Science.gov

Sample records for enabling international safeguards

  1. Enabling International Safeguards Research and Development in the United States

    SciTech Connect

    John E. Dwight; Mark J. Schanfein; Trond A. Bjornard

    2009-07-01

    Idaho National Laboratory (INL) is the lead laboratory in nuclear energy research and development within the U.S. Department of Energy national laboratory complex. INL is tasked with the advancement of nuclear energy research and development, and leadership in the renaissance of nuclear power globally. INL scientists have been central to the assessment of needs and the integration of technical programs aimed at the world-wide growth of nuclear power. One of the grand challenges of the nuclear energy resurgence is nuclear nonproliferation. Nonproliferation technology development is key to meeting this challenge. The needed advances in nonproliferation technologies are being made more difficult by the growing gap between increasing demands for nuclear materials to support technology development, and reduced availability of these materials. The gap is caused by the reduction, consolidation and more stringent lockdown of nuclear materials, made necessary by heightened and evolving security concerns, in the face of increased demand for materials to support technology development. Ironically, the increased demand for materials for technology development is made necessary by these same security concerns. The situation will continue to worsen if safeguards and security budgets remain limited for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and many member states, while growth in global nuclear energy becomes a reality. Effective U.S. leadership in the closing of this gap is vital to homeland security and global stability. INL has taken positive steps, described in this paper, to close this gap by reestablishing a viable base for the development, testing and demonstration of safeguards and security technologies. Key attributes of this technology development base are (1) the availability of a wide variety of special nuclear materials in forms that allow for enhanced accessibility; (2) ease of access by U.S. government, national laboratory, industry and academic institution

  2. Simulation Enabled Safeguards Assessment Methodology

    SciTech Connect

    Robert Bean; Trond Bjornard; Thomas Larson

    2007-09-01

    It is expected that nuclear energy will be a significant component of future supplies. New facilities, operating under a strengthened international nonproliferation regime will be needed. There is good reason to believe virtual engineering applied to the facility design, as well as to the safeguards system design will reduce total project cost and improve efficiency in the design cycle. Simulation Enabled Safeguards Assessment MEthodology (SESAME) has been developed as a software package to provide this capability for nuclear reprocessing facilities. The software architecture is specifically designed for distributed computing, collaborative design efforts, and modular construction to allow step improvements in functionality. Drag and drop wireframe construction allows the user to select the desired components from a component warehouse, render the system for 3D visualization, and, linked to a set of physics libraries and/or computational codes, conduct process evaluations of the system they have designed.

  3. International safeguards data authentication

    SciTech Connect

    Melton, R.B.; Smith, C.E.; DeLand, S.M.; Manatt, D.R.

    1996-07-01

    The International Safeguards community is becoming increasingly reliant on information stored in electronic form. In international monitoring and related activities it must be possible to verify and maintain the integrity of this electronic information. This paper discusses the use of data authentication technology to assist in accomplishing this task. The paper provides background information, identifies the relevance to international safeguards, discusses issues related to export controls, algorithm patents, key management and the use of commercial vs. custom software.

  4. International Nuclear Safeguards at Sandia

    SciTech Connect

    Sternat, Matthew R.

    2015-02-01

    As global nuclear energy expands, assuring peaceful uses of nuclear technology becomes increasingly important. In addition to complying with international nuclear safeguards, a responsible nuclear energy program promotes a corresponding safeguards culture. Establishment of transparent peaceful uses of nuclear technologies starts with cooperative international engagements and safeguards systems. Developing states investing in nuclear energy must assure the international community of their longterm commitment to safeguards, safety, and security (3S) of nuclear materials and technologies. Cultivating a safeguards culture starts in the initial phases of infrastructure planning and must be integrated into the process of developing a responsible nuclear energy program. Sandia National Laboratories supports the implementation of safeguards culture through a variety of activities, including infrastructure development.

  5. Information analysis and international safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Pilat, Joseph F.; Budlong-Sylvester, K. W.; Tape, J. W.

    2004-01-01

    After the first Gulf War, it was recognized that one of the key weaknesses of the international safeguards system was that there was no systematic attempt by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to analyze all available information about States nuclear programs to determine whether these programs were consistent with nonproliferation obligations. The IAEA, as part of its effort to redesign the international safeguards system, is looking closely at the issue of information review and evaluation. The application of information analysis (IA) techniques to the international nuclear safeguards system has the potential to revolutionize the form and practice of safeguards. Assessing the possibilities of IA for the IAEA, and in particular those embodied in concepts of information-driven safeguards, requires an understanding of IA, the limits on its effectiveness and the requirements placed on such analyses in a variety of safeguards contexts. The Australian Safeguards and Nonproliferation Office (ASNO) and the United States Department of Energy (DOE) agreed in July 2002 to undertake a joint study of 'information-driven safeguards' under a long-standing cooperative arrangement. It was decided that a broad range of ideas should be considered, and that the study would not be intended to be and would not be an elaboration of either US or Australian governmental positions. This paper reports some findings of Phase 1 of this collaborative effort and offers some initial thinking on the part of the authors on the outstanding issues to be addressed in Phase 2. An effort to explore through case studies alternative strategies for utilizing IA by the IAEA that provide the same or increased confidence in safeguards conclusions while allowing safeguards resource allocation to be determined not only by the types and quantities of nuclear material and facilities in a State but also by other objective factors.

  6. Future issues in international safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Hakkila, E.A.; Markin, J.T.; Mullen, M.F.

    1991-01-01

    The introduction of large bulk-handling facilities into the internationally safeguarded, commercial nuclear fuel cycle, increased concerns for radiation exposure, and the constant level of resources available to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are driving new and innovative approaches to international safeguards. Inspector resources have traditionally been allocated on a facility-type basis. Approaches such as randomization of inspections either within a facility or across facilities in a State or the application of a fuel-cycle approach within a State are being considered as means of conserving resources. Large bulk-handling facilities require frequent material balance closures to meet IAEA timeliness goals. Approaches such as near-real-time accounting, running book inventories, and adjusted running book inventories are considered as means to meet these goals. The automated facilities require that safeguards measures also be automated, leading to more reliance on operator-supplied equipment that must be authenticated by the inspectorate. New Non-Proliferation Treaty signatory States with advanced nuclear programs will further drain IAEA resources. Finally, the role of special inspections in IAEA safeguards may be expanded. This paper discusses these issues in terms of increasing safeguards effectiveness and the possible impact on operators. 14 refs.

  7. Remote monitoring for international safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Dupree, S.A.; Sonnier, C.S.

    1997-09-01

    Remote monitoring is not a new technology, and its application to safeguards relevant activities has been examined for a number of years. On behalf of the US Department of Energy and international partners, remote monitoring systems have been emplaced in nuclear facilities and laboratories in various parts of the world. The experience gained from these field trials of remote monitoring systems has shown the viability of the concept of using integrated monitoring systems. Although a wide variety of sensors has been used in the remote monitoring field trials conducted to date, the possible range of instrumentation that might be used has scarcely been touched. As the technology becomes widespread, large amounts of data will become available to inspectors responsible for safeguards activities at the sites. Effective use of remote monitoring will require processing, archiving, presenting, and assessing of these data. To provide reasonable efficiency in the application of this technology, data processing should be done in a careful and organized manner. The problem will be not an issue of poring over scant records but of surviving under a deluge of information made possible by modern technology. Fortunately, modern technology, which created the problem of the data glut, is available to come to the assistance of those inundated by data. Apart from the technological problems, one of the most important aspects of remote monitoring is the potential constraint related to the transmission of data out of a facility or beyond national borders. Remote monitoring across national borders can be seriously considered only in the context of a comprehensive, transparent, and open implementation regime.

  8. International safeguards for reprocessing plants. Final report

    SciTech Connect

    Kratzer, M.; Scheinman, L.; Sievering, N.; Wonder, E.; Lipman, D.; Immerman, W.; Elliott, J.M.; Crane, F.

    1981-04-01

    Proliferation risks inherent in reprocessing show the need to employ technically effective safeguards which can detect, with a high degree of assurance and on a timely basis, the diversion of significant quantities of fissionable material. A balance must be struck between what is technically feasible and effective and what is institutionally acceptable. Purpose of this report is to examine the several technical approaches to safeguards in light of their prospective acceptability. This study defines the economic, political and institutional nature of the safeguards problem; surveys generically alternative technical approaches to international safeguards including their effectiveness and relative development; characterizes the institutional implications and uncertainties associated with the acceptance and implementation of each technical alternative; and integrates these assessments into a set of overall judgments on feasible directions for reprocessing plant safeguards systems.

  9. Technical Training Workshop on International Safeguards: An Introduction to Safeguards for Emerging Nuclear States

    SciTech Connect

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Gastelum, Zoe N.; Olson, Jarrod; Mathews, Caroline E.; Solodov, Alexander; Zhernosek, Alena; Raffo-Caiado, Ana; Baldwin, George; Horak, Karl; McClelland-Kerr, John; VanSickle, Matthew; Mininni, Margot; Kovacic, Donald

    2009-10-06

    The U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) hosted a workshop from May 4-22, 2009, on the fundamental elements of international safeguards. Entitled "A Technical Training Workshop on International Safeguards," the workshop introduced post-graduate students from Malaysia, Vietnam, Indonesia, Thailand, Morocco, Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia to the fundamental issues and best practices associated with international safeguards and encouraged them to explore potential career paths in safeguards. Workshops like these strengthen the international safeguards regime by promoting the development of a "safeguards culture" among young nuclear professionals within nascent nuclear countries. While this concept of safeguards culture is sometimes hard to define and even harder to measure, this paper will demonstrate that the promotion of safeguards cultures through workshops like these justifies the investment of U.S. taxpayer dollars.

  10. International safeguards for spent fuel storage

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Kratzer, M.; Wonder, E.; Immerman, W.; Crane, F.

    1981-08-01

    The nonproliferation effectiveness and political and economic acceptability of prospective improvements in international safeguard techniques for LWR spent fuel storage were analyzed. Although the applicability of item accounting considerably eases the safeguarding of stored spent fuel, the problem of verification is potentially serious. A number of simple gamma and neutron nondestructive assay techniques were found to offer considerable improvements, of a qualitative rather than quantiative nature, in verification-related data and information, and possess the major advantage of intruding very littel on facility operations. A number of improved seals and monitors appear feasible as well, but improvements in the timeliness of detection will not occur unless the frequency of inspection is increased or a remote monitoring capability is established. Limitations on IAEA Safeguards resources and on the integration of results from material accounting and containment and surveillance remain problems.

  11. International safeguards for spent fuel storage

    SciTech Connect

    Kratzer, M.; Wonder, E.; Immerman, W.; Crane, F.

    1981-08-01

    This report analyzes the nonproliferation effectiveness and political and economic acceptability of prospective improvements in international safeguard techniques for LWR spent fuel storage. Although the applicability of item accounting considerably eases the safeguarding of stored spent fuel, the problem of verification is potentially serious. A number of simple gamma and neutron nondestructive assay techniques were found to offer considerable improvements, of a qualitative rather than quantitative nature, in verification-related data and information, and possess the major advantage of intruding very little on facility operations. A number of improved seals and monitors appear feasible as well, but improvements in the timeliness of detection will not occur unless the frequency of inspection is increased or a remote monitoring capability is established. Limitations on IAEA Safeguards resources and on the integration of results from material accounting and containment and surveillance remain problems.

  12. International safeguards without material balance areas

    SciTech Connect

    Sanborn, J.B.; Lu Mingshih; Indusi, J.P.

    1992-09-01

    Recently altered perceptions of the role of the non-proliferation regime, as well as continued IAEA funding constraints, suggest a need to re-examine the fundamentals of IAEA verification strategy. This paper suggests that abandoning certain material balance area (MBA) related concepts that nominally form the basic framework of ``full-scope`` safeguards would result in a more flexible inspection regime. The MBA concept applied in the domestic context enables a national authority to localize losses in space and in time and to minimize the need to measure in-process inventory. However, these advantages do not accrue to an international verification regime because it cannot truly verify the ``flows`` between MBAs without extensive containment/surveillance measures. In the verification model studied, the entire nuclear inventory of a state is periodically declared and verified simultaneously in one or two large segments (containing possibly many MBAS). Simultaneous inventory of all MBAs within a segment would occur through advance ``mailbox`` declarations and random selection of MBAs for on-site verification or through enhanced containment/surveillance techniques. Flows are generally speaking not verified. This scheme would free the inspectorate from the obligation to attempt to verify on-site each stratum of the material balance of every facility declaring significant quantities of nuclear material.

  13. International safeguards without material balance areas

    SciTech Connect

    Sanborn, J.B.; Lu Mingshih; Indusi, J.P.

    1992-01-01

    Recently altered perceptions of the role of the non-proliferation regime, as well as continued IAEA funding constraints, suggest a need to re-examine the fundamentals of IAEA verification strategy. This paper suggests that abandoning certain material balance area (MBA) related concepts that nominally form the basic framework of full-scope'' safeguards would result in a more flexible inspection regime. The MBA concept applied in the domestic context enables a national authority to localize losses in space and in time and to minimize the need to measure in-process inventory. However, these advantages do not accrue to an international verification regime because it cannot truly verify the flows'' between MBAs without extensive containment/surveillance measures. In the verification model studied, the entire nuclear inventory of a state is periodically declared and verified simultaneously in one or two large segments (containing possibly many MBAS). Simultaneous inventory of all MBAs within a segment would occur through advance mailbox'' declarations and random selection of MBAs for on-site verification or through enhanced containment/surveillance techniques. Flows are generally speaking not verified. This scheme would free the inspectorate from the obligation to attempt to verify on-site each stratum of the material balance of every facility declaring significant quantities of nuclear material.

  14. International safeguards: Accounting for nuclear materials

    SciTech Connect

    Fishbone, L.G.

    1988-09-28

    Nuclear safeguards applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are one element of the non-proliferation regime'', the collection of measures whose aim is to forestall the spread of nuclear weapons to countries that do not already possess them. Safeguards verifications provide evidence that nuclear materials in peaceful use for nuclear-power production are properly accounted for. Though carried out in cooperation with nuclear facility operators, the verifications can provide assurance because they are designed with the capability to detect diversion, should it occur. Traditional safeguards verification measures conducted by inspectors of the IAEA include book auditing; counting and identifying containers of nuclear material; measuring nuclear material; photographic and video surveillance; and sealing. Novel approaches to achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness in safeguards verifications are under investigation as the number and complexity of nuclear facilities grow. These include the zone approach, which entails carrying out verifications for groups of facilities collectively, and randomization approach, which entails carrying out entire inspection visits some fraction of the time on a random basis. Both approaches show promise in particular situations, but, like traditional measures, must be tested to ensure their practical utility. These approaches are covered on this report. 15 refs., 16 figs., 3 tabs.

  15. Science and Technology Challenges for International Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Mark Schanfein

    2009-07-01

    The science and technology challenges for international safeguards range from cutting edge physics needs to practical technology solutions for high volume data handling and analysis issues. This paper will take a narrow look at some of the predominant challenges, which include those at high throughput commercial facilities and those in the detection of undeclared facilities. It is hoped that by highlighting these areas it can encourage a concerted effort by scientific institutions and industry to provide robust cost-effective solutions.

  16. Secret Objective Standoff: International Safeguards Educational Exercise

    SciTech Connect

    Okowita, Samantha L

    2014-01-01

    The International Safeguards Regime, being so multi-faceted, can be overwhelming to those first introduced to its many components. The organizers and lecturers of workshops and courses on nonproliferation often provide a series of independent lectures and must somehow demonstrate the cohesive and effective nature of the system. An exercise titled The Secret Objective Standoff was developed to complement lectures with hands-on learning to assist participants in bringing all the many components (IAEA agreements, export controls, treaty obligations, international diplomacy, etc.) of the International Safeguards Regime together. This exercise divides participants into teams that are assigned the role of either a country or the IAEA and asks that they fully immerse themselves in their roles. The teams are then randomly assigned three unique and secret objectives that are intended to represent realistic and current geopolitical scenarios. Through construction, trading, or hoarding of four resources (experts, technology, money, and uranium), the teams have a finite number of turns to accomplish their objectives. Each turn has three phases random dispersal of resources, a timed discussion where teams can coordinate and strategize with others, and an action phase. During the action phase, teams inform the moderator individually and secretly what they will be doing that turn. The exercise has been tested twice with Oak Ridge National Laboratory personnel, and has been conducted with outside participants twice, in each case the experience was well received by both participants and instructors. This exercise provides instructors the ability to modify the exercise before or during game play to best fit their educational goals. By offering a range of experiences, from an in-depth look at specific components to a generalized overview, this exercise is an effective tool in helping participants achieve a full understanding the International Safeguards Regime.

  17. International Nuclear Safeguards Inspection Support Tool (INSIST)

    SciTech Connect

    St. Pierre, D.E.; Steinmaus, K.L.; Moon, B.D.

    1994-07-01

    DOE is committed to providing technologies to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to meet escalating monitoring and inspection requirements associated with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). One example of technology provided to the IAEA is the information management and remote monitoring capabilities being customized for the IAEA by the International Safeguards Division of the Office of Non-Proliferation and National Security. The ongoing Safeguards Information Management Systems (SIMS) program is an interlaboratory effort providing the IAEA with a range of information management capabilities designed to enhance the effectiveness of their nuclear inspection activities. The initial commitment involved the customization of computer capabilities to provide IAEA with the basic capability to geographically organize, store, and retrieve the large quantity of information involved in their nuclear on site inspection activities in Iraq. This initial system, the International Nuclear Safeguards Inspection Support Tool (INSIST), was developed by DOE`s Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL). To date, two INSIST workstations have been deployed at the IAEA. The first has been used to support the IAEA Action Team in the inspection of Iraqi nuclear facilities since August 1993. A second, and similar, workstation has been deployed to support environmental monitoring under the IAEA 93+2 Programme. Both INSIST workstations geographically integrate analog (video) and digital data to provide an easy to use and effective tool for storing retrieving and displaying multimedia site and facility information including world-wide maps, satellite and aerial imagery, on site photography, live inspection videos, and treaty and inspection textual information. The interactive, UNIX-based workstations have a variety of peripheral devices for information input and output. INSIST software includes commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) modules and application-specific code developed at PNL.

  18. Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Pepper,S.; Rosenthal, M.; Fishbone, L.; Occhiogrosso, D.; Carroll, C.; Dreicer, M.; Wallace, R.; Rankhauser, J.

    2008-10-22

    In 2007, the National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24) completed a yearlong review of the challenges facing the international safeguards system today and over the next 25 years. The study found that without new investment in international safeguards, the U.S. safeguards technology base, and our ability to support International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, will continue to erode and soon may be at risk. To reverse this trend, the then U.S. Secretary of Energy, Samuel Bodman, announced at the 2007 IAEA General Conference that the Department of Energy (DOE) would launch the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). He stated 'IAEA safeguards must be robust and capable of addressing proliferation threats. Full confidence in IAEA safeguards is essential for nuclear power to grow safely and securely. To this end, the U.S. Department of Energy will seek to ensure that modern technology, the best scientific expertise, and adequate resources are available to keep pace with expanding IAEA responsibilities.' To meet this goal, the NGSI objectives include the recruitment of international safeguards experts to work at the U.S. national laboratories and to serve at the IAEA's headquarters. Part of the latter effort will involve enhancing our existing efforts to place well-qualified Americans in a sufficient number of key safeguards positions within the IAEA's Department of Safeguards. Accordingly, the International Safeguards Project Office (ISPO) at Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) hosted a Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards (ERIS) on October 22 and 23, 2008. The ISPO used a workshop format developed earlier with Sonalysts, Inc., that was followed at the U.S. Support Program's (USSP's) technology road-mapping sessions. ISPO invited participants from the U.S. DOE, the IAEA, the U.S. national laboratories, private industry, academia, and professional societies who either

  19. Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Pepper,S.E.; Rosenthal, M.D.; Fishbone, L.G.; Occhogrosso, D.M.; Lockwood, D.; Carroll, C.J.; Dreicer, M.; Wallace, R.; Fankhauser, J.

    2009-07-12

    Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) hosted a Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards October 22 and 23, 2008. The workshop was sponsored by DOE/NA-243 under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). Placing well-qualified Americans in sufficient number and in key safeguards positions within the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) Department of Safeguards is an important U.S. non-proliferation objective. The goal of the NGSI Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards was to improve U.S. efforts to recruit U.S. citizens for IAEA positions in the Department of Safeguards. The participants considered the specific challenges of recruiting professional staff, safeguards inspectors, and managers. BNL’s International Safeguards Project Office invited participants from the U.S. Department of Energy, the IAEA, U.S. national laboratories, private industry, academia, and professional societies who are either experts in international safeguards or who understand the challenges of recruiting for technical positions. A final report for the workshop will be finalized and distributed in early 2009. The main finding of the workshop was the need for an integrated recruitment plan to take into account pools of potential candidates, various government and private agency stakeholders, the needs of the IAEA, and the NGSI human capital development plan. There were numerous findings related to and recommendations for maximizing the placement of U.S. experts in IAEA Safeguards positions. The workshop participants offered many ideas for increasing the pool of candidates and increasing the placement rate. This paper will provide details on these findings and recommendations

  20. Safeguards Guidance for Designers of Commercial Nuclear Facilities – International Safeguards Requirements for Uranium Enrichment Plants

    SciTech Connect

    Philip Casey Durst; Scott DeMuth; Brent McGinnis; Michael Whitaker; James Morgan

    2010-04-01

    For the past two years, the United States National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of International Regimes and Agreements (NA-243), has sponsored the Safeguards-by-Design Project, through which it is hoped new nuclear facilities will be designed and constructed worldwide more amenable to nuclear safeguards. In the course of this project it was recognized that commercial designer/builders of nuclear facilities are not always aware of, or understand, the relevant domestic and international safeguards requirements, especially the latter as implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). To help commercial designer/builders better understand these requirements, a report was prepared by the Safeguards-by-Design Project Team that articulated and interpreted the international nuclear safeguards requirements for the initial case of uranium enrichment plants. The following paper summarizes the subject report, the specific requirements, where they originate, and the implications for design and construction. It also briefly summarizes the established best design and operating practices that designer/builder/operators have implemented for currently meeting these requirements. In preparing the subject report, it is recognized that the best practices are continually evolving as the designer/builder/operators and IAEA consider even more effective and efficient means for meeting the safeguards requirements and objectives.

  1. 7 CFR 4290.506 - Safeguarding the RBIC's assets/Internal controls.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 15 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safeguarding the RBIC's assets/Internal controls... Safeguarding the RBIC's assets/Internal controls. You must adopt a plan to safeguard your assets and monitor... your control procedures....

  2. U. S. spent-fuel disposal strategies and International safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Pillay, K.K.; Picard, R.R.; Hafer, J.F. )

    1993-08-01

    Domestic safeguards for fissile nuclear materials are universal, and a variety of international safeguards regimes are applicable, in most member states of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to declared nuclear facilities dedicated to peaceful missions. The U.S. strategy to dispose of all spent nuclear fuels (SNFs) and high-level wastes (HLWs) in engineered geologic repositories has a sometimes-overlooked consequence, namely, the need to maintain domestic and international safeguards in perpetuity. The Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), which has the responsibility to accept and store the spent fuels in the long term either in surface facilities or in engineered geologic repositories, has yet to include safeguards issues in their mission plan.'' There are several stages in the nuclear fuel cycle where materials usable in weapons are available for diversion. This discussion, however, is limited to the potential diversion of spent fuels for clandestine plutonium recovery. The concepts proposed here highlight safeguards elements necessary for a pragmatic safeguards system for SNF from nuclear power generation. The efforts required to initiate and maintain a verifiable international safeguards regime are examined in the context of a typical storage facility in the United States.

  3. Interim Procedures Safeguarding Mobile Devices during International Travel

    EPA Pesticide Factsheets

    This procedure is for safeguarding EPA information and systems for all employees, contractors, and other users while on international travel or to specifically designated locations within the United States and foreign embassies.

  4. Process monitoring in international safeguards for reprocessing plants: A demonstration

    SciTech Connect

    Ehinger, M.H.

    1989-01-01

    In the period 1985--1987, the Oak Ridge National Laboratory investigated the possible role of process monitoring for international safeguards applications in fuel reprocessing plants. This activity was conducted under Task C.59, ''Review of Process Monitoring Safeguards Technology for Reprocessing Facilities'' of the US program of Technical Assistance to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards program. The final phase was a demonstration of process monitoring applied in a prototypical reprocessing plant test facility at ORNL. This report documents the demonstration and test results. 35 figs.

  5. STATE-WIDE PERFORMANCE CRITERIA FOR INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS

    SciTech Connect

    K. W. BUDLONG-SYLVESTER; W. D. STANBRO

    2001-06-01

    Traditionally, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has relied upon prescriptive criteria to guide safeguards implementation. The prospect of replacing prescriptive safeguards criteria with more flexible performance criteria would constitute a structural change in safeguards and raises several important questions. Performance criteria imply that while safeguards goals will be fixed, the means of attaining those goals will not be explicitly prescribed. What would the performance objectives be under such a system? How would they be formulated? How would performance be linked to higher level safeguards objectives? How would safeguards performance be measured Statewide? The implementation of safeguards under performance criteria would also signal a dramatic change in the manner the Agency does business. A higher degree of flexibility could, in principle, produce greater effectiveness and efficiency, but would come with a need for increased Agency responsibility in practice. To the extent that reliance on prescriptive criteria decreases, the burden of justifying actions and ensuring their transparency will rise. Would there need to be limits to safeguards implementation? What would be the basis for setting such limits? This paper addresses these and other issues and questions relating to both the formulation and the implementation of performance-based criteria.

  6. International Safeguards and the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory

    SciTech Connect

    Olsen, Khris B.; Smith, Leon E.; Frazar, Sarah L.; Kurzrok, Andrew J.; Orton, Christopher R.; Schanfein, Mark J.; Sayre, Amanda M.; Jones, Rebecca L.

    2016-07-21

    Established in 1965, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory’s (PNNL) strong technical ties and shared heritage with the nearby U.S. Department of Energy Hanford Site were central to the early development of expertise in nuclear fuel cycle signatures, separations chemistry, plutonium chemistry, environmental monitoring, modeling and analysis of reactor systems, and nuclear material safeguards and security. From these Hanford origins, PNNL has grown into a multi-program science and engineering enterprise that utilizes this diversity to strengthen the international safeguards regime. Today, PNNL supports the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in its mission to provide assurances to the international community that nations do not use nuclear materials and equipment outside of peaceful uses. PNNL also serves in the IAEA’s Network of Analytical Laboratories (NWAL) by providing analysis of environmental samples gathered around the world. PNNL is involved in safeguards research and development activities in support of many U.S. Government programs such as the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Office of Research and Development, NNSA Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control, and the U.S. Support Program to IAEA Safeguards. In addition to these programs, PNNL invests internal resources including safeguards-specific training opportunities for staff, and laboratory-directed research and development funding to further ideas that may grow into new capabilities. This paper and accompanying presentation highlight some of PNNL’s contributions in technology development, implementation concepts and approaches, policy, capacity building, and human capital development, in the field of international safeguards.

  7. International training course on nuclear materials accountability for safeguards purposes

    SciTech Connect

    Not Available

    1980-12-01

    The two volumes of this report incorporate all lectures and presentations at the International Training Course on Nuclear Materials Accountability and Control for Safeguards Purposes, held May 27-June 6, 1980, at the Bishop's Lodge near Santa Fe, New Mexico. The course, authorized by the US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act and sponsored by the US Department of Energy in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, was developed to provide practical training in the design, implementation, and operation of a National system of nuclear materials accountability and control that satisfies both National and IAEA International safeguards objectives. Volume I, covering the first week of the course, presents the background, requirements, and general features of material accounting and control in modern safeguard systems. Volume II, covering the second week of the course, provides more detailed information on measurement methods and instruments, practical experience at power reactor and research reactor facilities, and examples of operating state systems of accountability and control.

  8. Third International Meeting on Next Generation Safeguards:Safeguards-by-Design at Enrichment Facilities

    SciTech Connect

    Long, Jon D.; McGinnis, Brent R; Morgan, James B; Whitaker, Michael; Lockwood, Mr. Dunbar; Shipwash, Jacqueline L

    2011-01-01

    The Third International Meeting on Next Generation Safeguards (NGS3) was hosted by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) in Washington, D.C. on 14-15 December 2010; this meeting focused on the Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) concept. There were approximately 100 participants from 13 countries, comprised of safeguards policy and technical experts from government and industry. Representatives also were present from the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), the European Atomic Energy Agency (Euratom), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The primary objective of this meeting was to exchange views and provide recommendations on implementation of the SBD concept for four specific nuclear fuel cycle facility types: gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs), GEN III and GEN IV reactors, aqueous reprocessing plants, and mixed oxide fuel fabrication facilities. The general and facility-specific SBD documents generated from the four working groups, which were circulated for comment among working group participants, are intended to provide a substantive contribution to the IAEA's efforts to publish SBD guidance for these specific types of nuclear facilities in the near future. The IAEA has described the SBD concept as an approach in which 'international safeguards are fully integrated into the design process of a new nuclear facility from the initial planning through design, construction, operation, and decommissioning.' As part of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), the DOE is working to establish SBD as a global norm through DOE laboratory studies, international workshops, engagement with industry and the IAEA, and setting an example through its use in new nuclear facilities in the United States. This paper describes the discussion topics and final recommendations of the Enrichment Facilities Working

  9. Safeguards Guidance Document for Designers of Commercial Nuclear Facilities: International Nuclear Safeguards Requirements and Practices For Uranium Enrichment Plants

    SciTech Connect

    Robert Bean; Casey Durst

    2009-10-01

    This report is the second in a series of guidelines on international safeguards requirements and practices, prepared expressly for the designers of nuclear facilities. The first document in this series is the description of generic international nuclear safeguards requirements pertaining to all types of facilities. These requirements should be understood and considered at the earliest stages of facility design as part of a new process called “Safeguards-by-Design.” This will help eliminate the costly retrofit of facilities that has occurred in the past to accommodate nuclear safeguards verification activities. The following summarizes the requirements for international nuclear safeguards implementation at enrichment plants, prepared under the Safeguards by Design project, and funded by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Office of NA-243. The purpose of this is to provide designers of nuclear facilities around the world with a simplified set of design requirements and the most common practices for meeting them. The foundation for these requirements is the international safeguards agreement between the country and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Relevant safeguards requirements are also cited from the Safeguards Criteria for inspecting enrichment plants, found in the IAEA Safeguards Manual, Part SMC-8. IAEA definitions and terms are based on the IAEA Safeguards Glossary, published in 2002. The most current specification for safeguards measurement accuracy is found in the IAEA document STR-327, “International Target Values 2000 for Measurement Uncertainties in Safeguarding Nuclear Materials,” published in 2001. For this guide to be easier for the designer to use, the requirements have been restated in plainer language per expert interpretation using the source documents noted. The safeguards agreement is fundamentally a

  10. International Safeguards Technology and Policy Education and Training Pilot Programs

    SciTech Connect

    Dreicer, M; Anzelon, G A; Essner, J T; Dougan, A D; Doyle, J; Boyer, B; Hypes, P; Sokava, E; Wehling, F; Martin, J; Charlton, W

    2009-06-16

    A major focus of the National Nuclear Security Administration-led Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) is the development of human capital to meet present and future challenges to the safeguards regime. An effective university-level education in safeguards and related disciplines is an essential element in a layered strategy to rebuild the safeguards human resource capacity. NNSA launched two pilot programs in 2008 to develop university level courses and internships in association with James, Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) at the Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS) and Texas A&M University (TAMU). These pilot efforts involved 44 students in total and were closely linked to hands-on internships at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The Safeguards and Nuclear Material Management pilot program was a collaboration between TAMU, LANL, and LLNL. The LANL-based coursework was shared with the students undertaking internships at LLNL via video teleconferencing. A weeklong hands-on exercise was also conducted at LANL. A second pilot effort, the International Nuclear Safeguards Policy and Information Analysis pilot program was implemented at MIIS in cooperation with LLNL. Speakers from MIIS, LLNL, and other U.S. national laboratories (LANL, BNL) delivered lectures for the audience of 16 students. The majority of students were senior classmen or new master's degree graduates from MIIS specializing in nonproliferation policy studies. The two pilots programs concluded with an NGSI Summer Student Symposium, held at LLNL, where 20 students participated in LLNL facility tours and poster sessions. The value of bringing together the students from the technical and policy pilots was notable and will factor into the planning for the continued refinement of the two programs in the coming years.

  11. Process monitoring in support of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Ehinger, M.H.; Wachter, J.W.; Hebble, T.L.; Kerr, H.T.

    1987-08-01

    A review of previous efforts in process monitoring for safeguards was conducted. Previous efforts touched on various concepts and a few specific applications, but none was comprehensive in addressing all aspects of a process monitoring application for safeguards. This report develops prototypical process monitoring concepts that can be incorporated into the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) general safeguards approach for fuel reprocessing plants. This effort considers existing approaches, recognizing limitations and needed improvements. Prototypical process monitoring applications are developed and proposed for implementation and demonstration in the Integrated Equipment Test facility, which is located at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. The specific information needed to accomplish the process monitoring objectives are defined, and the mechanics for obtaining that information are described. Effort is given to the identification and assessment of potential impacts and benefits associated with process monitoring concepts, with particular attention to IAEA, state, and plant operator interests. The historical development of process monitoring is described and the implications of using process monitoring in international safeguards are discussed. Specific process process monitoring applications for demonstration in the IET facility are developed in Sects. 6 through 14. 1 fig.

  12. Internal audits can safeguard hospital revenue.

    PubMed

    Allen, Barbara

    2013-09-01

    Hospitals should routinely perform internal audits of all functions affecting billing accuracy to mitigate the effects of payer audits and to protect revenue by improving billing processes. A primary focus for internal audits should be on coding accuracy, because coding errors leading to denials often reflect gaps in coders' knowledge or training. Effective communication between coding and denials management professionals is a critical success factor. Audits should support appeals processes, and audit findings should be used in educational initiatives aimed at improving coding accuracy.

  13. Global partnering related to nuclear materials safeguards and security - A pragmatic approach to international safeguards work

    SciTech Connect

    Stanford, Dennis

    2007-07-01

    This paper documents issues Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. has addressed in the performance of international work to safeguards and security work. It begins with a description of the package we put together for a sample proposal for the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, for which we were ranked number one for technical approach and cost, and concludes with a discussion of approaches that we have taken to performing this work, including issues related to performing the work as part of a team. The primary focus is on communication, workforce, equipment, and coordination issues. Finally, the paper documents the rules that we use to assure the work is performed safely and successfully. (author)

  14. Swedish experiences in implementing national and international safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Nilsson, A. ); Elborn, M. ); Grahn, P. )

    1991-01-01

    This paper reports that international safeguards have been applied in Sweden since the early 70s. Experiences have been achieved from exclusive bilateral and trilateral control followed by NPT safeguards in 1975. The Swedish State System for accountancy and Control (SSAC) includes all regulations that follows from prevailing obligations regarding the peaceful uses of nuclear material. The system has been developed in cooperation between the national authority, the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate (SKI) and the Swedish nuclear industry. The paper presents experiences from the practical implementation of the SSAC and the IAEA safeguards system, gained by the SKI and the nuclear industry, respectively. Joint approaches and solutions to some significant safeguards issues are presented. The cooperation between the nuclear industry and the authority in R and D activities, in particular with respect to the Swedish Support Program is highlighted, e.g. the use of nuclear facilities in development or training tasks. some of the difficulties encountered with the system are also touched upon.

  15. FY 2008 Next Generation Safeguards Initiative International Safeguards Education and Training Pilot Progerams Summary Report

    SciTech Connect

    Dreicer, M; Anzelon, G; Essner, J; Dougan, A; Doyle, J; Boyer, B; Hypes, P; Sokova, E; Wehling, F

    2008-10-17

    Key component of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) launched by the National Nuclear Security Administration is the development of human capital to meet present and future challenges to the safeguards regime. An effective university-level education in safeguards and related disciplines is an essential element in a layered strategy to rebuild the safeguards human resource capacity. Two pilot programs at university level, involving 44 students, were initiated and implemented in spring-summer 2008 and linked to hands-on internships at LANL or LLNL. During the internships, students worked on specific safeguards-related projects with a designated Laboratory Mentor to provide broader exposure to nuclear materials management and information analytical techniques. The Safeguards and Nuclear Material Management pilot program was a collaboration between the Texas A&M University (TAMU), Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). It included a 16-lecture course held during a summer internship program. The instructors for the course were from LANL together with TAMU faculty and LLNL experts. The LANL-based course was shared with the students spending their internship at LLNL via video conference. A week-long table-top (or hands-on) exercise on was also conducted at LANL. The student population was a mix of 28 students from a 12 universities participating in a variety of summer internship programs held at LANL and LLNL. A large portion of the students were TAMU students participating in the NGSI pilot. The International Nuclear Safeguards Policy and Information Analysis pilot program was implemented at the Monterey Institute for International Studies (MIIS) in cooperation with LLNL. It included a two-week intensive course consisting of 20 lectures and two exercises. MIIS, LLNL, and speakers from other U.S. national laboratories (LANL, BNL) delivered lectures for the audience of 16 students. The majority of students were

  16. Lessons Learned in International Safeguards - Implementation of Safeguards at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant

    SciTech Connect

    Ehinger, Michael H; Johnson, Shirley

    2010-02-01

    The focus of this report is lessons learned at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP). However, the subject of lessons learned for application of international safeguards at reprocessing plants includes a cumulative history of inspections starting at the West Valley (New York, U.S.A.) reprocessing plant in 1969 and proceeding through all of the efforts over the years. The RRP is the latest and most challenging application the International Atomic Energy Agency has faced. In many ways the challenges have remained the same, timely inspection and evaluation with limited inspector resources, with the continuing realization that planning and preparations can never start early enough in the life cycle of a facility. Lessons learned over the years have involved the challenges of using ongoing advances in technology and dealing with facilities with increased throughput and continuous operation. This report will begin with a review of historical developments and lessons learned. This will provide a basis for a discussion of the experiences and lessons learned from the implementation of international safeguards at RRP.

  17. Safeguards Culture

    SciTech Connect

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2012-07-01

    The concepts of nuclear safety and security culture are well established; however, a common understanding of safeguards culture is not internationally recognized. Supported by the National Nuclear Security Administration, the authors prepared this report, an analysis of the concept of safeguards culture, and gauged its value to the safeguards community. The authors explored distinctions between safeguards culture, safeguards compliance, and safeguards performance, and evaluated synergies and differences between safeguards culture and safety/security culture. The report concludes with suggested next steps.

  18. Determining information management needs for enhanced international safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Badalamente, R.V.; DeLand, S.M.; Whiteson, R.; Anzelon, G.

    1994-08-01

    The Safeguards Information Management System initiative is a program of the Department of Energy`s (DOE) Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation aimed at supporting the International Atomic Energy Agency`s (IAEA) efforts to strengthen safeguards through the enhancement of information management capabilities. The DOE hopes to provide the IAEA with the ability to correlate and analyze data from existing and new sources of information, including publicly available information, information on imports and exports, design information, environmental monitoring data, and non-safeguards information. The first step in this effort is to identify and define IAEA requirements. In support of this, we have created a users` requirements document based on interviews with IAEA staff that describes the information management needs of the end user projected by the IAEA, including needs for storage, retrieval, analysis, communication, and visualization of data. Also included are characteristics of the end user and attributes of the current environment. This paper describes our efforts to obtain the required information. We discuss how to accurately represent user needs and involve users for an international organization with a multi-cultural user population. We describe our approach, our experience in setting up and conducting the interviews and brainstorming sessions, and a brief discussion of what we learned.

  19. Bulk Analysis of International Atomic Energy Agency Environmental Samples in Support of International Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Wogman, Ned A.; Olsen, Khris B.; Farmer, Orville T.

    2008-03-28

    Inspectors for the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Safeguards Program collect environmental samples under traditional safeguards, strengthened safeguards, or additional protocols during facility inspections at declared nuclear facilities throughout the world. Currently, there are 400 facilities under IAEA safeguards in 70 countries. All environmental samples are returned to IAEA’s Clean Laboratory located in Seiberdorf, Austria, where they are screened for gamma-ray emitting isotopes and prepared for distribution to laboratories for additional sampling. After the sample(s) are analyzed, the results are reported to the United States Network of Analytical Laboratories for input into its database. The IAEA reviews the data and incorporates the results into the safeguards evaluation of the state (country).

  20. International Internships in Nuclear Safeguards and Security: Challenges and Successes

    SciTech Connect

    Duncan, Cristen L.; Heinberg, Cynthia L.; Killinger, Mark H.; Goodey, Kent O.; Kryuchkov, Eduard F.; Geraskin, Nikolai I.; Silaev, Maxim E.; Sokova, Elena K.; Ford, David G.

    2010-04-20

    All students in the Russian safeguards and security degree programs at the National Research Nuclear University MEPhI and Tomsk Polytechnic University, sponsored by the Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A) Education Project, take part in a domestic internship at a Russian enterprise or facility. In addition, a select few students are placed in an international internship. These internships provide students with a better view of how MPC&A and nonproliferation in general are addressed outside of Russia. The possibility of an international internship is a significant incentive for students to enroll in the safeguards and security degree programs. The U.S. members of the MPC&A Education Project team interview students who have been nominated by their professors. These students must have initiative and reasonable English skills. The project team and professors then select students to be tentatively placed in various international internships during the summer or fall of their final year of study. Final arrangements are then made with the host organizations. This paper describes the benefits of the joint United States/Russia cooperation for next-generation workforce development, some of the international internships that have been carried out, the benefits of these international internships, and lessons learned in implementing them.

  1. Materials management in an internationally safeguarded fuels reprocessing plant

    SciTech Connect

    Hakkila, E.A.; Baker, A.L.; Cobb, D.D.

    1980-04-01

    The following appendices are included: aqueous reprocessing and conversion technology, reference facilities, process design and operating features relevant to materials accounting, operator's safeguards system structure, design principles of dynamic materials accounting systems, modeling and simulation approach, optimization of measurement control, aspects of international verification problem, security and reliability of materials measurement and accounting system, estimation of in-process inventory in solvent-extraction contactors, conventional measurement techniques, near-real-time measurement techniques, isotopic correlation techniques, instrumentation available to IAEA inspectors, and integration of materials accounting and containment and surveillance. (DLC)

  2. U.S. Department of Energy`s International Safeguards Program

    SciTech Connect

    Sheely, K.B.

    1993-12-31

    Since 1978 the United States Department of Energy`s (DOE) International Safeguards Program has conducted policy analysis, strategies and technology development, international cooperation and training to support the formulation and implementation of international safeguards. The end of the Gulf War (1991), the end of the Cold War (1992), and the trend towards regionalization of safeguards has led to increased US and international attention to the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation and the need for significantly greater support to nonproliferation policy making and implementation activities. As a result, DOE`s International Safeguards Program has undergone substantial growth and has continued to focus its resources on the priority issues which are part of today`s and tomorrow`s world. In order to effectively and efficiently conduct and manage these activities the International Safeguards Program has developed and continues to refine and implement a strategic plan. This plan provides guidance for the activities conducted by support organizations and makes the program objectives and activities more transparent to other interested parties. The Strategic Plan centralizes into one document the mission, priorities, resources, activities, and operating procedures of DOE`s International Safeguards Program. The International Safeguards Program provides technical leadership in the formulation and implementation of the US nonproliferation policy concerning the IAEA, international safeguards, physical protection, and nuclear safeguards inspection activities.

  3. National and International Security Applications of Cryogenic Detectors—Mostly Nuclear Safeguards

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Rabin, Michael W.

    2009-12-01

    As with science, so with security—in both arenas, the extraordinary sensitivity of cryogenic sensors enables high-confidence detection and high-precision measurement even of the faintest signals. Science applications are more mature, but several national and international security applications have been identified where cryogenic detectors have high potential payoff. International safeguards and nuclear forensics are areas needing new technology and methods to boost speed, sensitivity, precision and accuracy. Successfully applied, improved nuclear materials analysis will help constrain nuclear materials diversion pathways and contribute to treaty verification. Cryogenic microcalorimeter detectors for X-ray, gamma-ray, neutron, and alpha-particle spectrometry are under development with these aims in mind. In each case the unsurpassed energy resolution of microcalorimeters reveals previously invisible spectral features of nuclear materials. Preliminary results of quantitative analysis indicate substantial improvements are still possible, but significant work will be required to fully understand the ultimate performance limits.

  4. International and national security applications of cryogenic detectors - mostly nuclear safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Rabin, Michael W

    2009-01-01

    As with science, so with security - in both arenas, the extraordinary sensitivity of cryogenic sensors enables high-confidence detection and high-precision measurement even of the faintest signals. Science applications are more mature, but several national and international security applications have been identified where cryogenic detectors have high potential payoff. International safeguards and nuclear forensics are areas needing new technology and methods to boost speed, sensitivity, precision and accuracy. Successfully applied, improved nuclear materials analysis will help constrain nuclear materials diversion pathways and contribute to treaty verification. Cryogenic microcalorimeter detectors for X-ray, gamma ray, neutron, and alpha particle spectrometry are under development with these aims in mind. In each case the unsurpassed energy resolution of microcalorimeters reveals previously invi sible spectral features of nuclear materials. Preliminary results of quantitative analysis indicate substantial improvements are still possible, but significant work will be required to fully understand the ultimate performance limits.

  5. Zone approaches to international safeguards of a nuclear fuel cycle

    SciTech Connect

    Fishbone, L.G.; Higinbotham, W.A.

    1986-01-01

    At present the IAEA designs its safeguards approach with regard to each type of nuclear facility so that the safeguards activities and effort are essentially the same for a given type and size of nuclear facility wherever it may be located. Conclusions regarding a state are derived by combining the results of safeguards verifications for the individual facilities within it. We have examined safeguards approaches for a state nuclear fuel cycle that take into account the existence of all of the nuclear facilities in the state. We have focussed on the fresh-fuel zone of an advanced nuclear fuel cycle, the several facilities of which use or process low-enriched uranium. At one extreme, flows and inventories would be verified at each material balance area. At the other extreme, the flows into and out of the zone and the inventory of the whole zone would be verified. The intention is to develop an approach which will make it possible to compare the technical effectiveness and the inspection effort for the facility-oriented approach, for the zone approach and for some reasonable intermediate safeguards approaches. Technical effectiveness, in these cases, means an estimate of the assurance that all nuclear material has been accounted for.

  6. Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1995-01-01

    process inventory: as above, for solutions - Wastes: leached hulls (short lengths of fuel-rod cladding after the fuel itself has been dissolved away...common tion probability is defined as 90 per- type is the liquid-metal fast breeder cent. reactor, or LMFBR ) 1137 138 1 Nuclear Safeguards and the

  7. Feasibility Study of Implementing a Mobile Collaborative Information Platform for International Safeguards Inspections

    SciTech Connect

    Gastelum, Zoe N.; Gitau, Ernest T. N.; Doehle, Joel R.; Toomey, Christopher M.

    2014-09-01

    In response to the growing pervasiveness of mobile technologies such as tablets and smartphones, the International Atomic Energy Agency and the U.S. Department of Energy National Laboratories have been exploring the potential use of these platforms for international safeguards activities. Specifically of interest are information systems (software, and accompanying servers and architecture) deployed on mobile devices to increase the situational awareness and productivity of an IAEA safeguards inspector in the field, while simultaneously reducing paperwork and pack weight of safeguards equipment. Exploratory development in this area has been met with skepticism regarding the ability to overcome technology deployment challenges for IAEA safeguards equipment. This report documents research conducted to identify potential challenges for the deployment of a mobile collaborative information system to the IAEA, and proposes strategies to mitigate those challenges.

  8. Lessons from post-war Iraq for the international full-scope safeguards regime

    SciTech Connect

    Scheinman, L.

    1993-04-01

    The discovery after the Gulf War of the extensive Iraqi nuclear weapon program severely shook public confidence in the nuclear non-proliferation regime in general, and the safeguards program of the IAEA under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, in particular. Iraq provided the justification for evaluating the safeguards regime under new political circumstances, so that appropriate corrective measures could be taken when necessary. It is now up to the individual states within the international system to take advantage of this opportunity.

  9. Developing the Next Generation of International Safeguards and Nonproliferation Experts: Highlights of Select Activities at the National Laboratories

    SciTech Connect

    Reed, J; Mathews, C; Kirk, B; Lynch, P; Doyle, J; Meek, E; Pepper, S; Metcalf, R

    2010-03-31

    With many safeguards experts in the United States at or near retirement age, and with the growing and evolving mission of international safeguards, attracting and educating a new generation of safeguards experts is an important element of maintaining a credible and capable international safeguards system. The United States National Laboratories, with their rich experience in addressing the technical and policy challenges of international safeguards, are an important resource for attracting, educating, and training future safeguards experts. This presentation highlights some of the safeguards education and professional development activities underway at the National Laboratories. These include university outreach, summer courses, internships, mid-career transition, knowledge retention, and other projects. The presentation concludes with thoughts on the challenge of interdisciplinary education and the recruitment of individuals with the right balance of skills and backgrounds are recruited to meet tomorrow's needs.

  10. 13 CFR 108.506 - Safeguarding the NMVC Company's assets/Internal controls.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... assets/Internal controls. 108.506 Section 108.506 Business Credit and Assistance SMALL BUSINESS... Requirements § 108.506 Safeguarding the NMVC Company's assets/Internal controls. You must adopt a plan to... document describing your control procedures....

  11. Lessons Learned from the Development of an Example Precision Information Environment for International Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Gastelum, Zoe N.; Henry, Michael J.; Burtner, IV, E. R.; Doehle, J. R.; Hampton, S. D.; La Mothe, R. R.; Nordquist, P. L.; Zarzhitsky, D. V.

    2014-12-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is interested in increasing capabilities of IAEA safeguards inspectors to access information that would improve their situational awareness on the job. A mobile information platform could potentially provide access to information, analytics, and technical and logistical support to inspectors in the field, as well as providing regular updates to analysts at IAEA Headquarters in Vienna or at satellite offices. To demonstrate the potential capability of such a system, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) implemented a number of example capabilities within a PNNL-developed precision information environment (PIE), and using a tablet as a mobile information platform. PNNL’s safeguards proof-of-concept PIE intends to; demonstrate novel applications of mobile information platforms to international safeguards use cases; demonstrate proof-of-principle capability implementation; and provide “vision” for capabilities that could be implemented. This report documents the lessons learned from this two-year development activity for the Precision Information Environment for International Safeguards (PIE-IS), describing the developed capabilities, technical challenges, and considerations for future development, so that developers working to develop a similar system for the IAEA or other safeguards agencies might benefit from our work.

  12. Oak Ridge National Laboratory Office of International Nuclear Safeguards: Human Capital Development Activity in FY16

    SciTech Connect

    Gilligan, Kimberly V.; Gaudet, Rachel N.

    2016-09-30

    In 2007, the U.S. Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control (NPAC) completed a comprehensive review of the current and potential future challenges facing the international safeguards system. One of the report’s key recommendations was for DOE NNSA to launch a major new program to revitalize the international safeguards technology and human resource base. In 2007, at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) General Conference, then Secretary of Energy Samuel W. Bodman announced the newly created Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). NGSI consists of five program elements: policy development and outreach, concepts and approaches, technology and analytical methodologies, human capital development (HCD), and infrastructure development. This report addresses the HCD component of NGSI. The goal of the HCD component as defined in the NNSA Program Plan is “to revitalize and expand the international safeguards human capital base by attracting and training a new generation of talent.” The major objectives listed in the HCD goal include education and training, outreach to universities and professional societies, postdoctoral appointments, and summer internships at national laboratories.

