45 CFR 164.310 - Physical safeguards.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-10-01

... 45 Public Welfare 1 2014-10-01 2014-10-01 false Physical safeguards. 164.310 Section 164.310... Information § 164.310 Physical safeguards. A covered entity or business associate must, in accordance with... physical access to its electronic information systems and the facility or facilities in which they are...

Using Deep Learning Algorithm to Enhance Image-review Software for Surveillance Cameras

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Cui, Yonggang; Thomas, Maikael A.

We propose the development of proven deep learning algorithms to flag objects and events of interest in Next Generation Surveillance System (NGSS) surveillance to make IAEA image review more efficient. Video surveillance is one of the core monitoring technologies used by the IAEA Department of Safeguards when implementing safeguards at nuclear facilities worldwide. The current image review software GARS has limited automated functions, such as scene-change detection, black image detection and missing scene analysis, but struggles with highly cluttered backgrounds. A cutting-edge algorithm to be developed in this project will enable efficient and effective searches in images and video streamsmore » by identifying and tracking safeguards relevant objects and detect anomalies in their vicinity. In this project, we will develop the algorithm, test it with the IAEA surveillance cameras and data sets collected at simulated nuclear facilities at BNL and SNL, and implement it in a software program for potential integration into the IAEA’s IRAP (Integrated Review and Analysis Program).« less

Exploring Operational Safeguards, Safety, and Security by Design to Address Real Time Threats in Nuclear Facilities

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Schanfein, Mark J.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

2015-07-07

Over the last few years, significant attention has been paid to both encourage application and provide domestic and international guidance for designing in safeguards and security in new facilities.1,2,3 However, once a facility is operational, safeguards, security, and safety often operate as separate entities that support facility operations. This separation is potentially a serious weakness should insider or outsider threats become a reality.Situations may arise where safeguards detects a possible loss of material in a facility. Will they notify security so they can, for example, check perimeter doors for tampering? Not doing so might give the advantage to an insidermore » who has already, or is about to, move nuclear material outside the facility building. If outsiders break into a facility, the availability of any information to coordinate the facility’s response through segregated alarm stations or a failure to include all available radiation sensors, such as safety’s criticality monitors can give the advantage to the adversary who might know to disable camera systems, but would most likely be unaware of other highly relevant sensors in a nuclear facility.This paper will briefly explore operational safeguards, safety, and security by design (3S) at a high level for domestic and State facilities, identify possible weaknesses, and propose future administrative and technical methods, to strengthen the facility system’s response to threats.« less

Safeguards by Design Challenge

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Alwin, Jennifer Louise

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines Safeguards as a system of inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials as part of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. IAEA oversees safeguards worldwide. Safeguards by Design (SBD) involves incorporation of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation during the design phase of a facility, rather that after the fact. Design challenge goals are the following: Design a system of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation for inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials. Cost should be minimized to work with the IAEA’s limited budget. Dose to workers should always bemore » as low are reasonably achievable (ALARA). Time is of the essence in operating facilities and flow of material should not be interrupted significantly. Proprietary process information in facilities may need to be protected, thus the amount of information obtained by inspectors should be the minimum required to achieve the measurement goal. Then three different design challenges are detailed: Plutonium Waste Item Measurement System, Marine-based Modular Reactor, and Floating Nuclear Power Plant (FNPP).« less

10 CFR 60.47 - Facility information and verification.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... REPOSITORIES Licenses Us/iaea Safeguards Agreement § 60.47 Facility information and verification. (a) In... International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and take other action as necessary to implement the US/IAEA Safeguards...

10 CFR 61.32 - Facility information and verification.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... WASTE Licenses Us/iaea Safeguards Agreement § 61.32 Facility information and verification. (a) In... as necessary to implement the US/IAEA Safeguards Agreement, as described in Part 75 of this chapter...

10 CFR 75.15 - Facility attachments.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 10 Energy 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Facility attachments. 75.15 Section 75.15 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) SAFEGUARDS ON NUCLEAR MATERIAL-IMPLEMENTATION OF US/IAEA AGREEMENT Material... under Article 39(b) of the main text of the Safeguards Agreement, do not have Facility Attachments or...

10 CFR 75.15 - Facility attachments.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Facility attachments. 75.15 Section 75.15 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) SAFEGUARDS ON NUCLEAR MATERIAL-IMPLEMENTATION OF US/IAEA AGREEMENT Material... under Article 39(b) of the main text of the Safeguards Agreement, do not have Facility Attachments or...

75 FR 45678 - Notice of Availability of Interim Staff Guidance Document for Fuel Cycle Facilities

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-08-03

... Document for Fuel Cycle Facilities AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ACTION: Notice of availability..., Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S... Commission (NRC) prepares and issues Interim Staff Guidance (ISG) documents for fuel cycle facilities. These...

Advancing the Fork detector for quantitative spent nuclear fuel verification

DOE PAGES

Vaccaro, S.; Gauld, I. C.; Hu, J.; ...

2018-01-31

The Fork detector is widely used by the safeguards inspectorate of the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to verify spent nuclear fuel. Fork measurements are routinely performed for safeguards prior to dry storage cask loading. Additionally, spent fuel verification will be required at the facilities where encapsulation is performed for acceptance in the final repositories planned in Sweden and Finland. The use of the Fork detector as a quantitative instrument has not been prevalent due to the complexity of correlating the measured neutron and gamma ray signals with fuel inventories and operator declarations.more » A spent fuel data analysis module based on the ORIGEN burnup code was recently implemented to provide automated real-time analysis of Fork detector data. This module allows quantitative predictions of expected neutron count rates and gamma units as measured by the Fork detectors using safeguards declarations and available reactor operating data. This study describes field testing of the Fork data analysis module using data acquired from 339 assemblies measured during routine dry cask loading inspection campaigns in Europe. Assemblies include both uranium oxide and mixed-oxide fuel assemblies. More recent measurements of 50 spent fuel assemblies at the Swedish Central Interim Storage Facility for Spent Nuclear Fuel are also analyzed. An evaluation of uncertainties in the Fork measurement data is performed to quantify the ability of the data analysis module to verify operator declarations and to develop quantitative go/no-go criteria for safeguards verification measurements during cask loading or encapsulation operations. The goal of this approach is to provide safeguards inspectors with reliable real-time data analysis tools to rapidly identify discrepancies in operator declarations and to detect potential partial defects in spent fuel assemblies with improved reliability and minimal false positive alarms. Finally, the results are summarized, and sources and magnitudes of uncertainties are identified, and the impact of analysis uncertainties on the ability to confirm operator declarations is quantified.« less

Advancing the Fork detector for quantitative spent nuclear fuel verification

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Vaccaro, S.; Gauld, I. C.; Hu, J.

The Fork detector is widely used by the safeguards inspectorate of the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to verify spent nuclear fuel. Fork measurements are routinely performed for safeguards prior to dry storage cask loading. Additionally, spent fuel verification will be required at the facilities where encapsulation is performed for acceptance in the final repositories planned in Sweden and Finland. The use of the Fork detector as a quantitative instrument has not been prevalent due to the complexity of correlating the measured neutron and gamma ray signals with fuel inventories and operator declarations.more » A spent fuel data analysis module based on the ORIGEN burnup code was recently implemented to provide automated real-time analysis of Fork detector data. This module allows quantitative predictions of expected neutron count rates and gamma units as measured by the Fork detectors using safeguards declarations and available reactor operating data. This study describes field testing of the Fork data analysis module using data acquired from 339 assemblies measured during routine dry cask loading inspection campaigns in Europe. Assemblies include both uranium oxide and mixed-oxide fuel assemblies. More recent measurements of 50 spent fuel assemblies at the Swedish Central Interim Storage Facility for Spent Nuclear Fuel are also analyzed. An evaluation of uncertainties in the Fork measurement data is performed to quantify the ability of the data analysis module to verify operator declarations and to develop quantitative go/no-go criteria for safeguards verification measurements during cask loading or encapsulation operations. The goal of this approach is to provide safeguards inspectors with reliable real-time data analysis tools to rapidly identify discrepancies in operator declarations and to detect potential partial defects in spent fuel assemblies with improved reliability and minimal false positive alarms. Finally, the results are summarized, and sources and magnitudes of uncertainties are identified, and the impact of analysis uncertainties on the ability to confirm operator declarations is quantified.« less

Advancing the Fork detector for quantitative spent nuclear fuel verification

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Vaccaro, S.; Gauld, I. C.; Hu, J.; De Baere, P.; Peterson, J.; Schwalbach, P.; Smejkal, A.; Tomanin, A.; Sjöland, A.; Tobin, S.; Wiarda, D.

2018-04-01

The Fork detector is widely used by the safeguards inspectorate of the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to verify spent nuclear fuel. Fork measurements are routinely performed for safeguards prior to dry storage cask loading. Additionally, spent fuel verification will be required at the facilities where encapsulation is performed for acceptance in the final repositories planned in Sweden and Finland. The use of the Fork detector as a quantitative instrument has not been prevalent due to the complexity of correlating the measured neutron and gamma ray signals with fuel inventories and operator declarations. A spent fuel data analysis module based on the ORIGEN burnup code was recently implemented to provide automated real-time analysis of Fork detector data. This module allows quantitative predictions of expected neutron count rates and gamma units as measured by the Fork detectors using safeguards declarations and available reactor operating data. This paper describes field testing of the Fork data analysis module using data acquired from 339 assemblies measured during routine dry cask loading inspection campaigns in Europe. Assemblies include both uranium oxide and mixed-oxide fuel assemblies. More recent measurements of 50 spent fuel assemblies at the Swedish Central Interim Storage Facility for Spent Nuclear Fuel are also analyzed. An evaluation of uncertainties in the Fork measurement data is performed to quantify the ability of the data analysis module to verify operator declarations and to develop quantitative go/no-go criteria for safeguards verification measurements during cask loading or encapsulation operations. The goal of this approach is to provide safeguards inspectors with reliable real-time data analysis tools to rapidly identify discrepancies in operator declarations and to detect potential partial defects in spent fuel assemblies with improved reliability and minimal false positive alarms. The results are summarized, and sources and magnitudes of uncertainties are identified, and the impact of analysis uncertainties on the ability to confirm operator declarations is quantified.

Long-Term Information Management (LTIM) of Safeguards Data at Repositories: Phase II

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Haddal, Risa N.

One of the challenges of implementing safeguards for geological repositories will be the long-term preservation of safeguards-related data for 100 years or more. While most countries considering the construction and operation of such facilities agree that safeguards information should be preserved, there are gaps with respect to standardized requirements, guidelines, timescales, and approaches. This study analyzes those gaps and explores research to clarify stakeholder needs, identify current policies, approaches, best practices and international standards, and explores existing safeguards information management infrastructure. The study also attempts to clarify what a safeguards data classification system might look like, how long data shouldmore » be retained, and how information should be exchanged between stakeholders at different phases of a repository’s life cycle. The analysis produced a variety of recommendations on what information to preserve, how to preserve it, where to store it, retention options and how to exchange information in the long term. Key findings include the use of the globally recognized international records management standard, ISO15489, for guidance on the development of information management systems, and the development of a Key Information File (KIF). The KIF could be used to identify only the most relevant, high-level safeguards information and the history of decision making about the repository. The study also suggests implementing on-site and off-site records storage in digital and physical form; developing a safeguards data classification system; long-term records retention with periodic reviews every 5 to 10 years during each phase of the repository life cycle; and establishing transition procedures well in advance so that data shepherds and records officers can transfer information with incoming facility managers effectively and efficiently. These and other recommendations are further analyzed in this study.« less

3S (Safeguards, Security, Safety) based pyroprocessing facility safety evaluation plan

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Ku, J.H.; Choung, W.M.; You, G.S.

The big advantage of pyroprocessing for the management of spent fuels against the conventional reprocessing technologies lies in its proliferation resistance since the pure plutonium cannot be separated from the spent fuel. The extracted materials can be directly used as metal fuel in a fast reactor, and pyroprocessing reduces drastically the volume and heat load of the spent fuel. KAERI has implemented the SBD (Safeguards-By-Design) concept in nuclear fuel cycle facilities. The goal of SBD is to integrate international safeguards into the entire facility design process since the very beginning of the design phase. This paper presents a safety evaluationmore » plan using a conceptual design of a reference pyroprocessing facility, in which 3S (Safeguards, Security, Safety)-By-Design (3SBD) concept is integrated from early conceptual design phase. The purpose of this paper is to establish an advanced pyroprocessing hot cell facility design concept based on 3SBD for the successful realization of pyroprocessing technology with enhanced safety and proliferation resistance.« less

Application of Framework for Integrating Safety, Security and Safeguards (3Ss) into the Design Of Used Nuclear Fuel Storage Facility

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Badwan, Faris M.; Demuth, Scott F

Department of Energy’s Office of Nuclear Energy, Fuel Cycle Research and Development develops options to the current commercial fuel cycle management strategy to enable the safe, secure, economic, and sustainable expansion of nuclear energy while minimizing proliferation risks by conducting research and development focused on used nuclear fuel recycling and waste management to meet U.S. needs. Used nuclear fuel is currently stored onsite in either wet pools or in dry storage systems, with disposal envisioned in interim storage facility and, ultimately, in a deep-mined geologic repository. The safe management and disposition of used nuclear fuel and/or nuclear waste is amore » fundamental aspect of any nuclear fuel cycle. Integrating safety, security, and safeguards (3Ss) fully in the early stages of the design process for a new nuclear facility has the potential to effectively minimize safety, proliferation, and security risks. The 3Ss integration framework could become the new national and international norm and the standard process for designing future nuclear facilities. The purpose of this report is to develop a framework for integrating the safety, security and safeguards concept into the design of Used Nuclear Fuel Storage Facility (UNFSF). The primary focus is on integration of safeguards and security into the UNFSF based on the existing Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approach to addressing the safety/security interface (10 CFR 73.58 and Regulatory Guide 5.73) for nuclear power plants. The methodology used for adaptation of the NRC safety/security interface will be used as the basis for development of the safeguards /security interface and later will be used as the basis for development of safety and safeguards interface. Then this will complete the integration cycle of safety, security, and safeguards. The overall methodology for integration of 3Ss will be proposed, but only the integration of safeguards and security will be applied to the design of the UNFSF. The framework for integration of safeguards and security into the UNFSF will include 1) identification of applicable regulatory requirements, 2) selection of a common system that share dual safeguard and security functions, 3) development of functional design criteria and design requirements for the selected system, 4) identification and integration of the dual safeguards and security design requirements, and 5) assessment of the integration and potential benefit.« less

49 CFR 195.575 - Which facilities must I electrically isolate and what inspections, tests, and safeguards are...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-10-01

... 49 Transportation 3 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Which facilities must I electrically isolate and what inspections, tests, and safeguards are required? 195.575 Section 195.575 Transportation Other... Corrosion Control § 195.575 Which facilities must I electrically isolate and what inspections, tests, and...

Proposal for Monitoring Within the Centrifuge Cascades of Uranium Enrichment Facilities

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Farrar, David R.

2017-04-01

Safeguards are technical measures implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to independently verify that nuclear material is not diverted from peaceful purposes to weapons (IAEA, 2017a). Safeguards implemented at uranium enrichment facilities (facilities hereafter) include enrichment monitors (IAEA, 2011). Figure 1 shows a diagram of how a facility could be monitored. The use of a system for monitoring within centrifuge cascades is proposed.

Proliferation resistance assessments during the design phase of a recycling facility as a means of reducing proliferation risks

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Lindell, M.A.; Grape, S.; Haekansson, A.

The sustainability criterion for Gen IV nuclear energy systems inherently presumes the availability of efficient fuel recycling capabilities. One area for research on advanced fuel recycling concerns safeguards aspects of this type of facilities. Since a recycling facility may be considered as sensitive from a non-proliferation perspective, it is important to address these issues early in the design process, according to the principle of Safeguards By Design. Presented in this paper is a mode of procedure, where assessments of the proliferation resistance (PR) of a recycling facility for fast reactor fuel have been performed so as to identify the weakestmore » barriers to proliferation of nuclear material. Two supplementing established methodologies have been applied; TOPS (Technological Opportunities to increase Proliferation resistance of nuclear power Systems) and PR-PP (Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection evaluation methodology). The chosen fuel recycling facility belongs to a small Gen IV lead-cooled fast reactor system that is under study in Sweden. A schematic design of the recycling facility, where actinides are separated using solvent extraction, has been examined. The PR assessment methodologies make it possible to pinpoint areas in which the facility can be improved in order to reduce the risk of diversion. The initial facility design may then be slightly modified and/or safeguards measures may be introduced to reduce the total identified proliferation risk. After each modification of design and/or safeguards implementation, a new PR assessment of the revised system can then be carried out. This way, each modification can be evaluated and new ways to further enhance the proliferation resistance can be identified. This type of iterative procedure may support Safeguards By Design in the planning of new recycling plants and other nuclear facilities. (authors)« less

Visualizing Safeguards: Software for Conceptualizing and Communicating Safeguards Data

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Gallucci, N.

2015-07-12

The nuclear programs of states are complex and varied, comprising a wide range of fuel cycles and facilities. Also varied are the types and terms of states’ safeguards agreements with the IAEA, each placing different limits on the inspectorate’s access to these facilities. Such nuances make it difficult to draw policy significance from the ground-level nuclear activities of states, or to attribute ground-level outcomes to the implementation of specific policies or initiatives. While acquiring a firm understanding of these relationships is critical to evaluating and formulating effective policy, doing so requires collecting and synthesizing large bodies of information. Maintaining amore » comprehensive working knowledge of the facilities comprising even a single state’s nuclear program poses a challenge, yet marrying this information with relevant safeguards and verification information is more challenging still. To facilitate this task, Brookhaven National Laboratory has developed a means of capturing the development, operation, and safeguards history of all the facilities comprising a state’s nuclear program in a single graphic. The resulting visualization offers a useful reference tool to policymakers and analysts alike, providing a chronology of states’ nuclear development and an easily digestible history of verification activities across their fuel cycles.« less

75 FR 29695 - Security Zones; Sabine Bank Channel, Sabine Pass Channel and Sabine-Neches Waterway, TX

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-05-27

... regime designed to safeguard human life, vessels, and waterfront facilities against sabotage or terrorist... effect on the human environment. A preliminary environmental analysis checklist supporting this...

Exploratory study on potential safeguards applications for shared ledger technology

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Frazar, Sarah L.; Jarman, Kenneth D.; Joslyn, Cliff A.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is responsible for providing credible assurance that countries are meeting their obligations not to divert or misuse nuclear materials and facilities for non-peaceful purposes. To this end, the IAEA integrates information about States’ nuclear material inventories and transactions with other types of data to draw its safeguards conclusions. As the amount and variety of data and information has increased, the IAEA’s data acquisition, management, and analysis processes have greatly benefited from advancements in computer science, data management, and cybersecurity during the last 20 years. Despite these advancements, inconsistent use of advanced computer technologies asmore » well as political concerns among certain IAEA Member States centered on trust, transparency, and IAEA authorities limit the overall effectiveness and efficiency of IAEA safeguards. As a result, there is an ongoing need to strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of IAEA safeguards while improving Member State cooperation and trust in the safeguards system. These chronic safeguards needs could be met with some emerging technologies, specifically those associated with the digital currency bitcoin.« less

JAEA's actions and contributions to the strengthening of nuclear non-proliferation

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Suda, Kazunori; Suzuki, Mitsutoshi; Michiji, Toshiro

2012-06-01

Japan, a non-nuclear weapons state, has established a commercial nuclear fuel cycle including LWRs, and now is developing a fast neutron reactor fuel cycle as part of the next generation nuclear energy system, with commercial operation targeted for 2050. Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) is the independent administrative agency for conducting comprehensive nuclear R&D in Japan after the merger of Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI) and Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute (JNC). JAEA and its predecessors have extensive experience in R&D, facility operations, and safeguards development and implementation for new types of nuclear facilities for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. As the operator of various nuclear fuel cycle facilities and numerous nuclear materials, JAEA makes international contributions to strengthen nuclear non-proliferation. This paper provides an overview of JAEA's development of nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards technologies, including remote monitoring of nuclear facilities, environmental sample analysis methods and new efforts since the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington D.C.

