Logistic Mixed Models to Investigate Implicit and Explicit Belief Tracking.

PubMed

Lages, Martin; Scheel, Anne

2016-01-01

We investigated the proposition of a two-systems Theory of Mind in adults' belief tracking. A sample of N = 45 participants predicted the choice of one of two opponent players after observing several rounds in an animated card game. Three matches of this card game were played and initial gaze direction on target and subsequent choice predictions were recorded for each belief task and participant. We conducted logistic regressions with mixed effects on the binary data and developed Bayesian logistic mixed models to infer implicit and explicit mentalizing in true belief and false belief tasks. Although logistic regressions with mixed effects predicted the data well a Bayesian logistic mixed model with latent task- and subject-specific parameters gave a better account of the data. As expected explicit choice predictions suggested a clear understanding of true and false beliefs (TB/FB). Surprisingly, however, model parameters for initial gaze direction also indicated belief tracking. We discuss why task-specific parameters for initial gaze directions are different from choice predictions yet reflect second-order perspective taking.

False belief attribution in children with Williams syndrome: the answer is in the emotion.

PubMed

Campos, R; Martínez-Castilla, P; Sotillo, M

2017-11-01

Individuals with Williams syndrome (WS) show difficulties in attributing false beliefs, whereas they are better at attributing emotions. This study examines whether being asked about the emotion linked to a false belief, instead of explicitly about the belief, facilitates performance on theory of mind (ToM) tasks. Thirty children with WS and 90 typically developing children, who were individually matched on mental age (50-112 months), were administered six explicit (i.e. questions on belief) and six implicit (i.e. questions on emotion) trials of false belief tasks. Theory of mind competences were related to cognitive development. Children with WS performed comparably to typically developing children on the emotion questions. Correct answers to questions on emotion reveal an implicit understanding of false belief. The Representational redescription process could be impaired in the domain of ToM in this population. This finding has relevant implications for the design of supports aiming to optimise the development of ToM competences in individuals with WS. © 2017 MENCAP and International Association of the Scientific Study of Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Implicit and Explicit False Belief Development in Preschool Children

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Grosse Wiesmann, Charlotte; Friederici, Angela D.; Singer, Tania; Steinbeis, Nikolaus

2017-01-01

The ability to represent the mental states of other agents is referred to as Theory of Mind (ToM). A developmental breakthrough in ToM consists of understanding that others can have false beliefs about the world. Recently, infants younger than 2 years of age have been shown to pass novel implicit false belief tasks. However, the processes…

Logistic Mixed Models to Investigate Implicit and Explicit Belief Tracking

PubMed Central

Lages, Martin; Scheel, Anne

2016-01-01

We investigated the proposition of a two-systems Theory of Mind in adults’ belief tracking. A sample of N = 45 participants predicted the choice of one of two opponent players after observing several rounds in an animated card game. Three matches of this card game were played and initial gaze direction on target and subsequent choice predictions were recorded for each belief task and participant. We conducted logistic regressions with mixed effects on the binary data and developed Bayesian logistic mixed models to infer implicit and explicit mentalizing in true belief and false belief tasks. Although logistic regressions with mixed effects predicted the data well a Bayesian logistic mixed model with latent task- and subject-specific parameters gave a better account of the data. As expected explicit choice predictions suggested a clear understanding of true and false beliefs (TB/FB). Surprisingly, however, model parameters for initial gaze direction also indicated belief tracking. We discuss why task-specific parameters for initial gaze directions are different from choice predictions yet reflect second-order perspective taking. PMID:27853440

Preschoolers' Implicit and Explicit False-Belief Understanding: Relations with Complex Syntactical Mastery

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Low, Jason

2010-01-01

Three studies were carried out to investigate sentential complements being the critical device that allows for false-belief understanding in 3- and 4-year-olds (N = 102). Participants across studies accurately gazed in anticipation of a character's mistaken belief in a predictive looking task despite erring on verbal responses for direct…

Implicit and explicit Theory of Mind reasoning in autism spectrum disorders: the impact of experience.

PubMed

Schuwerk, Tobias; Vuori, Maria; Sodian, Beate

2015-05-01

This study aimed to investigate the relationship between explicit and implicit forms of Theory of Mind reasoning and to test the influence of experience on implicit Theory of Mind reasoning in individuals with autism spectrum disorders and in neurotypical adults. Results from two standard explicit Theory of Mind tasks are mixed: Individuals with autism spectrum disorders did not differ from neurotypical adults in their performance in the Strange Stories Test, but scored significantly lower on the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test. Furthermore, in an implicit false-belief task, individuals with autism spectrum disorders differed from neurotypical adults in false belief-congruent anticipatory looking. However, this group difference disappeared by (1) providing participants with the outcome of a false belief-based action and (2) subsequently repeating this test trial. Although the tendency to fixate the false belief-congruent location significantly increased from the first to the second test trial in individuals with autism spectrum disorders, it differed in neither test trial from chance. These findings support the notion of an implicit Theory of Mind deficit in autism spectrum disorders, but give rise to the idea that anticipatory looking behaviors in autism spectrum disorders may be affected by experience. Additionally, the pattern of results from implicit and explicit Theory of Mind measures supports the theory of two independent Theory of Mind reasoning systems. © The Author(s) 2014.

Using eye-tracking to examine how embedding risk corrective statements improves cigarette risk beliefs: Implications for tobacco regulatory policy.

PubMed

Lochbuehler, Kirsten; Tang, Kathy Z; Souprountchouk, Valentina; Campetti, Dana; Cappella, Joseph N; Kozlowski, Lynn T; Strasser, Andrew A

2016-07-01

Tobacco companies have deliberately used explicit and implicit misleading information in marketing campaigns. The aim of the current study was to experimentally investigate whether the editing of explicit and implicit content of a print advertisement improves smokers' risk beliefs and smokers' knowledge of explicit and implicit information. Using a 2(explicit/implicit)×2(accurate/misleading) between-subject design, 203 smokers were randomly assigned to one of four advertisement conditions. The manipulation of graphic content was examined as an implicit factor to convey product harm. The inclusion of a text corrective in the body of the ad was defined as the manipulated explicit factor. Participants' eye movements and risk beliefs/recall were measured during and after ad exposure, respectively. Results indicate that exposure to a text corrective decreases false beliefs about the product (p<.01) and improves correct recall of information provided by the corrective (p<.05). Accurate graphic content did not alter the harmfulness of the product. Independent of condition, smokers who focused longer on the warning label made fewer false inferences about the product (p=.01) and were more likely to correctly recall the warning information (p<.01). Nonetheless, most smokers largely ignored the text warning. Embedding a corrective statement in the body of the ad is an effective strategy to convey health information to consumers, which can be mandated under the Tobacco Control Act. Eye-tracking results objectively demonstrate that text-only warnings are not viewed by smokers, thus minimizing their effectiveness for conveying risk information. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.

Using Eye-tracking to Examine How Embedding Risk Corrective Statements Improves Cigarette Risk Beliefs: Implications for Tobacco Regulatory Policy

PubMed Central

Lochbuehler, Kirsten; Tang, Kathy Z.; Souprountchouk, Valentina; Campetti, Dana; Cappella, Joseph N.; Kozlowski, Lynn T.; Strasser, Andrew A.

2016-01-01

Background Tobacco companies have deliberately used explicit and implicit misleading information in marketing campaigns. The aim of the current study was to experimentally investigate whether the editing of explicit and implicit content of a print advertisement improves smokers’ risk beliefs and smokers’ knowledge of explicit and implicit information. Methods Using a 2(explicit/implicit) x 2(accurate/misleading) between-subject design, 203 smokers were randomly assigned to one of four advertisement conditions. The manipulation of graphic content was examined as an implicit factor to convey product harm. The inclusion of a text corrective in the body of the ad was defined as the manipulated explicit factor. Participants’ eye movements and risk beliefs/recall were measured during and after ad exposure, respectively. Results Results indicate that exposure to a text corrective decreases false beliefs about the product (p < .01) and improves correct recall of information provided by the corrective (p < .05). Accurate graphic content did not alter the harmfulness of the product. Independent of condition, smokers who focused longer on the warning label made fewer false inferences about the product (p = .01) and were more likely to correctly recall the warning information (p < .01). Nonetheless, most smokers largely ignored the text warning. Conclusions Embedding a corrective statement in the body of the ad is an effective strategy to convey health information to consumers, which can be mandated under the Tobacco Control Act (2009). Eye-tracking results objectively demonstrate that text-only warnings are not viewed by smokers, thus minimizing their effectiveness for conveying risk information. PMID:27160034

Are there signature limits in early theory of mind?

PubMed

Fizke, Ella; Butterfill, Stephen; van de Loo, Lea; Reindl, Eva; Rakoczy, Hannes

2017-10-01

Current theory-of-mind research faces the challenge of reconciling two sets of seemingly incompatible findings: Whereas children come to solve explicit verbal false belief (FB) tasks from around 4years of age, recent studies with various less explicit measures such as looking time, anticipatory looking, and spontaneous behavior suggest that even infants can succeed on some FB tasks. In response to this tension, two-systems theories propose to distinguish between an early-developing system, tracking simple forms of mental states, and a later-developing system, based on fully developed concepts of belief and other propositional attitudes. One prediction of such theories is that the early-developing system has signature limits concerning aspectuality. We tested this prediction in two experiments. The first experiment showed (in line with previous findings) that 2- and 3-year-olds take into account a protagonist's true or false belief about the location of an object in their active helping behavior. In contrast, toddlers' helping behavior did not differentiate between true and false belief conditions when the protagonist's belief essentially involved aspectuality. Experiment 2 replicated these findings with a more stringent method designed to rule out more parsimonious explanations. Taken together, the current findings are compatible with the possibility that early theory-of-mind reasoning is subject to signature limits as predicted by the two-systems account. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

PREP advertisement features affect smokers' beliefs regarding potential harm.

PubMed

Strasser, A A; Tang, K Z; Tuller, M D; Cappella, J N

2008-09-01

The Institute of Medicine report on potential reduced exposure products (PREPs) recommends that advertising and labelling be regulated to prevent explicitly or implicitly false or misleading claims. Belief that a product is less harmful may increase use or prevent smoking cessation. To determine the effect of altering advertisement features on smokers' beliefs of the harm exposure from a PREP. A Quest advertisement was digitally altered using computer software and presented to participants using web-based television recruitment contracted through a survey company. 500 current smokers completed demographic and smoking history questions, were randomised to view one of three advertisement conditions, then completed eight items assessing their beliefs of the harmfulness of the product. Advertisement conditions included the original, unaltered advertisement; a "red" condition where the cigarette packages were digitally altered to the colour red, implying increased harm potential; and a "no text" condition where all text was removed to reduce explicit product information. Polytomous logistic regression, using "incorrect," "unsure" and "correct" as outcomes, and advertisement type and covariates as predictors, was used for analyses. Participants randomised to the "no text" advertisement were less likely to be incorrect in their beliefs that Quest cigarettes are lower in tar, less addictive, less likely to cause cancer, have fewer chemicals, are healthier and make smoking safer. Smokers can form false beliefs about the harmfulness of PREP products based on how the PREPs are marketed. Careful examination must be undertaken to provide empirical evidence to better formulate regulatory principles of PREP advertising.

When do counterstereotypic ingroup members inspire versus deflate? The effect of successful professional women on young women's leadership self-concept.

PubMed

Asgari, Shaki; Dasgupta, Nilanjana; Stout, Jane G

2012-03-01

Three experiments tested whether and when exposure to counterstereotypic ingroup members enhances women's implicit leadership self-concept. Participants read about professional women leaders framed as similar to versus different from most women (Experiment 1) or having the same versus different collegiate background as participants (Experiment 3). Experiment 2 manipulated similarity by giving false feedback about participants' similarity to women leaders. In all cases, seeing women leaders reduced implicit self-stereotyping relative to controls but only when they were portrayed as similar to one's ingroup (Experiment 1) and oneself (Experiments 2-3). Leaders portrayed as dissimilar either had no effect on self-beliefs (Experiment 1 and 3) or increased implicit self-stereotyping (Experiment 2). Dissimilar leaders also deflated participants' career goals and explicit leadership beliefs (Experiment 3). Finally, implicit self-beliefs became less stereotypic regardless of whether women believed the similarity feedback, but explicit self-beliefs changed only when they believed the feedback to be true (Experiment 2).

Language, Cognitive Flexibility, and Explicit False Belief Understanding: Longitudinal Analysis in Typical Development and Specific Language Impairment

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Farrant, Brad M.; Maybery, Murray T.; Fletcher, Janet

2012-01-01

The hypothesis that language plays a role in theory-of-mind (ToM) development is supported by a number of lines of evidence (e.g., H. Lohmann & M. Tomasello, 2003). The current study sought to further investigate the relations between maternal language input, memory for false sentential complements, cognitive flexibility, and the development of…

PREP advertisement features affect smokers’ beliefs regarding potential harm

PubMed Central

Strasser, Andrew A; Tang, Kathy Z; Tuller, Michael D; Cappella, Joseph N

2014-01-01

Background The Institute of Medicine report on potential reduced exposure products (PREPs) recommends that advertising and labelling be regulated to prevent explicitly or implicitly false or misleading claims. Belief that a product is less harmful may increase use or prevent smoking cessation. Objective To determine the effect of altering advertisement features on smokers’ beliefs of the harm exposure from a PREP. Methods A Quest advertisement was digitally altered using computer software and presented to participants using web-based television recruitment contracted through a survey company. 500 current smokers completed demographic and smoking history questions, were randomised to view one of three advertisement conditions, then completed eight items assessing their beliefs of the harmfulness of the product. Advertisement conditions included the original, unaltered advertisement; a “red” condition where the cigarette packages were digitally altered to the colour red, implying increased harm potential; and a “no text” condition where all text was removed to reduce explicit product information. Polytomous logistic regression, using “incorrect,” “unsure” and “correct” as outcomes, and advertisement type and covariates as predictors, was used for analyses. Results Participants randomised to the “no text” advertisement were less likely to be incorrect in their beliefs that Quest cigarettes are lower in tar, less addictive, less likely to cause cancer, have fewer chemicals, healthier and make smoking safer. Conclusions Smokers can form false beliefs about the harmfulness of PREP products based on how the PREPs are marketed. Careful examination must be undertaken to provide empirical evidence to better formulate regulatory principles of PREP advertising. PMID:18768457

Early conversational environment enables spontaneous belief attribution in deaf children.

PubMed

Meristo, Marek; Strid, Karin; Hjelmquist, Erland

2016-12-01

Previous research suggests that deaf children who grow up with hearing parents display considerable difficulties in understanding mental states of others, up to their teenage years when explicitly asked in a verbal test situation (Meristo et al., 2007). On the other hand, typically developing pre-verbal infants display evidence of spontaneous false belief attribution when tested in looking-time tasks, although verbal tests are typically not passed before the age of 4years (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005). The purpose of the present study was to examine whether deaf children of hearing parents are able to demonstrate spontaneous belief attribution in a non-verbal eye-tracking task. Thirty 4- to 8-year-old, deaf and hearing children, completed a non-verbal spontaneous-response false-belief task and a verbal elicited-response false-belief task. The deaf children were either children with cochlear implants or children with hearing aids. Comparative analyses were also carried out with a previous sample of deaf and hearing 2-year-olds (reported in Meristo, Morgan, et al., 2012). We found that in the non-verbal spontaneous-response task typically hearing children, but not deaf children, were able to predict that a person with a false belief about an object's location will search erroneously for the object. However, hearing children and deaf children with implants, but not deaf children with hearing aids, passed the verbal elicited-response task. Language development was significantly correlated with both types of false-belief tasks for the whole sample. Our findings strengthen the hypothesis that the emergence of the ability to recognize others' beliefs needs to be supported initially by very early conversational input in dialogues with caregivers. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

What Difference Does It Make? Implicit, Explicit and Complex Social Cognition in Autism Spectrum Disorders

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Schaller, Ulrich M.; Rauh, Reinhold

2017-01-01

We tested social cognition abilities of adolescents with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) and neurotypically developed peers (NTD). A multi-faceted test-battery including facial emotion categorization (FEC), classical false belief tasks (FBT), and complex social cognition (SC), yielded significantly lower accuracy rates for FEC and complex SC tasks…

Children's difficulty with true belief tasks: Competence deficit or performance problem?

PubMed

Oktay-Gür, Nese; Rakoczy, Hannes

2017-09-01

According to the standard picture of explicit theory of mind (ToM) development, children begin to (explicitly) ascribe beliefs to others and themselves from around age 4. The empirical basis of this picture comes from numerous studies consistently showing that children master verbal false belief (FB) tasks from around age 4 while children much younger have no difficulty in mastering structurally analogous true belief (TB) tasks. The standard picture, though, has come under serious attack from recent studies using TB tasks with wider age ranges. These studies have found that, paradoxically, children begin to fail TB tasks once they master FB tasks. Such findings cast doubt on the standard picture and suggest, instead, that FB tasks may be solved by much simpler strategies than proper belief reasoning. In the present study, we tested for the development of FB and TB performance in comprehensive and systematic ways. In particular, we tested the competing predictions of competence accounts (according to which TB failure reflects lack of conceptual competence) versus performance limitation accounts (according to which the standard picture is true yet children from around age 4 fail TB tasks due to performance factors). Studies 1 and 2 showed that performance in a variety of novel TB tasks showed a clear U-shaped curve, with children until age 3 and from age 10 performing competently and children in between failing, with strong negative correlations between TB and FB. Crucially, these patterns were found for various kinds of TB tasks, including those for which existing competence limitation accounts would not even predict any difficulty. Study 3, therefore, directly tested performance limitation accounts in terms of pragmatic and related factors and found that these patterns (failure in TB and negative TB-FB correlations) disappear once the relevant performance factors have been removed from the TB tasks. Taken together, these findings suggest that previous TB findings constitute false negatives, clearly speak for performance limitation accounts and thus corroborate the standard picture of the development of explicit theory of mind. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Task constraints distinguish perspective inferences from perspective use during discourse interpretation in a false belief task.

PubMed

Ferguson, Heather J; Apperly, Ian; Ahmad, Jumana; Bindemann, Markus; Cane, James

2015-06-01

Interpreting other peoples' actions relies on an understanding of their current mental states (e.g. beliefs, desires and intentions). In this paper, we distinguish between listeners' ability to infer others' perspectives and their explicit use of this knowledge to predict subsequent actions. In a visual-world study, two groups of participants (passive observers vs. active participants) watched short videos, depicting transfer events, where one character ('Jane') either held a true or false belief about an object's location. We tracked participants' eye-movements around the final visual scene, time-locked to related auditory descriptions (e.g. "Jane will look for the chocolates in the container on the left".). Results showed that active participants had already inferred the character's belief in the 1s preview period prior to auditory onset, before it was possible to use this information to predict an outcome. Moreover, they used this inference to correctly anticipate reference to the object's initial location on false belief trials at the earliest possible point (i.e. from "Jane" onwards). In contrast, passive observers only showed evidence of a belief inference from the onset of "Jane", and did not show reliable use of this inference to predict Jane's behaviour on false belief trials until much later, when the location ("left/right") was auditorily available. These results show that active engagement in a task activates earlier inferences about others' perspectives, and drives immediate use of this information to anticipate others' actions, compared to passive observers, who are susceptible to influences from egocentric or reality biases. Finally, we review evidence that using other peoples' perspectives to predict their behaviour is more cognitively effortful than simply using one's own. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

What do we know about implicit false-belief tracking?

PubMed

Schneider, Dana; Slaughter, Virginia P; Dux, Paul E

2015-02-01

There is now considerable evidence that neurotypical individuals track the internal cognitions of others, even in the absence of instructions to do so. This finding has prompted the suggestion that humans possess an implicit mental state tracking system (implicit Theory of Mind, ToM) that exists alongside a system that allows the deliberate and explicit analysis of the mental states of others (explicit ToM). Here we evaluate the evidence for this hypothesis and assess the extent to which implicit and explicit ToM operations are distinct. We review evidence showing that adults can indeed engage in ToM processing even without being conscious of doing so. However, at the same time, there is evidence that explicit and implicit ToM operations share some functional features, including drawing on executive resources. Based on the available evidence, we propose that implicit and explicit ToM operations overlap and should only be considered partially distinct.

Semantics and pragmatics of social influence: how affirmations and denials affect beliefs in referent propositions.

PubMed

Gruenfeld, D H; Wyer, R S

1992-01-01

Ss read either affirmations or denials of target propositions that ostensibly came from either newspapers or reference volumes. Denials of the validity of a proposition that was already assumed to be false increased Ss' beliefs in this proposition. The effect generalized to beliefs in related propositions that could be used to support the target's validity. When denials came from a newspaper, their "boomerang effect" was nearly equal in magnitude to the direct effect of affirming the target proposition's validity. When Ss were asked explicitly to consider the implications of the assertions, however, the impact of denials was eliminated. Affirmations of a target proposition that was already assumed to be true also had a boomerang effect. Results have implications for the effects of both semantic and pragmatic processing of assertions on belief change.

False Belief Reasoning in Adults with and without Autistic Spectrum Disorder: Similarities and Differences.

PubMed

Sommer, Monika; Döhnel, Katrin; Jarvers, Irina; Blaas, Lore; Singer, Manuela; Nöth, Victoria; Schuwerk, Tobias; Rupprecht, Rainer

2018-01-01

A central diagnostic criteria for autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is the qualitative impairment in reciprocal social interaction and a prominent hypotheses that tried to explain this impairment is the Theory of Mind (ToM) deficit hypotheses. On a behavioral level the critical test for having a ToM, the understanding of false beliefs (FB), is often used for testing ToM abilities in individuals with ASD. Investigating the neural underpinnings several neuroimaging studies revealed a network of areas involved in FB reasoning in neurotypical individuals. For ASD individuals the neural correlates of false belief processing are largely unknown. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging and an adapted unexpected transfer task, that makes it possible to distinguish between the computation of diverging beliefs and the selection of a belief-associated response, we investigated a group of adult high-functioning individuals with ASD ( N = 15) and an age and IQ matched group of neurotypical adults (NT; N = 15). On the behavioral level we found no group differences. On the neural level, results were two-fold: In the story phase, in which participants had to compute whether the character's belief is congruent or incongruent to their own belief, there were no differences between neurotypical participants and those diagnosed with ASD. But, in the subsequent question phase, participants with ASD showed increased activity in the bilateral anterior prefrontal cortex, the left posterior frontal cortex, the left superior temporal gyrus, and the left temporoparietal area. These results suggest that during the story phase in which the participants processed observable actions the neural correlates do not differ between adult individuals with ASD and NT individuals. But in the question phase in which participants had to infer an unobservable mental state results revealed neural differences between the two groups. Possibly, these subtle neural processing differences may contribute to the fact that adult ASD individuals are able to master explicit false belief tasks but fail to apply their strategies during everyday social interaction.

False Belief Reasoning in Adults with and without Autistic Spectrum Disorder: Similarities and Differences

PubMed Central

Sommer, Monika; Döhnel, Katrin; Jarvers, Irina; Blaas, Lore; Singer, Manuela; Nöth, Victoria; Schuwerk, Tobias; Rupprecht, Rainer

2018-01-01

A central diagnostic criteria for autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is the qualitative impairment in reciprocal social interaction and a prominent hypotheses that tried to explain this impairment is the Theory of Mind (ToM) deficit hypotheses. On a behavioral level the critical test for having a ToM, the understanding of false beliefs (FB), is often used for testing ToM abilities in individuals with ASD. Investigating the neural underpinnings several neuroimaging studies revealed a network of areas involved in FB reasoning in neurotypical individuals. For ASD individuals the neural correlates of false belief processing are largely unknown. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging and an adapted unexpected transfer task, that makes it possible to distinguish between the computation of diverging beliefs and the selection of a belief-associated response, we investigated a group of adult high-functioning individuals with ASD (N = 15) and an age and IQ matched group of neurotypical adults (NT; N = 15). On the behavioral level we found no group differences. On the neural level, results were two-fold: In the story phase, in which participants had to compute whether the character's belief is congruent or incongruent to their own belief, there were no differences between neurotypical participants and those diagnosed with ASD. But, in the subsequent question phase, participants with ASD showed increased activity in the bilateral anterior prefrontal cortex, the left posterior frontal cortex, the left superior temporal gyrus, and the left temporoparietal area. These results suggest that during the story phase in which the participants processed observable actions the neural correlates do not differ between adult individuals with ASD and NT individuals. But in the question phase in which participants had to infer an unobservable mental state results revealed neural differences between the two groups. Possibly, these subtle neural processing differences may contribute to the fact that adult ASD individuals are able to master explicit false belief tasks but fail to apply their strategies during everyday social interaction. PMID:29503627

Five-Year-Olds' Systematic Errors in Second-Order False Belief Tasks Are Due to First-Order Theory of Mind Strategy Selection: A Computational Modeling Study.

PubMed

Arslan, Burcu; Taatgen, Niels A; Verbrugge, Rineke

2017-01-01

The focus of studies on second-order false belief reasoning generally was on investigating the roles of executive functions and language with correlational studies. Different from those studies, we focus on the question how 5-year-olds select and revise reasoning strategies in second-order false belief tasks by constructing two computational cognitive models of this process: an instance-based learning model and a reinforcement learning model. Unlike the reinforcement learning model, the instance-based learning model predicted that children who fail second-order false belief tasks would give answers based on first-order theory of mind (ToM) reasoning as opposed to zero-order reasoning. This prediction was confirmed with an empirical study that we conducted with 72 5- to 6-year-old children. The results showed that 17% of the answers were correct and 83% of the answers were wrong. In line with our prediction, 65% of the wrong answers were based on a first-order ToM strategy, while only 29% of them were based on a zero-order strategy (the remaining 6% of subjects did not provide any answer). Based on our instance-based learning model, we propose that when children get feedback "Wrong," they explicitly revise their strategy to a higher level instead of implicitly selecting one of the available ToM strategies. Moreover, we predict that children's failures are due to lack of experience and that with exposure to second-order false belief reasoning, children can revise their wrong first-order reasoning strategy to a correct second-order reasoning strategy.

Five-Year-Olds’ Systematic Errors in Second-Order False Belief Tasks Are Due to First-Order Theory of Mind Strategy Selection: A Computational Modeling Study

PubMed Central

Arslan, Burcu; Taatgen, Niels A.; Verbrugge, Rineke

2017-01-01

The focus of studies on second-order false belief reasoning generally was on investigating the roles of executive functions and language with correlational studies. Different from those studies, we focus on the question how 5-year-olds select and revise reasoning strategies in second-order false belief tasks by constructing two computational cognitive models of this process: an instance-based learning model and a reinforcement learning model. Unlike the reinforcement learning model, the instance-based learning model predicted that children who fail second-order false belief tasks would give answers based on first-order theory of mind (ToM) reasoning as opposed to zero-order reasoning. This prediction was confirmed with an empirical study that we conducted with 72 5- to 6-year-old children. The results showed that 17% of the answers were correct and 83% of the answers were wrong. In line with our prediction, 65% of the wrong answers were based on a first-order ToM strategy, while only 29% of them were based on a zero-order strategy (the remaining 6% of subjects did not provide any answer). Based on our instance-based learning model, we propose that when children get feedback “Wrong,” they explicitly revise their strategy to a higher level instead of implicitly selecting one of the available ToM strategies. Moreover, we predict that children’s failures are due to lack of experience and that with exposure to second-order false belief reasoning, children can revise their wrong first-order reasoning strategy to a correct second-order reasoning strategy. PMID:28293206

Children exhibit different performance patterns in explicit and implicit theory of mind tasks.

PubMed

Oktay-Gür, Nese; Schulz, Alexandra; Rakoczy, Hannes

2018-04-01

Three studies tested scope and limits of children's implicit and explicit theory of mind. In Studies 1 and 2, three- to six-year-olds (N = 84) were presented with closely matched explicit false belief tasks that differed in whether or not they required an understanding of aspectuality. Results revealed that children performed equally well in the different tasks, and performance was strongly correlated. Study 3 tested two-year-olds (N = 81) in implicit interactive versions of these tasks and found evidence for dis-unity: children performed competently only in those tasks that did not require an understanding of aspectuality. Taken together, the present findings suggest that early implicit and later explicit theory of mind tasks may tap different forms of cognitive capacities. Copyright © 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

The base rate principle and the fairness principle in social judgment

PubMed Central

Cao, Jack; Banaji, Mahzarin R.

2016-01-01

Meet Jonathan and Elizabeth. One person is a doctor and the other is a nurse. Who is the doctor? When nothing else is known, the base rate principle favors Jonathan to be the doctor and the fairness principle favors both individuals equally. However, when individuating facts reveal who is actually the doctor, base rates and fairness become irrelevant, as the facts make the correct answer clear. In three experiments, explicit and implicit beliefs were measured before and after individuating facts were learned. These facts were either stereotypic (e.g., Jonathan is the doctor, Elizabeth is the nurse) or counterstereotypic (e.g., Elizabeth is the doctor, Jonathan is the nurse). Results showed that before individuating facts were learned, explicit beliefs followed the fairness principle, whereas implicit beliefs followed the base rate principle. After individuating facts were learned, explicit beliefs correctly aligned with stereotypic and counterstereotypic facts. Implicit beliefs, however, were immune to counterstereotypic facts and continued to follow the base rate principle. Having established the robustness and generality of these results, a fourth experiment verified that gender stereotypes played a causal role: when both individuals were male, explicit and implicit beliefs alike correctly converged with individuating facts. Taken together, these experiments demonstrate that explicit beliefs uphold fairness and incorporate obvious and relevant facts, but implicit beliefs uphold base rates and appear relatively impervious to counterstereotypic facts. PMID:27325760

The base rate principle and the fairness principle in social judgment.

PubMed

Cao, Jack; Banaji, Mahzarin R

2016-07-05

Meet Jonathan and Elizabeth. One person is a doctor and the other is a nurse. Who is the doctor? When nothing else is known, the base rate principle favors Jonathan to be the doctor and the fairness principle favors both individuals equally. However, when individuating facts reveal who is actually the doctor, base rates and fairness become irrelevant, as the facts make the correct answer clear. In three experiments, explicit and implicit beliefs were measured before and after individuating facts were learned. These facts were either stereotypic (e.g., Jonathan is the doctor, Elizabeth is the nurse) or counterstereotypic (e.g., Elizabeth is the doctor, Jonathan is the nurse). Results showed that before individuating facts were learned, explicit beliefs followed the fairness principle, whereas implicit beliefs followed the base rate principle. After individuating facts were learned, explicit beliefs correctly aligned with stereotypic and counterstereotypic facts. Implicit beliefs, however, were immune to counterstereotypic facts and continued to follow the base rate principle. Having established the robustness and generality of these results, a fourth experiment verified that gender stereotypes played a causal role: when both individuals were male, explicit and implicit beliefs alike correctly converged with individuating facts. Taken together, these experiments demonstrate that explicit beliefs uphold fairness and incorporate obvious and relevant facts, but implicit beliefs uphold base rates and appear relatively impervious to counterstereotypic facts.

From self to social cognition: Theory of Mind mechanisms and their relation to Executive Functioning.

PubMed

Bradford, Elisabeth E F; Jentzsch, Ines; Gomez, Juan-Carlos

2015-05-01

'Theory of Mind' refers to the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and other people (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). This study examined the extent to which 'Self' and 'Other' belief-attribution processes within the Theory of Mind (ToM) mechanism could be distinguished behaviourally, and whether these separable components differentially related to Executive Functioning (EF) abilities. A computerized false-belief task, utilizing a matched-design to allow direct comparison of self-oriented vs. other-oriented belief-attribution, was used to assess ToM, and a face-image Stroop task was employed to assess EF, within a population of typically-developed adults. Results revealed significantly longer reaction times when attributing beliefs to other people as opposed to recognizing and attributing beliefs to oneself. Intriguingly, results revealed that 'perspective-shift' requirements (i.e. changing from adoption of the 'self' perspective to the perspective of the 'other', or vice versa) across false-belief trials influenced reaction times. Reaction times were significantly longer when the perspective shift was from self-to-other than from other-to-self. It is suggested that the 'self' forms the stem of understanding the 'other', and is therefore processed regardless of ultimate task demands; in contrast, the 'other' perspective is only processed when explicitly required. We conclude that adopting another person's perspective, even when their belief state is matched to one's own, requires more cognitive effort than recalling and reflecting on self-oriented belief-states. Copyright © 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Atypical development of spontaneous social cognition in autism spectrum disorders.

PubMed

Senju, Atsushi

2013-02-01

Individuals with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) have profound impairment in the development of social interaction and communication. However, it is also known that some 'high-functioning' individuals with ASD show apparently typical capacity to process social information in a controlled experimental settings, despite their difficulties in daily life. The current paper overviews the spontaneous social cognition, spontaneous processing of social information in the absence of explicit instruction or task demand, in individuals with ASD. Three areas of the researches, false belief attribution, imitation/mimicry, and eye gaze processing, have been reviewed. The literatures suggest that high-functioning individuals with ASD (a) do not spontaneously attribute false belief to others, even though they can easily do so when explicitly instructed, (b) can imitate others' goal-directed actions under explicit instruction and show spontaneous mimicry of others' actions when they attend to the action, but are less likely to show spontaneous mimicry without the task structure to navigate attention to others' action and (c) can process others' gaze direction and shift attention to others' gaze directions, but fail to spontaneously attend to another person's eyes in social and communicative context, and less likely to be prompted to respond in response to perceived eye contact. These results are consistent with the claim that individuals with ASD do not spontaneously attend to socially relevant information, even though they can easily process the same information when their attention is navigated towards it. Copyright © 2012 The Japanese Society of Child Neurology. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Implicit and explicit appraisals of the importance of intrusive thoughts.

PubMed

Teachman, Bethany A; Woody, Sheila R; Magee, Joshua C

2006-06-01

To evaluate cognitive theories of obsessions, the current study experimentally manipulated appraisals of the importance of intrusive thoughts. Undergraduate students (N = 156) completed measures of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) symptoms and beliefs and were primed with a list of commonly reported unwanted thoughts. Participants were then informed that unwanted thoughts are either (1) significant and indicative of their personal values, or (2) meaningless, or participants (3) received no instructions about unwanted thoughts. Participants then completed implicit and explicit measures of self-evaluation and interpretations of their unwanted thoughts. Results indicated that the manipulation shifted implicit appraisals of unwanted thoughts in the expected direction, but not self-evaluations of morality or dangerousness. Interestingly, explicit self-esteem and beliefs about the significance of unwanted thoughts were associated with measures of OCD beliefs, whereas implicit self-evaluations of dangerousness were better predicted by the interaction of pre-existing OCD beliefs with the manipulation. Results are discussed in terms of divergent predictors of implicit and explicit responses to unwanted thoughts.

Children’s belief- and desire-reasoning in the temporoparietal junction: evidence for specialization from functional near-infrared spectroscopy

PubMed Central

Bowman, Lindsay C.; Kovelman, Ioulia; Hu, Xiaosu; Wellman, Henry M.

2015-01-01

Behaviorally, children’s explicit theory of mind (ToM) proceeds in a progression of mental-state understandings: developmentally, children demonstrate accurate explicit desire-reasoning before accurate explicit belief-reasoning. Given its robust and cross-cultural nature, we hypothesize this progression may be paced in part by maturation/specialization of the brain. Neuroimaging research demonstrates that the right temporoparietal junction (TPJ) becomes increasingly selective for ToM reasoning as children age, and as their ToM improves. But this research has narrowly focused on beliefs or on undifferentiated mental-states. A recent ERP study in children included a critical contrast to desire-reasoning, and demonstrated that right posterior potentials differentiated belief-reasoning from desire-reasoning. Taken together, the literature suggests that children’s desire-belief progression may be paced by specialization of the right TPJ for belief-reasoning specifically, beyond desire-reasoning. In the present study, we tested this hypothesis directly by examining children’s belief- and desire-reasoning using functional near-infrared spectroscopy in conjunction with structural magnetic resonance imaging to pinpoint brain activation in the right TPJ. Results showed greatest activation in the right TPJ for belief-reasoning, beyond desire-reasoning, and beyond non-mental reasoning (control). Findings replicate and critically extend prior ERP results, and provide clear evidence for a specific neural mechanism underlying children’s progression from understanding desires to understanding beliefs. PMID:26500527

The robustness and generalizability of findings on spontaneous false belief sensitivity: a replication attempt

PubMed Central

Priewasser, Beate; Sodian, Beate; Perner, Josef

2018-01-01

Influential studies showed that 25-month-olds and neurotypical adults take an agent's false belief into account in their anticipatory looking patterns (Southgate et al. 2007 Psychol. Sci. 18, 587–592 (doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01944.x); Senju et al. 2009 Science 325, 883–885 (doi:10.1126/science.1176170)). These findings constitute central pillars of current accounts distinguishing between implicit and explicit Theory of Mind. In our first experiment, which initially included a replication as well as two manipulations, we failed to replicate the original finding in 2- to 3-year-olds (N = 48). Therefore, we ran a second experiment with the sole purpose of seeing whether the effect can be found in an independent, tightly controlled, sufficiently powered and preregistered replication study. This replication attempt failed again in a sample of 25-month-olds (N = 78), but was successful in a sample of adults (N = 115). In all samples, a surprisingly high number of participants did not correctly anticipate the agent's action during the familiarization phase. This led to massive exclusion rates when adhering to the criteria of the original studies and strongly limits the interpretability of findings from the test phase. We discuss both the reliability of our replication attempts as well as the replicability of non-verbal anticipatory looking paradigms of implicit false belief sensitivity, in general. PMID:29892412

The robustness and generalizability of findings on spontaneous false belief sensitivity: a replication attempt.

PubMed

Schuwerk, Tobias; Priewasser, Beate; Sodian, Beate; Perner, Josef

2018-05-01

Influential studies showed that 25-month-olds and neurotypical adults take an agent's false belief into account in their anticipatory looking patterns (Southgate et al. 2007 Psychol. Sci. 18 , 587-592 (doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01944.x); Senju et al. 2009 Science 325 , 883-885 (doi:10.1126/science.1176170)). These findings constitute central pillars of current accounts distinguishing between implicit and explicit Theory of Mind. In our first experiment, which initially included a replication as well as two manipulations, we failed to replicate the original finding in 2- to 3-year-olds ( N  = 48). Therefore, we ran a second experiment with the sole purpose of seeing whether the effect can be found in an independent, tightly controlled, sufficiently powered and preregistered replication study. This replication attempt failed again in a sample of 25-month-olds ( N  = 78), but was successful in a sample of adults ( N  = 115). In all samples, a surprisingly high number of participants did not correctly anticipate the agent's action during the familiarization phase. This led to massive exclusion rates when adhering to the criteria of the original studies and strongly limits the interpretability of findings from the test phase. We discuss both the reliability of our replication attempts as well as the replicability of non-verbal anticipatory looking paradigms of implicit false belief sensitivity, in general.

Towards greater understanding of addiction stigma: Intersectionality with race/ethnicity and gender.

PubMed

Kulesza, Magdalena; Matsuda, Mauri; Ramirez, Jason J; Werntz, Alexandra J; Teachman, Bethany A; Lindgren, Kristen P

2016-12-01

In spite of the significant burden associated with substance use disorders, especially among persons who inject drugs (PWIDs), most affected individuals do not engage with any type of formal or informal treatment. Addiction stigma, which is represented by negative social attitudes toward individuals who use alcohol and/or other drugs, is one of the barriers to care that is poorly understood. The current study: a) assessed implicit (indirect and difficult to consciously control) and explicit (consciously controlled) beliefs about PWIDs among visitors to a public web site; and b) experimentally investigated the effects of ethnicity/race and gender on those implicit and explicit beliefs. N=899 predominantly White (70%) and women (62%) were randomly assigned to one of six target PWIDs conditions: gender (man/woman) x race/ethnicity (White, Black, Latino/a). Participants completed an Implicit Association Test and explicit assessment of addiction stigma. Participants implicitly associated PWIDs (especially Latino/a vs. White PWIDs) with deserving punishment as opposed to help (p=0.003, d=0.31), indicating presence of addiction stigma-related implicit beliefs. However, this bias was not evident on the explicit measure (p=0.89). Gender did not predict differential implicit or explicit addiction stigma (p=0.18). Contrary to explicit egalitarian views towards PWIDs, participants' implicit beliefs were more in line with addiction stigma. If replicated and clearer ties to behavior are established, results suggest the potential importance of identifying conditions under which implicit bias might influence behavior (even despite explicit egalitarian views) and increase the likelihood of discrimination towards PWIDs. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.

Not just a sum of its parts: How tasks of the theory of mind scale relate to executive function across time.

PubMed

Doenyas, Ceymi; Yavuz, H Melis; Selcuk, Bilge

2018-02-01

There is a well-established relationship between theory of mind (ToM) and executive function (EF) during the preschool years. However, less is known about the concurrent and longitudinal relations between EF and specific tasks tapping different aspects of ToM. The current study investigated the ToM-EF relationship across 1 year in 3- to 5-year-old Turkish children using the ToM battery of Wellman and Liu (2004), which measures understanding of diverse desires (DD), diverse beliefs (DB), knowledge access (KA), contents false belief (CFB), explicit false belief (EFB), and hidden emotion (HE). This battery has not yet been used in its entirety to test the predictive relations between ToM and EF. We used peg-tapping and day-night tasks to measure EF. Our sample comprised 150 Turkish preschool children (69 girls) aged 36-60 months at Time 1 (T1) and 49-73 months at Time 2 (T2). Using the ToM composite with all six tasks, when child's age, receptive language, and T1 ability level (EF or ToM) were controlled, T1 EF significantly predicted T2 ToM, whereas T1 ToM did not predict T2 EF. Among DD, DB, KA, false belief understanding (FBU: the composite score of CFB and EFB), and HE, only KA and FBU were significantly associated with EF at T1 and T2. Further regression analyses showed that KA did not have a predictive relationship with EF. Instead, FBU drove the predictive EF-ToM relationship across time. Thus, in Turkish children, earlier EF predicts later ToM, but especially the FBU component, in this well-validated battery. Copyright © 2017. Published by Elsevier Inc.

Beyond Sexist Beliefs: How Do People Decide to Use Gender-Inclusive Language?

PubMed

Sczesny, Sabine; Moser, Franziska; Wood, Wendy

2015-07-01

When people use generic masculine language instead of more gender-inclusive forms, they communicate gender stereotypes and sometimes exclusion of women from certain social roles. Past research related gender-inclusive language use to sexist beliefs and attitudes. Given that this aspect of language use may be transparent to users, it is unclear whether people explicitly act on these beliefs when using gender-exclusive language forms or whether these are more implicit, habitual patterns. In two studies with German-speaking participants, we showed that spontaneous use of gender-inclusive personal nouns is guided by explicitly favorable intentions as well as habitual processes involving past use of such language. Further indicating the joint influence of deliberate and habitual processes, Study 2 revealed that language-use intentions are embedded in explicit sexist ideologies. As anticipated in our decision-making model, the effects of sexist beliefs on language emerged through deliberate mechanisms involving attitudes and intentions. © 2015 by the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc.

Implicit and Explicit Gender Beliefs in Spatial Ability: Stronger Stereotyping in Boys than Girls.

PubMed

Vander Heyden, Karin M; van Atteveldt, Nienke M; Huizinga, Mariette; Jolles, Jelle

2016-01-01

Sex differences in spatial ability are a seriously debated topic, given the importance of spatial ability for success in the fields of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) and girls' underrepresentation in these domains. In the current study we investigated the presence of stereotypic gender beliefs on spatial ability (i.e., "spatial ability is for boys") in 10- and 12-year-old children. We used both an explicit measure (i.e., a self-report questionnaire) and an implicit measure (i.e., a child IAT). Results of the explicit measure showed that both sexes associated spatial ability with boys, with boys holding more male stereotyped attitudes than girls. On the implicit measure, boys associated spatial ability with boys, while girls were gender-neutral. In addition, we examined the effects of gender beliefs on spatial performance, by experimentally activating gender beliefs within a pretest-instruction-posttest design. We compared three types of instruction: boys are better, girls are better, and no sex differences. No effects of these gender belief instructions were found on children's spatial test performance (i.e., mental rotation and paper folding). The finding that children of this age already have stereotypic beliefs about the spatial capacities of their own sex is important, as these beliefs may influence children's choices for spatial leisure activities and educational tracks in the STEM domain.

Implicit and Explicit Gender Beliefs in Spatial Ability: Stronger Stereotyping in Boys than Girls

PubMed Central

Vander Heyden, Karin M.; van Atteveldt, Nienke M.; Huizinga, Mariette; Jolles, Jelle

2016-01-01

Sex differences in spatial ability are a seriously debated topic, given the importance of spatial ability for success in the fields of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) and girls' underrepresentation in these domains. In the current study we investigated the presence of stereotypic gender beliefs on spatial ability (i.e., “spatial ability is for boys”) in 10- and 12-year-old children. We used both an explicit measure (i.e., a self-report questionnaire) and an implicit measure (i.e., a child IAT). Results of the explicit measure showed that both sexes associated spatial ability with boys, with boys holding more male stereotyped attitudes than girls. On the implicit measure, boys associated spatial ability with boys, while girls were gender-neutral. In addition, we examined the effects of gender beliefs on spatial performance, by experimentally activating gender beliefs within a pretest—instruction—posttest design. We compared three types of instruction: boys are better, girls are better, and no sex differences. No effects of these gender belief instructions were found on children's spatial test performance (i.e., mental rotation and paper folding). The finding that children of this age already have stereotypic beliefs about the spatial capacities of their own sex is important, as these beliefs may influence children's choices for spatial leisure activities and educational tracks in the STEM domain. PMID:27507956

The Effectiveness of Gateway Communications in Anti-Marijuana Campaigns

PubMed Central

YZER, MARCO C.; CAPPELLA, JOSEPH N.; FISHBEIN, MARTIN; HORNIK, ROBERT; AHERN, R. KIRKLAND

2014-01-01

Successful anti-marijuana messages can be hypothesized to have two types of effects, namely persuasion effects, that is, a change in people’s beliefs about using marijuana, and priming effects, that is, a strengthened correlation between beliefs and associated variables such as attitude and intention. This study examined different sets of anti-drug advertisements for persuasion and priming effects. The ads targeted the belief that marijuana is a gateway to stronger drugs, a belief that is often endorsed by campaign planning officials and health educators. A sample of 418 middle and high school students was randomly assigned to a control video or one of three series of ads, two of which included the gateway message in either an explicit or implicit way. Results did not support the use of the gateway belief in anti-marijuana interventions. Whereas no clear persuasion or priming effects were found for any of the ad sequences, there is some possibility that an explicit gateway argument may actually boomerang. In comparison to the control condition, adolescents in the explicit gateway condition tended to agree less with the gateway message and displayed weaker correlations between anti-marijuana beliefs and their attitude toward marijuana use. The results suggest that the gateway message should not be used in anti-drug interventions. PMID:12746037

Disruption of the Right Temporoparietal Junction Impairs Probabilistic Belief Updating.

PubMed

Mengotti, Paola; Dombert, Pascasie L; Fink, Gereon R; Vossel, Simone

2017-05-31

Generating and updating probabilistic models of the environment is a fundamental modus operandi of the human brain. Although crucial for various cognitive functions, the neural mechanisms of these inference processes remain to be elucidated. Here, we show the causal involvement of the right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ) in updating probabilistic beliefs and we provide new insights into the chronometry of the process by combining online transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) with computational modeling of behavioral responses. Female and male participants performed a modified location-cueing paradigm, where false information about the percentage of cue validity (%CV) was provided in half of the experimental blocks to prompt updating of prior expectations. Online double-pulse TMS over rTPJ 300 ms (but not 50 ms) after target appearance selectively decreased participants' updating of false prior beliefs concerning %CV, reflected in a decreased learning rate of a Rescorla-Wagner model. Online TMS over rTPJ also impacted on participants' explicit beliefs, causing them to overestimate %CV. These results confirm the involvement of rTPJ in updating of probabilistic beliefs, thereby advancing our understanding of this area's function during cognitive processing. SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Contemporary views propose that the brain maintains probabilistic models of the world to minimize surprise about sensory inputs. Here, we provide evidence that the right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ) is causally involved in this process. Because neuroimaging has suggested that rTPJ is implicated in divergent cognitive domains, the demonstration of an involvement in updating internal models provides a novel unifying explanation for these findings. We used computational modeling to characterize how participants change their beliefs after new observations. By interfering with rTPJ activity through online transcranial magnetic stimulation, we showed that participants were less able to update prior beliefs with TMS delivered at 300 ms after target onset. Copyright © 2017 the authors 0270-6474/17/375419-10$15.00/0.

