Scope and verification of a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty
von Hippel, Frank N.
2014-01-01
A Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) would ban the production of fissile material – in practice highly-enriched uranium and separated plutonium – for weapons. It has been supported by strong majorities in the United Nations. After it comes into force, newly produced fissile materials could only be produced under international – most likely International Atomic Energy Agency – monitoring. There are many non-weapon states that argue the treaty should also place under safeguards pre-existing stocks of fissile material in civilian use or declared excess for weapons so as to make nuclear-weapons reductions irreversible. Our paper discusses the scope of themore » FMCT, the ability to detect clandestine production and verification challenges in the nuclear-weapons states.« less
Leo Szilard Lectureship Award Talk: Controlling and eliminating nuclear-weapon materials
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
von Hippel, Frank
2010-02-01
Fissile material -- in practice plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) -- is the essential ingredient in nuclear weapons. Controlling and eliminating fissile material and the means of its production is therefore the common denominator for nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and the prevention of nuclear terrorism. From a fundamentalist anti-nuclear-weapon perspective, the less fissile material there is and the fewer locations where it can be found, the safer a world we will have. A comprehensive fissile-material policy therefore would have the following elements: *Consolidation of all nuclear-weapon-usable materials at a minimum number of high-security sites; *A verified ban on the production of HEU and plutonium for weapons; *Minimization of non-weapon uses of HEU and plutonium; and *Elimination of all excess stocks of plutonium and HEU. There is activity on all these fronts but it is not comprehensive and not all aspects are being pursued vigorously or competently. It is therefore worthwhile to review the situation. )
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... source materials, atomic weapons, and by-product materials. Capital equipment, as used in this part... service life in excess of two years, regardless of type of funding, and having the potential for...
A Uniform Framework of Global Nuclear Materials Management
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Dupree, S.A.; Mangan, D.L.; Sanders, T.L
1999-04-20
Global Nuclear Materials Management (GNMM) anticipates and supports a growing international recognition of the importance of uniform, effective management of civilian, excess defense, and nuclear weapons materials. We expect thereto be a continuing increase in both the number of international agreements and conventions on safety, security, and transparency of nuclear materials, and the number of U.S.-Russian agreements for the safety, protection, and transparency of weapons and excess defense materials. This inventory of agreements and conventions may soon expand into broad, mandatory, international programs that will include provisions for inspection, verification, and transparency, To meet such demand the community must buildmore » on the resources we have, including State agencies, the IAEA and regional organizations. By these measures we will meet the future expectations for monitoring and inspection of materials, maintenance of safety and security, and implementation of transparency measures.« less
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
None
2009-01-01
Since September 11, 2001, the Department of Energy has, on several occasions, revised its security posture based on identified threats and adversaries. These revisions in security posture have driven Departmental sites to upgrade their defensive and tactical equipment. Subsequent changes in the perceived threats have, in some cases, led to a reduction in the need for certain types of weapons, thus creating a pool of surplus equipment. These surplus weapons could potentially be used by other Department sites and Federal law enforcement agencies. Recent Office of Inspector General reports have raised concerns with the adequacy of controls related to defensivemore » and tactical equipment. For example, our report on Management Controls Over Defense Related High Risk Property (OAS-M-08-06, April 2008) found that administrative controls over certain defense related high risk property were not sufficient for providing accountability over these items. Because of prior reported weaknesses in controls over defensive and tactical equipment, we initiated this audit to determine whether the Department and its contractors were properly managing excess weapons inventories and selected sensitive equipment used by protective forces. Our review disclosed that the Department was not always properly managing its inventories of excess weapons and selected sensitive equipment. We identified issues with the retention of unneeded weapons at many locations and with the identification and tracking of sensitive items. More specifically: Sites maintained large inventories of weapons that were no longer needed but had not been made available for use by either other Departmental sites or other Federal law enforcement agencies. For instance, at six of the locations included in our review we identified a total of 2,635 unneeded weapons with a total acquisition value of over $2.8 million that had not been officially declared as excess - an action that would have made them available for others to use. In addition; Sites were not always identifying, tracking and properly disposing of potentially high risk and sensitive equipment. In particular, we identified control weaknesses in this area related to weapons sights and scopes. These issues occurred because the Department did not have processes in place to properly manage excess inventories of weapons. In particular, the Department does not have requirements for ensuring timely declaration of excess weapons. Additionally, certain sites indicated that they were unwilling to give up excess weapons because of the possibility that they may be needed in the future. However, other sites had a need for some of these weapons and could have avoided purchasing them had they been made available through the excess screening process. Also, we found that the Department lacks clear guidance on the identification of high risk/sensitive equipment. Except for immaterial differences, we were able to locate and verify accountability over the items of defensive and tactical equipment we selected for review. Specifically, we took statistical samples of weapons, ammunition, and other related equipment and were able to verify their existence. While these accountability measures were noteworthy, additional action is necessary to strengthen controls over weapon and sensitive equipment management. Untimely declaration of excess weapons may result in an inefficient use of scarce Government resources. Similarly, if selected high risk/sensitive equipment is not properly categorized and tracked, accountability issues may occur. To address these issues, we made recommendations aimed at improving the management of these categories of defensive and tactical equipment.« less
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Farmer, J C; Diaz de la Rubia, T; Moses, E
2008-12-23
The National Ignition Facility (NIF) project, a laser-based Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) experiment designed to achieve thermonuclear fusion ignition and burn in the laboratory, is under construction at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and will be completed in April of 2009. Experiments designed to accomplish the NIF's goal will commence in late FY2010 utilizing laser energies of 1 to 1.3 MJ. Fusion yields of the order of 10 to 20 MJ are expected soon thereafter. Laser initiated fusion-fission (LIFE) engines have now been designed to produce nuclear power from natural or depleted uranium without isotopic enrichment, and from spentmore » nuclear fuel from light water reactors without chemical separation into weapons-attractive actinide streams. A point-source of high-energy neutrons produced by laser-generated, thermonuclear fusion within a target is used to achieve ultra-deep burn-up of the fertile or fissile fuel in a sub-critical fission blanket. Fertile fuels including depleted uranium (DU), natural uranium (NatU), spent nuclear fuel (SNF), and thorium (Th) can be used. Fissile fuels such as low-enrichment uranium (LEU), excess weapons plutonium (WG-Pu), and excess highly-enriched uranium (HEU) may be used as well. Based upon preliminary analyses, it is believed that LIFE could help meet worldwide electricity needs in a safe and sustainable manner, while drastically shrinking the nation's and world's stockpile of spent nuclear fuel and excess weapons materials. LIFE takes advantage of the significant advances in laser-based inertial confinement fusion that are taking place at the NIF at LLNL where it is expected that thermonuclear ignition will be achieved in the 2010-2011 timeframe. Starting from as little as 300 to 500 MW of fusion power, a single LIFE engine will be able to generate 2000 to 3000 MWt in steady state for periods of years to decades, depending on the nuclear fuel and engine configuration. Because the fission blanket in a fusion-fission hybrid system is subcritical, a LIFE engine can burn any fertile or fissile nuclear material, including unenriched natural or depleted U and SNF, and can extract a very high percentage of the energy content of its fuel resulting in greatly enhanced energy generation per metric ton of nuclear fuel, as well as nuclear waste forms with vastly reduced concentrations of long-lived actinides. LIFE engines could thus provide the ability to generate vast amounts of electricity while greatly reducing the actinide content of any existing or future nuclear waste and extending the availability of low cost nuclear fuels for several thousand years. LIFE also provides an attractive pathway for burning excess weapons Pu to over 99% FIMA (fission of initial metal atoms) without the need for fabricating or reprocessing mixed oxide fuels (MOX). Because of all of these advantages, LIFE engines offer a pathway toward sustainable and safe nuclear power that significantly mitigates nuclear proliferation concerns and minimizes nuclear waste. An important aspect of a LIFE engine is the fact that there is no need to extract the fission fuel from the fission blanket before it is burned to the desired final level. Except for fuel inspection and maintenance process times, the nuclear fuel is always within the core of the reactor and no weapons-attractive materials are available outside at any point in time. However, an important consideration when discussing proliferation concerns associated with any nuclear fuel cycle is the ease with which reactor fuel can be converted to weapons usable materials, not just when it is extracted as waste, but at any point in the fuel cycle. Although the nuclear fuel remains in the core of the engine until ultra deep actinide burn up is achieved, soon after start up of the engine, once the system breeds up to full power, several tons of fissile material is present in the fission blanket. However, this fissile material is widely dispersed in millions of fuel pebbles, which can be tagged as individual accountable items, and thus made difficult to divert in large quantities. This report discusses the application of the LIFE concept to nonproliferation issues, initially looking at the LIFE (Laser Inertial Fusion-Fission Energy) engine as a means of completely burning WG Pu and HEU. By combining a neutron-rich inertial fusion point source with energy-rich fission, the once-through closed fuel-cycle LIFE concept has the following characteristics: it is capable of efficiently burning excess weapons or separated civilian plutonium and highly enriched uranium; the fission blanket is sub-critical at all times (keff < 0.95); because LIFE can operate well beyond the point at which light water reactors (LWRs) need to be refueled due to burn-up of fissile material and the resulting drop in system reactivity, fuel burn-up of 99% or more appears feasible. The objective of this work is to develop LIFE technology for burning of WG-Pu and HEU.« less
Nuclear waste forms for actinides
Ewing, Rodney C.
1999-01-01
The disposition of actinides, most recently 239Pu from dismantled nuclear weapons, requires effective containment of waste generated by the nuclear fuel cycle. Because actinides (e.g., 239Pu and 237Np) are long-lived, they have a major impact on risk assessments of geologic repositories. Thus, demonstrable, long-term chemical and mechanical durability are essential properties of waste forms for the immobilization of actinides. Mineralogic and geologic studies provide excellent candidate phases for immobilization and a unique database that cannot be duplicated by a purely materials science approach. The “mineralogic approach” is illustrated by a discussion of zircon as a phase for the immobilization of excess weapons plutonium. PMID:10097054
Metal Hydride Heat Storage Technology for Directed Energy Weapon Systems
2007-11-16
high thermal conductivity materials for heat transfer enhancement. In addition, the PCMs ’ low heat storage density requires excessively large system...capacity as compared to the PCMs . For example, Ca0.2M0.8Ni5, a commercial hydride, has a heat storage density of 853.3MJ/m³ in raw material condition...Huston and Sandrock, 1980], while paraffin (Calwax 130), a common organic PCM has a heat storage capacity of 177.5MJ/m³ [Al-Hallaj and Selman, 2000]. The
LIFE Materials: Overview of Fuels and Structural Materials Issues Volume 1
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Farmer, J
2008-09-08
The National Ignition Facility (NIF) project, a laser-based Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) experiment designed to achieve thermonuclear fusion ignition and burn in the laboratory, is under construction at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and will be completed in April of 2009. Experiments designed to accomplish the NIF's goal will commence in late FY2010 utilizing laser energies of 1 to 1.3 MJ. Fusion yields of the order of 10 to 20 MJ are expected soon thereafter. Laser initiated fusion-fission (LIFE) engines have now been designed to produce nuclear power from natural or depleted uranium without isotopic enrichment, and from spentmore » nuclear fuel from light water reactors without chemical separation into weapons-attractive actinide streams. A point-source of high-energy neutrons produced by laser-generated, thermonuclear fusion within a target is used to achieve ultra-deep burn-up of the fertile or fissile fuel in a sub-critical fission blanket. Fertile fuels including depleted uranium (DU), natural uranium (NatU), spent nuclear fuel (SNF), and thorium (Th) can be used. Fissile fuels such as low-enrichment uranium (LEU), excess weapons plutonium (WG-Pu), and excess highly-enriched uranium (HEU) may be used as well. Based upon preliminary analyses, it is believed that LIFE could help meet worldwide electricity needs in a safe and sustainable manner, while drastically shrinking the nation's and world's stockpile of spent nuclear fuel and excess weapons materials. LIFE takes advantage of the significant advances in laser-based inertial confinement fusion that are taking place at the NIF at LLNL where it is expected that thermonuclear ignition will be achieved in the 2010-2011 timeframe. Starting from as little as 300 to 500 MW of fusion power, a single LIFE engine will be able to generate 2000 to 3000 MWt in steady state for periods of years to decades, depending on the nuclear fuel and engine configuration. Because the fission blanket in a fusion-fission hybrid system is subcritical, a LIFE engine can burn any fertile or fissile nuclear material, including un-enriched natural or depleted U and SNF, and can extract a very high percentage of the energy content of its fuel resulting in greatly enhanced energy generation per metric ton of nuclear fuel, as well as nuclear waste forms with vastly reduced concentrations of long-lived actinides. LIFE engines could thus provide the ability to generate vast amounts of electricity while greatly reducing the actinide content of any existing or future nuclear waste and extending the availability of low cost nuclear fuels for several thousand years. LIFE also provides an attractive pathway for burning excess weapons Pu to over 99% FIMA (fission of initial metal atoms) without the need for fabricating or reprocessing mixed oxide fuels (MOX). Because of all of these advantages, LIFE engines offer a pathway toward sustainable and safe nuclear power that significantly mitigates nuclear proliferation concerns and minimizes nuclear waste. An important aspect of a LIFE engine is the fact that there is no need to extract the fission fuel from the fission blanket before it is burned to the desired final level. Except for fuel inspection and maintenance process times, the nuclear fuel is always within the core of the reactor and no weapons-attractive materials are available outside at any point in time. However, an important consideration when discussing proliferation concerns associated with any nuclear fuel cycle is the ease with which reactor fuel can be converted to weapons usable materials, not just when it is extracted as waste, but at any point in the fuel cycle. Although the nuclear fuel remains in the core of the engine until ultra deep actinide burn up is achieved, soon after start up of the engine, once the system breeds up to full power, several tons of fissile material is present in the fission blanket. However, this fissile material is widely dispersed in millions of fuel pebbles, which can be tagged as individual accountable items, and thus made difficult to divert in large quantities. Several topical reports are being prepared on the materials and processes required for the LIFE engine. Specific materials of interest include: (1) Baseline TRISO Fuel (TRISO); (2) Inert Matrix Fuel (IMF) & Other Alternative Solid Fuels; (3) Beryllium (Be) & Molten Lead Blankets (Pb/PbLi); (4) Molten Salt Coolants (FLIBE/FLiNaBe/FLiNaK); (5) Molten Salt Fuels (UF4 + FLIBE/FLiNaBe); (6) Cladding Materials for Fuel & Beryllium; (7) ODS FM Steel (ODS); (8) Solid First Wall (SFW); and (9) Solid-State Tritium Storage (Hydrides).« less
Nuclear materials safeguards for the future
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Tape, J.W.
Basic concepts of domestic and international safeguards are described, with an emphasis on safeguards systems for the fuel cycles of commercial power reactors. Future trends in institutional and technical measures for nuclear materials safeguards are outlined. The conclusion is that continued developments in safeguards approaches and technology, coupled with institutional measures that facilitate the global management and protection of nuclear materials, are up to the challenge of safeguarding the growing inventories of nuclear materials in commercial fuel cycles in technologically advanced States with stable governments that have signed the nonproliferation treaty. These same approaches also show promise for facilitating internationalmore » inspection of excess weapons materials and verifying a fissile materials cutoff convention.« less
Passing It On: Fighting the Pushtun on Afghanistan’s Frontier
2010-01-01
tribesman who preferred slashing weapons. The standard British handgun at the turn of the century was the Webley front-break revolver; however a wide...common annoyance, not done for military reasons but to secure a really stout material for stringing the family bed; and if as our friend runs...a locally-manufactured long- barreled , often highly-decorated, curved- stocked firearm of the Pathan. It is usually in excess of .50 caliber and
Long-term retrievability and safeguards for immobilized weapons plutonium in geologic storage
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Peterson, P.F.
1996-05-01
If plutonium is not ultimately used as an energy source, the quantity of excess weapons plutonium (w-Pu) that would go into a US repository will be small compared to the quantity of plutonium contained in the commercial spent fuel in the repository, and the US repository(ies) will likely be only one (or two) locations out of many around the world where commercial spent fuel will be stored. Therefore excess weapons plutonium creates a small perturbation to the long-term (over 200,000 yr) global safeguard requirements for spent fuel. There are details in the differences between spent fuel and immobilized w-Pu wastemore » forms (i.e. chemical separation methods, utility for weapons, nuclear testing requirements), but these are sufficiently small to be unlikely to play a significant role in any US political decision to rebuild weapons inventories, or to change the long-term risks of theft by subnational groups.« less
Landmines on the Table: A Negotiations Analysis of the Global Campaign to Ban Landmines
2008-12-01
regard landmines as very cheap and effective weapons in defending troops and non-protected land against insurgents or attacking armies. The...weapons, including any which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects ‖ (UNGA, 1977). Resolution 32/152 paved the...Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects ‖ (CCW) and its annexed Protocols, of which Protocol II dealt specifically with landmines. The US
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Jardine, L J; Borisov, G B
2004-07-21
A fifth annual Excess Weapons Plutonium Disposition meeting organized by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) was held February 16-18, 2004, at the State Education Center (SEC), 4 Aerodromnya Drive, St. Petersburg, Russia. The meeting discussed Excess Weapons Plutonium Disposition topics for which LLNL has the US Technical Lead Organization responsibilities. The technical areas discussed included Radioactive Waste Treatment, Storage, and Disposal, Plutonium Oxide and Plutonium Metal Packaging, Storage and Transportation and Spent Fuel Packaging, Storage and Transportation. The meeting was conducted with a conference format using technical presentations of papers with simultaneous translation into English and Russian. There were 46more » Russian attendees from 14 different Russian organizations and six non-Russian attendees, four from the US and two from France. Forty technical presentations were made. The meeting agenda is given in Appendix B and the attendance list is in Appendix C.« less
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Not Available
1994-04-30
As part of the U.S. effort to evaluate technologies offering solutions for the safe disposal or utilization of surplus nuclear materials, the fiscal year 1993 Energy and Water Appropriations legislation provided the Department of Energy (DOE) the necessary funds to conduct multi-phased studies to determine the technical feasibility of using reactor technologies for the triple mission of burning weapons grade plutonium, producing tritium for the existing smaller weapons stockpile, and generating commercial electricity. DOE limited the studies to five advanced reactor designs. Among the technologies selected is the ABB-Combustion Engineering (ABB-CE) System 80+. The DOE study, currently in Phase ID,more » is proceeding with a more detailed evaluation of the design`s capability for plutonium disposition.« less
Field Artillery Cannon Weapons Systems and Ammunition Handbook.
1983-02-01
ground. I (2) When the weapon is emplaced on uneven terrain, the equalizing support rotates on the horizontal pivot pin, placing the tilting parts of the...intervisible. g. Direct fire-Fire from a weapon that is laid by sighting directly on the target. h. Cant-The tilting of the trunnions of the weapon...locking handle bends or breaks because excess mucle is applied. The screws vibrate loose and are lost because somebody forgets to check them for
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-01-01
... weapons, explosives, or other dangerous materials. 1204.1005 Section 1204.1005 Aeronautics and Space... Weapons or Dangerous Materials § 1204.1005 Unauthorized introduction of firearms or weapons, explosives... or causing to be introduced, or using firearms or other dangerous weapons, explosives or other...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-01-01
... weapons, explosives, or other dangerous materials. 1204.1005 Section 1204.1005 Aeronautics and Space... Weapons or Dangerous Materials § 1204.1005 Unauthorized introduction of firearms or weapons, explosives... or causing to be introduced, or using firearms or other dangerous weapons, explosives or other...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-01-01
... weapons, explosives, or other dangerous materials. 1204.1005 Section 1204.1005 Aeronautics and Space... Weapons or Dangerous Materials § 1204.1005 Unauthorized introduction of firearms or weapons, explosives... or causing to be introduced, or using firearms or other dangerous weapons, explosives or other...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-01-01
... weapons, explosives, or other dangerous materials. 1204.1005 Section 1204.1005 Aeronautics and Space... Weapons or Dangerous Materials § 1204.1005 Unauthorized introduction of firearms or weapons, explosives... or causing to be introduced, or using firearms or other dangerous weapons, explosives or other...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-01-01
... weapons, explosives, or other dangerous materials. § 1204.1005 Section § 1204.1005 Aeronautics and Space... Weapons or Dangerous Materials § 1204.1005 Unauthorized introduction of firearms or weapons, explosives... description of the consequences for unauthorized introduction of firearms or weapons, explosives, or other...
Excess Weapons Plutonium Immobilization in Russia
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Jardine, L.; Borisov, G.B.
2000-04-15
The joint goal of the Russian work is to establish a full-scale plutonium immobilization facility at a Russian industrial site by 2005. To achieve this requires that the necessary engineering and technical basis be developed in these Russian projects and the needed Russian approvals be obtained to conduct industrial-scale immobilization of plutonium-containing materials at a Russian industrial site by the 2005 date. This meeting and future work will provide the basis for joint decisions. Supporting R&D projects are being carried out at Russian Institutes that directly support the technical needs of Russian industrial sites to immobilize plutonium-containing materials. Special R&Dmore » on plutonium materials is also being carried out to support excess weapons disposition in Russia and the US, including nonproliferation studies of plutonium recovery from immobilization forms and accelerated radiation damage studies of the US-specified plutonium ceramic for immobilizing plutonium. This intriguing and extraordinary cooperation on certain aspects of the weapons plutonium problem is now progressing well and much work with plutonium has been completed in the past two years. Because much excellent and unique scientific and engineering technical work has now been completed in Russia in many aspects of plutonium immobilization, this meeting in St. Petersburg was both timely and necessary to summarize, review, and discuss these efforts among those who performed the actual work. The results of this meeting will help the US and Russia jointly define the future direction of the Russian plutonium immobilization program, and make it an even stronger and more integrated Russian program. The two objectives for the meeting were to: (1) Bring together the Russian organizations, experts, and managers performing the work into one place for four days to review and discuss their work with each other; and (2) Publish a meeting summary and a proceedings to compile reports of all the excellent Russian plutonium immobilization contract work. This proceedings document presents the wide extent of Russian immobilization activities, provides a reference for their work, and makes it available to others.« less
Study of plutonium disposition using the GE Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR)
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
NONE
1994-04-30
The end of the cold war and the resulting dismantlement of nuclear weapons has resulted in the need for the U.S. to disposition 50 to 100 metric tons of excess of plutonium in parallel with a similar program in Russia. A number of studies, including the recently released National Academy of Sciences (NAS) study, have recommended conversion of plutonium into spent nuclear fuel with its high radiation barrier as the best means of providing long-term diversion resistance to this material. The NAS study {open_quotes}Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium{close_quotes} identified light water reactor spent fuel as the most readilymore » achievable and proven form for the disposition of excess weapons plutonium. The study also stressed the need for a U.S. disposition program which would enhance the prospects for a timely reciprocal program agreement with Russia. This summary provides the key findings of a GE study where plutonium is converted into Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel and a 1350 MWe GE Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR) is utilized to convert the plutonium to spent fuel. The ABWR represents the integration of over 30 years of experience gained worldwide in the design, construction and operation of BWRs. It incorporates advanced features to enhance reliability and safety, minimize waste and reduce worker exposure. For example, the core is never uncovered nor is any operator action required for 72 hours after any design basis accident. Phase 1 of this study was documented in a GE report dated May 13, 1993. DOE`s Phase 1 evaluations cited the ABWR as a proven technical approach for the disposition of plutonium. This Phase 2 study addresses specific areas which the DOE authorized as appropriate for more in-depth evaluations. A separate report addresses the findings relative to the use of existing BWRs to achieve the same goal.« less
Control of a laser inertial confinement fusion-fission power plant
Moses, Edward I.; Latkowski, Jeffery F.; Kramer, Kevin J.
2015-10-27
A laser inertial-confinement fusion-fission energy power plant is described. The fusion-fission hybrid system uses inertial confinement fusion to produce neutrons from a fusion reaction of deuterium and tritium. The fusion neutrons drive a sub-critical blanket of fissile or fertile fuel. A coolant circulated through the fuel extracts heat from the fuel that is used to generate electricity. The inertial confinement fusion reaction can be implemented using central hot spot or fast ignition fusion, and direct or indirect drive. The fusion neutrons result in ultra-deep burn-up of the fuel in the fission blanket, thus enabling the burning of nuclear waste. Fuels include depleted uranium, natural uranium, enriched uranium, spent nuclear fuel, thorium, and weapons grade plutonium. LIFE engines can meet worldwide electricity needs in a safe and sustainable manner, while drastically shrinking the highly undesirable stockpiles of depleted uranium, spent nuclear fuel and excess weapons materials.
Global strike hypersonic weapons
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Lewis, Mark J.
2017-11-01
Beginning in the 1940's, the United States has pursued the development of hypersonic technologies, enabling atmospheric flight in excess of five times the speed of sound. Hypersonic flight has application to a range of military and civilian applications, including commercial transport, space access, and various weapons and sensing platforms. A number of flight tests of hypersonic vehicles have been conducted by countries around the world, including the United States, Russia, and China, that could lead the way to future hypersonic global strike weapon systems. These weapons would be especially effective at penetrating conventional defenses, and could pose a significant risk to national security.
Nuclear materials stewardship: Our enduring mission
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Isaacs, T.H.
1998-12-31
The US Department of Energy (DOE) and its predecessors have handled a remarkably wide variety of nuclear materials over the past 50 yr. Two fundamental changes have occurred that shape the current landscape regarding nuclear materials. If one recognizes the implications and opportunities, one sees that the stewardship of nuclear materials will be a fundamental and important job of the DOE for the foreseeable future. The first change--the breakup of the Soviet Union and the resulting end to the nuclear arms race--altered US objectives. Previously, the focus was on materials production, weapon design, nuclear testing, and stockpile enhancements. Now themore » attention is on dismantlement of weapons, excess special nuclear material inventories, accompanying increased concern over the protection afforded to such materials; new arms control measures; and importantly, maintenance of the safety and reliability of the remaining arsenal without testing. The second change was the raised consciousness and sense of responsibility for dealing with the environmental legacies of past nuclear arms programs. Recognition of the need to clean up radioactive contamination, manage the wastes, conduct current operations responsibly, and restore the environment have led to the establishment of what is now the largest program in the DOE. Two additional features add to the challenge and drive the need for recognition of nuclear materials stewardship as a fundamental, enduring, and compelling mission of the DOE. The first is the extraordinary time frames. No matter what the future of nuclear weapons and no matter what the future of nuclear power, the DOE will be responsible for most of the country`s nuclear materials and wastes for generations. Even if the Yucca Mountain program is successful and on schedule, it will last more than 100 yr. Second, the use, management, and disposition of nuclear materials and wastes affect a variety of nationally important and diverse objectives, from national security to the future of nuclear power in this country and abroad, to the care of the environment. Sometimes these objectives are in concert, but often they are seen as competing or being in conflict. By recognizing the corporate responsibility for these materials and the accompanying programs, national decision making will be improved.« less
Enhancing Energy in Future Conventional Munition
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Peiris, Suhithi
2017-06-01
Future conventional weapons are envisioned to contain more energy per volume than current weapons. Current weapons comprise of inert steel outer case, with inner volume for energetic materials, fuzing, sensor package, propulsion system, etc. Recent research on reactive materials (RM) & new energetics, and exploiting additive manufacturing can optimize the use of both mass and volume to achieve much higher energy in future weapons. For instance, replacing inert steel with RM of similar strength, additively manufacturing fuzing packages within the weapon form factor, and combing the whole with new energetics, will enable the same lethality effects from smaller weapons as obtained from today's larger weapons. This paper will elaborate on reactive materials and properties necessary for optimal utilization in various weapon features, and touch on other aspects of enhancing energy in future conventional munition.
28 CFR 13.6 - Criteria for reward.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-07-01
... Judicial Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ATOMIC WEAPONS AND SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS REWARDS... reward under the Atomic Weapons and Special Nuclear Materials Rewards Act must be original, and must..., acquire or export special nuclear material or atomic weapons, or (5) Loss, diversion or disposal or...
28 CFR 13.6 - Criteria for reward.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-07-01
... Judicial Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ATOMIC WEAPONS AND SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS REWARDS... reward under the Atomic Weapons and Special Nuclear Materials Rewards Act must be original, and must..., acquire or export special nuclear material or atomic weapons, or (5) Loss, diversion or disposal or...
28 CFR 13.6 - Criteria for reward.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-07-01
... Judicial Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ATOMIC WEAPONS AND SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS REWARDS... reward under the Atomic Weapons and Special Nuclear Materials Rewards Act must be original, and must..., acquire or export special nuclear material or atomic weapons, or (5) Loss, diversion or disposal or...
28 CFR 13.6 - Criteria for reward.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-07-01
... Judicial Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ATOMIC WEAPONS AND SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS REWARDS... reward under the Atomic Weapons and Special Nuclear Materials Rewards Act must be original, and must..., acquire or export special nuclear material or atomic weapons, or (5) Loss, diversion or disposal or...
28 CFR 13.6 - Criteria for reward.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-07-01
... Judicial Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ATOMIC WEAPONS AND SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS REWARDS... reward under the Atomic Weapons and Special Nuclear Materials Rewards Act must be original, and must..., acquire or export special nuclear material or atomic weapons, or (5) Loss, diversion or disposal or...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-01-01
... SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 3 CHEMICALS § 714.2 Annual reporting requirements for exports and imports in excess of 30 metric tons of... exports and imports in excess of 30 metric tons of Schedule 3 chemicals. 714.2 Section 714.2 Commerce and...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-01-01
... SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 3 CHEMICALS § 714.2 Annual reporting requirements for exports and imports in excess of 30 metric tons of... exports and imports in excess of 30 metric tons of Schedule 3 chemicals. 714.2 Section 714.2 Commerce and...
10 CFR 160.4 - Unauthorized introduction of weapons or dangerous materials.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-01-01
... 10 Energy 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Unauthorized introduction of weapons or dangerous materials. 160.4 Section 160.4 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) TRESPASSING ON COMMISSION PROPERTY § 160.4 Unauthorized introduction of weapons or dangerous materials. Unauthorized carrying...
10 CFR 160.4 - Unauthorized introduction of weapons or dangerous materials.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-01-01
... 10 Energy 2 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Unauthorized introduction of weapons or dangerous materials. 160.4 Section 160.4 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) TRESPASSING ON COMMISSION PROPERTY § 160.4 Unauthorized introduction of weapons or dangerous materials. Unauthorized carrying...
10 CFR 160.4 - Unauthorized introduction of weapons or dangerous materials.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-01-01
... 10 Energy 2 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Unauthorized introduction of weapons or dangerous materials. 160.4 Section 160.4 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) TRESPASSING ON COMMISSION PROPERTY § 160.4 Unauthorized introduction of weapons or dangerous materials. Unauthorized carrying...
10 CFR 160.4 - Unauthorized introduction of weapons or dangerous materials.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-01-01
... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Unauthorized introduction of weapons or dangerous materials. 160.4 Section 160.4 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) TRESPASSING ON COMMISSION PROPERTY § 160.4 Unauthorized introduction of weapons or dangerous materials. Unauthorized carrying...
10 CFR 160.4 - Unauthorized introduction of weapons or dangerous materials.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-01-01
... 10 Energy 2 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Unauthorized introduction of weapons or dangerous materials. 160.4 Section 160.4 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) TRESPASSING ON COMMISSION PROPERTY § 160.4 Unauthorized introduction of weapons or dangerous materials. Unauthorized carrying...
10 CFR 860.4 - Unauthorized introduction of weapons or dangerous materials.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-01-01
... 10 Energy 4 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Unauthorized introduction of weapons or dangerous materials. 860.4 Section 860.4 Energy DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY TRESPASSING ON DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY PROPERTY § 860.4 Unauthorized introduction of weapons or dangerous materials. Unauthorized carrying, transporting...
10 CFR 860.4 - Unauthorized introduction of weapons or dangerous materials.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-01-01
... 10 Energy 4 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Unauthorized introduction of weapons or dangerous materials. 860.4 Section 860.4 Energy DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY TRESPASSING ON DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY PROPERTY § 860.4 Unauthorized introduction of weapons or dangerous materials. Unauthorized carrying, transporting...
10 CFR 860.4 - Unauthorized introduction of weapons or dangerous materials.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-01-01
... 10 Energy 4 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Unauthorized introduction of weapons or dangerous materials. 860.4 Section 860.4 Energy DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY TRESPASSING ON DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY PROPERTY § 860.4 Unauthorized introduction of weapons or dangerous materials. Unauthorized carrying, transporting...
10 CFR 860.4 - Unauthorized introduction of weapons or dangerous materials.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-01-01
... 10 Energy 4 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Unauthorized introduction of weapons or dangerous materials. 860.4 Section 860.4 Energy DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY TRESPASSING ON DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY PROPERTY § 860.4 Unauthorized introduction of weapons or dangerous materials. Unauthorized carrying, transporting...
10 CFR 860.4 - Unauthorized introduction of weapons or dangerous materials.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-01-01
... 10 Energy 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Unauthorized introduction of weapons or dangerous materials. 860.4 Section 860.4 Energy DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY TRESPASSING ON DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY PROPERTY § 860.4 Unauthorized introduction of weapons or dangerous materials. Unauthorized carrying, transporting...
Zirconia ceramics for excess weapons plutonium waste
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Gong, W. L.; Lutze, W.; Ewing, R. C.
2000-01-01
We synthesized a zirconia (ZrO 2)-based single-phase ceramic containing simulated excess weapons plutonium waste. ZrO 2 has large solubility for other metallic oxides. More than 20 binary systems A xO y-ZrO 2 have been reported in the literature, including PuO 2, rare-earth oxides, and oxides of metals contained in weapons plutonium wastes. We show that significant amounts of gadolinium (neutron absorber) and yttrium (additional stabilizer of the cubic modification) can be dissolved in ZrO 2, together with plutonium (simulated by Ce 4+, U 4+ or Th 4+) and impurities (e.g., Ca, Mg, Fe, Si). Sol-gel and powder methods were applied to make homogeneous, single-phase zirconia solid solutions. Pu waste impurities were completely dissolved in the solid solutions. In contrast to other phases, e.g., zirconolite and pyrochlore, zirconia is extremely radiation resistant and does not undergo amorphization. Baddeleyite (ZrO 2) is suggested as the natural analogue to study long-term radiation resistance and chemical durability of zirconia-based waste forms.
15 CFR 716.1 - General information on the conduct of initial and routine inspections.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-01-01
... WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS INITIAL AND ROUTINE INSPECTIONS OF DECLARED FACILITIES § 716.1 General... is subject to inspection if it produced in excess of 100 grams aggregate of Schedule 1 chemicals in the previous calendar year or anticipates producing in excess of 100 grams aggregate of Schedule 1...
11. VIEW OF A SITE RETURN WEAPONS COMPONENT. SITE RETURNS ...
11. VIEW OF A SITE RETURN WEAPONS COMPONENT. SITE RETURNS WERE NUCLEAR WEAPONS SHIPPED TO THE ROCKY FLATS PLANT FROM THE NUCLEAR WEAPON STOCKPILE FOR RETIREMENT, TESTING, OR UPGRADING. FISSILE MATERIALS (PLUTONIUM, URANIUM, ETC.) AND RARE MATERIALS (BERYLLIUM) WERE RECOVERED FOR REUSE, AND THE REMAINDER WAS DISPOSED. (8/7/62) - Rocky Flats Plant, Plutonium Fabrication, Central section of Plant, Golden, Jefferson County, CO
10 CFR 1048.4 - Unauthorized introduction of weapons or dangerous materials.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-01-01
... 10 Energy 4 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Unauthorized introduction of weapons or dangerous materials. 1048.4 Section 1048.4 Energy DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (GENERAL PROVISIONS) TRESPASSING ON STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE FACILITIES AND OTHER PROPERTY § 1048.4 Unauthorized introduction of weapons or dangerous...
10 CFR 1048.4 - Unauthorized introduction of weapons or dangerous materials.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-01-01
... 10 Energy 4 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Unauthorized introduction of weapons or dangerous materials. 1048.4 Section 1048.4 Energy DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (GENERAL PROVISIONS) TRESPASSING ON STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE FACILITIES AND OTHER PROPERTY § 1048.4 Unauthorized introduction of weapons or dangerous...
10 CFR 1048.4 - Unauthorized introduction of weapons or dangerous materials.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-01-01
... 10 Energy 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Unauthorized introduction of weapons or dangerous materials. 1048.4 Section 1048.4 Energy DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (GENERAL PROVISIONS) TRESPASSING ON STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE FACILITIES AND OTHER PROPERTY § 1048.4 Unauthorized introduction of weapons or dangerous...
10 CFR 1048.4 - Unauthorized introduction of weapons or dangerous materials.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-01-01
... 10 Energy 4 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Unauthorized introduction of weapons or dangerous materials. 1048.4 Section 1048.4 Energy DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (GENERAL PROVISIONS) TRESPASSING ON STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE FACILITIES AND OTHER PROPERTY § 1048.4 Unauthorized introduction of weapons or dangerous...
10 CFR 1048.4 - Unauthorized introduction of weapons or dangerous materials.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-01-01
... 10 Energy 4 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Unauthorized introduction of weapons or dangerous materials. 1048.4 Section 1048.4 Energy DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (GENERAL PROVISIONS) TRESPASSING ON STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE FACILITIES AND OTHER PROPERTY § 1048.4 Unauthorized introduction of weapons or dangerous...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-01-01
... in the production of a chemical in any units within the same plant through chemical reaction... plant sites that produce a Schedule 3 chemical in excess of 30 metric tons. 714.1 Section 714.1 Commerce... AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-01-01
... in the production of a chemical in any units within the same plant through chemical reaction... plant sites that produce a Schedule 3 chemical in excess of 30 metric tons. 714.1 Section 714.1 Commerce... AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-01-01
... in the production of a chemical in any units within the same plant through chemical reaction... plant sites that produce a Schedule 3 chemical in excess of 30 metric tons. 714.1 Section 714.1 Commerce... AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-01-01
... in the production of a chemical in any units within the same plant through chemical reaction... plant sites that produce a Schedule 3 chemical in excess of 30 metric tons. 714.1 Section 714.1 Commerce... AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-01-01
... in the production of a chemical in any units within the same plant through chemical reaction... plant sites that produce a Schedule 3 chemical in excess of 30 metric tons. 714.1 Section 714.1 Commerce... AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING...
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Reed, B. Cameron
2014-12-01
The feed materials program of the Manhattan Project was responsible for procuring uranium-bearing ores and materials and processing them into forms suitable for use as source materials for the Project's uranium-enrichment factories and plutonium-producing reactors. This aspect of the Manhattan Project has tended to be overlooked in comparison with the Project's more dramatic accomplishments, but was absolutely vital to the success of those endeavors: without appropriate raw materials and the means to process them, nuclear weapons and much of the subsequent cold war would never have come to pass. Drawing from information available in Manhattan Engineer District Documents, this paper examines the sources and processing of uranium-bearing materials used in making the first nuclear weapons and how the feed materials program became a central foundational component of the postwar nuclear weapons complex.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-01-01
... to the Risk of Nuclear Proliferation Created by the Accumulation of Weapons-Usable Fissile Material... Proliferation Created by the Accumulation of Weapons-Usable Fissile Material in the Territory of the Russian... Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted from Nuclear Weapons, dated February 18, 1993, and related...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-01-01
... to the Risk of Nuclear Proliferation Created by the Accumulation of Weapons-usable Fissile Material... Proliferation Created by the Accumulation of Weapons-usable Fissile Material in the Territory of the Russian... Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted from Nuclear Weapons, dated February 18, 1993, and related...
Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014
2013-07-16
... Order 13382, ``Blocking Property of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators and Their Supporters... materially contributed to, or pose a risk of materially contributing to, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or their means of delivery (including missiles capable of delivering such weapons), including any...
Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014
2010-06-18
... To the Risk of Nuclear Proliferation Created By the Accumulation of Weapons-usable Fissile Material... Risk of Nuclear Proliferation Created By the Accumulation of Weapons-usable Fissile Material In the... Russian Federation Concerning the Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted from Nuclear Weapons...
Controlling Weapons-Grade Fissile Material
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Rotblat, J.
1977-01-01
Discusses the problems of controlling weapons-grade fissionable material. Projections of the growth of fission nuclear reactors indicates sufficient materials will be available to construct 300,000 atomic bombs each containing 10 kilograms of plutonium by 1990. (SL)
Ceramics: Durability and radiation effects
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Ewing, R.C.; Lutze, W.; Weber, W.J.