  13. Role of IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards in confidence building

    SciTech Connect

    Augustson, R.H.

    1989-01-01

    In this paper, I will examine some attributes of confidence building and connect them with how the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) interacts with its member states in carrying out its safeguards function. These interactions and the structure set up to define them help maintain and strengthen confidence between the IAEA and the member states and among these states. 3 refs.

  14. FEMO, A FLOW AND ENRICHMENT MONITOR FOR VERIFYING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS REQUIREMENTS AT A GAS CENTRIFUGE ENRICHMENT FACILITY

    SciTech Connect

    Gunning, John E; Laughter, Mark D; March-Leuba, Jose A

    2008-01-01

    A number of countries have received construction licenses or are contemplating the construction of large-capacity gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs). The capability to independently verify nuclear material flows is a key component of international safeguards approaches, and the IAEA does not currently have an approved method to continuously monitor the mass flow of 235U in uranium hexafluoride (UF6) gas streams. Oak Ridge National Laboratory is investigating the development of a flow and enrichment monitor, or FEMO, based on an existing blend-down monitoring system (BDMS). The BDMS was designed to continuously monitor both 235U mass flow and enrichment of UF6 streams at the low pressures similar to those which exists at GCEPs. BDMSs have been installed at three sites-the first unit has operated successfully in an unattended environment for approximately 10 years. To be acceptable to GCEP operators, it is essential that the instrument be installed and maintained without interrupting operations. A means to continuously verify flow as is proposed by FEMO will likely be needed to monitor safeguards at large-capacity plants. This will enable the safeguards effectiveness that currently exists at smaller plants to be maintained at the larger facilities and also has the potential to reduce labor costs associated with inspections at current and future plants. This paper describes the FEMO design requirements, operating capabilities, and development work required before field demonstration.

  15. Review of selected dynamic material control functions for international safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Lowry, L.L.

    1980-09-01

    With the development of Dynamic Special Nuclear Material Accounting and Control systems used in nuclear manufacturing and reprocessing plants, there arises the question as to how these systems affect the IAEA inspection capabilities. The systems in being and under development provide information and control for a variety of purposes important to the plant operator, the safeguards purpose being one of them. This report attempts to judge the usefulness of these dynamic systems to the IAEA and have defined 12 functions that provide essential information to it. If the information acquired by these dynamic systems is to be useful to the IAEA, the inspectors must be able to independently verify it. Some suggestions are made as to how this might be done. But, even if it should not be possible to verify all the data, the availability to the IAEA of detailed, simultaneous, and plant-wide information would tend to inhibit a plant operator from attempting to generate a floating or fictitious inventory. Suggestions are made that might be helpful in the design of future software systems, an area which has proved to be fatally deficient in some systems and difficult in all.

  16. The U.S./IAEA Workshop on Software Sustainability for Safeguards Instrumentation: Report to the NNSA DOE Office of International Nuclear Safeguards (NA-241)

    SciTech Connect

    Pepper, Susan E.; Pickett, Chris A.; Queirolo, Al; Bachner, Katherine M.; Worrall, Louise G.

    2015-04-07

    The U.S Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) convened a workshop on Software Sustainability for Safeguards Instrumentation in Vienna, Austria, May 6-8, 2014. Safeguards instrumentation software must be sustained in a changing environment to ensure existing instruments can continue to perform as designed, with improved security. The approaches to the development and maintenance of instrument software used in the past may not be the best model for the future and, therefore, the organizers’ goal was to investigate these past approaches and to determine an optimal path forward. The purpose of this report is to provide input for the DOE NNSA Office of International Nuclear Safeguards (NA-241) and other stakeholders that can be utilized when making decisions related to the development and maintenance of software used in the implementation of international nuclear safeguards. For example, this guidance can be used when determining whether to fund the development, upgrade, or replacement of a particular software product. The report identifies the challenges related to sustaining software, and makes recommendations for addressing these challenges, supported by summaries and detailed notes from the workshop discussions. In addition the authors provide a set of recommendations for institutionalizing software sustainability practices in the safeguards community. The term “software sustainability” was defined for this workshop as ensuring that safeguards instrument software and algorithm functionality can be maintained efficiently throughout the instrument lifecycle, without interruption and providing the ability to continue to improve that software as needs arise.

  17. Possible Contributions of International Organizations to Safeguarding Human Rights.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Bennett, A. LeRoy

    This paper discusses ways in which international organizations have in the past and can continue in the future to foster social, economic, and cultural rights on a global scale. Involvement of international organizations such as the United Nations in the realm of human rights expanded after the second world war. Examples of contributions to the…

  18. Enabling international adoption of LOINC through translation.

    PubMed

    Vreeman, Daniel J; Chiaravalloti, Maria Teresa; Hook, John; McDonald, Clement J

    2012-08-01

    Interoperable health information exchange depends on adoption of terminology standards, but international use of such standards can be challenging because of language differences between local concept names and the standard terminology. To address this important barrier, we describe the evolution of an efficient process for constructing translations of LOINC terms names, the foreign language functions in RELMA, and the current state of translations in LOINC. We also present the development of the Italian translation to illustrate how translation is enabling adoption in international contexts. We built a tool that finds the unique list of LOINC Parts that make up a given set of LOINC terms. This list enables translation of smaller pieces like the core component "hepatitis c virus" separately from all the suffixes that could appear with it, such "Ab.IgG", "DNA", and "RNA". We built another tool that generates a translation of a full LOINC name from all of these atomic pieces. As of version 2.36 (June 2011), LOINC terms have been translated into nine languages from 15 linguistic variants other than its native English. The five largest linguistic variants have all used the Part-based translation mechanism. However, even with efficient tools and processes, translation of standard terminology is a complex undertaking. Two of the prominent linguistic challenges that translators have faced include: the approach to handling acronyms and abbreviations, and the differences in linguistic syntax (e.g. word order) between languages. LOINC's open and customizable approach has enabled many different groups to create translations that met their needs and matched their resources. Distributing the standard and its many language translations at no cost worldwide accelerates LOINC adoption globally, and is an important enabler of interoperable health information exchange.

  19. Enabling international adoption of LOINC through translation

    PubMed Central

    Vreeman, Daniel J.; Chiaravalloti, Maria Teresa; Hook, John; McDonald, Clement J.

    2012-01-01

    Interoperable health information exchange depends on adoption of terminology standards, but international use of such standards can be challenging because of language differences between local concept names and the standard terminology. To address this important barrier, we describe the evolution of an efficient process for constructing translations of LOINC terms names, the foreign language functions in RELMA, and the current state of translations in LOINC. We also present the development of the Italian translation to illustrate how translation is enabling adoption in international contexts. We built a tool that finds the unique list of LOINC Parts that make up a given set of LOINC terms. This list enables translation of smaller pieces like the core component “hepatitis c virus” separately from all the suffixes that could appear with it, such “Ab.IgG”, “DNA”, and “RNA”. We built another tool that generates a translation of a full LOINC name from all of these atomic pieces. As of version 2.36 (June 2011), LOINC terms have been translated into 9 languages from 15 linguistic variants other than its native English. The five largest linguistic variants have all used the Part-based translation mechanism. However, even with efficient tools and processes, translation of standard terminology is a complex undertaking. Two of the prominent linguistic challenges that translators have faced include: the approach to handling acronyms and abbreviations, and the differences in linguistic syntax (e.g. word order) between languages. LOINC’s open and customizable approach has enabled many different groups to create translations that met their needs and matched their resources. Distributing the standard and its many language translations at no cost worldwide accelerates LOINC adoption globally, and is an important enabler of interoperable health information exchange PMID:22285984

  20. International safeguards for a modern MOX (mixed-oxide) fuel fabrication facility

    SciTech Connect

    Pillay, K.K.S.; Stirpe, D.; Picard, R.R.

    1987-03-01

    Bulk-handling facilities that process plutonium for commercial fuel cycles offer considerable challenges to nuclear materials safeguards. Modern fuel fabrication facilities that handle mixed oxides of plutonium and uranium (MOX) often have large inventories of special nuclear materials in their process lines and in storage areas for feed and product materials. In addition, the remote automated processing prevalent at new MOX facilities, which is necessary to minimize radiation exposures to personnel, tends to limit access for measurements and inspections. The facility design considered in this study incorporates all these features as well as state-of-the-art measurement technologies for materials accounting. Key elements of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards for such a fuel-cycle facility have been identified in this report, and several issues of primary importance to materials accountancy and IAEA verifications have been examined. We have calculated detection sensitivities for abrupt and protracted diversions of plutonium assuming a single materials balance area for all processing areas. To help achieve optimal use of limited IAEA inspection resources, we have calculated sampling plans for attributes/variables verification. In addition, we have demonstrated the usefulness of calculating sigma/sub (MUF-D)/ and detection probabilities corresponding to specified material-loss scenarios and resource allocations. The data developed and the analyses performed during this study can assist both the facility operator and the IAEA in formulating necessary safeguards approaches and verification procedures to implement international safeguards for special nuclear materials.

  1. International Atomic Energy agency use of facility calorimeters for safeguards purposes

    SciTech Connect

    Mcrae, L.P.

    1996-06-28

    The IAEA is performing nuclear materials safeguards on an inventory of pure and scrap plutonium oxide powder materials held in Vault 3 of the Plutonium Finishing Plant at the Hanford Site,Washington State. The IAEA uses qualitative and quantitative techniques (weighing, sampling, and destructive analyses) to verify the presence and quantity of the nuclear materials under safeguards. In contrast, the plant operator generally uses non-destructive plutonium assay based on gamma spectrometry and calorimetry for its most accurate plutonium powder container measurements. Recent results have shown that the operator`s calorimeter system achieves measurement variabilities comparable with, or better than, the destructive analyses, particularly for scrap. The results are achieved more quickly and economically,with less waste and lower radiation exposure and contamination hazard, by calorimetry than by classical destructive analyses.Techniques, including authentication methods, are being jointly developed to permit use of the operator`s calorimeter system for international safeguards purposes. The authentication is to ensure the independence of, and to substantiate the validity of,calorimeter measurements for international safeguards. The authentication methods considered and being developed are discussed.

  2. Safeguards Culture: Lessons Learned

    SciTech Connect

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2010-06-01

    Today, safeguards culture can be a useful tool for measuring nonproliferation postures, but so far its impact on the international safeguards regime has been underappreciated. There is no agreed upon definition for safeguards culture nor agreement on how it should be measured. This paper argues that safeguards culture as an indicator of a country’s nonproliferation posture can be a useful tool.

  3. Consultation and remediation in the north: meeting international commitments to safeguard health and well-being

    PubMed Central

    Banfield, Laura; Jardine, Cynthia G.

    2013-01-01

    Background International commitments exist for the safeguarding of health and the prevention of ill health. One of the earliest commitments is the Declaration of Alma-Ata (1978), which provides 5 principles guiding primary health care: equity, community participation, health promotion, intersectoral collaboration and appropriate technology. These broadly applicable international commitments are premised on the World Health Organization's multifaceted definition of health. The environment is one sector in which these commitments to safeguarding health can be applied. Giant Mine, a contaminated former gold mine in the Northwest Territories, Canada, represents potential threats to all aspects of health. Strategies for managing such threats usually involve an obligation to engage the affected communities through consultation. Objective To examine the remediation and consultation process associated with Giant Mine within the context of commitments to safeguard health and well-being through adapting and applying the principles of primary health care. Methods Semi-structured interviews with purposively selected key informants representing government proponents and community members were conducted. Results In reviewing themes which emerged from a series of interviews exploring the community consultation process for the remediation of Giant Mine, the principles guiding primary health were mapped to consultation in the North: (a) “equity” is the capacity to fairly and meaningfully participate in the consultation; (b) “community participation” is the right to engage in the process through reciprocal dialogue; (c) “health promotion” represents the need for continued information sharing towards awareness; (d) “intersectoral collaboration” signifies the importance of including all stakeholders; and (e) “appropriate technology” is the need to employ the best remediation actions relevant to the site and the community. Conclusions Within the context of mining

  4. Model of a Generic Natural Uranium Conversion Plant ? Suggested Measures to Strengthen International Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Raffo-Caiado, Ana Claudia; Begovich, John M; Ferrada, Juan J

    2009-11-01

    This is the final report that closed a joint collaboration effort between DOE and the National Nuclear Energy Commission of Brazil (CNEN). In 2005, DOE and CNEN started a collaborative effort to evaluate measures that can strengthen the effectiveness of international safeguards at a natural uranium conversion plant (NUCP). The work was performed by DOE s Oak Ridge National Laboratory and CNEN. A generic model of a NUCP was developed and typical processing steps were defined. Advanced instrumentation and techniques for verification purposes were identified and investigated. The scope of the work was triggered by the International Atomic Energy Agency s 2003 revised policy concerning the starting point of safeguards at uranium conversion facilities. Prior to this policy only the final products of the uranium conversion plant were considered to be of composition and purity suitable for use in the nuclear fuel cycle and therefore, subject to the IAEA safeguards control. DOE and CNEN have explored options for implementing the IAEA policy, although Brazil understands that the new policy established by the IAEA is beyond the framework of the Quadripartite Agreement of which it is one of the parties, together with Argentina, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) and the IAEA. Two technical papers on this subject were published at the 2005 and 2008 INMM Annual Meetings.

  5. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA) SAFEGUARDS DURING STABILIZATION AT HANFORD PLUTONIUM FINISHING PLANT (PFP)

    SciTech Connect

    MCRAE, L.P.

    2004-06-30

    The Vault at the Plutonium Finishing Plan (PFP) became subject to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards beginning in 1994 as part of the US excess fissile material program. The inventory needed to be stabilized and repackaged for long-term storage to comply with Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board Recommendation 94-1. In 1998, the United States began negotiations with IAEA to develop methods to maintain safeguards during stabilization and repackaging of this material. The Design Information Questionnaire was revised and submitted to the IAEA in 2002 describing modification to the facility to accommodate the stabilization process line. The operation plan for 2003 was submitted describing the proposed schedules for removing materials for stabilization. Stabilization and repackaging activities for the safeguarded plutonium began in January 2003 and were completed in December 2003. The stabilization was completed in five phases. IAEA containment and surveillance measures were maintained until the material was removed by phase for stabilization and repackaging. Following placement of the repackaged material into the storage vault, the IAEA conducted inventory change verification measurements, and re-established containment and surveillance. Plant activities and the impacts on operations are described.

  6. The 3f Enable sutureless bioprosthesis: Early results, safeguards, and pitfalls.

    PubMed

    Permanyer, Eduard; Estigarribia, Arnaldo-Javier; Ysasi, Alejandro; Herrero, Enrique; Semper, Omar; Llorens, Rafael

    2015-06-01

    The aim of the study was to evaluate the clinical and hemodynamic performance of the 3f Enable (Medtronic Inc, Minneapolis, Minn) sutureless bioprosthesis in the early postoperative period. Its implantation technique was also evaluated highlighting the modifications in regard to the original technique and mistakes made throughout the learning curve. This is a prospective, nonrandomized study. From February 2011 to March 2014, a total of 60 patients underwent aortic valve replacement with the 3f Enable valve at the Hospiten Rambla. All intraoperative and postoperative data were prospectively collected. The mean age was 81.3 ± 3.78 years. Mean logistic European System for Cardiac Operative Risk Evaluation I was 13.78%. An associated concomitant procedure was performed in 23 patients (38.3%). The extracorporeal circulation and crossclamping times were 49.8 ± 15.7 minutes and 35.4 ± 8.9 minutes, respectively. The average stay in the intensive care unit was 34.7 hours. Mean systolic pressure gradients ranged from 8.01 mm Hg (size 19 valve) to 7.2 mm Hg (size 25 valve). Mean effective orifice area ranged from 1.9 cm(2) (size 19 valve) to 2.5 cm(2) (size 25 valve). Severe mismatch (<0.65 cm(2)/m(2)) did not occur in any patient. Only 1.66% of patients had more than mild aortic insufficiency at discharge. The early (30-day) mortality was 6.6% (n = 4). The 3f Enable bioprosthesis is an important alternative to conventional prostheses, with reduction of surgery times and good hemodynamic results on discharge. It is especially useful for high-risk patients and octogenarians. Studies on a greater number of patients and long-term follow-ups are necessary. Copyright © 2015 The American Association for Thoracic Surgery. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

  7. Precision Information Environment (PIE) for International Safeguards: Pre-Demonstration Development Use Cases

    SciTech Connect

    Gastelum, Zoe N.; Henry, Michael J.

    2013-11-13

    In FY2013, the PIE International Safeguards team demonstrated our development progress to U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) staff from the Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24, our client) and the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development (NA-22). Following the demonstration, the team was asked by our client to complete additional development prior to a planned demonstration at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), scheduled tentatively for January or spring of 2014. The team discussed four potential areas for development (in priority order), and will develop them as time and funding permit prior to an IAEA demonstration. The four capability areas are: 1. Addition of equipment manuals to PIE-accessible files 2. Optical character recognition (OCR) of photographed text 3. Barcode reader with information look-up from a database 4. Add Facilities to Data Model 5. Geospatial capabilities with information integration Each area will be described below in a use case.

  8. Strenghening Safeguards Authorities and Institutions

    SciTech Connect

    Goodman,M.; Lockwood, d.; Rosenthal, M.D.; Tape, J.W.

    2008-06-06

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system has changed in major ways from the establishment of the IAEA in 1957 until the present. Changes include strengthening the legal framework of safeguards; improvements in concepts and approaches for safeguards implementation; and significant improvements in the technical tools available to inspectors. In this paper, we explore three broad areas related to strengthening safeguards authorities and institutions: integrated safeguards and State-Level Approaches; special inspections; and NPT withdrawal and the continuation of safeguards.

  9. Application of laser induced breakdown spectroscopy (LIBS) instrumentation for international safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Barefield Ii, James E; Clegg, Samuel M; Lopez, Leon N; Le, Loan A; Veirs, D Kirk; Browne, Mike

    2010-01-01

    Advanced methodologies and improvements to current measurements techniques are needed to strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of international safeguards. This need was recognized and discussed at a Technical Meeting on 'The Application of Laser Spectrometry Techniques in IAEA Safeguards' held at IAEA headquarters (September 2006). One of the principal recommendations from that meeting was the need to pursue the development of novel complementary access instrumentation based on Laser Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy (UBS) for the detection of gaseous and solid signatures and indicators of nuclear fuel cycle processes and associated materials'. Pursuant to this recommendation the Department of Safeguards (SG) under the Division of Technical Support (SGTS) convened the 'Experts and Users Advisory Meeting on Laser Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy (LIBS) for Safeguards Applications' also held at IAEA headquarters (July 2008). This meeting was attended by 12 LlBS experts from the Czech Republic, the European Commission, France, the Republic of South Korea, the United States of America, Germany, the United Kingdom of Great Britain, Canada, and Northern Ireland. Following a presentation of the needs of the IAEA inspectors, the LIBS experts agreed that needs as presented could be partially or fully fulfilled using LIBS instrumentation. Inspectors needs were grouped into the following broad categories: (1) Improvements to in-field measurements/environmental sampling; (2) Monitoring status of activities in Hot Cells; (3) Verify status of activity at a declared facility via process monitoring; and (4) Need for pre-screening of environmental samples before analysis. The primary tool employed by the IAEA to detect undeclared processes and activities at special nuclear material facilities and sites is environmental sampling. One of the objectives of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) Program Plan calls for the development of advanced tools and methodologies to

  10. Treaty on Open Skies sensor technologies with potential international safeguards applications

    SciTech Connect

    Sandoval, M.B.

    1996-12-01

    The Treaty on Open Skies is a precedent-setting agreement that allows signatory states to fly aircraft over each other`s territory with sensor systems. The purpose of the Treaty is to improve confidence and security with respect to military activities of the signatories. This paper reviews the sensor technology that is currently allowed by the Treaty on Open Skies and potential future sensor technology. The Treaty on Open Skies does have provisions to allow for the improvement of the technology of the current sensor systems and for the proposal of new sensors after a period of time. This can occur only after the Treaty has been ratified and has entered into force. If this regime was to be used for other than Treaty on Open Skies applications some modifications to the allowed sensor technology should be examined. This paper presents some ideas on potential improvements to existing allowed sensor technology as well as some suggested new advanced sensor systems that would be useful for future potential monitoring of safeguard`s related activities. This paper addresses advanced imaging sensors and non-imaging sensors for potential use in aerial remote sensing roles that involve international data sharing.

  11. International safeguards relevant to geologic disposal of high-level wastes and spent fuels

    SciTech Connect

    Pillay, K.K.S.; Picard, R.R.

    1989-01-01

    Spent fuels from once-through fuel cycles placed in underground repositories have the potential to become attractive targets for diversion and/or theft because of their valuable material content and decreasing radioactivity. The first geologic repository in the US, as currently designed, will contain approximately 500 Mt of plutonium, 60,000 Mt of uranium and a host of other fissile and strategically important elements. This paper identifies some of the international safeguards issues relevant to the various proposed scenarios for disposing of the spent fuel. In the context of the US program for geologic disposal of spent fuels, this paper highlights several issues that should be addressed in the near term by US industries, the Department of Energy, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission before the geologic repositories for spent fuels become a reality. Based on US spent fuel discharges, an example is presented to illustrate the enormity of the problem of verifying spent fuel inventories. The geologic disposal scenario for high-level wastes originating from defense facilities produced a practicably irrecoverable'' waste form. Therefore, safeguards issues for geologic disposal of high-level waste now in the US are less pressing. 56 refs. , 2 figs.

  12. Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant Safeguards System Modeling

    SciTech Connect

    Elayat, H A; O'Connell, W J; Boyer, B D

    2006-06-05

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is interested in developing tools and methods for potential U.S. use in designing and evaluating safeguards systems used in enrichment facilities. This research focuses on analyzing the effectiveness of the safeguards in protecting against the range of safeguards concerns for enrichment plants, including diversion of attractive material and unauthorized modes of use. We developed an Extend simulation model for a generic medium-sized centrifuge enrichment plant. We modeled the material flow in normal operation, plant operational upset modes, and selected diversion scenarios, for selected safeguards systems. Simulation modeling is used to analyze both authorized and unauthorized use of a plant and the flow of safeguards information. Simulation tracks the movement of materials and isotopes, identifies the signatures of unauthorized use, tracks the flow and compilation of safeguards data, and evaluates the effectiveness of the safeguards system in detecting misuse signatures. The simulation model developed could be of use to the International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA, enabling the IAEA to observe and draw conclusions that uranium enrichment facilities are being used only within authorized limits for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It will evaluate improved approaches to nonproliferation concerns, facilitating deployment of enhanced and cost-effective safeguards systems for an important part of the nuclear power fuel cycle.

  13. Assessment of the requirements for placing and maintaining Savannah River Site spent fuel storage basins under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Amacker, O.P. Jr.; Curtis, M.M.; Delegard, C.H.; Hsue, S.T.; Whitesel, R.N.

    1997-03-01

    The United States is considering the offer of irradiated research reactor spent fuel (RRSF) for international safeguards applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The offer would be to add one or more spent fuel storage basins to the list of facilities eligible for IAEA safeguards. The fuel to be safeguarded would be stored in basins on the Savannah River Site (SRS). This RRSF potentially can include returns of Material Test Reactor (MTR) VAX fuel from Argentina, Brazil, and Chile (ABC); returns from other foreign research reactors; and fuel from domestic research reactors. Basins on the SRS being considered for this fuel storage are the Receiving Basin for Offsite Fuel (RBOF) and the L-Area Disassembly Basin (L-Basin). A working group of SRS, U.S. Department of Energy International Safeguards Division (NN-44), and National Laboratory personnel with experience in IAEA safeguards was convened to consider the requirements for applying the safeguards to this material. The working group projected the safeguards requirements and described alternatives.

  14. The safeguards options study

    SciTech Connect

    Hakkila, E.A.; Mullen, M.F.; Olinger, C.T.; Stanbro, W.D.; Olsen, A.P.; Roche, C.T.; Rudolph, R.R.; Bieber, A.M.; Lemley, J.; Filby, E.

    1995-04-01

    The Safeguards Options Study was initiated to aid the International Safeguards Division (ISD) of the DOE Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation in developing its programs in enhanced international safeguards. The goal was to provide a technical basis for the ISD program in this area. The Safeguards Options Study has been a cooperative effort among ten organizations. These are Argonne National Laboratory, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Mound Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest Laboratories, Sandia National Laboratories, and Special Technologies Laboratory. Much of the Motivation for the Safeguards Options Study is the recognition after the Iraq experience that there are deficiencies in the present approach to international safeguards. While under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards at their declared facilities, Iraq was able to develop a significant weapons program without being noticed. This is because negotiated safeguards only applied at declared sites. Even so, their nuclear weapons program clearly conflicted with Iraq`s obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as a nonnuclear weapon state.

  15. The International Safeguards Technology Base: How is the Patient Doing? An Exploration of Effective Metrics

    SciTech Connect

    Schanfein, Mark J; Gouveia, Fernando S

    2010-07-01

    The term “Technology Base” is commonly used but what does it mean? Is there a common understanding of the components that comprise a technology base? Does a formal process exist to assess the health of a given technology base? These are important questions the relevance of which is even more pressing given the USDOE/NNSA initiatives to strengthen the safeguards technology base through investments in research & development and human capital development. Accordingly, the authors will establish a high-level framework to define and understand what comprises a technology base. Potential goal-driven metrics to assess the health of a technology base will also be explored, such as linear demographics and resource availability, in the hope that they can be used to better understand and improve the health of the U.S. safeguards technology base. Finally, through the identification of such metrics, the authors will offer suggestions and highlight choices for addressing potential shortfalls.

  16. Recover: A Potentially Useful Technology for Nuclear Safeguards, but Greater International Commitment is Needed.

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1983-01-25

    dated November 29, 1982 from the Department of State 50 ABEREVIATIONS ACDA Arms Control and Disarmament Agency CANDU Canadian Deuterium Reactor C/S...oxide fuel fabrication. Although IAEA’s safeguards system depends primarily on mate- rial accountancy and on-site inspections , IAIA now complements these...percent--18 CANDUs and as many as four fast critical assemblies--were of types at which Brookhaven found RECOVER to be 8 cost--effective. 1/ According

  17. Us-Japan cooperation on safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Beddingfield, David H; Menlove, Howard O; Hori, Masato; Kawakubo, Yoko; Mcclelland - Kerr, J

    2009-01-01

    There is a long history of collaborative safeguards development between the United States and Japan. Japan has built, and continues to expand, the largest civil nuclear fuel cycle under full-scope IAEA safeguards in world. This development has posed unique challenges to the international safeguards system. Safeguards developments made through the US-Japan cooperation to address these unique challenges have significantly impacted the technologies deployed for international safeguards applications around the world.

  18. A Voice Enabled Procedure Browser for the International Space Station

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Rayner, Manny; Chatzichrisafis, Nikos; Hockey, Beth Ann; Farrell, Kim; Renders, Jean-Michel

    2005-01-01

    Clarissa, an experimental voice enabled procedure browser that has recently been deployed on the International Space Station (ISS), is to the best of our knowledge the first spoken dialog system in space. This paper gives background on the system and the ISS procedures, then discusses the research developed to address three key problems: grammar-based speech recognition using the Regulus toolkit; SVM based methods for open microphone speech recognition; and robust side-effect free dialogue management for handling undos, corrections and confirmations.

  19. A Voice Enabled Procedure Browser for the International Space Station

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Rayner, Manny; Chatzichrisafis, Nikos; Hockey, Beth Ann; Farrell, Kim; Renders, Jean-Michel

    2005-01-01

    Clarissa, an experimental voice enabled procedure browser that has recently been deployed on the International Space Station (ISS), is to the best of our knowledge the first spoken dialog system in space. This paper gives background on the system and the ISS procedures, then discusses the research developed to address three key problems: grammar-based speech recognition using the Regulus toolkit; SVM based methods for open microphone speech recognition; and robust side-effect free dialogue management for handling undos, corrections and confirmations.

  20. NASA's Space Launch System: An Enabling Capability for International Exploration

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Creech, Stephen D.; May, Todd A.; Robinson, Kimberly F.

    2014-01-01

    As the program moves out of the formulation phase and into implementation, work is well underway on NASA's new Space Launch System, the world's most powerful launch vehicle, which will enable a new era of human exploration of deep space. As assembly and testing of the rocket is taking place at numerous sites around the United States, mission planners within NASA and at the agency's international partners continue to evaluate utilization opportunities for this ground-breaking capability. Developed with the goals of safety, affordability, and sustainability in mind, the SLS rocket will launch the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV), equipment, supplies, and major science missions for exploration and discovery. NASA is developing this new capability in an austere economic climate, a fact which has inspired the SLS team to find innovative solutions to the challenges of designing, developing, fielding, and operating the largest rocket in history, via a path that will deliver an initial 70 metric ton (t) capability in December 2017 and then continuing through an incremental evolutionary strategy to reach a full capability greater than 130 t. SLS will be enabling for the first missions of human exploration beyond low Earth in almost half a century, and from its first crewed flight will be able to carry humans farther into space than they have ever voyaged before. In planning for the future of exploration, the International Space Exploration Coordination Group, representing 12 of the world's space agencies, has created the Global Exploration Roadmap, which outlines paths toward a human landing on Mars, beginning with capability-demonstrating missions to the Moon or an asteroid. The Roadmap and corresponding NASA research outline the requirements for reference missions for these destinations. SLS will offer a robust way to transport international crews and the air, water, food, and equipment they would need for such missions.

  1. Facility Safeguardability Analysis In Support of Safeguards-by-Design

    SciTech Connect

    Philip Casey Durst; Roald Wigeland; Robert Bari; Trond Bjornard; John Hockert; Michael Zentner

    2010-07-01

    The following report proposes the use of Facility Safeguardability Analysis (FSA) to: i) compare and evaluate nuclear safeguards measures, ii) optimize the prospective facility safeguards approach, iii) objectively and analytically evaluate nuclear facility safeguardability, and iv) evaluate and optimize barriers within the facility and process design to minimize the risk of diversion and theft of nuclear material. As proposed by the authors, Facility Safeguardability Analysis would be used by the Facility Designer and/or Project Design Team during the design and construction of the nuclear facility to evaluate and optimize the facility safeguards approach and design of the safeguards system. Through a process of “Safeguards-by-Design” (SBD), this would be done at the earliest stages of project conceptual design and would involve domestic and international nuclear regulators and authorities, including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The benefits of the Safeguards-by-Design approach is that it would clarify at a very early stage the international and domestic safeguards requirements for the Construction Project Team, and the best design and operating practices for meeting these requirements. It would also minimize the risk to the construction project, in terms of cost overruns or delays, which might otherwise occur if the nuclear safeguards measures are not incorporated into the facility design at an early stage. Incorporating nuclear safeguards measures is straight forward for nuclear facilities of existing design, but becomes more challenging with new designs and more complex nuclear facilities. For this reason, the facility designer and Project Design Team require an analytical tool for comparing safeguards measures, options, and approaches, and for evaluating the “safeguardability” of the facility. The report explains how preliminary diversion path analysis and the Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection (PRPP) evaluation

  2. Cooperation between JRC and SNL in the field of surveillance and monitoring for international safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Johnson, C.S.; Sorel, F.

    1993-08-01

    Under a Cooperative Agreement between the Commission of European Communities (CEC) and the U. S. Department of Energy (DOE), the Joint Research Centre, (JRC) ISPRA, and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) have been cooperating in the development of Containment and Surveillance equipment for a number of years. With recent technology advancements, this cooperation is expanding into the areas of Data Authentication, Safeguards Data Networks, Integrated Systems, and Image Processing. This paper will describe recently expanded efforts in connecting the Integrated Monitoring System designed by SNL to the Computer Aided Video Surveillance System designed by JRC. An SNL Modular Video Authentication System was furnished to test in the video circuitry of the Computer Aided Video Surveillance System. The two systems will remain at JRC for demonstrations, training, and future development activities.

  3. International organizations to enable world-wide mobile satellite services

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Anglin, Richard L., Jr.

    1993-01-01

    Numbers of systems exist or have been proposed to provide world-wide mobile satellite services (MSS). Developers of these systems have formulated institutional structures they consider most appropriate for profitable delivery of these services. MSS systems provide niche services and complement traditional telecommunications networks; they are not integrated into world-wide networks. To be successful, MSS system operators must be able to provide an integrated suite of services to support the increasing globalization, interconnectivity, and mobility of business. The critical issue to enabling 'universal roaming' is securing authority to provide MSS in all of the nations of the world. Such authority must be secured in the context of evolving trends in international telecommunications, and must specifically address issues of standardization, regulation and organization. Today, only one existing organization has such world-wide authority. The question is how proponents of new MSS systems and services can gain similar authority. Securing the appropriate authorizations requires that these new organizations reflect the objectives of the nations in which services are to be delivered.

  4. Measuring Safeguards Culture

    SciTech Connect

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2011-07-19

    As the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements a State Level Approach to its safeguards verification responsibilities, a number of countries are beginning new nuclear power programs and building new nuclear fuel cycle faculties. The State Level approach is holistic and investigatory in nature, creating a need for transparent, non-discriminatory judgments about a state's nonproliferation posture. In support of this need, the authors previously explored the value of defining and measuring a state's safeguards culture. We argued that a clear definition of safeguards culture and an accompanying set of metrics could be applied to provide an objective evaluation and demonstration of a country's nonproliferation posture. As part of this research, we outlined four high-level metrics that could be used to evaluate a state's nuclear posture. We identified general data points. This paper elaborates on those metrics, further refining the data points to generate a measurable scale of safeguards cultures. We believe that this work could advance the IAEA's goals of implementing a safeguards system that is fully information driven, while strengthening confidence in its safeguards conclusions.

  5. Enabling conformity to international standards within SeaDataNet

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Schaap, Dick M. A.; Boldrini, Enrico; de Korte, Arjen; Santoro, Mattia; Manzella, Giuseppe; Nativi, Stefano

    2010-05-01

    SeaDataNet objective is to construct a standardized system for managing the large and diverse data sets collected by the oceanographic fleets and the new automatic observation systems. The aim is to network and enhance the currently existing infrastructures, which are the national oceanographic data centres and satellite data centres of 36 countries, active in data collection. The networking of these professional data centres, in a unique virtual data management system will provide integrated data sets of standardized quality on-line. The Common Data Index (CDI) is the middleware service adopted by SeaDataNet for discovery and access of the available data. In order to develop an interoperable and effective system, the use of international de facto and de jure standards is required. In particular the new goal object of this presentation is to introduce and discuss the solutions for making SeaDataNet compliant with the European Union (EU) INSPIRE directive and in particular with its Implementing Rules (IR). The European INSPIRE directive aims to rule the creation of an European Spatial Data Infrastructure (ESDI). This will enable the sharing of environmental spatial information among public sector organisations and better facilitate public access to spatial information across Europe. To ensure that the spatial data infrastructures of the European Member States are compatible and usable in a community and transboundary context, the directive requires that common IRs are adopted in a number of specific areas (Metadata, Data Specifications, Network Services, Data and Service Sharing and Monitoring and Reporting). Often the use of already approved digital geographic information standards is mandated, drawing from international organizations like the Open Geospatial Consortium (OGC) and the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), the latter by means of its Technical Committee 211 (ISO/TC 211). In the context of geographic data discovery a set of mandatory

  6. Safeguards Culture: Lessons Learned

    SciTech Connect

    Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2009-05-27

    Abstract: At the 2005 INMM/ESARDA Workshop in Santa Fe, New Mexico, I presented a paper entitled “Changing the Safeguards Culture: Broader Perspectives and Challenges.” That paper described a set of theoretical models that can be used as a basis for evaluating changes to safeguards culture. This paper builds on that theoretical discussion to address practical methods for influencing culture. It takes lessons from methods used to influence change in safety culture and security culture, and examines the applicability of these lessons to changing safeguards culture. Paper: At the 2005 INMM/ESARDA Workshop on “Changing the Safeguards Culture: Broader Perspectives and Challenges,” in Santa Fe, New Mexico, I presented a paper entitled “Changing the Safeguards Culture: Broader Perspectives and Challenges.” That paper, coauthored by Karyn R. Durbin and Andrew Van Duzer, described a set of theoretical models that can be used as a basis for evaluating changes to safeguards culture. This paper updates that theoretical discussion, and seeks to address practical methods for influencing culture. It takes lessons from methods used to influence change in safety culture and security culture, and examines the applicability of these lessons to changing safeguards culture. Implicit in this discussion is an understanding that improving a culture is not an end in itself, but is one method of improving the underlying discipline, that is safety, security, or safeguards. Culture can be defined as a way of life, or general customs and beliefs of a particular group of people at a particular time. There are internationally accepted definitions of safety culture and nuclear security culture. As yet, there is no official agreed upon definition of safeguards culture. At the end of the paper I will propose my definition. At the Santa Fe Workshop the summary by the Co-Chairs of Working Group 1, “The Further Evolution of Safeguards,” noted: “It is clear that ‘safeguards culture

  7. Integrating Nuclear Information to Enhance Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Suski, N; Dubrin, J; Scarbrough, J

    2001-10-01

    Implementation of the Strengthened Safeguards System provides many new opportunities and challenges for collecting; analyzing and archiving nuclear materials safeguards information. For the first time in the history of safeguards, the International Atomic Energy Agency will be required not only to verify the accuracy of declarations, but also the completeness. To successfully implement the new safeguards regime, new and innovative ways of collecting, analyzing and archiving large amounts of safeguards information will be required. A conceptual system design that utilizes a geographical information system for the integration and analysis of this safeguards information will be described and demonstrated.

  8. REVIEW OF THE NEGOTIATION OF THE MODEL PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE AGREEMENT(S) BETWEEN STATE(S) AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY FOR THE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS,INFCIRC/540 (Corrected) VOLUME I/III SETTING THE STAGE: 1991-1996.

    SciTech Connect

    Rosenthal, M.D.; Saum-Manning, L.; Houck, F.; Anzelon, G.

    2010-01-01

    Events in Iraq at the beginning of the 1990s demonstrated that the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) needed to be improved. It had failed, after all, to detect Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapon program even though some of Iraq's's activities had been pursued at inspected facilities in buildings adjacent to ones being inspected by the IAEA. Although there were aspects of the implementation of safeguards where the IAEA needed to improve, the primary limitations were considered to be part of the safeguards system itself. That system was based on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1970, to which Iraq was a party, and implemented on the basis of a model NPT safeguards agreement, published by the IAEA 1972 as INFCIRC/153 (corrected). The agreement calls for states to accept and for the IAEA to apply safeguards to all nuclear material in the state. Iraq was a party to such an agreement, but it violated the agreement by concealing nuclear material and other nuclear activities from the IAEA. Although the IAEA was inspecting in Iraq, it was hindered by aspects of the agreement that essentially limited its access to points in declared facilities and provided the IAEA with little information about nuclear activities anywhere else in Iraq. As a result, a major review of the NPT safeguards system was initiated by its Director General and Member States with the objective of finding the best means to enable the IAEA to detect both diversions from declared stocks and any undeclared nuclear material or activities in the state. Significant improvements that could be made within existing legal authority were taken quickly, most importantly a change in 1992 in how and when and what design information would be reported to the IAEA. During 1991-1996, the IAEA pursued intensive study, legal and technical analysis, and field trials and held numerous consultations with Member States. The Board of Governors discussed the issue of strengthening safeguards

  9. SAFEGUARDS ENVELOPE

    SciTech Connect

    Duc Cao; Richard Metcalf

    2010-07-01

    The Safeguards Envelope is a strategy to determine a set of specific operating parameters within which nuclear facilities may operate to maximize safeguards effectiveness without sacrificing safety or plant efficiency. This paper details advanced statistical techniques that will be applied to real plant process monitoring (PM) data from the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP). In a simulation based on this data, multi-tank and multi-attribute correlations were tested against synthetic diversion scenarios. Kernel regression smoothing was used to fit a curve to the historical data, and multivariable, residual analysis and cumulative sum techniques set parameters for operating conditions. Diversion scenarios were created and tested, showing improved results when compared with a previous study utilizing only one-variable Z-testing. A brief analysis of the impact of the safeguards optimization on the rest of plant efficiency, criticality concerns, and overall requirements is presented.

  10. Safeguards by Design Challenge

    SciTech Connect

    Alwin, Jennifer Louise

    2016-09-13

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines Safeguards as a system of inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials as part of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. IAEA oversees safeguards worldwide. Safeguards by Design (SBD) involves incorporation of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation during the design phase of a facility, rather that after the fact. Design challenge goals are the following: Design a system of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation for inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials. Cost should be minimized to work with the IAEA’s limited budget. Dose to workers should always be as low are reasonably achievable (ALARA). Time is of the essence in operating facilities and flow of material should not be interrupted significantly. Proprietary process information in facilities may need to be protected, thus the amount of information obtained by inspectors should be the minimum required to achieve the measurement goal. Then three different design challenges are detailed: Plutonium Waste Item Measurement System, Marine-based Modular Reactor, and Floating Nuclear Power Plant (FNPP).

  11. Project plan international atomic energy agency (IAEA) safeguards project plutonium finishing plant

    SciTech Connect

    BARTLETT, W.D.

    1999-05-13

    This plan presents the overall objectives, description, justification and planning for the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) project. The intent of this plan is to describe how this project will be managed and integrated with other facility stabilization and deactivation activities. This plan supplements the overall integrated plan presented in the PFP Integrated Project Management Plan (PMP), HNF-3617, Rev. 0. This project plan is the top-level definitive project management document for the PFP IAEA project. It specifies the technical, schedule, requirements and the cost baselines to manage the execution of the IAEA project. Any deviations to the document must be authorized through the appropriate change control process.

  12. Nuclear materials safeguards for the future

    SciTech Connect

    Tape, J.W.

    1995-12-31

    Basic concepts of domestic and international safeguards are described, with an emphasis on safeguards systems for the fuel cycles of commercial power reactors. Future trends in institutional and technical measures for nuclear materials safeguards are outlined. The conclusion is that continued developments in safeguards approaches and technology, coupled with institutional measures that facilitate the global management and protection of nuclear materials, are up to the challenge of safeguarding the growing inventories of nuclear materials in commercial fuel cycles in technologically advanced States with stable governments that have signed the nonproliferation treaty. These same approaches also show promise for facilitating international inspection of excess weapons materials and verifying a fissile materials cutoff convention.

  13. Report on the US Program of Technical Assistance to Safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (POTAS)

    SciTech Connect

    Not Available

    1981-05-01

    This document summarizes the work done under the US Program of Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards (POTAS), providing the US Government, IAEA, and others with a short review of the progress made in the program since its inception. Becaue of the size and complexity of the program, only major accomplishments are presented. These are grouped under the following categories: (1) equipment and standard which cover assay of irradiated and unirradiated nuclear materials, automatic data processing, and physical standards; (2) experts who are involved in technology transfer, training, system design, and safeguard information processing and analysis; (3) system studies which cover diversion hazard analysis, safeguards approaches and application, and inspection effort planning and forecasting; (4) techniques, procedures, and equipment evaluation; (5) training of IAEA inspectors and safeguards specialists from member states. The major achievement has been the provisions of safeguards equipment designed to be reliable, and tamper resistant, some of which have already been in use in the field by inspector or by IAEA staff members in Vienna. These are listed in a table. (AT)

  14. Deterring Nuclear Proliferation: The Importance of IAEA Safeguards: A TEXTBOOK

    SciTech Connect

    Rosenthal, M.D.; Fishbone, L.G.; Gallini, L.; Krass, A.; Kratzer, M.; Sanborn, J.; Ward, B.; Wulf, N. A.

    2012-03-13

    Nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation are among the most pressing challenges to international peace and security that we face today. Iran and Syria remain in non-compliance with the safeguards requirements of the NPT, and the nuclear ambitions of North Korea remain unchecked. Despite these challenges, the NPT remains a cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and the safeguards implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) under the NPT play a critical role in deterring nuclear proliferation.How do they work? Where did they come from? And what is their future? This book answers these questions. Anyone studying the field of nuclear non-proliferation will benefit from reading this book, and for anyone entering the field, the book will enable them to get a running start. Part I describes the foundations of the international safeguards system: its origins in the 1930s - when new discoveries in physics made it clear immediately that nuclear energy held both peril and promise - through the entry into force in 1970 of the NPT, which codified the role of IAEA safeguards as a means to verify states NPT commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons. Part II describes the NPT safeguards system, which is based on a model safeguards agreement developed specifically for the NPT, The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States required in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which has been published by the IAEA as INFCIRC/153. Part III describes events, especially in South Africa, the DPRK, and Iraq in the early 1990s, that triggered a transformation in the way in which safeguards were conceptualized and implemented.

  15. Integrating Safeguards and Security with Safety into Design

    SciTech Connect

    Robert S. Bean; John W. Hockert; David J. Hebditch

    2009-05-01

    There is a need to minimize security risks, proliferation hazards, and safety risks in the design of new nuclear facilities in a global environment of nuclear power expansion, while improving the synergy of major design features and raising operational efficiency. In 2008, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) launched the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) covering many safeguards areas. One of these, launched by NNSA with support of the DOE Office of Nuclear Energy, was a multi-laboratory project, led by the Idaho National Laboratory (INL), to develop safeguards by design. The proposed Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process has been developed as a structured approach to ensure the timely, efficient, and cost effective integration of international safeguards and other nonproliferation barriers with national material control and accountability, physical security, and safety objectives into the overall design process for the nuclear facility lifecycle. A graded, iterative process was developed to integrate these areas throughout the project phases. It identified activities, deliverables, interfaces, and hold points covering both domestic regulatory requirements and international safeguards using the DOE regulatory environment as exemplar to provide a framework and guidance for project management and integration of safety with security during design. Further work, reported in this paper, created a generalized SBD process which could also be employed within the licensed nuclear industry and internationally for design of new facilities. Several tools for integrating safeguards, safety, and security into design are discussed here. SBD appears complementary to the EFCOG TROSSI process for security and safety integration created in 2006, which focuses on standardized upgrades to enable existing DOE facilities to meet a more severe design basis threat. A collaborative approach is suggested.

  16. International Atomic Energy Agency's advisory group meeting on safeguards related to the final disposal of waste and spent fuel, Vienna, Austria, September 12-16, 1988: Foreign trip report

    SciTech Connect

    Moran, B.W.

    1988-10-01

    B.W. Moran traveled to Vienna, Austria, during the period of September 12--16, 1988, to serve as the technical advisor to the US Department of Energy's (DOE's) Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) representatives to the International Atomic Energy Agency's Advisory Group Meeting on ''Safeguards Related to the Final Disposal of Nuclear Material in Waste and Spent Fuel.'' The goal of the US representatives to this meeting was to ensure that the advisory group's recommendations established (1) an effective IAEA safeguards approach for all radioactive waste and spent fuel management facilities and (2) a safeguards approach that is appropriate for the US Federal Waste Management System. The principal concerns of the United States on entering the advisory group meeting were: criteria for the termination of safeguards on waste should not be established, but should be referred for further study, safeguards on spent fuel should not be terminated, and safeguards studies are required before IAEA safeguards approaches for spent fuel are established. The US representatives generally recommended that consultant meetings be convened to address the technical issues after the requisite safeguards related research and development tasks have been performed. These objectives of the US representatives were achieved, and the recommendations of the advisory group generally coincided with and extended the recommendations presented in the US position paper.

  17. SAFEGUARDS CULTURE: WHAT IS IT AND DOES IT MATTER?

    SciTech Connect

    Mladineo, Stephen V.; Frazar, Sarah L.

    2012-11-01

    The concepts of safety and security culture are well established; however, a common understanding of safeguards culture is not internationally recognized. With the support of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) the authors have attempted a rigorous analysis of the concept of safeguards culture, with the goal of determining its value to the international safeguards community, and to provide recommendations as to whether the concept deserves further development. As part of this analysis, the authors explore the distinctions between safeguards culture, safeguards compliance, and safeguards performance. The authors also discuss synergies and differences between safeguards culture and safety/security culture.

  18. Overview of the Facility Safeguardability Analysis (FSA) Process

    SciTech Connect

    Bari, Robert A.; Hockert, John; Wonder, Edward F.; Johnson, Scott J.; Wigeland, Roald; Zentner, Michael D.

    2012-08-01

    Executive Summary The safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is intended to provide the international community with credible assurance that a State is fulfilling its safeguards obligations. Effective and cost-efficient IAEA safeguards at the facility level are, and will remain, an important element of IAEA safeguards as those safeguards evolve towards a “State-Level approach.” The Safeguards by Design (SBD) concept can facilitate the implementation of these effective and cost-efficient facility-level safeguards (Bjornard, et al. 2009a, 2009b; IAEA, 1998; Wonder & Hockert, 2011). This report, sponsored by the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Nuclear Safeguards and Security, introduces a methodology intended to ensure that the diverse approaches to Safeguards by Design can be effectively integrated and consistently used to cost effectively enhance the application of international safeguards.

  19. Safeguards instrumentation: a computer-based catalog

    SciTech Connect

    Fishbone, L.G.; Keisch, B.

    1981-08-01

    The information contained in this catalog is needed to provide a data base for safeguards studies and to help establish criteria and procedures for international safeguards for nuclear materials and facilities. The catalog primarily presents information on new safeguards equipment. It also describes entire safeguards systems for certain facilities, but it does not describe the inspection procedures. Because IAEA safeguards do not include physical security, devices for physical protection (as opposed to containment and surveillance) are not included. An attempt has been made to list capital costs, annual maintenance costs, replacement costs, and useful lifetime for the equipment. For equipment which is commercially available, representative sources have been listed whenever available.

  20. A Working Framework for Enabling International Science Data System Interoperability

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Hughes, J. Steven; Hardman, Sean; Crichton, Daniel J.; Martinez, Santa; Law, Emily; Gordon, Mitchell K.

    2016-07-01

    For diverse scientific disciplines to interoperate they must be able to exchange information based on a shared understanding. To capture this shared understanding, we have developed a knowledge representation framework that leverages ISO level reference models for metadata registries and digital archives. This framework provides multi-level governance, evolves independent of the implementation technologies, and promotes agile development, namely adaptive planning, evolutionary development, early delivery, continuous improvement, and rapid and flexible response to change. The knowledge representation is captured in an ontology through a process of knowledge acquisition. Discipline experts in the role of stewards at the common, discipline, and project levels work to design and populate the ontology model. The result is a formal and consistent knowledge base that provides requirements for data representation, integrity, provenance, context, identification, and relationship. The contents of the knowledge base are translated and written to files in suitable formats to configure system software and services, provide user documentation, validate input, and support data analytics. This presentation will provide an overview of the framework, present a use case that has been adopted by an entire science discipline at the international level, and share some important lessons learned.

  1. DOE/ABACC safeguards cooperation

    SciTech Connect

    Whitaker, J.M.; Alvim, C.F.; Toth, P.; Rubio, J.