An endorsement-based approach to student modeling for planner-controlled intelligent tutoring systems

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Murray, William R.

1990-01-01

An approach is described to student modeling for intelligent tutoring systems based on an explicit representation of the tutor's beliefs about the student and the arguments for and against those beliefs (called endorsements). A lexicographic comparison of arguments, sorted according to evidence reliability, provides a principled means of determining those beliefs that are considered true, false, or uncertain. Each of these beliefs is ultimately justified by underlying assessment data. The endorsement-based approach to student modeling is particularly appropriate for tutors controlled by instructional planners. These tutors place greater demands on a student model than opportunistic tutors. Numerical calculi approaches are less well-suited because it is difficult to correctly assign numbers for evidence reliability and rule plausibility. It may also be difficult to interpret final results and provide suitable combining functions. When numeric measures of uncertainty are used, arbitrary numeric thresholds are often required for planning decisions. Such an approach is inappropriate when robust context-sensitive planning decisions must be made. A TMS-based implementation of the endorsement-based approach to student modeling is presented, this approach is compared to alternatives, and a project history is provided describing the evolution of this approach.

Source misattributions and false recognition errors: examining the role of perceptual resemblance and imagery generation processes.

PubMed

Foley, Mary Ann; Bays, Rebecca Brooke; Foy, Jeffrey; Woodfield, Mila

2015-01-01

In three experiments, we examine the extent to which participants' memory errors are affected by the perceptual features of an encoding series and imagery generation processes. Perceptual features were examined by manipulating the features associated with individual items as well as the relationships among items. An encoding instruction manipulation was included to examine the effects of explicit requests to generate images. In all three experiments, participants falsely claimed to have seen pictures of items presented as words, committing picture misattribution errors. These misattribution errors were exaggerated when the perceptual resemblance between pictures and images was relatively high (Experiment 1) and when explicit requests to generate images were omitted from encoding instructions (Experiments 1 and 2). When perceptual cues made the thematic relationships among items salient, the level and pattern of misattribution errors were also affected (Experiments 2 and 3). Results address alternative views about the nature of internal representations resulting in misattribution errors and refute the idea that these errors reflect only participants' general impressions or beliefs about what was seen.

Testing the domain-specificity of a theory of mind deficit in brain-injured patients: evidence for consistent performance on non-verbal, "reality-unknown" false belief and false photograph tasks.

PubMed

Apperly, Ian A; Samson, Dana; Chiavarino, Claudia; Bickerton, Wai-Ling; Humphreys, Glyn W

2007-05-01

To test the domain-specificity of "theory of mind" abilities we compared the performance of a case-series of 11 brain-lesioned patients on a recently developed test of false belief reasoning () and on a matched false photograph task, which did not require belief reasoning and which addressed problems with existing false photograph methods. A strikingly similar pattern of performance was shown across the false belief and false photograph tests. Patients who were selectively impaired on false belief tasks were also impaired on false photograph tasks; patients spared on false belief tasks also showed preserved performance with false photographs. In some cases the impairment on false belief and false photograph tasks coincided with good performance on control tasks matched for executive demands. We discuss whether the patients have a domain-specific deficit in reasoning about representations common to both false belief and false photograph tasks.

Mainstream Teachers' Implicit Beliefs about English Language Learners: An Implicit Association Test Study of Teacher Beliefs

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Harrison, Jamie; Lakin, Joni

2018-01-01

Teacher attitudes toward inclusion of English Learners (ELs) in the mainstream classroom have primarily focused on explicit beliefs as accessed through observation, case studies, and self-report surveys. The authors explore implicit mainstream teacher beliefs about ELs using the newly created Implicit Association Test-EL, with correlations to…

Interaction Effects between Exposure to Sexually Explicit Online Materials and Individual, Family, and Extrafamilial Factors on Hong Kong High School Students' Beliefs about Gender Role Equality and Body-Centered Sexuality

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

To, Siu-ming; Kan, Siu-mee Iu; Ngai, Steven Sek-yum

2015-01-01

This study examined the interaction effects between Hong Kong adolescents' exposure to sexually explicit online materials (SEOM) and individual, family, peer, and cultural factors on their beliefs about gender role equality and body-centered sexuality. Based on a survey design with a sample of 503 high school students in Hong Kong, the results…

On the nature of implicit soul beliefs: when the past weighs more than the present.

PubMed

Anglin, Stephanie M

2015-06-01

Intuitive childhood beliefs in dualism may lay the foundation for implicit soul and afterlife beliefs, which may diverge from explicit beliefs formed later in adulthood. Brief Implicit Association Tests were developed to investigate the relation of implicit soul and afterlife beliefs to childhood and current beliefs. Early but not current beliefs covaried with implicit beliefs. Results demonstrated greater discrepancies in current than in childhood soul and afterlife beliefs among religious groups, and no differences in implicit beliefs. These findings suggest that implicit soul and afterlife beliefs diverge from current self-reported beliefs, stemming instead from childhood beliefs. © 2014 The British Psychological Society.

Creativity Theories and Related Teachers' Beliefs

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Saracho, Olivia

2012-01-01

Creativity theories have been investigated in relation to explicit or implicit theories, which have dominated the field. The flourishing attention about creativity motivated many researchers to examine implicit and explicit theories to understand creativity in their studies. Explicit theories are those formulated by psychologists or other social…

Similar Brain Activation during False Belief Tasks in a Large Sample of Adults with and without Autism

PubMed Central

Dufour, Nicholas; Redcay, Elizabeth; Young, Liane; Mavros, Penelope L.; Moran, Joseph M.; Triantafyllou, Christina; Gabrieli, John D. E.; Saxe, Rebecca

2013-01-01

Reading about another person’s beliefs engages ‘Theory of Mind’ processes and elicits highly reliable brain activation across individuals and experimental paradigms. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we examined activation during a story task designed to elicit Theory of Mind processing in a very large sample of neurotypical (N = 462) individuals, and a group of high-functioning individuals with autism spectrum disorders (N = 31), using both region-of-interest and whole-brain analyses. This large sample allowed us to investigate group differences in brain activation to Theory of Mind tasks with unusually high sensitivity. There were no differences between neurotypical participants and those diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder. These results imply that the social cognitive impairments typical of autism spectrum disorder can occur without measurable changes in the size, location or response magnitude of activity during explicit Theory of Mind tasks administered to adults. PMID:24073267

Similar brain activation during false belief tasks in a large sample of adults with and without autism.

PubMed

Dufour, Nicholas; Redcay, Elizabeth; Young, Liane; Mavros, Penelope L; Moran, Joseph M; Triantafyllou, Christina; Gabrieli, John D E; Saxe, Rebecca

2013-01-01

Reading about another person's beliefs engages 'Theory of Mind' processes and elicits highly reliable brain activation across individuals and experimental paradigms. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we examined activation during a story task designed to elicit Theory of Mind processing in a very large sample of neurotypical (N = 462) individuals, and a group of high-functioning individuals with autism spectrum disorders (N = 31), using both region-of-interest and whole-brain analyses. This large sample allowed us to investigate group differences in brain activation to Theory of Mind tasks with unusually high sensitivity. There were no differences between neurotypical participants and those diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder. These results imply that the social cognitive impairments typical of autism spectrum disorder can occur without measurable changes in the size, location or response magnitude of activity during explicit Theory of Mind tasks administered to adults.

Modulation of the cortical false belief network during development.

PubMed

Sommer, Monika; Meinhardt, Jörg; Eichenmüller, Kerstin; Sodian, Beate; Döhnel, Katrin; Hajak, Göran

2010-10-01

The ability to represent false beliefs is commonly considered as to be the critical test for having a Theory of Mind (ToM). For correct predictions or explanations of other peoples' behavior it is necessary to understand that mental states are sometimes independent of reality and misrepresent the real state of the world. In contrast, when people hold true beliefs, predictions and explanations about behavior can simply be derived from reality. Previous neuroimaging studies with adults suggest that the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) and the right temporo-parietal junction (rTPJ) are engaged in false belief reasoning. However, studies investigating the neural correlates of belief reasoning in children are rare. Using cartoon stories that depicted an unexpected transfer, we compared false belief reasoning with true belief reasoning in children of a narrow age range between 10 and 12years and in adults. In both groups, the dorsal medial frontal cortex was activated during false versus true belief reasoning. In contrast to adults, children did not selectively recruit the rTPJ during false belief reasoning. We found a group by belief interaction in the right rostral PFC and the posterior cingulate cortex. In these areas, children compared to adults showed increased activity associated with false belief reasoning in contrast to true belief reasoning. These results implicate modulation of the cortical network that underlies false belief reasoning during development and far beyond the time children successfully master false belief tasks. Copyright (c) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

False-belief understanding in 2.5-year-olds: Evidence from two novel verbal spontaneous-response tasks

PubMed Central

Scott, Rose M.; He, Zijing; Baillargeon, Renée; Cummins, Denise

2011-01-01

Recent research indicates that toddlers and infants succeed at various non-verbal spontaneous-response false-belief tasks; here we asked whether toddlers would also succeed at verbal spontaneous-response false-belief tasks that imposed significant linguistic demands. 2.5-year-olds were tested using two novel tasks: a preferential-looking task in which children listened to a false-belief story while looking at a picture book (with matching and non-matching pictures), and a violation-of-expectation task in which children watched an adult “Subject” answer (correctly or incorrectly) a standard false-belief question. Positive results were obtained with both tasks, despite their linguistic demands. These results (1) support the distinction between spontaneous-and elicited-response tasks by showing that toddlers succeed at verbal false-belief tasks that do not require them to answer direct questions about agents’ false beliefs, (2) reinforce claims of robust continuity in early false-belief understanding as assessed by spontaneous-response tasks, and (3) provide researchers with new experimental tasks for exploring early false-belief understanding in neurotypical and autistic populations. PMID:22356174

False-belief understanding in 2.5-year-olds: evidence from two novel verbal spontaneous-response tasks.

PubMed

Scott, Rose M; He, Zijing; Baillargeon, Renée; Cummins, Denise

2012-03-01

Recent research indicates that toddlers and infants succeed at various non-verbal spontaneous-response false-belief tasks; here we asked whether toddlers would also succeed at verbal spontaneous-response false-belief tasks that imposed significant linguistic demands. We tested 2.5-year-olds using two novel tasks: a preferential-looking task in which children listened to a false-belief story while looking at a picture book (with matching and non-matching pictures), and a violation-of-expectation task in which children watched an adult 'Subject' answer (correctly or incorrectly) a standard false-belief question. Positive results were obtained with both tasks, despite their linguistic demands. These results (1) support the distinction between spontaneous- and elicited-response tasks by showing that toddlers succeed at verbal false-belief tasks that do not require them to answer direct questions about agents' false beliefs, (2) reinforce claims of robust continuity in early false-belief understanding as assessed by spontaneous-response tasks, and (3) provide researchers with new experimental tasks for exploring early false-belief understanding in neurotypical and autistic populations. © 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Neural correlates of true and false belief reasoning.

PubMed

Sommer, Monika; Döhnel, Katrin; Sodian, Beate; Meinhardt, Jörg; Thoermer, Claudia; Hajak, Göran

2007-04-15

Belief reasoning plays a central role in making inferences about other people's mental states. The ability to reason about false beliefs is considered as a critical test for having a Theory of Mind (ToM). There is some controversy as to whether it is the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) or the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) that is centrally involved in belief reasoning. According to developmental studies of belief reasoning we conducted an fMRI experiment with a carefully controlled paradigm (Sally Anne scenario). We compared false belief reasoning with true belief reasoning in parallel tasks, using a series of cartoon stories depicting transfer of an object unbeknownst to the protagonist (false belief) or with the protagonist witnessing (true belief). The false belief versus true belief contrast revealed activation of the dorsal part of the anterior cingulate cortex (dACC), the right lateral rostral prefrontal cortex and the right TPJ associated with false belief. We suggest that the activation of the dACC and the lateral PFC might be associated with action monitoring and stimulus-independent cognitive processing whereas the activation of the TPJ might be related to the computation of mental representations that create perspective differences, such as a person's false belief that contrasts with reality and therefore might be centrally involved in the decoupling mechanism. Additionally we found common patterns of activation for true and false belief reasoning, including inferior parietal and precuneus activation, but we found no activation of the MPFC or the TPJ in general belief reasoning.

Implicit Beliefs about Emotion Regulation and Their Relations with Emotional Experiences among Chinese Adolescents

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Deng, Xinmei; Sang, Biao; Chen, Xinyin

2017-01-01

There is growing interest in understanding how beliefs about emotion regulation are related to individual emotional experiences. Extant studies have mainly focused on explicit beliefs about emotion regulation among individuals in Western societies. The current study examined implicit emotion regulation and explored their contributions to emotional…

Making Learning Visible: Developing Preservice Teachers' Pedagogical Content Knowledge and Teaching Efficacy Beliefs in Environmental Education

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Richardson, Greer M.; Byrne, Laurel L.; Liang, Ling L.

2018-01-01

Recognizing that teaching efficacy beliefs influence pedagogical content knowledge, this study assesses the impact of a general methods course on preservice teachers' efficacy beliefs and instructional planning of environmental education content. The course used explicit and visible strategies to support pedagogical and content knowledge…

The Development of Theory of Mind According to False Belief Performance of Children Ages 3 to 5

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Keceli Kaysili, Bahar; Acarlar, Funda

2011-01-01

This study has examined the role of age in the false belief understanding in typically developing children and to determine if the different type of false belief tasks affects performance on false belief. The survey research design was used. False belief understanding was measured in 72 children between the ages of 3.00 to 5.11 year old. The…

Dissociation of understanding from applying others’ false beliefs in remitted schizophrenia: evidence from a computerized referential communication task

PubMed Central

2013-01-01

Background In research on theory of mind (ToM), false belief paradigms are commonly used. Previous studies have reported that there is heterogeneity in the magnitude of impairment on false belief tasks. Moreover, intact ability to attribute others’ false beliefs has been widely reported in patients with remitted schizophrenia. Increasingly, evidence suggests that there may be different cognitive mechanisms underlying the understanding others’ false beliefs versus applying one’s knowledge of others’ false beliefs. Since the role of psychotic symptoms in ToM impairments is an important issue in the study of ToM deficits in schizophrenia, we examined both remitted schizophrenia and non-remitted schizophrenia, with the aim to investigate whether psychotic symptoms in schizophrenia are associated with deficits in understanding others’ mental states or difficulties in applying this understanding. Methods The present study investigated 29 patients with non-remitted schizophrenia, 19 patients with remitted schizophrenia, and 22 healthy controls with a revised computerized referential communication task. The ability to understand others’ false beliefs and the ability to apply others’ false beliefs were measured separately. Results Patients with non-remitted schizophrenia performed significantly worse than patients with remitted schizophrenia and healthy controls on a task of understanding others’ false beliefs, whereas no significant difference was found between the patients with remitted schizophrenia and healthy controls. Both the patients with non-remitted schizophrenia and patients with remitted schizophrenia performed significantly worse than healthy controls on a task of applying others’ false beliefs. Conclusions Our findings suggested a dissociation of understanding others’ false beliefs from applying others’ false beliefs in remitted schizophrenia. We preliminarily conclude that deficits in the ToM ability of applying knowledge of others’ mental states might be state-dependent. PMID:23683146

Dissociation of understanding from applying others' false beliefs in remitted schizophrenia: evidence from a computerized referential communication task.

PubMed

Wang, Yong-guang; Roberts, David L; Xu, Bai-hua

2013-05-17

In research on theory of mind (ToM), false belief paradigms are commonly used. Previous studies have reported that there is heterogeneity in the magnitude of impairment on false belief tasks. Moreover, intact ability to attribute others' false beliefs has been widely reported in patients with remitted schizophrenia. Increasingly, evidence suggests that there may be different cognitive mechanisms underlying the understanding others' false beliefs versus applying one's knowledge of others' false beliefs. Since the role of psychotic symptoms in ToM impairments is an important issue in the study of ToM deficits in schizophrenia, we examined both remitted schizophrenia and non-remitted schizophrenia, with the aim to investigate whether psychotic symptoms in schizophrenia are associated with deficits in understanding others' mental states or difficulties in applying this understanding. The present study investigated 29 patients with non-remitted schizophrenia, 19 patients with remitted schizophrenia, and 22 healthy controls with a revised computerized referential communication task. The ability to understand others' false beliefs and the ability to apply others' false beliefs were measured separately. Patients with non-remitted schizophrenia performed significantly worse than patients with remitted schizophrenia and healthy controls on a task of understanding others' false beliefs, whereas no significant difference was found between the patients with remitted schizophrenia and healthy controls. Both the patients with non-remitted schizophrenia and patients with remitted schizophrenia performed significantly worse than healthy controls on a task of applying others' false beliefs. Our findings suggested a dissociation of understanding others' false beliefs from applying others' false beliefs in remitted schizophrenia. We preliminarily conclude that deficits in the ToM ability of applying knowledge of others' mental states might be state-dependent.

Relations between mental verb and false belief understanding in Cantonese-speaking children.

PubMed

Cheung, Him; Chen, Hsuan-Chih; Yeung, William

2009-10-01

Previous research has shown that linguistic forms that codify mental contents bear a specific relation with children's false belief understanding. These forms include mental verbs and their following complements, yet the two have not been considered separately. The current study examined the roles of mental verb semantics and the complement syntax in children's false belief understanding. Independent tasks were used to measure verb meaning, complements, and false belief understanding such that the verbs in question were present only in the verb meaning test, and no linguistic devices biased toward false belief were used in the false belief test. We focused on (a) some mental verbs that obligatorily affirm or negate what follows and (b) sentential complements, the content of which is to be evaluated against the mind of another person, not reality. Results showed that only (a) predicted false belief understanding in a group of Cantonese-speaking 4-year-olds, controlling for nonverbal intelligence and general language ability. In particular, children's understanding of the strong nonfactive semantics of the Cantonese verbs /ji5-wai4/ ("falsely think") predicted false belief understanding most strongly. The current findings suggest that false belief understanding is specifically related to the comprehension of mental verbs that entail false thought in their semantics.

An association account of false belief understanding.

PubMed

De Bruin, L C; Newen, A

2012-05-01

The elicited-response false belief task has traditionally been considered as reliably indicating that children acquire an understanding of false belief around 4 years of age. However, recent investigations using spontaneous-response tasks suggest that false belief understanding emerges much earlier. This leads to a developmental paradox: if young infants already understand false belief, then why do they fail the elicited-response false belief task? We postulate two systems to account for the development of false belief understanding: an association module, which provides infants with the capacity to register congruent associations between agents and objects, and an operating system, which allows them to transform these associations into incongruent associations through a process of inhibition, selection and representation. The interaction between the association module and the operating system enables infants to register increasingly complex associations on the basis of another agent's movements, visual perspective and propositional attitudes. This allows us account for the full range of findings on false belief understanding. Copyright © 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Eighteen-month-olds' memory interference and distraction in a modified A-not-B task is not associated with their anticipatory looking in a false-belief task.

PubMed

Zmyj, Norbert; Prinz, Wolfgang; Daum, Moritz M

2015-01-01

Infants' performance in non-verbal false-belief tasks is often interpreted as if they have understood false beliefs. This view has been questioned by a recent account that explains infants' performance in non-verbal false-belief tasks as the result of susceptibility to memory interference and distraction. We tested this alternative account by investigating the relationship between infants' false-belief understanding, susceptibility to memory interference and distraction, and general cognitive development in 18-month-old infants (N = 22). False-belief understanding was tested in an anticipatory looking paradigm of a standard false-belief task. Susceptibility to memory interference and distraction was tested in a modified A-not-B task. Cognitive development was measured via the Mental Scale of the Bayley Scales of Infant Development. We did not find any relationship between infants' performance in the false-belief task and the A-not-B task, even after controlling for cognitive development. This study shows that there is no ubiquitous relation between susceptibility to memory interference and distraction and performance in a false-belief task in infancy.

Eighteen-month-olds’ memory interference and distraction in a modified A-not-B task is not associated with their anticipatory looking in a false-belief task

PubMed Central

Zmyj, Norbert; Prinz, Wolfgang; Daum, Moritz M.

2015-01-01

Infants’ performance in non-verbal false-belief tasks is often interpreted as if they have understood false beliefs. This view has been questioned by a recent account that explains infants’ performance in non-verbal false-belief tasks as the result of susceptibility to memory interference and distraction. We tested this alternative account by investigating the relationship between infants’ false-belief understanding, susceptibility to memory interference and distraction, and general cognitive development in 18-month-old infants (N = 22). False-belief understanding was tested in an anticipatory looking paradigm of a standard false-belief task. Susceptibility to memory interference and distraction was tested in a modified A-not-B task. Cognitive development was measured via the Mental Scale of the Bayley Scales of Infant Development. We did not find any relationship between infants’ performance in the false-belief task and the A-not-B task, even after controlling for cognitive development. This study shows that there is no ubiquitous relation between susceptibility to memory interference and distraction and performance in a false-belief task in infancy. PMID:26157409

Testing the validity of a continuous false belief task in 3- to 7-year-old children.

PubMed

Mahy, Caitlin E V; Bernstein, Daniel M; Gerrard, Lindsey D; Atance, Cristina M

2017-08-01

In two studies, we examined young children's performance on the paper-and-pencil version of the Sandbox task, a continuous measure of false belief, and its relations with other false belief and inhibition tasks. In Study 1, 96 children aged 3 to 7years completed three false belief tasks (Sandbox, Unexpected Contents, and Appearance/Reality) and two inhibition tasks (Head-Shoulders-Knees-Toes and Grass/Snow). Results revealed that false belief bias-a measure of egocentrism-on the Sandbox task correlated with age but not with the Unexpected Contents or Appearance/Reality task or with measures of inhibition after controlling for age. In Study 2, 90 3- to 7-year-olds completed five false belief tasks (Sandbox, Unexpected Contents, Appearance/Reality, Change of Location, and a second-order false belief task), two inhibition tasks (Simon Says and Grass/Snow), and a receptive vocabulary task (Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test). Results showed that false belief bias on the Sandbox task correlated negatively with age and with the Change of Location task but not with the other false belief or inhibition tasks after controlling for age and receptive vocabulary. The Sandbox task shows promise as an age-sensitive measure of false belief performance during early childhood and shows convergent and discriminant validity. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Faculty Definitions of Desirable Teacher Beliefs. Program Evaluation Series No. 17.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Brousseau, Bruce; Freeman, Donald J.

This paper describes the results of a survey of teacher education faculty that was prompted by efforts to make educational beliefs an explicit component of the curricula of teacher preparation programs at Michigan State University. The analysis sought to determine: (1) the extent to which faculty agree on the ways beliefs should be shaped within a…

An Association Account of False Belief Understanding

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

De Bruin, L. C.; Newen, A.

2012-01-01

The elicited-response false belief task has traditionally been considered as reliably indicating that children acquire an understanding of false belief around 4 years of age. However, recent investigations using spontaneous-response tasks suggest that false belief understanding emerges much earlier. This leads to a developmental paradox: if young…

Implicit and explicit measures of sexual orientation attitudes: in group preferences and related behaviors and beliefs among gay and straight men.

PubMed

Jellison, William A; McConnell, Allen R; Gabriel, Shira

2004-05-01

The relations among implicit and explicit measures of sexual orientation attitudes and sexual-orientation-related behavior and beliefs among gay men (Study 1) and straight men (Studies 1 and 2) were explored. Study 1 found relations between implicit and explicit measures of sexual orientation attitudes, large differences between gay and straight men on both implicit and explicit measures, and that these measures predicted sexual-orientation-related behaviors among gay men. Also, only straight men exhibited a negative relation between their attitudes toward homosexuality and heterosexuality. Study 2 found that as straight men held more negative attitudes toward homosexuality, they more strongly endorsed the importance of heterosexual identity and of traditional masculine gender roles. These endorsements mediated the negative relation between their attitudes toward heterosexuality and homosexuality. Implications for assessing attitudes toward sexual orientation and their relations for sexual orientation identity are discussed.

Child language and parent discipline mediate the relation between family income and false belief understanding.

PubMed

Tompkins, Virginia; Logan, Jessica A R; Blosser, Daniel F; Duffy, Kaylin

2017-06-01

Achieving false belief understanding is an important cognitive milestone that allows children to understand that thoughts and reality can differ. Researchers have found that low-income children score significantly lower than middle-income children on false belief understanding but have not examined why this difference exists. We hypothesized that children's language and parent discipline mediate the income-false belief relation. Participants were 174 3- to 6-year-olds. False belief understanding was significantly correlated with family income, children's vocabulary, parents' self-reported discussion of children's behavior, discussion of emotions, and power assertion. Family income had a significant indirect effect on false belief understanding through children's vocabulary and parent discipline when examined independently, but only through children's vocabulary when using parallel multiple mediation. This study contributes to our knowledge of individual differences in false belief understanding. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Language Promotes False-Belief Understanding

PubMed Central

Pyers, Jennie E.; Senghas, Ann

2010-01-01

Developmental studies have identified a strong correlation in the timing of language development and false-belief understanding. However, the nature of this relationship remains unresolved. Does language promote false-belief understanding, or does it merely facilitate development that could occur independently, albeit on a delayed timescale? We examined language development and false-belief understanding in deaf learners of an emerging sign language in Nicaragua. The use of mental-state vocabulary and performance on a low-verbal false-belief task were assessed, over 2 years, in adult and adolescent users of Nicaraguan Sign Language. Results show that those adults who acquired a nascent form of the language during childhood produce few mental-state signs and fail to exhibit false-belief understanding. Furthermore, those whose language developed over the period of the study correspondingly developed in false-belief understanding. Thus, language learning, over and above social experience, drives the development of a mature theory of mind. PMID:19515119

Preschoolers' Processing of False Beliefs within the Context of Picture Book Reading

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Riggio, Mary Mabel; Cassidy, Kimberly W.

2009-01-01

Research Findings: The current study examined preschoolers' processing of false belief situations presented in published picture books. Children were read one story with a plot that revolved around a single false belief occurrence and one story with multiple false belief occurrences. Children's narrative retellings of the stories were utilized as…

Absence of spontaneous action anticipation by false belief attribution in children with autism spectrum disorder.

PubMed

Senju, Atsushi; Southgate, Victoria; Miura, Yui; Matsui, Tomoko; Hasegawa, Toshikazu; Tojo, Yoshikuni; Osanai, Hiroo; Csibra, Gergely

2010-05-01

Recently, a series of studies demonstrated false belief understanding in young children through completely nonverbal measures. These studies have revealed that children younger than 3 years of age, who consistently fail the standard verbal false belief test, can anticipate others' actions based on their attributed false beliefs. The current study examined whether children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD), who are known to have difficulties in the verbal false belief test, may also show such action anticipation in a nonverbal false belief test. We presented video stimuli of an actor watching an object being hidden in a box. The object was then displaced while the actor was looking away. We recorded children's eye movements and coded whether they spontaneously anticipated the actor's subsequent behavior, which could only have been predicted if they had attributed a false belief to her. Although typically developing children correctly anticipated the action, children with ASD failed to show such action anticipation. The results suggest that children with ASD have an impairment in false belief attribution, which is independent of their verbal ability.

Do Admission Criteria for Teacher Education Institutions Matter? A Comparative Study on Beliefs of Student Teachers from Serbia and Slovenia about Inclusive Practices

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Pecek, Mojca; Macura-Milovanovic, Suncica

2015-01-01

The relationship between admissions criteria, the preparation provided by teacher education programmes and student teachers' (STs) beliefs about inclusive education (IE) are rarely made explicit. The paucity of data regarding this relationship leads us to question whether teacher candidates' prior beliefs matter relative to admissions criteria or…

Examination of the Relationship between False-Belief Understanding and Referential Communication Skills

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Maridaki-Kassotaki, Katerina; Antonopoulou, Katerina

2011-01-01

The present study is an attempt to examine the relation between false-belief understanding and referential communication skills. The ability of 76 children aged 5 years to attribute false beliefs to themselves and others was examined with three false-belief tasks. The referential communication skills of the same children were assessed with two…

Associations among false belief understanding, counterfactual reasoning, and executive function.

PubMed

Guajardo, Nicole R; Parker, Jessica; Turley-Ames, Kandi

2009-09-01

The primary purposes of the present study were to clarify previous work on the association between counterfactual thinking and false belief performance to determine (1) whether these two variables are related and (2) if so, whether executive function skills mediate the relationship. A total of 92 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds completed false belief, counterfactual, working memory, representational flexibility, and language measures. Counterfactual reasoning accounted for limited unique variance in false belief. Both working memory and representational flexibility partially mediated the relationship between counterfactual and false belief. Children, like adults, also generated various types of counterfactual statements to differing degrees. Results demonstrated the importance of language and executive function for both counterfactual and false belief. Implications are discussed.

Do false belief and verb non-factivity share similar neural circuits?

PubMed

Chen, Lan; Cheung, Him; Szeto, Ching-Yee; Zhu, Zude; Wang, Suiping

2012-02-21

The present study investigates whether the complement falsity elicited by strong non-factive verbs and the false belief activated by a standard nonverbal false belief task produce similar electrophysiological activities in the brain. The hypothesis is based on the notion that both complement falsity and false belief involve decoupling a false mental representation from reality. Some previous studies have reported a behavioral correlation between children's false belief reasoning and interpretation of strong non-factive verbs together with their false complements, but a neural basis for this correlation has not been found. Our event-related potential (ERP) results with normal adults showed that both nonverbal false belief and strong non-factive verb comprehension elicited a negative late slow waveform divergence compared to their respective baselines. Although these slow waves due to the two types of stimuli had slightly different scalp distributions, both were regarded as reflecting primarily frontal activation. Such ERP similarity provides evidence for a common neural basis shared by nonverbal false belief reasoning and comprehension of strong non-factive verbs. Copyright © 2012 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.

False-belief reasoning from 3 to 92 years of age

PubMed Central

Coolin, Alisha; Fischer, Ashley L.; Thornton, Wendy Loken; Sommerville, Jessica A.

2017-01-01

False-belief reasoning, defined as the ability to reason about another person’s beliefs and appreciate that beliefs can differ from reality, is an important aspect of perspective taking. We tested 266 individuals, at various ages ranging from 3 to 92 years, on a continuous measure of false-belief reasoning (the Sandbox task). All age groups had difficulty suppressing their own knowledge when estimating what a naïve person knew. After controlling for task-specific memory, our results showed similar false-belief reasoning abilities across the preschool years and from older childhood to younger adulthood, followed by a small reduction in this ability from younger to older adulthood. These results highlight the relative similarity in false-belief reasoning abilities at different developmental periods across the lifespan. PMID:28957366

False-belief reasoning from 3 to 92 years of age.

PubMed

Bernstein, Daniel M; Coolin, Alisha; Fischer, Ashley L; Thornton, Wendy Loken; Sommerville, Jessica A

2017-01-01

False-belief reasoning, defined as the ability to reason about another person's beliefs and appreciate that beliefs can differ from reality, is an important aspect of perspective taking. We tested 266 individuals, at various ages ranging from 3 to 92 years, on a continuous measure of false-belief reasoning (the Sandbox task). All age groups had difficulty suppressing their own knowledge when estimating what a naïve person knew. After controlling for task-specific memory, our results showed similar false-belief reasoning abilities across the preschool years and from older childhood to younger adulthood, followed by a small reduction in this ability from younger to older adulthood. These results highlight the relative similarity in false-belief reasoning abilities at different developmental periods across the lifespan.

Smearing the opposition: implicit and explicit stigmatization of the 2008 U.S. Presidential candidates and the current U.S. President.

PubMed

Kosloff, Spee; Greenberg, Jeff; Schmader, Toni; Dechesne, Mark; Weise, David

2010-08-01

Four studies investigated whether political allegiance and salience of outgroup membership contribute to the phenomenon of acceptance of false, stigmatizing information (smears) about political candidates. Studies 1-3 were conducted in the month prior to the 2008 U.S. Presidential election and together demonstrated that pre-standing opposition to John McCain or Barack Obama, as well as the situational salience of differentiating social categories (i.e., for Obama, race; for McCain, age), contributed to the implicit activation and explicit endorsement of smearing labels (i.e., Obama is Muslim; McCain is senile). The influence of salient differentiating categories on smear acceptance was particularly pronounced among politically undecided individuals. Study 4 clarified that social category differences heighten smear acceptance, even if the salient category is semantically unrelated to the smearing label, showing that, approximately 1 year after the election, the salience of race amplified belief that Obama is a socialist among undecided people and McCain supporters. Taken together, these findings suggest that, at both implicit and explicit cognitive levels, social category differences and political allegiance contribute to acceptance of smears against political candidates. 2010 APA, all rights reserved

Attributing False Beliefs about Non-Obvious Properties at 18 Months

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Scott, Rose M.; Baillargeon, Renee; Song, Hyun-joo; Leslie, Alan M.

2010-01-01

Reports that infants in the second year of life can attribute false beliefs to others have all used a "search" paradigm in which an agent with a false belief about an object's location searches for the object. The present research asked whether 18-month-olds would still demonstrate false-belief understanding when tested with a novel "non-search"…

The Weird World of Cross-Cultural False-Belief Research: A True- and False-Belief Study among Samoan Children Based on Commands

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Mayer, Andreas; Träuble, Birgit

2015-01-01

Previous cross-cultural research using false-belief tasks has explored whether children's theory of mind develops synchronously across cultures. Success on false-belief tasks is usually interpreted as an important indicator of children's mental state understanding, but inconsistent findings have led to questions regarding the interpretation of…

Deception and false belief in paranoia: modelling theory of mind stories.

PubMed

Shryane, Nick M; Corcoran, Rhiannon; Rowse, Georgina; Moore, Rosanne; Cummins, Sinead; Blackwood, Nigel; Howard, Robert; Bentall, Richard P

2008-01-01

This study used Item Response Theory (IRT) to model the psychometric properties of a Theory of Mind (ToM) stories task. The study also aimed to determine whether the ability to understand states of false belief in others and the ability to understand another's intention to deceive are separable skills, and to establish which is more sensitive to the presence of paranoia. A large and diverse clinical and nonclinical sample differing in levels of depression and paranoid ideation performed a ToM stories task measuring false belief and deception at first and second order. A three-factor IRT model was found to best fit the data, consisting of first- and second-order deception factors and a single false-belief factor. The first-order deception and false-belief factors had good measurement properties at low trait levels, appropriate for samples with reduced ToM ability. First-order deception and false beliefs were both sensitive to paranoid ideation with IQ predicting performance on false belief items. Separable abilities were found to underlie performance on verbal ToM tasks. However, paranoia was associated with impaired performance on both false belief and deception understanding with clear impairment at the simplest level of mental state attribution.

Attributing false beliefs about non-obvious properties at 18 months

PubMed Central

Scott, Rose M.; Baillargeon, Renée; Song, Hyun-joo; Leslie, Alan M.

2010-01-01

Reports that infants in the second year of life can attribute false beliefs to others have all used a search paradigm in which an agent with a false belief about an object’s location searches for the object. The present research asked whether 18-month-olds would still demonstrate false-belief understanding when tested with a novel non-search paradigm. An experimenter shook an object, demonstrating that it rattled, and then asked an agent, “Can you do it?” In response to this prompt, the agent selected one of two test objects. Infants realized that the agent could be led through inference (Experiment 1) or memory (Experiment 2) to hold a false belief about which of the two test objects rattled. These results suggest that 18-month-olds can attribute false beliefs about non-obvious properties to others, and can do so in a non-search paradigm. These and additional results (Experiment 3) help address several alternative interpretations of false-belief findings with infants. PMID:21047625

Preschoolers’ Development of Theory of Mind: The Contribution of Understanding Psychological Causality in Stories

PubMed Central

Sanefuji, Wakako; Haryu, Etsuko

2018-01-01

This study investigated the relationship between children’s abilities to understand causal sequences and another’s false belief. In Experiment 1, we tested 3-, 4-, 5-, and 6-year-old children (n = 28, 28, 27, and 27, respectively) using false belief and picture sequencing tasks involving mechanical, behavioral, and psychological causality. Understanding causal sequences in mechanical, behavioral, and psychological stories was related to understanding other’s false beliefs. In Experiment 2, children who failed the initial false belief task (n = 50) were reassessed 5 months later. High scorers in the sequencing of the psychological stories in Experiment 1 were more likely to pass the standard false belief task than were the low scorers. Conversely, understanding causal sequences in the mechanical and behavioral stories in Experiment 1 did not predict passing the false belief task in Experiment 2. Thus, children may understand psychological causality before they are able to use it to understand false beliefs.

Early false-belief understanding in traditional non-Western societies

PubMed Central

Barrett, H. Clark; Broesch, Tanya; Scott, Rose M.; He, Zijing; Baillargeon, Renée; Wu, Di; Bolz, Matthias; Henrich, Joseph; Setoh, Peipei; Wang, Jianxin; Laurence, Stephen

2013-01-01

The psychological capacity to recognize that others may hold and act on false beliefs has been proposed to reflect an evolved, species-typical adaptation for social reasoning in humans; however, controversy surrounds the developmental timing and universality of this trait. Cross-cultural studies using elicited-response tasks indicate that the age at which children begin to understand false beliefs ranges from 4 to 7 years across societies, whereas studies using spontaneous-response tasks with Western children indicate that false-belief understanding emerges much earlier, consistent with the hypothesis that false-belief understanding is a psychological adaptation that is universally present in early childhood. To evaluate this hypothesis, we used three spontaneous-response tasks that have revealed early false-belief understanding in the West to test young children in three traditional, non-Western societies: Salar (China), Shuar/Colono (Ecuador) and Yasawan (Fiji). Results were comparable with those from the West, supporting the hypothesis that false-belief understanding reflects an adaptation that is universally present early in development. PMID:23363628

The Accidental Transgressor: Morally Relevant Theory of Mind

PubMed Central

Killen, Melanie; Mulvey, Kelly Lynn; Richardson, Cameron; Jampol, Noah

2014-01-01

To test young children’s false belief theory of mind in a morally relevant context, two experiments were conducted. In Experiment 1, children (N = 162) at 3.5, 5.5, and 7.5 years of age were administered 3 tasks: prototypic moral transgression task, false belief theory of mind task (ToM), and an “accidental transgressor” task, which measured a morally relevant false belief theory of mind (MoToM). Children who did not pass false belief ToM were more likely to attribute negative intentions to an accidental transgressor than children who passed false belief ToM, and to use moral reasons when blaming the accidental transgressor. In Experiment 2, children (N = 46) who did not pass false belief ToM viewed it as more acceptable to punish the accidental transgressor than did participants who passed false belief ToM. Findings are discussed in light of research on the emergence of moral judgment and theory of mind. PMID:21377148

Early false-belief understanding in traditional non-Western societies.

PubMed

Barrett, H Clark; Broesch, Tanya; Scott, Rose M; He, Zijing; Baillargeon, Renée; Wu, Di; Bolz, Matthias; Henrich, Joseph; Setoh, Peipei; Wang, Jianxin; Laurence, Stephen

2013-03-22

The psychological capacity to recognize that others may hold and act on false beliefs has been proposed to reflect an evolved, species-typical adaptation for social reasoning in humans; however, controversy surrounds the developmental timing and universality of this trait. Cross-cultural studies using elicited-response tasks indicate that the age at which children begin to understand false beliefs ranges from 4 to 7 years across societies, whereas studies using spontaneous-response tasks with Western children indicate that false-belief understanding emerges much earlier, consistent with the hypothesis that false-belief understanding is a psychological adaptation that is universally present in early childhood. To evaluate this hypothesis, we used three spontaneous-response tasks that have revealed early false-belief understanding in the West to test young children in three traditional, non-Western societies: Salar (China), Shuar/Colono (Ecuador) and Yasawan (Fiji). Results were comparable with those from the West, supporting the hypothesis that false-belief understanding reflects an adaptation that is universally present early in development.

Aligning Spinoza with Descartes: An informed Cartesian account of the truth bias.

PubMed

Street, Chris N H; Kingstone, Alan

2017-08-01

There is a bias towards believing information is true rather than false. The Spinozan account claims there is an early, automatic bias towards believing. Only afterwards can people engage in an effortful re-evaluation and disbelieve the information. Supporting this account, there is a greater bias towards believing information is true when under cognitive load. However, developing on the Adaptive Lie Detector (ALIED) theory, the informed Cartesian can equally explain this data. The account claims the bias under load is not evidence of automatic belief; rather, people are undecided, but if forced to guess they can rely on context information to make an informed judgement. The account predicts, and we found, that if people can explicitly indicate their uncertainty, there should be no bias towards believing because they are no longer required to guess. Thus, we conclude that belief formation can be better explained by an informed Cartesian account - an attempt to make an informed judgment under uncertainty. © 2016 The British Psychological Society.

Development of the social brain from age three to twelve years.

PubMed

Richardson, Hilary; Lisandrelli, Grace; Riobueno-Naylor, Alexa; Saxe, Rebecca

2018-03-12

Human adults recruit distinct networks of brain regions to think about the bodies and minds of others. This study characterizes the development of these networks, and tests for relationships between neural development and behavioral changes in reasoning about others' minds ('theory of mind', ToM). A large sample of children (n = 122, 3-12 years), and adults (n = 33), watched a short movie while undergoing fMRI. The movie highlights the characters' bodily sensations (often pain) and mental states (beliefs, desires, emotions), and is a feasible experiment for young children. Here we report three main findings: (1) ToM and pain networks are functionally distinct by age 3 years, (2) functional specialization increases throughout childhood, and (3) functional maturity of each network is related to increasingly anti-correlated responses between the networks. Furthermore, the most studied milestone in ToM development, passing explicit false-belief tasks, does not correspond to discontinuities in the development of the social brain.

Making sense of early false-belief understanding.

PubMed

Helming, Katharina A; Strickland, Brent; Jacob, Pierre

2014-04-01

We address the puzzle about early belief ascription: young children fail elicited-response false-belief tasks, but they demonstrate spontaneous false-belief understanding. Based on recent converging evidence, we articulate a pragmatic framework to solve this puzzle. Young children do understand the contents of others' false belief, but they are overwhelmed when they must simultaneously make sense of two distinct actions: the instrumental action of a mistaken agent and the experimenter's communicative action. Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Justifying all the fuss about false belief.

PubMed

Russell, James

2005-07-01

The classic study by Wimmer and Perner showed that children below the age of about 4 years of age fail to appreciate others' false beliefs. This opened the floodgates to the theory-of-mind research programme. Recently, a study by Riggs and Simpson has called the central challenge of false belief into question, reporting similar difficulties with true belief. I would argue, however, that not only should the acquisition of false belief remain a central concern but that we should think harder about it and its earlier manifestations.

False belief and verb non-factivity: a common neural basis?

PubMed

Cheung, Him; Chen, Lan; Szeto, Ching-Yee; Feng, Gangyi; Lu, Guangming; Zhang, Zhiqiang; Zhu, Zude; Wang, Suiping

2012-03-01

Using fMRI, the present study compares the brain activation underlying false belief thinking induced by pictorial, nonverbal material to that instigated by strong non-factive verbs in a sample of adult Chinese speakers. These verbs obligatorily negate their complements which describe the mind content of the sentence agent, and thus may activate part of the false belief network. Some previous studies have shown a behavioral correlation between verb non-factivity/false complementation and conventional false belief but corresponding neural evidence is lacking. Our results showed that the non-factive grammar and false belief commonly implicated the right temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), which had been shown by past studies to play a role in general mentalizing. Regions that were unique to nonverbal false belief were the left TPJ and right middle frontal gyrus (MFG), whereas the unique regions for the non-factive grammar were the left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and right superior temporal gyrus (STG). Hence, conventional nonverbal false belief and verb non-factivity have both shared and unique neural representations. Copyright © 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Theory of mind and executive function: working-memory capacity and inhibitory control as predictors of false-belief task performance.

PubMed

Mutter, Brigitte; Alcorn, Mark B; Welsh, Marilyn

2006-06-01

This study of the relationship between theory of mind and executive function examined whether on the false-belief task age differences between 3 and 5 ears of age are related to development of working-memory capacity and inhibitory processes. 72 children completed tasks measuring false belief, working memory, and inhibition. Significant age effects were observed for false-belief and working-memory performance, as well as for the false-alarm and perseveration measures of inhibition. A simultaneous multiple linear regression specified the contribution of age, inhibition, and working memory to the prediction of false-belief performance. This model was significant, explaining a total of 36% of the variance. To examine the independent contributions of the working-memory and inhibition variables, after controlling for age, two hierarchical multiple linear regressions were conducted. These multiple regression analyses indicate that working memory and inhibition make small, overlapping contributions to false-belief performance after accounting for age, but that working memory, as measured in this study, is a somewhat better predictor of false-belief understanding than is inhibition.

Implicit Theories and Naïve Beliefs: Using the Theory of Practice Architectures to Deconstruct the Practices of Early Childhood Educators

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Salamon, Andi; Sumsion, Jennifer; Press, Frances; Harrison, Linda

2016-01-01

This article proposes utilising the theory of practice architectures to uncover and make explicit the beliefs and implicit theories of early childhood educators, as well as to examine the conditions out of which they have emerged. The beliefs and implicit theories of early childhood educators influence many early childhood practices and play a…

Older Children's Misunderstanding of Uncertain Belief after Passing the False Belief Test

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Zhang, Ting; Zheng, Xueru; Zhang, Li; Sha, Wenju; Deak, Gedeon; Li, Hong

2010-01-01

A four-location belief task was designed to examine children's understanding of another's uncertain belief after passing a false belief (FB) task. In Experiment 1, after passing the FB task, participants were asked what a puppet would do after he failed to find his toy at the falsely believed location. Most 4-year-olds and half of 6-year-olds…

Anorexia nervosa and body dysmorphic disorder: A comparison of body image concerns and explicit and implicit attractiveness beliefs.

PubMed

Hartmann, A S; Thomas, J J; Greenberg, J L; Elliott, C M; Matheny, N L; Wilhelm, S

2015-06-01

Although body image is central to the etiological models of anorexia nervosa and body dysmorphic disorder, studies comparing body image and beliefs about attractiveness between the disorders are rare. Sixty-nine individuals (anorexia nervosa: n=24, body dysmorphic disorder: n=23, healthy controls: n=22) completed self-report measures (body image and general psychopathology), diagnostic interviews, and Go/No-Go Association tasks measuring implicit associations. Compared to controls, both clinical groups exhibited greater negative body image, a more negative attitude toward their physical selves, and more dysfunctional coping strategies (ps<.001). Also, both clinical groups shared greater explicit beliefs about the importance of attractiveness (ps<.001). In addition to supporting previous research with regard to comparable body image disturbance, this study also showed that beliefs regarding the importance of appearance (e.g., "one must be attractive to be successful") might be a fruitful target for therapy across both disorders. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Testing the implicit processing hypothesis of precognitive dream experience.

PubMed

Valášek, Milan; Watt, Caroline; Hutton, Jenny; Neill, Rebecca; Nuttall, Rachel; Renwick, Grace

2014-08-01

Seemingly precognitive (prophetic) dreams may be a result of one's unconscious processing of environmental cues and having an implicit inference based on these cues manifest itself in one's dreams. We present two studies exploring this implicit processing hypothesis of precognitive dream experience. Study 1 investigated the relationship between implicit learning, transliminality, and precognitive dream belief and experience. Participants completed the Serial Reaction Time task and several questionnaires. We predicted a positive relationship between the variables. With the exception of relationships between transliminality and precognitive dream belief and experience, this prediction was not supported. Study 2 tested the hypothesis that differences in the ability to notice subtle cues explicitly might account for precognitive dream beliefs and experiences. Participants completed a modified version of the flicker paradigm. We predicted a negative relationship between the ability to explicitly detect changes and precognitive dream variables. This relationship was not found. There was also no relationship between precognitive dream belief and experience and implicit change detection. Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Children's understanding of first- and third-person perspectives in complement clauses and false-belief tasks.

