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Sample records for enhancing nuclear safeguards

  1. Integrating Nuclear Information to Enhance Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Suski, N; Dubrin, J; Scarbrough, J

    2001-10-01

    Implementation of the Strengthened Safeguards System provides many new opportunities and challenges for collecting; analyzing and archiving nuclear materials safeguards information. For the first time in the history of safeguards, the International Atomic Energy Agency will be required not only to verify the accuracy of declarations, but also the completeness. To successfully implement the new safeguards regime, new and innovative ways of collecting, analyzing and archiving large amounts of safeguards information will be required. A conceptual system design that utilizes a geographical information system for the integration and analysis of this safeguards information will be described and demonstrated.

  2. International Nuclear Safeguards at Sandia

    SciTech Connect

    Sternat, Matthew R.

    2015-02-01

    As global nuclear energy expands, assuring peaceful uses of nuclear technology becomes increasingly important. In addition to complying with international nuclear safeguards, a responsible nuclear energy program promotes a corresponding safeguards culture. Establishment of transparent peaceful uses of nuclear technologies starts with cooperative international engagements and safeguards systems. Developing states investing in nuclear energy must assure the international community of their longterm commitment to safeguards, safety, and security (3S) of nuclear materials and technologies. Cultivating a safeguards culture starts in the initial phases of infrastructure planning and must be integrated into the process of developing a responsible nuclear energy program. Sandia National Laboratories supports the implementation of safeguards culture through a variety of activities, including infrastructure development.

  3. Integration of the advanced transparency framework to advanced nuclear systems : enhancing Safety, Operations, Security and Safeguards (SOSS).

    SciTech Connect

    Mendez, Carmen Margarita; Rochau, Gary Eugene; Cleary, Virginia D.

    2008-08-01

    The advent of the nuclear renaissance gives rise to a concern for the effective design of nuclear fuel cycle systems that are safe, secure, nonproliferating and cost-effective. We propose to integrate the monitoring of the four major factors of nuclear facilities by focusing on the interactions between Safeguards, Operations, Security, and Safety (SOSS). We proposed to develop a framework that monitors process information continuously and can demonstrate the ability to enhance safety, operations, security, and safeguards by measuring and reducing relevant SOSS risks, thus ensuring the safe and legitimate use of the nuclear fuel cycle facility. A real-time comparison between expected and observed operations provides the foundation for the calculation of SOSS risk. The automation of new nuclear facilities requiring minimal manual operation provides an opportunity to utilize the abundance of process information for monitoring SOSS risk. A framework that monitors process information continuously can lead to greater transparency of nuclear fuel cycle activities and can demonstrate the ability to enhance the safety, operations, security and safeguards associated with the functioning of the nuclear fuel cycle facility. Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) has developed a risk algorithm for safeguards and is in the process of demonstrating the ability to monitor operational signals in real-time though a cooperative research project with the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA). The risk algorithms for safety, operations and security are under development. The next stage of this work will be to integrate the four algorithms into a single framework.

  4. Integrated Process Monitoring based on Systems of Sensors for Enhanced Nuclear Safeguards Sensitivity and Robustness

    SciTech Connect

    Humberto E. Garcia

    2014-07-01

    This paper illustrates safeguards benefits that process monitoring (PM) can have as a diversion deterrent and as a complementary safeguards measure to nuclear material accountancy (NMA). In order to infer the possible existence of proliferation-driven activities, the objective of NMA-based methods is often to statistically evaluate materials unaccounted for (MUF) computed by solving a given mass balance equation related to a material balance area (MBA) at every material balance period (MBP), a particular objective for a PM-based approach may be to statistically infer and evaluate anomalies unaccounted for (AUF) that may have occurred within a MBP. Although possibly being indicative of proliferation-driven activities, the detection and tracking of anomaly patterns is not trivial because some executed events may be unobservable or unreliably observed as others. The proposed similarity between NMA- and PM-based approaches is important as performance metrics utilized for evaluating NMA-based methods, such as detection probability (DP) and false alarm probability (FAP), can also be applied for assessing PM-based safeguards solutions. To this end, AUF count estimates can be translated into significant quantity (SQ) equivalents that may have been diverted within a given MBP. A diversion alarm is reported if this mass estimate is greater than or equal to the selected value for alarm level (AL), appropriately chosen to optimize DP and FAP based on the particular characteristics of the monitored MBA, the sensors utilized, and the data processing method employed for integrating and analyzing collected measurements. To illustrate the application of the proposed PM approach, a protracted diversion of Pu in a waste stream was selected based on incomplete fuel dissolution in a dissolver unit operation, as this diversion scenario is considered to be problematic for detection using NMA-based methods alone. Results demonstrate benefits of conducting PM under a system

  5. Nuclear Materials Safeguards - Manpower Needs.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Kanter, Manuel A.

    Nuclear safeguard systems, their operation and implications for future manpower needs, and the need for these topics to be integrated into the engineering education curriculum, are focused on in this paper. The elements of a safeguard system and factors influencing the selection of a particular system are presented. Projections concerning the use…

  6. Acoustic techniques in nuclear safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Olinger, C.T.; Sinha, D.N.

    1995-07-01

    Acoustic techniques can be employed to address many questions relevant to current nuclear technology needs. These include establishing and monitoring intrinsic tags and seals, locating holdup in areas where conventional radiation-based measurements have limited capability, process monitoring, monitoring containers for corrosion or changes in pressure, and facility design verification. These acoustics applications are in their infancy with respect to safeguards and nuclear material management, but proof-of-principle has been demonstrated in many of the areas listed.

  7. AFCI Safeguards Enhancement Study: Technology Development Roadmap

    SciTech Connect

    Smith, Leon E.; Dougan, A.; Tobin, Stephen; Cipiti, B.; Ehinger, Michael H.; Bakel, A. J.; Bean, Robert; Grate, Jay W.; Santi, P.; Bryan, Steven; Kinlaw, M. T.; Schwantes, Jon M.; Burr, Tom; Lehn, Scott A.; Tolk, K.; Chichester, David; Menlove, H.; Vo, D.; Duckworth, Douglas C.; Merkle, P.; Wang, T. F.; Duran, F.; Nakae, L.; Warren, Glen A.; Friedrich, S.; Rabin, M.

    2008-12-31

    The Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI) Safeguards Campaign aims to develop safeguards technologies and processes that will significantly reduce the risk of proliferation in the U.S. nuclear fuel cycle of tomorrow. The Safeguards Enhancement Study was chartered with identifying promising research and development (R&D) directions over timescales both near-term and long-term, and under safeguards oversight both domestic and international. This technology development roadmap documents recognized gaps and needs in the safeguarding of nuclear fuel cycles, and outlines corresponding performance targets for each of those needs. Drawing on the collective expertise of technologists and user-representatives, a list of over 30 technologies that have the potential to meet those needs was developed, along with brief summaries of each candidate technology. Each summary describes the potential impact of that technology, key research questions to be addressed, and prospective development milestones that could lead to a definitive viability or performance assessment. Important programmatic linkages between U.S. agencies and offices are also described, reflecting the emergence of several safeguards R&D programs in the U.S. and the reinvigoration of nuclear fuel cycles across the globe.

  8. Nuclear materials safeguards for the future

    SciTech Connect

    Tape, J.W.

    1995-12-31

    Basic concepts of domestic and international safeguards are described, with an emphasis on safeguards systems for the fuel cycles of commercial power reactors. Future trends in institutional and technical measures for nuclear materials safeguards are outlined. The conclusion is that continued developments in safeguards approaches and technology, coupled with institutional measures that facilitate the global management and protection of nuclear materials, are up to the challenge of safeguarding the growing inventories of nuclear materials in commercial fuel cycles in technologically advanced States with stable governments that have signed the nonproliferation treaty. These same approaches also show promise for facilitating international inspection of excess weapons materials and verifying a fissile materials cutoff convention.

  9. Advanced safeguards for the nuclear renaissance

    SciTech Connect

    Miller, Michael C; Menlove, Howard O

    2008-01-01

    The global expansion of nuclear energy provides not only the benefit of carbon-neutral electricity, but also the potential for proliferation concern as well. Nuclear safeguards implemented at the state level (domestic) and at the international level by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are essential for ensuring that nuclear materials are not misused and are thereby a critical component of the increased usage of nuclear energy. In the same way that the 1950's Atoms for Peace initiative provided the foundation for a robust research and development program in nuclear safeguards, the expansion of nuclear energy that is underway today provides the impetus to enter a new era of technical development in the safeguards community. In this paper, we will review the history of nuclear safeguards research and development as well future directions.

  10. Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Pepper,S.; Rosenthal, M.; Fishbone, L.; Occhiogrosso, D.; Carroll, C.; Dreicer, M.; Wallace, R.; Rankhauser, J.

    2008-10-22

    In 2007, the National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24) completed a yearlong review of the challenges facing the international safeguards system today and over the next 25 years. The study found that without new investment in international safeguards, the U.S. safeguards technology base, and our ability to support International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, will continue to erode and soon may be at risk. To reverse this trend, the then U.S. Secretary of Energy, Samuel Bodman, announced at the 2007 IAEA General Conference that the Department of Energy (DOE) would launch the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). He stated 'IAEA safeguards must be robust and capable of addressing proliferation threats. Full confidence in IAEA safeguards is essential for nuclear power to grow safely and securely. To this end, the U.S. Department of Energy will seek to ensure that modern technology, the best scientific expertise, and adequate resources are available to keep pace with expanding IAEA responsibilities.' To meet this goal, the NGSI objectives include the recruitment of international safeguards experts to work at the U.S. national laboratories and to serve at the IAEA's headquarters. Part of the latter effort will involve enhancing our existing efforts to place well-qualified Americans in a sufficient number of key safeguards positions within the IAEA's Department of Safeguards. Accordingly, the International Safeguards Project Office (ISPO) at Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) hosted a Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards (ERIS) on October 22 and 23, 2008. The ISPO used a workshop format developed earlier with Sonalysts, Inc., that was followed at the U.S. Support Program's (USSP's) technology road-mapping sessions. ISPO invited participants from the U.S. DOE, the IAEA, the U.S. national laboratories, private industry, academia, and professional societies who either

  11. Fundamentals of materials accounting for nuclear safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Pillay, K.K.S.

    1989-04-01

    Materials accounting is essential to providing the necessary assurance for verifying the effectiveness of a safeguards system. The use of measurements, analyses, records, and reports to maintain knowledge of the quantities of nuclear material present in a defined area of a facility and the use of physical inventories and materials balances to verify the presence of special nuclear materials are collectively known as materials accounting for nuclear safeguards. This manual, prepared as part of the resource materials for the Safeguards Technology Training Program of the US Department of Energy, addresses fundamental aspects of materials accounting, enriching and complementing them with the first-hand experiences of authors from varied disciplines. The topics range from highly technical subjects to site-specific system designs and policy discussions. This collection of papers is prepared by more than 25 professionals from the nuclear safeguards field. Representing research institutions, industries, and regulatory agencies, the authors create a unique resource for the annual course titled ''Materials Accounting for Nuclear Safeguards,'' which is offered at the Los Alamos National Laboratory.

  12. International safeguards: Accounting for nuclear materials

    SciTech Connect

    Fishbone, L.G.

    1988-09-28

    Nuclear safeguards applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are one element of the non-proliferation regime'', the collection of measures whose aim is to forestall the spread of nuclear weapons to countries that do not already possess them. Safeguards verifications provide evidence that nuclear materials in peaceful use for nuclear-power production are properly accounted for. Though carried out in cooperation with nuclear facility operators, the verifications can provide assurance because they are designed with the capability to detect diversion, should it occur. Traditional safeguards verification measures conducted by inspectors of the IAEA include book auditing; counting and identifying containers of nuclear material; measuring nuclear material; photographic and video surveillance; and sealing. Novel approaches to achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness in safeguards verifications are under investigation as the number and complexity of nuclear facilities grow. These include the zone approach, which entails carrying out verifications for groups of facilities collectively, and randomization approach, which entails carrying out entire inspection visits some fraction of the time on a random basis. Both approaches show promise in particular situations, but, like traditional measures, must be tested to ensure their practical utility. These approaches are covered on this report. 15 refs., 16 figs., 3 tabs.

  13. Applications of Virtual Reality to Nuclear Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Stansfield, S.

    1998-11-03

    This paper explores two potential applications of Virtual Reality (VR) to international nuclear safeguards: training and information organization and navigation. The applications are represented by two existing prototype systems, one for training nuclear weapons dismantlement and one utilizing a VR model to facilitate intuitive access to related sets of information.

  14. Mass-spectrometric measurements for nuclear safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Carter, J.A.; Smith, D.H.; Walker, R.L.

    1982-01-01

    The need of an on-site inspection device to provide isotopic ratio measurements led to the development of a quadrupole mass spectrometer mounted in a van. This mobile laboratory has the ability, through the use of the resin bead technique, to acquire, prepare, and analyze samples of interest to nuclear safeguards. Precision of the measurements is about 1 to 2%.

  15. Technical Training Workshop on International Safeguards: An Introduction to Safeguards for Emerging Nuclear States

    SciTech Connect

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Gastelum, Zoe N.; Olson, Jarrod; Mathews, Caroline E.; Solodov, Alexander; Zhernosek, Alena; Raffo-Caiado, Ana; Baldwin, George; Horak, Karl; McClelland-Kerr, John; VanSickle, Matthew; Mininni, Margot; Kovacic, Donald

    2009-10-06

    The U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) hosted a workshop from May 4-22, 2009, on the fundamental elements of international safeguards. Entitled "A Technical Training Workshop on International Safeguards," the workshop introduced post-graduate students from Malaysia, Vietnam, Indonesia, Thailand, Morocco, Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia to the fundamental issues and best practices associated with international safeguards and encouraged them to explore potential career paths in safeguards. Workshops like these strengthen the international safeguards regime by promoting the development of a "safeguards culture" among young nuclear professionals within nascent nuclear countries. While this concept of safeguards culture is sometimes hard to define and even harder to measure, this paper will demonstrate that the promotion of safeguards cultures through workshops like these justifies the investment of U.S. taxpayer dollars.

  16. Environmental Monitoring for Nuclear Safeguards

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1995-09-01

    l o inside tubes which in turn are inside the pressure probably be stored, following exposure, to allowvessel. Leakage of fission products and...be hand-carried at an inspection pressure or because they react with atmospheric site can provide immediate results to guide the gases to form other...agreement ending the war included the right for the spread of nuclear weapons. Prior to the United Nations to inspect all Iraqi nuclear the 1991 Persian

  17. Environmental monitoring for nuclear safeguards. Background paper

    SciTech Connect

    1995-09-01

    To assure that states are not violating their Non-Proliferation Treaty commitments, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) must verify that states do not possess convert nuclear facilities-a mission that prior to the 1991 Gulf War, it had neither the political backing nor the resources to conduct. The IAEA recognizes the importance of this new mission and is in the process of assuming it. One of the tools it is exploring to provide some indication of the presence of secret, or undeclared, nuclear activities and facilities is environmental monitoring. Modern sampling and analysis technologies provide powerful tools to detect the presence of characteristic substances that are likely to be emitted by such illicit activities. This background paper examines the prospects for such technologies to improve nuclear safeguards. It concludes that environmental monitoring can greatly increase the ability to detect undeclared activity at declared, or known, sites, and it can significantly increase the chances of detecting and locating undeclared sites.

  18. Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence for Safeguards Applications

    SciTech Connect

    Ludewigt, Bernhard A; Quiter, Brian J; Ambers, Scott D

    2011-02-04

    In nuclear resonance fluorescence (NRF) measurements, resonances are excited by an external photon beam leading to the emission of {gamma} rays with specific energies that are characteristic of the emitting isotope. The promise of NRF as a non-destructive analysis technique (NDA) in safeguards applications lies in its potential to directly quantify a specific isotope in an assay target without the need for unfolding the combined responses of several fissile isotopes as often required by other NDA methods. The use of NRF for detection of sensitive nuclear materials and other contraband has been researched in the past. In the safeguards applications considered here one has to go beyond mere detection and precisely quantify the isotopic content, a challenge that is discussed throughout this report. Basic NRF measurement methods, instrumentation, and the analytical calculation of NRF signal strengths are described in Section 2. Well understood modeling and simulation tools are needed for assessing the potential of NRF for safeguards and for designing measurement systems. All our simulations were performed with the radiation transport code MCNPX, a code that is widely used in the safeguards community. Our initial studies showed that MCNPX grossly underestimated the elastically scattered background at backwards angles due to an incorrect treatment of Rayleigh scattering. While new, corrected calculations based on ENDF form factors showed much better agreement with experimental data for the elastic scattering of photons on an uranium target, the elastic backscatter is still not rigorously treated. Photonuclear scattering processes (nuclear Thomson, Delbruck and Giant Dipole Resonance scattering), which are expected to play an important role at higher energies, are not yet included. These missing elastic scattering contributions were studied and their importance evaluated evaluated against data found in the literature as discussed in Section 3. A transmission experiment

  19. DESIGN INFORMATION VERIFICATION FOR NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS

    SciTech Connect

    Robert S. Bean; Richard R. M. Metcalf; Phillip C. Durst

    2009-07-01

    A critical aspect of international safeguards activities performed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the verification that facility design and construction (including upgrades and modifications) do not create opportunities for nuclear proliferation. These Design Information Verification activities require that IAEA inspectors compare current and past information about the facility to verify the operator’s declaration of proper use. The actual practice of DIV presents challenges to the inspectors due to the large amount of data generated, concerns about sensitive or proprietary data, the overall complexity of the facility, and the effort required to extract just the safeguards relevant information. Planned and anticipated facilities will (especially in the case of reprocessing plants) be ever larger and increasingly complex, thus exacerbating the challenges. This paper reports the results of a workshop held at the Idaho National Laboratory in March 2009, which considered technologies and methods to address these challenges. The use of 3D Laser Range Finding, Outdoor Visualization System, Gamma-LIDAR, and virtual facility modeling, as well as methods to handle the facility data issues (quantity, sensitivity, and accessibility and portability for the inspector) were presented. The workshop attendees drew conclusions about the use of these techniques with respect to successfully employing them in an operating environment, using a Fuel Conditioning Facility walk-through as a baseline for discussion.

  20. Safeguards Guidance Document for Designers of Commercial Nuclear Facilities: International Nuclear Safeguards Requirements and Practices For Uranium Enrichment Plants

    SciTech Connect

    Robert Bean; Casey Durst

    2009-10-01

    This report is the second in a series of guidelines on international safeguards requirements and practices, prepared expressly for the designers of nuclear facilities. The first document in this series is the description of generic international nuclear safeguards requirements pertaining to all types of facilities. These requirements should be understood and considered at the earliest stages of facility design as part of a new process called “Safeguards-by-Design.” This will help eliminate the costly retrofit of facilities that has occurred in the past to accommodate nuclear safeguards verification activities. The following summarizes the requirements for international nuclear safeguards implementation at enrichment plants, prepared under the Safeguards by Design project, and funded by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Office of NA-243. The purpose of this is to provide designers of nuclear facilities around the world with a simplified set of design requirements and the most common practices for meeting them. The foundation for these requirements is the international safeguards agreement between the country and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Relevant safeguards requirements are also cited from the Safeguards Criteria for inspecting enrichment plants, found in the IAEA Safeguards Manual, Part SMC-8. IAEA definitions and terms are based on the IAEA Safeguards Glossary, published in 2002. The most current specification for safeguards measurement accuracy is found in the IAEA document STR-327, “International Target Values 2000 for Measurement Uncertainties in Safeguarding Nuclear Materials,” published in 2001. For this guide to be easier for the designer to use, the requirements have been restated in plainer language per expert interpretation using the source documents noted. The safeguards agreement is fundamentally a

  1. Safeguards Guidance for Designers of Commercial Nuclear Facilities – International Safeguards Requirements for Uranium Enrichment Plants

    SciTech Connect

    Philip Casey Durst; Scott DeMuth; Brent McGinnis; Michael Whitaker; James Morgan

    2010-04-01

    For the past two years, the United States National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of International Regimes and Agreements (NA-243), has sponsored the Safeguards-by-Design Project, through which it is hoped new nuclear facilities will be designed and constructed worldwide more amenable to nuclear safeguards. In the course of this project it was recognized that commercial designer/builders of nuclear facilities are not always aware of, or understand, the relevant domestic and international safeguards requirements, especially the latter as implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). To help commercial designer/builders better understand these requirements, a report was prepared by the Safeguards-by-Design Project Team that articulated and interpreted the international nuclear safeguards requirements for the initial case of uranium enrichment plants. The following paper summarizes the subject report, the specific requirements, where they originate, and the implications for design and construction. It also briefly summarizes the established best design and operating practices that designer/builder/operators have implemented for currently meeting these requirements. In preparing the subject report, it is recognized that the best practices are continually evolving as the designer/builder/operators and IAEA consider even more effective and efficient means for meeting the safeguards requirements and objectives.

  2. Safeguards-by-Design: Early Integration of Physical Protection and Safeguardability into Design of Nuclear Facilities

    SciTech Connect

    T. Bjornard; R. Bean; S. DeMuth; P. Durst; M. Ehinger; M. Golay; D. Hebditch; J. Hockert; J. Morgan

    2009-09-01

    The application of a Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process for new nuclear facilities has the potential to minimize proliferation and security risks as the use of nuclear energy expands worldwide. This paper defines a generic SBD process and its incorporation from early design phases into existing design / construction processes and develops a framework that can guide its institutionalization. SBD could be a basis for a new international norm and standard process for nuclear facility design. This work is part of the U.S. DOE’s Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), and is jointly sponsored by the Offices of Non-proliferation and Nuclear Energy.

  3. Safeguards Issues at Nuclear Reactors and Enrichment Plants

    SciTech Connect

    Boyer, Brian D

    2012-08-15

    The Agency's safeguards technical objective is the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection.

  4. REPORT OF THE WORKSHOP ON NUCLEAR FACILITY DESIGN INFORMATION EXAMINATION AND VERIFICATION FOR SAFEGUARDS

    SciTech Connect

    Richard Metcalf; Robert Bean

    2009-10-01

    in the future. Consequently, the NNSA Office of International Regimes and Agreements (NA-243) sponsored a team of U.S. Department of Energy National Laboratory nuclear safeguards experts and technologists to conduct a workshop on methods and technologies for improving this activity, under the ASA-100 Advanced Safeguards Approaches Project. The workshop focused on reviewing and discussing the fundamental safeguards needs, and presented technology and/or methods that could potentially address those needs more effectively and efficiently. Conclusions and Recommendations for technology to enhance the performance of DIV inspections are presented by the workshop team.

  5. Nuclear safeguards and security: we can do better.

    SciTech Connect

    Johnston, R. G.; Warner, Jon S.; Garcia, A. R. E.; Martinez, R. K.; Lopez, L. N.; Pacheco, A. N.; Trujillo, S. J.; Herrera, A. M.; Bitzer, E. G. , III

    2005-01-01

    There are a number of practical ways to significantly improve nuclear safeguards and security. These include recognizing and minimizing the insider threat; using adversarial vulnerability assessments to find vulnerabilities and countermeasures; fully appreciating the disparate nature of domestic and international nuclear safeguards; improving tamper detection and tamper-indicating seals; not confusing the inventory and security functions; and recognizing the limitations of GPS tracking, contact memory buttons, and RFID tags. The efficacy of nuclear safeguards depends critically on employing sophisticated security strategies and effective monitoring hardware. The Vulnerability Assessment Team (VAT) at Los Alamos National Laboratory has extensively researched issues associated with nuclear safeguards, especially in the areas of tamper/intrusion detection, transport security, and vulnerability assessments. This paper discusses some of our findings, recommendations, and warnings.

  6. Deterring Nuclear Proliferation: The Importance of IAEA Safeguards: A TEXTBOOK

    SciTech Connect

    Rosenthal, M.D.; Fishbone, L.G.; Gallini, L.; Krass, A.; Kratzer, M.; Sanborn, J.; Ward, B.; Wulf, N. A.

    2012-03-13

    Nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation are among the most pressing challenges to international peace and security that we face today. Iran and Syria remain in non-compliance with the safeguards requirements of the NPT, and the nuclear ambitions of North Korea remain unchecked. Despite these challenges, the NPT remains a cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and the safeguards implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) under the NPT play a critical role in deterring nuclear proliferation.How do they work? Where did they come from? And what is their future? This book answers these questions. Anyone studying the field of nuclear non-proliferation will benefit from reading this book, and for anyone entering the field, the book will enable them to get a running start. Part I describes the foundations of the international safeguards system: its origins in the 1930s - when new discoveries in physics made it clear immediately that nuclear energy held both peril and promise - through the entry into force in 1970 of the NPT, which codified the role of IAEA safeguards as a means to verify states NPT commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons. Part II describes the NPT safeguards system, which is based on a model safeguards agreement developed specifically for the NPT, The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States required in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which has been published by the IAEA as INFCIRC/153. Part III describes events, especially in South Africa, the DPRK, and Iraq in the early 1990s, that triggered a transformation in the way in which safeguards were conceptualized and implemented.

  7. Zone approaches to international safeguards of a nuclear fuel cycle

    SciTech Connect

    Fishbone, L.G.; Higinbotham, W.A.

    1986-01-01

    At present the IAEA designs its safeguards approach with regard to each type of nuclear facility so that the safeguards activities and effort are essentially the same for a given type and size of nuclear facility wherever it may be located. Conclusions regarding a state are derived by combining the results of safeguards verifications for the individual facilities within it. We have examined safeguards approaches for a state nuclear fuel cycle that take into account the existence of all of the nuclear facilities in the state. We have focussed on the fresh-fuel zone of an advanced nuclear fuel cycle, the several facilities of which use or process low-enriched uranium. At one extreme, flows and inventories would be verified at each material balance area. At the other extreme, the flows into and out of the zone and the inventory of the whole zone would be verified. The intention is to develop an approach which will make it possible to compare the technical effectiveness and the inspection effort for the facility-oriented approach, for the zone approach and for some reasonable intermediate safeguards approaches. Technical effectiveness, in these cases, means an estimate of the assurance that all nuclear material has been accounted for.

  8. Robot speeds assays and enhances safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Phelan, P.F.; Powell, W.D.; Blankenship, R.W.

    1990-01-01

    At the Los Alamos National Laboratory Plutonium Facility, a robotics system utilizing a gantry robot and an automated inventory system operates five calorimeters and two gamma isotopic assay instruments. This system has significantly improved safeguards, because the opportunity for diversion has been greatly reduced. Not only is the accountability much more timely because throughput has doubled but the special nuclear material has been made physically more secure in several ways. First, items awaiting assay are kept in the inventory system, whose doors remain locked whenever the robot is unattended. An alarm sounds if the doors are unlocked without authorization. Second, light curtains surround the robot's work envelope and pressure-sensitive pads cover the floor to detect entry into the assay area. Third, the robot weighs each item whenever it is moved, and the result is compared with the weight that was measured when the item was first put into inventory. 2 refs., 3 figs.

  9. The Los Alamos nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation technology development program

    SciTech Connect

    Smith, H.A. Jr.; Menlove, H.O.; Reilly, T.D.; Bosler, G.E.; Hakkila, E.A.; Eccleston, G.W.

    1994-04-01

    For nearly three decades, Los Alamos National Laboratory has developed and implemented nuclear measurement technology and training in support of national and international nuclear safeguards. This paper outlines the major elements of those technologies and highlights some of the latest developments.

  10. International training course on nuclear materials accountability for safeguards purposes

    SciTech Connect

    Not Available

    1980-12-01

    The two volumes of this report incorporate all lectures and presentations at the International Training Course on Nuclear Materials Accountability and Control for Safeguards Purposes, held May 27-June 6, 1980, at the Bishop's Lodge near Santa Fe, New Mexico. The course, authorized by the US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act and sponsored by the US Department of Energy in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, was developed to provide practical training in the design, implementation, and operation of a National system of nuclear materials accountability and control that satisfies both National and IAEA International safeguards objectives. Volume I, covering the first week of the course, presents the background, requirements, and general features of material accounting and control in modern safeguard systems. Volume II, covering the second week of the course, provides more detailed information on measurement methods and instruments, practical experience at power reactor and research reactor facilities, and examples of operating state systems of accountability and control.

  11. THIEF: An interactive simulation of nuclear materials safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Stanbro, W. D.

    1990-01-01

    The safeguards community is facing an era in which it will be called upon to tighten protection of nuclear material. At the same time, it is probable that safeguards will face more competition for available resources from other activities such as environmental cleanup. To exist in this era, it will be necessary to understand and coordinate all aspects of the safeguards system. Because of the complexity of the interactions involved, this process puts a severe burden on designers and operators of safeguards systems. This paper presents a simulation tool developed at the Los Alamos National Laboratory to allow users to examine the interactions among safeguards elements as they apply to combating the insider threat. The tool consists of a microcomputer-based simulation in which the user takes the role of the insider trying to remove nuclear material from a facility. The safeguards system is run by the computer and consists of both physical protection and MC A computer elements. All data elements describing a scenario can be altered by the user. The program can aid in training, as well as in developing threat scenarios. 4 refs.

  12. Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Pepper,S.E.; Rosenthal, M.D.; Fishbone, L.G.; Occhogrosso, D.M.; Lockwood, D.; Carroll, C.J.; Dreicer, M.; Wallace, R.; Fankhauser, J.

    2009-07-12

    Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) hosted a Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards October 22 and 23, 2008. The workshop was sponsored by DOE/NA-243 under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). Placing well-qualified Americans in sufficient number and in key safeguards positions within the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) Department of Safeguards is an important U.S. non-proliferation objective. The goal of the NGSI Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards was to improve U.S. efforts to recruit U.S. citizens for IAEA positions in the Department of Safeguards. The participants considered the specific challenges of recruiting professional staff, safeguards inspectors, and managers. BNL’s International Safeguards Project Office invited participants from the U.S. Department of Energy, the IAEA, U.S. national laboratories, private industry, academia, and professional societies who are either experts in international safeguards or who understand the challenges of recruiting for technical positions. A final report for the workshop will be finalized and distributed in early 2009. The main finding of the workshop was the need for an integrated recruitment plan to take into account pools of potential candidates, various government and private agency stakeholders, the needs of the IAEA, and the NGSI human capital development plan. There were numerous findings related to and recommendations for maximizing the placement of U.S. experts in IAEA Safeguards positions. The workshop participants offered many ideas for increasing the pool of candidates and increasing the placement rate. This paper will provide details on these findings and recommendations

  13. Fuzzy risk analysis for nuclear safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Zardecki, A.

    1993-01-01

    Analysis of a safeguards system, based on the notion of fuzzy sets and linguistic variables, concerns such as complexity and inherent imprecision in estimating the possibility of loss or compromise. The automated risk analysis allows the risk to be determined for an entire system based on estimates for lowest level components and the component proportion. In addition, for each component (asset) the most effective combination of protection mechanisms against a given set of threats is determined. A distinction between bar and featured risk is made.

  14. Safeguarding nuclear materials in the Former Soviet Union

    SciTech Connect

    Erkkila, B.

    1995-12-31

    This article is a discussion of the safeguarding of nuclear materials in the states of the former Soviet Union. Several issues have been identified and improvements are being pursued at many facilities. These issues include: (1) improvements to existing computerized accounting systems, (2) access control, and (3) control of material movement.

  15. A GRADUATE CERTIFICATE PROGRAM IN NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS TECHNOLOGY.

    SciTech Connect

    FISHBONE, L.; SISKIND, B.; PEPPER, S.

    2005-07-10

    While there are a number of university graduate-education programs that address non-proliferation and safeguards policy issues; there are none in the United States that train students in the specific technical aspects of nuclear safeguards. Formal education of this kind is necessary to sustain the flow of technically trained individuals to diverse programs in safeguards, nonproliferation, and national security. In response to this need, the University of Missouri-Columbia, with assistance from Brookhaven National Laboratory, is initiating a Graduate Certificate Program in Nuclear Safeguards Technology: Students seeking advanced degrees in a variety of technical areas will complete a required sequence of courses in order to receive the certification. Required course work covers topics such as Nuclear Material Control and Accountability (MC&A), Physical Protection (PP); nuclear measurements, and a variety of other relevant subjects. Laboratory-based instruction will be included which will utilize the University of Missouri Research Reactor(MURR). MURR is the largest university-based research reactor and has extensive laboratory resources including a Canberra Aquila MPC&A Operational Monitoring demonstration system.

  16. Nuclear material control and accounting safeguards in the United States

    SciTech Connect

    Woltermann, H.A.; Rudy, C.R.; Rakel, D.A.; DeVer, E.A.

    1982-07-01

    Material control and accounting (MC and A) of special nuclear material (SNM) must supplement physical security to protect SNM from unlawful use such as terrorist activities. This article reviews MC and A safeguards of SNM in the United States. The following topics are covered: a brief perspective and history of MC and A safeguards, current MC and A practices, measurement methods for SNM, historical MC and A performance, a description of near-real-time MC and A systems, and conclusions on the status of MC and A in the United States.

  17. Strengthening IAEA safeguards in an era of nuclear cooperation

    SciTech Connect

    Hooper, R.

    1995-11-01

    Since the end of the Cold War the world has witnessed a remarkable series of events demonstrating that universal adherence to the principles of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament are no longer utopian dreams. The author reviews the actions of various countries to terminate or reduce nuclear weapons programs and those that are resisting the non-proliferation efforts. The author addresses efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to safeguard declared nuclear material more cost-effectively and deal with the possibility of undeclared nuclear activities.

  18. Nuclear Safeguards and Security Education at Russian Universities

    SciTech Connect

    Killinger, Mark H.; Goodey, Kent O.; Butler, Gilbert W.; Duncan, Cristen L.

    2008-05-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy is assisting key Russian universities in developing safeguards and security degree programs to prepare the next generation of specialists who will be responsible for protecting nuclear material from illicit use. These programs include course and laboratory work in nuclear material measurements, vulnerability analysis, exterior and interior sensors, and legal aspects of nuclear nonproliferation. Moscow Engineering Physics Institute (MEPhI) has graduated nine classes of master’s students, most of who are working in government agencies, research organizations, or pursuing their PhD. With DOE support, MEPhI has also established a 5½-year engineering degree program in safeguards and security. This is a hands-on degree that more closely meets the needs of nuclear facilities. The first class graduated in February 2007, marking a major milestone in Russian nonproliferation education. A second engineering degree program has been established at Tomsk Polytechnic University and is designed to reach those students east of the Ural Mountains, where many nuclear facilities are located. The first class will graduate in February 2009. This paper describes current development of these education programs, new initiatives, and sustainability efforts to ensure their continued viability after DOE support ends. The paper also describes general nonproliferation education activities supported by DOE that complement the more technical safeguards and security education programs.

  19. Application of Telepresence Technologies to Nuclear Material Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Wright, M.C.; Rome, J.A.

    1999-09-20

    Implementation of remote monitoring systems has become a priority area for the International Atomic Energy Agency and other international inspection regimes. For the past three years, DOE2000 has been the US Department of Energy's (DOE's) initiative to develop innovative applications to exploit the capabilities of broadband networks and media integration. The aim is to enhance scientific collaboration by merging computing and communications technologies. These Internet-based telepresence technologies could be easily extended to provide remote monitoring and control for confidence building and transparency systems at nuclear facilities around the world. One of the original DOE2000 projects, the Materials Microcharacterization Collaboratory is an interactive virtual laboratory, linking seven DOE user facilities located across the US. At these facilities, external collaborators have access to scientists, data, and instrumentation, all of which are available to varying degrees using the Internet. Remote operation of the instruments varies between passive (observational) to active (direct control), in many cases requiring no software at the remote site beyond a Web browser. Live video streams are continuously available on the Web so that participants can see what is happening at a particular location. An X.509 certificate system provides strong authentication, The hardware and software are commercially available and are easily adaptable to safeguards applications.

  20. The Gulf Nuclear Energy Infrastructure Institute : an integrated approach to safety, security & safeguards.

    SciTech Connect

    Williams, Adam David

    2010-04-01

    Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and the Nuclear Security Science and Policy Institute (NSSPI) at Texas A&M University are working with Middle East regional partners to set up a nuclear energy safety, safeguards, and security educational institute in the Gulf region. SNL and NSSPI, partnered with the Khalifa University of Science, Technology, and Research (KUSTAR), with suppot from its key nuclear stakeholders, the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC), and the Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation (FANR), plan to jointly establish the institute in Abu Dhabi. The Gulf Nuclear Energy Infrastructure Institute (GNEII) will be a KUSTAR-associated, credit-granting regional education program providing both classroom instruction and hands-on experience. The ultimate objective is for GNEII to be autonomous - regionally funded and staffed with personnel capable of teaching all GNEII courses five years after its inauguration. This is a strategic effort to indigenize a responsible nuclear energy culture - a culture shaped by an integrated understanding of nuclear safety, safeguards and security - in regional nuclear energy programs. GNEII also promotes international interests in developing a nuclear energy security and safety culture, increases collaboration between the nuclear energy security and safety communities, and helps to enhance global standards for nuclear energy technology in the Middle East.

  1. The Gulf Nuclear Energy Infrastructure Institute : an integrated approach to safety, security and safeguards.

    SciTech Connect

    Beeley, Phillip A.; Boyle, David R.; Williams, Adam David; Mohagheghi, Amir Hossein

    2010-04-01

    Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and the Nuclear Security Science and Policy Institute (NSSPI) at Texas A&M University are working with Middle East regional partners to set up a nuclear energy safety, safeguards, and security educational institute in the Gulf region. SNL and NSSPI, partnered with the Khalifa University of Science, Technology, and Research (KUSTAR), with suppot from its key nuclear stakeholders, the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC), and the Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation (FANR), plan to jointly establish the institute in Abu Dhabi. The Gulf Nuclear Energy Infrastructure Institute (GNEII) will be a KUSTAR-associated, credit-granting regional education program providing both classroom instruction and hands-on experience. The ultimate objective is for GNEII to be autonomous - regionally funded and staffed with personnel capable of teaching all GNEII courses five years after its inauguration. This is a strategic effort to indigenize a responsible nuclear energy culture - a culture shaped by an integrated understanding of nuclear safety, safeguards and security - in regional nuclear energy programs. GNEII also promotes international interests in developing a nuclear energy security and safety culture, increases collaboration between the nuclear energy security and safety communities, and helps to enhance global standards for nuclear energy technology in the Middle East.

  2. Current Status of Helium-3 Alternative Technologies for Nuclear Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Henzlova, Daniela; Kouzes, R.; McElroy, R.; Peerani, P.; Aspinall, M.; Baird, K.; Bakel, A.; Borella, M.; Bourne, M.; Bourva, L.; Cave, F.; Chandra, R.; Chernikova, D.; Croft, S.; Dermody, G.; Dougan, A.; Ely, J.; Fanchini, E.; Finocchiaro, P.; Gavron, Victor; Kureta, M.; Ianakiev, Kiril Dimitrov; Ishiyama, K.; Lee, T.; Martin, Ch.; McKinny, K.; Menlove, Howard Olsen; Orton, Ch.; Pappalardo, A.; Pedersen, B.; Peranteau, D.; Plenteda, R.; Pozzi, S.; Schear, M.; Seya, M.; Siciliano, E.; Stave, S.; Sun, L.; Swinhoe, Martyn Thomas; Tagziria, H.; Vaccaro, S.; Takamine, J.; Weber, A. -L.; Yamaguchi, T.; Zhu, H.

    2015-12-01

    International safeguards inspectorates (e.g., International Atomic Energy Agency {IAEA}, or Euratom) rely heavily on neutron assay techniques, and in particular, on coincidence counters for the verification of declared nuclear materials under safeguards and for monitoring purposes. While 3He was readily available, the reliability, safety, ease of use, gamma-ray insensitivity, and high intrinsic thermal neutron detection efficiency of 3He-based detectors obviated the need for alternative detector technologies. However, the recent decline of the 3He gas supply has triggered international efforts to develop and field neutron detectors that make use of alternative materials. In response to this global effort, the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and Euratom launched a joint effort aimed at bringing together international experts, technology users and developers in the field of nuclear safeguards to discuss and evaluate the proposed 3He alternative materials and technologies. The effort involved a series of two workshops focused on detailed overviews and viability assessments of various 3He alternative technologies for use in nuclear safeguards applications. The key objective was to provide a platform for collaborative discussions and technical presentations organized in a compact, workshop-like format to stimulate interactions among the participants. The meetings culminated in a benchmark exercise providing a unique opportunity for the first inter-comparison of several available alternative technologies. This report provides an overview of the alternative technology efforts presented during the two workshops along with a summary of the benchmarking activities and results. The workshop recommendations and key consensus observations are discussed in the report, and used to outline a proposed path forward and future needs foreseeable in the area of 3

  3. Safeguards Culture

    SciTech Connect

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2012-07-01

    The concepts of nuclear safety and security culture are well established; however, a common understanding of safeguards culture is not internationally recognized. Supported by the National Nuclear Security Administration, the authors prepared this report, an analysis of the concept of safeguards culture, and gauged its value to the safeguards community. The authors explored distinctions between safeguards culture, safeguards compliance, and safeguards performance, and evaluated synergies and differences between safeguards culture and safety/security culture. The report concludes with suggested next steps.

  4. Global partnering related to nuclear materials safeguards and security - A pragmatic approach to international safeguards work

    SciTech Connect

    Stanford, Dennis

    2007-07-01

    This paper documents issues Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. has addressed in the performance of international work to safeguards and security work. It begins with a description of the package we put together for a sample proposal for the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, for which we were ranked number one for technical approach and cost, and concludes with a discussion of approaches that we have taken to performing this work, including issues related to performing the work as part of a team. The primary focus is on communication, workforce, equipment, and coordination issues. Finally, the paper documents the rules that we use to assure the work is performed safely and successfully. (author)

  5. End user needs for enhanced IAEA Safeguards Information Management Capabilities

    SciTech Connect

    Badalamente, R.; Anzelon, G.; Deland, S.; Whiteson, R.

    1994-07-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency is undertaking a program for strengthening its safeguards on the recognition that safeguards must give assurance not only of the non-diversion of declared material or that declared facilities are not being misused, but also of the absence of any undeclared nuclear activities in States which have signed comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency. The IAEA has determined that the detection of undeclared nuclear activities and the creation of confidence in the continuing peaceful use of declared material and facilities is largely dependent on more information being made available to the Agency and on the capability of the Agency to make more effective use of this additional information, as well as existing information.

  6. Nuclear safeguards research and development. Program status report, October 1980-January 1981

    SciTech Connect

    Henry, C.N.

    1981-11-01

    This report presents the status of the Nuclear Safeguards Research and Development Program pursued by the Energy, Chemistry-Materials Science, and Operational Security/Safeguards Divisions of the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Topics include nondestructive assay technology development and applications, international safeguards systems. Also discussed are training courses, technology transfer, analytical chemistry methods for fissionable materials safeguards, the Department of Energy Computer Security Technical Center, and operational security.

  7. Nuclear Safeguards Infrastructure Required for the Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP)

    SciTech Connect

    Dr. Mark Schanfein; Philip Casey Durst

    2012-07-01

    The Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP) is a Very High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor (VHTR) to be constructed near Idaho Falls, Idaho The NGNP is intrinsically safer than current reactors and is planned for startup ca. 2021 Safety is more prominent in the minds of the Public and Governing Officials following the nuclear reactor meltdown accidents in Fukushima, Japan The authors propose that the NGNP should be designed with International (IAEA) Safeguards in mind to support export to Non-Nuclear-Weapons States There are two variants of the NGNP design; one using integral Prismatic-shaped fuel assemblies in a fixed core; and one using recirculating fuel balls (or Pebbles) The following presents the infrastructure required to safeguard the NGNP This infrastructure is required to safeguard the Prismatic and Pebble-fueled NGNP (and other HTGR/VHTR) The infrastructure is based on current Safeguards Requirements and Practices implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for similar reactors The authors of this presentation have worked for decades in the area of International Nuclear Safeguards and are recognized experts in this field Presentation for INMM conference in July 2012.

  8. Nuclear Safeguards Considerations For The Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR)

    SciTech Connect

    Phillip Casey Durst; David Beddingfield; Brian Boyer; Robert Bean; Michael Collins; Michael Ehinger; David Hanks; David L. Moses; Lee Refalo

    2009-10-01

    High temperature reactors (HTRs) have been considered since the 1940s, and have been constructed and demonstrated in the United Kingdom (Dragon), United States (Peach Bottom and Fort Saint Vrain), Japan (HTTR), Germany (AVR and THTR-300), and have been the subject of conceptual studies in Russia (VGM). The attraction to these reactors is that they can use a variety of reactor fuels, including abundant thorium, which upon reprocessing of the spent fuel can produce fissile U-233. Hence, they could extend the stocks of available uranium, provided the fuel is reprocessed. Another attractive attribute is that HTRs typically operate at a much higher temperature than conventional light water reactors (LWRs), because of the use of pyrolytic carbon and silicon carbide coated (TRISO) fuel particles embedded in ceramic graphite. Rather than simply discharge most of the unused heat from the working fluid in the power plant to the environment, engineers have been designing reactors for 40 years to recover this heat and make it available for district heating or chemical conversion plants. Demonstrating high-temperature nuclear energy conversion was the purpose behind Fort Saint Vrain in the United States, THTR-300 in Germany, HTTR in Japan, and HTR-10 and HTR-PM, being built in China. This resulted in nuclear reactors at least 30% or more thermodynamically efficient than conventional LWRs, especially if the waste heat can be effectively utilized in chemical processing plants. A modern variant of high temperature reactors is the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR). Originally developed in the United States and Germany, it is now being redesigned and marketed by the Republic of South Africa and China. The team examined historical high temperature and high temperature gas reactors (HTR and HTGR) and reviewed safeguards considerations for this reactor. The following is a preliminary report on this topic prepared under the ASA-100 Advanced Safeguards Project in support of the NNSA Next

  9. International Internships in Nuclear Safeguards and Security: Challenges and Successes

    SciTech Connect

    Duncan, Cristen L.; Heinberg, Cynthia L.; Killinger, Mark H.; Goodey, Kent O.; Kryuchkov, Eduard F.; Geraskin, Nikolai I.; Silaev, Maxim E.; Sokova, Elena K.; Ford, David G.

    2010-04-20

    All students in the Russian safeguards and security degree programs at the National Research Nuclear University MEPhI and Tomsk Polytechnic University, sponsored by the Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A) Education Project, take part in a domestic internship at a Russian enterprise or facility. In addition, a select few students are placed in an international internship. These internships provide students with a better view of how MPC&A and nonproliferation in general are addressed outside of Russia. The possibility of an international internship is a significant incentive for students to enroll in the safeguards and security degree programs. The U.S. members of the MPC&A Education Project team interview students who have been nominated by their professors. These students must have initiative and reasonable English skills. The project team and professors then select students to be tentatively placed in various international internships during the summer or fall of their final year of study. Final arrangements are then made with the host organizations. This paper describes the benefits of the joint United States/Russia cooperation for next-generation workforce development, some of the international internships that have been carried out, the benefits of these international internships, and lessons learned in implementing them.

  10. Development of Metallic Magnetic Calorimeters for Nuclear Safeguards Applications

    SciTech Connect

    Bates, Cameron Russell

    2015-03-11

    Many nuclear safeguards applications could benefit from high-resolution gamma-ray spectroscopy achievable with metallic magnetic calorimeters. This dissertation covers the development of a system for these applications based on gamma-ray detectors developed at the University of Heidelberg. It demonstrates new calorimeters of this type, which achieved an energy resolution of 45.5 eV full-width at half-maximum at 59.54 keV, roughly ten times better than current state of the art high purity germanium detectors. This is the best energy resolution achieved with a gamma-ray metallic magnetic calorimeter at this energy to date. In addition to demonstrating a new benchmark in energy resolution, an experimental system for measuring samples with metallic magnetic calorimeters was constructed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. This system achieved an energy resolution of 91.3 eV full-width at half-maximum at 59.54 keV under optimal conditions. Using this system it was possible to characterize the linearity of the response, the count-rate limitations, and the energy resolution as a function of temperature of the new calorimeter. With this characterization it was determined that it would be feasible to measure 242Pu in a mixed isotope plutonium sample. A measurement of a mixed isotope plutonium sample was performed over the course of 12 days with a single two-pixel metallic magnetic calorimeter. The relative concentration of 242Pu in comparison to other plutonium isotopes was determined by direct measurement to less than half a percent accuracy. This is comparable with the accuracy of the best-case scenario using traditional indirect methods. The ability to directly measure the relative concentration of 242Pu in a sample could enable more accurate accounting and detection of indications of undeclared activities in nuclear safeguards, a better constraint on source material in forensic samples containing plutonium, and improvements in verification in a future plutonium

  11. Termination of Safeguards for Accountable Nuclear Materials at the Idaho National Laboratory

    SciTech Connect

    Michael Holzemer; Alan Carvo

    2012-04-01

    Termination of safeguards ends requirements of Nuclear Material Control and Accountability (MC&A) and thereby removes the safeguards basis for applying physical protection requirements for theft and diversion of nuclear material, providing termination requirements are met as described. Department of Energy (DOE) M 470.4 6 (Nuclear Material Control and Accountability [8/26/05]) stipulates: 1. Section A, Chapter I (1)( q) (1): Safeguards can be terminated on nuclear materials provided the following conditions are met: (a) 'If the material is special nuclear material (SNM) or protected as SNM, it must be attractiveness level E and have a measured value.' (b) 'The material has been determined by DOE line management to be of no programmatic value to DOE.' (c) 'The material is transferred to the control of a waste management organization where the material is accounted for and protected in accordance with waste management regulations. The material must not be collocated with other accountable nuclear materials.' Requirements for safeguards termination depend on the safeguards attractiveness levels of the material. For attractiveness level E, approval has been granted from the DOE Idaho Operations Office (DOE ID) to Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC (BEA) Safeguards and Security (S&S). In some cases, it may be necessary to dispose of nuclear materials of attractiveness level D or higher. Termination of safeguards for such materials must be approved by the Departmental Element (this is the DOE Headquarters Office of Nuclear Energy) after consultation with the Office of Security.

  12. Organizational Culture for Safety, Security, and Safeguards in New Nuclear Power Countries

    SciTech Connect

    Kovacic, Donald N

    2015-01-01

    This chapter will contain the following sections: Existing international norms and standards for developing the infrastructure to support new nuclear power programs The role of organizational culture and how it supports the safe, secure, and peaceful application of nuclear power Identifying effective and efficient strategies for implementing safety, security and safeguards in nuclear operations Challenges identified in the implementation of safety, security and safeguards Potential areas for future collaboration between countries in order to support nonproliferation culture

  13. Integrated neutron/gamma-ray portal monitors for nuclear safeguards

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Fehlau, Paul E.

    1994-08-01

    Radiation monitoring is one nuclear-safeguards measure used to protect against the theft of special nuclear materials (SNM) by pedestrians departing from SNM access areas. The integrated neutron/gamma-ray portal monitor is an ideal radiation monitor for the task when the SNM is plutonium. It achieves high sensitivity for detecting both bare and shielded plutonium by combining two types of radiation detector. One type is a neutron-chamber detector, comprising a large, hollow, neutron moderator that contains a single thermal-neutron proportional counter. The entrance wall of each chamber is thin to admit slow neutrons from plutonium contained in a moderating shield, while the other walls are thick to moderate fast neutrons from bare or lead-shielded plutonium so that they can be detected. The other type of detector is a plastic scintillator that is primarily for detecting gamma rays from small amounts of unshielded plutonium. The two types of detector are easily integrated by making scintillators part of the thick back wall of each neutron chamber or by inserting them into each chamber void. We compared the influence of the two methods of integration on detecting neutrons and gamma rays, and we examined the effectiveness of other design factors and the methods for signal detection as well.