    1995-12-31

    In 1994, the US Department of Energy (DOE) and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) signed a safeguards cooperation agreement. The agreement provides for cooperation in the areas of nuclear material control, accountancy, verification, and advanced containment and surveillance technologies for international safeguards applications. ABACC is an international safeguards organization responsible for verifying the commitments of a 1991 bilateral agreement between Argentina and Brazil in which both countries agreed to submit all nuclear material in all nuclear activities to a Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC). DOE provides critical assistance (including equipment and training) through the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security to countries and international organizations to enhance their capabilities to control and verify nuclear material inventories. Specific activities initiated under the safeguards agreement include: (1) active US participation in ABACC`s safeguards training courses, (2) joint development of specialized measurement training workshops, (3) characterization of laboratory standards, and (4) development and application of an extensive analytical laboratory comparison program. The results realized from these initial activities have been mutually beneficial in regard to strengthening the application of international safeguards in Argentina and Brazil.

  2. Documentation and Analysis of IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) Safeguards Implementation at the Exxon Nuclear Fuel Fabrication Plant.

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1984-10-01

    Those efforts also resulted in the development of innovative approaches for improving effectiveness and minimizing the cost burden. The experience showed...approaches for improving effectiveness and minimizing the cost burden. The experience showed that IAEA safeguards could be technically effective...services such as the cost of shipping the IAEA equipment to other locations in the U.S. and for providing the IAEA with working standards for use at the U.S

  3. Safeguards issues in spent fuel consolidation facilities

    SciTech Connect

    Belew, W.L.; Moran, B.W.

    1991-01-01

    In the nuclear power industry, the fuel assembly is the basic unit for nuclear material accountancy. The safeguards procedures for the spent fuel assemblies, therefore, are based on an item accountancy approach. When fuel consolidation occurs in at-reactor'' or away-from-reactor'' facilities, the fuel assemblies are disassembled and cease to be the basic unit containing nuclear material. Safeguards can no longer be based on item accountancy of fuel assemblies. The spent fuel pins containing plutonium are accessible, and the possibilities for diversion of spent fuel for clandestine reprocessing to recover the plutonium are increased. Thus, identifying the potential safeguards concerns created by operation of these facilities is necessary. Potential safeguards techniques to address these concerns also must be identified so facility designs may include the equipment and systems required to provide an acceptable level of assurance that the international safeguards objectives can be met when these facilities come on-line. The objectives of this report are (1) to identify the safeguards issues associated with operation of spent fuel consolidation facilities, (2) to provide a preliminary assessment of the assessment of the safeguards vulnerabilities introduced, and (3) to identify potential safeguards approaches that could meet international safeguards requirements. The safeguards aspects of spent fuel consolidation are addressed in several recent reports and papers. 11 refs., 3 figs., 3 tabs.

  4. Safeguards Considerations for Thorium Fuel Cycles

    DOE PAGES

    Worrall, Louise G.; Worrall, Andrew; Flanagan, George F.; ...

    2016-04-21

    We report that by around 2025, thorium-based fuel cycles are likely to be deployed internationally. States such as China and India are pursuing research, development, and deployment pathways toward a number of commercial-scale thorium fuel cycles, and they are already building test reactors and the associated fuel cycle infrastructure. In the future, the potential exists for these emerging programs to sell, export, and deploy thorium fuel cycle technology in other states. Without technically adequate international safeguards protocols and measures in place, any future potential clandestine misuse of these fuel cycles could go undetected, compromising the deterrent value of these protocolsmore » and measures. The development of safeguards approaches for thorium-based fuel cycles is therefore a matter of some urgency. Yet, the focus of the international safeguards community remains mainly on safeguarding conventional 235U- and 239Pu-based fuel cycles while the safeguards challenges of thorium-uranium fuel cycles remain largely uninvestigated. This raises the following question: Is the International Atomic Energy Agency and international safeguards system ready for thorium fuel cycles? Furthermore, is the safeguards technology of today sufficiently mature to meet the verification challenges posed by thorium-based fuel cycles? In defining these and other related research questions, the objectives of this paper are to identify key safeguards considerations for thorium-based fuel cycles and to call for an early dialogue between the international safeguards and the nuclear fuel cycle communities to prepare for the potential safeguards challenges associated with these fuel cycles. In this paper, it is concluded that directed research and development programs are required to meet the identified safeguards challenges and to take timely action in preparation for the international deployment of thorium fuel cycles.« less

  5. Safeguards Considerations for Thorium Fuel Cycles

    SciTech Connect

    Worrall, Louise G.; Worrall, Andrew; Flanagan, George F.; Croft, Steven

    2016-04-21

    We report that by around 2025, thorium-based fuel cycles are likely to be deployed internationally. States such as China and India are pursuing research, development, and deployment pathways toward a number of commercial-scale thorium fuel cycles, and they are already building test reactors and the associated fuel cycle infrastructure. In the future, the potential exists for these emerging programs to sell, export, and deploy thorium fuel cycle technology in other states. Without technically adequate international safeguards protocols and measures in place, any future potential clandestine misuse of these fuel cycles could go undetected, compromising the deterrent value of these protocols and measures. The development of safeguards approaches for thorium-based fuel cycles is therefore a matter of some urgency. Yet, the focus of the international safeguards community remains mainly on safeguarding conventional 235U- and 239Pu-based fuel cycles while the safeguards challenges of thorium-uranium fuel cycles remain largely uninvestigated. This raises the following question: Is the International Atomic Energy Agency and international safeguards system ready for thorium fuel cycles? Furthermore, is the safeguards technology of today sufficiently mature to meet the verification challenges posed by thorium-based fuel cycles? In defining these and other related research questions, the objectives of this paper are to identify key safeguards considerations for thorium-based fuel cycles and to call for an early dialogue between the international safeguards and the nuclear fuel cycle communities to prepare for the potential safeguards challenges associated with these fuel cycles. In this paper, it is concluded that directed research and development programs are required to meet the identified safeguards challenges and to take timely action in preparation for the international deployment of thorium fuel cycles.

  6. Safeguards Considerations for Thorium Fuel Cycles

    SciTech Connect

    Worrall, Louise G.; Worrall, Andrew; Flanagan, George F.; Croft, Steven

    2016-04-21

    We report that by around 2025, thorium-based fuel cycles are likely to be deployed internationally. States such as China and India are pursuing research, development, and deployment pathways toward a number of commercial-scale thorium fuel cycles, and they are already building test reactors and the associated fuel cycle infrastructure. In the future, the potential exists for these emerging programs to sell, export, and deploy thorium fuel cycle technology in other states. Without technically adequate international safeguards protocols and measures in place, any future potential clandestine misuse of these fuel cycles could go undetected, compromising the deterrent value of these protocols and measures. The development of safeguards approaches for thorium-based fuel cycles is therefore a matter of some urgency. Yet, the focus of the international safeguards community remains mainly on safeguarding conventional 235U- and 239Pu-based fuel cycles while the safeguards challenges of thorium-uranium fuel cycles remain largely uninvestigated. This raises the following question: Is the International Atomic Energy Agency and international safeguards system ready for thorium fuel cycles? Furthermore, is the safeguards technology of today sufficiently mature to meet the verification challenges posed by thorium-based fuel cycles? In defining these and other related research questions, the objectives of this paper are to identify key safeguards considerations for thorium-based fuel cycles and to call for an early dialogue between the international safeguards and the nuclear fuel cycle communities to prepare for the potential safeguards challenges associated with these fuel cycles. In this paper, it is concluded that directed research and development programs are required to meet the identified safeguards challenges and to take timely action in preparation for the international deployment of thorium fuel cycles.

  7. IAEA safeguards and classified materials

    SciTech Connect

    Pilat, J.F.; Eccleston, G.W.; Fearey, B.L.; Nicholas, N.J.; Tape, J.W.; Kratzer, M.

    1997-11-01

    The international community in the post-Cold War period has suggested that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) utilize its expertise in support of the arms control and disarmament process in unprecedented ways. The pledges of the US and Russian presidents to place excess defense materials, some of which are classified, under some type of international inspections raises the prospect of using IAEA safeguards approaches for monitoring classified materials. A traditional safeguards approach, based on nuclear material accountancy, would seem unavoidably to reveal classified information. However, further analysis of the IAEA`s safeguards approaches is warranted in order to understand fully the scope and nature of any problems. The issues are complex and difficult, and it is expected that common technical understandings will be essential for their resolution. Accordingly, this paper examines and compares traditional safeguards item accounting of fuel at a nuclear power station (especially spent fuel) with the challenges presented by inspections of classified materials. This analysis is intended to delineate more clearly the problems as well as reveal possible approaches, techniques, and technologies that could allow the adaptation of safeguards to the unprecedented task of inspecting classified materials. It is also hoped that a discussion of these issues can advance ongoing political-technical debates on international inspections of excess classified materials.

  8. Safeguarding Porpoises

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    1997-01-01

    The NetMark 1000 by the Dukane Corporation, used to safeguard porpoises from net entanglement, employs technology developed in the late 1960s by NASA engineers at the Langley Research Center. It is based on an underwater location aid, able to withstand high impact, then emit multidirectional signals for hours on end, originally used in the retrieval of NASA payloads following watery touch-downs on Earth. Dukane and Burnett Electronics later obtained a license from NASA, further improving on the beacon design. In a large scale experiment off the coast of New Hampshire in autumn of 1994, it was found that the use of acoustic alarms appears to hold considerable promise in reducing the number of harbor porpoises killed in the sink gill nets in the Gulf of Maine. Dukane has sold well over 100,000 units. Applications of the pinger are also expanding to other animal species.

  9. Implications of Export/Import Reporting Requirements in the United States - International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards Additional Protocol

    SciTech Connect

    Killinger, Mark H.; Benjamin, Eugene L.; McNair, Gary W.

    2001-02-20

    The United States has signed but not ratified the US/IAEA Safeguards Additional Protocol. If ratified, the Additional Protocol will require the US to report to the IAEA certain nuclear-related exports and imports to the IAEA. This document identifies and assesses the issues associated with the US making those reports. For example, some regulatory changes appear to be necessary. The document also attempts to predict the impact on the DOE Complex by assessing the historical flow of exports and imports that would be reportable if the Additional Protocol were in force.

  10. Safeguards Information Management Systems (SIMS)

    SciTech Connect

    Sorenson, R.J.; Sheely, K.B.; Brown, J.B.; Horton, R.D.; Strittmatter, R.; Manatt, D.R.

    1994-04-01

    The requirements for the management of information at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its Department of Safeguards are rapidly changing. Historically, the Department of Safeguards has had the requirement to process large volumes of conventional safeguards information. An information management system is currently in place that adequately handles the IAEA`s conventional safeguards data needs. In the post-Iraq environment, however, there is a growing need to expand the IAEA information management capability to include unconventional forms of information. These data include environmental sampling results, photographs, video film, lists of machine tools, and open-source materials such as unclassified publications. The US Department of Energy (DOE) has responded to this information management need by implementing the Safeguards Information Management Systems (SIMS) initiative. SIMS was created by the DOE to anticipate and respond to IAEA information management needs through a multilaboratory initiative that will utilize an integrated approach to develop and deploy technology in a timely and cost-effective manner. The DOE will use the SIMS initiative to coordinate US information management activities that support the IAEA Department of Safeguards.

  11. a state department perspective on IAEA safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Kessler, J.C. )

    1989-07-01

    The maintenance of effective international safeguards is a fundamental tenet of U.S. non-proliferation policy. The U.S. Department of State plays a substantial role not only in articulating U.S. non-proliferation policy, but in the implementation of that policy, including a substantial role in all aspects of U.S. support of IAEA safeguards. The State Department's role in supporting IAEA safeguards ranges from considerations related to bilateral agreements for cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy and export control to many rather technical aspects of safeguards such as the U.S. Program of Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards (POTAS) and negotiation of Facility Attachments for U.S. nuclear facilities subject to IAEA safeguards. TSO plays an important role in support of these efforts by providing technical advice on a broad range of matters where technical and policy issues are closely intertwined.

  12. The state-level approach: moving beyond integrated safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Tape, James W

    2008-01-01

    The concept of a State-Level Approach (SLA) for international safeguards planning, implementation, and evaluation was contained in the Conceptual Framework for Integrated Safeguards (IS) agreed in 2002. This paper describes briefly the key elements of the SLA, including State-level factors and high-level safeguards objectives, and considers different cases in which application of the SLA methodology could address safeguards for 'suspect' States, 'good' States, and Nuclear Weapons States hosting fuel cycle centers. The continued use and further development of the SLA to customize safeguards for each State, including for States already under IS, is seen as central to effective and efficient safeguards for an expanding nuclear world.

  13. A comparison of the additional protocols of the five nuclear weapon states and the ensuing safeguards benefits to international nonproliferation efforts

    SciTech Connect

    Uribe, Eva C; Sandoval, M Analisa; Sandoval, Marisa N; Boyer, Brian D; Leitch, Rosalyn M

    2009-01-01

    With the 6 January 2009 entry into force of the Additional Protocol by the United States of America, all five declared Nuclear Weapon States that are part of the Nonproliferation Treaty have signed, ratified, and put into force the Additional Protocol. This paper makes a comparison of the strengths and weaknesses of the five Additional Protocols in force by the five Nuclear Weapon States with respect to the benefits to international nonproliferation aims. This paper also documents the added safeguards burden to the five declared Nuclear Weapon States that these Additional Protocols put on the states with respect to access to their civilian nuclear programs and the hosting of complementary access activities as part of the Additional Protocol.

  14. Achieving the Benefits of Safeguards by Design

    SciTech Connect

    Trond Bjornard; Robert Bean; David Hebditch; Jim Morgan; Bruce Meppen; Scott DeMuth; Michael Ehinger; John Hockert

    2008-07-01

    The overarching driver for developing a formalized process to achieve safeguards by design is to support the global growth of nuclear power while reducing ‘nuclear security’ risks. This paper discusses an institutional approach to the design process for a nuclear facility, for designing proliferation resistance, international safeguards and U.S. national safeguards and security into new nuclear facilities. In the United States, the need exists to develop a simple, concise, formalized, and integrated approach for incorporating international safeguards and other non-proliferation considerations into the facility design process. An effective and efficient design process is one which clearly defines the functional requirements at the beginning of the project and provides for the execution of the project to achieve a reasonable balance among competing objectives in a cost effective manner. Safeguards by Design is defined as “the integration of international and national safeguards, physical security and non-proliferation features as full and equal partners in the design process of a nuclear energy system or facility,” with the objective to achieve facilities that are intrinsically more robust while being less expensive to safeguard and protect. This Safeguards by Design process has been developed such that it: • Provides improved safeguards, security, and stronger proliferation barriers, while reducing the life cycle costs to the operator and regulatory agencies, • Can be translated to any international context as a model for nuclear facility design, • Fosters a culture change to ensure the treatment of ‘nuclear security’ considerations as “full and equal” partners in the design process, • Provides a useful tool for the project manager responsible for the design, construction, and start-up of nuclear facilities, and • Addresses the key integration activities necessary to efficiently incorporate International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards into

  15. Enabling School Structures, Trust, and Collective Efficacy in Private International Schools

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Gray, Julie A.; Summers, Robert

    2016-01-01

    This article explores the role of enabling school structures, collegial trust, and collective efficacy in 15 pre-Kindergarten to 12th grade international, private schools in South and Central America and Mexico. While most of these schools shared an "American" curriculum the local culture and school norms affected the climate of the…

  16. International Professional Learning Communities: The Role of Enabling School Structures, Trust, and Collective Efficacy

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Gray, Julie A.; Summers, Robert

    2015-01-01

    We explored the role of enabling school structures, trust in the principal, collegial trust, and collective efficacy in 15 pre-Kindergarten to 12th grade international, private schools in South and Central America. While the majority of these schools shared an "American" curriculum that was taught predominantly in English, we found that…

  17. International Professional Learning Communities: The Role of Enabling School Structures, Trust, and Collective Efficacy

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Gray, Julie A.; Summers, Robert

    2015-01-01

    We explored the role of enabling school structures, trust in the principal, collegial trust, and collective efficacy in 15 pre-Kindergarten to 12th grade international, private schools in South and Central America. While the majority of these schools shared an "American" curriculum that was taught predominantly in English, we found that…

  18. An improved characterization method for international accountancy measurements of fresh and irradiated mixed oxide (MOX) fuel: helping achieve continual monitoring and safeguards through the fuel cycle

    SciTech Connect

    Evans, Louise G; Croft, Stephen; Swinhoe, Martyn T; Tobin, S. J.; Menlove, H. O.; Schear, M. A.; Worrall, Andrew

    2011-01-13

    Nuclear fuel accountancy measurements are conducted at several points through the nuclear fuel cycle to ensure continuity of knowledge (CofK) of special nuclear material (SNM). Non-destructive assay (NDA) measurements are performed on fresh fuel (prior to irradiation in a reactor) and spent nuclear fuel (SNF) post-irradiation. We have developed a fuel assembly characterization system, based on the novel concept of 'neutron fingerprinting' with multiplicity signatures to ensure detailed CofK of nuclear fuel through the entire fuel cycle. The neutron fingerprint in this case is determined by the measurement of the various correlated neutron signatures, specific to fuel isotopic composition, and therefore offers greater sensitivity to variations in fissile content among fuel assemblies than other techniques such as gross neutron counting. This neutron fingerprint could be measured at the point of fuel dispatch (e.g. from a fuel fabrication plant prior to irradiation, or from a reactor site post-irradiation), monitored during transportation of the fuel assembly, and measured at a subsequent receiving site (e.g. at the reactor site prior to irradiation, or reprocessing facility post-irradiation); this would confirm that no unexpected changes to the fuel composition or amount have taken place during transportation and/ or reactor operations. Changes may indicate an attempt to divert material for example. Here, we present the current state of the practice of fuel measurements for both fresh mixed oxide (MOX) fuel and SNF (both MOX and uranium dioxide). This is presented in the framework of international safeguards perspectives from the US and UK. We also postulate as to how the neutron fingerprinting concept could lead to improved fuel characterization (both fresh MOX and SNF) resulting in: (a) assured CofK of fuel across the nuclear fuel cycle, (b) improved detection of SNM diversion, and (c) greater confidence in safeguards of SNF transportation.

  19. An improved characterization method for international accountancy measurements of fresh and irradiated mixed oxide (MOX) fuel: helping achieve continual monitoring and safeguards through the fuel cycle

    SciTech Connect

    Evans, Louise G; Croft, Stephen; Swinhoe, Martyn T; Tobin, S. J.; Boyer, B. D.; Menlove, H. O.; Schear, M. A.; Worrall, Andrew

    2010-11-24

    Nuclear fuel accountancy measurements are conducted at several points through the nuclear fuel cycle to ensure continuity of knowledge (CofK) of special nuclear material (SNM). Non-destructive assay (NDA) measurements are performed on fresh fuel (prior to irradiation in a reactor) and spent nuclear fuel (SNF) post-irradiation. We have developed a fuel assembly characterization system, based on the novel concept of 'neutron fingerprinting' with multiplicity signatures to ensure detailed CofK of nuclear fuel through the entire fuel cycle. The neutron fingerprint in this case is determined by the measurement of the various correlated neutron signatures, specific to fuel isotopic composition, and therefore offers greater sensitivity to variations in fissile content among fuel assemblies than other techniques such as gross neutron counting. This neutron fingerprint could be measured at the point of fuel dispatch (e.g. from a fuel fabrication plant prior to irradiation, or from a reactor site post-irradiation), monitored during transportation of the fuel assembly, and measured at a subsequent receiving site (e.g. at the reactor site prior to irradiation, or reprocessing facility post-irradiation); this would confirm that no unexpected changes to the fuel composition or amount have taken place during transportation and/or reactor operations. Changes may indicate an attempt to divert material for example. Here, we present the current state of the practice of fuel measurements for both fresh mixed oxide (MOX) fuel and SNF (both MOX and uranium dioxide). This is presented in the framework of international safeguards perspectives from the US and UK. We also postulate as to how the neutron fingerprinting concept could lead to improved fuel characterization (both fresh MOX and SNF) resulting in: (a) assured CofK of fuel across the nuclear fuel cycle, (b) improved detection of SNM diversion, and (c) greater confidence in safeguards of SNF transportation.

  20. IAEA Safeguards: Past, Present, and Future

    SciTech Connect

    Santi, Peter A.; Hypes, Philip A.

    2012-06-14

    This talk will present an overview of the International Atomic Energy Agency with a specific focus on its international safeguards mission and activities. The talk will first present a brief history of the IAEA and discuss its current governing structure. It will then focus on the Safeguards Department and its role in providing assurance that nuclear materials are being used for peaceful purposes. It will then look at how the IAEA is currently evolving the way in which it executes its safeguards mission with a focus on the idea of a state-level approach.

  1. INSTITUTIONALIZING SAFEGUARDS-BY-DESIGN: HIGH-LEVEL FRAMEWORK

    SciTech Connect

    Trond Bjornard PhD; Joseph Alexander; Robert Bean; Brian Castle; Scott DeMuth, Ph.D.; Phillip Durst; Michael Ehinger; Prof. Michael Golay, Ph.D.; Kevin Hase, Ph.D.; David J. Hebditch, DPhil; John Hockert, Ph.D.; Bruce Meppen; James Morgan; Jerry Phillips, Ph.D., PE

    2009-02-01

    The application of a Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process for new nuclear facilities can reduce proliferation risks. A multi-laboratory team was sponsored in Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 to define a SBD process and determine how it could be incorporated into existing facility design and construction processes. The possibility to significantly influence major design features, such as process selection and plant layout, largely ends with the conceptual design step. Therefore SBD’s principal focus must be on the early inclusion of safeguards requirements and the early identification of beneficial design features. The result could help form the basis for a new international norm for integrating safeguards into facility design. This is an interim report describing progress and project status as of the end of FY08. In this effort, SBD is defined as a structured approach to ensure the timely, efficient, and cost-effective integration of international and national safeguards, physical security, and other nonproliferation objectives into the overall design process for a nuclear facility. A key objective is to ensure that security and nonproliferation issues are considered when weighing facility design alternatives. Central to the work completed in FY08 was a study in which a SBD process was developed in the context of the current DOE facility acquisition process. The DOE study enabled the development of a “SBD design loop” that is suitable for use in any facility design process. It is a graded, iterative process that incorporates safeguards concerns throughout the conceptual, preliminary and final design processes. Additionally, a set of proposed design principles for SBD was developed. A “Generic SBD Process” was then developed. Key features of the process include the initiation of safeguards design activities in the pre-conceptual planning phase, early incorporation of safeguards requirements into the project requirements, early appointment of an SBD team, and

  2. Fiscal Year 2014 Annual Report on BNLs Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Human Capital Development Activities

    SciTech Connect

    Pepper, Susan E.

    2014-10-10

    Brookhaven National Laboratory’s (BNL’s) Nonproliferation and National Security Department contributes to the National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Nonproliferation and International Security Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) through university engagement, safeguards internships, safeguards courses, professional development, recruitment, and other activities aimed at ensuring the next generation of international safeguards professionals is adequately prepared to support the U.S. safeguards mission. This report is a summary of BNL s work under the NGSI program in Fiscal Year 2014.

  3. IMPLEMENTING THE SAFEGUARDS-BY-DESIGN PROCESS

    SciTech Connect

    Whitaker, J Michael; McGinnis, Brent; Laughter, Mark D; Morgan, Jim; Bjornard, Trond; Bean, Robert; Durst, Phillip; Hockert, John; DeMuth, Scott; Lockwood, Dunbar

    2010-01-01

    The Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) approach incorporates safeguards into the design and construction of nuclear facilities at the very beginning of the design process. It is a systematic and structured approach for fully integrating international and national safeguards for material control and accountability (MC&A), physical protection, and other proliferation barriers into the design and construction process for nuclear facilities. Implementing SBD is primarily a project management or project coordination challenge. This paper focuses specifically on the design process; the planning, definition, organization, coordination, scheduling and interaction of the safeguards experts and stakeholders as they participate in the design and construction of a nuclear facility. It delineates the steps in a nuclear facility design and construction project in order to provide the project context within which the safeguards design activities take place, describes the involvement of the safeguards experts in the design process, the nature of their analyses, interactions and decisions, and describes the documents created and how they are used. This report highlights the project context of safeguards activities, and identifies the safeguards community (nuclear facility operator, designer/builder, state regulator, SSAC and IAEA) must accomplish in order to implement SBD within the project.

  4. 26 CFR 301.6803-1 - Accounting and safeguarding.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-04-01

    ... 26 Internal Revenue 18 2013-04-01 2013-04-01 false Accounting and safeguarding. 301.6803-1 Section 301.6803-1 Internal Revenue INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY (CONTINUED) PROCEDURE... Accounting and safeguarding. In cases coming within the provisions of section 6802 (2) and (3) and...

  5. 26 CFR 301.6803-1 - Accounting and safeguarding.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-04-01

    ... 26 Internal Revenue 18 2011-04-01 2011-04-01 false Accounting and safeguarding. 301.6803-1 Section 301.6803-1 Internal Revenue INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY (CONTINUED) PROCEDURE... Accounting and safeguarding. In cases coming within the provisions of section 6802 (2) and (3) and...

  6. 26 CFR 301.6803-1 - Accounting and safeguarding.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-04-01

    ... 26 Internal Revenue 18 2014-04-01 2014-04-01 false Accounting and safeguarding. 301.6803-1 Section 301.6803-1 Internal Revenue INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY (CONTINUED) PROCEDURE... Accounting and safeguarding. In cases coming within the provisions of section 6802 (2) and (3) and...

  7. Implementing Safeguards-by-Design

    SciTech Connect

    Trond Bjornard; Robert Bean; Phillip Casey Durst; John Hockert; James Morgan

    2010-02-01

    Executive Summary Excerpt Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) is an approach to the design and construction of nuclear facilities whereby safeguards are designed-in from the very beginning. It is a systematic and structured approach for fully integrating international and national safeguards (MC&A), physical security, and other proliferation barriers into the design and construction process for nuclear facilities. SBD is primarily a project management or project coordination challenge, and this report focuses on that aspect of SBD. The present report continues the work begun in 2008 and focuses specifically on the design process, or project management and coordination - the planning, definition, organization, coordination, scheduling and interaction of activities of the safeguards experts and stakeholders as they participate in the design and construction of a nuclear facility. It delineates the steps in a nuclear facility design and construction project, in order to provide the project context within which the safeguards design activities take place, describes the involvement of safeguards experts in the design process, the nature of their analyses, interactions and decisions, as well as describing the documents created and how they are used. Designing and constructing a nuclear facility is an extremely complex undertaking. The stakeholders in an actual project are many – owner, operator, State regulators, nuclear facility primary contractor, subcontractors (e.g. instrument suppliers), architect engineers, project management team, safeguards, safety and security experts, in addition to the IAEA and its team. The purpose of the present report is to provide a common basis for discussions amongst stakeholders to collaboratively develop a SBD approach that will be both practically useful and mutually beneficial. The principal conclusions from the present study are: • In the short term, the successful implementation of SBD is principally a project management problem.

  8. Safeguards for spent fuels: Verification problems

    SciTech Connect

    Pillay, K.K.S.; Picard, R.R.

    1991-01-01

    The accumulation of large quantities of spent nuclear fuels world-wide is a serious problem for international safeguards. A number of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) member states, including the US, consider spent fuel to be a material form for which safeguards cannot be terminated, even after permanent disposal in a geologic repository. Because safeguards requirements for spent fuels are different from those of conventional bulk-handling and item-accounting facilities, there is room for innovation to design a unique safeguards regime for spent fuels that satisfies the goals of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty at a reasonable cost to both the facility and the IAEA. Various strategies being pursued for long-term management of spent fuels are examined with a realistic example to illustrate the problems of verifying safeguards under the present regime. Verification of a safeguards regime for spent fuels requires a mix of standard safeguards approaches, such as quantitative verification and use of seals, with other measures that are unique to spent fuels. 17 refs.

  9. Total internal reflection fluorescence based multiplane localization microscopy enables super-resolved volume imaging

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Mondal, Partha Pratim; Hess, Samuel T.

    2017-05-01

    Total internal reflection fluorescence (TIRF) based geometry is attractive for super-resolution localization microscopy. Although the traditional TIRF configuration enables near-surface 2D imaging, it is not capable of imaging multiple axial planes. We propose a simultaneous multiplane imaging based localization encoded (SMILE) technique in the TIRF configuration that utilizes point spread function (PSF) information (PSF size, corresponding to single molecules located at the focal plane and off-focal planes, and the detected photons per PSF) to reconstruct a near-surface volume stack. The natural spread of the detection PSFs (far from the specimen-coverslip interface) is used to fix the axial locations of single molecules, and the corresponding photon count determines their localization precision. The proposed SMILE microscopy technique enables super-resolved volume reconstruction based on 2D recorded data.

  10. Safeguards Envelope Progress FY08

    SciTech Connect

    Robert Bean; Richard Metcalf; Aaron Bevill

    2008-09-01

    The Safeguards Envelope Project met its milestones by creating a rudimentary safeguards envelope, proving the value of the approach on a small scale, and determining the most appropriate path forward. The Idaho Chemical Processing Plant’s large cache of reprocessing process monitoring data, dubbed UBER Data, was recovered and used in the analysis. A probabilistic Z test was used on a Markov Monte Carlo simulation of expected diversion data when compared with normal operating data. The data regarding a fully transient event in a tank was used to create a simple requirement, representative of a safeguards envelope, whose impact was a decrease in operating efficiency by 1.3% but an increase in material balance period of 26%. This approach is operator, state, and international safeguards friendly and should be applied to future reprocessing plants. Future requirements include tank-to-tank correlations in reprocessing facilities, detailed operations impact studies, simulation inclusion, automated optimization, advanced statistics analysis, and multi-attribute utility analysis.

  11. Advanced safeguards for the nuclear renaissance

    SciTech Connect

    Miller, Michael C; Menlove, Howard O

    2008-01-01

    The global expansion of nuclear energy provides not only the benefit of carbon-neutral electricity, but also the potential for proliferation concern as well. Nuclear safeguards implemented at the state level (domestic) and at the international level by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are essential for ensuring that nuclear materials are not misused and are thereby a critical component of the increased usage of nuclear energy. In the same way that the 1950's Atoms for Peace initiative provided the foundation for a robust research and development program in nuclear safeguards, the expansion of nuclear energy that is underway today provides the impetus to enter a new era of technical development in the safeguards community. In this paper, we will review the history of nuclear safeguards research and development as well future directions.

  12. A study of a zone approach to IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards: The low-enriched-uranium zone of a light-water-reactor fuel cycle

    SciTech Connect

    Fishbone, L.G.; Higinbotham, W.A.

    1986-06-01

    At present the IAEA designs its safeguards approach with regard to each type of nuclear facility so that the safeguards activities and effort are essentially the same for a given type and size of nuclear facility wherever it may be located. Conclusions regarding a state are derived by combining the conclusions regarding the effectiveness of safeguards for the individual facilities within a state. In this study it was convenient to define three zones in a state with a closed light-water-reactor nuclear fuel cycle. Each zone contains those facilities or parts thereof which use or process nuclear materials of the same safeguards significance: low-enriched uranium, radioactive spent fuel, or recovered plutonium. The possibility that each zone might be treated as an extended material balance area for safeguards purposes is under investigation. The approach includes defining the relevant features of the facilities in the three zones and listing the safeguards activities which are now practiced. This study has focussed on the fresh-fuel zone, the several facilities of which use or process low-enriched uranium. At one extreme, flows and inventories would be verified at each material balance area. At the other extreme, the flows into and out of the zone and the inventory of the whole zone would be verified. There are a number of possible safeguards approaches which fall between the two extremes. The intention is to develop a rational approach which will make it possible to compare the technical effectiveness and the inspection effort for the facility-oriented approach, for the approach involving the zone as a material balance area, and for some reasonable intermediate safeguards approaches.

  13. Panel on protection and management of plutonium: Subpanel on safeguards and security

    SciTech Connect

    Tape, J.W.

    1995-07-01

    Nuclear materials safeguards and security systems are described in the context of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Materials of interest to safeguards, threats, proposals to strengthen International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, evolving safeguards issues and requirements, system effectiveness, and elements of a global nuclear materials management regime are discussed. Safeguards are seen as an essential element of nuclear materials management, but not a driver for decisions regarding nuclear power or the disposal of excess weapon nuclear materials.

  14. Violence: Safeguarding Our Children.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Our Children, 1995

    1995-01-01

    This adaptation of the National Parent Teacher Association (PTA) booklet "Safeguarding Your Children" discusses cooperative efforts of communities, schools, and homes to protect children from violence. (SM)

  15. Building safeguards infrastructure

    SciTech Connect

    Stevens, Rebecca S; Mcclelland - Kerr, John

    2009-01-01

    Much has been written in recent years about the nuclear renaissance - the rebirth of nuclear power as a clean and safe source of electricity around the world. Those who question the nuclear renaissance often cite the risk of proliferation, accidents or an attack on a facility as concerns, all of which merit serious consideration. The integration of these three areas - sometimes referred to as 3S, for safety, security and safeguards - is essential to supporting the growth of nuclear power, and the infrastructure that supports them should be strengthened. The focus of this paper will be on the role safeguards plays in the 3S concept and how to support the development of the infrastructure necessary to support safeguards. The objective of this paper has been to provide a working definition of safeguards infrastructure, and to discuss xamples of how building safeguards infrastructure is presented in several models. The guidelines outlined in the milestones document provide a clear path for establishing both the safeguards and the related infrastructures needed to support the development of nuclear power. The model employed by the INSEP program of engaging with partner states on safeguards-related topics that are of current interest to the level of nuclear development in that state provides another way of approaching the concept of building safeguards infrastructure. The Next Generation Safeguards Initiative is yet another approach that underscored five principal areas for growth, and the United States commitment to working with partners to promote this growth both at home and abroad.

  16. Advanced Safeguards Approaches for New Reprocessing Facilities

    SciTech Connect

    Durst, Philip C.; Therios, Ike; Bean, Robert; Dougan, A.; Boyer, Brian; Wallace, Richard; Ehinger, Michael H.; Kovacic, Don N.; Tolk, K.

    2007-06-24

    U.S. efforts to promote the international expansion of nuclear energy through the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) will result in a dramatic expansion of nuclear fuel cycle facilities in the United States. New demonstration facilities, such as the Advanced Fuel Cycle Facility (AFCF), the Advanced Burner Reactor (ABR), and the Consolidated Fuel Treatment Center (CFTC) will use advanced nuclear and chemical process technologies that must incorporate increased proliferation resistance to enhance nuclear safeguards. The ASA-100 Project, “Advanced Safeguards Approaches for New Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities,” commissioned by the NA-243 Office of NNSA, has been tasked with reviewing and developing advanced safeguards approaches for these demonstration facilities. Because one goal of GNEP is developing and sharing proliferation-resistant nuclear technology and services with partner nations, the safeguards approaches considered are consistent with international safeguards as currently implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This first report reviews possible safeguards approaches for the new fuel reprocessing processes to be deployed at the AFCF and CFTC facilities. Similar analyses addressing the ABR and transuranic (TRU) fuel fabrication lines at AFCF and CFTC will be presented in subsequent reports.

  17. Safeguards and Security progress report, January--December 1989

    SciTech Connect

    Smith, D.B.; Jaramillo, G.R.

    1990-11-01

    From January to December 1989, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Research and Development (R D) program carried out the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Science and Technology Base Development, Basic Systems Design, Onsite Test and Evaluation and Facility Support, and International Safeguards. For the most part, these activities were sponsored by the Department of Energy's Office of Safeguards and Security. Part 1 covers development of the basic technology essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards and security. It includes our computer security R D and the activities of the DOE Center for Computer Security, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this important technology. Part 2 treats activities aimed at developing methods for designing and evaluating safeguards systems, with special emphasis on the integration of the several subsystems into a real safeguards system. Part 3 describes efforts of direct assistance to the DOE and its contractors and includes consultation on materials control and accounting problems, development and demonstration of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and demonstration of advanced safeguards systems. Part 3 also reports a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards that makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Part 5 reports several safeguards-related activities that have sponsors other than the DOE/OSS. 87 refs., 52 figs.

  18. Safeguards effectiveness evaluations in safeguards planning

    SciTech Connect

    Al-Ayat, R.A.

    1987-12-03

    This paper describes analytic tools we developed to quantify the effectiveness of safeguards against theft of special nuclear material by insiders. These tools help identify vulnerabilities in existing safeguards, suggest potential improvements, and help assess the benefits of these upgrades prior to implementation. Alone, these tools are not sufficient for safeguards planning, since the cost of implementing all suggested upgrades almost always exceeds the available resources. This paper describes another tool we developed to allow comparsion of benefits of various upgrades to identify those upgrade packages that achieve the greatest improvement in protection for a given cost and to provide a priority ranking among cost-effective packages, thereby helping decision-makers select the upgrades to implement and highlight the mount of residual risk. 5 refs., 3 figs.

  19. International Cooperation to Enable the Diagnosis of All Rare Genetic Diseases.

    PubMed

    Boycott, Kym M; Rath, Ana; Chong, Jessica X; Hartley, Taila; Alkuraya, Fowzan S; Baynam, Gareth; Brookes, Anthony J; Brudno, Michael; Carracedo, Angel; den Dunnen, Johan T; Dyke, Stephanie O M; Estivill, Xavier; Goldblatt, Jack; Gonthier, Catherine; Groft, Stephen C; Gut, Ivo; Hamosh, Ada; Hieter, Philip; Höhn, Sophie; Hurles, Matthew E; Kaufmann, Petra; Knoppers, Bartha M; Krischer, Jeffrey P; Macek, Milan; Matthijs, Gert; Olry, Annie; Parker, Samantha; Paschall, Justin; Philippakis, Anthony A; Rehm, Heidi L; Robinson, Peter N; Sham, Pak-Chung; Stefanov, Rumen; Taruscio, Domenica; Unni, Divya; Vanstone, Megan R; Zhang, Feng; Brunner, Han; Bamshad, Michael J; Lochmüller, Hanns

    2017-05-04

    Provision of a molecularly confirmed diagnosis in a timely manner for children and adults with rare genetic diseases shortens their "diagnostic odyssey," improves disease management, and fosters genetic counseling with respect to recurrence risks while assuring reproductive choices. In a general clinical genetics setting, the current diagnostic rate is approximately 50%, but for those who do not receive a molecular diagnosis after the initial genetics evaluation, that rate is much lower. Diagnostic success for these more challenging affected individuals depends to a large extent on progress in the discovery of genes associated with, and mechanisms underlying, rare diseases. Thus, continued research is required for moving toward a more complete catalog of disease-related genes and variants. The International Rare Diseases Research Consortium (IRDiRC) was established in 2011 to bring together researchers and organizations invested in rare disease research to develop a means of achieving molecular diagnosis for all rare diseases. Here, we review the current and future bottlenecks to gene discovery and suggest strategies for enabling progress in this regard. Each successful discovery will define potential diagnostic, preventive, and therapeutic opportunities for the corresponding rare disease, enabling precision medicine for this patient population. Copyright © 2017 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

  20. Global biosurveillance: enabling science and technology. Workshop background and motivation: international scientific engagement for global security

    SciTech Connect

    Cui, Helen H

    2011-01-18

    Through discussion the conference aims to: (1) Identify core components of a comprehensive global biosurveillance capability; (2) Determine the scientific and technical bases to support such a program; (3) Explore the improvement in biosurveillance to enhance regional and global disease outbreak prediction; (4) Recommend an engagement approach to establishing an effective international community and regional or global network; (5) Propose implementation strategies and the measures of effectiveness; and (6) Identify the challenges that must be overcome in the next 3-5 years in order to establish an initial global biosurveillance capability that will have significant positive impact on BioNP as well as public health and/or agriculture. There is also a look back at the First Biothreat Nonproliferation Conference from December 2007. Whereas the first conference was an opportunity for problem solving to enhance and identify new paradigms for biothreat nonproliferation, this conference is moving towards integrated comprehensive global biosurveillance. Main reasons for global biosurveillance are: (1) Rapid assessment of unusual disease outbreak; (2) Early warning of emerging, re-emerging and engineered biothreat enabling reduced morbidity and mortality; (3) Enhanced crop and livestock management; (4) Increase understanding of host-pathogen interactions and epidemiology; (5) Enhanced international transparency for infectious disease research supporting BWC goals; and (6) Greater sharing of technology and knowledge to improve global health.

  1. An American Academy for Training Safeguards Inspectors - An Idea Revisited

    SciTech Connect

    Philip Casey Durst; Robert Bean

    2010-07-01

    In 2009, we presented the idea of an American academy for training safeguards inspectors for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), due to the declining percentage of Americans in that international organization. In this paper we assert that there is still a compelling need for this academy. While the American Safeguards Academy would be useful in preparing and pre-training American inspectors for the IAEA, it would also be useful for preparing Americans for domestic safeguards duties in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), U.S. DOE National Laboratories, and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). It is envisioned that such an academy would train graduate and post-graduate university students, DOE National Laboratory interns, and nuclear safeguards professionals in the modern equipment, safeguards measures, and approaches currently used by the IAEA. It is also envisioned that the Academy would involve the domestic nuclear industry, which could provide use of commercial nuclear facilities for tours and demonstrations of the safeguards tools and methods in actual nuclear facilities. This would be in support of the U.S. DOE National Nuclear Security Administration’s Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). This training would also help American nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation professionals better understand the potential limitations of the current tools used by the IAEA and give them a foundation from which to consider even more effective and efficient safeguards measures and approaches.

  2. Overview of the Facility Safeguardability Analysis (FSA) Process

    SciTech Connect

    Bari, Robert A.; Hockert, John; Wonder, Edward F.; Johnson, Shirley J.; Wigeland, Roald; Zentner, Michael D.

    2011-10-10

    The safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) provides the international community with credible assurance that a State is fulfilling its nonproliferation obligations. The IAEA draws such conclusions from the evaluation of all available information. Effective and cost-efficient IAEA safeguards at the facility level are, and will remain, an important element of this “State-level” approach. Efficiently used, the Safeguards by Design (SBD) methodologies , , , now being developed can contribute to effective and cost-efficient facility-level safeguards. The Facility Safeguardability Assessment (FSA) introduced here supports SBD in three areas. 1. It describes necessary interactions between the IAEA, the State regulator, and the owner / designer of a new or modified facility to determine where SBD efforts can be productively applied, 2. It presents a screening approach intended to identify potential safeguard issues for; a) design changes to existing facilities; b) new facilities similar to existing facilities with approved safeguards approaches, and c) new designs, 3. It identifies resources (the FSA toolkit), such as good practice guides, design guidance, and safeguardability evaluation methods that can be used by the owner/designer to develop solutions for potential safeguards issues during the interactions with the State regulator and IAEA. FSA presents a structured framework for the application of the SBD tools developed in other efforts. The more a design evolves, the greater the probability that new safeguards issues could be introduced. Likewise, for first-of-a-kind facilities or research facilities that involve previously unused processes or technologies, it is reasonable to expect that a number of possible safeguards issues might exist. Accordingly, FSA is intended to help the designer and its safeguards experts identify early in the design process: • Areas where elements of previous accepted safeguards approach(es) may be applied

  3. FUTURE SAFEGUARDS EFFECTIVENESS: CONCEPTS AND ISSUES

    SciTech Connect

    K. W. BUDLONG-SYLVESTER; J. F. PILAT

    2000-09-01

    With new safeguards measures (under old and new authority) now available to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), there will be fundamental changes in the manner IAEA safeguards are implemented, raising questions about their effectiveness in meeting expanded Agency safeguards objectives. In order to characterize the capability of various safeguards approaches in meeting their objectives, it will be necessary to fully understand what is involved in the new safeguards equation. Both old and new measures will be required to construct a comprehensive picture of a State's nuclear activities and capabilities, and they both have strengths and weaknesses. There are (for political and cost reasons) likely to be tradeoffs between the two types of measures. Significant differences among measures with respect to the probability of their detecting an anomaly, along with other characteristics, need be considered in this context. Given the important role of both types of measures in future approaches, their inherent differences with regard to their capabilities and limitations, and their potential impact on the credibility of safeguards, it will be essential to consider these measures systematically, independently, and in combination in any effectiveness evaluation. This paper will consider concepts and issues in addressing this need.

  4. AFCI Safeguards Enhancement Study: Technology Development Roadmap

    SciTech Connect

    Smith, Leon E.; Dougan, A.; Tobin, Stephen; Cipiti, B.; Ehinger, Michael H.; Bakel, A. J.; Bean, Robert; Grate, Jay W.; Santi, P.; Bryan, Steven; Kinlaw, M. T.; Schwantes, Jon M.; Burr, Tom; Lehn, Scott A.; Tolk, K.; Chichester, David; Menlove, H.; Vo, D.; Duckworth, Douglas C.; Merkle, P.; Wang, T. F.; Duran, F.; Nakae, L.; Warren, Glen A.; Friedrich, S.; Rabin, M.

    2008-12-31

    The Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI) Safeguards Campaign aims to develop safeguards technologies and processes that will significantly reduce the risk of proliferation in the U.S. nuclear fuel cycle of tomorrow. The Safeguards Enhancement Study was chartered with identifying promising research and development (R&D) directions over timescales both near-term and long-term, and under safeguards oversight both domestic and international. This technology development roadmap documents recognized gaps and needs in the safeguarding of nuclear fuel cycles, and outlines corresponding performance targets for each of those needs. Drawing on the collective expertise of technologists and user-representatives, a list of over 30 technologies that have the potential to meet those needs was developed, along with brief summaries of each candidate technology. Each summary describes the potential impact of that technology, key research questions to be addressed, and prospective development milestones that could lead to a definitive viability or performance assessment. Important programmatic linkages between U.S. agencies and offices are also described, reflecting the emergence of several safeguards R&D programs in the U.S. and the reinvigoration of nuclear fuel cycles across the globe.

  5. Remote monitoring: A global partnership for safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Bardsley, J.

    1996-08-01

    With increased awareness of the significant changes of the past several years and their effect on the expectations to international safeguards, it is necessary to reflect on the direction for development of nuclear safeguards in a new era and the resulting implications. The time proven monitoring techniques, based on quantitative factors and demonstrated universal application, have shown their merit. However, the new expectations suggest a possibility that a future IAEA safeguards system could rely more heavily on the value of a comprehensive, transparent, and open implementation regime. With the establishment of such a regime, it is highly likely that remote monitoring will play a significant role. Several states have seen value in cooperating with each other to address the many problems associated with the remote interrogation of integrated monitoring systems. As a consequence the International Remote Monitoring Project was organized to examine the future of remote monitoring in International Safeguards. This paper provides an update on the technical issues, the future plans, and the safeguards implications of cooperative programs relating to remote monitoring. Without providing answers to the policy questions involved, it suggests that it is timely to begin addressing these issues.

  6. Strengthening regional safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Palhares, L.; Almeida, G.; Mafra, O.

    1996-08-01

    Nuclear cooperation between Argentina and Brazil has been growing since the early 1980`s and as it grew, so did cooperation with the US Department of Energy (DOE). The Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) was formed in December 1991 to operate the Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC). In April 1994, ABACC and the DOE signed an Agreement of Cooperation in nuclear material safeguards. This cooperation has included training safeguards inspectors, exchanging nuclear material measurement and containment and surveillance technology, characterizing reference materials, and studying enrichment plant safeguards. The goal of the collaboration is to exchange technology, evaluate new technology in Latin American nuclear facilities, and strengthen regional safeguards. This paper describes the history of the cooperation, its recent activities, and future projects. The cooperation is strongly supported by all three governments: the Republics of Argentina and Brazil and the United States.

  7. Beyond Human Capital Development: Balanced Safeguards Workforce Metrics and the Next Generation Safeguards Workforce

    SciTech Connect

    Burbank, Roberta L.; Frazar, Sarah L.; Gitau, Ernest TN; Shergur, Jason M.; Scholz, Melissa A.; Undem, Halvor A.

    2014-03-28

    Since its establishment in 2008, the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) has achieved a number of objectives under its five pillars: concepts and approaches, policy development and outreach, international nuclear safeguards engagement, technology development, and human capital development (HCD). As a result of these efforts, safeguards has become much more visible as a critical U.S. national security interest across the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) complex. However, limited budgets have since created challenges in a number of areas. Arguably, one of the more serious challenges involves NGSI’s ability to integrate entry-level staff into safeguards projects. Laissez fair management of this issue across the complex can lead to wasteful project implementation and endanger NGSI’s long-term sustainability. The authors provide a quantitative analysis of this problem, focusing on the demographics of the current safeguards workforce and compounding pressures to operate cost-effectively, transfer knowledge to the next generation of safeguards professionals, and sustain NGSI safeguards investments.

  8. Changing Landscapes in Safeguarding Babies and Young Children in England

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Lumsden, Eunice

    2014-01-01

    The importance of safeguarding children from violence is internationally recognised. However, detecting, intervening and protecting children from abuse both within the family and in institutions is complex. This paper specifically focuses on safeguarding in England and how workforce reform in the early years offers the opportunity to forge new…

  9. The Role of School Psychologists in Child Protection and Safeguarding

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Woods, Kevin; Bond, Caroline; Tyldesley, Kath; Farrell, Peter; Humphrey, Neil

    2011-01-01

    Child protection and safeguarding are important aspects of work for all professionals working with children. The current article outlines the international context of school psychologists' work in relation to child protection and safeguarding and describes the United Kingdom context in more detail. Given the relatively recent broadening of the UK…

  10. The Role of School Psychologists in Child Protection and Safeguarding

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Woods, Kevin; Bond, Caroline; Tyldesley, Kath; Farrell, Peter; Humphrey, Neil

    2011-01-01

    Child protection and safeguarding are important aspects of work for all professionals working with children. The current article outlines the international context of school psychologists' work in relation to child protection and safeguarding and describes the United Kingdom context in more detail. Given the relatively recent broadening of the UK…

  11. Training in Environmental Analyses for Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Williams, R W; Gaffney, A M; Hutcheon, N A; Kersting, A B

    2009-05-28

    Responding to recommendations of the DOE/NNSA's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative, a new course, Training in Environmental Sample Analysis for IAEA Safeguards, is being offered as a summer internship opportunity at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. The first students completed the 8 week program during the summer of 2008. Interns are given training in the analysis of bulk environmental samples for safeguards through hands-on experience working in a clean laboratory, purifying U and Pu from bulk environmental samples, and measuring U and Pu isotope ratios by multi-collector ICP mass spectrometry. A series of lectures by invited safeguards and non-proliferation experts gives the students a broad picture of the safeguards work of the IAEA. At the end of the course, the students prepare a poster of their work to showcase at LLNL's summer student poster symposium. Both undergraduate and graduate students are recruited and hired as paid interns under the aegis of the Glenn T. Seaborg Institute in the Physical and Life Sciences Directorate at LLNL. This training course seeks to introduce students to analytical and interpretive skill-sets that are not generally taught at universities, and to encourage them to pursue careers with the IAEA.

  12. Combining Measurements with Three-Dimensional Laser Scanning System and Coded Aperture Gamma-Ray Imaging Systems for International Safeguards Applications

    SciTech Connect

    Boehnen, Chris Bensing; Bogard, James S; Hayward, Jason P; Raffo-Caiado, Ana Claudia; Smith, Stephen E; Ziock, Klaus-Peter

    2010-01-01

    Being able to verify the operator's declaration in regards to technical design of nuclear facilities is an important aspect of every safeguards approach. In addition to visual observation, it is relevant to know if nuclear material is present or has been present in piping and ducts not declared. The possibility of combining different measurement techniques into one tool should optimize the inspection effort and increase safeguards effectiveness. Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is engaged in a technical collaboration project involving two U.S. Department of Energy foreign partners to investigate combining measurements from a three-dimensional (3D) laser scanning system and gamma-ray imaging systems. ORNL conducted simultaneous measurements with a coded-aperture gamma-ray imager and the 3D laser scanner in an operational facility with complex configuration and different enrichment levels and quantities of uranium. This paper describes these measurements and their results.