U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress

DTIC Science & Technology

2008-10-17

safeguards-irrelevant.” The following facilities and activities were not on the separation list: ! 8 indigenous Indian power reactors ! Fast Breeder ...test Reactor (FTBR) and Prototype Fast Breeder Reactors (PFBR) under construction ! Enrichment facilities ! Spent fuel reprocessing facilities (except...potential use in a bomb. In addition, safeguards on enrichment, reprocessing plants, and breeder reactors would support the 2002 U.S. National Strategy to

76 FR 67765 - Notice of Availability of Uranium Enrichment Fuel Cycle Facility's Inspection Reports Regarding...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-11-02

... Uranium Enrichment Fuel Cycle Facility's Inspection Reports Regarding Louisiana Energy Services, National..., Uranium Enrichment Branch, Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards, Office of Nuclear Material Safety... Commission. Brian W. Smith, Chief, Uranium Enrichment Branch, Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards...

75 FR 44817 - Notice of Availability of Uranium Enrichment Fuel Cycle Facility Inspection Reports Regarding...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-07-29

... Uranium Enrichment Fuel Cycle Facility Inspection Reports Regarding Louisiana Energy Services, National... Enrichment Branch, Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and... Enrichment Branch, Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and...

Next Generation Safeguards Initiative research to determine the Pu mass in spent fuel assemblies: Purpose, approach, constraints, implementation, and calibration

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Tobin, S. J.; Menlove, H. O.; Swinhoe, M. T.; Schear, M. A.

2011-10-01

The Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) of the U.S. Department of Energy has funded a multi-lab/multi-university collaboration to quantify the plutonium mass in spent nuclear fuel assemblies and to detect the diversion of pins from them. The goal of this research effort is to quantify the capability of various non-destructive assay (NDA) technologies as well as to train a future generation of safeguards practitioners. This research is "technology driven" in the sense that we will quantify the capabilities of a wide range of safeguards technologies of interest to regulators and policy makers; a key benefit to this approach is that the techniques are being tested in a unified manner. When the results of the Monte Carlo modeling are evaluated and integrated, practical constraints are part of defining the potential context in which a given technology might be applied. This paper organizes the commercial spent fuel safeguard needs into four facility types in order to identify any constraints on the NDA system design. These four facility types are the following: future reprocessing plants, current reprocessing plants, once-through spent fuel repositories, and any other sites that store individual spent fuel assemblies (reactor sites are the most common facility type in this category). Dry storage is not of interest since individual assemblies are not accessible. This paper will overview the purpose and approach of the NGSI spent fuel effort and describe the constraints inherent in commercial fuel facilities. It will conclude by discussing implementation and calibration of measurement systems. This report will also provide some motivation for considering a couple of other safeguards concepts (base measurement and fingerprinting) that might meet the safeguards need but not require the determination of plutonium mass.

Safeguardability of the vitrification option for disposal of plutonium

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Pillay, K.K.S.

1996-05-01

Safeguardability of the vitrification option for plutonium disposition is rather complex and there is no experience base in either domestic or international safeguards for this approach. In the present treaty regime between the US and the states of the former Soviet Union, bilaterial verifications are considered more likely with potential for a third-party verification of safeguards. There are serious technological limitations to applying conventional bulk handling facility safeguards techniques to achieve independent verification of plutonium in borosilicate glass. If vitrification is the final disposition option chosen, maintaining continuity of knowledge of plutonium in glass matrices, especially those containing boron andmore » those spike with high-level wastes or {sup 137}Cs, is beyond the capability of present-day safeguards technologies and nondestructive assay techniques. The alternative to quantitative measurement of fissile content is to maintain continuity of knowledge through a combination of containment and surveillance, which is not the international norm for bulk handling facilities.« less

77 FR 75676 - Standard Review Plan for Review of Fuel Cycle Facility License Applications

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2012-12-21

... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION [NRC-2012-0220] Standard Review Plan for Review of Fuel Cycle... Review of a License Application for a Fuel Cycle Facility.'' The NRC is extending the public comment... of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards. [FR Doc. 2012...

The Case for the Application of Worldwide Marine Radioactivity Studies In the Search for Undeclared Facilities and Activities

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Mark Schanfein

2013-06-01

Undeclared nuclear facilities unequivocally remain the most difficult safeguards challenge facing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Recent cases of undeclared facilities revealed in Iran and Syria, which are NPT signatory States, show both the difficulty and the seriousness of this threat to nonproliferation. In the case of undeclared nuclear facilities, the most effective deterrent against proliferation is the application of Wide-Area Environmental Sampling (WAES); however, WAES is currently cost-prohibitive. As with any threat, the most effective countering strategy is a multifaceted approach. Some of the approaches applied by the IAEA include: open source analysis, satellite imagery, on-site environmental sampling,more » complementary access under the Additional Protocol (where in force), traditional safeguards inspections, and information provided by member States. These approaches, naturally, are focused on specific States. Are there other opportunities not currently within the IAEA purview to assess States that may provide another opportunity to detect clandestine facilities? In this paper, the author will make the case that the IAEA Department of Safeguards should explore the area of worldwide marine radioactivity studies as one possible opportunity. One such study was released by the IAEA Marine Environment Laboratory in January 2005. This technical document focused on 90Sr, 137Cs, and 239/240Pu. It is clearly a challenging area because of the many sources of anthropogenic radionuclides in the world’s oceans and seas including: nuclear weapons testing, reprocessing, accidents, waste dumping, and industrial and medical radioisotopes, whose distributions change based on oceanographic, geochemical, and biological processes, and their sources. It is additionally challenging where multiple States share oceans, seas, and rivers. But with the application of modern science, historical sampling to establish baselines, and a focus on the most relevant radionuclides, the potential is there to support this challenging IAEA safeguards mission.« less

7 CFR 352.10 - Inspection; safeguards; disposal.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... facilities for immediate exportation. (x) Any other related factor which should be considered, such as intent...; safeguards; disposal. (a) Inspection and release. Prohibited and restricted products and articles subject to... restricted products and articles under this part shall be subject to such safeguards as may be prescribed in...

45 CFR 164.310 - Physical safeguards.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-10-01

... 45 Public Welfare 1 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Physical safeguards. 164.310 Section 164.310... Information § 164.310 Physical safeguards. A covered entity must, in accordance with § 164.306: (a)(1) Standard: Facility access controls. Implement policies and procedures to limit physical access to its...

45 CFR 164.310 - Physical safeguards.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-10-01

... 45 Public Welfare 1 2012-10-01 2012-10-01 false Physical safeguards. 164.310 Section 164.310... Information § 164.310 Physical safeguards. A covered entity must, in accordance with § 164.306: (a)(1) Standard: Facility access controls. Implement policies and procedures to limit physical access to its...

45 CFR 164.310 - Physical safeguards.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... 45 Public Welfare 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Physical safeguards. 164.310 Section 164.310... Information § 164.310 Physical safeguards. A covered entity must, in accordance with § 164.306: (a)(1) Standard: Facility access controls. Implement policies and procedures to limit physical access to its...

17 CFR 37.1400 - Core Principle 14-System safeguards.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-04-01

... procedures, and automated systems, that: (1) Are reliable and secure; and (2) Have adequate scalable capacity... 17 Commodity and Securities Exchanges 1 2014-04-01 2014-04-01 false Core Principle 14-System... SWAP EXECUTION FACILITIES System Safeguards § 37.1400 Core Principle 14—System safeguards. The swap...

SARS: Safeguards Accounting and Reporting Software

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Mohammedi, B.; Saadi, S.; Ait-Mohamed, S.

In order to satisfy the requirements of the SSAC (State System for Accounting and Control of nuclear materials), for recording and reporting objectives; this computer program comes to bridge the gape between nuclear facilities operators and national inspection verifying records and delivering reports. The SARS maintains and generates at-facility safeguards accounting records and generates International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards reports based on accounting data input by the user at any nuclear facility. A database structure is built and BORLAND DELPHI programming language has been used. The software is designed to be user-friendly, to make extensive and flexible management of menus and graphs. SARS functions include basic physical inventory tacking, transaction histories and reporting. Access controls are made by different passwords.

Safeguards on uranium ore concentrate? the impact of modern mining and milling process

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Francis, Stephen

2013-07-01

Increased purity in uranium ore concentrate not only raises the question as to whether Safeguards should be applied to the entirety of uranium conversion facilities, but also as to whether some degree of coverage should be moved back to uranium ore concentrate production at uranium mining and milling facilities. This paper looks at uranium ore concentrate production across the globe and explores the extent to which increased purity is evident and the underlying reasons. Potential issues this increase in purity raises for IAEA's strategy on the Starting Point of Safeguards are also discussed.

INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEM CYBER SECURITY: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS RELEVANT TO NUCLEAR FACILITIES, SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Robert S. Anderson; Mark Schanfein; Trond Bjornard

2011-07-01

Typical questions surrounding industrial control system (ICS) cyber security always lead back to: What could a cyber attack do to my system(s) and; how much should I worry about it? These two leading questions represent only a fraction of questions asked when discussing cyber security as it applies to any program, company, business, or organization. The intent of this paper is to open a dialog of important pertinent questions and answers that managers of nuclear facilities engaged in nuclear facility security and safeguards should examine, i.e., what questions should be asked; and how do the answers affect an organization's abilitymore » to effectively safeguard and secure nuclear material. When a cyber intrusion is reported, what does that mean? Can an intrusion be detected or go un-noticed? Are nuclear security or safeguards systems potentially vulnerable? What about the digital systems employed in process monitoring, and international safeguards? Organizations expend considerable efforts to ensure that their facilities can maintain continuity of operations against physical threats. However, cyber threats particularly on ICSs may not be well known or understood, and often do not receive adequate attention. With the disclosure of the Stuxnet virus that has recently attacked nuclear infrastructure, many organizations have recognized the need for an urgent interest in cyber attacks and defenses against them. Several questions arise including discussions about the insider threat, adequate cyber protections, program readiness, encryption, and many more. These questions, among others, are discussed so as to raise the awareness and shed light on ways to protect nuclear facilities and materials against such attacks.« less

REVIEW OF THE NEGOTIATION OF THE MODEL PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE AGREEMENT(S) BETWEEN STATE(S) AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY FOR THE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS,INFCIRC/540 (Corrected) VOLUME I/III SETTING THE STAGE: 1991-1996.

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Rosenthal, M.D.; Saum-Manning, L.; Houck, F.

Events in Iraq at the beginning of the 1990s demonstrated that the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) needed to be improved. It had failed, after all, to detect Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapon program even though some of Iraq's's activities had been pursued at inspected facilities in buildings adjacent to ones being inspected by the IAEA. Although there were aspects of the implementation of safeguards where the IAEA needed to improve, the primary limitations were considered to be part of the safeguards system itself. That system was based on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1970, to whichmore » Iraq was a party, and implemented on the basis of a model NPT safeguards agreement, published by the IAEA 1972 as INFCIRC/153 (corrected). The agreement calls for states to accept and for the IAEA to apply safeguards to all nuclear material in the state. Iraq was a party to such an agreement, but it violated the agreement by concealing nuclear material and other nuclear activities from the IAEA. Although the IAEA was inspecting in Iraq, it was hindered by aspects of the agreement that essentially limited its access to points in declared facilities and provided the IAEA with little information about nuclear activities anywhere else in Iraq. As a result, a major review of the NPT safeguards system was initiated by its Director General and Member States with the objective of finding the best means to enable the IAEA to detect both diversions from declared stocks and any undeclared nuclear material or activities in the state. Significant improvements that could be made within existing legal authority were taken quickly, most importantly a change in 1992 in how and when and what design information would be reported to the IAEA. During 1991-1996, the IAEA pursued intensive study, legal and technical analysis, and field trials and held numerous consultations with Member States. The Board of Governors discussed the issue of strengthening safeguards at almost all of its meeting.« less

10 CFR 50.58 - Hearings and report of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 10 Energy 1 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Hearings and report of the Advisory Committee on Reactor... Hearings and report of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. (a) Each application for a....22, or for a testing facility, shall be referred to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards for...

10 CFR 50.58 - Hearings and report of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 10 Energy 1 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Hearings and report of the Advisory Committee on Reactor... Hearings and report of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. (a) Each application for a....22, or for a testing facility, shall be referred to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards for...

Project Report on Development of a Safeguards Approach for Pyroprocessing

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Robert Bean

The Idaho National Laboratory has undertaken an effort to develop a standard safeguards approach for international commercial pyroprocessing facilities. This report details progress for the fiscal year 2010 effort. A component by component diversion pathway analysis has been performed, and has led to insight on the mitigation needs and equipment development needed for a valid safeguards approach. The effort to develop an in-hot cell detection capability led to the digital cloud chamber, and more importantly, the significant potential scientific breakthrough of the inverse spectroscopy algorithm, including the ability to identify energy and spatial location of gamma ray emitting sources withmore » a single, non-complex, stationary radiation detector system. Curium measurements were performed on historical and current samples at the FCF to attempt to determine the utility of using gross neutron counting for accountancy measurements. A solid cost estimate of equipment installation at FCF has been developed to guide proposals and cost allocations to use FCF as a test bed for safeguards measurement demonstrations. A combined MATLAB and MCNPX model has been developed to perform detector placement calculations around the electrorefiner. Early harvesting has occurred wherein the project team has been requested to provide pyroprocessing technology and safeguards short courses.« less

Development of a SPARK Training Dataset

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Sayre, Amanda M.; Olson, Jarrod R.

2015-03-01

In its first five years, the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) sponsored more than 400 undergraduate, graduate, and post-doctoral students in internships and research positions (Wyse 2012). In the past seven years, the NGSI program has, and continues to produce a large body of scientific, technical, and policy work in targeted core safeguards capabilities and human capital development activities. Not only does the NGSI program carry out activities across multiple disciplines, but also across all U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)/NNSA locations in the United States. However, products are not readily shared among disciplines and acrossmore » locations, nor are they archived in a comprehensive library. Rather, knowledge of NGSI-produced literature is localized to the researchers, clients, and internal laboratory/facility publication systems such as the Electronic Records and Information Capture Architecture (ERICA) at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). There is also no incorporated way of analyzing existing NGSI literature to determine whether the larger NGSI program is achieving its core safeguards capabilities and activities. A complete library of NGSI literature could prove beneficial to a cohesive, sustainable, and more economical NGSI program. The Safeguards Platform for Automated Retrieval of Knowledge (SPARK) has been developed to be a knowledge storage, retrieval, and analysis capability to capture safeguards knowledge to exist beyond the lifespan of NGSI. During the development process, it was necessary to build a SPARK training dataset (a corpus of documents) for initial entry into the system and for demonstration purposes. We manipulated these data to gain new information about the breadth of NGSI publications, and they evaluated the science-policy interface at PNNL as a practical demonstration of SPARK’s intended analysis capability. The analysis demonstration sought to answer the question, “Who leads research and development at PNNL, scientists or policy researchers?” The analysis was inconclusive as to whether policy researchers or scientists are primary drivers for research at PNNL. However, the dataset development and analysis activity did demonstrate the utility and usability of the SPARK dataset. After the initiation of the NGSI program there is a clear increase in the number of publications of safeguards products. Employing the natural language analysis tool IN SPIRE™ showed the presence of vocation- and topic-specific vernacular within NGSI sub-topics. The methodology developed to define the scope of the dataset was useful in describing safeguards applications, but may be applicable for research on other topics beyond safeguards. The analysis emphasized the need for an expanded dataset to fully understand the scope of safeguards publications and research both nationally and internationally. As the SPARK dataset grows to include publications outside PNNL, topics crosscutting disciplines and DOE/NNSA locations should become more apparent. NGSI was established in 2008 to cultivate the next generation of safeguards professionals and support the development of core safeguards capabilities (NNSA 2012). Now a robust system to preserve and share institutional memory such as SPARK is needed to inspire and equip the next generation of safeguards experts, technologies, and policies.« less

Simulation Enabled Safeguards Assessment Methodology

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Robert Bean; Trond Bjornard; Thomas Larson

2007-09-01

It is expected that nuclear energy will be a significant component of future supplies. New facilities, operating under a strengthened international nonproliferation regime will be needed. There is good reason to believe virtual engineering applied to the facility design, as well as to the safeguards system design will reduce total project cost and improve efficiency in the design cycle. Simulation Enabled Safeguards Assessment MEthodology (SESAME) has been developed as a software package to provide this capability for nuclear reprocessing facilities. The software architecture is specifically designed for distributed computing, collaborative design efforts, and modular construction to allow step improvements inmore » functionality. Drag and drop wireframe construction allows the user to select the desired components from a component warehouse, render the system for 3D visualization, and, linked to a set of physics libraries and/or computational codes, conduct process evaluations of the system they have designed.« less

78 FR 69286 - Facility Security Clearance and Safeguarding of National Security Information and Restricted Data

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-11-19

... Clearance and Safeguarding of National Security Information and Restricted Data AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory... Executive Order 13526, Classified National Security Information. In addition, this direct final rule allowed... licensees (or their designees) to conduct classified [[Page 69287

A Monte Carlo Analysis of Weight Data from UF 6 Cylinder Feed and Withdrawal Stations

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Garner, James R; Whitaker, J Michael

2015-01-01

As the number of nuclear facilities handling uranium hexafluoride (UF 6) cylinders (e.g., UF 6 production, enrichment, and fuel fabrication) increase in number and throughput, more automated safeguards measures will likely be needed to enable the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to achieve its safeguards objectives in a fiscally constrained environment. Monitoring the process data from the load cells built into the cylinder feed and withdrawal (F/W) stations (i.e., cylinder weight data) can significantly increase the IAEA’s ability to efficiently achieve the fundamental safeguards task of confirming operations as declared (i.e., no undeclared activities). Researchers at the Oak Ridge Nationalmore » Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, the Joint Research Center (in Ispra, Italy), and University of Glasgow are investigating how this weight data can be used for IAEA safeguards purposes while fully protecting the operator’s proprietary and sensitive information related to operations. A key question that must be resolved is, what is the necessary frequency of recording data from the process F/W stations to achieve safeguards objectives? This paper summarizes Monte Carlo simulations of typical feed, product, and tails withdrawal cycles and evaluates longer sampling frequencies to determine the expected errors caused by low-frequency sampling and its impact on material balance calculations.« less

Adversary modeling: an analysis of criminal activities analogous to potential threats to nuclear safeguard systems

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Heineke, J.M.

1978-12-20

This study examines and analyzes several classes of incidents in which decision makers are confronted with adversaries. The classes are analogous to adversaries in a material control system in a nuclear facility. Both internal threats (bank frauds and embezzlements) and external threats (aircraft hijackings and hostage-type terrorist events were analyzed. (DLC)

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

MacDonald, Douglas G.; Clements, Samuel L.; Patrick, Scott W.