  14. Integrated neutron/gamma-ray portal monitors for nuclear safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Fehlau, P.E. )

    1994-08-01

    Radiation monitoring is one nuclear-safeguards measure used to protect against the theft of special nuclear materials (SNM) by pedestrians departing from SNM access areas. The integrated neutron/gamma-ray portal monitor is an ideal radiation monitor for the task when the SNM is plutonium. It achieves high sensitivity for detecting both bare and shielded plutonium by combining two types of radiation detector. One type is a neutron-chamber detector, comprising a large, hollow, neutron moderator that contains a single thermal-neutron proportional counter. The entrance wall of each chamber is thin to admit slow neutrons from plutonium contained in a moderating shield, while the other walls are thick to moderate fast neutrons from bare or lead-shielded plutonium so that they can be detected. The other type of detector is a plastic scintillator that is primarily for detecting gamma rays from small amounts of unshielded plutonium. The two types of detector are easily integrated by making scintillators part of the thick back wall of each neutron chamber or by inserting them into each chamber void. The authors compared the influence of the two methods of integration on detecting neutrons and gamma rays, and they examined the effectiveness of other design factors and the methods for signal detection as well.

  15. Integrated neutron/gamma-ray portal monitors for nuclear safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Fehlau, P.E.

    1993-09-01

    Radiation monitoring is one nuclear-safeguards measure used to protect against the theft of special nuclear materials (SNM) by pedestrians departing from SNM access areas. The integrated neutron/gamma-ray portal monitor is an ideal radiation monitor for the task when the SNM is plutonium. It achieves high sensitivity for detecting both bare and shielded plutonium by combining two types of radiation detector. One type is a neutron-chamber detector, comprising a large, hollow, neutron moderator that contains a single thermal-neutron proportional counter. The entrance wall of each chamber is thin to admit slow neutrons from plutonium contained in a moderating shield, while the other walls are thick to moderate fast neutrons from bare or lead-shielded plutonium so that they can be detected. The other type of detector is a plastic scintillator that is primarily for detecting gamma rays from small amounts of unshielded plutonium. The two types of detector are easily integrated by making scintillators part of the thick back wall of each neutron chamber or by inserting them into each chamber void. We compared the influence of the two methods of integration on detecting neutrons and gamma rays, and we examined the effectiveness of other design factors and the methods for signal detection as well.

  16. Evaluation of a Business Case for Safeguards by Design in Nuclear Power Reactors

    SciTech Connect

    Wood, Thomas W.; Seward, Amy M.; Lewis, Valerie A.; Gitau, Ernest TN; Zentner, Michael D.

    2012-12-01

    Safeguards by Design (SbD) is a well-known paradigm for consideration and incorporation of safeguards approaches and associated design features early in the nuclear facility development process. This paradigm has been developed as part of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), and has been accepted as beneficial in many discussions and papers on NGSI or specific technologies under development within NGSI. The Office of Nuclear Safeguards and Security funded the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory to examine the business case justification of SbD for nuclear power reactors. Ultimately, the implementation of SbD will rely on the designers of nuclear facilities. Therefore, it is important to assess the incentives which will lead designers to adopt SbD as a standard practice for nuclear facility design. This report details the extent to which designers will have compelling economic incentives to adopt SbD.

  17. 10 CFR 1.42 - Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... and secure production of nuclear fuel used in commercial nuclear reactors; the safe storage... nuclear materials, including certification of transport containers and reactor spent fuel storage; and... 10 Energy 1 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards....

  18. 10 CFR 1.42 - Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... and secure production of nuclear fuel used in commercial nuclear reactors; the safe storage... nuclear materials, including certification of transport containers and reactor spent fuel storage; and... 10 Energy 1 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards....

  19. Determining information management needs for enhanced international safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Badalamente, R.V.; DeLand, S.M.; Whiteson, R.; Anzelon, G.

    1994-08-01

    The Safeguards Information Management System initiative is a program of the Department of Energy`s (DOE) Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation aimed at supporting the International Atomic Energy Agency`s (IAEA) efforts to strengthen safeguards through the enhancement of information management capabilities. The DOE hopes to provide the IAEA with the ability to correlate and analyze data from existing and new sources of information, including publicly available information, information on imports and exports, design information, environmental monitoring data, and non-safeguards information. The first step in this effort is to identify and define IAEA requirements. In support of this, we have created a users` requirements document based on interviews with IAEA staff that describes the information management needs of the end user projected by the IAEA, including needs for storage, retrieval, analysis, communication, and visualization of data. Also included are characteristics of the end user and attributes of the current environment. This paper describes our efforts to obtain the required information. We discuss how to accurately represent user needs and involve users for an international organization with a multi-cultural user population. We describe our approach, our experience in setting up and conducting the interviews and brainstorming sessions, and a brief discussion of what we learned.

  20. Facility Safeguardability Analysis In Support of Safeguards-by-Design

    SciTech Connect

    Philip Casey Durst; Roald Wigeland; Robert Bari; Trond Bjornard; John Hockert; Michael Zentner

    2010-07-01

    methodology can be adapted for evaluating and assessing the safeguardability of nuclear facilities – both existing, as well as those still on the drawing board. The advantages of the Facility Safeguardability Analysis is that it would not only give the facility designer an analytical method for evaluating and assessing the safeguards measures and approaches for the prospective facility, but also the ability to optimize the design of the facility process for enhancing facility safeguardability. The following report explains the need for Facility Safeguardability Analysis and explains how it could be used in the Safeguards-by-Design, in support of the design and construction of nuclear facilities.

  1. NNSA Signs Memorandum with Kuwait to Increase Cooperation on Nuclear Safeguards and Nonproliferation

    ScienceCinema

    Thomas D'Agostino

    2016-07-12

    On June 23, 2010, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) signed a Memorandum of Cooperation on nuclear safeguards and other nonproliferation topics with the Kuwait National Nuclear Energy Committee (KNNEC). NNSA Administrator Thomas D'Agostino and KNNEC's Secretary General, Dr. Ahmad Bishara, signed the memorandum at a ceremony at U.S. Department of Energy headquarters in Washington.

  2. NNSA Signs Memorandum with Kuwait to Increase Cooperation on Nuclear Safeguards and Nonproliferation

    SciTech Connect

    Thomas D'Agostino

    2010-06-23

    On June 23, 2010, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) signed a Memorandum of Cooperation on nuclear safeguards and other nonproliferation topics with the Kuwait National Nuclear Energy Committee (KNNEC). NNSA Administrator Thomas D'Agostino and KNNEC's Secretary General, Dr. Ahmad Bishara, signed the memorandum at a ceremony at U.S. Department of Energy headquarters in Washington.

  3. Possible Nuclear Safeguards Applications: Workshop on Next-Generation Laser Compton Gamma Source

    SciTech Connect

    Durham, J. Matthew

    2016-11-17

    These are a set of slides for the development of a next-generation photon source white paper. The following topics are covered in these slides: Nuclear Safeguards; The Nuclear Fuel Cycle; Precise isotopic determination via NRF; UF6 Enrichment Assay; and Non-Destructive Assay of Spent Nuclear Fuel. In summary: A way to non-destructively measure precise isotopics of ~kg and larger samples has multiple uses in nuclear safeguards; Ideally this is a compact, fieldable device that can be used by international inspectors. Must be rugged and reliable; A next-generation source can be used as a testing ground for these techniques as technology develops.

  4. Applications of virtual reality to nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation

    SciTech Connect

    Stansfield, S.

    1996-12-31

    This paper presents several applications of virtual reality relevant to the areas of nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation. Each of these applications was developed to the prototype stage at Sandia National Laboratories` Virtual Reality and Intelligent Simulation laboratory. These applications include the use of virtual reality for facility visualization, training of inspection personnel, and security and monitoring of nuclear facilities.

  5. Framework for Integrating Safety, Operations, Security, and Safeguards in the Design and Operation of Nuclear Facilities

    SciTech Connect

    Darby, John L.; Horak, Karl Emanuel; LaChance, Jeffrey L.; Tolk, Keith Michael; Whitehead, Donnie Wayne

    2007-10-01

    The US is currently on the brink of a nuclear renaissance that will result in near-term construction of new nuclear power plants. In addition, the Department of Energy’s (DOE) ambitious new Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) program includes facilities for reprocessing spent nuclear fuel and reactors for transmuting safeguards material. The use of nuclear power and material has inherent safety, security, and safeguards (SSS) concerns that can impact the operation of the facilities. Recent concern over terrorist attacks and nuclear proliferation led to an increased emphasis on security and safeguard issues as well as the more traditional safety emphasis. To meet both domestic and international requirements, nuclear facilities include specific SSS measures that are identified and evaluated through the use of detailed analysis techniques. In the past, these individual assessments have not been integrated, which led to inefficient and costly design and operational requirements. This report provides a framework for a new paradigm where safety, operations, security, and safeguards (SOSS) are integrated into the design and operation of a new facility to decrease cost and increase effectiveness. Although the focus of this framework is on new nuclear facilities, most of the concepts could be applied to any new, high-risk facility.

  6. Enhanced AFCI Sampling, Analysis, and Safeguards Technology Review

    SciTech Connect

    John Svoboda

    2009-09-01

    The focus of this study includes the investigation of sampling technologies used in industry and their potential application to nuclear fuel processing. The goal is to identify innovative sampling methods using state of the art techniques that could evolve into the next generation sampling and analysis system for metallic elements. Sampling and analysis of nuclear fuel recycling plant processes is required both to monitor the operations and ensure Safeguards and Security goals are met. In addition, environmental regulations lead to additional samples and analysis to meet licensing requirements. The volume of samples taken by conventional means, can restrain productivity while results samples are analyzed, require process holding tanks that are sized to meet analytical issues rather than process issues (and that create a larger facility footprint), or, in some cases, simply overwhelm analytical laboratory capabilities. These issues only grow when process flowsheets propose new separations systems and new byproduct material for transmutation purposes. Novel means of streamlining both sampling and analysis are being evaluated to increase the efficiency while meeting all requirements for information. This report addresses just a part of the effort to develop and study novel methods by focusing on the sampling and analysis of aqueous samples for metallic elements. It presents an overview of the sampling requirements, including frequency, sensitivity, accuracy, and programmatic drivers, to demonstrate the magnitude of the task. The sampling and analysis system needed for metallic element measurements is then discussed, and novel options being applied to other industrial analytical needs are presented. Inductively coupled mass spectrometry instruments are the most versatile for metallic element analyses and are thus chosen as the focus for the study. Candidate novel means of process sampling, as well as modifications that are necessary to couple such instruments to

  7. The new geospatial tools: global transparency enhancing safeguards verification

    SciTech Connect

    Pabian, Frank Vincent

    2010-09-16

    This paper focuses on the importance and potential role of the new, freely available, geospatial tools for enhancing IAEA safeguards and how, together with commercial satellite imagery, they can be used to promote 'all-source synergy'. As additional 'open sources', these new geospatial tools have heralded a new era of 'global transparency' and they can be used to substantially augment existing information-driven safeguards gathering techniques, procedures, and analyses in the remote detection of undeclared facilities, as well as support ongoing monitoring and verification of various treaty (e.g., NPT, FMCT) relevant activities and programs. As an illustration of how these new geospatial tools may be applied, an original exemplar case study provides how it is possible to derive value-added follow-up information on some recent public media reporting of a former clandestine underground plutonium production complex (now being converted to a 'Tourist Attraction' given the site's abandonment by China in the early 1980s). That open source media reporting, when combined with subsequent commentary found in various Internet-based Blogs and Wikis, led to independent verification of the reporting with additional ground truth via 'crowdsourcing' (tourist photos as found on 'social networking' venues like Google Earth's Panoramio layer and Twitter). Confirmation of the precise geospatial location of the site (along with a more complete facility characterization incorporating 3-D Modeling and visualization) was only made possible following the acquisition of higher resolution commercial satellite imagery that could be correlated with the reporting, ground photos, and an interior diagram, through original imagery analysis of the overhead imagery.

  8. The safeguards options study

    SciTech Connect

    Hakkila, E.A.; Mullen, M.F.; Olinger, C.T.; Stanbro, W.D.; Olsen, A.P.; Roche, C.T.; Rudolph, R.R.; Bieber, A.M.; Lemley, J.; Filby, E.

    1995-04-01

    The Safeguards Options Study was initiated to aid the International Safeguards Division (ISD) of the DOE Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation in developing its programs in enhanced international safeguards. The goal was to provide a technical basis for the ISD program in this area. The Safeguards Options Study has been a cooperative effort among ten organizations. These are Argonne National Laboratory, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Mound Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest Laboratories, Sandia National Laboratories, and Special Technologies Laboratory. Much of the Motivation for the Safeguards Options Study is the recognition after the Iraq experience that there are deficiencies in the present approach to international safeguards. While under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards at their declared facilities, Iraq was able to develop a significant weapons program without being noticed. This is because negotiated safeguards only applied at declared sites. Even so, their nuclear weapons program clearly conflicted with Iraq`s obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as a nonnuclear weapon state.

  9. Overview of the Facility Safeguardability Analysis (FSA) Process

    SciTech Connect

    Bari, Robert A.; Hockert, John; Wonder, Edward F.; Johnson, Scott J.; Wigeland, Roald; Zentner, Michael D.

    2012-08-01

    Executive Summary The safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is intended to provide the international community with credible assurance that a State is fulfilling its safeguards obligations. Effective and cost-efficient IAEA safeguards at the facility level are, and will remain, an important element of IAEA safeguards as those safeguards evolve towards a “State-Level approach.” The Safeguards by Design (SBD) concept can facilitate the implementation of these effective and cost-efficient facility-level safeguards (Bjornard, et al. 2009a, 2009b; IAEA, 1998; Wonder & Hockert, 2011). This report, sponsored by the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Nuclear Safeguards and Security, introduces a methodology intended to ensure that the diverse approaches to Safeguards by Design can be effectively integrated and consistently used to cost effectively enhance the application of international safeguards.

  10. Advanced Nuclear Measurements - Sensitivity Analysis Emerging Safeguards, Problems and Proliferation Risk

    SciTech Connect

    Dreicer, J.S.

    1999-07-15

    During the past year this component of the Advanced Nuclear Measurements LDRD-DR has focused on emerging safeguards problems and proliferation risk by investigating problems in two domains. The first is related to the analysis, quantification, and characterization of existing inventories of fissile materials, in particular, the minor actinides (MA) formed in the commercial fuel cycle. Understanding material forms and quantities helps identify and define future measurement problems, instrument requirements, and assists in prioritizing safeguards technology development. The second problem (dissertation research) has focused on the development of a theoretical foundation for sensor array anomaly detection. Remote and unattended monitoring or verification of safeguards activities is becoming a necessity due to domestic and international budgetary constraints. However, the ability to assess the trustworthiness of a sensor array has not been investigated. This research is developing an anomaly detection methodology to assess the sensor array.

  11. DOE/DHS INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEM CYBER SECURITY PROGRAMS: A MODEL FOR USE IN NUCLEAR FACILITY SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY

    SciTech Connect

    Robert S. Anderson; Mark Schanfein; Trond Bjornard; Paul Moskowitz

    2011-07-01

    Many critical infrastructure sectors have been investigating cyber security issues for several years especially with the help of two primary government programs. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National SCADA Test Bed and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Control Systems Security Program have both implemented activities aimed at securing the industrial control systems that operate the North American electric grid along with several other critical infrastructure sectors (ICS). These programs have spent the last seven years working with industry including asset owners, educational institutions, standards and regulating bodies, and control system vendors. The programs common mission is to provide outreach, identification of cyber vulnerabilities to ICS and mitigation strategies to enhance security postures. The success of these programs indicates that a similar approach can be successfully translated into other sectors including nuclear operations, safeguards, and security. The industry regulating bodies have included cyber security requirements and in some cases, have incorporated sets of standards with penalties for non-compliance such as the North American Electric Reliability Corporation Critical Infrastructure Protection standards. These DOE and DHS programs that address security improvements by both suppliers and end users provide an excellent model for nuclear facility personnel concerned with safeguards and security cyber vulnerabilities and countermeasures. It is not a stretch to imagine complete surreptitious collapse of protection against the removal of nuclear material or even initiation of a criticality event as witnessed at Three Mile Island or Chernobyl in a nuclear ICS inadequately protected against the cyber threat.

  12. The U.S./IAEA Workshop on Software Sustainability for Safeguards Instrumentation: Report to the NNSA DOE Office of International Nuclear Safeguards (NA-241)

    SciTech Connect

    Pepper, Susan E.; Pickett, Chris A.; Queirolo, Al; Bachner, Katherine M.; Worrall, Louise G.

    2015-04-07

    The U.S Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) convened a workshop on Software Sustainability for Safeguards Instrumentation in Vienna, Austria, May 6-8, 2014. Safeguards instrumentation software must be sustained in a changing environment to ensure existing instruments can continue to perform as designed, with improved security. The approaches to the development and maintenance of instrument software used in the past may not be the best model for the future and, therefore, the organizers’ goal was to investigate these past approaches and to determine an optimal path forward. The purpose of this report is to provide input for the DOE NNSA Office of International Nuclear Safeguards (NA-241) and other stakeholders that can be utilized when making decisions related to the development and maintenance of software used in the implementation of international nuclear safeguards. For example, this guidance can be used when determining whether to fund the development, upgrade, or replacement of a particular software product. The report identifies the challenges related to sustaining software, and makes recommendations for addressing these challenges, supported by summaries and detailed notes from the workshop discussions. In addition the authors provide a set of recommendations for institutionalizing software sustainability practices in the safeguards community. The term “software sustainability” was defined for this workshop as ensuring that safeguards instrument software and algorithm functionality can be maintained efficiently throughout the instrument lifecycle, without interruption and providing the ability to continue to improve that software as needs arise.

  13. INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEM CYBER SECURITY: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS RELEVANT TO NUCLEAR FACILITIES, SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY

    SciTech Connect

    Robert S. Anderson; Mark Schanfein; Trond Bjornard; Paul Moskowitz

    2011-07-01

    Typical questions surrounding industrial control system (ICS) cyber security always lead back to: What could a cyber attack do to my system(s) and; how much should I worry about it? These two leading questions represent only a fraction of questions asked when discussing cyber security as it applies to any program, company, business, or organization. The intent of this paper is to open a dialog of important pertinent questions and answers that managers of nuclear facilities engaged in nuclear facility security and safeguards should examine, i.e., what questions should be asked; and how do the answers affect an organization's ability to effectively safeguard and secure nuclear material. When a cyber intrusion is reported, what does that mean? Can an intrusion be detected or go un-noticed? Are nuclear security or safeguards systems potentially vulnerable? What about the digital systems employed in process monitoring, and international safeguards? Organizations expend considerable efforts to ensure that their facilities can maintain continuity of operations against physical threats. However, cyber threats particularly on ICSs may not be well known or understood, and often do not receive adequate attention. With the disclosure of the Stuxnet virus that has recently attacked nuclear infrastructure, many organizations have recognized the need for an urgent interest in cyber attacks and defenses against them. Several questions arise including discussions about the insider threat, adequate cyber protections, program readiness, encryption, and many more. These questions, among others, are discussed so as to raise the awareness and shed light on ways to protect nuclear facilities and materials against such attacks.

  14. Exploring Operational Safeguards, Safety, and Security by Design to Address Real Time Threats in Nuclear Facilities

    SciTech Connect

    Schanfein, Mark J.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2015-07-07

    Over the last few years, significant attention has been paid to both encourage application and provide domestic and international guidance for designing in safeguards and security in new facilities.1,2,3 However, once a facility is operational, safeguards, security, and safety often operate as separate entities that support facility operations. This separation is potentially a serious weakness should insider or outsider threats become a reality.Situations may arise where safeguards detects a possible loss of material in a facility. Will they notify security so they can, for example, check perimeter doors for tampering? Not doing so might give the advantage to an insider who has already, or is about to, move nuclear material outside the facility building. If outsiders break into a facility, the availability of any information to coordinate the facility’s response through segregated alarm stations or a failure to include all available radiation sensors, such as safety’s criticality monitors can give the advantage to the adversary who might know to disable camera systems, but would most likely be unaware of other highly relevant sensors in a nuclear facility.This paper will briefly explore operational safeguards, safety, and security by design (3S) at a high level for domestic and State facilities, identify possible weaknesses, and propose future administrative and technical methods, to strengthen the facility system’s response to threats.

  15. Passive Measurement of Organic-Scintillator Neutron Signatures for Nuclear Safeguards Applications

    SciTech Connect

    Jennfier L. Dolan; Eric C. Miller; Alexis C. Kaplan; Andreas Enqvist; Marek Flaska; Alice Tomanin; Paolo Peerani; David L. Chichester; Sara A. Pozzi

    2012-10-01

    At nuclear facilities, domestically and internationally, most measurement systems used for nuclear materials’ control and accountability rely on He-3 detectors. Due to resource shortages, alternatives to He-3 systems are needed. This paper presents preliminary simulation and experimental efforts to develop a fast-neutron-multiplicity counter based on liquid organic scintillators. This mission also provides the opportunity to broaden the capabilities of such safeguards measurement systems to improve current neutron-multiplicity techniques and expand the scope to encompass advanced nuclear fuels.

  16. Signal estimation and change detection in tank data for nuclear safeguards

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Burr, Tom; Suzuki, Mitsutoshi; Howell, John; Longo, Claire E.; Hamada, Michael S.

    2011-06-01

    Process monitoring (PM) is increasingly important in nuclear safeguards as a complement to mass-balance based nuclear materials accounting (NMA). Typically, PM involves more frequent but lower quality measurements than NMA. While NMA estimates special nuclear material (SNM) mass balances and uncertainties, PM often tracks SNM attributes qualitatively or in the case of solution monitoring (SM) tracks bulk mass and volume. Automatic event marking is used in several nuclear safeguards PM systems. The aims are to locate the start and stop times and signal changes associated with key events. This paper describes results using both real and simulated SM data to quantify the errors associated with imperfect marking of start and stop times of tank events such as receipts and shipments. In the context of safeguards, one can look both forward and backward in modest time intervals to recognize events. Event marking methods evaluated include differencing, multi-scale principal component analysis using wavelets, and piecewise linear regression (PLR). All methods are evaluated on both raw and smoothed data, and several smoothing options are compared, including standard filters, hybrid filters, and local kernel smoothing. The main finding for real and simulated examples considered is that a two-step strategy is most effective. First, any reasonably effective initial smoother is used to provide a good initial guess at change point locations. Second, PLR is applied, looking for one change point at a time. In contrast, PLR that allows for multiple change points simultaneously has worse performance.

  17. Plutonium Measurements with a Fast-Neutron Multiplicity Counter for Nuclear Safeguards Applications

    SciTech Connect

    Jennifer L. Dolan; Marek Flaska; Alexis Poitrasson-Riviere; Andreas Enqvist; Paolo Peerani; David L. Chichester; Sara A. Pozzi

    2014-11-01

    Measurements were performed at the Joint Research Centre in Ispra, Italy to field test a fast-neutron multiplicity counter developed at the University of Michigan. The measurements allowed the illustration of the system’s photon discrimination abilities, efficiency when measuring neutron multiplicity, ability to characterize 240Pueff mass, and performance relative to a currently deployed neutron coincidence counter. This work is motivated by the need to replace and improve upon 3He neutron detection systems for nuclear safeguards applications.

  18. Monitoring nuclear reactors for safeguards purposes using anti-neutrinos

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Carroll, J.; Coleman, J.; Lockwood, M.; Metelko, C.; Murdoch, M.; Touramanis, C.; Davies, G.; Roberts, A.

    2015-04-01

    Preventing nuclear proliferation is a high priority for the international community. Monitoring of nuclear facilities to detect unauthorised removal of fissile materials from operational cores is central to this. Neutrino detection devices can be used to remotely monitor the core of operating reactors in a safe, reliable manner. Technology developed for the T2K experiment can be adapted to make a small footprint, reliable, anti-neutrino detector. Through, characterisation of the anti-neutrino spectrum there is a possibility to provide core material accountancy. A prototype of such a device has been developed and demonstrated at the University of Liverpool. Based on the design of the T2K Near Detector Calorimeter, the device will detect anti-neutrinos through the distinctive delayed coincidence signal of inverse beta decay interactions. This poster presented data from detector commissioning. The detector is currently deployed at Wylfa power station, UK for field testing.

  19. Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1995-01-01

    Meyer Chairman since June 1, 1993 Senior Staff Consultant Center for International Studies Executive Director Martin Marietta Energy MIT Washington...mantlement of Nuclear Weapons. Disarmament Studies Center for International Security 2 Panel member until June 1, 1993; panel and Arms Control chair after...Russian and Eurasian Peace Studies Program SE 2T International, Ltd. Studies Cornell University Monterey Institute of International Studies Leonard S

  20. Global Survey of the Concepts and Understanding of the Interfaces Between Nuclear Safety, Security, and Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Kovacic, Don N.; Stewart, Scott; Erickson, Alexa R.; Ford, Kerrie D.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2015-07-15

    There is increasing global discourse on how the elements of nuclear safety, security, and safeguards can be most effectively implemented in nuclear power programs. While each element is separate and unique, they must nevertheless all be addressed in a country’s laws and implemented via regulations and in facility operations. This topic is of particular interest to countries that are currently developing the infrastructure to support nuclear power programs. These countries want to better understand what is required by these elements and how they can manage the interfaces between them and take advantages of any synergies that may exist. They need practical examples and guidance in this area in order to develop better organizational strategies and technical capacities. This could simplify their legal, regulatory, and management structures and avoid inefficient approaches and costly mistakes that may not be apparent to them at this early stage of development. From the perspective of IAEA International Safeguards, supporting Member States in exploring such interfaces and synergies provides a benefit to them because it acknowledges that domestic safeguards in a country do not exist in a vacuum. Instead, it relies on a strong State System of Accounting and Control that is in turn dependent on a capable and independent regulatory body as well as a competent operator and technical staff. These organizations must account for and control nuclear material, communicate effectively, and manage and transmit complete and correct information to the IAEA in a timely manner. This, while in most cases also being responsible for the safety and security of their facilities. Seeking efficiencies in this process benefits international safeguards and nonproliferation. This paper will present the results of a global survey of current and anticipated approaches and practices by countries and organizations with current or future nuclear power programs on how they are implementing, or

  1. Oak Ridge National Laboratory Office of International Nuclear Safeguards: Human Capital Development Activity in FY16

    SciTech Connect

    Gilligan, Kimberly V.; Gaudet, Rachel N.

    2016-09-30

    In 2007, the U.S. Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control (NPAC) completed a comprehensive review of the current and potential future challenges facing the international safeguards system. One of the report’s key recommendations was for DOE NNSA to launch a major new program to revitalize the international safeguards technology and human resource base. In 2007, at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) General Conference, then Secretary of Energy Samuel W. Bodman announced the newly created Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). NGSI consists of five program elements: policy development and outreach, concepts and approaches, technology and analytical methodologies, human capital development (HCD), and infrastructure development. This report addresses the HCD component of NGSI. The goal of the HCD component as defined in the NNSA Program Plan is “to revitalize and expand the international safeguards human capital base by attracting and training a new generation of talent.” The major objectives listed in the HCD goal include education and training, outreach to universities and professional societies, postdoctoral appointments, and summer internships at national laboratories.

  2. Application of Framework for Integrating Safety, Security and Safeguards (3Ss) into the Design Of Used Nuclear Fuel Storage Facility

    SciTech Connect

    Badwan, Faris M.; Demuth, Scott F

    2015-01-06

    Department of Energy’s Office of Nuclear Energy, Fuel Cycle Research and Development develops options to the current commercial fuel cycle management strategy to enable the safe, secure, economic, and sustainable expansion of nuclear energy while minimizing proliferation risks by conducting research and development focused on used nuclear fuel recycling and waste management to meet U.S. needs. Used nuclear fuel is currently stored onsite in either wet pools or in dry storage systems, with disposal envisioned in interim storage facility and, ultimately, in a deep-mined geologic repository. The safe management and disposition of used nuclear fuel and/or nuclear waste is a fundamental aspect of any nuclear fuel cycle. Integrating safety, security, and safeguards (3Ss) fully in the early stages of the design process for a new nuclear facility has the potential to effectively minimize safety, proliferation, and security risks. The 3Ss integration framework could become the new national and international norm and the standard process for designing future nuclear facilities. The purpose of this report is to develop a framework for integrating the safety, security and safeguards concept into the design of Used Nuclear Fuel Storage Facility (UNFSF). The primary focus is on integration of safeguards and security into the UNFSF based on the existing Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approach to addressing the safety/security interface (10 CFR 73.58 and Regulatory Guide 5.73) for nuclear power plants. The methodology used for adaptation of the NRC safety/security interface will be used as the basis for development of the safeguards /security interface and later will be used as the basis for development of safety and safeguards interface. Then this will complete the integration cycle of safety, security, and safeguards. The overall methodology for integration of 3Ss will be proposed, but only the integration of safeguards and security will be applied to the design of the

  3. Certified reference materials and reference methods for nuclear safeguards and security.

    PubMed

    Jakopič, R; Sturm, M; Kraiem, M; Richter, S; Aregbe, Y

    2013-11-01

    Confidence in comparability and reliability of measurement results in nuclear material and environmental sample analysis are established via certified reference materials (CRMs), reference measurements, and inter-laboratory comparisons (ILCs). Increased needs for quality control tools in proliferation resistance, environmental sample analysis, development of measurement capabilities over the years and progress in modern analytical techniques are the main reasons for the development of new reference materials and reference methods for nuclear safeguards and security. The Institute for Reference Materials and Measurements (IRMM) prepares and certifices large quantities of the so-called "large-sized dried" (LSD) spikes for accurate measurement of the uranium and plutonium content in dissolved nuclear fuel solutions by isotope dilution mass spectrometry (IDMS) and also develops particle reference materials applied for the detection of nuclear signatures in environmental samples. IRMM is currently replacing some of its exhausted stocks of CRMs with new ones whose specifications are up-to-date and tailored for the demands of modern analytical techniques. Some of the existing materials will be re-measured to improve the uncertainties associated with their certified values, and to enable laboratories to reduce their combined measurement uncertainty. Safeguards involve the quantitative verification by independent measurements so that no nuclear material is diverted from its intended peaceful use. Safeguards authorities pay particular attention to plutonium and the uranium isotope (235)U, indicating the so-called 'enrichment', in nuclear material and in environmental samples. In addition to the verification of the major ratios, n((235)U)/n((238)U) and n((240)Pu)/n((239)Pu), the minor ratios of the less abundant uranium and plutonium isotopes contain valuable information about the origin and the 'history' of material used for commercial or possibly clandestine purposes, and

  4. Multi-Element CZT Array for Nuclear Safeguards Applications

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Kwak, S.-W.; Lee, A.-R.; Shin, J.-K.; Park, U.-R.; Park, S.; Kim, Y.; Chung, H.

    2016-12-01

    Due to its electronic properties, a cadmium zinc telluride (CZT) detector has been used as a hand-held portable nuclear measurement instrument. However, a CZT detector has low detection efficiency because of a limitation of its single crystal growth. To address its low efficiency, we have constructed a portable four-CZT array based gamma-ray spectrometer consisting of a CZT array, electronics for signal processing and software. Its performance has been characterized in terms of energy resolution and detection efficiency using radioactive sources and nuclear materials. Experimental results showed that the detection efficiency of the four-CZT array based gamma-ray spectrometer was much higher than that of a single CZT detector in the array. The FWHMs of the CZT array were 9, 18, and 21 keV at 185.7, 662, and 1,332 keV, respectively. Some gamma-rays in a range of 100 keV to 200 keV were not clear in a single crystal detector while those from the CZT array system were observed to be clear. The energy resolution of the CZT array system was only slightely worse than those of the single CZT detectors. By combining several single crystals and summing signals from each single detector at a digital electronic circuit, the detection efficiency of a CZT array system increased without degradation of its energy resolution. The technique outlined in this paper shows a very promising method for designing a CZT-based gamma-ray spectroscopy that overcomes the fundamental limitations of a small volume CZT detector.

  5. Mock Nuclear Processing Facility-Safeguards Training Requirements

    SciTech Connect

    Gibbs, Philip; Hasty, Tim; Johns, Rissell; Baum, Gregory

    2014-08-31

    This document outlines specific training requirements in the topical areas of Material Control and Accounting (MC&A) and Physical Protection(PP) which are to be used as technical input for designing a mock Integrated Security Facility (ISF) at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). The overall project objective for these requirements is to enhance the ability to deliver training on Material Protection Control and Accounting (MC&A) concepts regarding hazardous material such as irradiated materials with respect to bulk processing facilities.

  6. Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence Measurements on ^237Np for Security and Safeguards Applications

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Angell, C. T.; Joshi, T.; Yee, Ryan; Norman, E. B.; Kulp, W. D.; Warren, G. A.; Korbly, S.; Klimenko, A.; Wilson, C.; Copping, R.; Shuh, D. K.

    2009-10-01

    The smuggling of nuclear material and the diversion of fissile material for covert weapon programs both present grave risks to world security. Methods are needed to detect nuclear material smuggled in cargo, and for proper material accountability in civilian fuel re-processing facilities. Nuclear resonance fluorescence (NRF) is a technique that can address both needs. It is a non-destructive active interrogation method that provides isotope-specific information. It works by using a γ-ray beam to resonantly excite levels in a nucleus and observing the γ-rays emitted whose energy and intensity are characteristic of that isotope. ^237Np presents significant safeguard challenges; it is fissile yet currently has fewer safeguard restrictions. NRF measurements on ^237Np will expand the nuclear database and will permit designing interrogation and assay systems. Measurements were made using the bremsstrahlung beam at the HVRL at MIT on a 7 g target of ^237Np with two incident electron energies of 2.8 and 3.1 MeV. Results will be presented with discussion of the relevant nuclear structure necessary to predict levels in other actinides.

  7. Hybrid statistical testing for nuclear material accounting data and/or process monitoring data in nuclear safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Burr, Tom; Hamada, Michael S.; Ticknor, Larry; Sprinkle, James

    2015-01-01

    The aim of nuclear safeguards is to ensure that special nuclear material is used for peaceful purposes. Historically, nuclear material accounting (NMA) has provided the quantitative basis for monitoring for nuclear material loss or diversion, and process monitoring (PM) data is collected by the operator to monitor the process. PM data typically support NMA in various ways, often by providing a basis to estimate some of the in-process nuclear material inventory. We develop options for combining PM residuals and NMA residuals (residual = measurement - prediction), using a hybrid of period-driven and data-driven hypothesis testing. The modified statistical tests can be used on time series of NMA residuals (the NMA residual is the familiar material balance), or on a combination of PM and NMA residuals. The PM residuals can be generated on a fixed time schedule or as events occur.

  8. Hybrid statistical testing for nuclear material accounting data and/or process monitoring data in nuclear safeguards

    DOE PAGES

    Burr, Tom; Hamada, Michael S.; Ticknor, Larry; ...

    2015-01-01

    The aim of nuclear safeguards is to ensure that special nuclear material is used for peaceful purposes. Historically, nuclear material accounting (NMA) has provided the quantitative basis for monitoring for nuclear material loss or diversion, and process monitoring (PM) data is collected by the operator to monitor the process. PM data typically support NMA in various ways, often by providing a basis to estimate some of the in-process nuclear material inventory. We develop options for combining PM residuals and NMA residuals (residual = measurement - prediction), using a hybrid of period-driven and data-driven hypothesis testing. The modified statistical tests canmore » be used on time series of NMA residuals (the NMA residual is the familiar material balance), or on a combination of PM and NMA residuals. The PM residuals can be generated on a fixed time schedule or as events occur.« less

  9. DOE/ABACC safeguards cooperation

    SciTech Connect

    Whitaker, J.M.; Alvim, C.F.; Toth, P.; Rubio, J.

    1995-12-31

    In 1994, the US Department of Energy (DOE) and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) signed a safeguards cooperation agreement. The agreement provides for cooperation in the areas of nuclear material control, accountancy, verification, and advanced containment and surveillance technologies for international safeguards applications. ABACC is an international safeguards organization responsible for verifying the commitments of a 1991 bilateral agreement between Argentina and Brazil in which both countries agreed to submit all nuclear material in all nuclear activities to a Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC). DOE provides critical assistance (including equipment and training) through the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security to countries and international organizations to enhance their capabilities to control and verify nuclear material inventories. Specific activities initiated under the safeguards agreement include: (1) active US participation in ABACC`s safeguards training courses, (2) joint development of specialized measurement training workshops, (3) characterization of laboratory standards, and (4) development and application of an extensive analytical laboratory comparison program. The results realized from these initial activities have been mutually beneficial in regard to strengthening the application of international safeguards in Argentina and Brazil.

  10. International and national security applications of cryogenic detectors - mostly nuclear safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Rabin, Michael W

    2009-01-01

    As with science, so with security - in both arenas, the extraordinary sensitivity of cryogenic sensors enables high-confidence detection and high-precision measurement even of the faintest signals. Science applications are more mature, but several national and international security applications have been identified where cryogenic detectors have high potential payoff. International safeguards and nuclear forensics are areas needing new technology and methods to boost speed, sensitivity, precision and accuracy. Successfully applied, improved nuclear materials analysis will help constrain nuclear materials diversion pathways and contribute to treaty verification. Cryogenic microcalorimeter detectors for X-ray, gamma ray, neutron, and alpha particle spectrometry are under development with these aims in mind. In each case the unsurpassed energy resolution of microcalorimeters reveals previously invi sible spectral features of nuclear materials. Preliminary results of quantitative analysis indicate substantial improvements are still possible, but significant work will be required to fully understand the ultimate performance limits.

  11. National and International Security Applications of Cryogenic Detectors—Mostly Nuclear Safeguards

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Rabin, Michael W.

    2009-12-01

    As with science, so with security—in both arenas, the extraordinary sensitivity of cryogenic sensors enables high-confidence detection and high-precision measurement even of the faintest signals. Science applications are more mature, but several national and international security applications have been identified where cryogenic detectors have high potential payoff. International safeguards and nuclear forensics are areas needing new technology and methods to boost speed, sensitivity, precision and accuracy. Successfully applied, improved nuclear materials analysis will help constrain nuclear materials diversion pathways and contribute to treaty verification. Cryogenic microcalorimeter detectors for X-ray, gamma-ray, neutron, and alpha-particle spectrometry are under development with these aims in mind. In each case the unsurpassed energy resolution of microcalorimeters reveals previously invisible spectral features of nuclear materials. Preliminary results of quantitative analysis indicate substantial improvements are still possible, but significant work will be required to fully understand the ultimate performance limits.

  12. Evaluating Safeguards Benefits of Process Monitoring as compared with Nuclear Material Accountancy

    SciTech Connect

    Humberto Garcia; Wen-Chiao Lin; Reed Carlson

    2014-07-01

    This paper illustrates potential safeguards benefits that process monitoring (PM) may have as a diversion deterrent and as a complementary safeguards measure to nuclear material accountancy (NMA). This benefit is illustrated by quantifying the standard deviation associated with detecting a considered material diversion scenario using either an NMA-based method or a PM-based approach. To illustrate the benefits of PM for effective safeguards, we consider a reprocessing facility. We assume that the diversion of interest for detection manifests itself as a loss of Pu caused by abnormally operating a dissolver for an extended period to accomplish protracted diversion (or misdirection) of Pu to a retained (unconditioned) waste stream. For detecting the occurrence of this diversion (which involves anomalous operation of the dissolver), we consider two different data evaluation and integration (DEI) approaches, one based on NMA and the other based on PM. The approach based on PM does not directly do mass balance calculations, but rather monitors for the possible occurrence of anomaly patterns related to potential loss of nuclear material. It is thus assumed that the loss of a given mass amount of nuclear material can be directly associated with the execution of proliferation-driven activities that trigger the occurrence of an anomaly pattern consisting of series of events or signatures occurring at different unit operations and time instances. By effectively assessing these events over time and space, the PM-based DEI approach tries to infer whether this specific pattern of events has occurred and how many times within a given time period. To evaluate the goodness of PM, the 3 Sigma of the estimated mass loss is computed under both DEI approaches as function of the number of input batches processed. Simulation results are discussed.

  13. High-resolution microcalorimeter detectors as a tool in the future of nuclear safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Hoteling, Nathan J; Hoover, Andrew S

    2010-01-01

    New measurements are presented from the LANL-NIST microcalorimeter array for two standard plutonium sources. The results demonstrate substantially smaller error bars obtained from the spectral analysis program FRAM. Some areas of improvement to the analysis technique have been identified, indicating that the micro calorimeter results can be improved upon. These results support the viability of a device for performing real nuclear safeguards measurements in the near future. The challenge of providing reliably accurate and precise data is a critical component of any safeguards initiative. In the realm of nuclear safeguards, this is an especially daunting task since inaccurate and/or imprecise data could have very serious international consequences. As such, there is a constant drive within the community to establish better measurement and analysis techniques in order to further reduce the associated errors and uncertainties. Even with todays state of the art equipment, measurement uncertainties can extend to several significant quantities worth of material over a relatively modest period of time. Furthermore, there is a strong desire for improved nondestructive analysis techniques in order to reduce both the cost, turnover rate, and inconvenience of destructive analyses. One promising new technology that may help to realize these goals is that of gamma-ray microcalorimeter detectors. The hallmark quality of this new technique is the ability to achieve energy resolution nearly an order of magnitude better than typical planar high-purity germanium (HPGe) detectors. Such an improvement may help reduce uncertainties associated with, for instance, plutonium isotopics or uranium enrichment measurements. This may, in turn, help to reduce uncertainties in total plutonium and/or uranium content in a given sample without the need for destructive analysis. In this paper, we will describe this new detector technology as well as some recent measurements carried out with the LANL

  14. United States Program for Technical assistance to IAEA Standards. Concept Paper: Knowledge Acquisition, Skills training for enhanced IAEA safeguards inspections

    SciTech Connect

    Morris, F.A.; Toquam, J.L.

    1993-11-01

    This concept paper explores the potential contribution of ``Knowledge Acquisition Skills`` in enhancing the effectiveness of international safeguards inspections by the International Atomic energy Agency (IAEA, or Agency) and identifies types of training that could be provided to develop or improve such skills. For purposes of this concept paper, Knowledge Acquisition Skills are defined broadly to include all appropriate techniques that IAEA safeguards inspectors can use to acquire and analyze information relevant to the performance of successful safeguards inspections. These techniques include a range of cognitive, analytic, judgmental, interpersonal, and communications skills that have the potential to help IAEA safeguards inspectors function more effectively.

  15. The Coming Nuclear Renaissance for Next Generation Safeguards Specialists--Maximizing Potential and Minimizing the Risks

    SciTech Connect

    Eipeldauer, Mary D

    2009-01-01

    This document is intended to provide an overview of the workshop entitled 'The Coming Nuclear Renaissance for the Next Generation Safeguards Experts-Maximizing Benefits While Minimizing Proliferation Risks', conducted at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) in partnership with the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) and the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL). This document presents workshop objectives; lists the numerous participant universities and individuals, the nuclear nonproliferation lecture topics covered, and the facilities tours taken as part of the workshop; and discusses the university partnership sessions and proposed areas for collaboration between the universities and ORNL for 2009. Appendix A contains the agenda for the workshop; Appendix B lists the workshop attendees and presenters with contact information; Appendix C contains graphics of the evaluation form results and survey areas; and Appendix D summarizes the responses to the workshop evaluation form. The workshop was an opportunity for ORNL, Y-12, and SRNL staff with more than 30 years combined experience in nuclear nonproliferation to provide a comprehensive overview of their expertise for the university professors and their students. The overall goal of the workshop was to emphasize nonproliferation aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle and to identify specific areas where the universities and experts from operations and national laboratories could collaborate.

  16. Uncertainty Quantification for Nuclear Safeguards and Non-Destructive Assay - Fact Sheet

    SciTech Connect

    Croft, Stephen; Nicholson, Andrew D

    2016-04-01

    UQ is the scientific art of generating confidence statements. Without defensible UQ physical measurements and calculations have no meaning. The UQ team performed a series of case studies with the following results: minimum detectable activity of a Tomographic Gamma-Ray Scanning system was determined using the Currie formalism. Bootstrapping method was used to generate fluorescence yield parameters and uncertainties. For Hybrid K-Edge Densitometry (HKED) measurements, these parameters can be used to predict the concentration of plutonium and quantify uncertainty in HKED models for nuclear safeguards measurements. Detection efficiency was determined for a coincidence counter using covariance data. The use of covariance information drastically reduced the total uncertainty in the average detection efficiency.

  17. Advanced Safeguards Approaches for New Reprocessing Facilities

    SciTech Connect

    Durst, Philip C.; Therios, Ike; Bean, Robert; Dougan, A.; Boyer, Brian; Wallace, Richard; Ehinger, Michael H.; Kovacic, Don N.; Tolk, K.

    2007-06-24

    U.S. efforts to promote the international expansion of nuclear energy through the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) will result in a dramatic expansion of nuclear fuel cycle facilities in the United States. New demonstration facilities, such as the Advanced Fuel Cycle Facility (AFCF), the Advanced Burner Reactor (ABR), and the Consolidated Fuel Treatment Center (CFTC) will use advanced nuclear and chemical process technologies that must incorporate increased proliferation resistance to enhance nuclear safeguards. The ASA-100 Project, “Advanced Safeguards Approaches for New Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities,” commissioned by the NA-243 Office of NNSA, has been tasked with reviewing and developing advanced safeguards approaches for these demonstration facilities. Because one goal of GNEP is developing and sharing proliferation-resistant nuclear technology and services with partner nations, the safeguards approaches considered are consistent with international safeguards as currently implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This first report reviews possible safeguards approaches for the new fuel reprocessing processes to be deployed at the AFCF and CFTC facilities. Similar analyses addressing the ABR and transuranic (TRU) fuel fabrication lines at AFCF and CFTC will be presented in subsequent reports.

  18. SAFEGUARDS ENVELOPE

    SciTech Connect

    Duc Cao; Richard Metcalf

    2010-07-01

    The Safeguards Envelope is a strategy to determine a set of specific operating parameters within which nuclear facilities may operate to maximize safeguards effectiveness without sacrificing safety or plant efficiency. This paper details advanced statistical techniques that will be applied to real plant process monitoring (PM) data from the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP). In a simulation based on this data, multi-tank and multi-attribute correlations were tested against synthetic diversion scenarios. Kernel regression smoothing was used to fit a curve to the historical data, and multivariable, residual analysis and cumulative sum techniques set parameters for operating conditions. Diversion scenarios were created and tested, showing improved results when compared with a previous study utilizing only one-variable Z-testing. A brief analysis of the impact of the safeguards optimization on the rest of plant efficiency, criticality concerns, and overall requirements is presented.

  19. Technology diffusion of a different nature: Applications of nuclear safeguards technology to the chemical weapons verification regime

    SciTech Connect

    Kadner, S.P.; Reisman, A.; Turpen, E.

    1996-10-01

    The following discussion focuses on the issue of arms control implementation from the standpoint of technology and technical assistance. Not only are the procedures and techniques for safeguarding nuclear materials undergoing substantial changes, but the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) will give rise to technical difficulties unprecedented in the implementation of arms control verification. Although these regimes present new challenges, an analysis of the similarities between the nuclear and chemical weapons non-proliferation verification regimes illustrates the overlap in technological solutions. Just as cost-effective and efficient technologies can solve the problems faced by the nuclear safeguards community, these same technologies offer solutions for the CWC safeguards regime. With this in mind, experts at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), who are responsible for verification implementation, need to devise a CWC verification protocol that considers the technology already available. The functional similarity of IAEA and the OPCW, in conjunction with the technical necessities of both verification regimes, should receive attention with respect to the establishment of a technical assistance program. Lastly, the advanced status of the nuclear and chemical regime vis-a-vis the biological non-proliferation regime can inform our approach to implementation of confidence building measures for biological weapons.

  20. Building safeguards infrastructure

    SciTech Connect

    Stevens, Rebecca S; Mcclelland - Kerr, John

    2009-01-01

    Much has been written in recent years about the nuclear renaissance - the rebirth of nuclear power as a clean and safe source of electricity around the world. Those who question the nuclear renaissance often cite the risk of proliferation, accidents or an attack on a facility as concerns, all of which merit serious consideration. The integration of these three areas - sometimes referred to as 3S, for safety, security and safeguards - is essential to supporting the growth of nuclear power, and the infrastructure that supports them should be strengthened. The focus of this paper will be on the role safeguards plays in the 3S concept and how to support the development of the infrastructure necessary to support safeguards. The objective of this paper has been to provide a working definition of safeguards infrastructure, and to discuss xamples of how building safeguards infrastructure is presented in several models. The guidelines outlined in the milestones document provide a clear path for establishing both the safeguards and the related infrastructures needed to support the development of nuclear power. The model employed by the INSEP program of engaging with partner states on safeguards-related topics that are of current interest to the level of nuclear development in that state provides another way of approaching the concept of building safeguards infrastructure. The Next Generation Safeguards Initiative is yet another approach that underscored five principal areas for growth, and the United States commitment to working with partners to promote this growth both at home and abroad.

  1. State Regulatory Authority (SRA) Coordination of Safety, Security, and Safeguards of Nuclear Facilities: A Framework for Analysis

    SciTech Connect

    Mladineo, Stephen V.; Frazar, Sarah L.; Kurzrok, Andrew J.; Martikka, Elina; Hack, Tapani; Wiander, Timo

    2013-05-30

    This paper will explore the development of a framework for conducting an assessment of safety-security-safeguards integration within a State. The goal is to examine State regulatory structures to identify conflicts and gaps that hinder management of the three disciplines at nuclear facilities. Such an analysis could be performed by a State Regulatory Authority (SRA) to provide a self-assessment or as part of technical cooperation with either a newcomer State, or to a State with a fully developed SRA.

  2. Results in Developing an Engineering Degree Program in Safeguards and Security of Nuclear Materials at Moscow Engineering Physics Institute

    SciTech Connect

    Kryuchkov, Eduard F.; Geraskin, Nikolay I.; Killinger, Mark H.; Goodey, Kent O.; Butler, Gilbert W.; Duncan, Cristen L.

    2007-07-01

    The world’s first master’s degree program in nuclear safeguards and security, established at Moscow Engineering Physics Institute (MEPhI), has now graduated nine classes of students. Most of the graduates have gone on to work at government agencies, research organizations, or obtain their PhD. In order to meet the demand for safeguards and security specialists at nuclear facilities, MEPhI established a 5½ year engineering degree program that provides more hands-on training desired by facilities. In February 2004, the first students began their studies in the new discipline Nuclear Material Safeguards and Nonproliferation. This class, as well as other subsequent classes, included students who started the program in their third year of studies, as the first 2½ years consists of general engineering curriculum. Fourteen students made up the first graduating class, receiving their engineering degrees in February 2007. The topics addressed in this paper include specific features of the program caused by peculiarities of Russian education legislation and government quality control of academic education. This paper summarizes the main joint actions undertaken by MEPhI and the US National Laboratories in conjunction with the U.S. Department of Energy, to develop the engineering degree program. Also discussed are the program’s specific training requirements, student internships, and job placement. The paper concludes with recommendations from a recent international seminar on nonproliferation education and training.

  3. Modeling of UF{sub 6} enrichment with gas centrifuges for nuclear safeguards activities

    SciTech Connect

    Mercurio, G.; Peerani, P.; Richir, P.; Janssens, W.; Eklund, G.