1996-05-01
At present, there are three seriously considered options for the disposition of excess weapons plutonium: (1) incorporation, partial burn-up and direct disposal of MOX-fuel; (2) vitrification with defense waste and disposal as glass {open_quotes}logs{close_quotes}; (3) deep borehole disposal. The first two options provide a safeguard due to the high activity of fission products in the irradiated fuel and the defense waste. The latter option has only been examined in a preliminary manner, and the exact form of the plutonium has not been identified. In this paper, we review the potential for the immobilization of plutonium in highly durable crystalline ceramicsmore » apatite, pyrochlore, zirconolite, monazite and zircon. Based on available data, we propose zircon as the preferred crystalline ceramic for the permanent disposition of excess weapons plutonium.« less
15 CFR 265.39 - Weapons and explosives.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-01-01
... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 1 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 265.39 Section..., GAITHERSBURG, MARYLAND, AND BOULDER AND FORT COLLINS, COLORADO Buildings and Grounds § 265.39 Weapons and... dangerous or deadly weapons or materials, or explosives, either openly or concealed, without the written...
15 CFR 265.39 - Weapons and explosives.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-01-01
... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 1 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 265.39 Section..., GAITHERSBURG, MARYLAND, AND BOULDER AND FORT COLLINS, COLORADO Buildings and Grounds § 265.39 Weapons and... dangerous or deadly weapons or materials, or explosives, either openly or concealed, without the written...
15 CFR 265.39 - Weapons and explosives.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-01-01
... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 1 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 265.39 Section..., GAITHERSBURG, MARYLAND, AND BOULDER AND FORT COLLINS, COLORADO Buildings and Grounds § 265.39 Weapons and... dangerous or deadly weapons or materials, or explosives, either openly or concealed, without the written...
15 CFR 265.39 - Weapons and explosives.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-01-01
... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 1 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 265.39 Section..., GAITHERSBURG, MARYLAND, AND BOULDER AND FORT COLLINS, COLORADO Buildings and Grounds § 265.39 Weapons and... dangerous or deadly weapons or materials, or explosives, either openly or concealed, without the written...
2016-06-01
of these three pillars, yet current detectors for fast neutrons from nuclear weapons materials are bulky, expensive, and have low efficiencies, well...passive fast neutron emissions. Similarly, isotopes present in weapons grade Plutonium (which is predominantly Pu-239), especially Pu-240, are... weapons material, and the propensity of the neutrons resulting from their fission to inelastically scatter, defines the interactions of interest
Fuzzy-probabilistic model for risk assessment of radioactive material railway transportation.
Avramenko, M; Bolyatko, V; Kosterev, V
2005-01-01
Transportation of radioactive materials is obviously accompanied by a certain risk. A model for risk assessment of emergency situations and terrorist attacks may be useful for choosing possible routes and for comparing the various defence strategies. In particular, risk assessment is crucial for safe transportation of excess weapons-grade plutonium arising from the removal of plutonium from military employment. A fuzzy-probabilistic model for risk assessment of railway transportation has been developed taking into account the different natures of risk-affecting parameters (probabilistic and not probabilistic but fuzzy). Fuzzy set theory methods as well as standard methods of probability theory have been used for quantitative risk assessment. Information-preserving transformations are applied to realise the correct aggregation of probabilistic and fuzzy parameters. Estimations have also been made of the inhalation doses resulting from possible accidents during plutonium transportation. The obtained data show the scale of possible consequences that may arise from plutonium transportation accidents.
Proliferation of nuclear weapons: opportunities for control and abolition.
Sidel, Victor W; Levy, Barry S
2007-09-01
Nuclear weapons pose a particularly destructive threat. Prevention of the proliferation and use of nuclear weapons is urgently important to public health. "Horizontal" proliferation refers to nation-states or nonstate entities that do not have, but are acquiring, nuclear weapons or developing the capability and materials for producing them. "Vertical" proliferation refers to nation-states that do possess nuclear weapons and are increasing their stockpiles of these weapons, improving the technical sophistication or reliability of their weapons, or developing new weapons. Because nation-states or other entities that wish to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons need methods for delivering those weapons, proliferation of delivery mechanisms must also be prevented. Controlling proliferation--and ultimately abolishing nuclear weapons--involves national governments, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental and professional organizations, and society at large.
Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues
2009-12-09
Nuclear Terrorism in Pakistan: Sabotage of a Spent Fuel Cask or a Commercial Irradiation Source in Transport ,” in Pakistan’s Nuclear Future, 2008...gave additional urgency to the program. Pakistan produced fissile material for its nuclear weapons using gas-centrifuge-based uranium enrichment...technology, which it mastered by the mid-1980s. Highly-enriched uranium (HEU) is one of two types of fissile material used in nuclear weapons; the other
2014-09-22
2010, the Naval Air Warfare Center–Weapons Division, China Lake , California, tested commercial fire suppression systems for use in U.S. Marine Corps...review, the excessive concentrations of carbon monoxide, nitrous oxide, hydrogen cyanide , and the acid gases experienced during the Molotov...excessive concentration levels of carbon monoxide, nitrous oxide, hydrogen cyanide , and the acid gases were identified during the Molotov cocktail live
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Hayes, Timothy; Nelson, Roger
The Department of Energy (DOE) and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) manages defense nuclear material that has been determined to be excess to programmatic needs and declared waste. When these wastes contain plutonium, they almost always meet the definition of defense transuranic (TRU) waste and are thus eligible for disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). The DOE operates the WIPP in a manner that physical protections for attractiveness level D or higher special nuclear material (SNM) are not the normal operating condition. Therefore, there is currently a requirement to terminate safeguards before disposal of these wastes atmore » the WIPP. Presented are the processes used to terminate safeguards, lessons learned during the termination process, and how these approaches might be useful for future defense TRU waste needing safeguards termination prior to shipment and disposal at the WIPP. Also described is a new criticality control container, which will increase the amount of fissile material that can be loaded per container, and how it will save significant taxpayer dollars. Retrieval, compliant packaging and shipment of retrievably stored legacy TRU waste has dominated disposal operations at WIPP since it began operations 12 years ago. But because most of this legacy waste has successfully been emplaced in WIPP, the TRU waste clean-up focus is turning to newly-generated TRU materials. A major component will be transuranic SNM, currently managed in safeguards-protected vaults around the weapons complex. As DOE and NNSA continue to consolidate and shrink the weapons complex footprint, it is expected that significant quantities of transuranic SNM will be declared surplus to the nation's needs. Safeguards termination of SNM varies due to the wide range of attractiveness level of the potential material that may be directly discarded as waste. To enhance the efficiency of shipping waste with high TRU fissile content to WIPP, DOE designed an over-pack container, similar to the pipe component, called the criticality control over-pack, which will significantly enhance the efficiency of disposal. Hundreds of shipments of transuranic SNM, suitably packaged to meet WIPP waste acceptance criteria and with safeguards terminated have been successfully emplaced at WIPP (primarily from the Rocky Flats site clean-up) since WIPP opened. DOE expects that thousands more may eventually result from SNM consolidation efforts throughout the weapons complex. (authors)« less
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Cluff, D.
1996-04-01
The Center operates under a cooperative agreement between DOE and the State of Texas and is directed and administered by an education consortium. Its programs include developing peaceful uses for the materials removed from dismantled weapons, studying effects of nuclear materials on environment and public health, remedying contaminated soils and water, studying storage, disposition, and transport of Pu, HE, and other hazardous materials removed from weapons, providing research and counsel to US in carrying out weapons reductions in cooperation with Russia, and conducting a variety of education and training programs.
Radiological Weapons Control: A Soviet and US Perspective. Occasional Paper 29.
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Issraelyan, Victor L.; Flowerree, Charles C.
Two international diplomats from the Soviet Union and the United States focus on the need for a treaty to ban the use of radiological weapons. Radiological weapons are those based on the natural decay of nuclear material such as waste from military or civilian nuclear reactors. Such devices include both weapons and equipment, other than a nuclear…
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Opportunities for Control and Abolition
Sidel, Victor W.; Levy, Barry S.
2007-01-01
Nuclear weapons pose a particularly destructive threat. Prevention of the proliferation and use of nuclear weapons is urgently important to public health. “Horizontal” proliferation refers to nation-states or nonstate entities that do not have, but are acquiring, nuclear weapons or developing the capability and materials for producing them. “Vertical” proliferation refers to nation-states that do possess nuclear weapons and are increasing their stockpiles of these weapons, improving the technical sophistication or reliability of their weapons, or developing new weapons. Because nation-states or other entities that wish to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons need methods for delivering those weapons, proliferation of delivery mechanisms must also be prevented. Controlling proliferation—and ultimately abolishing nuclear weapons—involves national governments, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental and professional organizations, and society at large. PMID:17666690
Atoms for peace and the nonproliferation treaty: unintended consequences
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Streeper, Charles Blamires
2009-01-01
In April 2009, President Obama revived nonproliferation and arms control efforts with a speech calling for the worldwide abolition of nuclear weapons. His speech correctly acknowledged the threat of nuclear terrorism and the vulnerabilities of the related unsecure nuclear materials. Unfortunately, the president did not mention and has not mentioned in any speech the threat posed by at-risk radiological materials. Nonproliferation efforts have a well documented history of focus on special nuclear materials (fissionable weapons usable materials or SNM), and other key materials (chemical and biological) and technologies for a Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD). Such intense focus on WMDmore » related materials/technologies is essential for international safety and security and merit continued attention and funding. However, the perception that radioactive sealed sources (sources) are of less concern than WMD is unfortunate. These perceptions are based solely on the potentially enormous and tragic consequences associated with their deliberate or accidental misuse and proliferation concerns. However, there is a documented history of overemphasis on the nuclear threat at the expense of ignoring the far more likely and also devastating chemical and biological threats. The radiological threat should not be minimized or excluded from policy discussions and decisions on these far ranging scopes of threat to the international community. Sources have a long history of use; and a wider distribution worldwide than fissile materials. Pair this with their broad ranges in isotopes/activities along with scant national and international attention and mechanisms for their safe and secure management and it is not difficult to envision a deadly threat. Arguments that minimize or divert attention away from sources may have the effect of distracting necessary policy attention on preventing/mitigating a radiological dispersal event. The terrorist attacks on 9/11 should be a clear reminder of the inherent danger of diminishing or dismissing lower-level threats in exchange for enhanced focus on high priority special nuclear materials with the basis for this emphasis being solely on the magnitude of the consequences of a single event. Mitigating all possible or likely terrorist attacks is impossible; however, weaponized sources, in the form of a radiological dispersal device, have been a declared target material of Al-Qaida. Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace initiative promoted the spread of the paradoxical beneficial yet destructive properties of the atom. Typically, the focus of nonproliferation efforts focuses on the fissile materials associated with Weapons of Mass Destruction, with less emphasis on radioactive materials that could be used for a Weapon of Mass Disruption. Most nonproliferation policy discussion involves securing or preventing the diversion of weapons grade fissile materials (uranium (U) with concentration of over 90% of the isotope {sup 235}U (HEU) and plutonium with more than 90% of the isotope {sup 239}Pu), with scant attention given to the threat posed by a prolific quantity of sources spread worldwide. Further acerbating the problem of inattention, it appears that the momentum of the continued evolution in the beneficial applications of sources will only increase in the near future. Several expert studies have demonstrated on the potentially devastating economic, psychological and public health impacts of terrorist use of a radiological dispersal or radiation emitting device (ROD/RED) in a metropolis. The development of such a weapon, from the acquisition of the radioactive material to the technical knowledge needed to fashion it into an ROD, is many orders of magnitude easier than diverting enough fissile material for and fabrication/acquisition of a nuclear weapon. Unlike nuclear weapons, worldwide, there are many well documented accounts of accidental and purposeful diversions of radioactive materials from regulatory control. As of the end of 2008, the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Illicit Trafficking Database had logged 1562 incidents, of which only 18 include weapons grade nuclear materials. As much as 66% of the radioactive material involved in these incidents was not recovered. Since 2004, there has been a 75% increase in incidents of unrecoverable material, much of which is labeled dangerous with potential for deterministic health affects if misused. This makes clear that a black market of illicit trade in sources exists. The incidents reported to the IAEA's database rely only on voluntary state reporting; therefore, the number of lost or stolen sources is expected to be much higher.« less
Williams, Bill; Ruff, Tilman A
2007-01-01
Abolishing the threat of nuclear war requires the outlawing of nuclear weapons and dismantling current nuclear weapon stockpiles, but also depends on eliminating access to fissile material (nuclear weapon fuel). The near-universal use of weapons-grade, highly enriched uranium (HEU) to produce radiopharmaceuticals is a significant proliferation hazard. Health professionals have a strategic opportunity and obligation to progress the elimination of medically-related commerce in HEU, closing one of the most vulnerable pathways to the much-feared 'terrorist bomb'.
76 FR 23515 - Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications
Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014
2011-04-27
... material and would add new event notification requirements on the theft or loss of enhanced weapons...-2011-0017] RIN 3150-AI49 Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications... regulations governing security event notifications. These proposed regulations are consistent with the...
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Bunch, Kyle J.; Jones, Anthony M.; Ramuhalli, Pradeep
The ratification and ongoing implementation of the New START Treaty have been widely regarded as noteworthy global security achievements for both the Obama Administration and the Putin (formerly Medvedev) regime. But deeper cuts that move beyond the United States and Russia to engage the P-5 and other nuclear weapons possessor states are envisioned under future arms control regimes, and are indeed required for the P-5 in accordance with their Article VI disarmament obligations in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Future verification needs will include monitoring the cessation of production of new fissile material for weapons, monitoring storage of warhead components andmore » fissile materials and verifying dismantlement of warheads, pits, secondary stages, and other materials. A fundamental challenge to implementing a nuclear disarmament regime is the ability to thwart unauthorized material diversion throughout the dismantlement and disposition process through strong chain of custody implementation. Verifying the declared presence, or absence, of nuclear materials and weapons components throughout the dismantlement and disposition lifecycle is a critical aspect of the disarmament process. From both the diplomatic and technical perspectives, verification under these future arms control regimes will require new solutions. Since any acceptable verification technology must protect sensitive design information and attributes to prevent the release of classified or other proliferation-sensitive information, non-nuclear non-sensitive modalities may provide significant new verification tools which do not require the use of additional information barriers. Alternative verification technologies based upon electromagnetic and acoustics could potentially play an important role in fulfilling the challenging requirements of future verification regimes. For example, researchers at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) have demonstrated that low frequency electromagnetic signatures of sealed metallic containers can be used to rapidly confirm the presence of specific components on a yes/no basis without revealing classified information. PNNL researchers have also used ultrasonic measurements to obtain images of material microstructures which may be used as templates or unique identifiers of treaty-limited items. Such alternative technologies are suitable for application in various stages of weapons dismantlement and often include the advantage of an inherent information barrier due to the inability to extract classified weapon design information from the collected data. As a result, these types of technologies complement radiation-based verification methods for arms control. This article presents an overview of several alternative verification technologies that are suitable for supporting a future, broader and more intrusive arms control regime that spans the nuclear weapons disarmament lifecycle. The general capabilities and limitations of each verification modality are discussed and example technologies are presented. Potential applications are defined in the context of the nuclear material and weapons lifecycle. Example applications range from authentication (e.g., tracking and signatures within the chain of custody from downloading through weapons storage, unclassified templates and unique identification) to verification of absence and final material disposition.« less
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-07-01
... 28 Judicial Administration 1 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Policy. 13.2 Section 13.2 Judicial Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ATOMIC WEAPONS AND SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS REWARDS REGULATIONS § 13.2... material or atomic weapons. The broad scope of this program is to help guard against the loss or diversion...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-07-01
... 28 Judicial Administration 1 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Policy. 13.2 Section 13.2 Judicial Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ATOMIC WEAPONS AND SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS REWARDS REGULATIONS § 13.2... material or atomic weapons. The broad scope of this program is to help guard against the loss or diversion...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-07-01
... 28 Judicial Administration 1 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Policy. 13.2 Section 13.2 Judicial Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ATOMIC WEAPONS AND SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS REWARDS REGULATIONS § 13.2... material or atomic weapons. The broad scope of this program is to help guard against the loss or diversion...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-07-01
... 28 Judicial Administration 1 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Policy. 13.2 Section 13.2 Judicial Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ATOMIC WEAPONS AND SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS REWARDS REGULATIONS § 13.2... material or atomic weapons. The broad scope of this program is to help guard against the loss or diversion...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-07-01
... 28 Judicial Administration 1 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Policy. 13.2 Section 13.2 Judicial Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ATOMIC WEAPONS AND SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS REWARDS REGULATIONS § 13.2... material or atomic weapons. The broad scope of this program is to help guard against the loss or diversion...
Final Environmental Assessment for Camp Rudder Master Plan at Eglin Air Force Base, FL
2005-06-07
warranting detailed analysis. Hazardous Materials The 6th RTB currently generates hazardous materials in the form of weapons cleaning products and...wastes. There would be no increase in the use of weapons cleaning products ; and therefore, this area does not require analysis. Additionally
Chlorine Gas: An Evolving Hazardous Material Threat and Unconventional Weapon
Jones, Robert; Wills, Brandon; Kang, Christopher
2010-01-01
Chlorine gas represents a hazardous material threat from industrial accidents and as a terrorist weapon. This review will summarize recent events involving chlorine disasters and its use by terrorists, discuss pre-hospital considerations and suggest strategies for the initial management for acute chlorine exposure events. PMID:20823965
Modeling and Comparison of Options for the Disposal of Excess Weapons Plutonium in Russia
2002-04-01
fuel LWR cooling time LWR Pu load rate LWR net destruction frac ~ LWR reactors op life mox core frac Excess Separated Pu HTGR Cycle Pu in Waste LWR MOX...reflecting the cycle used in this type of reactor. For the HTGR , the entire core consists of plutonium fuel , therefore a core fraction is not specified...cooling time Time spent fuel unloaded from HTGR reactor must cool before permanently stored 3 years Mox core fraction Fraction of
The Basics of Electric Weapons and Pulsed-Power Technologies
2012-01-01
launchers. DEWs send energy, instead of matter, toward a target, and can be separated into three types: laser weapons, particle -beam weapons, and high...beam’s energy de- position, target material, and flight dynamics is needed. Particle Beams A particle -beam weapon is a directed flow of atomic or sub...atomic particles . These parti- cles can be neutral or electrically charged. Neutral beams need to be used outside the atmosphere (in space), where
Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014
2011-06-20
... Accumulation of Weapons-Useable Fissile Material in the Territory of the Russian Federation #0; #0; #0... National Emergency With Respect to the Risk of Nuclear Proliferation Created by the Accumulation of Weapons... Extracted from Nuclear Weapons, dated February 18, 1993, and related contracts and agreements (collectively...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-01-01
... Extracted From Nuclear Weapons 13617 Order 13617 Presidential Documents Executive Orders Executive Order... to the Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted From Nuclear Weapons By the authority vested... accumulation of a large volume of weapons-usable fissile material in the territory of the Russian Federation...
The nuclear arsenals and nuclear disarmament.
Barnaby, F
1998-01-01
Current world stockpiles of nuclear weapons and the status of treaties for nuclear disarmament and the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons are summarised. The need for including stockpiles of civil plutonium in a programme for ending production and disposing of fissile materials is emphasized, and the ultimate difficulty of disposing of the last few nuclear weapons discussed.
Trapp, Ralf
2006-09-01
The article gives an overview on worldwide efforts to eliminate chemical weapons and facilities for their production in the context of the implementation of the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). It highlights the objectives of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the international agency set up in The Hague to implement the CWC, and provides an overview of the present status of implementation of the CWC requirements with respect to chemical weapons (CW) destruction under strict international verification. It addresses new requirements that result from an increased threat that terrorists might attempt to acquire or manufacture CW or related materials. The article provides an overview of risks associated with CW and their elimination, from storage or recovery to destruction. It differentiates between CW in stockpile and old/abandoned CW, and gives an overview on the factors and key processes that risk assessment, management, and communication need to address. This discussion is set in the overall context of the CWC that requires the completion of the destruction of all declared CW stockpiles by 2012 at the latest.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-01-01
... atomic weapon, designed or used to sustain nuclear fission in a self-supporting chain reaction. (g... experiments; or (ii) A liquid fuel loading; or (iii) An experimental facility in the core in excess of 16... in the isotope 235, except laboratory scale facilities designed or used for experimental or...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-01-01
... in the isotope 235, except laboratory scale facilities designed or used for experimental or... atomic weapon, designed or used to sustain nuclear fission in a self-supporting chain reaction. (g... experiments; or (ii) A liquid fuel loading; or (iii) An experimental facility in the core in excess of 16...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-01-01
... in the isotope 235, except laboratory scale facilities designed or used for experimental or... atomic weapon, designed or used to sustain nuclear fission in a self-supporting chain reaction. (g... experiments; or (ii) A liquid fuel loading; or (iii) An experimental facility in the core in excess of 16...
Review of Dangerous Radioisotopes: What is Available in Practice, What Should We be Concerned About?
2015-06-01
of the credibility of a radioactive material as a radiological weapon to be applied to specific scenarios. • This does not replace the IAEA "AID...34 ratios, but more precisely applies this concept to assessments of interest. 7Jt#,$ 2 IDA I Radiological Weapons • This analysis identified the...radiological weapons under seven different routes of exposure (or types of radiological weapons ), including external irradiation from a point source
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Benton, J; Wall, D; Parker, E
This paper presents the latest information on one of the Accelerated Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Disposition initiatives that resulted from the May 2002 Summit meeting between Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir V. Putin. These initiatives are meant to strengthen nuclear nonproliferation objectives by accelerating the disposition of nuclear weapons-useable materials. The HEU Transparency Implementation Program (TIP), within the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is working to implement one of the selected initiatives that would purchase excess Russian HEU (93% 235U) for use as fuel in U.S. research reactors over the next ten years. This will parallel efforts to convertmore » the reactors' fuel core from HEU to low enriched uranium (LEU) material, where feasible. The paper will examine important aspects associated with the U.S. research reactor HEU purchase. In particular: (1) the establishment of specifications for the Russian HEU, and (2) transportation safeguard considerations for moving the HEU from the Mayak Production Facility in Ozersk, Russia, to the Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, TN.« less
Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014
2012-06-27
... Extracted From Nuclear Weapons #0; #0; #0; Presidential Documents #0; #0; #0;#0;Federal Register / Vol. 77... Federation Relating to the Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted From Nuclear Weapons By the... the accumulation of a large volume of weapons-usable fissile material in the territory of the Russian...
Nuclear Weapons Effects (Self-Teaching Materials).
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DOD), Battle Creek, MI.
Developed by the Civil Defense Preparedness Agency, this autoinstructional text deals with nuclear weapons effects. The destructive effects of an atomic blast are first introduced, and then long-term radioactive consequences are stressed. (CP)
Research progress of VO2 thin film as laser protecting material
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Liu, Zhiwei; Lu, Yuan; Hou, Dianxin
2018-03-01
With the development of laser technology, the battlefield threat of directional laser weapons is becoming more and more serious. The blinding and destruction caused by laser weapons on the photoelectric equipment is an important part of the current photo-electronic warfare. The research on the defense technology of directional laser weapons based on the phase transition characteristics of VO2 thin films is an important subject. The researches of VO2 thin films are summarized based on review these points: the preparation methods of VO2 thin films, phase transition mechanism, phase transition temperature regulating, interaction between VO2 thin films and laser, and the application prospect of vo2 thin film as laser protecting material. This paper has some guiding significance for further research on the VO2 thin films in the field of defense directional laser weapons.
U.S. Nuclear Weapons Modernization - the Stockpile Life Extension Program
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Cook, Donald
2016-03-01
Underground nuclear testing of U.S. nuclear weapons was halted by President George H.W. Bush in 1992 when he announced a moratorium. In 1993, the moratorium was extended by President Bill Clinton and, in 1995, a program of Stockpile Stewardship was put in its place. In 1996, President Clinton signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Twenty years have passed since then. Over the same time, the average age of a nuclear weapon in the stockpile has increased from 6 years (1992) to nearly 29 years (2015). At its inception, achievement of the objectives of the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) appeared possible but very difficult. The cost to design and construct several large facilities for precision experimentation in hydrodynamics and high energy density physics was large. The practical steps needed to move from computational platforms of less than 100 Mflops/sec to 10 Teraflops/sec and beyond were unknown. Today, most of the required facilities for SSP are in place and computational speed has been increased by more than six orders of magnitude. These, and the physicists and engineers in the complex of labs and plants within the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) who put them in place, have been the basis for underpinning an annual decision, made by the weapons lab directors for each of the past 20 years, that resort to underground nuclear testing is not needed for maintaining confidence in the safety and reliability of the U.S stockpile. A key part of that decision has been annual assessment of the physical changes in stockpiled weapons. These weapons, quite simply, are systems that invariably and unstoppably age in the internal weapon environment of radioactive materials and complex interfaces of highly dissimilar organic and inorganic materials. Without an ongoing program to rebuild some components and replace other components to increase safety or security, i.e., life extending these weapons, either underground testing would again be required to assess many changes at once, or confidence in these weapons would be reduced. The strategy and details of the U.S. Stockpile Life Extension Program will be described in this talk. In brief, the strategy is to reduce the number of weapons in the stockpile while increasing confidence in the weapons that remain and, where possible, increase their safety, increase their security, and reduce their nuclear material quantities and yields. A number of ``myths'' pertaining to nuclear weapons, the SSP, and the Stockpile Life Extension Program will be explored.
Policy and Technical Issues Facing a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty
von Hippel, Frank; Mian, Zia
2015-05-18
We report the largest obstacle to creating nuclear weapons, starting with the ones that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki, has been to make sufficient quantities of fissile materials – highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium – to sustain an explosive fission chain reaction.1 Recognition of this fact has, for more than fifty years, underpinned both the support for and the opposition to adoption of an international treaty banning at a minimum the production of more fissile materials for nuclear weapons, commonly referred to as a fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT).
Special Issue on University Nonproliferation Education and Training Introduction.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Leek, K. M.
2006-07-31
Nonproliferation, like many aspects of security, has not played out as many expected following the end of the cold war. The peace dividend has been elusive in many countries. The notion that the world would become a safer and more secure place as nuclear weapons stockpiles were reduced has been trumped by the rise in international terrorism. Hopes that nuclear weapons would lose their salience as markers of elite status among nations along with pressures to acquire them have been dashed. The drive by some countries and terrorist groups to acquire nuclear weapons has not diminished, and the threat ofmore » proliferation has increased. At the level of the nation state, the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) itself is under pressure as more nations acquire nuclear weapons, de facto weapons states fail to join, and nations that want to acquire them leave or threaten to leave. At the sub-state level, the convergence of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has introduced an element of uncertainty into nonproliferation that is unprecedented. Another feature of the post-cold war era that has taken many by surprise is the continued, and growing need for trained specialists in nonproliferation and nuclear materials management. Contained within the notion of disarmament and reduced strategic importance of nuclear weapons was the expectation of a diminishing workforce of trained nonproliferation and nuclear materials specialists. Events have overtaken this assumption.« less
1982-05-01
CALIBER WEAPON SYSTEMS LABORATORY BENleT WEAPONS LABORATORY WATERVLIET, N. Y. 12189 ANCMS No. 61110191A0011 DA Project No. 1L161101AS& PRON No...Benet Weapons Laboratory, DRDAR-LCB-TL DA Project No. lL16110IA9A Watervliet, NY 12189 PRON No. 1A2231491AIA I. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS 12
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-01-01
... a chemical in any units within the same plant through chemical reaction, including any associated... plant sites that produce, process or consume Schedule 2 chemicals in excess of specified thresholds. 713... (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-01-01
... a chemical in any units within the same plant through chemical reaction, including any associated... plant sites that produce, process or consume Schedule 2 chemicals in excess of specified thresholds. 713... (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-01-01
... a chemical in any units within the same plant through chemical reaction, including any associated... plant sites that produce, process or consume Schedule 2 chemicals in excess of specified thresholds. 713... (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-01-01
... a chemical in any units within the same plant through chemical reaction, including any associated... plant sites that produce, process or consume Schedule 2 chemicals in excess of specified thresholds. 713... (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS...
2008-12-19
Undistributed ISFF-Funded Equipment 105 17. Iraqi Army Maintenance Program 107 18. Class IX Material Management 115 Part V – Medical Sustainability 123...database and are subsequently forwarded to the Army Material Command, Logistics Support Activity for inclusion in the DoD Small Arms and Light Weapons...be forwarded to the Army Material Command, Logistics Support Activity for inclusion in the DoD Small Arms and Light Weapons Serialization Program
Dangers associated with civil nuclear power programmes: weaponization and nuclear waste.
Boulton, Frank
2015-07-24
The number of nuclear power plants in the world rose exponentially to 420 by 1990 and peaked at 438 in 2002; but by 2014, as closed plants were not replaced, there were just 388. In spite of using more renewable energy, the world still relies on fossil fuels, but some countries plan to develop new nuclear programmes. Spent nuclear fuel, one of the most dangerous and toxic materials known, can be reprocessed into fresh fuel or into weapons-grade materials, and generates large amounts of highly active waste. This article reviews available literature on government and industry websites and from independent analysts on world energy production, the aspirations of the 'new nuclear build' programmes in China and the UK, and the difficulties in keeping the environment safe over an immense timescale while minimizing adverse health impacts and production of greenhouse gases, and preventing weaponization by non-nuclear-weapons states acquiring civil nuclear technology.
One perspective on stakeholder involvement at Hanford.
Martin, Todd
2011-11-01
The Hanford nuclear site in Washington State had a major role in the production of nuclear weapons materials during the Manhattan Project in World War II and during the Cold War that followed. The production of weapons-grade radionuclides produced a large amount of radioactive byproducts that have been stored since the mid-1900s at the Hanford Site. These by-product radionuclides have leaked from containment facilities into the groundwater, contaminated buildings used for radionuclide processing, and also contaminated the nuclear reactors used to produce weapons-grade uranium and plutonium. This issue has been a major concern to Hanford stakeholders for several decades, and the U.S. Department of Energy, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and the Washington State Department of Ecology established a Tri-Party Agreement in 1989, at which time Hanford ceased production of nuclear weapons materials and began a major effort to clean up and remediate the Hanford Site's contaminated groundwater, soil, and facilities. This paper describes the concerns of stakeholders in the production of nuclear weapons, the secrecy of Hanford operations, and the potential impacts to public health and the environment from the unintended releases of weapons-grade materials and by-products associated with their production at the Hanford Site. It also describes the involvement of public stakeholders in the development and oversight by the Hanford Advisory Board of the steps that have been taken in cleanup activities at the Hanford Site that began as a major effort about two decades ago. The importance of involvement of the general public and public interest organizations in developing and implementing the Hanford cleanup strategy are described in detail.
Irans Nuclear Program: Tehrans Compliance with International Obligations
2016-04-07
ratified the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970. Article III of the treaty requires non-nuclear- weapon states-parties 1 to accept...concern that Tehran is pursuing nuclear weapons . Tehran’s construction of gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facilities is currently the main source...uranium (HEU), which is one of the two types of fissile material used in nuclear weapons . HEU can also be used as fuel in certain types of nuclear
Irans Nuclear Program: Tehrans Compliance with International Obligations
2016-03-03
ratified the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970. Article III of the treaty requires non-nuclear- weapon states-parties 1 to accept...concern that Tehran is pursuing nuclear weapons . Tehran’s construction of gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facilities is currently the main source...uranium (HEU), which is one of the two types of fissile material used in nuclear weapons . HEU can also be used as fuel in certain types of nuclear
2012 Review on the Extension of the AMedP-8(C) Methodology to New Agents, Materials, and Conditions
2013-10-01
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to estimate casualties from chemical, biological , radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons . The final draft...chemical, biological , radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons . The final draft documenting this methodology was published by IDA in 2009 and was...from Battlefield Exposure to Chemical, Biological and Radiological Agents and Nuclear Weapon Effects. IDA Document D- 4465. Alexandria, VA: IDA
Medical Engagement: Beyond the MEDCAP
2008-04-16
threat faced by the possibility of the spread of biological weapons that could potentially impact the US. In response to the threat of biological ...spread and potential use of weaponized biological material improves the capacity to respond to such outbreaks as pandemic influenza,9 and is an...on the greater social order, (5) they may serve as a catalyst for regional instability, and (6) the threat posed by biological weapons use during
Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues
2012-05-10
2009. 143 Abdul Mannan, “Preventing Nuclear Terrorism in Pakistan: Sabotage of a Spent Fuel Cask or a Commercial Irradiation Source in Transport ,” in...Program.” Some analysts argue that spent nuclear fuel is more vulnerable when being transported . 144 Martellini, 2008. Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons...urgency to the program. Pakistan produced fissile material for its nuclear weapons using gas-centrifuge-based uranium enrichment technology, which it
Frank, Michael I [Dublin, CA
2010-02-02
A self-contained source of gamma-ray and neutron radiation suitable for use as a radiation surrogate for weapons-grade plutonium is described. The source generates a radiation spectrum similar to that of weapons-grade plutonium at 5% energy resolution between 59 and 2614 keV, but contains no special nuclear material and emits little .alpha.-particle radiation. The weapons-grade plutonium radiation surrogate also emits neutrons having fluxes commensurate with the gamma-radiation intensities employed.
10 CFR 1045.17 - Classification levels.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-01-01
... classification include detailed technical descriptions of critical features of a nuclear explosive design that... classification include designs for specific weapon components (not revealing critical features), key features of uranium enrichment technologies, or specifications of weapon materials. (3) Confidential. The Director of...
10 CFR 1045.17 - Classification levels.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-01-01
... classification include detailed technical descriptions of critical features of a nuclear explosive design that... classification include designs for specific weapon components (not revealing critical features), key features of uranium enrichment technologies, or specifications of weapon materials. (3) Confidential. The Director of...
10 CFR 1045.17 - Classification levels.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-01-01
... classification include detailed technical descriptions of critical features of a nuclear explosive design that... classification include designs for specific weapon components (not revealing critical features), key features of uranium enrichment technologies, or specifications of weapon materials. (3) Confidential. The Director of...
10 CFR 1045.17 - Classification levels.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-01-01
... classification include detailed technical descriptions of critical features of a nuclear explosive design that... classification include designs for specific weapon components (not revealing critical features), key features of uranium enrichment technologies, or specifications of weapon materials. (3) Confidential. The Director of...
Consolidation of Fe-N Magnets Using Equal Channel Angular Extrusion
2016-03-23
Consolidation of Fe-N Magnets Using Equal Channel Angular Extrusion SG Sankar Advanced Materials Corporation (AMC), Pittsburgh, PA LJ Kecskes Weapons and...at the US Army Research Laboratory (ARL), Weapons and Materials Research Directorate, at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. Unlike conventional...Widenmeyer M, Hansen TC, Niewa R. Formation and decomposition of metastable α’’-Fe16N2 from in-situ powder neutron diffraction and thermal analysis. Zeit
Expanding Fixed-Wing Aircraft Capability in US Army Aviation Operations
2009-06-12
48 CHAPTER 5 FINDINGS AND RESULTS ...forces were being neglected by excessive reliance on nuclear weapons as a deterrent to war (Fowler 1990). In 1954, General Gavin wrote an influential...aircraft had deposited them as far forward as possible (Tolson 1989, 23). As a result of the Howze Board recommendations, the Department of Defense
2007-06-01
if used on the battlefield. Clarification of what chemicals will be allowed under the treaty’s exception is needed. “The biological weapons threat... biological , and chemical weapons countermeasures include: • adoption of amendments to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material...to Increase Enforcement of Environmental Regulations and Public Participation Sixth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention Kyoto
FMDP reactor alternative summary report. Volume 1 - existing LWR alternative
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Greene, S.R.; Bevard, B.B.
1996-10-07
Significant quantities of weapons-usable fissile materials [primarily plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU)] are becoming surplus to national defense needs in both the United States and Russia. These stocks of fissile materials pose significant dangers to national and international security. The dangers exist not only in the potential proliferation of nuclear weapons but also in the potential for environmental, safety, and health (ES&H) consequences if surplus fissile materials are not properly managed. This document summarizes the results of analysis concerned with existing light water reactor plutonium disposition alternatives.
Detection of Nuclear Weapons and Materials: Science, Technologies, Observations
2010-06-04
extensive use of photons, packets of energy with no rest mass and no electrical charge. Electromagnetic radiation consists of photons, and may be measured...bulk property, expressed as mass per unit volume. In general, the densest materials are those of high Z. These properties may be used to detect...SNM by detecting the time pattern of neutron generation. A subcritical mass of highly enriched uranium or weapons-grade plutonium can support a
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-07-01
... Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ATOMIC WEAPONS AND SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS REWARDS REGULATIONS § 13.1 Purpose. This part implements the responsibility given to the Attorney General under the Atomic Weapons... entitled to a reward for furnishing certain original information to the United States pertaining to atomic...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-07-01
... Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ATOMIC WEAPONS AND SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS REWARDS REGULATIONS § 13.1 Purpose. This part implements the responsibility given to the Attorney General under the Atomic Weapons... entitled to a reward for furnishing certain original information to the United States pertaining to atomic...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-07-01
... Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ATOMIC WEAPONS AND SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS REWARDS REGULATIONS § 13.1 Purpose. This part implements the responsibility given to the Attorney General under the Atomic Weapons... entitled to a reward for furnishing certain original information to the United States pertaining to atomic...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-07-01
... Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ATOMIC WEAPONS AND SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS REWARDS REGULATIONS § 13.1 Purpose. This part implements the responsibility given to the Attorney General under the Atomic Weapons... entitled to a reward for furnishing certain original information to the United States pertaining to atomic...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-07-01
... Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ATOMIC WEAPONS AND SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS REWARDS REGULATIONS § 13.1 Purpose. This part implements the responsibility given to the Attorney General under the Atomic Weapons... entitled to a reward for furnishing certain original information to the United States pertaining to atomic...
10 CFR 1045.15 - Classification and declassification presumptions.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-01-01
... experimental physics, engineering, materials science, biology and medicine; (2) Magnetic confinement fusion... the application of the criteria in § 1045.16 indicates otherwise: (1) Detailed designs, specifications... design and analysis of nuclear weapons; (3) Vulnerabilities of U.S. nuclear weapons to sabotage...
10 CFR 1045.15 - Classification and declassification presumptions.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-01-01
... experimental physics, engineering, materials science, biology and medicine; (2) Magnetic confinement fusion... the application of the criteria in § 1045.16 indicates otherwise: (1) Detailed designs, specifications... design and analysis of nuclear weapons; (3) Vulnerabilities of U.S. nuclear weapons to sabotage...
Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014
2013-09-25
... Use in Syria To Prevent the Use or Proliferation of Chemical Weapons and Related Materials... proliferation of Syria's chemical weapons, is essential to the national security interests of the United States...
Legin, G A; Bondarchuk, A O; Perebetjuk, A N
2015-01-01
The objective of the present study was to compare the injurious action of three types of the bullets for the pneumatic weapons shot from different distances using the Gamo pump air pistol and the BAM B22-1 pneumatic rifle. The following four kinds of the bullets were tested: "the fireball", "Luman cap 0.3", "Luman Field Target 0.68" and "DIABOLO". It was experimentally shown that the injurious action of the bullets fired from the same distance from the pneumatic weapons depends on the type of both the bullet and the weapon, as well as the properties of the target material. Specifically, the action of bullets fired from the piston pneumatic rifle remained stable whereas that of the bullets shot from the gas-balloon air pistol decreased as the gas was exhausted. The studies by the contact-diffusion method have demonstrated that the entrance bullet holes created by the shots from pneumatic weapons are surrounded by dispersed metal particles which makes it possible to estimate the shooting distance. Moreover, the bullets fired from the pneumatic weapons leave the muzzle face imprint on certain target materials.
Evaluating Nonproliferation Bona Fides
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Seward, Amy M.; Mathews, Caroline E.; Kessler, Carol E.
2008-07-14
Anticipated growth of global nuclear energy in a difficult international security environment heightens concerns that states could decide to exploit their civilian nuclear fuel cycles as a means of acquiring nuclear weapons. Such concerns partly reflect a fundamental tension in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). On the one hand, Articles II and III of the NPT clearly prohibit each non-nuclear-weapon state party from acquiring nuclear weapons. On the other hand, Article IV of the NPT confers the “inalienable right” of Parties to the treaty to “develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes…,”more » and directs all Parties to “facilitate… the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy…,” and “cooperate in contributing…to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes….” This juxtaposition raises the possibility that a state could exercise its Article IV right to develop a civilian nuclear fuels cycle and then use the equipment, materials and technology to acquire nuclear weapons in violation of its Article II and III obligations.« less
Facing reality: The future of the US nuclear weapons complex
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Not Available
1992-01-01
Facing Reality is a collaboration by 15 authors from environmental and grass-roots groups. The authors bluntly conclude that whether the inertia, habit, or material interest, the nuclear weapons establishment has proven itself incapable of genuine reform.' They therefore call for government agencies other than the Department of Energy to manage the tasks of decontamination and decommissioning. Just a partial list of what needs to be done to clean up the DOE's mess is daunting: closing, decommissioning, and decontaminating production facilities, dismantling thousands of nuclear warheads, safely storing dangerous radioactive materials, identifying alternative employment for weapons specialists, conducting meaningful health studiesmore » of workers and citizens exposed to radiation, and providng compensation for the victims of the nuclear buildup.« less
Prevent, Counter, and Respond - A Strategic Plan to Reduce Global Nuclear Threats (FY 2016-FY2020)
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
None
2015-03-01
NNSA’s second core mission is reducing global nuclear dangers by preventing the acquisition of nuclear weapons or weapons-usable materials, countering efforts to acquire such weapons or materials, and responding to nuclear or radiological incidents. In 2015, NNSA reorganized its nonproliferation activities based on core competencies and realigned its counterterrorism and counterproliferation functions to more efficiently address both current and emerging threats and challenges. The reorganization accompanied the March 2015 release of the first ever Prevent, Counter, and Respond – A Strategic Plan to Reduce Global Nuclear Threats. This report, which NNSA will update annually, highlights key nuclear threat trends andmore » describes NNSA’s integrated threat reduction strategy.« less
A long view of global plutonium management
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Wagner, R.L. Jr.