PubMed

Brandt, Silke; Buttelmann, David; Lieven, Elena; Tomasello, Michael

2016-11-01

De Villiers (Lingua, 2007, Vol. 117, pp. 1858-1878) and others have claimed that children come to understand false belief as they acquire linguistic constructions for representing a proposition and the speaker's epistemic attitude toward that proposition. In the current study, English-speaking children of 3 and 4years of age (N=64) were asked to interpret propositional attitude constructions with a first- or third-person subject of the propositional attitude (e.g., "I think the sticker is in the red box" or "The cow thinks the sticker is in the red box", respectively). They were also assessed for an understanding of their own and others' false beliefs. We found that 4-year-olds showed a better understanding of both third-person propositional attitude constructions and false belief than their younger peers. No significant developmental differences were found for first-person propositional attitude constructions. The older children also showed a better understanding of their own false beliefs than of others' false beliefs. In addition, regression analyses suggest that the older children's comprehension of their own false beliefs was mainly related to their understanding of third-person propositional attitude constructions. These results indicate that we need to take a closer look at the propositional attitude constructions that are supposed to support children's false-belief reasoning. Children may come to understand their own and others' beliefs in different ways, and this may affect both their use and understanding of propositional attitude constructions and their performance in various types of false-belief tasks. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Undermining belief in false memories leads to less efficient problem-solving behaviour.

PubMed

Wang, Jianqin; Otgaar, Henry; Howe, Mark L; Smeets, Tom; Merckelbach, Harald; Nahouli, Zacharia

2017-08-01

Memories of events for which the belief in the occurrence of those events is undermined, but recollection is retained, are called nonbelieved memories (NBMs). The present experiments examined the effects of NBMs on subsequent problem-solving behaviour. In Experiment 1, we challenged participants' beliefs in their memories and examined whether NBMs affected subsequent solution rates on insight-based problems. True and false memories were elicited using the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm. Then participants' belief in true and false memories was challenged by telling them the item had not been presented. We found that when the challenge led to undermining belief in false memories, fewer problems were solved than when belief was not challenged. In Experiment 2, a similar procedure was used except that some participants solved the problems one week rather than immediately after the feedback. Again, our results showed that undermining belief in false memories resulted in lower problem solution rates. These findings suggest that for false memories, belief is an important agent in whether memories serve as effective primes for immediate and delayed problem-solving.

False-belief understanding in frontotemporal dementia and Alzheimer's disease.

PubMed

Fernandez-Duque, Diego; Baird, Jodie A; Black, Sandra E

2009-05-01

The ability to understand other people's behavior in terms of mental states, such as beliefs, desires, and intentions, is central to social interaction. It has been argued that the interpersonal problems of patients with behavioral variant of frontotemporal dementia (FTD-b) are due to a dysfunction of that system. We used first- and second-order false-belief tasks to assess theory-of-mind reasoning in a group of patients with FTD-b and a cognitively matched group of patients with Alzheimer's disease (AD). Both patient groups were equally impaired relative to a healthy elderly group in the cognitively demanding second-order false-belief tasks, revealing that cognitive demands are an important factor in false-belief task performance. Both patient groups reached ceiling performance in the first-order false-belief tasks with minimal cognitive demands, despite the striking difference in their social graces. These results suggest that a conceptual deficit in theory of mind-as measured by the false-belief task-is not at the core of the differences between FTD-b and AD.

Implicit Gender Stereotypes and Essentialist Beliefs Predict Preservice Teachers' Tracking Recommendations

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Nürnberger, Miriam; Nerb, Josef; Schmitz, Florian; Keller, Johannes; Sütterlin, Stefan

2016-01-01

This study investigated the extent to which differences in implicit and explicit math--language gender stereotypes, and essentialist beliefs among preservice teachers affect tracking recommendations for math/science versus language-oriented secondary schools. Consistent with expectations, the results suggest that student's gender influences…

Theory of mind in schizophrenia: exploring neural mechanisms of belief attribution.

PubMed

Lee, Junghee; Quintana, Javier; Nori, Poorang; Green, Michael F

2011-01-01

Although previous behavioral studies have shown that schizophrenia patients have impaired theory of mind (ToM), the neural mechanisms associated with this impairment are poorly understood. This study aimed to identify the neural mechanisms of ToM in schizophrenia, using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) with a belief attribution task. In the scanner, 12 schizophrenia patients and 13 healthy control subjects performed the belief attribution task with three conditions: a false belief condition, a false photograph condition, and a simple reading condition. For the false belief versus simple reading conditions, schizophrenia patients showed reduced neural activation in areas including the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) and medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) compared with controls. Further, during the false belief versus false photograph conditions, we observed increased activations in the TPJ and the MPFC in healthy controls, but not in schizophrenia patients. For the false photograph versus simple reading condition, both groups showed comparable neural activations. Schizophrenia patients showed reduced task-related activation in the TPJ and the MPFC during the false belief condition compared with controls, but not for the false photograph condition. This pattern suggests that reduced activation in these regions is associated with, and specific to, impaired ToM in schizophrenia.

Late, but not early, arriving younger siblings foster firstborns' understanding of second-order false belief.

PubMed

Paine, Amy L; Pearce, Holly; van Goozen, Stephanie H M; de Sonneville, Leo M J; Hay, Dale F

2018-02-01

This study examined the influence of younger siblings on children's understanding of second-order false belief. In a representative community sample of firstborn children (N=229) with a mean age of 7years (SD=4.58), false belief was assessed during a home visit using an adaptation of a well-established second-order false belief narrative enacted with Playmobil figures. Children's responses were coded to establish performance on second-order false belief questions. When controlling for verbal IQ and age, the existence of a younger sibling predicted a twofold advantage in children's second-order false belief performance, yet this was the case only for firstborns who experienced the arrival of a sibling after their second birthday. These findings provide a foundation for future research on family influences on social cognition. Copyright © 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

False Belief vs. False Photographs: A Test of Theory of Mind or Working Memory?

PubMed

Callejas, Alicia; Shulman, Gordon L; Corbetta, Maurizio

2011-01-01

Theory of mind (ToM), the ability to reason about other people's thoughts and beliefs, has been traditionally studied in behavioral and neuroimaging experiments by comparing performance in "false belief" and "false photograph" (control) stories. However, some evidence suggests that these stories are not matched in difficulty, complicating the interpretation of results. Here, we more fully evaluated the relative difficulty of comprehending these stories and drawing inferences from them. Subjects read false belief and false photograph stories followed by comprehension questions that probed true ("reality" questions) or false beliefs ("representation" questions) appropriate to the stories. Stories and comprehension questions were read and answered, respectively, more slowly in the false photograph than false belief conditions, indicating their greater difficulty. Interestingly, accuracy on representation questions for false photograph stories was significantly lower than for all other conditions and correlated positively with participants' working memory span scores. These results suggest that drawing representational inferences from false photo stories is particularly difficult and places heavy demands on working memory. Extensive naturalistic practice with ToM reasoning may enable a more flexible and efficient mental representation of false belief stories, resulting in lower memory load requirements. An important implication of these results is that the differential modulation of right temporal-parietal junction (RTPJ) during ToM and "false photo" control conditions may reflect the documented negative correlation of RTPJ activity with working memory load rather than a specialized involvement in ToM processes.

Functional activity of the right temporo-parietal junction and of the medial prefrontal cortex associated with true and false belief reasoning.

PubMed

Döhnel, Katrin; Schuwerk, Tobias; Meinhardt, Jörg; Sodian, Beate; Hajak, Göran; Sommer, Monika

2012-04-15

Since false belief reasoning requires mental state representation independently of the state of reality, it is seen as a key ability in Theory of Mind (ToM). Although true beliefs do not have to be processed independently of the state of reality, growing behavioural evidence indicates that true belief reasoning is different from just reasoning about the state of reality. So far, neural studies on true and false belief reasoning revealed inconsistent findings in the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and in the right temporo-parietal junction (R-TPJ), brain regions that are hypothesized to play an important role in ToM. To further explore true and false belief reasoning, the present functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study in eighteen adult subjects used methodological refinements such as ensuring that the true belief trials did not elicit false belief reasoning, as well as including paralleled control conditions requiring reasoning about the state of reality. When compared to its control condition, common R-TPJ activity was observed for true and false belief reasoning, supporting its role in belief reasoning in general, and indicating that, at least in adults, also true belief reasoning appears to be different from reasoning about the state of reality. Differential activity was observed in a broad network of brain regions such as the MPFC, the inferior frontal cortex, and the precuneus. False over true belief reasoning induced activation in the posterior MPFC (pMPFC), supporting its role in the decoupling mechanisms, which is defined as processing a mental state independently of the state of reality. Copyright © 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Deaf children's use of clear visual cues in mindreading.

PubMed

Hao, Jian; Su, Yanjie

2014-11-01

Previous studies show that typically developing 4-year old children can understand other people's false beliefs but that deaf children of hearing families have difficulty in understanding false beliefs until the age of approximately 13. Because false beliefs are implicit mental states that are not expressed through clear visual cues in standard false belief tasks, the present study examines the hypothesis that the deaf children's developmental delay in understanding false beliefs may reflect their difficulty in understanding a spectrum of mental states that are not expressed through clear visual cues. Nine- to 13-year-old deaf children of hearing families and 4-6-year-old typically developing children completed false belief tasks and emotion recognition tasks under different cue conditions. The results indicated that after controlling for the effect of the children's language abilities, the deaf children inferred other people's false beliefs as accurately as the typically developing children when other people's false beliefs were clearly expressed through their eye-gaze direction. However, the deaf children performed worse than the typically developing children when asked to infer false beliefs with ambiguous or no eye-gaze cues. Moreover, the deaf children were capable of recognizing other people's emotions that were clearly conveyed by their facial or body expressions. The results suggest that although theory-based or simulation-based mental state understanding is typical of hearing children's theory of mind mechanism, for deaf children of hearing families, clear cue-based mental state understanding may be their specific theory of mind mechanism. Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Changing Epistemological Beliefs with Nature of Science Implementations

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Johnson, Keith; Willoughby, Shannon

2018-01-01

This article discusses our investigation regarding nature of science (NOS) implementations and epistemological beliefs within an undergraduate introductory astronomy course. The five year study consists of two years of baseline data in which no explicit use of NOS material was implemented, then three years of subsequent data in which specific NOS…

Can We Forget What We Know in a False-Belief Task? An Investigation of the True-Belief Default.

PubMed

Rubio-Fernández, Paula

2017-01-01

It has been generally assumed in the Theory of Mind literature of the past 30 years that young children fail standard false-belief tasks because they attribute their own knowledge to the protagonist (what Leslie and colleagues called a "true-belief default"). Contrary to the traditional view, we have recently proposed that the children's bias is task induced. This alternative view was supported by studies showing that 3 year olds are able to pass a false-belief task that allows them to focus on the protagonist, without drawing their attention to the target object in the test phase. For a more accurate comparison of these two accounts, the present study tested the true-belief default with adults. Four experiments measuring eye movements and response inhibition revealed that (a) adults do not have an automatic tendency to respond to the false-belief question according to their own knowledge and (b) the true-belief response need not be inhibited in order to correctly predict the protagonist's actions. The positive results observed in the control conditions confirm the accuracy of the various measures used. I conclude that the results of this study undermine the true-belief default view and those models that posit mechanisms of response inhibition in false-belief reasoning. Alternatively, the present study with adults and recent studies with children suggest that participants' focus of attention in false-belief tasks may be key to their performance. Copyright © 2015 Cognitive Science Society, Inc.

Is False Belief Skin-Deep? The Agent's Eye Status Influences Infants' Reasoning in Belief-Inducing Situations

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Poulin-Dubois, Diane; Polonia, Alexandra; Yott, Jessica

2013-01-01

Two experiments were conducted to determine if infants attribute false beliefs to others when tested with the violation-of-expectancy procedure. In Experiment 1, the false-belief task was administered to 14- and 18-month-old infants. The procedure was identical to the one used by Onishi and Baillargeon (2005), except that two transparent boxes…

Rethinking the Relationship between Social Experience and False-Belief Understanding: A Mentalistic Account.

PubMed

Roby, Erin; Scott, Rose M

2016-01-01

It was long assumed that the capacity to represent false beliefs did not emerge until at least age four, as evidenced by children's performance on elicited-response tasks. However, recent evidence that infants appear to demonstrate false-belief understanding when tested with alternative, non-elicited-response measures has led some researchers to conclude that the capacity to represent beliefs emerges in the 1st year of life. This mentalistic view has been criticized for failing to offer an explanation for the well-established positive associations between social factors and preschoolers' performance on elicited-response false-belief tasks. In this paper, we address this criticism by offering an account that reconciles these associations with the mentalistic claim that false-belief understanding emerges in infancy. We propose that rather than facilitating the emergence of the capacity to represent beliefs, social factors facilitate the use of this ability via effects on attention, inference, retrieval, and response production. Our account predicts that the relationship between social factors and false-belief understanding should not be specific to preschoolers' performance in elicited-response tasks: this relationship should be apparent across the lifespan in a variety of paradigms. We review an accumulating body of evidence that supports this prediction.

Reduced nicotine content cigarette advertising: How false beliefs and subjective ratings affect smoking behavior

PubMed Central

Mercincavage, Melissa; Saddleson, Megan L.; Gup, Emily; Halstead, Angela; Mays, Darren; Strasser, Andrew A.

2017-01-01

Introduction Tobacco advertising can create false beliefs about health harms that are reinforced by product design features. Reduced nicotine content (RNC) cigarettes may reduce harm, but research has not addressed advertising influences. This study examined RNC cigarette advertising effects on false harm beliefs, and how these beliefs – along with initial subjective ratings of RNC cigarettes – affect subsequent smoking behaviors. We further explored whether subjective ratings moderate associations between false beliefs and behavior. Methods Seventy-seven daily, non-treatment-seeking smokers (66.2% male) participated in the first 15 days of a randomized, controlled, open-label RNC cigarette trial. Participants viewed an RNC cigarette advertisement at baseline before completing a 5-day period of preferred brand cigarette use, followed by a 10-day period of RNC cigarette use (0.6 mg nicotine yield). Participants provided pre- and post-advertisement beliefs, and subjective ratings and smoking behaviors for cigarettes smoked during laboratory visits. Results Viewing the advertisement increased beliefs that RNC cigarettes contain less nicotine and are healthier than regular cigarettes (p’s < 0.001 and 0.011), and decreased the belief that they are less likely to cause cancer (p = 0.046). Neither false beliefs nor subjective ratings directly affected smoking behaviors. Significant interactions of strength and taste ratings with beliefs (p’s < 0.001), however, indicated that among smokers with less negative initial subjective ratings, greater false beliefs were associated with greater RNC cigarette consumption. Conclusions Smokers may misconstrue RNC cigarettes as less harmful than regular cigarettes. These beliefs, in conjunction with favorable subjective ratings, may increase product use. PMID:28214392

Reduced nicotine content cigarette advertising: How false beliefs and subjective ratings affect smoking behavior.

PubMed

Mercincavage, Melissa; Saddleson, Megan L; Gup, Emily; Halstead, Angela; Mays, Darren; Strasser, Andrew A

2017-04-01

Tobacco advertising can create false beliefs about health harms that are reinforced by product design features. Reduced nicotine content (RNC) cigarettes may reduce harm, but research has not addressed advertising influences. This study examined RNC cigarette advertising effects on false harm beliefs, and how these beliefs - along with initial subjective ratings of RNC cigarettes - affect subsequent smoking behaviors. We further explored whether subjective ratings moderate associations between false beliefs and behavior. Seventy-seven daily, non-treatment-seeking smokers (66.2% male) participated in the first 15days of a randomized, controlled, open-label RNC cigarette trial. Participants viewed an RNC cigarette advertisement at baseline before completing a 5-day period of preferred brand cigarette use, followed by a 10-day period of RNC cigarette use (0.6mg nicotine yield). Participants provided pre- and post-advertisement beliefs, and subjective ratings and smoking behaviors for cigarettes smoked during laboratory visits. Viewing the advertisement increased beliefs that RNC cigarettes contain less nicotine and are healthier than regular cigarettes (p's<0.001 and 0.011), and decreased the belief that they are less likely to cause cancer (p=0.046). Neither false beliefs nor subjective ratings directly affected smoking behaviors. Significant interactions of strength and taste ratings with beliefs (p's<0.001), however, indicated that among smokers with less negative initial subjective ratings, greater false beliefs were associated with greater RNC cigarette consumption. Smokers may misconstrue RNC cigarettes as less harmful than regular cigarettes. These beliefs, in conjunction with favorable subjective ratings, may increase product use. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Searching for Components of Conceptual Ecology That Mediate Development of Epistemological Beliefs in Science

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Deniz, Hasan

2011-12-01

This paper articulates the importance of epistemological beliefs (EBs) and draws a parallel between EBs literature in educational psychology and nature of science (NOS) literature in science education. The paper stresses that EBs in science and NOS ideas have common ground and they can be best improved through explicit-reflective instruction informed by conceptual change theory. The paper concludes that future studies should explore the factors that mediate the development of EBs in science and NOS ideas rather than documenting the changes in students' and teachers' EBs in science and NOS ideas after explicit-reflective instruction through pre- and post assessments.

Why are bilinguals better than monolinguals at false-belief tasks?

PubMed

Rubio-Fernández, Paula

2017-06-01

In standard Theory of Mind tasks, such as the Sally-Anne, children have to predict the behaviour of a mistaken character, which requires attributing the character a false belief. Hundreds of developmental studies in the last 30 years have shown that children under 4 fail standard false-belief tasks. However, recent studies have revealed that bilingual children and adults outperform their monolingual peers in this type of tasks. Bilinguals' better performance in false-belief tasks has generally been interpreted as a result of their better inhibitory control; that is, bilinguals are allegedly better than monolinguals at inhibiting the erroneous response to the false-belief question. In this review, I challenge the received view and argue instead that bilinguals' better false-belief performance results from more effective attention management. This challenge ties in with two independent lines of research: on the one hand, recent studies on the role of attentional processes in false-belief tasks with monolingual children and adults; and on the other, current research on bilinguals' performance in different Executive Function tasks. The review closes with an exploratory discussion of further benefits of bilingual cognition to Theory of Mind development and pragmatics, which may be independent from Executive Function.

Understanding of Speaker Certainty and False-Belief Reasoning: A Comparison of Japanese and German Preschoolers

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Matsui, Tomoko; Rakoczy, Hannes; Miura, Yui; Tomasello, Michael

2009-01-01

It has been repeatedly shown that when asked to identify a protagonist's false belief on the basis of his false statement, English-speaking 3-year-olds dismiss the statement and fail to attribute to him a false belief. In the present studies, we tested 3-year-old Japanese children in a similar task, using false statements accompanied by…

Oscillatory brain activity differentially reflects false belief understanding and complementation syntax processing.

PubMed

Guan, Yao; Farrar, M Jeffrey; Keil, Andreas

2018-02-01

False belief understanding (FBU) enables people to consider conflicting beliefs about the same situation. While language has been demonstrated to be a correlate of FBU, there is still controversy about the extent to which a specific aspect of language, complementation syntax, is a necessary condition for FBU. The present study tested an important notion from the debate proposing that complementation syntax task is redundant to FBU measures. Specifically, we examined electrophysiological correlates of false belief, false complementation, and their respective true conditions in adults using electroencephalography (EEG), focusing on indices of oscillatory brain activity and large-scale connectivity. The results showed strong modulation of parieto-occipital alpha (8-12 Hz) and beta (13-20 Hz) power by the experimental manipulations, with heightened sustained alpha power reflective of effortful internal processing observed in the false compared to the true conditions and reliable beta power reductions sensitive to mentalizing and/or syntactic demands in the belief versus the complementation conditions. In addition, higher coupling between parieto-occipital regions and widespread frontal sites in the beta band was found for the false-belief condition selectively. The result of divergence in beta oscillatory activity and in connectivity between false belief and false complementation does not support the redundancy hypothesis.

Theory of mind in schizophrenia: Exploring neural mechanisms of belief attribution

PubMed Central

Lee, Junghee; Quintana, Javier; Nori, Poorang; Green, Michael F.

2014-01-01

Background Although previous behavioral studies have shown that schizophrenia patients have impaired theory of mind (ToM), the neural mechanisms associated with this impairment are poorly understood. This study aimed to identify the neural mechanisms of ToM in schizophrenia using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) with a Belief Attribution Task. Methods In the scanner, 12 schizophrenia patients and 13 healthy control subjects performed the Belief Attribution Task with 3 conditions: a false belief condition, a false photograph condition, and a simple reading condition. Results For the false belief vs. simple reading conditions, schizophrenia patients showed reduced neural activation in areas including the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) and medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) compared with controls. Further, during the false belief vs. false photograph conditions we observed increased activations in the TPJ and the MPFC in healthy controls, but not in schizophrenia patients. For the false photograph vs. simple reading condition, both groups showed comparable neural activations. Conclusions Schizophrenia patients showed reduced task-related activation in the TPJ and the MPFC during the false belief condition compared with controls, but not for the false photograph condition. This pattern suggests that reduced activation in these regions is associated with, and specific to, impaired ToM in schizophrenia. PMID:22050432

Processing demands in belief-desire reasoning: inhibition or general difficulty?

PubMed

Friedman, Ori; Leslie, Alan M

2005-05-01

Most 4-year-olds can predict the behavior of a person who wants an object but is mistaken about its location. More difficult is predicting behavior when the person is mistaken about location and wants to avoid the object. We tested between two explanations for children's difficulties with avoidance false belief: the Selection Processing model of inhibitory processing and a General Difficulty account. Children were presented with a false belief task and a control task, in which belief attribution was as difficult as in the false belief task. Predicting behavior in light of the character's desire to avoid the object added more difficulty in the false belief task. This finding is consistent with the Selection Processing model, but not with the General Difficulty account.

Which penguin is This? Attributing False Beliefs About Object Identity at 18 Months

PubMed Central

Scott, Rose M.; Baillargeon, Renée

2010-01-01

Recent research has shown that infants as young as 13 months can attribute false beliefs to agents, suggesting that the psychological-reasoning subsystem necessary for attributing reality-incongruent informational states (SS2) is operational in infancy. The present research asked whether 18-month-olds’ false-belief reasoning extends to false beliefs about object identity. Infants watched events involving an agent and two toy penguins; one penguin could be disassembled (2-piece penguin) and the other could not (1-piece penguin). Infants realized that outdated contextual information could lead the agent to falsely believe she was facing the 1-piece rather than the 2-piece penguin, suggesting that 18-month-olds can attribute false beliefs about the identity of objects and providing new evidence for SS2 reasoning in the second year of life. PMID:19630901

Which penguin is this? Attributing false beliefs about object identity at 18 months.

PubMed

Scott, Rose M; Baillargeon, Renée

2009-01-01

Recent research has shown that infants as young as 13 months can attribute false beliefs to agents, suggesting that the psychological-reasoning subsystem necessary for attributing reality-incongruent informational states (Subsystem-2, SS2) is operational in infancy. The present research asked whether 18-month-olds' false-belief reasoning extends to false beliefs about object identity. Infants watched events involving an agent and 2 toy penguins; 1 penguin could be disassembled (2-piece penguin) and 1 could not (1-piece penguin). Infants realized that outdated contextual information could lead the agent to falsely believe she was facing the 1-piece rather than the 2-piece penguin, suggesting that 18-month-olds can attribute false beliefs about the identity of objects and providing new evidence for SS2 reasoning in the 2nd year of life.

Epistemological Separation of Research and Teaching among Graduate Teaching Assistants

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Kinchin, Ian Miles; Hatzipanagos, Stylianos; Turner, Nancy

2009-01-01

Development of a more scholarly approach to teaching at university may expose the novice university teacher to an apparent conflict in belief systems about teaching and learning (i.e. epistemological beliefs). Educational research is explicit in its recognition of a constructivist framework, whilst other academic research is often embedded more…

Further Evidence for Nonspecificity of Theory of Mind in Preschoolers: Training and Transferability in the Understanding of False Beliefs and False Signs

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Iao, Lai-Sang; Leekam, Susan; Perner, Josef; McConachie, Helen

2011-01-01

In a training study, the authors addressed whether or not preschoolers' difficulty with false belief is due to a domain-specific problem with mental states. Following Slaughter's (1998) design, 57 children who failed a false-belief (FB) pretest received two sessions of training on either an FB, false sign (FS), or control task. All children were…

The Role of the Counterfactually Satisfied Desire in the Lag between False-Belief and False-Emotion Attributions in Children Aged 4-7

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Bradmetz, Joel; Schneider, Roland

2004-01-01

A robust lag was evidenced between the attribution to an individual of a false belief about the world and the attribution of the false emotion associated with this false belief (Bradmetz & Schneider, 1999). This lag was unexpected in the frame of current theories of mind which consider that emotion has a rational cognitive basis. The present paper…

Two sources of evidence on the non-automaticity of true and false belief ascription.

PubMed

Back, Elisa; Apperly, Ian A

2010-04-01

A recent study by Apperly et al. (2006) found evidence that adults do not automatically infer false beliefs while watching videos that afford such inferences. This method was extended to examine true beliefs, which are sometimes thought to be ascribed by "default" (e.g., Leslie & Thaiss, 1992). Sequences of pictures were presented in which the location of an object and a character's belief about the location of the object often changed. During the picture sequences participants responded to an unpredictable probe picture about where the character believed the object to be located or where the object was located in reality. In Experiment 1 participants were not directly instructed to track the character's beliefs about the object. There was a significant reaction time cost for belief probes compared with matched reality probes, whether the character's belief was true or false. In Experiment 2, participants were asked to track where the character thought the object was located, responses to belief probes were faster than responses to reality probes, suggesting that the difference observed in Experiment 1 was not due to intrinsic differences between the probes, but was more likely to be due to participants inferring beliefs ad hoc in response to the probe. In both Experiments 1 and 2, responses to belief and reality probes were faster in the true belief condition than in the false belief condition. In Experiment 3 this difference was largely eliminated when participants had fewer reasons to make belief inferences spontaneously. These two lines of evidence are neatly explained by the proposition that neither true nor false beliefs are ascribed automatically, but that belief ascription may occur spontaneously in response to task demands. Copyright 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

False Belief, Complementation Language, and Contextual Bias in Preschoolers

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Ng, Lisa; Cheung, Him; Xiao, Wen

2010-01-01

In the present study, we address two questions concerning the relation between children's false belief and their understanding of complex object complements. The first question is whether the previously demonstrated association between tensed complements and false belief generalizes to infinitival complements (de Villiers & Pyers, 2002). The…

Competence and Performance in Belief-Desire Reasoning across Two Cultures: The Truth, the Whole Truth and Nothing but the Truth about False Belief?

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Yazdi, Amir Amin; German, Tim P.; Defeyter, Margaret Anne; Siegal, Michael

2006-01-01

There is a change in false belief task performance across the 3-5 year age range, as confirmed in a recent meta-analysis [Wellman, H. M., Cross, D., & Watson, J. (2001). Meta-analysis of theory mind development: The truth about false-belief. "Child Development," 72, 655-684]. This meta-analysis identified several performance factors influencing…

Rethinking the Relationship between Social Experience and False-Belief Understanding: A Mentalistic Account

PubMed Central

Roby, Erin; Scott, Rose M.

2016-01-01

It was long assumed that the capacity to represent false beliefs did not emerge until at least age four, as evidenced by children’s performance on elicited-response tasks. However, recent evidence that infants appear to demonstrate false-belief understanding when tested with alternative, non-elicited-response measures has led some researchers to conclude that the capacity to represent beliefs emerges in the 1st year of life. This mentalistic view has been criticized for failing to offer an explanation for the well-established positive associations between social factors and preschoolers’ performance on elicited-response false-belief tasks. In this paper, we address this criticism by offering an account that reconciles these associations with the mentalistic claim that false-belief understanding emerges in infancy. We propose that rather than facilitating the emergence of the capacity to represent beliefs, social factors facilitate the use of this ability via effects on attention, inference, retrieval, and response production. Our account predicts that the relationship between social factors and false-belief understanding should not be specific to preschoolers’ performance in elicited-response tasks: this relationship should be apparent across the lifespan in a variety of paradigms. We review an accumulating body of evidence that supports this prediction. PMID:27857702

Making the Implicit Explicit: Supporting Teachers to Bridge Cultures

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Rothstein-Fisch, Carrie; Trumbull, Elise; Garcia, Sandra Gloria

2009-01-01

In this paper, we report the results of a longitudinal action research project in which elementary teachers used a cultural framework (individualism-collectivism) to understand differences between the culture of immigrant Latino families and the culture of U.S. schools. Making explicit the culture-based beliefs implicit in home and school…

The Psychosexual Impacts on Adolescent Girls Viewing Sexually Explicit Internet Material

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Grant, Piper S.

2014-01-01

Literature indicates that 72% of adolescent girls are exposed to sexually explicit Internet material (SEIM) before the age of 18, and between 2%-30% of girls report intentionally seeking SEIM. Despite the recognition that adolescent girls are consuming SEIM, and that their use impacts behaviors, beliefs, and attitudes, there has been limited…

Black Preschoolers' Social Cognition: Storytelling and False Belief.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Curenton, Stephanie M.; Wilson, Melvin N.; Lillard, Angeline S.

Noting that the lower performance of low-income children on false belief tasks in comparison to that of middle-income children has not been adequately explained, this study examined the possibility that black children's experiences and talents with storytelling may facilitate their performance on false belief tasks when narrative questions are…

False Belief Understanding in Cantonese-Speaking Children

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Tardif, Twila; Wellman, Henry M.; Cheung, Kar Man

2004-01-01

The present study investigates the performance of 96 Cantonese-speaking three- to five-year-old preschoolers on three false belief tasks--a deceptive object, a change of location, and an unexpected contents task encompassing a variety of task factors. Most importantly, the research examines the possibility that false belief performance depends on…

Early False-Belief Understanding.

PubMed

Scott, Rose M; Baillargeon, Renée

2017-04-01

Intense controversy surrounds the question of when children first understand that others can hold false beliefs. Results from traditional tasks suggest that false-belief understanding does not emerge until about 4 years of age and constitutes a major developmental milestone in social cognition. By contrast, results from nontraditional tasks, which have steadily accumulated over the past 10 years, suggest that false-belief understanding is already present in infants (under age 2 years) and toddlers (age 2-3 years) and thus forms an integral part of social cognition from early in life. Here we first present an overview of the findings from nontraditional tasks. We then return to traditional tasks and argue that processing difficulties, rather than limitations in false-belief understanding, account for young children's failure at these tasks. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Pluto behaving badly: false beliefs and their consequences.

PubMed

Berkowitz, Shari R; Laney, Cara; Morris, Erin K; Garry, Maryanne; Loftus, Elizabeth F

2008-01-01

We exposed college students to suggestive materials in order to lead them to believe that, as children, they had a negative experience at Disneyland involving the Pluto character. A sizable minority of subjects developed a false belief or memory that Pluto had uncomfortably licked their ear. Suggestions about a positive experience with Pluto led to even greater acceptance of a lovable ear-licking episode. False beliefs and memories had repercussions; those seduced by the bad suggestions were not willing to pay as much for a Pluto souvenir. These findings are among the first to demonstrate that false beliefs can have repercussions for people, meaning that they can influence their later thoughts, beliefs, and behaviors.

Processing Demands Impact 3-Year-Olds' Performance in a Spontaneous-Response Task: New Evidence for the Processing-Load Account of Early False-Belief Understanding.

PubMed

Scott, Rose M; Roby, Erin

2015-01-01

Prior to age four, children succeed in non-elicited-response false-belief tasks but fail elicited-response false-belief tasks. To explain this discrepancy, the processing-load account argues that the capacity to represent beliefs emerges in infancy, as indicated by early success on non-elicited-response tasks, but that children's ability to demonstrate this capacity depends on the processing demands of the task and children's processing skills. When processing demands exceed young children's processing abilities, such as in standard elicited-response tasks, children fail despite their capacity to represent beliefs. Support for this account comes from recent evidence that reducing processing demands improves young children's performance: when demands are sufficiently reduced, 2.5-year-olds succeed in elicited-response tasks. Here we sought complementary evidence for the processing-load account by examining whether increasing processing demands impeded children's performance in a non-elicited-response task. 3-year-olds were tested in a preferential-looking task in which they heard a change-of-location false-belief story accompanied by a picture book; across children, we manipulated the amount of linguistic ambiguity in the story. The final page of the book showed two images: one that was consistent with the main character's false belief and one that was consistent with reality. When the story was relatively unambiguous, children looked reliably longer at the false-belief-consistent image, successfully demonstrating their false-belief understanding. When the story was ambiguous, however, this undermined children's performance: looking times to the belief-consistent image were correlated with verbal ability, and only children with verbal skills in the upper quartile of the sample demonstrated a significant preference for the belief-consistent image. These results support the processing-load account by demonstrating that regardless of whether a task involves an elicited response, children's performance depends on the processing demands of the task and their processing skills. These findings also have implications for alternative, deflationary accounts of early false-belief understanding.

Processing Demands Impact 3-Year-Olds’ Performance in a Spontaneous-Response Task: New Evidence for the Processing-Load Account of Early False-Belief Understanding

PubMed Central

Scott, Rose M.; Roby, Erin

2015-01-01

Prior to age four, children succeed in non-elicited-response false-belief tasks but fail elicited-response false-belief tasks. To explain this discrepancy, the processing-load account argues that the capacity to represent beliefs emerges in infancy, as indicated by early success on non-elicited-response tasks, but that children’s ability to demonstrate this capacity depends on the processing demands of the task and children’s processing skills. When processing demands exceed young children’s processing abilities, such as in standard elicited-response tasks, children fail despite their capacity to represent beliefs. Support for this account comes from recent evidence that reducing processing demands improves young children’s performance: when demands are sufficiently reduced, 2.5-year-olds succeed in elicited-response tasks. Here we sought complementary evidence for the processing-load account by examining whether increasing processing demands impeded children’s performance in a non-elicited-response task. 3-year-olds were tested in a preferential-looking task in which they heard a change-of-location false-belief story accompanied by a picture book; across children, we manipulated the amount of linguistic ambiguity in the story. The final page of the book showed two images: one that was consistent with the main character’s false belief and one that was consistent with reality. When the story was relatively unambiguous, children looked reliably longer at the false-belief-consistent image, successfully demonstrating their false-belief understanding. When the story was ambiguous, however, this undermined children’s performance: looking times to the belief-consistent image were correlated with verbal ability, and only children with verbal skills in the upper quartile of the sample demonstrated a significant preference for the belief-consistent image. These results support the processing-load account by demonstrating that regardless of whether a task involves an elicited response, children’s performance depends on the processing demands of the task and their processing skills. These findings also have implications for alternative, deflationary accounts of early false-belief understanding. PMID:26562840

Placebo effects in competitive sport: qualitative data.

PubMed

Beedie, Christopher J

2007-01-01

The paper examines the placebo effect in sports performance. The possibility that the placebo effect is a more common phenomenon than the quantity of published research would suggest is briefly addressed. It is suggested that the placebo control design often used in sports performance research masks any placebo effects and thus presents a false picture of the mechanisms underlying performance-enhancing interventions in the real world. An electronic survey was sent to 48 competitive, international and professional athletes. Questions related to the placebo effect in competitive sport. Thirty responses were received. Data indicate that the majority (97%) of respondents believe that the placebo effect can exert an influence on sports performance, and that a significant number (73%) have experienced what they defined as a placebo effect. Inductive content analysis reveals that these experiences fall into several categories such as explicit placebo effects, inadvertent false beliefs, ritual and reverse placebo effects. Furthermore, 10 respondents (33%) offer explanations as to the nature of the placebo effect. Again, inductive content analysis reveals that these explanations fall into several categories including deliberate changes in competitive strategy, belief/expectancy, faith in a third party, and marketing. Overall, responses support previous experimental research and anecdotal reports that have found a relationship between belief and sports performance. It is suggested that further research be structured to not simply control for the placebo effect, but to elucidate it. Key pointsA survey of 30 athletes revealed that 73% have experienced a placebo effect in sport.Athletes suggest several potential explanations for these effects.Findings support the idea that placebo effects might be common in sport.Researchers and practitioners should be aware of the possible impact of these effects on research findings and competitive performance.

The Impact of Explicit Teaching of Methodological Aspects of Physics on Scientistic Beliefs and Interest

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Korte, Stefan; Berger, Roland; Hänze, Martin

2017-01-01

We assessed the impact of teaching methodological aspects of physics on students' scientistic beliefs and subject interest in physics in a repeated-measurement design with a total of 142 students of upper secondary physics classes. Students gained knowledge of methodological aspects from the pre-test to the post-test and reported reduced…

Explicitly Teaching Critical Thinking Skills in a History Course

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

McLaughlin, Anne Collins; McGill, Alicia Ebbitt

2017-01-01

Critical thinking skills are often assessed via student beliefs in non-scientific ways of thinking, (e.g, pseudoscience). Courses aimed at reducing such beliefs have been studied in the STEM fields with the most successful focusing on skeptical thinking. However, critical thinking is not unique to the sciences; it is crucial in the humanities and…

Call Me "Madame": Re-Presenting Culture in the French Language Classroom

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Siskin, H. Jay

2007-01-01

This study examines autobiographies of American teachers of French in order to make explicit their beliefs regarding French language and culture. The themes of class and power are prominent in these teachers' belief systems, as is the desire for self-transformation through mastery of French and miming a subset of French behaviors. These notions…

The Origins of Belief Representation: Monkeys Fail to Automatically Represent Others’ Beliefs

PubMed Central

Martin, Alia; Santos, Laurie R.

2014-01-01

Young infants’ successful performance on false belief tasks has led several researchers to argue that there may be a core knowledge system for representing the beliefs of other agents, emerging early in human development and constraining automatic belief processing into adulthood. One way to investigate this purported core belief representation system is to examine whether non-human primates share such a system. Although non-human primates have historically performed poorly on false belief tasks that require executive function capacities, little work has explored how primates perform on more automatic measures of belief processing. To get at this issue, we modified Kovács et al. (2010)’s test of automatic belief representation to examine whether one non-human primate species—the rhesus macaque (Macaca mulatta)—is automatically influenced by another agent’s beliefs when tracking an object’s location. Monkeys saw an event in which a human agent watched an apple move back and forth between two boxes and an outcome in which one box was revealed to be empty. By occluding segments of the apple’s movement from either the monkey or the agent, we manipulated both the monkeys’ belief (true or false) and agent’s belief (true or false) about the final location of the apple. We found that monkeys looked longer at events that violated their own beliefs than at events that were consistent with their beliefs. In contrast to human infants, however, monkeys’ expectations were not influenced by another agent’s beliefs, suggesting that belief representation may be an aspect of core knowledge unique to humans. PMID:24374209

The origins of belief representation: monkeys fail to automatically represent others' beliefs.

PubMed

Martin, Alia; Santos, Laurie R

2014-03-01

Young infants' successful performance on false belief tasks has led several researchers to argue that there may be a core knowledge system for representing the beliefs of other agents, emerging early in human development and constraining automatic belief processing into adulthood. One way to investigate this purported core belief representation system is to examine whether non-human primates share such a system. Although non-human primates have historically performed poorly on false belief tasks that require executive function capacities, little work has explored how primates perform on more automatic measures of belief processing. To get at this issue, we modified Kovács et al. (2010)'s test of automatic belief representation to examine whether one non-human primate species--the rhesus macaque (Macaca mulatta)--is automatically influenced by another agent's beliefs when tracking an object's location. Monkeys saw an event in which a human agent watched an apple move back and forth between two boxes and an outcome in which one box was revealed to be empty. By occluding segments of the apple's movement from either the monkey or the agent, we manipulated both the monkeys' belief (true or false) and agent's belief (true or false) about the final location of the apple. We found that monkeys looked longer at events that violated their own beliefs than at events that were consistent with their beliefs. In contrast to human infants, however, monkeys' expectations were not influenced by another agent's beliefs, suggesting that belief representation may be an aspect of core knowledge unique to humans. Copyright © 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Which Penguin Is This? Attributing False Beliefs about Object Identity at 18 Months

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Scott, Rose M.; Baillargeon, Renee

2009-01-01

Recent research has shown that infants as young as 13 months can attribute false beliefs to agents, suggesting that the psychological-reasoning subsystem necessary for attributing reality-incongruent informational states (Subsystem-2, SS2) is operational in infancy. The present research asked whether 18-month-olds' false-belief reasoning extends…

The Roles of Explanation and Feedback in False Belief Understanding: A Microgenetic Analysis

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Guajardo, Nicole R.; Petersen, Rachel; Marshall, Timothy R.

2013-01-01

The authors examined effects of feedback and explanation on false belief performance. Thirty-three children (42-54 months; 15 girls, 18 boys) were randomly assigned to four treatment conditions: explanation, feedback, feedback researcher explains, and feedback child explains. Children completed false belief tasks during pretraining, 8 training…

Understanding False Belief as Generalized Operant Behavior

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

McHugh, Louise; Barnes-Holmes, Yvonne; Barnes-Holmes, Dermot; Stewart, Ian

2006-01-01

The current work reports 2 experiments that investigate the development of false belief from the perspective of Relational Frame Theory. The true and false belief test protocol used across both experiments contained a range of tasks that involved responding in accordance with the 3 perspective-taking frames of I-YOU, HERE-THERE, NOW-THEN, and in…

Children's Understanding of Behavioral Consequences of Epistemic States: A Comparison of Knowledge, Ignorance, and False Belief.

PubMed

Deneault, Joane

2015-01-01

The author addressed the issue of the simultaneity of false belief and knowledge understanding by investigating children's ability to predict the behavioral consequences of knowledge, ignorance, and false belief. The second aim of the study was to explore the role of counterfactuals in knowledge understanding. Ninety-nine (99) children, age 3-7 years old, completed the unexpected transfer task and a newly designed task in which a protagonist experienced 1 of the following 4 situations: knowing a fact, not knowing a fact, knowing a procedure, and not knowing a procedure. The results showed that factual ignorance was as difficult as false belief for the children, whereas the other conditions were all easier than false belief, suggesting that the well-known lag between ignorance and false belief may be partly methodologically based. The results provide support for a common underlying conceptual system for both knowing and believing, and evidence of the role of counterfactual reasoning in the development of epistemic state understanding. Methodological variations of the new task are proposed for future research.

Development and neurophysiology of mentalizing.

PubMed Central

Frith, Uta; Frith, Christopher D

2003-01-01

The mentalizing (theory of mind) system of the brain is probably in operation from ca. 18 months of age, allowing implicit attribution of intentions and other mental states. Between the ages of 4 and 6 years explicit mentalizing becomes possible, and from this age children are able to explain the misleading reasons that have given rise to a false belief. Neuroimaging studies of mentalizing have so far only been carried out in adults. They reveal a system with three components consistently activated during both implicit and explicit mentalizing tasks: medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), temporal poles and posterior superior temporal sulcus (STS). The functions of these components can be elucidated, to some extent, from their role in other tasks used in neuroimaging studies. Thus, the MPFC region is probably the basis of the decoupling mechanism that distinguishes mental state representations from physical state representations; the STS region is probably the basis of the detection of agency, and the temporal poles might be involved in access to social knowledge in the form of scripts. The activation of these components in concert appears to be critical to mentalizing. PMID:12689373

Great apes anticipate that other individuals will act according to false beliefs.

PubMed

Krupenye, Christopher; Kano, Fumihiro; Hirata, Satoshi; Call, Josep; Tomasello, Michael

2016-10-07

Humans operate with a "theory of mind" with which they are able to understand that others' actions are driven not by reality but by beliefs about reality, even when those beliefs are false. Although great apes share with humans many social-cognitive skills, they have repeatedly failed experimental tests of such false-belief understanding. We use an anticipatory looking test (originally developed for human infants) to show that three species of great apes reliably look in anticipation of an agent acting on a location where he falsely believes an object to be, even though the apes themselves know that the object is no longer there. Our results suggest that great apes also operate, at least on an implicit level, with an understanding of false beliefs. Copyright © 2016, American Association for the Advancement of Science.

Language and theory of mind: meta-analysis of the relation between language ability and false-belief understanding.

PubMed

Milligan, Karen; Astington, Janet Wilde; Dack, Lisa Ain

2007-01-01

Numerous studies show that children's language ability is related to false-belief understanding. However, there is considerable variation in the size of the correlation reported. Using data from 104 studies (N=8,891), this meta-analysis determines the strength of the relation in children under age 7 and examines moderators that may account for the variability across studies--including aspect of language ability assessed, type of false-belief task used, and direction of effect. The results indicate a moderate to large effect size overall that remains significant when age is controlled. Receptive vocabulary measures had weaker relations than measures of general language. Stronger effects were found from earlier language to later false belief than the reverse. Significant differences were not found among types of false-belief task.

Sociolinguistic awareness and false belief in young Cantonese learners of English.

PubMed

Cheung, Him; Mak, Wing Yan; Luo, Xueying; Xiao, Wen

2010-10-01

In this study, we examined whether sociolinguistic awareness and false belief were uniquely related in 3- and 4-year-old Cantonese-speaking children learning English as a second language. The English-use background of these children varied so that they possessed sociolinguistic awareness to different degrees. Results indicated that sociolinguistic awareness predicted false belief uniquely after controlling for age, nonverbal intelligence, English vocabulary, and family income for both the second language learners and the more balanced bilinguals. The group difference in false belief was adequately explained by the corresponding difference in sociolinguistic awareness over and above the other variables. Such findings provide evidence for the claim that false belief understanding is critically related to sociolinguistic awareness, which in turn is influenced by how a second language is learned. Copyright 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Children's understanding of promising, lying, and false belief.

PubMed

Maas, Fay K

2008-07-01

Understanding promising and lying requires an understanding of intention and the ability to interpret mental states. The author examined (a) the extent to which 4- to 6-year-olds focus on the sincerity of the speaker's intention when the 4-to 6-year-olds make judgments about promises and lies and (b) whether false-belief reasoning skills are related to understanding promising and lying. Participants watched videotaped stories and made promise and lie judgments from their own perspective and from the listener-character's perspective. Children also completed false-belief reasoning tasks. Older children made more correct promise judgments from both perspectives. All children made correct lie judgments from the listener's perspective. The author found that Ist-order false-belief reasoning was related to making judgments from the participant's perspective; 2nd-order false-belief reasoning was related to making judgments from the listener-character's perspective. Results suggest that children's understanding of promising and lying moves from a focus on outcome toward a focus on the belief that each utterance is designed to create.

A Dual Pathway of Student Motivation: Combining an Implicit and Explicit Measure of Student Motivation

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Hornstra, Lisette; Kamsteeg, Antoinette; Pot, Sara; Verheij, Lydia

2018-01-01

Abundant research in social psychology shows human behaviour is guided by beliefs through two pathways, a deliberate and automatic pathway. Research on student motivation has thus far focused mostly on the deliberate pathway and consequently almost exclusively relied on explicit measures (i.e. self-reports of motivation) to assess student…

Do 15-month-old infants understand false beliefs?

PubMed

Onishi, Kristine H; Baillargeon, Renée

2005-04-08

For more than two decades, researchers have argued that young children do not understand mental states such as beliefs. Part of the evidence for this claim comes from preschoolers' failure at verbal tasks that require the understanding that others may hold false beliefs. Here, we used a novel nonverbal task to examine 15-month-old infants' ability to predict an actor's behavior on the basis of her true or false belief about a toy's hiding place. Results were positive, supporting the view that, from a young age, children appeal to mental states--goals, perceptions, and beliefs--to explain the behavior of others.

Racial bias in pain assessment and treatment recommendations, and false beliefs about biological differences between blacks and whites.