    2012-09-26

    The physical modeling of uranium isotopes ({sup 235}U, {sup 238}U) separation process by centrifugation of is a key aspect for predicting the nuclear fuel enrichment plant performances under surveillance by the Nuclear Safeguards Authorities. In this paper are illustrated some aspects of the modeling of fast centrifuges for UF{sub 6} gas enrichment and of a typical cascade enrichment plant with the Theoretical Centrifuge and Cascade Simulator (TCCS). The background theory for reproducing the flow field characteristics of a centrifuge is derived from the work of Cohen where the separation parameters are calculated using the solution of a differential enrichment equation. In our case we chose to solve the hydrodynamic equations for the motion of a compressible fluid in a centrifugal field using the Berman - Olander vertical velocity radial distribution and the solution was obtained using the Matlab software tool. The importance of a correct estimation of the centrifuge separation parameters at different flow regimes, lies in the possibility to estimate in a reliable way the U enrichment plant performances, once the separation external parameters are set (feed flow rate and feed, product and tails assays). Using the separation parameters of a single centrifuge allow to determine the performances of an entire cascade and, for this purpose; the software Simulink was used. The outputs of the calculation are the concentrations (assays) and the flow rates of the enriched (product) and depleted (tails) gas mixture. These models represent a valid additional tool, in order to verify the compliance of the U enrichment plant operator declarations with the 'on site' inspectors' measurements.

  4. The Nuclear Energy Advanced Modeling and Simulation Safeguards and Separations Reprocessing Plant Toolkit

    SciTech Connect

    McCaskey, Alex; Billings, Jay Jay; de Almeida, Valmor F

    2011-08-01

    This report details the progress made in the development of the Reprocessing Plant Toolkit (RPTk) for the DOE Nuclear Energy Advanced Modeling and Simulation (NEAMS) program. RPTk is an ongoing development effort intended to provide users with an extensible, integrated, and scalable software framework for the modeling and simulation of spent nuclear fuel reprocessing plants by enabling the insertion and coupling of user-developed physicochemical modules of variable fidelity. The NEAMS Safeguards and Separations IPSC (SafeSeps) and the Enabling Computational Technologies (ECT) supporting program element have partnered to release an initial version of the RPTk with a focus on software usability and utility. RPTk implements a data flow architecture that is the source of the system's extensibility and scalability. Data flows through physicochemical modules sequentially, with each module importing data, evolving it, and exporting the updated data to the next downstream module. This is accomplished through various architectural abstractions designed to give RPTk true plug-and-play capabilities. A simple application of this architecture, as well as RPTk data flow and evolution, is demonstrated in Section 6 with an application consisting of two coupled physicochemical modules. The remaining sections describe this ongoing work in full, from system vision and design inception to full implementation. Section 3 describes the relevant software development processes used by the RPTk development team. These processes allow the team to manage system complexity and ensure stakeholder satisfaction. This section also details the work done on the RPTk ``black box'' and ``white box'' models, with a special focus on the separation of concerns between the RPTk user interface and application runtime. Section 4 and 5 discuss that application runtime component in more detail, and describe the dependencies, behavior, and rigorous testing of its constituent components.

  5. Enhancing professionalism at GPU Nuclear

    SciTech Connect

    Coe, R.P. )

    1992-01-01

    Late in 1988, GPU Nuclear embarked on a major program aimed at enhancing professionalism at its Oyster Creek and Three Mile Island nuclear generating stations. The program was also to include its corporate headquarters in Parsippany, New Jersey. The overall program was to take several directions, including on-site degree programs, a sabbatical leave-type program for personnel to finish college degrees, advanced technical training for licensed staff, career progression for senior reactor operators, and expanded teamwork and leadership training for control room crew. The largest portion of this initiative was the development and delivery of professionalism training to the nearly 2,000 people at both nuclear generating sites.

  6. Self-Reliability and Motivation in a Nuclear Security Culture Enhancement Program

    SciTech Connect

    Rogers,E.; deBoer,G.; Crawford, C.; De Castro, K.; Landers, J.

    2009-10-19

    The threat of nuclear terrorism has become a global concern. Many countries continue to make efforts to strengthen nuclear security by enhancing systems of nuclear material protection, control, and accounting (MPC&A). Though MPC&A systems can significantly upgrade nuclear security, they do not eliminate the "human factor." Gen. Eugene Habiger, a former "Assistant Secretary for Safeguards and Security" at the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) nuclear-weapons complex and a former commander of U.S. strategic nuclear forces, has observed that "good security is 20% equipment and 80% people." Although eliminating the "human factor" is not possible, accounting for and mitigating the risk of the insider threat is an essential element in establishing an effective nuclear security culture. This paper will consider the organizational role in mitigating the risk associated with the malicious insider through monitoring and enhancing human reliability and motivation as well as enhancing the nuclear security culture.

  7. Strengthening regional safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Palhares, L.; Almeida, G.; Mafra, O.

    1996-08-01

    Nuclear cooperation between Argentina and Brazil has been growing since the early 1980`s and as it grew, so did cooperation with the US Department of Energy (DOE). The Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) was formed in December 1991 to operate the Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC). In April 1994, ABACC and the DOE signed an Agreement of Cooperation in nuclear material safeguards. This cooperation has included training safeguards inspectors, exchanging nuclear material measurement and containment and surveillance technology, characterizing reference materials, and studying enrichment plant safeguards. The goal of the collaboration is to exchange technology, evaluate new technology in Latin American nuclear facilities, and strengthen regional safeguards. This paper describes the history of the cooperation, its recent activities, and future projects. The cooperation is strongly supported by all three governments: the Republics of Argentina and Brazil and the United States.

  8. Spectroscopic methods of process monitoring for safeguards of used nuclear fuel separations

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Warburton, Jamie Lee

    To support the demonstration of a more proliferation-resistant nuclear fuel processing plant, techniques and instrumentation to allow the real-time, online determination of special nuclear material concentrations in-process must be developed. An ideal materials accountability technique for proliferation resistance should provide nondestructive, realtime, on-line information of metal and ligand concentrations in separations streams without perturbing the process. UV-Visible spectroscopy can be adapted for this precise purpose in solvent extraction-based separations. The primary goal of this project is to understand fundamental URanium EXtraction (UREX) and Plutonium-URanium EXtraction (PUREX) reprocessing chemistry and corresponding UV-Visible spectroscopy for application in process monitoring for safeguards. By evaluating the impact of process conditions, such as acid concentration, metal concentration and flow rate, on the sensitivity of the UV-Visible detection system, the process-monitoring concept is developed from an advanced application of fundamental spectroscopy. Systematic benchtop-scale studies investigated the system relevant to UREX or PUREX type reprocessing systems, encompassing 0.01-1.26 M U and 0.01-8 M HNO3. A laboratory-scale TRansUranic Extraction (TRUEX) demonstration was performed and used both to analyze for potential online monitoring opportunities in the TRUEX process, and to provide the foundation for building and demonstrating a laboratory-scale UREX demonstration. The secondary goal of the project is to simulate a diversion scenario in UREX and successfully detect changes in metal concentration and solution chemistry in a counter current contactor system with a UV-Visible spectroscopic process monitor. UREX uses the same basic solvent extraction flowsheet as PUREX, but has a lower acid concentration throughout and adds acetohydroxamic acid (AHA) as a complexant/reductant to the feed solution to prevent the extraction of Pu. By examining

  9. The multi-isotope process monitor: Non-destructive, near-real-time nuclear safeguards monitoring at a reprocessing facility

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Orton, Christopher Robert

    The IAEA will require advanced technologies to effectively safeguard nuclear material at envisioned large scale nuclear reprocessing plants. This dissertation describes results from simulations and experiments designed to test the Multi-Isotope Process (MIP) Monitor, a novel safeguards approach for process monitoring in reprocessing plants. The MIP Monitor combines the detection of intrinsic gamma ray signatures emitted from process solutions with multivariate analysis to detect off-normal conditions in process streams, nondestructively and in near-real time (NRT). Three different models were used to predict spent nuclear fuel composition, estimate chemical distribution during separation, and simulate spectra from a variety of gamma detectors in product and raffinate streams for processed fuel. This was done for fuel with various irradiation histories and under a variety of plant operating conditions. Experiments were performed to validate the results from the model. Three segments of commercial spent nuclear fuel with variations in burnup and cooling time were dissolved and subjected to a batch PUREX method to separate the uranium and plutonium from fission and activation products. Gamma spectra were recorded by high purity germanium (HPGe) and cadmium zinc telluride (CZT) detectors. Hierarchal Cluster Analysis (HCA) and Principal Component Analysis (PCA) were applied to spectra from both model and experiment to investigate spectral variations as a function of acid concentration, burnup level and cooling time. Partial Least Squares was utilized to extract quantitative information about process variables, such as acid concentration or burnup. The MIP Monitor was found to be sensitive to the induced variations of the process and was capable of extracting quantitative process information from the analyzed spectra.

  10. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Updated ’Safeguards’ and Net Assessments

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2009-06-03

    Appendix B. Recommendations by General John Shalikashvili (USA, ret.), 2001...................... 25 Appendix C. Letter and Memorandum from Senators Kyl...August 1963 (Washington: GPO, 1963). Testimony of General Maxwell Taylor, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 15, 1963, pp. 272-273...Safeguards were of critical importance to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Henry Shelton, U.S. Army, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified

  11. Recover: A Potentially Useful Technology for Nuclear Safeguards, but Greater International Commitment is Needed.

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1983-01-25

    dated November 29, 1982 from the Department of State 50 ABEREVIATIONS ACDA Arms Control and Disarmament Agency CANDU Canadian Deuterium Reactor C/S...oxide fuel fabrication. Although IAEA’s safeguards system depends primarily on mate- rial accountancy and on-site inspections , IAIA now complements these...percent--18 CANDUs and as many as four fast critical assemblies--were of types at which Brookhaven found RECOVER to be 8 cost--effective. 1/ According

  12. Safeguards Options for Natural Uranium Conversion Facilities ? A Collaborative Effort between the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the National Nuclear Energy Commission of Brazil (CNEN)

    SciTech Connect

    Raffo-Caiado, Ana Claudia; Begovich, John M; Ferrada, Juan J

    2008-01-01

    In 2005, the National Nuclear Energy Commission of Brazil (CNEN) and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) agreed on a collaborative effort to evaluate measures that can strengthen the effectiveness of international safeguards at a natural uranium conversion plant (NUCP). The work was performed by DOE's Oak Ridge National Laboratory and CNEN. A generic model of an NUCP was developed and typical processing steps were defined. The study, completed in early 2007, identified potential safeguards measures and evaluated their effectiveness and impacts on operations. In addition, advanced instrumentation and techniques for verification purposes were identified and investigated. The scope of the work was framed by the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) 2003 revised policy concerning the starting point of safeguards at uranium conversion facilities. Before this policy, only the final products of the uranium conversion plant were considered to be of composition and purity suitable for use in the nuclear fuel cycle and, therefore, subject to AEA safeguards control. DOE and CNEN have explored options for implementing the IAEA policy, although Brazil understands that the new policy established by the IAEA is beyond the framework of the Quadripartite Agreement of which it is one of the parties, together with Argentina, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, and the IAEA. This paper highlights the findings of this joint collaborative effort and identifies technical measures to strengthen international safeguards in NUCPs.

  13. Supplemental Report on Nuclear Safeguards Considerations for the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR)

    SciTech Connect

    Moses, David Lewis; Ehinger, Michael H

    2010-05-01

    Recent reports by Department of Energy National Laboratories have discussed safeguards considerations for the low enriched uranium (LEU) fueled Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR) and the need for bulk accountancy of the plutonium in used fuel. These reports fail to account effectively for the degree of plutonium dilution in the graphitized-carbon pebbles that is sufficient to meet the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) 'provisional' guidelines for termination of safeguards on 'measured discards.' The thrust of this finding is not to terminate safeguards but to limit the need for specific accountancy of plutonium in stored used fuel. While the residual uranium in the used fuel may not be judged sufficiently diluted to meet the IAEA provisional guidelines for termination of safeguards, the estimated quantities of {sup 232}U and {sup 236}U in the used fuel at the target burn-up of {approx}91 GWD/MT exceed specification limits for reprocessed uranium (ASTM C787) and will require extensive blending with either natural uranium or uranium enrichment tails to dilute the {sup 236}U content to fall within specification thus making the PBMR used fuel less desirable for commercial reprocessing and reuse than that from light water reactors. Also the PBMR specific activity of reprocessed uranium isotopic mixture and its A{sub 2} values for effective dose limit if released in a dispersible form during a transportation accident are more limiting than the equivalent values for light water reactor spent fuel at 55 GWD/MT without accounting for the presence of the principal carry-over fission product ({sup 99}Tc) and any possible plutonium contamination that may be present from attempted covert reprocessing. Thus, the potentially recoverable uranium from PBMR used fuel carries reactivity penalties and radiological penalties likely greater than those for reprocessed uranium from light water reactors. These factors impact the economics of reprocessing, but a more significant

  14. Emergency preparedness source term development for the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards-Licensed Facilities

    SciTech Connect

    Sutter, S.L.; Mishima, J.; Ballinger, M.Y.; Lindsey, C.G.

    1984-08-01

    In order to establish requirements for emergency preparedness plans at facilities licensed by the Office of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) needs to develop source terms (the amount of material made airborne) in accidents. These source terms are used to estimate the potential public doses from the events, which, in turn, will be used to judge whether emergency preparedness plans are needed for a particular type of facility. Pacific Northwest Laboratory is providing the NRC with source terms by developing several accident scenarios for eleven types of fuel cycle and by-product operations. Several scenarios are developed for each operation, leading to the identification of the maximum release considered for emergency preparedness planning (MREPP) scenario. The MREPP scenarios postulated were of three types: fire, tornado, and criticality. Fire was significant at oxide fuel fabrication, UF/sub 6/ production, radiopharmaceutical manufacturing, radiopharmacy, sealed source manufacturing, waste warehousing, and university research and development facilities. Tornadoes were MREPP events for uranium mills and plutonium contaminated facilities, and criticalities were significant at nonoxide fuel fabrication and nuclear research and development facilities. Techniques for adjusting the MREPP release to different facilities are also described.

  15. Ultra-high-resolution alpha spectrometry for nuclear forensics and safeguards applications

    SciTech Connect

    Bacrania, Minesh K; Croce, Mark; Bond, Evelyn; Dry, Donald; Moody, W. Allen; Lamont, Stephen; Rabin, Michael; Rim, Jung; Smith, Audrey; Beall, James; Bennett, Douglas; Kotsubo, Vincent; Horansky, Robert; Hilton, Gene; Schmidt, Daniel; Ullom, Joel; Cantor, Robin

    2010-01-01

    We will present our work on the development of ultra-high-resolution detectors for alpha particle spectrometry. These detectors, based on superconducting transition-edge sensors, offer energy resolution that is five to ten times better than conventional silicon detectors. Using these microcalorimeter detectors, the isotopic composition of mixed-actinide samples can be determined rapidly without the need for actinide separation chemistry to isolate each element, or mass spectrometry to separate isotopic signatures that can not be resolved using traditional alpha spectrometry (e.g. Pu-239/Pu-240, or Pu-238/Am-241). This paper will cover the detector and measurement system, actinide source preparation, and the quantitative isotopic analysis of a number of forensics- and safeguards-relevant radioactive sources.

  16. Considerations for Possible Light Impact of Spent Nuclear Fuel for Safeguards Measurements

    SciTech Connect

    Brian K. Castle; Kelly D. Ellis

    2012-09-01

    This effort is designed to be a preliminary study to determine the appropriateness of lightly contacting SNF with zirconium-based cladding, in wet storage, for the purpose of taking safeguards measurements. Contact will likely consist of an initial impact followed by a light tensile load on the exterior surface of the SNF cladding. In the past, concerns have been raised that contacting SNF cladding could result in a loss of long-term mechanical integrity due to crack initiation, uncontrolled crack propagation, and a mechanical exfoliation of the protective oxide layer. The mechanical integrity concerns are addressed with an analytic model that evaluates the threshold impact limits for degraded, but undamaged SNF cladding. Aqueous corrosion concerns, associated with exfoliation of the protective oxide layer, are addressed with a qualitative argument, focusing on the possible corrosion mechanisms of zirconium-based cladding.

  17. Towards a tactical nuclear weapons treaty? Is There a Role of IAEA Tools of Safeguards?

    SciTech Connect

    Saunders, Emily C.; Rowberry, Ariana N.; Fearey, Bryan L.

    2012-07-12

    In recent years, there is growing interest in formal negotiations on non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons. With the negotiations of New START, there has been much speculation that a tactical nuclear weapons treaty should be included in the follow on to New START. This paper examines the current policy environment related to tactical weapons and some of the issues surrounding the definition of tactical nuclear weapons. We then map out the steps that would need to be taken in order to begin discussions on a tactical nuclear weapons treaty. These steps will review the potential role of the IAEA in verification of a tactical nuclear weapons treaty. Specifically, does IAEA involvement in various arms control treaties serve as a useful roadmap on how to overcome some of the issues pertaining to a tactical nuclear weapons treaty?

  18. Measuring Safeguards Culture

    SciTech Connect

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2011-07-19

    As the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements a State Level Approach to its safeguards verification responsibilities, a number of countries are beginning new nuclear power programs and building new nuclear fuel cycle faculties. The State Level approach is holistic and investigatory in nature, creating a need for transparent, non-discriminatory judgments about a state's nonproliferation posture. In support of this need, the authors previously explored the value of defining and measuring a state's safeguards culture. We argued that a clear definition of safeguards culture and an accompanying set of metrics could be applied to provide an objective evaluation and demonstration of a country's nonproliferation posture. As part of this research, we outlined four high-level metrics that could be used to evaluate a state's nuclear posture. We identified general data points. This paper elaborates on those metrics, further refining the data points to generate a measurable scale of safeguards cultures. We believe that this work could advance the IAEA's goals of implementing a safeguards system that is fully information driven, while strengthening confidence in its safeguards conclusions.

  19. 10 CFR Appendix C to Part 73 - Nuclear Power Plant Safeguards Contingency Plans

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... sabotage relating to special nuclear material or nuclear facilities licensed under the Atomic Energy Act of.... Licensee's Organizational Structure for Contingency Responses—A delineation of the organization's chain of...) Fixed Sites—A description of the physical structures and their location on the site, and a...

  20. 10 CFR Appendix C to Part 73 - Nuclear Power Plant Safeguards Contingency Plans

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... sabotage relating to special nuclear material or nuclear facilities licensed under the Atomic Energy Act of.... Licensee's Organizational Structure for Contingency Responses—A delineation of the organization's chain of...) Fixed Sites—A description of the physical structures and their location on the site, and a...

  1. 10 CFR Appendix C to Part 73 - Nuclear Power Plant Safeguards Contingency Plans

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... sabotage relating to special nuclear material or nuclear facilities licensed under the Atomic Energy Act of.... Licensee's Organizational Structure for Contingency Responses—A delineation of the organization's chain of...) Fixed Sites—A description of the physical structures and their location on the site, and a...

  2. 10 CFR Appendix C to Part 73 - Nuclear Power Plant Safeguards Contingency Plans

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... sabotage relating to special nuclear material or nuclear facilities licensed under the Atomic Energy Act of.... Licensee's Organizational Structure for Contingency Responses—A delineation of the organization's chain of...) Fixed Sites—A description of the physical structures and their location on the site, and a...

  3. 10 CFR Appendix C to Part 73 - Nuclear Power Plant Safeguards Contingency Plans

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... sabotage relating to special nuclear material or nuclear facilities licensed under the Atomic Energy Act of.... Licensee's Organizational Structure for Contingency Responses—A delineation of the organization's chain of...) Fixed Sites—A description of the physical structures and their location on the site, and a...

  4. Update of the α - n Yields for Reactor Fuel Materials for the Interest of Nuclear Safeguards

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Simakov, S. P.; van den Berg, Q. Y.

    2017-01-01

    The neutron yields caused by spontaneous α-decay of actinides and subsequent (α,xn) reactions were re-evaluated for the reactor fuel materials UO2, UF6, PuO2 and PuF4. For this purpose, the most recent reference data for decay parameters, α-particle stopping powers and (α,xn) cross sections were collected, analysed and used in calculations. The input data and elaborated code were validated against available thick target neutron yields in pure and compound materials measured at accelerators or with radioactive sources. This paper provides the specific neutron yields and their uncertainties resultant from α-decay of actinides 241Am, 249Bk, 252Cf, 242,244Cm, 237Np, 238-242Pu, 232Th and 232-236,238U in oxide and fluoride compounds. The obtained results are an update of previous reference tables issued by the Los Alamos National Laboratory in 1991 which were used for the safeguarding of radioactive materials by passive non-destructive techniques. The comparison of the updated values with previous ones shows an agreement within one estimated uncertainty (≈ 10%) for oxides, and deviations of up to 50% for fluorides.

  5. Safeguards by Design Challenge

    SciTech Connect

    Alwin, Jennifer Louise

    2016-09-13

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines Safeguards as a system of inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials as part of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. IAEA oversees safeguards worldwide. Safeguards by Design (SBD) involves incorporation of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation during the design phase of a facility, rather that after the fact. Design challenge goals are the following: Design a system of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation for inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials. Cost should be minimized to work with the IAEA’s limited budget. Dose to workers should always be as low are reasonably achievable (ALARA). Time is of the essence in operating facilities and flow of material should not be interrupted significantly. Proprietary process information in facilities may need to be protected, thus the amount of information obtained by inspectors should be the minimum required to achieve the measurement goal. Then three different design challenges are detailed: Plutonium Waste Item Measurement System, Marine-based Modular Reactor, and Floating Nuclear Power Plant (FNPP).

  6. Enhancing laboratory activities in nuclear medicine education.

    PubMed

    Grantham, Vesper; Martin, Chris; Schmitz, Casey

    2009-12-01

    Hands-on or active learning is important in nuclear medicine education. As more curricula start to require greater standards and as distance education expands, the effective use of laboratories in nuclear medicine education remains important in physics, instrumentation, and imaging but is often overlooked or underutilized. Laboratory exercises are a unique opportunity for nuclear medicine educators to facilitate students' critical thinking and problem-solving skills in a manner that often cannot occur in lectures or during online education. Given the lack of current laboratory tools and publications, there exists a requirement for nuclear medicine educators to develop, enhance, and monitor educational tools for laboratory exercises. Expanding technologies, variations in imaging and measurement systems, and the need to ensure that the taught technology is relevant to nuclear medicine students are issues faced by nuclear medicine educators. This article, based on principles of instructional design, focuses on the components and development of effective and enhanced nuclear medicine laboratories in our current educational environment.

  7. Safeguards effectiveness evaluations in safeguards planning

    SciTech Connect

    Al-Ayat, R.A.

    1987-12-03

    This paper describes analytic tools we developed to quantify the effectiveness of safeguards against theft of special nuclear material by insiders. These tools help identify vulnerabilities in existing safeguards, suggest potential improvements, and help assess the benefits of these upgrades prior to implementation. Alone, these tools are not sufficient for safeguards planning, since the cost of implementing all suggested upgrades almost always exceeds the available resources. This paper describes another tool we developed to allow comparsion of benefits of various upgrades to identify those upgrade packages that achieve the greatest improvement in protection for a given cost and to provide a priority ranking among cost-effective packages, thereby helping decision-makers select the upgrades to implement and highlight the mount of residual risk. 5 refs., 3 figs.

  8. Integration of Nuclear Safeguards Infrastructure Development with UNSCR 1540 Implementation - Context and Challenges

    SciTech Connect

    Dreicer, M; Essner, J

    2008-11-03

    On 28 April 2004, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1540 (2004), obliging States, inter alia, to refrain from supporting by any means non-State actors from developing, acquiring, manufacturing, possessing, transporting, transferring or using nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their delivery systems. It imposes binding obligations on all States to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and their means of delivery, including by establishing appropriate controls over related materials. This mandate was extended an additional two years with the adoption of Resolution 1673 (2006) and an additional three years with the adoption of Resolution 1810 (2008). UNSCR 1540 is a key nonproliferation and counterterrorism tool that needs to be implemented well. Its obligations are a core part of nuclear infrastructure development.

  9. 10 CFR 1.42 - Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... responsible for regulation and licensing of recycling technologies intended to reduce the amount of waste to... an appropriate regulatory framework, in recycling during development, demonstration, and deployment of new advanced recycling technologies that recycle nuclear fuel in a manner which does not...

  10. 10 CFR 1.42 - Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... responsible for regulation and licensing of recycling technologies intended to reduce the amount of waste to... an appropriate regulatory framework, in recycling during development, demonstration, and deployment of new advanced recycling technologies that recycle nuclear fuel in a manner which does not...

  11. 10 CFR 1.42 - Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... responsible for regulation and licensing of recycling technologies intended to reduce the amount of waste to... an appropriate regulatory framework, in recycling during development, demonstration, and deployment of new advanced recycling technologies that recycle nuclear fuel in a manner which does not...

  12. Application of Inductively Coupled Plasma Mass Spectrometry to the determination of uranium isotope ratios in individual particles for nuclear safeguards

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Zhang, Xiao Zhi; Esaka, Fumitaka; Esaka, Konomi T.; Magara, Masaaki; Sakurai, Satoshi; Usuda, Shigekazu; Watanabe, Kazuo

    2007-10-01

    The capability of inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (ICP-MS) for the determination of uranium isotope ratios in individual particles was determined. For this purpose, we developed an experimental procedure including single particle transfer with a manipulator, chemical dissolution and isotope ratio analysis, and applied to the analysis of individual uranium particles in certified reference materials (NBL CRM U050 and U350). As the result, the 235U/ 238U isotope ratio for the particle with the diameter between 0.5 and 3.9 μm was successfully determined with the deviation from the certified ratio within 1.8%. The relative standard deviation (R.S.D.) of the 235U/ 238U isotope ratio was within 4.2%. Although the analysis of 234U/ 238U and 236U/ 238U isotope ratios gave the results with inferior precision, the R.S.D. within 20% was possible for the measurement of the particle with the diameter more than 2.1 μm. The developed procedure was successfully applied to the analysis of a simulated environmental sample prepared from a mixture of indoor dust (NIST SRM 2583) and uranium particles (NBL CRM U050, U350 and U950a). From the results, the proposed procedure was found to be an alternative analytical tool for nuclear safeguards.

  13. Research and Development for Safeguards.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Inman, Guy M.

    This report summarizes the results of unclassified research and development contracts in the field of peaceful use safeguards regarding the use of nuclear material. These summaries indicate there is really no sharp line of demarcation between research for safeguards and research for many other purposes. It includes areas of research effort and…

  14. Measured 19F(α,n) with VANDLE for Nuclear Safeguards

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Peters, William; Clement, R. C. C.; Smith, M. S.; Pain, S.; Febbraro, M.; Pittman, S.; Thomspon, S.; Grinder, M.; Cizewski, J. A.; Reingold, C.; Manning, B.; Burcher, S.; Bardayan, D. W.; Tan, W.-P.; Stech, E.; Smith, M. K.; Avetisyan, R.; Gyurjinyan, A.; Lowe, M.; Ilyushkin, S.; Grzywacz, R.; Madurga, M.; Paulauskas, S. V.; Taylor, S. Z.; Smith, K.

    2015-10-01

    One of the most promising non-destructive assay (NDA) methods to monitor UF6 canisters consists of measuring gross neutron rates induced by uranium-decay alpha particles reacting with the fluorine and emitting a neutron. This method currently lacks reliable nuclear data on the 19F(α,n) reaction cross section to determine an accurate neutron yield rate for a given sample of UF6. We have measured the cross section and coincident neutron spectrum for the alpha-decay energy range using the VANDLE system. This experiment had two parts: first at Notre Dame with a LaF3 target and and a pulsed alpha-particle beam, and second at ORNL with a windowless He-gas target and a 19F beam. The motivation for this measurement and cross section results will be presented. This work is funded in part by the DOE Office of Science, the National Nuclear Security Administration SSAA and the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation R&D, and the NSF.

  15. Measurement of the 19F(α,n)22Na Cross Section for Nuclear Safeguards Science

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Lowe, Marcus; Smith, M. S.; Pain, S.; Febbraro, M.; Pittman, S.; Chipps, K. A.; Thompson, S. J.; Grinder, M.; Grzywacz, R.; Smith, K.; Thornsberry, C.; Thompson, P.; Peters, W. A.; Waddell, D.; Blanchard, R.; Carls, A.; Shadrick, S.; Engelhardt, A.; Hertz-Kintish, D.; Allen, N.; Sims, H.

    2015-10-01

    Enriched uranium is commonly stored in fluoride matrices such as UF6. Alpha decays of uranium in UF6 will create neutrons via the 19F(α,n)22Na reaction. An improved cross section for this reaction will enable improved nondestructive assays of uranium content in storage cylinders at material enrichment facilities. To determine this reaction cross section, we have performed experiments using both forward and inverse kinematic techniques at the University of Notre Dame (forward) and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (inverse). Both experiments utilized the Versatile Array of Neutron Detectors at Low Energy (VANDLE) for neutron detection. The ORNL experiment also used a new ionization chamber for 22Na particle identification. Gating on the 22Na nuclei detected drastically reduced the background counts in the neutron time-of-flight spectra. The latest analysis and results will be presented for 19F beam energies ranging from 20-37 MeV. This work is funded in part by the DOE Office of Nuclear Physics, the National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation R&D, and the NSF.

  16. A potential alternative/complement to the traditional thermal neutron based counting in Nuclear Safeguards and Security

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Chernikova, Dina; Naeem, Syed F.; Axell, Kåre; Trnjanin, Nermin; Nordlund, Anders

    2016-02-01

    A new concept for thermal neutron based correlation and multiplicity measurements is proposed in this paper. The main idea of the concept consists of using 2.223 MeV gammas (or 1.201 MeV, DE) originating in the 1 H (n , γ) 2 D-reaction instead of using traditional thermal neutron counting. Results of investigations presented in this paper indicate that gammas from thermal neutron capture reactions preserve the information about the correlation characteristics of thermal (fast) neutrons in the same time scale. Therefore, instead of thermal neutron detectors (or as a complement) one may use traditional and inexpensive gamma detectors, such as NaI, BGO, CdZnTe or any other gamma detector. In this work we used D8×8 cm2 NaI scintillator to test the concept. Thus, the new approach helps to address the problem of replacement of 3He-counters and problems related to the specific measurements of spent nuclear fuel directly in the spent fuel pool. It has a particular importance for Nuclear Safeguards and Security. Overall, this work represents the proof of concept study and reports on the experimental and numerical evidence that thermal neutron capture gammas may be used in the context of correlation and multiplicity measurements. Investigations were performed using a 252Cf-correlated neutron source and an 241Am-Be-random neutron source. The related idea of the Gamma Differential Die-Away approach is investigated numerically in this paper as well, and will be tested experimentally in future work.

  17. Development of uranium reference particles for nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation control

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Kips, Ruth

    In the oversight of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and as part of the Additional Protocol of the International Atomic Energy Agency, environmental sampling has become an important tool for the detection of non-declared nuclear activities. One extensively developed technique in environmental sampling (ES) makes use of pieces of cotton cloth called swipes to wipe surfaces in and around a nuclear facility. The dust collected on these swipes typically contains micrometer-sized uranium particles with an isotopic composition characteristic for the processes at the inspected facility. Since its implementation in the 1990s, ES has proven to be a very effective tool in the detection of clandestine activities owing to a number of highly sensitive and selective techniques, including secondary ion mass spectrometry and thermal ionisation mass spectrometry. However, considering the potential consequences of the analyses, these measurements need to be subjected to a rigorous quality management system. In a continuous effort to improve the accuracy and detection efficiency of the uranium isotope ratio measurements, uranium particle reference materials are being developed by different research groups. It was concluded however, that the existing methods for the production of particulate reference materials generally do not reproduce the particles recovered from swipe samples. For this reason, we developed the aerosol deposition chamber at the Institute for Reference Materials and Measurements for the production of reference uranium particles that are representative of the particles collected at enrichment facilities. This method is based on the controlled hydrolysis of milligram amounts of uranium hexafluoride with a certified uranium isotopic composition. After optimization of the experimental set-up, the particles produced by the aerosol deposition chamber were characterized by scanning electron microscopy, transmission electron microscopy, micro-Raman spectroscopy and

  18. Safeguards Culture: Lessons Learned

    SciTech Connect

    Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2009-05-27

    Abstract: At the 2005 INMM/ESARDA Workshop in Santa Fe, New Mexico, I presented a paper entitled “Changing the Safeguards Culture: Broader Perspectives and Challenges.” That paper described a set of theoretical models that can be used as a basis for evaluating changes to safeguards culture. This paper builds on that theoretical discussion to address practical methods for influencing culture. It takes lessons from methods used to influence change in safety culture and security culture, and examines the applicability of these lessons to changing safeguards culture. Paper: At the 2005 INMM/ESARDA Workshop on “Changing the Safeguards Culture: Broader Perspectives and Challenges,” in Santa Fe, New Mexico, I presented a paper entitled “Changing the Safeguards Culture: Broader Perspectives and Challenges.” That paper, coauthored by Karyn R. Durbin and Andrew Van Duzer, described a set of theoretical models that can be used as a basis for evaluating changes to safeguards culture. This paper updates that theoretical discussion, and seeks to address practical methods for influencing culture. It takes lessons from methods used to influence change in safety culture and security culture, and examines the applicability of these lessons to changing safeguards culture. Implicit in this discussion is an understanding that improving a culture is not an end in itself, but is one method of improving the underlying discipline, that is safety, security, or safeguards. Culture can be defined as a way of life, or general customs and beliefs of a particular group of people at a particular time. There are internationally accepted definitions of safety culture and nuclear security culture. As yet, there is no official agreed upon definition of safeguards culture. At the end of the paper I will propose my definition. At the Santa Fe Workshop the summary by the Co-Chairs of Working Group 1, “The Further Evolution of Safeguards,” noted: “It is clear that ‘safeguards culture

  19. Self-Reliability and Motivation in a Nuclear Security Culture Enhancement Program

    SciTech Connect

    Crawford, Cary E.; de Boer, Gloria; De Castro, Kara; Landers, John; Rogers, Erin

    2010-10-01

    The threat of nuclear terrorism has become a global concern. Many countries continue to make efforts to strengthen nuclear security by enhancing systems of nuclear material protection, control, and accounting (MPC&A). Though MPC&A systems can significantly upgrade nuclear security, they do not eliminate the “human factor.” Gen. Eugene Habiger, a former “Assistant Secretary for Safeguards and Security” at the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) nuclear-weapons complex and a former commander of U.S. strategic nuclear forces, has observed that “good security is 20% equipment and 80% people.”1 Although eliminating the “human factor” is not possible, accounting for and mitigating the risk of the insider threat is an essential element in establishing an effective nuclear security culture. This paper will consider the organizational role in mitigating the risk associated with the malicious insider through monitoring and enhancing human reliability and motivation as well as enhancing the nuclear security culture.

  20. 3 CFR - Certifications Pursuant to Section 104 of the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval...

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act Regarding the Safeguards Agreement Between India and the International Atomic Energy Agency Presidential Documents Other Presidential... of the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement...

  1. Preliminary Study of the Efficacy of Using Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence with Quasi-Monoenergetic Gamma-Ray Sources for Nuclear Safeguards Assay

    SciTech Connect

    Johnson, M S; McNabb, D P; Hall, J M; Gonzalez, J J

    2011-02-17

    We have studied the efficacy of using nuclear resonance fluorescence (NRF)-based techniques to assay spent nuclear fuel for Pu content using quasi-monoenergetic sources. We have developed two techniques to precisely determine the Pu content in a fuel rod/pin. One of our approaches is virtually free of systematic uncertainties. Using analytical models, we have determined the amount of time required to measure the Pu content in spent nuclear fuel rods and spent fuel assemblies to within 1% precision. We note that Pu content can be determined in a fuel assembly about as fast as in a single fuel pin. The performance of NRF-based assay techniques with improved photon sources, which are currently under development, will also estimated. For follow-on research we propose to: (1) Construct research prototype detection systems for both of the NRF-based assay systems proposed in this paper and measure their calibration curves; (2) Determine the systematic errors associated with both assay methods, explore ways to reduce the errors and fold the results into future performance calculations; (3) Develop an algorithm to assay a fuel assembly; (4) Perform validation measurements using a single pin and scaled assemblies; (5) Research and develop current-mode detection and/or threshold detection techniques to improve assay times; (6) Characterize the flux of newly constructed sources and fold the results into the calculations presented here to determine the feasibility of a variety of proposed sources; and (7) Collaborate with others in the safeguards community to build a prototype system and perform an NRF-based assay demonstration on spent fuel.

  2. A comparison of the additional protocols of the five nuclear weapon states and the ensuing safeguards benefits to international nonproliferation efforts

    SciTech Connect

    Uribe, Eva C; Sandoval, M Analisa; Sandoval, Marisa N; Boyer, Brian D; Leitch, Rosalyn M

    2009-01-01

    With the 6 January 2009 entry into force of the Additional Protocol by the United States of America, all five declared Nuclear Weapon States that are part of the Nonproliferation Treaty have signed, ratified, and put into force the Additional Protocol. This paper makes a comparison of the strengths and weaknesses of the five Additional Protocols in force by the five Nuclear Weapon States with respect to the benefits to international nonproliferation aims. This paper also documents the added safeguards burden to the five declared Nuclear Weapon States that these Additional Protocols put on the states with respect to access to their civilian nuclear programs and the hosting of complementary access activities as part of the Additional Protocol.

  3. Information analysis and international safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Pilat, Joseph F.; Budlong-Sylvester, K. W.; Tape, J. W.

    2004-01-01

    After the first Gulf War, it was recognized that one of the key weaknesses of the international safeguards system was that there was no systematic attempt by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to analyze all available information about States nuclear programs to determine whether these programs were consistent with nonproliferation obligations. The IAEA, as part of its effort to redesign the international safeguards system, is looking closely at the issue of information review and evaluation. The application of information analysis (IA) techniques to the international nuclear safeguards system has the potential to revolutionize the form and practice of safeguards. Assessing the possibilities of IA for the IAEA, and in particular those embodied in concepts of information-driven safeguards, requires an understanding of IA, the limits on its effectiveness and the requirements placed on such analyses in a variety of safeguards contexts. The Australian Safeguards and Nonproliferation Office (ASNO) and the United States Department of Energy (DOE) agreed in July 2002 to undertake a joint study of 'information-driven safeguards' under a long-standing cooperative arrangement. It was decided that a broad range of ideas should be considered, and that the study would not be intended to be and would not be an elaboration of either US or Australian governmental positions. This paper reports some findings of Phase 1 of this collaborative effort and offers some initial thinking on the part of the authors on the outstanding issues to be addressed in Phase 2. An effort to explore through case studies alternative strategies for utilizing IA by the IAEA that provide the same or increased confidence in safeguards conclusions while allowing safeguards resource allocation to be determined not only by the types and quantities of nuclear material and facilities in a State but also by other objective factors.

  4. The evolution of information-driven safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Budlong-sylvester, Kory W; Pilat, Joseph F

    2010-10-14

    From the adoption of the Model Additional Protocol and integrated safeguards in the 1990s, to current International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) efforts to deal with cases of noncompliance, the question of how the Agency can best utilize all the information available to it remains of great interest and increasing importance. How might the concept of 'information-driven' safeguards (IDS) evolve in the future? The ability of the Agency to identify and resolve anomalies has always been important and has emerged as a core Agency function in recent years as the IAEA has had to deal with noncompliance in Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). Future IAEA safeguards implementation should be designed with the goal of facilitating and enhancing this vital capability. In addition, the Agency should utilize all the information it possesses, including its in-house assessments and expertise, to direct its safeguards activities. At the State level, knowledge of proliferation possibilities is currently being used to guide the analytical activities of the Agency and to develop inspection plans. How far can this approach be extended? Does it apply across State boundaries? Should it dictate a larger fraction of safeguards activities? Future developments in IDS should utilize the knowledge resident within the Agency to ensure that safeguards resources flow to where they are most needed in order to address anomalies first and foremost, but also to provide greater confidence in conclusions regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear activities. The elements of such a system and related implementation issues are assessed in this paper.

  5. Proof of concept simulations of the Multi-Isotope Process monitor: An online, nondestructive, near-real-time safeguards monitor for nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Orton, Christopher R.; Fraga, Carlos G.; Christensen, Richard N.; Schwantes, Jon M.

    2011-02-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency will require the development of advanced technologies to effectively safeguard nuclear material at increasingly large-scale nuclear recycling facilities. Ideally, the envisioned technologies would be capable of nondestructive, near-real-time, autonomous process monitoring. This paper describes recent results from model simulations designed to test the Multi-Isotope Process (MIP) monitor, a novel addition to a safeguards system for reprocessing facilities. The MIP monitor combines the detection of intrinsic gamma ray signatures emitted from process solutions with multivariate analysis to detect off-normal conditions in process streams nondestructively and in near-real-time. Three computer models including ORIGEN-ARP, AMUSE, and SYNTH were used in series to predict spent nuclear fuel composition, estimate element partitioning during separation, and simulate spectra from product and raffinate streams using a variety of gamma detectors, respectively. Simulations were generated for fuel with various irradiation histories and under a variety of plant operating conditions. Principal component analysis was applied to the simulated gamma spectra to investigate pattern variations as a function of acid concentration, burnup, and cooling time. Hierarchical cluster analysis and partial least squares (PLS) were also used in the analysis. The MIP monitor was found to be sensitive to induced variations of several operating parameters including distinguishing ±2.5% variation from normal process acid concentrations. The ability of PLS to predict burnup levels from simulated spectra was also demonstrated to be within 3.5% of measured values.

  6. A Mock UF6 Feed and Withdrawal System for Testing Safeguards Monitoring Systems and Strategies Intended for Nuclear Fuel Enrichment and Processing Plants

    SciTech Connect

    Krichinsky, Alan M; Bates, Bruce E; Chesser, Joel B; Koo, Sinsze; Whitaker, J Michael

    2009-12-01

    This report describes an engineering-scale, mock UF6 feed and withdrawal (F&W) system, its operation, and its intended uses. This system has been assembled to provide a test bed for evaluating and demonstrating new methodologies that can be used in remote, unattended, continuous monitoring of nuclear material process operations. These measures are being investigated to provide independent inspectors improved assurance that operations are being conducted within declared parameters, and to increase the overall effectiveness of safeguarding nuclear material. Testing applicable technologies on a mock F&W system, which uses water as a surrogate for UF6, enables thorough and cost-effective investigation of hardware, software, and operational strategies before their direct installation in an industrial nuclear material processing environment. Electronic scales used for continuous load-cell monitoring also are described as part of the basic mock F&W system description. Continuous monitoring components on the mock F&W system are linked to a data aggregation computer by a local network, which also is depicted. Data collection and storage systems are described only briefly in this report. The mock UF{sub 6} F&W system is economical to operate. It uses a simple process involving only a surge tank between feed tanks and product and withdrawal (or waste) tanks. The system uses water as the transfer fluid, thereby avoiding the use of hazardous UF{sub 6}. The system is not tethered to an operating industrial process involving nuclear materials, thereby allowing scenarios (e.g., material diversion) that cannot be conducted otherwise. These features facilitate conducting experiments that yield meaningful results with a minimum of expenditure and quick turnaround time. Technologies demonstrated on the engineering-scale system lead to field trials (described briefly in this report) for determining implementation issues and performance of the monitoring technologies under plant

  7. Polyatomic interferences on high precision uranium isotope ratio measurements by MC-ICP-MS: Applications to environmental sampling for nuclear safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Pollington, Anthony D.; Kinman, William S.; Hanson, Susan K.; Steiner, Robert E.

    2015-09-04

    Modern mass spectrometry and separation techniques have made measurement of major uranium isotope ratios a routine task; however accurate and precise measurement of the minor uranium isotopes remains a challenge as sample size decreases. One particular challenge is the presence of isobaric interferences and their impact on the accuracy of minor isotope 234U and 236U measurements. Furthermore, we present techniques used for routine U isotopic analysis of environmental nuclear safeguards samples and evaluate polyatomic interferences that negatively impact accuracy as well as methods to mitigate their impacts.

  8. Polyatomic interferences on high precision uranium isotope ratio measurements by MC-ICP-MS: Applications to environmental sampling for nuclear safeguards

    DOE PAGES

    Pollington, Anthony D.; Kinman, William S.; Hanson, Susan K.; ...

    2015-09-04

    Modern mass spectrometry and separation techniques have made measurement of major uranium isotope ratios a routine task; however accurate and precise measurement of the minor uranium isotopes remains a challenge as sample size decreases. One particular challenge is the presence of isobaric interferences and their impact on the accuracy of minor isotope 234U and 236U measurements. Furthermore, we present techniques used for routine U isotopic analysis of environmental nuclear safeguards samples and evaluate polyatomic interferences that negatively impact accuracy as well as methods to mitigate their impacts.

  9. Los Alamos safeguards program overview and NDA in safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Keepin, G.R.

    1988-01-01

    Over the years the Los Alamos safeguards program has developed, tested, and implemented a broad range of passive and active nondestructive analysis (NDA) instruments (based on gamma and x-ray detection and neutron counting) that are now widely employed in safeguarding nuclear materials of all forms. Here very briefly, the major categories of gamma ray and neutron based NDA techniques, give some representative examples of NDA instruments currently in use, and cite a few notable instances of state-of-the-art NDA technique development. Historical aspects and a broad overview of the safeguards program are also presented.

  10. Safeguards instrumentation: a computer-based catalog

    SciTech Connect

    Fishbone, L.G.; Keisch, B.

    1981-08-01

    The information contained in this catalog is needed to provide a data base for safeguards studies and to help establish criteria and procedures for international safeguards for nuclear materials and facilities. The catalog primarily presents information on new safeguards equipment. It also describes entire safeguards systems for certain facilities, but it does not describe the inspection procedures. Because IAEA safeguards do not include physical security, devices for physical protection (as opposed to containment and surveillance) are not included. An attempt has been made to list capital costs, annual maintenance costs, replacement costs, and useful lifetime for the equipment. For equipment which is commercially available, representative sources have been listed whenever available.

  11. Network adaptable information systems for safeguard applications

    SciTech Connect

    Rodriguez, C.; Burczyk, L.; Chare, P.; Wagner, H.

    1996-09-01

    While containment and surveillance systems designed for nuclear safeguards have greatly improved through advances in computer, sensor, and microprocessor technologies, the authors recognize the need to continue the advancement of these systems to provide more standardized solutions for safeguards applications of the future. The benefits to be gained from the use of standardized technologies are becoming evident as safeguard activities are increasing world-wide while funding of these activities is becoming more limited. The EURATOM Safeguards Directorate and Los Alamos National Laboratory are developing and testing advanced monitoring technologies coupled with the most efficient solutions for the safeguards applications of the future.

  12. Annual Report FY2013-- A Kinematically Complete, Interdisciplinary, and Co-Institutional Measurement of the 19F(α,n) Cross-section for Nuclear Safeguards Science

    SciTech Connect

    Peters, William A; Smith, Michael Scott; Clement, Ryan; Tan, Wanpeng; Stech, Ed; Cizewski, J A; Febbraro, Michael; Madurga Flores, Miguel

    2013-10-01

    The goal of this proposal is to enable neutron detection for precision Non-Destructive Assays (NDAs) of actinide-fluoride samples. Neutrons are continuously generated from a UFx matrix in a container or sample as a result of the interaction of alpha particles from uranium-decay α particles with fluorine nuclei in the matrix. Neutrons from 19F(α,n)22Na were once considered a poorly characterized background for assays of UFx samples via 238U spontaneous fission neutron detection [SMI2010B]. However, the yield of decay-α-driven neutrons is critical for 234,235U LEU and HEU assays, as it can used to determine both the total amount of uranium and the enrichment [BER2010]. This approach can be extremely valuable in a variety of safeguard applications, such as cylinder monitoring in underground uranium storage facilities, nuclear criticality safety studies, nuclear materials accounting, and other nonproliferation applications. The success of neutron-based assays critically depends on an accurate knowledge of the cross section of the (α,n) reaction that generates the neutrons. The 40% uncertainty in the 19F(α,n)22Na cross section currently limits the precision of such assays, and has been identified as a key factor in preventing accurate enrichment determinations [CRO2003]. The need for higher quality cross section data for (α,n) reactions has been a recurring conclusion in reviews of the nuclear data needs to support safeguards. The overarching goal of this project is to enable neutron detection to be used for precision Non- Destructive Assays (NDAs) of actinide-fluoride samples. This will significantly advance safeguards verification at existing declared facilities, nuclear materials accounting, process control, nuclear criticality safety monitoring, and a variety of other nonproliferation applications. To reach this goal, Idaho National Laboratory (INL), in partnership with Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), Rutgers University (RU), and the University of Notre

  13. 10 CFR 75.7 - Notification of IAEA safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Notification of IAEA safeguards. 75.7 Section 75.7 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) SAFEGUARDS ON NUCLEAR MATERIAL-IMPLEMENTATION OF US/IAEA AGREEMENT General Provisions § 75.7 Notification of IAEA safeguards. (a) The licensee must inform the...

  14. 10 CFR 75.7 - Notification of IAEA safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Notification of IAEA safeguards. 75.7 Section 75.7 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) SAFEGUARDS ON NUCLEAR MATERIAL-IMPLEMENTATION OF US/IAEA AGREEMENT General Provisions § 75.7 Notification of IAEA safeguards. (a) The licensee must inform the...

  15. 10 CFR 75.7 - Notification of IAEA safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Notification of IAEA safeguards. 75.7 Section 75.7 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) SAFEGUARDS ON NUCLEAR MATERIAL-IMPLEMENTATION OF US/IAEA AGREEMENT General Provisions § 75.7 Notification of IAEA safeguards. (a) The licensee must inform the...

  16. 10 CFR 75.7 - Notification of IAEA safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Notification of IAEA safeguards. 75.7 Section 75.7 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) SAFEGUARDS ON NUCLEAR MATERIAL-IMPLEMENTATION OF US/IAEA AGREEMENT General Provisions § 75.7 Notification of IAEA safeguards. (a) The licensee must inform the...

  17. 10 CFR 75.7 - Notification of IAEA safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Notification of IAEA safeguards. 75.7 Section 75.7 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) SAFEGUARDS ON NUCLEAR MATERIAL-IMPLEMENTATION OF US/IAEA AGREEMENT General Provisions § 75.7 Notification of IAEA safeguards. (a) The licensee must inform the...

  18. SAFEGUARDS CULTURE: WHAT IS IT AND DOES IT MATTER?

    SciTech Connect

    Mladineo, Stephen V.; Frazar, Sarah L.

    2012-11-01

    The concepts of safety and security culture are well established; however, a common understanding of safeguards culture is not internationally recognized. With the support of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) the authors have attempted a rigorous analysis of the concept of safeguards culture, with the goal of determining its value to the international safeguards community, and to provide recommendations as to whether the concept deserves further development. As part of this analysis, the authors explore the distinctions between safeguards culture, safeguards compliance, and safeguards performance. The authors also discuss synergies and differences between safeguards culture and safety/security culture.

  19. Safeguards issues in spent fuel consolidation facilities

    SciTech Connect

    Belew, W.L.; Moran, B.W.

    1991-01-01

    In the nuclear power industry, the fuel assembly is the basic unit for nuclear material accountancy. The safeguards procedures for the spent fuel assemblies, therefore, are based on an item accountancy approach. When fuel consolidation occurs in at-reactor'' or away-from-reactor'' facilities, the fuel assemblies are disassembled and cease to be the basic unit containing nuclear material. Safeguards can no longer be based on item accountancy of fuel assemblies. The spent fuel pins containing plutonium are accessible, and the possibilities for diversion of spent fuel for clandestine reprocessing to recover the plutonium are increased. Thus, identifying the potential safeguards concerns created by operation of these facilities is necessary. Potential safeguards techniques to address these concerns also must be identified so facility designs may include the equipment and systems required to provide an acceptable level of assurance that the international safeguards objectives can be met when these facilities come on-line. The objectives of this report are (1) to identify the safeguards issues associated with operation of spent fuel consolidation facilities, (2) to provide a preliminary assessment of the assessment of the safeguards vulnerabilities introduced, and (3) to identify potential safeguards approaches that could meet international safeguards requirements. The safeguards aspects of spent fuel consolidation are addressed in several recent reports and papers. 11 refs., 3 figs., 3 tabs.