1995-10-01
Dealing with the large and growing world inventories of fissile materials from all sources is a major part of the long term challenge of limiting the danger from nuclear weapons. Providing clean, safe nuclear power may also be needed to prevent conditions from arising which could lead to large scale nuclear weapon (re)armament. ADTT technologies might reconcile the seeming dilemma of providing nuclear power while maintaining a very low world inventory of nuclear materials which can be used in weapons. This vision for ADTT should be tested in a variety of ways, including comparisons with competing approaches and with othermore » objectives. Such testing is one part of constructing a path for a decades-long, worldwide implementation campaign for ADTT.« less
Petrenko, V D; Karimov, Yu N; Podkovirin, A I; Shipilov, N N; Yuldashev, B S; Fazylov, M I
2005-01-01
Uzbekistan is located on the cross-roads from the north--Russia, Western Europe--to the south--Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq and others. The appearance of terrorist organizations urged some Asian countries to make the nuclear weapons, the making the task of stopping the transportation of nuclear materials and technologies from the north (from countries possessing nuclear weapon) to the south (to countries desiring to have weapons and its components) a reality. To resolve this problem, on the main transportation routes, "Yantar" stationary radiation monitors of Russian production were installed, and development and production of monitors of our own make was started. This paper covers these works as well as those on preventing possible terrorist attacks on nuclear objects of Uzbekistan.
The Task of Detecting Illicit Nuclear Material: Status and Challenges
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Kouzes, Richard
2006-04-01
In August 1994, police at the Munich airport intercepted a suitcase from Moscow with half a kilogram of nuclear-reactor fuel, of which 363 grams was weapons- grade plutonium. A few months later police seized 2.7 kilograms of highly enriched uranium from a former worker at a Russian nuclear institute and his accomplices in Prague. These are just two of 18 incidents involving the smuggling of weapons grade nuclear materials between 1993 and 2004 reported by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The consequences of a stolen or improvised nuclear device being exploded in a U.S. city would be world changing. The concern over the possibility of a nuclear weapon, or the material for a weapon or a radiological dispersion device, being smuggled across U.S. borders has led to the deployment of radiation detection equipment at the borders. Related efforts are occurring around the world. Radiation portal monitors are used as the main screening tool, supplemented by handheld detectors, personal radiation detectors, and x-ray imaging systems. Passive detection techniques combined with imaging, and possibly active techniques, are the current available tools for screening cargo for items of concern. There are a number of physics limitations to what is possible with each technology given the presence of naturally occurring radioactive materials, commercial sources, and medical radionuclides in the stream of commerce. There have been a number of lessons learned to date from the various efforts in the U.S. and internationally about the capability for interdicting illicit nuclear material.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-07-01
... Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ATOMIC WEAPONS AND SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS REWARDS REGULATIONS § 13.3 Definitions. Atomic energy means all forms of energy released in the course of nuclear fission or nuclear transformation. Atomic weapon means any device utilizing atomic energy, exclusive of the means for transporting...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-07-01
... Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ATOMIC WEAPONS AND SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS REWARDS REGULATIONS § 13.3 Definitions. Atomic energy means all forms of energy released in the course of nuclear fission or nuclear transformation. Atomic weapon means any device utilizing atomic energy, exclusive of the means for transporting...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-07-01
... Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ATOMIC WEAPONS AND SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS REWARDS REGULATIONS § 13.3 Definitions. Atomic energy means all forms of energy released in the course of nuclear fission or nuclear transformation. Atomic weapon means any device utilizing atomic energy, exclusive of the means for transporting...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-07-01
... Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ATOMIC WEAPONS AND SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS REWARDS REGULATIONS § 13.3 Definitions. Atomic energy means all forms of energy released in the course of nuclear fission or nuclear transformation. Atomic weapon means any device utilizing atomic energy, exclusive of the means for transporting...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-07-01
... Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ATOMIC WEAPONS AND SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS REWARDS REGULATIONS § 13.3 Definitions. Atomic energy means all forms of energy released in the course of nuclear fission or nuclear transformation. Atomic weapon means any device utilizing atomic energy, exclusive of the means for transporting...
Effectiveness of passivation techniques on hydrogen desorption in a tritium environment
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Woodall, Steven Michael
2009-11-01
Tritium is a radioactive isotope of hydrogen. It is used as a fuel in fusion reactors, a booster material in nuclear weapons and as a light source in commercial applications. When tritium is used in fusion reactors, and especially when used in the manufacture of nuclear weapons, purity is critical. For U.S. Department of Energy use, tritium is recycled by Savannah River Site in South Carolina and is processed to a minimum purity of 99.5%. For use elsewhere in the country, it must be shipped and stored, while maintaining the highest purity possible. As an isotope of hydrogen it exchanges easily with the most common isotope of hydrogen, protium. Stainless steel bottles are used to transport and store tritium. Protium, present in air, becomes associated in and on the surface of stainless steel during and after the manufacture of the steel. When filled, the tritium within the bottle exchanges with the protium in and on the surface of the stainless steel, slowly contaminating the pure tritium with protium. The stainless steel is therefore passivated to minimize the protium outgrowth of the bottles into the pure tritium. This research is to determine how effective different passivation techniques are in minimizing the contamination of tritium with protium. Additionally, this research will attempt to determine a relationship between surface chemistry of passivated steels and protium contamination of tritium. The conclusions of this research found that passivated bottles by two companies which routinely provide passivated materials to the US Department of Energy provide low levels of protium outgrowth into pure tritium. A bottle passivated with a material to prevent excessive corrosion in a highly corrosive environment, and a clean and polished bottle provided outgrowth rates roughly twice those of the passivated bottles above. Beyond generally high levels of chromium, oxygen, iron and nickel in the passivated bottles, there did not appear to be a strong correlation between surface chemistry in the surface of the bottles and protium outgrowth rates.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Heyes, Alan
2007-07-01
Through the Global Partnership the UK continues to make a significant contribution to improve national and global security. Over the past year the UK has continued to implement a wide range of projects across the breadth of its Global Partnership Programme. As well as ensuring the Programme is robust and capable of dealing with new challenges, the UK has cooperated with other donor countries to help them progress projects associated with submarine dismantling, scientist redirection, enhancing nuclear security and Chemical Weapons Destruction. The Global Partnership, although only five years old, has already achieved a great deal. Some 23 states, plusmore » the European Union, are now working closer together under the Global Partnership, and collectively have enhanced global regional and national security by reducing the availability of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) materials and expertise to both states of concern and terrorists. Considerable progress has already been made in, for example: - Improving the security of fissile materials, dangerous biological agents and chemical weapons stocks; - Reducing the number of sites containing radioactive materials; - Working towards closure of reactors still producing weapon-grade plutonium; - Improving nuclear safety to reduce the risks of further, Chernobyl style accidents; - Constructing facilities for destroying Chemical Weapons stocks, and starting actual destruction; - Providing sustainable employment for former WMD scientists to reduce the risk that their expertise will be misused by states or terrorists. By contributing to many of these activities, the UK has helped to make the world safer. This paper reports on the UK's practical and sustainable contribution to the Global Partnership and identifies a number of challenges that remain if it is to have a wider impact on reducing the threats from WMD material. (authors)« less
Environmental Information Document: L-reactor reactivation
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Mackey, H.E. Jr.
1982-04-01
Purpose of this Environmental Information Document is to provide background for assessing environmental impacts associated with the renovation, restartup, and operation of L Reactor at the Savannah River Plant (SRP). SRP is a major US Department of Energy installation for the production of nuclear materials for national defense. The purpose of the restart of L Reactor is to increase the production of nuclear weapons materials, such as plutonium and tritium, to meet projected needs in the nuclear weapons program.
Westinghouse, DOE see apples, oranges in IG staffing report
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Lobsenz, G.
1994-03-01
The operator of the Energy Department's Savannah River weapons plant has at least 1,800 more employees than it needs, and could save $400 million over a five-year period by cutting its staff accordingly, a DOE inspector general study says. Most of the boat - 1,206 employees - was attributed to excessive numbers of managers, with the inspector general concluding that Westinghouse Savannah River Co. had roughly twice as many layers of management than two other DOE weapons contractors. The study also concluded that Westinghouse in fiscal year 1992 significantly understated its actual staffing levels in reports to DOE, failing tomore » disclose 1,765 full-time employees or the equivalent hours worked. Through such underreporting Westinghouse was able to [open quotes]circumvent staffing ceilings established by the department,[close quotes] the study added. Overall, DOE Inspector General John Layton said Westinghouse's staff levels substantially exceeded those needed for efficient operation of the South Carolina nuclear weapons facility. Layton based his analysis on efficiency standards attained by other DOE weapons plant contractors, such as Martin Marietta Energy Systems at DOE's Oak Ridge, Tenn., plant and EG G Rocky Flats, as well as widely utilized worker performance requirements used by the Navy and private sector companies that perform work similar to that done at Savannah River.« less
Helmet-Mounted Display Design Guide
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Newman, Richard L.; Greeley, Kevin W.
1997-01-01
Helmet Mounted Displays (HMDs) present flight, navigation, and weapon information in the pilot's line of sight. The HMD was developed to allow the pilot to retain aircraft and weapon information while looking off boresight. This document reviews current state of the art in HMDs and presents a design guide for the HMD engineer in identifying several critical HMD issues: symbol stabilization, inadequate definitions, undefined symbol drive laws, helmet considerations, and Field Of View (FOV) vs. resolution tradeoff requirements. In particular, display latency is a key issue for HMDs. In addition to requiring further experimental studies, it impacts the definition and control law issues. Symbol stabilization is also critical. In the case of the Apache helicopter, the lack of compensation for pilot head motion creates excessive workload during hovering and Nap Of the Earth (NOE) flight. This translates into excessive training requirements. There is no agreed upon set of definitions or descriptions for how HMD symbols are driven to compensate for pilot head motion. A set of definitions is proposed to address this. There are several specific areas where simulation and flight experiments are needed: development of hover and NOE symbologies which compensate for pilot head movement; display latency and sampling, and the tradeoff between FOV, sensor resolution and symbology.
On the Materials Science of Nature's Arms Race.
Liu, Zengqian; Zhang, Zhefeng; Ritchie, Robert O
2018-06-05
Biological material systems have evolved unique combinations of mechanical properties to fulfill their specific function through a series of ingenious designs. Seeking lessons from Nature by replicating the underlying principles of such biological materials offers new promise for creating unique combinations of properties in man-made systems. One case in point is Nature's means of attack and defense. During the long-term evolutionary "arms race," naturally evolved weapons have achieved exceptional mechanical efficiency with a synergy of effective offense and persistence-two characteristics that often tend to be mutually exclusive in many synthetic systems-which may present a notable source of new materials science knowledge and inspiration. This review categorizes Nature's weapons into ten distinct groups, and discusses the unique structural and mechanical designs of each group by taking representative systems as examples. The approach described is to extract the common principles underlying such designs that could be translated into man-made materials. Further, recent advances in replicating the design principles of natural weapons at differing lengthscales in artificial materials, devices and tools to tackle practical problems are revisited, and the challenges associated with biological and bioinspired materials research in terms of both processing and properties are discussed. © 2018 WILEY-VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, Weinheim.
12. VIEW OF A SITE RETURN WEAPONS COMPONENT. AFTER SEGREGATION, ...
12. VIEW OF A SITE RETURN WEAPONS COMPONENT. AFTER SEGREGATION, PLUTONIUM MATERIALS WERE EITHER RETURNED TO THE BUILDING 776 FOUNDRY WHERE THEY WERE CAST INTO FEED INGOTS, OR UNDERWENT CHEMICAL RECOVERY FOR PURIFICATION. (8/7/62) - Rocky Flats Plant, Plutonium Fabrication, Central section of Plant, Golden, Jefferson County, CO
Materials for Children about Nuclear War.
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Eiss, Harry
President Reagan's Fiscal Year 1987 budget was an attempt to increase dramatically spending on national defense, on nuclear weapons, while cutting back on social programs. The increases for almost all nuclear weapons indicate the Administration of the United States saw its major responsibility as one of providing a strong military, one centered on…
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-01-01
... pursuant to section 142 of the Atomic Energy Act. Sensitive nuclear technology means any information... nuclear material (SNM) or which a U.S. provider of assistance knows or has reason to know will be used for... International Atomic Energy Agency. Non-nuclear-weapon state is a country not recognized as a nuclear-weapon...
Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014
2010-07-14
... (Missile Technology Control Regime, Australia Group, Chemical Weapons Convention, Nuclear Suppliers Group... of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or cruise or ballistic missile systems. The latter category... or cruise or ballistic missile systems, (b) other items with the potential of making such a material...
Comparison of Bite Registration Material Accuracy on in office Laser Scanned Digital Model Occlusion
2014-05-20
School/Department/Center: Two Year Advanced Education in General Dentistry . Fort Bragg,NC 4. Phone:910-429-6626 5. Type of clearance: _X_Paper...Date: 11.~ l~ 4. Higher approval clearance required (for University-, DoD- or US Gov’t-level policy, communication systems or weapons issues review...or US Gov’t-level policy, communications systems or weapons issues review). *Note: It is DoD policy that clearance of information or material
Bond Strength of Resin Cements to Dentin Using New Universal Bonding Agents
2015-06-30
34Bond Strength of Resin Cements to Dentin Using New Universal Bonding Agents" Materials Repaired with Composite Resin" 7. Intended publication...DoD- or US Gov’t-level policy, communications systems or weapons issues review"). *Note: It is DoD policy that clearance of information or material...University-, DoD- or US Gov’t-level policy, communications systems or weapons issues review"). *Note: It is DoD po/icy that clearance of
Overall View of Chemical and Biochemical Weapons
Pitschmann, Vladimír
2014-01-01
This article describes a brief history of chemical warfare, which culminated in the signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention. It describes the current level of chemical weapons and the risk of using them. Furthermore, some traditional technology for the development of chemical weapons, such as increasing toxicity, methods of overcoming chemical protection, research on natural toxins or the introduction of binary technology, has been described. In accordance with many parameters, chemical weapons based on traditional technologies have achieved the limit of their development. There is, however, a big potential of their further development based on the most recent knowledge of modern scientific and technical disciplines, particularly at the boundary of chemistry and biology. The risk is even higher due to the fact that already, today, there is a general acceptance of the development of non-lethal chemical weapons at a technologically higher level. In the future, the chemical arsenal will be based on the accumulation of important information from the fields of chemical, biological and toxin weapons. Data banks obtained in this way will be hardly accessible and the risk of their materialization will persist. PMID:24902078
Overall view of chemical and biochemical weapons.
Pitschmann, Vladimír
2014-06-04
This article describes a brief history of chemical warfare, which culminated in the signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention. It describes the current level of chemical weapons and the risk of using them. Furthermore, some traditional technology for the development of chemical weapons, such as increasing toxicity, methods of overcoming chemical protection, research on natural toxins or the introduction of binary technology, has been described. In accordance with many parameters, chemical weapons based on traditional technologies have achieved the limit of their development. There is, however, a big potential of their further development based on the most recent knowledge of modern scientific and technical disciplines, particularly at the boundary of chemistry and biology. The risk is even higher due to the fact that already, today, there is a general acceptance of the development of non-lethal chemical weapons at a technologically higher level. In the future, the chemical arsenal will be based on the accumulation of important information from the fields of chemical, biological and toxin weapons. Data banks obtained in this way will be hardly accessible and the risk of their materialization will persist.
Sandia Dynamic Materials Program Strategic Plan.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Flicker, Dawn Gustine; Benage, John F.; Desjarlais, Michael P.
2017-05-01
Materials in nuclear and conventional weapons can reach multi-megabar pressures and 1000s of degree temperatures on timescales ranging from microseconds to nanoseconds. Understanding the response of complex materials under these conditions is important for designing and assessing changes to nuclear weapons. In the next few decades, a major concern will be evaluating the behavior of aging materials and remanufactured components. The science to enable the program to underwrite decisions quickly and confidently on use, remanufacturing, and replacement of these materials will be critical to NNSA’s new Stockpile Responsiveness Program. Material response is also important for assessing the risks posed bymore » adversaries or proliferants. Dynamic materials research, which refers to the use of high-speed experiments to produce extreme conditions in matter, is an important part of NNSA’s Stockpile Stewardship Program.« less
Explaining weapons proliferation: Going beyond the security dilemma
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Rattray, G.J.
1994-07-01
Most analyses addressing the subject of why states choose to proliferate focus on external motivations, particularly the security dilemma, facing a country`s leaders. This paper concludes that, other factors, such as prestige, regime type and stability, and economic status, can have impact in determining proliferation outcomes. In the case of Newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union (NIS), the domestic problems generated by internal conflicts, arms remaining from the Cold War, excess defense industrial capacity, economic difficulties and the breakdown of central authority resulting in a loss of border control and corruption have all made the NIS an extremelymore » fertile ground for weapons proliferation. A more positive `rollback` situation has emerged in Latin America where both Argentina and Brazil have seemingly decided to forgo the acquisition of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. The US must understand the `strategic personality` of each potential proliferation. Not all state behavior can be explained in terms of the security dilemma. One must also keep in mind the complexity of possible motivations. Economic and technological assistance and cooperative efforts at institution-building hold great potential to combating proliferation.« less
Uranium-233 waste definition: Disposal options, safeguards, criticality control, and arms control
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Forsberg, C.W.; Storch, S.N.; Lewis, L.C.
1998-07-07
The US investigated the use of {sup 233}U for weapons, reactors, and other purposes from the 1950s into the 1970s. Based on the results of these investigations, it was decided not to use {sup 233}U on a large scale. Most of the {sup 233}U-containing materials were placed in long-term storage. At the end of the cold war, the US initiated, as part of its arms control policies, a disposition program for excess fissile materials. Other programs were accelerated for disposal of radioactive wastes placed in storage during the cold war. Last, potential safety issues were identified related to the storagemore » of some {sup 233}U-containing materials. Because of these changes, significant activities associated with {sup 233}U-containing materials are expected. This report is one of a series of reports to provide the technical bases for future decisions on how to manage this material. A basis for defining when {sup 233}U-containing materials can be managed as waste and when they must be managed as concentrated fissile materials has been developed. The requirements for storage, transport, and disposal of radioactive wastes are significantly different than those for fissile materials. Because of these differences, it is important to classify material in its appropriate category. The establishment of a definition of what is waste and what is fissile material will provide the guidance for appropriate management of these materials. Wastes are defined in this report as materials containing sufficiently small masses or low concentrations of fissile materials such that they can be managed as typical radioactive waste. Concentrated fissile materials are defined herein as materials containing sufficient fissile content such as to warrant special handling to address nuclear criticality, safeguards, and arms control concerns.« less
III-V strain layer superlattice based band engineered avalanche photodiodes (Presentation Recording)
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Ghosh, Sid
2015-08-01
Laser detection and ranging (LADAR)-based systems operating in the Near Infrared (NIR) and Short Wave Infrared (SWIR) have become popular optical sensors for remote sensing, medical, and environmental applications. Sophisticated laser-based radar and weapon systems used for long-range military and astronomical applications need to detect, recognize, and track a variety of targets under a wide spectrum of atmospheric conditions. Infrared APDs play an important role in LADAR systems by integrating the detection and gain stages in a single device. Robust silicon-APDs are limited to visible and very near infrared region (< 1 um), while InGaAs works well up to wavelengths of about 1.5um. Si APDs have low multiplication or excess noise but are limited to below 1um due very poor quantum efficiency above 0.8um. InGaAs and Ge APDs operate up to wavelengths of 1.5um but have poor multiplication or excess noise due to a low impact ionization coefficient ratio between electrons and holes. For the past several decades HgCdTe has been traditionally used in longer wavelength (> 3um) infrared photon detection applications. Recently, various research groups (including Ghosh et. al.) have reported SWIR and MWIR HgCdTe APDs on CdZnTe and Si substrates. However, HgCdTe APDs suffer from low breakdown fields due to material defects, and excess noise increases significantly at high electric fields. During the past decade, InAs/GaSb Strain Layer Superlattice (SLS) material system has emerged as a potential material for the entire infrared spectrum because of relatively easier growth, comparable absorption coefficients, lower tunneling currents and longer Auger lifetimes resulting in enhanced detectivities (D*). Band engineering in type II SLS allows us to engineer avalanche properties of electrons and holes. This is a great advantage over bulk InGaAs and HgCdTe APDs where engineering avalanche properties is not possible. The talk will discuss the evolution of superlattice based avalanche photodiodes and some of the recent results on the work being done at Raytheon on SWIR avalanche photodiodes.
2005-05-01
form of weapons cleaning products and wastes. State of Florida and Air Force regulations have been implemented 05/31/05 Final Environmental Assessment...Forces Complex will generate hazardous materials in the form of weapons cleaning products and wastes. Break-Free CLP Liquid is a cleaner, lubricant
Chemistry and materials science progress report, FY 1994
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
NONE
1995-07-01
Research is reported in the areas of surface science, fundamentals of the physics and processing of metals, energetic materials, transactinide materials and properties and other indirectly related areas of weapons research.
Can Nuclear Terrorists be Deterred?
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Ferguson, Charles
2005-04-01
Conventional thinking since September 11, 2001, posits that nuclear-armed terrorists cannot be deterred. However, not all terrorist groups are alike. For instance, those that are strongly affiliated with a national territory or a constituency that can be held hostage are more likely to be self-deterred against using or even acquiring nuclear weapons. In contrast, international terrorist organizations, such as al Qaeda, or apocalyptic groups, such as Aum Shinrikyo, may welcome retaliatory nuclear strikes because they embrace martyrdom. Such groups may be immune to traditional deterrence, which threatens direct punishment against the group in question or against territory or people the terrorists' value. Although deterring these groups may appear hopeless, nuclear forensic techniques could provide the means to establish deterrence through other means. In particular, as long as the source of the nuclear weapon or fissile material could be identified, the United States could threaten a retaliatory response against a nation that did not provide adequate security for its nuclear weapons or weapons-usable fissile material. This type of deterrent threat could be used to compel the nation with lax security to improve its security to meet rigorous standards.
Applications of high power lasers in the battlefield
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Kalisky, Yehoshua
2009-09-01
Laser weapon is currently considered as tactical as well as strategic beam weapons, and is considered as a part of a general layered defense system against ballistic missiles and short-range rockets. This kind of weapon can disable or destroy military targets or incoming objects used by small groups of terrorists or countries, at the speed of light. Laser weapon is effective at long or short distances, owing to beam's unique characteristics such as narrow bandwidth, high brightness, coherent both in time and space, and it travels at the speed of light. Unlike kinetic weapon, laser weapon converts the energy stored in an electromagnetic laser beam into a large amount of heat aimed on a small area spot at the skin of the missile, usually close to the liquid fuel storage tank, warhead case or engine area, following by a temperature increase and finally-catastrophic failure by material ablation or melt. The usefulness of laser light as a weapon has been studied for decades but only in recent years became feasible. There are two types of lasers being used: gas lasers and solid state lasers, including fiber lasers. All these types of lasers will be discussed below.
Lithium Ion Batteries Used for Nuclear Forensics
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Johnson, Erik B.; Stapels, Christopher J.; Chen, X. Jie; Whitney, Chad; Holbert, Keith E.; Christian, James F.
2013-10-01
Nuclear forensics includes the study of materials used for the attribution a nuclear event. Analysis of the nuclear reaction products resulting both from the weapon and the material in the vicinity of the event provides data needed to identify the source of the nuclear material and the weapon design. The spectral information of the neutrons produced by the event provides information on the weapon configuration. The lithium battery provides a unique platform for nuclear forensics, as the Li-6 content is highly sensitive to neutrons, while the battery construction consists of various layers of materials. Each of these materials represents an element for a threshold detector scheme, where isotopes are produced in the battery components through various nuclear reactions that require a neutron energy above a fundamental threshold energy. This study looks into means for extracting neutron spectral information by understanding the isotopic concentration prior to and after exposure. The radioisotopes decay through gamma and beta emission, and radiation spectrometers have been used to measure the radiation spectra from the neutron exposed batteries. The batteries were exposed to various known neutron fields, and analysis was conducted to reconstruct the incident neutron spectra. This project is supported by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, grant number HDTRA1-11-1-0028.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Winstanley, J. L.
In August 1945, U.S. Navy Captain William Parsons served as the weaponeer aboard the Enola Gay for the mission to Hiroshima (Shelton 1988). In view of the fact that four B-29s had crashed and burned on takeoff from Tinian the night before, Captain Parsons made the decision to arm the gun-type weapon after takeoff for safety reasons (15 kilotons of TNT equivalent). Although he had no control over the success of the takeoff, he could prevent the possibility of a nuclear detonation on Tinian by controlling what we now call the nuclear explosive. As head of the Ordnance Division atmore » Los Alamos and a former gunnery officer, Captain Parsons clearly understood the role of safety in his work. The advent of the pre-assembled implosion weapon where the high explosive and nuclear materials are always in an intimate configuration meant that nuclear explosive safety became a reality at a certain point in development and production not just at the time of delivery by the military. This is the only industry where nuclear materials are intentionally put in contact with high explosives. The agency of the U.S. Government responsible for development and production of U.S. nuclear weapons is the Department of Energy (DOE) (and its predecessor agencies). This paper will be limited to nuclear explosive safety as it is currently practiced within the DOE nuclear weapons« less
[Scrining workers employed at the weapons and military technology recycling and disposal facilitie].
2012-01-01
A screening study was performed to identify factors of the raised risk of cardiovascular and bronchopulmonary diseases among workers involved in weapons and military technology recycling and disposal. A high prevalence of risk factors such as smoking, excess body mass, adiposis, disorders of the carbohydrate, lipid and purine metabolism was found for workers aged 35 years and older. Circulatory, musculoskeletal, and eye diseases prevailed in the structure of first diagnosed diseases. Taking into account an unfavorable profile of risk factors, groups with the raised risk of cardiovascular and bronchopulmonary diseases were identified. An expansion of the standard scope of examination in the framework of regular medical monitoring in compliance with the applicable regulatory documents by inclusion of screening studies would provide additional opportunities for the early diagnosing and prevention of the above diseases.
1960-01-01
Title Agenda and AV^stracts - Watertown Arsenal, Watnrtovm, Mass. llj April i960 - Producers Coordination Meeting, "Titanium Materials for Davy...u.nd J.i’.l~.Jhr!l’ Scicnti~’ic Comp::1.~1y1 Chlc::-.~~o, IJ~~nois. oth :r c~tUl’ll~nt and 1Jl’Occ1t.G.~cn !.Jn.y be uoed if :J..CCC:t.> td )le to
The 871 keV gamma ray from 17O and the identification of plutonium oxide
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Peurrung, Anthony; Arthur, Richard; Elovich, Robert; Geelhood, Bruce; Kouzes, Richard; Pratt, Sharon; Scheele, Randy; Sell, Richard
2001-12-01
Disarmament agreements and discussions between the United States and the Russian Federation for reducing the number of stockpiled nuclear weapons require verification of the origin of materials as having come from disassembled weapons. This has resulted in the identification of measurable "attributes" that characterize such materials. It has been proposed that the 871 keV gamma ray of 17O can be observed as an indicator of the unexpected presence of plutonium oxide, as opposed to plutonium metal, in such materials. We have shown that the observation of the 871 keV gamma ray is not a specific indicator of the presence of the oxide, but rather indicates the presence of nitrogen.
Why is weapons grade plutonium more hazardous to work with than highly enriched uranium?
Cournoyer, Michael E.; Costigan, Stephen A.; Schake, Bradley S.
2015-08-01
Highly Enriched Uranium and Weapons grade plutonium have assumed positions of dominant importance among the actinide elements because of their successful uses as explosive ingredients in nuclear weapons and the place they hold as key materials in the development of industrial use of nuclear power. While most chemists are familiar with the practical interest concerning HEU and WG Pu, fewer know the subtleties among their hazards. In this study, a primer is provided regarding the hazards associated with working with HEU and WG Pu metals and oxides. The care that must be taken to safely handle these materials is emphasizedmore » and the extent of the hazards is described. The controls needed to work with HEU and WG Pu metals and oxides are differentiated. Given the choice, one would rather work with HEU metal and oxides than WG Pu metal and oxides.« less
Why is weapons grade plutonium more hazardous to work with than highly enriched uranium?
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Cournoyer, Michael E.; Costigan, Stephen A.; Schake, Bradley S.
Highly Enriched Uranium and Weapons grade plutonium have assumed positions of dominant importance among the actinide elements because of their successful uses as explosive ingredients in nuclear weapons and the place they hold as key materials in the development of industrial use of nuclear power. While most chemists are familiar with the practical interest concerning HEU and WG Pu, fewer know the subtleties among their hazards. In this study, a primer is provided regarding the hazards associated with working with HEU and WG Pu metals and oxides. The care that must be taken to safely handle these materials is emphasizedmore » and the extent of the hazards is described. The controls needed to work with HEU and WG Pu metals and oxides are differentiated. Given the choice, one would rather work with HEU metal and oxides than WG Pu metal and oxides.« less
Stabilization and immobilization of military plutonium: A non-proliferation perspective
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Leventhal, P.
1996-05-01
The Nuclear Control Institute welcomes this DOE-sponsored technical workshop on stabilization and immobilization of weapons plutonium (W Pu) because of the significant contribution it can make toward the ultimate non-proliferation objective of eliminating weapons-usable nuclear material, plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU), from world commerce. The risk of theft or diversion of these materials warrants concern, as only a few kilograms in the hands of terrorists or threshold states would give them the capability to build nuclear weapons. Military plutonium disposition questions cannot be addressed in isolation from civilian plutonium issues. The National Academy of Sciences has urged that {open_quotes}furthermore » steps should be taken to reduce the proliferation risks posed by all of the world`s plutonium stocks, military and civilian, separated and unseparated...{close_quotes}. This report discusses vitrification and a mixed oxide fuels option, and the effects of disposition choices on civilian plutonium fuel cycles.« less
Another Inconvenient Truth: Even a Small Nuclear War Could be Much Worse Than you Think
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Toon, O. B.
2008-05-01
The number of nuclear warheads in the world has fallen by about a factor of three since its peak in 1986. However, the potential exists for numerous regional nuclear arms races, and for a significant expansion in the number of nuclear weapons states. Eight countries are known to have nuclear weapons, 2 are constructing them, and an additional 32 nations already have the fissile material needed to build weapons if they so desire. Population and economic activity worldwide are congregated to an increasing extent in "megacities", which are ideal targets for nuclear weapons. Based upon observations of the damage caused by nuclear explosions in World War II and in nuclear tests, a group of researchers has estimated the area that might be consumed in firestorms following a regional war between the smallest current nuclear states involving 100, 15-kt explosions (less than 0.1% of the explosive yield of the current global nuclear arsenal). Based upon observations of large forest fires these firestorms should inject smoke into the upper troposphere. Using estimates of the mass of flammable material in the areas that would burn we find that 5x1012 g of elemental carbon could be injected into the upper troposphere in a regional nuclear war. A suite of numerical models show that this upper tropospheric soot will be transported due to solar heating into the stratosphere and will rise to altitudes above 40 km. The elemental carbon will absorb sunlight, heating the stratosphere and cooling the ground. The heating of the stratosphere could cause column ozone losses in excess of 20% globally, 25-45% at mid-latitudes, and 50- 70% at northern high latitudes persisting for 5 years, with substantial losses continuing for 5 additional years. Column ozone amounts would remain near or below 220 Dobson units at all latitudes even after three years, constituting an extra-tropical "ozone hole". The cooling at the ground would reduce precipitation globally by about 10%, create lower temperatures than any observed in the past thousand years, and cause a several week shortening of the growing season at mid-latitudes in both hemispheres for several years. While these environmental perturbations from a regional scale conflict involving smaller nuclear powers, such as India and Pakistan, are very serious, recent studies of the results of a global nuclear war between the superpowers show that a "nuclear winter" could occur that is even more long lasting than previously believed. Following a global nuclear conflict global precipitation might fall by 45% for several years, and surface temperatures might decline to values not seen since the ice ages. There are many uncertainties in the issues we discuss here, however these results indicate that nuclear weapons pose a dire threat to everyone on the planet, even those far removed from any combat zone. Each of these potential hazards deserves careful analysis by governments worldwide advised by a broad section of the world scientific community, as well as widespread debate.
Nuclear Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Counterterrorism: Impacts on Public Health
Pregenzer, Arian
2014-01-01
Reducing the risks of nuclear war, limiting the spread of nuclear weapons, and reducing global nuclear weapons stockpiles are key national and international security goals. They are pursued through a variety of international arms control, nonproliferation, and counterterrorism treaties and agreements. These legally binding and political commitments, together with the institutional infrastructure that supports them, work to establish global norms of behavior and have limited the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Beyond the primary security objectives, reducing the likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons, preventing environmental releases of radioactive material, increasing the availability of safe and secure nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, and providing scientific data relevant to predicting and managing the consequences of natural or human-caused disasters worldwide provide significant benefits to global public health. PMID:24524501
Update on NRF Measurements on ^237Np for National Security and Safeguards Applications
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Angell, C. T.; Joshi, T.; Yee, R.; Swanberg, E.; Norman, E. B.; Kulp, W. D.; Warren, G.; Hicks, C. L., Jr.; Korbly, S.; Klimenko, A.; Wilson, C.; Bray, T. H.; Copping, R.; Shuh, D. K.
2010-11-01
Nuclear resonance fluorescence (NRF) uses γ rays to excite nuclear levels and measure their properties. This provides a unique isotopic signature, and can be used to identify and assay material. This is particularly important for applications that detect the smuggling of nuclear material or the diversion of fissile material for covert weapon programs, both of which present grave risks to world security. ^237Np presents significant safeguard challenges; it is fissile yet currently has fewer safeguard restrictions potentially making it an attractive material for covert weapon programs. This talk will present the final results of two measurements of NRF on ^237Np using a bremsstrahlung photon source. 15 NRF states have been identified between 1.5 and 2.5 MeV excitation energy.
The myth of the ``proliferation-resistant'' closed nuclear fuel cycle
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Lyman, Edwin S.
2000-07-01
National nuclear energy programs that engage in reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and the development of "closed" nuclear fuel cycles based on the utilization of plutonium process and store large quantities of weapons-usable nuclear materials in forms vulnerable to diversion or theft by national or subnational groups. Proliferation resistance, an idea dating back at least as far as the International Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) of the late 1970s, is a loosely defined term referring to processes for chemical separation of SNF that do not extract weapons-usable materials in a purified form.
The continuing risk of nuclear war.
McCoy, Ronald
2007-01-01
Climate change and nuclear war are currently the most dangerous challenges to human civilisation and survival. The effects of climate change are now sufficient to persuade many governments to take effective measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Today there are about 27,000 nuclear warheads, many at least ten times more powerful than the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs, and a meaningful medical response to a nuclear attack is impossible. Nevertheless, the threat of nuclear war does not raise public concern, and indeed the nuclear-weapon states are upgrading their capability. The only effective preventive measure is the abolition of nuclear weapons. Steps towards this include: a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, for the nuclear weapon states to observe their obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to enter into force. The ultimate need is for a Nuclear Weapons Convention; International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War have launched an International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear weapons (ICAN) to promote a NWC.
Price-Based Acquisition. Issues and Challenges for Defense Department Procurement of Weapon Systems
2005-01-01
government without excess non- value -added work. Again, however, the central issue is how can DoD determine whether the price is fair and reasonable without a...document THE ARTS CHILD POLICY CIVIL JUSTICE EDUCATION ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS NATIONAL SECURITY POPULATION AND...contracting and to providing incentives for contractors so as to achieve the best value in defense procurement. iv Price-Based Acquisition This
Linking Logistics and Operations: A Case Study of World War II Air Power
1991-01-01
Weapon System Evaluation Group, 1951, p. 30). The logistic innovation greatly extended the time that combat ships could remain on station and...presented. This Note was produced under the Project AIR FORCE Resource Management and System Acquisition Program in the project "Combat Support C3 Needs...maintenance workload data suggest either unacceptable system performance or excessive costs. The predictive power of these models is so poor as to
Leo Szilard Lectureship Award Talk: Nuclear disarmament after the cold war
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Podvig, Pavel
2008-04-01
Now that the cold war is long over, our thinking of nuclear weapons and the role that they play in international security has undergone serious changes. The emphasis has shifted from superpower confrontation to nuclear proliferation, spread of weapon materials, and to the dangers of countries developing nuclear weapon capability under a cover of a civilian program. At the same time, the old cold-war dangers, while receded, have not disappeared completely. The United States and Russia keep maintaining thousands of nuclear weapons in their arsenals, some of them in very high degree of readiness. This situation presents a serious challenge that the international community has to deal with. Although Russia and the United States are taking some steps to reduce their nuclear arsenals, the traditional arms control process has stalled -- the last treaty that was signed in 2002 does not place serious limits on strategic forces of either side. The START Treaty, which provides a framework for verification and transparency in reduction of nuclear arsenals, will expire at the end of 2009. Little effort has been undertaken to extend the treaty or renegotiate it. Moreover, in recent years Russia has stepped up the efforts to modernize its strategic nuclear forces. The United States has resisted joining the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and has been working on controversial new nuclear weapon development programs. The U.S. missile defense program makes the dialogue between Russia and the United States even more difficult. The reluctance of Russia and the United States to engage in a discussion about drastic reductions of their nuclear forces undermines the case of nuclear nonproliferation and seriously complicated their effort to contain the spread of nuclear weapon technologies and expertise. One of the reasons for the current lack of progress in nuclear disarmament is the contradiction between the diminished role that nuclear weapons play in security of nuclear weapon states and the inertia of cold-war institutions that are involved in their development and support. Dealing with this contradiction would require development of new mechanisms of cooperation between nuclear weapons states and their strong commitment to the cause of nuclear nonproliferation. One important area of cooperation is development of a framework that would prevent the spread of nuclear materials and technology at the time when increasing number of countries is turning toward expanded use of nuclear power to cover their energy needs.
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Holliday, Kiel Steven
There is a significant buildup in plutonium stockpiles throughout the world, because of spent nuclear fuel and the dismantling of weapons. The radiotoxicity of this material and proliferation risk has led to a desire for destroying excess plutonium. To do this effectively, it must be fissioned in a reactor as part of a uranium free fuel to eliminate the generation of more plutonium. This requires an inert matrix to volumetrically dilute the fissile plutonium. Zirconia-magnesia dual phase ceramic has been demonstrated to be a favorable material for this task. It is neutron transparent, zirconia is chemically robust, magnesia has good thermal conductivity and the ceramic has been calculated to conform to current economic and safety standards. This dissertation contributes to the knowledge of zirconia-magnesia as an inert matrix fuel to establish behavior of the material containing a fissile component. First, the zirconia-magnesia inert matrix is synthesized in a dual phase ceramic containing a fissile component and a burnable poison. The chemical constitution of the ceramic is then determined. Next, the material performance is assessed under conditions relevant to an advanced fuel cycle. Reactor conditions were assessed with high temperature, high pressure water. Various acid solutions were used in an effort to dissolve the material for reprocessing. The ceramic was also tested as a waste form under environmental conditions, should it go directly to a repository as a spent fuel. The applicability of zirconia-magnesia as an inert matrix fuel and waste form was tested and found to be a promising material for such applications.
SAVANNAH RIVER SITE ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT FOR 2010
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Mamatey, A.; Dunaway-Ackerman, J.