  13. Combining Measurements with Three-Dimensional Laser Scanning System and Coded Aperture Gamma-Ray Imaging System for International Safeguards Applications

    SciTech Connect

    Boehnen, Chris Bensing; Bogard, James S; Hayward, Jason P; Raffo-Caiado, Ana Claudia; Smith, Steven E; Ziock, Klaus-Peter

    2010-01-01

    Being able to verify the operator's declaration in regard to the technical design of nuclear facilities is an important aspect of every safeguards approach. In addition to visual observation, it is necessary to know if nuclear material is present or has been present in undeclared piping and ducts. The possibility of combining the results from different measurement techniques into one easily interpreted product should optimize the inspection effort and increase safeguards effectiveness. A collaborative effort to investigate the possibility of combining measurements from a three-dimensional (3D) laser scanning system and gamma-ray imaging systems is under way. The feasibility of the concept has been previously proven with different laboratory prototypes of gamma-ray imaging systems. Recently, simultaneous measurements were conducted with a new highly portable, mechanically cooled, High Purity Germanium (HPGe), coded-aperture gamma-ray imager and a 3D laser scanner in an operational facility with complex configuration and different enrichment levels and quantities of uranium. With specially designed software, data from both instruments were combined and a 3D model of the facility was generated that also identified locations of radioactive sources. This paper provides an overview of the technology, describes the measurements, discusses the various safeguards scenarios addressed, and presents results of experiments.

  14. Oak Ridge National Laboratory Next Generation Safeguards Initiative

    SciTech Connect

    Kirk, Bernadette Lugue; Eipeldauer, Mary D; Whitaker, J Michael

    2011-12-01

    In 2007, the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24) completed a comprehensive review of the current and potential future challenges facing the international safeguards system. The review examined trends and events impacting the mission of international safeguards and the implications of expanding and evolving mission requirements on the legal authorities and institutions that serve as the foundation of the international safeguards system, as well as the technological, financial, and human resources required for effective safeguards implementation. The review's findings and recommendations were summarized in the report, 'International Safeguards: Challenges and Opportunities for the 21st Century (October 2007)'. One of the report's key recommendations was for DOE/NNSA to launch a major new program to revitalize the international safeguards technology and human resource base. In 2007, at the International Atomic Energy Agency's General Conference, then Secretary of Energy Samuel W. Bodman announced the newly created Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). NGSI consists of five program elements: (1) Policy development and outreach; (2) Concepts and approaches; (3) Technology and analytical methodologies; (4) Human resource development; and (5) Infrastructure development. The ensuing report addresses the 'Human Resource Development (HRD)' component of NGSI. The goal of the HRD as defined in the NNSA Program Plan (November 2008) is 'to revitalize and expand the international safeguards human capital base by attracting and training a new generation of talent.' One of the major objectives listed in the HRD goal includes education and training, outreach to universities, professional societies, postdoctoral appointments, and summer internships at national laboratories. ORNL is a participant in the NGSI program, together with several DOE laboratories such as Pacific

  15. 1996 initiatives under the CNEN/DOE safeguards cooperation agreement

    SciTech Connect

    Vinhas, L.; Iskin, M.C.L.; Almeida, S.G. de; Dupree, S.; Reilly, D.; Smith, C.; Whitaker, J.M.

    1996-12-31

    In September 1995, the US Department of Energy (DOE) and the Brazilian Comissao Nacional de Energia Nuclear (CNEN) signed an agreement on methods and technologies for safeguards applications. This agreement provides for cooperation in the areas of nuclear material control, accountancy, verification, physical protection, and advanced containment and surveillance technologies for international safeguards applications. CNEN is responsible for managing nuclear facilities and institutions in Brazil and is responsible for coordinating international safeguards as applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC). Following the ratification of the Quadripartite Agreement among Argentina, Brazil, ABACC, and IAEA in March 1994, all nuclear materials in all nuclear activities in Brazil became subject to comprehensive safeguards. Collaboration between CNEN and DOE in 1996 is focusing on: (1) the use of a GRAND FORK detector at the Angra Nuclear Power Station, (2) a remote monitoring field trial, (3) workshops on environmental monitoring and analysis as a safeguards application, (4) developing and studying methods and techniques for applying safeguards at enrichment plants, and (5) support of CNEN`s safeguards analytical laboratory. This paper will describe each of the aforementioned safeguards cooperation activities.

  16. Safeguards and security status report, August 1981-January 1982

    SciTech Connect

    Shipley, J.P.

    1982-09-01

    From August 1981 through January 1982, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in many activities that are described in the four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Safeguards Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Support. Part 1 covers those efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensee facilities. This assistance varies from consultation on materials accounting problems, through development of specialized techniques and devices, to comprehensive participation in the design and implementation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards helps make the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 concerns a relatively new set of activities at Los Alamos aimed at the security of information and computer systems. The focus this period has been on furthering the development of the Computer Security Center, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating the emerging technology. Part 3 describes the development efforts that are essential to continued improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, in every case they are directed ultimately at recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. In addition, enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gaseous Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer.

  17. Safeguards and security research and development progress report, October 1993--September 1994

    SciTech Connect

    Smith, D.B.; Jaramillo, G.R.

    1995-08-01

    This report describes the activities carried out by the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Research and Development (R&D) program from October 1993 through September 1994. The activities presented in the first part of the report were directed primarily to domestic US safeguards applications and were, for the most part, sponsored by the Department of Energy`s Office of Safeguards and Security (DOE/OSS, NN-50). The activities described in Part 2, International Safeguards, were supported by the International Safeguards Division of the Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation (DOE/OACN, NN-40). Part 3 describes several safeguards or safeguards-related activities that have other sponsors. The final part of the report lists titles and abstracts of Los Alamos safeguards R&D reports, technical journal articles, and conference papers that were published or presented in 1994.

  18. Safeguardability of the vitrification option for disposal of plutonium

    SciTech Connect

    Pillay, K.K.S.

    1996-05-01

    Safeguardability of the vitrification option for plutonium disposition is rather complex and there is no experience base in either domestic or international safeguards for this approach. In the present treaty regime between the US and the states of the former Soviet Union, bilaterial verifications are considered more likely with potential for a third-party verification of safeguards. There are serious technological limitations to applying conventional bulk handling facility safeguards techniques to achieve independent verification of plutonium in borosilicate glass. If vitrification is the final disposition option chosen, maintaining continuity of knowledge of plutonium in glass matrices, especially those containing boron and those spike with high-level wastes or {sup 137}Cs, is beyond the capability of present-day safeguards technologies and nondestructive assay techniques. The alternative to quantitative measurement of fissile content is to maintain continuity of knowledge through a combination of containment and surveillance, which is not the international norm for bulk handling facilities.

  19. Improving the Safeguardability of Nuclear Facilities

    SciTech Connect

    T. Bjornard; R. Bari; D. Hebditch; P. Peterson; M. Schanfein

    2009-07-01

    The application of a Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process for new nuclear facilities has the potential to reduce security risks and proliferation hazards while improving the synergy of major design features and raising operational efficiency, in a world where significant expansion of nuclear energy use may occur. Correspondingly, the U.S. DOE’s Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) includes objectives to contribute to international efforts to develop SBD, and to apply SBD in the development of new U.S. nuclear infrastructure. Here, SBD is defined as a structured approach to ensure the timely, efficient and cost effective integration of international safeguards and other nonproliferation barriers with national material control and accountability, physical protection, and safety objectives into the overall design process for a nuclear facility, from initial planning through design, construction and operation. The SBD process, in its simplest form, may be applied usefully today within most national regulatory environments. Development of a mature approach to implementing SBD requires work in the areas of requirements definition, design processes, technology and methodology, and institutionalization. The U.S. efforts described in this paper are supportive of SBD work for international safeguards that has recently been initiated by the IAEA with the participation of many stakeholders including member States, the IAEA, nuclear technology suppliers, nuclear utilities, and the broader international nonproliferation community.

  20. Applications of Virtual Reality to Nuclear Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Stansfield, S.

    1998-11-03

    This paper explores two potential applications of Virtual Reality (VR) to international nuclear safeguards: training and information organization and navigation. The applications are represented by two existing prototype systems, one for training nuclear weapons dismantlement and one utilizing a VR model to facilitate intuitive access to related sets of information.

  1. Nuclear safeguards research and development. Program status report, October 1980-January 1981

    SciTech Connect

    Henry, C.N.

    1981-11-01

    This report presents the status of the Nuclear Safeguards Research and Development Program pursued by the Energy, Chemistry-Materials Science, and Operational Security/Safeguards Divisions of the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Topics include nondestructive assay technology development and applications, international safeguards systems. Also discussed are training courses, technology transfer, analytical chemistry methods for fissionable materials safeguards, the Department of Energy Computer Security Technical Center, and operational security.

  2. Reactor monitoring and safeguards using antineutrino detectors

    SciTech Connect

    Bowden, N S

    2008-09-07

    Nuclear reactors have served as the antineutrino source for many fundamental physics experiments. The techniques developed by these experiments make it possible to use these very weakly interacting particles for a practical purpose. The large flux of antineutrinos that leaves a reactor carries information about two quantities of interest for safeguards: the reactor power and fissile inventory. Measurements made with antineutrino detectors could therefore offer an alternative means for verifying the power history and fissile inventory of a reactors, as part of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other reactor safeguards regimes. Several efforts to develop this monitoring technique are underway across the globe.

  3. University-Based Enabling Program Outcomes: Comparing Distance Education and Internal Study

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Bookallil, Cheryl; Rolfe, John

    2016-01-01

    Enrolment in university enabling programs has expanded dramatically in the last decade as universities strive to increase enrolments, particularly of students from low socioeconomic backgrounds. Offering enabling study by distance education has been part of this expansion with the benefit of providing access to a wider enrolment base. The purpose…

  4. Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1985

    SciTech Connect

    Not Available

    1987-03-01

    From January to December 1985, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Safeguards Operations, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Support. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development and demonstration of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and evaluation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this period was on continuing the activities of the Center for Computer Security, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards and international safeguards for reprocessing plants required a significant portion of our resources. All of these efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in our benefiting from field experiences in operating environments.

  5. Safeguards management inspection procedures

    SciTech Connect

    Barth, M.J.; Dunn, D.R.

    1984-08-01

    The objective of this inspection module is to independently assess the contributions of licensee management to overall safeguards systems performance. The inspector accomplishes this objective by comparing the licensee's safeguards management to both the 10 CFR, parts 70 and 73, requirements and to generally accepted management practices. The vehicle by which this comparison is to be made consists of assessment questions and key issues which point the inspector to areas of primary concern to the NRC and which raise additional issues for the purpose of exposing management ineffectiveness. Further insight into management effectiveness is obtained through those assessment questions specifically directed toward the licensee's safeguards system performance. If the quality of the safeguards is poor, then the inspector should strongly suspect that management's role is ineffective and should attempt to determine management's influence (or lack thereof) on the underlying safeguards deficiencies. (The converse is not necessarily true, however.) The assessment questions in essence provide an opportunity for the inspector to identify, to single out, and to probe further, questionable management practices. Specific issues, circumstances, and concerns which point to questionable or inappropriate practices should be explicitly identified and referenced against the CFR and the assessment questions. The inspection report should also explain why the inspector feels certain management practices are poor, counter to the CFR, and/or point to ineffecive management. Concurrent with documenting the inspection results, the inspector should provide recommendations for alleviating observed management practices that are detrimental to effective safeguards. The recommendations could include: specific changes in the practices of the licensee, followup procedures on the part of NRC, and proposed license changes.

  6. Application of Framework for Integrating Safety, Security and Safeguards (3Ss) into the Design Of Used Nuclear Fuel Storage Facility

    SciTech Connect

    Badwan, Faris M.; Demuth, Scott F

    2015-01-06

    Department of Energy’s Office of Nuclear Energy, Fuel Cycle Research and Development develops options to the current commercial fuel cycle management strategy to enable the safe, secure, economic, and sustainable expansion of nuclear energy while minimizing proliferation risks by conducting research and development focused on used nuclear fuel recycling and waste management to meet U.S. needs. Used nuclear fuel is currently stored onsite in either wet pools or in dry storage systems, with disposal envisioned in interim storage facility and, ultimately, in a deep-mined geologic repository. The safe management and disposition of used nuclear fuel and/or nuclear waste is a fundamental aspect of any nuclear fuel cycle. Integrating safety, security, and safeguards (3Ss) fully in the early stages of the design process for a new nuclear facility has the potential to effectively minimize safety, proliferation, and security risks. The 3Ss integration framework could become the new national and international norm and the standard process for designing future nuclear facilities. The purpose of this report is to develop a framework for integrating the safety, security and safeguards concept into the design of Used Nuclear Fuel Storage Facility (UNFSF). The primary focus is on integration of safeguards and security into the UNFSF based on the existing Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approach to addressing the safety/security interface (10 CFR 73.58 and Regulatory Guide 5.73) for nuclear power plants. The methodology used for adaptation of the NRC safety/security interface will be used as the basis for development of the safeguards /security interface and later will be used as the basis for development of safety and safeguards interface. Then this will complete the integration cycle of safety, security, and safeguards. The overall methodology for integration of 3Ss will be proposed, but only the integration of safeguards and security will be applied to the design of the

  7. Designing and Operating for Safeguards: Lessons Learned From the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP)

    SciTech Connect

    Johnson, Shirley J.; Ehinger, Michael

    2010-08-07

    This paper will address the lessons learned during the implementation of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP) which are relevant to the issue of ‘safeguards by design’. However, those lessons are a result of a cumulative history of international safeguards experiences starting with the West Valley reprocessing plant in 1969, continuing with the Barnwell plant, and then with the implementation of international safeguards at WAK in Germany and TRP in Japan. The design and implementation of safeguards at RRP in Japan is the latest and most challenging that the IAEA has faced. This paper will discuss the work leading up to the development of a safeguards approach, the design and operating features that were introduced to improve or aid in implementing the safeguards approach, and the resulting recommendations for future facilities. It will provide an overview of how ‘safeguardability’ was introduced into RRP.

  8. NEAMS safeguards and separations

    SciTech Connect

    Sadasivan, Pratap; De Paoli, David W

    2011-01-25

    This presentation provides a program management update on the Safeguards and Separations Integrated Performance and Safety Code (IPSC) program in the DOE Nuclear Energy Advanced Modeling and Simulation (NEAMS). It provides an overview of FY11 work packages at multiple DOE Labs and includes material on challenge problem definitions for the IPSC effort.

  9. Enabling Tools and Methods for International, Inter-disciplinary and Educational Collaboration

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Robinson, E. M.; Hoijarvi, K.; Falke, S.; Fialkowski, E.; Kieffer, M.; Husar, R. B.

    2008-05-01

    In the past, collaboration has taken place in tightly-knit workgroups where the members had direct connections to each other. Such collaboration was confined to small workgroups and person-to-person communication. Recent developments through the Internet foster virtual workgroups and organizations where dynamic, 'just-in-time' collaboration can take place over a much larger scale. The emergence of virtual workgroups has strongly influenced the interaction of inter-national, inter-disciplinary, as well as educational activities. In this paper we present an array of enabling tools and methods that incorporate the new technologies including web services, software mashups, tag-based structuring and searching, and wikis for collaborative writing and content organization. Large monolithic, 'do-it-all' software tools are giving way to web service modules, combined through service chaining. Application software can now be created using Service Oriented Architecture (SOA). In the air quality community, data providers and users are distributed in space and time creating barriers for data access. By exposing the data on the internet the space, time barriers are lessened. The federated data system, DataFed, developed at Washington University, accesses data from autonomous, distributed providers. Through data "wrappers", DataFed provides uniform and standards-based access services to heterogeneous, distributed data. Service orientation not only lowers the entry resistance for service providers, but it also allows the creation of user-defined applications and/or mashups. For example, Google Earth's open API allowed many groups to mash their content with Google Earth. Ad hoc tagging gives a rich description of the internet resources, but it has the disadvantage of providing a fuzzy schema. The semantic uniformity of the internet resources can be improved by controlled tagging which apply a consistent namespace and tag combinations to diverse objects. One example of this is the

  10. The future of IAEA safeguards: challenges and responses

    SciTech Connect

    Pilat, Joseph F; Budlong - Sylvester, Kory W

    2011-01-01

    For nearly two decades, the International Atomic Energy Agency (lAEA) has been transforming its safeguards system to address the challenges posed by undeclared nuclear programs, the associated revelation of an extensive non-State nuclear procurement network and other issues, including past limits to its verification mandate and the burden of noncompliance issues. Implementing the new measures, including those in the Additional Protocol, and integrating new and old safeguards measures, remains a work in progress. Implementation is complicated by factors including the limited teclmological tools that are available to address such issues as safeguarding bulk handling facilities, detection of undeclared facilities/activities, especially related to enrichment, etc. As this process continues, new challenges are arising, including the demands of expanding nuclear power production worldwide, so-called safeguards by design for a new generation of facilities, the possible IAEA role in a fissile material cutoff treaty and other elements of the arms control and disarmament agenda, the possible role in 'rollback' cases, etc. There is no doubt safeguards will need to evolve in the future, as they have over the last decades. In order for the evolutionary path to proceed, there will inter alia be a need to identify technological gaps, especially with respect to undeclared facilities, and ensure they are filled by adapting old safeguards technologies, by developing and introducing new and novel safeguards teclmologies and/or by developing new procedures and protocols. Safeguards will also need to respond to anticipated emerging threats and to future, unanticipated threats. This will require strategic planning and cooperation among Member States and with the Agency. This paper will address challenges to IAEA safeguards and the technological possibilities and R&D strategies needed to meet those challenges in the context of the forty-year evolution of safeguards, including the ongoing

  11. Enabling Quantitative Analysis in Ambient Ionization Mass Spectrometry: Internal Standard Coated Capillary Samplers

    PubMed Central

    Liu, Jiangjiang; Cooks, R. Graham; Ouyang, Zheng

    2013-01-01

    We describe a sampling method using glass capillaries for quantitative analysis of trace analytes in small volumes of complex mixtures (~1 μL) using ambient ionization mass spectrometry. The internal surface of a sampling glass capillary was coated with internal standard then used to draw liquid sample and so transfer both the analyte and internal standard in a single fixed volume onto a substrate for analysis. The internal standard was automatically mixed into the sample during this process and the volumes of the internal standard solution and sample are both fixed by the capillary volume. Precision in quantitation is insensitive to variations in length of the capillary, making the preparation of the sampling capillary simple and providing a robust sampling protocol. Significant improvements in quantitation accuracy were obtained for analysis of 1 μL samples using various ambient ionization methods. PMID:23731380

  12. Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1984

    SciTech Connect

    Smith, D.B.

    1986-01-01

    From January to December 1984, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Safeguards. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensee facilities. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. was Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in benefiting from field experiences in operating environments.

  13. The evolution of information-driven safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Budlong-sylvester, Kory W; Pilat, Joseph F

    2010-10-14

    From the adoption of the Model Additional Protocol and integrated safeguards in the 1990s, to current International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) efforts to deal with cases of noncompliance, the question of how the Agency can best utilize all the information available to it remains of great interest and increasing importance. How might the concept of 'information-driven' safeguards (IDS) evolve in the future? The ability of the Agency to identify and resolve anomalies has always been important and has emerged as a core Agency function in recent years as the IAEA has had to deal with noncompliance in Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). Future IAEA safeguards implementation should be designed with the goal of facilitating and enhancing this vital capability. In addition, the Agency should utilize all the information it possesses, including its in-house assessments and expertise, to direct its safeguards activities. At the State level, knowledge of proliferation possibilities is currently being used to guide the analytical activities of the Agency and to develop inspection plans. How far can this approach be extended? Does it apply across State boundaries? Should it dictate a larger fraction of safeguards activities? Future developments in IDS should utilize the knowledge resident within the Agency to ensure that safeguards resources flow to where they are most needed in order to address anomalies first and foremost, but also to provide greater confidence in conclusions regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear activities. The elements of such a system and related implementation issues are assessed in this paper.

  14. Safeguards-By-Design: Guidance and Tools for Stakeholders

    SciTech Connect

    Mark Schanfein; Shirley Johnson

    2012-02-01

    Effective implementation of the Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) approach can help meet the challenges of global nuclear energy growth, by designing facilities that have improved safeguardability and reduced safeguards-related life cycle costs. The ultimate goal of SBD is to implement effective and efficient safeguards that reduce the burden to both the facility operator and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Since 2008, the National Nuclear Security Administration's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative's Safeguards By Design Project has initiated multiple studies and workshops with industry and regulatory stakeholders, including the IAEA, to develop relevant documents to support the implementation of SBD. These 'Good Practices Guides' describe facility and process design features that will facilitate implementation of effective nuclear material safeguards starting in the earliest phases of design through to final design. These guides, which are in their final editorial stages, start at a high level and then narrow down to specific nuclear fuel cycle facilities such as Light Water Reactors, Generation III/IV Reactors, High Temperature Gas Cooled Reactors, and Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants. Most recently, NGSI has begun development of a facility safeguardability assessment toolkit to assist the designer. This paper will review the current status of these efforts, provide some examples of these documents, and show some standard IAEA Unattended Instrumentation that is permanently installed in nuclear facilities for monitoring.

  15. Sustaining International CBRN Centers of Excellence with a Focus on Nuclear Security and Safeguards: Initial Scoping Session London, 23-24 September 2013 SUMMARY REPORT

    SciTech Connect

    Anderson, Roger G.; Frazar, Sarah L.

    2013-12-12

    This report provides a summary-level description of the key information, observations, ideas, and recommendations expressed during the subject meeting. The report is organized to correspond to the meeting agenda provided in Appendix 1 and includes references to several of the participants listed in Appendix 2 .The meeting venue was Lloyd’s Register in the City of London. Lloyd’s Register graciously accommodated the request of The Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNNL) with whom it works on various safeguards activities commissioned by NNSA. PNNL and NNSA also shared the goal of the meeting/study with the United Kingdom (UK) Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Department of Energy and Climate Change with whom they coordinated the participant list.

  16. The U.S. Support Program to IAEA Safeguards - How It Works

    SciTech Connect

    Nock,C.; Hoffheins,B.

    2008-07-13

    The U.S. Support Program to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards (USSP) was established in 1977 to transfer US technology and expertise to assist the IAEA Department of Safeguards because its limited budget and scope would not allow for R&D activities and the procurement of specialized or customized equipment. Over the years, the USSP and the Department of Safeguards have worked together continuously to develop and improve processes for requesting, selecting, and managing projects that support the Safeguards verification mission. This paper will discuss the main USSP processes for accepting and processing Safeguards requests, and managing and reporting task progress.

  17. Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1983

    SciTech Connect

    Smith, D.B.

    1984-09-01

    From January to December 1983, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Safeguards. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and implementation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this peiod was on continuing the activities of the Computer Security Center, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in our benefiting from field experiences in operating environments.

  18. Sweden's International Training Programme in Education for Sustainable Development Enables Students to Change Institutions

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Taylor, Jim; Neeser, Marie

    2012-01-01

    The Swedish International Training Programme in Education for Sustainable Development, which has been run annually for the past 10 years, is a five-phase program that supports participants to develop and implement a change project in their work places. It requires a team of students from an institution and provides extensive follow up. The course…

  19. Safeguards-by-Design: Early Integration of Physical Protection and Safeguardability into Design of Nuclear Facilities

    SciTech Connect

    T. Bjornard; R. Bean; S. DeMuth; P. Durst; M. Ehinger; M. Golay; D. Hebditch; J. Hockert; J. Morgan

    2009-09-01

    The application of a Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process for new nuclear facilities has the potential to minimize proliferation and security risks as the use of nuclear energy expands worldwide. This paper defines a generic SBD process and its incorporation from early design phases into existing design / construction processes and develops a framework that can guide its institutionalization. SBD could be a basis for a new international norm and standard process for nuclear facility design. This work is part of the U.S. DOE’s Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), and is jointly sponsored by the Offices of Non-proliferation and Nuclear Energy.

  20. Synchronized excitability in a network enables generation of internal neuronal sequences

    PubMed Central

    Wang, Yingxue; Roth, Zachary; Pastalkova, Eva

    2016-01-01

    Hippocampal place field sequences are supported by sensory cues and network internal mechanisms. In contrast, sharp-wave (SPW) sequences, theta sequences, and episode field sequences are internally generated. The relationship of these sequences to memory is unclear. SPW sequences have been shown to support learning and have been assumed to also support episodic memory. Conversely, we demonstrate these SPW sequences were present in trained rats even after episodic memory was impaired and after other internal sequences – episode field and theta sequences – were eliminated. SPW sequences did not support memory despite continuing to ‘replay’ all task-related sequences – place- field and episode field sequences. Sequence replay occurred selectively during synchronous increases of population excitability -- SPWs. Similarly, theta sequences depended on the presence of repeated synchronized waves of excitability – theta oscillations. Thus, we suggest that either intermittent or rhythmic synchronized changes of excitability trigger sequential firing of neurons, which in turn supports learning and/or memory. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.7554/eLife.20697.001 PMID:27677848

  1. Next generation safeguards initiative (NGSI) program plan for safeguards by design

    SciTech Connect

    Demuth, Scott F; Budlong - Sylvester, Kory; Lockwood, Dunbar

    2010-01-01

    Safeguards by Design (SBD) is defined as the incorporation of safeguards features early in the design phase of a new nuclear facility in order to avoid the need to redesign the facility at a later date, or retrofit the completed facility. Not only can SBD avoid the need for redesign or retrofit, but consideration of safeguards features early in the facility design effort can provide for a more efficient and effective safeguards design. A program has been initiated by the United States Department of Energy during the past several years to develop, demonstrate and institutionalization SBD. This plan has been developed in parallel with a similar effort at the IAEA while taking into account their achievements and future plans. The United States SBD program is focused on (1) identification of best practices that satisfy existing safeguards requirements, (2) identification of advanced concepts where best practices can be improved, and (3) institutionalizing SBD by gaining its acceptance as a global norm for the design of new nuclear facilities. SBD guidance documents are being prepared as an aid to industry for their design activities, to describe the relationship between requirements, best practices, and advanced concepts. SBD 'lessons learned' studies have been conducted to help identify the existing best practices and potential areas for improvement. Finally, acceptance as a global norm is being pursued by way of international workshops, engagement with industry and the IAEA, and setting an example by way of its use in new nuclear facilities in the United States.

  2. Using Process Load Cell Information for IAEA Safeguards at Enrichment Plants

    SciTech Connect

    Laughter, Mark D; Whitaker, J Michael; Howell, John

    2010-01-01

    Uranium enrichment service providers are expanding existing enrichment plants and constructing new facilities to meet demands resulting from the shutdown of gaseous diffusion plants, the completion of the U.S.-Russia highly enriched uranium downblending program, and the projected global renaissance in nuclear power. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conducts verification inspections at safeguarded facilities to provide assurance that signatory States comply with their treaty obligations to use nuclear materials only for peaceful purposes. Continuous, unattended monitoring of load cells in UF{sub 6} feed/withdrawal stations can provide safeguards-relevant process information to make existing safeguards approaches more efficient and effective and enable novel safeguards concepts such as information-driven inspections. The IAEA has indicated that process load cell monitoring will play a central role in future safeguards approaches for large-scale gas centrifuge enrichment plants. This presentation will discuss previous work and future plans related to continuous load cell monitoring, including: (1) algorithms for automated analysis of load cell data, including filtering methods to determine significant weights and eliminate irrelevant impulses; (2) development of metrics for declaration verification and off-normal operation detection ('cylinder counting,' near-real-time mass balancing, F/P/T ratios, etc.); (3) requirements to specify what potentially sensitive data is safeguards relevant, at what point the IAEA gains on-site custody of the data, and what portion of that data can be transmitted off-site; (4) authentication, secure on-site storage, and secure transmission of load cell data; (5) data processing and remote monitoring schemes to control access to sensitive and proprietary information; (6) integration of process load cell data in a layered safeguards approach with cross-check verification; (7) process mock-ups constructed to provide simulated

  3. Ames Culture Chamber System: Enabling Model Organism Research Aboard the international Space Station

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Steele, Marianne

    2014-01-01

    Understanding the genetic, physiological, and behavioral effects of spaceflight on living organisms and elucidating the molecular mechanisms that underlie these effects are high priorities for NASA. Certain organisms, known as model organisms, are widely studied to help researchers better understand how all biological systems function. Small model organisms such as nem-atodes, slime mold, bacteria, green algae, yeast, and moss can be used to study the effects of micro- and reduced gravity at both the cellular and systems level over multiple generations. Many model organisms have sequenced genomes and published data sets on their transcriptomes and proteomes that enable scientific investigations of the molecular mechanisms underlying the adaptations of these organisms to space flight.

  4. 26 CFR 301.6803-1 - Accounting and safeguarding.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-04-01

    ... 26 Internal Revenue 18 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false Accounting and safeguarding. 301.6803-1 Section 301.6803-1 Internal Revenue INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY (CONTINUED) PROCEDURE AND ADMINISTRATION PROCEDURE AND ADMINISTRATION General Provisions Relating to Stamps § 301.6803-1...

  5. NNSA's next generation safeguards initiative to define an effective state system of accounting and control

    SciTech Connect

    Stevens, Rebecca S; Sunshine, Alexander; Matthews, Caroline; Frazer, Sarah; Matthews, Carrie

    2010-01-01

    build confidence in the State System. Viewed from this perspective, the model can be thought of as a quality assurance tool that assists states in ensuring that the outputs of their State System (the tangible 'goods' that are provided to the International Atomic Energy Agency under the State's agreements) are of high quality. As such, this tool is for the internal use of a State System that wishes to assess and improve its capacity. It is not intended for comparison or outside evaluation. In addition to providing a self-assessment tool, INSEP expects this model to be useful in several other ways: it will inform the approach that INSEP uses in bilateral consultations to identify areas where INSEP outreach and training may be of value, and it will provide a structure for its training curriculum. It will help INSEP to evaluate the effectiveness of its outreach - where there are gaps in the training provided, and whether the training that is provided meets its stated objectives. Finally, it will provide a framework for coordinating with the IAEA and other member states in the 'harmonization' efforts currently underway to align the outreach efforts of states that provide safeguards training. This paper describes the process of evaluation that INSEP is developing. It looks at the expected usefulness of the metrics for conducting self-assessments and joint assessments and enabling partners to identify training needs. The paper begins with a description of various performance requirements that define what must be done at the state and facility level to implement effective and efficient international safeguards. Next, technical performance measures are discussed, that define how well a state and its facilities are fulfilling these requirements. Then a functional analysis is conducted to align the technical requirements with competencies and determine who should carry out the various activities necessary to fulfill the performance requirements. Finally, the paper concludes with a

  6. Communication: Automatic code generation enables nuclear gradient computations for fully internally contracted multireference theory

    SciTech Connect

    MacLeod, Matthew K.; Shiozaki, Toru

    2015-02-07

    Analytical nuclear gradients for fully internally contracted complete active space second-order perturbation theory (CASPT2) are reported. This implementation has been realized by an automated code generator that can handle spin-free formulas for the CASPT2 energy and its derivatives with respect to variations of molecular orbitals and reference coefficients. The underlying complete active space self-consistent field and the so-called Z-vector equations are solved using density fitting. The implementation has been applied to the vertical and adiabatic ionization potentials of the porphin molecule to illustrate its capability.

  7. Safeguard Vulnerability Analysis Program (SVAP)

    SciTech Connect

    Gilman, F.M.; Dittmore, M.H.; Orvis, W.J.; Wahler, P.S.

    1980-06-23

    This report gives an overview of the Safeguard Vulnerability Analysis Program (SVAP) developed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. SVAP was designed as an automated method of analyzing the safeguard systems at nuclear facilities for vulnerabilities relating to the theft or diversion of nuclear materials. SVAP addresses one class of safeguard threat: theft or diversion of nuclear materials by nonviolent insiders, acting individually or in collusion. SVAP is a user-oriented tool which uses an interactive input medium for preprocessing the large amounts of safeguards data. Its output includes concise summary data as well as detailed vulnerability information.

  8. International mobility placements enable students and staff in Higher Education to enhance transversal and employability-related skills.

    PubMed

    Standley, Henrietta J

    2015-10-01

    Internationalization has commanded an ever-more prominent position in higher education over recent years, and is now firmly entrenched. While academia has long been outward looking-international research collaborations, conferences and student exchanges are well-established practices-it is relatively recently that internationalization has become a goal in its own right, rather than a consequence of normal academic activity. There are multiple interdependent drivers behind this: a focus on graduate employability and development of broad competencies and transferable skills in addition to subject-specific training, 'international awareness' being confirmed as a graduate attribute that is highly valued by employers, the availability of detailed information enabling prospective students to choose between Higher Education Institutions on the basis of their international opportunities and graduate employment rates, increasing competition between Institutions to attract the best students and to ascend national and international league tables, and (both driving and reflecting these trends) national policy frameworks. This minireview focuses on two aspects of internationalization of direct relevance to microbiology students and academic staff in a typical Higher Education Institution: student research placements overseas, and the impact of international mobility on teaching practice and the student experience. Practical strategies for developing intercultural awareness and enhancing employability are highlighted. © FEMS 2015. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com.

  9. Using Distributed Operations to Enable Science Research on the International Space Station

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Bathew, Ann S.; Dudley, Stephanie R. B.; Lochmaier, Geoff D.; Rodriquez, Rick C.; Simpson, Donna

    2011-01-01

    In the early days of the International Space Station (ISS) program, and as the organization structure was being internationally agreed upon and documented, one of the principal tenets of the science program was to allow customer-friendly operations. One important aspect of this was to allow payload developers and principle investigators the flexibility to operate their experiments from either their home sites or distributed telescience centers. This telescience concept was developed such that investigators had several options for ISS utilization support. They could operate from their home site, the closest telescience center, or use the payload operations facilities at the Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama. The Payload Operations Integration Center (POIC) processes and structures were put into place to allow these different options to its customers, while at the same time maintain its centralized authority over NASA payload operations and integration. For a long duration space program with many scientists, researchers, and universities expected to participate, it was imperative that the program structure be in place to successfully facilitate this concept of telescience support. From a payload control center perspective, payload science operations require two major elements in order to make telescience successful within the scope of the ISS program. The first element is decentralized control which allows the remote participants the freedom and flexibility to operate their payloads within their scope of authority. The second element is a strong ground infrastructure, which includes voice communications, video, telemetry, and commanding between the POIC and the payload remote site. Both of these elements are important to telescience success, and both must be balanced by the ISS program s documented requirements for POIC to maintain its authority as an integration and control center. This paper describes both elements of distributed payload

  10. Full spectrum optical safeguard

    DOEpatents

    Ackerman, Mark R.

    2008-12-02

    An optical safeguard device with two linear variable Fabry-Perot filters aligned relative to a light source with at least one of the filters having a nonlinear dielectric constant material such that, when a light source produces a sufficiently high intensity light, the light alters the characteristics of the nonlinear dielectric constant material to reduce the intensity of light impacting a connected optical sensor. The device can be incorporated into an imaging system on a moving platform, such as an aircraft or satellite.

  11. THE NEXT GENERATION SAFEGUARDS PROFESSIONAL NETWORK: PROGRESS AND NEXT STEPS

    SciTech Connect

    Zhernosek, Alena V; Lynch, Patrick D; Scholz, Melissa A

    2011-01-01

    President Obama has repeatedly stated that the United States must ensure that the international safeguards regime, as embodied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has 'the authority, information, people, and technology it needs to do its job.' The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) works to implement the President's vision through the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), a program to revitalize the U.S. DOE national laboratories safeguards technology and human capital base so that the United States can more effectively support the IAEA and ensure that it meets current and emerging challenges to the international safeguards system. In 2009, in response to the human capital development goals of NGSI, young safeguards professionals within the Global Nuclear Security Technology Division at Oak Ridge National Laboratory launched the Next Generation Safeguards Professional Network (NGSPN). The purpose of this initiative is to establish working relationships and to foster collaboration and communication among the next generation of safeguards leaders. The NGSPN is an organization for, and of, young professionals pursuing careers in nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation - as well as mid-career professionals new to the field - whether working within the U.S. DOE national laboratory complex, U.S. government agencies, academia, or industry or at the IAEA. The NGSPN is actively supported by the NNSA, boasts more than 70 members, maintains a website and newsletter, and has held two national meetings as well as an NGSPN session and panel at the July 2010 Institute of Nuclear Material Management Annual Meeting. This paper discusses the network; its significance, goals and objectives; developments and progress to date; and future plans.

  12. Research and Development for Safeguards.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Inman, Guy M.

    This report summarizes the results of unclassified research and development contracts in the field of peaceful use safeguards regarding the use of nuclear material. These summaries indicate there is really no sharp line of demarcation between research for safeguards and research for many other purposes. It includes areas of research effort and…

  13. Nuclear Materials Safeguards - Manpower Needs.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Kanter, Manuel A.

    Nuclear safeguard systems, their operation and implications for future manpower needs, and the need for these topics to be integrated into the engineering education curriculum, are focused on in this paper. The elements of a safeguard system and factors influencing the selection of a particular system are presented. Projections concerning the use…

  14. The Importance of Safeguards Culture

    SciTech Connect

    Mladineo, Stephen V.; Frazar, Sarah L.

    2013-11-01

    This is a paper we plan to submit to the Nonproliferation Review for publication. The paper provides an analysis of the concept of safeguards culture and gauges its value to the safeguards community. Accompanying the paper are three additional documents that contain the figures and tables cited in the paper. NPR guidelines state these figures and tables are to be submitted in separate documents.

  15. Nuclear Materials Safeguards - Manpower Needs.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Kanter, Manuel A.

    Nuclear safeguard systems, their operation and implications for future manpower needs, and the need for these topics to be integrated into the engineering education curriculum, are focused on in this paper. The elements of a safeguard system and factors influencing the selection of a particular system are presented. Projections concerning the use…

  16. Oak Ridge National Laboratory Next-Generation Safeguards Initiative: Human Capital Development

    SciTech Connect

    Gilligan, Kimberly

    2014-01-01

    In 2007, the US Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24) completed a comprehensive review of the current and potential future challenges facing the international safeguards system. The review examined: trends and events that have an effect on the mission of international safeguards; the implications of expanding and evolving mission requirements of the legal authorities and institutions that serve as the foundation of the international safeguards system; and, the technological, financial, and human resources required for effective safeguards implementation. The review’s findings and recommendations were summarized in the report International Safeguards: Challenges and Opportunities for the 21st Century (October 2007). The executive summary is available at the following link: http://nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/nnsa/inlinefiles/NGSI_Report.pdf.

  17. Safeguards operations in the integral fast reactor fuel cycle

    SciTech Connect

    Goff, K.M.; Benedict, R.W.; Brumbach, S.B.; Dickerman, C.E.; Tompot, R.W.

    1994-08-01

    Argonne National Laboratory is currently demonstrating the fuel cycle for the Integral Fast Reactor (IFR), an advanced reactor concept that takes advantage of the properties of metallic fuel and liquid metal cooling to offer significant improvements in reactor safety, operation, fuel-cycle economics, environmental protection, and safeguards. The IFR fuel cycle employs a pyrometallurgical process using molten salts and liquid metals to recover actinides from spent fuel. The safeguards aspects of the fuel cycle demonstration must be approved by the United States Department of Energy, but a further goal of the program is to develop a safeguards system that could gain acceptance from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and International Atomic Energy Agency. This fuel cycle is described with emphasis on aspects that differ from aqueous reprocessing and on its improved safeguardability due to decreased attractiveness and diversion potential of all process streams, including the fuel product.

  18. Nuclear safeguards and security: we can do better.

    SciTech Connect

    Johnston, R. G.; Warner, Jon S.; Garcia, A. R. E.; Martinez, R. K.; Lopez, L. N.; Pacheco, A. N.; Trujillo, S. J.; Herrera, A. M.; Bitzer, E. G. , III

    2005-01-01

    There are a number of practical ways to significantly improve nuclear safeguards and security. These include recognizing and minimizing the insider threat; using adversarial vulnerability assessments to find vulnerabilities and countermeasures; fully appreciating the disparate nature of domestic and international nuclear safeguards; improving tamper detection and tamper-indicating seals; not confusing the inventory and security functions; and recognizing the limitations of GPS tracking, contact memory buttons, and RFID tags. The efficacy of nuclear safeguards depends critically on employing sophisticated security strategies and effective monitoring hardware. The Vulnerability Assessment Team (VAT) at Los Alamos National Laboratory has extensively researched issues associated with nuclear safeguards, especially in the areas of tamper/intrusion detection, transport security, and vulnerability assessments. This paper discusses some of our findings, recommendations, and warnings.

  19. On the absence of a 'Socio-emotional Enablement' discourse component in international socio-economic development thought.

    PubMed

    Affolter, Friedrich W

    2004-12-01

    Socio-emotional well-being, established through nurturing relationships and community experiences, enables children and adults to evolve into caring, nonviolent, emotionally healthy citizens. This paper analyses purposefully selected development texts, authored by three prominent contributors of socio-economic development discourse: the United Nations, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. On the basis of a socio-emotional capacity development framework that draws from research produced in the areas of developmental psychology, biopsychology, brain research and peace psychology, the study evaluates texts' tendencies to make socio-emotionally conducive -- or neglectful -- programme recommendations. The study finds that United Nations conference reports indirectly acknowledge the relevance for socio-emotional enablement and protection, in the context of discussions related to human and children's rights, education or women's empowerment. However, they only marginally discuss the need to foster socio-emotional well-being as a human capacity development rationale per se. The International Monetary Fund, while acknowledging responsibility for the social conduciveness of macro-economic development interventions, does not address socio-emotional capacity development issues. The World Bank's strategic plan and other strategy papers touch on issues of socio-emotional capacity development only tangentially. The study concludes that the discourse communities authoring the selected development texts largely ignore the question of socio-emotional capacity development. Their discourses 'background' discussions about the kind and nature of social structures necessary for nurturing socio-emotional enablement. Developmental psychologists are challenged to 'infect' socio-economic development discourse by calling for the effective integration of the theme of socio-emotional well-being into socio-economic development publications.

  20. Safeguards aspects of spent-fuel management

    SciTech Connect

    Richter, B.; Stein, G.; Remagen, H.H.; Weh, R.

    1989-11-01

    In the Federal Republic of Germany, the concept of spent-fuel management is based on a closed fuel cycle that has the following principal features: (1) intermediate dry storage of spent fuel; (2) reprocessing; (3) thermal recycling of unconsumed nuclear material; and (4) conditioning and final disposal of radioactive waste. Complementary to this concept, methods and techniques for the direct final disposal of spent fuel are under development, including investigations of licensing issues. Furthermore, a licensing procedure is under way for the construction of a pilot conditioning plant close to the Gorleben dry storage facility. Apart from operational safety and environmental protection, the issue of international safeguards is of paramount interest. This paper discusses safeguards aspects of spent-fuel management related to direct final disposal.

  1. Safeguards and security research and development: Program status report, February-July 1981

    SciTech Connect

    Henry, C.N.; Walton, R.B.

    1982-04-01

    This report, one of a series of biannual progress reports, describes the status of research and development in the Safeguards and Security Program at Los Alamos from February-July 1981. Most work covered here is sponsored by the Office of Safeguards and Security of the Department of Energy; however, project activities that are technically closely related to nuclear safeguards and security also are included where appropriate for conveying information useful to the nuclear community. The report comprises four major subject areas: Security Development and Support; Nuclear Materials Measurement and Engineering; Nuclear Facility Safeguards Support; and International Safeguards, Technology Transfer, and Training. Some technical topics included in the subject areas are computer and informational security, chemical and nondestructive analysis of nuclear materials, process modeling and analysis, nuclear materials accounting systems, evaluation of prototype measurement instrumentation and procedures in nuclear facilities, design and consultation for facilities, technical exchange, training courses, and international safeguards.

  2. Safeguards First Principle Initiative (SFPI) Cost Model

    SciTech Connect

    Mary Alice Price

    2010-07-11

    The Nevada Test Site (NTS) began operating Material Control and Accountability (MC&A) under the Safeguards First Principle Initiative (SFPI), a risk-based and cost-effective program, in December 2006. The NTS SFPI Comprehensive Assessment of Safeguards Systems (COMPASS) Model is made up of specific elements (MC&A plan, graded safeguards, accounting systems, measurements, containment, surveillance, physical inventories, shipper/receiver differences, assessments/performance tests) and various sub-elements, which are each assigned effectiveness and contribution factors that when weighted and rated reflect the health of the MC&A program. The MC&A Cost Model, using an Excel workbook, calculates budget and/or actual costs using these same elements/sub-elements resulting in total costs and effectiveness costs per element/sub-element. These calculations allow management to identify how costs are distributed for each element/sub-element. The Cost Model, as part of the SFPI program review process, enables management to determine if spending is appropriate for each element/sub-element.

  3. Assessing the effectiveness of safeguards at a medium-sized spent-fuel reprocessing facility

    SciTech Connect

    Higinbotham, W.; Fishbone, L.G.; Suda, S.

    1983-01-01

    In order to evaluate carefully and systematically the effectiveness of safeguards at nuclear-fuel-cycle facilities, the International Atomic Energy Agency has adopted a safeguards effectiveness assessment methodology. The methodology has been applied to a well-characterized, medium-sized, spent-fuel reprocessing plant to understand how explicit safeguards inspection procedures would serve to expose conceivable nuclear materials diversion schemes, should such diversion occur.

  4. Los Alamos safeguards program overview and NDA in safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Keepin, G.R.

    1988-01-01

    Over the years the Los Alamos safeguards program has developed, tested, and implemented a broad range of passive and active nondestructive analysis (NDA) instruments (based on gamma and x-ray detection and neutron counting) that are now widely employed in safeguarding nuclear materials of all forms. Here very briefly, the major categories of gamma ray and neutron based NDA techniques, give some representative examples of NDA instruments currently in use, and cite a few notable instances of state-of-the-art NDA technique development. Historical aspects and a broad overview of the safeguards program are also presented.

  5. An internal deletion in MTH1 enables growth on glucose of pyruvate-decarboxylase negative, non-fermentative Saccharomyces cerevisiae.

    PubMed

    Oud, Bart; Flores, Carmen-Lisset; Gancedo, Carlos; Zhang, Xiuying; Trueheart, Joshua; Daran, Jean-Marc; Pronk, Jack T; van Maris, Antonius J A

    2012-09-15

    Pyruvate-decarboxylase negative (Pdc⁻) strains of Saccharomyces cerevisiae combine the robustness and high glycolytic capacity of this yeast with the absence of alcoholic fermentation. This makes Pdc⁻S. cerevisiae an interesting platform for efficient conversion of glucose towards pyruvate-derived products without formation of ethanol as a by-product. However, Pdc⁻ strains cannot grow on high glucose concentrations and require C₂-compounds (ethanol or acetate) for growth under conditions with low glucose concentrations, which hitherto has limited application in industry. Genetic analysis of a Pdc⁻ strain previously evolved to overcome these deficiencies revealed a 225 p in-frame internal deletion in MTH1, encoding a transcriptional regulator involved in glucose sensing. This internal deletion contains a phosphorylation site required for degradation, thereby hypothetically resulting in increased stability of the protein. Reverse engineering of this alternative MTH1 allele into a non-evolved Pdc⁻ strain enabled growth on 20 g l⁻¹ glucose and 0.3% (v/v) ethanol at a maximum specific growth rate (0.24 h⁻¹) similar to that of the evolved Pdc⁻ strain (0.23 h⁻¹). Furthermore, the reverse engineered Pdc⁻ strain grew on glucose as sole carbon source, albeit at a lower specific growth rate (0.10 h⁻¹) than the evolved strain (0.20 h⁻¹). The observation that overexpression of the wild-type MTH1 allele also restored growth of Pdc⁻S. cerevisiae on glucose is consistent with the hypothesis that the internal deletion results in decreased degradation of Mth1. Reduced degradation of Mth1 has been shown to result in deregulation of hexose transport. In Pdc⁻ strains, reduced glucose uptake may prevent intracellular accumulation of pyruvate and/or redox problems, while release of glucose repression due to the MTH1 internal deletion may contribute to alleviation of the C₂-compound auxotrophy. In this study we have discovered and characterised a

  6. Gamma-ray spectrometric determination of UF/sub 6/ assay with 1 percent precision for international safeguards. Part 1: product and feed in 1S and 2S sample cylinders

    SciTech Connect

    Ricci, E.

    1981-06-15

    The method is based on counting the 186-keV gamma rays emitted by /sup 235/U using a Pb-collimated Ge(Li) detector. Measurements of fifty UF/sub 6/ product and feed cylinders reveal the following precisions and counting times: Product - 2S, 0.98% (600 s); Feed - 2S, 0.48% (2500 s); Product - 1S, 0.62% (1000 s); Feed - 1S, 0.73% (3000 s). A 1% precision is desired for variables - attributes verification measurements of /sup 235/U assay in UF/sub 6/ sample cylinders for safeguards inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Statistically, these measurements stand between fine, high-precision (or variables) measurements and gross, low-precision (or attributes) ones. Because of their intermediate precisions, the variables-attributes measurements may not require analysis of all samples, and this could result in significant savings of IAEA inspector time. Although the precision of the above results is satisfactory, the average relative differences between gamma-ray and mass-spectrometric determinations for the last two sets of measurements (1S cylinders) have positive biases.

  7. Design Vulnerability Assessments for Safeguards Sealing Systems

    SciTech Connect

    Brockman, Linda; Johnston, Roger; Kravtchenko, Victor; Undem, Halvor A.; Wishard, Bernard

    2010-08-11

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (the "Agency") engages in a rigorous equipment authorization process prior to deploying Safeguards instrumentation, including Safeguards sealing systems, for world-wide use. A positive result from a vulnerability assessment is one of the many requirements that must be met prior to instrumentation deployment. Given the long time period in the Safeguards instrumentation development cycle, the substantial Member State investments made, and the significant Agency staff time required, a negative result for the vulnerability assessment can result in the loss of time, considerable additional expense, or even the failure to deploy an instrument or sealing system at all. First suggested in 1998 by the General Physics Institute in Moscow, an approach that incorporates a design vulnerability assessment minimizes the risk of deployment failure by teaming a public sector vulnerability assessment team with the instrument or sealing system design team in order to identify, at the earliest possible design stage, inherent vulnerabilities. Involving the vulnerability assessors early and often in the design and development process avoids many of the problems inherent in evaluating security vulnerabilities only after the design is finalized. The disadvantages include increased costs and time to deployment. An improved pressure-sensitive adhesive label seal, called the "VOID-3 seal" was developed for the Agency using this design vulnerability assessment process.

  8. Safeguard Requirements for Fusion Power Plants

    SciTech Connect

    Robert J. Goldston and Alexander Glaser

    2012-08-10

    Nuclear proliferation risks from magnetic fusion energy associated with access to fissile materials can be divided into three main categories: 1) clandestine production of fissile material in an undeclared facility, 2) covert production and diversion of such material in a declared and safeguarded facility, and 3) use of a declared facility in a breakout scenario, in which a state openly produces fissile material in violation of international agreements. The degree of risk in each of these categories is assessed, taking into account both state and non-state actors, and it is found that safeguards are required for fusion energy to be highly attractive from a non-proliferation standpoint. Specific safeguard requirements and R&D needs are outlined for each category of risk, and the technical capability of the ITER experiment, under construction, to contribute to this R&D is noted. A preliminary analysis indicates a potential legal pathway for fusion power systems to be brought under the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. "Vertical" proliferation risks associated with tritium and with the knowledge that can be gained from inertial fusion energy R&D are outlined.