PubMed

Hoffman, Kelly M; Trawalter, Sophie; Axt, Jordan R; Oliver, M Norman

2016-04-19

Black Americans are systematically undertreated for pain relative to white Americans. We examine whether this racial bias is related to false beliefs about biological differences between blacks and whites (e.g., "black people's skin is thicker than white people's skin"). Study 1 documented these beliefs among white laypersons and revealed that participants who more strongly endorsed false beliefs about biological differences reported lower pain ratings for a black (vs. white) target. Study 2 extended these findings to the medical context and found that half of a sample of white medical students and residents endorsed these beliefs. Moreover, participants who endorsed these beliefs rated the black (vs. white) patient's pain as lower and made less accurate treatment recommendations. Participants who did not endorse these beliefs rated the black (vs. white) patient's pain as higher, but showed no bias in treatment recommendations. These findings suggest that individuals with at least some medical training hold and may use false beliefs about biological differences between blacks and whites to inform medical judgments, which may contribute to racial disparities in pain assessment and treatment.

Explaining body size beliefs in anorexia.

PubMed

Gadsby, Stephen

2017-11-01

Cognitive neuropsychiatry has had much success in providing theoretical models for the causal origins of many delusional beliefs. Recently, it has been suggested that some anorexia nervosa patients' beliefs about their own body size should be considered delusions. As such, it seems high time the methods of cognitive neuropsychiatry were turned to modelling the false body size beliefs of anorexics. In this paper, I adopt an empiricist approach to modelling the causal origins of false body size beliefs in anorexia. Within the background of cognitive neuropsychiatry, empiricist models claim that abnormal beliefs are grounded by abnormal experiences bearing similar content. I discuss the kinds of abnormal experiences of body size anorexics suffer from which could ground their false beliefs about body size. These oversized experiences come in three varieties: false self-other body comparisons, spontaneous mental imagery of a fat body and distorted perception of affordances. Further theoretical and empirical research into the oversized experiences which anorexics suffer from presents a promising avenue for understanding and treating the disorder.

Associations among False Belief Understanding, Counterfactual Reasoning, and Executive Function

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Guajardo, Nicole R.; Parker, Jessica; Turley-Ames, Kandi

2009-01-01

The primary purposes of the present study were to clarify previous work on the association between counterfactual thinking and false belief performance to determine (1) whether these two variables are related and (2) if so, whether executive function skills mediate the relationship. A total of 92 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds completed false belief,…

False Belief Understanding in Language Impaired and Typically Developing Spanish-Speaking Preschoolers from Lower Income Backgrounds

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Guiberson, Mark; Rodriguez, Barbara L.

2013-01-01

Research Findings: The present study describes developmental trends in false belief (in other and self) in 46 Mexican-dialect Spanish-speaking children from lower socioeconomic backgrounds with and without language impairment (LI). Results indicate that typically developing children's performance on false belief tasks improves with age, with very…

Eighteen-Month-Old Infants Show False Belief Understanding in an Active Helping Paradigm

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Buttelmann, David; Carpenter, Malinda; Tomasello, Michael

2009-01-01

Recently, several studies have claimed that soon after their first birthday infants understand others' false beliefs. However, some have questioned these findings based on criticisms of the looking-time paradigms used. Here we report a new paradigm to test false belief understanding in infants using a more active behavioral response: helping.…

Theory of Mind Development in Deaf Children: A Nonverbal Test of False-Belief Understanding.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Figueras-Costa, Berta; Harris, Paul

2001-01-01

Twenty-one children (ages 4-11) prelingually deaf and orally trained, were tested with verbal and nonverbal versions of a false-belief task. Children did not perform above chance in the verbal task. The nonverbal task significantly facilitated performance, however, only older children performed above change in the nonverbal false-belief tests.…

Representing metarepresentations: is there theory of mind-specific cognition?

PubMed

Egeth, Marc; Kurzban, Robert

2009-03-01

What cognitive mechanisms underlie Theory of Mind? Some infer domain-specific Theory of Mind cognition based the pattern of children diagnosed with autism failing the False Belief test but passing the False Photograph test. However, we argue that the False Belief test entails various task demands the False Photograph task does not, including the necessity to represent a higher-order representation (a metarepresentation), thus confounding the inference of domain-specificity. Instead, a general difficulty that affects representations of metarepresentations might account for the seeming domain-specific failure. Here we find that False-Belief failing False-Photograph passing children fail the Meta Photograph test, a new photograph-domain test that requires subjects to represent a metarepresentation. We conclude that people who fail the False Belief test but pass the False Photograph test do not necessarily have a content-specific Theory of Mind deficit. Instead, the general ability to represent representations and metarepresentations might underlie Theory of Mind.

Children's Understanding of Second-Order False Belief: Comparisons of Content and Method of Assessment

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Miller, Scott A.

2013-01-01

This research examined children's performance on second-order false belief tasks as a function of the content area for the belief and the method of assessing understanding. A total of 70 kindergarten and first-grade children responded to four second-order stories. On two stories, the task was to judge a belief about a belief, and on two, the…

Does social distance modulate adults' egocentric biases when reasoning about false beliefs?

PubMed

Farrar, Benjamin G; Ostojić, Ljerka

2018-01-01

When given privileged information of an object's true location, adults often overestimate the likelihood that a protagonist holding a false belief will search in the correct location for that object. This type of egocentric bias is often labelled the 'curse of knowledge'. Interestingly, the magnitude of this bias may be modulated by the social distance between the perspective taker and target. However, this social distance effect has yet to be fully demonstrated when adults reason about false beliefs. Using a continuous false belief task, we investigated i) whether adults were biased by their own knowledge when reasoning about another's false belief, ii) whether the magnitude of this egocentric bias was modulated by social distance, and iii) whether this social distance effect extended to a heterospecific out-group, namely a dog. To test these hypotheses we conducted three experiments. In Experiment 1 (N = 283), we used an established continuous false belief task, in Experiment 2 (N = 281) we modified this task, and Experiment 3 (N = 744) was a direct replication of Experiment 2. Across these experiments, the curse of knowledge effect was reliably replicated when adults mentalised about an in-group protagonist, and replicated in two of the three studies (Experiments 1 and 3) when adults mentalised about out-group protagonists. In an internal-meta analysis, the curse of knowledge effect was present across all conditions, and there was no effect of social distance. Hence, overall these data are not consistent with the hypothesis that social distance modulates adults' egocentric biases when reasoning about false beliefs. The finding that egocentric biases of a similar magnitude were observed when adults mentalised about an in-group protagonist and a dog suggests that interpersonal dissimilarity is not in itself sufficient to reduce egocentric bias when reasoning about false beliefs.

Infants Understand Deceptive Intentions to Implant False Beliefs about Identity: New Evidence for Early Mentalistic Reasoning

PubMed Central

Scott, Rose M.; Richman, Josh C.; Baillargeon, Renée

2015-01-01

Are infants capable of representing false beliefs, as the mentalistic account of early psychological reasoning suggests, or are they incapable of doing so, as the minimalist account suggests? The present research sought to shed light on this debate by testing the minimalist claim that a signature limit of early psychological reasoning is a specific inability to understand false beliefs about identity: because of their limited representational capabilities, infants should be unable to make sense of situations where an agent mistakes one object for another, visually identical object. To evaluate this claim, three experiments examined whether 17-month-olds could reason about the actions of a deceptive agent who sought to implant in another agent a false belief about the identity of an object. In each experiment, a thief attempted to secretly steal a desirable rattling toy during its owner’s absence by substituting a less desirable silent toy. Infants realized that this substitution could be effective only if the silent toy was visually identical to the rattling toy (Experiment 1) and the owner did not routinely shake her toy when she returned (Experiment 2). When these conditions were met, infants expected the owner to be deceived and to mistake the silent toy for the rattling toy she had left behind (Experiment 3). Together, these results cast doubt on the minimalist claim that infants cannot represent false beliefs about identity. More generally, these results indicate that infants in the 2nd year of life can reason not only about the actions of agents who hold false beliefs, but also about the actions of agents who seek to implant false beliefs, thus providing new support for the mentalistic claim that an abstract capacity to reason about false beliefs emerges early in human development. PMID:26374383

Belief-desire reasoning as a process of selection.

PubMed

Leslie, Alan M; German, Tim P; Polizzi, Pamela

2005-02-01

Human learning may depend upon domain specialized mechanisms. A plausible example is rapid, early learning about the thoughts and feelings of other people. A major achievement in this domain, at about age four in the typically developing child, is the ability to solve problems in which the child attributes false beliefs to other people and predicts their actions. The main focus of theorizing has been why 3-year-olds fail, and only recently have there been any models of how success is achieved in false-belief tasks. Leslie and Polizzi (Inhibitory processing in the false-belief task: Two conjectures. Developmental Science, 1, 247-254, 1998) proposed two competing models of success, which are the focus of the current paper. The models assume that belief-desire reasoning is a process which selects a content for an agent's belief and an action for the agent's desire. In false belief tasks, the theory of mind mechanism (ToMM) provides plausible candidate belief contents, among which will be a 'true-belief.' A second process reviews these candidates and by default will select the true-belief content for attribution. To succeed in a false-belief task, the default content must be inhibited so that attention shifts to another candidate belief. In traditional false-belief tasks, the protagonist's desire is to approach an object. Here we make use of tasks in which the protagonist has a desire to avoid an object, about which she has a false-belief. Children find such tasks much more difficult than traditional tasks. Our models explain the additional difficulty by assuming that predicting action from an avoidance desire also requires an inhibition. The two processing models differ in the way that belief and desire inhibitory processes combine to achieve successful action prediction. In six experiments we obtain evidence favoring one model, in which parallel inhibitory processes cancel out, over the other model, in which serial inhibitions force attention to a previously inhibited location. These results are discussed in terms of a set of simple proposals for the modus operandi of a domain specific learning mechanism. The learning mechanism is in part modular--the ToMM--and in part penetrable--the Selection Processor (SP). We show how ToMM-SP can account both for competence and for successful and unsuccessful performance on a wide range of belief-desire tasks across the preschool period. Together, ToMM and SP attend to and learn about mental states.

Testing the Domain-Specificity of a Theory of Mind Deficit in Brain-Injured Patients: Evidence for Consistent Performance on Non-Verbal, ''Reality-Unknown'' False Belief and False Photograph Tasks

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Apperly, Ian A.; Samson, Dana; Chiavarino, Claudia; Bickerton, Wai-Ling; Humphreys, Glyn W.

2007-01-01

To test the domain-specificity of ''theory of mind'' abilities we compared the performance of a case-series of 11 brain-lesioned patients on a recently developed test of false belief reasoning (Apperly, Samson, Chiavarino, & Humphreys, 2004) and on a matched false photograph task, which did not require belief reasoning and which addressed problems…

False-belief understanding and social preference over the first 2 years of school: a longitudinal study.

PubMed

Fink, Elian; Begeer, Sander; Hunt, Caroline; de Rosnay, Marc

2014-01-01

The role of false belief in establishing children's social relationships during the transition to school was examined and compared to other social cognitive constructs. One hundred and fourteen 5-year-olds were recruited during their 1st year of school (Time 1); 106 children were retained 1 year later. False belief, emotion expression recognition, empathy, verbal ability, and peer-rated social preference were measured at both times. False belief at Time 1 had a direct influence on concurrent social preference, over and above the influence of emotion expression recognition and empathy. False belief made no independent contribution to later social preference accounting for stability in social preference. The role of social cognitive development is discussed with respect to how children establish and maintain their position in a peer group. © 2014 The Authors. Child Development © 2014 Society for Research in Child Development, Inc.

A Bayesian Framework for False Belief Reasoning in Children: A Rational Integration of Theory-Theory and Simulation Theory

PubMed Central

Asakura, Nobuhiko; Inui, Toshio

2016-01-01

Two apparently contrasting theories have been proposed to account for the development of children's theory of mind (ToM): theory-theory and simulation theory. We present a Bayesian framework that rationally integrates both theories for false belief reasoning. This framework exploits two internal models for predicting the belief states of others: one of self and one of others. These internal models are responsible for simulation-based and theory-based reasoning, respectively. The framework further takes into account empirical studies of a developmental ToM scale (e.g., Wellman and Liu, 2004): developmental progressions of various mental state understandings leading up to false belief understanding. By representing the internal models and their interactions as a causal Bayesian network, we formalize the model of children's false belief reasoning as probabilistic computations on the Bayesian network. This model probabilistically weighs and combines the two internal models and predicts children's false belief ability as a multiplicative effect of their early-developed abilities to understand the mental concepts of diverse beliefs and knowledge access. Specifically, the model predicts that children's proportion of correct responses on a false belief task can be closely approximated as the product of their proportions correct on the diverse belief and knowledge access tasks. To validate this prediction, we illustrate that our model provides good fits to a variety of ToM scale data for preschool children. We discuss the implications and extensions of our model for a deeper understanding of developmental progressions of children's ToM abilities. PMID:28082941

A Bayesian Framework for False Belief Reasoning in Children: A Rational Integration of Theory-Theory and Simulation Theory.

PubMed

Asakura, Nobuhiko; Inui, Toshio

2016-01-01

Two apparently contrasting theories have been proposed to account for the development of children's theory of mind (ToM): theory-theory and simulation theory. We present a Bayesian framework that rationally integrates both theories for false belief reasoning. This framework exploits two internal models for predicting the belief states of others: one of self and one of others. These internal models are responsible for simulation-based and theory-based reasoning, respectively. The framework further takes into account empirical studies of a developmental ToM scale (e.g., Wellman and Liu, 2004): developmental progressions of various mental state understandings leading up to false belief understanding. By representing the internal models and their interactions as a causal Bayesian network, we formalize the model of children's false belief reasoning as probabilistic computations on the Bayesian network. This model probabilistically weighs and combines the two internal models and predicts children's false belief ability as a multiplicative effect of their early-developed abilities to understand the mental concepts of diverse beliefs and knowledge access. Specifically, the model predicts that children's proportion of correct responses on a false belief task can be closely approximated as the product of their proportions correct on the diverse belief and knowledge access tasks. To validate this prediction, we illustrate that our model provides good fits to a variety of ToM scale data for preschool children. We discuss the implications and extensions of our model for a deeper understanding of developmental progressions of children's ToM abilities.

Effects of Explicit-Reflective Instruction on Preservice and Novice Teachers' Epistemic and Conceptual Change Mediated by Reasoning

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Murphy, Danny R.

2017-01-01

Teachers' beliefs shape their daily instruction and the materials presented to students. The personal views of educators are especially relevant when socioscientific issues are involved. Preservice and novice teachers' mastery of the nature of science (NOS) and personal beliefs in and out of the classroom influence their worldviews and classroom…

Matched False-Belief Performance during Verbal and Nonverbal Interference

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Dungan, James; Saxe, Rebecca

2012-01-01

Language has been shown to play a key role in the development of a child's theory of mind, but its role in adult belief reasoning remains unclear. One recent study used verbal and nonverbal interference during a false-belief task to show that accurate belief reasoning in adults necessarily requires language (Newton & de Villiers, 2007). The…

The second shift reflected in the second generation: do parents' gender roles at home predict children's aspirations?

PubMed

Croft, Alyssa; Schmader, Toni; Block, Katharina; Baron, Andrew Scott

2014-07-01

Gender inequality at home continues to constrain gender equality at work. How do the gender disparities in domestic labor that children observe between their parents predict those children's visions for their future roles? The present research examined how parents' behaviors and implicit associations concerning domestic roles, over and above their explicit beliefs, predict their children's future aspirations. Data from 326 children aged 7 to 13 years revealed that mothers' explicit beliefs about domestic gender roles predicted the beliefs held by their children. In addition, when fathers enacted or espoused a more egalitarian distribution of household labor, their daughters in particular expressed a greater interest in working outside the home and having a less stereotypical occupation. Fathers' implicit gender-role associations also uniquely predicted daughters' (but not sons') occupational preferences. These findings suggest that a more balanced division of household labor between parents might promote greater workforce equality in future generations. © The Author(s) 2014.

Implicit associations and compensatory health beliefs in smokers: exploring their role for behaviour and their change through warning labels.

PubMed

Glock, Sabine; Müller, Barbara C N; Krolak-Schwerdt, Sabine

2013-11-01

Smokers might think that the negative effects of smoking can be compensated for by other behaviours, such as doing exercise or eating healthily. This phenomenon is known as compensatory health beliefs (CHBs). Graphic warning labels on cigarette packets emphasize the negative effects of smoking, which may impact CHBs. Research so far has assessed CHBs explicitly only via questionnaires, although implicit cognition might be an important factor in continuing to smoke. This study investigated the impact of graphic warning labels on CHBs, by testing CHBs both implicitly and explicitly. The study had a three-group experimental design. ANOVAs and multiple regression analyses were run on the results. We assessed explicit CHBs among non-smokers, smokers, and smokers confronted with graphic warning labels (N = 107; 47 females, 23.89 years old, 78 daily smokers). Implicit associations between smoking and CHB-specific behaviours (e.g., eating healthy food) were measured using a Single-Target Implicit Association Test. After the experiment, participants were able to choose between a healthy and unhealthy food reward. Non-smokers and smokers differed in explicit CHBs but not in implicit cognitions. Warning labels influenced implicit associations among smokers but did not affect explicit CHBs. Most interestingly, implicit associations and explicit CHBs predicted food choice and smoking among smokers not confronted with warning labels. Graphic warning labels could be used in interventions to inhibit automatic associations between smoking and healthy behaviours. Unlearning implicit cognitions might in turn affect explicit CHBs, thus decreasing their role in reducing the negative feelings caused by smoking. © 2013 The British Psychological Society.

Language, Mental State Vocabulary, and False Belief Understanding in Children with Cochlear Implants

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Peters, Kimberly; Remmel, Ethan; Richards, Debra

2009-01-01

Purpose: This study examined false belief understanding and its predictors in school-age children who are deaf with cochlear implants and who use spoken language. Method: False belief understanding was measured through an explanation-of-action task in 30 children between the ages of 3 and 12 years who used cochlear implants. Children told a…

False-Belief Understanding in 2.5-Year-Olds: Evidence from Two Novel Verbal Spontaneous-Response Tasks

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Scott, Rose M.; He, Zijing; Baillargeon, Renee; Cummins, Denise

2012-01-01

Recent research indicates that toddlers and infants succeed at various "non-verbal" spontaneous-response false-belief tasks; here we asked whether toddlers would also succeed at verbal spontaneous-response false-belief tasks that imposed significant linguistic demands. We tested 2.5-year-olds using two novel tasks: a "preferential-looking" task in…

Understanding the Mind or Predicting Signal-Dependent Action? Performance of Children with and without Autism on Analogues of the False-Belief Task

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Bowler, Dermot M.; Briskman, Jackie; Gurvidi, Nicole; Fornells-Ambrojo, Miriam

2005-01-01

To evaluate the claim that correct performance on unexpected transfer false-belief tasks specifically involves mental-state understanding, two experiments were carried out with children with autism, intellectual disabilities, and typical development. In both experiments, children were given a standard unexpected transfer false-belief task and a…

Temporo-Parietal Junction Activity in Theory-of-Mind Tasks: Falseness, Beliefs, or Attention

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Aichhorn, Markus; Perner, Josef; Weiss, Benjamin; Kronbichler, Martin; Staffen, Wolfgang; Ladurner, Gunther

2009-01-01

By combining the false belief (FB) and photo (PH) vignettes to identify theory-of-mind areas with the false sign (FS) vignettes, we re-establish the functional asymmetry between the left and right temporo-parietal junction (TPJ). The right TPJ (TPJ-R) is specially sensitive to processing belief information, whereas the left TPJ (TPJ-L) is equally…

The Relationship between Second-Order False Belief and Display Rules Reasoning: The Integration of Cognitive and Affective Social Understanding

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Naito, Mika; Seki, Yoshimi

2009-01-01

To investigate the relation between cognitive and affective social understanding, Japanese 4- to 8-year-olds received tasks of first- and second-order false beliefs and prosocial and self-presentational display rules. From 6 to 8 years, children comprehended display rules, as well as second-order false belief, using social pressures justifications…

The missing explanation of the false-belief advantage in bilingual children: a longitudinal study.

PubMed

Diaz, Vanessa; Farrar, M Jeffrey

2018-07-01

Bilingual preschoolers often perform better than monolingual children on false-belief understanding. It has been hypothesized that this is due to their enhanced executive function skills, although this relationship has rarely been tested or supported. The current longitudinal study tested whether metalinguistic awareness was responsible for this advantage. Further, we examined the contributions of both executive functioning and language ability to false-belief understanding by including multiple measures of both. Seventy-eight children (n = 40 Spanish-English bilingual; age M = 49.29, SD = 7.38 and, n = 38 English monolingual; age M = 47.75, SD = 6.86) were tested. A year later the children were tested again (n = 22 bilingual, n = 25 monolingual). The results indicated that language and executive function (inhibitory control) at time 1 were related to false belief in monolinguals at time 2. In contrast, bilinguals' metalinguistic performance at time 1 was the sole predictor of false belief at time 2. The different linguistic and cognitive profiles of monolinguals and bilinguals may create different pathways for their development of false-belief understanding. A video abstract of this article can be viewed at: https://youtu.be/vILn2gKjFxw. © 2017 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Procedural Metacognition and False Belief Understanding in 3- to 5-Year-Old Children

PubMed Central

Bernard, Stéphane; Proust, Joëlle; Clément, Fabrice

2015-01-01

Some studies, so far limited in number, suggest the existence of procedural metacognition in young children, that is, the practical capacity to monitor and control one’s own cognitive activity in a given task. The link between procedural metacognition and false belief understanding is currently under theoretical discussion. If data with primates seem to indicate that procedural metacognition and false belief understanding are not related, no study in developmental psychology has investigated this relation in young children. The present paper aims, first, to supplement the findings concerning young children’s abilities to monitor and control their uncertainty (procedural metacognition) and, second, to explore the relation between procedural metacognition and false belief understanding. To examine this, 82 3- to 5-year-old children were presented with an opt-out task and with 3 false belief tasks. Results show that children can rely on procedural metacognition to evaluate their perceptual access to information, and that success in false belief tasks does not seem related to success in the task we used to evaluate procedural metacognition. These results are coherent with a procedural view of metacognition, and are discussed in the light of recent data from primatology and developmental psychology. PMID:26517260

Procedural Metacognition and False Belief Understanding in 3- to 5-Year-Old Children.

PubMed

Bernard, Stéphane; Proust, Joëlle; Clément, Fabrice

2015-01-01

Some studies, so far limited in number, suggest the existence of procedural metacognition in young children, that is, the practical capacity to monitor and control one's own cognitive activity in a given task. The link between procedural metacognition and false belief understanding is currently under theoretical discussion. If data with primates seem to indicate that procedural metacognition and false belief understanding are not related, no study in developmental psychology has investigated this relation in young children. The present paper aims, first, to supplement the findings concerning young children's abilities to monitor and control their uncertainty (procedural metacognition) and, second, to explore the relation between procedural metacognition and false belief understanding. To examine this, 82 3- to 5-year-old children were presented with an opt-out task and with 3 false belief tasks. Results show that children can rely on procedural metacognition to evaluate their perceptual access to information, and that success in false belief tasks does not seem related to success in the task we used to evaluate procedural metacognition. These results are coherent with a procedural view of metacognition, and are discussed in the light of recent data from primatology and developmental psychology.

I am against us? Unpacking cultural differences in ingroup favoritism via dialecticism.

PubMed

Ma-Kellams, Christine; Spencer-Rodgers, Julie; Peng, Kaiping

2011-01-01

The authors proposed a novel explanation for cultural differences in ingroup favoritism (dialecticism) and tested this hypothesis across cultures/ethnicities, domains, and levels of analysis (explicit vs. implicit, cognitive vs. affective). Dialecticism refers to the cognitive tendency to tolerate contradiction and is more frequently found among East Asian than North American cultures. In Study 1, Chinese were significantly less positive, compared to European Americans, in their explicit judgments of family members. Study 2 investigated ingroup attitudes among Chinese, Latinos, and European Americans. Only Chinese participants showed significant in-group derogation, relative to the other groups, and dialecticism (Dialectical Self Scale) was associated with participants' in group attitudes. Study 3 manipulated dialectical versus linear lay beliefs; participants primed with dialecticism showed more negative, explicit ingroup attitudes. Although ingroup disfavoring tendencies were more prevalent among Chinese across studies, they may be a reflection of one's culturally based lay beliefs rather than deep-rooted negative feelings toward one's ingroup.

The curious incident of the photo that was accused of being false: issues of domain specificity in development, autism, and brain imaging.

PubMed

Perner, Josef; Leekam, Susan

2008-01-01

We resume an exchange of ideas with Uta Frith that started before the turn of the century. The curious incident responsible for this exchange was the finding that children with autism fail tests of false belief, while they pass Zaitchik's (1990) photograph task (Leekam & Perner, 1991). This finding led to the conclusion that children with autism have a domain-specific impairment in Theory of Mind (mental representations), because the photograph task and the false-belief task are structurally equivalent except for the nonmental character of photographs. In this paper we argue that the false-belief task and the false-photograph task are not structurally equivalent and are not empirically associated. Instead a truly structurally equivalent task is the false-sign task. Performance on this task is strongly associated with the false-belief task. A version of this task, the misleading-signal task, also poses severe problems for children with autism (Bowler, Briskman, Gurvidi, & Fornells-Ambrojo, 2005). These new findings therefore challenge the earlier interpretation of a domain-specific difficulty in inferring mental states and suggest that children with autism also have difficulty understanding misleading nonmental objects. Brain imaging data using false-belief, "false"-photo, and false-sign scenarios provide further supporting evidence for our conclusions.

Mental Rotation in False Belief Understanding.

PubMed

Xie, Jiushu; Cheung, Him; Shen, Manqiong; Wang, Ruiming

2018-05-01

This study examines the spontaneous use of embodied egocentric transformation (EET) in understanding false beliefs in the minds of others. EET involves the participants mentally transforming or rotating themselves into the orientation of an agent when trying to adopt his or her visuospatial perspective. We argue that psychological perspective taking such as false belief reasoning may also involve EET because of what has been widely reported in the embodied cognition literature, showing that our processing of abstract, propositional information is often grounded in concrete bodily sensations which are not apparently linked to higher cognition. In Experiment 1, an agent placed a ball into one of two boxes and left. The ball then rolled out and moved either into the other box (new box) or back into the original one (old box). The participants were to decide from which box they themselves or the agent would try to recover the ball. Results showed that false belief performance was affected by increased orientation disparity between the participants and the agent, suggesting involvement of embodied transformation. In Experiment 2, false belief was similarly induced and the participants were to decide if the agent would try to recover the ball in one specific box. Orientation disparity was again found to affect false belief performance. The present results extend previous findings on EET in visuospatial perspective taking and suggest that false belief reasoning, which is a kind of psychological perspective taking, can also involve embodied rotation, consistent with the embodied cognition view. Copyright © 2018 Cognitive Science Society, Inc.

The cost of thinking about false beliefs: evidence from adults' performance on a non-inferential theory of mind task.

PubMed

Apperly, Ian A; Back, Elisa; Samson, Dana; France, Lisa

2008-03-01

Much of what we know about other people's beliefs comes non-inferentially from what people tell us. Developmental research suggests that 3-year-olds have difficulty processing such information: they suffer interference from their own knowledge of reality when told about someone's false belief (e.g., [Wellman, H. M., & Bartsch, K. (1988). Young children's reasoning about beliefs. Cognition, 30, 239-277.]). The current studies examined for the first time whether similar interference occurs in adult participants. In two experiments participants read sentences describing the real colour of an object and a man's false belief about the colour of the object, then judged the accuracy of a picture probe depicting either reality or the man's belief. Processing costs for picture probes depicting reality were consistently greater in this false belief condition than in a matched control condition in which the sentences described the real colour of one object and a man's unrelated belief about the colour of another object. A similar pattern was observed for picture probes depicting the man's belief in most cases. Processing costs were not sensitive to the time available for encoding the information presented in the sentences: costs were observed when participants read the sentences at their own pace (Experiment 1) or at a faster or a slower pace (Experiment 2). This suggests that adults' difficulty was not with encoding information about reality and a conflicting false belief, but with holding this information in mind and using it to inform a subsequent judgement.

Belief inhibition during thinking: not always winning but at least taking part.

PubMed

De Neys, Wim; Franssens, Samuel

2009-10-01

Human thinking is often biased by intuitive beliefs. Inhibition of these tempting beliefs is considered a key component of human thinking, but the process is poorly understood. In the present study we clarify the nature of an inhibition failure and the resulting belief bias by probing the accessibility of cued beliefs after people reasoned. Results indicated that even the poorest reasoners showed an impaired memory access to words that were associated with cued beliefs after solving reasoning problems in which the beliefs conflicted with normative considerations (Experiment 1 and 2). The study further established that the impairment was only temporary in nature (Experiment 3) and did not occur when people were explicitly instructed to give mere intuitive judgments (Experiment 4). Findings present solid evidence for the postulation of an inhibition process and imply that belief bias does not result from a failure to recognize the need to inhibit inappropriate beliefs, but from a failure to complete the inhibition process. This indicates that people are far more logical than hitherto believed.

Racial bias in pain assessment and treatment recommendations, and false beliefs about biological differences between blacks and whites

PubMed Central

Hoffman, Kelly M.; Trawalter, Sophie; Axt, Jordan R.; Oliver, M. Norman

2016-01-01

Black Americans are systematically undertreated for pain relative to white Americans. We examine whether this racial bias is related to false beliefs about biological differences between blacks and whites (e.g., “black people’s skin is thicker than white people’s skin”). Study 1 documented these beliefs among white laypersons and revealed that participants who more strongly endorsed false beliefs about biological differences reported lower pain ratings for a black (vs. white) target. Study 2 extended these findings to the medical context and found that half of a sample of white medical students and residents endorsed these beliefs. Moreover, participants who endorsed these beliefs rated the black (vs. white) patient’s pain as lower and made less accurate treatment recommendations. Participants who did not endorse these beliefs rated the black (vs. white) patient’s pain as higher, but showed no bias in treatment recommendations. These findings suggest that individuals with at least some medical training hold and may use false beliefs about biological differences between blacks and whites to inform medical judgments, which may contribute to racial disparities in pain assessment and treatment. PMID:27044069

Young children have difficulty ascribing true beliefs.

PubMed

Riggs, Kevin J; Simpson, Andrew

2005-05-01

Using the format of a false belief task (Wimmer & Perner, 1983), we investigated the ability of 88 3- and 4-year-olds to ascribe a previously held true belief to a story protagonist. In an unexpected transfer task, children found true belief ascription as difficult as false belief ascription even though they could answer memory questions about story details. Results are discussed in relation to theoretical accounts of theory of mind development that stress the importance of understanding the falsity of belief, and those accounts that stress the importance of information or executive processes.

Effects of Maternal Negativity and of Early and Recent Recurrent Depressive Disorder on Children's False Belief Understanding

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Rohrer, Lisa M.; Cicchetti, Dante; Rogosch, Fred A.; Toth, Sheree L.; Maughan, Angeline

2011-01-01

Research has shown that children of depressed mothers are at risk for problems in a variety of developmental domains; however, little is known about the effects of maternal depression on children's emerging understanding of false beliefs. In this study, 3 false belief tasks were administered to 5-year-old children whose mothers had either met…

Apes perform like infants in false-belief tasks.

PubMed

Bugnyar, Thomas

2017-12-01

Although the extent to which some nonhuman animals understand mental states is currently under debate, attributing false beliefs has been considered to be beyond their limits. A recent study by Krupenye, Kano, Hirata, Call, and Tomasello (Science, 354, 110-114, 2016) shows that great apes pass a false-belief task when they are tested with an anticipatory-looking paradigm developed for nonverbal human infants.

Breaking the Rules: Do Infants Have a True Understanding of False Belief?

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Yott, Jessica; Poulin-Dubois, Diane

2012-01-01

It has been suggested that infants' performance on the false belief task can be explained by the use of behavioural rules. To test this hypothesis, 18-month-old infants were trained to learn the new rule that an object that disappeared in location A could be found in location B. Infants were then administered a false belief task based on the…

Promoting functional foods as acceptable alternatives to doping: potential for information-based social marketing approach.

PubMed

James, Ricky; Naughton, Declan P; Petróczi, Andrea

2010-11-10

Substances with performance enhancing properties appear on a continuum, ranging from prohibited performance enhancing drugs (PED) through dietary supplements to functional foods (FF). Anti-doping messages designed to dissuade athletes from using PEDs have been typically based on moralising sport competition and/or employing scare campaigns with focus on the negative consequences. Campaigns offering comparable and acceptable alternatives are nonexistent, nor are athletes helped in finding these for themselves. It is timely that social marketing strategies for anti-doping prevention and intervention incorporate media messages that complement the existing approaches by promoting comparable and acceptable alternatives to doping. To facilitate this process, the aim of this study was to ascertain whether a single exposure knowledge-based information intervention led to increased knowledge and subsequently result in changes in beliefs and automatic associations regarding performance enhancements. In a repeated measure design, 115 male recreational gym users were recruited and provided with a brief information pamphlet on nitrite/nitrate and erythropoietin as a comparison. Measures of knowledge, beliefs and automatic associations were taken before and after the intervention with at least 24 hours between the two assessments. The psychological tests included explicit measures of beliefs and cognitive attitudes toward FF and PED using a self-reported questionnaire and computerised assessments of automatic associations using the modified and shortened version of the Implicit Association Test. The information based intervention significantly increased knowledge (p < 0.001), changed explicit beliefs in specific FF (p < 0.001) and shifted the automatic association of FF with health to performance (p < 0.001). Explicitly expressed beliefs and automatic associations appear to be independent. Evidence was found that even a single exposure to a persuasive positive message can lead to belief change and can create new or alter existing associations - but only in the specific domain. Interventions to change outcome expectations in a positive way could be a rewarding avenue for anti-doping. Effective social marketing campaigns for drug free sport should follow appropriate market segmentation and use targeted messages via promoting the natural form as opposed to the purified form of the main active ingredient.

Promoting functional foods as acceptable alternatives to doping: potential for information-based social marketing approach

PubMed Central

2010-01-01

Background Substances with performance enhancing properties appear on a continuum, ranging from prohibited performance enhancing drugs (PED) through dietary supplements to functional foods (FF). Anti-doping messages designed to dissuade athletes from using PEDs have been typically based on moralising sport competition and/or employing scare campaigns with focus on the negative consequences. Campaigns offering comparable and acceptable alternatives are nonexistent, nor are athletes helped in finding these for themselves. It is timely that social marketing strategies for anti-doping prevention and intervention incorporate media messages that complement the existing approaches by promoting comparable and acceptable alternatives to doping. To facilitate this process, the aim of this study was to ascertain whether a single exposure knowledge-based information intervention led to increased knowledge and subsequently result in changes in beliefs and automatic associations regarding performance enhancements. Methods In a repeated measure design, 115 male recreational gym users were recruited and provided with a brief information pamphlet on nitrite/nitrate and erythropoietin as a comparison. Measures of knowledge, beliefs and automatic associations were taken before and after the intervention with at least 24 hours between the two assessments. The psychological tests included explicit measures of beliefs and cognitive attitudes toward FF and PED using a self-reported questionnaire and computerised assessments of automatic associations using the modified and shortened version of the Implicit Association Test. Results The information based intervention significantly increased knowledge (p < 0.001), changed explicit beliefs in specific FF (p < 0.001) and shifted the automatic association of FF with health to performance (p < 0.001). Explicitly expressed beliefs and automatic associations appear to be independent. Conclusion Evidence was found that even a single exposure to a persuasive positive message can lead to belief change and can create new or alter existing associations - but only in the specific domain. Interventions to change outcome expectations in a positive way could be a rewarding avenue for anti-doping. Effective social marketing campaigns for drug free sport should follow appropriate market segmentation and use targeted messages via promoting the natural form as opposed to the purified form of the main active ingredient. PMID:21067611

True- and false-belief reasoning in children and adults: an event-related potential study of theory of mind.

PubMed

Meinhardt, Jörg; Sodian, Beate; Thoermer, Claudia; Döhnel, Katrin; Sommer, Monika

2011-01-01

The understanding that another person's belief can differ from reality and that behaviour is guided by beliefs and not by reality reflects an important cornerstone in the development of a Theory of Mind. The present event-related potential (ERP) study had two aims: first, to reveal ERPs that distinguish between false- and true-belief reasoning and second, to investigate the neural changes in the development of false- and true-belief reasoning from childhood to adulthood. True- and false-belief cartoon stories were presented to adults and 6-8-year-old children. Results revealed two waveforms that differentiated between the two conditions: a late positive complex (LPC) associated with the reorientation from external stimuli to internal mental representations and a late anterior slow wave (LSW) associated with stimulus-independent processing of internal mental representations, a process that might be centrally involved in the decoupling mechanism. Additionally, we found developmental effects at an ERP level. Children showed a more posterior localization of the LPC and a broader frontal distribution of the LSW. The results may reflect developmental progress in conceptualizing the mental domain and support the idea that the cortical mentalizing network continues to develop even after children are able to master false beliefs. Copyright © 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

A Lag between Understanding False Belief and Emotion Attribution in Young Children: Relationships with Linguistic Ability and Mothers' Mental-State Language

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

de Rosnay, Marc; Pons, Francisco; Harris, Paul L.; Morrell, Julian M. B.

2004-01-01

This study examines the contribution of children's linguistic ability and mothers' use of mental-state language to young children's understanding of false belief and their subsequent ability to make belief-based emotion attributions. In Experiment 1, children (N = 51) were given three belief-based emotion-attribution tasks. A standard task in…

How to pass the false-belief task before your fourth birthday.

PubMed

Rubio-Fernández, Paula; Geurts, Bart

2013-01-01

The experimental record of the last three decades shows that children under 4 years old fail all sorts of variations on the standard false-belief task, whereas more recent studies have revealed that infants are able to pass nonverbal versions of the task. We argue that these paradoxical results are an artifact of the type of false-belief tasks that have been used to test infants and children: Nonverbal designs allow infants to keep track of a protagonist's perspective over a course of events, whereas verbal designs tend to disrupt the perspective-tracking process in various ways, which makes it too hard for younger children to demonstrate their capacity for perspective tracking. We report three experiments that confirm this hypothesis by showing that 3-year-olds can pass a suitably streamlined version of the verbal false-belief task. We conclude that young children can pass the verbal false-belief task provided that they are allowed to keep track of the protagonist's perspective without too much disruption.

False-belief understanding i 2.5-year-olds: evidence for violation-of-expectation change-of-location and unexpected-contents tasks.

PubMed

He, Zijing; Bolz, Matthias; Baillargeon, Renée

2011-03-01

Until recently, it was generally assumed that the ability to attribute false beliefs did not emerge until about 4 years of age. However, recent reports using spontaneous- as opposed to elicited-response tasks have suggested that this ability may be present much earlier. To date, researchers have employed two kinds of spontaneous-response false-belief tasks: violation-of-expectation tasks have been used with infants in the second year of life, and anticipatory-looking tasks have been used with toddlers in the third year of life. In the present research, 2.5-year-old toddlers were tested in violation-of-expectation tasks involving a change-of-location situation (Experiment 1) and an unexpected-contents situation (Experiment 2). Results were positive in both situations, providing the first demonstrations of false-belief understanding in toddlers using violation-of-expectation tasks and, as such, pointing to a consistent and continuous picture of early false-belief understanding.

False-belief understanding in 2.5-year-olds: evidence from violation-of-expectation change-of-location and unexpected-contents tasks

PubMed Central

He, Zijing; Bolz, Matthias; Baillargeon, Renée

2012-01-01

Until recently, it was generally assumed that the ability to attribute false beliefs did not emerge until about 4 years of age. However, recent reports using spontaneous- as opposed to elicited-response tasks have suggested that this ability may be present much earlier. To date, researchers have employed two kinds of spontaneous-response false-belief tasks: violation-of-expectation tasks have been used with infants in the second year of life, and anticipatory-looking tasks have been used with toddlers in the third year of life. In the present research, 2.5-year-old toddlers were tested in violation-of-expectation tasks involving a change-of-location situation (Experiment 1) and an unexpected-contents situation (Experiment 2). Results were positive in both situations, providing the first demonstrations of false-belief understanding in toddlers using violation-of-expectation tasks and, as such, pointing to a consistent and continuous picture of early false-belief understanding. PMID:22213902

Tracking speakers' false beliefs: is theory of mind available earlier for word learning?

PubMed

Houston-Price, Carmel; Goddard, Kate; Séclier, Catherine; Grant, Sally C; Reid, Caitlin J B; Boyden, Laura E; Williams, Rhiannon

2011-07-01

Happé and Loth (2002) describe word learning as a 'privileged domain' in the development of a theory of mind. We test this claim in a series of experiments based on the Sally-Anne paradigm. Three- and 4-year-old children's ability to represent others' false beliefs was investigated in tasks that required the child either to predict the actions of a protagonist in a story or to learn the meaning of a new word used by the protagonist. Experiment 1 replicated previous findings of better performance in a false belief word-learning task compared to a false belief action-prediction task. However, systematic manipulation of the task parameters in Experiments 2 and 3 revealed that this performance discrepancy disappeared when tasks were equated in their 'referential pull' (Perner, Rendl & Garnham, 2007). We conclude that the notion of a precocious theory of mind for word learning is not required to explain dissociations in performance on false belief tasks. © 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Teachers' Implicit Attitudes, Explicit Beliefs, and the Mediating Role of Respect and Cultural Responsibility on Mastery and Performance-Focused Instructional Practices

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Kumar, Revathy; Karabenick, Stuart A.; Burgoon, Jacob N.

2015-01-01

The theory of planned behavior and the dual process attitude-to-behavior MODE model framed an examination of how White teachers' (N = 241) implicit and explicit attitudes toward White versus non-White students were related to their classroom instructional practices in 2 school districts with a high percentage of Arab American and Chaldean American…

The Role of Age and Oral Lexical Competence in False Belief Understanding by Children and Adolescents with Hearing Loss

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Gonzalez, Antonia; Quintana, Inmaculada; Barajas, Carmen; Linero, Maria Jose

2007-01-01

In the past decade, most studies have reported that children who are deaf and hard of hearing who have parents with typical hearing experience a serious delay in the understanding of false belief. False belief understanding consists of the ability to infer that someone else believes that something is true when one knows it to be wrong. This…

Two-and-a-half-year-olds succeed at a traditional false-belief task with reduced processing demands.

PubMed

Setoh, Peipei; Scott, Rose M; Baillargeon, Renée

2016-11-22

When tested with traditional false-belief tasks, which require answering a standard question about the likely behavior of an agent with a false belief, children perform below chance until age 4 y or later. When tested without such questions, however, children give evidence of false-belief understanding much earlier. Are traditional tasks difficult because they tap a more advanced form of false-belief understanding (fundamental-change view) or because they impose greater processing demands (processing-demands view)? Evidence that young children succeed at traditional false-belief tasks when processing demands are reduced would support the latter view. In prior research, reductions in inhibitory-control demands led to improvements in young children's performance, but often only to chance (instead of below-chance) levels. Here we examined whether further reductions in processing demands might lead to success. We speculated that: (i) young children could respond randomly in a traditional low-inhibition task because their limited information-processing resources are overwhelmed by the total concurrent processing demands in the task; and (ii) these demands include those from the response-generation process activated by the standard question. This analysis suggested that 2.5-y-old toddlers might succeed at a traditional low-inhibition task if response-generation demands were also reduced via practice trials. As predicted, toddlers performed above chance following two response-generation practice trials; toddlers failed when these trials either were rendered less effective or were used in a high-inhibition task. These results support the processing-demands view: Even toddlers succeed at a traditional false-belief task when overall processing demands are reduced.

Great apes distinguish true from false beliefs in an interactive helping task

PubMed Central

Buttelmann, Frances; Carpenter, Malinda; Call, Josep; Tomasello, Michael

2017-01-01

Understanding the behavior of others in a wide variety of circumstances requires an understanding of their psychological states. Humans’ nearest primate relatives, the great apes, understand many psychological states of others, for example, perceptions, goals, and desires. However, so far there is little evidence that they possess the key marker of advanced human social cognition: an understanding of false beliefs. Here we demonstrate that in a nonverbal (implicit) false-belief test which is passed by human 1-year-old infants, great apes as a group, including chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), bonobos (Pan paniscus), and orangutans (Pongo abelii), distinguish between true and false beliefs in their helping behavior. Great apes thus may possess at least some basic understanding that an agent’s actions are based on her beliefs about reality. Hence, such understanding might not be the exclusive province of the human species. PMID:28379987

Great apes distinguish true from false beliefs in an interactive helping task.

PubMed

Buttelmann, David; Buttelmann, Frances; Carpenter, Malinda; Call, Josep; Tomasello, Michael

2017-01-01

Understanding the behavior of others in a wide variety of circumstances requires an understanding of their psychological states. Humans' nearest primate relatives, the great apes, understand many psychological states of others, for example, perceptions, goals, and desires. However, so far there is little evidence that they possess the key marker of advanced human social cognition: an understanding of false beliefs. Here we demonstrate that in a nonverbal (implicit) false-belief test which is passed by human 1-year-old infants, great apes as a group, including chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), bonobos (Pan paniscus), and orangutans (Pongo abelii), distinguish between true and false beliefs in their helping behavior. Great apes thus may possess at least some basic understanding that an agent's actions are based on her beliefs about reality. Hence, such understanding might not be the exclusive province of the human species.

Explicitly Teaching Critical Thinking Skills in a History Course

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

McLaughlin, Anne Collins; McGill, Alicia Ebbitt

2017-03-01

Critical thinking skills are often assessed via student beliefs in non-scientific ways of thinking, (e.g, pseudoscience). Courses aimed at reducing such beliefs have been studied in the STEM fields with the most successful focusing on skeptical thinking. However, critical thinking is not unique to the sciences; it is crucial in the humanities and to historical thinking and analysis. We investigated the effects of a history course on epistemically unwarranted beliefs in two class sections. Beliefs were measured pre- and post-semester. Beliefs declined for history students compared to a control class and the effect was strongest for the honors section. This study provides evidence that a humanities education engenders critical thinking. Further, there may be individual differences in ability or preparedness in developing such skills, suggesting different foci for critical thinking coursework.

Gesture as a window on children's beginning understanding of false belief.

PubMed

Carlson, Stephanie M; Wong, Antoinette; Lemke, Margaret; Cosser, Caron

2005-01-01

Given that gestures may provide access to transitions in cognitive development, preschoolers' performance on standard tasks was compared with their performance on a new gesture false belief task. Experiment 1 confirmed that children (N=45, M age=54 months) responded consistently on two gesture tasks and that there is dramatic improvement on both the gesture false belief task and a standard task from ages 3 to 5. In 2 subsequent experiments focusing on children in transition with respect to understanding false beliefs (Ns=34 and 70, M age=48 months), there was a significant advantage of gesture over standard and novel verbal-response tasks. Iconic gesture may facilitate reasoning about opaque mental states in children who are rapidly developing concepts of mind.

The overlap between false belief and spatial reorientation in the temporo-parietal junction: The role of input modality and task.

PubMed

Özdem, Ceylan; Brass, Marcel; Van der Cruyssen, Laurens; Van Overwalle, Frank

2017-04-01

Neuroimaging research has demonstrated that the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) is activated when unexpected stimuli appear in spatial reorientation tasks as well as during thinking about the beliefs of other people triggered by verbal scenarios. While the role of potential common component processes subserved by the TPJ has been extensively studied to explain this common activation, the potential confounding role of input modality (spatial vs. verbal) has been largely ignored. To investigate the role of input modality apart from task processes, we developed a novel spatial false belief task based on moving shapes. We explored the overlap in TPJ activation across this novel task and traditional tasks of spatial reorientation (Posner) and verbal belief (False Belief vs. Photo stories). The results show substantial overlap across the same spatial input modality (both reorientation and false belief) as well as across the common task process (verbal and spatial belief), but no triple overlap. This suggests the potential for an overarching function of the TPJ, with some degree of specialization in different subregions due to modality, function and connectivity. The results are discussed with respect to recent theoretical models of the TPJ.

The divided mind of a disbeliever: Intuitive beliefs about nature as purposefully created among different groups of non-religious adults.