Securing high value and critical assets is one of the biggest challenges facing this nation and others around the world. In modern integrated systems, there are four potential modes of attack available to an adversary: • physical only attack, • cyber only attack, • physical-enabled cyber attack, • cyber-enabled physical attack. Blended attacks involve an adversary working in one domain to reduce system effectiveness in another domain. This enables the attacker to penetrate further into the overall layered defenses. Existing vulnerability assessment (VA) processes and software tools which predict facility vulnerabilities typically evaluate the physical and cyber domains separately. Vulnerabilitiesmore » which result from the integration of cyber-physical control systems are not well characterized and are often overlooked by existing assessment approaches. In this paper, we modified modification of the timely detection methodology, used for decades in physical security VAs, to include cyber components. The Physical and Cyber Risk Analysis Tool (PACRAT) prototype illustrates an integrated vulnerability assessment that includes cyber-physical interdependencies. Information about facility layout, network topology, and emplaced safeguards is used to evaluate how well suited a facility is to detect, delay, and respond to attacks, to identify the pathways most vulnerable to attack, and to evaluate how often safeguards are compromised for a given threat or adversary type. We have tested the PACRAT prototype on critical infrastructure facilities and the results are promising. Future work includes extending the model to prescribe the recommended security improvements via an automated cost-benefit analysis.« less

Report on Concepts & Approaches for SSBD for eCHEM

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Murphy, Chantell Lynne-Marie

The verification of special nuclear material (SNM) in spent fuel pyroprocessing is an important safeguards challenge. The detection of spontaneous fission (SF) neutrons from curium is an accepted, non-destructive technique that has been applied to verify special nuclear material (SNM) content in used fuel and other materials in the fuel cycle. The nuclear material accounting (NMA) technique at the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute’s Reference Engineering-scale Pyroprocessing Facility (REPF) is based on the Cm balance technique. Several publications have demonstrated the safeguards benefit from using process monitoring (PM) on nuclear facilities as a complementary measure to NMA. More recently, thismore » concept was expanded and preliminarily demonstrated for pyroprocessing. The concept of Signature Based Safeguards (SBS) is part of this expansion, and is built around the interpretation of input from various sensors in a declared facility coupled with complementary NMA methods to increase confidence and lower standard error inventory differences (SEID). The SBS methodology was conceptually developed and relies on near real time analysis of process monitoring data to detect material diversion complemented by robust containment and surveillance (C/S) measures. This work demonstrates one example of how the SBS framework can be used in the electrorefiner. In this SBS application, a combination of cyclic voltammetry (CV) and neutron counting is applied to track and monitor Pu mass balance. The main purpose of this experiment is to determine if meaningful information can be gained from CV measurements with regard to the Mg/Gd ratio. This data will be coupled with ICP-MS to verify Gd concentrations and analyzed for statistical significance. It is expected the CV data will register a significant change under the off-normal operating conditions. Knowing how to identify and interpret those changes may help inform how to target more traditional neutron counting methods, which could support a more efficient safeguards system. The experimental results will be compared with theoretical calculations and the ERAD simulations.« less

Non-proliferation, safeguards, and security for the fissile materials disposition program immobilization alternatives

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Duggan, R.A.; Jaeger, C.D.; Tolk, K.M.

1996-05-01

The Department of Energy is analyzing long-term storage and disposition alternatives for surplus weapons-usable fissile materials. A number of different disposition alternatives are being considered. These include facilities for storage, conversion and stabilization of fissile materials, immobilization in glass or ceramic material, fabrication of fissile material into mixed oxide (MOX) fuel for reactors, use of reactor based technologies to convert material into spent fuel, and disposal of fissile material using geologic alternatives. This paper will focus on how the objectives of reducing security and proliferation risks are being considered, and the possible facility impacts. Some of the areas discussed inmore » this paper include: (1) domestic and international safeguards requirements, (2) non-proliferation criteria and measures, (3) the threats, and (4) potential proliferation, safeguards, and security issues and impacts on the facilities. Issues applicable to all of the possible disposition alternatives will be discussed in this paper. However, particular attention is given to the plutonium immobilization alternatives.« less

78 FR 4790 - Security Zone, Potomac and Anacostia Rivers; Washington, DC

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-01-23

... comprehensive port security regimes designed to safeguard human life, vessels, and waterfront facilities while... the need for immediate action, the restriction of vessel traffic is necessary to protect life... necessary to safeguard life and property on the navigable waters before, during, and after activities...

Developing a Signature Based Safeguards Approach for the Electrorefiner and Salt Cleanup Unit Operations in Pyroprocessing Facilities

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Murphy, Chantell Lynne-Marie

Traditional nuclear materials accounting does not work well for safeguards when applied to pyroprocessing. Alternate methods such as Signature Based Safeguards (SBS) are being investigated. The goal of SBS is real-time/near-real-time detection of anomalous events in the pyroprocessing facility as they could indicate loss of special nuclear material. In high-throughput reprocessing facilities, metric tons of separated material are processed that must be accounted for. Even with very low uncertainties of accountancy measurements (<0.1%) the uncertainty of the material balances is still greater than the desired level. Novel contributions of this work are as follows: (1) significant enhancement of SBS developmentmore » for the salt cleanup process by creating a new gas sparging process model, selecting sensors to monitor normal operation, identifying safeguards-significant off-normal scenarios, and simulating those off-normal events and generating sensor output; (2) further enhancement of SBS development for the electrorefiner by simulating off-normal events caused by changes in salt concentration and identifying which conditions lead to Pu and Cm not tracking throughout the rest of the system; and (3) new contribution in applying statistical techniques to analyze the signatures gained from these two models to help draw real-time conclusions on anomalous events.« less

75 FR 36717 - Washington State University; Notice of Acceptance for Docketing and Opportunity for Hearing on...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-06-28

... University (the licensee, WSU) to operate the Washington State University Modified TRIGA Nuclear Radiation... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION [Docket No. 50-27; Facility Operating License No. R-76; NRC-2010... Safeguards Information and Sensitive Unclassified Non-Safeguards Information AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory...

76 FR 63841 - Security Zone; Potomac River, Georgetown Channel, Washington, DC

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-10-14

... safeguard human life, vessels, and waterfront facilities while still sustaining the flow of commerce. The... restriction of vessel traffic is necessary to protect life, property and the environment, therefore, a 30-day... to safeguard life, property, and the environment on or near the navigable waters. Discussion of Rule...

76 FR 51255 - Security Zone; Potomac River, Georgetown Channel, Washington, DC

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-08-18

... security regimes designed to safeguard human life, vessels, and waterfront facilities while still... restriction of vessel traffic is necessary to protect life, property and the environment, therefore, a 30-day... maritime safety and security in order to safeguard life, property, and the environment on or near the...

77 FR 3118 - Security Zone; Choptank River and Cambridge Channel, Cambridge, MD

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2012-01-23

... security regimes designed to safeguard human life, vessels, and waterfront facilities while still... restriction of vessel traffic is necessary to protect life, property and the environment, therefore, a 30-day... maritime safety and security in order to safeguard life, property, and the environment on or near the...

78 FR 23312 - Uranium Enrichment Fuel Cycle Inspection Reports Regarding Louisiana Energy Services, National...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-04-18

... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION [Docket No. 70-3103; NRC-2010-0264] Uranium Enrichment Fuel Cycle Inspection Reports Regarding Louisiana Energy Services, National Enrichment Facility, Eunice, New Mexico..., Division of Fuel Cycle Safety, and Safeguards Office of Nuclear Material Safety, and Safeguards. [FR Doc...

75 FR 12581 - Notice of Availability of Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact for...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-03-16

...; Commencement of Construction Requirements; AREVA Enrichment Services, Eagle Rock Enrichment Facility..., Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S... the site. Site grading and erosion control. Excavating the site including rock blasting and removal...

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Ward,R.; Rosenthal,M.

Global expansion of nuclear power has made the need for improved safeguards measures at Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants (GCEPs) imperative. One technology under consideration for safeguards applications is Radio Frequency Identification Devices (RFIDs). RFIDs have the potential to increase IAEA inspector"s efficiency and effectiveness either by reducing the number of inspection visits necessary or by reducing inspection effort at those visits. This study assesses the use of RFIDs as an integral component of the "Option 4" safeguards approach developed by Bruce Moran, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), for a model GCEP [1]. A previous analysis of RFIDs was conducted bymore » Jae Jo, Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL), which evaluated the effectiveness of an RFID tag applied by the facility operator [2]. This paper presents a similar evaluation carried out in the framework of Jo’s paper, but it is predicated on the assumption that the RFID tag is applied by the manufacturer at the birth of the cylinder, rather than by the operator. Relevant diversion scenarios are examined to determine if RFIDs increase the effectiveness and/ or efficiency of safeguards in these scenarios. Conclusions on the benefits offered to inspectors by using in-born RFID tagging are presented.« less

10 CFR 1016.12 - Termination of security facility approval.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 10 Energy 4 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Termination of security facility approval. 1016.12 Section 1016.12 Energy DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (GENERAL PROVISIONS) SAFEGUARDING OF RESTRICTED DATA Physical Security § 1016.12 Termination of security facility approval. Security facility approval will be terminated...

10 CFR 1016.12 - Termination of security facility approval.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 10 Energy 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Termination of security facility approval. 1016.12 Section 1016.12 Energy DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (GENERAL PROVISIONS) SAFEGUARDING OF RESTRICTED DATA Physical Security § 1016.12 Termination of security facility approval. Security facility approval will be terminated...

Application of laser induced breakdown spectroscopy (LIBS) instrumentation for international safeguards

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Barefield Ii, James E; Clegg, Samuel M; Lopez, Leon N

2010-01-01

Advanced methodologies and improvements to current measurements techniques are needed to strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of international safeguards. This need was recognized and discussed at a Technical Meeting on 'The Application of Laser Spectrometry Techniques in IAEA Safeguards' held at IAEA headquarters (September 2006). One of the principal recommendations from that meeting was the need to pursue the development of novel complementary access instrumentation based on Laser Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy (UBS) for the detection of gaseous and solid signatures and indicators of nuclear fuel cycle processes and associated materials'. Pursuant to this recommendation the Department of Safeguards (SG) undermore » the Division of Technical Support (SGTS) convened the 'Experts and Users Advisory Meeting on Laser Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy (LIBS) for Safeguards Applications' also held at IAEA headquarters (July 2008). This meeting was attended by 12 LlBS experts from the Czech Republic, the European Commission, France, the Republic of South Korea, the United States of America, Germany, the United Kingdom of Great Britain, Canada, and Northern Ireland. Following a presentation of the needs of the IAEA inspectors, the LIBS experts agreed that needs as presented could be partially or fully fulfilled using LIBS instrumentation. Inspectors needs were grouped into the following broad categories: (1) Improvements to in-field measurements/environmental sampling; (2) Monitoring status of activities in Hot Cells; (3) Verify status of activity at a declared facility via process monitoring; and (4) Need for pre-screening of environmental samples before analysis. The primary tool employed by the IAEA to detect undeclared processes and activities at special nuclear material facilities and sites is environmental sampling. One of the objectives of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) Program Plan calls for the development of advanced tools and methodologies to detect and analyze undeclared processing or production of special nuclear material. Los Alamos National Laboratory is currently investigating potential uses of LIBS for safeguards applications, including (1) a user-friendly man-portable LIBS system to characterize samples in real to near-real time (typical analysis time are on the order of minutes) across a wide range of elements in the periodic table from hydrogen up to heavy elements like plutonium and uranium, (2) a LIBS system that can be deployed in harsh environments such as hot cells and glove boxes providing relative compositional analysis of process streams for example ratios like Cm/Up and Cm/U, (3) an inspector field deployable system that can be used to analyze the elemental composition of microscopic quantities of samples containing plutonium and uranium, and (4) a high resolution LIBS system that can be used to determine the isotopic composition of samples containing for example uranium, plutonium... etc. In this paper, we will describe our current development and performance testing results for LIBS instrumentation both in a fixed lab and measurements in field deployable configurations.« less

Validation of gamma-ray detection techniques for safeguards monitoring at natural uranium conversion facilities

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Dewji, S. A.; Lee, D. L.; Croft, S.; Hertel, N. E.; Chapman, J. A.; McElroy, R. D.; Cleveland, S.

2016-07-01

Recent IAEA circulars and policy papers have sought to implement safeguards when any purified aqueous uranium solution or uranium oxides suitable for isotopic enrichment or fuel fabrication exists. Under the revised policy, IAEA Policy Paper 18, the starting point for nuclear material under safeguards was reinterpreted, suggesting that purified uranium compounds should be subject to safeguards procedures no later than the first point in the conversion process. In response to this technical need, a combination of simulation models and experimental measurements were employed to develop and validate concepts of nondestructive assay monitoring systems in a natural uranium conversion plant (NUCP). In particular, uranyl nitrate (UO2(NO3)2) solution exiting solvent extraction was identified as a key measurement point (KMP), where gamma-ray spectroscopy was selected as the process monitoring tool. The Uranyl Nitrate Calibration Loop Equipment (UNCLE) facility at Oak Ridge National Laboratory was employed to simulate the full-scale operating conditions of a purified uranium-bearing aqueous stream exiting the solvent extraction process in an NUCP. Nondestructive assay techniques using gamma-ray spectroscopy were evaluated to determine their viability as a technical means for drawing safeguards conclusions at NUCPs, and if the IAEA detection requirements of 1 significant quantity (SQ) can be met in a timely way. This work investigated gamma-ray signatures of uranyl nitrate circulating in the UNCLE facility and evaluated various gamma-ray detector sensitivities to uranyl nitrate. These detector validation activities include assessing detector responses to the uranyl nitrate gamma-ray signatures for spectrometers based on sodium iodide, lanthanum bromide, and high-purity germanium detectors. The results of measurements under static and dynamic operating conditions at concentrations ranging from 10-90 g U/L of natural uranyl nitrate are presented. A range of gamma-ray lines is examined, including attenuation for transmission measurement of density and concentration. It was determined that transmission-corrected gamma-ray spectra provide a reliable way to monitor the 235U concentration of uranyl nitrate solution in transfer pipes in NUCPs. Furthermore, existing predictive and analysis methods are adequate to design and realize practical designs. The 137Cs transmission source employed in this work is viable but not optimal for 235U densitometry determination. Validated simulations assessed the viability of 133Ba and 57Co as alternative densitometry sources. All three gamma-ray detectors are viable for monitoring natural uranium feed; although high-purity germanium is easiest to interpret, it is, however, the least attractive as an installation instrument. Overall, for monitoring throughput in a facility such as UNCLE, emulating the uranium concentration and pump speeds of the Springfields conversion facility in the United Kingdom, an uncertainty of less than 0.17% is required in order to detect the diversion of 1 SQ of uranyl nitrate through changes in uranium concentration over an accountancy period of one year with a detection probability of 50%. Although calibrated gamma-ray detection systems are capable of determining the concentration of uranium content in NUCPs, it is only in combination with verifiable operator declarations and supporting data, such as flow rate and enrichment, that safeguards conclusions can be drawn.

International Safeguards Technology and Policy Education and Training Pilot Programs

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Dreicer, M; Anzelon, G A; Essner, J T

2009-06-16

A major focus of the National Nuclear Security Administration-led Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) is the development of human capital to meet present and future challenges to the safeguards regime. An effective university-level education in safeguards and related disciplines is an essential element in a layered strategy to rebuild the safeguards human resource capacity. NNSA launched two pilot programs in 2008 to develop university level courses and internships in association with James, Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) at the Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS) and Texas A&M University (TAMU). These pilot efforts involved 44 students in total andmore » were closely linked to hands-on internships at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The Safeguards and Nuclear Material Management pilot program was a collaboration between TAMU, LANL, and LLNL. The LANL-based coursework was shared with the students undertaking internships at LLNL via video teleconferencing. A weeklong hands-on exercise was also conducted at LANL. A second pilot effort, the International Nuclear Safeguards Policy and Information Analysis pilot program was implemented at MIIS in cooperation with LLNL. Speakers from MIIS, LLNL, and other U.S. national laboratories (LANL, BNL) delivered lectures for the audience of 16 students. The majority of students were senior classmen or new master's degree graduates from MIIS specializing in nonproliferation policy studies. The two pilots programs concluded with an NGSI Summer Student Symposium, held at LLNL, where 20 students participated in LLNL facility tours and poster sessions. The value of bringing together the students from the technical and policy pilots was notable and will factor into the planning for the continued refinement of the two programs in the coming years.« less

Nondestructive Assay Data Integration with the SKB-50 Assemblies - FY16 Update

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Tobin, Stephen Joseph; Fugate, Michael Lynn; Trellue, Holly Renee

2016-10-28

A project to research the application of non-destructive assay (NDA) techniques for spent fuel assemblies is underway at the Central Interim Storage Facility for Spent Nuclear Fuel (for which the Swedish acronym is Clab) in Oskarshamn, Sweden. The research goals of this project contain both safeguards and non-safeguards interests. These nondestructive assay (NDA) technologies are designed to strengthen the technical toolkit of safeguard inspectors and others to determine the following technical goals more accurately; Verify initial enrichment, burnup, and cooling time of facility declaration for spent fuel assemblies; Detect replaced or missing pins from a given spent fuel assembly tomore » confirm its integrity; and Estimate plutonium mass and related plutonium and uranium fissile mass parameters in spent fuel assemblies. Estimate heat content, and measure reactivity (multiplication).« less

10 CFR Appendix C to Part 73 - Nuclear Power Plant Safeguards Contingency Plans

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... 10 Energy 2 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Nuclear Power Plant Safeguards Contingency Plans C Appendix C to Part 73 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND... sabotage relating to special nuclear material or nuclear facilities licensed under the Atomic Energy Act of...

10 CFR Appendix C to Part 73 - Nuclear Power Plant Safeguards Contingency Plans

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... 10 Energy 2 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Nuclear Power Plant Safeguards Contingency Plans C Appendix C to Part 73 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND... sabotage relating to special nuclear material or nuclear facilities licensed under the Atomic Energy Act of...

USSP-IAEA WORKSHOP ON ADVANCED SENSORS FOR SAFEGUARDS.

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

PEPPER,S.; QUEIROLO, A.; ZENDEL, M.

2007-11-13

The IAEA Medium Term Strategy (2006-2011) defines a number of specific goals in respect to the IAEA's ability to provide assurances to the international community regarding the peaceful use of nuclear energy through States adherences to their respective non-proliferation treaty commitments. The IAEA has long used and still needs the best possible sensors to detect and measure nuclear material. The Department of Safeguards, recognizing the importance of safeguards-oriented R&D, especially targeting improved detection capabilities for undeclared facilities, materials and activities, initiated a number of activities in early 2005. The initiatives included letters to Member State Support Programs (MSSPs), personal contactsmore » with known technology holders, topical meetings, consultant reviews of safeguards technology, and special workshops to identify new and novel technologies and methodologies. In support of this objective, the United States Support Program to IAEA Safeguards hosted a workshop on ''Advanced Sensors for Safeguards'' in Santa Fe, New Mexico, from April 23-27, 2007. The Organizational Analysis Corporation, a U.S.-based management consulting firm, organized and facilitated the workshop. The workshop's goal was to help the IAEA identify and plan for new sensors for safeguards implementation. The workshop, which was attended by representatives of seven member states and international organizations, included presentations by technology holders and developers on new technologies thought to have relevance to international safeguards, but not yet in use by the IAEA. The presentations were followed by facilitated breakout sessions where the participants considered two scenarios typical of what IAEA inspectors might face in the field. One scenario focused on an enrichment plant; the other scenario focused on a research reactor. The participants brainstormed using the technologies presented by the participants and other technologies known to them to propose techniques and methods that could be used by the IAEA to strengthen safeguards. Creative thinking was encouraged during discussion of the proposals. On the final day of the workshop, the OAC facilitators summarized the participant's ideas in a combined briefing. This paper will report on the results of the April 2007 USSP-IAEA Workshop on Advanced Sensors for Safeguards and give an overview of the proposed technologies of greatest promise.« less

10 CFR 63.47 - Facility information and verification.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... REPOSITORY AT YUCCA MOUNTAIN, NEVADA Licenses Us/iaea Safeguards Agreement § 63.47 Facility information and... the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and take other action as necessary to implement the US...