2011-08-16
This report was prepared in accordance with U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 231.1A, 'Environment, Safety and Health Reporting,' to present summary environmental data for the purpose of: (a) characterizing site's environmental management performance; (b) summarizing environmental occurrences and responses reported during the calendar year; (c) describing compliance status with respect to environmental standards and requirements; and (d) highlighting significant site programs and efforts. This report is the principal document that demonstrates compliance with the requirements of DOE Order 5400.5, 'Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment,' and is a key component of DOE's effort to keep the publicmore » informed of environmental conditions at Savannah River Site (SRS). SRS has four primary missions: (1) Environmental Management - Cleaning up the legacy of the Cold War efforts and preparing decommissioned facilities and areas for long-term stewardship; (2) Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Support - Meeting the needs of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile through the tritium programs of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA); (3) Nuclear Nonproliferation Support - Meeting the needs of the NNSA's nuclear nonproliferation programs by safely storing and dispositioning excess special nuclear materials; and (4) Research and Development - Supporting the application of science by the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) to meet the needs of SRS, the DOE complex, and other federal agencies During 2010, SRS worked to fulfill these missions and position the site for future operations. SRS continued to work with the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to find and implement solutions and schedules for waste management and disposition. As part of its mission to clean up the Cold War legacy, SRS will continue to address the highest-risk waste management issues by safely storing and preparing liquid waste and nuclear materials for disposition, and by safely stabilizing any tank waste residues that remain on site.« less
Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues
2012-06-26
145 Abdul Mannan, “Preventing Nuclear Terrorism in Pakistan: Sabotage of a Spent Fuel Cask or a Commercial ...Pakistan’s Civil Nuclear Program.” Some analysts argue that spent nuclear fuel is more vulnerable when being transported . 146 Martellini, 2008. 147...produced fissile material for its nuclear weapons using gas-centrifuge-based uranium enrichment technology, which it mastered by the mid-1980s
Nuclear Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Counterterrorism: Impacts on Public Health
Dreicer, Mona; Pregenzer, Arian
2014-04-01
Reducing the risks of nuclear war, limiting the spread of nuclear weapons and reducing global nuclear weapons stockpiles are key national and international security goals. They are pursued through a variety of international arms control, nonproliferation and counter-terrorism treaties and agreements. These legally binding and political commitments, together with the institutional infrastructure that supports them, work to establish global norms of behavior and have limited the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Beyond the primary security objectives, reducing the likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons, preventing environmental releases of radioactive material, increasing the availability of safe and secure nuclearmore » technology for peaceful purposes, and providing scientific data relevant to predicting and managing the consequences of natural or human-caused disasters world-wide provide significant benefits to global public health.« less
Entrepreneurial proliferation: Russia`s nuclear industry suits the buyers market. Master`s thesis
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Whalen, T.D.; Williams, A.R.
1995-06-01
The Soviet Union collapsed in December 1991, bringing an end to four decades of the Cold War. A system of tight centralized controls has given way to chaotic freedom and un-managed, entrepreneurial capitalism. Of immediate concern to most world leaders has been the control and safety of over 30,000 Soviet nuclear weapons. After 1991, the Soviet, centralized system of management lost one key structural element: a reliable `human factor` for nuclear material control. The Soviet systems for physical security and material control are still in place in the nuclear inheritor states - Russia, Ukraine, Khazakhnstan, and Belarus - but theymore » do not restrain or regulate their nuclear industry. In the chaos created by the Soviet collapse, the nonproliferation regime may not adequately temper the supply of the nuclear materials of the new inheritor states. This could permit organizations or states seeking nuclear weapons easier access to fissile materials. New initiatives such as the United States Cooperative Threat Reduction program, which draws upon U.S. technology and expertise to help the NIS solve these complex problems, are short-tern tactics. At present there are no strategies which address the long-tern root problems caused by the Soviet collapse.This thesis demonstrates the extent of the nuclear control problems in Russia. Specifically, we examine physical security, material control and accounting regulation and enforcement, and criminal actions. It reveals that the current lack of internal controls make access to nuclear materials easier for aspiring nuclear weapons States.« less
[In-hospital management of victims of chemical weapons of mass destruction].
Barelli, Alessandro; Gargano, Flavio; Proietti, Rodolfo
2005-01-01
Emergency situations caused by chemical weapons of mass destruction add a new dimension of risk to those handling and treating casualties. The fundamental difference between a hazardous materials incident and conventional emergencies is the potential for risk from contamination to health care professionals, patients, equipment and facilities of the Emergency Department. Accurate and specific guidance is needed to describe the procedures to be followed by emergency medical personnel to safely care for a patient, as well as to protect equipment and people. This review is designed to familiarize readers with the concepts, terminology and key operational considerations that affect the in-hospital management of incidents by chemical weapons.
Concealed weapons detection using electromagnetic resonances
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Hunt, Allen R.; Hogg, R. Douglas; Foreman, William
1998-12-01
Concealed weapons pose a significant threat to both law enforcement and security agency personnel. The uncontrolled environments associated with peacekeeping and the move toward relaxation of concealed weapons laws here in the U.S. provide a strong motivation for developing weapons detection technologies which are noninvasive and can function noncooperatively. Existing weapons detection systems are primarily oriented to detecting metal and require the cooperation of the person being searched. The new generation of detectors under development that focuses primarily on imaging methods, faces problems associated with privacy issues. There remains a need for a weapons detector which is portable, detects weapons remotely, avoids the issues associated with privacy rights, can tell the difference between car keys and a knife, and is affordable enough that one can be issued to every peacekeeper and law enforcement officer. AKELA is developing a concealed weapons detector that uses wideband radar techniques to excite natural electromagnetic resonances that characterize the size, shape, and material composition of an object. Neural network processing is used to classify the difference between weapons and nuisance objects. We have constructed both time and frequency domain test systems and used them to gather experimental data on a variety of armed and unarmed individuals. These experiments have been performed in an environment similar to the operational environment. Preliminary results from these experiments show that it is possible to detect a weapon being carried by an individual from a distance of 10 to 15 feet, and to detect a weapon being concealed behind the back. The power required is about 100 milliwatts. A breadboard system is being fabricated and will be used by AKELA and our law enforcement partner to gather data in operationally realistic situations. While a laptop computer will control the breadboard system, the wideband radar electronics will fit in a box the size of a CD ROM drive of a computer.
Non-Proliferation, the IAEA Safeguards System, and the importance of nuclear material measurements
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Stevens, Rebecca S.
2017-09-18
The objective of this project is to explain the contribution of nuclear material measurements to the system of international verification of State declarations and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Polycythemia vera among participants of a nuclear weapons test
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Sobell, J.L.; Codd, M.B.; Silverstein, M.N.
1987-03-06
Three letters-to-the-editors discuss the finding of a statistically significant excess of polycythemia vera cases among participants in the Smoky detonation. Had population-based incidence rates from Rochester been used to derive an expected incidence, and had only bona fide polycythemia vera cases been considered, as is the rule in most epidemiologic studies, the observed frequency of polycythemia vera among participants in the Smoky test would have been found to be well within chance expectations.
Bastian, Nathaniel D; Brown, David; Fulton, Lawrence V; Mitchell, Robert; Pollard, Wayne; Robinson, Mark; Wilson, Ronald
2013-03-01
We utilize a mixed methods approach to provide three new, separate analyses as part of the development of the next aeromedical evacuation (MEDEVAC) platform of the Future of Vertical Lift (FVL) program. The research questions follow: RQ1) What are the optimal capabilities of a FVL MEDEVAC platform given an Afghanistan-like scenario and parameters associated with the treatment/ground evacuation capabilities in that theater?; RQ2) What are the MEDEVAC trade-off considerations associated with different aircraft engines operating under variable conditions?; RQ3) How does the additional weight of weaponizing the current MEDEVAC fleet affect range, coverage radius, and response time? We address RQ1 using discrete-event simulation based partially on qualitative assessments from the field, while RQ2 and RQ3 are based on deterministic analysis. Our results confirm previous findings that travel speeds in excess of 250 knots and ranges in excess of 300 nautical miles are advisable for the FVL platform design, thereby reducing the medical footprint in stability operations. We recommend a specific course of action regarding a potential engine bridging strategy based on deterministic analysis of endurance and altitude, and we suggest that the weaponization of the FVL MEDEVAC aircraft will have an adverse effect on coverage capability. Reprint & Copyright © 2013 Association of Military Surgeons of the U.S.
Analysis and studies on the threats to the composite material from laser
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Xu, Wei; Yao, Weixing; Wang, Liwei; Wang, Guoliang; Xie, Fang
2015-10-01
It is always an attracting research field for the interaction between laser and matters. The interaction between laser and matters is used not only in the natural science, but also in practical application, for example, laser machine, laser weapon, laser ablations and so on. In this paper, we will give the model for the damage effect of the composite materials caused by the superpower laser weapons. Mechanism of the laser damage on the composite materials have been researched and modeled by the numerical analysis methods. Through the designed model, we analyzed the temperature and the stress fields of the composite material after the superpower lasers attacks with different power densities. By analyzing these modeling results, we achieved some conclusions on the threats to the composite materials from the superpower lasers. From the results, we have obtained the Irradiated threshold from the Laser. This paper will provide the theoretical foundations for the anti-laser design of the composite materials.
Study of Using Excess Stock to Reduce Naval Aviation Depot-Level Repairable Piece Part Backorders
2016-12-01
Designator Code, may get involved to ensure timely receipt. When a high-priority (Issue Priority Group 1) requisition is backordered, a CAS...alternative source for acquiring bit-piece parts is Navy excess material. Excess material is inventory designated by Navy organizations as meeting...potential alternative source for acquiring bit-piece parts is Navy excess material. Excess material is inventory designated by Navy organizations as
Nuclear Forensics: Report of the AAAS/APS Working Group
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Tannenbaum, Benn
2008-04-01
This report was produced by a Working Group of the American Physical Society's Program on Public Affairs in conjunction with the American Association for the Advancement of Science Center for Science, Technology and Security Policy. The primary purpose of this report is to provide the Congress, U.S. government agencies and other institutions involved in nuclear forensics with a clear unclassified statement of the state of the art of nuclear forensics; an assessment of its potential for preventing and identifying unattributed nuclear attacks; and identification of the policies, resources and human talent to fulfill that potential. In the course of its work, the Working Group observed that nuclear forensics was an essential part of the overall nuclear attribution process, which aims at identifying the origin of unidentified nuclear weapon material and, in the event, an unidentified nuclear explosion. A credible nuclear attribution capability and in particular nuclear forensics capability could deter essential participants in the chain of actors needed to smuggle nuclear weapon material or carry out a nuclear terrorist act and could also encourage states to better secure such materials and weapons. The Working Group also noted that nuclear forensics result would take some time to obtain and that neither internal coordination, nor international arrangements, nor the state of qualified personnel and needed equipment were currently enough to minimize the time needed to reach reliable results in an emergency such as would be caused by a nuclear detonation or the intercept of a weapon-size quantity of material. The Working Group assesses international cooperation to be crucial for forensics to work, since the material would likely come from inadequately documented foreign sources. In addition, international participation, if properly managed, could enhance the credibility of the deterrent effect of attribution. Finally the Working Group notes that the U.S. forensics capability involved a number of agencies and other groups that would have to cooperate rapidly in an emergency and that suitable exercises to ensure such cooperation were needed.
Nuclear threat in the post cold-war era. Monograph
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Kurey, W.S.
1995-05-14
This monograph discusses the nuclear threat that the United States faces following the downfall of the Soviet Union. The Russian and Chinese nuclear arsenals represent a formidable threat that must be countered and a new threat is emerging in the third world despite efforts to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The monograph reviews the current status of both the Russian and Chinese arsenals and lists the programs that are being undertaken to modernize and improve their respective nuclear capabilities. Both nations are taking significant steps to preserve and improve their nuclear strike capability. The proliferation of nuclearmore » weapons technology, fissile material, and ballistic missiles in the third world is an emerging threat to national security interests. The lack of appropriate security measures during the on-going dismantling of the former Soviet nuclear arsenal presents an opportunity for rogue states and terrorist organizations to readily obtain the materials to produce their own nuclear weapons.« less
Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and Agreements
2007-08-09
security and control over nuclear weapons and fissile materials. These projects provided Russia with bullet-proof Kevlar blankets, secure canisters ...U.S. security concerns. The United States and Soviet Union began to sign agreements limiting their strategic offensive nuclear weapons in the early...U.S.-Russian relationship. At the same time, however, the two sides began to cooperate on securing and eliminating Soviet-era nuclear , chemical, and
American-Ukrainian Nuclear Relations
1996-10-01
Ukrainian nuclear question. Foreign Minister Kozyrev was blunt in his view that the Ukrainians were seeking to gain control of the nuclear weapons and...the nuclear material in the weapons on its territory. Kiev was very pleased with the U.S. position, claiming that it mirrored the Ukrainian stance...had pcrsonally directed Kozyrev to come up with language that would please Ukraine and that Russia would be willing to provide the assurances
Director`s series on proliferation
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Bailey, K.C.; Price, M.E.
1994-10-17
This series is an occasional publication of essays on the topics of nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile proliferation. Essays contained in this document include: Key issues on NPT renewal and extension, Africa and nuclear nonproliferation, Kenya`s views on the NPT, Prospects for establishing a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the middle east, effects of a special nuclear weapon materials cut-off convention, and The UK view of NPT renewal.
Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues
2009-07-30
Pakistan: Sabotage of a Spent Fuel Cask or a Commercial Irradiation Source in Transport ,” in Pakistan’s Nuclear Future, 2008; Martellini, 2008. 79...that Pakistan’s strategic nuclear assets could be obtained by terrorists, or used by elements in the Pakistani government. Chair of the Joint Chiefs...that gave additional urgency to the program. Pakistan produced fissile material for its nuclear weapons using gas-centrifuge-based uranium
Superior Weapons Systems Through Castings (SWC)
2012-11-30
little or no additional processing. This reduction in finishing can eliminate more than two-thirds of the production costs for some parts...lower weight and cost with the same or better functionality. The SWC program has successfully: • developed materials that reduce weight and/or are more...critical to the capability of the DoD’s weapon systems. However supply chain constraints have made it difficult to obtain high-quality, lightweight, cost
Nuclear programs in India and Pakistan
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Mian, Zia
India and Pakistan launched their respective nuclear programs in the 1940s and 1950s with considerable foreign technical support, especially from the United States Atoms for Peace Program. The technology and training that was acquired served as the platform for later nuclear weapon development efforts that included nuclear weapon testing in 1974 and in 1998 by India, and also in 1998 by Pakistan - which had illicitly acquired uranium enrichment technology especially from Europe and received assistance from China. As of 2013, both India and Pakistan were continuing to produce fissile material for weapons, in the case of India also formore » nuclear naval fuel, and were developing a diverse array of ballistic and cruise missiles. International efforts to restrain the South Asian nuclear build-up have been largely set aside over the past decade as Pakistani support became central for the U.S. war in Afghanistan and as U.S. geopolitical and economic interests in supporting the rise of India, in part as a counter to China, led to India being exempted both from U.S non-proliferation laws and international nuclear trade guidelines. In the absence of determined international action and with Pakistan blocking the start of talks on a fissile material cutoff treaty, nuclear weapon programs in South Asia are likely to keep growing for the foreseeable future.« less
Nuclear programs in India and Pakistan
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Mian, Zia
2014-05-01
India and Pakistan launched their respective nuclear programs in the 1940s and 1950s with considerable foreign technical support, especially from the United States Atoms for Peace Program. The technology and training that was acquired served as the platform for later nuclear weapon development efforts that included nuclear weapon testing in 1974 and in 1998 by India, and also in 1998 by Pakistan - which had illicitly acquired uranium enrichment technology especially from Europe and received assistance from China. As of 2013, both India and Pakistan were continuing to produce fissile material for weapons, in the case of India also for nuclear naval fuel, and were developing a diverse array of ballistic and cruise missiles. International efforts to restrain the South Asian nuclear build-up have been largely set aside over the past decade as Pakistani support became central for the U.S. war in Afghanistan and as U.S. geopolitical and economic interests in supporting the rise of India, in part as a counter to China, led to India being exempted both from U.S non-proliferation laws and international nuclear trade guidelines. In the absence of determined international action and with Pakistan blocking the start of talks on a fissile material cutoff treaty, nuclear weapon programs in South Asia are likely to keep growing for the foreseeable future.
Passive millimeter-wave concealed weapon detection
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Sinclair, Gordon N.; Anderton, Rupert N.; Appleby, Roger
2001-02-01
A method of detecting weapons concealed under clothing using passive millimeter wave imaging is described. The optical properties of clothing are discussed and examples given of the spectral reflectivity and transmission. The transmission tends to be constant from 60 to 150 GHz above which it decreases for some clothing materials. The transmission of a cotton T-shirt is typically 95% and of a leather jacket up to 85% at lower frequencies. A model is presented for calculating the contrast of a metallic concealed weapon when hidden under clothing and it indicates contrasts as large as 200 K can be realized outdoors. The advantages of real time over static frame imagery are discussed. It is concluded that real time imagery offers considerable advantages as weapons can be very varied in size, position and orientation and movement offers vital clues to the human observer which aid the recognition process.
IMPROVED TECHNNOLOGY TO PREVENT ILLICIT TRAFFICKING IN NUCLEAR MATERIALS
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Richardson, J H
2005-07-20
The proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons (collectively known as weapons of mass destruction, or WMD) and the potential acquisition and use of WMD against the world by terrorists are extremely serious threats to international security. These threats are complex and interrelated. There are myriad routes to weapons of mass destruction--many different starting materials, material sources, and production processes. There are many possible proliferators--threshold countries, rogue states, state-sponsored or transnational terrorists groups, domestic terrorists, and even international crime organizations. Motives for acquiring and using WMD are similarly wide ranging--from a desire to change the regional power balance, deny accessmore » to a strategic area, or alter international policy to extortion, revenge, or hate. Because of the complexity of this threat landscape, no single program, technology, or capability--no silver bullet--can solve the WMD proliferation and terrorism problem. An integrated program is needed that addresses the WMD proliferation and terrorism problem from end to end, from prevention to detection, reversal, and response, while avoiding surprise at all stages, with different activities directed specifically at different types of WMD and proliferators. Radiation detection technologies are an important tool in the prevention of proliferation. A variety of new developments have enabled enhanced performance in terms of energy resolution, spatial resolution, predictive modeling and simulation, active interrogation, and ease of operation and deployment in the field. The radiation properties of nuclear materials, particularly highly enriched uranium (HEU), make the detection of smuggled nuclear materials technically difficult. A number of efforts are under way to devise improved detector materials and instruments and to identify novel signatures that could be detected. Key applications of this work include monitoring for radioactive materials at choke points, searching for nuclear materials, and developing instruments for response personnel.« less
Tomassoni, Anthony J; French, Robert N E; Walter, Frank G
2015-02-01
Toxidromes aid emergency care providers in the context of the patient presenting with suspected poisoning, unexplained altered mental status, unknown hazardous materials or chemical weapons exposure, or the unknown overdose. The ability to capture an adequate chemical exposure history and to recognize toxidromes may reduce dependence on laboratory tests, speed time to delivery of specific antidote therapy, and improve selection of supportive care practices tailored to the etiologic agent. This article highlights elements of the exposure history and presents selected toxidromes that may be caused by toxic industrial chemicals and chemical weapons. Specific antidotes for toxidromes and points regarding their use, and special supportive measures, are presented. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Excess plutonium disposition: The deep borehole option
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Ferguson, K.L.
1994-08-09
This report reviews the current status of technologies required for the disposition of plutonium in Very Deep Holes (VDH). It is in response to a recent National Academy of Sciences (NAS) report which addressed the management of excess weapons plutonium and recommended three approaches to the ultimate disposition of excess plutonium: (1) fabrication and use as a fuel in existing or modified reactors in a once-through cycle, (2) vitrification with high-level radioactive waste for repository disposition, (3) burial in deep boreholes. As indicated in the NAS report, substantial effort would be required to address the broad range of issues relatedmore » to deep bore-hole emplacement. Subjects reviewed in this report include geology and hydrology, design and engineering, safety and licensing, policy decisions that can impact the viability of the concept, and applicable international programs. Key technical areas that would require attention should decisions be made to further develop the borehole emplacement option are identified.« less
1981-03-01
systems, sub- systems, equipment, weapons, tactics, missions, etc. Concepts and Principles - Fundamental truths, ideas, opinions and thoughts formed from...verification, etc. Grasping the meaning of concepts and principles , i.e., understanding the basic principles of infrared and radar detection. Understanding...concepts, principles , procedures, etc.). Analysis A demonstration of a learned process of breaking down material (i.e., data, other information) into
2000-03-01
national security. The focus should include improved intelligence on development of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, their means of...Chemical/ Biological /Nuclear Anti-Terrorism" site provides a variety of links to related materials, (http://www.mindspring.com/~nbcnco) The roots of...vital commercial supplies, and perhaps even the general population with biological or chemical weapons. Accustomed to a qualitative as well as
Underlying Reasons for Success and Failure of Terrorist Attacks: Selected Case Studies
2007-06-04
acquired materials during residence in North Carolina. May have been self- financed . No known dry runs or weapons tests. Two working weapons...Apparently self- financed (total cost less than 8K pounds; possibly AQ directed, inspired, or unaffiliated Jun 28 may have been a dry run Four...the heart of the city’s government district and is within walking distance of the Ministries of Health & Welfare, Foreign Affairs, Finance , and
A Guide to Nuclear Weapons Phenomena and Effects Literature
1984-10-31
and Disarmament Agency. An article entitled "Limited Nuclear War" in Scientific American (Reference ECE-14) is also of interest because of its rela... Sistems and the Aemosphere’-BCj=9. 43 Personne l; .-EP)- / 47 Civilian .S’ector and the .Environment, (ECE) 50 5 SPECIAL REFERENCE MATERIALS (R) ’<ൾ...approximations. DNA has sponsored the development of software for scientific and military applications of nuclear weapon phenomena and effects information
MPA-11: Materials Synthesis and Integrated Devices; Overview of an Applied Energy Group
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Dattelbaum, Andrew Martin
Our mission is to provide innovative and creative chemical synthesis and materials science solutions to solve materials problems across the LANL missions. Our group conducts basic and applied research in areas related to energy security as well as problems relevant to the Weapons Program.
X-ray attenuation properties of stainless steel (u)
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Wang, Lily L; Berry, Phillip C
2009-01-01
Stainless steel vessels are used to enclose solid materials for studying x-ray radiolysis that involves gas release from the materials. Commercially available stainless steel components are easily adapted to form a static or a dynamic condition to monitor the gas evolved from the solid materials during and after the x-ray irradiation. Experimental data published on the x-ray attenuation properties of stainless steel, however, are very scarce, especially over a wide range of x-ray energies. The objective of this work was to obtain experimental data that will be used to determine how a poly-energetic x-ray beam is attenuated by the stainlessmore » steel container wall. The data will also be used in conjunction with MCNP (Monte Carlos Nuclear Particle) modeling to develop an accurate method for determining energy absorbed in known solid samples contained in stainless steel vessels. In this study, experiments to measure the attenuation properties of stainless steel were performed for a range of bremsstrahlung x-ray beams with a maximum energy ranging from 150 keV to 10 MeV. Bremsstrahlung x-ray beams of these energies are commonly used in radiography of engineering and weapon components. The weapon surveillance community has a great interest in understanding how the x-rays in radiography affect short-term and long-term properties of weapon materials.« less
Chemistry and Materials Science progress report, FY 1994. Revision 2
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
NONE
1996-01-01
Thrust areas of the weapons-supporting research include surface science, fundamentals of the physics and processing of metals, energetic materials, etc. The laboratory directed R and D include director`s initiatives, individual projects, and transactinium science studies.
Multi-Detector Analysis System for Spent Nuclear Fuel Characterization
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Reber, Edward Lawrence; Aryaeinejad, Rahmat; Cole, Jerald Donald
1999-09-01
The Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Non-Destructive Analysis (NDA) program at INEEL is developing a system to characterize SNF for fissile mass, radiation source term, and fissile isotopic content. The system is based on the integration of the Fission Assay Tomography System (FATS) and the Gamma-Neutron Analysis Technique (GNAT) developed under programs supported by the DOE Office of Non-proliferation and National Security. Both FATS and GNAT were developed as separate systems to provide information on the location of special nuclear material in weapons configuration (FATS role), and to measure isotopic ratios of fissile material to determine if the material was frommore » a weapon (GNAT role). FATS is capable of not only determining the presence and location of fissile material but also the quantity of fissile material present to within 50%. GNAT determines the ratios of the fissile and fissionable material by coincidence methods that allow the two prompt (immediately) produced fission fragments to be identified. Therefore, from the combination of FATS and GNAT, MDAS is able to measure the fissile material, radiation source term, and fissile isotopics content.« less
McLean, A D
2001-02-01
Burn injury is a ubiquitous threat in the military environment. The risks during combat are well recognised, but the handling of fuel, oil, munitions and other hot or flammable materials during peacetime deployment and training also imposes an inherent risk of accidental burn injury. Over the last hundred years, the burn threat in combat has ranged from nuclear weapons to small shoulder-launched missiles. Materials such as napalm and white phosphorus plainly present a risk of burn, but the threat extends to encompass personnel in vehicles attacked by anti-armour weapons, large missiles, fuel-air explosives and detonations/conflagrations on weapons platforms such as ships. Large numbers of burn casualties were caused at Pearl Harbor, in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Vietnam, during the Arab/Israeli Wars and in the Falkland Islands conflict. The threat from burns is unlikely to diminish, indeed new developments in weapons seek to exploit the vulnerability of the serviceman and servicewoman to burns. Clothing can be a barrier to some types of burn--both inherently in the properties of the material, but also by trapping air between clothing layers. Conversely, ignition of the clothing may exacerbate a burn. There is hearsay that burnt clothing products within a wound may complicate the clinical management, or that materials that melt (thermoplastic materials) should not be worn if there is a burn threat. This paper explores the incidence of burn injury, the mechanisms of heat transfer to bare skin and skin covered by materials, and the published evidence for the complication of wound management by materials. Even light-weight combat clothing can offer significant protection to skin from short duration flash burns; the most vulnerable areas are the parts of the body not covered--face and hands. Multilayered combat clothing can offer significant protection for short periods from engulfment by flames; lightweight tropical wear with few layers offers little protection. Under high heat loads in the laboratory, combat clothing can ignite, but there is little evidence that clothing ignition is a common occurrence in military burn casualties. Thermoplastic materials have many benefits in civil and military clothing. There is little objective evidence that they exacerbate burns, or complicate burn management. Their use in military clothing must be based on objective evidence, not hearsay.
1989-01-01
25 wt % Solid Sorbent Collection solution in water 1. Glass tubing (6.0 mm OD, (Aldrich G400-y or equivalent) 4.0 mm ID) 2. 2,4- Dinitrophenylhydrazine ... dinitrophenylhydrazine in boiling 4M HCI. When the DNPH has dissolved completely, cool the Folution in an ice bath. Collect the yellow crystalline precipitate... dinitrophenylhydrazine . Add the aldehyde in excess to assure that no underivatized DNPH remains. Extract the derivative with dichloromethane. Remove the
Bio-Terrorism Threat and Casualty Prevention
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
NOEL,WILLIAM P.
2000-01-01
The bio-terrorism threat has become the ''poor man's'' nuclear weapon. The ease of manufacture and dissemination has allowed an organization with only rudimentary skills and equipment to pose a significant threat with high consequences. This report will analyze some of the most likely agents that would be used, the ease of manufacture, the ease of dissemination and what characteristics of the public health response that are particularly important to the successful characterization of a high consequence event to prevent excessive causalities.
Defense Threat Reduction Agency Radiochemical Needs
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Walsh, Michael A. R.; Velazquez, Daniel L.
2009-08-01
The United States Government (USG) first developed nuclear forensics-related capabilities to analyze radiological and nuclear materials, including underground nuclear test debris and interdicted materials. Nuclear forensics is not a new mission for Department of Defense (DoD). The department's existing nuclear forensics capability is the result of programs that span six (6) decades and includes activities to assess foreign nuclear weapons testing activities, monitor and verify nuclear arms control treaties, and to support intelligence and law enforcement activities. Today, nuclear forensics must support not only weapons programs and nuclear smuggling incidents, but also the scientific analysis and subsequent attribution of terrorists' use of radiological or nuclear materials/devices. Nuclear forensics can help divulge the source of origin of nuclear materials, the type of design for an interdicted or detonated device, as well as the pathway of the materials or device to the incident. To accomplish this mission, the USG will need trained radiochemists and nuclear scientists to fill new positions and replace the retiring staff.
Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) [SEC 1 THRU 11
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
ULLAH, M K
2001-02-26
The Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) is located on the US Department of Energy (DOE) Hanford Site in south central Washington State. The DOE Richland Operations (DOE-RL) Project Hanford Management Contract (PHMC) is with Fluor Hanford Inc. (FH). Westinghouse Safety Management Systems (WSMS) provides management support to the PFP facility. Since 1991, the mission of the PFP has changed from plutonium material processing to preparation for decontamination and decommissioning (D and D). The PFP is in transition between its previous mission and the proposed D and D mission. The objective of the transition is to place the facility into a stablemore » state for long-term storage of plutonium materials before final disposition of the facility. Accordingly, this update of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) reflects the current status of the buildings, equipment, and operations during this transition. The primary product of the PFP was plutonium metal in the form of 2.2-kg, cylindrical ingots called buttoms. Plutonium nitrate was one of several chemical compounds containing plutonium that were produced as an intermediate processing product. Plutonium recovery was performed at the Plutonium Reclamation Facility (PRF) and plutonium conversion (from a nitrate form to a metal form) was performed at the Remote Mechanical C (RMC) Line as the primary processes. Plutonium oxide was also produced at the Remote Mechanical A (RMA) Line. Plutonium processed at the PFP contained both weapons-grade and fuels-grade plutonium materials. The capability existed to process both weapons-grade and fuels-grade material through the PRF and only weapons-grade material through the RMC Line although fuels-grade material was processed through the line before 1984. Amounts of these materials exist in storage throughout the facility in various residual forms left from previous years of operations.« less
1990-02-01
Representative is Mr. H. C. Race, AMC Smart Weapons Management Office, ATTN: AMSMI-SW, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama 35898- 5222. Reproduction. Permission to...reproduce any material contained in this document must be requested and approved in writing by the AMC Smart Weapons Management Office, AMSMI-SW, Redstone...elevation points, necessitating a large geometric data base that requires heavy computation loads for rendering. The second innovative technique is the
Stealing the Sword: Limiting Terrorist Use of Advanced Conventional Weapons
2007-01-01
ammunition, are combined (see Figure 2.9 for a handgun concept that features four barrels , two with lethal and two with nonlethal ammunition). Other...Weapons Figure 2.9 A Four- Barreled Concept Handgun Mortar Systems Mortars have long been regarded as cheap, lightweight, short-range artillery. Mortars are...Terrorists? 37 manner).63 An example of an advance in lightweight materials for mor- tars is the development of the carbon fiber composite barrel in the
Field Emission Properties of Carbon Nanotube Fibers and Sheets for a High Current Electron Source
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Christy, Larry
Field emission (FE) properties of carbon nanotube (CNT) fibers from Rice University and the University of Cambridge have been studied for use within a high current electron source for a directed energy weapon. Upon reviewing the performance of these two prevalent CNT fibers, cathodes were designed with CNT fibers from the University of Cincinnati Nanoworld Laboratory. Cathodes composed of a single CNT fiber, an array of three CNT fibers, and a nonwoven CNT sheet were investigated for FE properties; the goal was to design a cathode with emission current in excess of 10 mA. Once the design phase was complete, the cathode samples were fabricated, characterized, and then analyzed to determine FE properties. Electrical conductivity of the CNT fibers was characterized with a 4-probe technique. FE characteristics were measured in an ultra-high vacuum chamber at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. The arrayed CNT fiber and the enhanced nonwoven CNT sheet emitter design demonstrated the most promising FE properties. Future work will include further analysis and cathode design using this nonwoven CNT sheet material to increase peak current performance during electron emission.
Manpower Requirements Report FY 1994
1993-06-01
decrease in FY 1993 is primarily due to reductions in advanced weapons (-144), aerospace avionics (-48), materials (-37), and test and evaluation support...sub- sistence, medical goods, industrial and construction material , general and electronic supplies, and petroleum products. Logistic services include...efficiencies resulting from streamlining depots, modernizing/automating materials handling, and a projected decline in contract administration and
Weapons proliferation and organized crime: The Russian military and security force dimension
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Turbiville, G.H.
One dimension of international security of the post-Cold War era that has not received enough attention is how organized crime facilitates weapons proliferation worldwide. The former Soviet Union (FSU) has emerged as the world`s greatest counterproliferation challenge. It contains the best developed links among organized crime, military and security organizations, and weapons proliferation. Furthermore, Russian military and security forces are the principle source of arms becoming available to organized crime groups, participants in regional conflict, and corrupt state officials engaged in the black, gray, and legal arms markets in their various dimensions. The flourishing illegal trade in conventional weapons ismore » the clearest and most tangible manifestation of the close links between Russian power ministries and criminal organizations. The magnitude of the WMD proliferation problem from the FSU is less clear and less tangible. There have been many open reports of small-scale fissile material smuggling out of the FSU. The situation with regard to the proliferation of chemical weapon usually receives less attention but may be more serious. With an acknowledged stockpile of 40,000 metric tons of chemical agents, the potential for proliferation is enormous.« less
30 CFR 717.15 - Disposal of excess rock and earth materials on surface areas.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-07-01
... 30 Mineral Resources 3 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Disposal of excess rock and earth materials on surface areas. 717.15 Section 717.15 Mineral Resources OFFICE OF SURFACE MINING RECLAMATION AND... STANDARDS § 717.15 Disposal of excess rock and earth materials on surface areas. Excess rock and earth...
30 CFR 717.15 - Disposal of excess rock and earth materials on surface areas.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-07-01
... 30 Mineral Resources 3 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Disposal of excess rock and earth materials on surface areas. 717.15 Section 717.15 Mineral Resources OFFICE OF SURFACE MINING RECLAMATION AND... STANDARDS § 717.15 Disposal of excess rock and earth materials on surface areas. Excess rock and earth...
30 CFR 717.15 - Disposal of excess rock and earth materials on surface areas.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-07-01
... 30 Mineral Resources 3 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Disposal of excess rock and earth materials on surface areas. 717.15 Section 717.15 Mineral Resources OFFICE OF SURFACE MINING RECLAMATION AND... STANDARDS § 717.15 Disposal of excess rock and earth materials on surface areas. Excess rock and earth...
30 CFR 717.15 - Disposal of excess rock and earth materials on surface areas.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-07-01
... 30 Mineral Resources 3 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Disposal of excess rock and earth materials on surface areas. 717.15 Section 717.15 Mineral Resources OFFICE OF SURFACE MINING RECLAMATION AND... STANDARDS § 717.15 Disposal of excess rock and earth materials on surface areas. Excess rock and earth...
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Martz, Joseph C; Stevens, Patrice A; Branstetter, Linda
Until very recently, an evaluation of US policy regarding deterrence and the role of its nuclear weapons arsenal as a deterrent has been largely absent in the public debate. With President's Obama embrace of a goal of a future world without nuclear weapons, issues of nuclear policy and deterrence have just recently risen to the forefront of policy discussions. The traditional role of US nuclear weapons-to deter the use of nuclear weapons by other states-endures, but is no longer unique nor even predominant. In an increasingly multi-polar world, the US now faces growing risks of nuclear weapons proliferation; the spreadmore » of weapons of mass destruction generally to non-state, substate and transnational actors; cyber, space, economic, environmental and resource threats along with the application of numerous other forms of 'soft power' in ways that are inimical to national security and to global stability. What concept of deterrence should the US seek to maintain in the 21st Century? That question remains fluid and central to the current debate. Recently there has been a renewed focusing of attention on the role of US nuclear weapons and a national discussion about what the underlying policy should be. In this environment, both the United States and Russia have committed to drastic reductions in their nuclear arsenals, while still maintaining forces sufficient to ensure unacceptable consequence in response to acts of aggression. Further, the declared nuclear powers have maintained that a limited nuclear arsenal continues to provide insurance against uncertain developments in a changing world. In this environment of US and Russian stockpile reductions, all declared nuclear states have reiterated the central role which nuclear weapons continue to provide for their supreme national security interests. Given this new environment and the challenges of the next several decades, how might the United States structure its policy and forces with regard to nuclear weapons? Many competing objectives have been stated across the spectrum of political, social, and military thought. These objectives include goals of ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, recommitment to further downsizing of the nuclear arsenal, embracing a long-term goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons, limitations on both the production complex and upgrades to nuclear weapons and delivery systems, and controls and constraints to limit proliferation of nuclear materials and weapons, particularly to rogue states and terrorist groups.« less
[Physical diseases in alcoholism].
Takase, Kojiro
2015-09-01
Rapid excessive alcohol drinking frequently causes disturbance of consciousness due to head trauma, brain edema, hypoglycemia, hyponatremia, hepatic coma and so on, provoked by acute alcohol intoxication. Rapid differential diagnosis and management are extremely important to save a life. On the other hands, the chronic users of alcohol so called alcoholism has many kinds of physical diseases such as liver diseases (i.e., fatty liver, alcoholic hepatitis, alcoholic liver cirrhosis and miscellaneous liver disease), diabetes mellitus, injury to happen in drunkenness, pancreas disease (i.e., acute and chronic pancreatitis and deterioration of chronic pancreatitis), gastrontestinal diseases (i.e., gastroduodenal ulcer), and so on. Enough attention should be paid to above mentioned diseases, otherwise they would turn worse more with continuation and increase in quantity of the alcohol. It should be born in its mind that the excessive drinking becomes the weapon threatening life.
Uranium Conversion & Enrichment
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Karpius, Peter Joseph
2017-02-06
The isotopes of uranium that are found in nature, and hence in ‘fresh’ Yellowcake’, are not in relative proportions that are suitable for power or weapons applications. The goal of conversion then is to transform the U 3O 8 yellowcake into UF 6. Conversion and enrichment of uranium is usually required to obtain material with enough 235U to be usable as fuel in a reactor or weapon. The cost, size, and complexity of practical conversion and enrichment facilities aid in nonproliferation by design.
2007-03-01
similar in structure to HMX. HMX is used to implode fissionable material in nuclear devices to achieve critical mass and as a component of plastic...extent of DTRA activities on WSMR and reduce the Department of Defense capability to control and eliminate weapons of mass destruction. The Final...safeguarding the United States and its allies from weapons of mass destruction (WMD). DTRA maintains a number of test beds and target types at White Sands
2016-02-01
functionality in weapon system components. Many steps in the rare earths supply chain, such as mining , are conducted in China, a situation that may pose...functionality in weapon systems components.1 Many steps in the rare earths supply chain, such as mining and refining the ore, are primarily conducted outside...are difficult and costly to mine and process. Rare earth elements are Page 5 GAO-16-161 Rare Earth Materials often classified as either
Marine Corps Research and Development Objectives Document (RADOD)
1980-08-08
461.1 Data exchange /joint projects, evaluation of foreign weapon systems .......................... N/A MANAGEMENT SUPPORT 471.0 General management...DI3ZITiL WIDEBAND TtAMSISSION ;YSTem W2AK D~ CQ)43L CCC 9S22 AUTOMATED DATA ENTlY SYSTEM (AES) usM: CCC 9269 ORMBDAND 3MNDIRE:TID04AL VHF 4NTEM44...Standardization and Interoper- ability through data exchanges , joint projects, evaluation of foreign weapon systems , material or related technology. 461.0
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
BLEJWAS,THOMAS E.; SANDERS,THOMAS L.; EAGAN,ROBERT J.
2000-01-01
Nuclear power is an important and, the authors believe, essential component of a secure nuclear future. Although nuclear fuel cycles create materials that have some potential for use in nuclear weapons, with appropriate fuel cycles, nuclear power could reduce rather than increase real proliferation risk worldwide. Future fuel cycles could be designed to avoid plutonium production, generate minimal amounts of plutonium in proliferation-resistant amounts or configurations, and/or transparently and efficiently consume plutonium already created. Furthermore, a strong and viable US nuclear infrastructure, of which nuclear power is a large element, is essential if the US is to maintain a leadershipmore » or even participatory role in defining the global nuclear infrastructure and controlling the proliferation of nuclear weapons. By focusing on new fuel cycles and new reactor technologies, it is possible to advantageously burn and reduce nuclear materials that could be used for nuclear weapons rather than increase and/or dispose of these materials. Thus, the authors suggest that planners for a secure nuclear future use technology to design an ideal future. In this future, nuclear power creates large amounts of virtually atmospherically clean energy while significantly lowering the threat of proliferation through the thoughtful use, physical security, and agreed-upon transparency of nuclear materials. The authors must develop options for policy makers that bring them as close as practical to this ideal. Just as Atoms for Peace became the ideal for the first nuclear century, they see a potential nuclear future that contributes significantly to power for peace and prosperity.« less
Kozachenko, I N
2016-01-01
The classification of the injuries inflicted to the human body by gunshots from the pneumatic weapons remains to be developed. The objective of the present work was to elaborate the classification of the injuries caused by gunshots from the pneumatic weapons based on the analysis of 98 expert and acts of forensic medical expertises (surveys) of living subjects (n=76) and corpses (n=22) affected by gunshots from the pneumatic weapons. These materials were collected from the bureaus of forensic medical expertise in different regions of the Ukraine during the period from 2006 till 2015. In addition, scientific publications concerned with the problem of interest were used along with the relevant explanatory and terminological dictionaries. The terminology and the conceptual framework proposed by the author in the earlier papers provided a basis for the development of the first standard classification of the injuries inflicted to the human body by gunshots from the pneumatic weapons categorized into 15 groups. It is believed that this classification will lay the foundation for the common approach of forensic medical experts to the examination and analysis of the data on the gunshots from the pneumatic weapons used to be found on the bodies of living subjects and the corpses. Moreover, it may be useful for the clinicians in their diagnostic and therapeutic practices and for the legal practitioners engaged in the quality assessment of the results of forensic medical expertises. It is recommended to present information about the gunshots from the pneumatic weapons in the accounting documents in a separate line.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Herron, K.G.; Jenkins-Smith, H.C.