PubMed

Järnefelt, Elisa; Canfield, Caitlin F; Kelemen, Deborah

2015-07-01

Do non-religious adults - despite their explicit disavowal of religious beliefs - have a tacit tendency to view nature as purposefully created by some being? This question was explored in three online studies using a speeded judgment procedure, which assessed disbelievers in two different Western cultures (United States and Finland). Despite strong performance on control trials, across all three studies non-religious individuals displayed a default bias to increasingly judge pictures of natural phenomena as "purposefully made by some being" under processing constraints. Personal beliefs in the supernatural agency of nature ("Gaia beliefs") consistently predicted this tendency. However, beliefs in nature as purposefully made by some being persisted even when such secular agency beliefs were controlled. These results suggest that the tendency to view nature as designed is rooted in evolved cognitive biases as well as cultural socialization. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Executive Function and Children's Understanding of False Belief: How Specific Is the Relation?

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Muller, U.; Zelazo, P.D.; Imrisek, S.

2005-01-01

The present study examined developmental relations among understanding false belief, understanding ''false'' photographs, performance on the Dimensional Change Card Sort (DCCS), and performance on a picture-sentence verification task in 69 3-5-year-old children. Results showed that performance on the DCCS predicted performance on false belief…

Deafness, Thought Bubbles, and Theory-of-Mind Development

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Wellman, Henry M.; Peterson, Candida C.

2013-01-01

The processes and mechanisms of theory-of-mind development were examined via a training study of false-belief conceptions in deaf children of hearing parents (N = 43). In comparison to 2 different control conditions, training based on thought-bubble instruction about beliefs was linked with improved false-belief understanding as well as progress…

Do 10-Month-Old Infants Understand Others' False Beliefs?

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Luo, Yuyan

2011-01-01

As adults, we know that others' mental states, such as beliefs, guide their behavior and that these mental states can deviate from reality. Researchers have examined whether young children possess adult-like theory of mind by focusing on their understanding about others' false beliefs. The present research revealed that 10-month-old infants seemed…

Social contract and social integration in adolescent development.

PubMed

Hilles, W S; Kahle, L R

1985-10-01

Eighty-nine subjects from two high schools were tested during the spring of their sophomore and senior years, when their mean ages were 16 years, 1 month, and 18 years, 1 month, respectively. Composites measured social contract with: (a) independence, (b) implicit social contract, societal norms and expectations, and (c) explicit social contracts, rules. Composites and single items measured social integration with: (d) role commitment, (e) social-American Dream, accepting the belief in the American Dream that hard work would lead to social success, (f) self-American Dream, belief that hard work will produce personal satisfaction and success, (g) raw deal, perceptions of being treated unfairly, (h) self-blame, and (i) feelings of hopelessness. The results of the cross-lagged panel correlations generally support the hypothesis that students respond to implicit social contracts through role commitment, which is further expressed by a belief in the American Dream for social fulfillment, while responding to the perception of explicit social contracts by not believing in the benefits of the American Dream for personal fulfillment. These results were interpreted as supporting Dienstbier's theory of moral development.

Two-and-a-half-year-olds succeed at a traditional false-belief task with reduced processing demands

PubMed Central

Scott, Rose M.; Baillargeon, Renée

2016-01-01

When tested with traditional false-belief tasks, which require answering a standard question about the likely behavior of an agent with a false belief, children perform below chance until age 4 y or later. When tested without such questions, however, children give evidence of false-belief understanding much earlier. Are traditional tasks difficult because they tap a more advanced form of false-belief understanding (fundamental-change view) or because they impose greater processing demands (processing-demands view)? Evidence that young children succeed at traditional false-belief tasks when processing demands are reduced would support the latter view. In prior research, reductions in inhibitory-control demands led to improvements in young children’s performance, but often only to chance (instead of below-chance) levels. Here we examined whether further reductions in processing demands might lead to success. We speculated that: (i) young children could respond randomly in a traditional low-inhibition task because their limited information-processing resources are overwhelmed by the total concurrent processing demands in the task; and (ii) these demands include those from the response-generation process activated by the standard question. This analysis suggested that 2.5-y-old toddlers might succeed at a traditional low-inhibition task if response-generation demands were also reduced via practice trials. As predicted, toddlers performed above chance following two response-generation practice trials; toddlers failed when these trials either were rendered less effective or were used in a high-inhibition task. These results support the processing-demands view: Even toddlers succeed at a traditional false-belief task when overall processing demands are reduced. PMID:27821728

2.5-year-olds Succeed at a Verbal Anticipatory-Looking False-Belief Task

PubMed Central

He, Zijing; Bolz, Matthias; Baillargeon, Renée

2012-01-01

Recent research suggests that infants and toddlers succeed at a wide range of nonelicited-response false-belief tasks (i.e., tasks that do not require children to answer a direct question about a mistaken agent’s likely behavior). However, one exception to this generalization comes from verbal anticipatory-looking tasks, which have produced inconsistent findings with toddlers. One possible explanation for these findings is that toddlers succeed when they correctly interpret the prompt as a self-addressed utterance (making the task a nonelicited-response task), but fail when they mistakenly interpret the prompt as a direct question (making the task an elicited-response task). Here, 2.5-year-old toddlers were tested in a verbal anticipatory-looking task that was designed to help them interpret the anticipatory prompt as a self-addressed utterance: the experimenter looked at the ceiling, chin in hand, during and after the prompt. Children gave evidence of false-belief understanding in this task, but failed when the experimenter looked at the child during and after the prompt. These results reinforce claims of robust continuity in early false-belief reasoning and provide additional support for the distinction between nonelicited- and elicited-response false-belief tasks. Three accounts of the discrepant results obtained with these tasks—and of early false-belief understanding more generally—are discussed. PMID:22429030

2.5-year-olds succeed at a verbal anticipatory-looking false-belief task.

PubMed

He, Zijing; Bolz, Matthias; Baillargeon, Renée

2012-03-01

Recent research suggests that infants and toddlers succeed at a wide range of non-elicited-response false-belief tasks (i.e., tasks that do not require children to answer a direct question about a mistaken agent's likely behaviour). However, one exception to this generalization comes from verbal anticipatory-looking tasks, which have produced inconsistent findings with toddlers. One possible explanation for these findings is that toddlers succeed when they correctly interpret the prompt as a self-addressed utterance (making the task a non-elicited-response task), but fail when they mistakenly interpret the prompt as a direct question (making the task an elicited-response task). Here, 2.5-year-old toddlers were tested in a verbal anticipatory-looking task that was designed to help them interpret the anticipatory prompt as a self-addressed utterance: the experimenter looked at the ceiling, chin in hand, during and after the prompt. Children gave evidence of false-belief understanding in this task, but failed when the experimenter looked at the child during and after the prompt. These results reinforce claims of robust continuity in early false-belief reasoning and provide additional support for the distinction between non-elicited- and elicited-response false-belief tasks. Three accounts of the discrepant results obtained with these tasks - and of early false-belief understanding more generally - are discussed. © 2011 The British Psychological Society.

False-Belief Understanding and Language Ability Mediate the Relationship between Emotion Comprehension and Prosocial Orientation in Preschoolers.

PubMed

Ornaghi, Veronica; Pepe, Alessandro; Grazzani, Ilaria

2016-01-01

Emotion comprehension (EC) is known to be a key correlate and predictor of prosociality from early childhood. In the present study, we examined this relationship within the broad theoretical construct of social understanding which includes a number of socio-emotional skills, as well as cognitive and linguistic abilities. Theory of mind, especially false-belief understanding, has been found to be positively correlated with both EC and prosocial orientation. Similarly, language ability is known to play a key role in children's socio-emotional development. The combined contribution of false-belief understanding and language to explaining the relationship between EC and prosociality has yet to be investigated. Thus, in the current study, we conducted an in-depth exploration of how preschoolers' false-belief understanding and language ability each contribute to modeling the relationship between children's comprehension of emotion and their disposition to act prosocially toward others, after controlling for age and gender. Participants were 101 4- to 6-year-old children (54% boys), who were administered measures of language ability, false-belief understanding, EC and prosocial orientation. Multiple mediation analysis of the data suggested that false-belief understanding and language ability jointly and fully mediated the effect of preschoolers' EC on their prosocial orientation. Analysis of covariates revealed that gender exerted no statistically significant effect, while age had a trivial positive effect. Theoretical and practical implications of the findings are discussed.

Do 15-Month-Old Infants Understand False Beliefs?

PubMed Central

Onishi, Kristine H.; Baillargeon, Renée

2012-01-01

For more than two decades, researchers have argued that young children do not understand mental states such as beliefs. Part of the evidence for this claim comes from preschoolers’ failure at verbal tasks that require the understanding that others may hold false beliefs. Here, we used a novel nonverbal task to examine 15-month-old infants’ ability to predict an actor’s behavior on the basis of her true or false belief about a toy’s hiding place. Results were positive, supporting the view that, from a young age, children appeal to mental states—goals, perceptions, and beliefs—to explain the behavior of others. PMID:15821091

Breaking the rules: do infants have a true understanding of false belief?

PubMed

Yott, Jessica; Poulin-Dubois, Diane

2012-03-01

It has been suggested that infants' performance on the false belief task can be explained by the use of behavioural rules. To test this hypothesis, 18-month-old infants were trained to learn the new rule that an object that disappeared in location A could be found in location B. Infants were then administered a false belief task based on the violation of expectation (VOE) paradigm, an intention understanding task, and a modified detour-reaching task. Results revealed that infants looked significantly longer at the display when the experimenter looked for the toy in the full box (box with the toy) compared to infants who observed the experimenter search in the empty box (box without the toy). Results also revealed significant correlations between infants' looking time at the display and their scores on the intention task and on the detour-reaching task. Taken together, these findings suggest that infants possess an implicit understanding of false belief. In addition, they challenge the view that success on the implicit false belief task does not require executive functioning abilities. © 2011 The British Psychological Society.

Metacognitive development of deaf children: lessons from the appearance-reality and false belief tasks.

PubMed

Courtin, Cyril; Melot, Anne-Marie

2005-01-01

'Theory of mind' development is now an important research field in deaf studies. Past research with the classic false belief task has consistently reported a delay in theory of mind development in deaf children born of hearing parents, while performance of second-generation deaf children is more problematic with some contradictory results. The present paper is aimed at testing the metacognitive abilities of deaf children on two tasks: the appearance-reality paradigm designed by Flavell, Flavell and Green (1983) and the classic false belief inference task (Wimmer & Perner, 1983; Hogrefe, Wimmer & Perner, 1986). Twenty-eight second-generation deaf children, 60 deaf children of hearing parents and 36 hearing children, aged 5 to 7, were tested and compared on three appearance-reality and three false belief items. Results show that early exposure to language, be it signed or oral, facilitates performance on the two theory of mind tasks. In addition, native signers equal hearing children in the appearance-reality task while surpassing them on the false belief one. The differences of performance patterns in the two tasks are discussed in terms of linguistic and metarepresentational development.

When representations conflict with reality: the preschooler's problem with false beliefs and "false" photographs.

PubMed

Zaitchik, D

1990-04-01

It has been argued that young preschoolers cannot correctly attribute a false belief to a deceived actor (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). Some researchers claim that the problem lies in the child's inadequate epistemology (Chandler & Boyes, 1982; Wellman, 1988); as such, it is specific to the child's theory of mind and no such problem should appear in reasoning about nonmental representations. This prediction is tested below in the "false photograph" task: here an actor takes a photograph of an object in location X; the object is then moved to location Y. Preschool subjects are asked: "In the picture, where is the object?" Results indicate that photographs are no easier to reason about than are beliefs. Manipulations to boost performance on the photograph task proved ineffective. Further, an explanation of the failure as a processing limitation having nothing to do with the representational nature of beliefs or photographs was ruled out. It is argued that young children's failure on the false belief task is not due to an inadequate epistemology (though they may have one) and is symptomatic of a larger problem with representations.

The role of language in the development of false belief understanding: a training study.

PubMed

Lohmann, Heidemarie; Tomasello, Michael

2003-01-01

The current study used a training methodology to determine whether different kinds of linguistic interaction play a causal role in children's development of false belief understanding. After 3 training sessions, 3-year-old children improved their false belief understanding both in a training condition involving perspective-shifting discourse about deceptive objects (without mental state terms) and in a condition in which sentential complement syntax was used (without deceptive objects). Children did not improve in a condition in which they were exposed to deceptive objects without accompanying language. Children showed most improvement in a condition using both perspective-shifting discourse and sentential complement syntax, suggesting that each of these types of linguistic experience plays an independent role in the ontogeny of false belief understanding.

Core Intuitions About Persons Coexist and Interfere With Acquired Christian Beliefs About God.

PubMed

Barlev, Michael; Mermelstein, Spencer; German, Tamsin C

2017-04-01

This study tested the hypothesis that in the minds of adult religious adherents, acquired beliefs about the extraordinary characteristics of God coexist with, rather than replace, an initial representation of God formed by co-option of the evolved person concept. In three experiments, Christian religious adherents were asked to evaluate a series of statements for which core intuitions about persons and acquired Christian beliefs about God were consistent (i.e., true according to both [e.g., "God has beliefs that are true"] or false according to both [e.g., "All beliefs God has are false"]) or inconsistent (i.e., true on intuition but false theologically [e.g., "God has beliefs that are false"] or false on intuition but true theologically [e.g., "All beliefs God has are true"]). Participants were less accurate and slower to respond to inconsistent versus consistent statements, suggesting that the core intuitions both coexisted alongside and interfered with the acquired beliefs (Experiments 1 and 2). In Experiment 2 when responding under time pressure participants were disproportionately more likely to make errors on inconsistent versus consistent statements than when responding with no time pressure, suggesting that the resolution of interference requires cognitive resources the functioning of which decreases under cognitive load. In Experiment 3 a plausible alternative interpretation of these findings was ruled out by demonstrating that the response accuracy and time differences on consistent versus inconsistent statements occur for God-a supernatural religious entity-but not for a natural religious entity (a priest). Copyright © 2016 Cognitive Science Society, Inc.

Three- and Four-Year-Old Children's Ability to Use Desire- and Belief-Based Reasoning.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Cassidy, Kimberly Wright

1998-01-01

This study investigated the relationship of 3-year olds' reliance on desire when predicting behavior and their performance on false-belief tasks. Results suggested that young children may use the desires of the agent, rather than their own desires, to predict behavior in standard false-belief paradigms. Older preschoolers also have difficulty…

A test of the submentalizing hypothesis: Apes' performance in a false belief task inanimate control

PubMed Central

Hirata, Satoshi; Call, Josep; Tomasello, Michael

2017-01-01

ABSTRACT Much debate concerns whether any nonhuman animals share with humans the ability to infer others' mental states, such as desires and beliefs. In a recent eye-tracking false-belief task, we showed that great apes correctly anticipated that a human actor would search for a goal object where he had last seen it, even though the apes themselves knew that it was no longer there. In response, Heyes proposed that apes' looking behavior was guided not by social cognitive mechanisms but rather domain-general cueing effects, and suggested the use of inanimate controls to test this alternative submentalizing hypothesis. In the present study, we implemented the suggested inanimate control of our previous false-belief task. Apes attended well to key events but showed markedly fewer anticipatory looks and no significant tendency to look to the correct location. We thus found no evidence that submentalizing was responsible for apes' anticipatory looks in our false-belief task. PMID:28919941

A test of the submentalizing hypothesis: Apes' performance in a false belief task inanimate control.

PubMed

Krupenye, Christopher; Kano, Fumihiro; Hirata, Satoshi; Call, Josep; Tomasello, Michael

2017-01-01

Much debate concerns whether any nonhuman animals share with humans the ability to infer others' mental states, such as desires and beliefs. In a recent eye-tracking false-belief task, we showed that great apes correctly anticipated that a human actor would search for a goal object where he had last seen it, even though the apes themselves knew that it was no longer there. In response, Heyes proposed that apes' looking behavior was guided not by social cognitive mechanisms but rather domain-general cueing effects, and suggested the use of inanimate controls to test this alternative submentalizing hypothesis. In the present study, we implemented the suggested inanimate control of our previous false-belief task. Apes attended well to key events but showed markedly fewer anticipatory looks and no significant tendency to look to the correct location. We thus found no evidence that submentalizing was responsible for apes' anticipatory looks in our false-belief task.

Theory of mind: a new perspective on the puzzle of belief ascription.

PubMed

Airenti, Gabriella

2015-01-01

The concept of theory of mind (ToM) has considerably changed since its first proposal. The aim of first human studies was to understand how young children acquire the representation of others' mental states, in particular beliefs, and how they distinguish them from their own and from reality. The False Belief Task was designed to prove the acquisition of this capacity. According to children's performance in this test the acquisition of ToM has been attested at around 4 years of age. In last years it has been shown that using spontaneous response tasks also 15-month-old-children could attribute to an agent a false belief about the location of an object. These results have generated the puzzle of belief-ascription: Why do 3-year-old children fail the classical false belief tasks whereas much younger children show the correct expectation in the spontaneous response tasks? In this paper I shall argue that (i) infants and young children, when confronted with the two forms of false belief tasks do not face the same problem and (ii) behind the two testing situations there are different ways to understand theory of mind. I shall propose that what appears in infants is the natural human disposition to intersubjectivity.

Delusions as harmful malfunctioning beliefs.

PubMed

Miyazono, Kengo

2015-05-01

Delusional beliefs are typically pathological. Being pathological is clearly distinguished from being false or being irrational. Anna might falsely believe that his husband is having an affair but it might just be a simple mistake. Again, Sam might irrationally believe, without good evidence, that he is smarter than his colleagues, but it might just be a healthy self-deceptive belief. On the other hand, when a patient with brain damage caused by a car accident believes that his father was replaced by an imposter or another patient with schizophrenia believes that "The Organization" painted the shops on a street in red and green to convey a message, these beliefs are not merely false or irrational. They are pathological. What makes delusions pathological? This paper explores the negative features because of which delusional beliefs are pathological. First, I critically examine the proposals according to which delusional beliefs are pathological because of (1) their strangeness, (2) their extreme irrationality, (3) their resistance to folk psychological explanations or (4) impaired responsibility-grounding capacities of people with them. I present some counterexamples as well as theoretical problems for these proposals. Then, I argue, following Wakefield's harmful dysfunction analysis of disorder, that delusional beliefs are pathological because they involve some sorts of harmful malfunctions. In other words, they have a significant negative impact on wellbeing (=harmful) and, in addition, some psychological mechanisms, directly or indirectly related to them, fail to perform the jobs for which they were selected in the past (=malfunctioning). An objection to the proposal is that delusional beliefs might not involve any malfunctions. For example, they might be playing psychological defence functions properly. Another objection is that a harmful malfunction is not sufficient for something to be pathological. For example, false beliefs might involve some malfunctions according to teleosemantics, a popular naturalist account of mental content, but harmful false beliefs do not have to be pathological. I examine those objections in detail and show that they should be rejected after all. Copyright © 2014. Published by Elsevier Inc.

Recovering the negative mode for type B Coleman-de Luccia instantons

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Yang, I.-Sheng

2013-04-01

The usual (type A) thin-wall Coleman—de Luccia instanton is made by a bigger-than-half sphere of the false vacuum and a smaller-than-half sphere of the true vacuum. It has the standard O(4) symmetric negative mode associated with changing the size of the true vacuum region. On the other hand, the type B instanton, made by two smaller-than-half spheres, was believed to have lost this negative mode. We argue that such a belief is misguided due to an overrestriction on the Euclidean path integral. We introduce the idea of a “purely geometric junction” to visualize why such a restriction could be removed, and then we explicitly construct this negative mode. We also show that type B and type A instantons have the same thermal interpretation for mediating tunnelings.

False-Belief Understanding and Language Ability Mediate the Relationship between Emotion Comprehension and Prosocial Orientation in Preschoolers

PubMed Central

Ornaghi, Veronica; Pepe, Alessandro; Grazzani, Ilaria

2016-01-01

Emotion comprehension (EC) is known to be a key correlate and predictor of prosociality from early childhood. In the present study, we examined this relationship within the broad theoretical construct of social understanding which includes a number of socio-emotional skills, as well as cognitive and linguistic abilities. Theory of mind, especially false-belief understanding, has been found to be positively correlated with both EC and prosocial orientation. Similarly, language ability is known to play a key role in children’s socio-emotional development. The combined contribution of false-belief understanding and language to explaining the relationship between EC and prosociality has yet to be investigated. Thus, in the current study, we conducted an in-depth exploration of how preschoolers’ false-belief understanding and language ability each contribute to modeling the relationship between children’s comprehension of emotion and their disposition to act prosocially toward others, after controlling for age and gender. Participants were 101 4- to 6-year-old children (54% boys), who were administered measures of language ability, false-belief understanding, EC and prosocial orientation. Multiple mediation analysis of the data suggested that false-belief understanding and language ability jointly and fully mediated the effect of preschoolers’ EC on their prosocial orientation. Analysis of covariates revealed that gender exerted no statistically significant effect, while age had a trivial positive effect. Theoretical and practical implications of the findings are discussed. PMID:27774075

Making sense of theory of mind and paranoia: the psychometric properties and reasoning requirements of a false belief sequencing task.

PubMed

Corcoran, Rhiannon; Bentall, Richard P; Rowse, Georgina; Moore, Rosanne; Cummins, Sinead; Blackwood, Nigel; Howard, Robert; Shryane, Nick M

2011-11-01

INTRODUCTION. This study used Item-Response Theory (IRT) to model the psychometric properties of a false belief picture sequencing task. Consistent with the mental time travel hypothesis of paranoia, we anticipated that performance on this deductive theory of mind (ToM) task would not be associated with the presence of persecutory delusions but would be related to other clinical, cognitive, and demographic factors. METHOD. A large (N=237) and diverse clinical and nonclinical sample differing in levels of depression and paranoid ideation performed 2 ToM tasks: the false belief sequencing task and a ToM stories task that was used to assess the validity of the false belief sequencing task as a measure of ToM. RESULTS. A unidimensional IRT model was found to fit the data well. Latent ToM ability as measured by the false belief sequencing task was negatively related with age and positively with IQ. In contrast to the ToM stories measure, there was no association between clinical diagnosis or symptoms and false belief picture sequencing after controlling for age and IQ. CONCLUSIONS. In line with mental time travel hypothesis of paranoia (Corcoran, 2010 ), performance on this deductive nonverbal ToM task is not related to the presence of paranoid symptoms. This measure is best suited for assessing ToM functioning where participants' performance falls just short of the average latent ToM ability. Furthermore, it is sensitive to the effects of increasing age and decreasing IQ.

Spirituality and Ten False Beliefs and Pursuits of Women with Eating Disorders: Implications for Counselors.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Hardman, Randy K.; Berrett, Michael E.; Richards, P. Scott

2003-01-01

Authors describe ten false beliefs that women with eating disorders may hold. They explain how the pursuit of these beliefs can prevent the women from connecting with God and with others in genuine ways. They also suggest some therapeutic strategies that may help women with eating disorders find a healing and helpful spiritual perspective.…

18-Month-Olds Predict Specific Action Mistakes through Attribution of False Belief, Not Ignorance, and Intervene Accordingly

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Knudsen, Birgit; Liszkowski, Ulf

2012-01-01

This study employed a new "anticipatory intervening" paradigm to tease apart false belief and ignorance-based interpretations of 18-month-olds' helpful informing. We investigated in three experiments whether 18-month-old infants inform an adult selectively about one of the two locations depending on the adult's belief about which of the two…

Two Sources of Evidence on the Non-Automaticity of True and False Belief Ascription

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Back, Elisa; Apperly, Ian A.

2010-01-01

A recent study by Apperly et al. (2006) found evidence that adults do not automatically infer false beliefs while watching videos that afford such inferences. This method was extended to examine true beliefs, which are sometimes thought to be ascribed by "default" (e.g., Leslie & Thaiss, 1992). Sequences of pictures were presented in which the…

On the persuadability of memory: Is changing people's memories no more than changing their minds?

PubMed

Nash, Robert A; Wheeler, Rebecca L; Hope, Lorraine

2015-05-01

The observation of parallels between the memory distortion and persuasion literatures leads, quite logically, to the appealing notion that people can be 'persuaded' to change their memories. Indeed, numerous studies show that memory can be influenced and distorted by a variety of persuasive tactics, and the theoretical accounts commonly used by researchers to explain episodic and autobiographical memory distortion phenomena can generally predict and explain these persuasion effects. Yet, despite these empirical and theoretical overlaps, explicit reference to persuasion and attitude-change research in the memory distortion literature is surprisingly rare. In this paper, we argue that stronger theoretical foundations are needed to draw the memory distortion and persuasion literatures together in a productive direction. We reason that theoretical approaches to remembering that distinguish (false) beliefs in the occurrence of events from (false) memories of those events - compatible with a source monitoring approach - would be beneficial to this end. Such approaches, we argue, would provide a stronger platform to use persuasion findings to enhance the psychological understanding of memory distortion. © 2014 The British Psychological Society.

False belief and counterfactual reasoning in a social environment.

PubMed

Van Hoeck, Nicole; Begtas, Elizabet; Steen, Johan; Kestemont, Jenny; Vandekerckhove, Marie; Van Overwalle, Frank

2014-04-15

Behavioral studies indicate that theory of mind and counterfactual reasoning are strongly related cognitive processes. In a neuroimaging study, we explored the common and distinct regions underlying these inference processes. We directly compared false belief reasoning (inferring an agent's false belief about an object's location or content) and counterfactual reasoning (inferring what the object's location or content would be if an agent had acted differently), both in contrast with a baseline condition of conditional reasoning (inferring what the true location or content of an object is). Results indicate that these three types of reasoning about social scenarios are supported by activations in the mentalizing network (left temporo-parietal junction and precuneus) and the executive control network (bilateral prefrontal cortex [PFC] and right inferior parietal lobule). In addition, representing a false belief or counterfactual state (both not directly observable in the external world) recruits additional activity in the executive control network (left dorsolateral PFC and parietal lobe). The results further suggest that counterfactual reasoning is a more complex cognitive process than false belief reasoning, showing stronger activation of the dorsomedial, left dorsolateral PFC, cerebellum and left temporal cortex. Copyright © 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

False Belief Performance of Children Adopted Internationally.

PubMed

Hwa-Froelich, Deborah A; Matsuo, Hisako; Jacobs, Kristal

2017-02-01

The purpose of this study was to explore relationships among adoption, individual, and family variables on false belief performance of children adopted internationally (CAI). Using a quasiexperimental design, thirty-five 4-year-old children adopted from Asian and Eastern European countries before age 2 years were compared with a U.S. group of 33 nonadopted 4-year-old children on a standardized English-language measure, 3 false belief tasks, and a go/no-go inhibition measure. The adopted group differed significantly from the U.S. nonadopted group in expressive language and false belief performance. For the adopted group, inhibition measures were significantly correlated with core language scores. Core language scores and number of older siblings predicted false belief performance. Similar to children who are not adopted, language competence and living with older siblings positively influenced social understanding in CAI. Because CAI experience interrupted language acquisition and live with fewer older siblings, they are at risk of having weaker language competence and social understanding in their adopted language. When working with CAI, practitioners should assess social communication, language competence, and inhibition skills. They should assist adoptive families in providing socially mentored opportunities for their children to observe and interact with older children.

Are emotion and mind understanding differently linked to young children's social adjustment? Relationships between behavioral consequences of emotions, false belief, and SCBE.

PubMed

Deneault, Joane; Ricard, Marcelle

2013-01-01

According to empirical findings, emotional knowledge and false belief understanding seem to be differently linked to social adjustment. However, whereas false belief is assessed through the capacity to identify its behavioral consequences, emotion tasks usually rely on the comprehension of facial expressions and of the situational causes of emotions. The authors examined if the documented relationship between social adjustment and emotion knowledge in children extends to the understanding of behavioral consequences of emotions. Eighty French-speaking preschoolers undertook false belief and consequence-of-emotion tasks. Their social adjustment was measured by the Social Competence and Behavior Evaluation. Children's language ability, their parent's level of education, and the familial socioeconomic score were taken into account. Results showed that children's social adjustment was significantly predicted by their knowledge of emotion, but not by their understanding of false belief. The findings confirm the special status of emotion among mental states for social adaptation and specify which dimensions of adaptation to peers and adults are predicted by the child's emotion understanding. They also suggest that the distinction between mind and emotion understanding may be conceptual rather than methodological.

The Impact of Explicit Teaching of Methodological Aspects of Physics on Scientistic Beliefs and Interest

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Korte, Stefan; Berger, Roland; Hänze, Martin

2017-05-01

We assessed the impact of teaching methodological aspects of physics on students' scientistic beliefs and subject interest in physics in a repeated-measurement design with a total of 142 students of upper secondary physics classes. Students gained knowledge of methodological aspects from the pre-test to the post-test and reported reduced scientistic beliefs, both from their own views and from their presumed prototypical physicists' views. We found no direct impact of teaching on students' subject interest in physics. As path analysis indicates, this result can be traced back to opposing paths: Lower scientistic beliefs of students attenuate subject interest while lower presumed scientistic beliefs that they hold of physicists foster subject interest. This finding is in accordance with the self-to-prototype matching theory that predicts an impact of the overlap between students' self-image and their prototypical image on subject interest in physics.

A Nonverbal False Belief Task: The Performance of Children and Great Apes.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Call, Josep; Tomasello, Michael

1999-01-01

Compared performance of preschool children, chimpanzees, and orangutans on nonverbal task of false-belief understanding and tested children's performance on a verbal version of the same task. Found that children's performance on verbal and nonverbal tasks were highly correlated, and no chimp or orangutan succeeded in the nonverbal false-belief…

A Reaction Time Advantage for Calculating Beliefs over Public Representations Signals Domain Specificity for "Theory of Mind"

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Cohen, Adam S.; German, Tamsin C.

2010-01-01

In a task where participants' overt task was to track the location of an object across a sequence of events, reaction times to unpredictable probes requiring an inference about a social agent's beliefs about the location of that object were obtained. Reaction times to false belief situations were faster than responses about the (false) contents of…

The Cost of Thinking about False Beliefs: Evidence from Adults' Performance on a Non-Inferential Theory of Mind Task

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Apperly, Ian A.; Back, Elisa; Samson, Dana; France, Lisa

2008-01-01

Much of what we know about other people's beliefs comes non-inferentially from what people tell us. Developmental research suggests that 3-year-olds have difficulty processing such information: they suffer interference from their own knowledge of reality when told about someone's false belief (e.g., [Wellman, H. M., & Bartsch, K. (1988). Young…

“Prejudiced” Behavior Without Prejudice? Beliefs About the Malleability of Prejudice Affect Interracial Interactions

PubMed Central

Carr, Priyanka B.; Dweck, Carol S.; Pauker, Kristin

2013-01-01

Prejudiced behavior is typically seen as emanating from prejudiced attitudes. Eight studies showed that majority-group members’ beliefs about prejudice can create seemingly “prejudiced” behaviors above and beyond prejudice measured explicitly (Study 1b) and implicitly (Study 2). Those who believed prejudice was relatively fixed, rather than malleable, were less interested in interracial interactions (Studies 1a–d), race- or diversity-related activities (Study 1a), and activities to reduce their prejudice (Study 3). They were also more uncomfortable in interracial, but not same-race, interactions (Study 2). Study 4 manipulated beliefs about prejudice and found that a fixed belief, by heightening concerns about revealing prejudice to oneself and others, depressed interest in interracial interactions. Further, though those taught a fixed belief were more anxious and unfriendly in an interaction with a Black compared to White individual, those taught a malleable belief were not (Study 5). Implications for reducing prejudice and improving intergroup relations are discussed. PMID:22708626

The Development of Theory of Mind and Positive and Negative Reciprocity in Preschool Children

PubMed Central

Schug, Joanna; Takagishi, Haruto; Benech, Catalina; Okada, Hiroyuki

2016-01-01

This study examined the relation between the acquisition of false-beliefs theory of mind (ToM) and reciprocity in preschoolers. Preschool-aged children completed a task assessing the understanding of false beliefs, and played an Ultimatum Game (UG) with another child in a face-to-face setting. Negative reciprocity was assessed by examining the rejection of unfair offers made by another child in the UG, while positive reciprocity was assessed by examining allocations made by participants in a Dictator Game (DG) following the UG. The results indicated that children who had passed a task assessing first-order false beliefs were more likely to make generous offers in a DG following a fair offer made by their partner in a proceeding UG, but that false beliefs ToM was unrelated to the rejection of unfair offers in the UG. PMID:27445881

The Development of Theory of Mind and Positive and Negative Reciprocity in Preschool Children.

PubMed

Schug, Joanna; Takagishi, Haruto; Benech, Catalina; Okada, Hiroyuki

2016-01-01

This study examined the relation between the acquisition of false-beliefs theory of mind (ToM) and reciprocity in preschoolers. Preschool-aged children completed a task assessing the understanding of false beliefs, and played an Ultimatum Game (UG) with another child in a face-to-face setting. Negative reciprocity was assessed by examining the rejection of unfair offers made by another child in the UG, while positive reciprocity was assessed by examining allocations made by participants in a Dictator Game (DG) following the UG. The results indicated that children who had passed a task assessing first-order false beliefs were more likely to make generous offers in a DG following a fair offer made by their partner in a proceeding UG, but that false beliefs ToM was unrelated to the rejection of unfair offers in the UG.

Validity of false belief tasks in blind children.

PubMed

Brambring, Michael; Asbrock, Doreen

2010-12-01

Previous studies have reported that congenitally blind children without any additional impairment reveal a developmental delay of at least 4 years in perspective taking based on testing first-order false-belief tasks. These authors interpret this delay as a sign of autism-like behavior. However, the delay may be caused by testing blind children with false-belief tasks that require visual experience. Therefore, the present study gave alternative false-belief tasks based on tactile or auditory experience to 45 congenitally blind 4-10-year-olds and 37 sighted 3-6-year-olds. Results showed criterion performance at 80 months (6; 8 years) in blind children compared with 61 months (5; 1 years) in sighted controls. It is concluded that this 19-month (1; 7 year) difference, which is comparable with delays in other developmental areas, is a developmental delay caused by the fact of congenital blindness rather than a sign of a psychopathological disorder of autism-like behavior.

Together I Can! Joint Attention Boosts 3- to 4-Year-Olds' Performance in a Verbal False-Belief Test.

PubMed

Psouni, Elia; Falck, Andreas; Boström, Leni; Persson, Martin; Sidén, Lisa; Wallin, Maria

2018-04-20

Effects of joint attention were addressed on 3- to 4-year-olds' performance in a verbal false-Belief Test (FBT), featuring the experimenter as co-watcher rather than narrator. In two experiments, children (N = 183) watched a filmed-FBT jointly with a test leader, disjointed from a test leader, or alone. Children attending jointly with a test leader were more likely to pass the FBT compared with normative data and to spontaneously recall information indicating false-belief understanding, suggesting that joint attention strengthens the plausibility of the FBT and renders plot-critical information more salient. In a third experiment (N = 59), results were replicated using a typical, image-based FBT. Overall findings highlight the profound impact of experimenter as social context in verbal FBTs, and link recall of specific story features to false-belief understanding. © 2018 Society for Research in Child Development.

Effects of maternal negativity and of early and recent recurrent depressive disorder on children's false belief understanding.

PubMed

Rohrer, Lisa M; Cicchetti, Dante; Rogosch, Fred A; Toth, Sheree L; Maughan, Angeline

2011-01-01

Research has shown that children of depressed mothers are at risk for problems in a variety of developmental domains; however, little is known about the effects of maternal depression on children's emerging understanding of false beliefs. In this study, 3 false belief tasks were administered to 5-year-old children whose mothers had either met criteria for major depressive disorder within the first 20 months of the child's life (n = 91) or had never been depressed (n = 50). Significant difficulties in performance were found among the children of depressed mothers, especially those whose mothers had experienced early and recent recurrent depressive disorder. Regardless of diagnostic status, children whose mothers exhibited negativity during problem-solving tasks administered at an earlier developmental period also were less likely to demonstrate false belief understanding. These effects remained even after child verbal ability was controlled.

Effects of Maternal Negativity and of Early and Recent Recurrent Depressive Disorder on Children’s False Belief Understanding

PubMed Central

Rohrer, Lisa M.; Cicchetti, Dante; Rogosch, Fred A.; Toth, Sheree L.; Maughan, Angeline

2015-01-01

Research has shown that children of depressed mothers are at risk for problems in a variety of developmental domains; however, little is known about the effects of maternal depression on children’s emerging understanding of false beliefs. In this study, three false belief tasks were administered to five-year-old children whose mothers had either met criteria for major depressive disorder within the first 20 months of the child’s life (n = 91) or had never been depressed (n = 50). Significant difficulties in performance were found among the children of depressed mothers, especially those whose mothers had experienced early and recent recurrent depressive disorder. Regardless of diagnostic status, children whose mothers exhibited negativity during problem-solving tasks administered at an earlier developmental period also were less likely to demonstrate false belief understanding. These effects remained even after child verbal ability was controlled. PMID:21244156

Belief propagation decoding of quantum channels by passing quantum messages

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Renes, Joseph M.

2017-07-01

The belief propagation (BP) algorithm is a powerful tool in a wide range of disciplines from statistical physics to machine learning to computational biology, and is ubiquitous in decoding classical error-correcting codes. The algorithm works by passing messages between nodes of the factor graph associated with the code and enables efficient decoding of the channel, in some cases even up to the Shannon capacity. Here we construct the first BP algorithm which passes quantum messages on the factor graph and is capable of decoding the classical-quantum channel with pure state outputs. This gives explicit decoding circuits whose number of gates is quadratic in the code length. We also show that this decoder can be modified to work with polar codes for the pure state channel and as part of a decoder for transmitting quantum information over the amplitude damping channel. These represent the first explicit capacity-achieving decoders for non-Pauli channels.

When truth is personally inconvenient, attitudes change: the impact of extreme weather on implicit support for green politicians and explicit climate-change beliefs.

PubMed

Rudman, Laurie A; McLean, Meghan C; Bunzl, Martin

2013-11-01

A naturalistic investigation of New Jersey residents, both before and after they experienced Hurricanes Irene and Sandy, examined support for politicians committed or opposed to policies designed to combat climate change. At Time 1, before both hurricanes, participants showed negative implicit attitudes toward a green politician, but at Time 2, after the hurricanes, participants drawn from the same cohort showed a reversed automatic preference. Moreover, those who were significantly affected by Hurricane Sandy were especially likely to implicitly prefer the green politician, and implicit attitudes were the best predictor of voting after the storms, whereas explicit climate-change beliefs was the best predictor before the storms. In concert, the results suggest that direct experience with extreme weather can increase pro-environmentalism, and further support conceptualizing affective experiences as a source of implicit attitudes.

Characterization of mathematics instructional practises for prospective elementary teachers with varying levels of self-efficacy in classroom management and mathematics teaching

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Lee, Carrie W.; Walkowiak, Temple A.; Nietfeld, John L.

2017-03-01

The purpose of this study was to investigate the relationship between prospective teachers' (PTs) instructional practises and their efficacy beliefs in classroom management and mathematics teaching. A sequential, explanatory mixed-methods design was employed. Results from efficacy surveys, implemented with 54 PTs were linked to a sample of teachers' instructional practises during the qualitative phase. In this phase, video-recorded lessons were analysed based on tasks, representations, discourse, and classroom management. Findings indicate that PTs with higher levels of mathematics teaching efficacy taught lessons characterised by tasks of higher cognitive demand, extended student explanations, student-to-student discourse, and explicit connections between representations. Classroom management efficacy seems to bear influence on the utilised grouping structures. These findings support explicit attention to PTs' mathematics teaching and classroom management efficacy throughout teacher preparation and a need for formative feedback to inform development of beliefs about teaching practises.

A Paradigm to Assess Implicit Attitudes towards God: The Positive/Negative God Associations Task.

PubMed

Pirutinsky, Steven; Carp, Sean; Rosmarin, David H

2017-02-01

Psychological research on the relationship between spirituality/religion and mental health has grown considerably over the past several decades and now constitutes a sizable body of scholarship. Among dimensions of S/R, positive beliefs about God have been significantly related to better mental health outcomes, and conversely negative beliefs about God are generally associated with more distress. However, prior research on this topic has relied heavily upon self-report Likert-type scales, which are vulnerable to self-report biases and measure only explicit cognitive processes. In this study, we developed and validated an implicit social cognition task, the Positive/Negative God Go/No-go Association Task (PNG-GNAT), for use in psychological research on spirituality and religion (S/R). Preliminary evidence in a large sample (N = 381) suggests that the PNG-GNAT demonstrates internal consistency, test-retest and split-half reliability, and concurrent evidence of validity. Further, our results suggest that PNG-GNAT scores represent different underlying dimensions of S/R than explicit self-report measures, and incrementally predict mental health above and beyond self-report assessment. The PNG-GNAT appears to be an effective tool for measuring implicit positive/negative beliefs about God.

The Development of Gender Constancy in Early Childhood and Its Relation to Time Comprehension and False-Belief Understanding

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Zmyj, Norbert; Bischof-Köhler, Doris

2015-01-01

What is the developmental course of children's gender constancy? Do other cognitive abilities such as time comprehension and false-belief understanding foster gender constancy and the subcomponents gender stability and gender consistency? We examined the development of gender constancy and its relation to time comprehension and false-belief…

The effect of articulatory suppression on implicit and explicit false memory in the DRM paradigm.

PubMed

Van Damme, Ilse; Menten, Jan; d'Ydewalle, Gery

2010-11-01

Several studies have shown that reliable implicit false memory can be obtained in the DRM paradigm. There has been considerable debate, however, about whether or not conscious activation of critical lures during study is a necessary condition for this. Recent findings have revealed that articulatory suppression prevents subsequent false priming in an anagram task (Lovden & Johansson, 2003). The present experiment sought to replicate and extend these findings to an implicit word stem completion task, and to additionally investigate the effect of articulatory suppression on explicit false memory. Results showed an inhibitory effect of articulatory suppression on veridical memory, as well as on implicit false memory, whereas the level of explicit false memory was heightened. This suggests that articulatory suppression did not merely eliminate conscious lure activation, but had a more general capacity-delimiting effect. The drop in veridical memory can be attributed to diminished encoding of item-specific information. Superficial encoding also limited the spreading of semantic activation during study, which inhibited later false priming. In addition, the lack of item-specific and phenomenological details caused impaired source monitoring at test, resulting in heightened explicit false memory.

How beliefs about self-creation inflate value in the human brain.

PubMed

Koster, Raphael; Sharot, Tali; Yuan, Rachel; De Martino, Benedetto; Norton, Michael I; Dolan, Raymond J

2015-01-01

Humans have a tendency to overvalue their own ideas and creations. Understanding how these errors in judgement emerge is important for explaining suboptimal decisions, as when individuals and groups choose self-created alternatives over superior or equal ones. We show that such overvaluation is a reconstructive process that emerges when participants believe they have created an item, regardless of whether this belief is true or false. This overvaluation is observed both when false beliefs of self-creation are elicited (Experiment 1) or implanted (Experiment 2). Using brain imaging data we highlight the brain processes mediating an interaction between value and belief of self-creation. Specifically, following the creation manipulation there is an increased functional connectivity during valuation between the right caudate nucleus, where we show BOLD activity correlated with subjective value, and the left amygdala, where we show BOLD activity is linked to subjective belief. Our study highlights psychological and neurobiological processes through which false beliefs alter human valuation and in doing so throw light on a common source of error in judgements of value.

How beliefs about self-creation inflate value in the human brain

PubMed Central

Koster, Raphael; Sharot, Tali; Yuan, Rachel; De Martino, Benedetto; Norton, Michael I.; Dolan, Raymond J.

2015-01-01

Humans have a tendency to overvalue their own ideas and creations. Understanding how these errors in judgement emerge is important for explaining suboptimal decisions, as when individuals and groups choose self-created alternatives over superior or equal ones. We show that such overvaluation is a reconstructive process that emerges when participants believe they have created an item, regardless of whether this belief is true or false. This overvaluation is observed both when false beliefs of self-creation are elicited (Experiment 1) or implanted (Experiment 2). Using brain imaging data we highlight the brain processes mediating an interaction between value and belief of self-creation. Specifically, following the creation manipulation there is an increased functional connectivity during valuation between the right caudate nucleus, where we show BOLD activity correlated with subjective value, and the left amygdala, where we show BOLD activity is linked to subjective belief. Our study highlights psychological and neurobiological processes through which false beliefs alter human valuation and in doing so throw light on a common source of error in judgements of value. PMID:26388755

Improving Low-Income Preschoolers’ Theory of Mind: A Training Study

PubMed Central

Tompkins, Virginia

2015-01-01

This study examined the efficacy of training theory of mind via storybook interactions focused on characters' mental states (i.e., beliefs and emotions) in a sample of 73 low-income preschoolers, and determined if training transferred to social competence. Children in the experimental group participated in experimenter-led book interactions in which characters' false beliefs and emotions were discussed. Children in the first control group were read the same stories, but without the embedded discussions; children in the second control group were not read books. Children's false belief understanding, emotion understanding, and social competence were assessed at pretest, an immediate posttest, and a delayed posttest two months later. Children in the experimental group outperformed both controls on false belief understanding, but not emotion understanding or social competence, at both posttests. PMID:26294810

Proposing an Operational Definition of Science Teacher Beliefs

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Hutner, Todd L.; Markman, Arthur B.

2016-10-01

Much research has shown that a science teacher's beliefs are related to their teaching practice. This line of research has often defined "belief" epistemologically. That is, beliefs are often defined relative to other mental constructs, such as knowledge, dispositions, or attitudes. Left unspecified is the role beliefs play in cognition and how they come to influence science teachers' classroom practice. As such, researchers and science teacher educators have relied on an (at times, implicit) assumption that there is a direct causal relationship between teachers' beliefs and classroom practice. In this paper, we propose an operational, as opposed to epistemological, definition of belief. That is, we are explicit about the role a belief plays in science teachers' cognition and how that leads to classroom practice. We define a belief as a mental representation that influences the practice of a teacher if and only if the belief is active in cognition. We then turn our attention to two limitations in the literature on that have arisen via previous definitions and assumptions regarding science teacher beliefs, showing how defining beliefs operationally helps think about these issues in new ways. The two limitations surround: (1) the difficulty in precisely delineating belief from knowledge; and (2) the interconnectedness of beliefs such that they draw meaning from one another. We then show how our definition of beliefs is congruent with other models of teacher cognition reported in the literature. Finally, we provide implications arising from this definition of belief for both science teacher educators and those who conduct research on the beliefs of both preservice and in-service science teachers.

False Signs and the Non-Specificity of Theory of Mind: Evidence that Preschoolers Have General Difficulties in Understanding Representations

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Leekam, Susan; Perner, Josef; Healey, Laura; Sewell, Claire

2008-01-01

The discovery that 3-year-old children have difficulties understanding false belief has fuelled two decades of research directed at understanding why children have this problem. One unresolved question is whether false belief problems are due to difficulties with mental or representational aspects of mental states. This question has implications…

Can an agent’s false belief be corrected by an appropriate communication? Psychological reasoning in 18-month-old infants

PubMed Central

Song, Hyun-joo; Onishi, Kristine H.; Baillargeon, Renée; Fisher, Cynthia

2008-01-01

Do 18-month-olds understand that an agent’s false belief can be corrected by an appropriate, though not an inappropriate, communication? In Experiment 1, infants watched a series of events involving two agents, a ball, and two containers: a box and a cup. To start, agent1 played with the ball and then hid it in the box, while agent2 looked on. Next, in agent1’s absence, agent2 moved the ball from the box to the cup. When agent1 returned, agent2 told her “The ball is in the cup!” (informative-intervention condition) or “I like the cup!” (uninformative-intervention condition). During test, agent1 reached for either the box (box event) or the cup (cup event). In the informative-intervention condition, infants who saw the box event looked reliably longer than those who saw the cup event; in the uninformative-intervention condition, the reverse pattern was found. These results suggest that infants expected agent1’s false belief about the ball’s location to be corrected when she was told “The ball is in the cup!”, but not “I like the cup!”. In Experiment 2, agent2 simply pointed to the ball’s new location, and infants again expected agent1’s false belief to be corrected. These and control results provide additional evidence that infants in the second year of life can attribute false beliefs to agents. In addition, the results suggest that by 18 months of age infants expect agents’ false beliefs to be corrected by relevant communications involving words or gestures. PMID:18976745

Why do we remember? The communicative function of episodic memory.