10 CFR 63.47 - Facility information and verification.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... REPOSITORY AT YUCCA MOUNTAIN, NEVADA Licenses Us/iaea Safeguards Agreement § 63.47 Facility information and... the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and take other action as necessary to implement the US...

32 CFR 2001.44 - Reciprocity of use and inspection of facilities.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... 32 National Defense 6 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Reciprocity of use and inspection of facilities. 2001.44 Section 2001.44 National Defense Other Regulations Relating to National Defense INFORMATION... INFORMATION Safeguarding § 2001.44 Reciprocity of use and inspection of facilities. (a) Once a facility is...

32 CFR 2001.44 - Reciprocity of use and inspection of facilities.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-07-01

... 32 National Defense 6 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Reciprocity of use and inspection of facilities. 2001.44 Section 2001.44 National Defense Other Regulations Relating to National Defense INFORMATION... INFORMATION Safeguarding § 2001.44 Reciprocity of use and inspection of facilities. (a) Once a facility is...

32 CFR 2001.44 - Reciprocity of use and inspection of facilities.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-07-01

... 32 National Defense 6 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Reciprocity of use and inspection of facilities. 2001.44 Section 2001.44 National Defense Other Regulations Relating to National Defense INFORMATION... INFORMATION Safeguarding § 2001.44 Reciprocity of use and inspection of facilities. (a) Once a facility is...

32 CFR 2001.44 - Reciprocity of use and inspection of facilities.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-07-01

... 32 National Defense 6 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Reciprocity of use and inspection of facilities. 2001.44 Section 2001.44 National Defense Other Regulations Relating to National Defense INFORMATION... INFORMATION Safeguarding § 2001.44 Reciprocity of use and inspection of facilities. (a) Once a facility is...

32 CFR 2001.44 - Reciprocity of use and inspection of facilities.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-07-01

... 32 National Defense 6 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Reciprocity of use and inspection of facilities. 2001.44 Section 2001.44 National Defense Other Regulations Relating to National Defense INFORMATION... INFORMATION Safeguarding § 2001.44 Reciprocity of use and inspection of facilities. (a) Once a facility is...

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Hoover, Andrew Scott; Bennett, D. A.; Croce, Mark Philip

In 2005 the LANL/NIST team used a single high-resolution microcalorimeter detector to measure the gamma-ray spectrum of a plutonium sample. After more than a decade of research and development on this topic, both the technology and our general understanding of its capabilities have advanced greatly, such that a progress review is now timely. We examine the scenario of a large-scale reprocessing plant and conclude that current non-destructive analysis (NDA) methods are inadequate to safeguard such a facility to the desired levels, leading to undesirable dependence on massspectrometry (MS) destructive analysis (DA). The development of microcalorimeter detectors is intended to closemore » the performance gap between NDA and DA methods to address the needs of nuclear facilities.« less

RESULTS FROM A DEMONSTRATION OF RF-BASED UF6 CYLINDER ACCOUNTING AND TRACKING SYSTEM INSTALLED AT A USEC FACILITY

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Pickett, Chris A; Kovacic, Donald N; Morgan, Jim

Approved industry-standard cylinders are used globally for storing and transporting uranium hexafluoride (UF{sub 6}) at uranium enrichment plants and processing facilities. To verify that no diversion or undeclared production of nuclear material involving UF{sub 6} cylinders at the facility has occurred, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conducts periodic, labor-intensive physical inspections to validate facility records, cylinder identities, and cylinder weights. A reliable cylinder monitoring system that would improve overall inspector effectiveness would be a significant improvement to the current international safeguards inspection regime. Such a system could include real-time unattended monitoring of cylinder movements, situation-specific rules-based event detection algorithms,more » and the capability to integrate with other types of safeguards technologies. This type of system could provide timely detection of abnormal operational activities that may be used to ensure more appropriate and efficient responses by the IAEA. A system of this type can reduce the reliance on paper records and have the additional benefit of facilitating domestic safeguards at the facilities at which it is installed. A radio-frequency (RF)-based system designed to track uranium hexafluoride (UF{sub 6}) cylinders during processing operations was designed, assembled, and tested at the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) facility in Portsmouth, Ohio, to determine the operational feasibility and durability of RF technology. The overall objective of the effort was to validate the robustness of RF technology for potential use as a future international safeguards tool for tracking UF6 cylinders at uranium-processing facilities. The results to date indicate that RF tags represent a feasible technique for tracking UF{sub 6} cylinders in operating facilities. Additional work will be needed to improve the operational robustness of the tags for repeated autoclave processing and to add tamper-indicating and data authentication features to some of the pertinent system components. Future efforts will focus on these needs along with implementing protocols relevant to IAEA safeguards. The work detailed in this report demonstrates the feasibility of constructing RF devices that can survive the operational rigors associated with the transportation, storage, and processing of UF6 cylinders. The system software specially designed for this project is called Cylinder Accounting and Tracking System (CATS). This report details the elements of the CATS rules-based architecture and its use in safeguards-monitoring and asset-tracking applications. Information is also provided on improvements needed to make the technology ready, as well as options for improving the safeguards aspects of the technology. The report also includes feedback from personnel involved in the testing, as well as individuals who could utilize an RF-based system in supporting the performance of their work. The system software was set up to support a Mailbox declaration, where a declaration can be made either before or after cylinder movements take place. When the declaration is made before cylinders move, the operators must enter this information into CATS. If the IAEA then shows up unexpectedly at the facility, they can see how closely the operational condition matches the declaration. If the declaration is made after the cylinders move, this provides greater operational flexibility when schedules are interrupted or are changed, by allowing operators to declare what moves have been completed. The IAEA can then compare where cylinders are with where CATS or the system says they are located. The ability of CATS to automatically generate Mailbox declarations is seen by the authors as a desirable feature. The Mailbox approach is accepted by the IAEA but has not been widely implemented (and never in enrichment facilities). During the course of this project, we have incorporated alternative methods for implementation.« less

On Line Enrichment Monitor (OLEM) UF 6 Tests for 1.5" Sch40 SS Pipe, Revision 1

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

March-Leuba, José A.; Garner, Jim; Younkin, Jim

As global uranium enrichment capacity under international safeguards expands, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is challenged to develop effective safeguards approaches at gaseous centrifuge enrichment plants while working within budgetary constraints. The “Model Safeguards Approach for Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants” (GCEPs) developed by the IAEA Division of Concepts and Planning in June 2006, defines the three primary Safeguards objectives to be the timely detection of: 1) diversion of significant quantities of natural (NU), depleted (DU) or low-enriched uranium (LEU) from declared plant flow, 2) facility misuse to produce undeclared LEU product from undeclared feed, and 3) facility misuse tomore » produce enrichments higher than the declared maximum, in particular, highly enriched uranium (HEU). The ability to continuously and independently (i.e. with a minimum of information from the facility operator) monitor not only the uranium mass balance but also the 235U mass balance in the facility could help support all three verification objectives described above. Two key capabilities required to achieve an independent and accurate material balance are 1) continuous, unattended monitoring of in-process UF 6 and 2) monitoring of cylinders entering and leaving the facility. The continuous monitoring of in-process UF 6 would rely on a combination of load-cell monitoring of the cylinders at the feed and withdrawal stations, online monitoring of gas enrichment, and a high-accuracy net weight measurement of the cylinder contents. The Online Enrichment Monitor (OLEM) is the instrument that would continuously measure the time-dependent relative uranium enrichment, E(t), in weight percent 235U, of the gas filling or being withdrawn from the cylinders. The OLEM design concept combines gamma-ray spectrometry using a collimated NaI(Tl) detector with gas pressure and temperature data to calculate the enrichment of the UF 6 gas within the unit header pipe as a function of time. The OLEM components have been tested on ORNL UF 6 flow loop. Data were collected at five different enrichment levels (0.71%, 2.97%, 4.62%, 6.0%, and 93.7%) at several pressure conditions. The test data were collected in the standard OLEM N.4242 file format for each of the conditions with a 10-minute sampling period and then averaged over the span of constant pressures. Analysis of the collected data has provided enrichment constants that can be used for 1.5” stainless steel schedule 40 pipe measurement sites. The enrichment constant is consistent among all the wide range of enrichment levels and pressures used.« less

10 CFR 60.47 - Facility information and verification.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Facility information and verification. 60.47 Section 60.47 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) DISPOSAL OF HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTES IN GEOLOGIC REPOSITORIES Licenses Us/iaea Safeguards Agreement § 60.47 Facility information and verification. (a) In...

78 FR 48076 - Facility Security Clearance and Safeguarding of National Security Information and Restricted Data

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-08-07

... facility's involvement with classified information and may include a Facility Security Officer Orientation... procedures and duties applicable to the employee's job. (g) Refresher Briefings. The licensee or other.... (j) Records reflecting an individual's initial and refresher security orientations and security...

78 FR 48037 - Facility Security Clearance and Safeguarding of National Security Information and Restricted Data

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-08-07

... facility's involvement with classified information and may include a Facility Security Officer Orientation... procedures and duties applicable to the employee's job. (g) Refresher Briefings. The licensee or other.... (j) Records reflecting an individual's initial and refresher security orientations and security...

77 FR 65729 - Uranium Enrichment Fuel Cycle Facility Inspection Reports Regarding Louisiana Energy Services LLC...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2012-10-30

... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION [Docket No. 70-3103; NRC-2010-0264] Uranium Enrichment Fuel Cycle Facility Inspection Reports Regarding Louisiana Energy Services LLC, National Enrichment Facility, Eunice..., Chief, Uranium Enrichment Branch, Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards, Office of Nuclear...

10 CFR 61.32 - Facility information and verification.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... 10 Energy 2 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Facility information and verification. 61.32 Section 61.32 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) LICENSING REQUIREMENTS FOR LAND DISPOSAL OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE Licenses Us/iaea Safeguards Agreement § 61.32 Facility information and verification. (a) In...

10 CFR 61.32 - Facility information and verification.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... 10 Energy 2 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Facility information and verification. 61.32 Section 61.32 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) LICENSING REQUIREMENTS FOR LAND DISPOSAL OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE Licenses Us/iaea Safeguards Agreement § 61.32 Facility information and verification. (a) In...

10 CFR 61.32 - Facility information and verification.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 10 Energy 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Facility information and verification. 61.32 Section 61.32 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) LICENSING REQUIREMENTS FOR LAND DISPOSAL OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE Licenses Us/iaea Safeguards Agreement § 61.32 Facility information and verification. (a) In...

48 CFR 3004.470 - Security requirements for access to unclassified facilities, Information Technology resources...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-10-01

... access to unclassified facilities, Information Technology resources, and sensitive information. 3004.470... Technology resources, and sensitive information. ... ACQUISITION REGULATION (HSAR) GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS Safeguarding Classified and Sensitive Information...

48 CFR 3004.470 - Security requirements for access to unclassified facilities, Information Technology resources...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... access to unclassified facilities, Information Technology resources, and sensitive information. 3004.470... Technology resources, and sensitive information. ... ACQUISITION REGULATION (HSAR) GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS Safeguarding Classified and Sensitive Information...

48 CFR 3004.470 - Security requirements for access to unclassified facilities, Information Technology resources...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-10-01

... access to unclassified facilities, Information Technology resources, and sensitive information. 3004.470... Technology resources, and sensitive information. ... ACQUISITION REGULATION (HSAR) GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS Safeguarding Classified and Sensitive Information...

48 CFR 3004.470 - Security requirements for access to unclassified facilities, Information Technology resources...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-10-01

... access to unclassified facilities, Information Technology resources, and sensitive information. 3004.470... Technology resources, and sensitive information. ... ACQUISITION REGULATION (HSAR) GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS Safeguarding Classified and Sensitive Information...

48 CFR 3004.470 - Security requirements for access to unclassified facilities, Information Technology resources...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-10-01

... access to unclassified facilities, Information Technology resources, and sensitive information. 3004.470... Technology resources, and sensitive information. ... ACQUISITION REGULATION (HSAR) GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS Safeguarding Classified and Sensitive Information...

Strengthening IAEA Safeguards for Research Reactors

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Reid, Bruce D.; Anzelon, George A.; Budlong-Sylvester, Kory

During their December 10-11, 2013, workshop in Grenoble France, which focused on the history and future of safeguarding research reactors, the United States, France and the United Kingdom (UK) agreed to conduct a joint study exploring ways to strengthen the IAEA’s safeguards approach for declared research reactors. This decision was prompted by concerns about: 1) historical cases of non-compliance involving misuse (including the use of non-nuclear materials for production of neutron generators for weapons) and diversion that were discovered, in many cases, long after the violations took place and as part of broader pattern of undeclared activities in half amore » dozen countries; 2) the fact that, under the Safeguards Criteria, the IAEA inspects some reactors (e.g., those with power levels under 25 MWt) less than once per year; 3) the long-standing precedent of States using heavy water research reactors (HWRR) to produce plutonium for weapons programs; 4) the use of HEU fuel in some research reactors; and 5) various technical characteristics common to some types of research reactors that could provide an opportunity for potential proliferators to misuse the facility or divert material with low probability of detection by the IAEA. In some research reactors it is difficult to detect diversion or undeclared irradiation. In addition, infrastructure associated with research reactors could pose a safeguards challenge. To strengthen the effectiveness of safeguards at the State level, this paper advocates that the IAEA consider ways to focus additional attention and broaden its safeguards toolbox for research reactors. This increase in focus on the research reactors could begin with the recognition that the research reactor (of any size) could be a common path element on a large number of technically plausible pathways that must be considered when performing acquisition pathway analysis (APA) for developing a State Level Approach (SLA) and Annual Implementation Plan (AIP). To broaden the IAEA safeguards toolbox, the study recommends that the Agency consider closing potential gaps in safeguards coverage by, among other things: 1) adapting its safeguards measures based on a case-by-case assessment; 2) using more frequent and expanded/enhanced mailbox declarations (ideally with remote transmission of the data to IAEA Headquarters in Vienna) coupled with short-notice or unannounced inspections; 3) putting more emphasis on the collection and analysis of environmental samples at hot cells and waste storage tanks; 4) taking Safeguards by Design into account for the construction of new research reactors and best practices for existing research reactors; 5) utilizing fully all legal authorities to enhance inspection access (including a strengthened and continuing DIV process); and 6) utilizing new approaches to improve auditing activities, verify reactor operating data history, and track/monitor the movement and storage of spent fuel.« less

Brain Science and International Nuclear Safeguards: Implications from Cognitive Science and Human Factors Research on the Provision and Use of Safeguards-Relevant Information in the Field

DOE PAGES

Gastelum, Zoe Nellie; Matzen, Laura E.; Smartt, Heidi A.; ...

2017-06-01

Today’s international nuclear safeguards inspectors have access to an increasing volume of supplemental information about the facilities under their purview, including commercial satellite imagery, nuclear trade data, open source information, and results from previous safeguards activities. In addition to completing traditional in-field safeguards activities, inspectors are now responsible for being able to act upon this growing corpus of supplemental safeguards-relevant data and for maintaining situational awareness of unusual activities taking place in their environment. However, cognitive science research suggests that maintaining too much information can be detrimental to a user’s understanding, and externalizing information (for example, to a mobile device)more » to reduce cognitive burden can decrease cognitive function related to memory, navigation, and attention. Given this dichotomy, how can international nuclear safeguards inspectors better synthesize information to enhance situational awareness, decision making, and performance in the field? This paper examines literature from the fields of cognitive science and human factors in the areas of wayfinding, situational awareness, equipment and technical assistance, and knowledge transfer, and describes the implications for the provision of, and interaction with, safeguards-relevant information for international nuclear safeguards inspectors working in the field.« less

Brain Science and International Nuclear Safeguards: Implications from Cognitive Science and Human Factors Research on the Provision and Use of Safeguards-Relevant Information in the Field

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Gastelum, Zoe Nellie; Matzen, Laura E.; Smartt, Heidi A.

Today’s international nuclear safeguards inspectors have access to an increasing volume of supplemental information about the facilities under their purview, including commercial satellite imagery, nuclear trade data, open source information, and results from previous safeguards activities. In addition to completing traditional in-field safeguards activities, inspectors are now responsible for being able to act upon this growing corpus of supplemental safeguards-relevant data and for maintaining situational awareness of unusual activities taking place in their environment. However, cognitive science research suggests that maintaining too much information can be detrimental to a user’s understanding, and externalizing information (for example, to a mobile device)more » to reduce cognitive burden can decrease cognitive function related to memory, navigation, and attention. Given this dichotomy, how can international nuclear safeguards inspectors better synthesize information to enhance situational awareness, decision making, and performance in the field? This paper examines literature from the fields of cognitive science and human factors in the areas of wayfinding, situational awareness, equipment and technical assistance, and knowledge transfer, and describes the implications for the provision of, and interaction with, safeguards-relevant information for international nuclear safeguards inspectors working in the field.« less

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Han, Bo-Young; Choi, Daewoong; Park, Se Hwan

Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) have been developing the design and deployment methodology of Laser- Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy (LIBS) instrument for safeguards application within the argon hot cell environment at Advanced spent fuel Conditioning Process Facility (ACPF), where ACPF is a facility being refurbished for the laboratory-scaled demonstration of advanced spent fuel conditioning process. LIBS is an analysis technology used to measure the emission spectra of excited elements in the local plasma of a target material induced by a laser. The spectra measured by LIBS are analyzed to verify the quality and quantity of the specific element in themore » target matrix. Recently LIBS has been recognized as a promising technology for safeguards purposes in terms of several advantages including a simple sample preparation and in-situ analysis capability. In particular, a feasibility study of LIBS to remotely monitor the nuclear material in a high radiation environment has been carried out for supporting the IAEA safeguards implementation. Fiber-Optic LIBS (FO-LIBS) deployment was proposed by Applied Photonics Ltd because the use of fiber optics had benefited applications of LIBS by delivering the laser energy to the target and by collecting the plasma light. The design of FO-LIBS instrument for the measurement of actinides in the spent fuel and high temperature molten salt at ACPF had been developed in cooperation with Applied Photonics Ltd. FO-LIBS has some advantages as followings: the detectable plasma light wavelength range is not limited by the optical properties of the thick lead-glass shield window and the potential risk of laser damage to the lead-glass shield window is not considered. The remote LIBS instrument had been installed at ACPF and then the feasibility study for monitoring actinide elements such as uranium, plutonium, and curium in process materials has been carried out. (authors)« less

10 CFR 1016.39 - Termination, suspension, or revocation of security facility approval.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 10 Energy 4 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Termination, suspension, or revocation of security facility approval. 1016.39 Section 1016.39 Energy DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (GENERAL PROVISIONS) SAFEGUARDING OF RESTRICTED DATA Control of Information § 1016.39 Termination, suspension, or revocation of security facility...

10 CFR 1016.39 - Termination, suspension, or revocation of security facility approval.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 10 Energy 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Termination, suspension, or revocation of security facility approval. 1016.39 Section 1016.39 Energy DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (GENERAL PROVISIONS) SAFEGUARDING OF RESTRICTED DATA Control of Information § 1016.39 Termination, suspension, or revocation of security facility...

10 CFR 1016.11 - Cancellation of requests for security facility approval.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 10 Energy 4 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Cancellation of requests for security facility approval. 1016.11 Section 1016.11 Energy DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (GENERAL PROVISIONS) SAFEGUARDING OF RESTRICTED DATA Physical Security § 1016.11 Cancellation of requests for security facility approval. When a...