  20. Documentation and Analysis of IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) Safeguards Implementation at the Exxon Nuclear Fuel Fabrication Plant.

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1984-10-01

    Those efforts also resulted in the development of innovative approaches for improving effectiveness and minimizing the cost burden. The experience showed...approaches for improving effectiveness and minimizing the cost burden. The experience showed that IAEA safeguards could be technically effective...services such as the cost of shipping the IAEA equipment to other locations in the U.S. and for providing the IAEA with working standards for use at the U.S

  1. Electrochemically Modulated Separation for Plutonium Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Pratt, Sandra H.; Breshears, Andrew T.; Arrigo, Leah M.; Schwantes, Jon M.; Duckworth, Douglas C.

    2013-12-31

    Accurate and timely analysis of plutonium in spent nuclear fuel is critical in nuclear safeguards for detection of both protracted and rapid plutonium diversions. Gamma spectroscopy is a viable method for accurate and timely measurements of plutonium provided that the plutonium is well separated from the interfering fission and activation products present in spent nuclear fuel. Electrochemically modulated separation (EMS) is a method that has been used successfully to isolate picogram amounts of Pu from nitric acid matrices. With EMS, Pu adsorption may be turned "on" and "off" depending on the applied voltage, allowing for collection and stripping of Pu without the addition of chemical reagents. In this work, we have scaled up the EMS process to isolate microgram quantities of Pu from matrices encountered in spent nuclear fuel during reprocessing. Several challenges have been addressed including surface area limitations, radiolysis effects, electrochemical cell performance stability, and chemical interferences. After these challenges were resolved, 6 µg Pu was deposited in the electrochemical cell with approximately an 800-fold reduction of fission and activation product levels from a spent nuclear fuel sample. Modeling showed that these levels of Pu collection and interference reduction may not be sufficient for Pu detection by gamma spectroscopy. The main remaining challenges are to achieve a more complete Pu isolation and to deposit larger quantities of Pu for successful gamma analysis of Pu. If gamma analyses of Pu are successful, EMS will allow for accurate and timely on-site analysis for enhanced Pu safeguards.

  2. Progress and goals for INMM ASC N15 consensus standard ""Administrative practices for the determination and reporting of results of non-destructive assay measurements of nuclear material in situ for safeguards nuclear criticality safety and other purposes

    SciTech Connect

    Bracken, David S; Lamb, Frank W

    2009-01-01

    This paper will discuss the goals and progress to date on the development of INMM Accredited Standard Committee (ASC) N15 consensus standard Administrative Practices for the Determination and Reporting of Results of Non-Destructive Assay Measurements of Nuclear Material in situ for Safeguards, Nuclear Criticality Safety, and Other Purposes. This standard will define administrative practices in the areas of data generation and reporting of NDA assay of holdup deposits with consideration of the stakeholders of the reported results. These stakeholders may include nuclear material accounting and safeguards, nuclear criticality safety, waste management, health physics, facility characterization, authorization basis, radiation safety, and site licensing authorities. Stakeholder input will be solicited from interested parties and incorporated during the development of the document. Currently only one consensus standard exists that explicitly deals with NDA holdup measurements: ASTM C1455 Standard Test Method for Nondestructive Assay of Special Nuclear Material Holdup Using Gamma-Ray Spectroscopic Methods. The ASTM International standard emphasizes the activities involved in actually making measurements, and was developed by safeguards and NDA experts. This new INMM ASC N15 standard will complement the existing ASTM international standard. One of the largest driving factors for writing this new standard was the recent emphasis on in situ NDA measurements by the safeguards community due to the Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board (DNFSB) recommendation 2007-1 on in situ NDA measurements. Specifically, DNFSB recommendation 2007-1 referenced the lack of programmatic requirements for accurate in situ measurements and the use of measurement results for compliance with safety based requirements. That being the case, this paper will also discuss the progress made on the Implementation Plan for Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 2007-1 Safety-Related In Situ

  3. The state-level approach: moving beyond integrated safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Tape, James W

    2008-01-01

    The concept of a State-Level Approach (SLA) for international safeguards planning, implementation, and evaluation was contained in the Conceptual Framework for Integrated Safeguards (IS) agreed in 2002. This paper describes briefly the key elements of the SLA, including State-level factors and high-level safeguards objectives, and considers different cases in which application of the SLA methodology could address safeguards for 'suspect' States, 'good' States, and Nuclear Weapons States hosting fuel cycle centers. The continued use and further development of the SLA to customize safeguards for each State, including for States already under IS, is seen as central to effective and efficient safeguards for an expanding nuclear world.

  4. IMPLEMENTING THE SAFEGUARDS-BY-DESIGN PROCESS

    SciTech Connect

    Whitaker, J Michael; McGinnis, Brent; Laughter, Mark D; Morgan, Jim; Bjornard, Trond; Bean, Robert; Durst, Phillip; Hockert, John; DeMuth, Scott; Lockwood, Dunbar

    2010-01-01

    The Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) approach incorporates safeguards into the design and construction of nuclear facilities at the very beginning of the design process. It is a systematic and structured approach for fully integrating international and national safeguards for material control and accountability (MC&A), physical protection, and other proliferation barriers into the design and construction process for nuclear facilities. Implementing SBD is primarily a project management or project coordination challenge. This paper focuses specifically on the design process; the planning, definition, organization, coordination, scheduling and interaction of the safeguards experts and stakeholders as they participate in the design and construction of a nuclear facility. It delineates the steps in a nuclear facility design and construction project in order to provide the project context within which the safeguards design activities take place, describes the involvement of the safeguards experts in the design process, the nature of their analyses, interactions and decisions, and describes the documents created and how they are used. This report highlights the project context of safeguards activities, and identifies the safeguards community (nuclear facility operator, designer/builder, state regulator, SSAC and IAEA) must accomplish in order to implement SBD within the project.

  5. Strengthening IAEA Safeguards for Research Reactors

    SciTech Connect

    Reid, Bruce D.; Anzelon, George A.; Budlong-Sylvester, Kory

    2016-09-01

    During their December 10-11, 2013, workshop in Grenoble France, which focused on the history and future of safeguarding research reactors, the United States, France and the United Kingdom (UK) agreed to conduct a joint study exploring ways to strengthen the IAEA’s safeguards approach for declared research reactors. This decision was prompted by concerns about: 1) historical cases of non-compliance involving misuse (including the use of non-nuclear materials for production of neutron generators for weapons) and diversion that were discovered, in many cases, long after the violations took place and as part of broader pattern of undeclared activities in half a dozen countries; 2) the fact that, under the Safeguards Criteria, the IAEA inspects some reactors (e.g., those with power levels under 25 MWt) less than once per year; 3) the long-standing precedent of States using heavy water research reactors (HWRR) to produce plutonium for weapons programs; 4) the use of HEU fuel in some research reactors; and 5) various technical characteristics common to some types of research reactors that could provide an opportunity for potential proliferators to misuse the facility or divert material with low probability of detection by the IAEA. In some research reactors it is difficult to detect diversion or undeclared irradiation. In addition, infrastructure associated with research reactors could pose a safeguards challenge. To strengthen the effectiveness of safeguards at the State level, this paper advocates that the IAEA consider ways to focus additional attention and broaden its safeguards toolbox for research reactors. This increase in focus on the research reactors could begin with the recognition that the research reactor (of any size) could be a common path element on a large number of technically plausible pathways that must be considered when performing acquisition pathway analysis (APA) for developing a State Level Approach (SLA) and Annual Implementation Plan (AIP). To

  6. The Safeguards Evaluation Method for evaluating vulnerability to insider threats

    SciTech Connect

    Al-Ayat, R.A.; Judd, B.R.; Renis, T.A.

    1986-01-01

    As protection of DOE facilities against outsiders increases to acceptable levels, attention is shifting toward achieving comparable protection against insiders. Since threats and protection measures for insiders are substantially different from those for outsiders, new perspectives and approaches are needed. One such approach is the Safeguards Evaluation Method. This method helps in assessing safeguards vulnerabilities to theft or diversion of special nuclear material (SNM) by insiders. The Safeguards Evaluation Method-Insider Threat is a simple model that can be used by safeguards and security planners to evaluate safeguards and proposed upgrades at their own facilities. A discussion of the Safeguards Evaluation Method is presented in this paper.

  7. Implementing Safeguards-by-Design

    SciTech Connect

    Trond Bjornard; Robert Bean; Phillip Casey Durst; John Hockert; James Morgan

    2010-02-01

    Executive Summary Excerpt Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) is an approach to the design and construction of nuclear facilities whereby safeguards are designed-in from the very beginning. It is a systematic and structured approach for fully integrating international and national safeguards (MC&A), physical security, and other proliferation barriers into the design and construction process for nuclear facilities. SBD is primarily a project management or project coordination challenge, and this report focuses on that aspect of SBD. The present report continues the work begun in 2008 and focuses specifically on the design process, or project management and coordination - the planning, definition, organization, coordination, scheduling and interaction of activities of the safeguards experts and stakeholders as they participate in the design and construction of a nuclear facility. It delineates the steps in a nuclear facility design and construction project, in order to provide the project context within which the safeguards design activities take place, describes the involvement of safeguards experts in the design process, the nature of their analyses, interactions and decisions, as well as describing the documents created and how they are used. Designing and constructing a nuclear facility is an extremely complex undertaking. The stakeholders in an actual project are many – owner, operator, State regulators, nuclear facility primary contractor, subcontractors (e.g. instrument suppliers), architect engineers, project management team, safeguards, safety and security experts, in addition to the IAEA and its team. The purpose of the present report is to provide a common basis for discussions amongst stakeholders to collaboratively develop a SBD approach that will be both practically useful and mutually beneficial. The principal conclusions from the present study are: • In the short term, the successful implementation of SBD is principally a project management problem.

  8. Future issues in international safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Hakkila, E.A.; Markin, J.T.; Mullen, M.F.

    1991-01-01

    The introduction of large bulk-handling facilities into the internationally safeguarded, commercial nuclear fuel cycle, increased concerns for radiation exposure, and the constant level of resources available to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are driving new and innovative approaches to international safeguards. Inspector resources have traditionally been allocated on a facility-type basis. Approaches such as randomization of inspections either within a facility or across facilities in a State or the application of a fuel-cycle approach within a State are being considered as means of conserving resources. Large bulk-handling facilities require frequent material balance closures to meet IAEA timeliness goals. Approaches such as near-real-time accounting, running book inventories, and adjusted running book inventories are considered as means to meet these goals. The automated facilities require that safeguards measures also be automated, leading to more reliance on operator-supplied equipment that must be authenticated by the inspectorate. New Non-Proliferation Treaty signatory States with advanced nuclear programs will further drain IAEA resources. Finally, the role of special inspections in IAEA safeguards may be expanded. This paper discusses these issues in terms of increasing safeguards effectiveness and the possible impact on operators. 14 refs.

  9. IAEA safeguards and classified materials

    SciTech Connect

    Pilat, J.F.; Eccleston, G.W.; Fearey, B.L.; Nicholas, N.J.; Tape, J.W.; Kratzer, M.

    1997-11-01

    The international community in the post-Cold War period has suggested that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) utilize its expertise in support of the arms control and disarmament process in unprecedented ways. The pledges of the US and Russian presidents to place excess defense materials, some of which are classified, under some type of international inspections raises the prospect of using IAEA safeguards approaches for monitoring classified materials. A traditional safeguards approach, based on nuclear material accountancy, would seem unavoidably to reveal classified information. However, further analysis of the IAEA`s safeguards approaches is warranted in order to understand fully the scope and nature of any problems. The issues are complex and difficult, and it is expected that common technical understandings will be essential for their resolution. Accordingly, this paper examines and compares traditional safeguards item accounting of fuel at a nuclear power station (especially spent fuel) with the challenges presented by inspections of classified materials. This analysis is intended to delineate more clearly the problems as well as reveal possible approaches, techniques, and technologies that could allow the adaptation of safeguards to the unprecedented task of inspecting classified materials. It is also hoped that a discussion of these issues can advance ongoing political-technical debates on international inspections of excess classified materials.

  10. Development of Pattern Recognition Options for Combining Safeguards Subsystems

    SciTech Connect

    Burr, Thomas L.; Hamada, Michael S.

    2012-08-24

    This talk reviews project progress in combining process monitoring data and nuclear material accounting data to improve the over nuclear safeguards system. Focus on 2 subsystems: (1) nuclear materials accounting (NMA); and (2) process monitoring (PM).

  11. 10 CFR 72.184 - Safeguards contingency plan.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ..., and Responsibility Matrix, the first four categories of information relating to nuclear facilities... contained in the Responsibility Matrix of the licensee's safeguards contingency plan. The licensee...

  12. 75 FR 78777 - Advisory Committee On Reactor Safeguards; Renewal

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-12-16

    ...: The Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards was established by Section 29 of the Atomic Energy Act... accident phenomena; design of nuclear power plant structures, systems and components; materials...

  13. Advanced integrated safeguards at Barnwell

    SciTech Connect

    Bambas, K.J.; Barnes, L.D.

    1980-06-01

    The development and initial performance testing of an advanced integrated safeguards system at the Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant (BNFP) is described. The program concentrates on the integration and coordination of physical security and nuclear materials control and accounting at a single location. Hardware and software for this phase have been installed and are currently being evaluated. The AGNS/DOE program is now in its third year of development at the BNFP.

  14. Safeguards Culture: Lessons Learned

    SciTech Connect

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2010-06-01

    Today, safeguards culture can be a useful tool for measuring nonproliferation postures, but so far its impact on the international safeguards regime has been underappreciated. There is no agreed upon definition for safeguards culture nor agreement on how it should be measured. This paper argues that safeguards culture as an indicator of a country’s nonproliferation posture can be a useful tool.

  15. Visualizing Safeguards: Software for Conceptualizing and Communicating Safeguards Data

    SciTech Connect

    Gallucci, N.

    2015-07-12

    The nuclear programs of states are complex and varied, comprising a wide range of fuel cycles and facilities. Also varied are the types and terms of states’ safeguards agreements with the IAEA, each placing different limits on the inspectorate’s access to these facilities. Such nuances make it difficult to draw policy significance from the ground-level nuclear activities of states, or to attribute ground-level outcomes to the implementation of specific policies or initiatives. While acquiring a firm understanding of these relationships is critical to evaluating and formulating effective policy, doing so requires collecting and synthesizing large bodies of information. Maintaining a comprehensive working knowledge of the facilities comprising even a single state’s nuclear program poses a challenge, yet marrying this information with relevant safeguards and verification information is more challenging still. To facilitate this task, Brookhaven National Laboratory has developed a means of capturing the development, operation, and safeguards history of all the facilities comprising a state’s nuclear program in a single graphic. The resulting visualization offers a useful reference tool to policymakers and analysts alike, providing a chronology of states’ nuclear development and an easily digestible history of verification activities across their fuel cycles.

  16. Regional Cooperation to Strengthen Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Minnini, Margot; Elkhamri, Oksana O.

    2016-06-06

    President Obama’s decision over four years ago to ”pivot” toward Asia represented an important strategic shift in American foreign policy and a rebalancing of U.S. economic and security engagement in the Asia-Pacific countries. The United States has since supported a variety of regional initiatives aimed at promoting nuclear security and safeguards. When a new regional organization, the Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network (APSN) was established in 2010, DOE/NNSA became an early member and enthusiastic advocate. Launched on the initiative of Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, and Indonesia, the APSN aims to strengthen the quality and effectiveness of safeguards implementation in the Asia-Pacific region.

  17. An American Academy for Training Safeguards Inspectors - An Idea Revisited

    SciTech Connect

    Philip Casey Durst; Robert Bean

    2010-07-01

    In 2009, we presented the idea of an American academy for training safeguards inspectors for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), due to the declining percentage of Americans in that international organization. In this paper we assert that there is still a compelling need for this academy. While the American Safeguards Academy would be useful in preparing and pre-training American inspectors for the IAEA, it would also be useful for preparing Americans for domestic safeguards duties in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), U.S. DOE National Laboratories, and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). It is envisioned that such an academy would train graduate and post-graduate university students, DOE National Laboratory interns, and nuclear safeguards professionals in the modern equipment, safeguards measures, and approaches currently used by the IAEA. It is also envisioned that the Academy would involve the domestic nuclear industry, which could provide use of commercial nuclear facilities for tours and demonstrations of the safeguards tools and methods in actual nuclear facilities. This would be in support of the U.S. DOE National Nuclear Security Administration’s Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). This training would also help American nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation professionals better understand the potential limitations of the current tools used by the IAEA and give them a foundation from which to consider even more effective and efficient safeguards measures and approaches.

  18. Characterization of the neutron source term and multiplicity of a spent fuel assembly in support of NSDA safeguards of spent nuclear fuel

    SciTech Connect

    Richard, Joshua G; Fensin, Michael L; Tobin, Stephen J; Swinhoe, Martyn T; Menlove, Howard O; Baciak, James

    2010-01-01

    The gross neutron signal (GNS) is being considered as part of a fingerprinting or neutron balance approach to safeguards of spent nuclear fuel (SNF). Because the GNS is composed of many derivative components, understanding the time-dependent contribution of these derivative components is crucial to gauging the limitations of these approaches. The major components of the GNS are ({alpha}, n), spontaneous fission (SF), and multiplication neutrons. A methodology was developed to link MCNPX burnup output files to SOURCES4C input files for the purpose of automatically generating both the ({alpha}, n) and SF signals. Additional linking capabilities were developed to write MCNPX multiplication input files using the data obtained from the SOURCES4C output files. In this paper, the following are presented: (1) the relative contributions by source nuclide to the ({alpha}, n) signal as a function of initial enrichment/burnup/cooling time; (2) the relative contributions by source nuclide to the SF signal as a function of initial enrichment/burnup/cooling time; (3) the relative contributions by reaction type ({alpha},n vs. SF) to the GNS; and (4) the multiplication of the GNS as a function of initial enrichment/burnup/cooling time/counting environment. By developing these technologies to characterize the GNS, we can better evaluate the viability of the GNS fingerprint and neutron balance concepts for SNF.

  19. Neutron flux from a 14-MeV neutron generator with tungsten filter for research in NDA methods for nuclear safeguards and security

    SciTech Connect

    Rennhofer, H.; Pedersen, B.; Crochemore, J.-M.

    2009-12-02

    The Joint Research Centre has taken into operation a new experimental device designed for research in the fields of nuclear safeguards and security applications. The research projects currently undertaken include detection of shielded contraband materials, detection of fissile materials, and mass determination of small fissile materials in shielded containers. The device, called the Pulsed Neutron Interrogation Test Assembly (PUNITA), incorporates a pulsed 14-MeV (D-T) neutron generator and a large graphite mantle surrounding the sample cavity. By pulsing the neutron generator with a frequency in the range of 10 to 150 Hz, a sample may be interrogated first by fast neutrons and a few hundred micro-seconds later by a pure thermal neutron flux. The permanent detection systems incorporated in PUNITA include {sup 3}He neutrons detectors, HPGe gamma detectors, and lanthanum bromide scintillation detectors.We have studied the effects of placing a tungsten liner around the neutron generator target. The 14-MeV neutrons induce (n, 2n) and (n, 3n) reactions. In addition the mean neutron energy emitted from generator/tungsten assembly is reduced to about 1 MeV. Both of these effects increase the thermal neutron flux in the sample cavity. The paper describes the observed advantages of the tungsten liner with respect to increase in thermal flux, and better shielding capabilities of the nearby gamma and neutron detectors.

  20. Improved safeguards and security of a national resource

    SciTech Connect

    Zack, N.R.; Hunteman, W.J.; Rinard, P.M.; Metzler, J.F.; Jaeger, C.D.

    1994-07-01

    Initiatives by the President and the Secretary of Energy to reduce the quantity of nuclear materials in the nation`s strategic reserve are increasing the quantity of materials to be held in long-term storage until a final disposition option is imposed. These excess materials will be available for third-party inspection and verification to provide assurance that declared materials are not being diverted for weapons production. These protection systems must be capable of detecting unauthorized attempts to gain access to or control of the materials and information. Facility designs can incorporate new concepts and techniques that will minimize impact on operations and significantly reduce lifetime operational and infrastructure costs from safeguards and security requirements. The safeguards and security systems will be coupled with other facility systems such as safety, emergency preparedness, and process control to enhance public, worker, and environmental protection; protect nuclear materials, related information, and technology; and mitigate or prevent accidents and sabotage involving the nuclear materials. This paper will discuss the application of proven, state-of-the-art safeguards, physical security, computer/information security, and materials assay systems that can be combined to provide a cost-effective, efficient means for monitoring and protecting these materials.

  1. U.S./Russian cooperative efforts to enhance nuclear MPC&A at VNIITF, (Chelyabinsk-70)

    SciTech Connect

    Abramson, B; Apt, K; Blasy, J; Bukin, D; Churikov, Y; Eras, A; Magda, E; Neymotin, L; Schultz, F; Slankas, T; Tsygankov, G; Zuev, V

    1998-09-01

    The All Russian Scientific Research Institute of Technical Physics (VNIITF) is one of the major sites in the nuclear weapons complex in Russia. The site contains a number of research facilities which use nuclear material as well as assembly, disassembly, and testing of prototypes (pilot samples) of nuclear weapons. VNIITF also has ties to the major nuclear materials production facilities in the Urals region of Russia. The objective of the U.S./Russian Materials Protection Control and Accounting (MPC&A) cooperative program between the US Department of Energy and Russia's Ministry of Atomic Eneryy, at VNIITF is to improve the protection and accountability of nuclear material at VNIITF. Enhanced safeguards systems have been implemented at a reactor test area called the Pulse Research Reactor Facility (PRR) in Area 20. The area contains three pulse reactors with associated storage areas. The integrated MPC&A system at the PRR was demonstrated to US and Russian audiences in May, 1998. Expansion of work into several new facilities is underway both in Area 20 and at other locations. These include processing and production facilities some of which are considered sensitive facilities, by the Russian side. Methods have been developed to assure that work is done as agreed without actually having access to the buildings. C-70 has developed an extensive computerized system which integrates the physical security alarm station with elements of the nuclear material control system. Under the MPC&A program, the existing systems have been augmented with Russian and US technologies. This paper will describe the work completed at the PRR, and the on-going activities and cooperative effort between the Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, Sandia, Oak Ridge, Pacific Northwest, and Brookhaven US Department of Energy National Laboratories in support of VNIITF.

  2. Field trial of the enhanced data authentication system (EDAS)

    SciTech Connect

    Thomas, Maikael A.; Hymel, Ross W.; Baldwin, George; Smejkal, Andreas; Linnebach, Ralf

    2016-11-01

    The Enhanced Data Authentication System (EDAS) is means to securely branch information from an existing measurement system or data stream to a secondary observer. In an international nuclear safeguards context, the EDAS connects to operator instrumentation, and provides a cryptographically secure copy of the information for a safeguards inspectorate. However, this novel capability could be a valuable complement to inspector-owned safeguards instrumentation, offering context that is valuable for anomaly resolution and contingency.

  3. INSTITUTIONALIZING SAFEGUARDS-BY-DESIGN: HIGH-LEVEL FRAMEWORK

    SciTech Connect

    Trond Bjornard PhD; Joseph Alexander; Robert Bean; Brian Castle; Scott DeMuth, Ph.D.; Phillip Durst; Michael Ehinger; Prof. Michael Golay, Ph.D.; Kevin Hase, Ph.D.; David J. Hebditch, DPhil; John Hockert, Ph.D.; Bruce Meppen; James Morgan; Jerry Phillips, Ph.D., PE

    2009-02-01

    participation in facility design options analysis in the conceptual design phase to enhance intrinsic features, among others. The SBD process is unlikely to be broadly applied in the absence of formal requirements to do so, or compelling evidence of its value. Neither exists today. A formal instrument to require the application of SBD is needed and would vary according to both the national and regulatory environment. Several possible approaches to implementation of the requirements within the DOE framework are explored in this report. Finally, there are numerous barriers to the implementation of SBD, including the lack of a strong safeguards culture, intellectual property concerns, the sensitive nature of safeguards information, and the potentially divergent or conflicting interests of participants in the process. In terms of SBD implementation in the United States, there are no commercial nuclear facilities that are under IAEA safeguards. Efforts to institutionalize SBD must address these issues. Specific work in FY09 could focus on the following: finalizing the proposed SBD process for use by DOE and performing a pilot application on a DOE project in the planning phase; developing regulatory options for mandating SBD; further development of safeguards-related design guidance, principles and requirements; development of a specific SBD process tailored to the NRC environment; and development of an engagement strategy for the IAEA and other international partners.

  4. Safeguards Considerations for Thorium Fuel Cycles

    DOE PAGES

    Worrall, Louise G.; Worrall, Andrew; Flanagan, George F.; ...

    2016-04-21

    We report that by around 2025, thorium-based fuel cycles are likely to be deployed internationally. States such as China and India are pursuing research, development, and deployment pathways toward a number of commercial-scale thorium fuel cycles, and they are already building test reactors and the associated fuel cycle infrastructure. In the future, the potential exists for these emerging programs to sell, export, and deploy thorium fuel cycle technology in other states. Without technically adequate international safeguards protocols and measures in place, any future potential clandestine misuse of these fuel cycles could go undetected, compromising the deterrent value of these protocolsmore » and measures. The development of safeguards approaches for thorium-based fuel cycles is therefore a matter of some urgency. Yet, the focus of the international safeguards community remains mainly on safeguarding conventional 235U- and 239Pu-based fuel cycles while the safeguards challenges of thorium-uranium fuel cycles remain largely uninvestigated. This raises the following question: Is the International Atomic Energy Agency and international safeguards system ready for thorium fuel cycles? Furthermore, is the safeguards technology of today sufficiently mature to meet the verification challenges posed by thorium-based fuel cycles? In defining these and other related research questions, the objectives of this paper are to identify key safeguards considerations for thorium-based fuel cycles and to call for an early dialogue between the international safeguards and the nuclear fuel cycle communities to prepare for the potential safeguards challenges associated with these fuel cycles. In this paper, it is concluded that directed research and development programs are required to meet the identified safeguards challenges and to take timely action in preparation for the international deployment of thorium fuel cycles.« less

  5. Safeguards Considerations for Thorium Fuel Cycles

    SciTech Connect

    Worrall, Louise G.; Worrall, Andrew; Flanagan, George F.; Croft, Steven

    2016-04-21

    We report that by around 2025, thorium-based fuel cycles are likely to be deployed internationally. States such as China and India are pursuing research, development, and deployment pathways toward a number of commercial-scale thorium fuel cycles, and they are already building test reactors and the associated fuel cycle infrastructure. In the future, the potential exists for these emerging programs to sell, export, and deploy thorium fuel cycle technology in other states. Without technically adequate international safeguards protocols and measures in place, any future potential clandestine misuse of these fuel cycles could go undetected, compromising the deterrent value of these protocols and measures. The development of safeguards approaches for thorium-based fuel cycles is therefore a matter of some urgency. Yet, the focus of the international safeguards community remains mainly on safeguarding conventional 235U- and 239Pu-based fuel cycles while the safeguards challenges of thorium-uranium fuel cycles remain largely uninvestigated. This raises the following question: Is the International Atomic Energy Agency and international safeguards system ready for thorium fuel cycles? Furthermore, is the safeguards technology of today sufficiently mature to meet the verification challenges posed by thorium-based fuel cycles? In defining these and other related research questions, the objectives of this paper are to identify key safeguards considerations for thorium-based fuel cycles and to call for an early dialogue between the international safeguards and the nuclear fuel cycle communities to prepare for the potential safeguards challenges associated with these fuel cycles. In this paper, it is concluded that directed research and development programs are required to meet the identified safeguards challenges and to take timely action in preparation for the international deployment of thorium fuel cycles.

  6. The Application of High-Resolution Gamma-Ray Spectrometry (HRGS) to Nuclear Safeguards, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control Activities

    SciTech Connect

    Kane, Walter R.; Lemley, James R.; Forman, Leon

    1997-12-31

    While well-developed methodologies exist for the employment of high- resolution gamma ray spectrometry (HRGS) in determining the isotopic composition of plutonium samples, the potential capabilities of such measurements in determining the properties of nuclear materials otherwise remain largely unexploited. These measurements contain information sufficiently detailed such that not only can the isotopic composition of uranium and plutonium materials be determined, but the details of the spectrum obtained will depend reproducibly upon other factors including the total mass, density, chemical composition, and geometrical configuration of the material, and for certain materials, the elapsed time since chemical processing. The potential thus exists to obtain a `gamma-ray fingerprint` for typical containers or assemblies of nuclear material which will then serve to identify that class of item in a later confirmatory measurement. These measurements have the additional advantage that, by comparison with active interrogation techniques which usually require the introduction of some extraneous form of radiation or other intrusive activity, they are totally passive, and thus impose only minimal additional safety or regulatory burdens on the operators. In the application of these measurements to the verification of treaty-limited items, where the information acquired may be sensitive in nature, the use of the CIVET (Controlled Intrusiveness Verification Technique) approach, where a computer-based interface is employed to limit access to the information obtained, may be followed.

  7. Gas centrifuge enrichment plants inspection frequency and remote monitoring issues for advanced safeguards implementation

    SciTech Connect

    Boyer, Brian David; Erpenbeck, Heather H; Miller, Karen A; Ianakiev, Kiril D; Reimold, Benjamin A; Ward, Steven L; Howell, John

    2010-09-13

    Current safeguards approaches used by the IAEA at gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs) need enhancement in order to verify declared low enriched uranium (LEU) production, detect undeclared LEU production and detect high enriched uranium (BEU) production with adequate probability using non destructive assay (NDA) techniques. At present inspectors use attended systems, systems needing the presence of an inspector for operation, during inspections to verify the mass and {sup 235}U enrichment of declared cylinders of uranium hexafluoride that are used in the process of enrichment at GCEPs. This paper contains an analysis of how possible improvements in unattended and attended NDA systems including process monitoring and possible on-site destructive analysis (DA) of samples could reduce the uncertainty of the inspector's measurements providing more effective and efficient IAEA GCEPs safeguards. We have also studied a few advanced safeguards systems that could be assembled for unattended operation and the level of performance needed from these systems to provide more effective safeguards. The analysis also considers how short notice random inspections, unannounced inspections (UIs), and the concept of information-driven inspections can affect probability of detection of the diversion of nuclear material when coupled to new GCEPs safeguards regimes augmented with unattended systems. We also explore the effects of system failures and operator tampering on meeting safeguards goals for quantity and timeliness and the measures needed to recover from such failures and anomalies.

  8. Safeguards for spent fuels: Verification problems

    SciTech Connect

    Pillay, K.K.S.; Picard, R.R.

    1991-01-01

    The accumulation of large quantities of spent nuclear fuels world-wide is a serious problem for international safeguards. A number of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) member states, including the US, consider spent fuel to be a material form for which safeguards cannot be terminated, even after permanent disposal in a geologic repository. Because safeguards requirements for spent fuels are different from those of conventional bulk-handling and item-accounting facilities, there is room for innovation to design a unique safeguards regime for spent fuels that satisfies the goals of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty at a reasonable cost to both the facility and the IAEA. Various strategies being pursued for long-term management of spent fuels are examined with a realistic example to illustrate the problems of verifying safeguards under the present regime. Verification of a safeguards regime for spent fuels requires a mix of standard safeguards approaches, such as quantitative verification and use of seals, with other measures that are unique to spent fuels. 17 refs.

  9. Development of analytical techniques for ultra trace amounts of nuclear materials in environmental samples using ICP-MS for safeguards

    PubMed

    Magara; Hanzawa; Esaka; Miyamoto; Yasuda; Watanabe; Usuda; Nishimura; Adachi

    2000-07-01

    The authors have begun to develop analytical techniques for ultra trace amounts of nuclear materials and to prepare a clean chemistry laboratory for environmental sample analyses. The analytical techniques include bulk and particle analyses. For the bulk analysis, concentrations and isotopic ratios of U and/or Pu are determined by inductively-coupled plasma mass spectrometry (ICP-MS) and thermal ionization mass spectrometry (TIMS). In the particle analysis, isotopic ratios of U and/or Pu in each particle will be measured by secondary ion mass spectrometry (SIMS). This paper reports on the outline for the development of analytical techniques and the current situation of the development of the bulk analysis using ICP-MS is described.

  10. The Concept of Goals-Driven Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    R. Wigeland; T Bjornard; B. Castle

    2009-02-01

    The IAEA, NRC, and DOE regulations and requirements for safeguarding nuclear material and facilities have been reviewed and each organization’s purpose, objectives, and scope are discussed in this report. Current safeguards approaches are re-examined considering technological advancements and how these developments are changing safeguards approaches used by these organizations. Additionally, the physical protection approaches required by the IAEA, NRC, and DOE were reviewed and the respective goals, objectives, and requirements are identified and summarized in this report. From these, a brief comparison is presented showing the high-level similarities among these regulatory organizations’ approaches to physical protection. The regulatory documents used in this paper have been assembled into a convenient reference library called the Nuclear Safeguards and Security Reference Library. The index of that library is included in this report, and DVDs containing the full library are available.

  11. IAEA Safeguards: Past, Present, and Future

    SciTech Connect

    Santi, Peter A.; Hypes, Philip A.

    2012-06-14

    This talk will present an overview of the International Atomic Energy Agency with a specific focus on its international safeguards mission and activities. The talk will first present a brief history of the IAEA and discuss its current governing structure. It will then focus on the Safeguards Department and its role in providing assurance that nuclear materials are being used for peaceful purposes. It will then look at how the IAEA is currently evolving the way in which it executes its safeguards mission with a focus on the idea of a state-level approach.

  12. Simulation Enabled Safeguards Assessment Methodology

    SciTech Connect

    Robert Bean; Trond Bjornard; Thomas Larson

    2007-09-01

    It is expected that nuclear energy will be a significant component of future supplies. New facilities, operating under a strengthened international nonproliferation regime will be needed. There is good reason to believe virtual engineering applied to the facility design, as well as to the safeguards system design will reduce total project cost and improve efficiency in the design cycle. Simulation Enabled Safeguards Assessment MEthodology (SESAME) has been developed as a software package to provide this capability for nuclear reprocessing facilities. The software architecture is specifically designed for distributed computing, collaborative design efforts, and modular construction to allow step improvements in functionality. Drag and drop wireframe construction allows the user to select the desired components from a component warehouse, render the system for 3D visualization, and, linked to a set of physics libraries and/or computational codes, conduct process evaluations of the system they have designed.

  13. Fiscal Year 2014 Annual Report on BNLs Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Human Capital Development Activities

    SciTech Connect

    Pepper, Susan E.

    2014-10-10

    Brookhaven National Laboratory’s (BNL’s) Nonproliferation and National Security Department contributes to the National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Nonproliferation and International Security Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) through university engagement, safeguards internships, safeguards courses, professional development, recruitment, and other activities aimed at ensuring the next generation of international safeguards professionals is adequately prepared to support the U.S. safeguards mission. This report is a summary of BNL s work under the NGSI program in Fiscal Year 2014.

  14. 1996 initiatives under the CNEN/DOE safeguards cooperation agreement

    SciTech Connect

    Vinhas, L.; Iskin, M.C.L.; Almeida, S.G. de; Dupree, S.; Reilly, D.; Smith, C.; Whitaker, J.M.

    1996-12-31

    In September 1995, the US Department of Energy (DOE) and the Brazilian Comissao Nacional de Energia Nuclear (CNEN) signed an agreement on methods and technologies for safeguards applications. This agreement provides for cooperation in the areas of nuclear material control, accountancy, verification, physical protection, and advanced containment and surveillance technologies for international safeguards applications. CNEN is responsible for managing nuclear facilities and institutions in Brazil and is responsible for coordinating international safeguards as applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC). Following the ratification of the Quadripartite Agreement among Argentina, Brazil, ABACC, and IAEA in March 1994, all nuclear materials in all nuclear activities in Brazil became subject to comprehensive safeguards. Collaboration between CNEN and DOE in 1996 is focusing on: (1) the use of a GRAND FORK detector at the Angra Nuclear Power Station, (2) a remote monitoring field trial, (3) workshops on environmental monitoring and analysis as a safeguards application, (4) developing and studying methods and techniques for applying safeguards at enrichment plants, and (5) support of CNEN`s safeguards analytical laboratory. This paper will describe each of the aforementioned safeguards cooperation activities.

  15. The requirement for proper storage of nuclear and related decommissioning samples to safeguard accuracy of tritium data.

    PubMed

    Kim, Daeji; Croudace, Ian W; Warwick, Phillip E

    2012-04-30

    Large volumes of potentially tritium-contaminated waste materials are generated during nuclear decommissioning that require accurate characterisation prior to final waste sentencing. The practice of initially determining a radionuclide waste fingerprint for materials from an operational area is often used to save time and money but tritium cannot be included because of its tendency to be chemically mobile. This mobility demands a specific measurement for tritium and also poses a challenge in terms of sampling, storage and reliable analysis. This study shows that the extent of any tritium redistribution during storage will depend on its form or speciation and the physical conditions of storage. Any weakly or moderately bound tritium (e.g. adsorbed water, waters of hydration or crystallisation) may be variably lost at temperatures over the range 100-300 °C whereas for more strongly bound tritium (e.g. chemically bound or held in mineral lattices) the liberation temperature can be delayed up to 800 °C. For tritium that is weakly held the emanation behaviour at different temperatures becomes particularly important. The degree of (3)H loss and cross-contamination that can arise after sampling and before analysis can be reduced by appropriate storage. Storing samples in vapour tight containers at the point of sampling, the use of triple enclosures, segregating high activity samples and using a freezer all lead to good analytical practice.

  16. Enhancing nuclear emergency response through international cooperation.

    PubMed

    Ugletveit, Finn; Aaltonen, Hannele

    2004-01-01

    Nuclear and radiological emergencies may easily become severe international emergencies requiring substantial resources in several or many states for an adequate response, which in some cases may require resources exceeding national capabilities. Through the development of a consistent, coherent and sustainable joint programme for improved and more efficient international responses to nuclear and radiological emergencies, it is believed that we could achieve a better and more cost-effective response capability for nuclear and radiological emergencies. This requires, however, that we be willing and able to establish mechanisms of assistance where information and resources are globally shared and that standardised/harmonised procedures be developed and implemented. If we are willing to make this investment, we believe that, in the long term, there will be a significant benefit for all of us.

  17. Assess How Changes in Fuel Cycle Operation Impact Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Tobin, Stephen Joseph; Adigun, Babatunde John; Fugate, Michael Lynn; Trellue, Holly Renee; Sprinkle, James K.

    2016-10-31

    In this report two research topics of interest to Concepts and Approaches are investigated. The motivation of joining them into one project is that both require (1) the simulation of fuel irradiation in a reactor and (2) the transport of gamma and neutron irradiation from the fuel to safeguards detectors. In the next two subsections the merits of each of the two safeguards applications are further introduced. Given the cumulative impact of the enhancements listed above, it is not surprising that both fuel assembly design and fuel assembly irradiation optimization have improved over the past 50+ years. The purpose of the research summarized in this sub-­section is to investigate what, if any, consequence this evolution in reactor operation might have for nuclear safeguards. It is anticipated that the burnup and isotopics of the spent fuel should exhibit less variation over the decades as reactor operators irradiate each assembly to the optimum amount. In contrast, older spent fuel is anticipated to vary more in burnup and resulting isotopics for a given initial enrichment. Continuing with this thesis, modern fuel should be more uniform in composition, and thus, measured safeguards results should be easier to interpret than results from older spent fuel. With spent fuel ponds filling up, interim and long-­term storage of spent fuel will need to be addressed. Additionally after long periods of storage, spent fuel is no longer self-­protecting and as such the IAEA will categorize it as more attractive; in approximately 20 years many of the assemblies from early commercial cores will no longer be considered self-­protecting. This study will assess how more recent changes in the reactor operation could impact the interpretation of safeguards measurements.

  18. Modeling and Simulation for Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Swinhoe, Martyn T.

    2012-07-26

    The purpose of this talk is to give an overview of the role of modeling and simulation in Safeguards R&D and introduce you to (some of) the tools used. Some definitions are: (1) Modeling - the representation, often mathematical, of a process, concept, or operation of a system, often implemented by a computer program; (2) Simulation - the representation of the behavior or characteristics of one system through the use of another system, especially a computer program designed for the purpose; and (3) Safeguards - the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material. The role of modeling and simulation are: (1) Calculate amounts of material (plant modeling); (2) Calculate signatures of nuclear material etc. (source terms); and (3) Detector performance (radiation transport and detection). Plant modeling software (e.g. FACSIM) gives the flows and amount of material stored at all parts of the process. In safeguards this allow us to calculate the expected uncertainty of the mass and evaluate the expected MUF. We can determine the measurement accuracy required to achieve a certain performance.

  19. Nuclear-enhanced geothermal heat recovery

    SciTech Connect

    Clark, W.H. II

    1995-12-31

    This report proposes the testing of an abandoned drill well for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel rods. The well need not be in a geothermal field, since the downhole assembly takes advantage of only the natural thermal gradient. The water in the immediate vicinity of the fuel will be chemically treated for corrosion resistance. Above this will be a long column of viscous fluid insoluble in water, to act as a fluid barrier. The remainder of the well bore, up to the surface, will be the working fluid for the power turbine at the surface. There will be a low-pressure region in the immediate vicinity of the fuel, encouraging the flashing of steam. Due to the low level of heat emitted by the fuel rods, the radioactive material will be surrounded by a secondary casing that will reduce the water it contacts directly, thus causing it to heat up quickly and to maximize the steam-generating process, and the formation of air nuclides. These will percolate upward through the viscous column where steadily decreasing pressure causes expansion. The nuclear fuel`s thermal energy will have been transferred through the high radioactive zone as pressure, then it will flash to steam and heat the water in the top of the wellbore. The drill well, a minimum of 10,000 ft. in depth, will naturally heat any circulating fluid. The fuel is not used as a thermal source, but only to produce a few spontaneous bubbles, sufficient to increase the fluid pressure by expansion as it rises in the wellbore. The additional thermal energy from the nuclear source will superheat the water for use in the power-generation apparatus at the surface. This equipment, operating on very-low radioactive fluid, will be protected by a secondary containment. The typical drill well is ideally suited for the insertion of spent fuel rods, which are smaller than downhole tools and instrumentation regularly installed in production wells.

  20. Safeguards-By-Design: Guidance and Tools for Stakeholders

    SciTech Connect

    Mark Schanfein; Shirley Johnson

    2012-02-01

    Effective implementation of the Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) approach can help meet the challenges of global nuclear energy growth, by designing facilities that have improved safeguardability and reduced safeguards-related life cycle costs. The ultimate goal of SBD is to implement effective and efficient safeguards that reduce the burden to both the facility operator and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Since 2008, the National Nuclear Security Administration's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative's Safeguards By Design Project has initiated multiple studies and workshops with industry and regulatory stakeholders, including the IAEA, to develop relevant documents to support the implementation of SBD. These 'Good Practices Guides' describe facility and process design features that will facilitate implementation of effective nuclear material safeguards starting in the earliest phases of design through to final design. These guides, which are in their final editorial stages, start at a high level and then narrow down to specific nuclear fuel cycle facilities such as Light Water Reactors, Generation III/IV Reactors, High Temperature Gas Cooled Reactors, and Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants. Most recently, NGSI has begun development of a facility safeguardability assessment toolkit to assist the designer. This paper will review the current status of these efforts, provide some examples of these documents, and show some standard IAEA Unattended Instrumentation that is permanently installed in nuclear facilities for monitoring.

  1. Safeguards and security research and development: Program status report, February-July 1981

    SciTech Connect

    Henry, C.N.; Walton, R.B.

    1982-04-01

    This report, one of a series of biannual progress reports, describes the status of research and development in the Safeguards and Security Program at Los Alamos from February-July 1981. Most work covered here is sponsored by the Office of Safeguards and Security of the Department of Energy; however, project activities that are technically closely related to nuclear safeguards and security also are included where appropriate for conveying information useful to the nuclear community. The report comprises four major subject areas: Security Development and Support; Nuclear Materials Measurement and Engineering; Nuclear Facility Safeguards Support; and International Safeguards, Technology Transfer, and Training. Some technical topics included in the subject areas are computer and informational security, chemical and nondestructive analysis of nuclear materials, process modeling and analysis, nuclear materials accounting systems, evaluation of prototype measurement instrumentation and procedures in nuclear facilities, design and consultation for facilities, technical exchange, training courses, and international safeguards.

  2. SAFEGUARDS ENVELOPE: PREVIOUS WORK AND EXAMPLES

    SciTech Connect

    Richard Metcalf; Aaron Bevill; William Charlton; Robert Bean

    2008-07-01

    The future expansion of nuclear power will require not just electricity production but fuel cycle facilities such as fuel fabrication and reprocessing plants. As large reprocessing facilities are built in various states, they must be built and operated in a manner to minimize the risk of nuclear proliferation. Process monitoring has returned to the spotlight as an added measure that can increase confidence in the safeguards of special nuclear material (SNM). Process monitoring can be demonstrated to lengthen the allowable inventory period by reducing accountancy requirements, and to reduce the false positive indications. The next logical step is the creation of a Safeguards Envelope, a set of operational parameters and models to maximize anomaly detection and inventory period by process monitoring while minimizing operator impact and false positive rates. A brief example of a rudimentary Safeguards Envelope is presented, and shown to detect synthetic diversions overlaying a measured processing plant data set. This demonstration Safeguards Envelope is shown to increase the confidence that no SNM has been diverted with minimal operator impact, even though it is based on an information sparse environment. While the foundation on which a full Safeguards Envelope can be built has been presented in historical demonstrations of process monitoring, several requirements remain yet unfulfilled. Future work will require reprocessing plant transient models, inclusion of “non-traditional” operating data, and exploration of new methods of identifying subtle events in transient processes.

  3. Evolution of Safeguards over Time: Past, Present, and Projected Facilities, Material, and Budget

    SciTech Connect

    Kollar, Lenka; Mathews, Caroline E.

    2009-07-01

    This study examines the past trends and evolution of safeguards over time and projects growth through 2030. The report documents the amount of nuclear material and facilities under safeguards from 1970 until present, along with the corresponding budget. Estimates for the future amount of facilities and material under safeguards are made according to non-nuclear-weapons states’ (NNWS) plans to build more nuclear capacity and sustain current nuclear infrastructure. Since nuclear energy is seen as a clean and economic option for base load electric power, many countries are seeking to either expand their current nuclear infrastructure, or introduce nuclear power. In order to feed new nuclear power plants and sustain existing ones, more nuclear facilities will need to be built, and thus more nuclear material will be introduced into the safeguards system. The projections in this study conclude that a zero real growth scenario for the IAEA safeguards budget will result in large resource gaps in the near future.

  4. 76 FR 30404 - Advisory Committee On Reactor Safeguards; Meeting

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-05-25

    ... [Federal Register Volume 76, Number 101 (Wednesday, May 25, 2011)] [Notices] [Pages 30404-30405] [FR Doc No: 2011-12954] NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee On Reactor Safeguards... (42 U.S.C. 2039, 2232b), the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) will hold a meeting...

  5. 75 FR 3501 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-01-21

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards In accordance with the purposes of Sections 29 and 182b of the Atomic Energy Act (42 U.S.C. 2039, 2232b), the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards...

  6. 75 FR 70304 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-11-17

    ... COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards In accordance with the purposes of Sections 29 and 182b of the Atomic Energy Act (42 U.S.C. 2039, 2232b), the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS... Power Reactors;'' Interim Staff Guidance (ISG) NSIR/DPR-ISG- 01,''Emergency Planning for Nuclear...

  7. 75 FR 64366 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-10-19

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards In accordance with the purposes of Sections 29 and 182b of the Atomic Energy Act (42 U.S.C. 2039, 2232b), the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards...

  8. Strenghening Safeguards Authorities and Institutions

    SciTech Connect

    Goodman,M.; Lockwood, d.; Rosenthal, M.D.; Tape, J.W.

    2008-06-06

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system has changed in major ways from the establishment of the IAEA in 1957 until the present. Changes include strengthening the legal framework of safeguards; improvements in concepts and approaches for safeguards implementation; and significant improvements in the technical tools available to inspectors. In this paper, we explore three broad areas related to strengthening safeguards authorities and institutions: integrated safeguards and State-Level Approaches; special inspections; and NPT withdrawal and the continuation of safeguards.

  9. FUTURE SAFEGUARDS EFFECTIVENESS: CONCEPTS AND ISSUES

    SciTech Connect

    K. W. BUDLONG-SYLVESTER; J. F. PILAT

    2000-09-01

    With new safeguards measures (under old and new authority) now available to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), there will be fundamental changes in the manner IAEA safeguards are implemented, raising questions about their effectiveness in meeting expanded Agency safeguards objectives. In order to characterize the capability of various safeguards approaches in meeting their objectives, it will be necessary to fully understand what is involved in the new safeguards equation. Both old and new measures will be required to construct a comprehensive picture of a State's nuclear activities and capabilities, and they both have strengths and weaknesses. There are (for political and cost reasons) likely to be tradeoffs between the two types of measures. Significant differences among measures with respect to the probability of their detecting an anomaly, along with other characteristics, need be considered in this context. Given the important role of both types of measures in future approaches, their inherent differences with regard to their capabilities and limitations, and their potential impact on the credibility of safeguards, it will be essential to consider these measures systematically, independently, and in combination in any effectiveness evaluation. This paper will consider concepts and issues in addressing this need.

  10. Safeguards Envelope Progress FY10

    SciTech Connect

    Richard Metcalf

    2010-10-01

    The Safeguards Envelope is a strategy to determine a set of specific operating parameters within which nuclear facilities may operate to maximize safeguards effectiveness without sacrificing safety or plant efficiency. This paper details the additions to the advanced operating techniques that will be applied to real plant process monitoring (PM) data from the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP). Research this year focused on combining disparate pieces of data together to maximize operating time with minimal downtime due to safeguards. A Chi-Square and Croiser's cumulative sum were both included as part of the new analysis. Because of a major issue with the original data, the implementation of the two new tests did not add to the existing set of tests, though limited one-variable optimization made a small increase in detection probability. Additional analysis was performed to determine if prior analysis would have caused a major security or safety operating envelope issue. It was determined that a safety issue would have resulted from the prior research, but that the security may have been increased under certain conditions.

  11. Safeguarding inheritance and enhancing the resilience of orphaned young people living in child- and youth-headed households in Tanzania and Uganda.

    PubMed

    Evans, Ruth

    2012-10-01

    This article explores the resilience of orphaned young people in safeguarding physical assets (land and property) inherited from their parents and sustaining their households without a co-resident adult relative. Drawing on the concept of resilience and the sustainable livelihoods framework, the article analyses the findings of an exploratory study conducted in 2008-2009 in Tanzania and Uganda with 15 orphaned young people heading households, 18 of their siblings, and 39 NGO workers and community members. The findings suggest that inherited land and property were key determining factors in the formation and viability of the child- and youth-headed households in both rural and urban areas. Despite experiences of stigma and marginalisation in the community, social networks were crucial in enabling the young people to protect themselves and their property, providing access to material and emotional resources, and enhancing their skills and capabilities to develop sustainable livelihoods. Support for child- and youth-headed households needs to recognise young people's agency and should adopt a holistic approach to their lives by analysing the physical assets, material resources, and human and social capital available to the household, as well as giving consideration to individual young people's wellbeing, outlook and aspirations. Alongside cash transfers and material support, youth-led collective mobilisation that is sustained over time may also help build resilience and foster supportive social environments in order to challenge property-grabbing and the stigmatisation of child- and youth-headed households.