  9. REVIEW OF THE NEGOTIATION OF THE MODEL PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE AGREEMENT(S) BETWEEN STATE(S) AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY FOR THE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS, INFCIRC/540 (Corrected) VOLUME II/III IAEA COMMITTEE 24, Major Issues Underlying the Model Additional Protocol (1996-1997).

    SciTech Connect

    Rosenthal, M.D.; Saum-Manning, L.; Houck, F.

    2010-01-01

    Volume I of this Review traces the origins of the Model Additional Protocol. It covers the period from 1991, when events in Iraq triggered an intensive review of the safeguards system, until 1996, when the IAEA Board of Governors established Committee 24 to negotiate a new protocol to safeguards agreement. The period from 1991-1996 set the stage for this negotiation and shaped its outcome in important ways. During this 5-year period, many proposals for strengthening safeguards were suggested and reviewed. Some proposals were dropped, for example, the suggestion by the IAEA Secretariat to verify certain imports, and others were refined. A rough consensus was established about the directions in which the international community wanted to go, and this was reflected in the draft of an additional protocol that was submitted to the IAEA Board of Governors on May 6, 1996 in document GOV/2863, Strengthening the Effectiveness and Improving the Efficiency of the Safeguards System - Proposals For Implementation Under Complementary Legal Authority, A Report by the Director General. This document ended with a recommendation that, 'the Board, through an appropriate mechanism, finalize the required legal instrument taking as a basis the draft protocol proposed by the Secretariat and the explanation of the measures contained in this document.'

  10. International collaboration between Volcanic Ash Advisory Centers: Geospatially enabled tools to ensure forecast harmonization across global air routes

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Osiensky, J. M.; Moore, D.; Kibler, J.; Bensimon, D.

    2013-12-01

    Volcanic plumes and drifting ash clouds pose a risk to flight operations somewhere across the globe every day. Airborne ash plumes pose a significant hazard to aircraft and timely and accurate forecasts greatly help mitigate the risk of an encounter. The world's nine (9) Volcanic Ash Advisory Centers (VAACs) provide products and services to address the volcanic ash hazard to aviation. These nine centers are operated by the meteorological authority within the state in which they are located. Each VAAC has its unique set of tools and procedures on how the data will be captured, displayed, analyzed and turned into a suite of products. The end products (e.g. Volcanic Ash Advisories (VAA) and Volcanic Ash Graphic (VAG)) are standardized through the International Civil Aviation Organization's International Airways Volcano Watch Operations Group (ICAO IAVWOPSG). Improvements in methods of collaboration between the VAACs are needed to allow for a seamless global harmonization of volcanic ash products. A geospatially enabled tool would allow for a common operating platform, data sharing, and situational awareness. The North American VAACs have been testing a capability to provide this environment to make forecast collaboration simple across the globe. This presentation highlights work that has been done to demonstrate this capability.

  11. Integrated safeguards and facility design and operations

    SciTech Connect

    Tape, J.W.; Coulter, C.A.; Markin, J.T.; Thomas, K.E.

    1987-01-01

    The integration of safeguards functions to deter or detect unauthorized actions by insiders requires careful communication and management of safeguards-relevant information on a timely basis. The separation of safeguards functions into physical protection, materials control, and materials accounting often inhibits important information flows. Redefining the major safeguards functions as authorization, enforcement, and verification and careful attention to management of information can result in effective safeguards integration. Whether designing new systems or analyzing existing ones, understanding the interface between facility operations and safeguards is critical to cost-effective integrated safeguards systems that meet modern standards of performance.

  12. The Use of Performance Metrics for the Assessment of Safeguards Effectiveness at the State Level

    SciTech Connect

    Bachner K. M.; George Anzelon, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA Yana Feldman, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA Mark Goodman,Department of State, Washington, DC Dunbar Lockwood, National Nuclear Security Administration, Washington, DC Jonathan B. Sanborn, JBS Consulting, LLC, Arlington, VA.

    2016-07-24

    In the ongoing evolution of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards at the state level, many safeguards implementation principles have been emphasized: effectiveness, efficiency, non-discrimination, transparency, focus on sensitive materials, centrality of material accountancy for detecting diversion, independence, objectivity, and grounding in technical considerations, among others. These principles are subject to differing interpretations and prioritizations and sometimes conflict. This paper is an attempt to develop metrics and address some of the potential tradeoffs inherent in choices about how various safeguards policy principles are implemented. The paper carefully defines effective safeguards, including in the context of safeguards approaches that take account of the range of state-specific factors described by the IAEA Secretariat and taken note of by the Board in September 2014, and (2) makes use of performance metrics to help document, and to make transparent, how safeguards implementation would meet such effectiveness requirements.

  13. Reactor safeguards against insider sabotage

    SciTech Connect

    Bennett, H.A.

    1982-03-01

    A conceptual safeguards system is structured to show how both reactor operations and physical protection resources could be integrated to prevent release of radioactive material caused by insider sabotage. Operational recovery capabilities are addressed from the viewpoint of both detection of and response to disabled components. Physical protection capabilities for preventing insider sabotage through the application of work rules are analyzed. Recommendations for further development of safeguards system structures, operational recovery, and sabotage prevention are suggested.

  14. Safeguards for spent fuel in an irretrievable storage facility

    SciTech Connect

    Richter, B.; Stein, G. )

    1992-01-01

    Ultimately, high-level waste from the reprocessing of German spent fuel, spent light water reactor (LWR) fuel assemblies that will not be reprocessed, and spent THTR-300 fuel will be disposed of in a geologic repository in the Gorleben salt dome, provided it will be licensed; the exploration of the salt dome is under way. Because of its fissile material content, particularly plutonium, the International Atomic Energy Agency will not release spent fuel from safeguards, although the irradiated material will be packaged in huge containers and irretrievably buried in the salt. International safeguards in an irretrievable storage facility will have to be designed accordingly. This paper discusses various safeguards aspects, investigations, and results. Technical aspects were presented in a previous paper.

  15. Multilayered genetic safeguards limit growth of microorganisms to defined environments

    PubMed Central

    Gallagher, Ryan R.; Patel, Jaymin R.; Interiano, Alexander L.; Rovner, Alexis J.; Isaacs, Farren J.

    2015-01-01

    Genetically modified organisms (GMOs) are commonly used to produce valuable compounds in closed industrial systems. However, their emerging applications in open clinical or environmental settings require enhanced safety and security measures. Intrinsic biocontainment, the creation of bacterial hosts unable to survive in natural environments, remains a major unsolved biosafety problem. We developed a new biocontainment strategy containing overlapping ‘safeguards’—engineered riboregulators that tightly control expression of essential genes, and an engineered addiction module based on nucleases that cleaves the host genome—to restrict viability of Escherichia coli cells to media containing exogenously supplied synthetic small molecules. These multilayered safeguards maintain robust growth in permissive conditions, eliminate persistence and limit escape frequencies to <1.3 × 10−12. The staged approach to safeguard implementation revealed mechanisms of escape and enabled strategies to overcome them. Our safeguarding strategy is modular and employs conserved mechanisms that could be extended to clinically or industrially relevant organisms and undomesticated species. PMID:25567985

  16. USSP-IAEA WORKSHOP ON ADVANCED SENSORS FOR SAFEGUARDS.

    SciTech Connect

    PEPPER,S.; QUEIROLO, A.; ZENDEL, M.; WHICHELLO, J.; ANNESE, C.; GRIEBE, J.; GRIEBE, R.

    2007-11-13

    The IAEA Medium Term Strategy (2006-2011) defines a number of specific goals in respect to the IAEA's ability to provide assurances to the international community regarding the peaceful use of nuclear energy through States adherences to their respective non-proliferation treaty commitments. The IAEA has long used and still needs the best possible sensors to detect and measure nuclear material. The Department of Safeguards, recognizing the importance of safeguards-oriented R&D, especially targeting improved detection capabilities for undeclared facilities, materials and activities, initiated a number of activities in early 2005. The initiatives included letters to Member State Support Programs (MSSPs), personal contacts with known technology holders, topical meetings, consultant reviews of safeguards technology, and special workshops to identify new and novel technologies and methodologies. In support of this objective, the United States Support Program to IAEA Safeguards hosted a workshop on ''Advanced Sensors for Safeguards'' in Santa Fe, New Mexico, from April 23-27, 2007. The Organizational Analysis Corporation, a U.S.-based management consulting firm, organized and facilitated the workshop. The workshop's goal was to help the IAEA identify and plan for new sensors for safeguards implementation. The workshop, which was attended by representatives of seven member states and international organizations, included presentations by technology holders and developers on new technologies thought to have relevance to international safeguards, but not yet in use by the IAEA. The presentations were followed by facilitated breakout sessions where the participants considered two scenarios typical of what IAEA inspectors might face in the field. One scenario focused on an enrichment plant; the other scenario focused on a research reactor. The participants brainstormed using the technologies presented by the participants and other technologies known to them to propose

  17. Safeguards and security by design (SSBD) for the domestic threat - theft and sabotage

    SciTech Connect

    Demuth, Scott F; Mullen, Mark

    2011-10-05

    Safeguards by Design (SBD) is receiving significant interest with respect to international safeguards objectives. However, less attention has been focused on the equally important topic of domestic Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD), which addresses requirements such as those of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in the United States. While international safeguards are concerned with detecting State diversion of nuclear material from peaceful to nuclear explosives purposes, domestic Material Protection, Control and Accounting measures (MPC&A) are focused on non-State theft and sabotage. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has described the Safeguards by Design (SBD) concept as an approach in which 'international safeguards are fully integrated into the design process of a new nuclear facility from the initial planning through design, construction, operation, and decommissioning.' This same concept is equally applicable to SSBD for domestic requirements. The United States Department of Energy (DOE) has initiated a project through its Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) and more specifically its Fuel Cycle Research and Development (FCRD) program, to develop a domestic SSBD discipline and methodology in parallel with similar efforts sponsored by the DOE Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) and the IAEA for international safeguards. This activity includes the participation of industry (through DOE-sponsored contracts) and DOE National Laboratories. This paper will identify the key domestic safeguards and security requirements (i.e. MC&A and physical protection) and explain how and why Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) is important and beneficial for the design of future US nuclear energy systems.

  18. Waste management safeguards project: History of and recommendations for development activities in support of safeguards of final disposal of spent fuel

    SciTech Connect

    Moran, B.W.

    1994-02-16

    Coordinated safeguards assessment and development activities in support of the U.S. Civilian Radioactive Waste Management System (CRWMS) and international safeguards objectives were initiated in Fiscal Year 1987. Initial technical support activities were performed at the direction of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM); however, as the priority of support activities changed, direction for the support tasks was transferred to the U.S. Department of State (State), the DOE Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation (DOE/IS-40), and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The direction for technical support activities was established at the International Atomic Energy Agency`s (IAEA`s) advisory group meeting and subsequent consultants` meetings on safeguards related to the final disposal of nuclear material contained in waste and spent fuel. Task directions for the development of international safeguards in support of the final disposal of spent fuel are currently being provided by DOE/IS-40. A summary of safeguards activities performed by the Waste Management Safeguards Project is provided. Systems for design information verification for spent fuel consolidation and conditioning operations are needed immediately. Safeguards approaches for maintaining continuity of knowledge of spent fuel processed at the conditioning facility and for verification of the final disposal package will be needed within three years. Systems for design information verification of the repository facilities will be needed by the end of the decade.

  19. A perspective on safeguarding and monitoring of excess military plutonium

    SciTech Connect

    Sutcliffe, W.G.

    1994-10-02

    The purpose of this paper is to provide a perspective and framework for the development of safeguarding and monitoring procedures for the various stages of disposition of excess military plutonium. The paper briefly outlines and comments on some of the issues involved in safeguarding and monitoring excess military plutonium as it progresses from weapons through dismantlement, to fabrication as reactor fuel, to use in a reactor, and finally to storage and disposal as spent fuel. {open_quotes}Military{close_quotes} refers to ownership, and includes both reactor-grade and weapon-grade plutonium. {open_quotes}Excess{close_quotes} refers to plutonium (in any form) that a government decides is no longer needed for military use and can be irrevocably removed from military stockpiles. Many of the issues and proposals presented in this paper are based on, or are similar to, those mentioned in the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) report on excess military plutonium. Safeguards for plutonium disposition are discussed elsewhere in terms of requirements established by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Here, the discussion is less specific. The term {open_quotes}safeguarding{close_quotes} is used broadly to refer to materials control and accountancy (MC&A), containment and surveillance (C&S), and physical protection of nuclear materials by the state that possesses those materials. This is also referred to as material protection, control, and accountancy (MPCA). The term {open_quotes}safeguarding{close_quotes} was chosen for brevity and to distinguish MPCA considered in this paper from international or IAEA safeguards. {open_quotes}Monitoring{close_quotes} is used to refer to activities designed to assure another party (state or international organization) that the nuclear materials of the host state (the United States or Russia) are secure and not subject to unauthorized use.

  20. Safeguarding health care workers.

    PubMed

    Benton, David; Williamson, Lindsey

    2014-12-01

    Editor's note: The International Council of Nurses (ICN) is a federation of more than 130 international nursing organizations. We invited the ICN to contribute a periodic column highlighting some of its initiatives to address global nursing issues. For more information, see the ICN Web site at www.icn.ch.

  1. The Los Alamos nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation technology development program

    SciTech Connect

    Smith, H.A. Jr.; Menlove, H.O.; Reilly, T.D.; Bosler, G.E.; Hakkila, E.A.; Eccleston, G.W.

    1994-04-01

    For nearly three decades, Los Alamos National Laboratory has developed and implemented nuclear measurement technology and training in support of national and international nuclear safeguards. This paper outlines the major elements of those technologies and highlights some of the latest developments.

  2. 41 CFR 101-28.306-5 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ...-Customer Supply Centers § 101-28.306-5 Safeguards. Agencies shall establish internal controls to ensure that the customer access codes assigned for their accounts are properly protected. It is by use of... all orders filled by the CSC with the exception of orders picked up at the CSC by the customer....

  3. The European Safeguards Research and Development Association Addresses Safeguards and Nonproliferation

    SciTech Connect

    Janssens-Maenhout, Greet; Kusumi, R.; Daures, Pascal A.; Janssens, Willem; Dickman, Deborah A.

    2010-06-16

    The renaissance of efforts to expand the use of nuclear energy requires the parallel development of a renewed and more sophisticated work force. Growth in the nuclear sector with high standard of safety, safeguards and security requires skilled staff for design, operations, inspections etc. High-quality nuclear technology educational programs are diminished from past years, and the ability of universities to attract students and to meet future staffing requirements of the nuclear industry is becoming seriously compromised. Thus, education and training in nuclear engineering and sciences is one of the cornerstones for the nuclear sector. Teaching in the nuclear field still seems strongly influenced by national history but it is time to strengthen resources and collaborate. Moreover with the current nuclear security threats it becomes critical that nuclear technology experts master the basic principles not only of safety, but also of nuclear safeguards, nonproliferation and nuclear security. In Europe the European Nuclear Education Network (ENEN) Association has established the certificate 'European Master of Science in Nuclear Engineering (EMSNE)' as the classic nuclear engineering program covering reactor operation and nuclear safety. However, it does not include courses on nonproliferation, safeguards, or dual-use technologies. The lack of education in nuclear safeguards was tackled by the European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA), through development and implementation of safeguards course modules. Since 2005 the ESARDA Working Group, called the Training and Knowledge Management Working Group, (TKMWG) has worked with the Joint Research Centre (JRC) in Ispra, Italy to organize a Nuclear Safeguards and Nonproliferation course. This five-day course is held each spring at the JRC, and continues to show increasing interest as evidenced by the positive responses of international lecturers and students. The standard set of lectures covers a broad

  4. DESIGN INFORMATION VERIFICATION FOR NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS

    SciTech Connect

    Robert S. Bean; Richard R. M. Metcalf; Phillip C. Durst

    2009-07-01

    A critical aspect of international safeguards activities performed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the verification that facility design and construction (including upgrades and modifications) do not create opportunities for nuclear proliferation. These Design Information Verification activities require that IAEA inspectors compare current and past information about the facility to verify the operator’s declaration of proper use. The actual practice of DIV presents challenges to the inspectors due to the large amount of data generated, concerns about sensitive or proprietary data, the overall complexity of the facility, and the effort required to extract just the safeguards relevant information. Planned and anticipated facilities will (especially in the case of reprocessing plants) be ever larger and increasingly complex, thus exacerbating the challenges. This paper reports the results of a workshop held at the Idaho National Laboratory in March 2009, which considered technologies and methods to address these challenges. The use of 3D Laser Range Finding, Outdoor Visualization System, Gamma-LIDAR, and virtual facility modeling, as well as methods to handle the facility data issues (quantity, sensitivity, and accessibility and portability for the inspector) were presented. The workshop attendees drew conclusions about the use of these techniques with respect to successfully employing them in an operating environment, using a Fuel Conditioning Facility walk-through as a baseline for discussion.

  5. Regional Cooperation to Strengthen Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Minnini, Margot; Elkhamri, Oksana O.

    2016-06-06

    President Obama’s decision over four years ago to ”pivot” toward Asia represented an important strategic shift in American foreign policy and a rebalancing of U.S. economic and security engagement in the Asia-Pacific countries. The United States has since supported a variety of regional initiatives aimed at promoting nuclear security and safeguards. When a new regional organization, the Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network (APSN) was established in 2010, DOE/NNSA became an early member and enthusiastic advocate. Launched on the initiative of Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, and Indonesia, the APSN aims to strengthen the quality and effectiveness of safeguards implementation in the Asia-Pacific region.

  6. Advanced Safeguards Approaches for New TRU Fuel Fabrication Facilities

    SciTech Connect

    Durst, Philip C.; Ehinger, Michael H.; Boyer, Brian; Therios, Ike; Bean, Robert; Dougan, A.; Tolk, K.

    2007-12-15

    This second report in a series of three reviews possible safeguards approaches for the new transuranic (TRU) fuel fabrication processes to be deployed at AFCF – specifically, the ceramic TRU (MOX) fuel fabrication line and the metallic (pyroprocessing) line. The most common TRU fuel has been fuel composed of mixed plutonium and uranium dioxide, referred to as “MOX”. However, under the Advanced Fuel Cycle projects custom-made fuels with higher contents of neptunium, americium, and curium may also be produced to evaluate if these “minor actinides” can be effectively burned and transmuted through irradiation in the ABR. A third and final report in this series will evaluate and review the advanced safeguards approach options for the ABR. In reviewing and developing the advanced safeguards approach for the new TRU fuel fabrication processes envisioned for AFCF, the existing international (IAEA) safeguards approach at the Plutonium Fuel Production Facility (PFPF) and the conceptual approach planned for the new J-MOX facility in Japan have been considered as a starting point of reference. The pyro-metallurgical reprocessing and fuel fabrication process at EBR-II near Idaho Falls also provided insight for safeguarding the additional metallic pyroprocessing fuel fabrication line planned for AFCF.

  7. End user needs for enhanced IAEA Safeguards Information Management Capabilities

    SciTech Connect

    Badalamente, R.; Anzelon, G.; Deland, S.; Whiteson, R.

    1994-07-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency is undertaking a program for strengthening its safeguards on the recognition that safeguards must give assurance not only of the non-diversion of declared material or that declared facilities are not being misused, but also of the absence of any undeclared nuclear activities in States which have signed comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency. The IAEA has determined that the detection of undeclared nuclear activities and the creation of confidence in the continuing peaceful use of declared material and facilities is largely dependent on more information being made available to the Agency and on the capability of the Agency to make more effective use of this additional information, as well as existing information.

  8. Safeguards techniques in a pilot conditioning plant for spent fuel

    SciTech Connect

    Leitner, E.; Rudolf, K.; Weh, R. )

    1991-01-01

    The pilot conditioning plant at Gorleben, Germany, is designed as a multi-purpose plant. Its primary task is the conditioning of spent fuel assemblies into a form suitable for final disposal. As a pilot plant, it allows furthermore for the development and testing of various conditioning techniques. In terms of international safeguards, the pilot conditioning plant is basically considered an item facility. Entire fuel assemblies enter the plant in transport casks, whereas bins filled with fuel rods or canisters containing cut fuel rods leave the facility in final disposal packages (e.g. POLLUX). Each POLLUX final disposal package content is uniquely correlated to a definite number of fuel assemblies which have entered the conditioning process. For this type of facility, containment/surveillance (C/S) should take over the major role in nuclear material safeguards. This paper discusses the safeguards at the Gorleben plant.

  9. United States Program for Technical assistance to IAEA Standards. Concept Paper: Knowledge Acquisition, Skills training for enhanced IAEA safeguards inspections

    SciTech Connect

    Morris, F.A.; Toquam, J.L.

    1993-11-01

    This concept paper explores the potential contribution of ``Knowledge Acquisition Skills`` in enhancing the effectiveness of international safeguards inspections by the International Atomic energy Agency (IAEA, or Agency) and identifies types of training that could be provided to develop or improve such skills. For purposes of this concept paper, Knowledge Acquisition Skills are defined broadly to include all appropriate techniques that IAEA safeguards inspectors can use to acquire and analyze information relevant to the performance of successful safeguards inspections. These techniques include a range of cognitive, analytic, judgmental, interpersonal, and communications skills that have the potential to help IAEA safeguards inspectors function more effectively.

  10. New challenges in adolescent safeguarding.

    PubMed

    James, David R; Sargant, Nwanneka N; Bostock, Nancy; Khadr, Sophie

    2017-02-01

    The environment in which young people are growing up has changed significantly with the growth in social communication, changes in migration patterns and the proliferation of gangs. These changes pose a real and present danger to the health and well-being of young people in the UK and around the world. However, recognition of the safeguarding needs for this group continues to lag behind those of younger children and services often remain patchy and incomplete. We present a review of current safeguarding concerns as well as practical suggestions on their recognition and response for professionals working with young people in all branches of healthcare as well as education and wider society.

  11. Safeguards and security research and development: Progress report, October 1994--September 1995

    SciTech Connect

    Rutherford, D.R.; Henriksen, P.W.

    1997-03-01

    The primary goal of the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Technology Development Program, International Safeguards, and other Safeguards and Security Programs is to continue to be the center of excellence in the field of Safeguards and Security. This annual report for 1995 describes those scientific and engineering projects that contribute to all of the aforementioned programs. The authors have presented the information in a different format from previous annual reports. Part I is devoted to Nuclear Material Measurement Systems. Part II contains projects that are specific to Integrated Safeguards Systems. Part III highlights Safeguards Systems Effectiveness Evaluations and Part IV is a compilation of highlights from Information Assurance projects. Finally Part V highlights work on the projects at Los Alamos for International Safeguards. The final part of this annual report lists titles and abstracts of Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Technology Development reports, technical journal articles, and conference papers that were presented and published in 1995. This is the last annual report in this format. The authors wish to thank all of the individuals who have contributed to this annual report and made it so successful over the years.

  12. Containment and surveillance -- A principal IAEA safeguards measure

    SciTech Connect

    Drayer, D.D.; Dupree, S.A.; Sonnier, C.S.

    1997-12-31

    The growth of the safeguards inspectorate of the Agency, spanning more than 40 years, has produced a variety of interesting subjects (legal, technical, political, etc.) for recollection, discussion, and study. Although the Agency was established in 1957, the first practical inspections did not occur until the early 1960s. In the early inspections, thee was little C/S equipment available, and no optical surveillance was used. However, by the third decade of the IAEA, the 1980s, many technology advances were made, and the level of C/S equipment activities increased. By the late 1980s, some 200 Twin Minolta film camera systems were deployed by the Agency for safeguards use. At the present time, the Agency is evaluating and beginning to implement remote monitoring as part of the Strengthened Safeguards System. However, adoption of remote monitoring by international agencies cannot occur rapidly because of the many technical and policy issues associated with this activity. A glimpse into the future indicates that an important element of safeguards instrumentation will be the merging of C/S and NDA equipment into integrated systems. The use of modern interior area monitors in International Safeguards also offers a great potential for advancing C/S measures. The research in microsensors is in its infancy, and the opportunities for their reducing the cost, increasing the life time, and increasing the reliability of sensors for safeguards applications are manifold. A period may be approaching in which the terminology of C/S will no longer have its original meaning, as integrated systems combining NDA instruments and C/S instruments are already in use and are expected to be the norm in the near future.

  13. 77 FR 37804 - Rules for Investigations Relating to Global and Bilateral Safeguard Actions, Market Disruption...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2012-06-25

    ..., Market Disruption, Trade Diversion, and Review of Relief Actions AGENCY: United States International...) governing investigations relating to global and bilateral safeguard actions, market disruption, trade...--INVESTIGATIONS RELATING TO GLOBAL AND BILATERAL SAFEGUARG ACTIONS, MARKET DISRUPTION, TRADE DIVERSION, AND...

  14. 78 FR 2295 - Consideration of Approval of Application Containing Sensitive Unclassified Non-Safeguards...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2013-01-10

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office ] NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Consideration of Approval of Application Containing Sensitive Unclassified Non-Safeguards Information Regarding Proposed Energy Future Holdings Corporation Internal Restructuring AGENCY:...

  15. Reversing the Trend: Creating a Growing and Sustainable Cadre of Safeguards Experts in the United States

    SciTech Connect

    Lockwood, Dunbar; Mathews, Caroline E.; Seward, Amy M.

    2008-07-17

    In October 2007, the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Office of Non-Proliferation and International Security (NA-24) completed a wide-ranging study on international safeguards issues that found, inter alia, that the human capital base in the United States must be revitalized and expanded to ensure a seamless succession from the current generation of safeguards experts. Many current safeguards experts will soon retire and a new generation of talent with capabilities that cover the full spectrum of safeguards-relevant disciplines is needed. The success of this effort will have direct bearing on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). An effective international safeguards system that responds to current and future nonproliferation challenges requires a cadre of skilled safeguards specialists. However, a number of factors have converged in recent years that have challenged the IAEA’s ability to effectively carry out its safeguards mission, e.g. flat funding, expanding responsibilities, and several ad hoc high profile investigations. In the near future, the Agency will require increased numbers of qualified staff to address the expansion and evolution of its mission and anticipated worldwide growth in nuclear energy production. Without a large-scale effort to address this requirement in the near future, the international community will have far less confidence that nuclear material in civil programs is not being diverted for nuclear weapons and the risks of nuclear proliferation will increase around the world. This paper will describe in detail NNSA’s efforts, in coordination with other federal agencies, to address the safeguards human resources challenge, focusing on the recommendations of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI).

  16. Network adaptable information systems for safeguard applications

    SciTech Connect

    Rodriguez, C.; Burczyk, L.; Chare, P.; Wagner, H.

    1996-09-01

    While containment and surveillance systems designed for nuclear safeguards have greatly improved through advances in computer, sensor, and microprocessor technologies, the authors recognize the need to continue the advancement of these systems to provide more standardized solutions for safeguards applications of the future. The benefits to be gained from the use of standardized technologies are becoming evident as safeguard activities are increasing world-wide while funding of these activities is becoming more limited. The EURATOM Safeguards Directorate and Los Alamos National Laboratory are developing and testing advanced monitoring technologies coupled with the most efficient solutions for the safeguards applications of the future.

  17. The US Support program to IAEA Safeguards - 2008

    SciTech Connect

    Pepper,S.

    2008-06-09

    The U.S. Support Program to IAEA Safeguards (USSP) was established in 1977 to provide technical assistance to the IAEA Department of Safeguards. Since that time the U.S. Department of State has provided funding of over $200 million and over 900 tasks have been completed by USSP contractors on behalf of the KEA. The USSP is directed by a U.S. interagency subcommittee known as the Subgroup on Safeguards Technical Support (SSTS) and is managed by the International Safeguards Project Office (ISPO) at Brookhaven National Laboratory. In recent years, the SSTS and ISPO have identified priorities to guide the process of determining which IAEA requests are aligned with US. policy and will be funded. The USSP priorities are reviewed and updated prior to the USSP Annual Review Meeting which is hosted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) each spring in Vienna, Austria. This paper will report on the 2008 USSP priorities and be an introduction for a session which will consist of four papers on USSP priorities and four other papers related to USSP activities.

  18. Improving Transparency in the Reporting of Safeguards Implementation: FY11 Update

    SciTech Connect

    Toomey, Christopher; Odlaug, Christopher S.; Wyse, Evan T.

    2011-09-30

    In 2008, the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI) indicated that the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR) has not kept pace with the evolution of safeguards and provided the IAEA with a set of recommendations for improvement. The SIR is the primary mechanism for providing an overview of safeguards implementation in a given year and reporting on the annual safeguards findings and conclusions drawn by the Secretariat. As the IAEA transitions to State-level safeguards approaches, SIR reporting must adapt to reflect these evolutionary changes. This evolved report will better reflect the IAEA's transition to a more qualitative and information-driven approach, based upon State-as-a-whole considerations. This paper applies SAGSI's recommendations to the development of multiple models for an evolved SIR and finds that an SIR repurposed as a 'safeguards portal' could significantly enhance information delivery, clarity, and transparency. In addition, this paper finds that the 'portal concept' also appears to have value as a standardized information presentation and analysis platform for use by Country Officers, for continuity of knowledge purposes, and the IAEA Secretariat in the safeguards conclusion process. Accompanying this paper is a fully functional prototype of the 'portal' concept, built using commercial software and IAEA Annual Report data and available for viewing at http://safeguardsportal.pnnl.gov.

  19. Liverpool's healthcare future safeguarded.

    PubMed

    Lewis, David

    2014-03-01

    David Lewis, Principal and design lead for the London studio of international design and architecture firm, NBBJ, and part of the Carillion consortium designing the new Royal Liverpool University Hospital with HKS for The Royal Liverpool and Broadgreen University Hospitals NHS Trust, describes how the masterplan will seek to more clearly define the urban space of the street, restore public access to the centre of the site, and 'knit' the hospital more fully into fabric of Liverpool than is the case with the current, 1970s-built, Royal Liverpool University Hospital.

  20. Visualizing Safeguards: Software for Conceptualizing and Communicating Safeguards Data

    SciTech Connect

    Gallucci, N.

    2015-07-12

    The nuclear programs of states are complex and varied, comprising a wide range of fuel cycles and facilities. Also varied are the types and terms of states’ safeguards agreements with the IAEA, each placing different limits on the inspectorate’s access to these facilities. Such nuances make it difficult to draw policy significance from the ground-level nuclear activities of states, or to attribute ground-level outcomes to the implementation of specific policies or initiatives. While acquiring a firm understanding of these relationships is critical to evaluating and formulating effective policy, doing so requires collecting and synthesizing large bodies of information. Maintaining a comprehensive working knowledge of the facilities comprising even a single state’s nuclear program poses a challenge, yet marrying this information with relevant safeguards and verification information is more challenging still. To facilitate this task, Brookhaven National Laboratory has developed a means of capturing the development, operation, and safeguards history of all the facilities comprising a state’s nuclear program in a single graphic. The resulting visualization offers a useful reference tool to policymakers and analysts alike, providing a chronology of states’ nuclear development and an easily digestible history of verification activities across their fuel cycles.

  1. Potential application of LIBS to NNSA next generation safeguards initiative (NGSI)

    SciTech Connect

    Barefield Ii, James E; Clegg, Samuel M; Veirs, Douglas K; Browne, Mike; Lopez, Leon; Martinez, Ron; Le, Loan; Lamontagne, Stephen A

    2009-01-01

    In a climate in which states and nations have been and perhaps currently are involved in the prol iferation of nuclear materials and technologies, advanced methodologies and improvements in current measurement techniques are needed to combat new threats and increased levels of sophistication. The Department of Energy through the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has undertaken a broad review of International Safeguards. The conclusion from that review was that a comprehensive initiative to revitalize international safeguards technology and the human resource base was urgently needed to keep pace with demands and increasingly sophisticated emerging safeguards challenges. To address these challenges, NNSA launched the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) to develop policies, concepts, technologies, expertise, and infrastructure necessary to sustain the international safeguards system as its mission evolves for the next 25 years. NGSI is designed to revitalize and strengthen the U.S. safeguards technical base, recognizing that without a robust program the United States of America will not be in a position to exercise leadership or provide the necessary support to the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency). International safeguards as administrated by the IAEA are the primary vehicle for verifying compliance with the peaceful use and nonproliferation of nuclear materials and technologies. Laser Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy or LIBS has the potential to support the goals of NGSI as follows: by providing (1) automated analysis in complex nuclear processing or reprocessing facilities in real-time or near real-time without sample preparation or removal, (2) isotopic and important elemental ratio (Cm/Pu, Cm/U, ... etc) analysis, and (3) centralized remote control, process monitoring, and analysis of nuclear materials in nuclear facilities at multiple locations within the facility. Potential application of LIBS to international safeguards as

  2. REPORT OF THE WORKSHOP ON NUCLEAR FACILITY DESIGN INFORMATION EXAMINATION AND VERIFICATION FOR SAFEGUARDS

    SciTech Connect

    Richard Metcalf; Robert Bean

    2009-10-01

    Executive Summary The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements nuclear safeguards and verifies countries are compliant with their international nuclear safeguards agreements. One of the key provisions in the safeguards agreement is the requirement that the country provide nuclear facility design and operating information to the IAEA relevant to safeguarding the facility, and at a very early stage. , This provides the opportunity for the IAEA to verify the safeguards-relevant features of the facility and to periodically ensure that those features have not changed. The national authorities (State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material - SSAC) provide the design information for all facilities within a country to the IAEA. The design information is conveyed using the IAEA’s Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ) and specifies: (1) Identification of the facility’s general character, purpose, capacity, and location; (2) Description of the facility’s layout and nuclear material form, location, and flow; (3) Description of the features relating to nuclear material accounting, containment, and surveillance; and (4) Description of existing and proposed procedures for nuclear material accounting and control, with identification of nuclear material balance areas. The DIQ is updated as required by written addendum. IAEA safeguards inspectors examine and verify this information in design information examination (DIE) and design information verification (DIV) activities to confirm that the facility has been constructed or is being operated as declared by the facility operator and national authorities, and to develop a suitable safeguards approach. Under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), the National Nuclear Security Administrations (NNSA) Office of Non-Proliferation and International Security identified the need for more effective and efficient verification of design information by the IAEA for improving international safeguards

  3. Future challenges and DOE/NNSA-JAEA cooperation for the development of advanced safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Stevens, Rebecca S; Mc Clelland - Kerr, John; Senzaki, Masao; Hori, Masato

    2009-01-01

    The United States Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) has been cooperating with Japan on nuclear safeguards for over thirty years. DOE/NNSA has collaborated with the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) and its predecessors in addressing the need for innovative solutions to nuclear transparency and verification issues in one of the world's most advanced nuclear fuel cycle states. This collaboration includes over ninety activities that have involved nearly every facility in the JAEA complex and many national laboratories in the U.S. complex. The partnership has yielded new technologies and approaches that have benefited international safeguards not only in Japan, but around the world. The International Atomic Energy Agency uses a number of safeguards solutions developed under this collaboration to improve its inspection efforts in Japan and elsewhere. Japanese facilities serve as test beds for emerging safeguards technologies and are setting the trend for new nuclear energy and fuel cycle development worldwide. The collaboration continues to be an essential component of U.S. safeguards outreach and is integral to the DOE/NNSA's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative. In addition to fostering international safeguards development, the cooperation is an opportunity for U.S. scientists to work in facilities that have no analog in the United States, thus providing crucial real-life experience for and aiding development of the next generation of U.S. safeguards specialists. It is also an important element of promoting regional transparency thereby building confidence in the peaceful nature of nuclear programs in the region. The successes engendered by this partnership provide a strong basis for addressing future safeguards challenges, in Japan and elsewhere. This paper summarizes these challenges and the associated cooperative efforts that are either underway or anticipated.

  4. Environmental monitoring for nuclear safeguards. Background paper

    SciTech Connect

    1995-09-01

    To assure that states are not violating their Non-Proliferation Treaty commitments, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) must verify that states do not possess convert nuclear facilities-a mission that prior to the 1991 Gulf War, it had neither the political backing nor the resources to conduct. The IAEA recognizes the importance of this new mission and is in the process of assuming it. One of the tools it is exploring to provide some indication of the presence of secret, or undeclared, nuclear activities and facilities is environmental monitoring. Modern sampling and analysis technologies provide powerful tools to detect the presence of characteristic substances that are likely to be emitted by such illicit activities. This background paper examines the prospects for such technologies to improve nuclear safeguards. It concludes that environmental monitoring can greatly increase the ability to detect undeclared activity at declared, or known, sites, and it can significantly increase the chances of detecting and locating undeclared sites.

  5. Advanced integrated safeguards at Barnwell

    SciTech Connect

    Bambas, K.J.; Barnes, L.D.

    1980-06-01

    The development and initial performance testing of an advanced integrated safeguards system at the Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant (BNFP) is described. The program concentrates on the integration and coordination of physical security and nuclear materials control and accounting at a single location. Hardware and software for this phase have been installed and are currently being evaluated. The AGNS/DOE program is now in its third year of development at the BNFP.

  6. Acoustic techniques in nuclear safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Olinger, C.T.; Sinha, D.N.

    1995-07-01

    Acoustic techniques can be employed to address many questions relevant to current nuclear technology needs. These include establishing and monitoring intrinsic tags and seals, locating holdup in areas where conventional radiation-based measurements have limited capability, process monitoring, monitoring containers for corrosion or changes in pressure, and facility design verification. These acoustics applications are in their infancy with respect to safeguards and nuclear material management, but proof-of-principle has been demonstrated in many of the areas listed.

  7. Safeguards Envelope Progress FY10

    SciTech Connect

    Richard Metcalf

    2010-10-01

    The Safeguards Envelope is a strategy to determine a set of specific operating parameters within which nuclear facilities may operate to maximize safeguards effectiveness without sacrificing safety or plant efficiency. This paper details the additions to the advanced operating techniques that will be applied to real plant process monitoring (PM) data from the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP). Research this year focused on combining disparate pieces of data together to maximize operating time with minimal downtime due to safeguards. A Chi-Square and Croiser's cumulative sum were both included as part of the new analysis. Because of a major issue with the original data, the implementation of the two new tests did not add to the existing set of tests, though limited one-variable optimization made a small increase in detection probability. Additional analysis was performed to determine if prior analysis would have caused a major security or safety operating envelope issue. It was determined that a safety issue would have resulted from the prior research, but that the security may have been increased under certain conditions.

  8. Are xenotransplantation safeguards legally viable?

    PubMed

    Florencio, P S; Ramanathan, E D

    2001-01-01

    Scientists agree on the need for robust public health safeguards to accompany the imminent introduction of xenotransplantation--clinical transplantation of animal tissue into humans. To protect society in the event of emerging infectious diseases, governments must devise a legally effective means of ensuring compliance with such safeguards. Neither consent law, the law of contracts, nor existing public health legislation can adequately enforce such compliance. Consent law serves as a mechanism of communicating the momentary waiver of legal rights, not as a durable enforcement doctrine. Because it would be essential for recipients personally to comply with public safety measures, the law of contracts would also be unable to compel compliance. Existing public health legislation would also likely be ineffective because it would need to be substantially amended to incorporate the heightened powers necessary for the periodic examination of asymptomatic xenotransplant recipients. Xenotransplantation-specific legislation would be a legally effective means of enforcing public health safeguards since it could require conforming behaviors and could impose monetary fines on those recipients who, having benefited from life-saving intervention, fail to comply. This Article argues that legislation implementing a post-xenotransplantation surveillance system should withstand constitutional scrutiny because it would not be discriminatory and because, although it would violate fundamental rights of recipients, such violations would be justified under existing constitutional doctrines.

  9. Modeling and Simulation for Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Swinhoe, Martyn T.

    2012-07-26

    The purpose of this talk is to give an overview of the role of modeling and simulation in Safeguards R&D and introduce you to (some of) the tools used. Some definitions are: (1) Modeling - the representation, often mathematical, of a process, concept, or operation of a system, often implemented by a computer program; (2) Simulation - the representation of the behavior or characteristics of one system through the use of another system, especially a computer program designed for the purpose; and (3) Safeguards - the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material. The role of modeling and simulation are: (1) Calculate amounts of material (plant modeling); (2) Calculate signatures of nuclear material etc. (source terms); and (3) Detector performance (radiation transport and detection). Plant modeling software (e.g. FACSIM) gives the flows and amount of material stored at all parts of the process. In safeguards this allow us to calculate the expected uncertainty of the mass and evaluate the expected MUF. We can determine the measurement accuracy required to achieve a certain performance.

  10. Nuclear material safeguards for enrichments plants: Part 4, Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant: Diversion scenarios and IAEA safeguards activities: Safeguards training course

    SciTech Connect

    Not Available

    1988-10-01

    This publication is Part 4 of a safeguards training course in Nuclear Material Safeguards for enrichment plants. This part of the course deals with diversion scenarios and safeguards activities at gas centrifuge enrichment plants.

  11. Preliminary Safeguards Assessment for the Pebble-Bed Fluoride High-Temperature Reactor (PB-FHR) Concept

    SciTech Connect

    Disser, Jay; Arthur, Edward; Lambert, Janine

    2016-09-01

    This report examines a preliminary design for a pebble bed fluoride salt-cooled high temperature reactor (PB-FHR) concept, assessing it from an international safeguards perspective. Safeguards features are defined, in a preliminary fashion, and suggestions are made for addressing further nuclear materials accountancy needs.

  12. POSSIBLE ROLES FOR THE INTEGRATED SAFEGUARDS EVALUATION METHODOLOGY (ISEM)

    SciTech Connect

    J. F. PILAT

    2001-06-01

    The Integrated Safeguards Evaluation Methodology (ISEM) is designed to be a flexible tool capable of meeting as yet undefined requirements for the evaluation of a range of integrated safeguards proposals (ISPs), irrespective of the precise scope, the author of the proposal or the level of analysis desired. Its objective as a tool is to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to make informed decisions on integrated safeguards that strengthen the international safeguards system and maximize its efficiency. The ISEM can be used to evaluate generic facility or State-wide ISPs in support of integrated safeguards criteria development and to evaluate ISPs for implementation in specific states. Reflecting the interests and needs of the Agency, ISEM has been used to evaluate generic, single-facility ISPs. This role, with a hypothetical State assumed, was the basis for the March-April and September 2000 exercises undertaken to evaluate an Agency proposal for LWRs without MOX and Agency ISPs for research reactors and critical assemblies, respectively. It was also the basis for Agency evaluation of its ISP for spent-fuel storage. In a similar fashion, the methodology could be used to evaluate multiple-facility ISPs. However, the primary use of ISEM envisioned during its creation was for the evaluation of State-wide ISPs, both generic and State-specific. A simple State-level ISP was evaluated as the first illustrative application of the ISEM. A generic State-wide approach can reflect any number of real-world fuel cycles, or it might usefully be limited to considerations of a small number of representative groupings of facilities. It allows an evaluation of tradeoffs as well as optimization of cost and effectiveness in general terms. For any of these uses, and perhaps others, ISEM can help the Agency to filter and to optimize proposals, and to focus information analysis and complementary access.

  13. Safeguards-by-Design: Guidance for Independent Spent Fuel Dry Storage Installations (ISFSI)

    SciTech Connect

    Trond Bjornard; Philip C. Durst

    2012-05-01

    This document summarizes the requirements and best practices for implementing international nuclear safeguards at independent spent fuel storage installations (ISFSIs), also known as Away-from- Reactor (AFR) storage facilities. These installations may provide wet or dry storage of spent fuel, although the safeguards guidance herein focuses on dry storage facilities. In principle, the safeguards guidance applies to both wet and dry storage. The reason for focusing on dry independent spent fuel storage installations is that this is one of the fastest growing nuclear installations worldwide. Independent spent fuel storage installations are typically outside of the safeguards nuclear material balance area (MBA) of the reactor. They may be located on the reactor site, but are generally considered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the State Regulator/SSAC to be a separate facility. The need for this guidance is becoming increasingly urgent as more and more nuclear power plants move their spent fuel from resident spent fuel ponds to independent spent fuel storage installations. The safeguards requirements and best practices described herein are also relevant to the design and construction of regional independent spent fuel storage installations that nuclear power plant operators are starting to consider in the absence of a national long-term geological spent fuel repository. The following document has been prepared in support of two of the three foundational pillars for implementing Safeguards-by-Design (SBD). These are: i) defining the relevant safeguards requirements, and ii) defining the best practices for meeting the requirements. This document was prepared with the design of the latest independent dry spent fuel storage installations in mind and was prepared specifically as an aid for designers of commercial nuclear facilities to help them understand the relevant international requirements that follow from a country’s safeguards agreement with

  14. Implementation of remove monitoring in facilities under safeguards with unattended systems

    SciTech Connect

    Beddingfield, David H; Nordquist, Heather A; Umebayaashi, Eiji

    2009-01-01

    Remote monitoring is being applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at nuclear facilities around the world. At the Monju Reactor in Japan we have designed, developed and implemented a remote monitoring approach that can serve as a model for applying remote monitoring to facilities that are already under full-scope safeguards using unattended instrumentation. Remote monitoring implementations have historically relied upon the use of specialized data collection hardware and system design features that integrate remote monitoring into the safeguards data collection system. The integration of remote monitoring and unattended data collection increases the complexity of safeguards data collection systems. This increase in complexity necessarily produces a corresponding reduction of system reliability compared to less-complex unattended monitoring systems. At the Monju facility we have implemented a remote monitoring system that is decoupled from the activity of safeguards data collection. In the completed system the function of remote data transfer is separated from the function of safeguards data collection. As such, a failure of the remote monitoring function cannot produce an associated loss of safeguards data, as is possible with integrated remote-monitoring implementations. Currently, all safeguards data from this facility is available to the IAEA on a 24/7 basis. This facility employs five radiation-based unattended systems, video surveillance and numerous optical seal systems. The implementation of remote monitoring at this facility, while increasing the complexity of the safeguards system, is designed to avoid any corresponding reduction in reliability of the safeguards data collection systems by having decoupled these functions. This design and implementation can serve as a model for implementation of remote monitoring at nuclear facilities that currently employ unattended safeguards systems.

  15. Project Report on Development of a Safeguards Approach for Pyroprocessing

    SciTech Connect

    Robert Bean

    2010-09-01

    The Idaho National Laboratory has undertaken an effort to develop a standard safeguards approach for international commercial pyroprocessing facilities. This report details progress for the fiscal year 2010 effort. A component by component diversion pathway analysis has been performed, and has led to insight on the mitigation needs and equipment development needed for a valid safeguards approach. The effort to develop an in-hot cell detection capability led to the digital cloud chamber, and more importantly, the significant potential scientific breakthrough of the inverse spectroscopy algorithm, including the ability to identify energy and spatial location of gamma ray emitting sources with a single, non-complex, stationary radiation detector system. Curium measurements were performed on historical and current samples at the FCF to attempt to determine the utility of using gross neutron counting for accountancy measurements. A solid cost estimate of equipment installation at FCF has been developed to guide proposals and cost allocations to use FCF as a test bed for safeguards measurement demonstrations. A combined MATLAB and MCNPX model has been developed to perform detector placement calculations around the electrorefiner. Early harvesting has occurred wherein the project team has been requested to provide pyroprocessing technology and safeguards short courses.

  16. Safeguards-by-Design: An Element of 3S Integration

    SciTech Connect

    R. S. Bean; T. A. Bjornard; D. J. Hebdich

    2009-04-01

    In 2008, the “20/20 Vision for the Future” background report by the IAEA Director General identified the possibility of integrating certain activities related to safeguards, safety, and security. Later in the year, the independent Commission report prepared at the request of the IAEA Director General noted that the Agency’s roles in nuclear safeguards, safety, and security (3S) complement and can mutually reinforce each other. Safeguards-by-design (SBD) is a practical measure that strengthens 3S integration, especially for the stage of nuclear facility design and construction, but also with ramifications for other stages of the facility life-cycle. This paper describes the SBD concept, with examples for diverse regulatory environments, being developed in the U.S under the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Next Generation Safeguards Initiative and the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative. This is compared with related international SBD work performed in the recent IAEA workshop on “Facility Design and Plant Operation Features that Facilitate the Implementation of IAEA Safeguards”. Potential future directions for further development of SBD and its integration within 3S are identified.

  17. Long-term proliferation and safeguards issues in future technologies

    SciTech Connect

    Keisch, B.; Auerbach, C.; Fainberg, A.; Fiarman, S.; Fishbone, L.G.; Higinbotham, W.A.; Lemley, J.R.; O'Brien, J.

    1986-02-01

    The purpose of the task was to assess the effect of potential new technologies, nuclear and non-nuclear, on safeguards needs and non-proliferation policies, and to explore possible solutions to some of the problems envisaged. Eight subdivisions were considered: New Enrichment Technologies; Non-Aqueous Reprocessing Technologies; Fusion; Accelerator-Driven Reactor Systems; New Reactor Types; Heavy Water and Deuterium; Long-Term Storage of Spent Fuel; and Other Future Technologies (Non-Nuclear). For each of these subdivisions, a careful review of the current world-wide effort in the field provided a means of subjectively estimating the viability and qualitative probability of fruition of promising technologies. Technologies for which safeguards and non-proliferation requirements have been thoroughly considered by others were not restudied here (e.g., the Fast Breeder Reactor). The time scale considered was 5 to 40 years for possible initial demonstration although, in some cases, a somewhat optimistic viewpoint was embraced. Conventional nuclear-material safeguards are only part of the overall non-proliferation regime. Other aspects are international agreements, export controls on sensitive technologies, classification of information, intelligence gathering, and diplomatic initiatives. The focus here is on safeguards, export controls, and classification.

  18. Safeguards equipment of the future integrated monitoring systems and remote monitoring

    SciTech Connect

    Sonnier, C.S.; Johnson, C.S.

    1994-08-01

    Becoming aware of the significant events of the past four years and their effect on the expectations to international safeguards, it is necessary to reflect on which direction the development of nuclear safeguards in a new era needs to take and the implications. The lime proven monitoring techniques, based on quantitative factor`s and demonstrated universal application, have shown their merit. However, the new expectations suggest a possibility that a future IAEA safeguards system could rely more heavily on the value of a comprehensive, transparent and open implementation regime. Within such a regime, the associated measures need to be determined and technological support identified. This paper will identify the proven techniques which, with appropriate implementation support, could most quickly make available additional measures for a comprehensive, transparent and open implementation regime. In particular, it will examine the future of Integrated Monitoring Systems and Remote Monitoring in international safeguards, including technical and other related factors.

  19. Recommended observational skills training for IAEA safeguards inspections. Final report: Recommended observational skills training for IAEA safeguards inspections

    SciTech Connect

    Toquam, J.L.; Morris, F.A.