10 CFR 1016.11 - Cancellation of requests for security facility approval.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 10 Energy 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Cancellation of requests for security facility approval. 1016.11 Section 1016.11 Energy DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (GENERAL PROVISIONS) SAFEGUARDING OF RESTRICTED DATA Physical Security § 1016.11 Cancellation of requests for security facility approval. When a...

10 CFR 1016.10 - Grant, denial, or suspension of security facility approval.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 10 Energy 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Grant, denial, or suspension of security facility approval. 1016.10 Section 1016.10 Energy DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (GENERAL PROVISIONS) SAFEGUARDING OF RESTRICTED DATA Physical Security § 1016.10 Grant, denial, or suspension of security facility approval...

10 CFR 1016.10 - Grant, denial, or suspension of security facility approval.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 10 Energy 4 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Grant, denial, or suspension of security facility approval. 1016.10 Section 1016.10 Energy DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (GENERAL PROVISIONS) SAFEGUARDING OF RESTRICTED DATA Physical Security § 1016.10 Grant, denial, or suspension of security facility approval...

77 FR 60482 - Regulatory Guide 5.67, Material Control and Accounting for Uranium Enrichment Facilities...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2012-10-03

... Accounting for Uranium Enrichment Facilities Authorized To Produce Special Nuclear Material of Low Strategic... Accounting for Uranium Enrichment Facilities Authorized to Produce Special Nuclear Material of Low Strategic... INFORMATION CONTACT: Glenn Tuttle, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, Division of Fuel Cycle...

10 CFR 1016.10 - Grant, denial, or suspension of security facility approval.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... 10 Energy 4 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Grant, denial, or suspension of security facility approval. 1016.10 Section 1016.10 Energy DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (GENERAL PROVISIONS) SAFEGUARDING OF RESTRICTED DATA Physical Security § 1016.10 Grant, denial, or suspension of security facility approval...

10 CFR 50.78 - Facility information and verification.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 10 Energy 1 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Facility information and verification. 50.78 Section 50.78 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION DOMESTIC LICENSING OF PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION FACILITIES Us/iaea... International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and take other action as necessary to implement the US/IAEA Safeguards...

10 CFR 50.78 - Facility information and verification.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 10 Energy 1 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Facility information and verification. 50.78 Section 50.78 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION DOMESTIC LICENSING OF PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION FACILITIES Us/iaea... International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and take other action as necessary to implement the US/IAEA Safeguards...

Safeguards Options for Natural Uranium Conversion Facilities ? A Collaborative Effort between the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the National Nuclear Energy Commission of Brazil (CNEN)

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Raffo-Caiado, Ana Claudia; Begovich, John M; Ferrada, Juan J

2008-01-01

In 2005, the National Nuclear Energy Commission of Brazil (CNEN) and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) agreed on a collaborative effort to evaluate measures that can strengthen the effectiveness of international safeguards at a natural uranium conversion plant (NUCP). The work was performed by DOE's Oak Ridge National Laboratory and CNEN. A generic model of an NUCP was developed and typical processing steps were defined. The study, completed in early 2007, identified potential safeguards measures and evaluated their effectiveness and impacts on operations. In addition, advanced instrumentation and techniques for verification purposes were identified and investigated. The scope ofmore » the work was framed by the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) 2003 revised policy concerning the starting point of safeguards at uranium conversion facilities. Before this policy, only the final products of the uranium conversion plant were considered to be of composition and purity suitable for use in the nuclear fuel cycle and, therefore, subject to AEA safeguards control. DOE and CNEN have explored options for implementing the IAEA policy, although Brazil understands that the new policy established by the IAEA is beyond the framework of the Quadripartite Agreement of which it is one of the parties, together with Argentina, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, and the IAEA. This paper highlights the findings of this joint collaborative effort and identifies technical measures to strengthen international safeguards in NUCPs.« less

Validation of gamma-ray detection techniques for safeguards monitoring at natural uranium conversion facilities

DOE PAGES

Dewji, Shaheen A.; Lee, Denise L.; Croft, Stephen; ...

2016-03-28

Recent IAEA circulars and policy papers have sought to implement safeguards when any purified aqueous uranium solution or uranium oxides suitable for isotopic enrichment or fuel fabrication exists. Under the revised policy, IAEA Policy Paper 18, the starting point for nuclear material under safeguards was reinterpreted, suggesting that purified uranium compounds should be subject to safeguards procedures no later than the first point in the conversion process. In response to this technical need, a combination of simulation models and experimental measurements were employed to develop and validate concepts of nondestructive assay monitoring systems in a natural uranium conversion plant (NUCP).more » In particular, uranyl nitrate (UO 2(NO 3) 2) solution exiting solvent extraction was identified as a key measurement point (KMP), where gamma-ray spectroscopy was selected as the process monitoring tool. The Uranyl Nitrate Calibration Loop Equipment (UNCLE) facility at Oak Ridge National Laboratory was employed to simulate the full-scale operating conditions of a purified uranium-bearing aqueous stream exiting the solvent extraction process in an NUCP. Nondestructive assay techniques using gamma-ray spectroscopy were evaluated to determine their viability as a technical means for drawing safeguards conclusions at NUCPs, and if the IAEA detection requirements of 1 significant quantity (SQ) can be met in a timely way. This work investigated gamma-ray signatures of uranyl nitrate circulating in the UNCLE facility and evaluated various gamma-ray detector sensitivities to uranyl nitrate. These detector validation activities include assessing detector responses to the uranyl nitrate gamma-ray signatures for spectrometers based on sodium iodide, lanthanum bromide, and high-purity germanium detectors. The results of measurements under static and dynamic operating conditions at concentrations ranging from 10–90 g U/L of natural uranyl nitrate are presented. A range of gamma-ray lines is examined, including attenuation for transmission measurement of density and concentration. It was determined that transmission-corrected gamma-ray spectra provide a reliable way to monitor the 235U concentration of uranyl nitrate solution in transfer pipes in NUCPs. Furthermore, existing predictive and analysis methods are adequate to design and realize practical designs. The 137Cs transmission source employed in this work is viable but not optimal for 235U densitometry determination. Validated simulations assessed the viability of 133Ba and 57Co as alternative densitometry sources. All three gamma-ray detectors are viable for monitoring natural uranium feed; although high-purity germanium is easiest to interpret, it is, however, the least attractive as an installation instrument. Overall, for monitoring throughput in a facility such as UNCLE, emulating the uranium concentration and pump speeds of the Springfields conversion facility in the United Kingdom, an uncertainty of less than 0.17% is required in order to detect the diversion of 1 SQ of uranyl nitrate through changes in uranium concentration over an accountancy period of one year with a detection probability of 50%. As a result, calibrated gamma-ray detection systems are capable of determining the concentration of uranium content in NUCPs, it is only in combination with verifiable operator declarations and supporting data, such as flow rate and enrichment, that safeguards conclusions can be drawn.« less

Nuclear safeguards in Brazil and Argentina: 25 years of ABACC

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Kassenova, Togzhan

2017-11-01

As possessors of advanced nuclear technology, Brazil and Argentina bear special responsibility for helping the international community and neighbors in their region feel confident that their nuclear programs are peaceful, secure, and safe. Over the past 25 years, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) has played an indispensable role in strengthening such confidence by implementing nuclear safeguards in the two countries. Today, ABACC carries out safeguards inspections at a total of 76 nuclear facilities in Brazil and Argentina. This article describes how Brazil and Argentina view trends in the global nonproliferation regime and international nuclear safeguards, and explains how these trends relate to unique challenges and opportunities facing Brazil, Argentina, and ABACC.

Routine inspection effort required for verification of a nuclear material production cutoff convention

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Dougherty, D.; Fainberg, A.; Sanborn, J.

On 27 September 1993, President Clinton proposed {open_quotes}... a multilateral convention prohibiting the production of highly enriched uranium or plutonium for nuclear explosives purposes or outside of international safeguards.{close_quotes} The UN General Assembly subsequently adopted a resolution recommending negotiation of a non-discriminatory, multilateral, and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty (hereinafter referred to as {open_quotes}the Cutoff Convention{close_quotes}) banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. The matter is now on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, although not yet under negotiation. This accord would, in effect, place all fissile material (defined as highly enriched uranium and plutonium) produced aftermore » entry into force (EIF) of the accord under international safeguards. {open_quotes}Production{close_quotes} would mean separation of the material in question from radioactive fission products, as in spent fuel reprocessing, or enrichment of uranium above the 20% level, which defines highly enriched uranium (HEU). Facilities where such production could occur would be safeguarded to verify that either such production is not occurring or that all material produced at these facilities is maintained under safeguards.« less

DEVELOPMENT OF A TAMPER RESISTANT/INDICATING AEROSOL COLLECTION SYSTEM FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING AT BULK HANDLING FACILITIES

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Sexton, L.

2012-06-06

Environmental sampling has become a key component of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards approaches since its approval for use in 1996. Environmental sampling supports the IAEA's mission of drawing conclusions concerning the absence of undeclared nuclear material or nuclear activities in a Nation State. Swipe sampling is the most commonly used method for the collection of environmental samples from bulk handling facilities. However, augmenting swipe samples with an air monitoring system, which could continuously draw samples from the environment of bulk handling facilities, could improve the possibility of the detection of undeclared activities. Continuous sampling offers the opportunity tomore » collect airborne materials before they settle onto surfaces which can be decontaminated, taken into existing duct work, filtered by plant ventilation, or escape via alternate pathways (i.e. drains, doors). Researchers at the Savannah River National Laboratory and Oak Ridge National Laboratory have been working to further develop an aerosol collection technology that could be installed at IAEA safeguarded bulk handling facilities. The addition of this technology may reduce the number of IAEA inspector visits required to effectively collect samples. The principal sample collection device is a patented Aerosol Contaminant Extractor (ACE) which utilizes electrostatic precipitation principles to deposit particulates onto selected substrates. Recent work has focused on comparing traditional swipe sampling to samples collected via an ACE system, and incorporating tamper resistant and tamper indicating (TRI) technologies into the ACE system. Development of a TRI-ACE system would allow collection of samples at uranium/plutonium bulk handling facilities in a manner that ensures sample integrity and could be an important addition to the international nuclear safeguards inspector's toolkit. This work was supported by the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA).« less

Decommissioning the Fuel Process Building, a Shift in Paradigm for Terminating Safeguards on Process Holdup

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Ivan R. Thomas

INMM Abstract 51st Annual Meeting Decommissioning the Fuel Process Building, a Shift in Paradigm for Terminating Safeguards on Process Holdup The Fuel Process Building at the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center (INTEC) is being decommissioned after nearly four decades of recovering high enriched uranium from various government owned spent nuclear fuels. The separations process began with fuel dissolution in one of multiple head-ends, followed by three cycles of uranium solvent extraction, and ending with denitration of uranyl nitrate product. The entire process was very complex, and the associated equipment formed an extensive maze of vessels, pumps, piping, and instrumentationmore » within several layers of operating corridors and process cells. Despite formal flushing and cleanout procedures, an accurate accounting for the residual uranium held up in process equipment over extended years of operation, presented a daunting safeguards challenge. Upon cessation of domestic reprocessing, the holdup remained inaccessible and was exempt from measurement during ensuing physical inventories. In decommissioning the Fuel Process Building, the Idaho Cleanup Project, which operates the INTEC, deviated from the established requirements that all nuclear material holdup be measured and credited to the accountability books and that all nuclear materials, except attractiveness level E residual holdup, be transferred to another facility. Instead, the decommissioning involved grouting the process equipment in place, rather than measuring and removing the contained holdup for subsequent transfer. The grouting made the potentially attractiveness level C and D holdup even more inaccessible, thereby effectually converting the holdup to attractiveness level E and allowing for termination of safeguards controls. Prior to grouting the facility, the residual holdup was estimated by limited sampling and destructive analysis of solutions in process lines and by acceptable knowledge based upon the separations process, plant layout, and operating history. The use of engineering estimates, in lieu of approved measurement methods, was justified by the estimated small quantity of holdup remaining, the infeasibility of measuring the holdup in a highly radioactive background, and the perceived hazards to personnel. The alternate approach to quantifying and terminating safeguards on process holdup was approved by deviation.« less

10 CFR 1016.8 - Approval for processing access permittees for security facility approval.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 10 Energy 4 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Approval for processing access permittees for security facility approval. 1016.8 Section 1016.8 Energy DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (GENERAL PROVISIONS) SAFEGUARDING OF RESTRICTED DATA Physical Security § 1016.8 Approval for processing access permittees for security facility...

10 CFR 1016.8 - Approval for processing access permittees for security facility approval.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 10 Energy 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Approval for processing access permittees for security facility approval. 1016.8 Section 1016.8 Energy DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (GENERAL PROVISIONS) SAFEGUARDING OF RESTRICTED DATA Physical Security § 1016.8 Approval for processing access permittees for security facility...

75 FR 68831 - Notice; Applications and Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses Involving Proposed No...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-11-09

...-safeguards information (SUNSI). The amendments would approve the proposed Cyber Security Plan and... Commission-approved Cyber Security Plan as required by 10 CFR 73.54. Basis for proposed no significant... Facility Operating License (FOL) to implement and maintain a Cyber Security Plan as part of the facility's...

Report on SARS backfit evaluation, Catalytic, Inc. Solvent Refined Coal Pilot Plant, Wilsonville, Alabama

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Meyer, A.F. Jr.

1980-07-02

A site visit was made in company with the DOE-OPTA-EA Safety and Health Official for the purpose of providing that official with technical assistance in evaluating the validity of an earlier DOE-OPTA recommendation exempting this facility from the Safety and Analysis and Review backfit requirements of DOE Order 5481.1. A further purpose of the visit was to assess and evaluate the occupational safety and health program at this facility, as compared with the criteria and guidelines contained in ASFE Order 5481.1. Adequate documentation regarding compliance with codes, standards, and regulations were observed at this facility. There is in existence anmore » ongoing continuous safety analysis effort for both modifications or additions to this facility. Adequate environmental safeguards and plans and procedures were observed. The SARS backfit exemption is appropriate. The occupational safety and health program is in many ways a model for the scope of work and nature of hazards involved, and is consistent with ASFE guidelines and statutory requirements.« less

A 3S Risk ?3SR? Assessment Approach for Nuclear Power: Safety Security and Safeguards.

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Forrest, Robert; Reinhardt, Jason Christian; Wheeler, Timothy A.

Safety-focused risk analysis and assessment approaches struggle to adequately include malicious, deliberate acts against the nuclear power industry's fissile and waste material, infrastructure, and facilities. Further, existing methods do not adequately address non- proliferation issues. Treating safety, security, and safeguards concerns independently is inefficient because, at best, it may not take explicit advantage of measures that provide benefits against multiple risk domains, and, at worst, it may lead to implementations that increase overall risk due to incompatibilities. What is needed is an integrated safety, security and safeguards risk (or "3SR") framework for describing and assessing nuclear power risks that canmore » enable direct trade-offs and interactions in order to inform risk management processes -- a potential paradigm shift in risk analysis and management. These proceedings of the Sandia ePRA Workshop (held August 22-23, 2017) are an attempt to begin the discussions and deliberations to extend and augment safety focused risk assessment approaches to include security concerns and begin moving towards a 3S Risk approach. Safeguards concerns were not included in this initial workshop and are left to future efforts. This workshop focused on four themes in order to begin building out a the safety and security portions of the 3S Risk toolkit: 1. Historical Approaches and Tools 2. Current Challenges 3. Modern Approaches 4. Paths Forward and Next Steps This report is organized along the four areas described above, and concludes with a summary of key points. 2 Contact: rforres@sandia.gov; +1 (925) 294-2728« less

University Engagement at INL

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Morrell, Sean Robert; Rynes, Amanda Renee

2014-07-01

There are currently over 900 facilities in over 170 countries which fall under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. As additional nations look to purse civilian nuclear programs or to expand infrastructure already in place, the number of reactors and accompanying facilities as well as the quantity of material has greatly increased. Due to the breadth of the threat and the burden placed on the IAEA as nuclear applications expand, it has become increasingly important that safeguards professionals have a strong understanding of both the technical and political aspects of nonproliferation starting early in their career. To begin overcoming thismore » challenge, Idaho National Laboratory, has partnered with local universities to deliver a graduate level nuclear engineering course that covers both aspects of the field with a focus on safeguards applications. To date over 60 students across multiple disciplines have participated in this course with many deciding to transition into a nonproliferation area of focus in both their academic and professional careers.« less

49 CFR 195.575 - Which facilities must I electrically isolate and what inspections, tests, and safeguards are...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... Corrosion Control § 195.575 Which facilities must I electrically isolate and what inspections, tests, and... isolation of a portion of a pipeline is necessary to facilitate the application of corrosion control. (c...

International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards: Challenge and response

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Spector, Leonard S.

2017-11-01

This article provides a critical review of the nuclear accounting and inspection system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), known as "IAEA safeguards." The article focuses on the multiple challenges the Agency confronts in verifying that all nuclear activities in the countries under its safeguards system are being pursued for exclusively peaceful purposes. The principal challenges noted are those posed by: undeclared facilities, the development of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities, illicit procurement activities, denial of inspector access, difficulties in verifying absence of weaponization activities, and difficulties in establishing that all nuclear-relevant activities in a state are peaceful. The article is in the form of annotated PowerPoint briefing slides.

Proliferation resistance assessment of various methods of spent nuclear fuel storage and disposal

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Kollar, Lenka

Many countries are planning to build or already are building new nuclear power plants to match their growing energy needs. Since all nuclear power plants handle nuclear materials that could potentially be converted and used for nuclear weapons, they each present a nuclear proliferation risk. Spent nuclear fuel presents the largest build-up of nuclear material at a power plant. This is a proliferation risk because spent fuel contains plutonium that can be chemically separated and used for a nuclear weapon. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards spent fuel in all non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Various safeguards methods are in use at nuclear power plants and research is underway to develop safeguards methods for spent fuel in centralized storage or underground storage and disposal. Each method of spent fuel storage presents different proliferation risks due to the nature of the storage method and the safeguards techniques that are utilized. Previous proliferation resistance and proliferation risk assessments have mainly compared nuclear material through the whole fuel cycle and not specifically focused on spent fuel storage. This project evaluates the proliferation resistance of the three main types of spent fuel storage: spent fuel pool, dry cask storage, and geological repository. The proliferation resistance assessment methodology that is used in this project is adopted from previous work and altered to be applicable to spent fuel storage. The assessment methodology utilizes various intrinsic and extrinsic proliferation-resistant attributes for each spent fuel storage type. These attributes are used to calculate a total proliferation resistant (PR) value. The maximum PR value is 1.00 and a greater number means that the facility is more proliferation resistant. Current data for spent fuel storage in the United States and around the world was collected. The PR values obtained from this data are 0.49 for the spent fuel pool, 0.42 for dry cask storage, 0.36 for the operating geological repository, and 0.28 for the closed geological repository. Therefore, the spent fuel pool is currently the most proliferation resistant method for storing spent fuel. The extrinsic attributes, mainly involving safeguards measures, affect the total PR value the most. As a result, several recommendations are made to improve the proliferation resistance of spent fuel. These recommendations include employing more advanced safeguards measures, such as verification techniques and remote monitoring, for dry cask storage and the geological repository. Dry cask storage facilities should also be located at the plant and in a secure building to minimize the proliferation risk. Finally, the cost-benefit analysis of increased safeguards needs to be considered. Taking these recommendations into account, the PR values of dry cask storage and the closed geological would be significantly increased, to 0.57 and 0.51, respectively. As a result, with increased safeguards to the safeguards level of the spent fuel pool, dry cask storage would be the most proliferation resistant method to store spent fuel. Therefore, the IAEA should continue to develop remote monitoring and cask storage verification techniques in order to improve the proliferation resistance of spent fuel.