This study analyzes findings from a national survey of 2,490 randomly selected members of the US public conducted between September 30 and November 14, 1995. It provides an over time comparison of public perceptions about nuclear weapons risks and benefits and key nuclear policy issues between 1993 and 1995. Other areas of investigation include policy preferences regarding nuclear proliferation, terrorism, US/Russian nuclear cooperation, and personal security. Public perceptions of post-cold war security were found to be evolving in unexpected ways. The perceived threat of nuclear conflict involving the US had not declined, and the threat of nuclear conflict between othermore » countries and fears of nuclear proliferation and terrorism had increased. Perceived risks associated with managing the US nuclear arsenal were also higher. Perceptions of external and domestic benefits from US nuclear weapons were not declining. Support was found for increasing funding for nuclear weapons safety, training, and maintenance, but most respondents favored decreasing funding for developing and testing new nuclear weapons. Strong support was evident for programs and funding to prevent nuclear proliferation and terrorism. Though skeptical that nuclear weapons can be eliminated, most respondents supported reducing the US nuclear arsenal, banning nuclear test explosions, and ending production of fissile materials to make nuclear weapons. Statistically significant relationships were found between perceptions of nuclear weapons risks and benefits and policy and spending preferences. Demographic variables and basic social and political beliefs were systematically related both to risk and benefit perceptions and policy and spending options.« less
International Nuclear Security
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Doyle, James E.
2012-08-14
This presentation discusses: (1) Definitions of international nuclear security; (2) What degree of security do we have now; (3) Limitations of a nuclear security strategy focused on national lock-downs of fissile materials and weapons; (4) What do current trends say about the future; and (5) How can nuclear security be strengthened? Nuclear security can be strengthened by: (1) More accurate baseline inventories; (2) Better physical protection, control and accounting; (3) Effective personnel reliability programs; (4) Minimize weapons-usable materials and consolidate to fewer locations; (5) Consider local threat environment when siting facilities; (6) Implement pledges made in the NSS process; andmore » (7) More robust interdiction, emergency response and special operations capabilities. International cooperation is desirable, but not always possible.« less
Russian Contract Procurement Document
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Tobin, J G
2010-03-29
This contract supports the enhancement of physical protection or nuclear material control and accounting systems at institutes or enterprises of the newly independent states under the material protection control and accounting (MPC&A) program. The contract is entered into pursuant to the MPC&A Program, a gratuitous technical assistance program, in accordance with the bilateral Agreements between the Russian Federation and the United States of America concerning the Safe and Secure Transportation, Storage and Destruction of Weapons and the Prevention of Weapons Proliferation of June 1992, as extended and amended by Protocol signed of June 1999, Agreement between the Government of themore » Russian Federation regarding Cooperation in the Area of Nuclear Materials Physical Protection, Control and Accounting of October 1999 and the Russian Federation law of May 1999 on the taxation exemption of gratuitous technical assistance with Russian Federation under registration No.DOE001000.« less
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Carmack, Jon; Hayes, Steven; Walters, L. C.
This document explores startup fuel options for a proposed test/demonstration fast reactor. The fuel options considered are the metallic fuels U-Zr and U-Pu-Zr and the ceramic fuels UO 2 and UO 2-PuO 2 (MOX). Attributes of the candidate fuel choices considered were feedstock availability, fabrication feasibility, rough order of magnitude cost and schedule, and the existing irradiation performance database. The reactor-grade plutonium bearing fuels (U-Pu-Zr and MOX) were eliminated from consideration as the initial startup fuels because the availability and isotopics of domestic plutonium feedstock is uncertain. There are international sources of reactor grade plutonium feedstock but isotopics and availabilitymore » are also uncertain. Weapons grade plutonium is the only possible source of Pu feedstock in sufficient quantities needed to fuel a startup core. Currently, the available U.S. source of (excess) weapons-grade plutonium is designated for irradiation in commercial light water reactors (LWR) to a level that would preclude diversion. Weapons-grade plutonium also contains a significant concentration of gallium. Gallium presents a potential issue for both the fabrication of MOX fuel as well as possible performance issues for metallic fuel. Also, the construction of a fuel fabrication line for plutonium fuels, with or without a line to remove gallium, is expected to be considerably more expensive than for uranium fuels. In the case of U-Pu-Zr, a relatively small number of fuel pins have been irradiated to high burnup, and in no case has a full assembly been irradiated to high burnup without disassembly and re-constitution. For MOX fuel, the irradiation database from the Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) is extensive. If a significant source of either weapons-grade or reactor-grade Pu became available (i.e., from an international source), a startup core based on Pu could be reconsidered.« less
Reformulation of Nonlinear Anisotropic Crystal Elastoplasticity for Impact Physics
2015-03-01
interest include metals, ceramics , minerals, and energetic materials . Accurate, efficient, stable, and thermodynamically consistent models for...Clayton JD. Phase field theory and analysis of pressure-shear induced amorphization and failure in boron carbide ceramic . AIMS Materials Science. 2014;1...of Nonlinear Anisotropic Crystal Elastoplasticity for Impact Physics by JD Clayton Weapons and Materials Research Directorate, ARL
Spring 2005 Industry Study. Strategic Materials
2005-01-01
Research Laboratory, Weapons and Materials Research Center. Presented at ARL, Aberdeen, MD. March 17, 2005. Ashley, Steven. “ Alchemy of a...Spring 2005 Industry Study Final Report Strategic Materials The Industrial College of the Armed Forces National...the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data
31 CFR 549.313 - Financial, material, or technological support.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-07-01
... transmission of value; weapons or related materiel; chemical or biological agents; explosives; false..., formulae, tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals, or other recorded instructions. ...
31 CFR 548.313 - Financial, material, or technological support.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-07-01
... transmission of value; weapons or related materiel; chemical or biological agents; explosives; false..., formulae, tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals, or other recorded instructions. ...
31 CFR 549.313 - Financial, material, or technological support.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-07-01
... transmission of value; weapons or related materiel; chemical or biological agents; explosives; false..., formulae, tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals, or other recorded instructions. ...
31 CFR 548.313 - Financial, material, or technological support.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-07-01
... transmission of value; weapons or related materiel; chemical or biological agents; explosives; false..., formulae, tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals, or other recorded instructions. ...
31 CFR 537.327 - Financial, material, or technological support.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-07-01
... transmission of value; weapons or related materiel; chemical or biological agents; explosives; false..., formulae, tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals, or other recorded instructions. ...
31 CFR 548.313 - Financial, material, or technological support.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-07-01
... transmission of value; weapons or related materiel; chemical or biological agents; explosives; false..., formulae, tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals, or other recorded instructions. ...
31 CFR 548.313 - Financial, material, or technological support.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-07-01
... transmission of value; weapons or related materiel; chemical or biological agents; explosives; false..., formulae, tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals, or other recorded instructions. ...
31 CFR 549.313 - Financial, material, or technological support.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-07-01
... transmission of value; weapons or related materiel; chemical or biological agents; explosives; false..., formulae, tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals, or other recorded instructions. ...
31 CFR 548.313 - Financial, material, or technological support.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-07-01
... transmission of value; weapons or related materiel; chemical or biological agents; explosives; false..., formulae, tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals, or other recorded instructions. ...
31 CFR 549.313 - Financial, material, or technological support.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-07-01
... transmission of value; weapons or related materiel; chemical or biological agents; explosives; false..., formulae, tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals, or other recorded instructions. ...
Actinide Waste Forms and Radiation Effects
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Ewing, R. C.; Weber, W. J.
Over the past few decades, many studies of actinides in glasses and ceramics have been conducted that have contributed substantially to the increased understanding of actinide incorporation in solids and radiation effects due to actinide decay. These studies have included fundamental research on actinides in solids and applied research and development related to the immobilization of the high level wastes (HLW) from commercial nuclear power plants and processing of nuclear weapons materials, environmental restoration in the nuclear weapons complex, and the immobilization of weapons-grade plutonium as a result of disarmament activities. Thus, the immobilization of actinides has become a pressing issue for the twenty-first century (Ewing, 1999), and plutonium immobilization, in particular, has received considerable attention in the USA (Muller et al., 2002; Muller and Weber, 2001). The investigation of actinides and
15 CFR 738.2 - Commerce Control List (CCL) structure.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-01-01
... 1: Missile Technology reasons 2: Nuclear Nonproliferation reasons 3: Chemical & Biological Weapons...) Categories. The CCL is divided into 10 categories, numbered as follows: 0—Nuclear Materials, Facilities and... and Production Equipment C—Materials D—Software E—Technology (c) Order of review. In order to classify...
15 CFR 738.2 - Commerce Control List (CCL) structure.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-01-01
... 1: Missile Technology reasons 2: Nuclear Nonproliferation reasons 3: Chemical & Biological Weapons...) Categories. The CCL is divided into 10 categories, numbered as follows: 0—Nuclear Materials, Facilities and... and Production Equipment C—Materials D—Software E—Technology (c) Order of review. In order to classify...
31 CFR 539.308 - Information or informational materials.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-07-01
... 31 Money and Finance: Treasury 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Information or informational materials. 539.308 Section 539.308 Money and Finance: Treasury Regulations Relating to Money and Finance (Continued) OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION TRADE...
31 CFR 594.317 - Financial, material, or technological support.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-07-01
... other transmission of value; weapons or related materiel; chemical or biological agents; explosives..., diagrams, models, formulae, tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals, or other recorded...
31 CFR 542.304 - Financial, material, or technological support.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-07-01
... other transmission of value; weapons or related materiel; chemical or biological agents; explosives..., diagrams, models, formulae, tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals, or other recorded...
31 CFR 588.312 - Financial, material, or technological support.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-07-01
... other transmission of value; weapons or related materiel; chemical or biological agents; explosives..., diagrams, models, formulae, tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals, or other recorded...
31 CFR 594.317 - Financial, material, or technological support.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-07-01
... other transmission of value; weapons or related materiel; chemical or biological agents; explosives..., diagrams, models, formulae, tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals, or other recorded...
31 CFR 594.317 - Financial, material, or technological support.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-07-01
... other transmission of value; weapons or related materiel; chemical or biological agents; explosives..., diagrams, models, formulae, tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals, or other recorded...
31 CFR 588.312 - Financial, material, or technological support.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-07-01
... other transmission of value; weapons or related materiel; chemical or biological agents; explosives..., diagrams, models, formulae, tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals, or other recorded...
31 CFR 594.317 - Financial, material, or technological support.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-07-01
... other transmission of value; weapons or related materiel; chemical or biological agents; explosives..., diagrams, models, formulae, tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals, or other recorded...
31 CFR 594.317 - Financial, material, or technological support.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-07-01
... other transmission of value; weapons or related materiel; chemical or biological agents; explosives..., diagrams, models, formulae, tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals, or other recorded...
31 CFR 588.312 - Financial, material, or technological support.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-07-01
... other transmission of value; weapons or related materiel; chemical or biological agents; explosives..., diagrams, models, formulae, tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals, or other recorded...
31 CFR 588.312 - Financial, material, or technological support.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-07-01
... other transmission of value; weapons or related materiel; chemical or biological agents; explosives..., diagrams, models, formulae, tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals, or other recorded...
31 CFR 547.313 - Financial, material, or technological support.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-07-01
..., or any other transmission of value; weapons or related materiel; chemical or biological agents..., diagrams, models, formulae, tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals, or other recorded...
31 CFR 546.313 - Financial, material, or technological support.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-07-01
...; weapons or related materiel; chemical or biological agents; explosives; false documentation or..., tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals, or other recorded instructions. [77 FR 6465, Feb...
31 CFR 543.313 - Financial, material, or technological support.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-07-01
... transmission of value; weapons or related materiel; chemical or biological agents; explosives; false..., formulae, tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals, or other recorded instructions. [77 FR...
31 CFR 546.313 - Financial, material, or technological support.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-07-01
...; weapons or related materiel; chemical or biological agents; explosives; false documentation or..., tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals, or other recorded instructions. [77 FR 6465, Feb...
31 CFR 546.313 - Financial, material, or technological support.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-07-01
...; weapons or related materiel; chemical or biological agents; explosives; false documentation or..., tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals, or other recorded instructions. [77 FR 6465, Feb...
31 CFR 547.313 - Financial, material, or technological support.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-07-01
..., or any other transmission of value; weapons or related materiel; chemical or biological agents..., diagrams, models, formulae, tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals, or other recorded...
31 CFR 595.317 - Financial, material, or technological support.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-07-01
... transmission of value; weapons or related materiel; chemical or biological agents; explosives; false..., formulae, tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals, or other recorded instructions. [78 FR...
31 CFR 543.313 - Financial, material, or technological support.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-07-01
... transmission of value; weapons or related materiel; chemical or biological agents; explosives; false..., formulae, tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals, or other recorded instructions. [77 FR...
31 CFR 595.317 - Financial, material, or technological support.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-07-01
... transmission of value; weapons or related materiel; chemical or biological agents; explosives; false..., formulae, tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals, or other recorded instructions. [78 FR...
31 CFR 543.313 - Financial, material, or technological support.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-07-01
... transmission of value; weapons or related materiel; chemical or biological agents; explosives; false..., formulae, tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals, or other recorded instructions. [77 FR...
31 CFR 547.313 - Financial, material, or technological support.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-07-01
..., or any other transmission of value; weapons or related materiel; chemical or biological agents..., diagrams, models, formulae, tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals, or other recorded...
75 FR 59176 - DoD Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR) Program
Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014
2010-09-27
... under Section 142 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. Transclassification of Foreign Nuclear... Department of Energy (or antecedent Agencies) and the Department of Defense that such information relates... atomic weapons; (2) Production of special nuclear material; or (3) Use of special nuclear material in the...
A Military Guide to Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century
2007-08-15
B-1 Handguns ...Compiled from open source materials , this handbook promotes a “Threats” perspective and enemy situational awareness of U.S. strategies and operations in...are one of the most effective casualty producing weapons in the ongoing coalition presence in Iraq. Syria’s political and material support of
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Hoffman, B.
This report examines recent trends and future prospects of terrorism in the United States and assesses their implications for the possibility of a terrorist group attempting an act of nuclear terrorism involving either the theft of a weapons system or strategic nuclear material or an attack on a weapons facility. An emerging trend of ideologically motivated terrorism by groups espousing white supremacist and anti-federalist beliefs or opposing specific issues such as abortion has largely supplanted the ethnic centered violence that dominated earlier domestic terrorist activity. The threat to U.S. nuclear weapons facilities from unknown terrorist groups in this country cannotmore » be considered high at this time. There is no evidence to suggest that any of the organizations reviewed in this study have seriously contemplated a nuclear-related act, nor is there any indication that any group is poised to undertake such an attack in the future. Nevertheless, trends in the terrorist activities of certain groups must be considered in the context of possible operations directed against nuclear weapons sites. Members of these groups are considerably more skilled with weapons than are other terrorist in this country, they possess large stockpiles of sophisticated weapons, they are well trained guerrilla warfare and survival techniques, and they possess an apocalyptic vision of the future-factors that make them the most likely domestic terrorists to attempt an act of nuclear terrorism. In sum, while the volume of annual terrorist incidents in the United States is relatively small, the emerging trends merit intensive and continuing attention.« less
Keeping Nuclear Materials Secure
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
None
For 50 years, Los Alamos National Laboratory has been helping to keep nuclear materials secure. We do this by developing instruments and training inspectors that are deployed to other countries to make sure materials such as uranium are being used for peaceful purposes and not diverted for use in weapons. These measures are called “nuclear safeguards,” and they help make the world a safer place.
Physics in the Confrontation of Nuclear Weapons
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Toevs, James
2011-03-01
Had the detonations on 9/11 involved nuclear explosives rather than jet fuel the number of deaths and the costs would have been multiplied by 100 or 1,000. This talk will briefly describe the nuclear threat and then focus on the technologies, both extant and evolving, for the detection and interdiction of clandestine trafficking of nuclear weapons and nuclear and radiological material. The methods vary from passive detection of heat, gamma radiation, neutrons, or other signatures from nuclear material, through radiological approaches to examine contents of vehicles and cargo containers, to active interrogation concepts that are under development. All of these methods have major physics components ranging from simple gamma ray detection as learned in a senior undergraduate lab to the latest ideas in muon production and acceleration.
The Mesoscale Science of the Matter-Radiation Interactions in Extremes (MaRIE) project
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Kippen, Karen Elizabeth; Montoya, Donald Raymond
The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) requires the ability to understand and test how material structures, defects, and interfaces determine performance in extreme environments such as in nuclear weapons. To do this, MaRIE will be an x-ray source that is laser-like and brilliant with very fl exible and fast pulses to see at weapons-relevant time scales, and with high enough energy to study critical materials. The Department of Energy (DOE) has determined there is a mission need for MaRIE to deliver this capability. MaRIE can use some of the existing infrastructure of the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE) andmore » its accelerator capability. MaRIE will be built as a strategic partnership of DOE national laboratories and university collaborators.« less
Design of integrated laser initiator
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Cao, Chunqiang; He, Aifeng; Jing, Bo; Ma, Yue
2018-03-01
This paper analyzes the design principle of integrated laser detonator, introduces the design method of integrated laser Detonators. Based on the integrated laser detonator, structure, laser energy -exchange device, circuit design and the energetic material properties and the charge parameters, developed a high level of integration Antistatic ability Small size of the integrated laser prototype Detonator. The laser detonator prototype antistatic ability of 25 kV. The research of this paper can solve the key design of laser detonator miniaturization and integration of weapons and equipment, satisfy the electromagnetic safety and micro weapons development of explosive demand.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Paul, J. N.; Chin, M. R.; Sjoden, G. E.
2013-07-01
A mobile 'drive by' passive radiation detection system to be applied in special nuclear materials (SNM) storage facilities for validation and compliance purposes has been designed through the use of computational modeling and new radiation detection methods. This project was the result of work over a 1 year period to create optimal design specifications to include creation of 3D models using both Monte Carlo and deterministic codes to characterize the gamma and neutron leakage out each surface of SNM-bearing canisters. Results were compared and agreement was demonstrated between both models. Container leakages were then used to determine the expected reactionmore » rates using transport theory in the detectors when placed at varying distances from the can. A 'typical' background signature was incorporated to determine the minimum signatures versus the probability of detection to evaluate moving source protocols with collimation. This established the criteria for verification of source presence and time gating at a given vehicle speed. New methods for the passive detection of SNM were employed and shown to give reliable identification of age and material for highly enriched uranium (HEU) and weapons grade plutonium (WGPu). The finalized 'Mobile Pit Verification System' (MPVS) design demonstrated that a 'drive-by' detection system, collimated and operating at nominally 2 mph, is capable of rapidly verifying each and every weapon pit stored in regularly spaced, shelved storage containers, using completely passive gamma and neutron signatures for HEU and WGPu. This system is ready for real evaluation to demonstrate passive total material accountability in storage facilities. (authors)« less
U, Pu, and Am nuclear signatures of the Thule hydrogen bomb debris.
Eriksson, Mats; Lindahl, Patric; Roos, Per; Dahlgaard, Henning; Holm, Elis
2008-07-01
This study concerns an arctic marine environment that was contaminated by actinide elements after a nuclear accident in 1968, the so-called Thule accident In this study we have analyzed five isolated hot particles as well as sediment samples containing particles from the weapon material for the determination of the nuclear fingerprint of the accident. We report that the fissile material in the hydrogen weapons involved in the Thule accident was a mixture of highly enriched uranium and weapon-grade plutonium and that the main fissile material was 235U (about 4 times more than the mass of 239Pu). In the five hot particles examined, the measured uranium atomic ratio was 235U/238U = 1.02 +/- 0.16 and the Pu-isotopic ratios were as follows: 24Pu/239Pu = 0.0551 +/- 0.0008 (atom ratio), 238Pu/239+240Pu = 0.0161 +/- 0.0005 (activity ratio), 241Pu/239+240Pu = 0.87 +/- 0.12 (activity ratio), and 241Am/ 239+240Pu = 0.169 +/- 0.005 (activity ratio) (reference date 2001-10-01). From the activity ratios of 241Pu/241Am, we estimated the time of production of this weapon material to be from the late 1950s to the early 1960s. The results from reanalyzed bulk sediment samples showed the presence of more than one Pu source involved in the accident, confirming earlier studies. The 238Pu/239+240PU activity ratio and the 240Pu/ 239Pu atomic ratio were divided into at least two Pu-isotopic ratio groups. For both Pu-isotopic ratios, one ratio group had identical ratios as the five hot particles described above and for the other groups the Pu isotopic ratios were lower (238Pu/ 239+240PU activity ratio approximately 0.01 and the 240Pu/P239Pu atomic ratio 0.03). On the studied particles we observed that the U/Pu ratio decreased as a function of the time these particles were present in the sediment. We hypothesis that the decrease in the ratio is due to a preferential leaching of U relative to Pu from the particle matrix.
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Johnson, J. Bruce; Reeve, S. W.; Burns, W. A.; Allen, Susan D.
2010-04-01
Termed Special Nuclear Material (SNM) by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, fissile materials, such as 235U and 239Pu, are the primary components used to construct modern nuclear weapons. Detecting the clandestine presence of SNM represents an important capability for Homeland Security. An ideal SNM sensor must be able to detect fissile materials present at ppb levels, be able to distinguish between the source of the detected fissile material, i.e., 235U, 239Pu, 233U or other fission source, and be able to perform the discrimination in near real time. A sensor with such capabilities would provide not only rapid identification of a threat but, ultimately, information on the potential source of the threat. For example, current detection schemes for monitoring clandestine nuclear testing and nuclear fuel reprocessing to provide weapons grade fissile material rely largely on passive air sampling combined with a subsequent instrumental analysis or some type of wet chemical analysis of the collected material. It would be highly useful to have a noncontact method of measuring isotopes capable of providing forensic information rapidly at ppb levels of detection. Here we compare the use of Kr, Xe and I as "canary" species for distinguishing between 235U and 239Pu fission sources by spectroscopic methods.
Using Ferromagnetic Material to Extend and Shield the Magnetic Field of a Coil
2017-06-14
ARL-MR-0954 ● Jun 2017 US Army Research Laboratory Using Ferromagnetic Material to Extend and Shield the Magnetic Field of a...to Extend and Shield the Magnetic Field of a Coil by W Casey Uhlig Weapons and Materials Research Directorate, ARL...Using Ferromagnetic Material to Extend and Shield the Magnetic Field of a Coil 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Daleus, Lennart
1975-01-01
A nationwide debate occurred in Sweden concerning their nuclear power program. The debate centered on safety, waste management, and use of weapons-grade material. Parliament voted for nuclear power despite negative public opinion. (MR)
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Ruffin, Paul; Brantley, Christina; Edwards, Eugene; Hutcheson, Guilford
2006-03-01
The Army Aviation and Missile Research, Development, and Engineering Center (AMRDEC) and the Army Research Laboratory (ARL) have initiated a joint advanced technology demonstration program entitled "Prognostics/Diagnostics for the Future Force (PDFF)" with a key objective of developing low or no power embedded sensor suites for harsh environmental monitoring. The most critical challenge of the program is to specify requirements for the embedded sensor suites which will perform on-board diagnostics, maintain a history of sensor data, and forecast weapon health. The authors are currently collaborating with the PDFF program managers and potential customers to quantify the requirements for remotely operated, micro/nano-technology-based sensors for a host of candidate weapon systems. After requirements are finalized, current micro/nanotechnology-based temperature, humidity, g-shock, vibration and chemical sensors for monitoring the out-gassing of weapons propellant, as well as hazardous gaseous species on the battlefield and in urban environments will be improved to meet the full requirements of the PDFF program. In this paper, performance requirements such as power consumption, reliability, maintainability, survivability, size, and cost, along with the associated technical challenges for micro/nanotechnology-based sensor systems operating in military environments, are discussed. In addition, laboratory results from the design and testing of a wireless sensor array, which was developed using a thin film of functionalized carbon nanotube materials, are presented. Conclusions from the research indicate that the detection of bio-hazardous materials is possible using passive and active wireless sensors based on monitoring the reflected phase from the sensor.
Technical approaches to reducing the threat of nuclear terrorism
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Priedhorsky, William C.
2005-04-01
The threat of a nuclear attack on the United States by terrorists using a smuggled weapon is now considered more likely than an attack by a nuclear-armed ballistic missle. Consequently it is important to understand what can be done to detect and intercept a nuclear weapon being smuggled into the United States. A significant quantity of smuggled nuclear material has been intercepted already, but science and technology have so far contributed little to its interception. The critical special nuclear materials, plutonium and highly enriched uranium, are only weakly radioactive and detection of their radioactivity is limited both by atmospheric attenuation and by competition with natural backgrounds. Although many schemes for long-range detection of radioactivity have been proposed, none so far appears feasible. Detection of nuclear radiation can be improved using new technologies and sensing systems, but it will still be possible only at relatively small distances. Consequently the best approach to containing dangerous nuclear materials is at their sources; containment within lengthy borders and large areas is extremely difficult.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Sandmeier, H.A.; Hansen, G.E.; Seamon, R.E.
This report lists 42-group, coupled, neutron -gamma cross sections for H, D, T, /sup 3/He, /sup 4/He, /sup 6/Li, /sup 7/Li, Be, /sup 10/B, /sup 11/B, C, N, O, Na, Mg, Ai, Si, Cl, A, K, Ca, Fe, Cu, W, Pb, /sup 235/U, /sup 238/U, / sup 239/Pu, and /sup 240/Pu. Most of these materials are used in nuclear- weaponseffects calculations, where the elements for air, ground, and sea water are needed. Further, lists are given of cross sections for materials used in nuclear weapons vulnerability calculations, such as the elements of high explosives as well as materials that willmore » undergo fusion and fission. Most of the common reactor materials are also listed. The 42 coupled neutron-gamma groups are split into 30 neutron groups (17 MeV through 1.39 x 10/sup -4/ eV) and 12 gamma groups (10 MeV through 0.01 MeV). Data sources and averaging schemes used for the development of these multigroup parameters are given. (119 tables) (auth)« less
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Mishra, Sitakanta; Ahmed, Mansoor
In 2012, India and Pakistan reaffirmed the Agreement on Reducing the Risk from Accidents Relating to Nuclear Weapons. Despite a history of mutual animosity and persistent conflict between the two countries, this agreement derives strength from a few successful nuclear confidence building measures that have stood the test of time. It also rests on the hope that the region would be spared a nuclear holocaust from an accidental nuclear weapon detonation that might be misconstrued as a deliberate use of a weapon by the other side. This study brings together two emerging strategic analysts from South Asia to explore measuresmore » to support the Agreement and further develop cooperation around this critical issue. This study briefly dwells upon the strategic landscape of nuclear South Asia with the respective nuclear force management structures, doctrines, and postures of India and Pakistan. It outlines the measures in place for the physical protection and safety of nuclear warheads, nuclear materials, and command and control mechanisms in the two countries, and it goes on to identify the prominent, emerging challenges posed by the introduction of new weapon technologies and modernization of the respective strategic forces. This is followed by an analysis of the agreement itself leading up to a proposed framework for cooperative measures that might enhance the spirit and implementation of the agreement.« less
OH-6A Helicopter, Unarmed (Clean) and Armed with the XM-7 or XM-8 Weapon Subsystem. Part II
1964-08-01
the engine response rates and acceleration rates were adequate. Large rotor speed variations caused by transient droop were not encountered...unsatisfactory. The transient power turbine droop was excessive when such large, rapid power demands were made and in some cases« the rotor speed decreased...r I ’ To CLGAK <A SÖ/ÖBSTACUC ■ ■ t ■ ■ • • GROSS ^Ct& HT ’>f^ LW , ; i i fCCT C R € PS" K’ p f V^ ? P. fJ »A I > i
Hanson, Todd
2016-07-01
Here, the historical material culture produced by American Cold War nuclear weapons testing includes objects of scientific inquiry that can be generally categorized as being either ephemeral or enduring. Objects deemed to be ephemeral were of a less substantial nature, being impermanent and expendable in a nuclear test, while enduring objects were by nature more durable and long-lasting. Although all of these objects were ultimately subject to disappearance, the processes by which they were transformed, degraded, or destroyed prior to their disappearing differ. Drawing principally upon archaeological theory, this paper proposes a functional dichotomy for categorizing and studying the historicalmore » trajectories of nuclear weapons testing technoscience artifacts. In examining the transformation patterns of steel towers and concrete blockhouses in particular, it explores an associated loss of scientific method that accompanies a science object's disappearance.« less
The Use of MCNP in Flash Radiographic Applications at AWE
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Quillin, S.; Crotch, I.; McAlpin, S.; O'Malley, J.
AWE performs experiments to investigate the hydrodynamic behavior of explosive metal systems in order to underwrite the UK nuclear deterrent. The experiments involve the manufacture of a device to mock up some aspect of the weapon. Inert simulant materials replace fissile weapon components. The device is then detonated under remote control within specially designed explosive containment buildings called firing chambers. During the experiment a very brief, intense, collimated flash of high energy x-rays are used to take a snapshot of the implosion (see Fig. 1). Prom the resulting image measurements of the dynamic configuration and density distribution of the components in the device are inferred. These are then used to compare with calculations of the hydrodynamic operation of the weapon and understand how the device would perform under various conditions. This type of experiment is known as a core punch experiment.
A study of Radar Cross Section (RCS) characteristics and their application in future weapon systems
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
McCluggage, W. A.
The sum of components technique was used to calculate the radar cross section (RCS) of a Canberra B2 aircraft. The theoretical result obtained by using simple shapes to model the aircraft were compared with practical results. It is found that this technique can be used to give a quick order of magnitude estimation of a target's RCS. However, the major drawback of this technique is that it cannot predict the rapid changes in RCS which result from a small change in aspect angle. Trends in radar guided weapons, the effects of aircraft shape on the overall RCS of a weapons platform, and reduction of aircraft RCS by appropriate shaping are discussed. Methods, including radar absorption, radar absorbing materials, impedance loading, and active cancellation, which can be used to reduce an aircraft's radar signature and the associated penalties are reviewed.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Hanson, Todd
Here, the historical material culture produced by American Cold War nuclear weapons testing includes objects of scientific inquiry that can be generally categorized as being either ephemeral or enduring. Objects deemed to be ephemeral were of a less substantial nature, being impermanent and expendable in a nuclear test, while enduring objects were by nature more durable and long-lasting. Although all of these objects were ultimately subject to disappearance, the processes by which they were transformed, degraded, or destroyed prior to their disappearing differ. Drawing principally upon archaeological theory, this paper proposes a functional dichotomy for categorizing and studying the historicalmore » trajectories of nuclear weapons testing technoscience artifacts. In examining the transformation patterns of steel towers and concrete blockhouses in particular, it explores an associated loss of scientific method that accompanies a science object's disappearance.« less
2008-08-05
metallic) materials, which fragment under certain dynamic loading conditions into small particles, which can chemically react with a suitable ambient ...medium, such as shock heated ambient air or hot detonation products. Such materials could be effectively used to devise new or improved weapons with...test is blue. The impacto conditions of the the center of the the opposite surfa reflection of the w Figure 6.1: Example o specimen. Another aspect
Cockpit Video: A Low Cost BDA Source
1993-12-01
military expertise, and material withheld for operational security, the press was very reluctant to accept the military’s claims. As one reporter...readout of the KA-71 and radar scope film, and the normal intelligence support to include aircrew briefing/debriefing, preparation of target materials ...target, and recording the result of impact, the effectivenass of a weapon system can be evaluated. The secondary purposes of ARP materials include
A perspective on the proliferation risks of plutonium mines
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Lyman, E.S.
1996-05-01
The program of geologic disposal of spent fuel and other plutonium-containing materials is increasingly becoming the target of criticism by individuals who argue that in the future, repositories may become low-cost sources of fissile material for nuclear weapons. This paper attempts to outline a consistent framework for analyzing the proliferation risks of these so-called {open_quotes}plutonium mines{close_quotes} and putting them into perspective. First, it is emphasized that the attractiveness of plutonium in a repository as a source of weapons material depends on its accessibility relative to other sources of fissile material. Then, the notion of a {open_quotes}material production standard{close_quotes} (MPS) ismore » proposed: namely, that the proliferation risks posed by geologic disposal will be acceptable if one can demonstrate, under a number of reasonable scenarios, that the recovery of plutonium from a repository is likely to be as difficult as new production of fissile material. A preliminary analysis suggests that the range of circumstances under which current mined repository concepts would fail to meet this standard is fairly narrow. Nevertheless, a broad application of the MPS may impose severe restrictions on repository design. In this context, the relationship of repository design parameters to easy of recovery is discussed.« less
Chemical speciation of U, Fe, and Pu in melt glass from nuclear weapons testing
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Pacold, J. I.; Lukens, W. W.; Booth, C. H.
Nuclear weapons testing generates large volumes of glassy materials that influence the transport of dispersed actinides in the environment and may carry information on the composition of the detonated device. We determine the oxidation state of U and Fe (which is known to buffer the oxidation state of actinide elements and to affect the redox state of groundwater) in samples of melt glass collected from three U.S. nuclear weapons tests. For selected samples, we also determine the coordination geometry of U and Fe, and we report the oxidation state of Pu from one melt glass sample. We find significant variationsmore » among the melt glass samples and, in particular, find a clear deviation in one sample from the expected buffering effect of Fe(II)/Fe(III) on the oxidation state of uranium. In the first direct measurement of Pu oxidation state in a nuclear test melt glass, we obtain a result consistent with existing literature that proposes Pu is primarily present as Pu(IV) in post-detonation material. In addition, our measurements imply that highly mobile U(VI) may be produced in significant quantities when melt glass is quenched rapidly following a nuclear detonation, though these products may remain immobile in the vitrified matrices. The observed differences in chemical state among the three samples show that redox conditions can vary dramatically across different nuclear test conditions. The local soil composition, associated device materials, and the rate of quenching are all likely to affect the final redox state of the glass. The resulting variations in glass chemistry are significant for understanding and interpreting debris chemistry and the later environmental mobility of dispersed material.« less
Chemical speciation of U, Fe, and Pu in melt glass from nuclear weapons testing
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Pacold, J. I.; Lukens, W. W.; Booth, C. H.
We report that nuclear weapons testing generates large volumes of glassy materials that influence the transport of dispersed actinides in the environment and may carry information on the composition of the detonated device. We determine the oxidation state of U and Fe (which is known to buffer the oxidation state of actinide elements and to affect the redox state of groundwater) in samples of melt glass collected from three U.S. nuclear weapons tests. For selected samples, we also determine the coordination geometry of U and Fe, and we report the oxidation state of Pu from one melt glass sample. Wemore » find significant variations among the melt glass samples and, in particular, find a clear deviation in one sample from the expected buffering effect of Fe(II)/Fe(III) on the oxidation state of uranium. In the first direct measurement of Pu oxidation state in a nuclear test melt glass, we obtain a result consistent with existing literature that proposes Pu is primarily present as Pu(IV) in post-detonation material. In addition, our measurements imply that highly mobile U(VI) may be produced in significant quantities when melt glass is quenched rapidly following a nuclear detonation, though these products may remain immobile in the vitrified matrices. The observed differences in chemical state among the three samples show that redox conditions can vary dramatically across different nuclear test conditions. The local soil composition, associated device materials, and the rate of quenching are all likely to affect the final redox state of the glass. Lastly, the resulting variations in glass chemistry are significant for understanding and interpreting debris chemistry and the later environmental mobility of dispersed material.« less
Chemical speciation of U, Fe, and Pu in melt glass from nuclear weapons testing
Pacold, J. I.; Lukens, W. W.; Booth, C. H.; ...
2016-05-18
We report that nuclear weapons testing generates large volumes of glassy materials that influence the transport of dispersed actinides in the environment and may carry information on the composition of the detonated device. We determine the oxidation state of U and Fe (which is known to buffer the oxidation state of actinide elements and to affect the redox state of groundwater) in samples of melt glass collected from three U.S. nuclear weapons tests. For selected samples, we also determine the coordination geometry of U and Fe, and we report the oxidation state of Pu from one melt glass sample. Wemore » find significant variations among the melt glass samples and, in particular, find a clear deviation in one sample from the expected buffering effect of Fe(II)/Fe(III) on the oxidation state of uranium. In the first direct measurement of Pu oxidation state in a nuclear test melt glass, we obtain a result consistent with existing literature that proposes Pu is primarily present as Pu(IV) in post-detonation material. In addition, our measurements imply that highly mobile U(VI) may be produced in significant quantities when melt glass is quenched rapidly following a nuclear detonation, though these products may remain immobile in the vitrified matrices. The observed differences in chemical state among the three samples show that redox conditions can vary dramatically across different nuclear test conditions. The local soil composition, associated device materials, and the rate of quenching are all likely to affect the final redox state of the glass. Lastly, the resulting variations in glass chemistry are significant for understanding and interpreting debris chemistry and the later environmental mobility of dispersed material.« less
Chemical speciation of U, Fe, and Pu in melt glass from nuclear weapons testing
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Pacold, J. I.; Lukens, W. W.; Booth, C. H.; Shuh, D. K.; Knight, K. B.; Eppich, G. R.; Holliday, K. S.
2016-05-01
Nuclear weapons testing generates large volumes of glassy materials that influence the transport of dispersed actinides in the environment and may carry information on the composition of the detonated device. We determine the oxidation state of U and Fe (which is known to buffer the oxidation state of actinide elements and to affect the redox state of groundwater) in samples of melt glass collected from three U.S. nuclear weapons tests. For selected samples, we also determine the coordination geometry of U and Fe, and we report the oxidation state of Pu from one melt glass sample. We find significant variations among the melt glass samples and, in particular, find a clear deviation in one sample from the expected buffering effect of Fe(II)/Fe(III) on the oxidation state of uranium. In the first direct measurement of Pu oxidation state in a nuclear test melt glass, we obtain a result consistent with existing literature that proposes Pu is primarily present as Pu(IV) in post-detonation material. In addition, our measurements imply that highly mobile U(VI) may be produced in significant quantities when melt glass is quenched rapidly following a nuclear detonation, though these products may remain immobile in the vitrified matrices. The observed differences in chemical state among the three samples show that redox conditions can vary dramatically across different nuclear test conditions. The local soil composition, associated device materials, and the rate of quenching are all likely to affect the final redox state of the glass. The resulting variations in glass chemistry are significant for understanding and interpreting debris chemistry and the later environmental mobility of dispersed material.
The Science of Nuclear Materials: A Modular, Laboratory-based Curriculum
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Cahill, C.L., E-mail: cahill@gwu.edu; Feldman, G.; Briscoe, W.J.
The development of a curriculum for nuclear materials courses targeting students pursuing Master of Arts degrees at The George Washington University is described. The courses include basic concepts such as radiation and radioactivity as well as more complex topics such the nuclear fuel cycle, nuclear weapons, radiation detection and technological aspects of non-proliferation.
77 FR 42482 - Materials Technical Advisory Committee; Notice of Partially Closed Meeting
Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014
2012-07-19
... Bureau of Industry and Security senior management. 3. Discussion on the role of the Implementation Support Unit of the Biological Weapons Convention. 4. Report on Composite Working Group and other working...
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Albright, D.