    1994-09-01

    This is the second of two reports prepared to assist the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA or Agency) in enhancing the effectiveness of its international safeguards inspections through inspector training in {open_quotes}Observational Skills{close_quotes}. The first (Phase 1) report was essentially exploratory. It defined Observational Skills broadly to include all appropriate cognitive, communications, and interpersonal techniques that have the potential to help IAEA safeguards inspectors function more effectively. It identified 10 specific Observational Skills components, analyzed their relevance to IAEA safeguards inspections, and reviewed a variety of inspection programs in the public and private sectors that provide training in one or more of these components. The report concluded that while it should be possible to draw upon these other programs in developing Observational Skills training for IAEA inspectors, the approaches utilized in these programs will likely require significant adaption to support the specific job requirements, policies, and practices that define the IAEA inspector`s job. The overall objective of this second (Phase 2) report is to provide a basis for the actual design and delivery of Observational Skills training to IAEA inspectors. The more specific purposes of this report are to convey a fuller understanding of the potential application of Observational Skills to the inspector`s job, describe inspector perspectives on the relevance and importance of particular Observational Skills, identify the specific Observational Skill components that are most important and relevant to enhancing safeguards inspections, and make recommendations as to Observational Skills training for the IAEA`s consideration in further developing its Safeguards training program.

  20. IMPACT OF THE U.S. SUPPORT PROGRAM SAFEGUARDS INTERNSHIP PROGRAM.

    SciTech Connect

    PEPPER, S.; OSIECKI, C.

    2006-07-16

    The U.S. Support Program began funding an internship program in the IAEA Department of Safeguards in 2002. Since that time, 39 U.S. citizens and permanent residents have been placed in one-year, paid internships with the IAEA. The management of the internship program was originally the responsibility of the International Safeguards Project Office but was transferred to the Office of Educational Programs at Brookhaven National Laboratory in 2004. Feedback on the internship program from the U.S. government and the IAEA has been positive. The interns have completed basic yet essential work for the Department of Safeguards and freed IAEA staff members to perform more complex tasks. The cost of an intern is low relative to other forms of human resources support. After the conclusion of their assignments, many of the interns go on to work for the U.S. government, the national laboratories, or companies in international safeguards and nonproliferation. This paper will discuss the work done by the interns for the IAEA, factors influencing the success of the internship program, and the effects the program has had on the careers of interns, in preparing the next generation to work in the nuclear industry, participation in INMM activities, and recruitment for U.S. citizens for safeguards positions.

  1. Organizational Culture for Safety, Security, and Safeguards in New Nuclear Power Countries

    SciTech Connect

    Kovacic, Donald N

    2015-01-01

    This chapter will contain the following sections: Existing international norms and standards for developing the infrastructure to support new nuclear power programs The role of organizational culture and how it supports the safe, secure, and peaceful application of nuclear power Identifying effective and efficient strategies for implementing safety, security and safeguards in nuclear operations Challenges identified in the implementation of safety, security and safeguards Potential areas for future collaboration between countries in order to support nonproliferation culture

  2. Current Status of Helium-3 Alternative Technologies for Nuclear Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Henzlova, Daniela; Kouzes, R.; McElroy, R.; Peerani, P.; Aspinall, M.; Baird, K.; Bakel, A.; Borella, M.; Bourne, M.; Bourva, L.; Cave, F.; Chandra, R.; Chernikova, D.; Croft, S.; Dermody, G.; Dougan, A.; Ely, J.; Fanchini, E.; Finocchiaro, P.; Gavron, Victor; Kureta, M.; Ianakiev, Kiril Dimitrov; Ishiyama, K.; Lee, T.; Martin, Ch.; McKinny, K.; Menlove, Howard Olsen; Orton, Ch.; Pappalardo, A.; Pedersen, B.; Peranteau, D.; Plenteda, R.; Pozzi, S.; Schear, M.; Seya, M.; Siciliano, E.; Stave, S.; Sun, L.; Swinhoe, Martyn Thomas; Tagziria, H.; Vaccaro, S.; Takamine, J.; Weber, A. -L.; Yamaguchi, T.; Zhu, H.

    2015-12-01

    International safeguards inspectorates (e.g., International Atomic Energy Agency {IAEA}, or Euratom) rely heavily on neutron assay techniques, and in particular, on coincidence counters for the verification of declared nuclear materials under safeguards and for monitoring purposes. While 3He was readily available, the reliability, safety, ease of use, gamma-ray insensitivity, and high intrinsic thermal neutron detection efficiency of 3He-based detectors obviated the need for alternative detector technologies. However, the recent decline of the 3He gas supply has triggered international efforts to develop and field neutron detectors that make use of alternative materials. In response to this global effort, the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and Euratom launched a joint effort aimed at bringing together international experts, technology users and developers in the field of nuclear safeguards to discuss and evaluate the proposed 3He alternative materials and technologies. The effort involved a series of two workshops focused on detailed overviews and viability assessments of various 3He alternative technologies for use in nuclear safeguards applications. The key objective was to provide a platform for collaborative discussions and technical presentations organized in a compact, workshop-like format to stimulate interactions among the participants. The meetings culminated in a benchmark exercise providing a unique opportunity for the first inter-comparison of several available alternative technologies. This report provides an overview of the alternative technology efforts presented during the two workshops along with a summary of the benchmarking activities and results. The workshop recommendations and key consensus observations are discussed in the report, and used to outline a proposed path forward and future needs foreseeable in the area of 3

  3. Safeguards-by-Design: Guidance for High Temperature Gas Reactors (HTGRs) With Pebble Fuel

    SciTech Connect

    Philip Casey Durst; Mark Schanfein

    2012-08-01

    The following is a guidance document from a series prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), to assist facility designers and operators in implementing international Safeguards-by-Design (SBD). SBD has two main objectives: (1) to avoid costly and time consuming redesign work or retrofits of new nuclear fuel cycle facilities and (2) to make the implementation of international safeguards more effective and efficient at such facilities. In the long term, the attainment of these goals would save industry and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) time, money, and resources and be mutually beneficial. This particular safeguards guidance document focuses on pebble fuel high temperature gas reactors (HTGR). The purpose of the IAEA safeguards system is to provide credible assurance to the international community that nuclear material and other specified items are not diverted from peaceful nuclear uses. The safeguards system consists of the IAEA’s statutory authority to establish safeguards; safeguards rights and obligations in safeguards agreements and additional protocols; and technical measures implemented pursuant to those agreements. Of foremost importance is the international safeguards agreement between the country and the IAEA, concluded pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). According to a 1992 IAEA Board of Governors decision, countries must: notify the IAEA of a decision to construct a new nuclear facility as soon as such decision is taken; provide design information on such facilities as the designs develop; and provide detailed design information based on construction plans at least 180 days prior to the start of construction, and on "as-built" designs at least 180 days before the first receipt of nuclear material. Ultimately, the design information will be captured in an IAEA Design Information

  4. 45 CFR 164.308 - Administrative safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-10-01

    ... reporting discrepancies. (D) Password management (Addressable). Procedures for creating, changing, and safeguarding passwords. (6)(i) Standard: Security incident procedures. Implement policies and procedures...

  5. 21 CFR 26.21 - Safeguard clause.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-04-01

    ... OF PHARMACEUTICAL GOOD MANUFACTURING PRACTICE REPORTS, MEDICAL DEVICE QUALITY SYSTEM AUDIT REPORTS... Specific Sector Provisions for Pharmaceutical Good Manufacturing Practices § 26.21 Safeguard clause....

  6. 34 CFR 300.623 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... § 300.623 Safeguards. (a) Each participating agency must protect the confidentiality of personally... participating agency must assume responsibility for ensuring the confidentiality of any personally...

  7. 34 CFR 300.623 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... § 300.623 Safeguards. (a) Each participating agency must protect the confidentiality of personally... participating agency must assume responsibility for ensuring the confidentiality of any personally...

  8. 21 CFR 26.21 - Safeguard clause.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-04-01

    ... OF PHARMACEUTICAL GOOD MANUFACTURING PRACTICE REPORTS, MEDICAL DEVICE QUALITY SYSTEM AUDIT REPORTS... Specific Sector Provisions for Pharmaceutical Good Manufacturing Practices § 26.21 Safeguard clause. Each...

  9. 21 CFR 26.21 - Safeguard clause.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-04-01

    ... OF PHARMACEUTICAL GOOD MANUFACTURING PRACTICE REPORTS, MEDICAL DEVICE QUALITY SYSTEM AUDIT REPORTS... Specific Sector Provisions for Pharmaceutical Good Manufacturing Practices § 26.21 Safeguard clause. Each...

  10. 21 CFR 26.21 - Safeguard clause.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-04-01

    ... OF PHARMACEUTICAL GOOD MANUFACTURING PRACTICE REPORTS, MEDICAL DEVICE QUALITY SYSTEM AUDIT REPORTS... Specific Sector Provisions for Pharmaceutical Good Manufacturing Practices § 26.21 Safeguard clause. Each...

  11. 21 CFR 26.21 - Safeguard clause.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-04-01

    ... OF PHARMACEUTICAL GOOD MANUFACTURING PRACTICE REPORTS, MEDICAL DEVICE QUALITY SYSTEM AUDIT REPORTS... Specific Sector Provisions for Pharmaceutical Good Manufacturing Practices § 26.21 Safeguard clause. Each...

  12. Strengthening IAEA Safeguards: Challenges Ahead (437th Brookhaven Lecture)

    SciTech Connect

    Rosenthal, Michael

    2008-06-25

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), headquartered in Vienna, Austria, was established in 1957 to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to discourage its military use. The agency's success in halting nuclear proliferation and in enhancing nuclear safeguards and security have been recognized internationally, including with the 2005 Nobel Peace Prize awarded to the IAEA and its Director General. BNL has long had a role in the IAEA, by providing technical advice and assistance to its safeguards department. In fact, the IAEA's International Safeguards Project Office (ISPO) is headquartered at the Lab and is responsible for the management of U.S. programs supporting ISPO. In the 437th Brookhaven Lecture on Wednesday, June 25th, at 4 p.m. in Berkner Hall, physicist Michael Rosenthal of the Energy, Environment & National Security Directorate will discuss the challenges facing the IAEA and ISPO in light of the world political situation and today's tight budgets, and BNL's role in finding and implementing solutions.

  13. Fuzzy resource optimization for safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Zardecki, A.; Markin, J.T.

    1991-01-01

    Authorization, enforcement, and verification -- three key functions of safeguards systems -- form the basis of a hierarchical description of the system risk. When formulated in terms of linguistic rather than numeric attributes, the risk can be computed through an algorithm based on the notion of fuzzy sets. Similarly, this formulation allows one to analyze the optimal resource allocation by maximizing the overall detection probability, regarded as a linguistic variable. After summarizing the necessary elements of the fuzzy sets theory, we outline the basic algorithm. This is followed by a sample computation of the fuzzy optimization. 10 refs., 1 tab.

  14. Home-centered health-enabling technologies and regional health information systems. An integration approach based on international standards.

    PubMed

    Gietzelt, M; von Bargen, T; Kohlmann, M; Marschollek, M; Schwartze, J; Song, B; Wagner, M; Wolf, K-H; Haux, R

    2014-01-01

    This article is part of the Focus Theme of Methods of Information in Medicine on "Using Data from Ambient Assisted Living and Smart Homes in Electronic Health Records". In this paper, we present a prototype of a Home-Centered Health-Enabling Technology (HET-HC), which is able to capture, store, merge and process data from various sensor systems at people's home. In addition, we present an architecture designed to integrate HET-HC into an exemplary regional Health Information System (rHIS). rHIS are traditionally document-based to fit to the needs in a clinical context. However, HET-HC are producing continuous data streams for which documents might be an inappropriate representation. Therefore, the HET-HC could register placeholder-documents at rHIS. These placeholder-documents are assembled upon user-authenticated request by the HET-HC and are always up-to-date. Moreover, it is not trivial to find a clinical coding system for continuous sensor data and to make the data machine-readable in order to enhance the interoperability of such systems. Therefore, we propose the use of SNOCAP-HET, which is a nomenclature to describe the context of sensor-based measurements in health-enabling technologies. We present an architectural approach to integrate HET-HC into rHIS. Our solution is the centralized registration of placeholder-documents with rHIS and the decentralized data storage at people's home. We concluded that the presented architecture of integrating HET-HC into rHIS might fit well to the traditional approach of document-based data storage. Data security and privacy issues are also duly considered.

  15. Safeguards.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Taylor, Steve, Ed.; And Others

    1993-01-01

    This policy bulletin addresses the issue of protecting the safety of people with developmental disabilities from their increased risk of neglect, abuse, and mistreatment. An article by Steven J. Taylor considers "The Paradox of Regulations," noting both the protective effects of regulations and their effect in stifling innovation and…

  16. Separations and safeguards model integration.

    SciTech Connect

    Cipiti, Benjamin B.; Zinaman, Owen

    2010-09-01

    Research and development of advanced reprocessing plant designs can greatly benefit from the development of a reprocessing plant model capable of transient solvent extraction chemistry. This type of model can be used to optimize the operations of a plant as well as the designs for safeguards, security, and safety. Previous work has integrated a transient solvent extraction simulation module, based on the Solvent Extraction Process Having Interaction Solutes (SEPHIS) code developed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, with the Separations and Safeguards Performance Model (SSPM) developed at Sandia National Laboratory, as a first step toward creating a more versatile design and evaluation tool. The goal of this work was to strengthen the integration by linking more variables between the two codes. The results from this integrated model show expected operational performance through plant transients. Additionally, ORIGEN source term files were integrated into the SSPM to provide concentrations, radioactivity, neutron emission rate, and thermal power data for various spent fuels. This data was used to generate measurement blocks that can determine the radioactivity, neutron emission rate, or thermal power of any stream or vessel in the plant model. This work examined how the code could be expanded to integrate other separation steps and benchmark the results to other data. Recommendations for future work will be presented.

  17. Safeguards Envelope Progress FY09

    SciTech Connect

    Richard Metcalf; Robert Bean

    2009-09-01

    The Safeguards Envelope is a strategy to determine a set of specific operating parameters which nuclear facilities may operate within to maximize safeguards effectiveness without sacrificing safety or plant efficiency. This paper details advanced statistical techniques will be applied to real plant process monitoring (PM) data from the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP). As a result of the U.S. having no operating nuclear chemical reprocessing plants, there has been a strong interest in obtaining process monitoring data from the ICPP. The ICPP was shut down in 1996 and a recent effort has been made to retrieve the PM data from storage in a data mining effort. In a simulation based on this data, multi-tank and multi-attribute correlations were tested against synthetic diversion scenarios. Kernel regression smoothing was used to fit a curve to the historical data, and multivariable, residual analysis and cumulative sum techniques set parameters for operating conditions. Diversion scenarios were created and tested, showing improved results when compared with a previous study utilizing only one-variable Z- testing7.

  18. 28 CFR 25.8 - System safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 28 Judicial Administration 1 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false System safeguards. 25.8 Section 25.8 Judicial Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE INFORMATION SYSTEMS The National Instant Criminal Background Check System § 25.8 System safeguards. (a) Information maintained in the...

  19. 28 CFR 25.8 - System safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 28 Judicial Administration 1 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false System safeguards. 25.8 Section 25.8 Judicial Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE INFORMATION SYSTEMS The National Instant Criminal Background Check System § 25.8 System safeguards. (a) Information maintained in the...

  20. 28 CFR 25.8 - System safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 28 Judicial Administration 1 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false System safeguards. 25.8 Section 25.8 Judicial Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE INFORMATION SYSTEMS The National Instant Criminal Background Check System § 25.8 System safeguards. (a) Information maintained in the...

  1. 28 CFR 25.8 - System safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 28 Judicial Administration 1 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false System safeguards. 25.8 Section 25.8 Judicial Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE INFORMATION SYSTEMS The National Instant Criminal Background Check System § 25.8 System safeguards. (a) Information maintained in the...

  2. 38 CFR 18.436 - Procedural safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... or are believed to need special instruction or related services. The system shall include: (1) Notice... Adult Education § 18.436 Procedural safeguards. (a) A recipient that operates a public elementary or secondary education program shall implement a system of procedural safeguards with respect to...

  3. 17 CFR 39.18 - System safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-04-01

    ... 17 Commodity and Securities Exchanges 1 2012-04-01 2012-04-01 false System safeguards. 39.18... ORGANIZATIONS Compliance with Core Principles § 39.18 System safeguards. (a) Definitions. For purposes of this... means the metropolitan or other geographic area within which a derivatives clearing organization has...

  4. 34 CFR 104.36 - Procedural safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 34 Education 1 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Procedural safeguards. 104.36 Section 104.36 Education Regulations of the Offices of the Department of Education OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION... Preschool, Elementary, and Secondary Education § 104.36 Procedural safeguards. A recipient that operates...

  5. 5 CFR 2500.9 - Safeguarding.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 5 Administrative Personnel 3 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safeguarding. 2500.9 Section 2500.9 Administrative Personnel OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT INFORMATION SECURITY REGULATION § 2500.9 Safeguarding. The Office of Administration shall protect information in its...

  6. 32 CFR 154.68 - Safeguarding procedures.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 1 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Safeguarding procedures. 154.68 Section 154.68 National Defense Department of Defense OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE SECURITY DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PERSONNEL SECURITY PROGRAM REGULATION Safeguarding Personnel Security Investigative Records §...

  7. 5 CFR 2500.9 - Safeguarding.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 5 Administrative Personnel 3 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Safeguarding. 2500.9 Section 2500.9 Administrative Personnel OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT INFORMATION SECURITY REGULATION § 2500.9 Safeguarding. The Office of Administration shall protect information in its custody...

  8. Development of laser induced breakdown spectroscopy instrumentatin for safeguards applications

    SciTech Connect

    Barefield Il, James E; Clegg, Samuel M; Le, Loan A; Lopez, Leon N

    2010-01-01

    In September 2006, a Technical Meeting on Application of Laser Spectrometry Techniques in IAEA Safeguards was held at IAEA headquarters (HQ). One of the principal recommendations from this meeting was the need to 'pursue the development of novel complementary access instrumentation based on laser induced breakdown spectroscopy (LIBS) for the detection of gaseous and solid signatures and indicators of nuclear fuel cycle processes and associated materials.' Pursuant to this recommendation the Department of Safeguards (SG) under the Division of Technical Support (SGTS) convened the Experts and Users Advisory Meeting on Laser Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy (LIBS) for Safeguards Applications. This meeting was held at IAEA HQ from July 7-11,2008 and hosted by the Novel Technologies Unit (NTU). The meeting was attended by 12 LIBS experts from the Czech Republic, the European Commission, France, the Republic of Korea, the United States of America, Germany, the United Kingdom of Great Britain, Canada, and Northern Ireland. After a presentation of the needs of the IAEA inspectors, the LIBS experts were in agreement that needs as presented could be partially or fully fulfilled using LIBS instrumentation. The needs of the IAEA inspectors were grouped in the following broad categories: (1) Improvements to in-field measurements/environmental sampling; (2) Monitoring status of activity in a Hot Cell; (3) Verifying status of activity at a declared facility via process monitoring; and (4) Need for pre-screening of environmental samples before analysis. Under the Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) Los Alamos National Laboratory is exploring three potential applications of LIBS for international safeguards. As part of this work, we are developing: (1) a user-friendly man-portable LIBS system to characterize samples across a wide range of elements in the periodic table from hydrogen up to heavy elements

  9. A preliminary study on the safeguardability of a Korean advanced pyro-processing facility (KAPF)

    SciTech Connect

    Lee, S.Y.; Thomas, K.E.; Marlow, J.B.; Menlove, H.O.; Ko, W.I.; Yang, M.S.; Park, S.W.

    2007-07-01

    A preliminary study on the safeguardability of the Korean Advanced Pyro-processing Facility (KAPF) was performed. The main processes of the facility include voloxidation, electrolytic reduction, electrorefining, electrowinning, and salt recycling with a transuranic (TRU) recovery process. The subprocesses and material flow of the conceptually designed KAPF with a unit capacity of 100 tHM/year were analysed, and subsequently, the relevant material balance area (MBA) and key measurement point (KMP) were designed for material accounting. Uncertainty in material accounting was evaluated with designed MBA and KMP, together with measurement uncertainties of analytic methods identified for the KAPF. It was found that the major safeguards challenges were Pu input accountability and U/Pu inventory measurement at each subprocess. The continuous association of Pu with Cm presents measurement options in both cases. It was concluded that a safeguards system for the KAPF could be designed to meet the International Atomic Energy Agency's comprehensive safeguards objective. (authors)

  10. Safeguards and security issues for the disposition of fissile materials

    SciTech Connect

    Jaeger, C.D.; Moya, R.W.; Duggan, R.A.; Mangan, D.L.; Tolk, K.M.; Rutherford, D.; Fearey, B.; Moore, L.

    1995-07-01

    The Department of Energy`s Office of Fissile Material Disposition (FMD) is analyzing long-term storage and disposition options for surplus weapons-usable fissile materials, preparing a programmatic environmental impact statement (PEIS), preparing for a record of decision (ROD) regarding this material and conducting other activities. The primary security objectives of this program are to reduce major security risks and strengthen arms reduction and nonproliferation (NP). To help achieve these objectives, a safeguards and security (S&S) team consisting of participants from Sandia, Los Alamos, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories was established. The S&S activity for this program is a cross-cutting task which addresses all of the FMD program options. It includes both domestic and international safeguards and includes areas such as physical protection, nuclear materials accountability and material containment and surveillance. This paper will discuss the activities of the Fissile Materials Disposition Program (FMDP) S&S team as well as some specific S&S issues associated with various FMDP options/facilities. Some of the items to be discussed include the threat, S&S requirements, S&S criteria for assessing risk, S&S issues concerning fissile material processing/facilities, and international and domestic safeguards.

  11. RADIO FREQUENCY IDENTIFICATION DEVICES: EFFECTIVENESS IN IMPROVING SAFEGUARDS AT GAS-CENTRIFUGE URANIUM-ENRICHMENT PLANTS.

    SciTech Connect

    JOE,J.

    2007-07-08

    Recent advances in radio frequency identification devices (RFIDs) have engendered a growing interest among international safeguards experts. Potentially, RFIDs could reduce inspection work, viz. the number of inspections, number of samples, and duration of the visits, and thus improve the efficiency and effectiveness of international safeguards. This study systematically examined the applications of RFIDs for IAEA safeguards at large gas-centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs). These analyses are expected to help identify the requirements and desirable properties for RFIDs, to provide insights into which vulnerabilities matter most, and help formulate the required assurance tests. This work, specifically assesses the application of RFIDs for the ''Option 4'' safeguards approach, proposed by Bruce Moran, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), for large gas-centrifuge uranium-enrichment plants. The features of ''Option 4'' safeguards include placing RFIDs on all feed, product and tails (F/P/T) cylinders, along with WID readers in all FP/T stations and accountability scales. Other features of Moran's ''Option 4'' are Mailbox declarations, monitoring of load-cell-based weighing systems at the F/P/T stations and accountability scales, and continuous enrichment monitors. Relevant diversion paths were explored to evaluate how RFIDs improve the efficiency and effectiveness of safeguards. Additionally, the analysis addresses the use of RFIDs in conjunction with video monitoring and neutron detectors in a perimeter-monitoring approach to show that RFIDs can help to detect unidentified cylinders.

  12. Safeguards and retrievability from waste forms

    SciTech Connect

    Danker, W.

    1996-05-01

    This report describes issues discussed at a session from the PLutonium Stabilization and Immobilization Workshop related to safeguards and retrievability from waste forms. Throughout the discussion, the group probed the goals of disposition efforts, particularly an understanding of the {open_quotes}spent fuel standard{close_quotes}, since the disposition material form derives from these goals. The group felt strongly that not only the disposition goals but safeguards to meet these goals could affect the material form. Accordingly, the Department was encouraged to explore and apply safeguards as early in the implementation process as possible. It was emphasized that this was particularly true for any planned use of existing facilities. It is much easier to build safeguards approaches into the development of new facilities, than to backfit existing facilities. Accordingly, special safeguards challenges are likely to be encountered, given the cost and schedule advantages offered by use of existing facilities.

  13. Noble Gas Excimer Detectors for Security and Safeguards Applications

    SciTech Connect

    Hynes, Michael V.; Lanza, Richard; Chandra, Rico; Davatz, Giovanna

    2011-12-13

    Noble gas excimer detectors are a technology that is common in particle physics research and less common in applications for security and international safeguards. These detectors offer the capability to detect gammas with an energy resolution similar to NaI and to detect neutrons with good energy resolution as well. Depending on the noble gas selected and whether or not it is in a gaseous or liquid state, the sensitivity to gammas and neutrons can be tuned according to the needs of the application. All of this flexibility can be available at a significant cost saving over alternative technologies. This paper will review this detector technology and its applicability to security and safeguards.

  14. Safeguards: The past present, and future

    SciTech Connect

    Seaton, M.B.

    1987-07-01

    The non-destructive assay techniques developed at Los Alamos have become a primary means for verification by the IAEA and most important for domestic safeguards. We must challenge our assumptions, e.g., that inventory differences are a valid measure of safeguards performance, that more money is the solution, and the threats are much exaggerated. A human reliability program will be initiated. Material control, accounting, and physical protection need further integration. A serious effort involving scholarships, internships, etc. is needed to attract and motivate young people. Increased emphasis will be placed on designing safeguards into new systems such as laser isotope separation. Finally, continuing generous support for the IAEA is most important.

  15. Smarter radiation monitors for safeguards and security

    SciTech Connect

    Fehlau, P.E.; Pratt, J.C.; Markin, J.T.; Scurry, T. Jr.

    1983-01-01

    Radiation monitors for nuclear safeguards and security depend on internal control circuits to determine when diversion of special nuclear materials is taking place. Early monitors depended on analog circuits for this purpose, subsequently, digital logic controllers made better monitoring methods possible. Now, versatile microprocessor systems permit new, more efficient, and more useful monitoring methods. One such method is simple stepwise monitoring, which has variable alarm levels to expedite monitoring where extended monitoring periods are required. Another method, sequential probability ratio logic, tests data as it accumulates against two hypothesis - background, or background plus a transient diversion signal - and terminates monitoring as soon as a decision can be made that meets false-alarm and detection confidence requirements. A third method, quantitative monitoring for personnel, calculates count ratios of high- to low-energy gamma-ray regions to predict whether the material detected is a small quantity of bare material or a larger quantity of shielded material. In addition, microprocessor system subprograms can assist in detector calibration and trouble-shooting. Examples of subprograms are a variance analysis technique to set bias levels in plastic scintillators and a state-of-health routine for detecting malfunctions in digital circuit components.

  16. Nuclear Safeguards Infrastructure Required for the Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP)

    SciTech Connect

    Dr. Mark Schanfein; Philip Casey Durst

    2012-07-01

    The Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP) is a Very High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor (VHTR) to be constructed near Idaho Falls, Idaho The NGNP is intrinsically safer than current reactors and is planned for startup ca. 2021 Safety is more prominent in the minds of the Public and Governing Officials following the nuclear reactor meltdown accidents in Fukushima, Japan The authors propose that the NGNP should be designed with International (IAEA) Safeguards in mind to support export to Non-Nuclear-Weapons States There are two variants of the NGNP design; one using integral Prismatic-shaped fuel assemblies in a fixed core; and one using recirculating fuel balls (or Pebbles) The following presents the infrastructure required to safeguard the NGNP This infrastructure is required to safeguard the Prismatic and Pebble-fueled NGNP (and other HTGR/VHTR) The infrastructure is based on current Safeguards Requirements and Practices implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for similar reactors The authors of this presentation have worked for decades in the area of International Nuclear Safeguards and are recognized experts in this field Presentation for INMM conference in July 2012.

  17. Safeguards by design - industry engagement for new uranium enrichment facilities in the United States

    SciTech Connect

    Demuth, Scott F; Grice, Thomas; Lockwood, Dunbar

    2010-01-01

    The United States Department of Energy's (DOE's) Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24) has initiated a Safeguards by Design (SBD) effort to encourage the incorporation of international (IAEA) safeguards features early in the design phase of a new nuclear facility in order to avoid the need to redesign or retrofit the facility at a later date. The main goals of Safeguards by Design are to (1) make the implementation of international safeguards at new civil nuclear facilities more effective and efficient, (2) avoid costly and time-consuming re-design work or retrofits at such facilities and (3) design such facilities in a way that makes proliferation as technically difficult, as time-consuming, and as detectable as possible. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has recently hosted efforts to facilitate the use of Safeguards by Design for new uranium enrichment facilities currently being planned for construction in the U.S. While SBD is not a NRC requirement, the NRC is aiding the implementation of SBD by coordinating discussions between DOE's NA-24 and industry's facility design teams. More specifically, during their normal course of licensing discussions the NRC has offered industry the opportunity to engage with NA-24 regarding SBD.

  18. Protecting children: the role of the law 2. Legal powers to safeguard children.

    PubMed

    Griffith, Richard; Tengnah, Cassam

    2007-04-01

    Last month's article on child protection considered the principles and key concepts that underpinned the approach to safeguarding children under the provisions of the Children Act 1989. This month Richard Griffith and Cassam Tengnah discuss the legal powers available under the Act that enable the proper authorities to intervene to protect children from significant harm.

  19. Security Management and Safeguards Office

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Bewley, Nathaniel M.

    2004-01-01

    The Security Management and Safeguards Office at NASA is here to keep the people working in a safe environment. They also are here to protect the buildings and documents from sabotage, espionage, and theft. During the summer of 2004, I worked with Richard Soppet in Physical Security. While I was working here I helped out with updating the map that we currently use at NASA Glenn Research Center, attended meetings for homeland security, worked with the security guards and the locksmith. The meetings that I attended for homeland security talked about how to protect ourselves before something happened, they told us to always be on the guard and look for anything suspicious, and the different ways that terrorist groups operate. When I was with the security guards I was taught how to check someone into the base, showed how to use a radar gun, observed a security guard make a traffic stop for training and was with them while they patrolled NASA Glenn Research Center to make sure things were running smooth and no one was in danger. When I was with the lock smith I was taught how to make keys and locks for the employees here at NASA. The lock smith also showed me that he had inventory cabinets of files that show how many keys were out to people and who currently has access to the rooms that they keys were made for. I also helped out the open house at NASA Glenn Research Center. I helped out by showing the Army Reserves, and Brook Park's SWAT team where all the main events were going to take place a week before the open house was going to begin. Then during the open house I helped out by making sure people had there IDS, checked through there bags, and handed out a map to them that showed where the different activities were going to take place. So the main job here at NASA Glenn Research Center for the Security Management and Safeguards Office is to make sure that nothing is stolen, sabotaged, and espionaged. Also most importantly make sure all the employees here at NASA are

  20. Security Management and Safeguards Office

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Bewley, Nathaniel M.

    2004-01-01

    The Security Management and Safeguards Office at NASA is here to keep the people working in a safe environment. They also are here to protect the buildings and documents from sabotage, espionage, and theft. During the summer of 2004, I worked with Richard Soppet in Physical Security. While I was working here I helped out with updating the map that we currently use at NASA Glenn Research Center, attended meetings for homeland security, worked with the security guards and the locksmith. The meetings that I attended for homeland security talked about how to protect ourselves before something happened, they told us to always be on the guard and look for anything suspicious, and the different ways that terrorist groups operate. When I was with the security guards I was taught how to check someone into the base, showed how to use a radar gun, observed a security guard make a traffic stop for training and was with them while they patrolled NASA Glenn Research Center to make sure things were running smooth and no one was in danger. When I was with the lock smith I was taught how to make keys and locks for the employees here at NASA. The lock smith also showed me that he had inventory cabinets of files that show how many keys were out to people and who currently has access to the rooms that they keys were made for. I also helped out the open house at NASA Glenn Research Center. I helped out by showing the Army Reserves, and Brook Park's SWAT team where all the main events were going to take place a week before the open house was going to begin. Then during the open house I helped out by making sure people had there IDS, checked through there bags, and handed out a map to them that showed where the different activities were going to take place. So the main job here at NASA Glenn Research Center for the Security Management and Safeguards Office is to make sure that nothing is stolen, sabotaged, and espionaged. Also most importantly make sure all the employees here at NASA are

  1. 22 CFR 9.13 - Safeguarding.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-04-01

    ... Relations DEPARTMENT OF STATE GENERAL SECURITY INFORMATION REGULATIONS § 9.13 Safeguarding. Specific controls on the use, processing, storage, reproduction, and transmittal of classified information within the Department to provide protection for such information and to prevent access by...

  2. 22 CFR 9.13 - Safeguarding.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-04-01

    ... Relations DEPARTMENT OF STATE GENERAL SECURITY INFORMATION REGULATIONS § 9.13 Safeguarding. Specific controls on the use, processing, storage, reproduction, and transmittal of classified information within the Department to provide protection for such information and to prevent access by...

  3. Safeguards Workforce Repatriation, Retention and Utilization

    SciTech Connect

    Gallucci, Nicholas; Poe, Sarah

    2015-10-01

    Brookhaven National Laboratory was tasked by NA-241 to assess the transition of former IAEA employees back to the United States, investigating the rate of retention and overall smoothness of the repatriation process among returning safeguards professionals. Upon conducting several phone interviews, study authors found that the repatriation process went smoothly for the vast majority and that workforce retention was high. However, several respondents expressed irritation over the minimal extent to which their safeguards expertise had been leveraged in their current positions. This sentiment was pervasive enough to prompt a follow-on study focusing on questions relating to the utilization rather than the retention of safeguards professionals. A second, web-based survey was conducted, soliciting responses from a larger sample pool. Results suggest that the safeguards workforce may be oversaturated, and that young professionals returning to the United States from Agency positions may soon encounter difficulties finding jobs in the field.

  4. 34 CFR 104.36 - Procedural safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... Preschool, Elementary, and Secondary Education § 104.36 Procedural safeguards. A recipient that operates a... to actions regarding the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of persons who, because...

  5. 34 CFR 303.415 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... Intervention Records § 303.415 Safeguards. (a) Each participating agency must protect the confidentiality of... stages. (b) One official at each participating agency must assume responsibility for ensuring...

  6. 34 CFR 303.415 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... Intervention Records § 303.415 Safeguards. (a) Each participating agency must protect the confidentiality of... stages. (b) One official at each participating agency must assume responsibility for ensuring...

  7. The Concept of Goals-Driven Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    R. Wigeland; T Bjornard; B. Castle

    2009-02-01

    The IAEA, NRC, and DOE regulations and requirements for safeguarding nuclear material and facilities have been reviewed and each organization’s purpose, objectives, and scope are discussed in this report. Current safeguards approaches are re-examined considering technological advancements and how these developments are changing safeguards approaches used by these organizations. Additionally, the physical protection approaches required by the IAEA, NRC, and DOE were reviewed and the respective goals, objectives, and requirements are identified and summarized in this report. From these, a brief comparison is presented showing the high-level similarities among these regulatory organizations’ approaches to physical protection. The regulatory documents used in this paper have been assembled into a convenient reference library called the Nuclear Safeguards and Security Reference Library. The index of that library is included in this report, and DVDs containing the full library are available.

  8. 7 CFR 987.59 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safeguards. 987.59 Section 987.59 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued) AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERVICE (Marketing Agreements... objectives of this part. Reports and Records ...

  9. Training course on nuclear material safeguards for enrichment plants, Vienna, Austria, November 14--18, 1988: Report of foreign travel

    SciTech Connect

    Cooley, J.N.; Swindle, D.W. Jr.; Von Halle, E.

    1989-02-01

    J. N. Cooley, manager, Safeguards Studies Department; E. Von Halle, head, Technical Resources Section; and D. W. Swindle, Jr., director, International Technology Programs Division, Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., traveled to Vienna, Austria, November 9--20, 1988, to conduct a 5-day uranium enrichment safeguards training course for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The course was developed and conducted by Energy Systems for the IAEA through the US. Program for Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards (POTAS) under Task B.48. Titled ''Nuclear Material Safeguards for Enrichment Plants,'' this second session of the course was held on November 14--18, 1988, for 15 IAEA inspectorate and support division personnel. The course was developed and initially taught in 1987 to train IAEA professionals whose responsibilities require knowledge of safeguarding nuclear material at enrichment plants on the safeguards-relevant principles of enrichment technology, particularly as related to centrifuge enrichment facilities. Based on comments received during initial training session, the course and reference materials were revised, updated, and expanded. The main objective of the course is to provide participants with the necessary skills to perform their inspection activities at enrichment plants. Overall, the course was very well received; the four-part course manual was especially appreciated because of the text accompanying the view graphs. The general consensus was that the course should be repeated so that inspectors who could not be accommodated in this session will have a chance to be trained in this important area of safeguards.

  10. Biodegradable internal fixation plates enabled with X-ray visibility by a radiopaque layer of β-tricalcium phosphate and poly (lactic-co-glycolic acid).

    PubMed

    Shasteen, Catherine; Park, Keun Yung; Kwong, Seok Min; Jung, Sun Young; Lee, Seung Ho; Park, Chun Gwon; Kim, Myung Hun; Kim, Sukwha; Son, Woo-Chan; Choi, Tae Hyun; Choy, Young Bin

    2013-02-01

    Biodegradable polymer plates can be clinically used as an alternative to metal plates (e.g., titanium) for internal fixation, which, however, are not visible with X-ray imaging, often used for post-operative diagnostics. In this study, therefore, we prepared a biodegradable plate enabled with X-ray visibility by attaching a radiopaque layer on a biodegradable fixation plate in clinical use (Inion, Finland). A radiopaque layer was made of a fine powder of a radiopaque agent, β-tricalcium phosphate (TCP) and a biodegradable binder material, poly (lactic-co-glycolic acid) (PLGA), which were physically mixed without change in their chemical structure. The radiopacity increased as we increased the layer thicknesses from 0.5 mm to 1.3 mm. Regardless of layer thickness, however, the radiopacity decreased with time both in vitro and in vivo due to decreasing density of TCP in the layer by swelling and degradation of a binder material, PLGA. The in vivo study with rabbits revealed that a discernible image of the radiopaque plate could be obtained by X-ray for up to 21 days, also showing the overall biocompatibility 6 months after implantation. Therefore, we conclude that the radiopaque plate prepared in this work is a promising fixation device enabled with both X-ray visibility and biodegradability. Copyright © 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

  11. Safeguards Envelope: The First Steps

    SciTech Connect

    Richard Metcalf; Jean Ragusa; Robert Bean

    2008-03-01

    The possibility exists for real time accountancy and assay of nuclear materials as they move through a reprocessing facility. This project aims to establish working parameters and local figures of merit to identify possible diversion in real time with minimal operational impact. Factors such as pH, NOX gas concentration, flow speeds and radiation fields are rarely taken into account in safeguards methodologies and will be included to increase the confidence of location and assay of nuclear materials. An adaptable, real data model is being created of the contactors of the Advanced Fuel Cycle Facility and will be analyzed using the appropriate modeling codes. This model will then be subjected to three, diversion scenarios and a figure of merit methodology will be utilized to create the operational parameters under which these diversion scenarios would be detected. This analysis for figure of merit methodology will include statistical fluctuations, operator error, and a rudimentary analysis of transient conditions. The long term goal of the project includes expansion universally over the plant, methods of detection without requiring access to proprietary information, and an evaluation of the requirements for future figure of merit methodologies.

  12. Long-Term Information Management (LTIM) of Safeguards Data at Repositories: Phase II

    SciTech Connect

    Haddal, Risa N.

    2016-10-01

    One of the challenges of implementing safeguards for geological repositories will be the long-term preservation of safeguards-related data for 100 years or more. While most countries considering the construction and operation of such facilities agree that safeguards information should be preserved, there are gaps with respect to standardized requirements, guidelines, timescales, and approaches. This study analyzes those gaps and explores research to clarify stakeholder needs, identify current policies, approaches, best practices and international standards, and explores existing safeguards information management infrastructure. The study also attempts to clarify what a safeguards data classification system might look like, how long data should be retained, and how information should be exchanged between stakeholders at different phases of a repository’s life cycle. The analysis produced a variety of recommendations on what information to preserve, how to preserve it, where to store it, retention options and how to exchange information in the long term. Key findings include the use of the globally recognized international records management standard, ISO15489, for guidance on the development of information management systems, and the development of a Key Information File (KIF). The KIF could be used to identify only the most relevant, high-level safeguards information and the history of decision making about the repository. The study also suggests implementing on-site and off-site records storage in digital and physical form; developing a safeguards data classification system; long-term records retention with periodic reviews every 5 to 10 years during each phase of the repository life cycle; and establishing transition procedures well in advance so that data shepherds and records officers can transfer information with incoming facility managers effectively and efficiently. These and other recommendations are further analyzed in this study.

  13. The Internal Audit.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Kuhn, Robert H.

    1981-01-01

    Internal control comprises the plan of organization and all the coordinate methods and measures adopted within a school system to safeguard its assets, check the reliability of its accounting data, promote operational efficiency, and encourage adherence to prescribed policies. (Author)

  14. The Internal Audit.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Kuhn, Robert H.

    1981-01-01

    Internal control comprises the plan of organization and all the coordinate methods and measures adopted within a school system to safeguard its assets, check the reliability of its accounting data, promote operational efficiency, and encourage adherence to prescribed policies. (Author)

  15. Strengthening IAEA safeguards in an era of nuclear cooperation

    SciTech Connect

    Hooper, R.

    1995-11-01

    Since the end of the Cold War the world has witnessed a remarkable series of events demonstrating that universal adherence to the principles of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament are no longer utopian dreams. The author reviews the actions of various countries to terminate or reduce nuclear weapons programs and those that are resisting the non-proliferation efforts. The author addresses efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to safeguard declared nuclear material more cost-effectively and deal with the possibility of undeclared nuclear activities.

  16. RECRUITMENT OF U.S. CITIZENS FOR VACANCIES IN IAEA SAFEGUARDS

    SciTech Connect

    PEPPER,S.E.; DECARO,D.; WILLIAMS,G.; CARELLI,J.; ASSUR,M.

    1999-07-25

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) relies on its member states to assist with recruiting qualified individuals for positions within the IAEA's secretariat. It is important that persons within and outside the US nuclear and safeguards industries become aware of career opportunities available at the IAEA, and informed about important vacancies. The IAEA has established an impressive web page to advertise opportunities for employment. However, additional effort is necessary to ensure that there is sufficient awareness in the US of these opportunities, and assistance for persons interested in taking positions at the IAEA. In 1998, the Subgroup on Safeguards Technical Support (SSTS) approved a special task under the US Support Program to IAEA Safeguards (USSP) for improving US efforts to identify qualified candidates for vacancies in IAEA's Department of Safeguards. The International Safeguards Project Office (ISPO) developed a plan that includes increased advertising, development of a web page to support US recruitment efforts, feedback from the US Mission in Vienna, and interaction with other recruitment services provided by US professional organizations. The main purpose of this effort is to educate US citizens about opportunities at the IAEA so that qualified candidates can be identified for the IAEA's consideration.

  17. Building a Successful Machine Safeguarding Program

    SciTech Connect

    McConnell, S

    2003-03-06

    Safeguarding hazards associated with machines is a goal common to all health and safety professionals. Whether the individual is new to the safety field or has held associated responsibilities for a period of time, safeguarding personnel who work with or around machine tools and equipment should be considered an important aspect of the job. Although significant progress has been made in terms of safeguarding machines since the era prior to the organized safety movement, companies continue to be cited by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and workers continue to be injured, even killed by machine tools and equipment. In the early 1900s, it was common practice to operate transmission machinery (gears, belts, pulleys, shafting, etc.) completely unguarded. At that time, the countersunk set screw used on shafting had not been invented and projecting set screws were involved in many horrific accidents. Manufacturers built machines with little regard for worker safety. Workers were killed or seriously injured before definitive actions were taken to improve safety in the workplace. Many states adopted legislation aimed at requiring machine guarding and improved injury reduction. The first patent for a machine safeguard was issued in 1868 for a mechanical interlock. Other patents followed. As methods for safeguarding machinery and tools were developed, standards were written and programs were set up to monitor factories for compliance. Many of those standards continue to govern how we protect workers today. It is common to see machine tools built in the forties, fifties and sixties being used in machine shops today. In terms of safeguarding, these machines may be considered poorly designed, improperly safeguarded or simply unguarded. In addition to the potential threat of an OSHA citation, these conditions expose the operator to serious hazards that must be addressed. The safety professional can help line management determine workable solutions for

  18. Safeguard monitoring of direct electrolytic reduction

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Jurovitzki, Abraham L.

    Nuclear power is regaining global prominence as a sustainable energy source as the world faces the consequences of depending on limited fossil based, CO2 emitting fuels. A key component to achieving this sustainability is to implement a closed nuclear fuel cycle. Without achieving this goal, a relatively small fraction of the energy value in nuclear fuel is actually utilized. This involves recycling of spent nuclear fuel (SNF)---separating fissile actinides from waste products and using them to fabricate fresh fuel. Pyroprocessing is a viable option being developed for this purpose with a host of benefits compared to other recycling options, such as PUREX. Notably, pyroprocessing is ill suited to separate pure plutonium from spent fuel and thus has non-proliferation benefits. Pyroprocessing involves high temperature electrochemical and chemical processing of SNF in a molten salt electrolyte. During this batch process, several intermediate and final streams are produced that contain radioactive material. While pyroprocessing is ineffective at separating pure plutonium, there are various process misuse scenarios that could result in diversion of impure plutonium into one or more of these streams. This is a proliferation risk that should be addressed with innovative safeguards technology. One approach to meeting this challenge is to develop real time monitoring techniques that can be implemented in the hot cells and coupled with the various unit operations involved with pyroprocessing. Current state of the art monitoring techniques involve external chemical assaying which requires sample removal from these unit operations. These methods do not meet International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) timeliness requirements. In this work, a number of monitoring techniques were assessed for their viability as online monitoring tools. A hypothetical diversion scenario for the direct electrolytic reduction process was experimentally verified (using Nd2O3 as a surrogate for PuO2

  19. SAFEGUARDS ENVELOPE: PREVIOUS WORK AND EXAMPLES

    SciTech Connect

    Richard Metcalf; Aaron Bevill; William Charlton; Robert Bean

    2008-07-01

    The future expansion of nuclear power will require not just electricity production but fuel cycle facilities such as fuel fabrication and reprocessing plants. As large reprocessing facilities are built in various states, they must be built and operated in a manner to minimize the risk of nuclear proliferation. Process monitoring has returned to the spotlight as an added measure that can increase confidence in the safeguards of special nuclear material (SNM). Process monitoring can be demonstrated to lengthen the allowable inventory period by reducing accountancy requirements, and to reduce the false positive indications. The next logical step is the creation of a Safeguards Envelope, a set of operational parameters and models to maximize anomaly detection and inventory period by process monitoring while minimizing operator impact and false positive rates. A brief example of a rudimentary Safeguards Envelope is presented, and shown to detect synthetic diversions overlaying a measured processing plant data set. This demonstration Safeguards Envelope is shown to increase the confidence that no SNM has been diverted with minimal operator impact, even though it is based on an information sparse environment. While the foundation on which a full Safeguards Envelope can be built has been presented in historical demonstrations of process monitoring, several requirements remain yet unfulfilled. Future work will require reprocessing plant transient models, inclusion of “non-traditional” operating data, and exploration of new methods of identifying subtle events in transient processes.

  20. Fundamentals of materials accounting for nuclear safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Pillay, K.K.S.

    1989-04-01

    Materials accounting is essential to providing the necessary assurance for verifying the effectiveness of a safeguards system. The use of measurements, analyses, records, and reports to maintain knowledge of the quantities of nuclear material present in a defined area of a facility and the use of physical inventories and materials balances to verify the presence of special nuclear materials are collectively known as materials accounting for nuclear safeguards. This manual, prepared as part of the resource materials for the Safeguards Technology Training Program of the US Department of Energy, addresses fundamental aspects of materials accounting, enriching and complementing them with the first-hand experiences of authors from varied disciplines. The topics range from highly technical subjects to site-specific system designs and policy discussions. This collection of papers is prepared by more than 25 professionals from the nuclear safeguards field. Representing research institutions, industries, and regulatory agencies, the authors create a unique resource for the annual course titled ''Materials Accounting for Nuclear Safeguards,'' which is offered at the Los Alamos National Laboratory.

  1. 77 FR 3922 - Rules for Investigations Relating to Global and Bilateral Safeguards Actions, Market Disruption...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2012-01-26

    ..., Market Disruption, Trade Diversion, and Review of Relief Actions AGENCY: United States International... governing investigations relating to global and bilateral safeguard actions, market disruption, trade... DISRUPTION, AND REVIEW OF RELIEF ACTIONS Section 206.1 of subpart 206, which lists the statutory...

  2. 42 CFR 431.305 - Types of information to be safeguarded.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-10-01

    ... 42 Public Health 4 2014-10-01 2014-10-01 false Types of information to be safeguarded. 431.305 Section 431.305 Public Health CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN... section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code, as applicable. (7) Any information received in connection...

  3. The Safeguards Evaluation Method for evaluating vulnerability to insider threats

    SciTech Connect

    Al-Ayat, R.A.; Judd, B.R.; Renis, T.A.

    1986-01-01

    As protection of DOE facilities against outsiders increases to acceptable levels, attention is shifting toward achieving comparable protection against insiders. Since threats and protection measures for insiders are substantially different from those for outsiders, new perspectives and approaches are needed. One such approach is the Safeguards Evaluation Method. This method helps in assessing safeguards vulnerabilities to theft or diversion of special nuclear material (SNM) by insiders. The Safeguards Evaluation Method-Insider Threat is a simple model that can be used by safeguards and security planners to evaluate safeguards and proposed upgrades at their own facilities. A discussion of the Safeguards Evaluation Method is presented in this paper.

  4. Safeguards-by-Design:Guidance for High Temperature Gas Reactors (HTGRs) With Prismatic Fuel

    SciTech Connect

    Mark Schanfein; Casey Durst

    2012-11-01

    Introduction and Purpose The following is a guidance document from a series prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), to assist facility designers and operators in implementing international Safeguards-by-Design (SBD). SBD has two main objectives: (1) to avoid costly and time consuming redesign work or retrofits of new nuclear fuel cycle facilities and (2) to make the implementation of international safeguards more effective and efficient at such facilities. In the long term, the attainment of these goals would save industry and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) time, money, and resources and be mutually beneficial. This particular safeguards guidance document focuses on prismatic fuel high temperature gas reactors (HTGR). The purpose of the IAEA safeguards system is to provide credible assurance to the international community that nuclear material and other specified items are not diverted from peaceful nuclear uses. The safeguards system consists of the IAEA’s statutory authority to establish safeguards; safeguards rights and obligations in safeguards agreements and additional protocols; and technical measures implemented pursuant to those agreements. Of foremost importance is the international safeguards agreement between the country and the IAEA, concluded pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). According to a 1992 IAEA Board of Governors decision, countries must: notify the IAEA of a decision to construct a new nuclear facility as soon as such decision is taken; provide design information on such facilities as the designs develop; and provide detailed design information based on construction plans at least 180 days prior to the start of construction, and on "as-built" designs at least 180 days before the first receipt of nuclear material. Ultimately, the design information will be captured in an IAEA

  5. 64Cu antibody-targeting of the T-cell receptor and subsequent internalization enables in vivo tracking of lymphocytes by PET

    PubMed Central

    Griessinger, Christoph M.; Maurer, Andreas; Kesenheimer, Christian; Kehlbach, Rainer; Reischl, Gerald; Ehrlichmann, Walter; Bukala, Daniel; Harant, Maren; Cay, Funda; Brück, Jürgen; Nordin, Renate; Kohlhofer, Ursula; Rammensee, Hans-Georg; Quintanilla-Martinez, Leticia; Schaller, Martin; Röcken, Martin; Pichler, Bernd J.; Kneilling, Manfred

    2015-01-01

    T cells are key players in inflammation, autoimmune diseases, and immunotherapy. Thus, holistic and noninvasive in vivo characterizations of the temporal distribution and homing dynamics of lymphocytes in mammals are of special interest. Herein, we show that PET-based T-cell labeling facilitates quantitative, highly sensitive, and holistic monitoring of T-cell homing patterns in vivo. We developed a new T-cell receptor (TCR)-specific labeling approach for the intracellular labeling of mouse T cells. We found that continuous TCR plasma membrane turnover and the endocytosis of the specific 64Cu-monoclonal antibody (mAb)–TCR complex enables a stable labeling of T cells. The TCR–mAb complex was internalized within 24 h, whereas antigen recognition was not impaired. Harmful effects of the label on the viability, DNA-damage and apoptosis-necrosis induction, could be minimized while yielding a high contrast in in vivo PET images. We were able to follow and quantify the specific homing of systemically applied 64Cu-labeled chicken ovalbumin (cOVA)-TCR transgenic T cells into the pulmonary and perithymic lymph nodes (LNs) of mice with cOVA-induced airway delayed-type hypersensitivity reaction (DTHR) but not into pulmonary and perithymic LNs of naïve control mice or mice diseased from turkey or pheasant OVA-induced DTHR. Our protocol provides consequent advancements in the detection of small accumulations of immune cells in single LNs and specific homing to the sites of inflammation by PET using the internalization of TCR-specific mAbs as a specific label of T cells. Thus, our labeling approach is applicable to other cells with constant membrane receptor turnover. PMID:25587131

  6. Possible Nuclear Safeguards Applications: Workshop on Next-Generation Laser Compton Gamma Source

    SciTech Connect

    Durham, J. Matthew

    2016-11-17

    These are a set of slides for the development of a next-generation photon source white paper. The following topics are covered in these slides: Nuclear Safeguards; The Nuclear Fuel Cycle; Precise isotopic determination via NRF; UF6 Enrichment Assay; and Non-Destructive Assay of Spent Nuclear Fuel. In summary: A way to non-destructively measure precise isotopics of ~kg and larger samples has multiple uses in nuclear safeguards; Ideally this is a compact, fieldable device that can be used by international inspectors. Must be rugged and reliable; A next-generation source can be used as a testing ground for these techniques as technology develops.