78 FR 66388 - Applications and Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses and Combined Licenses Involving...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-11-05

... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION [NRC-2013-0231] Applications and Amendments to Facility Operating... Sensitive Unclassified Non-Safeguards Information and Order Imposing Procedures for Access to Sensitive... describes a different method for submitting comments on a specific subject): Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go...

Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

DTIC Science & Technology

1995-01-01

designed to use HEU, the tite safeguards agreement already in place for cen- RERTR (Reduced Enrichment for Research and trifuge facilities (which allows only...notice in- types. Many such reactors have been converted. spections, such as provided for under the Hexa- (See discussion below on the RERTR program...the Schumer amendment to the United States was developing suitable alternate 19Some believe that the suspension of the RERTR program may have been a

Regulatory cross-cutting topics for fuel cycle facilities.

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Denman, Matthew R.; Brown, Jason; Goldmann, Andrew Scott

This report overviews crosscutting regulatory topics for nuclear fuel cycle facilities for use in the Fuel Cycle Research & Development Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation and Screening study. In particular, the regulatory infrastructure and analysis capability is assessed for the following topical areas: Fire Regulations (i.e., how applicable are current Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and/or International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) fire regulations to advance fuel cycle facilities) Consequence Assessment (i.e., how applicable are current radionuclide transportation tools to support risk-informed regulations and Level 2 and/or 3 PRA) While not addressed in detail, the following regulatory topic is also discussed: Integrated Security,more » Safeguard and Safety Requirement (i.e., how applicable are current Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations to future fuel cycle facilities which will likely be required to balance the sometimes conflicting Material Accountability, Security, and Safety requirements.)« less

Summary Report of Summer 2009 NGSI Human Capital Development Efforts at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Dougan, A; Dreicer, M; Essner, J

2009-11-16

In 2009, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) engaged in several activities to support NA-24's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). This report outlines LLNL's efforts to support Human Capital Development (HCD), one of five key components of NGSI managed by Dunbar Lockwood in the Office of International Regimes and Agreements (NA-243). There were five main LLNL summer safeguards HCD efforts sponsored by NGSI: (1) A joint Monterey Institute of International Studies/Center for Nonproliferation Studies-LLNL International Safeguards Policy and Information Analysis Course; (2) A Summer Safeguards Policy Internship Program at LLNL; (3) A Training in Environmental Sample Analysis for IAEA Safeguards Internship;more » (4) Safeguards Technology Internships; and (5) A joint LLNL-INL Summer Safeguards Lecture Series. In this report, we provide an overview of these five initiatives, an analysis of lessons learned, an update on the NGSI FY09 post-doc, and an update on students who participated in previous NGSI-sponsored LLNL safeguards HCD efforts.« less

75 FR 51500 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-08-20

..., October 14, 2009 (74 FR 52829-52830). Thursday, September 9, 2010, Conference Room T2-B1, Two White Flint... Fabrication Facility and the Associated Safety Evaluation Report (Open/ Closed)--The Committee will hold... the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility and the associated Safety Evaluation Report. [Note: A portion of...

78 FR 78402 - Applications and Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses and Combined Licenses Involving...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-12-26

... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION [NRC-2013-0272] Applications and Amendments to Facility Operating... Sensitive Unclassified Non-Safeguards Information and Order Imposing Procedures for Access to Sensitive... submitting comments on a specific subject): Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and...

10 CFR 75.6 - Facility and location reporting.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Facility and location reporting. 75.6 Section 75.6 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) SAFEGUARDS ON NUCLEAR MATERIAL-IMPLEMENTATION OF US/IAEA..., all communications concerning the regulations in this Part shall be addressed to the U.S. Nuclear...

10 CFR 75.6 - Facility and location reporting.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... 10 Energy 2 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Facility and location reporting. 75.6 Section 75.6 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) SAFEGUARDS ON NUCLEAR MATERIAL-IMPLEMENTATION OF US/IAEA..., all communications concerning the regulations in this Part shall be addressed to the U.S. Nuclear...

10 CFR 75.6 - Facility and location reporting.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... 10 Energy 2 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Facility and location reporting. 75.6 Section 75.6 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) SAFEGUARDS ON NUCLEAR MATERIAL-IMPLEMENTATION OF US/IAEA..., all communications concerning the regulations in this Part shall be addressed to the U.S. Nuclear...

10 CFR 75.6 - Facility and location reporting.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... 10 Energy 2 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Facility and location reporting. 75.6 Section 75.6 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) SAFEGUARDS ON NUCLEAR MATERIAL-IMPLEMENTATION OF US/IAEA..., all communications concerning the regulations in this Part shall be addressed to the U.S. Nuclear...

10 CFR 75.6 - Facility and location reporting.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 10 Energy 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Facility and location reporting. 75.6 Section 75.6 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) SAFEGUARDS ON NUCLEAR MATERIAL-IMPLEMENTATION OF US/IAEA..., all communications concerning the regulations in this Part shall be addressed to the U.S. Nuclear...

42 CFR 1007.11 - Duties and responsibilities of the unit.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-10-01

... patients in health care facilities receiving payments under the State Medicaid plan and may review complaints of the misappropriation of patient's private funds in such facilities. (2) If the initial review... involving the same suspects or allegations. (f) The unit will safeguard the privacy rights of all...

42 CFR 1007.11 - Duties and responsibilities of the unit.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-10-01

... patients in health care facilities receiving payments under the State Medicaid plan and may review complaints of the misappropriation of patient's private funds in such facilities. (2) If the initial review... involving the same suspects or allegations. (f) The unit will safeguard the privacy rights of all...

42 CFR 1007.11 - Duties and responsibilities of the unit.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-10-01

... patients in health care facilities receiving payments under the State Medicaid plan and may review complaints of the misappropriation of patient's private funds in such facilities. (2) If the initial review... involving the same suspects or allegations. (f) The unit will safeguard the privacy rights of all...

42 CFR 1007.11 - Duties and responsibilities of the unit.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-10-01

... patients in health care facilities receiving payments under the State Medicaid plan and may review complaints of the misappropriation of patient's private funds in such facilities. (2) If the initial review... involving the same suspects or allegations. (f) The unit will safeguard the privacy rights of all...

10 CFR 95.1 - Purpose.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... regulated by the Commission. This part does not apply to Top Secret information because Top Secret... obtaining facility security clearance and for safeguarding Secret and Confidential National Security...

A Priority-Based View of Future Challenges in International Nuclear Safeguards.

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Matteucci, Kayla

The international nuclear safeguards community is faced with a host of challenges in the coming years, many of which have been outlined but have not been described in terms of their urgency. Literature regarding safeguards challenges is either broad and devoid of any reference to prioritization or tailored to a specific problem and removed from the overall goals of the safeguards community. For example, developing new methods of environmental sampling, improving containment and surveillance (C/S) technologies to increase efficiency and decrease inspection time, advancing nuclear material accountancy (NMA) techniques, and planning safeguards approaches for new types of nuclear facilities aremore » all important. They have not, however, been distinctly prioritized at a high level within the safeguards community. Based on a review of existing literature and interviews with experts on these upcoming challenges, this paper offers a high-level summary of present and future priorities in safeguards, with attention both to what is feasible and to what is most imperative. In doing so, the paper addresses the potential repercussions for failing to prioritize, with a focus on the risk of diversion of nuclear material. Within the context of shifts in the American political landscape, and keeping in mind that nonproliferation issues may take a backseat to others in the near future, a prioritized view of safeguards objectives will be vital. In the interest of expanding upon this work, the paper offers several potential conceptual models for prioritization which can be explored in greater depth upon further research.« less

Biomedical user facility at the 400-MeV Linac at Fermilab

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Chu, W.T.

1993-12-01

In this paper, general requirements are discussed on a biomedical user facility at the Fermilab`s 400-MeV Linac, which meets the needs of biology and biophysics experiments, and a conceptual design and typical operations requirements of the facility is presented. It is assumed that no human patient treatment will take place in this facility. If human patients were treated, much greater attention would have to be paid to safeguarding the patients.

10 CFR 2.103 - Action on applications for byproduct, source, special nuclear material, facility and operator...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... nuclear material, facility and operator licenses. (a) If the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor... repository operations area under parts 60 or 63 of this chapter, the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Director, Office of New Reactors, Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, or...

10 CFR 2.103 - Action on applications for byproduct, source, special nuclear material, facility and operator...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... nuclear material, facility and operator licenses. (a) If the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor... repository operations area under parts 60 or 63 of this chapter, the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Director, Office of New Reactors, Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, or...

Fire suppression system of a small-scale LNG loading facility at PT Badak NGL

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Yustiarza, Farhan Hilmyawan

2017-03-01

LNG progressively become favorable energy to replace oil-based fuel due to lower cost and more environment-friendly. In order to support an emerging LNG demands in Kalimantan, PT Badak NGL, one of the leading LNG Company in the world, develops the land-transported LNG loading facility. This facility performs loading the LNG into a small-scale tank (ISO Tank) with 20 m3 capacities. Safety reviews over this facility were conducted. Based on these reviews, the LNG filling station requires supplemental safeguards, such as LNG spill containment and firefighting foam system besides firewater system and dry chemical system. The spill containment provides holding LNG spill within the limits of plant property, while the high expansion foam system deals to minimize the vaporization rate to prevent a fire incident. This paper mainly discusses designing of such supplemental safeguards. The requirement of the spill containment is 20 m3 (6.3 × 3.3 × 2.0) m and the foam system should be capable generating foam at least 40 m3/min.

K-Basins S/RIDS

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Watson, D.J.

1995-09-22

The Standards/Requirements Identification Document(S/RID) is a list of the Environmental, Safety, and Health (ES&H) and Safeguards and Security (SAS) standards/requirements applicable to the K Basins facility

The International Remote Monitoring Project: Results of the Swedish Nuclear Power Facility field trial

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Johnson, C.S.; af Ekenstam, G.; Sallstrom, M.

1995-07-01

The Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate (SKI) and the US Department of Energy (DOE) sponsored work on a Remote Monitoring System (RMS) that was installed in August 1994 at the Barseback Works north of Malmo, Sweden. The RMS was designed to test the front end detection concept that would be used for unattended remote monitoring activities. Front end detection reduces the number of video images recorded and provides additional sensor verification of facility operations. The function of any safeguards Containment and Surveillance (C/S) system is to collect information which primarily is images that verify the operations at a nuclear facility. Barsebackmore » is ideal to test the concept of front end detection since most activities of safeguards interest is movement of spent fuel which occurs once a year. The RMS at Barseback uses a network of nodes to collect data from microwave motion detectors placed to detect the entrance and exit of spent fuel casks through a hatch. A video system using digital compression collects digital images and stores them on a hard drive and a digital optical disk. Data and images from the storage area are remotely monitored via telephone from Stockholm, Sweden and Albuquerque, NM, USA. These remote monitoring stations operated by SKI and SNL respectively, can retrieve data and images from the RMS computer at the Barseback Facility. The data and images are encrypted before transmission. This paper presents details of the RMS and test results of this approach to front end detection of safeguard activities.« less

Discrimination of irradiated MOX fuel from UOX fuel by multivariate statistical analysis of simulated activities of gamma-emitting isotopes

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Åberg Lindell, M.; Andersson, P.; Grape, S.; Hellesen, C.; Håkansson, A.; Thulin, M.

2018-03-01

This paper investigates how concentrations of certain fission products and their related gamma-ray emissions can be used to discriminate between uranium oxide (UOX) and mixed oxide (MOX) type fuel. Discrimination of irradiated MOX fuel from irradiated UOX fuel is important in nuclear facilities and for transport of nuclear fuel, for purposes of both criticality safety and nuclear safeguards. Although facility operators keep records on the identity and properties of each fuel, tools for nuclear safeguards inspectors that enable independent verification of the fuel are critical in the recovery of continuity of knowledge, should it be lost. A discrimination methodology for classification of UOX and MOX fuel, based on passive gamma-ray spectroscopy data and multivariate analysis methods, is presented. Nuclear fuels and their gamma-ray emissions were simulated in the Monte Carlo code Serpent, and the resulting data was used as input to train seven different multivariate classification techniques. The trained classifiers were subsequently implemented and evaluated with respect to their capabilities to correctly predict the classes of unknown fuel items. The best results concerning successful discrimination of UOX and MOX-fuel were acquired when using non-linear classification techniques, such as the k nearest neighbors method and the Gaussian kernel support vector machine. For fuel with cooling times up to 20 years, when it is considered that gamma-rays from the isotope 134Cs can still be efficiently measured, success rates of 100% were obtained. A sensitivity analysis indicated that these methods were also robust.

K-Basins S/RIDS

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Watson, D.J.

The Standards/Requirements Identification Document (S/RID) is a list of the Environmental, Safety, and Health (ES{ampersand}H) and Safeguards and Security (SAS) standards/requirements applicable to the K Basins facility.

10 CFR 75.31 - General requirements.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... appropriate computer-readable format, an initial inventory report, and thereafter shall make accounting... given notice, under § 75.7 that their facilities are subject to the application of IAEA safeguards...

10 CFR 75.31 - General requirements.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... appropriate computer-readable format, an initial inventory report, and thereafter shall make accounting... given notice, under § 75.7 that their facilities are subject to the application of IAEA safeguards...

10 CFR 75.31 - General requirements.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... appropriate computer-readable format, an initial inventory report, and thereafter shall make accounting... given notice, under § 75.7 that their facilities are subject to the application of IAEA safeguards...

10 CFR 75.31 - General requirements.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... appropriate computer-readable format, an initial inventory report, and thereafter shall make accounting... given notice, under § 75.7 that their facilities are subject to the application of IAEA safeguards...

10 CFR 75.31 - General requirements.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... appropriate computer-readable format, an initial inventory report, and thereafter shall make accounting... given notice, under § 75.7 that their facilities are subject to the application of IAEA safeguards...

Process monitoring in modern safeguards applications

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Ehinger, M.H.

1989-11-01

From the safeguards standpoint, regulatory requirements are finally moving into the modern world of communication and information processing. Gone are the days when the accountant with the green eye shade and arm bands made judgments on the material balance a month after the balance was closed. The most recent Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations and U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) orders have very strict standards for timeliness and sensitivity to loss or removal of material. The latest regulations recognize that plant operators have a lot of information on and control over the location and movement of material within their facilities.more » This information goes beyond that traditionally reported under accountability requirements. These new regulations allow facility operators to take credit for many of the more informal process controls.« less

Nuclear Security Objectives of an NMAC System

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

West, Rebecca Lynn

After completing this module, you should be able to: Describe the role of Nuclear Material Accounting and Control (NMAC) in comprehensive nuclear security at a facility; Describe purpose of NMAC; Identify differences between the use of NMAC for IAEA safeguards and for facility nuclear security; List NMAC elements and measures; and Describe process for resolution of irregularities

Results in Developing an Engineering Degree Program in Safeguards and Security of Nuclear Materials at Moscow Engineering Physics Institute

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Kryuchkov, Eduard F.; Geraskin, Nikolay I.; Killinger, Mark H.

The world’s first master’s degree program in nuclear safeguards and security, established at Moscow Engineering Physics Institute (MEPhI), has now graduated nine classes of students. Most of the graduates have gone on to work at government agencies, research organizations, or obtain their PhD. In order to meet the demand for safeguards and security specialists at nuclear facilities, MEPhI established a 5½ year engineering degree program that provides more hands-on training desired by facilities. In February 2004, the first students began their studies in the new discipline Nuclear Material Safeguards and Nonproliferation. This class, as well as other subsequent classes, includedmore » students who started the program in their third year of studies, as the first 2½ years consists of general engineering curriculum. Fourteen students made up the first graduating class, receiving their engineering degrees in February 2007. The topics addressed in this paper include specific features of the program caused by peculiarities of Russian education legislation and government quality control of academic education. This paper summarizes the main joint actions undertaken by MEPhI and the US National Laboratories in conjunction with the U.S. Department of Energy, to develop the engineering degree program. Also discussed are the program’s specific training requirements, student internships, and job placement. The paper concludes with recommendations from a recent international seminar on nonproliferation education and training.« less

International training course on nuclear materials accountability for safeguards purposes

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Not Available

1980-12-01

The two volumes of this report incorporate all lectures and presentations at the International Training Course on Nuclear Materials Accountability and Control for Safeguards Purposes, held May 27-June 6, 1980, at the Bishop's Lodge near Santa Fe, New Mexico. The course, authorized by the US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act and sponsored by the US Department of Energy in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, was developed to provide practical training in the design, implementation, and operation of a National system of nuclear materials accountability and control that satisfies both National and IAEA International safeguards objectives. Volume I, covering the firstmore » week of the course, presents the background, requirements, and general features of material accounting and control in modern safeguard systems. Volume II, covering the second week of the course, provides more detailed information on measurement methods and instruments, practical experience at power reactor and research reactor facilities, and examples of operating state systems of accountability and control.« less

Global Survey of the Concepts and Understanding of the Interfaces Between Nuclear Safety, Security, and Safeguards

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Kovacic, Don N.; Stewart, Scott; Erickson, Alexa R.

There is increasing global discourse on how the elements of nuclear safety, security, and safeguards can be most effectively implemented in nuclear power programs. While each element is separate and unique, they must nevertheless all be addressed in a country’s laws and implemented via regulations and in facility operations. This topic is of particular interest to countries that are currently developing the infrastructure to support nuclear power programs. These countries want to better understand what is required by these elements and how they can manage the interfaces between them and take advantages of any synergies that may exist. They needmore » practical examples and guidance in this area in order to develop better organizational strategies and technical capacities. This could simplify their legal, regulatory, and management structures and avoid inefficient approaches and costly mistakes that may not be apparent to them at this early stage of development. From the perspective of IAEA International Safeguards, supporting Member States in exploring such interfaces and synergies provides a benefit to them because it acknowledges that domestic safeguards in a country do not exist in a vacuum. Instead, it relies on a strong State System of Accounting and Control that is in turn dependent on a capable and independent regulatory body as well as a competent operator and technical staff. These organizations must account for and control nuclear material, communicate effectively, and manage and transmit complete and correct information to the IAEA in a timely manner. This, while in most cases also being responsible for the safety and security of their facilities. Seeking efficiencies in this process benefits international safeguards and nonproliferation. This paper will present the results of a global survey of current and anticipated approaches and practices by countries and organizations with current or future nuclear power programs on how they are implementing, or planning to implement, safety, security, and safeguards in their programs. The idea is to capture current knowledge and thinking on this topic and to identify common themes in organizations and management. It will also document the most commonly held ideas and perception (and misperceptions) of what it means to manage interfaces and take advantage of synergies for operating nuclear facilities and those that are building their infrastructures. It is desired that the results of this paper will inform the current discourse on this topic with some quantitative data and identify any general trends in understanding.« less

The key to security is a balancing act.

PubMed

Macdonald, Grant

2011-11-01

Grant Macdonald, managing director at supplier of mechanical and electronic door locks, Codelocks, examines some of the important issues for healthcare estates and facilities personnel considering how best to protect parts of a healthcare facility--large or small--given the need to minimise costs and not "over-specify" on security, while simultaneously ensuring that patients, staff, and hospital property, are safeguarded.