  12. 75 FR 65038 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards; Procedures for Meetings

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-10-21

    ... COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards; Procedures for Meetings Background This notice describes...'s) Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) pursuant to the Federal Advisory Committee Act... Federal Register Notice, care of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear...

  13. Application of safeguards technology in DOE's environmental restoration program

    SciTech Connect

    Eccleston, G.W.; Baker, M.P.; Hansen, W.R.; Lucas, M.C.; Markin, J.T.; Phillips, J.R.

    1990-01-01

    During the last two decades, the Department of Energy's Office of Safeguards and Security (DOE/OSS) has supported the research and development of safeguards systems analysis methodologies and nondestructive assay (NDS) technology for characterizing, monitoring, and accounting nuclear materials. This paper discusses methodologies and NDA instrumentation developed by the DOE/OSS program that could be applied in the Environmental Restoration Program. NDA instrumentation could be used for field measurements during site characterization and to monitor nuclear materials, heavy metals, and other hazardous materials during site remediation. Systems methodologies can minimize the expenditure of resources and help specify appropriate combinations of NDA instrumentation and chemical analyses to characterize a variety of materials quickly and reduce personnel exposure in hazardous environments. A training program is available to teach fundamental and advanced principles and approaches to characterize and quantify nuclear materials properly and to organize and analyze measurement information for decision making. The ability to characterize the overall volume and distribution of materials at a waste site is difficult because of the inhomogeneous distribution of materials, the requirement for extreme sensitivity, and the lack of resources to collect and chemically analyze a sufficient number of samples. Using a systems study approach based on statistical sampling, the resources necessary to characterize a site can be enhanced by appropriately combining in situ and field NDA measurements with laboratory analyses. 35 refs., 1 figs., 2 tabs.

  14. U. S. spent-fuel disposal strategies and International safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Pillay, K.K.; Picard, R.R.; Hafer, J.F. )

    1993-08-01

    Domestic safeguards for fissile nuclear materials are universal, and a variety of international safeguards regimes are applicable, in most member states of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to declared nuclear facilities dedicated to peaceful missions. The U.S. strategy to dispose of all spent nuclear fuels (SNFs) and high-level wastes (HLWs) in engineered geologic repositories has a sometimes-overlooked consequence, namely, the need to maintain domestic and international safeguards in perpetuity. The Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), which has the responsibility to accept and store the spent fuels in the long term either in surface facilities or in engineered geologic repositories, has yet to include safeguards issues in their mission plan.'' There are several stages in the nuclear fuel cycle where materials usable in weapons are available for diversion. This discussion, however, is limited to the potential diversion of spent fuels for clandestine plutonium recovery. The concepts proposed here highlight safeguards elements necessary for a pragmatic safeguards system for SNF from nuclear power generation. The efforts required to initiate and maintain a verifiable international safeguards regime are examined in the context of a typical storage facility in the United States.

  15. Beyond Human Capital Development: Balanced Safeguards Workforce Metrics and the Next Generation Safeguards Workforce

    SciTech Connect

    Burbank, Roberta L.; Frazar, Sarah L.; Gitau, Ernest TN; Shergur, Jason M.; Scholz, Melissa A.; Undem, Halvor A.

    2014-03-28

    Since its establishment in 2008, the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) has achieved a number of objectives under its five pillars: concepts and approaches, policy development and outreach, international nuclear safeguards engagement, technology development, and human capital development (HCD). As a result of these efforts, safeguards has become much more visible as a critical U.S. national security interest across the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) complex. However, limited budgets have since created challenges in a number of areas. Arguably, one of the more serious challenges involves NGSI’s ability to integrate entry-level staff into safeguards projects. Laissez fair management of this issue across the complex can lead to wasteful project implementation and endanger NGSI’s long-term sustainability. The authors provide a quantitative analysis of this problem, focusing on the demographics of the current safeguards workforce and compounding pressures to operate cost-effectively, transfer knowledge to the next generation of safeguards professionals, and sustain NGSI safeguards investments.

  16. The future of IAEA safeguards: challenges and responses

    SciTech Connect

    Pilat, Joseph F; Budlong - Sylvester, Kory W

    2011-01-01

    For nearly two decades, the International Atomic Energy Agency (lAEA) has been transforming its safeguards system to address the challenges posed by undeclared nuclear programs, the associated revelation of an extensive non-State nuclear procurement network and other issues, including past limits to its verification mandate and the burden of noncompliance issues. Implementing the new measures, including those in the Additional Protocol, and integrating new and old safeguards measures, remains a work in progress. Implementation is complicated by factors including the limited teclmological tools that are available to address such issues as safeguarding bulk handling facilities, detection of undeclared facilities/activities, especially related to enrichment, etc. As this process continues, new challenges are arising, including the demands of expanding nuclear power production worldwide, so-called safeguards by design for a new generation of facilities, the possible IAEA role in a fissile material cutoff treaty and other elements of the arms control and disarmament agenda, the possible role in 'rollback' cases, etc. There is no doubt safeguards will need to evolve in the future, as they have over the last decades. In order for the evolutionary path to proceed, there will inter alia be a need to identify technological gaps, especially with respect to undeclared facilities, and ensure they are filled by adapting old safeguards technologies, by developing and introducing new and novel safeguards teclmologies and/or by developing new procedures and protocols. Safeguards will also need to respond to anticipated emerging threats and to future, unanticipated threats. This will require strategic planning and cooperation among Member States and with the Agency. This paper will address challenges to IAEA safeguards and the technological possibilities and R&D strategies needed to meet those challenges in the context of the forty-year evolution of safeguards, including the ongoing

  17. 75 FR 58447 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-09-24

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation Protection and Nuclear Materials The ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation Protection and Nuclear Materials...

  18. Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) for Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) through a Common Global Approach

    SciTech Connect

    Badwan, Faris M.; Demuth, Scott Francis; Miller, Michael Conrad; Pshakin, Gennady

    2015-02-23

    Small Modular Reactors (SMR) with power levels significantly less than the currently standard 1000 to 1600-MWe reactors have been proposed as a potential game changer for future nuclear power. SMRs may offer a simpler, more standardized, and safer modular design by using factory built and easily transportable components. Additionally, SMRs may be more easily built and operated in isolated locations, and may require smaller initial capital investment and shorter construction times. Because many SMRs designs are still conceptual and consequently not yet fixed, designers have a unique opportunity to incorporate updated design basis threats, emergency preparedness requirements, and then fully integrate safety, physical security, and safeguards/material control and accounting (MC&A) designs. Integrating safety, physical security, and safeguards is often referred to as integrating the 3Ss, and early consideration of safeguards and security in the design is often referred to as safeguards and security by design (SSBD). This paper describes U.S./Russian collaborative efforts toward developing an internationally accepted common approach for implementing SSBD/3Ss for SMRs based upon domestic requirements, and international guidance and requirements. These collaborative efforts originated with the Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Security working group established under the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission during the 2009 Presidential Summit. Initial efforts have focused on review of U.S. and Russian domestic requirements for Security and MC&A, IAEA guidance for security and MC&A, and IAEA requirements for international safeguards. Additionally, example SMR design features that can enhance proliferation resistance and physical security have been collected from past work and reported here. The development of a U.S./Russian common approach for SSBD/3Ss should aid the designer of SMRs located anywhere in the world. More specifically, the application of this approach may

  19. International safeguards without material balance areas

    SciTech Connect

    Sanborn, J.B.; Lu Mingshih; Indusi, J.P.

    1992-09-01

    Recently altered perceptions of the role of the non-proliferation regime, as well as continued IAEA funding constraints, suggest a need to re-examine the fundamentals of IAEA verification strategy. This paper suggests that abandoning certain material balance area (MBA) related concepts that nominally form the basic framework of ``full-scope`` safeguards would result in a more flexible inspection regime. The MBA concept applied in the domestic context enables a national authority to localize losses in space and in time and to minimize the need to measure in-process inventory. However, these advantages do not accrue to an international verification regime because it cannot truly verify the ``flows`` between MBAs without extensive containment/surveillance measures. In the verification model studied, the entire nuclear inventory of a state is periodically declared and verified simultaneously in one or two large segments (containing possibly many MBAS). Simultaneous inventory of all MBAs within a segment would occur through advance ``mailbox`` declarations and random selection of MBAs for on-site verification or through enhanced containment/surveillance techniques. Flows are generally speaking not verified. This scheme would free the inspectorate from the obligation to attempt to verify on-site each stratum of the material balance of every facility declaring significant quantities of nuclear material.

  20. International safeguards without material balance areas

    SciTech Connect

    Sanborn, J.B.; Lu Mingshih; Indusi, J.P.

    1992-01-01

    Recently altered perceptions of the role of the non-proliferation regime, as well as continued IAEA funding constraints, suggest a need to re-examine the fundamentals of IAEA verification strategy. This paper suggests that abandoning certain material balance area (MBA) related concepts that nominally form the basic framework of full-scope'' safeguards would result in a more flexible inspection regime. The MBA concept applied in the domestic context enables a national authority to localize losses in space and in time and to minimize the need to measure in-process inventory. However, these advantages do not accrue to an international verification regime because it cannot truly verify the flows'' between MBAs without extensive containment/surveillance measures. In the verification model studied, the entire nuclear inventory of a state is periodically declared and verified simultaneously in one or two large segments (containing possibly many MBAS). Simultaneous inventory of all MBAs within a segment would occur through advance mailbox'' declarations and random selection of MBAs for on-site verification or through enhanced containment/surveillance techniques. Flows are generally speaking not verified. This scheme would free the inspectorate from the obligation to attempt to verify on-site each stratum of the material balance of every facility declaring significant quantities of nuclear material.

  1. Implementation of IT-based applications in the safeguards field

    SciTech Connect

    Ekenstam, G.C. af; Sallstrom, M.

    1995-12-31

    For many years the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate, SKI, has used computers as a tool within nuclear material control and accountancy. Over the last five years a lot of effort has been put into projects related to the increasing possibilities of fast and reliable data transfer over large distances. The paper discusses related administrative and technical issues and presents experience gained in tasks of the Swedish Support Program to IAEA Safeguards and during the alternative Safeguards trials carried out by SKI. The following topics will be presented: (1) Main Safeguards purposes and data transfer; (2) Administrative systems and requirements; (3) Technical possibilities and experiences; and (4) The cost aspect.

  2. Reactor monitoring and safeguards using antineutrino detectors

    SciTech Connect

    Bowden, N S

    2008-09-07

    Nuclear reactors have served as the antineutrino source for many fundamental physics experiments. The techniques developed by these experiments make it possible to use these very weakly interacting particles for a practical purpose. The large flux of antineutrinos that leaves a reactor carries information about two quantities of interest for safeguards: the reactor power and fissile inventory. Measurements made with antineutrino detectors could therefore offer an alternative means for verifying the power history and fissile inventory of a reactors, as part of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other reactor safeguards regimes. Several efforts to develop this monitoring technique are underway across the globe.

  3. Is it possible to enhance the nuclear Schiff moment by nuclear collective modes?

    SciTech Connect

    Auerbach, N. Dmitriev, V. F. Flambaum, V. V. Lisetskiy, A. Sen'kov, R. A. Zelevinsky, V. G.

    2007-09-15

    The nuclear Schiff moment is predicted to be enhanced in nuclei with static quadrupole and octupole deformation. The analogous suggestion of the enhanced contribution to the Schiff moment from the soft collective quadrupole and octupole vibrations in spherical nuclei is tested in the framework of the quasiparticle random phase approximation with separable quadrupole and octupole forces applied to the odd {sup 217-221}Ra and {sup 217-221}Rn isotopes. In this framework, we confirm the existence of the enhancement effect due to the soft modes, but only in the limit when the frequencies of quadrupole and octupole vibrations are close to zero.

  4. Safeguards Envelope Progress FY09

    SciTech Connect

    Richard Metcalf; Robert Bean

    2009-09-01

    The Safeguards Envelope is a strategy to determine a set of specific operating parameters which nuclear facilities may operate within to maximize safeguards effectiveness without sacrificing safety or plant efficiency. This paper details advanced statistical techniques will be applied to real plant process monitoring (PM) data from the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP). As a result of the U.S. having no operating nuclear chemical reprocessing plants, there has been a strong interest in obtaining process monitoring data from the ICPP. The ICPP was shut down in 1996 and a recent effort has been made to retrieve the PM data from storage in a data mining effort. In a simulation based on this data, multi-tank and multi-attribute correlations were tested against synthetic diversion scenarios. Kernel regression smoothing was used to fit a curve to the historical data, and multivariable, residual analysis and cumulative sum techniques set parameters for operating conditions. Diversion scenarios were created and tested, showing improved results when compared with a previous study utilizing only one-variable Z- testing7.

  5. Radiation enhanced dissociation of hydrogen in nuclear rockets

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Watanabe, Yoichi

    1992-01-01

    The effect of radiation-induced dissociation of hydrogen gas in nuclear rockets is studied. The dissociation degree is obtained by solving rate equations, which include the fast-ion induced dissociation and ionization of atomic and molecular hydrogens. Analytical formulas are used to estimate a change in the viscosity and the specific impulse. It was found that the fast-ion induced dissociation plays an important role in enhancing the specific impulse for nuclear rocket concepts using hydrogen gas at low pressures (less than 0.1 MPa) and low temperatures (less than 3000 K). It is also shown that the specific impulse is enhanced by mixing helium-3, lithium-6, boron-10, or uranium-235 with hydrogen.

  6. The European Safeguards Research and Development Association Addresses Safeguards and Nonproliferation

    SciTech Connect

    Janssens-Maenhout, Greet; Kusumi, R.; Daures, Pascal A.; Janssens, Willem; Dickman, Deborah A.

    2010-06-16

    The renaissance of efforts to expand the use of nuclear energy requires the parallel development of a renewed and more sophisticated work force. Growth in the nuclear sector with high standard of safety, safeguards and security requires skilled staff for design, operations, inspections etc. High-quality nuclear technology educational programs are diminished from past years, and the ability of universities to attract students and to meet future staffing requirements of the nuclear industry is becoming seriously compromised. Thus, education and training in nuclear engineering and sciences is one of the cornerstones for the nuclear sector. Teaching in the nuclear field still seems strongly influenced by national history but it is time to strengthen resources and collaborate. Moreover with the current nuclear security threats it becomes critical that nuclear technology experts master the basic principles not only of safety, but also of nuclear safeguards, nonproliferation and nuclear security. In Europe the European Nuclear Education Network (ENEN) Association has established the certificate 'European Master of Science in Nuclear Engineering (EMSNE)' as the classic nuclear engineering program covering reactor operation and nuclear safety. However, it does not include courses on nonproliferation, safeguards, or dual-use technologies. The lack of education in nuclear safeguards was tackled by the European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA), through development and implementation of safeguards course modules. Since 2005 the ESARDA Working Group, called the Training and Knowledge Management Working Group, (TKMWG) has worked with the Joint Research Centre (JRC) in Ispra, Italy to organize a Nuclear Safeguards and Nonproliferation course. This five-day course is held each spring at the JRC, and continues to show increasing interest as evidenced by the positive responses of international lecturers and students. The standard set of lectures covers a broad

  7. International safeguards data authentication

    SciTech Connect

    Melton, R.B.; Smith, C.E.; DeLand, S.M.; Manatt, D.R.

    1996-07-01

    The International Safeguards community is becoming increasingly reliant on information stored in electronic form. In international monitoring and related activities it must be possible to verify and maintain the integrity of this electronic information. This paper discusses the use of data authentication technology to assist in accomplishing this task. The paper provides background information, identifies the relevance to international safeguards, discusses issues related to export controls, algorithm patents, key management and the use of commercial vs. custom software.

  8. Safeguards and security status report, August 1981-January 1982

    SciTech Connect

    Shipley, J.P.

    1982-09-01

    From August 1981 through January 1982, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in many activities that are described in the four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Safeguards Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Support. Part 1 covers those efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensee facilities. This assistance varies from consultation on materials accounting problems, through development of specialized techniques and devices, to comprehensive participation in the design and implementation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards helps make the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 concerns a relatively new set of activities at Los Alamos aimed at the security of information and computer systems. The focus this period has been on furthering the development of the Computer Security Center, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating the emerging technology. Part 3 describes the development efforts that are essential to continued improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, in every case they are directed ultimately at recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. In addition, enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gaseous Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer.

  9. Remote monitoring: A global partnership for safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Bardsley, J.

    1996-08-01

    With increased awareness of the significant changes of the past several years and their effect on the expectations to international safeguards, it is necessary to reflect on the direction for development of nuclear safeguards in a new era and the resulting implications. The time proven monitoring techniques, based on quantitative factors and demonstrated universal application, have shown their merit. However, the new expectations suggest a possibility that a future IAEA safeguards system could rely more heavily on the value of a comprehensive, transparent, and open implementation regime. With the establishment of such a regime, it is highly likely that remote monitoring will play a significant role. Several states have seen value in cooperating with each other to address the many problems associated with the remote interrogation of integrated monitoring systems. As a consequence the International Remote Monitoring Project was organized to examine the future of remote monitoring in International Safeguards. This paper provides an update on the technical issues, the future plans, and the safeguards implications of cooperative programs relating to remote monitoring. Without providing answers to the policy questions involved, it suggests that it is timely to begin addressing these issues.

  10. Optically enhanced nuclear cross polarization in acridine-doped fluorene

    SciTech Connect

    Oshiro, C.M.

    1982-06-01

    The objective of this work has been to create large polarizations of the dilute /sup 13/C nuclei in the solid state. The idea was to create /sup 1/H polarizations larger than Boltzmann and to use the proton enhanced nuclear induction spectroscopy cross polarization technique to then transfer this large polarization to the /sup 13/C spin system. Optical Nuclear Polarization (ONP) of acridine-doped fluorene single crystals was studied. In addition, ONP of powdered samples of the acridine-doped fluorene was studied. In general, many compounds do not crystallize easily or do not form large crystals suitable for NMR experiments. Powdered, amorphous and randomly dispersed samples are generally far more readily available than single crystals. One objective of this work has been to (first) create large /sup 1/H polarizations. Although large optical proton polarizations in single crystals have been reported previously, optically generated polarizations in powdered samples have not been reported. For these reasons, ONP studies of powdered samples of the acridine-doped fluorene were also undertaken. Using ONP in combination with the proton enhanced nuclear induction spectroscopy experiment, large /sup 13/C polarizations have been created in fluorene single crystals. These large /sup 13/C polarizations have permitted the determination of the seven incongruent chemical shielding tensors of the fluorene molecule. Part 2 of this thesis describes the proton enhanced nuclear induction spectroscopy experiment. Part 3 describes the ONP experiment. Part 4 is a description of the experimental set-up. Part 5 describes the data analysis for the determination of the chemical shielding tensors. Part 6 presents the results of the ONP experiments performed in this work and the chemical shielding tensors determined.

  11. Enhancement of NRC station blackout requirements for nuclear power plants

    SciTech Connect

    McConnell, M. W.

    2012-07-01

    The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) established a Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) in response to Commission direction to conduct a systematic and methodical review of NRC processes and regulations to determine whether the agency should make additional improvements to its regulatory system and to make recommendations to the Commission for its policy direction, in light of the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant. The NTTF's review resulted in a set of recommendations that took a balanced approach to defense-in-depth as applied to low-likelihood, high-consequence events such as prolonged station blackout (SBO) resulting from severe natural phenomena. Part 50, Section 63, of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), 'Loss of All Alternating Current Power,' currently requires that each nuclear power plant must be able to cool the reactor core and maintain containment integrity for a specified duration of an SBO. The SBO duration and mitigation strategy for each nuclear power plant is site specific and is based on the robustness of the local transmission system and the transmission system operator's capability to restore offsite power to the nuclear power plant. With regard to SBO, the NTTF recommended that the NRC strengthen SBO mitigation capability at all operating and new reactors for design-basis and beyond-design-basis external events. The NTTF also recommended strengthening emergency preparedness for prolonged SBO and multi-unit events. These recommendations, taken together, are intended to clarify and strengthen US nuclear reactor safety regarding protection against and mitigation of the consequences of natural disasters and emergency preparedness during SBO. The focus of this paper is on the existing SBO requirements and NRC initiatives to strengthen SBO capability at all operating and new reactors to address prolonged SBO stemming from design-basis and beyond-design-basis external events. The NRC initiatives are intended to

  12. Enhancing leadership at a nuclear power plant - a systematic approach

    SciTech Connect

    Jupiter, P.

    1989-01-01

    The increasing use of advanced technology, greater regulatory oversight, and critical public scrutiny create numerous pressures for leaders within nuclear power plant systems (NPPSs). These large, complex industrial installations have unusually high expectations imposed for safety and efficiency of operation - without the luxury of trial-and-error learning. Industry leaders assert that enhanced leadership and management can substantially improve the operating performance of a nuclear power plant. The need has been voiced within the nuclear industry for systematic and effective methods to address leadership and management issues. This paper presents a step-by-step model for enhancing leadership achievement within NPPS, which is defined as the combined structural, equipment, and human elements involved in a plant's operation. Within the model, key areas for which the leader is responsible build upon each other in sequential order to form a solid strategic structure; teachable actions and skills form an ongoing cycle for leadership achievement. Through the model's continued and appropriate functioning, a NPPS is likely to maintain its viability, productivity, and effectiveness for the full licensed term of a plant.

  13. Organizational Culture, 3S, and Safeguards by Design

    SciTech Connect

    Mladineo, Stephen V.; Frazar, Sarah L.

    2012-01-31

    While Safety and Security Culture are well socialized among nuclear facility designers, the concept of safeguards culture is less well defined. One area where safeguards culture may play a helpful role is in the area of Safeguards by Design. This paper will include a theoretical discussion of organizational culture, leading with safety culture and security culture that are well known, and positing that there may be room to think about safeguards culture along with the others. It will also examine the utility of the 3S concept and how this concept has been used in training for newcomer states. These will lead into a discussion of how the addition of safeguards to the mix of safety by design and security by design can be valuable, particularly as it is socialized to newcomer states.

  14. Enabling International Safeguards Research and Development in the United States

    SciTech Connect

    John E. Dwight; Mark J. Schanfein; Trond A. Bjornard

    2009-07-01

    Idaho National Laboratory (INL) is the lead laboratory in nuclear energy research and development within the U.S. Department of Energy national laboratory complex. INL is tasked with the advancement of nuclear energy research and development, and leadership in the renaissance of nuclear power globally. INL scientists have been central to the assessment of needs and the integration of technical programs aimed at the world-wide growth of nuclear power. One of the grand challenges of the nuclear energy resurgence is nuclear nonproliferation. Nonproliferation technology development is key to meeting this challenge. The needed advances in nonproliferation technologies are being made more difficult by the growing gap between increasing demands for nuclear materials to support technology development, and reduced availability of these materials. The gap is caused by the reduction, consolidation and more stringent lockdown of nuclear materials, made necessary by heightened and evolving security concerns, in the face of increased demand for materials to support technology development. Ironically, the increased demand for materials for technology development is made necessary by these same security concerns. The situation will continue to worsen if safeguards and security budgets remain limited for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and many member states, while growth in global nuclear energy becomes a reality. Effective U.S. leadership in the closing of this gap is vital to homeland security and global stability. INL has taken positive steps, described in this paper, to close this gap by reestablishing a viable base for the development, testing and demonstration of safeguards and security technologies. Key attributes of this technology development base are (1) the availability of a wide variety of special nuclear materials in forms that allow for enhanced accessibility; (2) ease of access by U.S. government, national laboratory, industry and academic institution

  15. Analysis of the effectiveness of gas centrifuge enrichment plants advanced safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Boyer, Brian David; Erpenbeck, Heather H; Miller, Karen A; Swinjoe, Martyn T; Ianakiev, Kiril D; Marlow, Johnna B

    2010-01-01

    Current safeguards approaches used by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs) need enhancement in order to verify declared low-enriched uranium (LEU) production, detect undeclared LEU production and detect highly enriched uranium (HEU) production with adequate detection probability using non destructive assay (NDA) techniques. At present inspectors use attended systems, systems needing the presence of an inspector for operation, during inspections to verify the mass and 235U enrichment of declared UF6 containers used in the process of enrichment at GCEPs. This paper contains an analysis of possible improvements in unattended and attended NDA systems including process monitoring and possible on-site destructive assay (DA) of samples that could reduce the uncertainty of the inspector's measurements. These improvements could reduce the difference between the operator's and inspector's measurements providing more effective and efficient IAEA GCEPs safeguards. We also explore how a few advanced safeguards systems could be assembled for unattended operation. The analysis will focus on how unannounced inspections (UIs), and the concept of information-driven inspections (IDS) can affect probability of detection of the diversion of nuclear materials when coupled to new GCEPs safeguards regimes augmented with unattended systems.

  16. Pebble bed modular reactor safeguards: developing new approaches and implementing safeguards by design

    SciTech Connect

    Beyer, Brian David; Beddingfield, David H; Durst, Philip; Bean, Robert

    2010-01-01

    The design of the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR) does not fit or seem appropriate to the IAEA safeguards approach under the categories of light water reactor (LWR), on-load refueled reactor (OLR, i.e. CANDU), or Other (prismatic HTGR) because the fuel is in a bulk form, rather than discrete items. Because the nuclear fuel is a collection of nuclear material inserted in tennis-ball sized spheres containing structural and moderating material and a PBMR core will contain a bulk load on the order of 500,000 spheres, it could be classified as a 'Bulk-Fuel Reactor.' Hence, the IAEA should develop unique safeguards criteria. In a multi-lab DOE study, it was found that an optimized blend of: (i) developing techniques to verify the plutonium content in spent fuel pebbles, (ii) improving burn-up computer codes for PBMR spent fuel to provide better understanding of the core and spent fuel makeup, and (iii) utilizing bulk verification techniques for PBMR spent fuel storage bins should be combined with the historic IAEA and South African approaches of containment and surveillance to verify and maintain continuity of knowledge of PBMR fuel. For all of these techniques to work the design of the reactor will need to accommodate safeguards and material accountancy measures to a far greater extent than has thus far been the case. The implementation of Safeguards-by-Design as the PBMR design progresses provides an approach to meets these safeguards and accountancy needs.

  17. Sustaining International CBRN Centers of Excellence with a Focus on Nuclear Security and Safeguards: Initial Scoping Session London, 23-24 September 2013 SUMMARY REPORT

    SciTech Connect

    Anderson, Roger G.; Frazar, Sarah L.

    2013-12-12

    This report provides a summary-level description of the key information, observations, ideas, and recommendations expressed during the subject meeting. The report is organized to correspond to the meeting agenda provided in Appendix 1 and includes references to several of the participants listed in Appendix 2 .The meeting venue was Lloyd’s Register in the City of London. Lloyd’s Register graciously accommodated the request of The Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNNL) with whom it works on various safeguards activities commissioned by NNSA. PNNL and NNSA also shared the goal of the meeting/study with the United Kingdom (UK) Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Department of Energy and Climate Change with whom they coordinated the participant list.

  18. Self-Reliability and Motivation in a Nuclear Security Culture Enhancement Program

    SciTech Connect

    Crawford,C.; de Boer,G.; De Castro, K; Landers, Ph.D., J; Rogers, E

    2009-10-19

    The threat of nuclear terrorism has become a global concern. Many countries continue to make efforts to strengthen nuclear security by enhancing systems of nuclear material protection, control, and accounting (MPC&A). Though MPC&A systems can significantly upgrade nuclear security, they do not eliminate the "human factor." This paper will describe some of the key elements of a comprehensive, sustainable nuclear security culture enhancement program and how implementation can mitigate the insider threat.

  19. International Safeguards and the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory

    SciTech Connect

    Olsen, Khris B.; Smith, Leon E.; Frazar, Sarah L.; Kurzrok, Andrew J.; Orton, Christopher R.; Schanfein, Mark J.; Sayre, Amanda M.; Jones, Rebecca L.

    2016-07-21

    Established in 1965, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory’s (PNNL) strong technical ties and shared heritage with the nearby U.S. Department of Energy Hanford Site were central to the early development of expertise in nuclear fuel cycle signatures, separations chemistry, plutonium chemistry, environmental monitoring, modeling and analysis of reactor systems, and nuclear material safeguards and security. From these Hanford origins, PNNL has grown into a multi-program science and engineering enterprise that utilizes this diversity to strengthen the international safeguards regime. Today, PNNL supports the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in its mission to provide assurances to the international community that nations do not use nuclear materials and equipment outside of peaceful uses. PNNL also serves in the IAEA’s Network of Analytical Laboratories (NWAL) by providing analysis of environmental samples gathered around the world. PNNL is involved in safeguards research and development activities in support of many U.S. Government programs such as the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Office of Research and Development, NNSA Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control, and the U.S. Support Program to IAEA Safeguards. In addition to these programs, PNNL invests internal resources including safeguards-specific training opportunities for staff, and laboratory-directed research and development funding to further ideas that may grow into new capabilities. This paper and accompanying presentation highlight some of PNNL’s contributions in technology development, implementation concepts and approaches, policy, capacity building, and human capital development, in the field of international safeguards.

  20. Uranyl peroxide enhanced nuclear fuel corrosion in seawater

    PubMed Central

    Armstrong, Christopher R.; Nyman, May; Shvareva, Tatiana; Sigmon, Ginger E.; Burns, Peter C.; Navrotsky, Alexandra

    2012-01-01

    The Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear accident brought together compromised irradiated fuel and large amounts of seawater in a high radiation field. Based on newly acquired thermochemical data for a series of uranyl peroxide compounds containing charge-balancing alkali cations, here we show that nanoscale cage clusters containing as many as 60 uranyl ions, bonded through peroxide and hydroxide bridges, are likely to form in solution or as precipitates under such conditions. These species will enhance the corrosion of the damaged fuel and, being thermodynamically stable and kinetically persistent in the absence of peroxide, they can potentially transport uranium over long distances. PMID:22308442

  1. Safeguards management inspection procedures

    SciTech Connect

    Barth, M.J.; Dunn, D.R.

    1984-08-01

    The objective of this inspection module is to independently assess the contributions of licensee management to overall safeguards systems performance. The inspector accomplishes this objective by comparing the licensee's safeguards management to both the 10 CFR, parts 70 and 73, requirements and to generally accepted management practices. The vehicle by which this comparison is to be made consists of assessment questions and key issues which point the inspector to areas of primary concern to the NRC and which raise additional issues for the purpose of exposing management ineffectiveness. Further insight into management effectiveness is obtained through those assessment questions specifically directed toward the licensee's safeguards system performance. If the quality of the safeguards is poor, then the inspector should strongly suspect that management's role is ineffective and should attempt to determine management's influence (or lack thereof) on the underlying safeguards deficiencies. (The converse is not necessarily true, however.) The assessment questions in essence provide an opportunity for the inspector to identify, to single out, and to probe further, questionable management practices. Specific issues, circumstances, and concerns which point to questionable or inappropriate practices should be explicitly identified and referenced against the CFR and the assessment questions. The inspection report should also explain why the inspector feels certain management practices are poor, counter to the CFR, and/or point to ineffecive management. Concurrent with documenting the inspection results, the inspector should provide recommendations for alleviating observed management practices that are detrimental to effective safeguards. The recommendations could include: specific changes in the practices of the licensee, followup procedures on the part of NRC, and proposed license changes.

  2. Polarization enhanced Nuclear Quadrupole Resonance with an atomic magnetometer

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Malone, Michael W.; Barrall, Geoffrey A.; Espy, Michelle A.; Monti, Mark C.; Alexson, Dimitri A.; Okamitsu, Jeffrey K.

    2016-05-01

    Nuclear Quadrupole Resonance (NQR) has been demonstrated for the detection of 14-N in explosive compounds. Application of a material specific radio-frequency (RF) pulse excites a response typically detected with a wire- wound antenna. NQR is non-contact and material specific, however fields produced by NQR are typically very weak, making demonstration of practical utility challenging. For certain materials, the NQR signal can be increased by transferring polarization from hydrogen nuclei to nitrogen nuclei using external magnetic fields. This polarization enhancement (PE) can enhance the NQR signal by an order of magnitude or more. Atomic magnetometers (AM) have been shown to improve detection sensitivity beyond a conventional antenna by a similar amount. AM sensors are immune to piezo-electric effects that hamper conventional NQR, and can be combined to form a gradiometer for effective RF noise cancellation. In principle, combining polarization enhancement with atomic magnetometer detection should yield improvement in signal-to-noise ratio that is the product of the two methods, 100-fold or more over conventional NQR. However both methods are even more exotic than traditional NQR, and have never been combined due to challenges in operating a large magnetic field and ultra-sensitive magnetic field sensor in proximity. Here we present NQR with and without PE with an atomic magnetometer, demonstrating signal enhancement greater than 20-fold for ammonium nitrate. We also demonstrate PE for PETN using a traditional coil for detection with an enhancement factor of 10. Experimental methods and future applications are discussed.

  3. Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1984

    SciTech Connect

    Smith, D.B.

    1986-01-01

    From January to December 1984, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Safeguards. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensee facilities. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. was Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in benefiting from field experiences in operating environments.

  4. TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT ON THE DUPIC SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM

    SciTech Connect

    H. KIM; H. CHA; ET AL

    2001-02-01

    A safeguards system has been developed since 1993 in the course of supporting a fuel cycle process to fabricate CANDU fuel with spent PWR fuel (known as Direct Use of PWR spent fuel In CANDU, DUPIC). The major safeguards technology involved here was to design and fabricate a neutron coincidence counting system for process accountability, and also an unattended continuous monitoring system in association with independent verification by the IAEA. This combined technology was to produce information of nuclear material content and to maintain knowledge of the continuity of nuclear material flow. In addition to hardware development, diagnosis software is being developed to assist data acquisition, data review, and data evaluation based on a neural network system on the IAEA C/S system.

  5. 78 FR 79020 - Advisory Committee On Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2013-12-27

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee On Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation Protection and Nuclear Materials; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation Protection and...

  6. 75 FR 16874 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-04-02

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation Protection and Nuclear Materials; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation Protection and...

  7. 76 FR 61119 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-10-03

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation Protection and Nuclear Materials; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation Protection and...

  8. 78 FR 66967 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting of the ACRS Subcommitte on Radiation...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2013-11-07

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting of the ACRS Subcommitte on Radiation Protection and Nuclear Materials; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation Protection and...

  9. 76 FR 27101 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-05-10

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation Protection and Nuclear Materials; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation Protection and...

  10. 76 FR 55717 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-09-08

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation Protection and Nuclear Materials; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation Protection and...

  11. 76 FR 55716 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of The ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-09-08

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of The ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation Protection and Nuclear Materials; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation Protection and...

  12. 77 FR 56240 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2012-09-12

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation Protection and Nuclear Materials; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation Protection and...

  13. 78 FR 17944 - Advisory Committee On Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2013-03-25

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee On Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation Protection and Nuclear Materials; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation Protection and...

  14. 76 FR 36160 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-06-21

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation Protection and Nuclear Materials Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation Protection and...

  15. 77 FR 68161 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2012-11-15

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation Protection and Nuclear Materials; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation Protection and...

  16. 76 FR 34779 - Advisory Committee On Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-06-14

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee On Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation Protection and Nuclear Materials; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation Protection and...

  17. 77 FR 38099 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2012-06-26

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation Protection and Nuclear Materials; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation Protection and...

  18. 75 FR 4881 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-01-29

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation Protection and Nuclear Materials; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation Protection and...

  19. THE NEXT GENERATION SAFEGUARDS PROFESSIONAL NETWORK: PROGRESS AND NEXT STEPS

    SciTech Connect

    Zhernosek, Alena V; Lynch, Patrick D; Scholz, Melissa A

    2011-01-01

    President Obama has repeatedly stated that the United States must ensure that the international safeguards regime, as embodied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has 'the authority, information, people, and technology it needs to do its job.' The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) works to implement the President's vision through the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), a program to revitalize the U.S. DOE national laboratories safeguards technology and human capital base so that the United States can more effectively support the IAEA and ensure that it meets current and emerging challenges to the international safeguards system. In 2009, in response to the human capital development goals of NGSI, young safeguards professionals within the Global Nuclear Security Technology Division at Oak Ridge National Laboratory launched the Next Generation Safeguards Professional Network (NGSPN). The purpose of this initiative is to establish working relationships and to foster collaboration and communication among the next generation of safeguards leaders. The NGSPN is an organization for, and of, young professionals pursuing careers in nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation - as well as mid-career professionals new to the field - whether working within the U.S. DOE national laboratory complex, U.S. government agencies, academia, or industry or at the IAEA. The NGSPN is actively supported by the NNSA, boasts more than 70 members, maintains a website and newsletter, and has held two national meetings as well as an NGSPN session and panel at the July 2010 Institute of Nuclear Material Management Annual Meeting. This paper discusses the network; its significance, goals and objectives; developments and progress to date; and future plans.

  20. Trial Application of the Facility Safeguardability Assessment Process to the NuScale SMR Design

    SciTech Connect

    Coles, Garill A.; Gitau, Ernest TN; Hockert, John; Zentner, Michael D.

    2012-11-09

    FSA is a screening process intended to focus a facility designer’s attention on the aspects of their facility or process design that would most benefit from application of SBD principles and practices. The process is meant to identify the most relevant guidance within the SBD tools for enhancing the safeguardability of the design. In fiscal year (FY) 2012, NNSA sponsored PNNL to evaluate the practical application of FSA by applying it to the NuScale small modular nuclear power plant. This report documents the application of the FSA process, presenting conclusions regarding its efficiency and robustness. It describes the NuScale safeguards design concept and presents functional "infrastructure" guidelines that were developed using the FSA process.

  1. Trial Application of the Facility Safeguardability Assessment Process to the NuScale SMR Design

    SciTech Connect

    Coles, Garill A.; Hockert, John; Gitau, Ernest TN; Zentner, Michael D.

    2013-01-26

    FSA is a screening process intended to focus a facility designer’s attention on the aspects of their facility or process design that would most benefit from application of SBD principles and practices. The process is meant to identify the most relevant guidance within the SBD tools for enhancing the safeguardability of the design. In fiscal year (FY) 2012, NNSA sponsored PNNL to evaluate the practical application of FSA by applying it to the NuScale small modular nuclear power plant. This report documents the application of the FSA process, presenting conclusions regarding its efficiency and robustness. It describes the NuScale safeguards design concept and presents functional "infrastructure" guidelines that were developed using the FSA process.

  2. Integrating Safeguards and Security with Safety into Design

    SciTech Connect

    Robert S. Bean; John W. Hockert; David J. Hebditch

    2009-05-01

    There is a need to minimize security risks, proliferation hazards, and safety risks in the design of new nuclear facilities in a global environment of nuclear power expansion, while improving the synergy of major design features and raising operational efficiency. In 2008, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) launched the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) covering many safeguards areas. One of these, launched by NNSA with support of the DOE Office of Nuclear Energy, was a multi-laboratory project, led by the Idaho National Laboratory (INL), to develop safeguards by design. The proposed Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process has been developed as a structured approach to ensure the timely, efficient, and cost effective integration of international safeguards and other nonproliferation barriers with national material control and accountability, physical security, and safety objectives into the overall design process for the nuclear facility lifecycle. A graded, iterative process was developed to integrate these areas throughout the project phases. It identified activities, deliverables, interfaces, and hold points covering both domestic regulatory requirements and international safeguards using the DOE regulatory environment as exemplar to provide a framework and guidance for project management and integration of safety with security during design. Further work, reported in this paper, created a generalized SBD process which could also be employed within the licensed nuclear industry and internationally for design of new facilities. Several tools for integrating safeguards, safety, and security into design are discussed here. SBD appears complementary to the EFCOG TROSSI process for security and safety integration created in 2006, which focuses on standardized upgrades to enable existing DOE facilities to meet a more severe design basis threat. A collaborative approach is suggested.

  3. Advanced integrated safeguards using front-end-triggering devices

    SciTech Connect

    Howell, J.A.; Whitty, W.J.

    1995-12-01

    This report addresses potential uses of front-end-triggering devices for enhanced safeguards. Such systems incorporate video surveillance as well as radiation and other sensors. Also covered in the report are integration issues and analysis techniques.

  4. Paramagnetic Enhancement of Nuclear Spin-Spin Coupling.

    PubMed

    Cherry, Peter John; Rouf, Syed Awais; Vaara, Juha

    2017-03-14

    We present a derivation and computations of the paramagnetic enhancement of the nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR) spin-spin coupling, which may be expressed in terms of the hyperfine coupling (HFC) and (for systems with multiple unpaired electrons) zero-field splitting (ZFS) tensors. This enhancement is formally analogous to the hyperfine contributions to the NMR shielding tensor as formulated by Kurland and McGarvey. The significance of the spin-spin coupling enhancement is demonstrated by using a combination of density-functional theory and correlated ab initio calculations, to determine the HFC and ZFS tensors, respectively, for two paramagnetic 3d metallocenes, a Cr(II)(acac)2 complex, a Co(II) pyrazolylborate complex, and a lanthanide system, Gd-DOTA. Particular attention is paid to relativistic effects in HFC tensors, which are calculated using two methods: a nonrelativistic method supplemented by perturbational spin-orbit coupling corrections, and a fully relativistic, four-component matrix-Dirac-Kohn-Sham approach. The paramagnetic enhancement lacks a direct dependence on the distance between the coupled nuclei, and represents more the strength and orientation of the individual hyperfine couplings of the two nuclei to the spin density distribution. Therefore, the enhancement gains relative importance as compared to conventional coupling as the distance between the nuclei increases, or generally in the cases where the conventional coupling mechanisms result in a small value. With the development of the experimental techniques of paramagnetic NMR, the more significant enhancements, e.g., of the (13)C(13)C couplings in the Gd-DOTA complex (as large as 9.4 Hz), may eventually become important.

  5. Nuclear Fuel Cycle & Vulnerabilities

    SciTech Connect

    Boyer, Brian D.

    2012-06-18

    The objective of safeguards is the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection. The safeguards system should be designed to provide credible assurances that there has been no diversion of declared nuclear material and no undeclared nuclear material and activities.

  6. Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1985

    SciTech Connect

    Not Available

    1987-03-01

    From January to December 1985, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Safeguards Operations, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Support. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development and demonstration of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and evaluation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this period was on continuing the activities of the Center for Computer Security, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards and international safeguards for reprocessing plants required a significant portion of our resources. All of these efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in our benefiting from field experiences in operating environments.

  7. Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1983

    SciTech Connect

    Smith, D.B.

    1984-09-01

    From January to December 1983, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Safeguards. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and implementation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this peiod was on continuing the activities of the Computer Security Center, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in our benefiting from field experiences in operating environments.

  8. Evaluating safeguard effectiveness against violent insiders

    SciTech Connect

    Al-Ayat, R.A.; Fortney, D.S.

    1990-07-16

    The threat posed by a violent insiders presents a major challenge to safeguards managers. These insiders, in addition to their ability to exploit their special authorities, access, and knowledge of facility operations and safeguards, could use violence to defeat safeguards components and personnel. In protecting against theft of special nuclear material, facilities have emphasized the use of perimeter protection and physical barriers to protect against attacks by an outsider adversary group. Recently emphasis has begun to shift toward the implementation of hardware and procedural measures to protect against nonviolent insiders. Approaches are also needed to help assess the effectiveness of protection against those insiders who are willing to use violence. In this paper we describe an approach we're developing for dealing with violent insiders. We begin by categorizing insiders according to whether they are active or passive, rational or irrational, and whether they are willing to use force against safeguards components or coworkers. We define characteristics of each category, and describe the extent to which each category is adequately modelled by existing evaluation tools. We also discuss several modelling issues posed by active insiders, including: entry of contraband; reluctance to use violence; neutralization of insiders; and the ability to switch modes of attack between force, stealth, and deceit. 5 refs., 2 figs.

  9. Advanced Safeguards Approaches for New Fast Reactors

    SciTech Connect

    Durst, Philip C.; Therios, Ike; Bean, Robert; Dougan, A.; Boyer, Brian; Wallace, Rick L.; Ehinger, Michael H.; Kovacic, Don N.; Tolk, K.

    2007-12-15

    This third report in the series reviews possible safeguards approaches for new fast reactors in general, and the ABR in particular. Fast-neutron spectrum reactors have been used since the early 1960s on an experimental and developmental level, generally with fertile blanket fuels to “breed” nuclear fuel such as plutonium. Whether the reactor is designed to breed plutonium, or transmute and “burn” actinides depends mainly on the design of the reactor neutron reflector and the whether the blanket fuel is “fertile” or suitable for transmutation. However, the safeguards issues are very similar, since they pertain mainly to the receipt, shipment and storage of fresh and spent plutonium and actinide-bearing “TRU”-fuel. For these reasons, the design of existing fast reactors and details concerning how they have been safeguarded were studied in developing advanced safeguards approaches for the new fast reactors. In this regard, the design of the Experimental Breeder Reactor-II “EBR-II” at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) was of interest, because it was designed as a collocated fast reactor with a pyrometallurgical reprocessing and fuel fabrication line – a design option being considered for the ABR. Similarly, the design of the Fast Flux Facility (FFTF) on the Hanford Site was studied, because it was a successful prototype fast reactor that ran for two decades to evaluate fuels and the design for commercial-scale fast reactors.

  10. Third International Meeting on Next Generation Safeguards:Safeguards-by-Design at Enrichment Facilities

    SciTech Connect

    Long, Jon D.; McGinnis, Brent R; Morgan, James B; Whitaker, Michael; Lockwood, Mr. Dunbar; Shipwash, Jacqueline L

    2011-01-01

    The Third International Meeting on Next Generation Safeguards (NGS3) was hosted by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) in Washington, D.C. on 14-15 December 2010; this meeting focused on the Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) concept. There were approximately 100 participants from 13 countries, comprised of safeguards policy and technical experts from government and industry. Representatives also were present from the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), the European Atomic Energy Agency (Euratom), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The primary objective of this meeting was to exchange views and provide recommendations on implementation of the SBD concept for four specific nuclear fuel cycle facility types: gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs), GEN III and GEN IV reactors, aqueous reprocessing plants, and mixed oxide fuel fabrication facilities. The general and facility-specific SBD documents generated from the four working groups, which were circulated for comment among working group participants, are intended to provide a substantive contribution to the IAEA's efforts to publish SBD guidance for these specific types of nuclear facilities in the near future. The IAEA has described the SBD concept as an approach in which 'international safeguards are fully integrated into the design process of a new nuclear facility from the initial planning through design, construction, operation, and decommissioning.' As part of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), the DOE is working to establish SBD as a global norm through DOE laboratory studies, international workshops, engagement with industry and the IAEA, and setting an example through its use in new nuclear facilities in the United States. This paper describes the discussion topics and final recommendations of the Enrichment Facilities Working

  11. Enhanced hydrogen production of Enterobacter aerogenes mutated by nuclear irradiation.

    PubMed

    Cheng, Jun; Liu, Min; Song, Wenlu; Ding, Lingkan; Liu, Jianzhong; Zhang, Li; Cen, Kefa

    2017-03-01

    Nuclear irradiation was used for the first time to generate efficient mutants of hydrogen-producing bacteria Enterobacter aerogenes, which were screened with larger colour circles of more fermentative acid by-products. E. aerogenes cells were mutated by nuclear irradiation of (60)Co γ-rays. The screened E. aerogenes ZJU1 mutant with larger colour circles enhanced the hydrogenase activity from 89.8 of the wild strain to 157.4mLH2/(gDWh). The hereditary stability of the E. aerogenes ZJU1 mutant was certified after over ten generations of cultivation. The hydrogen yield of 301mLH2/gglucose with the mutant was higher by 81.8% than that of 166mL/gglucose with the wild strain. The peak hydrogen production rate of 27.2mL/(L·h) with the mutant was higher by 40.9% compared with that of 19.3mL/(L·h) with the wild strain. The mutant produced more acetate and butyrate but less ethanol compared with the wild strain during hydrogen fermentation.

  12. UV Enhancement of CR-39 Nuclear Track Detector Etch Parameters

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Traynor, Nathan; McLauchlin, Christopher; Dodge, Kenneth; McLean, James; Padalino, Stephen; Burke, Michelle; Sangster, Craig

    2014-03-01

    CR-39 plastic is an effective and commonly used solid state nuclear track detector. High-energy charged particles leave tracks of chemical damage. When CR-39 is chemically etched with NaOH at elevated temperatures, pits are produced at the track sites that are measurable by an optical microscope. We have shown that by exposing the CR-39 to high intensity UV light between nuclear irradiation and chemical etching, the rate at which the pits grow during etching is increased. The effect has been observed for wavelengths shorter than 350 nm, to at least 250 nm. Heating of samples during UV exposure dramatically increases the etch rates, although heating alone does not produce the effect. The pit enhancement is the result of an increase in both the bulk and track etch rates, while the ratio of these rates (which determines sensitivity to particles) remains roughly constant. By determining the best processing parameters, this effect promises to significantly reduce the time required to process CR-39 track detectors. Funded in part by a grant from the DOE through the Laboratory for Laser Energetics.

  13. Enhancement of minority involvement in DOE nuclear physics programs

    SciTech Connect

    Zeidman, B.

    1995-08-01

    As a result of continuing efforts to interact with a large number of minority students, the Minority Program in the ANL Physics Division has succeeded in attracting many highly qualified students to apply for participation in the programs of the Physics Division and other ANL divisions. The program is directed toward the identification of institutions with relatively strong physics programs and with faculty interested in stimulating their students to pursue research activities, particularly summer programs. During visits to colleges, lectures are presented and are followed by discussion of activities in physics, at Argonne and other national laboratories, and the possibilities for graduate study, employment, etc. Additional activities included attending meetings of the Society for the Advancement of Chicanos and Native Americans in Science and of the Society of Black Physics Students. As a result of these efforts, 42 applications were received for the summer program in 1994. A total of 24 offers were made for the Summer Research Participation program in conjunction with Argonne`s Department of Educational Programs. A number of former participants are currently enrolled in graduate programs in physics; one student is working on his Ph.D. thesis in Nuclear Physics in the Physics Division. Various institutions will be visited during this year and several meetings of minority groups will be attended. These ongoing interactions are generating institutional relationships that will enrich the physics programs in minority institutions and substantially enhance minority involvement not only in nuclear physics, but in other branches of physics and science.

  14. Safeguards Evaluation Method for evaluating vulnerability to insider threats

    SciTech Connect

    Al-Ayat, R.A.; Judd, B.R.; Renis, T.A.

    1986-01-01

    As protection of DOE facilities against outsiders increases to acceptable levels, attention is shifting toward achieving comparable protection against insiders. Since threats and protection measures for insiders are substantially different from those for outsiders, new perspectives and approaches are needed. One such approach is the Safeguards Evaluation Method. This method helps in assessing safeguards vulnerabilities to theft or diversion of special nuclear meterial (SNM) by insiders. The Safeguards Evaluation Method-Insider Threat is a simple model that can be used by safeguards and security planners to evaluate safeguards and proposed upgrades at their own facilities. The method is used to evaluate the effectiveness of safeguards in both timely detection (in time to prevent theft) and late detection (after-the-fact). The method considers the various types of potential insider adversaries working alone or in collusion with other insiders. The approach can be used for a wide variety of facilities with various quantities and forms of SNM. An Evaluation Workbook provides documentation of the baseline assessment; this simplifies subsequent on-site appraisals. Quantitative evaluation is facilitated by an accompanying computer program. The method significantly increases an evaluation team's on-site analytical capabilities, thereby producing a more thorough and accurate safeguards evaluation.