PubMed

Mahr, Johannes; Csibra, Gergely

2017-01-19

Episodic memory has been analyzed in a number of different ways in both philosophy and psychology, and most controversy has centered on its self-referential, 'autonoetic' character. Here, we offer a comprehensive characterization of episodic memory in representational terms, and propose a novel functional account on this basis. We argue that episodic memory should be understood as a distinctive epistemic attitude taken towards an event simulation. On this view, episodic memory has a metarepresentational format and should not be equated with beliefs about the past. Instead, empirical findings suggest that the contents of human episodic memory are often constructed in the service of the explicit justification of such beliefs. Existing accounts of episodic memory function that have focused on explaining its constructive character through its role in 'future-oriented mental time travel' neither do justice to its capacity to ground veridical beliefs about the past nor to its representational format. We provide an account of the metarepresentational structure of episodic memory in terms of its role in communicative interaction. The generative nature of recollection allows us to represent and communicate the reasons for why we hold certain beliefs about the past. In this process, autonoesis corresponds to the capacity to determine when and how to assert epistemic authority in making claims about the past. A domain where such claims are indispensable are human social engagements. Such engagements commonly require the justification of entitlements and obligations, which is often possible only by explicit reference to specific past events.

Young Children's Understanding of Belief Constraints on Intention.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Moses, Louis J.

1993-01-01

One important characteristic of rational action is that intentions should be consistent with beliefs. Two studies examined whether three year olds understand belief constraints on intention. In both studies, subjects' understanding of unfulfilled intentions was excellent and significantly better than their understanding of false beliefs, but…

Eye tracking uncovered great apes' ability to anticipate that other individuals will act according to false beliefs.

PubMed

Kano, Fumihiro; Krupenye, Christopher; Hirata, Satoshi; Call, Josep

2017-01-01

Using a novel eye-tracking test, we recently showed that great apes anticipate that other individuals will act according to false beliefs. This finding suggests that, like humans, great apes understand others' false beliefs, at least in an implicit way. One key question raised by our study is why apes have passed our tests but not previous ones. In this article, we consider this question by detailing the development of our task. We considered 3 major differences in our task compared with the previous ones. First, we monitored apes' eye movements, and specifically their anticipatory looks, to measure their predictions about how agents will behave. Second, we adapted our design from an anticipatory-looking false belief test originally developed for human infants. Third, we developed novel test scenarios that were specifically designed to capture the attention of our ape participants. We then discuss how each difference may help explain differences in performance on our task and previous ones, and finally propose some directions for future studies.

How Children with Autism Reason about Other's Intentions: False-Belief and Counterfactual Inferences.

PubMed

Rasga, Célia; Quelhas, Ana Cristina; Byrne, Ruth M J

2017-06-01

We examine false belief and counterfactual reasoning in children with autism with a new change-of-intentions task. Children listened to stories, for example, Anne is picking up toys and John hears her say she wants to find her ball. John goes away and the reason for Anne's action changes-Anne's mother tells her to tidy her bedroom. We asked, 'What will John believe is the reason that Anne is picking up toys?' which requires a false-belief inference, and 'If Anne's mother hadn't asked Anne to tidy her room, what would have been the reason she was picking up toys?' which requires a counterfactual inference. We tested children aged 6, 8 and 10 years. Children with autism made fewer correct inferences than typically developing children at 8 years, but by 10 years there was no difference. Children with autism made fewer correct false-belief than counterfactual inferences, just like typically developing children.

Parental mind-mindedness but not false belief understanding predicts Hong Kong children's lie-telling behavior in a temptation resistance task.

PubMed

Wang, Lamei; Zhu, Liqi; Wang, Zhenlin

2017-10-01

Children can tell lies before they understand the concept of false belief. This study investigated the relationship between parental mind-mindedness, defined as the propensity of parents to view their children as mental agents with independent thoughts and feelings, and the lie-telling behavior of Hong Kong children aged 3-6years. The results confirmed earlier findings indicating that Hong Kong children's understanding of false belief is delayed; nevertheless, the participants appeared to lie just as well as children from other cultures. The lie-telling behavior of Hong Kong children was predicted by parental mind-mindedness and children's age but was unrelated to children's false belief understanding. It is suggested that children of mind-minded parents are more likely to exercise autonomy in socially ambiguous situations. Future studies should focus on the roles of parenting and children's multifaceted autonomy when addressing children's adaptive lie telling. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

32 CFR 1636.6 - Analysis of belief.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-07-01

... 32 National Defense 6 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Analysis of belief. 1636.6 Section 1636.6... CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS § 1636.6 Analysis of belief. (a) A registrant claiming conscientious objection is not... group opposed to participation in war in any form. (b) The registrant who identifies his beliefs with...

32 CFR 1636.6 - Analysis of belief.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-07-01

... 32 National Defense 6 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Analysis of belief. 1636.6 Section 1636.6... CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS § 1636.6 Analysis of belief. (a) A registrant claiming conscientious objection is not... group opposed to participation in war in any form. (b) The registrant who identifies his beliefs with...

32 CFR 1636.6 - Analysis of belief.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-07-01

... 32 National Defense 6 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Analysis of belief. 1636.6 Section 1636.6... CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS § 1636.6 Analysis of belief. (a) A registrant claiming conscientious objection is not... group opposed to participation in war in any form. (b) The registrant who identifies his beliefs with...

32 CFR 1636.6 - Analysis of belief.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... 32 National Defense 6 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Analysis of belief. 1636.6 Section 1636.6... CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS § 1636.6 Analysis of belief. (a) A registrant claiming conscientious objection is not... group opposed to participation in war in any form. (b) The registrant who identifies his beliefs with...

32 CFR 1636.6 - Analysis of belief.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-07-01

... 32 National Defense 6 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Analysis of belief. 1636.6 Section 1636.6... CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS § 1636.6 Analysis of belief. (a) A registrant claiming conscientious objection is not... group opposed to participation in war in any form. (b) The registrant who identifies his beliefs with...

Mental Rotation in False Belief Understanding

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Xie, Jiushu; Cheung, Him; Shen, Manqiong; Wang, Ruiming

2018-01-01

This study examines the spontaneous use of embodied egocentric transformation (EET) in understanding false beliefs in the minds of others. EET involves the participants mentally transforming or rotating themselves into the orientation of an agent when trying to adopt his or her visuospatial perspective. We argue that psychological perspective…

Exploring laypeople’s epistemic beliefs about medicine – a factor-analytic survey study

PubMed Central

2012-01-01

Background The aim of this study was to develop an instrument to measure laypeople’s beliefs about the nature of medical knowledge and knowing (the EBAM). Such beliefs should be a target of increased research interest because they influence how people handle medical information, for example in shared decision making. Methods An online survey was completed by 284 participants. Items assessed different aspects of laypeople’s epistemic beliefs about medicine and explicitly focused on the appearance of medical knowledge in everyday life and the evaluation of different sources as a way to justify knowledge. Results Factor analysis yielded a five-factor solution for the instrument. Dimensions covered by the instrument are certainty of medical knowledge, credibility of medical textbooks, credibility of medical information on the Internet, justification of medical knowledge, and preliminarity of medical knowledge. Conclusions Results indicate that laypeople have meaningful beliefs about the nature of medical knowledge and the trustworthiness of different sources. The instrument developed seems promising for measuring laypeople’s epistemic beliefs about medicine, which may help to increase patients’ compliance in medical decision making. PMID:22963643

Developmental Continuity in Theory of Mind: Speed and Accuracy of Belief-Desire Reasoning in Children and Adults

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Apperly, Ian A.; Warren, Frances; Andrews, Benjamin J.; Grant, Jay; Todd, Sophie

2011-01-01

On belief-desire reasoning tasks, children first pass tasks involving true belief before those involving false belief, and tasks involving positive desire before those involving negative desire. The current study examined belief-desire reasoning in participants old enough to pass all such tasks. Eighty-three 6- to 11-year-olds and 20 adult…

Children with autism can track others' beliefs in a competitive game.

PubMed

Peterson, Candida C; Slaughter, Virginia; Peterson, James; Premack, David

2013-05-01

Theory of mind (ToM) development, assessed via 'litmus' false belief tests, is severely delayed in autism, but the standard testing procedure may underestimate these children's genuine understanding. To explore this, we developed a novel test involving competition to win a reward as the motive for tracking other players' beliefs (the 'Dot-Midge task'). Ninety-six children, including 23 with autism (mean age: 10.36 years), 50 typically developing 4-year-olds (mean age: 4.40) and 23 typically developing 3-year-olds (mean age: 3.59) took a standard 'Sally-Ann' false belief test, the Dot-Midge task (which was closely matched to the Sally-Ann task procedure) and a norm-referenced verbal ability test. Results revealed that, of the children with autism, 74% passed the Dot-Midge task, yet only 13% passed the standard Sally-Ann procedure. A similar pattern of performance was observed in the older, but not the younger, typically developing control groups. This finding demonstrates that many children with autism who fail motivationally barren standard false belief tests can spontaneously use ToM to track their social partners' beliefs in the context of a competitive game. © 2013 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Three-Year-Olds Express Suspense when an Agent Approaches a Scene with a False Belief

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Moll, Henrike; Kane, Sarah; McGowan, Luke

2016-01-01

Research on early false belief understanding has entirely relied on affect-neutral measures such as judgments (standard tasks), attentional allocation (looking duration, preferential looking, anticipatory looking), or active intervention. We used a novel, affective measure to test whether preschoolers affectively anticipate another's misguided…

False Belief and Emotion Understanding in Post-Institutionalized Children

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Tarullo, Amanda R.; Bruce, Jacqueline; Gunnar, Megan R.

2007-01-01

Deficits in social cognition may impair the ability to negotiate social transactions and relationships and contribute to socio emotional difficulties experienced by some post-institutionalized children. We examined false belief and emotion understanding in 40 institutional care-adopted children, 40 foster care-adopted children and 40 birth…

Do People Who Believe in God Report More Meaning in Their Lives? The Existential Effects of Belief.

PubMed

Cranney, Stephen

2013-09-01

I conduct the first large-N study explicitly exploring the association between belief in God and sense of purpose in life. This relationship, while often discussed informally, has received little empirical attention. Here I use the General Social Survey to investigate how form of and confidence in belief in God is related to sense of purpose in life, as measured by a Likert item level of agreement with the statement "In my opinion, life does not serve any purpose." Using logistic regression analysis, I find that those who indicate that they are confident in God's existence report a higher sense of purpose compared to nonbelievers, believers in a higher power, and those who believe but occasionally doubt.

How Hispanic Patients Address Ambiguous versus Unambiguous Bias in the Doctor's Office

PubMed Central

Bean, Meghan G.; Covarrubias, Rebecca; Stone, Jeff

2014-01-01

Two studies examined Hispanic individuals’ preferences for using ten different bias reduction strategies when interacting with a doctor whose beliefs about their group were either ambiguous or clearly biased. Consistent with predictions, participants who imagined interacting with a doctor whose beliefs were ambiguous preferred strategies that facilitate positive doctor-patient interactions, whereas participants whose doctor explicitly endorsed negative stereotypes about their group preferred strategies that address stereotype content. The results also revealed that, regardless of whether the doctor's beliefs were ambiguous or clearly biased, stigma consciousness predicted participants’ preferences for using strategies that address stereotype content. These findings suggest that both doctors’ behavior and individual-level factors influence how minority individuals choose to behave in a healthcare setting. PMID:25395691

Drawing Insight from Pictures: The Development of Concepts of False Drawing and False Belief in Children with Deafness, Normal Hearing, and Autism.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Peterson, Candida C.

2002-01-01

Three studies examined theory-of-mind concepts among children ages 6-13 years with deafness or autism, and 4-year-olds with normal development. Findings indicated that while the children with deafness or autism scored significantly lower on standard tests of false belief understanding, they scored higher on even the most challenging drawing-based…

29 CFR 18.610 - Religious beliefs or opinions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-07-01

... 29 Labor 1 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Religious beliefs or opinions. 18.610 Section 18.610 Labor... OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES Rules of Evidence Witnesses § 18.610 Religious beliefs or opinions. Evidence of the beliefs or opinions of a witness on matters of religion is not admissible for the purpose...

29 CFR 18.610 - Religious beliefs or opinions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-07-01

... 29 Labor 1 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Religious beliefs or opinions. 18.610 Section 18.610 Labor... OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES Rules of Evidence Witnesses § 18.610 Religious beliefs or opinions. Evidence of the beliefs or opinions of a witness on matters of religion is not admissible for the purpose...

29 CFR 18.610 - Religious beliefs or opinions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-07-01

... 29 Labor 1 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Religious beliefs or opinions. 18.610 Section 18.610 Labor... OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES Rules of Evidence Witnesses § 18.610 Religious beliefs or opinions. Evidence of the beliefs or opinions of a witness on matters of religion is not admissible for the purpose...

Do Humans Have Two Systems to Track Beliefs and Belief-Like States?

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Apperly, Ian A.; Butterfill, Stephen A.

2009-01-01

The lack of consensus on how to characterize humans' capacity for belief reasoning has been brought into sharp focus by recent research. Children fail critical tests of belief reasoning before 3 to 4 years of age (H. Wellman, D. Cross, & J. Watson, 2001; H. Wimmer & J. Perner, 1983), yet infants apparently pass false-belief tasks at 13 or 15…

The Effect of Belief in Free Will on Prejudice

PubMed Central

Zhao, Xian; Liu, Li; Zhang, Xiao-xiao; Shi, Jia-xin; Huang, Zhen-wei

2014-01-01

The current research examined the role of the belief in free will on prejudice across Han Chinese and white samples. Belief in free will refers to the extent to which people believe human beings truly have free will. In Study 1, the beliefs of Han Chinese people in free will were measured, and their social distances from the Tibetan Chinese were used as an index of ethnic prejudice. The results showed that the more that Han Chinese endorsed the belief in free will, the less that they showed prejudice against the Tibetan Chinese. In Study 2, the belief of the Han Chinese in free will was manipulated, and their explicit feelings towards the Uyghur Chinese were used as an indicator of ethnic prejudice. The results showed that the participants in the condition of belief in free will reported less prejudice towards Uyghur Chinese compared to their counterparts in the condition of disbelief in free will. In Study 3, white peoples’ belief in free will was manipulated, and their pro-black attitudes were measured as an indirect indicator of racial prejudice. The results showed that, compared to the condition of disbelief in free will, the participants who were primed by a belief in free will reported stronger pro-black attitudes. These three studies suggest that endorsement of the belief in free will can lead to decreased ethnic/racial prejudice compared to denial of the belief in free will. The theoretical and practical implications are discussed. PMID:24622280

The effect of belief in free will on prejudice.

PubMed

Zhao, Xian; Liu, Li; Zhang, Xiao-xiao; Shi, Jia-xin; Huang, Zhen-wei

2014-01-01

The current research examined the role of the belief in free will on prejudice across Han Chinese and white samples. Belief in free will refers to the extent to which people believe human beings truly have free will. In Study 1, the beliefs of Han Chinese people in free will were measured, and their social distances from the Tibetan Chinese were used as an index of ethnic prejudice. The results showed that the more that Han Chinese endorsed the belief in free will, the less that they showed prejudice against the Tibetan Chinese. In Study 2, the belief of the Han Chinese in free will was manipulated, and their explicit feelings towards the Uyghur Chinese were used as an indicator of ethnic prejudice. The results showed that the participants in the condition of belief in free will reported less prejudice towards Uyghur Chinese compared to their counterparts in the condition of disbelief in free will. In Study 3, white peoples' belief in free will was manipulated, and their pro-black attitudes were measured as an indirect indicator of racial prejudice. The results showed that, compared to the condition of disbelief in free will, the participants who were primed by a belief in free will reported stronger pro-black attitudes. These three studies suggest that endorsement of the belief in free will can lead to decreased ethnic/racial prejudice compared to denial of the belief in free will. The theoretical and practical implications are discussed.

False beliefs predict increased circumcision satisfaction in a sample of US American men.

PubMed

Earp, Brian D; Sardi, Lauren M; Jellison, William A

2017-12-06

Critics of non-therapeutic male and female childhood genital cutting claim that such cutting is harmful. It is therefore puzzling that 'circumcised' women and men do not typically regard themselves as having been harmed by the cutting, notwithstanding the loss of sensitive, prima facie valuable tissue. For female genital cutting (FGC), a commonly proposed solution to this puzzle is that women who had part(s) of their vulvae removed before sexual debut 'do not know what they are missing' and may 'justify' their genitally-altered state by adopting false beliefs about the benefits of FGC, while simultaneously stigmatising unmodified genitalia as unattractive or unclean. Might a similar phenomenon apply to neonatally circumcised men? In this survey of 999 US American men, greater endorsement of false beliefs concerning circumcision and penile anatomy predicted greater satisfaction with being circumcised, while among genitally intact men, the opposite trend occurred: greater endorsement of false beliefs predicted less satisfaction with being genitally intact. These findings provide tentative support for the hypothesis that the lack-of-harm reported by many circumcised men, like the lack-of-harm reported by their female counterparts in societies that practice FGC, may be related to holding inaccurate beliefs concerning unaltered genitalia and the consequences of childhood genital modification.

Disowned recollections: denying true experiences undermines belief in occurrence but not judgments of remembering.

PubMed

Mazzoni, Giuliana; Clark, Andrew; Nash, Robert A

2014-01-01

Recent research findings have illustrated that false memories induced in the laboratory can be dissociated from the beliefs that the events had in fact occurred. In this study we assessed whether this dissociability is a quality peculiar to false memory, or whether it represents a general characteristic of autobiographical memory. To this end we examined whether people can be induced to stop believing in memories for true experiences. Participants observed and performed simple actions, and were later falsely informed that they had not performed some of them--that false memories for these actions had been implanted through the use of fabricated evidence. Before and after receiving this misinformation, participants rated their belief in and memory of performing those actions, other actions that they had also performed, and actions that they had not performed. Whereas the misinformation substantially undermined participants' beliefs in the specific performed actions about which they had been misinformed, it had little effect on their endorsement of remembering those actions. The misinformation thus boosted the proportion of occasions in which participants rated their memories as stronger than their beliefs, and it weakened the correlation between belief and memory ratings. Thus, this study provides the first experimental demonstration of non-believed memories of true experiences. We discuss our findings with reference to the small literature concerning the use of socially-communicated misinformation to undermine event memories, and with reference to the structure of autobiographical memory. Copyright © 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Functional neuroimaging of belief, disbelief, and uncertainty.

PubMed

Harris, Sam; Sheth, Sameer A; Cohen, Mark S

2008-02-01

The difference between believing and disbelieving a proposition is one of the most potent regulators of human behavior and emotion. When one accepts a statement as true, it becomes the basis for further thought and action; rejected as false, it remains a string of words. The purpose of this study was to differentiate belief, disbelief, and uncertainty at the level of the brain. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to study the brains of 14 adults while they judged written statements to be "true" (belief), "false" (disbelief), or "undecidable" (uncertainty). To characterize belief, disbelief, and uncertainty in a content-independent manner, we included statements from a wide range of categories: autobiographical, mathematical, geographical, religious, ethical, semantic, and factual. The states of belief, disbelief, and uncertainty differentially activated distinct regions of the prefrontal and parietal cortices, as well as the basal ganglia. Belief and disbelief differ from uncertainty in that both provide information that can subsequently inform behavior and emotion. The mechanism underlying this difference appears to involve the anterior cingulate cortex and the caudate. Although many areas of higher cognition are likely involved in assessing the truth-value of linguistic propositions, the final acceptance of a statement as "true" or its rejection as "false" appears to rely on more primitive, hedonic processing in the medial prefrontal cortex and the anterior insula. Truth may be beauty, and beauty truth, in more than a metaphorical sense, and false propositions may actually disgust us.

Theories of Mind in Transition: A Microgenetic Study of the Development of False Belief Understanding

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Amsterlaw, Jennifer; Wellman, Henry M.

2006-01-01

Microgenetic methods were used to document young children's (N = 36; M age = 3;5) acquisition of false belief (FB) understanding and investigate developmental mechanisms. A control group received no experience with FB; 2 other groups received microgenetic sessions designed to promote FB understanding. Over consecutive weeks, microgenetic groups…

Counterfactual Conditionals and False Belief: A Developmental Dissociation

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Perner, Josef; Sprung, Manuel; Steinkogler, Bettina

2004-01-01

The objective of this study was to explore factors that affect the difficulty of counterfactual reasoning in 3-5-year-old children and to shed light on the reason why counterfactual reasoning relates to understanding false belief [Cognitive Development, 13 (1998) 73-90]. Using travel scenarios, the difference between simple scenarios, in which…

Validity of False Belief Tasks in Blind Children

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Brambring, Michael; Asbrock, Doreen

2010-01-01

Previous studies have reported that congenitally blind children without any additional impairment reveal a developmental delay of at least 4 years in perspective taking based on testing first-order false-belief tasks. These authors interpret this delay as a sign of autism-like behavior. However, the delay may be caused by testing blind children…

Counterfactual Thinking and False Belief: The Role of Executive Function

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Drayton, Stefane; Turley-Ames, Kandi J.; Guajardo, Nicole R.

2011-01-01

The purpose of the current study was to examine further the relationship between counterfactual thinking and false belief (FB) as examined by Guajardo and Turley-Ames ("Cognitive Development, 19" (2004) 53-80). More specifically, the current research examined the importance of working memory and inhibitory control in understanding the relationship…

Sociolinguistic Awareness and False Belief in Young Cantonese Learners of English

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Cheung, Him; Mak, Wing Yan; Luo, Xueying; Xiao, Wen

2010-01-01

In this study, we examined whether sociolinguistic awareness and false belief were uniquely related in 3- and 4-year-old Cantonese-speaking children learning English as a second language. The English-use background of these children varied so that they possessed sociolinguistic awareness to different degrees. Results indicated that sociolinguistic…

Relations between Mental Verb and False Belief Understanding in Cantonese-Speaking Children

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Cheung, Him; Chen, Hsuan-Chih; Yeung, William

2009-01-01

Previous research has shown that linguistic forms that codify mental contents bear a specific relation with children's false belief understanding. These forms include mental verbs and their following complements, yet the two have not been considered separately. The current study examined the roles of mental verb semantics and the complement syntax…

Language and False-Belief Task Performance in Children with Autism Spectrum Disorder

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Farrar, M. Jeffrey; Seung, Hye Kyeung; Lee, Hyeonjin

2017-01-01

Purpose: Language is related to false-belief (FB) understanding in both typically developing children and children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD). The current study examined the role of complementation and general language in FB understanding. Of interest was whether language plays similar or different roles in the groups' FB performance.…

A Competitive Nonverbal False Belief Task for Children and Apes

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Krachun, Carla; Carpenter, Malinda; Call, Josep; Tomasello, Michael

2009-01-01

A nonverbal false belief task was administered to children (mean age 5 years) and two great ape species: chimpanzees ("Pan troglodytes") and bonobos ("Pan paniscus"). Because apes typically perform poorly in cooperative contexts, our task was competitive. Two versions were run: in both, a human competitor witnessed an experimenter hide a reward in…

Overrated adults: 4-year-olds' false belief understanding is influenced by the believer's age.

PubMed

Seehagen, Sabine; Dreier, Larissa; Zmyj, Norbert

2018-03-01

Children perceive adults as more knowledgeable than peers. We tested whether this general preconception influences preschoolers' performance in a false-belief task. Children (4- and 5-year-olds; N = 146) watched videos showing a peer protagonist or an adult protagonist experiencing events that should lead the protagonist to hold a false belief. Then children were asked to infer the protagonist's perception of the situation. Age of the protagonist influenced 4-year-olds' judgments but not 5-year-olds' judgments. Specifically, 4-year-olds' performance was at chance when presented with a peer protagonist. Their performance dropped further when presented with an adult protagonist and was significantly below chance. Children aged around 5 years performed above chance level regardless of whether they were presented with an adult or peer protagonist. This suggests that in the younger age group, children's tendency to regard adults as experts in general knowledge undermined their ability to accurately judge the possibility that an adult could hold a false belief. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Believe it or not: on the possibility of suspending belief.

PubMed

Hasson, Uri; Simmons, Joseph P; Todorov, Alexander

2005-07-01

We present two experiments that cast doubt on existing evidence suggesting that it is impossible to suspend belief in a comprehended proposition. In Experiment 1, we found that interrupting the encoding of a statement's veracity decreased memory for the statement's falsity when the false version of the statement was uninformative, but not when the false version was informative. This suggests that statements that are informative when false are not represented as if they were true. In Experiment 2, participants made faster lexical decisions to words implied by preceding statements when they were told that the statements were true than when the veracity of the statements was unknown or when the statements were false. The findings suggest that comprehending a statement may not require believing it, and that it may be possible to suspend belief in comprehended propositions.

Seeing Things Unseen: Fantasy Beliefs and False Reports

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Principe, Gabrielle F.; Smith, Eric

2008-01-01

Whereas past research has demonstrated that children's beliefs about the real world can influence their memory for events, the role of fantasy beliefs in children's recall remains largely unexplored. We examine this topic in 5- and 6-year-olds by focusing on how belief in a familiar fantasy figure, namely the Tooth Fairy, is related to children's…

Encoding of Others' Beliefs without Overt Instruction

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Cohen, Adam S.; German, Tamsin C.

2009-01-01

Under what conditions do people automatically encode and track the mental states of others? A recent investigation showed that when subjects are instructed to track the location of an object but are not instructed to track a belief about that location in a non-verbal false-belief task, they respond more slowly to questions about an agent's belief,…

Induction of belief decision trees from data

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

AbuDahab, Khalil; Xu, Dong-ling; Keane, John

2012-09-01

In this paper, a method for acquiring belief rule-bases by inductive inference from data is described and evaluated. Existing methods extract traditional rules inductively from data, with consequents that are believed to be either 100% true or 100% false. Belief rules can capture uncertain or incomplete knowledge using uncertain belief degrees in consequents. Instead of using singled-value consequents, each belief rule deals with a set of collectively exhaustive and mutually exclusive consequents. The proposed method extracts belief rules from data which contain uncertain or incomplete knowledge.

An fMRI study on the comparison of different types of false belief reasoning: False belief-based emotion and behavior attribution.

PubMed

Döhnel, Katrin; Schuwerk, Tobias; Sodian, Beate; Hajak, Göran; Rupprecht, Rainer; Sommer, Monika

2017-12-01

False belief (FB) reasoning is a key Theory of Mind (ToM) competence. By 4 years of age, children understand that a person's behavior can be based on a FB about reality. Children cannot understand that a person's emotion can also be based on a FB before the age of six. In order to generate hypothesis on basic processes distinguishing these two types of belief reasoning, the present functional magnetic resonance imaging study in adults directly compares functional activity associated with these two FB tasks. Both tasks were associated with activity in the ToM network including the medial prefrontal cortex and the left temporo-parietal junction. Differential activity was observed in the anterior dorsolateral prefrontal cortex for FB-based emotion relative to behavior attribution. Contrary to FB behavior attribution, FB-based emotion attribution requires the processing of two different mental states: a belief and an emotion and their relation to each other. The activity pattern may reflect the differential demands on cognitive processes associated with the two different belief-based attribution processes. These results shed new light on the still ongoing debate about the nature of the developmental lag between the two FB tasks.

Cooperation and deception in primates.

PubMed

Hall, Katie; Brosnan, Sarah F

2017-08-01

Though competition and cooperation are often considered opposing forces in an arms race driving natural selection, many animals, including humans, cooperate in order to mitigate competition with others. Understanding others' psychological states, such as seeing and knowing, others' goals and intentions, and coordinating actions are all important for complex cooperation-as well as for predicting behavior in order to take advantage of others through tactical deception, a form of competition. We outline evidence of primates' understanding of how others perceive the world, and then consider how the evidence from both deception and cooperation fits this framework to give us a more complete understanding of the evolution of complex social cognition in primates. In experimental food competitions, primates flexibly manipulate group-mates' behavior to tactically deceive them. Deception can infiltrate cooperative interactions, such as when one takes an unfair share of meat after a coordinated hunt. In order to counter competition of this sort, primates maintain cooperation through partner choice, partner control, and third party punishment. Yet humans appear to stand alone in their ability to understand others' beliefs, which allows us not only to deceive others with the explicit intent to create a false belief, but it also allows us to put ourselves in others' shoes to determine when cheaters need to be punished, even if we are not directly disadvantaged by the cheater. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Seeing it my way: a case of a selective deficit in inhibiting self-perspective.

PubMed

Samson, Dana; Apperly, Ian A; Kathirgamanathan, Umalini; Humphreys, Glyn W

2005-05-01

Little is known about the functional and neural architecture of social reasoning, one major obstacle being that we crucially lack the relevant tools to test potentially different social reasoning components. In the case of belief reasoning, previous studies have tried to separate the processes involved in belief reasoning per se from those involved in the processing of the high incidental demands such as the working memory demands of typical belief tasks. In this study, we developed new belief tasks in order to disentangle, for the first time, two perspective taking components involved in belief reasoning: (i) the ability to inhibit one's own perspective (self-perspective inhibition); and (ii) the ability to infer someone else's perspective as such (other-perspective taking). The two tasks had similar demands in other-perspective taking as they both required the participant to infer that a character has a false belief about an object's location. However, the tasks varied in the self-perspective inhibition demands. In the task with the lowest self-perspective inhibition demands, at the time the participant had to infer the character's false belief, he or she had no idea what the new object's location was. In contrast, in the task with the highest self-perspective inhibition demands, at the time the participant had to infer the character's false belief, he or she knew where the object was actually located (and this knowledge had thus to be inhibited). The two tasks were presented to a stroke patient, WBA, with right prefrontal and temporal damage. WBA performed well in the low-inhibition false-belief task but showed striking difficulty in the task placing high self-perspective inhibition demands, showing a selective deficit in inhibiting self-perspective. WBA also made egocentric errors in other social and visual perspective taking tasks, indicating a difficulty with belief attribution extending to the attribution of emotions, desires and visual experiences to other people. The case of WBA, together with the recent report of three patients impaired in belief reasoning even when self-perspective inhibition demands were reduced, provide the first neuropsychological evidence that the inhibition of one's own point of view and the ability to infer someone else's point of view rely on distinct neural and functional processes.

Language and False Belief: Evidence for General, Not Specific, Effects in Cantonese-Speaking Preschoolers

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Tardif, Twila; So, Catherine Wing-Chee; Kaciroti, Niko

2007-01-01

Two studies were conducted with Cantonese-speaking preschoolers examining J. de Villiers's (1995) hypothesis that syntactic complements play a unique role in the acquisition of false belief (FB). In Study 1, the authors found a positive correlation between FB and syntactic complements in 72 four- to six-year-old Cantonese-speaking preschoolers.…

Children's Performance on a False-belief Task Is Impaired by Activation of an Evolutionarily-Canalized Response System.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Keenan, Thomas; Ellis, Bruce J.

2003-01-01

Two studies examined how task content that activates predator-avoidance affects preschool children's performance on a false-belief task. Findings indicated that the proportion of correct answers on the playmate-avoidance task was greater than that for the predator-avoidance task, suggesting that activation of the predator-avoidance system…

Lie-Telling Behavior in Children with Autism and Its Relation to False-Belief Understanding

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Talwar, Victoria; Zwaigenbaum, Lonnie; Goulden, Keith J.; Manji, Shazeen; Loomes, Carly; Rasmussen, Carmen

2012-01-01

Children's lie-telling behavior and its relation to false-belief understanding was examined in children with autism spectrum disorders (ASD; n = 26) and a comparison group of typically developing children (n = 27). Participants were assessed using a temptation resistance paradigm, in which children were told not to peek at a forbidden toy while…

The Accidental Transgressor: Morally-Relevant Theory of Mind

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Killen, Melanie; Mulvey, Kelly Lynn; Richardson, Cameron; Jampol, Noah; Woodward, Amanda

2011-01-01

To test young children's false belief theory of mind in a morally relevant context, two experiments were conducted. In Experiment 1, children (N=162) at 3.5, 5.5, and 7.5 years of age were administered three tasks: prototypic moral transgression task, false belief theory of mind task (ToM), and an "accidental transgressor" task, which measured a…

Effects of Deception on Children's Understanding of Second-Order False Belief

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Miller, Scott A.

2013-01-01

This research examined two questions: effects of deception on children's understanding of second-order false belief, and possible effects of number of siblings on second-order performance. Kindergarten children responded to 3 second-order problems that varied in the presence and the nature of deception. Performance was better on the problems…

Siblings, Language, and False Belief in Low-Income Children

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Tompkins, Virginia; Farrar, M. Jeffrey; Guo, Ying

2013-01-01

The authors examined the relationship between number of siblings and false belief understanding (FBU) in 94 low-income 4-5-year-olds. Previous research with middle-income children has shown a positive association between number of siblings and FBU. However, it is unclear whether having multiple siblings in low-income families is related to better…

2.5-Year-Olds Succeed at a Verbal Anticipatory-Looking False-Belief Task

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

He, Zijing; Bolz, Matthias; Baillargeon, Renee

2012-01-01

Recent research suggests that infants and toddlers succeed at a wide range of non-elicited-response false-belief tasks (i.e., tasks that do not require children to answer a direct question about a mistaken agent's likely behaviour). However, one exception to this generalization comes from verbal anticipatory-looking tasks, which have produced…

Theory of Mind, Affective Empathy, and Persuasive Strategies in School-Aged Children

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Lonigro, Antonia; Baiocco, Roberto; Baumgartner, Emma; Laghi, Fiorenzo

2017-01-01

Understanding that other people hold different mental states and that they may be changed is the core of persuasion. Thus, theory of mind (ToM) abilities are fundamental to generate persuasive arguments. To date, only the relation between false belief and false belief-emotion understanding and persuasion has been investigated, ignoring other…

Knowing Me, Knowing You: Deictic Complexity in False-Belief Understanding

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

McHugh, Louise; Barnes-Holmes, Yvonne; Barnes-Holmes, Dermot; Whelan, Robert; Stewart, Ian

2007-01-01

Investigators examined the role of deictic complexity in the context of false-belief understanding. Deictic relations (i.e., I and YOU, HERE and THERE, and NOW and THEN) are used to describe one's perspective on events in the environment. Differences in complexity between responding in accordance with "I" (self) and "YOU" (other) relations are…

75 FR 70881 - Designation of a Chief Compliance Officer; Required Compliance Policies; and Annual Report of a...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-11-19

... and reasonable belief, the annual report is accurate and complete. Liability for false, incomplete, or... belief of the chief compliance officer, and under penalty of law, the information contained in the annual... supervise or false statements to the Commission. The Commission could seek an injunction against future...

Older (but Not Younger) Siblings Facilitate False Belief Understanding.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Ruffman, Ted; Perner, Josef; Naito, Mika; Parkin, Lindsay; Clements, Wendy A.

1998-01-01

Four experiments and an analysis of pooled data from English and Japanese children show a linear increase in understanding false beliefs with number of older siblings; no such effect for children younger than 38 months; no helpful effect of younger siblings at any age; no effect of siblings' gender; and no helpful effect of siblings on a source…

Monsters, Bananas and Seaweed: Active Participation and Young Children's Understanding of False Belief.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Szarkowicz, Diane Louise

This study investigated the effect of active participation in a story reading on children's understanding of false belief. Children, ages 38-63 months, were assigned to a participation or non-participation group. Participating children engaged in a book-reading process using puppets to respond to the story. Non-participating children were read the…

False Belief Understanding: Children Catch It from Classmates of Different Ages

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Wang, Yifang; Su, Yanjie

2009-01-01

Two experiments were conducted to compare the false belief understanding of children who have no siblings, but have classmates of different ages in kindergarten. In Experiment 1, 4- and 5-year-olds completed two unexpected location tasks. We found that 4-year-olds with classmates of different ages performed significantly better than those with…

Theory of mind through the ages: older and middle-aged adults exhibit more errors than do younger adults on a continuous false belief task.

PubMed

Bernstein, Daniel M; Thornton, Wendy Loken; Sommerville, Jessica A

2011-10-01

Theory of mind (ToM), or the ability to understand mental states, is a fundamental aspect of social cognition. Previous research has documented marked advances in ToM in preschoolers, and declines in ToM in older-aged adults. In the present study, younger (n=37), middle-aged (n=20), and older (n=37) adults completed a continuous false belief task measuring ToM. Middle-aged and older adults exhibited more false belief bias than did younger adults, irrespective of language ability, executive function, processing speed, and memory. The authors conclude that ToM declines from younger to older adulthood, independent of age-related changes to domain-general cognitive functioning.

Language and theory of mind in autism spectrum disorder: the relationship between complement syntax and false belief task performance.

PubMed

Lind, Sophie E; Bowler, Dermot M

2009-06-01

This study aimed to test the hypothesis that children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) use their knowledge of complement syntax as a means of "hacking out" solutions to false belief tasks, despite lacking a representational theory of mind (ToM). Participants completed a "memory for complements" task, a measure of receptive vocabulary, and traditional location change and unexpected contents false belief tasks. Consistent with predictions, the correlation between complement syntax score and location change task performance was significantly stronger within the ASD group than within the comparison group. However, contrary to predictions, complement syntax score was not significantly correlated with unexpected contents task performance within either group. Possible explanations for this pattern of results are considered.

The Role of Present Time Perspective in Predicting Early Adolescent Violence.

PubMed

Kruger, Daniel J; Carrothers, Jessica; Franzen, Susan P; Miller, Alison L; Reischl, Thomas M; Stoddard, Sarah A; Zimmerman, Marc A

2018-06-01

This study investigated the role of present and future time perspectives, and their relationships with subjective norms and beliefs regarding violence, in predicting violent behaviors among urban middle school students in the Midwestern United States. Although present time perspective covaried with subjective norms and beliefs, each made a unique prediction of self-reported violent behaviors. Future time perspective was not a significant predictor when accounting for these relationships. In addition, present orientation moderated the relationship between subjective norms and beliefs and rates of violent behaviors; those with higher present orientations exhibited stronger associations. We replicated this pattern of results in data from new participants in a subsequent wave of the study. Interventions that explicitly address issues related to time perspective may be effective in reducing early adolescent violence.

Do People Who Believe in God Report More Meaning in Their Lives? The Existential Effects of Belief

PubMed Central

Cranney, Stephen

2014-01-01

I conduct the first large-N study explicitly exploring the association between belief in God and sense of purpose in life. This relationship, while often discussed informally, has received little empirical attention. Here I use the General Social Survey to investigate how form of and confidence in belief in God is related to sense of purpose in life, as measured by a Likert item level of agreement with the statement “In my opinion, life does not serve any purpose.” Using logistic regression analysis, I find that those who indicate that they are confident in God's existence report a higher sense of purpose compared to nonbelievers, believers in a higher power, and those who believe but occasionally doubt. PMID:24729632

Beliefs about emotional residue: the idea that emotions leave a trace in the physical environment.

PubMed

Savani, Krishna; Kumar, Satishchandra; Naidu, N V R; Dweck, Carol S

2011-10-01

Drawing upon the literatures on beliefs about magical contagion and property transmission, we examined people's belief in a novel mechanism of human-to-human contagion, emotional residue. This is the lay belief that people's emotions leave traces in the physical environment, which can later influence others or be sensed by others. Studies 1-4 demonstrated that Indians are more likely than Americans to endorse a lay theory of emotions as substances that move in and out of the body, and to claim that they can sense emotional residue. However, when the belief in emotional residue is measured implicitly, both Indians and American believe to a similar extent that emotional residue influences the moods and behaviors of those who come into contact with it (Studies 5-7). Both Indians and Americans also believe that closer relationships and a larger number of people yield more detectable residue (Study 8). Finally, Study 9 demonstrated that beliefs about emotional residue can influence people's behaviors. Together, these finding suggest that emotional residue is likely to be an intuitive concept, one that people in different cultures acquire even without explicit instruction. 2011 APA, all rights reserved

Emotion malleability beliefs, emotion regulation, and psychopathology: Integrating affective and clinical science.

PubMed

Kneeland, Elizabeth T; Dovidio, John F; Joormann, Jutta; Clark, Margaret S

2016-04-01

Beliefs that individuals hold about whether emotions are malleable or fixed, also referred to as emotion malleability beliefs, may play a crucial role in individuals' emotional experiences and their engagement in changing their emotions. The current review integrates affective science and clinical science perspectives to provide a comprehensive review of how emotion malleability beliefs relate to emotionality, emotion regulation, and specific clinical disorders and treatment. Specifically, we discuss how holding more malleable views of emotion could be associated with more active emotion regulation efforts, greater motivation to engage in active regulatory efforts, more effort expended regulating emotions, and lower levels of pathological distress. In addition, we explain how extending emotion malleability beliefs into the clinical domain can complement and extend current conceptualizations of major depressive disorder, social anxiety disorder, and generalized anxiety disorder. This may prove important given the increasingly central role emotion dysregulation has been given in conceptualization and intervention for these psychiatric conditions. Additionally, discussion focuses on how emotion beliefs could be more explicitly addressed in existing cognitive therapies. Promising future directions for research are identified throughout the review. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Cognitive load disrupts implicit theory-of-mind processing.

PubMed

Schneider, Dana; Lam, Rebecca; Bayliss, Andrew P; Dux, Paul E

2012-08-01

Eye movements in Sally-Anne false-belief tasks appear to reflect the ability to implicitly monitor the mental states of other individuals (theory of mind, or ToM). It has recently been proposed that an early-developing, efficient, and automatically operating ToM system subserves this ability. Surprisingly absent from the literature, however, is an empirical test of the influence of domain-general executive processing resources on this implicit ToM system. In the study reported here, a dual-task method was employed to investigate the impact of executive load on eye movements in an implicit Sally-Anne false-belief task. Under no-load conditions, adult participants displayed eye movement behavior consistent with implicit belief processing, whereas evidence for belief processing was absent for participants under cognitive load. These findings indicate that the cognitive system responsible for implicitly tracking beliefs draws at least minimally on executive processing resources. Thus, even the most low-level processing of beliefs appears to reflect a capacity-limited operation.

Epistemology in Education: Epistemological Development Trajectory

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Labbas, Rachida

2013-01-01

Learning is a continuous process, and through the process of learning, people acquire or construct new knowledge; this knowledge is evaluated implicitly or explicitly (Hofer, 2000). Research on beliefs about knowledge has become an important field of inquiry in educational research (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). This field of research has emerged…

Youth Experiences of Family Violence and Teen Dating Violence Perpetration: Cognitive and Emotional Mediators

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Jouriles, Ernest N.; McDonald, Renee; Mueller, Victoria; Grych, John H.

2012-01-01

This article describes a conceptual model of cognitive and emotional processes proposed to mediate the relation between youth exposure to family violence and teen dating violence perpetration. Explicit beliefs about violence, internal knowledge structures, and executive functioning are hypothesized as cognitive mediators, and their potential…

Our Designs and the Social Agendas They Carry

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Barab, Sasha; Dodge, Tyler; Thomas, Michael K.; Jackson, Craig; Tuzun, Hakan

2007-01-01

Although the work of learning scientists and instructional designers has brought about countless curricula, designs, and theoretical claims, the community has been less active in communicating the explicit and implicit critical social agendas that result (or could result) from their work. It is our belief that the community of learning scientists…

Reducing Variation in the Assessment of Student Writing

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Hunter, Kerry; Docherty, Peter

2011-01-01

This paper extends the literature on grader variation and the role of moderation and socialisation processes in reducing this variation. It offers a fresh categorisation of academics' assessment beliefs and expectations, and uses this categorisation to analyse the interaction between implicit and explicit expectations in relation to grader…

Knowing English Grammar--An Important Aid in Second Language Learning

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Cleary, Colin

2004-01-01

This article discusses a small-scale study that explored students', teachers', and university lecturers' beliefs about the value of studying English grammar in foreign and second language learning. A major debate in second language acquisition literature has been concerned with experiential (implicit) learning as opposed to analytical (explicit)…

Myths about Foreign Language Learning and Learning Disabilities

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Sparks, Richard L.

2016-01-01

Conventional wisdom in education has suggested that students who are classified as learning disabled (LD) will exhibit inordinate difficulties learning a foreign language (FL). Even when not explicitly stated, the notion that those classified as LD have a disability for FL learning is implied. However, while beliefs about this purported disability…

Developing Preschool Teachers' Knowledge of Students' Number Conceptions

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Tsamir, Pessia; Tirosh, Dina; Levenson, Esther; Tabach, Michal; Barkai, Ruthi

2014-01-01

This article describes a study that investigates preschool teachers' knowledge of their young students' number conceptions and the teachers' related self-efficacy beliefs. It also presents and illustrates elements of a professional development program designed explicitly to promote this knowledge among preschool teachers. Results…

Children's Early Use of Mental Verbs and What They Mean.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Wellman, Henry M.; Estes, David

1987-01-01

Examines whether young children make explicit references to beliefs, ideas, thoughts, and intentions. Relates that three-year-old children correctly distinguish between real and mental items and that they think and dream about things that are not real. Concludes that conceptual development theories portraying early development as concrete and…

Integrating Service-Learning into an Introduction to Entrepreneurship Course

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

McCrea, Elizabeth A.

2010-01-01

Despite fairly widespread recognition that entrepreneurship occurs in both profit and nonprofit enterprises, a review of experiential learning techniques in entrepreneurship education does not explicitly mention service-learning. This omission may be because of a perceived lack of relevance of the pedagogy to entrepreneurship, the belief that…

Why did this happen to me? Religious believers' and non-believers' teleological reasoning about life events.

PubMed

Banerjee, Konika; Bloom, Paul

2014-10-01

People often believe that significant life events happen for a reason. In three studies, we examined evidence for the view that teleological beliefs reflect a general cognitive bias to view the world in terms of agency, purpose, and design. Consistent with this hypothesis, we found that individual differences in mentalizing ability predicted both the tendency to believe in fate (Study 1) and to infer purposeful causes of one's own life events (Study 2). In addition, people's perception of purpose in life events was correlated with their teleological beliefs about nature, but this relationship was driven primarily by individuals' explicit religious and paranormal beliefs (Study 3). Across all three studies, we found that while people who believe in God hold stronger teleological beliefs than those who do not, there is nonetheless evidence of teleological beliefs among non-believers, confirming that the perception of purpose in life events does not rely on theistic belief. These findings suggest that the tendency to perceive design and purpose in life events-while moderated by theistic belief-is not solely a consequence of culturally transmitted religious ideas. Rather, this teleological bias has its roots in certain more general social propensities. Copyright © 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Understanding of thought bubbles as mental representations in children with autism: implications for theory of mind.

PubMed

Kerr, Sharyn; Durkin, Kevin

2004-12-01

Standard false belief tasks indicate that normally developing children do not fully develop a theory of mind until the age of 4 years and that children with autism have an impaired theory of mind. Recent evidence, however, suggests that children as young as 3 years of age understand that thought bubbles depict mental representations and that these can be false. Twelve normally developing children and 11 children with autism were tested on a standard false belief task and a number of tasks that employed thought bubbles to represent mental states. While the majority of normally developing children and children with autism failed the standard false belief task, they understood that (i) thought bubbles represent thought, (ii) thought bubbles can be used to infer an unknown reality, (iii) thoughts can be different, and (iv) thoughts can be false. These results indicate that autistic children with a relatively low verbal mental age may be capable of understanding mental representations.

True or false: do 5-year-olds understand belief?

PubMed

Fabricius, William V; Boyer, Ty W; Weimer, Amy A; Carroll, Kathleen

2010-11-01

In 3 studies (N = 188) we tested the hypothesis that children use a perceptual access approach to reason about mental states before they understand beliefs. The perceptual access hypothesis predicts a U-shaped developmental pattern of performance in true belief tasks, in which 3-year-olds who reason about reality should succeed, 4- to 5-year-olds who use perceptual access reasoning should fail, and older children who use belief reasoning should succeed. The results of Study 1 revealed the predicted pattern in 2 different true belief tasks. The results of Study 2 disconfirmed several alternate explanations based on possible pragmatic and inhibitory demands of the true belief tasks. In Study 3, we compared 2 methods of classifying individuals according to which 1 of the 3 reasoning strategies (reality reasoning, perceptual access reasoning, belief reasoning) they used. The 2 methods gave converging results. Both methods indicated that the majority of children used the same approach across tasks and that it was not until after 6 years of age that most children reasoned about beliefs. We conclude that because most prior studies have failed to detect young children's use of perceptual access reasoning, they have overestimated their understanding of false beliefs. We outline several theoretical implications that follow from the perceptual access hypothesis.