Material Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) Advanced Integration Roadmap

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Miller, Mike; Cipiti, Ben; Demuth, Scott Francis

2017-01-30

The development of sustainable advanced nuclear fuel cycles is a long-term goal of the Office of Nuclear Energy’s (DOE-NE) Fuel Cycle Technologies program. The Material Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) campaign is supporting research and development (R&D) of advanced instrumentation, analysis tools, and integration methodologies to meet this goal (Miller, 2015). This advanced R&D is intended to facilitate safeguards and security by design of fuel cycle facilities. The lab-scale demonstration of a virtual facility, distributed test bed, that connects the individual tools being developed at National Laboratories and university research establishments, is a key program milestone for 2020. Thesemore » tools will consist of instrumentation and devices as well as computer software for modeling, simulation and integration.« less

Material Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) Advanced Integration Roadmap

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Durkee, Joe W.; Cipiti, Ben; Demuth, Scott Francis

The development of sustainable advanced nuclear fuel cycles is a long-term goal of the Office of Nuclear Energy’s (DOE-NE) Fuel Cycle Technologies program. The Material Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) campaign is supporting research and development (R&D) of advanced instrumentation, analysis tools, and integration methodologies to meet this goal (Miller, 2015). This advanced R&D is intended to facilitate safeguards and security by design of fuel cycle facilities. The lab-scale demonstration of a virtual facility, distributed test bed, that connects the individual tools being developed at National Laboratories and university research establishments, is a key program milestone for 2020. Thesemore » tools will consist of instrumentation and devices as well as computer software for modeling, simulation and integration.« less

FY 2008 Next Generation Safeguards Initiative International Safeguards Education and Training Pilot Progerams Summary Report

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Dreicer, M; Anzelon, G; Essner, J

2008-10-17

Key component of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) launched by the National Nuclear Security Administration is the development of human capital to meet present and future challenges to the safeguards regime. An effective university-level education in safeguards and related disciplines is an essential element in a layered strategy to rebuild the safeguards human resource capacity. Two pilot programs at university level, involving 44 students, were initiated and implemented in spring-summer 2008 and linked to hands-on internships at LANL or LLNL. During the internships, students worked on specific safeguards-related projects with a designated Laboratory Mentor to provide broader exposure tomore » nuclear materials management and information analytical techniques. The Safeguards and Nuclear Material Management pilot program was a collaboration between the Texas A&M University (TAMU), Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). It included a 16-lecture course held during a summer internship program. The instructors for the course were from LANL together with TAMU faculty and LLNL experts. The LANL-based course was shared with the students spending their internship at LLNL via video conference. A week-long table-top (or hands-on) exercise on was also conducted at LANL. The student population was a mix of 28 students from a 12 universities participating in a variety of summer internship programs held at LANL and LLNL. A large portion of the students were TAMU students participating in the NGSI pilot. The International Nuclear Safeguards Policy and Information Analysis pilot program was implemented at the Monterey Institute for International Studies (MIIS) in cooperation with LLNL. It included a two-week intensive course consisting of 20 lectures and two exercises. MIIS, LLNL, and speakers from other U.S. national laboratories (LANL, BNL) delivered lectures for the audience of 16 students. The majority of students were senior classmen or new master's degree graduates from MIIS specializing in nonproliferation policy studies. Other university/organizations represented: University of California in LA, Stanford University, and the IAEA. Four of the students that completed this intensive course participated in a 2-month internship at LLNL. The conclusions of the two pilot courses and internships was a NGSI Summer Student Symposium, held at LLNL, where 20 students participated in LLNL facility tours and poster sessions. The Poster sessions were designed to provide a forum for sharing the results of their summer projects and providing experience in presenting their work to a varied audience of students, faculty and laboratory staff. The success of bringing together the students from the technical and policy pilots was notable and will factor into the planning for the continued refinement of their two pilot efforts in the coming years.« less

Analysis of the impact of safeguards criteria

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Mullen, M.F.; Reardon, P.T.

As part of the US Program of Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards, the Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) was asked to assist in developing and demonstrating a model for assessing the impact of setting criteria for the application of IAEA safeguards. This report presents the results of PNL's work on the task. The report is in three parts. The first explains the technical approach and methodology. The second contains an example application of the methodology. The third presents the conclusions of the study. PNL used the model and computer programs developed as part of Task C.5 (Estimation of Inspection Efforts) ofmore » the Program of Technical Assistance. The example application of the methodology involves low-enriched uranium conversion and fuel fabrication facilities. The effects of variations in seven parameters are considered: false alarm probability, goal probability of detection, detection goal quantity, the plant operator's measurement capability, the inspector's variables measurement capability, the inspector's attributes measurement capability, and annual plant throughput. Among the key results and conclusions of the analysis are the following: the variables with the greatest impact on the probability of detection are the inspector's measurement capability, the goal quantity, and the throughput; the variables with the greatest impact on inspection costs are the throughput, the goal quantity, and the goal probability of detection; there are important interactions between variables. That is, the effects of a given variable often depends on the level or value of some other variable. With the methodology used in this study, these interactions can be quantitatively analyzed; reasonably good approximate prediction equations can be developed using the methodology described here.« less

48 CFR 3004.470-1 - Scope.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... ACQUISITION REGULATION (HSAR) GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS Safeguarding Classified and Sensitive Information Within Industry 3004.470-1 Scope. This section implements DHS's policies for assuring the security of unclassified facilities, Information Technology (IT) resources, and sensitive information during the...

Updated hazard rate equations for dual safeguard systems.

PubMed

Rothschild, Marc

2007-04-11

A previous paper by this author [M.J. Rothschild, Updated hazard rate equation for single safeguards, J. Hazard. Mater. 130 (1-2) (2006) 15-20] showed that commonly used analytical methods for quantifying failure rates overestimates the risk in some circumstances. This can lead the analyst to mistakenly believe that a given operation presents an unacceptable risk. For a single safeguard system, a formula was presented in that paper that accurately evaluates the risk over a wide range of conditions. This paper expands on that analysis by evaluating the failure rate for dual safeguard systems. The safeguards can be activated at the same time or at staggered times, and the safeguard may provide an indication whether it was successful upon a challenge, or its status may go undetected. These combinations were evaluated using a Monte Carlo simulation. Empirical formulas for evaluating the hazard rate were developed from this analysis. It is shown that having the safeguards activate at the same time while providing positive feedback of their individual actions is the most effective arrangement in reducing the hazard rate. The hazard rate can also be reduced by staggering the testing schedules of the safeguards.

Capsule review of the DOE research and development and field facilities

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

None

1980-09-01

A description is given of the roles of DOE's headquarters, field offices, major multiprogram laboratories, Energy Technology and Mining Technology Centers, and other government-owned, contractor-operated facilities, which are located in all regions of the US. Descriptions of DOE facilities are given for multiprogram laboratories (12); program-dedicated facilities (biomedical and environmental facilities-12, fossil energy facilities-7, fusion energy facility-1, nuclear development facilities-3, physical research facilities-4, safeguards facility-1, and solar facilities-2); and Production, Testing, and Fabrication Facilities (nuclear materials production facilities-5, weapon testing and fabrication complex-8). Three appendices list DOE field and project offices; DOE field facilities by state or territory, names, addresses,more » and telephone numbers; DOE R and D field facilities by type, contractor names, and names of directors. (MCW)« less

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Rodriguez, Salvador B.

SNL has a combination of experimental facilities, nuclear engineering, nuclear security, severe nuclear accidents, and nuclear safeguards expertise that can enable significant progress towards molten salts and fuels for Molten Salt Reactors (MSRs). The following areas and opportunities are discussed in more detail in this white paper.

Recommended safety guides for industrial laboratories and shops

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Allison, W. W.

1971-01-01

Booklet provides references to 29 publications providing information on hazard control and approved safety practices. Areas include pressurized gas and vacuum systems. Guidelines are presented for safeguarding facilities where machinery, equipment, electrical devices, or hazardous chemicals are used.

Substantiation To Accompany Claims of Trade Secrecy Under EPCRA

EPA Pesticide Factsheets

This form is required under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act. Facility must be able to describe safeguarding measures, disclosure history, and why the specific chemical identity is a secret of interest to competitors.

76 FR 1519 - Security Zones; Sabine Bank Channel, Sabine Pass Channel and Sabine-Neches Waterway, TX

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-01-11

... comprehensive port security regime designed to safeguard human life, vessels, and waterfront facilities against... do not individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment. This rule is...

Game Imaging Meets Nuclear Reality

ScienceCinema

Michel, Kelly; Watkins, Adam

2018-01-16

At Los Alamos National Laboratory, a team of artists and animators, nuclear engineers and computer scientists is teaming to provide 3-D models of nuclear facilities to train IAEA safeguards inspectors and others who need fast familiarity with specific nuclear sites.

Leveraging Safety Programs to Improve and Support Security Programs

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Leach, Janice; Snell, Mark K.; Pratt, R.

2015-10-01

There has been a long history of considering Safety, Security, and Safeguards (3S) as three functions of nuclear security design and operations that need to be properly and collectively integrated with operations. This paper specifically considers how safety programmes can be extended directly to benefit security as part of an integrated facility management programme. The discussion will draw on experiences implementing such a programme at Sandia National Laboratories’ Annular Research Reactor Facility. While the paper focuses on nuclear facilities, similar ideas could be used to support security programmes at other types of high-consequence facilities and transportation activities.

University-level Non-proliferation and Safeguards Education and Human Capital Development Activities at Brookhaven National Laboratory

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Bachner K. M.; Pepper, S.; Gomera, J.

BNL has offered Nuclear Nonproliferation, Safeguards and Security in the 21st Century,? referred to as NNSS, every year since 2009 for graduate students in technical and policy fields related to nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation. The course focuses on relevant policy issues, in addition to technical components, and is part of a larger NGSI short course initiative that includes separate courses that are delivered at three other national laboratories and NNSA headquarters. [SCHOLZ and ROSENTHAL] The course includes lectures from esteemed nonproliferation experts, tours of various BNL facilities and laboratories, and in-field and table-top exercises on both technical and policy subjects.more » Topics include the history of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and other relevant treaties, the history of and advances in international nuclear safeguards, current relevant political situations in countries such as Iran, Iraq, and the Democratic Peoples? Republic of Korea (DPRK), nuclear science and technology, instrumentation and techniques used for verification activities, and associated research and development. The students conduct a mock Design Information Verification (DIV) at BNL?s decommissioned Medical Research Reactor. The capstone of the course includes a series of student presentations in which students act as policy advisors and provide recommendations in response to scenarios involving a current nonproliferation related event that are prepared by the course organizers. ?The course is open to domestic and foreign students, and caters to students in, entering, or recently having completed graduate school. Interested students must complete an application and provide a resume and a statement describing their interest in the course. Eighteen to 22 students attend annually; 165 students have completed the course to date. A stipend helps to defray students? travel and subsistence expenses. In 2015, the course was shortened from three weeks to two weeks to streamline the material, standardize NGSI course length, and draw in a larger applicant pool. ?The international and interdisciplinary mix of students attending the course encourages discussions of the topics presented during the course. Information about the course is available at https://www.bnl.gov/nnsscourse/. While a complete analysis of course students has not been undertaken, BNL is aware of three individuals who worked at national laboratories after attending the NNSS course, one who worked at a national laboratory prior to attending NNSS, two who worked as federal employees after attending NNSS, three who were Nonproliferation Graduate Fellows before or after attending NNSS, and three who have participated in other NGSI activities.?Design Information Verification is an IAEA inspection activity that is implemented for the purpose of ensuring that the facility design is consistent with the declared use of a facility.« less

Qualification of heavy water based irradiation device in the JSI TRIGA reactor for irradiations of FT-TIMS samples for nuclear safeguards

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Radulović, Vladimir; Kolšek, Aljaž; Fauré, Anne-Laure; Pottin, Anne-Claire; Pointurier, Fabien; Snoj, Luka

2018-03-01

The Fission Track Thermal Ionization Mass Spectrometry (FT-TIMS) method is considered as the reference method for particle analysis in the field of nuclear Safeguards for measurements of isotopic compositions (fissile material enrichment levels) in micrometer-sized uranium particles collected in nuclear facilities. An integral phase in the method is the irradiation of samples in a very well thermalized neutron spectrum. A bilateral collaboration project was carried out between the Jožef Stefan Institute (JSI, Slovenia) and the Commissariat à l'Énergie Atomique et aux Énergies Alternatives (CEA, France) to determine whether the JSI TRIGA reactor could be used for irradiations of samples for the FT-TIMS method. This paper describes Monte Carlo simulations, experimental activation measurements and test irradiations performed in the JSI TRIGA reactor, firstly to determine the feasibility, and secondly to design and qualify a purpose-built heavy water based irradiation device for FT-TIMS samples. The final device design has been shown experimentally to meet all the required performance specifications.

Impact of Nuclear Data Uncertainties on Calculated Spent Fuel Nuclide Inventories and Advanced NDA Instrument Response

DOE PAGES

Hu, Jianwei; Gauld, Ian C.

2014-12-01

The U.S. Department of Energy’s Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Spent Fuel (NGSI-SF) project is nearing the final phase of developing several advanced nondestructive assay (NDA) instruments designed to measure spent nuclear fuel assemblies for the purpose of improving nuclear safeguards. Current efforts are focusing on calibrating several of these instruments with spent fuel assemblies at two international spent fuel facilities. Modelling and simulation is expected to play an important role in predicting nuclide compositions, neutron and gamma source terms, and instrument responses in order to inform the instrument calibration procedures. As part of NGSI-SF project, this work was carried outmore » to assess the impacts of uncertainties in the nuclear data used in the calculations of spent fuel content, radiation emissions and instrument responses. Nuclear data is an essential part of nuclear fuel burnup and decay codes and nuclear transport codes. Such codes are routinely used for analysis of spent fuel and NDA safeguards instruments. Hence, the uncertainties existing in the nuclear data used in these codes affect the accuracies of such analysis. In addition, nuclear data uncertainties represent the limiting (smallest) uncertainties that can be expected from nuclear code predictions, and therefore define the highest attainable accuracy of the NDA instrument. This work studies the impacts of nuclear data uncertainties on calculated spent fuel nuclide inventories and the associated NDA instrument response. Recently developed methods within the SCALE code system are applied in this study. The Californium Interrogation with Prompt Neutron instrument was selected to illustrate the impact of these uncertainties on NDA instrument response.« less

Impact of Nuclear Data Uncertainties on Calculated Spent Fuel Nuclide Inventories and Advanced NDA Instrument Response

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Hu, Jianwei; Gauld, Ian C.

The U.S. Department of Energy’s Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Spent Fuel (NGSI-SF) project is nearing the final phase of developing several advanced nondestructive assay (NDA) instruments designed to measure spent nuclear fuel assemblies for the purpose of improving nuclear safeguards. Current efforts are focusing on calibrating several of these instruments with spent fuel assemblies at two international spent fuel facilities. Modelling and simulation is expected to play an important role in predicting nuclide compositions, neutron and gamma source terms, and instrument responses in order to inform the instrument calibration procedures. As part of NGSI-SF project, this work was carried outmore » to assess the impacts of uncertainties in the nuclear data used in the calculations of spent fuel content, radiation emissions and instrument responses. Nuclear data is an essential part of nuclear fuel burnup and decay codes and nuclear transport codes. Such codes are routinely used for analysis of spent fuel and NDA safeguards instruments. Hence, the uncertainties existing in the nuclear data used in these codes affect the accuracies of such analysis. In addition, nuclear data uncertainties represent the limiting (smallest) uncertainties that can be expected from nuclear code predictions, and therefore define the highest attainable accuracy of the NDA instrument. This work studies the impacts of nuclear data uncertainties on calculated spent fuel nuclide inventories and the associated NDA instrument response. Recently developed methods within the SCALE code system are applied in this study. The Californium Interrogation with Prompt Neutron instrument was selected to illustrate the impact of these uncertainties on NDA instrument response.« less

42 CFR 485.60 - Condition of participation: Clinical records.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-10-01

... retrieval and compilation of information. (a) Standard: Content. Each clinical record must contain sufficient information to identify the patient clearly and to justify the diagnosis and treatment. Entries in...: Protection of clinical record information. The facility must safeguard clinical record information against...

42 CFR 485.60 - Condition of participation: Clinical records.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... retrieval and compilation of information. (a) Standard: Content. Each clinical record must contain sufficient information to identify the patient clearly and to justify the diagnosis and treatment. Entries in...: Protection of clinical record information. The facility must safeguard clinical record information against...

42 CFR 485.60 - Condition of participation: Clinical records.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-10-01

... retrieval and compilation of information. (a) Standard: Content. Each clinical record must contain sufficient information to identify the patient clearly and to justify the diagnosis and treatment. Entries in...: Protection of clinical record information. The facility must safeguard clinical record information against...

42 CFR 485.60 - Condition of participation: Clinical records.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-10-01

... retrieval and compilation of information. (a) Standard: Content. Each clinical record must contain sufficient information to identify the patient clearly and to justify the diagnosis and treatment. Entries in...: Protection of clinical record information. The facility must safeguard clinical record information against...

10 CFR 75.34 - Inventory change reports.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... Transactions Reports (Inventory Change Reports), when appropriate, must be accompanied by Concise Notes... Commission, Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards, Washington, DC 20555-0001. This Concise Note is... operational program for the facility, including particularly, but not exclusively, the schedule for taking...

10 CFR 75.34 - Inventory change reports.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... Transactions Reports (Inventory Change Reports), when appropriate, must be accompanied by Concise Notes... Commission, Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards, Washington, DC 20555-0001. This Concise Note is... operational program for the facility, including particularly, but not exclusively, the schedule for taking...

10 CFR 75.34 - Inventory change reports.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... Transactions Reports (Inventory Change Reports), when appropriate, must be accompanied by Concise Notes... Commission, Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards, Washington, DC 20555-0001. This Concise Note is... operational program for the facility, including particularly, but not exclusively, the schedule for taking...

10 CFR 75.34 - Inventory change reports.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... Transactions Reports (Inventory Change Reports), when appropriate, must be accompanied by Concise Notes... Commission, Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards, Washington, DC 20555-0001. This Concise Note is... operational program for the facility, including particularly, but not exclusively, the schedule for taking...

75 FR 44819 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Siting

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-07-29

...--8:30 a.m. Until 5 p.m. The Subcommittee will review the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility (Shaw-Areva... presentations by and hold discussions with representatives of the NRC staff, Shaw-Areva, LLC, and other...

10 CFR 75.21 - General requirements.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... Accounting and Control for Facilities § 75.21 General requirements. (a) Each licensee or certificate holder... Safeguards Agreement shall establish, maintain, and follow written material accounting and control procedures. The licensee or certificate holder shall retain as a record current material accounting and control...

10 CFR 95.39 - External transmission of documents and material.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... Procedures Plan for the protection of classified information. (e) Security of classified information in... Section 95.39 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) FACILITY SECURITY CLEARANCE AND SAFEGUARDING OF NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION AND RESTRICTED DATA Control of Information § 95.39 External...

10 CFR 95.39 - External transmission of documents and material.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... Procedures Plan for the protection of classified information. (e) Security of classified information in... Section 95.39 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) FACILITY SECURITY CLEARANCE AND SAFEGUARDING OF NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION AND RESTRICTED DATA Control of Information § 95.39 External...

10 CFR 95.39 - External transmission of documents and material.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... Procedures Plan for the protection of classified information. (e) Security of classified information in... Section 95.39 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) FACILITY SECURITY CLEARANCE AND SAFEGUARDING OF NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION AND RESTRICTED DATA Control of Information § 95.39 External...

10 CFR 95.39 - External transmission of documents and material.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... Procedures Plan for the protection of classified information. (e) Security of classified information in... Section 95.39 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) FACILITY SECURITY CLEARANCE AND SAFEGUARDING OF NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION AND RESTRICTED DATA Control of Information § 95.39 External...

10 CFR 95.39 - External transmission of documents and material.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... Procedures Plan for the protection of classified information. (e) Security of classified information in... Section 95.39 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) FACILITY SECURITY CLEARANCE AND SAFEGUARDING OF NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION AND RESTRICTED DATA Control of Information § 95.39 External...