  15. Safeguard Requirements for Fusion Power Plants

    SciTech Connect

    Robert J. Goldston and Alexander Glaser

    2012-08-10

    Nuclear proliferation risks from magnetic fusion energy associated with access to fissile materials can be divided into three main categories: 1) clandestine production of fissile material in an undeclared facility, 2) covert production and diversion of such material in a declared and safeguarded facility, and 3) use of a declared facility in a breakout scenario, in which a state openly produces fissile material in violation of international agreements. The degree of risk in each of these categories is assessed, taking into account both state and non-state actors, and it is found that safeguards are required for fusion energy to be highly attractive from a non-proliferation standpoint. Specific safeguard requirements and R&D needs are outlined for each category of risk, and the technical capability of the ITER experiment, under construction, to contribute to this R&D is noted. A preliminary analysis indicates a potential legal pathway for fusion power systems to be brought under the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. "Vertical" proliferation risks associated with tritium and with the knowledge that can be gained from inertial fusion energy R&D are outlined.

  16. Safeguards Envelope: The First Steps

    SciTech Connect

    Richard Metcalf; Jean Ragusa; Robert Bean

    2008-03-01

    The possibility exists for real time accountancy and assay of nuclear materials as they move through a reprocessing facility. This project aims to establish working parameters and local figures of merit to identify possible diversion in real time with minimal operational impact. Factors such as pH, NOX gas concentration, flow speeds and radiation fields are rarely taken into account in safeguards methodologies and will be included to increase the confidence of location and assay of nuclear materials. An adaptable, real data model is being created of the contactors of the Advanced Fuel Cycle Facility and will be analyzed using the appropriate modeling codes. This model will then be subjected to three, diversion scenarios and a figure of merit methodology will be utilized to create the operational parameters under which these diversion scenarios would be detected. This analysis for figure of merit methodology will include statistical fluctuations, operator error, and a rudimentary analysis of transient conditions. The long term goal of the project includes expansion universally over the plant, methods of detection without requiring access to proprietary information, and an evaluation of the requirements for future figure of merit methodologies.

  17. Safeguards aspects of spent-fuel management

    SciTech Connect

    Richter, B.; Stein, G.; Remagen, H.H.; Weh, R.

    1989-11-01

    In the Federal Republic of Germany, the concept of spent-fuel management is based on a closed fuel cycle that has the following principal features: (1) intermediate dry storage of spent fuel; (2) reprocessing; (3) thermal recycling of unconsumed nuclear material; and (4) conditioning and final disposal of radioactive waste. Complementary to this concept, methods and techniques for the direct final disposal of spent fuel are under development, including investigations of licensing issues. Furthermore, a licensing procedure is under way for the construction of a pilot conditioning plant close to the Gorleben dry storage facility. Apart from operational safety and environmental protection, the issue of international safeguards is of paramount interest. This paper discusses safeguards aspects of spent-fuel management related to direct final disposal.

  18. Oak Ridge National Laboratory Next Generation Safeguards Initiative

    SciTech Connect

    Kirk, Bernadette Lugue; Eipeldauer, Mary D; Whitaker, J Michael

    2011-12-01

    In 2007, the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24) completed a comprehensive review of the current and potential future challenges facing the international safeguards system. The review examined trends and events impacting the mission of international safeguards and the implications of expanding and evolving mission requirements on the legal authorities and institutions that serve as the foundation of the international safeguards system, as well as the technological, financial, and human resources required for effective safeguards implementation. The review's findings and recommendations were summarized in the report, 'International Safeguards: Challenges and Opportunities for the 21st Century (October 2007)'. One of the report's key recommendations was for DOE/NNSA to launch a major new program to revitalize the international safeguards technology and human resource base. In 2007, at the International Atomic Energy Agency's General Conference, then Secretary of Energy Samuel W. Bodman announced the newly created Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). NGSI consists of five program elements: (1) Policy development and outreach; (2) Concepts and approaches; (3) Technology and analytical methodologies; (4) Human resource development; and (5) Infrastructure development. The ensuing report addresses the 'Human Resource Development (HRD)' component of NGSI. The goal of the HRD as defined in the NNSA Program Plan (November 2008) is 'to revitalize and expand the international safeguards human capital base by attracting and training a new generation of talent.' One of the major objectives listed in the HRD goal includes education and training, outreach to universities, professional societies, postdoctoral appointments, and summer internships at national laboratories. ORNL is a participant in the NGSI program, together with several DOE laboratories such as Pacific

  19. Swedish experiences in implementing national and international safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Nilsson, A. ); Elborn, M. ); Grahn, P. )

    1991-01-01

    This paper reports that international safeguards have been applied in Sweden since the early 70s. Experiences have been achieved from exclusive bilateral and trilateral control followed by NPT safeguards in 1975. The Swedish State System for accountancy and Control (SSAC) includes all regulations that follows from prevailing obligations regarding the peaceful uses of nuclear material. The system has been developed in cooperation between the national authority, the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate (SKI) and the Swedish nuclear industry. The paper presents experiences from the practical implementation of the SSAC and the IAEA safeguards system, gained by the SKI and the nuclear industry, respectively. Joint approaches and solutions to some significant safeguards issues are presented. The cooperation between the nuclear industry and the authority in R and D activities, in particular with respect to the Swedish Support Program is highlighted, e.g. the use of nuclear facilities in development or training tasks. some of the difficulties encountered with the system are also touched upon.

  20. Oxamflatin Treatment Enhances Cloned Porcine Embryo Development and Nuclear Reprogramming*

    PubMed Central

    Mao, Jiude; Zhao, Ming-Tao; Whitworth, Kristin M.; Spate, Lee D.; Walters, Eric M.; O'Gorman, Chad; Lee, Kiho; Samuel, Melissa S.; Murphy, Clifton N.; Wells, Kevin; Rivera, Rocio M.

    2015-01-01

    Abstract Faulty epigenetic reprogramming of somatic nuclei is thought to be the main reason for low cloning efficiency by somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT). Histone deacetylase inhibitors (HDACi), such as Scriptaid, improve developmental competence of SCNT embryos in several species. Another HDACi, Oxamflatin, is about 100 times more potent than Scriptaid in the ability to inhibit nuclear-specific HDACs. The present study determined the effects of Oxamflatin treatment on embryo development, DNA methylation, and gene expression. Oxamflatin treatment enhanced blastocyst formation of SCNT embryos in vitro. Embryo transfer produced more pigs born and fewer mummies from the Oxamflatin-treated group compared to the Scriptaid-treated positive control. Oxamflatin also decreased DNA methylation of POU5F1 regulatory elements and centromeric repeat elements in day-7 blastocysts. When compared to in vitro–fertilized (IVF) embryos, the methylation status of POU5F1, NANOG, and centromeric repeat was similar in the cloned embryos, indicating these genes were successfully reprogrammed. However, compared to the lack of methylation of XIST in day-7 IVF embryos, a higher methylation level in day-7 cloned embryos was observed, implying that X chromosomes were activated in day-7 IVF blastocysts, but were not fully activated in cloned embryos, i.e., reprogramming of XIST was delayed. A time-course analysis of XIST DNA methylation on day-13, -15, -17, and -19 in vivo embryos revealed that XIST methylation initiated at about day 13 and was not completed by day 19. The methylation of the XIST gene in day-19 control cloned embryos was delayed again when compared to in vivo embryos. However, methylation of XIST in Oxamflatin-treated embryos was comparable with in vivo embryos, which further demonstrated that Oxamflatin could accelerate the delayed reprogramming of XIST gene and thus might improve cloning efficiency. PMID:25548976

  1. Lessons from post-war Iraq for the international full-scope safeguards regime

    SciTech Connect

    Scheinman, L.

    1993-04-01

    The discovery after the Gulf War of the extensive Iraqi nuclear weapon program severely shook public confidence in the nuclear non-proliferation regime in general, and the safeguards program of the IAEA under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, in particular. Iraq provided the justification for evaluating the safeguards regime under new political circumstances, so that appropriate corrective measures could be taken when necessary. It is now up to the individual states within the international system to take advantage of this opportunity.

  2. Developing a Signature Based Safeguards Approach for the Electrorefiner and Salt Cleanup Unit Operations in Pyroprocessing Facilities

    SciTech Connect

    Murphy, Chantell Lynne-Marie

    2016-01-27

    Traditional nuclear materials accounting does not work well for safeguards when applied to pyroprocessing. Alternate methods such as Signature Based Safeguards (SBS) are being investigated. The goal of SBS is real-time/near-real-time detection of anomalous events in the pyroprocessing facility as they could indicate loss of special nuclear material. In high-throughput reprocessing facilities, metric tons of separated material are processed that must be accounted for. Even with very low uncertainties of accountancy measurements (<0.1%) the uncertainty of the material balances is still greater than the desired level. Novel contributions of this work are as follows: (1) significant enhancement of SBS development for the salt cleanup process by creating a new gas sparging process model, selecting sensors to monitor normal operation, identifying safeguards-significant off-normal scenarios, and simulating those off-normal events and generating sensor output; (2) further enhancement of SBS development for the electrorefiner by simulating off-normal events caused by changes in salt concentration and identifying which conditions lead to Pu and Cm not tracking throughout the rest of the system; and (3) new contribution in applying statistical techniques to analyze the signatures gained from these two models to help draw real-time conclusions on anomalous events.

  3. 10 CFR 52.53 - Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS).

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). 52.53 Section 52.53 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) LICENSES, CERTIFICATIONS... Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). The Commission shall refer a copy of the application to the...

  4. 10 CFR 52.87 - Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS).

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). 52.87 Section 52.87 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) LICENSES, CERTIFICATIONS... Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). The Commission shall refer a copy of the application to the ACRS. The...

  5. 10 CFR 52.165 - Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS).

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). 52.165 Section 52.165 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) LICENSES, CERTIFICATIONS... Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). The Commission shall refer a copy of the application to the...

  6. 10 CFR 52.165 - Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS).

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). 52.165 Section 52.165 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) LICENSES, CERTIFICATIONS... Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). The Commission shall refer a copy of the application to the...

  7. 10 CFR 52.87 - Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS).

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). 52.87 Section 52.87 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) LICENSES, CERTIFICATIONS... Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). The Commission shall refer a copy of the application to the ACRS. The...

  8. 75 FR 66168 - Seeks Qualified Candidates for the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-10-27

    ... COMMISSION Seeks Qualified Candidates for the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards AGENCY: U.S. Nuclear...) seeks qualified candidates for the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). Submit r sum s to Ms... adequacy of proposed reactor safety standards. Of primary importance are the safety issues associated...

  9. 77 FR 61447 - Seeks Qualified Candidates for the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2012-10-09

    ... COMMISSION Seeks Qualified Candidates for the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards AGENCY: U.S. Nuclear...) seeks qualified candidates for the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). Submit resumes to Ms... adequacy of proposed reactor safety standards. Of primary importance are the safety issues associated...

  10. 10 CFR 52.23 - Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS).

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). 52.23 Section 52.23 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) LICENSES, CERTIFICATIONS... on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). The Commission shall refer a copy of the application for an early...

  11. 10 CFR 52.23 - Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS).

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). 52.23 Section 52.23 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) LICENSES, CERTIFICATIONS... on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). The Commission shall refer a copy of the application for an early...

  12. 10 CFR 52.141 - Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS).

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). 52.141 Section 52.141 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) LICENSES, CERTIFICATIONS... Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). The Commission shall refer a copy of the application to the...

  13. 10 CFR 54.25 - Report of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Report of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. 54.25 Section 54.25 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) REQUIREMENTS FOR RENEWAL OF... Reactor Safeguards. Each renewal application will be referred to the Advisory Committee on...

  14. 10 CFR 54.25 - Report of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Report of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. 54.25 Section 54.25 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) REQUIREMENTS FOR RENEWAL OF... Reactor Safeguards. Each renewal application will be referred to the Advisory Committee on...

  15. 10 CFR 52.141 - Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS).

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). 52.141 Section 52.141 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) LICENSES, CERTIFICATIONS... Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). The Commission shall refer a copy of the application to the...

  16. 10 CFR 52.53 - Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS).

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). 52.53 Section 52.53 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) LICENSES, CERTIFICATIONS... Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). The Commission shall refer a copy of the application to the...

  17. Full spectrum optical safeguard

    DOEpatents

    Ackerman, Mark R.

    2008-12-02

    An optical safeguard device with two linear variable Fabry-Perot filters aligned relative to a light source with at least one of the filters having a nonlinear dielectric constant material such that, when a light source produces a sufficiently high intensity light, the light alters the characteristics of the nonlinear dielectric constant material to reduce the intensity of light impacting a connected optical sensor. The device can be incorporated into an imaging system on a moving platform, such as an aircraft or satellite.

  18. Utility of Social Modeling for Proliferation Assessment - Enhancing a Facility-Level Model for Proliferation Resistance Assessment of a Nuclear Enegry System

    SciTech Connect

    Coles, Garill A.; Brothers, Alan J.; Gastelum, Zoe N.; Olson, Jarrod; Thompson, Sandra E.

    2009-10-26

    The Utility of Social Modeling for Proliferation Assessment project (PL09-UtilSocial) investigates the use of social and cultural information to improve nuclear proliferation assessments, including nonproliferation assessments, Proliferation Resistance (PR) assessments, safeguards assessments, and other related studies. These assessments often use and create technical information about a host State and its posture towards proliferation, the vulnerability of a nuclear energy system (NES) to an undesired event, and the effectiveness of safeguards. This objective of this project is to find and integrate social and technical information by explicitly considering the role of cultural, social, and behavioral factors relevant to proliferation; and to describe and demonstrate if and how social science modeling has utility in proliferation assessment. This report describes a modeling approach and how it might be used to support a location-specific assessment of the PR assessment of a particular NES. The report demonstrates the use of social modeling to enhance an existing assessment process that relies on primarily technical factors. This effort builds on a literature review and preliminary assessment performed as the first stage of the project and compiled in PNNL-18438. [ T his report describes an effort to answer questions about whether it is possible to incorporate social modeling into a PR assessment in such a way that we can determine the effects of social factors on a primarily technical assessment. This report provides: 1. background information about relevant social factors literature; 2. background information about a particular PR assessment approach relevant to this particular demonstration; 3. a discussion of social modeling undertaken to find and characterize social factors that are relevant to the PR assessment of a nuclear facility in a specific location; 4. description of an enhancement concept that integrates social factors into an existing, technically

  19. 3S (Safeguards, Security, Safety) based pyroprocessing facility safety evaluation plan

    SciTech Connect

    Ku, J.H.; Choung, W.M.; You, G.S.; Moon, S.I.; Park, S.H.; Kim, H.D.

    2013-07-01

    The big advantage of pyroprocessing for the management of spent fuels against the conventional reprocessing technologies lies in its proliferation resistance since the pure plutonium cannot be separated from the spent fuel. The extracted materials can be directly used as metal fuel in a fast reactor, and pyroprocessing reduces drastically the volume and heat load of the spent fuel. KAERI has implemented the SBD (Safeguards-By-Design) concept in nuclear fuel cycle facilities. The goal of SBD is to integrate international safeguards into the entire facility design process since the very beginning of the design phase. This paper presents a safety evaluation plan using a conceptual design of a reference pyroprocessing facility, in which 3S (Safeguards, Security, Safety)-By-Design (3SBD) concept is integrated from early conceptual design phase. The purpose of this paper is to establish an advanced pyroprocessing hot cell facility design concept based on 3SBD for the successful realization of pyroprocessing technology with enhanced safety and proliferation resistance.

  20. The Importance of Safeguards Culture

    SciTech Connect

    Mladineo, Stephen V.; Frazar, Sarah L.

    2013-11-01

    This is a paper we plan to submit to the Nonproliferation Review for publication. The paper provides an analysis of the concept of safeguards culture and gauges its value to the safeguards community. Accompanying the paper are three additional documents that contain the figures and tables cited in the paper. NPR guidelines state these figures and tables are to be submitted in separate documents.

  1. Advanced techniques in safeguarding a conditioning facility for spent fuel

    SciTech Connect

    Rudolf, K.; Weh, R. )

    1992-01-01

    Although reprocessing continues to be the main factor in the waste management of nuclear reactors, the alternative of direct final disposal is currently being developed to the level of industrial applications, based on an agreement between the heads of the federal government and the federal states of Germany. Thus, the Konrad and Gorleben sites are being studied as potential final repositories as is the pilot conditioning facility (PKA) under construction. Discussions on the application of safeguards measures have led to the drafting of an approach that will cover the entire back end of the fuel cycle. The conditioning of fuel prior to direct final disposal represents one element in the overall approach. A modern facility equipped with advanced technology, PKA is a pilot plant with regard to conditioning techniques as well as to safeguards. Therefore, the PKA safeguards approach is expected to facilitate future industrial applications of the conditioning procedure. This cannot be satisfactorily implemented without advanced safeguards techniques. The level of development of the safeguards techniques varies. While advanced camera and seal systems are basically available, the other techniques and methods still require research and development. Feasibility studies and equipment development are geared to providing applicable safeguards techniques in time for commissioning of the PKA.

  2. U.S. Department of Energy`s International Safeguards Program

    SciTech Connect

    Sheely, K.B.

    1993-12-31

    Since 1978 the United States Department of Energy`s (DOE) International Safeguards Program has conducted policy analysis, strategies and technology development, international cooperation and training to support the formulation and implementation of international safeguards. The end of the Gulf War (1991), the end of the Cold War (1992), and the trend towards regionalization of safeguards has led to increased US and international attention to the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation and the need for significantly greater support to nonproliferation policy making and implementation activities. As a result, DOE`s International Safeguards Program has undergone substantial growth and has continued to focus its resources on the priority issues which are part of today`s and tomorrow`s world. In order to effectively and efficiently conduct and manage these activities the International Safeguards Program has developed and continues to refine and implement a strategic plan. This plan provides guidance for the activities conducted by support organizations and makes the program objectives and activities more transparent to other interested parties. The Strategic Plan centralizes into one document the mission, priorities, resources, activities, and operating procedures of DOE`s International Safeguards Program. The International Safeguards Program provides technical leadership in the formulation and implementation of the US nonproliferation policy concerning the IAEA, international safeguards, physical protection, and nuclear safeguards inspection activities.

  3. Safeguards-by-Design: Guidance for Independent Spent Fuel Dry Storage Installations (ISFSI)

    SciTech Connect

    Trond Bjornard; Philip C. Durst

    2012-05-01

    This document summarizes the requirements and best practices for implementing international nuclear safeguards at independent spent fuel storage installations (ISFSIs), also known as Away-from- Reactor (AFR) storage facilities. These installations may provide wet or dry storage of spent fuel, although the safeguards guidance herein focuses on dry storage facilities. In principle, the safeguards guidance applies to both wet and dry storage. The reason for focusing on dry independent spent fuel storage installations is that this is one of the fastest growing nuclear installations worldwide. Independent spent fuel storage installations are typically outside of the safeguards nuclear material balance area (MBA) of the reactor. They may be located on the reactor site, but are generally considered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the State Regulator/SSAC to be a separate facility. The need for this guidance is becoming increasingly urgent as more and more nuclear power plants move their spent fuel from resident spent fuel ponds to independent spent fuel storage installations. The safeguards requirements and best practices described herein are also relevant to the design and construction of regional independent spent fuel storage installations that nuclear power plant operators are starting to consider in the absence of a national long-term geological spent fuel repository. The following document has been prepared in support of two of the three foundational pillars for implementing Safeguards-by-Design (SBD). These are: i) defining the relevant safeguards requirements, and ii) defining the best practices for meeting the requirements. This document was prepared with the design of the latest independent dry spent fuel storage installations in mind and was prepared specifically as an aid for designers of commercial nuclear facilities to help them understand the relevant international requirements that follow from a country’s safeguards agreement with

  4. Nuclear material operations manual

    SciTech Connect

    Tyler, R.P.

    1981-02-01

    This manual provides a concise and comprehensive documentation of the operating procedures currently practiced at Sandia National Laboratories with regard to the management, control, and accountability of nuclear materials. The manual is divided into chapters which are devoted to the separate functions performed in nuclear material operations-management, control, accountability, and safeguards, and the final two chapters comprise a document which is also issued separately to provide a summary of the information and operating procedures relevant to custodians and users of radioactive and nuclear materials. The manual also contains samples of the forms utilized in carrying out nuclear material activities. To enhance the clarity of presentation, operating procedures are presented in the form of playscripts in which the responsible organizations and necessary actions are clearly delineated in a chronological fashion from the initiation of a transaction to its completion.

  5. Lanthanum Bromide Detectors for Safeguards Measurements

    SciTech Connect

    Wright, J.

    2011-05-25

    Lanthanum bromide has advantages over other popular inorganic scintillator detectors. Lanthanum bromide offers superior resolution, and good efficiency when compared to sodium iodide and lanthanum chloride. It is a good alternative to high purity germanium detectors for some safeguards applications. This paper offers an initial look at lanthanum bromide detectors. Resolution of lanthanum bromide will be compared lanthanum chloride and sodium-iodide detectors through check source measurements. Relative efficiency and angular dependence will be looked at. Nuclear material spectra, to include plutonium and highly enriched uranium, will be compared between detector types.

  6. Nuclear nonproliferation and safety: Challenges facing the International Atomic Energy Agency

    SciTech Connect

    Not Available

    1993-09-01

    The Chairman of the Senate Committee on Govermental Affairs asked the United States General Accounting Office (GAO) to review the safeguards and nuclear power plant safety programs of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This report examines (1) the effectiveness of IAEA`s safeguards program and the adequacy of program funding, (2) the management of U.S. technical assistance to the IAEA`s safeguards program, and (3) the effectiveness of IAEA`s program for advising United Nations (UN) member states about nuclear power plant safety and the adequacy of program funding. Under its statute and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, IAEA is mandated to administer safeguards to detect diversions of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful uses. Because of limits on budget growth and unpaid contributions, IAEA has had difficulty funding the safeguards program. IAEA also conducts inspections of facilities or locations containing declared nuclear material, and manages a program for reviewing the operational safety of designated nuclear power plants. The U.S. technical assistance program for IAEA safeguards, overseen by an interagency coordinating committee, has enhanced the agency`s inspection capabilities, however, some weaknesses still exist. Despite financial limitations, IAEA is meeting its basic safety advisory responsibilities for advising UN member states on nuclear safety and providing requested safety services. However, IAEA`s program for reviewing the operational safety of nuclear power plants has not been fully effective because the program is voluntary and UN member states have not requested IAEA`s review of all nuclear reactors with serious problems. GAO believes that IAEA should have more discretion in selecting reactors for review.

  7. Preliminary considerations on developing IAEA technical safeguards for LMFBR power systems

    SciTech Connect

    Persiani, P. J.

    1980-09-01

    Nuclear fuel cycles safeguards should be considered in the dynamic context of a world deployment of various reactor types and varying availability of fuel-cycle services. There will be a close interaction between thermal-reactor cycles and the future deployment of fast breeders. The quantitites of plutonium and the reprocessing, conversion, fabrication, and storage methods of the fuel for the fast breeders will have a significant impact on safeguards techniques. The approach to the fast breeder fuel cycle safeguards follows the general safeguards system approach proposed by the IAEA. Objective of IAEA safeguards is the detection of diversion of nuclear material and deterrence of such diversion. To achieve independent verification of material balance accountancy requires the capability to monitor inventory status and verify material flows and quantities of all nuclear materials subject to safeguards. Containment and surveillance measures are applied to monitor key measurement points, maintain integrity of material balance, and complement material accountancy. The safeguards study attempts to develop a generic reference IAEA Safeguards System and explores various system options using containment/surveillance and material accountancy instrumentation and integrated systems designs.

  8. Remote instrumentation and safeguards monitoring for the star project

    SciTech Connect

    Buettner, H M; Labiak, W; Spiridon, A

    2000-06-15

    A part of the Nuclear Energy Research Initiative (NERI) is the development of the Small Transportable Autonomous Reactor (STAR) for deployment in countries that do not have a nuclear industry. STARs would have an output of from 100 to 150 MW electric, would be fueled in the country of manufacture, and after 15 to 20 years of operation the reactor core would be returned to the country of manufacture for refueling. A candidate STAR design can be found in (Greenspan, 2000). This paper describes the design of the control and monitoring system that might be used. There are two unique features to this system. One is that the monitored information will be transmitted to a remote site for two purposes, safeguards, and allowing experts a great distance away direct access to view the reactor's operating parameters. The second feature is safeguards sensors will be designed into the system and there will monitoring of the safeguards aspects of the system for tampering. Any safeguards anomalies will be sent to the remote site as alarms. Encrypted satellite communications will be used to transmit the data. These features allow the STAR to be operated by a small staff and will reduce the costs of safeguards monitoring by reducing the number of plant visits by inspectors.

  9. Long-term proliferation and safeguards issues in future technologies

    SciTech Connect

    Keisch, B.; Auerbach, C.; Fainberg, A.; Fiarman, S.; Fishbone, L.G.; Higinbotham, W.A.; Lemley, J.R.; O'Brien, J.

    1986-02-01

    The purpose of the task was to assess the effect of potential new technologies, nuclear and non-nuclear, on safeguards needs and non-proliferation policies, and to explore possible solutions to some of the problems envisaged. Eight subdivisions were considered: New Enrichment Technologies; Non-Aqueous Reprocessing Technologies; Fusion; Accelerator-Driven Reactor Systems; New Reactor Types; Heavy Water and Deuterium; Long-Term Storage of Spent Fuel; and Other Future Technologies (Non-Nuclear). For each of these subdivisions, a careful review of the current world-wide effort in the field provided a means of subjectively estimating the viability and qualitative probability of fruition of promising technologies. Technologies for which safeguards and non-proliferation requirements have been thoroughly considered by others were not restudied here (e.g., the Fast Breeder Reactor). The time scale considered was 5 to 40 years for possible initial demonstration although, in some cases, a somewhat optimistic viewpoint was embraced. Conventional nuclear-material safeguards are only part of the overall non-proliferation regime. Other aspects are international agreements, export controls on sensitive technologies, classification of information, intelligence gathering, and diplomatic initiatives. The focus here is on safeguards, export controls, and classification.

  10. Opportunities to more fully utilize safeguards information reported to the IAEA at Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants

    SciTech Connect

    Garner, James R; Whitaker, J Michael

    2015-01-01

    In an effort to increase transparency and to strengthen IAEA safeguards, more countries are adopting practices that provide the IAEA with more timely, safeguards-relevant information to confirm nuclear operations are as declared. At Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants (GCEPs) potential examples include installing unattended IAEA instruments that transmit selected information back to Vienna, instruments that collect and store measurement information on-site, and daily facility operator submissions of material receipts, shipments, or utilization of key operational systems (e.g., UF6 feed stations) to on-site mail boxes. Recently the IAEA has implemented the use of on-site mailbox systems supplemented with short notice or unannounced inspections to maintain effectiveness without significantly increasing the number of inspection days. While these measures significantly improves the IAEA’s effectiveness, we have identified several opportunities for how the use of this information could be improved and how some additional information would further improve safeguards. This paper presents concepts for how the safeguards information currently collected at GCEPs could be more effectively utilized through enhancing the way that raw data is displayed visually so that it is more intuitive to the inspector and provides for more effective inspection planning and execution, comparing information with previous IAEA inspection activities (lists of previous verified inventory), through comparing data with operator supplied data when inspectors arrive (notional inventory change reports), and through evaluating the data over time to provide even greater confidence in the data and operations as declared in between inspections. This paper will also discuss several potential improvements to the submissions themselves, such as including occupancy information about product and tails stations and including weight information for each station.

  11. 78 FR 2295 - Consideration of Approval of Application Containing Sensitive Unclassified Non-Safeguards...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2013-01-10

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office ] NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Consideration of Approval of Application Containing Sensitive Unclassified Non-Safeguards Information Regarding Proposed Energy Future Holdings Corporation Internal Restructuring AGENCY:...

  12. 78 FR 2694 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Fukushima...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2013-01-14

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Fukushima; Cancellation of the January 18, 2013, ACRS Subcommittee Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee meeting on...

  13. 77 FR 47680 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittees on Reliability...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2012-08-09

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittees on Reliability and PRA and Fukushima; Revision to Notice of Meetings The (ACRS) Subcommittee on Fukushima...

  14. 77 FR 24745 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Thermal...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2012-04-25

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office ] NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Thermal Hydraulic Phenomena; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Thermal Hydraulic Phenomena will hold...

  15. 76 FR 18585 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Advanced...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-04-04

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR); Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Advanced Boiling Water...

  16. 78 FR 66968 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Advanced...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2013-11-07

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Advanced Boiling Water Reactor; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Advanced Boiling Water Reactor...

  17. 76 FR 11524 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Advanced...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-03-02

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Advanced Boiling Water Reactors (ABWR); Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Advanced Boiling Water...

  18. 78 FR 79019 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Materials...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2013-12-27

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Materials, Metallurgy & Reactor Fuels; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Materials, Metallurgy & Reactor...

  19. 77 FR 74698 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Materials...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2012-12-17

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Materials, Metallurgy & Reactor Fuels; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Materials, Metallurgy & Reactor...

  20. 78 FR 56756 - Advisory Committee On Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Materials...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2013-09-13

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee On Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Materials, Metallurgy & Reactor Fuels; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Materials, Metallurgy & Reactor...

  1. 76 FR 24540 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Materials...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-05-02

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office Nuclear Regulatory Commission Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Materials, Metallurgy & Reactor Fuels; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Materials, Metallurgy & Reactor...

  2. 75 FR 55365 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting of the ACRS Joint Subcommittee

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-09-10

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting of the ACRS Joint Subcommittee The ACRS Subcommittees on Thermal Hydraulics Phenomena; Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR); and Materials,...

  3. 76 FR 55717 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Reliability...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-09-08

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Reliability and Probabilistic Risk Assessment The ACRS Subcommittee on Reliability and PRA will hold a...

  4. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory safeguards and security quarterly progress report to the US Department of Energy quarter ending September 30, 1994

    SciTech Connect

    Davis, G.; Mansur, D.L.; Ruhter, W.D.; Steele, E.; Strait, R.S.

    1994-10-01

    This report presents the details of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory safeguards and securities program. This program is focused on developing new technology, such as x- and gamma-ray spectrometry, for measurement of special nuclear materials. This program supports the Office of Safeguards and Securities in the following five areas; safeguards technology, safeguards and decision support, computer security, automated physical security, and automated visitor access control systems.

  5. Future challenges and DOE/NNSA-JAEA cooperation for the development of advanced safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Stevens, Rebecca S; Mc Clelland - Kerr, John; Senzaki, Masao; Hori, Masato

    2009-01-01

    The United States Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) has been cooperating with Japan on nuclear safeguards for over thirty years. DOE/NNSA has collaborated with the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) and its predecessors in addressing the need for innovative solutions to nuclear transparency and verification issues in one of the world's most advanced nuclear fuel cycle states. This collaboration includes over ninety activities that have involved nearly every facility in the JAEA complex and many national laboratories in the U.S. complex. The partnership has yielded new technologies and approaches that have benefited international safeguards not only in Japan, but around the world. The International Atomic Energy Agency uses a number of safeguards solutions developed under this collaboration to improve its inspection efforts in Japan and elsewhere. Japanese facilities serve as test beds for emerging safeguards technologies and are setting the trend for new nuclear energy and fuel cycle development worldwide. The collaboration continues to be an essential component of U.S. safeguards outreach and is integral to the DOE/NNSA's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative. In addition to fostering international safeguards development, the cooperation is an opportunity for U.S. scientists to work in facilities that have no analog in the United States, thus providing crucial real-life experience for and aiding development of the next generation of U.S. safeguards specialists. It is also an important element of promoting regional transparency thereby building confidence in the peaceful nature of nuclear programs in the region. The successes engendered by this partnership provide a strong basis for addressing future safeguards challenges, in Japan and elsewhere. This paper summarizes these challenges and the associated cooperative efforts that are either underway or anticipated.

  6. International Safeguards Technology and Policy Education and Training Pilot Programs

    SciTech Connect

    Dreicer, M; Anzelon, G A; Essner, J T; Dougan, A D; Doyle, J; Boyer, B; Hypes, P; Sokava, E; Wehling, F; Martin, J; Charlton, W

    2009-06-16

    A major focus of the National Nuclear Security Administration-led Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) is the development of human capital to meet present and future challenges to the safeguards regime. An effective university-level education in safeguards and related disciplines is an essential element in a layered strategy to rebuild the safeguards human resource capacity. NNSA launched two pilot programs in 2008 to develop university level courses and internships in association with James, Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) at the Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS) and Texas A&M University (TAMU). These pilot efforts involved 44 students in total and were closely linked to hands-on internships at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The Safeguards and Nuclear Material Management pilot program was a collaboration between TAMU, LANL, and LLNL. The LANL-based coursework was shared with the students undertaking internships at LLNL via video teleconferencing. A weeklong hands-on exercise was also conducted at LANL. A second pilot effort, the International Nuclear Safeguards Policy and Information Analysis pilot program was implemented at MIIS in cooperation with LLNL. Speakers from MIIS, LLNL, and other U.S. national laboratories (LANL, BNL) delivered lectures for the audience of 16 students. The majority of students were senior classmen or new master's degree graduates from MIIS specializing in nonproliferation policy studies. The two pilots programs concluded with an NGSI Summer Student Symposium, held at LLNL, where 20 students participated in LLNL facility tours and poster sessions. The value of bringing together the students from the technical and policy pilots was notable and will factor into the planning for the continued refinement of the two programs in the coming years.

  7. A perspective on safeguarding and monitoring of excess military plutonium

    SciTech Connect

    Sutcliffe, W.G.

    1994-10-02

    The purpose of this paper is to provide a perspective and framework for the development of safeguarding and monitoring procedures for the various stages of disposition of excess military plutonium. The paper briefly outlines and comments on some of the issues involved in safeguarding and monitoring excess military plutonium as it progresses from weapons through dismantlement, to fabrication as reactor fuel, to use in a reactor, and finally to storage and disposal as spent fuel. {open_quotes}Military{close_quotes} refers to ownership, and includes both reactor-grade and weapon-grade plutonium. {open_quotes}Excess{close_quotes} refers to plutonium (in any form) that a government decides is no longer needed for military use and can be irrevocably removed from military stockpiles. Many of the issues and proposals presented in this paper are based on, or are similar to, those mentioned in the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) report on excess military plutonium. Safeguards for plutonium disposition are discussed elsewhere in terms of requirements established by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Here, the discussion is less specific. The term {open_quotes}safeguarding{close_quotes} is used broadly to refer to materials control and accountancy (MC&A), containment and surveillance (C&S), and physical protection of nuclear materials by the state that possesses those materials. This is also referred to as material protection, control, and accountancy (MPCA). The term {open_quotes}safeguarding{close_quotes} was chosen for brevity and to distinguish MPCA considered in this paper from international or IAEA safeguards. {open_quotes}Monitoring{close_quotes} is used to refer to activities designed to assure another party (state or international organization) that the nuclear materials of the host state (the United States or Russia) are secure and not subject to unauthorized use.

  8. Integrated safeguards and facility design and operations

    SciTech Connect

    Tape, J.W.; Coulter, C.A.; Markin, J.T.; Thomas, K.E.

    1987-01-01

    The integration of safeguards functions to deter or detect unauthorized actions by insiders requires careful communication and management of safeguards-relevant information on a timely basis. The separation of safeguards functions into physical protection, materials control, and materials accounting often inhibits important information flows. Redefining the major safeguards functions as authorization, enforcement, and verification and careful attention to management of information can result in effective safeguards integration. Whether designing new systems or analyzing existing ones, understanding the interface between facility operations and safeguards is critical to cost-effective integrated safeguards systems that meet modern standards of performance.

  9. The Nuclear Power and Nuclear Weapons Connection.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Leventhal, Paul

    1990-01-01

    Explains problems enforcing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968. Provides factual charts and details concerning the production of nuclear energy and arms, the processing and disposal of waste products, and outlines the nuclear fuel cycle. Discusses safeguards, the risk of nuclear terrorism, and ways to deal with these problems. (NL)

  10. Reversing the Trend: Creating a Growing and Sustainable Cadre of Safeguards Experts in the United States

    SciTech Connect

    Lockwood, Dunbar; Mathews, Caroline E.; Seward, Amy M.

    2008-07-17

    In October 2007, the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Office of Non-Proliferation and International Security (NA-24) completed a wide-ranging study on international safeguards issues that found, inter alia, that the human capital base in the United States must be revitalized and expanded to ensure a seamless succession from the current generation of safeguards experts. Many current safeguards experts will soon retire and a new generation of talent with capabilities that cover the full spectrum of safeguards-relevant disciplines is needed. The success of this effort will have direct bearing on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). An effective international safeguards system that responds to current and future nonproliferation challenges requires a cadre of skilled safeguards specialists. However, a number of factors have converged in recent years that have challenged the IAEA’s ability to effectively carry out its safeguards mission, e.g. flat funding, expanding responsibilities, and several ad hoc high profile investigations. In the near future, the Agency will require increased numbers of qualified staff to address the expansion and evolution of its mission and anticipated worldwide growth in nuclear energy production. Without a large-scale effort to address this requirement in the near future, the international community will have far less confidence that nuclear material in civil programs is not being diverted for nuclear weapons and the risks of nuclear proliferation will increase around the world. This paper will describe in detail NNSA’s efforts, in coordination with other federal agencies, to address the safeguards human resources challenge, focusing on the recommendations of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI).

  11. Thermoacoustic sensor for nuclear fuel temperaturemonitoring and heat transfer enhancement

    SciTech Connect

    James A. Smith; Dale K. Kotter; Randall A. Alli; Steven L. Garrett

    2013-05-01

    A new acoustical sensing system for the nuclear power industry has been developed at The Pennsylvania State University in collaboration with Idaho National Laboratories. This sensor uses the high temperatures of nuclear fuel to convert a nuclear fuel rod into a standing-wave thermoacoustic engine. When a standing wave is generated, the sound wave within the fuel rod will be propagated, by acoustic radiation, through the cooling fluid within the reactor or spent fuel pool and can be monitored a remote location external to the reactor. The frequency of the sound can be correlated to an effective temperature of either the fuel or the surrounding coolant. We will present results for a thermoacoustic resonator built into a Nitonic-60 (stainless steel) fuel rod that requires only one passive component and no heat exchangers.

  12. Reactor safeguards against insider sabotage

    SciTech Connect

    Bennett, H.A.

    1982-03-01

    A conceptual safeguards system is structured to show how both reactor operations and physical protection resources could be integrated to prevent release of radioactive material caused by insider sabotage. Operational recovery capabilities are addressed from the viewpoint of both detection of and response to disabled components. Physical protection capabilities for preventing insider sabotage through the application of work rules are analyzed. Recommendations for further development of safeguards system structures, operational recovery, and sabotage prevention are suggested.

  13. USSP-IAEA WORKSHOP ON ADVANCED SENSORS FOR SAFEGUARDS.

    SciTech Connect

    PEPPER,S.; QUEIROLO, A.; ZENDEL, M.; WHICHELLO, J.; ANNESE, C.; GRIEBE, J.; GRIEBE, R.

    2007-11-13

    The IAEA Medium Term Strategy (2006-2011) defines a number of specific goals in respect to the IAEA's ability to provide assurances to the international community regarding the peaceful use of nuclear energy through States adherences to their respective non-proliferation treaty commitments. The IAEA has long used and still needs the best possible sensors to detect and measure nuclear material. The Department of Safeguards, recognizing the importance of safeguards-oriented R&D, especially targeting improved detection capabilities for undeclared facilities, materials and activities, initiated a number of activities in early 2005. The initiatives included letters to Member State Support Programs (MSSPs), personal contacts with known technology holders, topical meetings, consultant reviews of safeguards technology, and special workshops to identify new and novel technologies and methodologies. In support of this objective, the United States Support Program to IAEA Safeguards hosted a workshop on ''Advanced Sensors for Safeguards'' in Santa Fe, New Mexico, from April 23-27, 2007. The Organizational Analysis Corporation, a U.S.-based management consulting firm, organized and facilitated the workshop. The workshop's goal was to help the IAEA identify and plan for new sensors for safeguards implementation. The workshop, which was attended by representatives of seven member states and international organizations, included presentations by technology holders and developers on new technologies thought to have relevance to international safeguards, but not yet in use by the IAEA. The presentations were followed by facilitated breakout sessions where the participants considered two scenarios typical of what IAEA inspectors might face in the field. One scenario focused on an enrichment plant; the other scenario focused on a research reactor. The participants brainstormed using the technologies presented by the participants and other technologies known to them to propose

  14. Waste management safeguards project: History of and recommendations for development activities in support of safeguards of final disposal of spent fuel

    SciTech Connect

    Moran, B.W.

    1994-02-16

    Coordinated safeguards assessment and development activities in support of the U.S. Civilian Radioactive Waste Management System (CRWMS) and international safeguards objectives were initiated in Fiscal Year 1987. Initial technical support activities were performed at the direction of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM); however, as the priority of support activities changed, direction for the support tasks was transferred to the U.S. Department of State (State), the DOE Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation (DOE/IS-40), and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The direction for technical support activities was established at the International Atomic Energy Agency`s (IAEA`s) advisory group meeting and subsequent consultants` meetings on safeguards related to the final disposal of nuclear material contained in waste and spent fuel. Task directions for the development of international safeguards in support of the final disposal of spent fuel are currently being provided by DOE/IS-40. A summary of safeguards activities performed by the Waste Management Safeguards Project is provided. Systems for design information verification for spent fuel consolidation and conditioning operations are needed immediately. Safeguards approaches for maintaining continuity of knowledge of spent fuel processed at the conditioning facility and for verification of the final disposal package will be needed within three years. Systems for design information verification of the repository facilities will be needed by the end of the decade.

  15. Integrated safeguards & security for material protection, accounting, and control.

    SciTech Connect

    Duran, Felicia Angelica; Cipiti, Benjamin B.

    2009-10-01

    Traditional safeguards and security design for fuel cycle facilities is done separately and after the facility design is near completion. This can result in higher costs due to retrofits and redundant use of data. Future facilities will incorporate safeguards and security early in the design process and integrate the systems to make better use of plant data and strengthen both systems. The purpose of this project was to evaluate the integration of materials control and accounting (MC&A) measurements with physical security design for a nuclear reprocessing plant. Locations throughout the plant where data overlap occurs or where MC&A data could be a benefit were identified. This mapping is presented along with the methodology for including the additional data in existing probabilistic assessments to evaluate safeguards and security systems designs.

  16. Safeguards techniques in a pilot conditioning plant for spent fuel

    SciTech Connect

    Leitner, E.; Rudolf, K.; Weh, R. )

    1991-01-01

    The pilot conditioning plant at Gorleben, Germany, is designed as a multi-purpose plant. Its primary task is the conditioning of spent fuel assemblies into a form suitable for final disposal. As a pilot plant, it allows furthermore for the development and testing of various conditioning techniques. In terms of international safeguards, the pilot conditioning plant is basically considered an item facility. Entire fuel assemblies enter the plant in transport casks, whereas bins filled with fuel rods or canisters containing cut fuel rods leave the facility in final disposal packages (e.g. POLLUX). Each POLLUX final disposal package content is uniquely correlated to a definite number of fuel assemblies which have entered the conditioning process. For this type of facility, containment/surveillance (C/S) should take over the major role in nuclear material safeguards. This paper discusses the safeguards at the Gorleben plant.

  17. 76 FR 80410 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards; Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-12-23

    ... Doc No: 2011-32907] NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards; Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation Protection and Nuclear Materials; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation Protection and Nuclear Materials will hold a meeting on January 18, 2012, Room...

  18. 75 FR 27841 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-05-18

    ... Doc No: 2010-11820] NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation Protection and Nuclear Materials The ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation Protection and Nuclear Materials will hold a meeting on May 18, 2010, Room T-2B1, 11545...

  19. 78 FR 70597 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2013-11-26

    ... Doc No: 2013-28328] NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation Protection and Nuclear Materials; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation Protection and Nuclear Materials will hold a meeting on December 3, 2013, Room...

  20. 77 FR 31044 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2012-05-24

    ...] [FR Doc No: 2012-12611] NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation Protection and Nuclear Materials; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation Protection and Nuclear Materials will hold a meeting on June 5, 2012, Room...

  1. 75 FR 82093 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-12-29

    ... Doc No: 2010-32822] NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation Protection and Nuclear Materials; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation Protection and Nuclear Materials will hold a meeting on January 11, 2011, Room...

  2. 75 FR 82092 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-12-29

    ... Doc No: 2010-32810] NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation Protection and Nuclear Materials; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation Protection and Nuclear Materials will hold a meeting on January 12, 2011, Room...

  3. 75 FR 27840 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-05-18

    ... Doc No: 2010-11823] NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation Protection and Nuclear Materials The ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation Protection and Nuclear Materials will hold a meeting on May 18, 2010, Room T-2B1, 11545...

  4. 76 FR 44964 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-07-27

    ...] [FR Doc No: 2011-18954] NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation Protection and Nuclear Materials; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation Protection and Nuclear Materials will hold a meeting on August 17, 2011, Room...

  5. ASME Nuclear Crane Standards for Enhanced Crane Safety and Increased Profit

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Parkhurst, Stephen N.

    2000-01-01

    The ASME NOG-1 standard, 'Rules for Construction of Overhead and Gantry Cranes', covers top running cranes for nuclear facilities; with the ASME NUM-1 standard, 'Rules for Construction of Cranes, Monorails, and Hoists', covering the single girder, underhung, wall and jib cranes, as well as the monorails and hoists. These two ASME nuclear crane standards provide criteria for designing, inspecting and testing overhead handling equipment with enhanced safety to meet the 'defense-in-depth' approach of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) documents NUREG 0554 and NUREG 0612. In addition to providing designs for enhanced safety, the ASME nuclear crane standards provide a basis for purchasing overhead handling equipment with standard safety features, based upon accepted engineering principles, and including performance and environmental parameters specific to nuclear facilities. The ASME NOG-1 and ASME NUM-1 standards not only provide enhanced safety for handling a critical load, but also increase profit by minimizing the possibility of load drops, by reducing cumbersome operating restrictions, and by providing the foundation for a sound licensing position. The ASME nuclear crane standards can also increase profit by providing the designs and information to help ensure that the right standard equipment is purchased. Additionally, the ASME nuclear crane standards can increase profit by providing designs and information to help address current issues, such as the qualification of nuclear plant cranes for making 'planned engineered lifts' for steam generator replacement and decommissioning.

  6. Promoting global safeguards cooperation: Argentine-U.S. technical achievements

    SciTech Connect

    Owens, L.; Smith, C.

    1996-04-01

    The bilateral ENREN (Argentina National Nuclear Regulatory Board)-DOE Safeguards Agreement was signed by Dr. Dan Beninson, ENREN, and Dr. Kenneth Baker, DOE, at the Peaceful Uses Conference in Bariloche in 1994. Two major activities identified for immediate cooperation were: nondestructive assay (NDA) techniques for Pilcaniyeu, and advanced containment and surveillance at Embalse. Both of these are discussed here. While the activities of the past year and a half are significant, many more opportunities remain for valuable cooperative partnering to discover more effective and efficient ways to apply safeguards. Several that have been identified by ENREN and DOE for 1996 are: (1) environmental monitoring as a safeguards technique; (2) Pilcaniyeu measurement studies and joint IAEA support program activities; (3) information management and analysis tools; (4) safeguards analytical laboratory support; (5) study of the safeguards approach for Embalse; (6) expansion of the remote monitoring system at Embalse; (7) use of ground-penetrating radar technology at Embalse; and (8) computerized material control and accounting tools for Pilcaniyeu.

  7. FY 2008 Next Generation Safeguards Initiative International Safeguards Education and Training Pilot Progerams Summary Report

    SciTech Connect

    Dreicer, M; Anzelon, G; Essner, J; Dougan, A; Doyle, J; Boyer, B; Hypes, P; Sokova, E; Wehling, F

    2008-10-17

    Key component of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) launched by the National Nuclear Security Administration is the development of human capital to meet present and future challenges to the safeguards regime. An effective university-level education in safeguards and related disciplines is an essential element in a layered strategy to rebuild the safeguards human resource capacity. Two pilot programs at university level, involving 44 students, were initiated and implemented in spring-summer 2008 and linked to hands-on internships at LANL or LLNL. During the internships, students worked on specific safeguards-related projects with a designated Laboratory Mentor to provide broader exposure to nuclear materials management and information analytical techniques. The Safeguards and Nuclear Material Management pilot program was a collaboration between the Texas A&M University (TAMU), Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). It included a 16-lecture course held during a summer internship program. The instructors for the course were from LANL together with TAMU faculty and LLNL experts. The LANL-based course was shared with the students spending their internship at LLNL via video conference. A week-long table-top (or hands-on) exercise on was also conducted at LANL. The student population was a mix of 28 students from a 12 universities participating in a variety of summer internship programs held at LANL and LLNL. A large portion of the students were TAMU students participating in the NGSI pilot. The International Nuclear Safeguards Policy and Information Analysis pilot program was implemented at the Monterey Institute for International Studies (MIIS) in cooperation with LLNL. It included a two-week intensive course consisting of 20 lectures and two exercises. MIIS, LLNL, and speakers from other U.S. national laboratories (LANL, BNL) delivered lectures for the audience of 16 students. The majority of students were

  8. Potential application of LIBS to NNSA next generation safeguards initiative (NGSI)

    SciTech Connect

    Barefield Ii, James E; Clegg, Samuel M; Veirs, Douglas K; Browne, Mike; Lopez, Leon; Martinez, Ron; Le, Loan; Lamontagne, Stephen A

    2009-01-01

    In a climate in which states and nations have been and perhaps currently are involved in the prol iferation of nuclear materials and technologies, advanced methodologies and improvements in current measurement techniques are needed to combat new threats and increased levels of sophistication. The Department of Energy through the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has undertaken a broad review of International Safeguards. The conclusion from that review was that a comprehensive initiative to revitalize international safeguards technology and the human resource base was urgently needed to keep pace with demands and increasingly sophisticated emerging safeguards challenges. To address these challenges, NNSA launched the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) to develop policies, concepts, technologies, expertise, and infrastructure necessary to sustain the international safeguards system as its mission evolves for the next 25 years. NGSI is designed to revitalize and strengthen the U.S. safeguards technical base, recognizing that without a robust program the United States of America will not be in a position to exercise leadership or provide the necessary support to the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency). International safeguards as administrated by the IAEA are the primary vehicle for verifying compliance with the peaceful use and nonproliferation of nuclear materials and technologies. Laser Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy or LIBS has the potential to support the goals of NGSI as follows: by providing (1) automated analysis in complex nuclear processing or reprocessing facilities in real-time or near real-time without sample preparation or removal, (2) isotopic and important elemental ratio (Cm/Pu, Cm/U, ... etc) analysis, and (3) centralized remote control, process monitoring, and analysis of nuclear materials in nuclear facilities at multiple locations within the facility. Potential application of LIBS to international safeguards as

  9. Enhancing international radiation/nuclear detection training opportunities

    SciTech Connect

    Williams, Thomas L.; Bersell, Bridget M.; Booker, Paul M.; Anderson, Gerald E.; Leitch, Rosalyn M.; Meagher, John B.; Siefken, Rob R.; Spracklen, James L.