1995-07-01
This year, the nuclear proliferation spotlight has swung away from Iraq and North Korea, only to focus on Iran. Western intelligence agencies have assembled a substantial body of evidence suggesting that, although Iran signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), it is secretly pursuing a broad, organized effort to develop nuclear weapons. US officials say that Iran is attempting to acquire nuclear technologies that are not consistent with a strictly peaceful program. Intelligence agencies have detected procurement patterns that point to a weapons program. Iran has a multifaceted strategy to develop options to make nuclear weapons: Iran has sought, with limitedmore » success, to buy nuclear power and research facilities from many countries, particularly China and Russia; Iran has shopped quietly in many countries, particularly in Western and Eastern Europe, for a wide range of nuclear-related or dual-use nuclear items that might enable it to put together facilities to enrich uranium, separate plutonium, and make nuclear weapons. There is little public information about how effective this clandestine shopping has been or which countries have been contacted; There is no evidence that Iran has bought any fissile material - but not for wont of trying, and the matter continues to be scrutinized very closely.« less
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Luke, S J
2011-12-20
This report describes a path forward for implementing information barriers in a future generic biological arms-control verification regime. Information barriers have become a staple of discussion in the area of arms control verification approaches for nuclear weapons and components. Information barriers when used with a measurement system allow for the determination that an item has sensitive characteristics without releasing any of the sensitive information. Over the last 15 years the United States (with the Russian Federation) has led on the development of information barriers in the area of the verification of nuclear weapons and nuclear components. The work of themore » US and the Russian Federation has prompted other states (e.g., UK and Norway) to consider the merits of information barriers for possible verification regimes. In the context of a biological weapons control verification regime, the dual-use nature of the biotechnology will require protection of sensitive information while allowing for the verification of treaty commitments. A major question that has arisen is whether - in a biological weapons verification regime - the presence or absence of a weapon pathogen can be determined without revealing any information about possible sensitive or proprietary information contained in the genetic materials being declared under a verification regime. This study indicates that a verification regime could be constructed using a small number of pathogens that spans the range of known biological weapons agents. Since the number of possible pathogens is small it is possible and prudent to treat these pathogens as analogies to attributes in a nuclear verification regime. This study has determined that there may be some information that needs to be protected in a biological weapons control verification regime. To protect this information, the study concludes that the Lawrence Livermore Microbial Detection Array may be a suitable technology for the detection of the genetic information associated with the various pathogens. In addition, it has been determined that a suitable information barrier could be applied to this technology when the verification regime has been defined. Finally, the report posits a path forward for additional development of information barriers in a biological weapons verification regime. This path forward has shown that a new analysis approach coined as Information Loss Analysis might need to be pursued so that a numerical understanding of how information can be lost in specific measurement systems can be achieved.« less
Materials @ LANL: Solutions for National Security Challenges
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Teter, David
2012-10-01
Materials science activities impact many programmatic missions at LANL including nuclear weapons, nuclear energy, renewable energy, global security and nonproliferation. An overview of the LANL materials science strategy and examples of materials science programs will be presented. Major materials leadership areas are in materials dynamics, actinides and correlated electron materials, materials in radiation extremes, energetic materials, integrated nanomaterials and complex functional materials. Los Alamos is also planning a large-scale, signature science facility called MaRIE (Matter Radiation Interactions in Extremes) to address in-situ characterization of materials in dynamic and radiation environments using multiple high energy probes. An overview of this facility will also be presented.
Alcohol consumption in adolescent homicide victims in the city of Johannesburg, South Africa.
Swart, Lu-Anne; Seedat, Mohamed; Nel, Juan
2015-04-01
To describe the blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of adolescent homicide victims in Johannesburg, South Africa and to identify the victim and event characteristics associated with a positive BAC at the time of death. Logistic regression of mortality data collected by the National Injury Mortality Surveillance System (NIMSS). Johannesburg, South Africa. A total of 323 adolescent (15-19 years) homicide victims for the period 2001-9 who had been tested for the presence of alcohol. Data on the victims' BAC level, demographics, weapon or method used, scene, day and time of death were drawn from NIMSS. Alcohol was present in 39.3% of the homicide victims. Of these, 88.2% had a BAC level equivalent to or in excess of the South African limit of 0.05 g/100 ml for intoxication. Multivariate logistic analysis showed that a positive BAC in homicide victims was associated significantly with the victim's sex [male: odds ratio (OR) = 2.127; 95% confidence interval (CI) = 1.012-4.471], victim's age (18-19 years: OR = 2.364; CI = 1.343-4.163); weapon used (sharp instruments: OR = 2.972; CI = 1.708-5.171); and time of death (weekend: OR = 3.149; CI = 1.842-5.383; night-time: OR = 2.175; CI = 1.243-3.804). Excessive alcohol consumption is associated with a substantial proportion of adolescent homicides in Johannesburg, South Africa, and is more prevalent among male and older adolescent victims and in victims killed with sharp instruments over the weekends and during the evenings. © 2015 Society for the Study of Addiction.
Monitoring and verification R&D
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Pilat, Joseph F; Budlong - Sylvester, Kory W; Fearey, Bryan L
2011-01-01
The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) report outlined the Administration's approach to promoting the agenda put forward by President Obama in Prague on April 5, 2009. The NPR calls for a national monitoring and verification R&D program to meet future challenges arising from the Administration's nonproliferation, arms control and disarmament agenda. Verification of a follow-on to New START could have to address warheads and possibly components along with delivery capabilities. Deeper cuts and disarmament would need to address all of these elements along with nuclear weapon testing, nuclear material and weapon production facilities, virtual capabilities from old weapon and existingmore » energy programs and undeclared capabilities. We only know how to address some elements of these challenges today, and the requirements may be more rigorous in the context of deeper cuts as well as disarmament. Moreover, there is a critical need for multiple options to sensitive problems and to address other challenges. There will be other verification challenges in a world of deeper cuts and disarmament, some of which we are already facing. At some point, if the reductions process is progressing, uncertainties about past nuclear materials and weapons production will have to be addressed. IAEA safeguards will need to continue to evolve to meet current and future challenges, and to take advantage of new technologies and approaches. Transparency/verification of nuclear and dual-use exports will also have to be addressed, and there will be a need to make nonproliferation measures more watertight and transparent. In this context, and recognizing we will face all of these challenges even if disarmament is not achieved, this paper will explore possible agreements and arrangements; verification challenges; gaps in monitoring and verification technologies and approaches; and the R&D required to address these gaps and other monitoring and verification challenges.« less
Impact of Self-Reported Biases and Familiarity in a Baggage Screening Context
2012-03-22
Defense, or the United States Government. This material is declared a work of the United States Government and is not subject to copyright...literature explains that material which elicits an emotional response from a person is commonly assumed to be more accurately recognized than... material which does not elicit an emotional response (Bessette-Symons, 2008). The extent of the baggage screener’s emotional interest in weapons such as
ESD Protective Material and Equipment: A Critical Review
1982-04-01
having touched it. It is also of utmost importance that the resistivity of the work surface not change appreciably with changes in temperature , humidity...settings, e.g., temperature . No attempt was made to estimate the relative ease of heat-sealability of the bag materials, all of which use polyethylene...weapon in the battle against ESD. They function in two different ways. First, they reduce the materials’ coefficient of friction by increasing surface
Status of plutonium ceramic immobilization processes and immobilization forms
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Ebbinghaus, B.B.; Van Konynenburg, R.A.; Vance, E.R.
1996-05-01
Immobilization in a ceramic followed by permanent emplacement in a repository or borehole is one of the alternatives currently being considered by the Fissile Materials Disposition Program for the ultimate disposal of excess weapons-grade plutonium. To make Pu recovery more difficult, radioactive cesium may also be incorporated into the immobilization form. Valuable data are already available for ceramics form R&D efforts to immobilize high-level and mixed wastes. Ceramics have a high capacity for actinides, cesium, and some neutron absorbers. A unique characteristic of ceramics is the existence of mineral analogues found in nature that have demonstrated actinide immobilization over geologicmore » time periods. The ceramic form currently being considered for plutonium disposition is a synthetic rock (SYNROC) material composed primarily of zirconolite (CaZrTi{sub 2}O{sub 7}), the desired actinide host phase, with lesser amounts of hollandite (BaAl{sub 2}Ti{sub 6}O{sub 16}) and rutile (TiO{sub 2}). Alternative actinide host phases are also being considered. These include pyrochlore (Gd{sub 2}Ti{sub 2}O{sub 7}), zircon (ZrSiO{sub 4}), and monazite (CePO{sub 4}), to name a few of the most promising. R&D activities to address important technical issues are discussed. Primarily these include moderate scale hot press fabrications with plutonium, direct loading of PuO{sub 2} powder, cold press and sinter fabrication methods, and immobilization form formulation issues.« less
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Powell, Danny H; Jensen, Bruce A
2011-01-01
Improve protection of weapons-usable nuclear material from theft or diversion through the development and support of a nationwide sustainable and effective Material Control and Accountability (MC&A) program based on material measurement. The material protection, control, and accountability (MPC&A) cooperation has yielded significant results in implementing MC&A measurements at Russian nuclear facilities: (1) Establishment of MEM WG and MEMS SP; (2) Infrastructure for development, certification, and distribution of RMs; and (3) Coordination on development and implementation of MMs.
The development and application of high energy laser protective material
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Zhao, Xinying; Hu, Yihua; Zhao, Yizheng
2016-03-01
With the emergence of strong light source, laser weapons in the modern war, the threat of damage to the photoelectric sensor and the human eye, the laser protection technology has begun to be paid attention to and widespread concern. In the laser protective materials, we can divide it into the protective material based on the principle of linear optics and the protective material based on the principle of nonlinear optics. In this paper, two different mechanisms of laser protective materials are introduced, and their development and application are reviewed.
Research of laser stealth performance test technology
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Chen, Zhen-xing; Shi, Sheng-bing; Han, Fu-li; Wu, Yan-lin; Song, Chun-yan
2014-09-01
Laser stealth is an important way of photoelectric stealth weapons systems. According to operational principle of laser range finder, we actively explore and study the stealth performance approval testing technology of laser stealth materials, and bring forward and establish the stealth performance field test methods of stealth efficiency evaluation. Through contrastive test of two kinds of materials, the method is correct and effective.
2011-06-01
process would result in lower excess material and financial savings. The data set analyzed contained ISS purchased by both NAVAIR and NAVSEA as well as...demand data. Additionally, analysis of current ISS processes at NAVAIR and NAVSEA was conducted. The research resulted in finding that NAVAIR and...eventually categorized as excess material. A more efficient ISS process would result in lower excess material and financial savings. The data set analyzed
Safety analysis report for the SR-101 inert reservoir package
DOT National Transportation Integrated Search
1998-11-01
Department of Energy (DOE) AL Weapons Surety Division (WSD) requires the SR-101 Inert Reservoir Package to : meet applicable hazardous material transportation requirements. This Safety Analysis Report (SAR) is based on : requirements in place at the ...
Novel Modelling Tool for Energetics
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Dossi, Licia
Polymer science combines an understanding of chemistry and material properties to design, develop, model and manufacture new materials with special properties for new applications. The Binders by Design UK programme, funded through the Weapons Science and Technology Centre (WSTC) by the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl), develop new polymeric materials for energetic applications that can survive over the increased operating temperature ranges of future weapon platforms and satisfy international and national regulations. A multidisciplinary team of UK chemists, physicists, modellers and end users (Cranfield University, Sheffield-Hallam University, QinetiQ, Fluid Gravity Engineering, BAE Systems UK Land and Roxel UK) research together on the synthesis, characterisation and modelling of novel macromolecules with very promising thermal properties. Group Interaction Modelling supported by molecular mechanics calculations is used for a rapid assessment and selection of candidate molecules. New model and simulation protocols suitable for investigating the glass transition behaviour of HTPB oligomers are developed. The continuum level models and a constitutive model for a binder/energetic system are developing, for application in safety assessments (e.g. low-velocity impact tests).
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Swift, Alicia L.
There is no better time than now to close the loophole in Article IV of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) that excludes military uses of fissile material from nuclear safeguards. Several countries have declared their intention to pursue and develop naval reactor technology, including Argentina, Brazil, Iran, and Pakistan, while other countries such as China, India, Russia, and the United States are expanding their capabilities. With only a minority of countries using low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel in their naval reactors, it is possible that a state could produce highly enriched uranium (HEU) under the guise of a nuclear navymore » while actually stockpiling the material for a nuclear weapon program. This paper examines the likelihood that non-nuclear weapon states exploit the loophole to break out from the NPT and also the regional ramifications of deterrence and regional stability of expanding naval forces. Possible solutions to close the loophole are discussed, including expanding the scope of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, employing LEU fuel instead of HEU fuel in naval reactors, amending the NPT, creating an export control regime for naval nuclear reactors, and forming individual naval reactor safeguards agreements.« less
López-Muñoz, F; Alamo, C; Guerra, J A; García-García, P
The discovery and development of the so-called 'nerve agents' (neurotoxic substances to be used as weapons) took place in the Third Reich, largely thanks to the vast amount of progress being made in pharmacology in Germany at that time, both in academic and industrial terms. Furthermore, successive National Socialist governments set up a collaborative network made up of the academia, the chemical industry and military chiefs that also favoured this line of research. The first neurotoxic substance to be incorporated into the category of 'chemical warfare agent' did so almost wholly by chance. As part of the work being carried out on organophosphate-type pesticides and insecticides, Gerald Schrader, a chemist at the I.G. Farben company, synthesised tabun (ethyl N,N-dimethylphosphoramidocyanidate) and an incident involving accidental contamination of laboratory staff with this substance highlighted its potential toxicity. The same group of researchers later synthesised another substance with the same properties, sarin (isopropyl methylphosphonofluoridate). Both agents were studied for use as chemical weapons by Wolfgang Wirth. At the same time, a group led by Richard Kuhn, who won the Nobel Prize in Chemistry in 1938, synthesised pinacolyl methylphosphonofluoridate, otherwise known as soman. Pharmacological studies confirmed that the neurotoxic mechanism of action of these substances was the irreversible inhibition of the enzyme acetylcholinesterase, which is responsible for metabolising acetylcholine. Results also showed that an excess of this neurotransmitter led to a continuous over-stimulation of the cholinergic (nicotinic and muscarinic) receptors, which is what triggers the appearance of the wide range of symptoms of poisoning and their swift fatal effect.
2011-06-10
developing alternative materials or configurations for ammunition cases.4 By using suitable widely available lightweight materials in the case of these...and civilian weapons manufacturers’ materials are accurate. The 5.56mm cartridge will still be the primary caliber of ammunition used in U.S. Army...in this case). External ballistics refers to all events concerning a projectile after it leaves the launcher, or barrel , and before achieves
2008-10-24
COMMANDER, U.S. ARMY MATERIAL COMMAND LOGISTICS SUPPORT ACTIVITY Department of Defense Office of Inspector General Report No. SPO-2009...report the serial numbers of weapons it controlled to the DoD SA/LW Registry maintained by the U.S. Army Material Command Logistics Support... Material Command Logistics Support Activity assist the Combined Security Transition Command- Afghanistan in reporting serial numbers for U.S.-supplied
Introduction to Pits and Weapons Systems (U)
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Kautz, D.
2012-07-02
A Nuclear Explosive Package includes the Primary, Secondary, Radiation Case and related components. This is the part of the weapon that produces nuclear yield and it converts mechanical energy into nuclear energy. The pit is composed of materials that allow mechanical energy to be converted to electromagnetic energy. Fabrication processes used are typical of any metal fabrication facility: casting, forming, machining and welding. Some of the materials used in pits include: Plutonium, Uranium, Stainless Steel, Beryllium, Titanium, and Aluminum. Gloveboxes are used for three reasons: (1) Protect workers and public from easily transported, finely divided plutonium oxides - (a) Plutoniummore » is very reactive and produces very fine particulate oxides, (b) While not the 'Most dangerous material in the world' of Manhattan Project lore, plutonium is hazardous to health of workers if not properly controlled; (2) Protect plutonium from reactive materials - (a) Plutonium is extremely reactive at ambient conditions with several components found in air: oxygen, water, hydrogen, (b) As with most reactive metals, reactions with these materials may be violent and difficult to control, (c) As with most fabricated metal products, corrosion may significantly affect the mechanical, chemical, and physical properties of the product; and (3) Provide shielding from radioactive decay products: {alpha}, {gamma}, and {eta} are commonly associated with plutonium decay, as well as highly radioactive materials such as {sup 241}Am and {sup 238}Pu.« less
Near-field three-dimensional radar imaging techniques and applications.
Sheen, David; McMakin, Douglas; Hall, Thomas
2010-07-01
Three-dimensional radio frequency imaging techniques have been developed for a variety of near-field applications, including radar cross-section imaging, concealed weapon detection, ground penetrating radar imaging, through-barrier imaging, and nondestructive evaluation. These methods employ active radar transceivers that operate at various frequency ranges covering a wide range, from less than 100 MHz to in excess of 350 GHz, with the frequency range customized for each application. Computational wavefront reconstruction imaging techniques have been developed that optimize the resolution and illumination quality of the images. In this paper, rectilinear and cylindrical three-dimensional imaging techniques are described along with several application results.
Depression, materialism, and excessive Internet use in relation to compulsive buying.
Mueller, Astrid; Mitchell, James E; Peterson, Lisa A; Faber, Ronald J; Steffen, Kristine J; Crosby, Ross D; Claes, Laurence
2011-01-01
The objective of the study was to examine the relationship between compulsive buying (CB), depression, materialism, and excessive Internet use. An online survey of 387 consumers was conducted including questions about demographics and shopping venues, the Compulsive Buying Scale, the Patient Health Questionnaire Depression Scale, the Materialistic Values Scale, and questions concerning excessive Internet use. Seventeen percent of the participants reported Compulsive Buying Scale scores less than -1.34 and were considered to be having CB. Participants with CB did not significantly differ from those without CB regarding age, sex, marital status, annual household income, and shopping preferences. Individuals with CB reported more depressive symptoms, higher materialistic values endorsement, and more severe excessive Internet use compared with those without CB. Results of a stepwise logistic regression analysis with CB as the dependent variable showed that materialism and depression were associated with CB, whereas excessive Internet use was not. Materialism and depression jointly influence CB. Further research is needed to examine the influence of materialism on CB in a clinical sample consisting of patients with diagnosed CB. Copyright © 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Priyono, S.; Primasari, R. D.; Saptari, S. A.; Prihandoko, B.
2017-07-01
Li4Ti5O12 powder as anode lithium ion battery was synthesized via solid state reaction with excess LiOH.H2O. Technical grades raw materials like LiOH.H2O and TiO2 were used as starting materials. LiOH.H2O excess was varied from 0; 2.5; 5 and 7.5% to get higher optimum phases and capacity of Li4Ti5O12. All raw materials were mixed stoichiometry then followed by calcination and sintering process to get final products. The obtained products were characterized by XRD, SEM, and PSA to get properties of active materials and the electrochemical properties were done by cyclic voltametry and charge-discharge test. The XRD test showed that 5% excess have highest Li4Ti5O12 phases. All samples have same in morphology, agglomerate and same in particle size distribution. Sample with 5% excess showed good reversible process and chargedischarge test showed that increasing Li4Ti5O12 phase can improve specific capacity.
Active interrogation of highly enriched uranium
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Fairrow, Nannette Lea
Safeguarding special nuclear material (SNM) in the Department of Energy Complex is vital to the national security of the United States. Active and passive nondestructive assays are used to confirm the presence of SNM in various configurations ranging from waste to nuclear weapons. Confirmation measurements for nuclear weapons are more challenging because the design complicates the detection of a distinct signal for highly enriched uranium. The emphasis of this dissertation was to investigate a new nondestructive assay technique that provides an independent and distinct signal to confirm the presence of highly enriched uranium (HEU). Once completed and tested this assay method could be applied to confirmation measurements of nuclear weapons. The new system uses a 14-MeV neutron source for interrogation and records the arrival time of neutrons between the pulses with a high efficiency detection system. The data is then analyzed by the Feynman reduced variance method. The analysis determined the amount of correlation in the data and provided a unique signature of correlated fission neutrons. Measurements of HEU spheres were conducted at Los Alamos with the new system. Then, Monte Carlo calculations were performed to verify hypothesis made about the behavior of the neutrons in the experiment. Comparisons of calculated counting rates by the Monte Carlo N-Particle Transport Code (MCNP) were made with the experimental data to confirm that the measured response reflected the desired behavior of neutron interactions in the highly enriched uranium. In addition, MCNP calculations of the delayed neutron build-up were compared with the measured data. Based on the results obtained from this dissertation, this measurement method has the potential to be expanded to include mass determinations of highly enriched uranium. Although many safeguards techniques exist for measuring special nuclear material, the number of assays that can be used to confirm HEU in shielded systems is limited. These assays also rely on secondary characteristics of the material to be measured. A review of the nondestructive techniques with potential applications for nuclear weapons confirmatory measurements were evaluated with summaries of the pros and cons involved in implementing the methods at production type facilities.
State-of-the-art in biosafety and biosecurity in European countries.
Bielecka, Anna; Mohammadi, Ali Akbar
2014-06-01
The terms biosafety and biosecurity are widely used in different concepts and refer not only to protection of human beings and their surrounding environment against hazardous biological agent, but also to global disarmament of weapons of mass destruction. As a result, the biosafety and biosecurity issues should be considered interdisciplinary based on multilateral agreements against proliferation of biological weapons, public health and environmental protection. This publication presents information on both, international and national biosafety and biosecurity legislation. Status of national implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, penalization issues and measures to account for and secure production, use, storage of particularly dangerous pathogens or activities involving humans, plants and animals where infection may pose a risk have been analyzed. Safety and security measures in laboratories have been studied. Moreover, dual-use technology and measures of secure transport of biohazard materials have been also taken into account. In addition, genetic engineering regulations, biosecurity activities in laboratories and code of conducts have been investigated, as well.
Incorporation and Effects of Nanoparticles in a Supramolecular Polymer
2016-05-01
Oak Ridge, TN Robert H Lambeth and Frederick L Beyer Weapons and Materials Research Directorate, ARL Approved for...nanocomposites: phase diagram, rheology and structure using a combined small angle neutron scattering and reverse Monte Carlo approach. Soft Matter. 2010;6
VOC sink behaviour on building materials--model evaluation
The event of 11 September 2001 underscored the need to study the vulnerability of buildings to weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including chemical, biological, physical, and radiological agents. Should these agents be released inside a building, they would interact with interio...
Acoustic Nondestructive Evaluation of Aircraft Paneling Using Piezoelectric Sensors
2012-12-01
Electromagnetic Materials Team of the U.S. Army Research Laboratory, Weapons and Materials Research Directorate, Clinical Trials Monitoring Branch, for...connected to this clip. This electrical connection ensures single-point grounding, which has been implemented to avoid electromagnetic interference...waveform of each sensor features an electromagnetic pick-up signature that is aligned with the transduced signal but phase shifted by 180. We know to
Deploying Nuclear Detection Systems: A Proposed Strategy for Combating Nuclear Terrorism
2007-07-01
lower cost than other gamma radiation detectors (if increased count rate is all one is looking for). Low cost makes plastic scintillation detectors...material, particularly enriched uranium and plutonium, the basic fuel for nuclear bombs. • Measures to strengthen international institutions to... uranium to specifications required for a nuclear weapon.1 This illicit shipment of centrifuges was part of an international nuclear materials
Characterization of Cyclohexanone Inclusions in Class 1 RDX
2014-06-01
characterized with respect to solvent inclusions in support of a U.S. Army Research Laboratory (ARL) program to model Multiscale Response of Energetic...pertinent to their modeling effort under the Multiscale Response of Energetic Materials (MREM) program, and the Weapons and Materials Research...support of a U.S. Army Research Laboratory (ARL) initiative called “ Multiscale Modeling of Energetic Materials” (MREM). The MREM program aims, for
Weapon-Specific Strategic Material Estimation Process (WSSMEP)
2014-12-01
Whitley for his insightful review and comments. We also want to thank the editor, Mr. John Everett , and Ms. Barbara Varvaglione for production...Institute for Defense Analyses, 2013. Thomason, Jim, Jim Bell , Eleanor Schwartz, Bob Atwell, Dick Van Atta, Nicholas Karvonides, Zack Rabold, Tiki...sources for more detailed documentation material. 41 Appendix A References Thomason, James S., Robert J. Atwell, D. Sean Burnett, James P. Bell
Implementing Advanced Technologies in the Republic of China Air Force Officer Training System
1994-03-01
Strategy Political Radar Systems Emergency Education Medicine Maneuvers Entertainment & Systems Design Primary Care Welfare Telegraph Systems I1 The...Planning area includes the career fields of Organization, Aircraft, Weapons, Air Strategy , and Maneuvers. In the Political area of occupational...materials to be considered. The current strategy is to maintain massive inventories of written testing materials for use in officer evaluations
Through-the-Wall Small Weapon Detection Based on Polarimetric Radar Techniques
2009-12-01
waves can penetrate through clothing (textile materials ), they have very poor penetration properties through many common construction materials (such...including the continuous metallic barrel ). Unless specified otherwise, the mesh has a resolution (cell size) of 2 mm. The wood dielectric constant...almost perpendicularly to the barrel ). Figure 2. Estimating the tilt angle of a cylindrical metallic rod of 1 m length
CF NEUTRON TIME OF FLIGHT TRANSMISSION FOR MATERIAL IDENTIFICATION FOR WEAPONS TRAINERS
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Mihalczo, John T; Valentine, Timothy E; Blakeman, Edward D
2011-01-01
The neutron transmission, elastic scattering, and non elastic reactions can be used to distinguish various isotopes. Neutron transmission as a function of energy can be used in some cases to identify materials in unknown objects. A time tagged californium source that provides a fission spectrum of neutrons is a useful source for neutron time-of-flight (TOF) transmission measurements. Many nuclear weapons trainer units for a particular weapons system (no fissile, but of same weight and center of gravity) in shipping containers were returned to the National Nuclear Security Administration Y-12 National Security Complex in the mid 1990s. Nuclear Materials Identification Systemmore » (NMIS) measurements with a time tagged californium neutron source were used to verify that these trainers did not contain fissile material. In these blind tests, the time distributions of neutrons through the containers were measured as a function of position to locate the approximate center of the trainer in the container. Measurements were also performed with an empty container. TOF template matching measurements were then performed at this location for a large number of units. In these measurements, the californium source was located on one end of the container and a proton recoil scintillator was located on the other end. The variations in the TOF transmission for times corresponding to 1 to 5 MeV were significantly larger than statistical. Further examination of the time distribution or the energy dependence revealed that these variations corresponded to the variations in the neutron cross section of aluminum averaged over the energy resolution of the californium TOF measurement with a flight path of about 90 cm. Measurements using different thicknesses of aluminum were also performed with the source and detector separated the same distance as for the trainer measurements. These comparison measurements confirmed that the material in the trainers was aluminum, and the total thickness of aluminum through the trainers was determined. This is an example of how californium transmission TOF measurements can be used to identify materials.« less
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Fish, Janet D.
2014-05-01
Man has used poisons for assassination purposes ever since the dawn of civilization, not only against individual enemies but also occasionally against armies. According to (Frischknecht, 2003)11 article on the History of Biological Warfare, during the past century, more than 500 million people died of infectious diseases. Several tens of thousands of these deaths were due to the deliberate release of pathogens or toxins. Two international treaties outlawed biological weapons in 1925 and 1972, but they have largely failed to stop countries from conducting offensive weapons research and large-scale production of biological weapons. Before the 20th century, biological warfare took on three main forms: (1) deliberate poisoning of food and water with infectious material, (2) use of microorganisms or toxins in some form of weapon system, and (3) use of biologically inoculated fabrics (Dire, 2013)8. This action plan is aimed at the recognition of the lack of current processes in place under an unidentified lead agency to detect, identify, track, and contain biological agents that can enter into the United States through a human host. This action plan program has been identified as the Consumer of Concern Early Entry Program or a simpler title is C-CEEP.
The ``Nuclear Renaissance'' and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Lyman, Edwin S.
2007-05-01
As interest grows around the world in nuclear power as an energy source that could help control greenhouse gas emissions, some have proclaimed the arrival of a ``nuclear renaissance.'' But can the increased risks of more nuclear power be managed? The political crisis surrounding Iran's pursuit of uranium enrichment has exposed weaknesses in the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Also, al Qaeda's declared interest in weapons of mass destruction raises the concern that terrorists could acquire nuclear weapons by stealing materials from poorly secured facilities. Growth of nuclear energy would require the construction of many additional uranium enrichment plants. And the generation of more spent nuclear fuel without a credible waste disposal strategy would increase political support for reprocessing, which separates large quantities of weapon-usable plutonium from spent fuel. There is little evidence that the various institutional arrangements and technical schemes proposed to mitigate the security risks of a major nuclear expansion would be effective. This talk will focus on the measures necessary to allow large-scale global growth of nuclear power without resulting in an unacceptably high risk of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism, and will discuss the feasibility of such measures. To cite this abstract, use the following reference: http://meetings.aps.org/link/BAPS.2007.OSS07.E1.2
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Fox, J.
Program of work to provide support to the Biological Arms Control Treaty Office (BACTO) of the U.S. Army Medical Research and Material Command (USAMRMC), in the development of Army and U.S. Government negotiation, implementation and compliance policies and preparations regarding potential verification and confidence measures for the 1975 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and related biological weapons agreements. Support services provided included the preparation of Army installations and commands for implementation of visits pursuant to the U.S./UK/Russian Trilateral Statement on BW. Support included site assistance visit, development of required facility documentation and briefings, identification of additional facilities potentially subject to access,more » and support to DOD development of guidelines, procedures, documentation, and other materials for the conduct of visits. Specific tasks under this contract included: identification and delineation of `Military Biological Facilities` and related activities at Army installations; development of visit implementation documentation for the Army; assessment of potentially at-risk equities and sensitivities at relevant facilities; facility staff training and preparation; and review and modification of facility inputs to annual BWC Confidence Building Measure Declarations. Also supported the provision of timely and critical technical support to the Joint Staff and OSD in the development of DoD negotiation biological arms control positions.« less
2008-12-04
tracked. The RFID tag can be of various designs, materials , and/or sizes and hold a variable amount of information. Each tag is composed of three...efficiency in acquiring material from suppliers and in delivering to units in the field (Business Wire, 2005). The military learned an important lesson...RFID Supply-chain applications of RFID are beneficial to both the DoD and suppliers. RFID technology has enabled the recording of material transfer
2008-12-01
The RFID tag can be of various designs, materials , and/or sizes and hold a variable amount of information. Each tag is composed 11 of three...acquiring material from suppliers and in delivering to units in the field (Business Wire, 2005). The military learned an important lesson during...recording of material transfer and enhanced TAV. In the limited implementations of RFID to date, the DoD has seen benefits in inventory management
Compatibility testing of vacuum seal materials
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Foster, P. A.; Rodin, W. A.
1993-05-01
Small scale materials compatibility testing was conducted for three elastomers considered for use as vacuum seal materials: Adiprene MOCA-cured; Adiprene Cyanacured; and Sylgard silastic rubber. The tests were conducted using orthogonal array designed experiments for each of the elastomers placed in contact with three materials commonly used during weapon disassembly operations: Duxseal, Sylgard 186 grease, and 2-propyl alcohol. The test results indicated that only the 2-propyl alcohol had a significant effect on the elastomer hardness and physical properties. The alcohol had the largest effect on the two Adiprene materials, and the silastic rubber was the least affected.
The NPR, NPT and the prospects for disarmament
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Pilat, Joseph F
2010-10-04
In Prague's Hradcany Square on April 5, 2009, President Barack Obama offered a bold vision of the nuclear future that encompasses both reducing nuclear dangers and pursuing the goal of a world without nuclear weapons while maintaining, as long as nuclear weapons remain, a safe secure, and effective arsenal, to deter potential adversaries and to assure U.S. allies and other security partners that they can count on America's security commitments. The agenda put forward in Prague involves the full range of issues from deterrence to nonproliferation and disarmament. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) report, reflecting the twin objectives ofmore » the Prague speech, for the first time places the United States effort to lead expanded international efforts to rebuild and strengthen the global nuclear nonproliferation regime at the top the U.S. nuclear agenda. This attention underscores the fact that the top priority of the United States is to discourage additional states from acquiring nuclear weapon capabilities and to stop terrorist groups from acquiring weapon-usable nuclear materials. It also reinforced the view that positively influencing the 2010 Review Conference (RevCon) of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was a key objective of the Obama Administration. The NPR developed both the vision and the policy, but details of implementation will need to be developed and better understood. This paper will address the Nuclear Posture Review and its implementation, as well as it's relation to, and impact on, the NPT RevCon and the long term prospects for nonproliferation and disarmament.« less
Analysis of Rail Gun Bore Residue
1984-03-01
erosion effects and elemental analysis of refractory materials. C. A. L. Westerdahl , J. Pinto, G. L. Ferventino, D. N. Saherhavth...accelerator facility at Large Caliber Weapons Systems Laboratory Dover, New Jersey. ’ 16 REFERENCES 1. C.A.L. Westerdahl , J. Pinto, G. L. Ferrentino, D
Purification Efficacy of Synthetic Cannabinoid Conjugates Using High-Pressure Liquid Chromatography
In the current study, we successfully purified several synthetic cannabinoid (SC):dark quencher conjugates essential for the success of the synthetic... cannabinoid detection platform developed at the US Army Research Laboratorys Weapons and Materials Research Directorate. The purification was
Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear War and the Health Professions: Curriculum Development in Medical Schools.
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Cassell, Christine K.; McCally, Michael
1984-01-01
Describes the design and development of a 10-week course entitled Medical Consequences of Nuclear War, offered to medical and nursing students at the Oregon Health Sciences University. Other curriculum models and teaching materials are also discussed. (SK)
THE GLOBAL ZERO MOVEMENT: A ROAD TO NOWHERE
2016-02-08
Agency ( IAEA ) to ensure continued compliance. Sixth recommendation: The United States must not adopt the concept of de- alerting its nuclear...nuclear weapons or moving fissile material in violation of NPT. These discussions should include intelligence community, law enforcement, and IAEA as
Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program Science and Technology Strategic Plan
2016-03-31
compact technology for sound generation using advanced materials Active Denial Technology (ADT) Future active denial technology system concept...investment objectives in human effects research, conducted energy weapons (human electro‐muscular incapacitation), and sound and light that will advance...advancing the development of megawatt class waveguides and rotary joints, innovative dielectrics and insulators , and on the characterization of
Detection of Nuclear Weapons and Materials: Science, Technologies, Observations
2009-08-04
use of photons, packets of energy with no rest mass and no electrical charge. Electromagnetic radiation consists of photons, and may be measured as...density is a bulk property, expressed as mass per unit volume. In general, the densest materials are those of high Z. These properties may be used...generally dictate detection threshold settings through their impact on innocent alarm rates. Characterization of these factors is critical to
1985-04-01
author and ProgramRationale, approach and results of Manager, and forward two copies of the reprinted - 10 to reduce spiraling weapon material to the...Technologies ADVAL STRUCTURAL 5 DESIGN/ MATERIALS P’rogram Nlam.4er 4 .’ . I...reading grade sciecnce and mathematics achieved on vanced technological societies, yet it is els It iwver tor somei rninorit\\’ groups,. national tests
Nuclear Deterrence: Strong Policy is Needed for Effective Defense
2011-03-24
providing anti-access to U.S. forces should conflict erupt, for example over the Taiwan sovereignty issue.29 Emerging Chinese long- range delivery systems...securing fissile material is already extremely difficult. It is quite possible that some nuclear material is unaccounted for in the world; even if banned ...Nuclear weapons are like very complicated chemical experiments, sometimes changing in unforeseen ways as metals corrode, plastics break down and
2016-04-01
Gerard Chaney, and Charles Pergantis Weapons and Materials Research Directorate, ARL Coatings, Corrosion, and Engineered Polymers Branch (CCEPB...SUBJECT TERMS single lap joint, adhesive, sample preparation, testing, database, metadata, material pedigree, ISO 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17...temperature/water immersion conditioning test for lap-joint test specimens using the test tubes and convection oven method
Laser-induced damage in optical materials: sixteenth ASTM symposium.
Bennett, H E; Guenther, A H; Milam, D; Newnam, B E
1987-03-01
The Sixteenth Annual Symposium on Optical Materials for High Power Lasers (Boulder Damage Symposium) was held at the National Bureau of Standards in Boulder, CO, 15-17 Oct. 1984. The Symposium was held under the auspices of ASTM Committee F-1, Subcommittee on Laser Standards, with the joint sponsorship of NBS, the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency, the Department of Energy, the Office of Naval Research, and the Air Force Office of Scientific Research. Approximately 180 scientists attended the Symposium, including representatives from England, France, The Netherlands, Scotland, and West Germany. The Symposium was divided into sessions concerning Materials and Measurements, Mirrors and Surfaces, Thin Films, and Fundamental Mechanisms. As in previous years, the emphasis of the papers presented at the Symposium was directed toward new frontiers and new developments. Particular emphasis was given to materials for high-power apparatus. The wavelength range of prime interest was from 10.6,microm to the UV region. Highlights included surface characterization, thin-film-substrate boundaries, and advances in fundamental laser-matter threshold interactions and mechanisms. Harold E. Bennett of the U.S. Naval Weapons Center, Arthur H. Guenther of the U.S. Air Force Weapons Laboratory, David Milam of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and Brian E. Newnam of the Los Alamos National Laboratory were cochairmen of the Symposium.
Update to Computational Aspects of Nitrogen-Rich HEDMs
2016-04-01
ARL-TR-7656 ● APR 2016 US Army Research Laboratory Update to “Computational Aspects of Nitrogen -Rich HEDMs” by Betsy M...Computational Aspects of Nitrogen -Rich HEDMs” by Betsy M Rice, Edward FC Byrd, and William D Mattson Weapons and Materials Research Directorate...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-01-01
... 14 Aeronautics and Space 5 2011-01-01 2010-01-01 true Trespass. 1204.1004 Section 1204.1004... Inspection of Persons and Personal Effects at NASA Installations or on NASA Property; Trespass or Unauthorized Introduction of Weapons or Dangerous Materials § 1204.1004 Trespass. Unauthorized entry upon any...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-01-01
... 14 Aeronautics and Space 5 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Trespass. 1204.1004 Section 1204.1004... Inspection of Persons and Personal Effects at NASA Installations or on NASA Property; Trespass or Unauthorized Introduction of Weapons or Dangerous Materials § 1204.1004 Trespass. Unauthorized entry upon any...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-01-01
... 14 Aeronautics and Space 5 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Trespass. 1204.1004 Section 1204.1004... Inspection of Persons and Personal Effects at NASA Installations or on NASA Property; Trespass or Unauthorized Introduction of Weapons or Dangerous Materials § 1204.1004 Trespass. Unauthorized entry upon any...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-01-01
... 14 Aeronautics and Space 5 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Trespass. 1204.1004 Section 1204.1004... Inspection of Persons and Personal Effects at NASA Installations or on NASA Property; Trespass or Unauthorized Introduction of Weapons or Dangerous Materials § 1204.1004 Trespass. Unauthorized entry upon any...
Synthesis and Characterization of Partial Biobased Furan Polyamides
2014-02-01
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. NOTICES Disclaimers The...Weapons and Materials Research Directorate, ARL Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited...ii REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average
Honeth, Louise; Ström, Peter; Ploner, Alexander; Bagger-Sjöbäck, Dan; Rosenhall, Ulf; Nyrén, Olof
2016-01-01
Aim: To investigate in this cross-sectional study among Swedish hunters if tobacco use modifies the previously observed association, expressed as prevalence ratio (PR), between unprotected exposure to impulse noise from hunting rifle caliber (HRC) weapons and high-frequency hearing impairment (HFHI). Settings and Design: A nationwide cross-sectional epidemiologic study was conducted among Swedish sport hunters in 2012. Materials and Methods: The study was Internet-based and consisted of a questionnaire and an Internet-based audiometry test. Results: In all, 202 hunters completed a questionnaire regarding the hearing test. Associations were modeled using Poisson regression. Current, daily use of tobacco was reported by 61 hunters (19 used cigarettes, 47 moist snuff, and 5 both). Tobacco users tended to be younger, fire more shots with HRC weapons, and report more hunting days. Their adjusted PR (1–6 unprotected HRC shots versus 0) was 3.2 (1.4–6.7), P = 0.01. Among the nonusers of tobacco, the corresponding PR was 1.3 (0.9–1.8), P = 0.18. P value for the interaction was 0.01. The importance of ear protection could not be quantified among hunters with HRC weapons because our data suggested that the HFHI outcome had led to changes in the use of such protection. Among hunters using weapons with less sound energy, however, no or sporadic use of hearing protection was linked to a 60% higher prevalence of HFHI, relative to habitual use. Conclusion: Tobacco use modifies the association between exposure to unprotected impulse noise from HRC weapons and the probability of having HFHI among susceptible hunters. The mechanisms remain to be clarified, but because the effect modification was apparent also among the users of smokeless tobacco, combustion products may not be critical for this effect. PMID:27991471
Consequences of Regional Scale Nuclear Conflicts and Acts of Individual Nuclear Terrorism
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Toon, O. B.; Turco, R. P.; Robock, A.; Bardeen, C.; Oman, L.; Stenchikov, G. L.
2006-12-01
The number of nuclear warheads in the world has fallen by about a factor of three since its peak in 1986. However, the potential exists for numerous regional nuclear arms races, and for a significant expansion in the number of nuclear weapons states. Eight countries are known to have nuclear weapons, 2 are constructing them, and an additional 32 nations already have the fissile material needed to build weapons if they so desire. Population and economic activity worldwide are congregated to an increasing extent in "megacities", which are ideal targets for nuclear weapons. We find that low yield weapons, which new nuclear powers are likely to construct, can produce 100 times as many fatalities and 100 times as much smoke from fires per kt yield as high-yield weapons, if they are targeted at city centers. A single low-yield nuclear detonation in an urban center could lead to more fatalities, in some cases by orders of magnitude, than have occurred in major historical conflicts. A regional war between the smallest current nuclear states involving 100 15-kt explosions (less than 0.1% of the explosive yield of the current global nuclear arsenal) could produce direct fatalities comparable to all of those worldwide in World War II (WW-II), or to those once estimated for a "counterforce" nuclear war between the superpowers. Portions of megacities attacked with nuclear devices or exposed to fallout of long-lived isotopes, through armed conflict or terrorism, would likely be abandoned indefinitely, with severe national and international implications. Smoke from urban firestorms in a regional war might induce significant climatic and ozone anomalies on global scales. While there are many uncertainties in the issues we discuss here, the major uncertainties are the type and scale of conflict that might occur. Each of these potential hazards deserves careful analysis by governments worldwide advised by a broad section of the world scientific community, as well as widespread debate.