Teacher beliefs and cultural models: A challenge for science teacher preparation programs

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Bryan, Lynn A.; Atwater, Mary M.

2002-11-01

The purpose of this paper is to present an argument for developing science teacher education programs that examine teachers' beliefs about multicultural issues and their impact on science teaching and learning. In the paper, we (a) delineate a rationale for the study of teacher beliefs about issues of culture and its impact on science teaching and learning; (b) assert three major categories of teacher beliefs to examine for designing teacher education programs that aim to meet the challenges of increasingly culturally diverse classrooms; and (c) discuss implications for science teacher education programs and research. Research has shown that knowing teachers' beliefs and designing instruction and experiences to explicitly confront those beliefs facilitate refinement of and/or transformation of beliefs and practices (Bryan & Abell, J Res Sci Teaching, 36, 121-140, 1999; Harrington & Hathaway, J Teacher Education, 46, 275-284, 1995; Hollingsworth, Am Educational Res J, 26(2), 160-189, 1989; Olmedo, J Teaching Teacher Education, 13, 245-258, 1997; Tobin & LaMaster, J Res Sci Teaching, 32, 225-242, 1995). Furthermore, prior to student teaching, preservice teachers need to be at least culturally sensitive teachers (Gillette, In Teacher Thinking in Cultural Contexts, F. A. Rios (Ed.); Albany, NY: State University of New York Press; 1996, pp. 104-128). Science educators need to continue to identify those beliefs and practices that undergird desirable and equitable science instruction.

Measuring beliefs in centimeters: private knowledge biases preschoolers' and adults' representation of others' beliefs.

PubMed

Sommerville, Jessica A; Bernstein, Daniel M; Meltzoff, Andrew N

2013-01-01

A novel task, using a continuous spatial layout, was created to investigate the degree to which (in centimeters) 3-year-old children's (N = 63), 5-year-old children's (N = 60), and adults' (N = 60) own privileged knowledge of the location of an object biased their representation of a protagonist's false belief about the object's location. At all ages, participants' knowledge of the object's actual location biased their search estimates, independent of the attentional or memory demands of the task. Children's degree of bias correlated with their performance on a classic change-of-location false belief task, controlling for age. This task is a novel tool for providing a quantitative measurement of the degree to which self-knowledge can bias estimates of others' beliefs. © 2013 The Authors. Child Development © 2013 Society for Research in Child Development, Inc.

Syntactic Recursion Facilitates and Working Memory Predicts Recursive Theory of Mind

PubMed Central

Arslan, Burcu; Hohenberger, Annette; Verbrugge, Rineke

2017-01-01

In this study, we focus on the possible roles of second-order syntactic recursion and working memory in terms of simple and complex span tasks in the development of second-order false belief reasoning. We tested 89 Turkish children in two age groups, one younger (4;6–6;5 years) and one older (6;7–8;10 years). Although second-order syntactic recursion is significantly correlated with the second-order false belief task, results of ordinal logistic regressions revealed that the main predictor of second-order false belief reasoning is complex working memory span. Unlike simple working memory and second-order syntactic recursion tasks, the complex working memory task required processing information serially with additional reasoning demands that require complex working memory strategies. Based on our results, we propose that children’s second-order theory of mind develops when they have efficient reasoning rules to process embedded beliefs serially, thus overcoming a possible serial processing bottleneck. PMID:28072823

Spatial Bayesian belief networks as a planning decision tool for mapping ecosystem services trade-offs on forested landscapes.

PubMed

Gonzalez-Redin, Julen; Luque, Sandra; Poggio, Laura; Smith, Ron; Gimona, Alessandro

2016-01-01

An integrated methodology, based on linking Bayesian belief networks (BBN) with GIS, is proposed for combining available evidence to help forest managers evaluate implications and trade-offs between forest production and conservation measures to preserve biodiversity in forested habitats. A Bayesian belief network is a probabilistic graphical model that represents variables and their dependencies through specifying probabilistic relationships. In spatially explicit decision problems where it is difficult to choose appropriate combinations of interventions, the proposed integration of a BBN with GIS helped to facilitate shared understanding of the human-landscape relationships, while fostering collective management that can be incorporated into landscape planning processes. Trades-offs become more and more relevant in these landscape contexts where the participation of many and varied stakeholder groups is indispensable. With these challenges in mind, our integrated approach incorporates GIS-based data with expert knowledge to consider two different land use interests - biodiversity value for conservation and timber production potential - with the focus on a complex mountain landscape in the French Alps. The spatial models produced provided different alternatives of suitable sites that can be used by policy makers in order to support conservation priorities while addressing management options. The approach provided provide a common reasoning language among different experts from different backgrounds while helped to identify spatially explicit conflictive areas. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

The influence of a bystander agent's beliefs on children's and adults' decision-making process.

PubMed

Buttelmann, Frances; Buttelmann, David

2017-01-01

The ability to attribute and represent others' mental states (e.g., beliefs; so-called "theory of mind") is essential for participation in human social interaction. Despite a considerable body of research using tasks in which protagonists in the participants' attentional focus held false or true beliefs, the question of automatic belief attribution to bystander agents has received little attention. In the current study, we presented adults and 6-year-olds (N=92) with an implicit computer-based avoidance false-belief task in which participants were asked to place an object into one of three boxes. While doing so, we manipulated the beliefs of an irrelevant human-like or non-human-like bystander agent who was visible on the screen. Importantly, the bystander agent's beliefs were irrelevant for solving the task. Still, children's decision making was significantly influenced by the bystander agent's beliefs even if this was a non-human-like self-propelled object. Such an influence did not become obvious in adults' deliberate decisions but occurred only in their reaction times, which suggests that they also processed the bystander agent's beliefs but were able to suppress the influence of such beliefs on their behavior regulation. The results of a control study (N=53) ruled out low-level explanations and confirmed that self-propelledness of agents is a necessary factor for belief attribution to occur. Thus, not only do humans spontaneously ascribe beliefs to self-propelled bystander agents, but those beliefs even influence meaningful decisions in children. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Reading instruction in science: Teachers' practices, beliefs, & self-efficacy

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Morales, Christina M.

The Common Core State Standards (CCSS, 2010) and the Next Generation Science Standards (NGSS, 2013) call on science teachers to play a stronger role in helping students learn from informational science texts. Curriculum implementation efforts aimed at addressing these new standards should build on what teachers are already doing to help students with reading in their classrooms and the pedagogical issues that they feel are important to science learning. However, few current studies have gathered these important insights from science teachers. Aiming to fill this gap in the literature, this study attempted to describe middle school science teachers' current practices, beliefs, and self-efficacy regarding reading and reading instruction in their classrooms. A conceptual model hypothesizing that self-efficacy mediates the relationship between teachers' beliefs about how important reading instruction is to science learning and how often they provide reading instruction in their science classes was also tested. Participants (N = 247) reported that students regularly engaged in reading-related tasks in science class. Somer's D correlation analyses highlighted positive associations between the frequency with which teachers reported that students engaged in various reading-related tasks and the frequency with which they reported providing reading instruction for those tasks, suggesting that students tended to receive explicit instruction or coaching for the reading-related tasks they engaged in most often. Middle school science teachers also expressed positive beliefs about the importance of reading-related tasks and explicit instruction or coaching for reading in science and tended to take on responsibility for helping students become better readers of science texts. Last, a path analysis confirmed that the association between teachers' beliefs and practices was mediated through teachers' self-efficacy (beta = .07, p < .001). This suggests that self-efficacy can influence teacher practice: even if teachers believe that reading instruction is important or even essential to science learning, they might avoid or resist providing reading instruction if they do not feel efficacious in helping students become stronger readers of science texts.

29 CFR 1605.1 - “Religious” nature of a practice or belief.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-07-01

... 29 Labor 4 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false âReligiousâ nature of a practice or belief. 1605.1 Section... GUIDELINES ON DISCRIMINATION BECAUSE OF RELIGION § 1605.1 “Religious” nature of a practice or belief. In most cases whether or not a practice or belief is religious is not at issue. However, in those cases in which...

29 CFR 1605.1 - “Religious” nature of a practice or belief.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-07-01

... 29 Labor 4 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false âReligiousâ nature of a practice or belief. 1605.1 Section... GUIDELINES ON DISCRIMINATION BECAUSE OF RELIGION § 1605.1 “Religious” nature of a practice or belief. In most cases whether or not a practice or belief is religious is not at issue. However, in those cases in which...

29 CFR 1605.1 - “Religious” nature of a practice or belief.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-07-01

... 29 Labor 4 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false âReligiousâ nature of a practice or belief. 1605.1 Section... GUIDELINES ON DISCRIMINATION BECAUSE OF RELIGION § 1605.1 “Religious” nature of a practice or belief. In most cases whether or not a practice or belief is religious is not at issue. However, in those cases in which...

29 CFR 1605.1 - “Religious” nature of a practice or belief.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-07-01

... 29 Labor 4 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false âReligiousâ nature of a practice or belief. 1605.1 Section... GUIDELINES ON DISCRIMINATION BECAUSE OF RELIGION § 1605.1 “Religious” nature of a practice or belief. In most cases whether or not a practice or belief is religious is not at issue. However, in those cases in which...

The Relation between Preschool Children's False-Belief Understanding and Domain-General Experimentation Skills

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Piekny, Jeanette; Grube, Dietmar; Maehler, Claudia

2013-01-01

The focus of the present study is on the developmental antecedents of domain-general experimentation skills. We hypothesized that false-belief understanding would predict the ability to distinguish a conclusive from an inconclusive experiment. We conducted a longitudinal study with two assessment points (t1 and t2) to investigate this hypothesis.…

A Constructivist Connectionist Model of Transitions on False-Belief Tasks

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Berthiaume, Vincent G.; Shultz, Thomas R.; Onishi, Kristine H.

2013-01-01

How do children come to understand that others have mental representations, e.g., of an object's location? Preschoolers go through two transitions on verbal false-belief tasks, in which they have to predict where an agent will search for an object that was moved in her absence. First, while three-and-a-half-year-olds usually fail at approach…

False Belief Development in Children Who Are Hard of Hearing Compared with Peers with Normal Hearing

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Walker, Elizabeth A.; Ambrose, Sophie E.; Oleson, Jacob; Moeller, Mary Pat

2017-01-01

Purpose: This study investigates false belief (FB) understanding in children who are hard of hearing (CHH) compared with children with normal hearing (CNH) at ages 5 and 6 years and at 2nd grade. Research with this population has theoretical significance, given that the early auditory-linguistic experiences of CHH are less restricted compared with…

Theory of mind development in Chinese children: a meta-analysis of false-belief understanding across cultures and languages.

PubMed

Liu, David; Wellman, Henry M; Tardif, Twila; Sabbagh, Mark A

2008-03-01

Theory of mind is claimed to develop universally among humans across cultures with vastly different folk psychologies. However, in the attempt to test and confirm a claim of universality, individual studies have been limited by small sample sizes, sample specificities, and an overwhelming focus on Anglo- European children. The current meta-analysis of children's false-belief performance provides the most comprehensive examination to date of theory-of-mind development in a population of non-Western children speaking non-Indo-European languages (i.e., Mandarin and Cantonese). The meta-analysis consisted of 196 Chinese conditions (127 from mainland China and 69 from Hong Kong), representing responses from more than 3,000 children, compared with 155 similar North American conditions (83 conditions from the United States and 72 conditions from Canada). The findings show parallel developmental trajectories of false-belief understanding for children in China and North America coupled with significant differences in the timing of development across communities-children's false-belief performance varied across different locales by as much as 2 or more years. These data support the importance of both universal trajectories and specific experiential factors in the development of theory of mind.

A new paper and pencil task reveals adult false belief reasoning bias.

PubMed

Coburn, Patricia I; Bernstein, Daniel M; Begeer, Sander

2015-09-01

Theory of mind (ToM) is the ability to take other people's perspective by inferring their mental state. Most 6-year olds pass the change-of-location false belief task that is commonly used to assess ToM. However, the change-of-location task is not suitable for individuals over 5 years of age, due to its discrete response options. In two experiments, we used a paper and pencil version of a modified change-of-location task (the Real Object Sandbox task) to assess false belief reasoning continuously rather than discretely in adults. Participants heard nine change-of-location scenarios and answered a critical question after each. The memory control questions only required the participant to remember the object's original location, whereas the false belief questions required participants to take the perspective of the protagonist. Participants were more accurate on memory trials than trials requiring perspective taking, and performance on paper and pencil trials correlated with corresponding trials on the Real Object Sandbox task. The Paper and Pencil Sandbox task is a convenient continuous measure of ToM that could be administered to a wide range of age groups.

Creating Non-Believed Memories for Recent Autobiographical Events

PubMed Central

Clark, Andrew; Nash, Robert A.; Fincham, Gabrielle; Mazzoni, Giuliana

2012-01-01

A recent study showed that many people spontaneously report vivid memories of events that they do not believe to have occurred [1]. In the present experiment we tested for the first time whether, after powerful false memories have been created, debriefing might leave behind nonbelieved memories for the fake events. In Session 1 participants imitated simple actions, and in Session 2 they saw doctored video-recordings containing clips that falsely suggested they had performed additional (fake) actions. As in earlier studies, this procedure created powerful false memories. In Session 3, participants were debriefed and told that specific actions in the video were not truly performed. Beliefs and memories for all critical actions were tested before and after the debriefing. Results showed that debriefing undermined participants' beliefs in fake actions, but left behind residual memory-like content. These results indicate that debriefing can leave behind vivid false memories which are no longer believed, and thus we demonstrate for the first time that the memory of an event can be experimentally dissociated from the belief in the event's occurrence. These results also confirm that belief in and memory for an event can be independently-occurring constructs. PMID:22427927

49 CFR 543.6 - Petition: Specific content requirements.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... 49 Transportation 6 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Petition: Specific content requirements. 543.6...; (4) The reasons for the petitioner's belief that the antitheft device will be effective in reducing... petitioner and form a basis for that belief; (5) The reasons for the petitioner's belief that the agency...

45 CFR 88.4 - Requirements and prohibitions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... 45 Public Welfare 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Requirements and prohibitions. 88.4 Section 88.4... his religious beliefs or moral convictions, or because of his religious beliefs or moral convictions... or consistent with the applicant's religious beliefs or moral convictions. (d) Entities to whom this...

49 CFR 543.6 - Petition: Specific content requirements.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-10-01

... 49 Transportation 6 2014-10-01 2014-10-01 false Petition: Specific content requirements. 543.6...; (4) The reasons for the petitioner's belief that the antitheft device will be effective in reducing... petitioner and form a basis for that belief; (5) The reasons for the petitioner's belief that the agency...

49 CFR 543.6 - Petition: Specific content requirements.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-10-01

... 49 Transportation 6 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Petition: Specific content requirements. 543.6...; (4) The reasons for the petitioner's belief that the antitheft device will be effective in reducing... petitioner and form a basis for that belief; (5) The reasons for the petitioner's belief that the agency...

Reasoning about Other People's Beliefs: Bilinguals Have an Advantage

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Rubio-Fernandez, Paula; Glucksberg, Sam

2012-01-01

Bilingualism can have widespread cognitive effects. In this article we investigate whether bilingualism might have an effect on adults' abilities to reason about other people's beliefs. In particular, we tested whether bilingual adults might have an advantage over monolingual adults in false-belief reasoning analogous to the advantage that has…

49 CFR 543.6 - Petition: Specific content requirements.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-10-01

... 49 Transportation 6 2012-10-01 2012-10-01 false Petition: Specific content requirements. 543.6...; (4) The reasons for the petitioner's belief that the antitheft device will be effective in reducing... petitioner and form a basis for that belief; (5) The reasons for the petitioner's belief that the agency...

49 CFR 543.6 - Petition: Specific content requirements.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-10-01

... 49 Transportation 6 2013-10-01 2013-10-01 false Petition: Specific content requirements. 543.6...; (4) The reasons for the petitioner's belief that the antitheft device will be effective in reducing... petitioner and form a basis for that belief; (5) The reasons for the petitioner's belief that the agency...

A Study of Common Beliefs and Misconceptions in Physical Science

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Stein, Mary; Larrabee, Timothy G.; Barman, Charles R.

2008-01-01

The Science Belief Test is an online instrument comprised of 47 statements that require true or false responses and request written explanations to accompany these responses. It targets topics in chemistry, physics, biology, earth science, and astronomy and was initially designed to assess preservice elementary teachers' beliefs about general…

Deaf Children's Use of Beliefs and Desires in Negotiation

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Terwogt, Mark Meerum; Rieffe, Carolien

2004-01-01

Although several studies have shown that deaf children demonstrated impaired performances on false-belief tasks, the children's belief understanding appeared intact when asked to explain emotions or behavior. However, this finding does not necessarily indicate a full-fledged theory of mind. This study aimed to investigate deaf children's…

Belief Function Based Decision Fusion for Decentralized Target Classification in Wireless Sensor Networks

PubMed Central

Zhang, Wenyu; Zhang, Zhenjiang

2015-01-01

Decision fusion in sensor networks enables sensors to improve classification accuracy while reducing the energy consumption and bandwidth demand for data transmission. In this paper, we focus on the decentralized multi-class classification fusion problem in wireless sensor networks (WSNs) and a new simple but effective decision fusion rule based on belief function theory is proposed. Unlike existing belief function based decision fusion schemes, the proposed approach is compatible with any type of classifier because the basic belief assignments (BBAs) of each sensor are constructed on the basis of the classifier’s training output confusion matrix and real-time observations. We also derive explicit global BBA in the fusion center under Dempster’s combinational rule, making the decision making operation in the fusion center greatly simplified. Also, sending the whole BBA structure to the fusion center is avoided. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed fusion rule has better performance in fusion accuracy compared with the naïve Bayes rule and weighted majority voting rule. PMID:26295399

Implicit theories concerning the intelligence of individuals with Down syndrome.

PubMed

Enea-Drapeau, Claire; Carlier, Michèle; Huguet, Pascal

2017-01-01

Studies over the past three decades have shown that learning difficulties are not only determined by neurological disorders, but also by motivational and/or socio-cognitive factors Among these factors, implicit theories of intelligence (also referred to as conceptions, mindsets or beliefs about intelligence) are key elements. The belief that intelligence is fixed (entity theory), as opposed to malleable (incremental theory), is generally associated with negative teaching practices and poorer student outcomes, yet beliefs about the intelligence of individuals with intellectual disabilities have not received much attention. We propose the first study on conceptions of intelligence of persons with intellectual disabilities, here people with Down syndrome. Participants were 55 professionally qualified people working with individuals with intellectual disabilities and 81 adults from the community. We compared what both groups of participants believe about intelligence of typical people and what they believe about the intelligence of individuals with Down syndrome. We also investigated implicit theories of intelligence as predictors of explicit judgments about intelligence and implicit attitudes toward people with Down syndrome. Whatever the work experience in the field of intellectual disability, implicit theories of intelligence were found to be less incremental when considering people with Down syndrome than when considering typical people; and the stronger the belief in entity theory, the more negative (and less positive) the judgments expressed explicitly. Implicit theories of intelligence were also found to be predictors of negative implicit attitude but only in adults from the community. These findings offer prospects for improving practices by people working in the field of intellectual disability. They might interest a wide range of people caring for people with intellectual disabilities, such as teachers, but also other professional caregivers, and other scientists focusing on intellectual disabilities or social cognition.

Implicit theories concerning the intelligence of individuals with Down syndrome

PubMed Central

Carlier, Michèle; Huguet, Pascal

2017-01-01

Studies over the past three decades have shown that learning difficulties are not only determined by neurological disorders, but also by motivational and/or socio-cognitive factors Among these factors, implicit theories of intelligence (also referred to as conceptions, mindsets or beliefs about intelligence) are key elements. The belief that intelligence is fixed (entity theory), as opposed to malleable (incremental theory), is generally associated with negative teaching practices and poorer student outcomes, yet beliefs about the intelligence of individuals with intellectual disabilities have not received much attention. We propose the first study on conceptions of intelligence of persons with intellectual disabilities, here people with Down syndrome. Participants were 55 professionally qualified people working with individuals with intellectual disabilities and 81 adults from the community. We compared what both groups of participants believe about intelligence of typical people and what they believe about the intelligence of individuals with Down syndrome. We also investigated implicit theories of intelligence as predictors of explicit judgments about intelligence and implicit attitudes toward people with Down syndrome. Whatever the work experience in the field of intellectual disability, implicit theories of intelligence were found to be less incremental when considering people with Down syndrome than when considering typical people; and the stronger the belief in entity theory, the more negative (and less positive) the judgments expressed explicitly. Implicit theories of intelligence were also found to be predictors of negative implicit attitude but only in adults from the community. These findings offer prospects for improving practices by people working in the field of intellectual disability. They might interest a wide range of people caring for people with intellectual disabilities, such as teachers, but also other professional caregivers, and other scientists focusing on intellectual disabilities or social cognition. PMID:29166393

The relationship between nature of science understandings and science self-efficacy beliefs of sixth grade students

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Parker, Elisabeth Allyn

Bandura (1986) posited that self-efficacy beliefs help determine what individuals do with the knowledge and skills they have and are critical determinants of how well skill and knowledge are acquired. Research has correlated self-efficacy beliefs with academic success and subject interest (Pajares, Britner, & Valiante, 2000). Similar studies report a decreasing interest by students in school science beginning in middle school claiming that they don't enjoy science because the classes are boring and irrelevant to their lives (Basu & Barton, 2007). The hypothesis put forth by researchers is that students need to observe models of how science is done, the nature of science (NOS), so that they connect with the human enterprise of science and thereby raise their self-efficacy (Britner, 2008). This study examined NOS understandings and science self-efficacy of students enrolled in a sixth grade earth science class taught with explicit NOS instruction. The research questions that guided this study were (a) how do students' self-efficacy beliefs change as compared with changes in their nature of science understandings?; and (b) how do changes in students' science self-efficacy beliefs vary with gender and ethnicity segregation? A mixed method design was employed following an embedded experimental model (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007). As the treatment, five NOS aspects were first taught by the teachers using nonintegrated activities followed by integrated instructional approach (Khishfe, 2008). Students' views of NOS using the Views on Nature of Science (VNOS) (Lederman, Abd-El-Khalick, & Schwartz, 2002) along with their self-efficacy beliefs using three Likert-type science self-efficacy scales (Britner, 2002) were gathered. Changes in NOS understandings were determined by categorizing student responses and then comparing pre- and post-instructional understandings. To determine changes in participants' self-efficacy beliefs as measured by the three subscales, a multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) was conducted. Findings indicated that explicit NOS instruction was effective for all students except minority (Black, Hispanic, Asian, or multiracial) male students in improving NOS understandings. Furthermore, all students that received NOS instruction demonstrated decreased anxiety towards science. Future research should focus on long-term investigations of changes in anxiety and value of research constructs with regards to NOS instruction.

Personalized and not general suggestion produces false autobiographical memories and suggestion-consistent behavior.

PubMed

Scoboria, Alan; Mazzoni, Giuliana; Jarry, Josée L; Bernstein, Daniel M

2012-01-01

Suggesting false childhood events produces false autobiographical beliefs, memories and suggestion-consistent behavior. The mechanisms by which suggestion affects behavior are not understood, and whether false beliefs and memories are necessary for suggestions to impact behavior remains unexplored. We examined the relative effects of providing a personalized suggestion (suggesting that an event occurred to the person in the past), and/or a general suggestion (suggesting that an event happened to others in the past). Participants (N=122) received a personalized suggestion, a general suggestion, both or neither, about childhood illness due to spoiled peach yogurt. The personalized suggestion resulted in false beliefs, false memories, and suggestion-consistent behavioral intentions immediately after the suggestion. One week or one month later participants completed a taste test that involved eating varieties of crackers and yogurts. The personalized suggestion led to reduced consumption of only peach yogurt, and those who reported a false memory showed the most eating suppression. This effect on behavior was equally strong after one week and one month, showing a long lived influence of the personalized suggestion. The general suggestion showed no effects. Suggestions that convey personal information about a past event produce false autobiographical memories, which in turn impact behavior. Copyright © 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Managers' Beliefs about the Glass Ceiling: Interpersonal and Organizational Factors

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Elacqua, Tina C.; Beehr, Terry A.; Hansen, Curtiss P.; Webster, Jennica

2009-01-01

The glass ceiling refers to the difficulty of women trying to be promoted into the top management levels. The present study examined managers' potential explanations, implicit or explicit, for why women rarely reach the top hierarchical levels in their own organization. Among 685 managers at a large Midwestern insurance company, a model was…

Language Ideologies of Arizona Voters, Language Managers, and Teachers

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Fitzsimmons-Doolan, Shannon

2014-01-01

Arizona is the site of many explicit language policies as well as ongoing scholarly discussions of related language ideologies--beliefs about the role of language in society. This study adds a critical piece to the investigation of the role of ideologies in language policy processes by thoroughly documenting language ideologies expressed by a…

Organizational Culture in Educational Institutions

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Efeoglu, I. Efe; Ulum, Ömer Gökhan

2017-01-01

The concept of culture closely refers to a wide scope of effects on how individuals act in a group, an institution, or a public place. Chiefly, it covers a range of universal ideas, beliefs, values, behaviors, criterion, and measures which may be both explicit and implicit. The study on organizational culture has gained much attention among…

Developing Principles of Physical Education Teacher Education Practice through Self-Study

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Fletcher, Tim

2016-01-01

Background: The articulation of specific principles of teacher education practice allows teacher educators to make explicit the beliefs, values, and actions that shape their practice. Engaging in processes to articulate the principles that guide practice is beneficial not only for teacher educators and their colleagues but also for students. There…

Social Norms and Self-Presentation: Children's Implicit and Explicit Intergroup Attitudes

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Rutland, Adam; Cameron, Lindsey; Milne, Alan; McGeorge, Peter

2005-01-01

Two studies examined whether social norms and children's concern for self-presentation affect their intergroup attitudes. Study 1 examined racial intergroup attitudes and normative beliefs among children aged 6 to 16 years (n=155). Accountability (i.e., public self-focus) was experimentally manipulated, and intergroup attitudes were assessed using…

Open-Ended versus Guided Laboratory Activities: Impact on Students' Beliefs about Experimental Physics

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Wilcox, Bethany R.; Lewandowski, H. J.

2016-01-01

Improving students' understanding of the nature of experimental physics is often an explicit or implicit goal of undergraduate laboratory physics courses. However, lab activities in traditional lab courses are typically characterized by highly structured, guided labs that often do not require or encourage students to engage authentically in the…

The Cheat-O-Meter: Talking about What It Means to "Be Faithful"

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Curtis, Jena Nicols; Coffey, Kathryn

2008-01-01

Many HIV/AIDS prevention programs advocate that audiences "be faithful" to their partners to prevent HIV and other sexually transmitted infections, yet beliefs about what exactly constitutes faithfulness and "cheating" are rarely explicitly discussed in relationships. The Cheat-O-Meter is an activity that encourages participants to explore and…

Theory of Mind in SLI Revisited: Links with Syntax, Comparisons with ASD

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Durrleman, Stephanie; Burnel, Morgane; Reboul, Anne

2017-01-01

Background: According to the linguistic determinism approach, knowledge of sentential complements such as: "John says that the earth" is flat plays a crucial role in theory of mind (ToM) development by providing a means to represent explicitly people's mental attitudes and beliefs. This approach predicts that mastery of complements…

Cognitive therapy for punishment paranoia: a single case experiment.

PubMed

Chadwick, P; Trower, P

1996-04-01

There is growing agreement that at least certain kinds of delusions defend against negative self-evaluation, and in consequence that cognitive therapy for delusions needs to address issues of self-evaluation more explicitly. However, in practice it can be difficult to enable clients to see the connection between delusions and self-esteem. The present single-case study exemplifies the conceptual and practical application of cognitive therapy for individuals who are both paranoid and have strong negative self-evaluative beliefs. A multiple-baseline approach is used, whereby one man's negative self-evaluative belief and two paranoid delusions are challenged sequentially. Conviction in two of the three beliefs changes at the point of intervention; conviction in the third changes prior to intervention. We discuss the details of the case, as well as the wider implications for cognitive approaches to delusions.

Tracking Speakers' False Beliefs: Is Theory of Mind Available Earlier for Word Learning?

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Houston-Price, Carmel; Goddard, Kate; Seclier, Catherine; Grant, Sally C.; Reid, Caitlin J. B.; Boyden, Laura E.; Williams, Rhiannon

2011-01-01

Happe and Loth (2002) describe word learning as a "privileged domain" in the development of a theory of mind. We test this claim in a series of experiments based on the Sally-Anne paradigm. Three- and 4-year-old children's ability to represent others' false beliefs was investigated in tasks that required the child either to predict the actions of…

How Children with Autism Reason about Other's Intentions: False-Belief and Counterfactual Inferences

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Rasga, Célia; Quelhas, Ana Cristina; Byrne, Ruth M. J.

2017-01-01

We examine false belief and counterfactual reasoning in children with autism with a new change-of-intentions task. Children listened to stories, for example, Anne is picking up toys and John hears her say she wants to find her ball. John goes away and the reason for Anne's action changes--Anne's mother tells her to tidy her bedroom. We asked,…

The "I Knew It All Along" Phenomenon: Second-Order False Belief Understanding and the Curse of Knowledge in Primary School Children

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Massaro, Davide; Castelli, Ilaria; Sanvito, Laura; Marchetti, Antonella

2014-01-01

This study investigated two different expressions of the so-called curse of knowledge in primary school children: hindsight bias and outcome bias. Further, it explored the possible predictive function of false belief understanding in reducing these biases. Ninety-one children aged 7, 9, and 11 years (middle- to upper-middle class) were…

Theory of Mind (ToM) in Children with Autism or Typical Development: Links between Eye-Reading and False Belief Understanding

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Peterson, Candida C.; Slaughter, Virginia

2009-01-01

Previous research shows that high-functioning children with autism are slow to pass "litmus" false belief tests of ToM but how this may relate to other aspects of mindreading (e.g., discerning thoughts from facial expressions) is less clear, partly for methodological reasons. Thus the joint methodological and conceptual goals of this…

Young Children's Knowledge of the Representational Function of Pictorial Symbols: Development across the Preschool Years in Three Cultures

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Callaghan, Tara C.; Rochat, Philippe; Corbit, John

2012-01-01

Three- to 5-year-old children's knowledge that pictures have a representational function for others was investigated using a pictorial false-belief task. In Study 1, children passed the task at around 4 years old, and performance was correlated with standard false-belief and pictorial symbol tasks. In Study 2, the performance of children from two…

False-Belief Understanding in 2.5-Year-Olds: Evidence From Violation-of-Expectation Change-of-Location and Unexpected-Contents tasks

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

He, Zijing; Bolz, Matthias; Baillargeon, Renee

2011-01-01

Until recently, it was generally assumed that the ability to attribute false beliefs did not emerge until about 4 years of age. However, recent reports using spontaneous- as opposed to elicited-response tasks have suggested that this ability may be present much earlier. To date, researchers have employed two kinds of spontaneous-response…

Training Preschoolers on First-Order False Belief Understanding: Transfer on Advanced ToM Skills and Metamemory

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Lecce, Serena; Bianco, Federica; Demicheli, Patrizia; Cavallini, Elena

2014-01-01

This study investigated the relation between theory of mind (ToM) and metamemory knowledge using a training methodology. Sixty-two 4- to 5-year-old children were recruited and randomly assigned to one of two training conditions: A first-order false belief (ToM) and a control condition. Intervention and control groups were equivalent at pretest for…

Language and Theory of Mind: Meta-Analysis of the Relation between Language Ability and False-Belief Understanding

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Milligan, Karen; Astington, Janet Wilde; Dack, Lisa Ain

2007-01-01

Numerous studies show that children's language ability is related to false-belief understanding. However, there is considerable variation in the size of the correlation reported. Using data from 104 studies (N=8,891), this meta-analysis determines the strength of the relation in children under age 7 and examines moderators that may account for the…

Where Will the Triangle Look for It? Attributing False Beliefs to a Geometric Shape at 17 Months

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Surian, Luca; Geraci, Alessandra

2012-01-01

Prior research on implicit mind-reading skills has focussed on how infants anticipate other persons' actions. This study investigated whether 11- and 17-month-olds spontaneously attribute false beliefs (FB) even to a simple animated geometric shape. Infants were shown a triangle chasing a disk through a tunnel. Using an eye-tracker, we found that…

Language and Theory of Mind in Autism Spectrum Disorder: The Relationship between Complement Syntax and False Belief Task Performance

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Lind, Sophie E.; Bowler, Dermot M.

2009-01-01

This study aimed to test the hypothesis that children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) use their knowledge of complement syntax as a means of "hacking out" solutions to false belief tasks, despite lacking a representational theory of mind (ToM). Participants completed a "memory for complements" task, a measure of receptive vocabulary, and…

Belief and sign, true and false: the unique of false belief reasoning.

PubMed

Zhang, Ting; Zhang, Qin; Li, Yiyuan; Long, Changquan; Li, Hong

2013-11-01

For a long time, a controversy has been proposed that whether the process of theory of mind is a result of domain-specific or domain-general changes (Wellman in The handbook of childhood cognitive development. Blackwell Publication, New Jersey, 2011). This event-related potential study explored the neural time course of domain-general and domain-specific components in belief reasoning. Fourteen participants completed location transfer false belief (FB), true belief (TB), false sign (FS) and true sign (TS) tasks, in which two pictures told a story related to a dog that ran from a green into a red box. In the TB and FB tasks, a boy saw or did not see the transfer of the dog, respectively. In the FS and TS tasks, an arrow that pointed to the green box either altered its direction to the red box or did not alter following the transfer of the dog. Participants then inferred where the boy thought of, or the arrow indicated the location of the dog. FB and TB reasoning elicited lower N2 amplitudes than FS and TS reasoning, which is associated with domain-general components, the detection, and classification. The late slow wave (LSW) for FB was more positive at frontal, central, and parietal sites than FS because of the domain-specific component involved in FB reasoning. However, the LSW was less positive for TB than for FB but did not differ from the TS condition, which implies that mental representation might not be involved in TB reasoning.

12 CFR 41.82 - Duties of users regarding address discrepancies.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... 12 Banks and Banking 1 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Duties of users regarding address discrepancies... belief. (1) Requirement to form a reasonable belief. A user must develop and implement reasonable policies and procedures designed to enable the user to form a reasonable belief that a consumer report...

22 CFR 92.27 - Affiant's allegations in affidavit.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-04-01

... 22 Foreign Relations 1 2011-04-01 2011-04-01 false Affiant's allegations in affidavit. 92.27... of his knowledge and belief. (3) If the allegations made on information and belief are material, the sources of information and grounds of belief should be set out and a good reason given why a positive...

Children with Autism can Track Others' Beliefs in a Competitive Game

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Peterson, Candida C.; Slaughter, Virginia; Peterson, James; Premack, David

2013-01-01

Theory of mind (ToM) development, assessed via "litmus" false belief tests, is severely delayed in autism, but the standard testing procedure may underestimate these children's genuine understanding. To explore this, we developed a novel test involving competition to win a reward as the motive for tracking other players' beliefs (the…

22 CFR 92.27 - Affiant's allegations in affidavit.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-04-01

... 22 Foreign Relations 1 2012-04-01 2012-04-01 false Affiant's allegations in affidavit. 92.27... of his knowledge and belief. (3) If the allegations made on information and belief are material, the sources of information and grounds of belief should be set out and a good reason given why a positive...

12 CFR 41.82 - Duties of users regarding address discrepancies.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 12 Banks and Banking 1 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Duties of users regarding address discrepancies... belief. (1) Requirement to form a reasonable belief. A user must develop and implement reasonable policies and procedures designed to enable the user to form a reasonable belief that a consumer report...

12 CFR 41.82 - Duties of users regarding address discrepancies.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... 12 Banks and Banking 1 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Duties of users regarding address discrepancies... belief.—(1) Requirement to form a reasonable belief. A user must develop and implement reasonable policies and procedures designed to enable the user to form a reasonable belief that a consumer report...

22 CFR 92.27 - Affiant's allegations in affidavit.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-04-01

... 22 Foreign Relations 1 2014-04-01 2014-04-01 false Affiant's allegations in affidavit. 92.27... of his knowledge and belief. (3) If the allegations made on information and belief are material, the sources of information and grounds of belief should be set out and a good reason given why a positive...

12 CFR 1022.82 - Duties of users regarding address discrepancies.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... 12 Banks and Banking 8 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Duties of users regarding address discrepancies... the consumer. (c) Reasonable belief. (1) Requirement to form a reasonable belief. A user must develop... belief that a consumer report relates to the consumer about whom it has requested the report, when the...

12 CFR 41.82 - Duties of users regarding address discrepancies.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 12 Banks and Banking 1 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Duties of users regarding address discrepancies... belief. (1) Requirement to form a reasonable belief. A user must develop and implement reasonable policies and procedures designed to enable the user to form a reasonable belief that a consumer report...

22 CFR 92.27 - Affiant's allegations in affidavit.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-04-01

... 22 Foreign Relations 1 2013-04-01 2013-04-01 false Affiant's allegations in affidavit. 92.27... of his knowledge and belief. (3) If the allegations made on information and belief are material, the sources of information and grounds of belief should be set out and a good reason given why a positive...

Monkeys Represent Others' Knowledge but Not Their Beliefs

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Marticorena, Drew C. W.; Ruiz, April M.; Mukerji, Cora; Goddu, Anna; Santos, Laurie R.

2011-01-01

The capacity to reason about the false beliefs of others is classically considered the benchmark for a fully fledged understanding of the mental lives of others. Although much is known about the developmental origins of our understanding of others' beliefs, we still know much less about the evolutionary origins of this capacity. Here, we examine…

Theory of mind in Williams syndrome assessed using a nonverbal task.

PubMed

Porter, Melanie A; Coltheart, Max; Langdon, Robyn

2008-05-01

This study examined Theory of Mind in Williams syndrome (WS) and in normal chronological age-matched and mental age-matched control groups, using a picture sequencing task. This task assesses understanding of pretence, intention and false belief, while controlling for social-script knowledge and physical cause-and-effect reasoning. The task was selected because it is entirely non-verbal, so that the WS individuals could not rely on their good verbal skills when performing the task. Results indicated a specific deficit in understanding of false belief within the WS group. There was also evidence of heterogeneity in the WS group, with the false belief impairment restricted to only a particular subgroup of WS individuals identified originally by Porter, M., & Coltheart, M. (2005). Cognitive heterogeneity in Williams syndrome. Developmental Neuropsychology, 27(2), 275-306.

Thinking about false belief: it's not just what children say, but how long it takes them to say it.

PubMed

Atance, Cristina M; Bernstein, Daniel M; Meltzoff, Andrew N

2010-08-01

We examined 240 children's (3.5-, 4.5-, and 5.5-year-olds) latency to respond to questions on a battery of false-belief tasks. Response latencies exhibited a significant cross-over interaction as a function of age and response type (correct vs. incorrect). 3.5-year-olds'incorrect latencies were faster than their correct latencies, whereas the opposite pattern emerged for 4.5- and 5.5-year-olds. Although these results are most consistent with conceptual change theories of false-belief reasoning, no extant theory fully accounts for our data pattern. We argue that response latency data provide new information about underlying cognitive processes in theory of mind reasoning, and can shed light on concept acquisition more broadly. Copyright (c) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Training preschoolers on first-order false belief understanding: transfer on advanced ToM skills and metamemory.

PubMed

Lecce, Serena; Bianco, Federica; Demicheli, Patrizia; Cavallini, Elena

2014-01-01

This study investigated the relation between theory of mind (ToM) and metamemory knowledge using a training methodology. Sixty-two 4- to 5-year-old children were recruited and randomly assigned to one of two training conditions: A first-order false belief (ToM) and a control condition. Intervention and control groups were equivalent at pretest for age, parents' education, verbal ability, inhibition, and ToM. Results showed that after the intervention children in the ToM group improved in their first-order false belief understanding significantly more than children in the control condition. Crucially, the positive effect of the ToM intervention was stable over 2 months and generalized to more complex ToM tasks and metamemory. © 2014 The Authors. Child Development © 2014 Society for Research in Child Development, Inc.

A reaction time advantage for calculating beliefs over public representations signals domain specificity for 'theory of mind'.

PubMed

Cohen, Adam S; German, Tamsin C

2010-06-01

In a task where participants' overt task was to track the location of an object across a sequence of events, reaction times to unpredictable probes requiring an inference about a social agent's beliefs about the location of that object were obtained. Reaction times to false belief situations were faster than responses about the (false) contents of a map showing the location of the object (Experiment 1) and about the (false) direction of an arrow signaling the location of the object (Experiment 2). These results are consistent with developmental, neuro-imaging and neuropsychological evidence that there exist domain specific mechanisms within human cognition for encoding and reasoning about mental states. Specialization of these mechanisms may arise from either core cognitive architecture or via the accumulation of expertise in the social domain.

The relationship between second-order false belief and display rules reasoning: the integration of cognitive and affective social understanding.

PubMed

Naito, Mika; Seki, Yoshimi

2009-01-01

To investigate the relation between cognitive and affective social understanding, Japanese 4- to 8-year-olds received tasks of first- and second-order false beliefs and prosocial and self-presentational display rules. From 6 to 8 years, children comprehended display rules, as well as second-order false belief, using social pressures justifications decreasingly and motivational justifications with embedded perspectives increasingly with age. Although not related to either type of display across ages, second-order tasks were associated with both types of display tasks only at 8 years when examined in each age group. Results suggest that children base their second-order theory of mind and display rules understanding on distinct reasoning until middle childhood, during which time the originally distinct aspects of social understanding are integrated.

Children's understanding of idioms and theory of mind development.

PubMed

Caillies, Stéphanie; Le Sourn-Bissaoui, Sandrine

2008-09-01

The aim of this study was to test the hypothesis according to which theory of mind competence was a prerequisite to ambiguous idioms understanding. We hypothesized that the child needs to understand that the literal interpretation could be a false world representation, a false belief, and that the speaker's intention is to mean something else, to correctly process idiomatic expressions. Two kinds of ambiguous idioms were of interest: decomposable and nondecomposable expressions (Titone & Connine, 1999). An experiment was designed to assess the figurative developmental changes that occur with theory of mind competence. Five-, 6- and 7-year-old children performed five theory of mind tasks (an appearance-reality task, three false-belief tasks and a second-order false-belief task) and listened to decomposable and nondecomposable idiomatic expressions inserted in context, before performing a multiple choice task. Results indicated that only nondecomposable idiomatic expression was predicted from the theory of mind scores, and particularly from the second-order competences. Results are discussed with respect to theory of mind and verbal competences.

Empathetic perspective-taking is impaired in schizophrenia: evidence from a study of emotion attribution and theory of mind.

PubMed

Langdon, Robyn; Coltheart, Max; Ward, Philip B

2006-03-01

Schizophrenia and autism are clinically distinct yet both disorders are characterised by theory of mind (ToM) deficits. Autistic individuals fail to appreciate false beliefs, yet understand the causal connections between behavioural events and simple emotions. Findings of this type have promoted the view that ToM deficits in autism reflect a domain-specific difficulty with appreciating the representational nature of epistemic mental states (i.e., beliefs and intentions and not emotions). This study examines whether the same holds true for schizophrenia. A picture-sequencing task assessed capacity to infer false beliefs in patients with schizophrenia and healthy controls. To assess emotion attribution, participants were shown cartoon strips of events likely to elicit strong emotional reactions in story characters. Characters' faces were blanked out. Participants were instructed to think about how the characters would be feeling in order to match up the cards depicting facial affect appropriately. Participants later named emotions depicted in facial affect cards. Patients were as capable as controls of identifying cartoon facial expressions, yet had greater difficulties with: (a) attributing emotions based on circumstances; and (b) inferring false beliefs. Schizophrenia patients, unlike autistic individuals, suffer a domain-general difficulty with empathetic perspective-taking that affects equally their appreciation of other people's beliefs, percepts, and emotions.

Common brain areas engaged in false belief reasoning and visual perspective taking: a meta-analysis of functional brain imaging studies.

PubMed

Schurz, Matthias; Aichhorn, Markus; Martin, Anna; Perner, Josef

2013-01-01

We performed a quantitative meta-analysis of functional neuroimaging studies to identify brain areas which are commonly engaged in social and visuo-spatial perspective taking. Specifically, we compared brain activation for visual-perspective taking to activation for false belief reasoning, which requires awareness of perspective to understand someone's mistaken belief about the world which contrasts with reality. In support of a previous account by Perner and Leekam (2008), our meta-analytic conjunction analysis found common activation for false belief reasoning and visual perspective taking in the left but not the right dorsal temporo-parietal junction (TPJ). This fits with the idea that the left dorsal TPJ is responsible for representing different perspectives in a domain-general fashion. Moreover, our conjunction analysis found activation in the precuneus and the left middle occipital gyrus close to the putative Extrastriate Body Area (EBA). The precuneus is linked to mental-imagery which may aid in the construction of a different perspective. The EBA may be engaged due to imagined body-transformations when another's viewpoint is adopted.

A constructivist connectionist model of transitions on false-belief tasks.

PubMed

Berthiaume, Vincent G; Shultz, Thomas R; Onishi, Kristine H

2013-03-01

How do children come to understand that others have mental representations, e.g., of an object's location? Preschoolers go through two transitions on verbal false-belief tasks, in which they have to predict where an agent will search for an object that was moved in her absence. First, while three-and-a-half-year-olds usually fail at approach tasks, in which the agent wants to find the object, children just under four succeed. Second, only after four do children succeed at tasks in which the agent wants to avoid the object. We present a constructivist connectionist model that autonomously reproduces the two transitions and suggests that the transitions are due to increases in general processing abilities enabling children to (1) overcome a default true-belief attribution by distinguishing false- from true-belief situations, and to (2) predict search in avoidance situations, where there is often more than one correct, empty search location. Constructivist connectionist models are rigorous, flexible and powerful tools that can be analyzed before and after transitions to uncover novel and emergent mechanisms of cognitive development. Copyright © 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Common brain areas engaged in false belief reasoning and visual perspective taking: a meta-analysis of functional brain imaging studies

PubMed Central

Schurz, Matthias; Aichhorn, Markus; Martin, Anna; Perner, Josef

2013-01-01

We performed a quantitative meta-analysis of functional neuroimaging studies to identify brain areas which are commonly engaged in social and visuo-spatial perspective taking. Specifically, we compared brain activation for visual-perspective taking to activation for false belief reasoning, which requires awareness of perspective to understand someone's mistaken belief about the world which contrasts with reality. In support of a previous account by Perner and Leekam (2008), our meta-analytic conjunction analysis found common activation for false belief reasoning and visual perspective taking in the left but not the right dorsal temporo-parietal junction (TPJ). This fits with the idea that the left dorsal TPJ is responsible for representing different perspectives in a domain-general fashion. Moreover, our conjunction analysis found activation in the precuneus and the left middle occipital gyrus close to the putative Extrastriate Body Area (EBA). The precuneus is linked to mental-imagery which may aid in the construction of a different perspective. The EBA may be engaged due to imagined body-transformations when another's viewpoint is adopted. PMID:24198773

Temporo-parietal junction activity in theory-of-mind tasks: falseness, beliefs, or attention.

PubMed

Aichhorn, Markus; Perner, Josef; Weiss, Benjamin; Kronbichler, Martin; Staffen, Wolfgang; Ladurner, Gunther

2009-06-01

By combining the false belief (FB) and photo (PH) vignettes to identify theory-of-mind areas with the false sign (FS) vignettes, we re-establish the functional asymmetry between the left and right temporo-parietal junction (TPJ). The right TPJ (TPJ-R) is specially sensitive to processing belief information, whereas the left TPJ (TPJ-L) is equally responsible for FBs as well as FSs. Measuring BOLD at two time points in each vignette, at the time the FB-inducing information (or lack of information) is presented and at the time the test question is processed, made clear that the FB is processed spontaneously as soon as the relevant information is presented and not on demand for answering the question in contrast to extant behavioral data. Finally, a fourth, true belief vignette (TB) required teleological reasoning, that is, prediction of a rational action without any doubts being raised about the adequacy of the actor's information about reality. Activation by this vignette supported claims that the TPJ-R is activated by TBs as well as FBs.