    2015-09-23

    The United States has worked domestically to develop and provide radiological and nuclear detection training and education initiatives aimed at interior law enforcement, but the international community has predominantly focused efforts at border and customs officials. The interior law enforcement officials of a State play a critical role in maintaining an effective national-level nuclear detection architecture. To meet this vital need, DNDO was funded by the U.S. Department of State (DOS) to create and deliver a 1-week course at the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Budapest, Hungary to inform interior law enforcement personnel of the overall mission, and to provide an understanding of how the participants can combat the threats of radiological and nuclear terrorism through detection efforts. Two courses, with approximately 20 students in each course, were delivered in fiscal year (FY) 2013, two were delivered in FY 2014 and FY 2015, and as of this report’s writing more are planned in FY 2016. However, while the ILEA courses produced measurable success, DNDO requested Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) research potential avenues to further increase the course impact.In a multi-phased approach, PNNL researched and analyzed several possible global training locations and venues, and other possible ways to increase the impact of the course using an agreed-to data-gathering format.

  10. Bulk Analysis of International Atomic Energy Agency Environmental Samples in Support of International Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Wogman, Ned A.; Olsen, Khris B.; Farmer, Orville T.

    2008-03-28

    Inspectors for the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Safeguards Program collect environmental samples under traditional safeguards, strengthened safeguards, or additional protocols during facility inspections at declared nuclear facilities throughout the world. Currently, there are 400 facilities under IAEA safeguards in 70 countries. All environmental samples are returned to IAEA’s Clean Laboratory located in Seiberdorf, Austria, where they are screened for gamma-ray emitting isotopes and prepared for distribution to laboratories for additional sampling. After the sample(s) are analyzed, the results are reported to the United States Network of Analytical Laboratories for input into its database. The IAEA reviews the data and incorporates the results into the safeguards evaluation of the state (country).

  11. Oak Ridge National Laboratory Next-Generation Safeguards Initiative: Human Capital Development

    SciTech Connect

    Gilligan, Kimberly

    2014-01-01

    In 2007, the US Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24) completed a comprehensive review of the current and potential future challenges facing the international safeguards system. The review examined: trends and events that have an effect on the mission of international safeguards; the implications of expanding and evolving mission requirements of the legal authorities and institutions that serve as the foundation of the international safeguards system; and, the technological, financial, and human resources required for effective safeguards implementation. The review’s findings and recommendations were summarized in the report International Safeguards: Challenges and Opportunities for the 21st Century (October 2007). The executive summary is available at the following link: http://nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/nnsa/inlinefiles/NGSI_Report.pdf.

  12. Amphiphilic Block Copolymers Enhance Cellular Uptake and Nuclear Entry of Polyplex-Delivered DNA

    PubMed Central

    Yang, Zhihui; Sahay, Gaurav; Sriadibhatla, Srikanth; Kabanov, Alexander V.

    2008-01-01

    This work for the first time demonstrates that synthetic polymers enhance uptake and nuclear import of plasmid DNA (pDNA) through the activation of cellular trafficking machinery. Nonionic block copolymers of poly(ethylene oxide) and poly(propylene oxide), Pluronics, are widely used as excipients in pharmaceutics. We previously demonstrated that Pluronics increase the phosphorylation of IκB and subsequent NFκB nuclear localization as well as upregulate numerous NFκB-related genes. In this study, we show that Pluronics enhance gene transfer by pDNA/polycation complexes (“polyplexes”) in a promoter-dependent fashion. Addition of Pluronic P123 or P85 to polyethyleneimine-based polyplexes had little effect on polyplex particle size but significantly enhanced pDNA cellular uptake, nuclear translocation and gene expression in several cell lines. When added to polyplex-transfected cells after transfection, Pluronics enhanced nuclear import of pDNA containing NFκB–binding sites, but have no effect on import of pDNA without these sites. All together, our studies suggest that Pluronics rapidly activate NFκB, which binds cytosolic pDNA that possesses promoters containing NFκB binding sites and consequently increases nuclear import of pDNA through NFκB nuclear translocation. PMID:18729495

  13. Oxygen-17 dynamic nuclear polarisation enhanced solid-state NMR spectroscopy at 18.8 T.

    PubMed

    Brownbill, Nick J; Gajan, David; Lesage, Anne; Emsley, Lyndon; Blanc, Frédéric

    2017-02-23

    We report (17)O dynamic nuclear polarisation (DNP) enhanced solid-state NMR experiments at 18.8 T. Several formulations were investigated on the Mg(OH)2 compound. A signal enhancement factor of 17 could be obtained when the solid particles were incorporated into a glassy o-terphenyl matrix doped with BDPA using the Overhauser polarisation transfer scheme whilst the cross effect mechanism enabled by TEKPol yielded a slightly lower enhancement but more time efficient data acquisition.

  14. Safeguards-by-Design: Guidance for High Temperature Gas Reactors (HTGRs) With Pebble Fuel

    SciTech Connect

    Philip Casey Durst; Mark Schanfein

    2012-08-01

    The following is a guidance document from a series prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), to assist facility designers and operators in implementing international Safeguards-by-Design (SBD). SBD has two main objectives: (1) to avoid costly and time consuming redesign work or retrofits of new nuclear fuel cycle facilities and (2) to make the implementation of international safeguards more effective and efficient at such facilities. In the long term, the attainment of these goals would save industry and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) time, money, and resources and be mutually beneficial. This particular safeguards guidance document focuses on pebble fuel high temperature gas reactors (HTGR). The purpose of the IAEA safeguards system is to provide credible assurance to the international community that nuclear material and other specified items are not diverted from peaceful nuclear uses. The safeguards system consists of the IAEA’s statutory authority to establish safeguards; safeguards rights and obligations in safeguards agreements and additional protocols; and technical measures implemented pursuant to those agreements. Of foremost importance is the international safeguards agreement between the country and the IAEA, concluded pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). According to a 1992 IAEA Board of Governors decision, countries must: notify the IAEA of a decision to construct a new nuclear facility as soon as such decision is taken; provide design information on such facilities as the designs develop; and provide detailed design information based on construction plans at least 180 days prior to the start of construction, and on "as-built" designs at least 180 days before the first receipt of nuclear material. Ultimately, the design information will be captured in an IAEA Design Information

  15. 10 CFR 76.119 - Security facility approval and safeguarding of National Security Information and Restricted Data.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Security facility approval and safeguarding of National Security Information and Restricted Data. 76.119 Section 76.119 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) CERTIFICATION OF GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANTS Safeguards and Security § 76.119 Security...

  16. 10 CFR 76.119 - Security facility approval and safeguarding of National Security Information and Restricted Data.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Security facility approval and safeguarding of National Security Information and Restricted Data. 76.119 Section 76.119 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) CERTIFICATION OF GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANTS Safeguards and Security § 76.119 Security...

  17. 10 CFR 76.119 - Security facility approval and safeguarding of National Security Information and Restricted Data.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Security facility approval and safeguarding of National Security Information and Restricted Data. 76.119 Section 76.119 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) CERTIFICATION OF GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANTS Safeguards and Security § 76.119 Security...

  18. 10 CFR 76.119 - Security facility approval and safeguarding of National Security Information and Restricted Data.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Security facility approval and safeguarding of National Security Information and Restricted Data. 76.119 Section 76.119 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) CERTIFICATION OF GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANTS Safeguards and Security § 76.119 Security...

  19. 10 CFR 76.119 - Security facility approval and safeguarding of National Security Information and Restricted Data.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Security facility approval and safeguarding of National Security Information and Restricted Data. 76.119 Section 76.119 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) CERTIFICATION OF GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANTS Safeguards and Security § 76.119 Security...

  20. Implementation of remove monitoring in facilities under safeguards with unattended systems

    SciTech Connect

    Beddingfield, David H; Nordquist, Heather A; Umebayaashi, Eiji

    2009-01-01

    Remote monitoring is being applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at nuclear facilities around the world. At the Monju Reactor in Japan we have designed, developed and implemented a remote monitoring approach that can serve as a model for applying remote monitoring to facilities that are already under full-scope safeguards using unattended instrumentation. Remote monitoring implementations have historically relied upon the use of specialized data collection hardware and system design features that integrate remote monitoring into the safeguards data collection system. The integration of remote monitoring and unattended data collection increases the complexity of safeguards data collection systems. This increase in complexity necessarily produces a corresponding reduction of system reliability compared to less-complex unattended monitoring systems. At the Monju facility we have implemented a remote monitoring system that is decoupled from the activity of safeguards data collection. In the completed system the function of remote data transfer is separated from the function of safeguards data collection. As such, a failure of the remote monitoring function cannot produce an associated loss of safeguards data, as is possible with integrated remote-monitoring implementations. Currently, all safeguards data from this facility is available to the IAEA on a 24/7 basis. This facility employs five radiation-based unattended systems, video surveillance and numerous optical seal systems. The implementation of remote monitoring at this facility, while increasing the complexity of the safeguards system, is designed to avoid any corresponding reduction in reliability of the safeguards data collection systems by having decoupled these functions. This design and implementation can serve as a model for implementation of remote monitoring at nuclear facilities that currently employ unattended safeguards systems.

  1. Mars mission performance enhancement with hybrid nuclear propulsion

    SciTech Connect

    Dagle, J.E.; Noffsinger, K.E.; Segna, D.R.

    1992-01-01

    Nuclear electric propulsion (NEP), compared with chemical and nuclear thermal propulsion (NTP), can effectively deliver the same mass to Mars using much less propellant, consequently requiring less mass delivered to Earth orbit. The lower thrust of NEP requires a spiral trajectory near planetary bodies, which significantly increases the travel time. Although the total travel time is long, the portion of the flight time spent during interplanetary transfer is shorter, because the vehicle is thrusting for much longer periods of time. This has led to the supposition that NEP, although very attractive for cargo missions, is not suitable for piloted missions to Mars. However, with the application of a hybrid application of a hybrid approach to propulsion, the benefits of NEP can be utilized while drastically reducing the overall travel time required. Development of a dual-mode system, which utilizes high-thrust NTP to propel the spacecraft from the planetary gravitational influence and low-thrust NEP to accelerate in interplanetary space, eliminates the spiral trajectory and results in a much faster transit time than could be obtained by either NEP or NTP alone. This results in a mission profile with a lower initial mass in low Earth orbit. In addition, the propulsion system would have the capability to provide electrical power for mission applications.

  2. Advanced hybrid nuclear propulsion Mars mission performance enhancement

    SciTech Connect

    Dagle, J.E.; Noffsinger, K.E.; Segna, D.R.

    1992-02-01

    Nuclear electric propulsion (NEP), compared with chemical and nuclear thermal propulsion (NTP), can effectively deliver the same mass to Mars using much less propellant, consequently requiring less mass delivered to Earth orbit. The lower thrust of NEP requires a spiral trajectory near planetary bodies, which significantly increases the travel time. Although the total travel time is long, the portion of the flight time spent during interplanetary transfer is shorter, because the vehicle is thrusting for much longer periods of time. This has led to the supposition that NEP, although very attractive for cargo missions, is not suitable for piloted missions to Mars. However, with the application of a hybrid approach to propulsion, the benefits of NEP can be utilized while drastically reducing the overall travel time required. Development of a dual-mode system, which utilizes high-thrust NTP to propel the spacecraft from the planetary gravitational influence and low-thrust NEP to accelerate in interplanetary space, eliminates the spiral trajectory and results in a much faster transit time than could be obtained by either NEP or NTP alone. This results in a mission profile with a lower initial mass in low Earth orbit. In addition, the propulsion system would have the capability to provide electrical power for mission applications.

  3. Working Toward Robust Process Monitoring for Safeguards Applications

    SciTech Connect

    Krichinsky, Alan M; Bell, Lisa S; Gilligan, Kimberly V; Laughter, Mark D; Miller, Paul; Pickett, Chris A; Richardson, Dave; Rowe, Nathan C; Younkin, James R

    2010-01-01

    New safeguards technologies allow continuous monitoring of plant processes. Efforts to deploy these technologies, as described in a preponderance of literature, typically have consisted of case studies attempting to prove their efficacy in proof-of-principle installations. While the enhanced safeguards capabilities of continuous monitoring have been established, studies thus far have not addressed such challenges as manipulation of a system by a host nation. To prevent this and other such vulnerabilities, one technology, continuous load cell monitoring, was reviewed. This paper will present vulnerabilities as well as mitigation strategies that were identified.

  4. Safeguards and security research and development: Progress report, October 1994--September 1995

    SciTech Connect

    Rutherford, D.R.; Henriksen, P.W.

    1997-03-01

    The primary goal of the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Technology Development Program, International Safeguards, and other Safeguards and Security Programs is to continue to be the center of excellence in the field of Safeguards and Security. This annual report for 1995 describes those scientific and engineering projects that contribute to all of the aforementioned programs. The authors have presented the information in a different format from previous annual reports. Part I is devoted to Nuclear Material Measurement Systems. Part II contains projects that are specific to Integrated Safeguards Systems. Part III highlights Safeguards Systems Effectiveness Evaluations and Part IV is a compilation of highlights from Information Assurance projects. Finally Part V highlights work on the projects at Los Alamos for International Safeguards. The final part of this annual report lists titles and abstracts of Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Technology Development reports, technical journal articles, and conference papers that were presented and published in 1995. This is the last annual report in this format. The authors wish to thank all of the individuals who have contributed to this annual report and made it so successful over the years.

  5. Enhancing the interaction between nuclear experiment and theory through information and statistics

    DOE PAGES

    Ireland, D. G.; Nazarewicz, W.

    2015-02-05

    This Focus Issue draws from a range of topics within nuclear physics, from studies of individual nucleons to the heaviest of nuclei. The unifying theme, however, is to illustrate the extent to which uncertainty is a key quantity, and to showcase applications of the latest computational methodologies. It is our assertion that a paradigm shift is needed in nuclear physics to enhance the coupling between theory and experiment, and we hope that this collection of articles is a good start.

  6. Potential opportunities for nano materials to help enable enhanced nuclear fuel performance

    SciTech Connect

    McClellan, Kenneth J.

    2012-06-06

    This presentation is an overview of the technical challenges for development of nuclear fuels with enhanced performance and accident tolerance. Key specific aspects of improved fuel performance are noted. Examples of existing nanonuclear projects and concepts are presented and areas of potential focus are suggested. The audience for this presentation includes representatives from: DOE-NE, other national laboratories, industry and academia. This audience is a mixture of nanotechnology experts and nuclear energy researchers and managers.

  7. New challenges in adolescent safeguarding.

    PubMed

    James, David R; Sargant, Nwanneka N; Bostock, Nancy; Khadr, Sophie

    2017-02-01

    The environment in which young people are growing up has changed significantly with the growth in social communication, changes in migration patterns and the proliferation of gangs. These changes pose a real and present danger to the health and well-being of young people in the UK and around the world. However, recognition of the safeguarding needs for this group continues to lag behind those of younger children and services often remain patchy and incomplete. We present a review of current safeguarding concerns as well as practical suggestions on their recognition and response for professionals working with young people in all branches of healthcare as well as education and wider society.

  8. Multilayered genetic safeguards limit growth of microorganisms to defined environments

    PubMed Central

    Gallagher, Ryan R.; Patel, Jaymin R.; Interiano, Alexander L.; Rovner, Alexis J.; Isaacs, Farren J.

    2015-01-01

    Genetically modified organisms (GMOs) are commonly used to produce valuable compounds in closed industrial systems. However, their emerging applications in open clinical or environmental settings require enhanced safety and security measures. Intrinsic biocontainment, the creation of bacterial hosts unable to survive in natural environments, remains a major unsolved biosafety problem. We developed a new biocontainment strategy containing overlapping ‘safeguards’—engineered riboregulators that tightly control expression of essential genes, and an engineered addiction module based on nucleases that cleaves the host genome—to restrict viability of Escherichia coli cells to media containing exogenously supplied synthetic small molecules. These multilayered safeguards maintain robust growth in permissive conditions, eliminate persistence and limit escape frequencies to <1.3 × 10−12. The staged approach to safeguard implementation revealed mechanisms of escape and enabled strategies to overcome them. Our safeguarding strategy is modular and employs conserved mechanisms that could be extended to clinically or industrially relevant organisms and undomesticated species. PMID:25567985

  9. Decreased activity and enhanced nuclear export of CCAAT-enhancer-binding protein beta during inhibition of adipogenesis by ceramide.

    PubMed Central

    Sprott, Kam M; Chumley, Michael J; Hanson, Janean M; Dobrowsky, Rick T

    2002-01-01

    To identify novel molecular mechanisms by which ceramide regulates cell differentiation, we examined its effect on adipogenesis of 3T3-L1 preadipocytes. Hormonal stimulation of 3T3-L1 preadipocytes induced formation of triacylglycerol-laden adipocytes over 7 days; in part, via the co-ordinated action of CCAAT-enhancer-binding proteins alpha, beta and delta (C/EBP-alpha, -beta and -delta) and peroxisome-proliferator-activated receptor gamma (PPARgamma). The addition of exogenous N-acetylsphingosine (C2-ceramide) or increasing endogenous ceramide levels inhibited the expression of C/EBPalpha and PPARgamma, and blocked adipocyte development. C2-ceramide did not decrease the cellular expression of C/EBPbeta, which is required for expression of C/EBPalpha and PPARgamma, but significantly blocked its transcriptional activity from a promoter construct after 24 h. The ceramide-induced decrease in the transcriptional activity of C/EBPbeta correlated with a strong decrease in its phosphorylation, DNA-binding ability and nuclear localization at 24 h. However, ceramide did not change the nuclear level of C/EBPbeta after a period of 4 or 16 h, suggesting that it was not affecting nuclear import. CRM1 (more recently named 'exportin-1') is a nuclear membrane protein that regulates protein export from the nucleus by binding to a specific nuclear export sequence. Leptomycin B is an inhibitor of CRM1/exportin-1, and reversed the ceramide-induced decrease in nuclear C/EBPbeta at 24 h. Taken together, these data support the hypothesis that ceramide may inhibit adipogenesis, at least in part, by enhancing dephosphorylation and premature nuclear export of C/EBPbeta at a time when its maximal transcriptional activity is required to drive adipogenesis. PMID:12071851

  10. Used fuel extended storage security and safeguards by design roadmap

    SciTech Connect

    Durbin, Samuel G.; Lindgren, Eric Richard; Jones, Robert; Ketusky, Edward; England, Jeffrey; Scherer, Carolynn; Sprinkle, James; Miller, Michael.; Rauch, Eric; Scaglione, John; Dunn, T.

    2016-05-01

    In the United States, spent nuclear fuel (SNF) is safely and securely stored in spent fuel pools and dry storage casks. The available capacity in spent fuel pools across the nuclear fleet has nearly reached a steady state value. The excess SNF continues to be loaded in dry storage casks. Fuel is expected to remain in dry storage for periods beyond the initial dry cask certification period of 20 years. Recent licensing renewals have approved an additional 40 years. This report identifies the current requirements and evaluation techniques associated with the safeguards and security of SNF dry cask storage. A set of knowledge gaps is identified in the current approaches. Finally, this roadmap identifies known knowledge gaps and provides a research path to deliver the tools and models needed to close the gaps and allow the optimization of the security and safeguards approaches for an interim spent fuel facility over the lifetime of the storage site.

  11. Apparatus for safeguarding a radiological source

    DOEpatents

    Bzorgi, Fariborz M

    2014-10-07

    A tamper detector is provided for safeguarding a radiological source that is moved into and out of a storage location through an access porthole for storage and use. The radiological source is presumed to have an associated shipping container approved by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission for transporting the radiological source. The tamper detector typically includes a network of sealed tubing that spans at least a portion of the access porthole. There is an opening in the network of sealed tubing that is large enough for passage therethrough of the radiological source and small enough to prevent passage therethrough of the associated shipping cask. Generally a gas source connector is provided for establishing a gas pressure in the network of sealed tubing, and a pressure drop sensor is provided for detecting a drop in the gas pressure below a preset value.

  12. Property enhancement of cast iron used for nuclear casks

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Behera, R. K.; Mahto, B. P.; Dubey, J. S.; Mishra, S. C.; Sen, S.

    2016-01-01

    Ductile iron (DI) is a preferred material for use in various structural, automotive, and engineering fields because of its excellent combination of strength, toughness, and ductility. In the current investigation, we elucidate the relationship between the morphological and mechanical properties of DI intended for use in safety applications in the nuclear industry. DI specimens with various alloying elements were subjected to annealing and austempering heat treatment processes. A faster cooling rate appeared to increase the nodule count in austempered specimens, compensating for their nodularity value and subsequently decreasing their ductility and impact strength. The ductility and impact energy values of annealed specimens increased with increasing ferrite area fraction and nodularity, whereas an increase in the amounts of Ni and Cr resulted in an increase of hardness via solid solution strengthening. Austempered specimens were observed to be stronger than annealed specimens and failed in a somewhat brittle manner characterized by a river pattern, whereas the ductile failure mode was characterized by the presence of dimples.

  13. Safeguards Envelope Progress FY08

    SciTech Connect

    Robert Bean; Richard Metcalf; Aaron Bevill

    2008-09-01

    The Safeguards Envelope Project met its milestones by creating a rudimentary safeguards envelope, proving the value of the approach on a small scale, and determining the most appropriate path forward. The Idaho Chemical Processing Plant’s large cache of reprocessing process monitoring data, dubbed UBER Data, was recovered and used in the analysis. A probabilistic Z test was used on a Markov Monte Carlo simulation of expected diversion data when compared with normal operating data. The data regarding a fully transient event in a tank was used to create a simple requirement, representative of a safeguards envelope, whose impact was a decrease in operating efficiency by 1.3% but an increase in material balance period of 26%. This approach is operator, state, and international safeguards friendly and should be applied to future reprocessing plants. Future requirements include tank-to-tank correlations in reprocessing facilities, detailed operations impact studies, simulation inclusion, automated optimization, advanced statistics analysis, and multi-attribute utility analysis.

  14. Phosphatidylinositol 3-kinase/Akt signaling enhances nuclear localization and transcriptional activity of BRCA1

    SciTech Connect

    Hinton, Cimona V.; Fitzgerald, Latricia D.; Thompson, Marilyn E. . E-mail: methompson@mmc.edu

    2007-05-15

    Signaling pathways involved in regulating nuclear-cytoplasmic distribution of BRCA1 have not been previously reported. Here, we provide evidence that heregulin {beta}1-induced activation of the Akt pathway increases the nuclear content of BRCA1. First, treatment of T47D breast cancer cells with heregulin {beta}1 results in a two-fold increase in nuclear BRCA1 as assessed by FACS analysis, immunoblotting and immunofluorescence. This heregulin-induced increase in nuclear BRCA1 is blocked by siRNA-mediated down-regulation of Akt. Second, mutation of threonine 509 in BRCA1, the site of Akt phosphorylation, to an alanine, attenuates the ability of heregulin to induce BRCA1 nuclear accumulation. These data suggest that Akt-catalyzed phosphorylation of BRCA1 is required for the heregulin-regulated nuclear concentration of BRCA1. Because most functions ascribed to BRCA1 occur within the nucleus, we postulated that phosphorylation-dependent nuclear accumulation of BRCA1 would result in enhanced nuclear activity, specifically transcriptional activity, of BRCA1. This postulate is affirmed by our observation that the ability of BRCA1 to transactivate GADD45 promoter constructs was enhanced in T47D cells treated with heregulin {beta}1. Furthermore, the heterologous expression of BRCA1 in HCC1937 human breast cancer cells, which have constitutively active Akt, also induces GADD45 promoter activity, whereas the expression of BRCA1 in which threonine 509 has been mutated to an alanine is able to only minimally induce promoter activity. These findings implicate Akt in upstream events leading to BRCA1 nuclear localization and function.

  15. 10 CFR 52.87 - Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS).

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). 52.87 Section 52.87 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) LICENSES, CERTIFICATIONS, AND APPROVALS FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS Combined Licenses § 52.87 Referral to the Advisory Committee...

  16. 10 CFR 52.165 - Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS).

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). 52.165 Section 52.165 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) LICENSES, CERTIFICATIONS, AND APPROVALS FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS Manufacturing Licenses § 52.165 Referral to the...

  17. 10 CFR 52.165 - Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS).

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). 52.165 Section 52.165 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) LICENSES, CERTIFICATIONS, AND APPROVALS FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS Manufacturing Licenses § 52.165 Referral to the...

  18. 10 CFR 52.23 - Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS).

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). 52.23 Section 52.23 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) LICENSES, CERTIFICATIONS, AND APPROVALS FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS Early Site Permits § 52.23 Referral to the Advisory...

  19. 10 CFR 52.87 - Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS).

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). 52.87 Section 52.87 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) LICENSES, CERTIFICATIONS, AND APPROVALS FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS Combined Licenses § 52.87 Referral to the Advisory Committee...

  20. 10 CFR 52.165 - Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS).

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). 52.165 Section 52.165 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) LICENSES, CERTIFICATIONS, AND APPROVALS FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS Manufacturing Licenses § 52.165 Referral to the...

  1. 10 CFR 52.87 - Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS).

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). 52.87 Section 52.87 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) LICENSES, CERTIFICATIONS, AND APPROVALS FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS Combined Licenses § 52.87 Referral to the Advisory Committee...

  2. 10 CFR 52.23 - Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS).

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). 52.23 Section 52.23 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) LICENSES, CERTIFICATIONS, AND APPROVALS FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS Early Site Permits § 52.23 Referral to the Advisory...

  3. 75 FR 1831 - Seeks Qualified Candidates for the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-01-13

    ... performance, and nuclear materials and radiation protection. The ACRS also has some involvement in security... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Seeks Qualified Candidates for the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards AGENCY: U.S....

  4. Analysis of a Nuclear Enhanced Airbreathing Rocket for Earth to Orbit Applications

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Adams, Robert B.; Landrum, D. Brian; Brown, Norman (Technical Monitor)

    2001-01-01

    The proposed engine concept is the Nuclear Enhanced Airbreathing Rocket (NEAR). The NEAR concept uses a fission reactor to thermally heat a propellant in a rocket plenum. The rocket is shrouded, thus the exhaust mixes with ingested air to provide additional thermal energy through combustion. The combusted flow is then expanded through a nozzle to provide thrust.

  5. Importin-4 Regulates Gene Delivery by Enhancing Nuclear Retention and Chromatin Deposition by Polyplexes

    PubMed Central

    Ross, Nikki L.; Sullivan, Millicent O.

    2016-01-01

    For successful gene delivery, plasmid DNA must be able to access the nucleus in order to be transcribed. Numerous studies have shown that gene delivery occurs more readily in dividing cells, which is attributed to increased nuclear access when the nuclear envelope disassembles during mitosis; however, nonviral carriers continue to have low transfection efficiencies and require large quantities of DNA per cell to achieve reasonable gene transfer, even in dividing cells. Therefore, we hypothesized that using histone-derived nuclear localization sequences (NLS)s to target polyplexes might enhance nuclear delivery by facilitating interactions with histone effectors that mediate nuclear partitioning and retention during mitosis. We discovered a novel interaction between polyplexes linked to histone 3 (H3) N-terminal tail peptides and the histone nuclear import protein importin-4, as evidenced by strong spatial colocalization as well as significantly decreased transfection when importin-4 expression was reduced. A fraction of the histone-targeted polyplexes was also found to colocalize with the retrotranslocon of the endoplasmic reticulum, Sec61. Super resolution microscopy demonstrated a high level of polyplex binding to chromatin post-mitosis, and there also was a significant decrease in the amount of chromatin binding following importin-4 knockdown. These results provide evidence that natural histone effectors mediate both nuclear entry and deposition on chromatin by histone-targeted polyplexes, and a translocation event from the endoplasmic reticulum into the cytosol may occur before mitosis to enable the polyplexes to interact with these essential cytoplasmic proteins. PMID:26465823

  6. Importin-4 Regulates Gene Delivery by Enhancing Nuclear Retention and Chromatin Deposition by Polyplexes.

    PubMed

    Ross, Nikki L; Sullivan, Millicent O

    2015-12-07

    For successful gene delivery, plasmid DNA must be able to access the nucleus in order to be transcribed. Numerous studies have shown that gene delivery occurs more readily in dividing cells, which is attributed to increased nuclear access when the nuclear envelope disassembles during mitosis; however, nonviral carriers continue to have low transfection efficiencies and require large quantities of DNA per cell to achieve reasonable gene transfer, even in dividing cells. Therefore, we hypothesized that using histone-derived nuclear localization sequences (NLS)s to target polyplexes might enhance nuclear delivery by facilitating interactions with histone effectors that mediate nuclear partitioning and retention during mitosis. We discovered a novel interaction between polyplexes linked to histone 3 (H3) N-terminal tail peptides and the histone nuclear import protein importin-4, as evidenced by strong spatial colocalization as well as significantly decreased transfection when importin-4 expression was reduced. A fraction of the histone-targeted polyplexes was also found to colocalize with the retrotranslocon of the endoplasmic reticulum, Sec61. Super resolution microscopy demonstrated a high level of polyplex binding to chromatin postmitosis, and there also was a significant decrease in the amount of chromatin binding following importin-4 knockdown. These results provide evidence that natural histone effectors mediate both nuclear entry and deposition on chromatin by histone-targeted polyplexes, and a translocation event from the endoplasmic reticulum into the cytosol may occur before mitosis to enable the polyplexes to interact with these essential cytoplasmic proteins.

  7. Improving Transparency in the Reporting of Safeguards Implementation: FY11 Update

    SciTech Connect

    Toomey, Christopher; Odlaug, Christopher S.; Wyse, Evan T.

    2011-09-30

    In 2008, the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI) indicated that the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR) has not kept pace with the evolution of safeguards and provided the IAEA with a set of recommendations for improvement. The SIR is the primary mechanism for providing an overview of safeguards implementation in a given year and reporting on the annual safeguards findings and conclusions drawn by the Secretariat. As the IAEA transitions to State-level safeguards approaches, SIR reporting must adapt to reflect these evolutionary changes. This evolved report will better reflect the IAEA's transition to a more qualitative and information-driven approach, based upon State-as-a-whole considerations. This paper applies SAGSI's recommendations to the development of multiple models for an evolved SIR and finds that an SIR repurposed as a 'safeguards portal' could significantly enhance information delivery, clarity, and transparency. In addition, this paper finds that the 'portal concept' also appears to have value as a standardized information presentation and analysis platform for use by Country Officers, for continuity of knowledge purposes, and the IAEA Secretariat in the safeguards conclusion process. Accompanying this paper is a fully functional prototype of the 'portal' concept, built using commercial software and IAEA Annual Report data and available for viewing at http://safeguardsportal.pnnl.gov.

  8. SULFUR HEXAFLUORIDE TREATMENT OF USED NUCLEAR FUEL TO ENHANCE SEPARATIONS

    SciTech Connect

    Gray, J.; Torres, R.; Korinko, P.; Martinez-Rodriguez, M.; Becnel, J.; Garcia-Diaz, B.; Adams, T.

    2012-09-25

    Reactive Gas Recycling (RGR) technology development has been initiated at Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL), with a stretch-goal to develop a fully dry recycling technology for Used Nuclear Fuel (UNF). This approach is attractive due to the potential of targeted gas-phase treatment steps to reduce footprint and secondary waste volumes associated with separations relying primarily on traditional technologies, so long as the fluorinators employed in the reaction are recycled for use in the reactors or are optimized for conversion of fluorinator reactant. The developed fluorination via SF{sub 6}, similar to the case for other fluorinators such as NF{sub 3}, can be used to address multiple fuel forms and downstream cycles including continued processing for LWR via fluorination or incorporation into a aqueous process (e.g. modified FLUOREX) or for subsequent pyro treatment to be used in advanced gas reactor designs such metal- or gas-cooled reactors. This report details the most recent experimental results on the reaction of SF{sub 6} with various fission product surrogate materials in the form of oxides and metals, including uranium oxides using a high-temperature DTA apparatus capable of temperatures in excess of 1000{deg}C . The experimental results indicate that the majority of the fission products form stable solid fluorides and sulfides, while a subset of the fission products form volatile fluorides such as molybdenum fluoride and niobium fluoride, as predicted thermodynamically. Additional kinetic analysis has been performed on additional fission products. A key result is the verification that SF{sub 6} requires high temperatures for direct fluorination and subsequent volatilization of uranium oxides to UF{sub 6}, and thus is well positioned as a head-end treatment for other separations technologies, such as the volatilization of uranium oxide by NF{sub 3} as reported by colleagues at PNNL, advanced pyrochemical separations or traditional full recycle

  9. Integrative Curriculum Development in Nuclear Education and Research Vertical Enhancement Program

    SciTech Connect

    Egarievwe, Stephen U.; Jow, Julius O.; Edwards, Matthew E.; Montgomery, V. Trent; James, Ralph B.; Blackburn, Noel D.; Glenn, Chance M.

    2015-07-01

    Using a vertical education enhancement model, a Nuclear Education and Research Vertical Enhancement (NERVE) program was developed. The NERVE program is aimed at developing nuclear engineering education and research to 1) enhance skilled workforce development in disciplines relevant to nuclear power, national security and medical physics, and 2) increase the number of students and faculty from underrepresented groups (women and minorities) in fields related to the nuclear industry. The program uses multi-track training activities that vertically cut across the several education domains: undergraduate degree programs, graduate schools, and post-doctoral training. In this paper, we present the results of an integrative curriculum development in the NERVE program. The curriculum development began with nuclear content infusion into existing science, engineering and technology courses. The second step involved the development of nuclear engineering courses: 1) Introduction to Nuclear Engineering, 2) Nuclear Engineering I, and 2) Nuclear Engineering II. The third step is the establishment of nuclear engineering concentrations in two engineering degree programs: 1) electrical engineering, and 2) mechanical engineering. A major outcome of the NERVE program is a collaborative infrastructure that uses laboratory work, internships at nuclear facilities, on-campus research, and mentoring in collaboration with industry and government partners to provide hands-on training for students. The major activities of the research and education collaborations include: - One-week spring training workshop at Brookhaven National Laboratory: The one-week training and workshop is used to enhance research collaborations and train faculty and students on user facilities/equipment at Brookhaven National Laboratory, and for summer research internships. Participants included students, faculty members at Alabama A and M University and research collaborators at BNL. The activities include 1) tour and

  10. Metazoan Nuclear Pores Provide a Scaffold for Poised Genes and Mediate Induced Enhancer-Promoter Contacts.

    PubMed

    Pascual-Garcia, Pau; Debo, Brian; Aleman, Jennifer R; Talamas, Jessica A; Lan, Yemin; Nguyen, Nha H; Won, Kyoung J; Capelson, Maya

    2017-04-06

    Nuclear pore complex components (Nups) have been implicated in transcriptional regulation, yet what regulatory steps are controlled by metazoan Nups remains unclear. We identified the presence of multiple Nups at promoters, enhancers, and insulators in the Drosophila genome. In line with this binding, we uncovered a functional role for Nup98 in mediating enhancer-promoter looping at ecdysone-inducible genes. These genes were found to be stably associated with nuclear pores before and after activation. Although changing levels of Nup98 disrupted enhancer-promoter contacts, it did not affect ongoing transcription but instead compromised subsequent transcriptional activation or transcriptional memory. In support of the enhancer-looping role, we found Nup98 to gain and retain physical interactions with architectural proteins upon stimulation with ecdysone. Together, our data identify Nups as a class of architectural proteins for enhancers and supports a model in which animal genomes use the nuclear pore as an organizing scaffold for inducible poised genes.

  11. Safeguards-by-Design:Guidance for High Temperature Gas Reactors (HTGRs) With Prismatic Fuel

    SciTech Connect

    Mark Schanfein; Casey Durst

    2012-11-01

    Introduction and Purpose The following is a guidance document from a series prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), to assist facility designers and operators in implementing international Safeguards-by-Design (SBD). SBD has two main objectives: (1) to avoid costly and time consuming redesign work or retrofits of new nuclear fuel cycle facilities and (2) to make the implementation of international safeguards more effective and efficient at such facilities. In the long term, the attainment of these goals would save industry and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) time, money, and resources and be mutually beneficial. This particular safeguards guidance document focuses on prismatic fuel high temperature gas reactors (HTGR). The purpose of the IAEA safeguards system is to provide credible assurance to the international community that nuclear material and other specified items are not diverted from peaceful nuclear uses. The safeguards system consists of the IAEA’s statutory authority to establish safeguards; safeguards rights and obligations in safeguards agreements and additional protocols; and technical measures implemented pursuant to those agreements. Of foremost importance is the international safeguards agreement between the country and the IAEA, concluded pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). According to a 1992 IAEA Board of Governors decision, countries must: notify the IAEA of a decision to construct a new nuclear facility as soon as such decision is taken; provide design information on such facilities as the designs develop; and provide detailed design information based on construction plans at least 180 days prior to the start of construction, and on "as-built" designs at least 180 days before the first receipt of nuclear material. Ultimately, the design information will be captured in an IAEA

  12. Are xenotransplantation safeguards legally viable?

    PubMed

    Florencio, P S; Ramanathan, E D

    2001-01-01

    Scientists agree on the need for robust public health safeguards to accompany the imminent introduction of xenotransplantation--clinical transplantation of animal tissue into humans. To protect society in the event of emerging infectious diseases, governments must devise a legally effective means of ensuring compliance with such safeguards. Neither consent law, the law of contracts, nor existing public health legislation can adequately enforce such compliance. Consent law serves as a mechanism of communicating the momentary waiver of legal rights, not as a durable enforcement doctrine. Because it would be essential for recipients personally to comply with public safety measures, the law of contracts would also be unable to compel compliance. Existing public health legislation would also likely be ineffective because it would need to be substantially amended to incorporate the heightened powers necessary for the periodic examination of asymptomatic xenotransplant recipients. Xenotransplantation-specific legislation would be a legally effective means of enforcing public health safeguards since it could require conforming behaviors and could impose monetary fines on those recipients who, having benefited from life-saving intervention, fail to comply. This Article argues that legislation implementing a post-xenotransplantation surveillance system should withstand constitutional scrutiny because it would not be discriminatory and because, although it would violate fundamental rights of recipients, such violations would be justified under existing constitutional doctrines.

  13. Framework for fuel-cycle approaches to IAEA safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Fishbone, L.G.

    1986-10-01

    In order to compare several nuclear-safeguards verification approaches to one another and to the conventional facility-oriented approach, we establish a framework of the classes of information routinely verifiable by IAEA safeguards inspections. For each facility type within a State nuclear fuel cycle, the classes include flow data, inventory data, and shipper and receiver data. By showing which classes of information are verified for each facility type within three fuel cycles of different complexity, we distinguish the inspection approaches from one anoter and exhibit their fuel-cycle dependence, i.e., their need for sets of safeguards inspection activities different from those required under the facility-oriented approach at similar facilities in fuel cycles of differing complexity. Tables V-1, V-2, and V-3 graphically depict these relations and give a qualitative summary of the relative effectiveness and effort requirements of the approaches classified. The zone, information-correlation, diversion-assumption-change, and randomization-over-facilities approaches depend intrinsically on the complexity of the fuel cycle: their very definition implies fuel-cycle dependence. The approaches involving randomization over activities and goal relaxations do not have such dependence.

  14. Safeguard monitoring of direct electrolytic reduction

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Jurovitzki, Abraham L.

    Nuclear power is regaining global prominence as a sustainable energy source as the world faces the consequences of depending on limited fossil based, CO2 emitting fuels. A key component to achieving this sustainability is to implement a closed nuclear fuel cycle. Without achieving this goal, a relatively small fraction of the energy value in nuclear fuel is actually utilized. This involves recycling of spent nuclear fuel (SNF)---separating fissile actinides from waste products and using them to fabricate fresh fuel. Pyroprocessing is a viable option being developed for this purpose with a host of benefits compared to other recycling options, such as PUREX. Notably, pyroprocessing is ill suited to separate pure plutonium from spent fuel and thus has non-proliferation benefits. Pyroprocessing involves high temperature electrochemical and chemical processing of SNF in a molten salt electrolyte. During this batch process, several intermediate and final streams are produced that contain radioactive material. While pyroprocessing is ineffective at separating pure plutonium, there are various process misuse scenarios that could result in diversion of impure plutonium into one or more of these streams. This is a proliferation risk that should be addressed with innovative safeguards technology. One approach to meeting this challenge is to develop real time monitoring techniques that can be implemented in the hot cells and coupled with the various unit operations involved with pyroprocessing. Current state of the art monitoring techniques involve external chemical assaying which requires sample removal from these unit operations. These methods do not meet International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) timeliness requirements. In this work, a number of monitoring techniques were assessed for their viability as online monitoring tools. A hypothetical diversion scenario for the direct electrolytic reduction process was experimentally verified (using Nd2O3 as a surrogate for PuO2

  15. Processing large sensor data sets for safeguards : the knowledge generation system.

    SciTech Connect

    Thomas, Maikel A.; Smartt, Heidi Anne; Matthews, Robert F.

    2012-04-01

    Modern nuclear facilities, such as reprocessing plants, present inspectors with significant challenges due in part to the sheer amount of equipment that must be safeguarded. The Sandia-developed and patented Knowledge Generation system was designed to automatically analyze large amounts of safeguards data to identify anomalous events of interest by comparing sensor readings with those expected from a process of interest and operator declarations. This paper describes a demonstration of the Knowledge Generation system using simulated accountability tank sensor data to represent part of a reprocessing plant. The demonstration indicated that Knowledge Generation has the potential to address several problems critical to the future of safeguards. It could be extended to facilitate remote inspections and trigger random inspections. Knowledge Generation could analyze data to establish trust hierarchies, to facilitate safeguards use of operator-owned sensors.

  16. Development of laser induced breakdown spectroscopy instrumentatin for safeguards applications

    SciTech Connect

    Barefield Il, James E; Clegg, Samuel M; Le, Loan A; Lopez, Leon N

    2010-01-01

    In September 2006, a Technical Meeting on Application of Laser Spectrometry Techniques in IAEA Safeguards was held at IAEA headquarters (HQ). One of the principal recommendations from this meeting was the need to 'pursue the development of novel complementary access instrumentation based on laser induced breakdown spectroscopy (LIBS) for the detection of gaseous and solid signatures and indicators of nuclear fuel cycle processes and associated materials.' Pursuant to this recommendation the Department of Safeguards (SG) under the Division of Technical Support (SGTS) convened the Experts and Users Advisory Meeting on Laser Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy (LIBS) for Safeguards Applications. This meeting was held at IAEA HQ from July 7-11,2008 and hosted by the Novel Technologies Unit (NTU). The meeting was attended by 12 LIBS experts from the Czech Republic, the European Commission, France, the Republic of Korea, the United States of America, Germany, the United Kingdom of Great Britain, Canada, and Northern Ireland. After a presentation of the needs of the IAEA inspectors, the LIBS experts were in agreement that needs as presented could be partially or fully fulfilled using LIBS instrumentation. The needs of the IAEA inspectors were grouped in the following broad categories: (1) Improvements to in-field measurements/environmental sampling; (2) Monitoring status of activity in a Hot Cell; (3) Verifying status of activity at a declared facility via process monitoring; and (4) Need for pre-screening of environmental samples before analysis. Under the Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) Los Alamos National Laboratory is exploring three potential applications of LIBS for international safeguards. As part of this work, we are developing: (1) a user-friendly man-portable LIBS system to characterize samples across a wide range of elements in the periodic table from hydrogen up to heavy elements

  17. Recommended observational skills training for IAEA safeguards inspections. Final report: Recommended observational skills training for IAEA safeguards inspections

    SciTech Connect

    Toquam, J.L.; Morris, F.A.

    1994-09-01

    This is the second of two reports prepared to assist the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA or Agency) in enhancing the effectiveness of its international safeguards inspections through inspector training in {open_quotes}Observational Skills{close_quotes}. The first (Phase 1) report was essentially exploratory. It defined Observational Skills broadly to include all appropriate cognitive, communications, and interpersonal techniques that have the potential to help IAEA safeguards inspectors function more effectively. It identified 10 specific Observational Skills components, analyzed their relevance to IAEA safeguards inspections, and reviewed a variety of inspection programs in the public and private sectors that provide training in one or more of these components. The report concluded that while it should be possible to draw upon these other programs in developing Observational Skills training for IAEA inspectors, the approaches utilized in these programs will likely require significant adaption to support the specific job requirements, policies, and practices that define the IAEA inspector`s job. The overall objective of this second (Phase 2) report is to provide a basis for the actual design and delivery of Observational Skills training to IAEA inspectors. The more specific purposes of this report are to convey a fuller understanding of the potential application of Observational Skills to the inspector`s job, describe inspector perspectives on the relevance and importance of particular Observational Skills, identify the specific Observational Skill components that are most important and relevant to enhancing safeguards inspections, and make recommendations as to Observational Skills training for the IAEA`s consideration in further developing its Safeguards training program.

  18. Changes to criminal records checks used to safeguard vulnerable patients.

    PubMed

    Griffith, Richard; Tengnah, Cassam

    2012-07-01

    The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 is introducing changes to the Criminal Records Bureau (CRB) checks carried out on those people who work with vulnerable groups. The new law is the coalition Government's response to the criticism of the Safeguarding Vulnerable Group Act 2006. It will merge the CRB and Independent Safeguarding Authority into a new Disclosure and Barring Service and will enhance the rights of applicants to challenge the CRB's right to disclose non-conviction information as part of an enhanced criminal records check. In the first of two articles on the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Richard Griffith and Cassam Tengnah discuss the current framework for disclosing criminal records and the impact of the changes on district nurses applying for new posts.

  19. Enhancing nuclear power plant performance through the use of artifical intelligence

    SciTech Connect

    Johnson, M.; Maren, A.; Miller, L.; Uhrig, R.; Upadhyaya, B.

    1989-06-15

    In the summer of 1988, the Department of Nuclear Engineering (NE) at the University of Tennessee (UT) in Knoxville was selected to carry out a research program in Enhancing the Operation of Nuclear Power plants through the use of Artificial Intelligence, This program is sponsored by the Department of Energy's Office of Energy Research under 10CFR605 for Nuclear Engineering Research. The objective of the research is to advance the state-of-the-art of nuclear power plant control, safety, management, and instrumentation systems through the use of artificial intelligence (AI) techniques, including both expert systems and neural networks. The emphasis will be placed on methods that can be implemented on a rapid or real-time basis. A second, but equally important, objective is to build a broadly based critical mass of expertise in the artificial intelligence, field that can be brought to bear on the technology of nuclear power plants. Both of these goals are being met. This overview and the attached technical reports describe the work that is being carried out. Although in some cases, the scope of the work differs somewhat from the specific tasks described in the original proposal, all activities are clearly within the overall scope of the contract.

  20. Enhancing nuclear power plant performance through the use of artifical intelligence. First annual report

    SciTech Connect

    Johnson, M.; Maren, A.; Miller, L.; Uhrig, R.; Upadhyaya, B.

    1989-06-15

    In the summer of 1988, the Department of Nuclear Engineering (NE) at the University of Tennessee (UT) in Knoxville was selected to carry out a research program in ``Enhancing the Operation of Nuclear Power plants through the use of Artificial Intelligence, This program is sponsored by the Department of Energy`s Office of Energy Research under 10CFR605 for Nuclear Engineering Research. The objective of the research is to advance the state-of-the-art of nuclear power plant control, safety, management, and instrumentation systems through the use of artificial intelligence (AI) techniques, including both expert systems and neural networks. The emphasis will be placed on methods that can be implemented on a rapid or real-time basis. A second, but equally important, objective is to build a broadly based critical mass of expertise in the artificial intelligence, field that can be brought to bear on the technology of nuclear power plants. Both of these goals are being met. This overview and the attached technical reports describe the work that is being carried out. Although in some cases, the scope of the work differs somewhat from the specific tasks described in the original proposal, all activities are clearly within the overall scope of the contract.

  1. 34 CFR 300.623 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... § 300.623 Safeguards. (a) Each participating agency must protect the confidentiality of personally... participating agency must assume responsibility for ensuring the confidentiality of any personally...

  2. 34 CFR 300.623 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... § 300.623 Safeguards. (a) Each participating agency must protect the confidentiality of personally... participating agency must assume responsibility for ensuring the confidentiality of any personally...

  3. 21 CFR 26.21 - Safeguard clause.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-04-01

    ... OF PHARMACEUTICAL GOOD MANUFACTURING PRACTICE REPORTS, MEDICAL DEVICE QUALITY SYSTEM AUDIT REPORTS... Specific Sector Provisions for Pharmaceutical Good Manufacturing Practices § 26.21 Safeguard clause....

  4. 21 CFR 26.21 - Safeguard clause.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-04-01

    ... OF PHARMACEUTICAL GOOD MANUFACTURING PRACTICE REPORTS, MEDICAL DEVICE QUALITY SYSTEM AUDIT REPORTS... Specific Sector Provisions for Pharmaceutical Good Manufacturing Practices § 26.21 Safeguard clause....

  5. 21 CFR 26.21 - Safeguard clause.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-04-01

    ... OF PHARMACEUTICAL GOOD MANUFACTURING PRACTICE REPORTS, MEDICAL DEVICE QUALITY SYSTEM AUDIT REPORTS... Specific Sector Provisions for Pharmaceutical Good Manufacturing Practices § 26.21 Safeguard clause....

  6. 21 CFR 26.21 - Safeguard clause.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-04-01

    ... OF PHARMACEUTICAL GOOD MANUFACTURING PRACTICE REPORTS, MEDICAL DEVICE QUALITY SYSTEM AUDIT REPORTS... Specific Sector Provisions for Pharmaceutical Good Manufacturing Practices § 26.21 Safeguard clause....

  7. 45 CFR 164.308 - Administrative safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-10-01

    ... reporting discrepancies. (D) Password management (Addressable). Procedures for creating, changing, and safeguarding passwords. (6)(i) Standard: Security incident procedures. Implement policies and procedures...

  8. 21 CFR 26.21 - Safeguard clause.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-04-01

    ... OF PHARMACEUTICAL GOOD MANUFACTURING PRACTICE REPORTS, MEDICAL DEVICE QUALITY SYSTEM AUDIT REPORTS... Specific Sector Provisions for Pharmaceutical Good Manufacturing Practices § 26.21 Safeguard clause....

  9. Termination of Safeguards on ULWBR Material

    SciTech Connect

    Ivan R. Thomas; Ernest L. Laible

    2008-07-01

    The Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Environmental Management, has approved the disposition of 31 metric tons of Unirradiated Light Water Breeder Reactor (ULWBR) material in canisters stored within dry wells of the Underground Fuel Storage Facility at the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center (INTEC). This unirradiated material consists primarily of ceramic pellets of thorium oxide in stainless steel cladding, but it also contains 300 kilograms of uranium that is 98 wt% U-233. The ULWBR material was not processed at the INTEC because it was incompatible with prior chemical separation schemes. Other economical recovery options have not been identified, and expressions of interest for consolidating the material with existing projects at other DOE sites have not been received. The U-233 could be used for producing the medical isotope Actinium-225, but the proof-of-principle demonstration and follow-on pilot program have not been developed to the point of requiring production quantities of U-233. Consequently, the selected disposition of the ULWBR material was burial as Low Level Waste at the Nevada Test Site (NTS), which required terminating safeguards controls for the contained Category II quantity of Attractiveness Level D special nuclear material (SNM). The requested termination followed the twelve point evaluation criteria of the Historical Defense Program Discard Guidance and included a security analysis for evaluating the risks of theft, diversion, and radiological sabotage associated with the material. Continuity of knowledge in the book inventory was assured by documenting that the original shipper’s measurements accurately reflected the quantities of materials received and that the ULWBR materials had remained under adequate physical protection and had been subject to periodic physical inventories. The method selected for substantiating the book values as the basis for terminating safeguards was the nondestructive assay used during physical

  10. Fuzzy resource optimization for safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Zardecki, A.; Markin, J.T.

    1991-01-01

    Authorization, enforcement, and verification -- three key functions of safeguards systems -- form the basis of a hierarchical description of the system risk. When formulated in terms of linguistic rather than numeric attributes, the risk can be computed through an algorithm based on the notion of fuzzy sets. Similarly, this formulation allows one to analyze the optimal resource allocation by maximizing the overall detection probability, regarded as a linguistic variable. After summarizing the necessary elements of the fuzzy sets theory, we outline the basic algorithm. This is followed by a sample computation of the fuzzy optimization. 10 refs., 1 tab.