  7. IAEA Safeguards and technical support programs: POTAS in the 1990s

    SciTech Connect

    Kessler, C.J. . Office of Nuclear Technology and Safeguards); Reisman, A.W. )

    1991-01-01

    The US Program of Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards (POTAS) has since 1978 provided technology and technical assistance to the IAEA to support its nuclear safeguards activities. The present level of support, $6.9 million per year, equals 10% of the Department of Safeguards annual budget. During the next decade, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will face new technical challenges in carrying out its verification activities. To help the IAEA acquire the technology and other technical support that it will require in the 1990s, POTAS expects to continue its assistance, both in the areas established in the past and in additional areas dictated by newly identified IAEA safeguards requirements. This paper will look at the political and policy context within which the Department of Safeguards, and hence POTAS, operates, and how that context is expected to evolve over the next decade. The roles and functions of POTAS will be identified and discussed in terms of their historical evolution. Lastly, the paper will consider how POTAS is expected to change during the 1990s, both to maintain effectiveness in existing roles and functions, and to meet the challenge of the changing policy context. 5 refs.

  8. Advanced Nuclear Measurements - Sensitivity Analysis Emerging Safeguards, Problems and Proliferation Risk

    SciTech Connect

    Dreicer, J.S.

    1999-07-15

    During the past year this component of the Advanced Nuclear Measurements LDRD-DR has focused on emerging safeguards problems and proliferation risk by investigating problems in two domains. The first is related to the analysis, quantification, and characterization of existing inventories of fissile materials, in particular, the minor actinides (MA) formed in the commercial fuel cycle. Understanding material forms and quantities helps identify and define future measurement problems, instrument requirements, and assists in prioritizing safeguards technology development. The second problem (dissertation research) has focused on the development of a theoretical foundation for sensor array anomaly detection. Remote and unattended monitoring or verification of safeguards activities is becoming a necessity due to domestic and international budgetary constraints. However, the ability to assess the trustworthiness of a sensor array has not been investigated. This research is developing an anomaly detection methodology to assess the sensor array.

  9. Nuclear proliferation-resistance and safeguards for future nuclear fuel cycle

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Kuno, Y.; Inoue, N.; Senzaki, M.

    2009-03-01

    Corresponding to the world nuclear security concerns, future nuclear fuel cycle (NFC) should have high proliferation-resistance (PR) and physical protection (PP), while promotion of the peaceful use of the nuclear energy must not be inhibited. In order to accomplish nuclear non-proliferation from NFC, a few models of the well-PR systems should be developed so that international community can recognize them as worldwide norms. To find a good balance of 'safeguard-ability (so-called extrinsic measure or institutional barrier)' and 'impede-ability (intrinsic feature or technical barrier)' will come to be essential for NFC designers to optimize civilian nuclear technology with nuclear non-proliferation, although the advanced safeguards with high detectability can still play a dominant role for PR in the states complying with full institutional controls. Accomplishment of such goal in a good economic efficiency is a future key challenge.

  10. Defining the needs for gas centrifuge enrichment plants advanced safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Boyer, Brian David; Erpenbeck, Heather H; Miller, Karen A; Swinhoe, Martyn T; Ianakiev, Kiril; Marlow, Johnna B

    2010-04-05

    Current safeguards approaches used by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs) need enhancement in order to verify declared low-enriched (LEU) production, detect undeclared LEU production and detect highly enriched uranium (HEU) production with adequate detection probability using nondestructive assay (NDA) techniques. At present inspectors use attended systems, systems needing the presence of an inspector for operation, during inspections to verify the mass and {sup 235}U enrichment of declared UF{sub 6} containers used in the process of enrichment at GCEPs. In verifying declared LEU production, the inspectors also take samples for off-site destructive assay (DA) which provide accurate data, with 0.1% to 0.5% measurement uncertainty, on the enrichment of the UF{sub 6} feed, tails, and product. However, taking samples of UF{sub 6} for off-site analysis is a much more labor and resource intensive exercise for the operator and inspector. Furthermore, the operator must ship the samples off-site to the IAEA laboratory which delays the timeliness of results and interruptions to the continuity of knowledge (CofK) of the samples during their storage and transit. This paper contains an analysis of possible improvements in unattended and attended NDA systems such as process monitoring and possible on-site analysis of DA samples that could reduce the uncertainty of the inspector's measurements and provide more effective and efficient IAEA GCEPs safeguards. We also introduce examples advanced safeguards systems that could be assembled for unattended operation.

  11. 21 CFR 312.88 - Safeguards for patient safety.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-04-01

    ... 21 Food and Drugs 5 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false Safeguards for patient safety. 312.88 Section 312... Severely-debilitating Illnesses § 312.88 Safeguards for patient safety. All of the safeguards incorporated within parts 50, 56, 312, 314, and 600 of this chapter designed to ensure the safety of clinical...

  12. 10 CFR Appendix G to Part 73 - Reportable Safeguards Events

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Reportable Safeguards Events G Appendix G to Part 73.... G Appendix G to Part 73—Reportable Safeguards Events Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 73.71 (b... shall report or record, as appropriate, the following safeguards events. I. Events to be reported...

  13. 10 CFR Appendix G to Part 73 - Reportable Safeguards Events

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Reportable Safeguards Events G Appendix G to Part 73.... G Appendix G to Part 73—Reportable Safeguards Events Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 73.71 (b... shall report or record, as appropriate, the following safeguards events. I. Events to be reported...

  14. 10 CFR Appendix G to Part 73 - Reportable Safeguards Events

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Reportable Safeguards Events G Appendix G to Part 73.... G Appendix G to Part 73—Reportable Safeguards Events Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 73.71 (b... shall report or record, as appropriate, the following safeguards events. I. Events to be reported...

  15. 10 CFR Appendix G to Part 73 - Reportable Safeguards Events

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Reportable Safeguards Events G Appendix G to Part 73.... G Appendix G to Part 73—Reportable Safeguards Events Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 73.71 (b... shall report or record, as appropriate, the following safeguards events. I. Events to be reported...

  16. 10 CFR 75.7 - Notification of IAEA safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Notification of IAEA safeguards. 75.7 Section 75.7 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) SAFEGUARDS ON NUCLEAR MATERIAL-IMPLEMENTATION OF US/IAEA AGREEMENT General Provisions § 75.7 Notification of IAEA safeguards. (a) The licensee must inform the...

  17. 10 CFR 75.7 - Notification of IAEA safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Notification of IAEA safeguards. 75.7 Section 75.7 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) SAFEGUARDS ON NUCLEAR MATERIAL-IMPLEMENTATION OF US/IAEA AGREEMENT General Provisions § 75.7 Notification of IAEA safeguards. (a) The licensee must inform the...

  18. 10 CFR 75.7 - Notification of IAEA safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Notification of IAEA safeguards. 75.7 Section 75.7 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) SAFEGUARDS ON NUCLEAR MATERIAL-IMPLEMENTATION OF US/IAEA AGREEMENT General Provisions § 75.7 Notification of IAEA safeguards. (a) The licensee must inform the...

  19. 10 CFR 75.7 - Notification of IAEA safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Notification of IAEA safeguards. 75.7 Section 75.7 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) SAFEGUARDS ON NUCLEAR MATERIAL-IMPLEMENTATION OF US/IAEA AGREEMENT General Provisions § 75.7 Notification of IAEA safeguards. (a) The licensee must inform the...

  20. 10 CFR 75.7 - Notification of IAEA safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Notification of IAEA safeguards. 75.7 Section 75.7 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) SAFEGUARDS ON NUCLEAR MATERIAL-IMPLEMENTATION OF US/IAEA AGREEMENT General Provisions § 75.7 Notification of IAEA safeguards. (a) The licensee must inform the...

  1. 16 CFR 314.3 - Standards for safeguarding customer information.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 16 Commercial Practices 1 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Standards for safeguarding customer... OF CONGRESS STANDARDS FOR SAFEGUARDING CUSTOMER INFORMATION § 314.3 Standards for safeguarding customer information. (a) Information security program. You shall develop, implement, and maintain...

  2. 34 CFR 300.150 - SEA implementation of procedural safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 34 Education 2 2014-07-01 2013-07-01 true SEA implementation of procedural safeguards. 300.150... EDUCATION OF CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES State Eligibility Sea Responsibility for General Supervision and Implementation of Procedural Safeguards § 300.150 SEA implementation of procedural safeguards. The SEA (and any...

  3. 34 CFR 300.150 - SEA implementation of procedural safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 34 Education 2 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false SEA implementation of procedural safeguards. 300.150... EDUCATION OF CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES State Eligibility Sea Responsibility for General Supervision and Implementation of Procedural Safeguards § 300.150 SEA implementation of procedural safeguards. The SEA (and any...

  4. 34 CFR 300.150 - SEA implementation of procedural safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 34 Education 2 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false SEA implementation of procedural safeguards. 300.150... EDUCATION OF CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES State Eligibility Sea Responsibility for General Supervision and Implementation of Procedural Safeguards § 300.150 SEA implementation of procedural safeguards. The SEA (and any...

  5. 29 CFR 452.83 - Enforcement of campaign safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 29 Labor 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Enforcement of campaign safeguards. 452.83 Section 452.83... AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959 Campaign Safeguards § 452.83 Enforcement of campaign safeguards. Certain of... statutory right to sue is limited to the distribution of campaign literature by the labor organization...

  6. 34 CFR 300.150 - SEA implementation of procedural safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 34 Education 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false SEA implementation of procedural safeguards. 300.150... EDUCATION OF CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES State Eligibility Sea Responsibility for General Supervision and Implementation of Procedural Safeguards § 300.150 SEA implementation of procedural safeguards. The SEA (and any...

  7. 34 CFR 300.150 - SEA implementation of procedural safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 34 Education 2 2011-07-01 2010-07-01 true SEA implementation of procedural safeguards. 300.150... EDUCATION OF CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES State Eligibility Sea Responsibility for General Supervision and Implementation of Procedural Safeguards § 300.150 SEA implementation of procedural safeguards. The SEA (and any...

  8. 21 CFR 312.88 - Safeguards for patient safety.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-04-01

    ... 21 Food and Drugs 5 2011-04-01 2011-04-01 false Safeguards for patient safety. 312.88 Section 312... Severely-debilitating Illnesses § 312.88 Safeguards for patient safety. All of the safeguards incorporated... includes the requirements for informed consent (part 50 of this chapter) and institutional review...

  9. 21 CFR 312.88 - Safeguards for patient safety.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-04-01

    ... 21 Food and Drugs 5 2012-04-01 2012-04-01 false Safeguards for patient safety. 312.88 Section 312... Severely-debilitating Illnesses § 312.88 Safeguards for patient safety. All of the safeguards incorporated... includes the requirements for informed consent (part 50 of this chapter) and institutional review...

  10. Irans Nuclear Program: Tehrans Compliance with International Obligations

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2016-03-03

    Research Service Summary Several U.N. Security Council resolutions required Iran to cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s...comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards; Tehran concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA in 1974. 2 In 2002...in the State (i.e. completeness).” 17 The Safeguards System of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Available at http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SG

  11. Safeguards considerations in the study of proliferation resistance of plutonium disposition options

    SciTech Connect

    Hakkila, E.A.; Burr, T.

    1997-11-01

    Domestic and international safeguards considerations of the various plutonium disposition program options were studied. The options included immobilization in either glass or ceramic; deep borehole disposal, either directly as oxide or after immobilization in ceramic pellets; and nine options of burning in reactors as mixed oxide (MOX) fuel. Two of the MOX options considered burning in CANDU (Canadian deuterium uranium) reactors in Canada; the remaining options used either existing or new reactors in the US. A facility for conversion of weapons-grade PU metal to plutonium oxide is common to all options. Although domestic safeguards are applied for all material in the facility, international verification probably will not be possible until weapons design information from material form can no longer be inferred. Assuming that the facility processed 5 tonnes of Pu/year and all measurements are made to meet 1993 ESARDA (European Safeguards Research and Development Association) Target Values, the best annual detection limit (false alarm probability = 0.05, detection probability = 0.95) for loss of Pu can be no smaller than 16.5 kg, and probably will be higher. A MOX fuel fabrication facility is required for all of the reactor options, and location of the facility either in the US or in a EURATOM country was considered. Assuming that the facility processes 3.2 tonnes of Pu/year, and all measurements are made to meet ESARDA Target Values, the best annual detection limit for loss of Pu can be no smaller than 24 kg. Location in Europe adds an additional international safeguards burden. Impact of the various disposal options on domestic and international safeguards will be reviewed.

  12. 45 CFR 164.308 - Administrative safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-10-01

    ... business processes for protection of the security of electronic protected health information while... Information § 164.308 Administrative safeguards. (a) A covered entity or business associate must, in accordance with § 164.306: (1)(i) Standard: Security management process. Implement policies and procedures...

  13. 45 CFR 164.308 - Administrative safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-10-01

    ... business processes for protection of the security of electronic protected health information while... Information § 164.308 Administrative safeguards. (a) A covered entity or business associate must, in accordance with § 164.306: (1)(i) Standard: Security management process. Implement policies and procedures...

  14. 45 CFR 164.310 - Physical safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... storage (Addressable). Create a retrievable, exact copy of electronic protected health information, when... Information § 164.310 Physical safeguards. A covered entity must, in accordance with § 164.306: (a)(1... electronic information systems and the facility or facilities in which they are housed, while ensuring...

  15. Mass-spectrometric measurements for nuclear safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Carter, J.A.; Smith, D.H.; Walker, R.L.

    1982-01-01

    The need of an on-site inspection device to provide isotopic ratio measurements led to the development of a quadrupole mass spectrometer mounted in a van. This mobile laboratory has the ability, through the use of the resin bead technique, to acquire, prepare, and analyze samples of interest to nuclear safeguards. Precision of the measurements is about 1 to 2%.

  16. Advanced Safeguards Approaches for New Fast Reactors

    SciTech Connect

    Durst, Philip C.; Therios, Ike; Bean, Robert; Dougan, A.; Boyer, Brian; Wallace, Rick L.; Ehinger, Michael H.; Kovacic, Don N.; Tolk, K.

    2007-12-15

    This third report in the series reviews possible safeguards approaches for new fast reactors in general, and the ABR in particular. Fast-neutron spectrum reactors have been used since the early 1960s on an experimental and developmental level, generally with fertile blanket fuels to “breed” nuclear fuel such as plutonium. Whether the reactor is designed to breed plutonium, or transmute and “burn” actinides depends mainly on the design of the reactor neutron reflector and the whether the blanket fuel is “fertile” or suitable for transmutation. However, the safeguards issues are very similar, since they pertain mainly to the receipt, shipment and storage of fresh and spent plutonium and actinide-bearing “TRU”-fuel. For these reasons, the design of existing fast reactors and details concerning how they have been safeguarded were studied in developing advanced safeguards approaches for the new fast reactors. In this regard, the design of the Experimental Breeder Reactor-II “EBR-II” at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) was of interest, because it was designed as a collocated fast reactor with a pyrometallurgical reprocessing and fuel fabrication line – a design option being considered for the ABR. Similarly, the design of the Fast Flux Facility (FFTF) on the Hanford Site was studied, because it was a successful prototype fast reactor that ran for two decades to evaluate fuels and the design for commercial-scale fast reactors.

  17. 17 CFR 49.24 - System safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-04-01

    ... 17 Commodity and Securities Exchanges 2 2014-04-01 2014-04-01 false System safeguards. 49.24 Section 49.24 Commodity and Securities Exchanges COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION (CONTINUED) SWAP...) Information security; (2) Business continuity—disaster recovery planning and resources; (3) Capacity...

  18. 17 CFR 49.24 - System safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-04-01

    ... 17 Commodity and Securities Exchanges 1 2013-04-01 2013-04-01 false System safeguards. 49.24 Section 49.24 Commodity and Securities Exchanges COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION SWAP DATA... shall address each of the following categories of risk analysis and oversight: (1) Information...

  19. 7 CFR 948.24 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Safeguards. 948.24 Section 948.24 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued) AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERVICE (MARKETING AGREEMENTS AND ORDERS; FRUITS, VEGETABLES, NUTS), DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE IRISH POTATOES GROWN IN COLORADO...

  20. 7 CFR 948.24 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Safeguards. 948.24 Section 948.24 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued) AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERVICE (Marketing Agreements and Orders; Fruits, Vegetables, Nuts), DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE IRISH POTATOES GROWN IN COLORADO...

  1. 7 CFR 948.24 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Safeguards. 948.24 Section 948.24 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued) AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERVICE (MARKETING AGREEMENTS AND ORDERS; FRUITS, VEGETABLES, NUTS), DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE IRISH POTATOES GROWN IN COLORADO...

  2. 7 CFR 948.24 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Safeguards. 948.24 Section 948.24 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued) AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERVICE (Marketing Agreements and Orders; Fruits, Vegetables, Nuts), DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE IRISH POTATOES GROWN IN COLORADO...

  3. 7 CFR 948.24 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safeguards. 948.24 Section 948.24 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued) AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERVICE (Marketing Agreements and Orders; Fruits, Vegetables, Nuts), DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE IRISH POTATOES GROWN IN COLORADO...

  4. 32 CFR 887.2 - Safeguarding certificates.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... National Defense Department of Defense (Continued) DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE MILITARY PERSONNEL ISSUING OF CERTIFICATES IN LIEU OF LOST OR DESTROYED CERTIFICATES OF SEPARATION § 887.2 Safeguarding certificates. Certificates of separation are important personal documents. Processing applications for CILs is...

  5. 32 CFR 887.2 - Safeguarding certificates.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... National Defense Department of Defense (Continued) DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE MILITARY PERSONNEL ISSUING OF CERTIFICATES IN LIEU OF LOST OR DESTROYED CERTIFICATES OF SEPARATION § 887.2 Safeguarding certificates. Certificates of separation are important personal documents. Processing applications for CILs is...

  6. 32 CFR 887.2 - Safeguarding certificates.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... National Defense Department of Defense (Continued) DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE MILITARY PERSONNEL ISSUING OF CERTIFICATES IN LIEU OF LOST OR DESTROYED CERTIFICATES OF SEPARATION § 887.2 Safeguarding certificates. Certificates of separation are important personal documents. Processing applications for CILs is...

  7. 32 CFR 887.2 - Safeguarding certificates.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... National Defense Department of Defense (Continued) DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE MILITARY PERSONNEL ISSUING OF CERTIFICATES IN LIEU OF LOST OR DESTROYED CERTIFICATES OF SEPARATION § 887.2 Safeguarding certificates. Certificates of separation are important personal documents. Processing applications for CILs is...

  8. 32 CFR 887.2 - Safeguarding certificates.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... National Defense Department of Defense (Continued) DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE MILITARY PERSONNEL ISSUING OF CERTIFICATES IN LIEU OF LOST OR DESTROYED CERTIFICATES OF SEPARATION § 887.2 Safeguarding certificates. Certificates of separation are important personal documents. Processing applications for CILs is...

  9. "Safeguarding" Sports Coaching: Foucault, Genealogy and Critique

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Garratt, Dean; Piper, Heather; Taylor, Bill

    2013-01-01

    This paper offers a genealogical account of safeguarding in sport. Drawing specifically on Foucault's work, it examines the "politics of touch" in relation to the social and historical formation of child protection policy in sports coaching. While the analysis has some resonance with the context of coaching as a whole, for illustrative…

  10. Evaluating safeguard effectiveness against violent insiders

    SciTech Connect

    Al-Ayat, R.A.; Fortney, D.S.

    1990-07-16

    The threat posed by a violent insiders presents a major challenge to safeguards managers. These insiders, in addition to their ability to exploit their special authorities, access, and knowledge of facility operations and safeguards, could use violence to defeat safeguards components and personnel. In protecting against theft of special nuclear material, facilities have emphasized the use of perimeter protection and physical barriers to protect against attacks by an outsider adversary group. Recently emphasis has begun to shift toward the implementation of hardware and procedural measures to protect against nonviolent insiders. Approaches are also needed to help assess the effectiveness of protection against those insiders who are willing to use violence. In this paper we describe an approach we're developing for dealing with violent insiders. We begin by categorizing insiders according to whether they are active or passive, rational or irrational, and whether they are willing to use force against safeguards components or coworkers. We define characteristics of each category, and describe the extent to which each category is adequately modelled by existing evaluation tools. We also discuss several modelling issues posed by active insiders, including: entry of contraband; reluctance to use violence; neutralization of insiders; and the ability to switch modes of attack between force, stealth, and deceit. 5 refs., 2 figs.

  11. 45 CFR 605.36 - Procedural safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-10-01

    ... Public Welfare Regulations Relating to Public Welfare (Continued) NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION... Preschool, Elementary, and Secondary Education § 605.36 Procedural safeguards. A recipient that operates a public elementary or secondary education program shall establish and implement, with respect to actions...

  12. 45 CFR 605.36 - Procedural safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-10-01

    ... Public Welfare Regulations Relating to Public Welfare (Continued) NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION... Preschool, Elementary, and Secondary Education § 605.36 Procedural safeguards. A recipient that operates a public elementary or secondary education program shall establish and implement, with respect to actions...

  13. 45 CFR 605.36 - Procedural safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-10-01

    ... Public Welfare Regulations Relating to Public Welfare (Continued) NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION... Preschool, Elementary, and Secondary Education § 605.36 Procedural safeguards. A recipient that operates a public elementary or secondary education program shall establish and implement, with respect to actions...

  14. 45 CFR 164.312 - Technical safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... Information § 164.312 Technical safeguards. A covered entity must, in accordance with § 164.306: (a)(1) Standard: Access control. Implement technical policies and procedures for electronic information systems that maintain electronic protected health information to allow access only to those persons or...

  15. 45 CFR 84.36 - Procedural safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... Welfare DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES GENERAL ADMINISTRATION NONDISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF... identification, evaluation, or educational placement of persons who, because of handicap, need or are believed to need special instruction or related services, a system of procedural safeguards that includes notice...

  16. "Safeguarding" Sports Coaching: Foucault, Genealogy and Critique

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Garratt, Dean; Piper, Heather; Taylor, Bill

    2013-01-01

    This paper offers a genealogical account of safeguarding in sport. Drawing specifically on Foucault's work, it examines the "politics of touch" in relation to the social and historical formation of child protection policy in sports coaching. While the analysis has some resonance with the context of coaching as a whole, for illustrative…

  17. Readability of Special Education Procedural Safeguards

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Mandic, Carmen Gomez; Rudd, Rima; Hehir, Thomas; Acevedo-Garcia, Dolores

    2012-01-01

    This study focused on literacy-related barriers to understanding the rights of students with disabilities and their parents within the special education system. SMOG readability scores were determined for procedural safeguards documents issued by all state departments of education. The average reading grade level was 16; 6% scored in the high…

  18. 7 CFR 15b.25 - Procedural safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 1 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Procedural safeguards. 15b.25 Section 15b.25 Agriculture Office of the Secretary of Agriculture NONDISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF HANDICAP IN PROGRAMS OR ACTIVITIES RECEIVING FEDERAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE Preschool, Elementary, Secondary, Adult, and...

  19. 45 CFR 84.36 - Procedural safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-10-01

    ... 45 Public Welfare 1 2013-10-01 2013-10-01 false Procedural safeguards. 84.36 Section 84.36 Public Welfare DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES GENERAL ADMINISTRATION NONDISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF HANDICAP IN PROGRAMS OR ACTIVITIES RECEIVING FEDERAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE Preschool, Elementary,...

  20. 7 CFR 15b.25 - Procedural safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 1 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Procedural safeguards. 15b.25 Section 15b.25 Agriculture Office of the Secretary of Agriculture NONDISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF HANDICAP IN PROGRAMS OR ACTIVITIES RECEIVING FEDERAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE Preschool, Elementary, Secondary, Adult, and...

  1. 7 CFR 15b.25 - Procedural safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 1 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Procedural safeguards. 15b.25 Section 15b.25 Agriculture Office of the Secretary of Agriculture NONDISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF HANDICAP IN PROGRAMS OR ACTIVITIES RECEIVING FEDERAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE Preschool, Elementary, Secondary, Adult, and...

  2. 45 CFR 84.36 - Procedural safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-10-01

    ... 45 Public Welfare 1 2012-10-01 2012-10-01 false Procedural safeguards. 84.36 Section 84.36 Public Welfare DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES GENERAL ADMINISTRATION NONDISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF HANDICAP IN PROGRAMS OR ACTIVITIES RECEIVING FEDERAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE Preschool, Elementary,...

  3. 45 CFR 84.36 - Procedural safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-10-01

    ... 45 Public Welfare 1 2014-10-01 2014-10-01 false Procedural safeguards. 84.36 Section 84.36 Public Welfare Department of Health and Human Services GENERAL ADMINISTRATION NONDISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF HANDICAP IN PROGRAMS OR ACTIVITIES RECEIVING FEDERAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE Preschool, Elementary,...

  4. 45 CFR 605.36 - Procedural safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-10-01

    ... Public Welfare Regulations Relating to Public Welfare (Continued) NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION... Preschool, Elementary, and Secondary Education § 605.36 Procedural safeguards. A recipient that operates a... that includes notice, an opportunity for the parents or guardian of the person to examine...

  5. 45 CFR 605.36 - Procedural safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... Public Welfare Regulations Relating to Public Welfare (Continued) NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION... Preschool, Elementary, and Secondary Education § 605.36 Procedural safeguards. A recipient that operates a... that includes notice, an opportunity for the parents or guardian of the person to examine...

  6. 17 CFR 39.18 - System safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-04-01

    ... ORGANIZATIONS Compliance with Core Principles § 39.18 System safeguards. (a) Definitions. For purposes of this... transportation, telecommunications, power, water, or other critical infrastructure components in a relevant area...) General—(1) Program of risk analysis. Each derivatives clearing organization shall establish and...

  7. 7 CFR 947.55 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Safeguards. 947.55 Section 947.55 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued) AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERVICE (Marketing Agreements..., with the approval of the Secretary, shall prescribe rules governing the issuance and the contents...

  8. 7 CFR 966.56 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Safeguards. 966.56 Section 966.56 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued) AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERVICE (Marketing Agreements... governing the issuance and the contents of Certificates of Privilege if such certificates are prescribed...

  9. 7 CFR 906.44 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Safeguards. 906.44 Section 906.44 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued) AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERVICE (Marketing Agreements... authorized therefor, and rules governing the issuance and the contents of certificates of privilege if...

  10. 7 CFR 946.55 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safeguards. 946.55 Section 946.55 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued) AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERVICE (Marketing Agreements... governing the issuance and the contents of the special purpose certificate. (d) The committee may...

  11. 7 CFR 945.56 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Safeguards. 945.56 Section 945.56 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued) AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERVICE (Marketing Agreements... approval of the Secretary, shall prescribe rules governing the issuance and the contents of Certificates...

  12. 7 CFR 947.55 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safeguards. 947.55 Section 947.55 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued) AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERVICE (Marketing Agreements..., with the approval of the Secretary, shall prescribe rules governing the issuance and the contents...

  13. 7 CFR 946.55 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Safeguards. 946.55 Section 946.55 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued) AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERVICE (Marketing Agreements... governing the issuance and the contents of the special purpose certificate. (d) The committee may...

  14. 7 CFR 945.56 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safeguards. 945.56 Section 945.56 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued) AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERVICE (Marketing Agreements... approval of the Secretary, shall prescribe rules governing the issuance and the contents of Certificates...

  15. Readability of Special Education Procedural Safeguards

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Mandic, Carmen Gomez; Rudd, Rima; Hehir, Thomas; Acevedo-Garcia, Dolores

    2012-01-01

    This study focused on literacy-related barriers to understanding the rights of students with disabilities and their parents within the special education system. SMOG readability scores were determined for procedural safeguards documents issued by all state departments of education. The average reading grade level was 16; 6% scored in the high…

  16. 7 CFR 966.56 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... AND ORDERS; FRUITS, VEGETABLES, NUTS), DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE TOMATOES GROWN IN FLORIDA Order..., may prescribe adequate safeguards to prevent handling of tomatoes pursuant to § 966.53 or § 966.54... applications with the committee to ship tomatoes pursuant to §§ 966.53 and 966.54; or (2) Handlers shall obtain...

  17. 7 CFR 966.56 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... AND ORDERS; FRUITS, VEGETABLES, NUTS), DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE TOMATOES GROWN IN FLORIDA Order..., may prescribe adequate safeguards to prevent handling of tomatoes pursuant to § 966.53 or § 966.54... applications with the committee to ship tomatoes pursuant to §§ 966.53 and 966.54; or (2) Handlers shall obtain...

  18. 7 CFR 966.56 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... and Orders; Fruits, Vegetables, Nuts), DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE TOMATOES GROWN IN FLORIDA Order..., may prescribe adequate safeguards to prevent handling of tomatoes pursuant to § 966.53 or § 966.54... applications with the committee to ship tomatoes pursuant to §§ 966.53 and 966.54; or (2) Handlers shall obtain...

  19. 7 CFR 966.56 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... and Orders; Fruits, Vegetables, Nuts), DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE TOMATOES GROWN IN FLORIDA Order..., may prescribe adequate safeguards to prevent handling of tomatoes pursuant to § 966.53 or § 966.54... applications with the committee to ship tomatoes pursuant to §§ 966.53 and 966.54; or (2) Handlers shall obtain...

  20. The integration of process monitoring for safeguards.

    SciTech Connect

    Cipiti, Benjamin B.; Zinaman, Owen R.

    2010-09-01

    The Separations and Safeguards Performance Model is a reprocessing plant model that has been developed for safeguards analyses of future plant designs. The model has been modified to integrate bulk process monitoring data with traditional plutonium inventory balances to evaluate potential advanced safeguards systems. Taking advantage of the wealth of operator data such as flow rates and mass balances of bulk material, the timeliness of detection of material loss was shown to improve considerably. Four diversion cases were tested including both abrupt and protracted diversions at early and late times in the run. The first three cases indicated alarms before half of a significant quantity of material was removed. The buildup of error over time prevented detection in the case of a protracted diversion late in the run. Some issues related to the alarm conditions and bias correction will need to be addressed in future work. This work both demonstrates the use of the model for performing diversion scenario analyses and for testing advanced safeguards system designs.

  1. Strengthening IAEA Safeguards for Research Reactors

    SciTech Connect

    Reid, Bruce D.; Anzelon, George A.; Budlong-Sylvester, Kory

    2016-09-01

    During their December 10-11, 2013, workshop in Grenoble France, which focused on the history and future of safeguarding research reactors, the United States, France and the United Kingdom (UK) agreed to conduct a joint study exploring ways to strengthen the IAEA’s safeguards approach for declared research reactors. This decision was prompted by concerns about: 1) historical cases of non-compliance involving misuse (including the use of non-nuclear materials for production of neutron generators for weapons) and diversion that were discovered, in many cases, long after the violations took place and as part of broader pattern of undeclared activities in half a dozen countries; 2) the fact that, under the Safeguards Criteria, the IAEA inspects some reactors (e.g., those with power levels under 25 MWt) less than once per year; 3) the long-standing precedent of States using heavy water research reactors (HWRR) to produce plutonium for weapons programs; 4) the use of HEU fuel in some research reactors; and 5) various technical characteristics common to some types of research reactors that could provide an opportunity for potential proliferators to misuse the facility or divert material with low probability of detection by the IAEA. In some research reactors it is difficult to detect diversion or undeclared irradiation. In addition, infrastructure associated with research reactors could pose a safeguards challenge. To strengthen the effectiveness of safeguards at the State level, this paper advocates that the IAEA consider ways to focus additional attention and broaden its safeguards toolbox for research reactors. This increase in focus on the research reactors could begin with the recognition that the research reactor (of any size) could be a common path element on a large number of technically plausible pathways that must be considered when performing acquisition pathway analysis (APA) for developing a State Level Approach (SLA) and Annual Implementation Plan (AIP). To

  2. 26 CFR 301.6103(p)(4)-1 - Procedures relating to safeguards for returns or return information.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-04-01

    ... or return information. 301.6103(p)(4)-1 Section 301.6103(p)(4)-1 Internal Revenue INTERNAL REVENUE... Information and Returns Returns and Records § 301.6103(p)(4)-1 Procedures relating to safeguards for returns..., see § 301.6103(p)(7)-1....

  3. 26 CFR 301.6103(p)(4)-1 - Procedures relating to safeguards for returns or return information.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-04-01

    ... or return information. 301.6103(p)(4)-1 Section 301.6103(p)(4)-1 Internal Revenue INTERNAL REVENUE... Information and Returns Returns and Records § 301.6103(p)(4)-1 Procedures relating to safeguards for returns..., see § 301.6103(p)(7)-1....

  4. 26 CFR 301.6103(p)(4)-1 - Procedures relating to safeguards for returns or return information.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-04-01

    ... or return information. 301.6103(p)(4)-1 Section 301.6103(p)(4)-1 Internal Revenue INTERNAL REVENUE... Information and Returns Returns and Records § 301.6103(p)(4)-1 Procedures relating to safeguards for returns..., see § 301.6103(p)(7)-1....

  5. 26 CFR 301.6103(p)(4)-1 - Procedures relating to safeguards for returns or return information.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-04-01

    ... or return information. 301.6103(p)(4)-1 Section 301.6103(p)(4)-1 Internal Revenue INTERNAL REVENUE... Information and Returns Returns and Records § 301.6103(p)(4)-1 Procedures relating to safeguards for returns..., see § 301.6103(p)(7)-1....

  6. 26 CFR 301.6103(p)(4)-1 - Procedures relating to safeguards for returns or return information.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-04-01

    ... or return information. 301.6103(p)(4)-1 Section 301.6103(p)(4)-1 Internal Revenue INTERNAL REVENUE... Information and Returns Returns and Records § 301.6103(p)(4)-1 Procedures relating to safeguards for returns..., see § 301.6103(p)(7)-1....

  7. New Measures to Safeguard Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants

    SciTech Connect

    Whitaker, Jr., James; Garner, James R; Whitaker, Michael; Lockwood, Dunbar; Gilligan, Kimberly V; Younkin, James R; Hooper, David A; Henkel, James J; Krichinsky, Alan M

    2011-01-01

    As Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants (GCEPs) increase in separative work unit (SWU) capacity, the current International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) model safeguards approach needs to be strengthened. New measures to increase the effectiveness of the safeguards approach are being investigated that will be mutually beneficial to the facility operators and the IAEA. One of the key concepts being studied for application at future GCEPs is embracing joint use equipment for process monitoring of load cells at feed and withdrawal (F/W) stations. A mock F/W system was built at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to generate and collect F/W data from an analogous system. The ORNL system has been used to collect data representing several realistic normal process and off-normal (including diversion) scenarios. Emphasis is placed on the novelty of the analysis of data from the sensors as well as the ability to build information out of raw data, which facilitates a more effective and efficient verification process. This paper will provide a progress report on recent accomplishments and next steps.

  8. Advanced Safeguards Technology Demonstration at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory

    SciTech Connect

    Orton, Christopher R.; Schwantes, Jon M.; Bryan, Samuel A.; Levitskaia, Tatiana G.; Duckworth, Douglas C.; Douglas, Matthew; Farmer, O. T.; Fraga, Carlos G.; Lehn, Scott A.; Liezers, Martin; Peper, Shane M.; Christensen, Richard

    2008-10-01

    The IAEA has established international safeguards standards for fissionable materials at spent fuel reprocessing plants to ensure that significant quantities of weapons-grade nuclear material are not diverted over a specified time frame. It is, therefore, necessary to confirm proper operational performance to verify facilities operate under adequate safeguard-declared conditions. This verification can be achieved by employing monitoring equipment. Online real time monitoring of the flowsheet radiochemical streams provides a unique capability to rapidly identify deviations from normal operating conditions. Flowsheet monitoring technologies being developed at PNNL include three integrated systems: Multi-Isotope Process (MIP) Monitor, spectroscopy-based monitor (UV-vis-NIR and Raman spectrometers), and Electrochemically Modulated Separations (EMS). The MIP Monitor is designed to identify off-normal conditions in process streams using gamma spectroscopy and pattern recognition software. The spectroscopic monitoring continuously measures chemical compositions of the process streams including actinide metal ions (U, Pu, Np), selected fission products, and major cold flowsheet chemicals. EMS provides an on-line means for pre-separating and pre-concentrating elements of interest out of complex matrices prior to detection. PNNL is preparing to test these multi-parametric technologies using different samples of dissolved spent fuel and aqueous and organic phases of the PUREX and UREX flowsheets. We will report our on-going efforts with specific focus given to quantifying sensitivity of the MIP Monitor and UV-Vis and Raman spectrometers to detect minor changes in major process variables.

  9. LANL Safeguards and Security Assurance Program. Revision 6

    SciTech Connect

    1995-04-03

    The Safeguards and Security (S and S) Assurance Program provides a continuous quality improvement approach to ensure effective, compliant S and S program implementation throughout the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Any issues identified through the various internal and external assessments are documented, tracked and closed using the Safeguards and Security Issue Management Program. The Laboratory utilizes an integrated S and S systems approach to protect US Department of Energy (DOE) interests from theft or diversion of special nuclear material (SNM), sabotage, espionage, loss or theft of classified/controlled matter or government property, and other hostile acts that may cause unacceptable impacts on national security, health and safety of employees and the public, and the environment. This document explains the basis, scope, and conduct of the S and S process to include: self-assessments, issue management, risk assessment, and root cause analysis. It also provides a discussion of S and S topical areas, roles and responsibilities, process flow charts, minimum requirements, methodology, terms, and forms.

  10. The U.S./IAEA Workshop on Software Sustainability for Safeguards Instrumentation

    SciTech Connect

    Pepper S. E.; .; Worrall, L.; Pickett, C.; Bachner, K.; Queirolo, A.

    2014-08-08

    The U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration’s Next Generation Safeguards Initiative, the U.S. Department of State, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) organized a a workshop on the subject of ”Software Sustainability for Safeguards Instrumentation.” The workshop was held at the Vienna International Centre in Vienna, Austria, May 6-8, 2014. The workshop participants included software and hardware experts from national laboratories, industry, government, and IAEA member states who were specially selected by the workshop organizers based on their experience with software that is developed for the control and operation of safeguards instrumentation. The workshop included presentations, to orient the participants to the IAEA Department of Safeguards software activities related to instrumentation data collection and processing, and case studies that were designed to inspire discussion of software development, use, maintenance, and upgrades in breakout sessions and to result in recommendations for effective software practices and management. This report summarizes the results of the workshop.

  11. Post-Web 2.0 Pedagogy: From Student-Generated Content to International Co-Production Enabled by Mobile Social Media

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Cochrane, Thomas; Antonczak, Laurent; Wagner, Daniel

    2013-01-01

    The advent of web 2.0 has enabled new forms of collaboration centred upon user-generated content, however, mobile social media is enabling a new wave of social collaboration. Mobile devices have disrupted and reinvented traditional media markets and distribution: iTunes, Google Play and Amazon now dominate music industry distribution channels,…

  12. Post-Web 2.0 Pedagogy: From Student-Generated Content to International Co-Production Enabled by Mobile Social Media

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Cochrane, Thomas; Antonczak, Laurent; Wagner, Daniel

    2013-01-01

    The advent of web 2.0 has enabled new forms of collaboration centred upon user-generated content, however, mobile social media is enabling a new wave of social collaboration. Mobile devices have disrupted and reinvented traditional media markets and distribution: iTunes, Google Play and Amazon now dominate music industry distribution channels,…

  13. Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) for Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) through a Common Global Approach

    SciTech Connect

    Badwan, Faris M.; Demuth, Scott Francis; Miller, Michael Conrad; Pshakin, Gennady

    2015-02-23

    Small Modular Reactors (SMR) with power levels significantly less than the currently standard 1000 to 1600-MWe reactors have been proposed as a potential game changer for future nuclear power. SMRs may offer a simpler, more standardized, and safer modular design by using factory built and easily transportable components. Additionally, SMRs may be more easily built and operated in isolated locations, and may require smaller initial capital investment and shorter construction times. Because many SMRs designs are still conceptual and consequently not yet fixed, designers have a unique opportunity to incorporate updated design basis threats, emergency preparedness requirements, and then fully integrate safety, physical security, and safeguards/material control and accounting (MC&A) designs. Integrating safety, physical security, and safeguards is often referred to as integrating the 3Ss, and early consideration of safeguards and security in the design is often referred to as safeguards and security by design (SSBD). This paper describes U.S./Russian collaborative efforts toward developing an internationally accepted common approach for implementing SSBD/3Ss for SMRs based upon domestic requirements, and international guidance and requirements. These collaborative efforts originated with the Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Security working group established under the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission during the 2009 Presidential Summit. Initial efforts have focused on review of U.S. and Russian domestic requirements for Security and MC&A, IAEA guidance for security and MC&A, and IAEA requirements for international safeguards. Additionally, example SMR design features that can enhance proliferation resistance and physical security have been collected from past work and reported here. The development of a U.S./Russian common approach for SSBD/3Ss should aid the designer of SMRs located anywhere in the world. More specifically, the application of this approach may

  14. The International Lunar Decade — 2017-2029: Framework for Concurrent Development of Enabling Technologies, Infrastructures, Financings, and Policies for Lunar Development

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Beldavs, V. Z.; Dunlop, D.; Crisafulli, J.; Foing, B.

    2015-10-01

    The International Lunar Decade (ILD) planned for launch in 2017 provides a framework for long-term international collaboration in the development of technologies, infrastructures, and financing mechanisms for lunar development.

  15. SARP-II: Safeguards Accounting and Reports Program, Revised

    SciTech Connect

    Kempf, C.R.

    1994-03-01

    A computer code, SARP (Safeguards Accounting and Reports Program) which will generate and maintain at-facility safeguards accounting records, and generate IAEA safeguards reports based on accounting data input by the user, was completed in 1990 by the Safeguards, Safety, and Nonproliferation Division (formerly the Technical Support Organization) at Brookhaven National Laboratory as a task under the US Program of Technical Support to IAEA safeguards. The code was based on a State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC) for off-load refueled power reactor facilities, with model facility and safeguards accounting regime as described in IAEA Safeguards Publication STR-165. Since 1990, improvements in computing capabilities and comments and suggestions from users engendered revision of the original code. The result is an updated, revised version called SARP-II which is discussed in this report.

  16. Safeguarding the child athlete in sport: a review, a framework and recommendations for the IOC youth athlete development model.

    PubMed

    Mountjoy, M; Rhind, D J A; Tiivas, A; Leglise, M

    2015-07-01

    Participation in sport has many physical, psychological and social benefits for the child athlete. A growing body of evidence indicates, however, that sport participation may have inherent threats for the child's well-being. The subject of safeguarding children in sport has seen an increase in scientific study in recent years. In particular, there is increasing emphasis on identifying who is involved in abuse, the context of where it occurs and the identification of the various forms of abuse that take place in the sporting domain. Safeguarding principles developed by the International Safeguarding Children in Sport Founders Group are presented along with 8 underlying pillars which underpin the successful adoption and implementation of safeguarding strategies. This safeguarding model is designed to assist sport organisations in the creation of a safe sporting environment to ensure that the child athlete can flourish and reach their athletic potential through an enjoyable experience. The aim of this narrative review is to (1) present a summary of the scientific literature on the threats to children in sport; (2) introduce a framework to categorise these threats; (3) identify research gaps in the field and (4) provide safeguarding recommendations for sport organisations.

  17. Safeguarding the child athlete in sport: a review, a framework and recommendations for the IOC youth athlete development model

    PubMed Central

    Mountjoy, M; Rhind, D J A; Tiivas, A; Leglise, M

    2015-01-01

    Participation in sport has many physical, psychological and social benefits for the child athlete. A growing body of evidence indicates, however, that sport participation may have inherent threats for the child’s well-being. The subject of safeguarding children in sport has seen an increase in scientific study in recent years. In particular, there is increasing emphasis on identifying who is involved in abuse, the context of where it occurs and the identification of the various forms of abuse that take place in the sporting domain. Safeguarding principles developed by the International Safeguarding Children in Sport Founders Group are presented along with 8 underlying pillars which underpin the successful adoption and implementation of safeguarding strategies. This safeguarding model is designed to assist sport organisations in the creation of a safe sporting environment to ensure that the child athlete can flourish and reach their athletic potential through an enjoyable experience. The aim of this narrative review is to (1) present a summary of the scientific literature on the threats to children in sport; (2) introduce a framework to categorise these threats; (3) identify research gaps in the field and (4) provide safeguarding recommendations for sport organisations. PMID:26084527

  18. TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT ON THE DUPIC SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM

    SciTech Connect

    H. KIM; H. CHA; ET AL

    2001-02-01

    A safeguards system has been developed since 1993 in the course of supporting a fuel cycle process to fabricate CANDU fuel with spent PWR fuel (known as Direct Use of PWR spent fuel In CANDU, DUPIC). The major safeguards technology involved here was to design and fabricate a neutron coincidence counting system for process accountability, and also an unattended continuous monitoring system in association with independent verification by the IAEA. This combined technology was to produce information of nuclear material content and to maintain knowledge of the continuity of nuclear material flow. In addition to hardware development, diagnosis software is being developed to assist data acquisition, data review, and data evaluation based on a neural network system on the IAEA C/S system.

  19. Safeguards Accountability Network accountability and materials management

    SciTech Connect

    Carnival, G.J.; Meredith, E.M.

    1985-01-01

    The Safeguards Accountability Network (SAN) is an on-line accountability system used by Rocky Flats Plant to provide accountability control of its nuclear material inventory. The system is also used to monitor and evaluate the use of the nuclear material inventory against programmatic objectives for materials management. The SAN system utilizes two Harris 800 Computers as central processing units. Enhancement plans are currently being formulated to provide automated data collection from process operations on the shop floor and from non-destructive analysis safeguards instrumentation. SAN, discussed in this paper, is an excellent system for basic accountability control of nuclear materials inventories and is a quite useful tool in evaluating the efficient use of nuclear materials inventories at Rocky Flats Plant.

  20. Next Generations Safeguards Initiative: The Life of a Cylinder

    SciTech Connect

    Morgan, James B; White-Horton, Jessica L

    2012-01-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Nonproliferation and International Security's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) has begun a program based on a five-year plan to investigate the concept of a global monitoring scheme that uniquely identifies uranium hexafluoride (UF6) cylinders and their locations throughout the life cycle. A key initial activity in the NGSI program is to understand and document the 'life of a UF6 cylinder' from cradle to grave. This document describes the life of a UF6 cylinder and includes cylinder manufacture and procurement processes as well as cylinder-handling and operational practices at conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication, and depleted UF6 conversion facilities. The NGSI multiple-laboratory team is using this document as a building block for subsequent tasks in the five-year plan, including development of the functional requirements for cylinder-tagging and tracking devices.

  1. Safeguards Education and Training: Short Term Supply vs. Demand

    SciTech Connect

    Mathews, Carrie E.; Crawford, Cary E.

    2004-07-16

    Much has been written and discussed in the past several years about the effect of the aging nuclear workforce on the sustainability of the U.S. safeguards and security infrastructure. This paper discusses the 10-15 year supply and demand forecast for nuclear material control and accounting specialists. The demand side of the review includes control and accounting of the materials at U.S. DOE and NRC facilities, and the federal oversight of those MC&A programs. The cadre of experts referred to as 'MC&A Specialists' available to meet the demand goes beyond domestic MC&A to include international programs, regulatory and inspection support, and so on.

  2. Maintaining continuity of knowledge on safeguards samples

    SciTech Connect

    Franssen, F; Islam, A B.M.N.; Sonnier, C; Schoeneman, J L; Baumann, M

    1992-01-01

    The conclusions of the vulnerability test on VOPAN (verification of Operator's Analysis) as conducted at Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (ASA) at Seibersdorf, Austria in October 1990 and documented in STR-266, indicate that whenever samples are taken for safeguards purposes extreme care must be taken to ensure that they have not been interfered with during the sample taking, transportation, storage or sample preparation process.'' Indeed there exist a number of possibilities to alter the content of a safeguards sample vial from the moment of sampling up to the arrival of the treated (or untreated) sample at SAL. The time lapse between these two events can range from a few days up to months. The sample history over this period can be subdivided into three main sub-periods: (1) the period from when the sampling activities are commenced up to the treatment in the operator's laboratory, (2) during treatment of samples in the operator's laboratory, and finally, (3) the period between that treatment and the arrival of the sample at SAL. A combined effort between the Agency and the United States Support Program to the Agency (POTAS) has resulted in two active tasks and one proposed task to investigate improving the maintenance of continuity of knowledge on safeguards samples during the entire period of their existence. This paper describes the use of the Sample Vial Secure Container (SVSC), of the Authenticated Secure Container System (ASCS), and of the Secure Container for Storage and Transportation of samples (SCST) to guarantee that a representative portion of the solution sample will be received at SAL.