Scanning of vehicles for nuclear materials
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Katz, J. I.
2014-05-01
Might a nuclear-armed terrorist group or state use ordinary commerce to deliver a nuclear weapon by smuggling it in a cargo container or vehicle? This delivery method would be the only one available to a sub-state actor, and it might enable a state to make an unattributed attack. Detection of a weapon or fissile material smuggled in this manner is difficult because of the large volume and mass available for shielding. Here I review methods for screening cargo containers to detect the possible presence of nuclear threats. Because of the large volume of innocent international commerce, and the cost and disruption of secondary screening by opening and inspection, it is essential that the method be rapid and have a low false-positive rate. Shielding can prevent the detection of neutrons emitted spontaneously or by induced fission. The two promising methods are muon tomography and high energy X-radiography. If they do not detect a shielded threat object they can detect the shield itself.
Pham, Martin H; Yu, Cheng; Rusch, Mairead; Holloway, Charles; Chang, Eric; Apuzzo, Michael L J
2014-12-01
Terrorism involving nuclear or radiologic weapons can devastate populations, city infrastructures, and entire sociopolitical systems. In our age of nuclear medicine and therapeutic radiation delivery, the unauthorized and illegal acquisition of radioactive materials needed for such an attack is always a possibility and risk. Physicians handling high-energy isotopes for medical radiotherapy must be aware of the basic security requirements as outlined by the Nuclear Regulation Commission, which include background checks and authorized access, physical protection during radionuclide use, and physical protection during its transit. The Leksell Gamma Knife and its Category 1 cobalt-60 radioactive source are discussed because of their significant potential for deployment in a weaponized device. Although this article presents a perspective relating to American rules and regulations, these precautions are applicable anywhere that similar situations exist. Understanding these materials and the security they require is essential to preventing the disastrous outcomes should these isotopes fall into terrorists' hands. Published by Elsevier Inc.
Scanning of vehicles for nuclear materials
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Katz, J. I.
2014-05-09
Might a nuclear-armed terrorist group or state use ordinary commerce to deliver a nuclear weapon by smuggling it in a cargo container or vehicle? This delivery method would be the only one available to a sub-state actor, and it might enable a state to make an unattributed attack. Detection of a weapon or fissile material smuggled in this manner is difficult because of the large volume and mass available for shielding. Here I review methods for screening cargo containers to detect the possible presence of nuclear threats. Because of the large volume of innocent international commerce, and the cost andmore » disruption of secondary screening by opening and inspection, it is essential that the method be rapid and have a low false-positive rate. Shielding can prevent the detection of neutrons emitted spontaneously or by induced fission. The two promising methods are muon tomography and high energy X-radiography. If they do not detect a shielded threat object they can detect the shield itself.« less
Global threat reduction initiative Russian nuclear material removal progress
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Cummins, Kelly; Bolshinsky, Igor
2008-07-15
In December 1999 representatives from the United States, the Russian Federation, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) started discussing a program to return to Russia Soviet- or Russian-supplied highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel stored at the Russian-designed research reactors outside Russia. Trilateral discussions among the United States, Russian Federation, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have identified more than 20 research reactors in 17 countries that have Soviet- or Russian-supplied HEU fuel. The Global Threat Reduction Initiative's Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return Program is an important aspect of the U.S. Government's commitment to cooperate with the other nationsmore » to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and weapons-usable proliferation-attractive nuclear materials. To date, 496 kilograms of Russian-origin HEU have been shipped to Russia from Serbia, Latvia, Libya, Uzbekistan, Romania, Bulgaria, Poland, Germany, and the Czech Republic. The pilot spent fuel shipment from Uzbekistan to Russia was completed in April 2006. (author)« less
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Mundt, Mark Osroe; Martinez, Matthew Ronald; Varela, Jeanette Judith
At the Pantex Plant in Amarillo, TX, Production Technicians (PTs) build and disassemble nuclear weapon systems. The weapons are held in an integrated work stand for stability and to increase the safety environment for the workers and for the materials being processed. There are many occasions in which a knob must be turned to tighten an assembly part. This can help to secure or manipulate pieces of the system. As there are so many knobs to turn, the instructions given to the PTs are to twist the knob to a hand-tight setting, without the aid of a torque wrench. Theremore » are inherent risks in this procedure as the knobs can be tightened too loosely such that the apparatus falls apart or too tightly such that the force can crush or pinch components in the system that contain energetic materials. We want to study these operations at Pantex. Our goal is to collect torque data to assess the safety and reliability of humantooling interfaces.« less
FROM CONCEPT TO REALITY, IN-SITU DECOMMISSIONING OF THE P AND R REACTORS AT THE SAVANNAH RIVER SITE
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Musall, J.; Blankenship, J.; Griffin, W.
2012-01-09
SRS recently completed an approximately three year effort to decommission two SRS reactors: P-Reactor (Building 105-P) and R-Reactor (Building 105-R). Completed in December 2011, the concurrent decommissionings marked the completion of two relatively complex and difficult facility disposition projects at the SRS. Buildings 105-P and 105-R began operating as production reactors in the early 1950s with the mission of producing weapons material (e.g., tritium and plutonium-239). The 'P' Reactor and was shutdown in 1991 while the 'R' Reactor and was shutdown in 1964. In the intervening period between shutdown and deactivation & decommissioning (D&D), Buildings 105-P and 105-R saw limitedmore » use (e.g., storage of excess heavy water and depleted uranium oxide). For Building 105-P, deactivation was initiated in April 2007 and was essentially complete by June 2010. For Building 105-R, deactivation was initiated in August 2008 and was essentially complete by September 2010. For both buildings, the primary objective of deactivation was to remove/mitigate hazards associated with the remaining hazardous materials, and thus prepare the buildings for in-situ decommissioning. Deactivation removed the following hazardous materials to the extent practical: combustibles/flammables, residual heavy water, acids, friable asbestos (as needed to protect workers performing deactivation and decommissioning), miscellaneous chemicals, lead/brass components, Freon(reg sign), oils, mercury/PCB containing components, mold and some radiologically-contaminated equipment. In addition to the removal of hazardous materials, deactivation included the removal of hazardous energy, exterior metallic components (representing an immediate fall hazard), and historical artifacts along with the evaporation of water from the two Disassembly Basins. Finally, so as to facilitate occupancy during the subsequent in-situ decommissioning, deactivation implemented repairs to the buildings and provided temporary power.« less
2004 research briefs :Materials and Process Sciences Center.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Cieslak, Michael J.
2004-01-01
This report is the latest in a continuing series that highlights the recent technical accomplishments associated with the work being performed within the Materials and Process Sciences Center. Our research and development activities primarily address the materials-engineering needs of Sandia's Nuclear-Weapons (NW) program. In addition, we have significant efforts that support programs managed by the other laboratory business units. Our wide range of activities occurs within six thematic areas: Materials Aging and Reliability, Scientifically Engineered Materials, Materials Processing, Materials Characterization, Materials for Microsystems, and Materials Modeling and Simulation. We believe these highlights collectively demonstrate the importance that a strong materials-sciencemore » base has on the ultimate success of the NW program and the overall DOE technology portfolio.« less
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Gillen, K.T.; Wise, J.; Celina, M.
1997-09-01
Because of the need to significantly extend the lifetimes of weapons, and because of potential implications of environmental O-ring failure on degradation of critical internal weapon components, the authors have been working on improved methods of predicting and verifying O-ring lifetimes. In this report, they highlight the successful testing of a new predictive method for deriving more confident lifetime extrapolations. This method involves ultrasensitive oxygen consumption measurements. The material studied is an EPDM formulation use for the environmental O-ring the W88. Conventional oven aging (155 C to 111 C) was done on compression molded sheet material; periodically, samples were removedmore » from the ovens and subjected to various measurements, including ultimate tensile elongation, density and modulus profiles. Compression stress relaxation (CSR) measurements were made at 125 C and 111 C on disc shaped samples (12.7 mm diameter by 6 mm thick) using a Shawbury Wallace Compression Stress Relaxometer MK 2. Oxygen consumption measurements were made versus time, at temperatures ranging from 160 C to 52 C, using chromatographic quantification of the change in oxygen content caused by reaction with the EPDM material in sealed containers.« less
A hypervelocity launcher for simulated large fragment space debris impacts at 10 km/s
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Tullos, R. J.; Gray, W. M.; Mullin, S. A.; Cour-Palais, B. G.
1989-01-01
The background, design, and testing of two explosive launchers for simulating large fragment space debris impacts are presented. The objective was to develop a launcher capable of launching one gram aluminum fragments at velocities of 10 km/s. The two launchers developed are based on modified versions of an explosive shaped charge, common in many military weapons. One launcher design has yielded a stable fragment launch of approximately one gram of aluminum at 8.93 km/s velocity. The other design yielded velocities in excess of 10 km/s, but failed to produce a cohesive fragment launch. This work is ongoing, and future plans are given.
28 CFR 13.5 - Procedures: Responsibilities of the intra-departmental committee.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-07-01
... 28 Judicial Administration 1 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Procedures: Responsibilities of the intra-departmental committee. 13.5 Section 13.5 Judicial Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ATOMIC WEAPONS AND SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS REWARDS REGULATIONS § 13.5 Procedures: Responsibilities of the intra...
28 CFR 13.7 - Judicial review.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-07-01
... 28 Judicial Administration 1 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Judicial review. 13.7 Section 13.7 Judicial Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ATOMIC WEAPONS AND SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS REWARDS REGULATIONS § 13.7 Judicial review. The decision of the Attorney General is final and conclusive and no court...
28 CFR 13.7 - Judicial review.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-07-01
... 28 Judicial Administration 1 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Judicial review. 13.7 Section 13.7 Judicial Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ATOMIC WEAPONS AND SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS REWARDS REGULATIONS § 13.7 Judicial review. The decision of the Attorney General is final and conclusive and no court...
28 CFR 13.7 - Judicial review.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-07-01
... 28 Judicial Administration 1 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Judicial review. 13.7 Section 13.7 Judicial Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ATOMIC WEAPONS AND SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS REWARDS REGULATIONS § 13.7 Judicial review. The decision of the Attorney General is final and conclusive and no court...
28 CFR 13.5 - Procedures: Responsibilities of the intra-departmental committee.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-07-01
... 28 Judicial Administration 1 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Procedures: Responsibilities of the intra-departmental committee. 13.5 Section 13.5 Judicial Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ATOMIC WEAPONS AND SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS REWARDS REGULATIONS § 13.5 Procedures: Responsibilities of the intra...
28 CFR 13.5 - Procedures: Responsibilities of the intra-departmental committee.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-07-01
... 28 Judicial Administration 1 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Procedures: Responsibilities of the intra-departmental committee. 13.5 Section 13.5 Judicial Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ATOMIC WEAPONS AND SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS REWARDS REGULATIONS § 13.5 Procedures: Responsibilities of the intra...
28 CFR 13.7 - Judicial review.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-07-01
... 28 Judicial Administration 1 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Judicial review. 13.7 Section 13.7 Judicial Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ATOMIC WEAPONS AND SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS REWARDS REGULATIONS § 13.7 Judicial review. The decision of the Attorney General is final and conclusive and no court...
28 CFR 13.5 - Procedures: Responsibilities of the intra-departmental committee.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-07-01
... 28 Judicial Administration 1 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Procedures: Responsibilities of the intra-departmental committee. 13.5 Section 13.5 Judicial Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ATOMIC WEAPONS AND SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS REWARDS REGULATIONS § 13.5 Procedures: Responsibilities of the intra...
28 CFR 13.7 - Judicial review.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-07-01
... 28 Judicial Administration 1 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Judicial review. 13.7 Section 13.7 Judicial Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ATOMIC WEAPONS AND SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS REWARDS REGULATIONS § 13.7 Judicial review. The decision of the Attorney General is final and conclusive and no court...
28 CFR 13.5 - Procedures: Responsibilities of the intra-departmental committee.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-07-01
... 28 Judicial Administration 1 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Procedures: Responsibilities of the intra-departmental committee. 13.5 Section 13.5 Judicial Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ATOMIC WEAPONS AND SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS REWARDS REGULATIONS § 13.5 Procedures: Responsibilities of the intra...
Laser Induced Damage in Optical Materials: 1980.
1981-10-01
is used to describe microplastic strain resulting from short duration loading, and the term microcreep refers to time dependent strains of small...effectively, and the maximum temperature rise will thus be at the Work supported by Naval Sea Systems Command, PflS-405, and Naval Weapons Center
Terrorists and Nuclear Technology
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Krieger, David
1975-01-01
This essay explores the ways terrorist groups may gain possession of nuclear materials; the way in which they may use nuclear weapons and other nuclear technologies to their benefit; and various courses of action designed to minimize the possibilities of terrorists utilizing nuclear technology to their benefit and society's detriment. (BT)
The Nuclear Power/Nuclear Weapons Connection.
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Totten, Sam; Totten, Martha Wescoat
1985-01-01
Once they have nuclear power, most countries will divert nuclear materials from commercial to military programs. In excerpts from the book "Facing the Danger" (by Totten, S. and M. W., Crossing Press, 1984), five anti-nuclear activists explain how and why they have been addressing the nuclear connection. (RM)
Resource Letter PSNAC-1: Physics and society: Nuclear arms control
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Glaser, Alexander; Mian, Zia
2008-01-01
This Resource Letter provides a guide to the literature on nuclear arms control for the nonspecialist. Journal articles and books are cited for the following topics: nuclear weapons, fissile materials, nonproliferation, missiles and missile defenses, verification, disarmament, and the role of scientists in arms control.
Measurements of plutonium, 237Np, and 137Cs in the BCR 482 lichen reference material
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Lavelle, Kevin B.; Miller, Jeffrey L.; Hanson, Susan K.
Select anthropogenic radionuclides were measured in lichen reference material, BCR 482. This material was originally collected in Axalp, Switzerland in 1991 and is composed of the epiphytic lichen Pseudevernia furfuracea. Samples from three separate bottles of BCR 482 were analyzed for uranium, neptunium, and plutonium isotopes by inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (ICP-MS) and analyzed for cesium-137 by gamma-ray spectrometry. The isotopic composition of the radionuclides measured in BCR 482 suggests contributions from both global fallout resulting from historical nuclear weapons testing and more volatile materials released following the Chernobyl accident.
Measurements of plutonium, 237Np, and 137Cs in the BCR 482 lichen reference material
Lavelle, Kevin B.; Miller, Jeffrey L.; Hanson, Susan K.; ...
2015-10-01
Select anthropogenic radionuclides were measured in lichen reference material, BCR 482. This material was originally collected in Axalp, Switzerland in 1991 and is composed of the epiphytic lichen Pseudevernia furfuracea. Samples from three separate bottles of BCR 482 were analyzed for uranium, neptunium, and plutonium isotopes by inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (ICP-MS) and analyzed for cesium-137 by gamma-ray spectrometry. The isotopic composition of the radionuclides measured in BCR 482 suggests contributions from both global fallout resulting from historical nuclear weapons testing and more volatile materials released following the Chernobyl accident.
Geochemistry of chemical weapon breakdown products on the seafloor: 1,4-thioxane in seawater.
Zhang, Xin; Hester, Keith C; Mancillas, Oscar; Peltzer, Edward T; Walz, Peter M; Brewer, Peter G
2009-02-01
The long-term fate of chemical weapon debris disposed of in the ocean some 50 years ago, now sinking into marine sediments and leaking into the ocean environment, is poorly known. Direct evidence exists showing chemical weapon agents actively being released on the sea floor with detrimental effects including harm to marine life. Thus there is strong interest in determining the fate and lifetime of these materials, their decomposition products, and the affected zones around these sites. Here we study the geochemical properties of a mustard gas breakdown product, 1,4-thioxane (TO), using Raman spectroscopy. We show that TO forms a hydrate with a help-gas (a second guest added to stabilize the hydrate), such as methane or hydrogen sulfide, with the hydrate stability regime some 10 degrees C above pure methane hydrate. The temperature, pressure, and reducing conditions required for hydrate formation commonly occur at known disposal sites. The TO solubility was measured in seawater and found to vary from 0.65 to 0.63 mol/kg water between 4.5 and 25.0 degrees C. Similar to other hydrate systems, the TO solubility decreased in the presence of hydrate. A low solubility in water coupled with its ability to form a hydrate within marine sediments can greatly decrease molecular mobility and increase its lifetime. These results demonstrate how unanticipated reactions with marine sediments can occur, and how little is known of the processes controlling the environmental science of these materials.
2013-10-29
or approval of the use thereof. Destroy this report when it is no longer needed. Do not return it to the originator. Army Research Laboratory...Leadore, and Daphne D. Pappas Weapons and Materials Research Directorate, ARL A reprint from ACS Applied Materials & Interfaces...NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Research Laboratory ATTN: RDRL-WMM-C Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 21005-5069 8
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Fraga, Carlos G.
This virtual special issue is devoted to chemical forensics, a developing scientific discipline that aims to provide information to support the attribution of a chemical (or mixture) of interest to its source. This process is carried out through the analysis of the chemical itself or associated material constituents to address investigative, legal or intelligence questions. “Source” refers to how, where and when a chemical was handled or produced. Source information is critical in investigations of incidents of chemicals used for illicit or nefarious purposes, especially when toxic chemicals are used as weapons. The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), an international disarmamentmore » treaty that entered into force in 1997, prohibits the use of chemicals as weapons. This treaty has 192 States Parties (the countries who have joined the treaty) encompassing more than 98% of the global population and landmass, yet chemical attacks have continued to increase since this treaty was opened for signature to the governments of the world in 1993. The first notorious use of a chemical weapon since 1993 was by the Aum Shinrikyo cult whose sarin attack on the Tokyo subway system in March 1995 killed 13 and drove another 6,000 to seek medical treatment. More recently, over 160 alleged chemical attacks have been reported in Syria and Iraq with both governments and terrorist groups being accused, and casualties numbering in the thousands. Additionally, recent high profile nerve agent poisoning of dissidents from North Korea and Russia illustrate a willingness to use chemical threat agents (CTAs) with impunity. Given the threat posed by those that choose to use CTAs as weapons, there is a dire need for advancements in chemical forensics that can be used in investigations and inquiries to help find and hold to account, the perpetrators of chemical attacks.« less
Fraga, Carlos G.
2018-04-22
This virtual special issue is devoted to chemical forensics, a developing scientific discipline that aims to provide information to support the attribution of a chemical (or mixture) of interest to its source. This process is carried out through the analysis of the chemical itself or associated material constituents to address investigative, legal or intelligence questions. “Source” refers to how, where and when a chemical was handled or produced. Source information is critical in investigations of incidents of chemicals used for illicit or nefarious purposes, especially when toxic chemicals are used as weapons. The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), an international disarmamentmore » treaty that entered into force in 1997, prohibits the use of chemicals as weapons. This treaty has 192 States Parties (the countries who have joined the treaty) encompassing more than 98% of the global population and landmass, yet chemical attacks have continued to increase since this treaty was opened for signature to the governments of the world in 1993. The first notorious use of a chemical weapon since 1993 was by the Aum Shinrikyo cult whose sarin attack on the Tokyo subway system in March 1995 killed 13 and drove another 6,000 to seek medical treatment. More recently, over 160 alleged chemical attacks have been reported in Syria and Iraq with both governments and terrorist groups being accused, and casualties numbering in the thousands. Additionally, recent high profile nerve agent poisoning of dissidents from North Korea and Russia illustrate a willingness to use chemical threat agents (CTAs) with impunity. Given the threat posed by those that choose to use CTAs as weapons, there is a dire need for advancements in chemical forensics that can be used in investigations and inquiries to help find and hold to account, the perpetrators of chemical attacks.« less
An Introduction to Risk with a Focus on Design Diversity in the Stockpile
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Noone, Bailey C
2012-08-13
The maintenance and security of nuclear weapons in the stockpile involves decisions based on risk analysis and quantitative measures of risk. Risk is a factor in all decisions, a particularly important factor in decisions of a large scale. One example of high-risk decisions we will discuss is the risk involved in design diversity within the stockpile of nuclear weapons arsenal. Risk is defined as 'possibility of loss or injury' and the 'degree of probability of such loss' (Kaplan and Garrick 12). To introduce the risk involved with maintaining the weapons stockpile we will draw a parallel to the design andmore » maintenance of Southwest Airlines fleet of Boeing 737 planes. The clear benefits for cost savings in maintenance of having a uniform fleet are what historically drove Southwest to have only Boeing 737s in their fleet. Less money and resources are need for maintenance, training, and materials. Naturally, risk accompanies those benefits. A defect in a part of the plane indicates a potential defect in that same part in all the planes of the fleet. As a result, safety, business, and credibility are at risk. How much variety or diversity does the fleet need to mitigate that risk? With that question in mind, a balance is needed to accommodate the different risks and benefits of the situation. In a similar way, risk is analyzed for the design and maintenance of nuclear weapons in the stockpile. In conclusion, risk must be as low as possible when it comes to the nuclear weapons stockpile. Design and care to keep the stockpile healthy involves all aspects of risk management. Design diversity is a method that helps to mitigate risk, and to help balance options in stockpile stewardship.« less
Haeberle, C Brent; Abreu, Amara; Metzler, Kurt
2015-01-01
Vinyl polysiloxane (VPS) has multiple applications in prosthodontics. This article describes how a bite registration fast-set VPS material was used to identify length overextension and/or excessive border thickness of denture flanges. In addition, the advantages of VPS over conventional materials are presented.
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
1972-01-01
Volume 2 of the final report on the B-70 aircraft study is presented here. The B-70 Program, at the onset, was a full weapon system capable of sustained Mach 3 flight for the major portion of its design missions. The weapon system was to enter the SAC inventory as an RS-70 with the first intercontinental resonnaissance/bomber wing scheduled to go operational in July, 1964. After several redirections, a two XB-70 air vehicle program emerged with its prime objective being to demonstrate the technical feasibility of sustained Mach 3 flight. This section describes the original Weapon System 110A concepts, the evolution of the RS-70 design, and the XB-70 air vehicles which demonstrated the design, fabrication, and technical feasibility of long range Mach 3 flights at high altitude. The data presented shows that a very large step forward in the state-of-the-art of manned aircraft design was achieved during the B-70 development program and that advances were made and incorporated in every area, including design, materials application, and manufacturing techniques.
Portable concealed weapon detection using millimeter-wave FMCW radar imaging
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Johnson, Michael A.; Chang, Yu-Wen
2001-02-01
Unobtrusive detection of concealed weapons on persons or in abandoned bags would provide law enforcement a powerful tool to focus resources and increase traffic throughput in high- risk situations. We have developed a fast image scanning 94 GHz radar system that is suitable for portable operation and remote viewing of radar data. This system includes a novel fast image-scanning antenna that allows for the acquisition of medium resolution 3D millimeter wave images of stationary targets with frame times on order of one second. The 3D radar data allows for potential isolation of concealed weapons from body and environmental clutter such as nearby furniture or other people. The radar is an active system so image quality is not affected indoors, emitted power is however very low so there are no health concerns for operator or targets. The low power operation is still sufficient to penetrate heavy clothing or material. Small system size allows for easy transport and rapid deployment of the system as well as an easy migration path to future hand held systems.
Institutional plan FY 1999--FY 2004
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
NONE
1998-10-01
Los Alamos has a well-defined and nationally important mission: to reduce the global nuclear danger. This central national security mission consists of four main elements: stockpile stewardship, nuclear materials management, nonproliferation and arms control, and cleanup of the environmental legacy of nuclear weapons activities. The Laboratory provides support for and ensures confidence in the nation`s nuclear stockpile without nuclear testing. This challenge requires the Laboratory to continually hone its scientific acumen and technological capabilities to perform this task reliably using an interdisciplinary approach and advanced experimental and modeling techniques. In the last two National Defense Authorization Acts, Congress identified themore » need to protect the nation from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which includes nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and their potential use by terrorists. Los Alamos is applying multidisciplinary science and engineering skills to address these problems. In addition, the Laboratory`s critical programmatic roles in stockpile stewardship and threat reduction are complemented by its waste management operations and environmental restoration work. Information on specific programs is available in Section 2 of this document.« less
77 FR 28669 - Pipeline Safety: Information Collection Activities, Excess Flow Valve Census
Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014
2012-05-15
... DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration [Docket No. PHMSA-2012-0086] Pipeline Safety: Information Collection Activities, Excess Flow Valve Census AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), DOT. ACTION: Notice and request for...
Cladding and duct materials for advanced nuclear recycle reactors
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Allen, T. R.; Busby, J. T.; Klueh, R. L.; Maloy, S. A.; Toloczko, M. B.
2008-01-01
The expanded use of nuclear energy without risk of nuclear weapons proliferation and with safe nuclear waste disposal is a primary goal of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). To achieve that goal the GNEP is exploring advanced technologies for recycling spent nuclear fuel that do not separate pure plutonium, and advanced reactors that consume transuranic elements from recycled spent fuel. The GNEP’s objectives will place high demands on reactor clad and structural materials. This article discusses the materials requirements of the GNEP’s advanced nuclear recycle reactors program.
Flexible weapons architecture design
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Pyant, William C., III
Present day air-delivered weapons are of a closed architecture, with little to no ability to tailor the weapon for the individual engagement. The closed architectures require weaponeers to make the target fit the weapon instead of fitting the individual weapons to a target. The concept of a flexible weapons aims to modularize weapons design using an open architecture shell into which different modules are inserted to achieve the desired target fractional damage while reducing cost and civilian casualties. This thesis shows that the architecture design factors of damage mechanism, fusing, weapons weight, guidance, and propulsion are significant in enhancing weapon performance objectives, and would benefit from modularization. Additionally, this thesis constructs an algorithm that can be used to design a weapon set for a particular target class based on these modular components.
Tereza, Guida Paola Genovez; de Oliveira, Gabriela Cristina; de Andrade Moreira Machado, Maria Aparecida; de Oliveira, Thais Marchine; da Silva, Thiago Cruvinel; Rios, Daniela
2016-04-01
The aim of this study was to evaluate the effect of removing excess of resin-based materials applied to eroded enamel, subjected to erosive challenge. Bovine enamel blocks were immersed in HCl 0.01M, pH 2.3, for 30s under agitation at 50 rpm in room temperature, in order to form a softened erosion lesion. The blocks were then randomly divided into eight groups (n=12) and treated as follows: Cn- and Ce-control without treatment, Hn- and He-fissure resin sealant (Helioseal Clear(®)), An- and Ae-self-etch adhesive (Adhese(®)), In- and Ie-infiltrant (Icon(®)); being n-with excess removal and e-without excess removal of the material. After application of the materials, the blocks were immersed in HCl for 2 min, followed by immersion in artificial saliva for 120 min. This cycle was repeated four times a day for five days. Material thickness and enamel wear were assessed using profilometry. Data were analyzed by two-way ANOVA and Tukey's test (P<0.05). Groups He, Ae, and Ie resulted in the formation of a layer of material over enamel, being similar effective in inhibiting erosion progression (P>0.05). Groups Hn, An, and In (with excess removal) were similar to controls (Cn, Ce) and resulted in near enamel loss after application and after erosive challenge (P>0.05). Resin-based materials are able to protect enamel against erosion only when they are present over enamel, as a physical barrier. The resin-based materials demonstrated potential to prevent the progression of erosion lesions when the material remains on the dental surface. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
VALIDATION OF STANDARD ANALYTICAL PROTOCOL FOR SEMI-VOLATILE ORGANIC COMPOUNDS
There is a growing concern with the potential for terrorist use of chemical weapons to cause civilian harm. In the event of an actual or suspected outdoor release of chemically hazardous material in a large area, the extent of contamination must be determined. This requires a s...
14 CFR § 1204.1004 - Trespass.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-01-01
... 14 Aeronautics and Space 5 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Trespass. § 1204.1004 Section § 1204.1004... Inspection of Persons and Personal Effects at NASA Installations or on NASA Property; Trespass or Unauthorized Introduction of Weapons or Dangerous Materials § 1204.1004 Trespass. Unauthorized entry upon any...
In-Service Support Plan for Electromagnetic Environment Effects.
1978-05-05
assure highly motivated and trained Fleet personnel are placed in positions to initiate formal EME deficiency reports. The human factors and technological...Assistant I )eputy C hief of Naval Material AD P Automiated Data Processing ALRE-I1 Air-LUmnhed G uided Weapons System Perform-rance Re- port APL
15 CFR 710.1 - Definitions of terms used in the Chemical Weapons Convention Regulations (CWCR).
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-01-01
... chemical means its conversion into another chemical via a chemical reaction. Unreacted material must be... formed through chemical reaction that is subsequently reacted to form another chemical. ITAR. Means the... formation of a chemical through chemical reaction, including biochemical or biologically mediated reaction...
Teaching Controversial Materials: Teaching about the Nuclear Issue.
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Wall, Joseph
1986-01-01
Describes difficulties encountered in presenting a college course on nuclear weapons and disarmament. Maintains that such courses must strive for a fuller historical account of the arms race, in addition to stressing the humanistic and ethical questions involved. Warns that controversy will arise and concludes that even blind anger is preferable…
Ball Bearing (BB) Guns, Ease of Purchase and Potential for Significant Injury
Grocock, C; McCarthy, R; Williams, DJ
2006-01-01
INTRODUCTION Ball bearing guns are used in the UK for war games, but they have the potential to cause severe injury if used incorrectly. MATERIALS AND METHODS A search was made for availability of these weapons, the ease of purchase and the potential for tissue damage. RESULTS These weapons are widely available on the Internet and are easy to purchase with no security checks. Once fully charged, an electric BB gun is capable of penetrating a cadaveric animal model at distances up to 5 m (1 m = 25 mm penetration, 3 m = 20 mm penetration, 5 m = 15 mm penetration). CONCLUSIONS BB guns are not toys and have a significant potential to cause injury. PMID:16834864
Firearm suppressor having enhanced thermal management for rapid heat dissipation
Moss, William C.; Anderson, Andrew T.
2014-08-19
A suppressor is disclosed for use with a weapon having a barrel through which a bullet is fired. The suppressor has an inner portion having a bore extending coaxially therethrough. The inner portion is adapted to be secured to a distal end of the barrel. A plurality of axial flow segments project radially from the inner portion and form axial flow paths through which expanding propellant gasses discharged from the barrel flow through. The axial flow segments have radially extending wall portions that define sections which may be filled with thermally conductive material, which in one example is a thermally conductive foam. The conductive foam helps to dissipate heat deposited within the suppressor during firing of the weapon.
Youths carrying a weapon or using a weapon in a fight: what makes the difference?
Thurnherr, Judit; Michaud, Pierre-André; Berchtold, André; Akré, Christina; Suris, Joan-Carles
2009-04-01
The objective of this study was to characterize weapon-carrying adolescents and to assess whether weapon carriers differ from weapon users. Data were drawn from a cross-sectional school-based survey of 7548 adolescents aged 16-20 years in Switzerland. Youths carrying a weapon were compared with those who do not. Subsequently, weapon carriers were divided into those who had used it in a fight and those who had not. Individual, family, school and social factors were analyzed using bivariate and stepwise multivariate analysis. For both genders, delinquent behavior and being victim of physical violence were associated with weapon carrying. For males, quarreling while intoxicated, being an apprentice, being sensation seekers, having a tattoo, having a poor relationship with parents and practicing unsafe sex were also related to weapon carrying. Compared with weapon carriers, female weapon users were more likely to be regular smokers. Male weapon users were foreign born, urban and apprentices; had poor school connectedness; practiced unsafe sex and quarreled while intoxicated. Carrying a weapon is a relatively frequent behavior among youths in Switzerland and a sizeable proportion of weapon carriers have used it in a fight. Weapon carrying should be part of the clinical assessment and preventive counseling of adolescents. Preventive programs specific for at-risk youth groups need to be developed.
Youths Carrying a Weapon or Using a Weapon in a Fight: What Makes the Difference?
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Thurnherr, Judit; Michaud, Pierre-Andre; Berchtold, Andre; Akre, Christina; Suris, Joan-Carles
2009-01-01
The objective of this study was to characterize weapon-carrying adolescents and to assess whether weapon carriers differ from weapon users. Data were drawn from a cross-sectional school-based survey of 7548 adolescents aged 16-20 years in Switzerland. Youths carrying a weapon were compared with those who do not. Subsequently, weapon carriers were…
Preparation and properties on hollow nano-structured smoke material
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Liu, Xiang-cui; Dai, Meng-yan; Fang, Guo-feng; Shi, Wei-dong; Cheng, Xiang; Liu, Hai-feng; Zhang, Tong
2013-09-01
In recent years, the weapon systems of laser guidance and infrared (IR) imaging guidance have been widely used in modern warfare because of their high precision and strong anti-interference. Notwithstanding, military smoke, as a rapid and effective passive jamming means, can effectively counteract the attack of enemy precision-guided weapons by scattering and absorbability. Conventional smoke has good attenuation capability only to visible light (0.4-0.76 μm), but hardly any effect to other electromagnetic wave band. The weapon systems of laser guidance and IR imaging guidance usually work in broad band, including near IR (1-3 μm), middle IR (3-5 μm), far IR (8-14 μm), and so on. Accordingly, exploiting and using new efficient obscurant materials, which is one of the important factors that develop smoke technology, have become a focus and attracted more interests around the world. Then nano-structured materials that are developing very quickly have turned into our new choice. Hollow nano-structured materials (HNSM) have many special properties because of their nano-size wall-thickness and sub-micron grain-size. After a lot of HNSM were synthesized in this paper, their physical and chemical properties, including grain size, phase composition, microstructure, optical properties and resistivity were tested and analysed. Then the experimental results of the optical properties showed that HNSM exhibit excellent wave-absorbing ability in ultraviolet, visible and infrared regions. On the basis of the physicochemmical properties, HNSM are firstly applied in smoke technology field. And the obscuration performance of HNSM smoke was tested in smoke chamber. The testing waveband included 1.06μm and 10.6μm laser, 3-5μm and 8-14μm IR radiation. Then the main parameters were obtained, including the attenuation rate, the transmission rate, the mass extinction coefficient, the efficiency obscuring time, and the sedimentation rate, etc. The main parameters of HNSM smoke were contrasted in detail with graphite powder smoke agent. The results showed that HNSM smoke possesses better obscuration capability compared with the smoke performance of conventional materials (such as HC, RP, oil, carbon black, and graphite powder). Therefore, they are new smoke obscurant materials which can effectively interfere with broadband electromagnetic radiation, including 1.06 μm and 10.6 μm laser, 3-5 μm and 8-14 μm IR waveband.
Mortality among workers at Oak Ridge National Laboratory.
Richardson, David B; Wing, Steve; Keil, Alexander; Wolf, Susanne
2013-07-01
Workers employed at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) were potentially exposed to a range of chemical and physical hazards, many of which are poorly characterized. We compared the observed deaths among workers to expectations based upon US mortality rates. The cohort included 22,831 workers hired between January 1, 1943 and December 31, 1984. Vital status and cause of death information were ascertained through December 31, 2008. Standardized mortality ratios (SMRs) were computed separately for males and females using US and Tennessee mortality rates; SMRs for men were tabulated separately for monthly-, weekly-, and hourly-paid workers. Hourly-paid males had more deaths due to cancer of the pleura (SMR = 12.09, 95% CI: 4.44, 26.32), cancer of the bladder (SMR = 1.89, 95% CI: 1.26, 2.71), and leukemia (SMR = 1.33, 95% CI: 0.87, 1.93) than expected based on US mortality rates. Female workers also had more deaths than expected from cancer of the bladder (SMR = 2.20, 95% CI: 1.20, 3.69) and leukemia (SMR = 1.64, 95% CI: 1.09, 2.36). The pleural cancer excess has only appeared since the 1980s, approximately 40 years after the start of operations. The bladder cancer excess was larger among workers who also had worked at other Oak Ridge nuclear weapons facilities, while the leukemia excess was among people who had not worked at other DOE facilities. Occupational hazards including asbestos and ionizing radiation may contribute to these excesses. Copyright © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Sandia National Laboratories: National Security Missions: Nuclear Weapons:
Safety & Security Sandia National Laboratories Exceptional service in the national interest & Figures Programs Nuclear Weapons About Nuclear Weapons Safety & Security Weapons Science & Twitter YouTube Flickr RSS Top Nuclear Weapons About Nuclear Weapons at Sandia Safety & Security
Bauer, Susanne; Gusev, Boris I; Pivina, Ludmila M; Apsalikov, Kazbek N; Grosche, Bernd
2005-10-01
Little information is available on the health effects of exposures to fallout from Soviet nuclear weapons testing and on the combined external and internal environmental exposures that have resulted from these tests. This paper reports the first analysis of the Semipalatinsk historical cohort exposed in the vicinity of the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site, Kazakhstan. The cohort study, which includes 19,545 inhabitants of exposed and comparison villages of the Semipalatinsk region, was set up in the 1960s and comprises 582,750 person-years of follow-up between 1960 and 1999. Cumulative effective radiation dose estimates in this cohort range from 20 mSv to approximately 4 Sv. Rates of mortality and cancer mortality in the exposed group substantially exceeded those of the comparison group. Dose-response analyses within the exposed group confirmed a significant trend with dose for all solid cancers (P < 0.0001) and for digestive and respiratory cancers (P = 0.0255 and P < 0.0001), whereas no consistent dose-response trend was found for all causes of death (P = 0.4296). Regarding specific cancer sites, a significant trend with dose was observed for lung cancer (P = 0.0001), stomach cancer (P = 0.0050), and female breast cancer (P = 0.0040) as well as for esophagus cancer in women (P = 0.0030). The excess relative risk per sievert for all solid cancers combined was 1.77 (1.35; 2.27) based on the total cohort data, yet a selection bias regarding the comparison group could not be entirely ruled out. The excess relative risk per sievert based on the cohort's exposed group was 0.81 (0.46; 1.33) for all solid cancers combined and thus still exceeds current risk estimates from the Life Span Study. Future epidemiological assessments based on this cohort will benefit from extension of follow-up and ongoing validation of dosimetric data.
A simulation study of detection of weapon of mass destruction based on radar
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Sharifahmadian, E.; Choi, Y.; Latifi, S.
2013-05-01
Typical systems used for detection of Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) are based on sensing objects using gamma rays or neutrons. Nonetheless, depending on environmental conditions, current methods for detecting fissile materials have limited distance of effectiveness. Moreover, radiation related to gamma- rays can be easily shielded. Here, detecting concealed WMD from a distance is simulated and studied based on radar, especially WideBand (WB) technology. The WB-based method capitalizes on the fact that electromagnetic waves penetrate through different materials at different rates. While low-frequency waves can pass through objects more easily, high-frequency waves have a higher rate of absorption by objects, making the object recognition easier. Measuring the penetration depth allows one to identify the sensed material. During simulation, radar waves and propagation area including free space, and objects in the scene are modeled. In fact, each material is modeled as a layer with a certain thickness. At start of simulation, a modeled radar wave is radiated toward the layers. At the receiver side, based on the received signals from every layer, each layer can be identified. When an electromagnetic wave passes through an object, the wave's power will be subject to a certain level of attenuation depending of the object's characteristics. Simulation is performed using radar signals with different frequencies (ranges MHz-GHz) and powers to identify different layers.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-07-01
... 32 National Defense 2 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Weapons. 234.10 Section 234.10 National Defense... PENTAGON RESERVATION § 234.10 Weapons. (a) Except as otherwise authorized under this section, the following are prohibited: (1) Possessing a weapon. (2) Carrying a weapon. (3) Using a weapon. (b) This section...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-07-01
... 32 National Defense 2 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Weapons. 234.10 Section 234.10 National Defense... PENTAGON RESERVATION § 234.10 Weapons. (a) Except as otherwise authorized under this section, the following are prohibited: (1) Possessing a weapon. (2) Carrying a weapon. (3) Using a weapon. (b) This section...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-07-01
... 32 National Defense 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Weapons. 234.10 Section 234.10 National Defense... PENTAGON RESERVATION § 234.10 Weapons. (a) Except as otherwise authorized under this section, the following are prohibited: (1) Possessing a weapon. (2) Carrying a weapon. (3) Using a weapon. (b) This section...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-07-01
... 32 National Defense 2 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Weapons. 234.10 Section 234.10 National Defense... PENTAGON RESERVATION § 234.10 Weapons. (a) Except as otherwise authorized under this section, the following are prohibited: (1) Possessing a weapon. (2) Carrying a weapon. (3) Using a weapon. (b) This section...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-07-01
... 32 National Defense 2 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Weapons. 234.10 Section 234.10 National Defense... PENTAGON RESERVATION § 234.10 Weapons. (a) Except as otherwise authorized under this section, the following are prohibited: (1) Possessing a weapon. (2) Carrying a weapon. (3) Using a weapon. (b) This section...