Belief attribution in deaf and hearing infants.

PubMed

Meristo, Marek; Morgan, Gary; Geraci, Alessandra; Iozzi, Laura; Hjelmquist, Erland; Surian, Luca; Siegal, Michael

2012-09-01

Based on anticipatory looking and reactions to violations of expected events, infants have been credited with 'theory of mind' (ToM) knowledge that a person's search behaviour for an object will be guided by true or false beliefs about the object's location. However, little is known about the preconditions for looking patterns consistent with belief attribution in infants. In this study, we compared the performance of 17- to 26-month-olds on anticipatory looking in ToM tasks. The infants were either hearing or were deaf from hearing families and thus delayed in communicative experience gained from access to language and conversational input. Hearing infants significantly outperformed their deaf counterparts in anticipating the search actions of a cartoon character that held a false belief about a target-object location. By contrast, the performance of the two groups in a true belief condition did not differ significantly. These findings suggest for the first time that access to language and conversational input contributes to early ToM reasoning. © 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Thinking about False Belief: It's Not Just What Children Say, but How Long It Takes Them to Say It

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Atance, Cristina M.; Bernstein, Daniel M.; Meltzoff, Andrew N.

2010-01-01

We examined 240 children's (3.5-, 4.5-, and 5.5-year-olds) latency to respond to questions on a battery of false-belief tasks. Response latencies exhibited a significant cross-over interaction as a function of age and response type (correct vs. incorrect). 3.5-year-olds' "in"correct latencies were faster than their correct latencies, whereas the…

What Did I Say? Versus What Did I Think? Attributing False Beliefs to Self amongst Children with and without Autism

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Williams, David M.; Happe, Francesca

2009-01-01

The task used most widely to assess recognition of false belief in self "and" others is the "Smarties" unexpected contents task. Amongst individuals with and without autism, the Self and Other-person test questions of this task are of an equivalent level of difficulty. However, a potential confound with this task may allow the Self test question…

A Continuous False Belief Task Reveals Egocentric Biases in Children and Adolescents with Autism Spectrum Disorders

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Begeer, Sander; Bernstein, Daniel M.; van Wijhe, Jonas; Scheeren, Anke M.; Koot, Hans M.

2012-01-01

This study reports on a new false belief measure in a sample of 124 children and adolescents with or without high functioning autism (HFASD). In the classic paradigm, a participant predicts in which of two discrete locations a deceived protagonist will look for an object. In the current Sandbox task, the object is buried and reburied in a sandbox,…

32 CFR 1636.3 - Basis for classification in Class 1-A-0.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-07-01

... 32 National Defense 6 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Basis for classification in Class 1-A-0. 1636.3...) A registrant's objection may be founded on religious training and belief; it may be based on strictly religious beliefs, or on personal beliefs that are purely ethical or moral in source or content...

32 CFR 1636.3 - Basis for classification in Class 1-A-0.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-07-01

... 32 National Defense 6 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Basis for classification in Class 1-A-0. 1636.3...) A registrant's objection may be founded on religious training and belief; it may be based on strictly religious beliefs, or on personal beliefs that are purely ethical or moral in source or content...

3 CFR 8869 - Proclamation 8869 of September 21, 2012. National Historically Black Colleges and Universities...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... 3 The President 1 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Proclamation 8869 of September 21, 2012. National... Nation's first colleges and universities for African Americans shared a fundamental belief that, with the... generation. Let us also reaffirm our belief in the power of progress through education—a belief we share with...

32 CFR 1636.3 - Basis for classification in Class 1-A-0.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-07-01

... 32 National Defense 6 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Basis for classification in Class 1-A-0. 1636.3...) A registrant's objection may be founded on religious training and belief; it may be based on strictly religious beliefs, or on personal beliefs that are purely ethical or moral in source or content...

30 CFR 721.14 - Failure to give notice and lack of reasonable belief.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-07-01

... 30 Mineral Resources 3 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Failure to give notice and lack of reasonable belief. 721.14 Section 721.14 Mineral Resources OFFICE OF SURFACE MINING RECLAMATION AND ENFORCEMENT... and lack of reasonable belief. No notice of violation or cessation order may be vacated by reason of...

30 CFR 721.14 - Failure to give notice and lack of reasonable belief.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... 30 Mineral Resources 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Failure to give notice and lack of reasonable belief. 721.14 Section 721.14 Mineral Resources OFFICE OF SURFACE MINING RECLAMATION AND ENFORCEMENT... and lack of reasonable belief. No notice of violation or cessation order may be vacated by reason of...

30 CFR 721.14 - Failure to give notice and lack of reasonable belief.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-07-01

... 30 Mineral Resources 3 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Failure to give notice and lack of reasonable belief. 721.14 Section 721.14 Mineral Resources OFFICE OF SURFACE MINING RECLAMATION AND ENFORCEMENT... and lack of reasonable belief. No notice of violation or cessation order may be vacated by reason of...

32 CFR 1636.3 - Basis for classification in Class 1-A-0.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... 32 National Defense 6 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Basis for classification in Class 1-A-0. 1636.3...) A registrant's objection may be founded on religious training and belief; it may be based on strictly religious beliefs, or on personal beliefs that are purely ethical or moral in source or content...

30 CFR 721.14 - Failure to give notice and lack of reasonable belief.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-07-01

... 30 Mineral Resources 3 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Failure to give notice and lack of reasonable belief. 721.14 Section 721.14 Mineral Resources OFFICE OF SURFACE MINING RECLAMATION AND ENFORCEMENT... and lack of reasonable belief. No notice of violation or cessation order may be vacated by reason of...

30 CFR 721.14 - Failure to give notice and lack of reasonable belief.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-07-01

... 30 Mineral Resources 3 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Failure to give notice and lack of reasonable belief. 721.14 Section 721.14 Mineral Resources OFFICE OF SURFACE MINING RECLAMATION AND ENFORCEMENT... and lack of reasonable belief. No notice of violation or cessation order may be vacated by reason of...

32 CFR 1636.3 - Basis for classification in Class 1-A-0.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-07-01

... 32 National Defense 6 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Basis for classification in Class 1-A-0. 1636.3...) A registrant's objection may be founded on religious training and belief; it may be based on strictly religious beliefs, or on personal beliefs that are purely ethical or moral in source or content...

True or False: Do 5-Year-Olds Understand Belief?

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Fabricius, William V.; Boyer, Ty W.; Weimer, Amy A.; Carroll, Kathleen

2010-01-01

In 3 studies (N = 188) we tested the hypothesis that children use a perceptual access approach to reason about mental states before they understand beliefs. The perceptual access hypothesis predicts a U-shaped developmental pattern of performance in true belief tasks, in which 3-year-olds who reason about reality should succeed, 4- to 5-year-olds…

29 CFR 1605.1 - “Religious” nature of a practice or belief.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... 29 Labor 4 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false âReligiousâ nature of a practice or belief. 1605.1 Section 1605.1 Labor Regulations Relating to Labor (Continued) EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION GUIDELINES ON DISCRIMINATION BECAUSE OF RELIGION § 1605.1 “Religious” nature of a practice or belief. In most...

Young Children's Understanding of Beliefs about Moral and Conventional Rule Violations

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Conry-Murray, Clare

2013-01-01

Children of ages 3-5 ("N" = 62) were assessed by using standard theory-of-mind tasks and unusual belief tasks related to false information and beliefs endorsing violations of moral (welfare and fairness) and social conventional (school rules) domains. Younger children (under 5 years) did not accurately attribute unusual factual beliefs…

The Effect of a Child's Sex on Support for Traditional Gender Roles

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Shafer, Emily Fitzgibbons; Malhotra, Neil

2011-01-01

We examine whether sex of child affects parents' beliefs about traditional gender roles. Using an improved methodological approach that explicitly analyzes the natural experiment via differences in differences, we find that having a daughter (vs. having a son) causes men to reduce their support for traditional gender roles, but a female child has…

The Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP) as a Measure of Implicit Relative Preferences: A First Study

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Power, Patricia; Barnes-Holmes, Dermot; Barnes-Holmes, Yvonne; Stewart, Ian

2009-01-01

The Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP) was designed to examine implicit beliefs or attitudes. In Experiment 1, response latencies obtained from Irish participants on the IRAP showed a strong preference for Irish over Scottish and American over African. In contrast, responses to explicit Likert measures diverged from the IRAP…

The Hidden Curriculum of Youth Policy: A Dutch Example

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Hopman, Marit; de Winter, Micha; Koops, Willem

2014-01-01

Youth policy is more than a mere response to the actual behavior of children, but it is equally influenced by values and beliefs of policy makers. These values are however rarely made explicit and, therefore, the authors refer to them as "the hidden curriculum" of youth policy. The study investigation explicates this hidden curriculum by…

Caring about Strangers: A Lingisian Reading of Kafka's "Metamorphosis"

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Hung, Ruyu

2013-01-01

This article explores a significant question, implicit in Kafka's novel "Metamorphosis," explicitly asked by Rorty: "Can I care about a stranger?" Alphonso Lingis's view is adopted to overcome a mainstream belief that there is a distinction between my community and the stranger's community, or us community and…

Explicit Science Reading Instruction in Grade 7: Metacognitive Awareness, Metacognitive Self-Management and Science Reading Comprehension.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Spence, David J.; And Others

Reading science text is not simply a process of translating printed symbols into meaning; it involves the interaction of the reader's prior knowledge, beliefs, concurrent experience, and the text in a sociocultural context to construct new meaning and understanding. The purposes of this study were to: explore the associations between metacognition…

From Cues to Action: Information Seeking and Exercise Self-Care among Older Adults Managing Chronic Illness

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Chou, Pak Hei Benedito; Wister, Andrew V.

2005-01-01

Drawing from the health belief model, cues to action have been theorized to influence health behaviours; however, few studies have examined these constructs explicitly. This study investigated the relationship between information cues to action and exercise self-care. It was hypothesized that reading about illness information, knowing about…

Watch Out for the Beast: Fear Information and Attentional Bias in Children

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Field, Andy P.

2006-01-01

Although valenced information about novel animals changes the implicit and explicit fear beliefs of children (Field & Lawson, 2003), how it might lead to anxiety is unknown. One possibility, based on cognitive models of anxiety, is that fear information creates attentional biases similar to those seen in anxiety disorders. Children between 7 and 9…

Using Sexually Explicit Material in a Therapeutic Context

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Darnell, Cyndi

2015-01-01

For most of us, sex is a subjective, lived experience that is as unique as our genetic make-up, our upbringing, our thoughts, values, feelings, beliefs and ideas. It is through our erotic interactions, or the absence thereof, that we form aspects of our fluid and mutable erotic paths and identities. Despite the proliferation of sexual imagery…

Early Childhood Educators' Perceived and Actual Metalinguistic Knowledge, Beliefs and Enacted Practice about Teaching Early Reading

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Hammond, Lorraine

2015-01-01

Results of influential reports on early literacy have drawn attention to the need for early childhood educators to take up a more explicit, teacher-directed approach to beginning reading. Positive classroom results however are in part dependent upon teacher knowledge and this study investigated the relationship between early childhood educators'…

Effects of Online Reciprocal Teaching on Reading Strategies, Comprehension, Self-Efficacy, and Motivation

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Huang, Ching-Ting; Yang, Shu Ching

2015-01-01

This study examines the effects of two types of online remedial reading interventions on the reading strategy and comprehension, motivational beliefs, and self-efficacy of 36 low-achieving students (explicit teaching before reciprocal teaching [ET-RT] vs. direct instruction [DI]). We designed a 10-unit online remedial English reading program based…

Equity- and Tolerance-Oriented Teachers: Approaches to Teaching Race in the Social Studies Classroom

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Martell, Christopher C.; Stevens, Kaylene M.

2017-01-01

In this interpretative case study, the researchers examined the beliefs and practices of 10 self-identifying race-conscious social studies teachers. Using critical race theory as the lens, the researchers found that most of the teachers made race explicit in their classrooms by including race in units not typically considered race-related and…

Impaired spontaneous belief inference following acquired damage to the left posterior temporoparietal junction

PubMed Central

Biervoye, Aurélie; Dricot, Laurence; Ivanoiu, Adrian

2016-01-01

Efficient social interactions require taking into account other people’s mental states such as their beliefs, intentions or emotions. Recent studies have shown that in some social situations at least, we do spontaneously take into account others’ mental states. The extent to which we have dedicated brain areas for such spontaneous perspective taking is however still unclear. Here, we report two brain-damaged patients whose common lesions were almost exclusively in the left posterior temporoparietal junction (TPJp) and who both showed the same striking and distinctive theory of mind (ToM) deficit. More specifically, they had an inability to take into account someone else’s belief unless they were explicitly instructed to tell what that other person thinks or what that person will do. These patients offer a unique insight into the causal link between a specific subregion of the TPJ and a specific cognitive facet of ToM. PMID:27317925

Can an Agent's False Belief Be Corrected by an Appropriate Communication? Psychological Reasoning in 18-Month-Old Infants

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Song, Hyun-joo; Onishi, Kristine H.; Baillargeon, Renee; Fisher, Cynthia

2008-01-01

Do 18-month-olds understand that an agent's false belief can be corrected by an appropriate, though not an inappropriate, communication? In Experiment 1, infants watched a series of events involving two agents, a ball, and two containers: a box and a cup. To start, agent 1 played with the ball and then hid it in the box, while agent 2 looked on.…

The Developmental Progression of Understanding of Mind during a Hiding Game

PubMed Central

Nelson, P. Brooke; Adamson, Lauren B.; Bakeman, Roger

2011-01-01

In this longitudinal study, 52 typically developing preschoolers engaged in a hiding game with their mothers when children were 42-, 54-, and 66-months old. Children's understanding of mind, positive affect, and engagement with the task were rated, and mothers' utterances were coded for role and content. Analyses confirmed that some facets of children's understanding of mind developed sequentially; specifically, they expressed an understanding of knowledge access before an understanding of deception and false beliefs, and expressed an understanding of deception before an understanding of false beliefs. Children's understanding of mind increased across visits and positively correlated with false belief task performance. Results suggest that mothers may tailor the content of their utterances to the child's growing expertise, but the role of mothers' utterances did not change. Observing preschoolers engaged in a playful hiding game revealed that children's understanding of mind not only increased with age but also developed sequentially. PMID:25960610

Social-cognitive processes in preschoolers' selective trust: three cultures compared.

PubMed

Lucas, Amanda J; Lewis, Charlie; Pala, F Cansu; Wong, Katie; Berridge, Damon

2013-03-01

Research on preschoolers' selective learning has mostly been conducted in English-speaking countries. We compared the performance of Turkish preschoolers (who are exposed to a language with evidential markers), Chinese preschoolers (known to be advanced in executive skills), and English preschoolers on an extended selective trust task (N = 144). We also measured children's executive function skills and their ability to attribute false belief. Overall we found a Turkish (rather than a Chinese) advantage in selective trust and a relationship between selective trust and false belief (rather than executive function). This is the 1st evidence that exposure to a language that obliges speakers to state the sources of their knowledge may sensitize preschoolers to informant reliability. It is also the first demonstration of an association between false belief and selective trust. Together these findings suggest that effective selective learning may progress alongside children's developing capacity to assess the knowledge of others.

The contribution of theory of mind, counterfactual reasoning, and executive function to pre-readers' language comprehension and later reading awareness and comprehension in elementary school.

PubMed

Guajardo, Nicole R; Cartwright, Kelly B

2016-04-01

The current longitudinal study examined the roles of theory of mind, counterfactual reasoning, and executive function in children's pre-reading skills, reading awareness, and reading comprehension. It is the first to examine this set of variables with preschool and school-aged children. A sample of 31 children completed language comprehension, working memory, cognitive flexibility, first-order false belief, and counterfactual reasoning measures when they were 3 to 5 years of age and completed second-order false belief, cognitive flexibility, reading comprehension, and reading awareness measures at 6 to 9 years of age. Results indicated that false belief understanding contributed to phrase and sentence comprehension and reading awareness, whereas cognitive flexibility and counterfactual reasoning accounted for unique variance in reading comprehension. Implications of the results for the development of reading skill are discussed. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Understanding of emotions and false beliefs among hearing children versus deaf children.

PubMed

Ziv, Margalit; Most, Tova; Cohen, Shirit

2013-04-01

Emotion understanding and theory of mind (ToM) are two major aspects of social cognition in which deaf children demonstrate developmental delays. The current study investigated these social cognition aspects in two subgroups of deaf children-those with cochlear implants who communicate orally (speakers) and those who communicate primarily using sign language (signers)-in comparison to hearing children. Participants were 53 Israeli kindergartners-20 speakers, 10 signers, and 23 hearing children. Tests included four emotion identification and understanding tasks and one false belief task (ToM). Results revealed similarities among all children's emotion labeling and affective perspective taking abilities, similarities between speakers and hearing children in false beliefs and in understanding emotions in typical contexts, and lower performance of signers on the latter three tasks. Adapting educational experiences to the unique characteristics and needs of speakers and signers is recommended.

32 CFR 1636.4 - Basis for classification in Class 1-0.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-07-01

... 32 National Defense 6 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Basis for classification in Class 1-0. 1636.4... objection may be founded on religious training and belief; it may be based on strictly religious beliefs, or on personal beliefs that are purely ethical or moral in source or centent and occupy in the life of a...

32 CFR 1636.4 - Basis for classification in Class 1-0.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-07-01

... 32 National Defense 6 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Basis for classification in Class 1-0. 1636.4... objection may be founded on religious training and belief; it may be based on strictly religious beliefs, or on personal beliefs that are purely ethical or moral in source or centent and occupy in the life of a...

32 CFR 1636.4 - Basis for classification in Class 1-0.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-07-01

... 32 National Defense 6 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Basis for classification in Class 1-0. 1636.4... objection may be founded on religious training and belief; it may be based on strictly religious beliefs, or on personal beliefs that are purely ethical or moral in source or centent and occupy in the life of a...

32 CFR 1636.4 - Basis for classification in Class 1-0.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-07-01

... 32 National Defense 6 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Basis for classification in Class 1-0. 1636.4... objection may be founded on religious training and belief; it may be based on strictly religious beliefs, or on personal beliefs that are purely ethical or moral in source or centent and occupy in the life of a...

32 CFR 1636.4 - Basis for classification in Class 1-0.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... 32 National Defense 6 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Basis for classification in Class 1-0. 1636.4... objection may be founded on religious training and belief; it may be based on strictly religious beliefs, or on personal beliefs that are purely ethical or moral in source or centent and occupy in the life of a...

The Development of Interindividual Sharing of Knowledge and Beliefs in 5- to 9-Year-Old Children

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Bradmetz, Joel; Gauthier, Cecile

2005-01-01

The authors studied the evolution of interindividual intentionality in children and showed that the sharing of knowledge and beliefs requires more complex operations than those involved in usual false-belief tasks. The authors conducted 3 experiments on 380 children (aged 5 years, 0 months to 9 years, 6 months). They assessed the children's…

Using Co-Occurrence to Evaluate Belief Coherence in a Large Non Clinical Sample

PubMed Central

Pechey, Rachel; Halligan, Peter

2012-01-01

Much of the recent neuropsychological literature on false beliefs (delusions) has tended to focus on individual or single beliefs, with few studies actually investigating the relationship or co-occurrence between different types of co-existing beliefs. Quine and Ullian proposed the hypothesis that our beliefs form an interconnected web in which the beliefs that make up that system must somehow “cohere” with one another and avoid cognitive dissonance. As such beliefs are unlikely to be encapsulated (i.e., exist in isolation from other beliefs). The aim of this preliminary study was to empirically evaluate the probability of belief co-occurrence as one indicator of coherence in a large sample of subjects involving three different thematic sets of beliefs (delusion-like, paranormal & religious, and societal/cultural). Results showed that the degree of belief co-endorsement between beliefs within thematic groupings was greater than random occurrence, lending support to Quine and Ullian’s coherentist account. Some associations, however, were relatively weak, providing for well-established examples of cognitive dissonance. PMID:23155383

Connections with nature and environmental behaviors.

PubMed

Geng, Liuna; Xu, Jingke; Ye, Lijuan; Zhou, Wenjun; Zhou, Kexin

2015-01-01

The influence of environmental attitudes on environmental behaviors has long been discussed. However, few studies have addressed the foundation of such attitudes. In the present study, we explored primitive belief underlying environmental attitudes, i.e., connections with nature, and its relationship with pro-environmental behaviors. Specifically, we used scales, a computerized Implicit Association Test, and a situational simulation experiment to examine both explicit and implicit connections with nature, both deliberate and spontaneous environmental behaviors, and to find correlations between environmental connectedness and environmental behaviors. Results showed that explicit connectedness was positively correlated with deliberate environmental behaviors, while implicit connectedness was positively correlated with spontaneous environmental behaviors. Additionally, explicit and implicit connectedness was independent of each other. In conclusion, the current study confirms the positive role played by connections with nature in promoting environmental behavior, and accordingly suggests means to encourage pro-environmental behavior by enhancing people's connectedness to nature.

Connections with Nature and Environmental Behaviors

PubMed Central

Geng, Liuna; Xu, Jingke; Ye, Lijuan; Zhou, Wenjun; Zhou, Kexin

2015-01-01

The influence of environmental attitudes on environmental behaviors has long been discussed. However, few studies have addressed the foundation of such attitudes. In the present study, we explored primitive belief underlying environmental attitudes, i.e., connections with nature, and its relationship with pro-environmental behaviors. Specifically, we used scales, a computerized Implicit Association Test, and a situational simulation experiment to examine both explicit and implicit connections with nature, both deliberate and spontaneous environmental behaviors, and to find correlations between environmental connectedness and environmental behaviors. Results showed that explicit connectedness was positively correlated with deliberate environmental behaviors, while implicit connectedness was positively correlated with spontaneous environmental behaviors. Additionally, explicit and implicit connectedness was independent of each other. In conclusion, the current study confirms the positive role played by connections with nature in promoting environmental behavior, and accordingly suggests means to encourage pro-environmental behavior by enhancing people’s connectedness to nature. PMID:25985075

Investigating the Neural and Cognitive Basis of Moral Luck: It's Not What You Do but What You Know.

PubMed

Young, Liane; Nichols, Shaun; Saxe, Rebecca

2010-09-01

Moral judgments, we expect, ought not to depend on luck. A person should be blamed only for actions and outcomes that were under the person's control. Yet often, moral judgments appear to be influenced by luck. A father who leaves his child by the bath, after telling his child to stay put and believing that he will stay put, is judged to be morally blameworthy if the child drowns (an unlucky outcome), but not if his child stays put and doesn't drown. Previous theories of moral luck suggest that this asymmetry reflects primarily the influence of unlucky outcomes on moral judgments. In the current study, we use behavioral methods and fMRI to test an alternative: these moral judgments largely reflect participants' judgments of the agent's beliefs. In "moral luck" scenarios, the unlucky agent also holds a false belief. Here, we show that moral luck depends more on false beliefs than bad outcomes. We also show that participants with false beliefs are judged as having less justified beliefs and are therefore judged as more morally blameworthy. The current study lends support to a rationalist account of moral luck: moral luck asymmetries are driven not by outcome bias primarily, but by mental state assessments we endorse as morally relevant, i.e. whether agents are justified in thinking that they won't cause harm.

Learning the futility of the thought suppression enterprise in normal experience and in obsessive compulsive disorder.

PubMed

Najmi, Sadia; Reese, Hannah; Wilhelm, Sabine; Fama, Jeanne; Beck, Celeste; Wegner, Daniel M

2010-01-01

The belief that we can control our thoughts is not inevitably adaptive, particularly when it fuels mental control activities that have ironic unintended consequences. The conviction that the mind can and should be controlled can prompt people to suppress unwanted thoughts, and so can set the stage for the intrusive return of those very thoughts. An important question is whether or not these beliefs about the control of thoughts can be reduced experimentally. One possibility is that behavioral experiments aimed at revealing the ironic return of suppressed thoughts might create a lesson that could reduce unrealistic beliefs about the control of thoughts. The present research assessed the influence of the thought suppression demonstration on beliefs about the control of thoughts in a non-clinical sample, and among individuals with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). In Study 1, we assessed the effect of the thought suppression demonstration on beliefs about the control of thoughts among low and high obsessive individuals in the non-clinical population (N = 62). In Study 2, we conducted a similar study with individuals with OCD (N = 29). Results suggest that high obsessive individuals in the non-clinical population are able to learn the futility of suppression through the thought suppression demonstration and to alter their faulty beliefs about the control of thoughts; however, for individuals with OCD, the demonstration may be insufficient for altering underlying beliefs. For individuals with OCD, the connection between suppressing a neutral thought in the suppression demonstration and suppressing a personally relevant obsession may need to be stated explicitly in order to affect their obsessive beliefs.

Why do we remember? The communicative function of episodic memory

PubMed Central

Mahr, Johannes B.; Csibra, Gergely

2017-01-01

Short Abstract We propose a novel account of episodic memory function based on a conceptual and empirical analysis of its role in belief formation. We provide a critique of the view that episodic memory serves future-directed imagination, and argue that the central features of this capacity can instead be explained by the role it plays in human communication. On this view, episodic memory allows us to communicatively support our interpretations of the past by gauging when we can assert epistemic authority. This capacity is ineliminable in justification of, and negotiations about, social commitments established by past interactions. Long Abstract Episodic memory has been analyzed in a number of different ways in both philosophy and psychology, and most controversy has centered on its self-referential, ‘autonoetic’ character. Here, we offer a comprehensive characterization of episodic memory in representational terms, and propose a novel functional account on this basis. We argue that episodic memory should be understood as a distinctive epistemic attitude taken towards an event simulation. On this view, episodic memory has a metarepresentational format and should not be equated with beliefs about the past. Instead, empirical findings suggest that the contents of human episodic memory are often constructed in the service of the explicit justification of such beliefs. Existing accounts of episodic memory function that have focused on explaining its constructive character through its role in ‘future-oriented mental time travel’ neither do justice to its capacity to ground veridical beliefs about the past nor to its representational format. We provide an account of the metarepresentational structure of episodic memory in terms of its role in communicative interaction. The generative nature of recollection allows us to represent and communicate the reasons for why we hold certain beliefs about the past. In this process, autonoesis corresponds to the capacity to determine when and how to assert epistemic authority in making claims about the past. A domain where such claims are indispensable are human social engagements. Such engagements commonly require the justification of entitlements and obligations, which is often possible only by explicit reference to specific past events. PMID:28100294

False Beliefs in Unreliable Knowledge Networks

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Ioannidis, Evangelos; Varsakelis, Nikos; Antoniou, Ioannis

2017-03-01

The aims of this work are: (1) to extend knowledge dynamics analysis in order to assess the influence of false beliefs and unreliable communication channels, (2) to investigate the impact of selection rule-policy for knowledge acquisition, (3) to investigate the impact of targeted link attacks ("breaks" or "infections") of certain "healthy" communication channels. We examine the knowledge dynamics analytically, as well as by simulations on both artificial and real organizational knowledge networks. The main findings are: (1) False beliefs have no significant influence on knowledge dynamics, while unreliable communication channels result in non-monotonic knowledge updates ("wild" knowledge fluctuations may appear) and in significant elongation of knowledge attainment. Moreover, false beliefs may emerge during knowledge evolution, due to the presence of unreliable communication channels, even if they were not present initially, (2) Changing the selection rule-policy, by raising the awareness of agents to avoid the selection of unreliable communication channels, results in monotonic knowledge upgrade and in faster knowledge attainment, (3) "Infecting" links is more harmful than "breaking" links, due to "wild" knowledge fluctuations and due to the elongation of knowledge attainment. Moreover, attacking even a "small" percentage of links (≤5%) with high knowledge transfer, may result in dramatic elongation of knowledge attainment (over 100%), as well as in delays of the onset of knowledge attainment. Hence, links of high knowledge transfer should be protected, because in Information Warfare and Disinformation, these links are the "best targets".

40 CFR 82.118 - Compliance by wholesalers, distributors and retailers.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-07-01

... 40 Protection of Environment 17 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Compliance by wholesalers...) Reliance on reasonable belief. The wholesaler, distributor or retailer of a product may rely on the... retailer is evidence of reasonable belief. ...

40 CFR 82.118 - Compliance by wholesalers, distributors and retailers.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... 40 Protection of Environment 17 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Compliance by wholesalers...) Reliance on reasonable belief. The wholesaler, distributor or retailer of a product may rely on the... retailer is evidence of reasonable belief. ...

40 CFR 82.118 - Compliance by wholesalers, distributors and retailers.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-07-01

... 40 Protection of Environment 18 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Compliance by wholesalers...) Reliance on reasonable belief. The wholesaler, distributor or retailer of a product may rely on the... retailer is evidence of reasonable belief. ...

40 CFR 82.118 - Compliance by wholesalers, distributors and retailers.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-07-01

... 40 Protection of Environment 18 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Compliance by wholesalers...) Reliance on reasonable belief. The wholesaler, distributor or retailer of a product may rely on the... retailer is evidence of reasonable belief. ...

40 CFR 82.118 - Compliance by wholesalers, distributors and retailers.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-07-01

... 40 Protection of Environment 18 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Compliance by wholesalers...) Reliance on reasonable belief. The wholesaler, distributor or retailer of a product may rely on the... retailer is evidence of reasonable belief. ...

False beliefs about fattening foods can have healthy consequences

PubMed Central

Bernstein, Daniel M.; Laney, Cara; Morris, Erin K.; Loftus, Elizabeth F.

2005-01-01

We suggested to 228 subjects in two experiments that, as children, they had had negative experiences with a fattening food. An additional 107 subjects received no such suggestion and served as controls. In Experiment 1, a minority of subjects came to believe that they had felt ill after eating strawberry ice cream as children, and these subjects were more likely to indicate not wanting to eat strawberry ice cream now. In contrast, we were unable to obtain these effects when the critical item was a more commonly eaten treat (chocolate chip cookie). In Experiment 2, we replicated and extended the strawberry ice cream results. Two different ways of processing the false suggestion succeeded in planting the false belief and producing avoidance of the food. These findings show that it is possible to convince people that, as children, they experienced a negative event involving a fattening food and that this false belief results in avoidance of that food in adulthood. More broadly, these results indicate that we can, through suggestion, manipulate nutritional selection and possibly even improve health. PMID:16079200

False beliefs about fattening foods can have healthy consequences.

PubMed

Bernstein, Daniel M; Laney, Cara; Morris, Erin K; Loftus, Elizabeth F

2005-09-27

We suggested to 228 subjects in two experiments that, as children, they had had negative experiences with a fattening food. An additional 107 subjects received no such suggestion and served as controls. In Experiment 1, a minority of subjects came to believe that they had felt ill after eating strawberry ice cream as children, and these subjects were more likely to indicate not wanting to eat strawberry ice cream now. In contrast, we were unable to obtain these effects when the critical item was a more commonly eaten treat (chocolate chip cookie). In Experiment 2, we replicated and extended the strawberry ice cream results. Two different ways of processing the false suggestion succeeded in planting the false belief and producing avoidance of the food. These findings show that it is possible to convince people that, as children, they experienced a negative event involving a fattening food and that this false belief results in avoidance of that food in adulthood. More broadly, these results indicate that we can, through suggestion, manipulate nutritional selection and possibly even improve health.

False belief in infancy: a fresh look.

PubMed

Heyes, Cecilia

2014-09-01

Can infants appreciate that others have false beliefs? Do they have a theory of mind? In this article I provide a detailed review of more than 20 experiments that have addressed these questions, and offered an affirmative answer, using nonverbal 'violation of expectation' and 'anticipatory looking' procedures. Although many of these experiments are both elegant and ingenious, I argue that their results can be explained by the operation of domain-general processes and in terms of 'low-level novelty'. This hypothesis suggests that the infants' looking behaviour is a function of the degree to which the observed (perceptual novelty) and remembered or expected (imaginal novelty) low-level properties of the test stimuli - their colours, shapes and movements - are novel with respect to events encoded by the infants earlier in the experiment. If the low-level novelty hypothesis is correct, research on false belief in infancy currently falls short of demonstrating that infants have even an implicit theory of mind. However, I suggest that the use of two experimental strategies - inanimate control procedures, and self-informed belief induction - could be used in combination with existing methods to bring us much closer to understanding the evolutionary and developmental origins of theory of mind. © 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Children's Understanding That Utterances Emanate from Minds: Using Speaker Belief To Aid Interpretation.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Mitchell, Peter; Robinson, Elizabeth J.; Thompson, Doreen E.

1999-01-01

Three experiments examined 3- to 6-year olds' ability to use a speaker's utterance based on false belief to identify which of several referents was intended. Found that many 4- to 5-year olds performed correctly only when it was unnecessary to consider the speaker's belief. When the speaker gave an ambiguous utterance, many 3- to 6-year olds…

Application of Knowledge Management: Pressing questions and practical answers

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

FROMM-LEWIS,MICHELLE

2000-02-11

Sandia National Laboratory are working on ways to increase production using Knowledge Management. Knowledge Management is: finding ways to create, identify, capture, and distribute organizational knowledge to the people who need it; to help information and knowledge flow to the right people at the right time so they can act more efficiently and effectively; recognizing, documenting and distributing explicit knowledge (explicit knowledge is quantifiable and definable, it makes up reports, manuals, instructional materials, etc.) and tacit knowledge (tacit knowledge is doing and performing, it is a combination of experience, hunches, intuition, emotions, and beliefs) in order to improve organizational performancemore » and a systematic approach to find, understand and use knowledge to create value.« less

Cultural consequences of miscarriages of justice.

PubMed

Cole, Simon A

2009-01-01

Social science scholarship has tended to focus more on the causes than the consequences of miscarriages of justice. Within the literature on consequences, the overwhelming emphasis has been on individual consequences: psychological and material impacts on the wrongly convicted individual and, in some cases, other indirectly impacted individuals such as family members of the wrongly convicted and victims of the true perpetrator's future crimes. Some attention has been devoted to social harms, the impact of miscarriages of justice on the broader society within which they are situated, such as the undermining of the legitimacy of the criminal justice system. This paper focuses on what are called here cultural consequences of miscarriages of justice: the way in which some high-profile miscarriages of justice can shape the public's beliefs about some of the most basic "facts" about crime, such as the nature, prevalence, or even existence of certain categories of crime and the types of individual who tend to perpetrate particular types of crime. In this way, the paper argues, miscarriages of justice may have hitherto underexplored consequences: reshaping, based on false premises, the public's belief about the very nature of crime itself. This paper discusses three cases studies of miscarriages of justice that for varying periods of time created widespread false beliefs about the nature of crime in large segments of the public. The paper concludes by noting that the "righting" of these false beliefs was in most cases fortuitous. This suggests that unexposed miscarriages of justice may still be shaping popular beliefs about the nature of crime, and aspects of the public's current conception of crime may yet be based on false premises. (c) 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Thinking about the thoughts of others; temporal and spatial neural activation during false belief reasoning.

PubMed

Mossad, Sarah I; AuCoin-Power, Michelle; Urbain, Charline; Smith, Mary Lou; Pang, Elizabeth W; Taylor, Margot J

2016-07-01

Theory of Mind (ToM) is the ability to understand the perspectives, mental states and beliefs of others in order to anticipate their behaviour and is therefore crucial to social interactions. Although fMRI has been widely used to establish the neural networks implicated in ToM, little is known about the timing of ToM-related brain activity. We used magnetoencephalography (MEG) to measure the neural processes underlying ToM, as MEG provides very accurate timing and excellent spatial localization of brain processes. We recorded MEG activity during a false belief task, a reliable measure of ToM, in twenty young adults (10 females). MEG data were recorded in a 151 sensor CTF system (MISL, Coquitlam, BC) and data were co-registered to each participant's MRI (Siemens 3T) for source reconstruction. We found stronger right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ) activations in the false belief condition from 150ms to 225ms, in the right precuneus from 275ms to 375ms, in the right inferior frontal gyrus from 200ms to 300ms and the superior frontal gyrus from 300ms to 400ms. Our findings extend the literature by demonstrating the timing and duration of neural activity in the main regions involved in the "mentalizing" network, showing that activations related to false belief in adults are predominantly right lateralized and onset around 100ms. The sensitivity of MEG will allow us to determine spatial and temporal differences in the brain processes in ToM in younger populations or those who demonstrate deficits in this ability. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Nonspecificity and theory of mind: new evidence from a nonverbal false-sign task and children with autism spectrum disorders.

PubMed

Iao, Lai-Sang; Leekam, Susan R

2014-06-01

Understanding of false belief has long been considered to be a crucial aspect of "theory of mind" that can be explained by a domain-specific mechanism. We argue against this claim using new evidence from a nonverbal false representation task (false-sign task) with typically developing children and children with autism spectrum disorders (ASD). Experiments 1 and 2 showed that typically developing children (mean age=62.67months) were equivalent in their performance across nonverbal and verbal forms of both the false-belief and false-sign tasks. Results for these two misrepresentation tasks differed from the results of an outdated representation task ("false"-photograph task). Experiment 3 showed that children with ASD had difficulties with the false representation tasks, and this could not be explained by executive functioning or language impairments. These findings support the view that children with ASD might not have a specific theory-of-mind deficit. Copyright © 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Mentalizing about emotion and its relationship to empathy.

PubMed

Hooker, Christine I; Verosky, Sara C; Germine, Laura T; Knight, Robert T; D'Esposito, Mark

2008-09-01

Mentalizing involves the ability to predict someone else's behavior based on their belief state. More advanced mentalizing skills involve integrating knowledge about beliefs with knowledge about the emotional impact of those beliefs. Recent research indicates that advanced mentalizing skills may be related to the capacity to empathize with others. However, it is not clear what aspect of mentalizing is most related to empathy. In this study, we used a novel, advanced mentalizing task to identify neural mechanisms involved in predicting a future emotional response based on a belief state. Subjects viewed social scenes in which one character had a False Belief and one character had a True Belief. In the primary condition, subjects were asked to predict what emotion the False Belief Character would feel if they had a full understanding about the situation. We found that neural regions related to both mentalizing and emotion were involved when predicting a future emotional response, including the superior temporal sulcus, medial prefrontal cortex, temporal poles, somatosensory related cortices (SRC), inferior frontal gyrus and thalamus. In addition, greater neural activity in primarily emotion-related regions, including right SRC and bilateral thalamus, when predicting emotional response was significantly correlated with more self-reported empathy. The findings suggest that predicting emotional response involves generating and using internal affective representations and that greater use of these affective representations when trying to understand the emotional experience of others is related to more empathy.

Deafness, Thought-Bubbles and Theory of Mind Development

PubMed Central

Wellman, Henry M.; Peterson, Candida C.

2013-01-01

The processes and mechanisms of theory of mind development were examined via a training study of false belief conceptions in deaf children of hearing parents (N = 43). In comparison to two different control conditions, training based on thought-bubble instruction about beliefs was linked with improved false belief understanding as well as progress on a broader theory-of-mind scale. By combining intervention, microgenetic, and developmental-scaling methods the findings provide informative data about the nature and mechanisms of theory-of-mind change in deaf children, as well as an initial demonstration of a useful intervention for enhancing social cognition in deaf children of hearing parents. The methods and results also point to possible avenues for the study of conceptual change more generally. PMID:23544856

Religion and organ donation: the views of UK faith leaders.

PubMed

Randhawa, Gurch; Brocklehurst, Anna; Pateman, Ruth; Kinsella, Suzannah; Parry, Vivienne

2012-09-01

This article reports the findings from the one-to-one interviews with the main UK faith and belief leaders which were commissioned by the Organ Donation Taskforce as part of its evidence gathering. Interviews were arranged with the main faith and belief organisations within the UK. Interviews covered a range of issues related to organ donation. Although some faith groups had some reservations regarding organ donation, interviews with these leaders demonstrated that none of these faith groups have reached a consensus against organ donation. The interviewees stated that the majority opinion in their faith or belief group is to permit organ donation, with some actively supporting it. Interviewees were keen to stress that there is a broad spectrum of opinion on organ transplantation within each faith and belief group and that consequently it is difficult to speak on behalf of an entire group. One complication mentioned by interviewees is that as organ transplantation is a relatively new medical procedure, there is no explicit reference to it in many original religious texts. Consequently, positions on the receipt and donation of organs are based on interpretation. It was felt that a much greater level of engagement is needed, as organ donation is currently not a priority for many faith and belief groups.

Semantic processes leading to true and false memory formation in schizophrenia.

PubMed

Paz-Alonso, Pedro M; Ghetti, Simona; Ramsay, Ian; Solomon, Marjorie; Yoon, Jong; Carter, Cameron S; Ragland, J Daniel

2013-07-01

Encoding semantic relationships between items on word lists (semantic processing) enhances true memories, but also increases memory distortions. Episodic memory impairments in schizophrenia (SZ) are strongly driven by failures to process semantic relations, but the exact nature of these relational semantic processing deficits is not well understood. Here, we used a false memory paradigm to investigate the impact of implicit and explicit semantic processing manipulations on episodic memory in SZ. Thirty SZ and 30 demographically matched healthy controls (HC) studied Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) lists of semantically associated words. Half of the lists had strong implicit semantic associations and the remainder had low strength associations. Similarly, half of the lists were presented under "standard" instructions and the other half under explicit "relational processing" instructions. After study, participants performed recall and old/new recognition tests composed of targets, critical lures, and unrelated lures. HC exhibited higher true memories and better discriminability between true and false memory compared to SZ. High, versus low, associative strength increased false memory rates in both groups. However, explicit "relational processing" instructions positively improved true memory rates only in HC. Finally, true and false memory rates were associated with severity of disorganized and negative symptoms in SZ. These results suggest that reduced processing of semantic relationships during encoding in SZ may stem from an inability to implement explicit relational processing strategies rather than a fundamental deficit in the implicit activation and retrieval of word meanings from patients' semantic lexicon. Copyright © 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Steady-state heat conduction in quiescent fluids: Incompleteness of the Navier-Stokes-Fourier equations

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Brenner, Howard

2011-10-01

Linear irreversible thermodynamic principles are used to demonstrate, by counterexample, the existence of a fundamental incompleteness in the basic pre-constitutive mass, momentum, and energy equations governing fluid mechanics and transport phenomena in continua. The demonstration is effected by addressing the elementary case of steady-state heat conduction (and transport processes in general) occurring in quiescent fluids. The counterexample questions the universal assumption of equality of the four physically different velocities entering into the basic pre-constitutive mass, momentum, and energy conservation equations. Explicitly, it is argued that such equality is an implicit constitutive assumption rather than an established empirical fact of unquestioned authority. Such equality, if indeed true, would require formal proof of its validity, currently absent from the literature. In fact, our counterexample shows the assumption of equality to be false. As the current set of pre-constitutive conservation equations appearing in textbooks are regarded as applicable both to continua and noncontinua (e.g., rarefied gases), our elementary counterexample negating belief in the equality of all four velocities impacts on all aspects of fluid mechanics and transport processes, continua and noncontinua alike.

Reducing the language content in ToM tests: A developmental scale.

PubMed

Burnel, Morgane; Perrone-Bertolotti, Marcela; Reboul, Anne; Baciu, Monica; Durrleman, Stephanie

2018-02-01

The goal of the current study was to statistically evaluate the reliable scalability of a set of tasks designed to assess Theory of Mind (ToM) without language as a confounding variable. This tool might be useful to study ToM in populations where language is impaired or to study links between language and ToM. Low verbal versions of the ToM tasks proposed by Wellman and Liu (2004) for their scale were tested in 234 children (2.5 years to 11.9 years). Results showed that 5 of the tasks formed a scale according to both Guttman and Rasch models whereas all 6 tasks could form a scale according to the Rasch model only. The main difference from the original scale was that the Explicit False Belief task could be included whereas the Knowledge Access (KA) task could not. The authors argue that the more verbal version of the KA task administered in previous studies could have measured language understanding rather than ToM. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved).

Empathy predicts false belief reasoning ability: evidence from the N400.

PubMed

Ferguson, Heather J; Cane, James E; Douchkov, Michelle; Wright, Daniel

2015-06-01

Interpreting others' actions relies on an understanding of their current mental state. Emerging research has begun to identify a number of factors that give rise to individual differences in this ability. We report an event-related brain potential study where participants (N = 28) read contexts that described a character having a true belief (TB) or false belief (FB) about an object's location. A second sentence described where that character would look for the object. Critically, this sentence included a sentence-final noun that was either consistent or inconsistent with the character's belief. Participants also completed the Empathy Quotient questionnaire. Analysis of the N400 revealed that when the character held a TB about the object's location, the N400 waveform was more negative-going for belief inconsistent vs belief consistent critical words. However, when the character held an FB about the object's location the opposite pattern was found. Intriguingly, correlations between the N400 inconsistency effect and individuals' empathy scores showed a significant correlation for FB but not TB. This suggests that people who are high in empathy can successfully interpret events according to the character's FB, while low empathizers bias their interpretation of events to their own egocentric view. © The Author (2014). Published by Oxford University Press. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com.

40 CFR 82.116 - Compliance by manufacturers or importers incorporating products manufactured with controlled...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-07-01

... 40 Protection of Environment 17 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Compliance by manufacturers or... reasonable belief. The importer of a product purchased or obtained from a foreign manufacturer or supplier... evidence of reasonable belief. ...

40 CFR 82.116 - Compliance by manufacturers or importers incorporating products manufactured with controlled...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-07-01

... 40 Protection of Environment 18 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Compliance by manufacturers or... reasonable belief. The importer of a product purchased or obtained from a foreign manufacturer or supplier... evidence of reasonable belief. ...

28 CFR 548.14 - Community involvement (volunteers, contractors).

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-07-01

... 28 Judicial Administration 2 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Community involvement (volunteers... INSTITUTIONAL MANAGEMENT RELIGIOUS PROGRAMS Religious Beliefs and Practices of Committed Offenders § 548.14... observing their religious beliefs. (c) The Warden or the Warden's designee (ordinarily the chaplain) may...

40 CFR 82.116 - Compliance by manufacturers or importers incorporating products manufactured with controlled...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-07-01

... 40 Protection of Environment 18 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Compliance by manufacturers or... reasonable belief. The importer of a product purchased or obtained from a foreign manufacturer or supplier... evidence of reasonable belief. ...

28 CFR 548.14 - Community involvement (volunteers, contractors).

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-07-01

... 28 Judicial Administration 2 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Community involvement (volunteers... INSTITUTIONAL MANAGEMENT RELIGIOUS PROGRAMS Religious Beliefs and Practices of Committed Offenders § 548.14... observing their religious beliefs. (c) The Warden or the Warden's designee (ordinarily the chaplain) may...

28 CFR 548.14 - Community involvement (volunteers, contractors).

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-07-01

... 28 Judicial Administration 2 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Community involvement (volunteers... INSTITUTIONAL MANAGEMENT RELIGIOUS PROGRAMS Religious Beliefs and Practices of Committed Offenders § 548.14... observing their religious beliefs. (c) The Warden or the Warden's designee (ordinarily the chaplain) may...

40 CFR 82.116 - Compliance by manufacturers or importers incorporating products manufactured with controlled...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-07-01

... 40 Protection of Environment 18 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Compliance by manufacturers or... reasonable belief. The importer of a product purchased or obtained from a foreign manufacturer or supplier... evidence of reasonable belief. ...

28 CFR 548.14 - Community involvement (volunteers, contractors).

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-07-01

... 28 Judicial Administration 2 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Community involvement (volunteers... INSTITUTIONAL MANAGEMENT RELIGIOUS PROGRAMS Religious Beliefs and Practices of Committed Offenders § 548.14... observing their religious beliefs. (c) The Warden or the Warden's designee (ordinarily the chaplain) may...

40 CFR 82.116 - Compliance by manufacturers or importers incorporating products manufactured with controlled...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... 40 Protection of Environment 17 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Compliance by manufacturers or... reasonable belief. The importer of a product purchased or obtained from a foreign manufacturer or supplier... evidence of reasonable belief. ...