  3. Pebble bed modular reactor safeguards: developing new approaches and implementing safeguards by design

    SciTech Connect

    Beyer, Brian David; Beddingfield, David H; Durst, Philip; Bean, Robert

    2010-01-01

    The design of the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR) does not fit or seem appropriate to the IAEA safeguards approach under the categories of light water reactor (LWR), on-load refueled reactor (OLR, i.e. CANDU), or Other (prismatic HTGR) because the fuel is in a bulk form, rather than discrete items. Because the nuclear fuel is a collection of nuclear material inserted in tennis-ball sized spheres containing structural and moderating material and a PBMR core will contain a bulk load on the order of 500,000 spheres, it could be classified as a 'Bulk-Fuel Reactor.' Hence, the IAEA should develop unique safeguards criteria. In a multi-lab DOE study, it was found that an optimized blend of: (i) developing techniques to verify the plutonium content in spent fuel pebbles, (ii) improving burn-up computer codes for PBMR spent fuel to provide better understanding of the core and spent fuel makeup, and (iii) utilizing bulk verification techniques for PBMR spent fuel storage bins should be combined with the historic IAEA and South African approaches of containment and surveillance to verify and maintain continuity of knowledge of PBMR fuel. For all of these techniques to work the design of the reactor will need to accommodate safeguards and material accountancy measures to a far greater extent than has thus far been the case. The implementation of Safeguards-by-Design as the PBMR design progresses provides an approach to meets these safeguards and accountancy needs.

  4. Safeguarding children: audit of staff knowledge.

    PubMed

    Wiener, Lorraine; Michelle, Mulvaney

    2008-05-01

    Following the publication in 2006 of 'Working together to safeguard children' (HM Government 2006), an audit was undertaken to assess the working knowledge of children's services staff about safeguarding. The aims of the audit were to: identify knowledge of key legal issues required when caring for children and young people; highlight gaps in knowledge; identify training needs. Staff in acute children's services in two district general hospitals and in the child and adolescent mental health service were interviewed using a structured questionnaire. The results of the audit showed that professional's knowledge about the sharing of information was good. This may have been due to a recent introduction of a policy on sharing information and also mandatory training on safeguarding children, which includes issues regarding sharing information. However, the audit identified a lack of understanding about parental responsibility with only 41 per cent of staff able to provide an acceptable response. Other gaps in staff knowledge were identified concerning legal orders, particularly emergency protection orders and police protection powers.

  5. Advanced Safeguards Technology Demonstration at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory

    SciTech Connect

    Arrigo, Leah M.; Bryan, Samuel A.; Christensen, Richard; Douglas, Matthew; Duckworth, Douglas C.; Fraga, Carlos G.; Levitskaia, Tatiana G.; Liezers, Martin; Orton, Christopher R.; Peper, Shane M.; Schwantes, Jon M.

    2010-05-21

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has established international safeguards standards for fissionable material at spent fuel reprocessing plants to ensure that significant quantities of weapons-grade nuclear material are not diverted over a specified time frame. Currently, methods to verify that the facilities are operating under adequate safeguard-declared conditions require time consuming sampling and expensive, destructive analysis. The time delay between sampling and subsequent analysis provides a potential opportunity to divert the material out of the appropriate chemical stream. One way to avoid this problem is to use process monitoring equipment that is capable of on-line and in near-real time monitoring of the flowsheet radiochemical streams to rapidly identify deviations from normal operating conditions. Three integrated systems for flowsheet monitoring are currently being developed at PNNL including: 1) Multi-Isotope Process Monitor (MIP), 2) a spectroscopy-based monitor utilizing UV-Vis-NIR (Ultra Violet-Visible-Near Infrared) and Raman spectrometers, and 3) Electrochemically Modulated Separations (EMS). MIP uses gamma spectroscopy and pattern recognition software to identify off-normal conditions in process streams. The UV-Vis-NIR and Raman spectroscopic monitoring continuously measures chemical compositions of the process streams including actinide metal ions (U, Pu, Np), selected fission products, and major cold flowsheet chemicals. EMS provides an on-line means for pre-separating and preconcentrating elements of interest out of complex matrices prior to detection via non-destructive assay by gamma spectroscopy or destructive analysis with mass spectrometry. PNNL previously reported some of its initial modeling work as proof of principle. Here we will provide a general overview of the technologies and the ongoing demonstrations that utilize actual spent fuel.

  6. Operational perspective on safeguards issues

    SciTech Connect

    Davis, F.B.; Ostenak, C.

    1991-12-31

    Today`s S&S regulatory environment is best characterized as dynamic and turbulent. As a result, S&S programs, policies and procedures are rapidly undergoing change, sometimes major, to withstand internal and external scrutiny. Currently the Material Control and Accountability (MC&A) DOE Order 5633.3 forms the basis of the MC&A programs throughout the DOE complex. Although these requirements can be and often are made more restrictive by the field office and/or the site contractor, this order establishes the minimum standards that programs must meet. The present policy makes exceptions to this order difficult, if not impossible, to be granted. Therefore, strict compliance is expected, and enforced through audits. Having the MC&A requirements commonly understood by those that enforce compliance and educating the contractors and DOE field offices in the standards they will be audited against would offer definite advantages. However, the requirements are not always commonly understood because some are ambiguous and leave room for interpretation. A further complicating factor is the different nature and mission of the facilities in the DOE complex, which forces many DOE requirements to be ambiguous or not applicable. This report analyzes operational issues at the Savannah River Site and Los Alamos National Laboratory.

  7. Operational perspective on safeguards issues

    SciTech Connect

    Davis, F.B.; Ostenak, C.

    1991-01-01

    Today's S S regulatory environment is best characterized as dynamic and turbulent. As a result, S S programs, policies and procedures are rapidly undergoing change, sometimes major, to withstand internal and external scrutiny. Currently the Material Control and Accountability (MC A) DOE Order 5633.3 forms the basis of the MC A programs throughout the DOE complex. Although these requirements can be and often are made more restrictive by the field office and/or the site contractor, this order establishes the minimum standards that programs must meet. The present policy makes exceptions to this order difficult, if not impossible, to be granted. Therefore, strict compliance is expected, and enforced through audits. Having the MC A requirements commonly understood by those that enforce compliance and educating the contractors and DOE field offices in the standards they will be audited against would offer definite advantages. However, the requirements are not always commonly understood because some are ambiguous and leave room for interpretation. A further complicating factor is the different nature and mission of the facilities in the DOE complex, which forces many DOE requirements to be ambiguous or not applicable. This report analyzes operational issues at the Savannah River Site and Los Alamos National Laboratory.

  8. INL Human Resource Development and the Next-Generation Safeguards Initiative

    SciTech Connect

    Gouveia, Fernando; Metcalf, Richard Royce Madison

    2010-07-01

    It is the stated goal of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) to promote the development of a strengthened nuclear safeguards base, one with the potential to advance the secure and peaceful implementation of nuclear energy world-wide. To meet this goal, the initiative, among other things, has sought to develop a revitalized effort to ensure the continued availability of next generation safeguards professionals. Accordingly, this paper serves to outline the human capital building strategies taken by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) in line with the NGSI. Various components are presented in detail, including INL’s efforts directed at university outreach, in particular the laboratory’s summer internship program, along with the development of various innovative training programs and long-term oriented strategies for student professional development. Special highlights include a video training series, developed by INL in cooperation with LLNL and other laboratories, which sought to expose students and entry-level professionals to the concept and practice of international nuclear safeguards.

  9. Framework for Integrating Safety, Operations, Security, and Safeguards in the Design and Operation of Nuclear Facilities

    SciTech Connect

    Darby, John L.; Horak, Karl Emanuel; LaChance, Jeffrey L.; Tolk, Keith Michael; Whitehead, Donnie Wayne

    2007-10-01

    The US is currently on the brink of a nuclear renaissance that will result in near-term construction of new nuclear power plants. In addition, the Department of Energy’s (DOE) ambitious new Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) program includes facilities for reprocessing spent nuclear fuel and reactors for transmuting safeguards material. The use of nuclear power and material has inherent safety, security, and safeguards (SSS) concerns that can impact the operation of the facilities. Recent concern over terrorist attacks and nuclear proliferation led to an increased emphasis on security and safeguard issues as well as the more traditional safety emphasis. To meet both domestic and international requirements, nuclear facilities include specific SSS measures that are identified and evaluated through the use of detailed analysis techniques. In the past, these individual assessments have not been integrated, which led to inefficient and costly design and operational requirements. This report provides a framework for a new paradigm where safety, operations, security, and safeguards (SOSS) are integrated into the design and operation of a new facility to decrease cost and increase effectiveness. Although the focus of this framework is on new nuclear facilities, most of the concepts could be applied to any new, high-risk facility.

  10. Safeguards equipment of the future: Integrated monitoring systems and remote monitoring

    SciTech Connect

    Sonnier, C.S.; Johnson, C.S.

    1994-02-01

    From the beginning, equipment to support IAEA Safeguards could be characterized as that which is used to measure nuclear material, Destructive Assay (DA) and Non Destructive Assay (NDA), and that which is used to provide continuity of knowledge between inspection intervals, Containment & Surveillance (C/S). C/S equipment has often been thought of as Cameras and Seals, with a limited number of monitors being employed as they became available. In recent years, technology has advanced at an extremely rapid rate, and continues to do so. The traditional film cameras are being replaced by video equipment, and fiber optic and electronic seals have come into rather widespread use. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of this evolution, and that which indicates the wave of the future without much question, is the integration of video surveillance and electronic seals with a variety of monitors. This is demonstrated by safeguards systems which are installed in several nuclear facilities in France, Germany, Japan, the UK, the USA, and elsewhere. The terminology of Integrated Monitoring Systems (IMS) has emerged, with the employment of network technology capable of interconnecting all desired elements in a very flexible manner. Also, the technology for transmission of a wide variety of information to off-site locations, termed Remote Monitoring, is in widespread industrial use, requiring very little adaptation for safeguards use. This paper examines the future of the Integrated Monitoring Systems and Remote Monitoring in International Safeguards, including technical and other related factors.

  11. Exploring Operational Safeguards, Safety, and Security by Design to Address Real Time Threats in Nuclear Facilities

    SciTech Connect

    Schanfein, Mark J.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2015-07-07

    Over the last few years, significant attention has been paid to both encourage application and provide domestic and international guidance for designing in safeguards and security in new facilities.1,2,3 However, once a facility is operational, safeguards, security, and safety often operate as separate entities that support facility operations. This separation is potentially a serious weakness should insider or outsider threats become a reality.Situations may arise where safeguards detects a possible loss of material in a facility. Will they notify security so they can, for example, check perimeter doors for tampering? Not doing so might give the advantage to an insider who has already, or is about to, move nuclear material outside the facility building. If outsiders break into a facility, the availability of any information to coordinate the facility’s response through segregated alarm stations or a failure to include all available radiation sensors, such as safety’s criticality monitors can give the advantage to the adversary who might know to disable camera systems, but would most likely be unaware of other highly relevant sensors in a nuclear facility.This paper will briefly explore operational safeguards, safety, and security by design (3S) at a high level for domestic and State facilities, identify possible weaknesses, and propose future administrative and technical methods, to strengthen the facility system’s response to threats.

  12. Analysis of the effectiveness of gas centrifuge enrichment plants advanced safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Boyer, Brian David; Erpenbeck, Heather H; Miller, Karen A; Swinjoe, Martyn T; Ianakiev, Kiril D; Marlow, Johnna B

    2010-01-01

    Current safeguards approaches used by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs) need enhancement in order to verify declared low-enriched uranium (LEU) production, detect undeclared LEU production and detect highly enriched uranium (HEU) production with adequate detection probability using non destructive assay (NDA) techniques. At present inspectors use attended systems, systems needing the presence of an inspector for operation, during inspections to verify the mass and 235U enrichment of declared UF6 containers used in the process of enrichment at GCEPs. This paper contains an analysis of possible improvements in unattended and attended NDA systems including process monitoring and possible on-site destructive assay (DA) of samples that could reduce the uncertainty of the inspector's measurements. These improvements could reduce the difference between the operator's and inspector's measurements providing more effective and efficient IAEA GCEPs safeguards. We also explore how a few advanced safeguards systems could be assembled for unattended operation. The analysis will focus on how unannounced inspections (UIs), and the concept of information-driven inspections (IDS) can affect probability of detection of the diversion of nuclear materials when coupled to new GCEPs safeguards regimes augmented with unattended systems.

  13. Development of Metallic Magnetic Calorimeters for Nuclear Safeguards Applications

    SciTech Connect

    Bates, Cameron Russell

    2015-03-11

    Many nuclear safeguards applications could benefit from high-resolution gamma-ray spectroscopy achievable with metallic magnetic calorimeters. This dissertation covers the development of a system for these applications based on gamma-ray detectors developed at the University of Heidelberg. It demonstrates new calorimeters of this type, which achieved an energy resolution of 45.5 eV full-width at half-maximum at 59.54 keV, roughly ten times better than current state of the art high purity germanium detectors. This is the best energy resolution achieved with a gamma-ray metallic magnetic calorimeter at this energy to date. In addition to demonstrating a new benchmark in energy resolution, an experimental system for measuring samples with metallic magnetic calorimeters was constructed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. This system achieved an energy resolution of 91.3 eV full-width at half-maximum at 59.54 keV under optimal conditions. Using this system it was possible to characterize the linearity of the response, the count-rate limitations, and the energy resolution as a function of temperature of the new calorimeter. With this characterization it was determined that it would be feasible to measure 242Pu in a mixed isotope plutonium sample. A measurement of a mixed isotope plutonium sample was performed over the course of 12 days with a single two-pixel metallic magnetic calorimeter. The relative concentration of 242Pu in comparison to other plutonium isotopes was determined by direct measurement to less than half a percent accuracy. This is comparable with the accuracy of the best-case scenario using traditional indirect methods. The ability to directly measure the relative concentration of 242Pu in a sample could enable more accurate accounting and detection of indications of undeclared activities in nuclear safeguards, a better constraint on source material in forensic samples containing plutonium, and improvements in verification in a future plutonium

  14. New Prototype Safeguards Technology Offers Improved Confidence and Automation for Uranium Enrichment Facilities

    SciTech Connect

    Brim, Cornelia P.

    2013-04-01

    An important requirement for the international safeguards community is the ability to determine the enrichment level of uranium in gas centrifuge enrichment plants and nuclear fuel fabrication facilities. This is essential to ensure that countries with nuclear nonproliferation commitments, such as States Party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, are adhering to their obligations. However, current technologies to verify the uranium enrichment level in gas centrifuge enrichment plants or nuclear fuel fabrication facilities are technically challenging and resource-intensive. NNSA’s Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) supports the development, testing, and evaluation of future systems that will strengthen and sustain U.S. safeguards and security capabilities—in this case, by automating the monitoring of uranium enrichment in the entire inventory of a fuel fabrication facility. One such system is HEVA—hybrid enrichment verification array. This prototype was developed to provide an automated, nondestructive assay verification technology for uranium hexafluoride (UF6) cylinders at enrichment plants.

  15. Physician Enabling Skills Questionnaire

    PubMed Central

    Hudon, Catherine; Lambert, Mireille; Almirall, José

    2015-01-01

    Abstract Objective To evaluate the reliability and validity of the newly developed Physician Enabling Skills Questionnaire (PESQ) by assessing its internal consistency, test-retest reliability, concurrent validity with patient-centred care, and predictive validity with patient activation and patient enablement. Design Validation study. Setting Saguenay, Que. Participants One hundred patients with at least 1 chronic disease who presented in a waiting room of a regional health centre family medicine unit. Main outcome measures Family physicians’ enabling skills, measured with the PESQ at 2 points in time (ie, while in the waiting room at the family medicine unit and 2 weeks later through a mail survey); patient-centred care, assessed with the Patient Perception of Patient-Centredness instrument; patient activation, assessed with the Patient Activation Measure; and patient enablement, assessed with the Patient Enablement Instrument. Results The internal consistency of the 6 subscales of the PESQ was adequate (Cronbach α = .69 to .92). The test-retest reliability was very good (r = 0.90; 95% CI 0.84 to 0.93). Concurrent validity with the Patient Perception of Patient-Centredness instrument was good (r = −0.67; 95% CI −0.78 to −0.53; P < .001). The PESQ accounts for 11% of the total variance with the Patient Activation Measure (r2 = 0.11; P = .002) and 19% of the variance with the Patient Enablement Instrument (r2 = 0.19; P < .001). Conclusion The newly developed PESQ presents good psychometric properties, allowing for its use in practice and research. PMID:26889507

  16. Progress Addressing Safeguards Capability Development Needs through Educational Outreach and Knowledge Management

    SciTech Connect

    Leek, K. M.; Seward, Amy M.; Dickman, Deborah A.; Toomey, Charles J.; Greenfield, Bryce A.; Mathews, Caroline E.; Fishbone, L.; Graham, T.; Rosenthal, Michael; Ward, B.

    2010-11-08

    This paper describes the NGSI Human Capital Development Program's domestic and international activities, and offers specific case studies to exemplify the outcomes and progress achieved in this area over the past several years. The paper highlights the importance of a sustained effort to address the human dimension of safeguards and nonproliferation and to address critical work force issues in the U.S. and abroad.

  17. Modeling and Simulation for Safeguards and Nonproliferation Workshop

    SciTech Connect

    Gilligan, Kimberly V.; Kirk, Bernadette Lugue

    2015-01-01

    The Modeling and Simulation for Safeguards and Nonproliferation Workshop was held December 15–18, 2014, at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. This workshop was made possible by the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Human Capital Development (NGSI HCD) Program. The idea of the workshop was to move beyond the tried-and-true boot camp training of nonproliferation concepts to spend several days on the unique perspective of applying modeling and simulation (M&S) solutions to safeguards challenges.

  18. A Monte Carlo based spent fuel analysis safeguards strategy assessment

    SciTech Connect

    Fensin, Michael L; Tobin, Stephen J; Swinhoe, Martyn T; Menlove, Howard O; Sandoval, Nathan P

    2009-01-01

    Safeguarding nuclear material involves the detection of diversions of significant quantities of nuclear materials, and the deterrence of such diversions by the risk of early detection. There are a variety of motivations for quantifying plutonium in spent fuel assemblies by means of nondestructive assay (NDA) including the following: strengthening the capabilities of the International Atomic Energy Agencies ability to safeguards nuclear facilities, shipper/receiver difference, input accountability at reprocessing facilities and burnup credit at repositories. Many NDA techniques exist for measuring signatures from spent fuel; however, no single NDA technique can, in isolation, quantify elemental plutonium and other actinides of interest in spent fuel. A study has been undertaken to determine the best integrated combination of cost effective techniques for quantifying plutonium mass in spent fuel for nuclear safeguards. A standardized assessment process was developed to compare the effective merits and faults of 12 different detection techniques in order to integrate a few techniques and to down-select among the techniques in preparation for experiments. The process involves generating a basis burnup/enrichment/cooling time dependent spent fuel assembly library, creating diversion scenarios, developing detector models and quantifying the capability of each NDA technique. Because hundreds of input and output files must be managed in the couplings of data transitions for the different facets of the assessment process, a graphical user interface (GUI) was development that automates the process. This GUI allows users to visually create diversion scenarios with varied replacement materials, and generate a MCNPX fixed source detector assessment input file. The end result of the assembly library assessment is to select a set of common source terms and diversion scenarios for quantifying the capability of each of the 12 NDA techniques. We present here the generalized

  19. 10 CFR 72.184 - Safeguards contingency plan.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ..., and Responsibility Matrix, the first four categories of information relating to nuclear facilities... contained in the Responsibility Matrix of the licensee's safeguards contingency plan. The licensee...

  20. Comprehensive safeguards evaluation methods and societal risk analysis

    SciTech Connect

    Richardson, J.M.

    1982-03-01

    Essential capabilities of an integrated evaluation methodology for analyzing safeguards systems are discussed. Such a methodology must be conceptually meaningful, technically defensible, discriminating and consistent. A decompostion of safeguards systems by function is mentioned as a possible starting point for methodology development. The application of a societal risk equation to safeguards systems analysis is addressed. Conceptual problems with this approach are discussed. Technical difficulties in applying this equation to safeguards systems are illustrated through the use of confidence intervals, information content, hypothesis testing and ranking and selection procedures.

  1. Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence for Safeguards Applications

    SciTech Connect

    Ludewigt, Bernhard A; Quiter, Brian J; Ambers, Scott D

    2011-02-04

    In nuclear resonance fluorescence (NRF) measurements, resonances are excited by an external photon beam leading to the emission of {gamma} rays with specific energies that are characteristic of the emitting isotope. The promise of NRF as a non-destructive analysis technique (NDA) in safeguards applications lies in its potential to directly quantify a specific isotope in an assay target without the need for unfolding the combined responses of several fissile isotopes as often required by other NDA methods. The use of NRF for detection of sensitive nuclear materials and other contraband has been researched in the past. In the safeguards applications considered here one has to go beyond mere detection and precisely quantify the isotopic content, a challenge that is discussed throughout this report. Basic NRF measurement methods, instrumentation, and the analytical calculation of NRF signal strengths are described in Section 2. Well understood modeling and simulation tools are needed for assessing the potential of NRF for safeguards and for designing measurement systems. All our simulations were performed with the radiation transport code MCNPX, a code that is widely used in the safeguards community. Our initial studies showed that MCNPX grossly underestimated the elastically scattered background at backwards angles due to an incorrect treatment of Rayleigh scattering. While new, corrected calculations based on ENDF form factors showed much better agreement with experimental data for the elastic scattering of photons on an uranium target, the elastic backscatter is still not rigorously treated. Photonuclear scattering processes (nuclear Thomson, Delbruck and Giant Dipole Resonance scattering), which are expected to play an important role at higher energies, are not yet included. These missing elastic scattering contributions were studied and their importance evaluated evaluated against data found in the literature as discussed in Section 3. A transmission experiment

  2. Secure Video Surveillance System (SVSS) for unannounced safeguards inspections.

    SciTech Connect

    Galdoz, Erwin G. , Rio de Janeiro, Brazil); Pinkalla, Mark

    2010-09-01

    The Secure Video Surveillance System (SVSS) is a collaborative effort between the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC). The joint project addresses specific requirements of redundant surveillance systems installed in two South American nuclear facilities as a tool to support unannounced inspections conducted by ABACC and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The surveillance covers the critical time (as much as a few hours) between the notification of an inspection and the access of inspectors to the location in facility where surveillance equipment is installed. ABACC and the IAEA currently use the EURATOM Multiple Optical Surveillance System (EMOSS). This outdated system is no longer available or supported by the manufacturer. The current EMOSS system has met the project objective; however, the lack of available replacement parts and system support has made this system unsustainable and has increased the risk of an inoperable system. A new system that utilizes current technology and is maintainable is required to replace the aging EMOSS system. ABACC intends to replace one of the existing ABACC EMOSS systems by the Secure Video Surveillance System. SVSS utilizes commercial off-the shelf (COTS) technologies for all individual components. Sandia National Laboratories supported the system design for SVSS to meet Safeguards requirements, i.e. tamper indication, data authentication, etc. The SVSS consists of two video surveillance cameras linked securely to a data collection unit. The collection unit is capable of retaining historical surveillance data for at least three hours with picture intervals as short as 1sec. Images in .jpg format are available to inspectors using various software review tools. SNL has delivered two SVSS systems for test and evaluation at the ABACC Safeguards Laboratory. An additional 'proto-type' system remains

  3. [Safeguarding herds from the animal hygiene point of view].

    PubMed

    Hartung, J

    2005-08-01

    One of the most important concepts for the protection of herd health is the implementation of structural and organisational measures to prevent infective agents and other adverse compounds from entering the farm. Safeguarding health, well-being and production efficiency is part of the overall management concept of hygiene in animal production systems. This paper presents an overview of the most important rules and recommendations to protect livestock production facilities from the intrusion of infectious pathogens, beginning with the right choice of the site for the farm and the animal housing ("safe distances" to neighbouring farm animal houses), solid fencing and control and disinfecting places at the entrance gate. The traffic of vehicles and people transporting animals, feedstuff, equipment and slurry or manure to and from the facility should be reduced to a minimum. Fallen animals should be stored in separate and safe containers until removed by specialised companies. Regular control of rodents, insects and wild birds is crucial to avoid the transfer of infectious agents from farm to farm and between herds within a farm. Equally important factors are the health status of personnel to avoid transmission of zoonotic diseases, the application of the all-in-all-out system and a strict cleaning and disinfecting regime. The internal and external organisational measures for preventing the spread of infections in animal production will gain increasing importance in the future because the farm animal producer bears the responsibility for the production of safe and healthy food at the primary segment of the food chain. Increasing restrictions on the use of veterinary drugs for food delivering animals will increase the importance of prophylaxis, prevention and protection of production units as the keys for safeguarding health, well-being and efficiency of farm animals. Only the application of strict hygiene principles in animal production will make it possible to meet

  4. A Simple Candle Filter Safeguard Device

    SciTech Connect

    Hurley, J.P.; Henderson, A.K.; Swanson, M.L.

    2002-09-18

    In order to reach the highest possible efficiencies in a coal-fired turbine-based power system, the turbine should be directly fired with the products of coal utilization. Two main designs employ these turbines: those based on pressurized fluidized-bed combustors (PFBCs) and those based on integrated gasification combined cycles (IGCCs). In both designs, the suspended particulates, or dust, must be cleaned from the gas before it enters the turbine to prevent fouling and erosion of the blades. To produce the cleanest gas, barrier filters are being developed and are in commercial use. Barrier filters are composed of porous, high-temperature materials that allow the hot gas to pass but collect the dust on the surface. The three main configurations are candle, cross-flow, and tube. Both candle and tube filters have been tested extensively. They are primarily composed of coarsely porous ceramic that serves as a structural support, overlain with a thin, microporous ceramic layer o n the dirty gas side that serves as the primary filter surface. They are highly efficient at removing particulate matter from the gas stream and, because of their ceramic construction, are resistant to gas and ash corrosion. However, ceramics are brittle, and individual elements can fail, allowing the particulates to pass through the hole left by the filter element and erode the turbine. Because of the possibility of occasional filter breakage, safeguard devices (SGDs) must be employed to prevent the dust streaming through broken filters from reaching the turbine. The Energy & Environmental Research Center (EERC) safeguard device is composed of three main parts: the ceramic substrate, the adhesive coating, and the safeguard device housing. This report describes the development and laboratory testing of each of those parts as well as the bench-scale performance of both types of complete SGDs.

  5. Safeguards and security modeling for electrochemical plants

    SciTech Connect

    Cipiti, B.B.; Duran, F.A.; Mendoza, L.A.; Parks, M.J.; Dominguez, D.; Le, T.D.

    2013-07-01

    Safeguards and security design for reprocessing plants can lead to excessive costs if not incorporated early in the design process. The design for electrochemical plants is somewhat uncertain since these plants have not been built at a commercial scale in the past. The Separation and Safeguards Performance Model (SSPM), developed at Sandia National Laboratories, has been used for safeguards design and evaluation for multiple reprocessing plant types. The SSPM includes the following capabilities: -) spent fuel source term library, -) mass tracking of elements 1-99 and bulk solid/liquids, -) tracking of heat load and activity, -) customisable measurement points, -) automated calculation of ID and error propagation, -) alarm conditions and statistical tests, and -) user-defined diversion scenarios. Materials accountancy and process monitoring data can provide more timely detection of material loss specifically to protect against the insider threat. While the SSPM is capable of determining detection probabilities and examining detection times for material loss scenarios, it does not model the operations or spatial effects for a plant design. The STAGE software was chosen to model the physical protection system. STAGE provides a framework to create end-to-end scalable force-on-force combat simulations. It allows for a complete 3D model of a facility to be designed along with the design of physical protection elements. This software, then, can be used to model operations and response for various material loss scenarios. The future integration of the SSPM model data with the STAGE software will provide a more complete analysis of diversion scenarios to assist plant designers.

  6. IAEA SAFEGUARDS DURING PLUTONIUM STABILIZATION AT HANFORDS PLUTONIUM FINISHING PLANT (PFP)

    SciTech Connect

    MCRAE, L.P.

    2004-02-20

    The Vault at the Plutonium Finishing Plan (PFP) became subject to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards beginning in 1994 as part of the US excess fissile material program. The inventory needed to be stabilized and repackaged for long-term storage to comply with Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 94-1. In 1998, the United States began negotiations with IAEA to develop methods to maintain safeguards as this material was stabilized and repackaged. The Design Information Questionnaire was revised and submitted to the IAEA in 2002 describing how PFP would be modified to accommodate the stabilization process line. The operation plan for 2003 was submitted describing the proposed schedules for removing materials for stabilization. Stabilization and repackaging activities for the safeguarded plutonium began in January 2003 and were completed in December 2003. The safeguards approach implemented at the Hanford Site was a combination of the original baseline approach augmented by a series of five vault additions of stabilized materials followed by five removals of unstabilized materials. IAEA containment and surveillance measures were maintained until the unstabilized material was removed. Following placement of repackaged material (most from the original safeguarded stock) into the storage vault, the IAEA conducted inventory change verification measurements and then established containment and surveillance. As part of the stabilization campaign, the IAEA developed new measurement methods and calibration standards representative of the materials and packaging. The annual physical inventory verification was conducted on the normal IAEA schedule following the fourth additional/removal phase. Plant activities and the impacts on operations are described.

  7. Lanthanum Bromide Detectors for Safeguards Measurements

    SciTech Connect

    Wright, J.

    2011-05-25

    Lanthanum bromide has advantages over other popular inorganic scintillator detectors. Lanthanum bromide offers superior resolution, and good efficiency when compared to sodium iodide and lanthanum chloride. It is a good alternative to high purity germanium detectors for some safeguards applications. This paper offers an initial look at lanthanum bromide detectors. Resolution of lanthanum bromide will be compared lanthanum chloride and sodium-iodide detectors through check source measurements. Relative efficiency and angular dependence will be looked at. Nuclear material spectra, to include plutonium and highly enriched uranium, will be compared between detector types.

  8. Fuzzy risk analysis for nuclear safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Zardecki, A.

    1993-01-01

    Analysis of a safeguards system, based on the notion of fuzzy sets and linguistic variables, concerns such as complexity and inherent imprecision in estimating the possibility of loss or compromise. The automated risk analysis allows the risk to be determined for an entire system based on estimates for lowest level components and the component proportion. In addition, for each component (asset) the most effective combination of protection mechanisms against a given set of threats is determined. A distinction between bar and featured risk is made.

  9. Strengthening the International Safeguards System, Institutional and Financial Issues,

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1978-02-26

    only rather typicl of"I nternat ional~organIzat:ions, I t I s about twice the increase In" US federal goVernrent expenditures in real terms over. the...the Agency provides assistance only to those projects it finds technically *23sound. Since there is probably some "padding" in the requests and since...promotional programs. The latter include peaceful explos.ions, agricultural applications, theoretical research projects , Information distribution, and others

  10. Applications of Photonuclear Physics for International Safeguards and Security

    SciTech Connect

    Johnson, M S; Hall, J M; McNabb, D P; McFarland, J; Norman, E; Bertozzi, W; Korbly, S; Ledoux, R; Park, W

    2010-04-16

    Studies of nuclear resonance fluorescence based applications are presented. Important for these applications are data for isotopes such as {sup 239}Pu. Nuclear resonance fluorescence measurements of {sup 239}Pu were performed at the free electron laser facility at UC Santa Barbara using photons from a bremsstrahlung beam with an endpoint energies between 4.0 MeV and 5.5 MeV. Though no discrete states with significant confidence level were measured, we have excluded the region above 27(3) eV-barns, or 4-sigma, where we would expect only a small chance of false positives. Details of the measurements and the results are presented here.

  11. Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1995-04-01

    density, or weight u/In-process inventory: as above, for solutions * Wastes: leached hulls (short lengths of fuel-rod cladding after the fuel itself has...Breeder Reactor (most common tion probability is defined as 90 per- type is the liquid-metal fast breeder cent. reactor, or LMFBR ) 1137 138 I Nuclear

  12. International.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Hoover, Linn

    1979-01-01

    The International Geological Correlation Project has attained scientific maturity and broad support and participation by geologists world wide. Its purpose is to provide a mechanism for international cooperation and information exchange about geological problems that transcend national boundaries. (Author/BB)

  13. Select Generic Dry-Storage Pilot Plant Design for Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) per Used Fuel Campaign

    SciTech Connect

    Demuth, Scott Francis; Sprinkle, James K.

    2015-05-26

    As preparation to the year-end deliverable (Provide SSBD Best Practices for Generic Dry-Storage Pilot Scale Plant) for the Work Package (FT-15LA040501–Safeguards and Security by Design for Extended Dry Storage), the initial step was to select a generic dry-storage pilot plant design for SSBD. To be consistent with other DOE-NE Fuel Cycle Research and Development (FCR&D) activities, the Used Fuel Campaign was engaged for the selection of a design for this deliverable. For the work Package FT-15LA040501–“Safeguards and Security by Design for Extended Dry Storage”, SSBD will be initiated for the Generic Dry-Storage Pilot Scale Plant described by the layout of Reference 2. SSBD will consider aspects of the design that are impacted by domestic material control and accounting (MC&A), domestic security, and international safeguards.

  14. A colalborative environment for information driven safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Scott, Mark R; Michel, Kelly D

    2010-09-15

    For two decades, the IAEA has recognized the need for a comprehensive and strongly integrated Knowledge Management system to support its Information Driven Safeguards activities. In the past, plans for the development of such a system have progressed slowly due to concerns over costs and feasibility. In recent years, Los Alamos National Laboratory has developed a knowledge management system that could serve as the basis for an IAEA Collaborative Environment (ICE). The ICE derivative knowledge management system described in this paper addresses the challenge of living in an era of information overload coupled with certain knowledge shortfalls. The paper describes and defines a system that is flexible, yet ensures coordinated and focused collaboration, broad data evaluation capabilities, architected and organized work flows, and improved communications. The paper and demonstration of ICE will utilize a hypothetical scenario to highlight the functional features that facilitate collaboration amongst and between information analysts and inspectors. The scenario will place these two groups into a simulated planning exercise for a safeguards inspection drawing upon past data acquisitions, inspection reports, analyst conclusions, and a coordinated walk-through of a 3-D model of the facility. Subsequent to the conduct of the simulated facility inspection, the detection of an anomaly and pursuit of follow up activities will illustrate the event notification, information sharing, and collaborative capabilities of the system. The use of a collaborative environment such as ICE to fulfill the complicated knowledge management demands of the Agency and facilitate the completion of annual State Evaluation Reports will also be addressed.

  15. Electrochemically Modulated Separation for Plutonium Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Pratt, Sandra H.; Breshears, Andrew T.; Arrigo, Leah M.; Schwantes, Jon M.; Duckworth, Douglas C.

    2013-12-31

    Accurate and timely analysis of plutonium in spent nuclear fuel is critical in nuclear safeguards for detection of both protracted and rapid plutonium diversions. Gamma spectroscopy is a viable method for accurate and timely measurements of plutonium provided that the plutonium is well separated from the interfering fission and activation products present in spent nuclear fuel. Electrochemically modulated separation (EMS) is a method that has been used successfully to isolate picogram amounts of Pu from nitric acid matrices. With EMS, Pu adsorption may be turned "on" and "off" depending on the applied voltage, allowing for collection and stripping of Pu without the addition of chemical reagents. In this work, we have scaled up the EMS process to isolate microgram quantities of Pu from matrices encountered in spent nuclear fuel during reprocessing. Several challenges have been addressed including surface area limitations, radiolysis effects, electrochemical cell performance stability, and chemical interferences. After these challenges were resolved, 6 µg Pu was deposited in the electrochemical cell with approximately an 800-fold reduction of fission and activation product levels from a spent nuclear fuel sample. Modeling showed that these levels of Pu collection and interference reduction may not be sufficient for Pu detection by gamma spectroscopy. The main remaining challenges are to achieve a more complete Pu isolation and to deposit larger quantities of Pu for successful gamma analysis of Pu. If gamma analyses of Pu are successful, EMS will allow for accurate and timely on-site analysis for enhanced Pu safeguards.

  16. DOE enrichment plants-safeguards means business

    SciTech Connect

    Donnelly, R.

    1987-01-01

    The Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant, owned by the US Department of Energy (DOE) and operated by Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., is a full service enrichment plant. Its long enriching cascade can process uranium hexafluoride (UF{sub 6}) feeds at almost any {sup 235}U level and can produce UF{sub 6} over the complete spectrum from depleted to very highly enriched uranium. The DOE uranium enrichment program is a government-owned enterprise operating as a business. The operating concerns of the DOE uranium enrichment plants and their safeguards programs have evolved together over the past three decades, and that evolution will likely continue. As the risk associated with possession, processing, and shipment of strategic nuclear material increased, the protection and control of it increased; as the value of the product grew with time, better ways were found to measure and conserve it. In each of these areas, safeguards objectives and the business requirements of the plant are complementary, and the progress made in one area has been reflected by progress in the other. The plant's material control and accountability program has become crucial to such business requirements as quantifying the enriched uranium (separative work units) produced in each monthly period and convincing financial auditors that the multibillion dollar enriched uranium assets located at the Portsmouth plant are properly stated.

  17. 10 CFR 73.71 - Reporting of safeguards events.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Reporting of safeguards events. 73.71 Section 73.71 Energy... § 73.71 Reporting of safeguards events. (a)(1) Each licensee subject to the provisions of §§ 73.25, 73... revised information. Each licensee shall maintain a copy of the written report of an event submitted...

  18. 10 CFR 73.71 - Reporting of safeguards events.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Reporting of safeguards events. 73.71 Section 73.71 Energy... § 73.71 Reporting of safeguards events. (a)(1) Each licensee subject to the provisions of §§ 73.25, 73... revised information. Each licensee shall maintain a copy of the written report of an event submitted...

  19. 10 CFR 73.71 - Reporting of safeguards events.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Reporting of safeguards events. 73.71 Section 73.71 Energy... § 73.71 Reporting of safeguards events. (a)(1) Each licensee subject to the provisions of §§ 73.25, 73... revised information. Each licensee shall maintain a copy of the written report of an event submitted...

  20. 10 CFR 73.71 - Reporting of safeguards events.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Reporting of safeguards events. 73.71 Section 73.71 Energy... § 73.71 Reporting of safeguards events. (a)(1) Each licensee subject to the provisions of §§ 73.25, 73... revised information. Each licensee shall maintain a copy of the written report of an event submitted...

  1. 10 CFR 73.71 - Reporting of safeguards events.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Reporting of safeguards events. 73.71 Section 73.71 Energy... § 73.71 Reporting of safeguards events. (a)(1) Each licensee subject to the provisions of §§ 73.25, 73... revised information. Each licensee shall maintain a copy of the written report of an event submitted...

  2. 75 FR 8154 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-02-23

    ... NRC staff regarding new advanced reactor designs such as NuScale, Iris, Babcock and Wilcox Modular... COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards In accordance with the purposes of Sections 29 and 182b of the Atomic Energy Act (42 U.S.C. 2039, 2232b), the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS...

  3. 75 FR 28074 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-05-19

    ... COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards In accordance with the purposes of Sections 29 and 182b of the Atomic Energy Act (42 U.S.C. 2039, 2232b), the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS... Accidental Radionuclide Releases.'' 10:15 a.m.-12 p.m.: Status of Risk-Informing Guidance of New...

  4. 76 FR 30404 - Advisory Committee On Reactor Safeguards; Meeting

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-05-25

    ... [Federal Register Volume 76, Number 101 (Wednesday, May 25, 2011)] [Notices] [Pages 30404-30405] [FR Doc No: 2011-12954] NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee On Reactor Safeguards... (42 U.S.C. 2039, 2232b), the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) will hold a meeting...

  5. 75 FR 3501 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-01-21

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards In accordance with the purposes of Sections 29 and 182b of the Atomic Energy Act (42 U.S.C. 2039, 2232b), the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards...

  6. 75 FR 21046 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-04-22

    ... COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards In accordance with the purposes of Sections 29 and 182b of the Atomic Energy Act (42 U.S.C. 2039, 2232b), the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS... discussions with the NRC Chairman to discuss topics of mutual interest. 1 p.m.-4 p.m.: Boiling Water...

  7. 76 FR 5218 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-01-28

    ... COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards In accordance with the purposes of Sections 29 and 182b of the Atomic Energy Act (42 U.S.C. 2039, 2232b), the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS... Facilities and Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRAs) for Reactors (Open)--The Committee will...

  8. 18 CFR 1301.69 - Safeguarding classified information.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-04-01

    ... 18 Conservation of Power and Water Resources 2 2014-04-01 2014-04-01 false Safeguarding classified information. 1301.69 Section 1301.69 Conservation of Power and Water Resources TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY PROCEDURES Protection of National Security Classified Information § 1301.69 Safeguarding...

  9. 32 CFR 310.13 - Safeguarding personal information.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... Standards and Technology. For paper records, disposal methods, such as tearing, burning, melting, chemical... (CONTINUED) PRIVACY PROGRAM DOD PRIVACY PROGRAM Systems of Records § 310.13 Safeguarding personal information... and physical safeguards to ensure that the records in each system of records are protected from...

  10. 5 CFR 293.107 - Special safeguards for automated records.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 5 Administrative Personnel 1 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Special safeguards for automated records. 293.107 Section 293.107 Administrative Personnel OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT CIVIL SERVICE REGULATIONS PERSONNEL RECORDS Basic Policies on Maintenance of Personnel Records § 293.107 Special safeguards...

  11. Systems Analysis of Safeguards Effectiveness in a Uranium Conversion Facility

    SciTech Connect

    Elayat, H A; Lambert, H; O'Connell, W J

    2004-06-16

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is interested in developing tools and methods for potential U.S. use in designing and evaluating safeguards systems. For this goal several DOE National Laboratories are defining the characteristics of typical facilities of several size scales, and the safeguards measures and instrumentation that could be applied. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory is providing systems modeling and analysis of facility and safeguards operations, diversion path generation, and safeguards system effectiveness. The constituent elements of diversion scenarios are structured using directed graphs (digraphs) and fault trees. Safeguards indicator probabilities are based on sampling statistics and/or measurement accuracies. Scenarios are ranked based on value and quantity of material removed and the estimated probability of non-detection. Significant scenarios, especially those involving timeliness or randomly varying order of events, are transferred to simulation analysis. Simulations show the range of conditions encountered by the safeguards measurements and inspections, e.g., the quantities of intermediate materials in temporary storage and the time sequencing of material flow. Given a diversion campaign, simulations show how much the range of the same parameters observed by the safeguards system can differ from the base-case range. The combination of digraphs, fault trees, statistics and simulation constitute a method for evaluation of the estimated benefit of alternate or additional safeguards equipment or features. A generic example illustrates the method.

  12. 48 CFR 814.401 - Receipt and safeguarding of bids.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 5 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Receipt and safeguarding of bids. 814.401 Section 814.401 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS....401 Receipt and safeguarding of bids. The contracting officer is designated as the official to open...

  13. 48 CFR 814.401 - Receipt and safeguarding of bids.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 5 2013-10-01 2013-10-01 false Receipt and safeguarding of bids. 814.401 Section 814.401 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS....401 Receipt and safeguarding of bids. The contracting officer is designated as the official to open...

  14. 48 CFR 814.401 - Receipt and safeguarding of bids.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 5 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Receipt and safeguarding of bids. 814.401 Section 814.401 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS....401 Receipt and safeguarding of bids. The contracting officer is designated as the official to open...

  15. 48 CFR 52.239-1 - Privacy or Security Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 2 2013-10-01 2013-10-01 false Privacy or Security....239-1 Privacy or Security Safeguards. As prescribed in 39.107, insert a clause substantially the same as the following: Privacy or Security Safeguards (AUG 1996) (a) The Contractor shall not publish...

  16. 48 CFR 52.239-1 - Privacy or Security Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 2 2014-10-01 2014-10-01 false Privacy or Security....239-1 Privacy or Security Safeguards. As prescribed in 39.107, insert a clause substantially the same as the following: Privacy or Security Safeguards (AUG 1996) (a) The Contractor shall not publish...

  17. 48 CFR 52.239-1 - Privacy or Security Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 2 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Privacy or Security....239-1 Privacy or Security Safeguards. As prescribed in 39.107, insert a clause substantially the same as the following: Privacy or Security Safeguards (AUG 1996) (a) The Contractor shall not publish...

  18. 48 CFR 52.239-1 - Privacy or Security Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 2 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Privacy or Security....239-1 Privacy or Security Safeguards. As prescribed in 39.107, insert a clause substantially the same as the following: Privacy or Security Safeguards (AUG 1996) (a) The Contractor shall not publish...

  19. 48 CFR 52.239-1 - Privacy or Security Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 2 2012-10-01 2012-10-01 false Privacy or Security....239-1 Privacy or Security Safeguards. As prescribed in 39.107, insert a clause substantially the same as the following: Privacy or Security Safeguards (AUG 1996) (a) The Contractor shall not publish...

  20. 7 CFR 352.10 - Inspection; safeguards; disposal.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 5 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Inspection; safeguards; disposal. 352.10 Section 352...; safeguards; disposal. (a) Inspection and release. Prohibited and restricted products and articles subject to... refused such entry or movement before unloading or landing, or which were refused such entry or...

  1. 10 CFR Appendix G to Part 73 - Reportable Safeguards Events

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Reportable Safeguards Events G Appendix G to Part 73.... G Appendix G to Part 73—Reportable Safeguards Events Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 73.71 (b.... (b) Any other threatened, attempted, or committed act not previously defined in appendix G with the...

  2. 30 CFR 77.1013 - Air drills; safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 30 Mineral Resources 1 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Air drills; safeguards. 77.1013 Section 77.1013... Control § 77.1013 Air drills; safeguards. Air shall be turned off and bled from the air hoses before hand-held air drills are moved from one working area to another. ...

  3. 30 CFR 77.1013 - Air drills; safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 30 Mineral Resources 1 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Air drills; safeguards. 77.1013 Section 77.1013... Control § 77.1013 Air drills; safeguards. Air shall be turned off and bled from the air hoses before hand-held air drills are moved from one working area to another. ...

  4. 30 CFR 77.1008 - Relocation of drills; safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 30 Mineral Resources 1 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Relocation of drills; safeguards. 77.1008... COAL MINES Ground Control § 77.1008 Relocation of drills; safeguards. (a) When a drill is being moved from one drilling area to another, drill steel, tools, and other equipment shall be secured and the...

  5. 30 CFR 77.1008 - Relocation of drills; safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 30 Mineral Resources 1 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Relocation of drills; safeguards. 77.1008... COAL MINES Ground Control § 77.1008 Relocation of drills; safeguards. (a) When a drill is being moved from one drilling area to another, drill steel, tools, and other equipment shall be secured and the...

  6. 30 CFR 77.1008 - Relocation of drills; safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 30 Mineral Resources 1 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Relocation of drills; safeguards. 77.1008... COAL MINES Ground Control § 77.1008 Relocation of drills; safeguards. (a) When a drill is being moved from one drilling area to another, drill steel, tools, and other equipment shall be secured and the...

  7. 30 CFR 77.1013 - Air drills; safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 30 Mineral Resources 1 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Air drills; safeguards. 77.1013 Section 77.1013... Control § 77.1013 Air drills; safeguards. Air shall be turned off and bled from the air hoses before hand-held air drills are moved from one working area to another. ...

  8. 30 CFR 77.1013 - Air drills; safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 30 Mineral Resources 1 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Air drills; safeguards. 77.1013 Section 77.1013... Control § 77.1013 Air drills; safeguards. Air shall be turned off and bled from the air hoses before hand-held air drills are moved from one working area to another. ...

  9. 30 CFR 77.1008 - Relocation of drills; safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 30 Mineral Resources 1 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Relocation of drills; safeguards. 77.1008... COAL MINES Ground Control § 77.1008 Relocation of drills; safeguards. (a) When a drill is being moved from one drilling area to another, drill steel, tools, and other equipment shall be secured and the...

  10. 30 CFR 77.204 - Openings in surface installations; safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 30 Mineral Resources 1 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Openings in surface installations; safeguards... COAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH MANDATORY SAFETY STANDARDS, SURFACE COAL MINES AND SURFACE WORK AREAS OF UNDERGROUND COAL MINES Surface Installations § 77.204 Openings in surface installations; safeguards....

  11. 7 CFR 996.60 - Safeguard procedures for imported peanuts.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Safeguard procedures for imported peanuts. 996.60... QUALITY AND HANDLING STANDARDS FOR DOMESTIC AND IMPORTED PEANUTS MARKETED IN THE UNITED STATES Quality and Handling Standards § 996.60 Safeguard procedures for imported peanuts. (a) Prior to, or upon, arrival of a...

  12. 7 CFR 996.60 - Safeguard procedures for imported peanuts.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Safeguard procedures for imported peanuts. 996.60... QUALITY AND HANDLING STANDARDS FOR DOMESTIC AND IMPORTED PEANUTS MARKETED IN THE UNITED STATES Quality and Handling Standards § 996.60 Safeguard procedures for imported peanuts. (a) Prior to, or upon, arrival of a...

  13. 7 CFR 996.60 - Safeguard procedures for imported peanuts.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Safeguard procedures for imported peanuts. 996.60... QUALITY AND HANDLING STANDARDS FOR DOMESTIC AND IMPORTED PEANUTS MARKETED IN THE UNITED STATES Quality and Handling Standards § 996.60 Safeguard procedures for imported peanuts. (a) Prior to, or upon, arrival of a...

  14. 7 CFR 996.60 - Safeguard procedures for imported peanuts.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Safeguard procedures for imported peanuts. 996.60... QUALITY AND HANDLING STANDARDS FOR DOMESTIC AND IMPORTED PEANUTS MARKETED IN THE UNITED STATES Quality and Handling Standards § 996.60 Safeguard procedures for imported peanuts. (a) Prior to, or upon, arrival of a...

  15. 42 CFR 438.58 - Conflict of interest safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-10-01

    ... 42 Public Health 4 2012-10-01 2012-10-01 false Conflict of interest safeguards. 438.58 Section 438... (CONTINUED) MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS MANAGED CARE State Responsibilities § 438.58 Conflict of interest... safeguards against conflict of interest on the part of State and local officers and employees and agents of...

  16. 42 CFR 438.58 - Conflict of interest safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-10-01

    ... 42 Public Health 4 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Conflict of interest safeguards. 438.58 Section 438... (CONTINUED) MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS MANAGED CARE State Responsibilities § 438.58 Conflict of interest... safeguards against conflict of interest on the part of State and local officers and employees and agents of...

  17. 42 CFR 438.58 - Conflict of interest safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-10-01

    ... 42 Public Health 4 2013-10-01 2013-10-01 false Conflict of interest safeguards. 438.58 Section 438... (CONTINUED) MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS MANAGED CARE State Responsibilities § 438.58 Conflict of interest... safeguards against conflict of interest on the part of State and local officers and employees and agents of...

  18. 5 CFR 293.107 - Special safeguards for automated records.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 5 Administrative Personnel 1 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Special safeguards for automated records. 293.107 Section 293.107 Administrative Personnel OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT CIVIL SERVICE REGULATIONS PERSONNEL RECORDS Basic Policies on Maintenance of Personnel Records § 293.107 Special safeguards...

  19. 5 CFR 293.107 - Special safeguards for automated records.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 5 Administrative Personnel 1 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Special safeguards for automated records. 293.107 Section 293.107 Administrative Personnel OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT CIVIL SERVICE REGULATIONS PERSONNEL RECORDS Basic Policies on Maintenance of Personnel Records § 293.107 Special safeguards...

  20. 5 CFR 293.107 - Special safeguards for automated records.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 5 Administrative Personnel 1 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Special safeguards for automated records. 293.107 Section 293.107 Administrative Personnel OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT CIVIL SERVICE REGULATIONS PERSONNEL RECORDS Basic Policies on Maintenance of Personnel Records § 293.107 Special safeguards...