  11. Safeguards.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Taylor, Steve, Ed.; And Others

    1993-01-01

    This policy bulletin addresses the issue of protecting the safety of people with developmental disabilities from their increased risk of neglect, abuse, and mistreatment. An article by Steven J. Taylor considers "The Paradox of Regulations," noting both the protective effects of regulations and their effect in stifling innovation and…

  12. Safeguards summary event list (SSEL), January 1, 1990--December 31, 1995

    SciTech Connect

    1996-07-01

    The Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL), Vol. 2, Rev. 4, provides brief summaries of several hundred safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) which occurred and were reported from January 1, 1990, rough December 31, 1995. Because of public interest, the Miscellaneous category includes a few events which involve either source material, byproduct material, or natural uranium which are exempt from safeguards requirements. Events are described under the categories of Bomb-related, Intrusion, Missing and/or Allegedly Stolen, Transportation-related, Tampering/Vandalism, Arson, Firearms, Radiological Sabotage, Nonradiological Sabotage, and Miscellaneous. The information contained in the event descriptions is derived primarily from official NRC reporting channels.

  13. Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL), January 1, 1990--December 31, 1996, Vol. 2, Rev. 5

    SciTech Connect

    1997-07-01

    The Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL), Vol. 2, Rev. 5, provides brief summaries of several hundred safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) which occurred and were reported from January 1, 1990, through December 31, 1996. Because of public interest, the Miscellaneous category includes a few events which involve either source material, byproduct material, or natural uranium which are exempt from safeguards requirements. Events are described under the categories of Bomb-related, Intrusion, Missing and/or Allegedly Stolen, Transportation-related, Tampering/Vandalism, Arson, Firearms, Radiological Sabotage, Nonradiological Sabotage, and Miscellaneous. The information contained in the event descriptions is derived primarily from official NRC reporting channels.

  14. Separations and safeguards model integration.

    SciTech Connect

    Cipiti, Benjamin B.; Zinaman, Owen

    2010-09-01

    Research and development of advanced reprocessing plant designs can greatly benefit from the development of a reprocessing plant model capable of transient solvent extraction chemistry. This type of model can be used to optimize the operations of a plant as well as the designs for safeguards, security, and safety. Previous work has integrated a transient solvent extraction simulation module, based on the Solvent Extraction Process Having Interaction Solutes (SEPHIS) code developed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, with the Separations and Safeguards Performance Model (SSPM) developed at Sandia National Laboratory, as a first step toward creating a more versatile design and evaluation tool. The goal of this work was to strengthen the integration by linking more variables between the two codes. The results from this integrated model show expected operational performance through plant transients. Additionally, ORIGEN source term files were integrated into the SSPM to provide concentrations, radioactivity, neutron emission rate, and thermal power data for various spent fuels. This data was used to generate measurement blocks that can determine the radioactivity, neutron emission rate, or thermal power of any stream or vessel in the plant model. This work examined how the code could be expanded to integrate other separation steps and benchmark the results to other data. Recommendations for future work will be presented.

  15. 5 CFR 2500.9 - Safeguarding.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 5 Administrative Personnel 3 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safeguarding. 2500.9 Section 2500.9 Administrative Personnel OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT INFORMATION SECURITY REGULATION § 2500.9 Safeguarding. The Office of Administration shall protect information in its...

  16. 34 CFR 104.36 - Procedural safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 34 Education 1 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Procedural safeguards. 104.36 Section 104.36 Education Regulations of the Offices of the Department of Education OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION... Preschool, Elementary, and Secondary Education § 104.36 Procedural safeguards. A recipient that operates...

  17. 34 CFR 104.36 - Procedural safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 34 Education 1 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Procedural safeguards. 104.36 Section 104.36 Education Regulations of the Offices of the Department of Education OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION... Preschool, Elementary, and Secondary Education § 104.36 Procedural safeguards. A recipient that operates...

  18. 32 CFR 154.68 - Safeguarding procedures.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 1 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Safeguarding procedures. 154.68 Section 154.68 National Defense Department of Defense OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE SECURITY DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PERSONNEL SECURITY PROGRAM REGULATION Safeguarding Personnel Security Investigative Records §...

  19. 5 CFR 2500.9 - Safeguarding.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 5 Administrative Personnel 3 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Safeguarding. 2500.9 Section 2500.9 Administrative Personnel OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT INFORMATION SECURITY REGULATION § 2500.9 Safeguarding. The Office of Administration shall protect information in its...

  20. 5 CFR 2500.9 - Safeguarding.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... 5 Administrative Personnel 3 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Safeguarding. 2500.9 Section 2500.9 Administrative Personnel OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT INFORMATION SECURITY REGULATION § 2500.9 Safeguarding. The Office of Administration shall protect information in its...

  1. 5 CFR 2500.9 - Safeguarding.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 5 Administrative Personnel 3 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Safeguarding. 2500.9 Section 2500.9 Administrative Personnel OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT INFORMATION SECURITY REGULATION § 2500.9 Safeguarding. The Office of Administration shall protect information in its...

  2. 5 CFR 2500.9 - Safeguarding.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 5 Administrative Personnel 3 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Safeguarding. 2500.9 Section 2500.9 Administrative Personnel OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT INFORMATION SECURITY REGULATION § 2500.9 Safeguarding. The Office of Administration shall protect information in its...

  3. 38 CFR 18.436 - Procedural safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... or are believed to need special instruction or related services. The system shall include: (1) Notice... Adult Education § 18.436 Procedural safeguards. (a) A recipient that operates a public elementary or secondary education program shall implement a system of procedural safeguards with respect to...

  4. 28 CFR 25.8 - System safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 28 Judicial Administration 1 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false System safeguards. 25.8 Section 25.8 Judicial Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE INFORMATION SYSTEMS The National Instant Criminal Background Check System § 25.8 System safeguards. (a) Information maintained in the...

  5. 28 CFR 25.8 - System safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 28 Judicial Administration 1 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false System safeguards. 25.8 Section 25.8 Judicial Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE INFORMATION SYSTEMS The National Instant Criminal Background Check System § 25.8 System safeguards. (a) Information maintained in the...

  6. 28 CFR 25.8 - System safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 28 Judicial Administration 1 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false System safeguards. 25.8 Section 25.8 Judicial Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE INFORMATION SYSTEMS The National Instant Criminal Background Check System § 25.8 System safeguards. (a) Information maintained in the...

  7. 28 CFR 25.8 - System safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 28 Judicial Administration 1 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false System safeguards. 25.8 Section 25.8 Judicial Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE INFORMATION SYSTEMS The National Instant Criminal Background Check System § 25.8 System safeguards. (a) Information maintained in the...

  8. 28 CFR 25.8 - System safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 28 Judicial Administration 1 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false System safeguards. 25.8 Section 25.8 Judicial Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE INFORMATION SYSTEMS The National Instant Criminal Background Check System § 25.8 System safeguards. (a) Information maintained in the...

  9. RADIO FREQUENCY IDENTIFICATION DEVICES: EFFECTIVENESS IN IMPROVING SAFEGUARDS AT GAS-CENTRIFUGE URANIUM-ENRICHMENT PLANTS.

    SciTech Connect

    JOE,J.

    2007-07-08

    Recent advances in radio frequency identification devices (RFIDs) have engendered a growing interest among international safeguards experts. Potentially, RFIDs could reduce inspection work, viz. the number of inspections, number of samples, and duration of the visits, and thus improve the efficiency and effectiveness of international safeguards. This study systematically examined the applications of RFIDs for IAEA safeguards at large gas-centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs). These analyses are expected to help identify the requirements and desirable properties for RFIDs, to provide insights into which vulnerabilities matter most, and help formulate the required assurance tests. This work, specifically assesses the application of RFIDs for the ''Option 4'' safeguards approach, proposed by Bruce Moran, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), for large gas-centrifuge uranium-enrichment plants. The features of ''Option 4'' safeguards include placing RFIDs on all feed, product and tails (F/P/T) cylinders, along with WID readers in all FP/T stations and accountability scales. Other features of Moran's ''Option 4'' are Mailbox declarations, monitoring of load-cell-based weighing systems at the F/P/T stations and accountability scales, and continuous enrichment monitors. Relevant diversion paths were explored to evaluate how RFIDs improve the efficiency and effectiveness of safeguards. Additionally, the analysis addresses the use of RFIDs in conjunction with video monitoring and neutron detectors in a perimeter-monitoring approach to show that RFIDs can help to detect unidentified cylinders.

  10. Oxidized LDL enhances stretch-induced smooth muscle cell proliferation through alterations in nuclear protein import.

    PubMed

    Chahine, Mirna N; Dibrov, Elena; Blackwood, David P; Pierce, Grant N

    2012-12-01

    Mechanical stress contributes to hypertension and atherosclerosis partly through the stimulation of vascular smooth muscle cell (VSMC) proliferation. Oxidized low density lipoprotein (oxLDL) is another important atherogenic factor that can increase VSMC proliferation. The purpose of this study was to investigate whether oxLDL could further enhance the proliferative action of mechanical stretch on VSMC, and to determine the mechanism responsible for this interaction. Because nuclear protein import is critical in regulating gene expression, transcription, and cell proliferation, its involvement in the mitogenic effects of oxLDL and mechanical stress was studied. OxLDL enhanced the proliferative effects of mechanical stretch on its own in rabbit aortic VSMC, and induced increases in the expression of HSP60 in an additive manner. Adenoviral-mediated overexpression of HSP60 induced increases in cell proliferation compared with uninfected VSMC. Mechanical stretch and oxLDL stimulated the rate of nuclear protein import in VSMC and increased the expression of nucleoporins. These effects were sensitive to inhibition of the MAPK pathway. We conclude that oxLDL and mechanical stretch have a synergistic effect on VSMC proliferation. This synergistic effect is induced through a stimulation of nuclear protein import via HSP60 and an activation of the MAPK pathway.

  11. LETTER TO THE EDITOR: Polarization enhancement in &vec{d}(\\vec{p},\\vec{n})^{2};He reaction: nuclear teleportation

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Hamieh, S.

    2004-02-01

    I show that an experimental technique used in nuclear physics may be successfully applied to quantum teleportation (QT) of spin states of massive matter. A new non-local physical effect, the 'quantum-teleportation effect', is discovered for the nuclear polarization measurement. Enhancement of the neutron polarization is expected in the proposed experiment for QT that discriminates only one of the Bell states.

  12. UC Berkeley Nuclear Engineering Curriculum and Research Enhancement. Final report, February 14, 1993--February 14, 1995

    SciTech Connect

    Fowler, T.K.; Peterson, P.F.

    1995-05-11

    This is a report for the 2/14/93 to 2/14/95 period of the five-year program proposed and initiated in 1992, for curriculum and research enhancement for the Department of Nuclear Engineering at the University of California, Berkeley. The program is designed to strengthen the departmental academic infrastructure and improve the education breadth of nuclear engineering students. The DOE funds have supported scholarships and a novel educational program which includes summer coursework at the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant. The summer course provides an important introduction to reactor safety and operations to students who will in the future be responsible for running many of our existing nuclear power plants. The work was funded under DOE contract DE-FG0393ER75856, with a matching gift to the Department from the Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E). The program described in the original grant proposal has been successful implemented with an enthusiastic response from our students and faculty. The program consisted of two parts, one for innovative additions to our curriculum funded by the DOE, and the other for distinguished lectureships and support for basic research funded by gifts from PG&E.

  13. Interactions between the nuclear matrix and an enhancer of the tryptophan oxygenase gene

    SciTech Connect

    Kaneoka, Hidenori; Miyake, Katsuhide; Iijima, Shinji

    2009-10-02

    The gene for tryptophan oxygenase (TO) is expressed in adult hepatocytes in a tissue- and differentiation-specific manner. The TO promoter has two glucocorticoid-responsive elements (GREs), and its expression is regulated by glucocorticoid hormone in the liver. We found a novel GRE in close proximity to a scaffold/matrix attachment region (S/MAR) that was located around -8.5 kb from the transcriptional start site of the TO gene by electrophoretic mobility shift and chromatin immunoprecipitation (ChIP) assays. A combination of nuclear fractionation and quantitative PCR analysis showed that the S/MAR was tethered to the nuclear matrix in both fetal and adult hepatocytes. ChIP assay showed that, in adult hepatocytes, the S/MAR-GRE and the promoter proximal regions interacted with lamin and heterogeneous nuclear ribonucleoprotein U in a dexamethasone dependent manner, but this was not the case in fetal cells, suggesting that developmental stage-specific expression of the TO gene might rely on the binding of the enhancer (the -8.5 kb S/MAR-GRE) and the promoter to the inner nuclear matrix.

  14. Safeguards and retrievability from waste forms

    SciTech Connect

    Danker, W.

    1996-05-01

    This report describes issues discussed at a session from the PLutonium Stabilization and Immobilization Workshop related to safeguards and retrievability from waste forms. Throughout the discussion, the group probed the goals of disposition efforts, particularly an understanding of the {open_quotes}spent fuel standard{close_quotes}, since the disposition material form derives from these goals. The group felt strongly that not only the disposition goals but safeguards to meet these goals could affect the material form. Accordingly, the Department was encouraged to explore and apply safeguards as early in the implementation process as possible. It was emphasized that this was particularly true for any planned use of existing facilities. It is much easier to build safeguards approaches into the development of new facilities, than to backfit existing facilities. Accordingly, special safeguards challenges are likely to be encountered, given the cost and schedule advantages offered by use of existing facilities.

  15. Nuclear F-actin enhances the transcriptional activity of β-catenin by increasing its nuclear localization and binding to chromatin.

    PubMed

    Yamazaki, Shota; Yamamoto, Koji; de Lanerolle, Primal; Harata, Masahiko

    2016-04-01

    Actin plays multiple roles both in the cytoplasm and in the nucleus. Cytoplasmic actin, in addition to its structural role in the cytoskeleton, also contributes to the subcellular localization of transcription factors by interacting with them or their partners. The transcriptional cofactor β-catenin, which acts as an intracellular transducer of canonical Wnt signaling, indirectly associates with the cytoplasmic filamentous actin (F-actin). Recently, it has been observed that F-actin is transiently formed within the nucleus in response to serum stimulation and integrin signaling, and also during gene reprogramming. Despite these earlier observations, information about the function of nuclear F-actin is poorly defined. Here, by facilitating the accumulation of nuclear actin artificially, we demonstrate that polymerizing nuclear actin enhanced the nuclear accumulation and transcriptional function of β-catenin. Our results also show that the nuclear F-actin colocalizes with β-catenin and enhances the binding of β-catenin to the downstream target genes of the Wnt/β-catenin signaling pathway, including the genes for the cell cycle regulators c-myc and cyclin D, and the OCT4 gene. Nuclear F-actin itself also associated with these genes. Since Wnt/β-catenin signaling has important roles in cell differentiation and pluripotency, our observations suggest that nuclear F-actin formed during these biological processes is involved in regulating Wnt/β-catenin signaling.

  16. Framework for fuel-cycle approaches to IAEA safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Fishbone, L.G.; Higinbotham, W.

    1986-01-01

    A framework is presented for comparing various safeguards verification approaches which have been proposed for consideration. Each inventory change, inventory, and material balance for each nuclear facility, reported by a state, may be verified. Verification approaches are compared by listing which of these reports would be verified and to what degree for each approach as they might be applied to a state with a closed fuel cycle. The comparison indicates that the extended-material-balance-area (or zone), the information-correlation, and the randomization-over-facilities approaches make more efficient use of Agency resources than the facility-oriented approach for states with large nuclear power programs. In contrast, any advantages of randomizing inspections over inspection activities within facilities are, percentagewise, relatively independent of the size of a state's nuclear program.

  17. Safeguards and security considerations for automated and robotic systems

    SciTech Connect

    Jordan, S.E.; Jaeger, C.D.

    1994-09-01

    Within the reconfigured Nuclear Weapons Complex there will be a large number of automated and robotic (A&R) systems because of the many benefits derived from their use. To meet the overall security requirements of a facility, consideration must be given to those systems that handle and process nuclear material. Since automation and robotics is a relatively new technology, not widely applied to the Nuclear Weapons Complex, safeguards and security (S&S) issues related to these systems have not been extensively explored, and no guidance presently exists. The goal of this effort is to help integrate S&S into the design of future A&R systems. Towards this, the authors first examined existing A and R systems from a security perspective to identify areas of concern and possible solutions of these problems. They then were able to develop generalized S&S guidance and design considerations for automation and robotics.

  18. 75 FR 25301 - Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc.; Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact for...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-05-07

    ... implement NRC-approved radiation safety procedures for storing and handling radioactive materials. Thus, the... Proposed Extension of Deadline for Inventory of Special Nuclear Material AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory... Safeguards, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Mail...

  19. Radiation detectors as surveillance monitors for IAEA safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Fehlau, P.E.; Dowdy, E.J.

    1980-10-01

    Radiation detectors used for personnel dosimetry are examined for use under IAEA Safeguards as monitors to confirm the passage or nonpassage (YES/NO) of plutonium-bearing nuclear material at barrier penetrations declared closed. In this application where backgrounds are ill defined, no advantage is found for a particular detector type because of intrinsic efficiency. Secondary considerations such as complexity, ease of tamper-proofing, and ease of readout are used to recommend specific detector types for routine monitoring and for data-base measurements. Recommendations are made for applications, data acquisition, and instrument development.

  20. 77 FR 64147 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Fukushima...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2012-10-18

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Fukushima; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Fukushima will hold a meeting on October 31, 2012, Room...

  1. 77 FR 74697 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Fukushima...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2012-12-17

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Fukushima; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Fukushima will hold a meeting on January 18, 2013, Room...

  2. 77 FR 68161 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Fukushima...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2012-11-15

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office ] NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Fukushima; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Fukushima will hold a meeting on December 4, 2012, Room...

  3. 78 FR 27442 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Fukushima...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2013-05-10

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Fukushima; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Fukushima will hold a meeting on May 23, Room T-2B1,...

  4. 77 FR 59676 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Fukushima...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2012-09-28

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Fukushima; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Fukushima will hold a meeting on October 3, 2012, Room...

  5. 77 FR 28637 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Fukushima...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2012-05-15

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Fukushima; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Fukushima will hold a meeting on May 22- 23, 2012, Room...

  6. 77 FR 45699 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Fukushima...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2012-08-01

    ... [Federal Register Volume 77, Number 148 (Wednesday, August 1, 2012)] [Notices] [Page 45699] [FR Doc No: 2012-18757] NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Fukushima; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Fukushima...

  7. 78 FR 65008 - Advisory Committee On Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee On Fukushima...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2013-10-30

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee On Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee On Fukushima; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Fukushima will hold a meeting on November 5, 2013, Room...

  8. 78 FR 50457 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Fukushima...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2013-08-19

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Fukushima; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Fukushima will hold a meeting on September 4, 2013, Room...

  9. 78 FR 51752 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Fukushima...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2013-08-21

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Fukushima; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Fukushima will hold a meeting on September 18, 2013, Room...

  10. 77 FR 52371 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Fukushima...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2012-08-29

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Fukushima; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Fukushima will hold a meeting on September 5, 2012, Room...

  11. 77 FR 31676 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Fukushima...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2012-05-29

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Fukushima; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Fukushima will hold a meeting on June 20, 2012, Room...

  12. 77 FR 28903 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Fukushima...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2012-05-16

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Fukushima; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Fukushima will hold a meeting on May 22, 2012, Room...

  13. 77 FR 45699 - Advisory Committee On Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee On Economic...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2012-08-01

    ... [Federal Register Volume 77, Number 148 (Wednesday, August 1, 2012)] [Notices] [Pages 45699-45700] [FR Doc No: 2012-18759] NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee On Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee On Economic Simplified Boiling Water Reactors (ESBWR); Notice of...

  14. 75 FR 30077 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on ESBWR

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-05-28

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on ESBWR The ACRS Subcommittee on Economic Simplified Boiling Water Reactor (ESBWR) will hold a meeting on June...

  15. 75 FR 32229 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on ABWR

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-06-07

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on ABWR The ACRS Subcommittee on Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR) will hold a meeting on June 23-24, 2010, Room...

  16. 75 FR 57536 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on ABWR

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-09-21

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office ] NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on ABWR The ACRS Subcommittee on Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR) will hold a meeting on October 20, 2010, Room...

  17. 75 FR 66803 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Advanced...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-10-29

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR); Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on ABWR will hold a meeting...

  18. 76 FR 68793 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Economic...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-11-07

    ... No: 2011-28737] NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Economic Simplified Boiling Water Reactor; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Economic Simplified Boiling Water Reactor (ESBWR) will hold a meeting on November 30,...

  19. 77 FR 38341 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards; Notice of Meeting

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2012-06-27

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards; Notice of Meeting In accordance with the purposes of Sections 29 and 182b of the Atomic Energy Act (42 U.S.C. 2039, 2232b), the Advisory Committee on...

  20. 78 FR 25769 - Notice of Meeting; Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2013-05-02

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Notice of Meeting; Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards In accordance with the purposes of Sections 29 and 182b of the Atomic Energy Act (42 U.S.C. 2039, 2232b), the Advisory Committee on...

  1. 76 FR 70778 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards; Notice of Meeting

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-11-15

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office ] NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards; Notice of Meeting In accordance with the purposes of Sections 29 and 182b of the Atomic Energy Act (42 U.S.C. 2039, 2232b), the Advisory Committee on...

  2. 10 CFR 2.809 - Participation by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 1 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Participation by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. 2.809 Section 2.809 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION RULES OF PRACTICE FOR DOMESTIC LICENSING PROCEEDINGS AND ISSUANCE OF ORDERS Rulemaking § 2.809 Participation by the Advisory Committee on...

  3. 76 FR 64399 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards; Notice of Meeting

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-10-18

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards; Notice of Meeting In accordance with the purposes of Sections 29 and 182b of the Atomic Energy Act (42 U.S.C. 2039, 2232b), the Advisory Committee on...

  4. 78 FR 3473 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards; Notice of Meeting

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2013-01-16

    ... COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards; Notice of Meeting In accordance with the purposes of Sections 29 and 182b of the Atomic Energy Act (42 U.S.C. 2039, 2232b), the Advisory Committee on Reactor... inspection of a large Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS). 1:15 p.m.-3:15 p.m.: Revised Construction...

  5. 75 FR 81317 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards; Notice of Meeting

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-12-27

    ... COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards; Notice of Meeting In accordance with the purposes of Sections 29 and 182b of the Atomic Energy Act (42 U.S.C. 2039, 2232b), the Advisory Committee on Reactor..., ``Guidance on Making Changes to Emergency Plans for Nuclear Power Reactors''; Interim Staff Guidance...

  6. 75 FR 72844 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards; Revised Meeting Notice

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-11-26

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards; Revised Meeting Notice The Agenda for the 578th ACRS meeting, scheduled to be held on December 2-4, 2010, has been revised as noted below. Notice of...

  7. 78 FR 32279 - Advisory Committee On Reactor Safeguards; Notice of Meeting

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2013-05-29

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee On Reactor Safeguards; Notice of Meeting In accordance with the purposes of Sections 29 and 182b of the Atomic Energy Act (42 U.S.C. 2039, 2232b), the Advisory Committee on...

  8. 78 FR 12801 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards; Notice of Meeting

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2013-02-25

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards; Notice of Meeting In accordance with the purposes of Sections 29 and 182b of the Atomic Energy Act (42 U.S.C. 2039, 2232b), the Advisory Committee on...

  9. 76 FR 61118 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards; Revised Meeting Notice

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-10-03

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards; Revised Meeting Notice The Agenda for the 587th ACRS meeting, scheduled to be held on October 6-8, 2011, has been revised as noted below. Notice of...

  10. 76 FR 72451 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Materials...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-11-23

    ...-72452] [FR Doc No: 2011-30238] NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Materials, Metallurgy & Reactor Fuels; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Materials, Metallurgy & Reactor Fuels will hold a meeting on December 15,...

  11. 78 FR 65009 - Advisory Committee On Reactor Safeguards; Notice of Meeting

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2013-10-30

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee On Reactor Safeguards; Notice of Meeting In accordance with the purposes of Sections 29 and 182b of the Atomic Energy Act (42 U.S.C. 2039, 2232b), the Advisory Committee on...

  12. 10 CFR 2.809 - Participation by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 1 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Participation by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. 2.809 Section 2.809 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION RULES OF PRACTICE FOR DOMESTIC LICENSING PROCEEDINGS AND ISSUANCE OF ORDERS Rulemaking § 2.809 Participation by the Advisory Committee on...

  13. 75 FR 38564 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting of the Subcommittee on Plant Operations...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-07-02

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting of the Subcommittee on Plant Operations and Fire Protection The ACRS Subcommittee on Plant Operations and Fire Protection will hold a...

  14. Dynamic Nuclear Polarization enhanced NMR at 187 GHz/284 MHz using an Extended Interaction Klystron amplifier

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Kemp, Thomas F.; Dannatt, Hugh R. W.; Barrow, Nathan S.; Watts, Anthony; Brown, Steven P.; Newton, Mark E.; Dupree, Ray

    2016-04-01

    A Dynamic Nuclear Polarisation (DNP) enhanced solid-state Magic Angle Spinning (MAS) NMR spectrometer which uses a 187 GHz (corresponding to 1H NMR frequency of 284 MHz) Extended Interaction Klystron (EIK) amplifier as the microwave source is briefly described. Its performance is demonstrated for a biomolecule (bacteriorhodopsin), a pharmaceutical, and surface functionalised silica. The EIK is very compact and easily incorporated into an existing spectrometer. The bandwidth of the amplifier is sufficient that it obviates the need for a sweepable magnetic field, once set, for all commonly used radicals. The variable power (CW or pulsed) output from the EIK is transmitted to the DNP-NMR probe using a quasi-optic system with a high power isolator and a corrugated waveguide which feeds the microwaves into the DNP-NMR probe. Curved mirrors inside the probe project the microwaves down the axis of the MAS rotor, giving a very efficient system such that maximum DNP enhancement is achieved with less than 3 W output from the microwave source. The DNP-NMR probe operates with a sample temperature down to 90 K whilst spinning at 8 kHz. Significant enhancements, in excess of 100 for bacteriorhodopsin in purple membrane (bR in PM), are shown along with spectra which are enhanced by ≈25 with respect to room temperature, for both the pharmaceutical furosemide and surface functionalised silica. These enhancements allow hitherto prohibitively time consuming experiments to be undertaken. The power at which the DNP enhancement in bR in PM saturates does not change significantly between 90 K and 170 K even though the enhancement drops by a factor of ≈11. As the DNP build up time decreases by a factor 3 over this temperature range, the reduction in T1n is presumably a significant contribution to the drop in enhancement.

  15. 75 FR 61227 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Future Plant Designs...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-10-04

    ..., General Electric--Hitachi Nuclear Energy (GEH), and their contractors, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552b(c)(4... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Future Plant...

  16. New Prototype Safeguards Technology Offers Improved Confidence and Automation for Uranium Enrichment Facilities

    SciTech Connect

    Brim, Cornelia P.

    2013-04-01

    An important requirement for the international safeguards community is the ability to determine the enrichment level of uranium in gas centrifuge enrichment plants and nuclear fuel fabrication facilities. This is essential to ensure that countries with nuclear nonproliferation commitments, such as States Party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, are adhering to their obligations. However, current technologies to verify the uranium enrichment level in gas centrifuge enrichment plants or nuclear fuel fabrication facilities are technically challenging and resource-intensive. NNSA’s Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) supports the development, testing, and evaluation of future systems that will strengthen and sustain U.S. safeguards and security capabilities—in this case, by automating the monitoring of uranium enrichment in the entire inventory of a fuel fabrication facility. One such system is HEVA—hybrid enrichment verification array. This prototype was developed to provide an automated, nondestructive assay verification technology for uranium hexafluoride (UF6) cylinders at enrichment plants.

  17. Nuclear Lamin-A Scales with Tissue Stiffness and Enhances Matrix-Directed Differentiation

    PubMed Central

    Swift, Joe; Ivanovska, Irena L.; Buxboim, Amnon; Harada, Takamasa; Dingal, P. C. Dave P.; Pinter, Joel; Pajerowski, J. David; Spinler, Kyle R.; Shin, Jae-Won; Tewari, Manorama; Rehfeldt, Florian; Speicher, David W.; Discher, Dennis E.

    2014-01-01

    Tissues can be soft like fat, which bears little stress, or stiff like bone, which sustains high stress, but whether there is a systematic relationship between tissue mechanics and differentiation is unknown. Here, proteomics analyses revealed that levels of the nucleoskeletal protein lamin-A scaled with tissue elasticity, E, as did levels of collagens in the extracellular matrix that determine E. Stem cell differentiation into fat on soft matrix was enhanced by low lamin-A levels, whereas differentiation into bone on stiff matrix was enhanced by high lamin-A levels. Matrix stiffness directly influenced lamin-A protein levels, and, although lamin-A transcription was regulated by the vitamin A/retinoic acid (RA) pathway with broad roles in development, nuclear entry of RA receptors was modulated by lamin-A protein. Tissue stiffness and stress thus increase lamin-A levels, which stabilize the nucleus while also contributing to lineage determination. PMID:23990565

  18. Reduced Noise UV Enhancement of Etch Rates for Nuclear Tracks in CR-39

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Sheets, Rebecca; Clarkson, David; Ume, Rubab; Regan, Sean; Sangster, Craig; Padalino, Stephen; McLean, James

    2016-10-01

    The use of CR-39 plastic as a Solid State Nuclear Track Detector is an effective technique for obtaining data in high-energy particle experiments including inertial confinement fusion. To reveal particle tracks after irradiation, CR-39 is chemically etched in NaOH at 80°C for 6 hours, producing micron-scale signal pits at the nuclear track sites. Using CR-39 irradiated with 5.4 MeV alpha particles and 1.0 MeV protons, we show that exposing the CR-39 to high intensity UV light before etching, with wavelengths between 240 nm and 350 nm, speeds the etch process. Elevated temperatures during UV exposure amplifies this effect, with etch rates up to 50% greater than unprocessed conditions. CR-39 pieces exposed to UV light and heat can also exhibit heightened levels of etch-induced noise (surface features not caused by nuclear particles). By illuminating the CR-39 from the side opposite to the tracks, a similar level of etch enhancement was obtained with little to no noise. The effective wavelength range is reduced, due to strong attenuation of shorter wavelengths. Funded in part by a LLE contract through the DOE.

  19. Game Imaging Meets Nuclear Reality

    ScienceCinema

    Michel, Kelly; Watkins, Adam

    2016-07-12

    At Los Alamos National Laboratory, a team of artists and animators, nuclear engineers and computer scientists is teaming to provide 3-D models of nuclear facilities to train IAEA safeguards inspectors and others who need fast familiarity with specific nuclear sites.

  20. Game Imaging Meets Nuclear Reality

    SciTech Connect

    Michel, Kelly; Watkins, Adam

    2011-03-21

    At Los Alamos National Laboratory, a team of artists and animators, nuclear engineers and computer scientists is teaming to provide 3-D models of nuclear facilities to train IAEA safeguards inspectors and others who need fast familiarity with specific nuclear sites.

  1. Safeguards: The past present, and future

    SciTech Connect

    Seaton, M.B.

    1987-07-01

    The non-destructive assay techniques developed at Los Alamos have become a primary means for verification by the IAEA and most important for domestic safeguards. We must challenge our assumptions, e.g., that inventory differences are a valid measure of safeguards performance, that more money is the solution, and the threats are much exaggerated. A human reliability program will be initiated. Material control, accounting, and physical protection need further integration. A serious effort involving scholarships, internships, etc. is needed to attract and motivate young people. Increased emphasis will be placed on designing safeguards into new systems such as laser isotope separation. Finally, continuing generous support for the IAEA is most important.

  2. Measurement and simulation of a Compton suppression system for safeguards application

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Lee, Seung Kyu; Seo, Hee; Won, Byung-Hee; Lee, Chaehun; Shin, Hee-Sung; Na, Sang-Ho; Song, Dae-Yong; Kim, Ho-Dong; Park, Geun-Il; Park, Se-Hwan

    2015-11-01

    Plutonium (Pu) contents in spent nuclear fuels, recovered uranium (U) or uranium/transuranium (U/TRU) products must be measured in order to secure the safeguardability of a pyroprocessing facility. Self-induced X-Ray fluorescence (XRF) and gamma-ray spectroscopy are useful techniques for determining Pu-to-U ratios and Pu isotope ratios of spent fuel. Photon measurements of spent nuclear fuel by using high-resolution spectrometers such as high-purity germanium (HPGe) detectors show a large continuum background in the low-energy region, which is due in large part to Compton scattering of energetic gamma rays. This paper proposes a Compton suppression system for reducing of the Compton continuum background. In the present study, the system was configured by using an HPGe main detector and a BGO (bismuth germanate: Bi4Ge3O12) guard detector. The system performances for gamma-ray measurement and XRF were evaluated by means of Monte Carlo simulations and measurements of the radiation source. The Monte Carlo N-Particle eXtended (MCNPX) simulations were performed using the same geometry as for the experiments, and considered, for exact results, the production of secondary electrons and photons. As a performance test of the Compton suppression system, the peak-to-Compton ratio, which is a figure of merit to evaluate the gamma-ray detection, was enhanced by a factor of three or more when the Compton suppression system was used.

  3. Prompt gamma ray diagnostics and enhanced hadron-therapy using neutron-free nuclear reactions

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Giuffrida, L.; Margarone, D.; Cirrone, G. A. P.; Picciotto, A.; Cuttone, G.; Korn, G.

    2016-10-01

    We propose a series of simulations about the potential use of Boron isotopes to trigger neutron-free (aneutronic) nuclear reactions in cancer cells through the interaction with an incoming energetic proton beam, thus resulting in the emission of characteristic prompt gamma radiation (429 keV, 718 keV and 1435 keV). Furthermore assuming that the Boron isotopes are absorbed in cancer cells, the three alpha-particles produced in each p-11B aneutronic nuclear fusion reactions can potentially result in the enhancement of the biological dose absorbed in the tumor region since these multi-MeV alpha-particles are stopped inside the single cancer cell, thus allowing to spare the surrounding tissues. Although a similar approach based on the use of 11B nuclei has been proposed in [Yoon et al. Applied Physics Letters 105, 223507 (2014)], our work demonstrate, using Monte Carlo simulations, the crucial importance of the use of 10B nuclei (in a solution containing also 11B) for the generation of prompt gamma-rays, which can be applied to medical imaging. In fact, we demonstrate that the use of 10B nuclei can enhance the intensity of the 718 keV gamma-ray peak more than 30 times compared to the solution containing only 11B nuclei. A detailed explanation of the origin of the different prompt gamma-rays, as well as of their application as real-time diagnostics during a potential cancer treatment, is here discussed.

  4. Nuclear Security for Floating Nuclear Power Plants

    SciTech Connect

    Skiba, James M.; Scherer, Carolynn P.

    2015-10-13

    Recently there has been a lot of interest in small modular reactors. A specific type of these small modular reactors (SMR,) are marine based power plants called floating nuclear power plants (FNPP). These FNPPs are typically built by countries with extensive knowledge of nuclear energy, such as Russia, France, China and the US. These FNPPs are built in one country and then sent to countries in need of power and/or seawater desalination. Fifteen countries have expressed interest in acquiring such power stations. Some designs for such power stations are briefly summarized. Several different avenues for cooperation in FNPP technology are proposed, including IAEA nuclear security (i.e. safeguards), multilateral or bilateral agreements, and working with Russian design that incorporates nuclear safeguards for IAEA inspections in non-nuclear weapons states

  5. DOE/NNSA perspective safeguard by design: GEN III/III+ light water reactors and beyond

    SciTech Connect

    Pan, Paul Y

    2010-12-10

    An overview of key issues relevant to safeguards by design (SBD) for GEN III/IV nuclear reactors is provided. Lessons learned from construction of typical GEN III+ water reactors with respect to SBD are highlighted. Details of SBD for safeguards guidance development for GEN III/III+ light water reactors are developed and reported. This paper also identifies technical challenges to extend SBD including proliferation resistance methodologies to other GEN III/III+ reactors (except HWRs) and GEN IV reactors because of their immaturity in designs.

  6. Fully integrated safeguards and security for reprocessing plant monitoring.

    SciTech Connect

    Duran, Felicia Angelica; Ward, Rebecca; Cipiti, Benjamin B.; Middleton, Bobby D.

    2011-10-01

    Nuclear fuel reprocessing plants contain a wealth of plant monitoring data including material measurements, process monitoring, administrative procedures, and physical protection elements. Future facilities are moving in the direction of highly-integrated plant monitoring systems that make efficient use of the plant data to improve monitoring and reduce costs. The Separations and Safeguards Performance Model (SSPM) is an analysis tool that is used for modeling advanced monitoring systems and to determine system response under diversion scenarios. This report both describes the architecture for such a future monitoring system and present results under various diversion scenarios. Improvements made in the past year include the development of statistical tests for detecting material loss, the integration of material balance alarms to improve physical protection, and the integration of administrative procedures. The SSPM has been used to demonstrate how advanced instrumentation (as developed in the Material Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies campaign) can benefit the overall safeguards system as well as how all instrumentation is tied into the physical protection system. This concept has the potential to greatly improve the probability of detection for both abrupt and protracted diversion of nuclear material.

  7. 34 CFR 303.415 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... Intervention Records § 303.415 Safeguards. (a) Each participating agency must protect the confidentiality of... stages. (b) One official at each participating agency must assume responsibility for ensuring...

  8. 34 CFR 303.415 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... Intervention Records § 303.415 Safeguards. (a) Each participating agency must protect the confidentiality of... stages. (b) One official at each participating agency must assume responsibility for ensuring...

  9. 22 CFR 9.13 - Safeguarding.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-04-01

    ... Relations DEPARTMENT OF STATE GENERAL SECURITY INFORMATION REGULATIONS § 9.13 Safeguarding. Specific controls on the use, processing, storage, reproduction, and transmittal of classified information within the Department to provide protection for such information and to prevent access by...

  10. 22 CFR 9.13 - Safeguarding.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-04-01

    ... Relations DEPARTMENT OF STATE GENERAL SECURITY INFORMATION REGULATIONS § 9.13 Safeguarding. Specific controls on the use, processing, storage, reproduction, and transmittal of classified information within the Department to provide protection for such information and to prevent access by...

  11. Safeguards Workforce Repatriation, Retention and Utilization

    SciTech Connect

    Gallucci, Nicholas; Poe, Sarah

    2015-10-01

    Brookhaven National Laboratory was tasked by NA-241 to assess the transition of former IAEA employees back to the United States, investigating the rate of retention and overall smoothness of the repatriation process among returning safeguards professionals. Upon conducting several phone interviews, study authors found that the repatriation process went smoothly for the vast majority and that workforce retention was high. However, several respondents expressed irritation over the minimal extent to which their safeguards expertise had been leveraged in their current positions. This sentiment was pervasive enough to prompt a follow-on study focusing on questions relating to the utilization rather than the retention of safeguards professionals. A second, web-based survey was conducted, soliciting responses from a larger sample pool. Results suggest that the safeguards workforce may be oversaturated, and that young professionals returning to the United States from Agency positions may soon encounter difficulties finding jobs in the field.

  12. International safeguards for a modern MOX (mixed-oxide) fuel fabrication facility

    SciTech Connect

    Pillay, K.K.S.; Stirpe, D.; Picard, R.R.

    1987-03-01

    Bulk-handling facilities that process plutonium for commercial fuel cycles offer considerable challenges to nuclear materials safeguards. Modern fuel fabrication facilities that handle mixed oxides of plutonium and uranium (MOX) often have large inventories of special nuclear materials in their process lines and in storage areas for feed and product materials. In addition, the remote automated processing prevalent at new MOX facilities, which is necessary to minimize radiation exposures to personnel, tends to limit access for measurements and inspections. The facility design considered in this study incorporates all these features as well as state-of-the-art measurement technologies for materials accounting. Key elements of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards for such a fuel-cycle facility have been identified in this report, and several issues of primary importance to materials accountancy and IAEA verifications have been examined. We have calculated detection sensitivities for abrupt and protracted diversions of plutonium assuming a single materials balance area for all processing areas. To help achieve optimal use of limited IAEA inspection resources, we have calculated sampling plans for attributes/variables verification. In addition, we have demonstrated the usefulness of calculating sigma/sub (MUF-D)/ and detection probabilities corresponding to specified material-loss scenarios and resource allocations. The data developed and the analyses performed during this study can assist both the facility operator and the IAEA in formulating necessary safeguards approaches and verification procedures to implement international safeguards for special nuclear materials.

  13. Education in Safeguards and Security Technology Meeting Challenges with Technology and Experience

    SciTech Connect

    Paschal, Linda J; Chapman, Jeffrey Allen; Rowe, Nathan C; Stinson, Brad J

    2011-01-01

    Education and hands-on experience are crucial to ensuring a workforce of safeguards and security professionals who can meet the challenges currently faced in global nuclear safeguards and security. Global demand for nuclear energy and technology, the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), and the cleanup of Cold War facilities have resulted in an increased need for trained safeguards and security personnel. At the same time, the global community is facing a growing shortage of experienced workers with hands-on knowledge of nuclear material processing. Limited access to operating facilities has dramatically reduced the opportunities for next-generation practitioners to obtain hands-on training experience. To address these needs, the Safeguards Technology Integration Center (STIC) at Oak Ridge National Laboratory was created as a Department of Energy User Facility to provide access both to the latest technology and to field-experienced professionals. The STIC provides real-world conditions, process equipment mock-ups, and controlled access to encapsulated radioactive materials (including highly enriched uranium and plutonium) for training and technology evaluation encompassing various techniques and skills, such as Radiation Inspection Systems, Containment and Surveillance Systems, Nondestructive Assay, Security System Performance Testing, and System Design and Analysis. The STIC facilities, laboratories, test beds, and training facilities are described along with the more notable aspects of the training program, which has included more than 1000 participants in the last four years.

  14. INL Human Resource Development and the Next-Generation Safeguards Initiative

    SciTech Connect

    Gouveia, Fernando; Metcalf, Richard Royce Madison

    2010-07-01

    It is the stated goal of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) to promote the development of a strengthened nuclear safeguards base, one with the potential to advance the secure and peaceful implementation of nuclear energy world-wide. To meet this goal, the initiative, among other things, has sought to develop a revitalized effort to ensure the continued availability of next generation safeguards professionals. Accordingly, this paper serves to outline the human capital building strategies taken by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) in line with the NGSI. Various components are presented in detail, including INL’s efforts directed at university outreach, in particular the laboratory’s summer internship program, along with the development of various innovative training programs and long-term oriented strategies for student professional development. Special highlights include a video training series, developed by INL in cooperation with LLNL and other laboratories, which sought to expose students and entry-level professionals to the concept and practice of international nuclear safeguards.

  15. Security Management and Safeguards Office

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Bewley, Nathaniel M.

    2004-01-01

    The Security Management and Safeguards Office at NASA is here to keep the people working in a safe environment. They also are here to protect the buildings and documents from sabotage, espionage, and theft. During the summer of 2004, I worked with Richard Soppet in Physical Security. While I was working here I helped out with updating the map that we currently use at NASA Glenn Research Center, attended meetings for homeland security, worked with the security guards and the locksmith. The meetings that I attended for homeland security talked about how to protect ourselves before something happened, they told us to always be on the guard and look for anything suspicious, and the different ways that terrorist groups operate. When I was with the security guards I was taught how to check someone into the base, showed how to use a radar gun, observed a security guard make a traffic stop for training and was with them while they patrolled NASA Glenn Research Center to make sure things were running smooth and no one was in danger. When I was with the lock smith I was taught how to make keys and locks for the employees here at NASA. The lock smith also showed me that he had inventory cabinets of files that show how many keys were out to people and who currently has access to the rooms that they keys were made for. I also helped out the open house at NASA Glenn Research Center. I helped out by showing the Army Reserves, and Brook Park's SWAT team where all the main events were going to take place a week before the open house was going to begin. Then during the open house I helped out by making sure people had there IDS, checked through there bags, and handed out a map to them that showed where the different activities were going to take place. So the main job here at NASA Glenn Research Center for the Security Management and Safeguards Office is to make sure that nothing is stolen, sabotaged, and espionaged. Also most importantly make sure all the employees here at NASA are

  16. Thermal and thermomechanical calculations of deep-rock nuclear waste disposal with the enhanced SANGRE code

    SciTech Connect

    Heuze, F.E.

    1983-03-01

    An attempt to model the complex thermal and mechanical phenomena occurring in the disposal of high-level nuclear wastes in rock at high power loading is described. Such processes include melting of the rock, convection of the molten material, and very high stressing of the rock mass, leading to new fracturing. Because of the phase changes and the wide temperature ranges considered, realistic models must provide for coupling of the thermal and mechanical calculations, for large deformations, and for steady-state temperature-depenent creep of the rock mass. Explicit representation of convection would be desirable, as would the ability to show fracture development and migration of fluids in cracks. Enhancements to SNAGRE consisted of: array modifications to accommodate complex variations of thermal and mechanical properties with temperature; introduction of the ability of calculate thermally induced stresses; improved management of the minimum time step and minimum temperature step to increase code efficiency; introduction of a variable heat-generation algorithm to accommodate heat decay of the nuclear materials; streamlining of the code by general editing and extensive deletion of coding used in mesh generation; and updating of the program users' manual. The enhanced LLNL version of the code was renamed LSANGRE. Phase changes were handled by introducing sharp variations in the specific heat of the rock in a narrow range about the melting point. The accuracy of this procedure was tested successfully on a melting slab problem. LSANGRE replicated the results of both the analytical solution and calculations with the finite difference TRUMP code. Following enhancement and verification, a purely thermal calculation was carried to 105 years. It went beyond the extent of maximum melt and into the beginning of the cooling phase.

  17. Safeguards Education and Training: Short Term Supply vs. Demand

    SciTech Connect

    Mathews, Carrie E.; Crawford, Cary E.

    2004-07-16

    Much has been written and discussed in the past several years about the effect of the aging nuclear workforce on the sustainability of the U.S. safeguards and security infrastructure. This paper discusses the 10-15 year supply and demand forecast for nuclear material control and accounting specialists. The demand side of the review includes control and accounting of the materials at U.S. DOE and NRC facilities, and the federal oversight of those MC&A programs. The cadre of experts referred to as 'MC&A Specialists' available to meet the demand goes beyond domestic MC&A to include international programs, regulatory and inspection support, and so on.

  18. ELECTROCHEMICALLY-MODULATED SEPARATIONS FOR SAFEGUARDS MEASUREMENTS

    SciTech Connect

    Green, Michael A.; Arrigo, Leah M.; Liezers, Martin; Orton, Christopher R.; Douglas, Matthew; Peper, Shane M.; Schwantes, Jon M.; Hazelton, Sandra G.; Duckworth, Douglas C.

    2010-08-11

    A critical objective of materials accountability in safeguards is the accurate and timely analysis of fuel reprocessing streams to detect both abrupt and prolonged diversions of nuclear materials. For this reason both on-line nondestructive (NDA) and destructive analysis (DA) approaches are sought-after. Current methods for DA involve grab sampling and laboratory based column extractions that are costly, hazardous, and time consuming. While direct on-line gamma measurements of Pu are desirable, they are not possible due to contributions from other actinides and fission products. Researchers at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory are currently investigating electrochemically-modulated separation (EMS) as a straightforward, cost-effective technology for selective separation of Pu or U from aqueous reprocessing streams. The EMS selectivity is electrochemically controlled and results from the sorption of Pu4+ and U4+ redox states onto the anodized target electrode, allowing for selective accumulation of U or Pu from nitric acid streams to be turned “on” or “off.” It is envisioned that this technology can be utilized to isolate Pu for both NDA and DA analysis. For the NDA approach, rapid Pu analysis by gamma-ray spectroscopy could be performed after chemical clean-up of activation and fission products by EMS. Likewise, in the DA approach, EMS could be used to retain and concentrate the Pu in nanogram quantities on the electrode surface to be transported to the lab for analysis using high precision mass spectrometry. Due to the challenges associated with complex matrices, a systematic investigation of the redox-dependent accumulation of Pu using EMS was necessary, and results will be presented. Approaches to mitigate interelement effects using large surface area cells will also be discussed. The EMS chemistry and spectroscopy for Pu isolation and measurement will be presented, proof-of-principle measurements will be described, and the application of this

  19. Nuclear transcription factors: a new approach to enhancing cellular responses to ALA-mediated photodynamic therapy

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Maytin, Edward V.; Anand, Sanjay; Sato, Nobuyuki; Moore, Brian; Mack, Judith; Gasbarre, Christopher; Keevey, Samantha; Ortel, Bernhard; Sinha, Alok; Khachemoune, Amor

    2006-02-01

    Photodynamic therapy (PDT) using aminolevulinic acid (ALA) relies upon the uptake of ALA into cancer cells, where it is converted into a porphyrin intermediate, protoporphyrin IX (PpIX) that is highly photosensitizing. For large or resistant tumors, however, ALA/PDT is often not completely effective due to inadequate PpIX levels. Therefore, new approaches to enhance the intracellular production of PpIX are sought. Here, we describe a general approach to improve intracellular PpIX accumulation via manipulations that increase the expression of an enzyme, coproporphyrinogen oxidase (CPO), that is rate-determining for PpIX production. We show that nuclear hormones that promote terminal differentiation, e.g. vitamin D or androgens, can also increase the accumulation of PpIX and the amount of killing of the target cells upon exposure to light. These hormones bind to intracellular hormone receptors that translocate to the nucleus, where they act as transcription factors to increase the expression of target genes. We have found that several other transcription factors associated with terminal differentiation, including members of the CCAAT enhancer binding (C/EBP) family, and a homeobox protein named Hoxb13, are also capable of enhancing PpIX accumulation. These latter transcription factors appear to interact directly with the CPO gene promoter, resulting in enhanced CPO transcriptional activity. Our data in several different cell systems, including epithelial cells of the skin and prostate cancer cells, indicate that enhancement of CPO expression and PpIX accumulation represents a viable new approach toward improving the efficacy of ALA/PDT.

  20. Structure of Colloidal Quantum Dots from Dynamic Nuclear Polarization Surface Enhanced NMR Spectroscopy.

    PubMed

    Piveteau, Laura; Ong, Ta-Chung; Rossini, Aaron J; Emsley, Lyndon; Copéret, Christophe; Kovalenko, Maksym V

    2015-11-04

    Understanding the chemistry of colloidal quantum dots (QDs) is primarily hampered by the lack of analytical methods to selectively and discriminately probe the QD core, QD surface and capping ligands. Here, we present a general concept for studying a broad range of QDs such as CdSe, CdTe, InP, PbSe, PbTe, CsPbBr3, etc., capped with both organic and inorganic surface capping ligands, through dynamic nuclear polarization (DNP) surface enhanced NMR spectroscopy. DNP can enhance NMR signals by factors of 10-100, thereby reducing the measurement times by 2-4 orders of magnitude. 1D DNP enhanced spectra acquired in this way are shown to clearly distinguish QD surface atoms from those of the QD core, and environmental effects such as oxidation. Furthermore, 2D NMR correlation experiments, which were previously inconceivable for QD surfaces, are demonstrated to be readily performed with DNP and provide the bonding motifs between the QD surfaces and the capping ligands.