41 CFR 50-204.25 - Exceptions from posting requirements.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-07-01
... to prevent the exposure of any individual to radiation or radioactive material in excess of the... necessary to prevent the exposure of any individual to radiation or radioactive materials in excess of the... CONTRACTS Radiation Standards § 50-204.25 Exceptions from posting requirements. Notwithstanding the...
41 CFR 50-204.25 - Exceptions from posting requirements.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-07-01
... to prevent the exposure of any individual to radiation or radioactive material in excess of the... necessary to prevent the exposure of any individual to radiation or radioactive materials in excess of the... CONTRACTS Radiation Standards § 50-204.25 Exceptions from posting requirements. Notwithstanding the...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-01-01
... to the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Presidential Documents Other Presidential... Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction On November 14, 1994, by Executive Order 12938, the President... chemical weapons (weapons of mass destruction) and the means of delivering such weapons. On July 28, 1998...
[Chemical weapons and chemical terrorism].
Nakamura, Katsumi
2005-10-01
Chemical Weapons are kind of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). They were used large quantities in WWI. Historically, large quantities usage like WWI was not recorded, but small usage has appeared now and then. Chemical weapons are so called "Nuclear weapon for poor countrys" because it's very easy to produce/possession being possible. They are categorized (1) Nerve Agents, (2) Blister Agents, (3) Cyanide (blood) Agents, (4) Pulmonary Agents, (5) Incapacitating Agents (6) Tear Agents from the viewpoint of human body interaction. In 1997 the Chemical Weapons Convention has taken effect. It prohibits chemical weapons development/production, and Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) verification regime contributes to the chemical weapons disposal. But possibility of possession/use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist group represented in one by Matsumoto and Tokyo Subway Sarin Attack, So new chemical terrorism countermeasures are necessary.
S&TR Preview: Smashing Materials to Reveal Unusual Behavior
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Hunsberger, Maren; Akin, Minta; Chau, Ricky
2016-01-13
Squeeze a material hard enough, and its structure and properties will change, sometimes dramatically so. With enough heat and pressure, scientists can turn pencil lead (graphite), one of Earth’s softest materials, into diamond, one of its hardest. Apply even more pressure—such as might be found in explosions, detonating nuclear weapons, laser fusion experiments, meteorite impacts, or the hearts of stars and planets—and materials can take stranger forms. Deep in Jupiter’s core, for instance, where pressures likely reach 50 to 100 million times that of Earth’s atmosphere, hydrogen is predicted to be a metallic liquid rather than the familiar transparent gas.
Bugs and gas: Agreements banning chemical and biological weapons
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Mikulak, Robert P.
2017-11-01
The use of chemical or biological weapons, whether by a State or terrorists, continues to be a serious security concern. Both types of weapons are prohibited by multilateral treaties that have very broad membership, but both the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention are facing major challenges. In particular, the continued use of chemical weapons in the Syrian civil war by government forces risks eroding the norm against the use of such weapons. This paper briefly explore the recent history of efforts to constrain chemical and biological weapons and outlines challenges for the future.
Wallace, Lacey N
2017-01-01
Prior research has found that persistently delinquent youth or more violent youth were less popular than their less delinquent peers (Young, 2013). However, recent research has also found that weapon carrying is associated with being more popular in adolescence (Dijkstra et al., 2010). The present paper examines the perceived popularity of adolescents who carry weapons in comparison to those who both carry and use weapons in acts of violence or threatened violence. Data consist of two waves from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent to Adult Health. Analyses use OLS regression with lagged predictors. This paper found no differences in number of friends between weapon carriers and weapon users. However, among both male and female gang members, those who did not use or carry weapons (abstainers) named significantly fewer friends than weapon users. Among females, weapon abstainers both named and were named by significantly more people than weapon users. These differences were not observed for males. Implications of these results and directions for future research are discussed.
Fabrication and Tests of M240 Machine Gun Barrels Lined with Stellite 25
2016-04-01
ARL-TR-7662 ● APR 2016 US Army Research Laboratory Fabrication and Tests of M240 Machine Gun Barrels Lined with Stellite 25...Fabrication and Tests of M240 Machine Gun Barrels Lined with Stellite 25 by William S de Rosset and Sean Fudger Weapons and Materials Research...
10 CFR 110.46 - Conduct resulting in termination of nuclear exports.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-01-01
... EQUIPMENT AND MATERIAL Review of License Applications § 110.46 Conduct resulting in termination of nuclear... technology to the sovereign control of a non-nuclear weapon state, except in connection with an international... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Conduct resulting in termination of nuclear exports. 110...
10 CFR 110.46 - Conduct resulting in termination of nuclear exports.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-01-01
... EQUIPMENT AND MATERIAL Review of License Applications § 110.46 Conduct resulting in termination of nuclear... technology to the sovereign control of a non-nuclear weapon state, except in connection with an international... 10 Energy 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Conduct resulting in termination of nuclear exports. 110...
Development of Improved Environmental Resistant Organic-Reinforced Materials Systems
1975-11-01
Advanced composites , graphite and boron reinforced laminates, moisture resistance, environmental resistance, organic matrix composites . 20. ABSTRACT...in November 1975 for publication. Efforts at TOD were conducted within the Advanced Composites Engineering Departmfntrunde; L technical...weight makes^organic matrix advanced composites hardware extremely attractive for today s modern Air Force weapons systems. Accordingly, such
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-01-01
..., including Additional Protocols, designed to ensure that special nuclear materials and other related nuclear... headquarters in Luxembourg. Euratom establishes and administers safeguards designed to ensure that special... the aggregation exceeds the APP parameter set forth in ECCN 4A003.b. (v) “600 series” items may not be...
Colorimetric Detection of Water Vapor Using Metal-Organic Framework Composites.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Allendorf, Mark D.
Purpose: Water vapor trapped in encapsulation materials or enclosed volumes leads to corrosion issues for critical NW components. Sandia National Laboratories has created a new diagnostic to indicate the presence of water in weapon systems. Impact: Component exposure to water now can be determined instantly, without need for costly, time-consuming analytical methods.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-01-01
... 10 Energy 4 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Criteria for evaluation of restricted data and formerly restricted data information. 1045.16 Section 1045.16 Energy DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (GENERAL PROVISIONS) NUCLEAR..., produce nuclear weapons materials, or make other military use of nuclear energy; (4) Whether publication...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-01-01
... 10 Energy 4 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Criteria for evaluation of restricted data and formerly restricted data information. 1045.16 Section 1045.16 Energy DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (GENERAL PROVISIONS) NUCLEAR..., produce nuclear weapons materials, or make other military use of nuclear energy; (4) Whether publication...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-01-01
... 10 Energy 4 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Criteria for evaluation of restricted data and formerly restricted data information. 1045.16 Section 1045.16 Energy DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (GENERAL PROVISIONS) NUCLEAR..., produce nuclear weapons materials, or make other military use of nuclear energy; (4) Whether publication...
Depleted Uranium | RadTown USA | US EPA
2018-01-12
Depleted uranium is the material left after most of the highly radioactive uranium-235 is removed from uranium ore for nuclear power and weapons. DU is used for tank armor, armor-piercing bullets and as weights to help balance aircraft. DU is both a toxic chemical and radiation health hazard when inside the body.
1979-02-26
Williams, Electronic States of Semiconductors with Graded Periodic Inhomogeneities, Phys. Rev. Eli, 2200 (1975) . 7. P. DiBona and R. Ewing, ESR of...Fellow) - K. Daghir, Ph.D. (1974) (IBM) P. DiBona , M.S. (1967), Ph.D. (1974) (U.S. Navy, Surface Weapons Research Laboratory) D. Hoover (current
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-01-01
... 10 Energy 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Criteria for evaluation of restricted data and formerly restricted data information. 1045.16 Section 1045.16 Energy DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (GENERAL PROVISIONS) NUCLEAR..., produce nuclear weapons materials, or make other military use of nuclear energy; (4) Whether publication...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-01-01
... 10 Energy 4 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Criteria for evaluation of restricted data and formerly restricted data information. 1045.16 Section 1045.16 Energy DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (GENERAL PROVISIONS) NUCLEAR..., produce nuclear weapons materials, or make other military use of nuclear energy; (4) Whether publication...
76 FR 24854 - Proposed Information Collection; Comment Request; Additional Protocol Report Forms
Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014
2011-05-03
... States to submit declaration forms to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on a number of... purposes, but also would be necessary elements for a nuclear weapons program. These forms provides the IAEA... and milling of nuclear materials; buildings on sites of facilities selected by the IAEA from the U.S...
36 CFR 2.4 - Weapons, traps and nets.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-07-01
... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 1 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Weapons, traps and nets. 2.4... PROTECTION, PUBLIC USE AND RECREATION § 2.4 Weapons, traps and nets. (a)(1) Except as otherwise provided in... prohibited: (i) Possessing a weapon, trap or net (ii) Carrying a weapon, trap or net (iii) Using a weapon...
36 CFR 2.4 - Weapons, traps and nets.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-07-01
... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 1 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Weapons, traps and nets. 2.4... PROTECTION, PUBLIC USE AND RECREATION § 2.4 Weapons, traps and nets. (a)(1) Except as otherwise provided in... prohibited: (i) Possessing a weapon, trap or net (ii) Carrying a weapon, trap or net (iii) Using a weapon...
36 CFR 2.4 - Weapons, traps and nets.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-07-01
... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 1 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Weapons, traps and nets. 2.4... PROTECTION, PUBLIC USE AND RECREATION § 2.4 Weapons, traps and nets. (a)(1) Except as otherwise provided in... prohibited: (i) Possessing a weapon, trap or net (ii) Carrying a weapon, trap or net (iii) Using a weapon...
36 CFR 2.4 - Weapons, traps and nets.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-07-01
... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 1 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Weapons, traps and nets. 2.4... PROTECTION, PUBLIC USE AND RECREATION § 2.4 Weapons, traps and nets. (a)(1) Except as otherwise provided in... prohibited: (i) Possessing a weapon, trap or net (ii) Carrying a weapon, trap or net (iii) Using a weapon...
36 CFR 2.4 - Weapons, traps and nets.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-07-01
... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 1 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Weapons, traps and nets. 2.4... PROTECTION, PUBLIC USE AND RECREATION § 2.4 Weapons, traps and nets. (a)(1) Except as otherwise provided in... prohibited: (i) Possessing a weapon, trap or net (ii) Carrying a weapon, trap or net (iii) Using a weapon...
Benjamin, Arlin James; Bushman, Brad J
2018-02-01
In some societies, weapons are plentiful and highly visible. This review examines recent trends in research on the weapons effect, which is the finding that the mere presence of weapons can prime people to behave aggressively. The General Aggression Model provides a theoretical framework to explain why the weapons effect occurs. This model postulates that exposure to weapons increases aggressive thoughts and hostile appraisals, thus explaining why weapons facilitate aggressive behavior. Data from meta-analytic reviews are consistent with the General Aggression Model. These findings have important practical as well as theoretical implications. They suggest that the link between weapons and aggression is very strong in semantic memory, and that merely seeing a weapon can make people more aggressive. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Beryllium in the environment: a review.
Taylor, Tammy P; Ding, Mei; Ehler, Deborah S; Foreman, Trudi M; Kaszuba, John P; Sauer, Nancy N
2003-02-01
Beryllium is an important industrial metal because of its unusual material properties: it is lighter than aluminum and six times stronger than steel. Often alloyed with other metals such as copper, beryllium is a key component of materials used in the aerospace and electronics industries. Beryllium has a small neutron cross-section, which makes it useful in the production of nuclear weapons and in sealed neutron sources. Unfortunately, beryllium is one of the most toxic elements in the periodic table. It is responsible for the often-fatal lung disease, Chronic Beryllium Disease (CBD) or berylliosis, and is listed as a Class A EPA carcinogen. Coal-fired power plants, industrial manufacturing and nuclear weapons production and disposal operations have released beryllium to the environment. This contamination has the potential to expose workers and the public to beryllium. Despite the increasing use of beryllium in industry, there is surprisingly little published information about beryllium fate and transport in the environment. This information is crucial for the development of strategies that limit worker and public exposure. This review summarizes the current understanding of beryllium health hazards, current regulatory mandates, environmental chemistry, geochemistry and environmental contamination.
The application of an MPM-MFM method for simulating weapon-target interaction.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Ma, X.; Zou, Q.; Zhang, D. Z.
2005-01-01
During the past two decades, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has developed computational algorithms and software for analysis of multiphase flow suitable for high-speed projectile penetration of metallic and nonmetallic materials, using a material point method (MPM)-multiphase flow method (MFM). Recently, ACTA has teamed with LANL to advance a computational algorithm for simulating complex weapon-target interaction for penetrating and exploding munitions, such as tank rounds and artillery shells, as well as non-exploding kinetic energy penetrators. This paper will outline the mathematical basis for the MPM-MFM method as implemented in LANL's CartaBlanca code. CartaBlanca, written entirely in Java using object-oriented design,more » is used to solve complex problems involving (a) failure and penetration of solids, (b) heat transfer, (c) phase change, (d) chemical reactions, and (e) multiphase flow. We will present its application to the penetration of a steel target by a tungsten cylinder and compare results with time-resolved experimental data published by Anderson, et. al., Int. J. Impact Engng., Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 1-18, 1995.« less
Administrator Highlights U.S.-Georgian Nuclear Security Cooperation in Tbilisi
Thomas D'Agostino
2017-12-09
NNSA Administrator Thomas D'Agostino highlighted the strong U.S.-Georgian cooperation on nuclear security issues during a day-long visit to the Republic of Georgia in mid-June. He briefed the media at availability at the Tbilisi airport. In April 2009, President Obama outlined an ambitious agenda to secure vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years, calling the danger of a terrorist acquiring nuclear weapons "the most immediate and extreme threat to global security." In this year's State of the Union, he called the threat of nuclear weapons, "the greatest danger to the American people." In order to meet that challenge, the President's FY2011 Budget Request includes close to $2.7 billion for the National Nuclear Security Administration's Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation program -- an increase of 25.7 percent over FY2010. Included in that request is NNSA's Second Line of Defense (SLD) program, which works around the world to strengthen the capability of foreign governments to deter, detect, and interdict illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials across international borders and through the global maritime shipping system.
Administrator Highlights U.S.-Georgian Nuclear Security Cooperation in Tbilisi
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Thomas D'Agostino
2010-07-16
NNSA Administrator Thomas D'Agostino highlighted the strong U.S.-Georgian cooperation on nuclear security issues during a day-long visit to the Republic of Georgia in mid-June. He briefed the media at availability at the Tbilisi airport. In April 2009, President Obama outlined an ambitious agenda to secure vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years, calling the danger of a terrorist acquiring nuclear weapons "the most immediate and extreme threat to global security." In this year's State of the Union, he called the threat of nuclear weapons, "the greatest danger to the American people." In order to meet that challenge, themore » President's FY2011 Budget Request includes close to $2.7 billion for the National Nuclear Security Administration's Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation program -- an increase of 25.7 percent over FY2010. Included in that request is NNSA's Second Line of Defense (SLD) program, which works around the world to strengthen the capability of foreign governments to deter, detect, and interdict illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials across international borders and through the global maritime shipping system.« less
HOW OLD IS IT? - 241PU/241AM NUCLEAR FORENSIC CHRONOLOGY REFERENCE MATERIALS
Fitzgerald, Ryan; Inn, Kenneth G.W.; Horgan, Christopher
2018-01-01
One material attribute for nuclear forensics is material age. 241Pu is almost always present in uranium- and plutonium-based nuclear weapons, which pose the greatest threat to our security. The in-growth of 241Am due to the decay of 241Pu provides an excellent chronometer of the material. A well-characterized 241Pu/241Am standard is needed to validate measurement capability, as a basis for between-laboratory comparability, and as material for verifying laboratory performance. This effort verifies the certification of a 38 year old 241Pu Standard Reference Material (SRM4340) through alpha-gamma anticoincidence counting, and also establishes the separation date to two weeks of the documented date. PMID:29720779
The Use of Prototypes in Weapon System Development
1981-03-01
engine to minimize flameouts; experience showed that some uses of composite mate- rials were unwarranted, and other uses were proved valid; and a special... composite structure materials. The YF-16 used a single F100, an engine already developed for the F-15 program. By the time of the YF-16 first flight...lessons learned during the prototype tests led to a reduction in the use of composite materials ir the full scale F-16A program. UTTAS. Because of the
2009-10-01
will guarantee a solid base for the future. The content of this publication has been reproduced directly from material supplied by RTO or the...intensity threat involving a local population wanting to break into the camp to steal material and food supplies ; and • A higher intensity threat...combatant evacuation opeations, distribute emergency supplies , and evacuate/ relocate refugees and displaced persons. Specified NLW-relevant tasks are
Sherlock Holmes counts the atoms
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Tuniz, C.; Zoppi, U.; Hotchkis, M. A. C.
2004-01-01
Modern forensic science has to deal not only with homicides and other traditional crimes but also with more global threats such as smuggling of nuclear materials, clandestine production of weapons of mass destruction, stockpiling of illicit drugs by state-controlled groups and war crimes. Forensic applications have always benefited from the use of advanced analytical tools that can characterise materials found at crime scenes. In this paper we will discuss the use of accelerator mass spectrometry as an ultra sensitive tool for the crime labs of the third millennium.
1980-10-23
1700 N. Moore Street, Suite 1923 Mail Stop 24021000 Western Avenue Arlington, VA 22209 Lynn, MA 01910 KLIMAN, DR. M. KOTLER , R. Army Materials...Mechanics Research Center US Army Missile Command ATTN: DR. MORTON KLIMAN ATTN: MR. RICHARD KOTLER Army Materials & Mechanics Res. Cir. DRSMI-ET...SMITH, P. J. STOYKO, M. A. Naval Weapons Support Center US Army Mun. Prod. Base Mod. Agency ATTN: MR. PHILIP J. SMITH ATTN: MR. MICHAEL A. STOYKO Code
2010-04-07
Commercialization Pilot Programs – Portable Fuel Analyzer – Non-woven FR Materials – Automatic Test Equipment – Night Vision Fusion • Significant efforts – Sensing...contract with the government". Advertising material , commercial item offer, or contribution, as defined in FAR 15.601 shall not be considered to...systems through the entire lifecycle. Our portfolio includes; •Individual & crew-served weapons ranging from 9 mm handguns to 87mm mortar systems
Believing Your Eyes: Strengthening the Reliability of Tags and Seals
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Brim, Cornelia P.; Denlinger, Laura S.
2013-07-01
NNSA’s Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) is working together with scientific experts at the DOE national laboratories to develop the tools needed to safeguard and secure nuclear material from diversion, theft, and sabotage--tasks critical to support future arms control treaties that may involve the new challenge of monitoring nuclear weapons dismantlement. Use of optically stimulated luminescent material is one method to enhance the security and robustness of existing tamper indicating devices such as tags and seals.
Correlates of weapon carrying in school among adolescents in three countries.
Stickley, Andrew; Koyanagi, Ai; Koposov, Roman; Blatný, Marek; Hrdlička, Michal; Schwab-Stone, Mary; Ruchkin, Vladislav
2015-01-01
To determine the factors associated with weapon carrying in school among Czech, Russian, and US adolescents. Logistic regression was used to analyze data drawn from the Social and Health Assessment (SAHA). Violent behavior (perpetration / victimization) was linked to adolescent weapon carrying in all countries. Substance use was associated with weapon carrying among boys in all countries. Greater parental warmth reduced the odds for weapon carrying among Czech and Russian adolescents. Associating with delinquent peers was important for weapon carrying only among US adolescents. Factors associated with weapon carrying in school vary among countries although violent behavior and substance use may be associated with weapon carrying across countries.
Analyses of battle casualties by weapon type aboard U.S. Navy warships.
Blood, C G
1992-03-01
The number of casualties was determined for 513 incidents involving U.S. Navy warships sunk or damaged during World War II. Ship type and weapon were significant factors in determining the numbers of wounded and killed. Multiple weapon attacks and kamikazes yielded more wounded in action than other weapon types. Multiple weapons and torpedos resulted in a higher incidence of killed in action than other weapons. Penetrating wounds and burns were the most prominent injury types. Kamikaze attacks yielded significantly more burns than incidents involving bombs, gunfire, torpedos, mines, and multiple weapons. Mine explosions were responsible for more strains, sprains, and dislocations than the other weapon types.
Verification of a Finite Element Model for Pyrolyzing Ablative Materials
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Risch, Timothy K.
2017-01-01
Ablating thermal protection system (TPS) materials have been used in many reentering spacecraft and in other applications such as rocket nozzle linings, fire protection materials, and as countermeasures for directed energy weapons. The introduction of the finite element model to the analysis of ablation has arguably resulted in improved computational capabilities due the flexibility and extended applicability of the method, especially to complex geometries. Commercial finite element codes often provide enhanced capability compared to custom, specially written programs based on versatility, usability, pre- and post-processing, grid generation, total life-cycle costs, and speed.
Minimizing Glovebox Glove Breaches, Part III: Deriving Service Lifetimes
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Cournoyer, M.E.; Wilson, K.V.; Maestas, M.M.
At the Los Alamos Plutonium Facility, various isotopes of plutonium along with other actinides are handled in a glove box environment. Weapons-grade plutonium consists mainly in Pu-239. Pu-238 is another isotope used for heat sources. The Pu-238 is more aggressive regarding gloves due to its higher alpha-emitting characteristic ({approx}300 times more active than Pu-239), which modifies the change-out intervals for gloves. Optimization of the change-out intervals for gloves is fundamental since Nuclear Materials Technology (NMT) Division generates approximately 4 m{sup 3}/yr of TRU waste from the disposal of glovebox gloves. To reduce the number of glovebox glove failures, the NMTmore » Division pro-actively investigates processes and procedures that minimize glove failures. Aging studies have been conducted that correlate changes in mechanical (physical) properties with degradation chemistry. This present work derives glovebox glove change intervals based on mechanical data of thermally aged Hypalon{sup R}, and Butasol{sup R} glove samples. Information from this study represent an important baseline in gauging the acceptable standards for polymeric gloves used in a laboratory glovebox environment and will be used later to account for possible presence of dose-rate or synergistic effects in 'combined-environment'. In addition, excursions of contaminants into the operator's breathing zone and excess exposure to the radiological sources associated with unplanned breaches in the glovebox are reduced. (authors)« less
Dijkstra, Jan Kornelis; Gest, Scott D; Lindenberg, Siegwart; Veenstra, René; Cillessen, Antonius H N
2012-04-01
To examine the relative contribution of weapon carrying of peers, aggression, and victimization to weapon carrying of male and female adolescents over time. Data were derived from a population-based sample of male (N = 224) and female (N = 244) adolescents followed from grade 10 (M age = 15.5) to grade 11 (M age = 16.5). Peer networks were derived from best friend nominations. Self-reports were used to assess weapon carrying. Aggression and victimization were assessed using both self- and peer-reports. Use of dynamic social network modeling (SIENA) allowed prediction of weapon carrying in grade 11 as a function of weapon carrying of befriended peers, aggression, and victimization in grade 10, while selection processes and structural network effects (reciprocity and transitivity) were controlled for. Peer influence processes accounted for changes in weapon carrying over time. Self-reported victimization decreased weapon carrying 1 year later. Peer-reported victimization increased the likelihood of weapon carrying, particularly for highly aggressive adolescents. Boys were more likely to carry weapons than girls, but the processes associated with weapon carrying did not differ for boys and girls. These findings revealed that, in this population-based sample, weapon carrying of best friends, as well as aggression, contributed to the proliferation of weapons in friendship networks, suggesting processes of peer contagion as well as individual vulnerability to weapon carrying. Copyright © 2012 Society for Adolescent Health and Medicine. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Weapon carrying and psychopathic-like features in a population-based sample of Finnish adolescents.
Saukkonen, Suvi; Laajasalo, Taina; Jokela, Markus; Kivivuori, Janne; Salmi, Venla; Aronen, Eeva T
2016-02-01
We investigated the prevalence of juvenile weapon carrying and psychosocial and personality-related risk factors for carrying different types of weapons in a nationally representative, population-based sample of Finnish adolescents. Specifically, we aimed to investigate psychopathic-like personality features as a risk factor for weapon carrying. The participants were 15-16-year-old adolescents from the Finnish self-report delinquency study (n = 4855). Four different groups were formed based on self-reported weapon carrying: no weapon carrying, carrying knife, gun or other weapon. The associations between psychosocial factors, psychopathic-like features and weapon carrying were examined with multinomial logistic regression analysis. 9% of the participants had carried a weapon in the past 12 months. Adolescents with a history of delinquency, victimization and antisocial friends were more likely to carry weapons in general; however, delinquency and victimization were most strongly related to gun carrying, while perceived peer delinquency (antisocial friends) was most strongly related to carrying a knife. Better academic performance was associated with a reduced likelihood of carrying a gun and knife, while feeling secure correlated with a reduced likelihood of gun carrying only. Psychopathic-like features were related to a higher likelihood of weapon carrying, even after adjusting for other risk factors. The findings of the study suggest that adolescents carrying a weapon have a large cluster of problems in their lives, which may vary based on the type of weapon carried. Furthermore, psychopathic-like features strongly relate to a higher risk of carrying a weapon.
Wallace, Lacey N.
2017-01-01
Prior research has found that persistently delinquent youth or more violent youth were less popular than their less delinquent peers (Young, 2013). However, recent research has also found that weapon carrying is associated with being more popular in adolescence (Dijkstra et al., 2010). The present paper examines the perceived popularity of adolescents who carry weapons in comparison to those who both carry and use weapons in acts of violence or threatened violence. Data consist of two waves from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent to Adult Health. Analyses use OLS regression with lagged predictors. This paper found no differences in number of friends between weapon carriers and weapon users. However, among both male and female gang members, those who did not use or carry weapons (abstainers) named significantly fewer friends than weapon users. Among females, weapon abstainers both named and were named by significantly more people than weapon users. These differences were not observed for males. Implications of these results and directions for future research are discussed. PMID:29104446
Silicon Photomultipliers for Compact Neutron Scatter Cameras
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Ruch, Marc L.
The ability to locate and identify special nuclear material (SNM) is critical for treaty verification and emergency response applications. SNM is used as the nuclear explosive in a nuclear weapon. This material emits neutrons, either spontaneously or when interrogated. The ability to form an image of the neutron source can be used for characterization and/or to confirm that the item is a weapon by determining whether its shape is consistent with that of a weapon. Additionally, treaty verification and emergency response applications might not be conducive to non-portable instruments. In future weapons treaties, for example, it is unlikely that host countries will make great efforts to facilitate large, bulky, and/or fragile inspection equipment. Furthermore, inspectors and especially emergency responders may need to access locations not easily approachable by vehicles. Therefore, there is a considerable need for a compact, human-portable neutron imaging system. Of the currently available neutron imaging technologies, only neutron scatter cameras (NSCs) can be made truly compact because aperture-based imagers, and time-encoded imagers, rely on large amounts of materials to modulate the neutron signal. NSCs, in contrast, can be made very small because most of the volume of the imager can be filled with active detector material. Also, unlike other neutron imaging technologies, NSCs have the inherent ability to act as neutron spectrometers which gives them an additional means of identifying a neutron source. Until recently, NSCs have relied on photomultiplier tubes (PMT) readouts, which are bulky and fragile, require high voltage, and are very sensitive to magnetic fields. Silicon photomultipliers (SiPMs) do not suffer from these drawbacks and are comparable to PMTs in many respects such as gain, and cost with better time resolution. Historically, SiPMs have been too noisy for these applications; however, recent advancements have greatly reduced this issue and they have now been shown to be viable alternatives to PMTs for neutron detection applications. In this thesis, the development of a handheld NSC based on SiPMs coupled to stilbene bars is presented. An algorithm for performing image reconstruction with this type of device is detailed. Prototype design optimization is achieved using a series of simulations and the construction of the optimized prototype is described. The device is calibrated through a series of collimated measurements, backscatter-gated measurements, and a time-of-flight measurement. Experimental imaging and spectroscopic results are presented for a measurement of a Cf-252 spontaneous fission source. Simulated detector response, based on measurements performed with components of the design, demonstrates that fission sources of different sizes would be distinguishable. Notably, a significant quantity of plutonium can be confidently distinguished from a point neutron source.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Kunsman, D.M.
We technologists generally only address risk magnitudes in our analyses, although other studies have found nineteen additional dimensions for the way the public perceives risk. These include controllability, voluntariness, catastrophic potential, and trust in the institution putting forth the risk. We and the geneml public use two different languages, and to understand what their concerns are, we need to realize that the culture surrounding nuclear weapons is completely alien to the general public. Ultimately, the acceptability of a risk is a values question, not a technical question. For most of the risk dimensions, the public would perceive no significant differencemore » between using oralloy and plutonium. This does not mean that the suggested design change should not be proposed, only that the case for, or against, it be made comprehensively using the best information available today. The world has changed: the ending of the cold war has decreased the benefit of nuclear weapons in the minds of the public and the specter of Chernobyl has increased the perceived risks of processes that use radioactive materials. Our analyses need to incorporate the lessons pertinent to this newer world.« less
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Kunsman, D.M.
We technologists generally only address risk magnitudes in our analyses, although other studies have found nineteen additional dimensions for the way the public perceives risk. These include controllability, voluntariness, catastrophic potential, and trust in the institution putting forth the risk. We and the geneml public use two different languages, and to understand what their concerns are, we need to realize that the culture surrounding nuclear weapons is completely alien to the general public. Ultimately, the acceptability of a risk is a values question, not a technical question. For most of the risk dimensions, the public would perceive no significant differencemore » between using oralloy and plutonium. This does not mean that the suggested design change should not be proposed, only that the case for, or against, it be made comprehensively using the best information available today. The world has changed: the ending of the cold war has decreased the benefit of nuclear weapons in the minds of the public and the specter of Chernobyl has increased the perceived risks of processes that use radioactive materials. Our analyses need to incorporate the lessons pertinent to this newer world.« less
Air gun wounding and current UK laws controlling air weapons.
Bruce-Chwatt, Robert Michael
2010-04-01
Air weapons whether rifles or pistols are, potentially, lethal weapons. The UK legislation is complex and yet little known to the public. Hunting with air weapons and the laws controlling those animals that are permitted to be shot with air weapons is even more labyrinthine due to the legal power limitations on the possession of air weapons. Still relatively freely available by mail order or on the Internet, an increasing number of deaths have been reported from the misuse of air weapons or accidental discharges. Ammunition for air weapons has become increasingly sophisticated, effective and therefore increasingly dangerous if misused, though freely available being a mere projectile without a concomitant cartridge containing a propellant and an initiator.
MSTD 2007 Publications and Patents
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
King, W E
2008-04-01
The Materials Science and Technology Division (MSTD) supports the central scientific and technological missions of the Laboratory, and at the same time, executes world-class, fundamental research and novel technological development over a wide range of disciplines. Our organization is driven by the institutional needs in nuclear weapons stockpile science, high-energy-density science, nuclear reactor science, and energy and environment science and technology. We maintain expertise and capabilities in many diverse areas, including actinide science, electron microscopy, laser-materials interactions, materials theory, simulation and modeling, materials synthesis and processing, materials science under extreme conditions, ultrafast materials science, metallurgy, nanoscience and technology, nuclear fuelsmore » and energy security, optical materials science, and surface science. MSTD scientists play leadership roles in the scientific community in these key and emerging areas.« less
Benjamin, Arlin J; Kepes, Sven; Bushman, Brad J
2017-09-01
Guns are associated with aggression. A landmark 1967 study showed that simply seeing a gun can increase aggression-called the "weapons effect." This meta-analysis integrates the findings of weapons effect studies conducted from 1967 to 2017. It includes 162 effect-size estimates from 78 independent studies involving 7,668 participants. The theoretical framework used to explain the weapons effect was the General Aggression Model (GAM), which proposes three routes to aggression-cognitive, affective, and arousal. The GAM also proposes that hostile appraisals can facilitate aggression. As predicted by the GAM, the mere presence of weapons increased aggressive thoughts, hostile appraisals, and aggression, suggesting a cognitive route from weapons to aggression. Weapons did not significantly increase angry feelings. Only one study tested the effects of weapons on arousal. These findings also contribute to the debate about social priming by showing that incidental exposure to a stimulus (weapon) can affect subsequent related behavior (aggression).
30 CFR 817.71 - Disposal of excess spoil: General requirements.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-07-01
.... (1) All vegetative and organic materials shall be removed from the disposal area prior to placement... § 817.22. If approved by the regulatory authority, organic material may be used as mulch or may be... of the soil. (2) Excess spoil shall be transported and placed in a controlled manner in horizontal...
30 CFR 817.71 - Disposal of excess spoil: General requirements.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-07-01
.... (1) All vegetative and organic materials shall be removed from the disposal area prior to placement... § 817.22. If approved by the regulatory authority, organic material may be used as mulch or may be... of the soil. (2) Excess spoil shall be transported and placed in a controlled manner in horizontal...
30 CFR 817.71 - Disposal of excess spoil: General requirements.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-07-01
.... (1) All vegetative and organic materials shall be removed from the disposal area prior to placement... § 817.22. If approved by the regulatory authority, organic material may be used as mulch or may be... of the soil. (2) Excess spoil shall be transported and placed in a controlled manner in horizontal...
30 CFR 816.71 - Disposal of excess spoil: General requirements.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-07-01
.... (1) All vegetative and organic materials shall be removed from the disposal area prior to placement... with § 816.22. If approved by the regulatory authority, organic material may be used as mulch or may be... of the soil. (2) Excess spoil shall be transported and placed in a controlled manner in horizontal...
30 CFR 816.71 - Disposal of excess spoil: General requirements.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-07-01
.... (1) All vegetative and organic materials shall be removed from the disposal area prior to placement... with § 816.22. If approved by the regulatory authority, organic material may be used as mulch or may be... of the soil. (2) Excess spoil shall be transported and placed in a controlled manner in horizontal...
30 CFR 816.71 - Disposal of excess spoil: General requirements.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-07-01
.... (1) All vegetative and organic materials shall be removed from the disposal area prior to placement... with § 816.22. If approved by the regulatory authority, organic material may be used as mulch or may be... of the soil. (2) Excess spoil shall be transported and placed in a controlled manner in horizontal...
30 CFR 816.71 - Disposal of excess spoil: General requirements.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-07-01
.... (1) All vegetative and organic materials shall be removed from the disposal area prior to placement... with § 816.22. If approved by the regulatory authority, organic material may be used as mulch or may be... of the soil. (2) Excess spoil shall be transported and placed in a controlled manner in horizontal...
30 CFR 816.71 - Disposal of excess spoil: General requirements.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-07-01
.... (1) All vegetative and organic materials shall be removed from the disposal area prior to placement... with § 816.22. If approved by the regulatory authority, organic material may be used as mulch or may be... of the soil. (2) Excess spoil shall be transported and placed in a controlled manner in horizontal...
30 CFR 817.71 - Disposal of excess spoil: General requirements.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-07-01
.... (1) All vegetative and organic materials shall be removed from the disposal area prior to placement... § 817.22. If approved by the regulatory authority, organic material may be used as mulch or may be... of the soil. (2) Excess spoil shall be transported and placed in a controlled manner in horizontal...
30 CFR 817.71 - Disposal of excess spoil: General requirements.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-07-01
.... (1) All vegetative and organic materials shall be removed from the disposal area prior to placement... § 817.22. If approved by the regulatory authority, organic material may be used as mulch or may be... of the soil. (2) Excess spoil shall be transported and placed in a controlled manner in horizontal...
32 CFR 552.104 - Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-07-01
... 32 National Defense 3 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. 552... RESERVATIONS AND NATIONAL CEMETERIES REGULATIONS AFFECTING MILITARY RESERVATIONS Firearms and Weapons § 552.104 Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. All weapons, ammunition, explosives or other devices defined in...
32 CFR 552.104 - Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-07-01
... 32 National Defense 3 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. 552... RESERVATIONS AND NATIONAL CEMETERIES REGULATIONS AFFECTING MILITARY RESERVATIONS Firearms and Weapons § 552.104 Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. All weapons, ammunition, explosives or other devices defined in...
32 CFR 552.104 - Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-07-01
... 32 National Defense 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 true Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. 552... RESERVATIONS AND NATIONAL CEMETERIES REGULATIONS AFFECTING MILITARY RESERVATIONS Firearms and Weapons § 552.104 Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. All weapons, ammunition, explosives or other devices defined in...
32 CFR 552.104 - Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-07-01
... 32 National Defense 3 2012-07-01 2009-07-01 true Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. 552... RESERVATIONS AND NATIONAL CEMETERIES REGULATIONS AFFECTING MILITARY RESERVATIONS Firearms and Weapons § 552.104 Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. All weapons, ammunition, explosives or other devices defined in...
32 CFR 552.104 - Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-07-01
... 32 National Defense 3 2011-07-01 2009-07-01 true Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. 552... RESERVATIONS AND NATIONAL CEMETERIES REGULATIONS AFFECTING MILITARY RESERVATIONS Firearms and Weapons § 552.104 Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. All weapons, ammunition, explosives or other devices defined in...
Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014
2012-10-01
... Request; Chemical Weapons Convention Declaration and Report Handbook and Forms AGENCY: Bureau of Industry.... Abstract The Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 and Commerce Chemical Weapons... Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), an international arms control treaty. II. Method of Collection Submitted...
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Solodov, Alexander
The proliferation of nuclear weapons is a great threat to world peace and stability. The question of strengthening the nonproliferation regime has been open for a long period of time. In 1997 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors (BOG) adopted the Additional Safeguards Protocol. The purpose of the protocol is to enhance the IAEA's ability to detect undeclared production of fissile materials in member states. However, the IAEA does not always have sufficient human and financial resources to accomplish this task. Developed here is a concept for making use of human and technical resources available in academia that could be used to enhance the IAEA's mission. The objective of this research was to study the feasibility of an academic community using commercially or publicly available sources of information and products for the purpose of detecting covert facilities and activities intended for the unlawful acquisition of fissile materials or production of nuclear weapons. In this study, the availability and use of commercial satellite imagery systems, commercial computer codes for satellite imagery analysis, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) verification International Monitoring System (IMS), publicly available information sources such as watchdog groups and press reports, and Customs Services information were explored. A system for integrating these data sources to form conclusions was also developed. The results proved that publicly and commercially available sources of information and data analysis can be a powerful tool in tracking violations in the international nuclear nonproliferation regime and a framework for implementing these tools in academic community was developed. As a result of this study a formation of an International Nonproliferation Monitoring Academic Community (INMAC) is proposed. This would be an independent organization consisting of academics (faculty, staff and students) from both nuclear weapon states (NWS) and non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS). This community analyzes all types of unclassified publicly and commercially available information to aid in detection of violations of the non-proliferation regime. INMAC shares all of this information with the IAEA and the public. Since INMAC is composed solely by members of the academic community, this organization would not demonstrate any biases in its investigations or reporting.
Material from the Internal Surface of Squid Axon Exhibits Excess Noise
Fishman, Harvey M.
1981-01-01
A fluid material from a squid (Loligo pealei) axon was isolated by mechanical application of two types of microcapillary (1-3-μm Diam) to the internal surface of intact and cut-axon preparations. Current noise in the isolated material exceeded thermal levels and power spectra were 1/f in form in the frequency range 1.25-500 Hz with voltage-dependent intensities that were unrelated to specific ion channels. Whether conduction in this material is a significant source of excess noise during axon conduction remains to be determined. Nevertheless, a source of excess noise external to or within an ion channel may not be properly represented solely as an additive term to the spectrum of ion channel noise; a deconvolution of these spectral components may be required for modeling purposes. PMID:6266542
2017-01-23
operations for financial and supply chain management . ii │ DODIG-2017-043 ( Project No. D2016-D000RD-0052.000) Results in Brief Management of Excess...following page. Recommendations (cont’d) DODIG-2017-043 ( Project No. D2016-D000RD-0052.000) │ iii Recommendations Table Management Recommendations...No. DODIG-2017-043 J A N U A R Y 2 3 , 2 0 1 7 Management of Excess Material in the Navy’s Real-Time Reutilization Asset Management Facilities
3 CFR - Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-01-01
... to Weapons of Mass Destruction Presidential Documents Other Presidential Documents Notice of November 9, 2011 Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction On... United States posed by the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (weapons of mass...
32 CFR 552.130 - Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-07-01
... 32 National Defense 3 2011-07-01 2009-07-01 true Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. 552..., Ammunition and Other Dangerous Weapons on Fort Gordon § 552.130 Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. All weapons, ammunition, explosives, or other devices defined in this subpart, that are confiscated...
3 CFR - Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-01-01
... to Weapons of Mass Destruction Presidential Documents Other Presidential Documents Notice of November 1, 2012 Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction On... United States posed by the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (weapons of mass...