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Hayes, Birchard P; Michel, Kelly D; Few, Douglas A

From stereophonic, positional sound to high-definition imagery that is crisp and clean, high fidelity computer graphics enhance our view, insight, and intuition regarding our environments and conditions. Contemporary 3-D modeling tools offer an open architecture framework that enables integration with other technologically innovative arenas. One innovation of great interest is Augmented Reality, the merging of virtual, digital environments with physical, real-world environments creating a mixed reality where relevant data and information augments the real or actual experience in real-time by spatial or semantic context. Pairing 3-D virtual immersive models with a dynamic platform such as semi-autonomous robotics or personnel odometrymore » systems to create a mixed reality offers a new and innovative design information verification inspection capability, evaluation accuracy, and information gathering capability for nuclear facilities. Our paper discusses the integration of two innovative technologies, 3-D visualizations with inertial positioning systems, and the resulting augmented reality offered to the human inspector. The discussion in the paper includes an exploration of human and non-human (surrogate) inspections of a nuclear facility, integrated safeguards knowledge within a synchronized virtual model operated, or worn, by a human inspector, and the anticipated benefits to safeguards evaluations of facility operations.« less

New Brunswick Laboratory. Progress report, October 1995--September 1996

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

NONE

Fiscal year (FY) 1996 was a very good year for New Brunswick Laboratory (NBL), whose major sponsor is the Office of Safeguards and Security (NN-51) in the US Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Nonproliferation and National Security, Office of Security Affairs. Several projects pertinent to the NBL mission were completed, and NBL`s interactions with partners and customers were encouraging. Among the partners with which NBL interacted in this report period were the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), NN-51. Environmental Program Group of the DOE Chicago Operations Office, International Safeguards Project Office, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), Ukraine Working Group,more » Fissile Materials Assurance Working Group, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Institute for Reference Materials and Measurements (IRMM) in Belgium, Brazilian/Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), Lockheed Idaho Technologies Company, and other DOE facilities and laboratories. NBL staff publications, participation in safeguards assistance and other nuclear programs, development of new reference materials, involvement in the updating and refinement of DOE documents, service in enhancing the science education of others, and other related activities enhanced NBL`s status among DOE laboratories and facilities. Noteworthy are the facts that NBL`s small inventory of nuclear materials is accurately accounted for, and, as in past years, its materials and human resources were used in peaceful nuclear activities worldwide.« less

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Donnelly, H.; Fullwood, R.; Glancy, J.

This is the second volume of a two volume report on the VISA method for evaluating safeguards at fixed-site facilities. This volume contains appendices that support the description of the VISA concept and the initial working version of the method, VISA-1, presented in Volume I. The information is separated into four appendices, each describing details of one of the four analysis modules that comprise the analysis sections of the method. The first appendix discusses Path Analysis methodology, applies it to a Model Fuel Facility, and describes the computer codes that are being used. Introductory material on Path Analysis given inmore » Chapter 3.2.1 and Chapter 4.2.1 of Volume I. The second appendix deals with Detection Analysis, specifically the schemes used in VISA-1 for classifying adversaries and the methods proposed for evaluating individual detection mechanisms in order to build the data base required for detection analysis. Examples of evaluations on identity-access systems, SNM portal monitors, and intrusion devices are provided. The third appendix describes the Containment Analysis overt-segment path ranking, the Monte Carlo engagement model, the network simulation code, the delay mechanism data base, and the results of a sensitivity analysis. The last appendix presents general equations used in Interruption Analysis for combining covert-overt segments and compares them with equations given in Volume I, Chapter 3.« less

Gas centrifuge enrichment plants inspection frequency and remote monitoring issues for advanced safeguards implementation

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Boyer, Brian David; Erpenbeck, Heather H; Miller, Karen A

2010-09-13

Current safeguards approaches used by the IAEA at gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs) need enhancement in order to verify declared low enriched uranium (LEU) production, detect undeclared LEU production and detect high enriched uranium (BEU) production with adequate probability using non destructive assay (NDA) techniques. At present inspectors use attended systems, systems needing the presence of an inspector for operation, during inspections to verify the mass and {sup 235}U enrichment of declared cylinders of uranium hexafluoride that are used in the process of enrichment at GCEPs. This paper contains an analysis of how possible improvements in unattended and attended NDAmore » systems including process monitoring and possible on-site destructive analysis (DA) of samples could reduce the uncertainty of the inspector's measurements providing more effective and efficient IAEA GCEPs safeguards. We have also studied a few advanced safeguards systems that could be assembled for unattended operation and the level of performance needed from these systems to provide more effective safeguards. The analysis also considers how short notice random inspections, unannounced inspections (UIs), and the concept of information-driven inspections can affect probability of detection of the diversion of nuclear material when coupled to new GCEPs safeguards regimes augmented with unattended systems. We also explore the effects of system failures and operator tampering on meeting safeguards goals for quantity and timeliness and the measures needed to recover from such failures and anomalies.« less

Anti-malware software and medical devices.

PubMed

2010-10-01

Just as much as healthcare information systems, medical devices need protection against cybersecurity threats. Anti-malware software can help safeguard the devices in your facility-but it has limitations and even risks. Find out what steps you can take to manage anti-malware applications in your devices.

75 FR 64366 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-10-19

... NUREG/CR- 6997, ``Modeling a Digital Feedwater Control System Using Traditional Probabilistic Risk.../reading-rm/adams.html or http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/ACRS/ . Video teleconferencing... line charges and for providing the equipment and facilities that they use to establish the video...

10 CFR 75.11 - Location information.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 10 Energy 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Location information. 75.11 Section 75.11 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) SAFEGUARDS ON NUCLEAR MATERIAL-IMPLEMENTATION OF US/IAEA AGREEMENT Facility and Location Information § 75.11 Location information. (a) As required by the Additional Protocol...

77 FR 27740 - Privacy Act of 1974; System of Records

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2012-05-11

... storage media''. Retrievability: Delete ``and Social Security Number''. Safeguards: Delete last sentence...: * * * * * Categories of individuals covered by the system: Delete entry and replace with ``Children and their sponsors... admission to, DLA-managed day care facilities.'' Categories of records in the system: Delete ``Social...

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Anheier, Norman C.; Cannon, Bret D.; Martinez, Alonzo

The International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) long-term research and development plan calls for more cost-effective and efficient safeguard methods to detect and deter misuse of gaseous centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs). The IAEA’s current safeguards approaches at GCEPs are based on a combination of routine and random inspections that include environmental sampling and destructive assay (DA) sample collection from UF6 in-process material and selected cylinders. Samples are then shipped offsite for subsequent laboratory analysis. In this paper, a new DA sample collection and onsite analysis approach that could help to meet challenges in transportation and chain of custody for UF6 DAmore » samples is introduced. This approach uses a handheld sampler concept and a Laser Ablation, Laser Absorbance Spectrometry (LAARS) analysis instrument, both currently under development at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. A LAARS analysis instrument could be temporarily or permanently deployed in the IAEA control room of the facility, in the IAEA data acquisition cabinet, for example. The handheld PNNL DA sampler design collects and stabilizes a much smaller DA sample mass compared to current sampling methods. The significantly lower uranium mass reduces the sample radioactivity and the stabilization approach diminishes the risk of uranium and hydrogen fluoride release. These attributes enable safe sample handling needed during onsite LAARS assay and may help ease shipping challenges for samples to be processed at the IAEA’s offsite laboratory. The LAARS and DA sampler implementation concepts will be described and preliminary technical viability results presented.« less

10 CFR 95.27 - Protection while in use.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Protection while in use. 95.27 Section 95.27 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) FACILITY SECURITY CLEARANCE AND SAFEGUARDING OF NATIONAL..., classified matter must be under the direct control of an authorized individual to preclude physical, audio...

10 CFR 72.184 - Safeguards contingency plan.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... contingency plan for responding to threats and radiological sabotage must be as defined in appendix C to part..., and Responsibility Matrix, the first four categories of information relating to nuclear facilities licensed under part 50 of this chapter. (The fifth and last category of information, Procedures, does not...

10 CFR 75.21 - General requirements.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 10 Energy 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false General requirements. 75.21 Section 75.21 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) SAFEGUARDS ON NUCLEAR MATERIAL-IMPLEMENTATION OF US/IAEA AGREEMENT Material Accounting and Control for Facilities § 75.21 General requirements. (a) Each licensee or certificate holder...

46 CFR 503.59 - Safeguarding classified information.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-10-01

... classification. (b) Whenever classified material is removed from a storage facility, such material shall not be... classification of the information; and (2) The prospective recipient requires access to the information in order... documents that have been destroyed. (k) An inventory of all documents classified higher than confidential...

46 CFR 503.59 - Safeguarding classified information.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-10-01

... classification. (b) Whenever classified material is removed from a storage facility, such material shall not be... classification of the information; and (2) The prospective recipient requires access to the information in order... documents that have been destroyed. (k) An inventory of all documents classified higher than confidential...

46 CFR 503.59 - Safeguarding classified information.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-10-01

... classification. (b) Whenever classified material is removed from a storage facility, such material shall not be... classification of the information; and (2) The prospective recipient requires access to the information in order... documents that have been destroyed. (k) An inventory of all documents classified higher than confidential...

Watch It

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Bolch, Matt

2008-01-01

For the school chief information officer (CIO), safeguarding students and facilities is as much a part of the job description as keeping the data networks running and the servers protected from hackers. This article describes how two districts, Miami-Dade County Public Schools and Taos Municipal Schools, secured their surveillance systems. The…

Used fuel extended storage security and safeguards by design roadmap

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Durbin, Samuel G.; Lindgren, Eric Richard; Jones, Robert

2016-05-01

In the United States, spent nuclear fuel (SNF) is safely and securely stored in spent fuel pools and dry storage casks. The available capacity in spent fuel pools across the nuclear fleet has nearly reached a steady state value. The excess SNF continues to be loaded in dry storage casks. Fuel is expected to remain in dry storage for periods beyond the initial dry cask certification period of 20 years. Recent licensing renewals have approved an additional 40 years. This report identifies the current requirements and evaluation techniques associated with the safeguards and security of SNF dry cask storage. Amore » set of knowledge gaps is identified in the current approaches. Finally, this roadmap identifies known knowledge gaps and provides a research path to deliver the tools and models needed to close the gaps and allow the optimization of the security and safeguards approaches for an interim spent fuel facility over the lifetime of the storage site.« less

Security breaches: tips for assessing and limiting your risks.

PubMed

Coons, Leeanne R

2011-01-01

As part of their compliance planning, medical practices should undergo a risk assessment to determine any vulnerability within the practice relative to security breaches. Practices should also implement safeguards to limit their risks. Such safeguards include facility access controls, information and electronic media management, use of business associate agreements, and education and enforcement. Implementation of specific policies and procedures to address security incidents is another critical step that medical practices should take as part of their security incident prevention plan. Medical practices should not only develop policies and procedures to prevent, detect, contain, and correct security violations, but should make sure that such policies and procedures are actually implemented in their everyday operations.

Evaluation of accountability measurements

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Cacic, C.G.

The New Brunswick Laboratory (NBL) is programmatically responsible to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Safeguards and Security (OSS) for providing independent review and evaluation of accountability measurement technology in DOE nuclear facilities. This function is addressed in part through the NBL Safegaurds Measurement Evaluation (SME) Program. The SME Program utilizes both on-site review of measurement methods along with material-specific measurement evaluation studies to provide information concerning the adequacy of subject accountability measurements. This paper reviews SME Program activities for the 1986-87 time period, with emphasis on noted improvements in measurement capabilities. Continued evolution of the SME Programmore » to respond to changing safeguards concerns is discussed.« less

76 FR 62862 - Notice; Applications and Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses Involving Proposed No...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-10-11

... Operating Licenses Involving Proposed No Significant Hazards Considerations and Containing Sensitive Unclassified Non-Safeguards Information and Order Imposing Procedures for Access to Sensitive Unclassified Non... document. You may submit comments by any one of the following methods: Federal Rulemaking Web Site: Go to...

75 FR 39053 - Agency Information Collection Activities: Submission for the Office of Management and Budget (OMB...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-07-07

.... The title of the information collection: 10 CFR Part 95-- Facility Security Clearance and Safeguarding of National Security Information and Restricted Data. 3. Current OMB approval number: 3150-0047. 4... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION [Docket No. NRC-2010-0104] Agency Information Collection Activities...

78 FR 55300 - Agency Information Collection Activities: Submission for the Office of Management and Budget (OMB...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-09-10

... CFR Part 95-- Facility Security Clearance and Safeguarding of National Security Information and... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION [Docket No. NRC-2013-0088] Agency Information Collection Activities... Commission. ACTION: Notice of the OMB review of information collection and solicitation of public comment...

10 CFR 95.49 - Security of automatic data processing (ADP) systems.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Security of automatic data processing (ADP) systems. 95.49 Section 95.49 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) FACILITY SECURITY CLEARANCE AND SAFEGUARDING OF NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION AND RESTRICTED DATA Control of Information § 95.49 Security of...

10 CFR 95.29 - Establishment of Restricted or Closed areas.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... 10 Energy 2 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Establishment of Restricted or Closed areas. 95.29 Section 95.29 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) FACILITY SECURITY CLEARANCE AND SAFEGUARDING...) The Closed Area must be accorded supplemental protection during non-working hours. During these hours...

10 CFR 95.29 - Establishment of Restricted or Closed areas.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Establishment of Restricted or Closed areas. 95.29 Section 95.29 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) FACILITY SECURITY CLEARANCE AND SAFEGUARDING...) The Closed Area must be accorded supplemental protection during non-working hours. During these hours...

10 CFR 95.29 - Establishment of Restricted or Closed areas.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... 10 Energy 2 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Establishment of Restricted or Closed areas. 95.29 Section 95.29 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) FACILITY SECURITY CLEARANCE AND SAFEGUARDING...) The Closed Area must be accorded supplemental protection during non-working hours. During these hours...

10 CFR 95.29 - Establishment of Restricted or Closed areas.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... 10 Energy 2 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Establishment of Restricted or Closed areas. 95.29 Section 95.29 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) FACILITY SECURITY CLEARANCE AND SAFEGUARDING...) The Closed Area must be accorded supplemental protection during non-working hours. During these hours...

10 CFR 95.29 - Establishment of Restricted or Closed areas.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 10 Energy 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Establishment of Restricted or Closed areas. 95.29 Section 95.29 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) FACILITY SECURITY CLEARANCE AND SAFEGUARDING...) The Closed Area must be accorded supplemental protection during non-working hours. During these hours...

78 FR 1753 - Security Zone, Potomac and Anacostia Rivers; Washington, DC

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-01-09

... immediate action, the restriction of vessel traffic is necessary to protect life, property and the... of the Port the ability to implement comprehensive port security regimes designed to safeguard human life, vessels, and waterfront facilities while still sustaining the flow of commerce. The Captain of...

78 FR 54392 - Security Zone, Baltimore Harbor, Baltimore's Inner Harbor; Baltimore, MD

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-09-04

... restriction of vessel traffic is necessary to protect life, property and the environment, therefore, a 30-day... of the Port the ability to implement comprehensive port security regimes designed to safeguard human life, vessels, and waterfront facilities while still sustaining the flow of commerce. The Captain of...

10 CFR 95.35 - Access to matter classified as National Security Information and Restricted Data.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... Information and Restricted Data. 95.35 Section 95.35 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) FACILITY SECURITY CLEARANCE AND SAFEGUARDING OF NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION AND RESTRICTED DATA Control of Information § 95.35 Access to matter classified as National Security Information and Restricted Data. (a...

Safeguarding Your Business and Management Succession.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Maness, Irving; And Others

The 12th publication in a series of subject presentations in the field of administrative management for use by educators and businessmen who teach management courses is presented. These presentations are intended to be particularly useful to Distributive Education in the smaller community where library research facilities are limited and equipment…

75 FR 62895 - Notice of Availability of Safety Evaluation Report; AREVA Enrichment Services LLC, Eagle Rock...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-10-13

... Evaluation Report; AREVA Enrichment Services LLC, Eagle Rock Enrichment Facility, Bonneville County, ID... report. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Breeda Reilly, Senior Project Manager, Advanced Fuel Cycle, Enrichment, and Uranium Conversion, Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards, Office of Nuclear Material...

10 CFR 75.12 - Communication of information to IAEA.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Communication of information to IAEA. 75.12 Section 75.12 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) SAFEGUARDS ON NUCLEAR MATERIAL-IMPLEMENTATION OF US/IAEA AGREEMENT Facility and Location Information § 75.12 Communication of information to IAEA. (a) Except as...

10 CFR 75.12 - Communication of information to IAEA.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 10 Energy 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Communication of information to IAEA. 75.12 Section 75.12 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) SAFEGUARDS ON NUCLEAR MATERIAL-IMPLEMENTATION OF US/IAEA AGREEMENT Facility and Location Information § 75.12 Communication of information to IAEA. (a) Except as...

10 CFR 75.22 - Accounting records.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 10 Energy 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Accounting records. 75.22 Section 75.22 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) SAFEGUARDS ON NUCLEAR MATERIAL-IMPLEMENTATION OF US/IAEA AGREEMENT Material Accounting and Control for Facilities § 75.22 Accounting records. (a) The accounting records required by § 75...

10 CFR 75.23 - Operating records.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 10 Energy 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Operating records. 75.23 Section 75.23 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) SAFEGUARDS ON NUCLEAR MATERIAL-IMPLEMENTATION OF US/IAEA AGREEMENT Material Accounting and Control for Facilities § 75.23 Operating records. The operating records required by § 75.21...

78 FR 25769 - Notice of Meeting; Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-05-02

... October 18, 2012, (76 FR 64146-64147). In accordance with those procedures, oral or written views may be... http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/ACRS/ . Video teleconferencing service is available for... facilities that they use to establish the video teleconferencing link. The availability of video...

78 FR 3473 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards; Notice of Meeting

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-01-16

... Federal Register on October 18, 2012, (77 FR 64146-64147). In accordance with those procedures, oral or.../reading-rm/adams.html or http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/ACRS/ . Video teleconferencing... providing the equipment and facilities that they use to establish the video teleconferencing link. The...

78 FR 12801 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards; Notice of Meeting

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-02-25

... meetings were published in the Federal Register on October 18, 2012, (77 FR 64146-64147). In accordance.../reading-rm/adams.html or http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/ACRS/ . Video teleconferencing... providing the equipment and facilities that they use to establish the video teleconferencing link. The...

78 FR 65009 - Advisory Committee On Reactor Safeguards; Notice of Meeting

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-10-30

... of and participation in ACRS meetings were published in the Federal Register on October 18, 2012, (77... http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/ACRS/ . Video teleconferencing service is available for... facilities that they use to establish the video teleconferencing link. The availability of video...

78 FR 53485 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards; Notice of Meeting

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-08-29

... of and participation in ACRS meetings were published in the Federal Register on October 18, 2012, (77... http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/ACRS/ . Video teleconferencing service is available for... facilities that they use to establish the video teleconferencing link. The availability of video...

Health Care Financing Administration--Medicare and Medicaid programs; protection of patients' funds. Final regulation.

PubMed

1980-07-24

This rule sets forth expanded standards for protection of personal funds of patients in skilled nursing facilities (SNFs) and intermediate care facilities (ICFs) that participate in the Medicare or Medicaid programs. The changes are required for SNFs by Section 21(a) of Pub. L. 95-142, the Medicare-Medcaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments of 1977, and for ICFs by Section 8(c) of Pub. L. 95-292, the End-Stage Renal Disease Amendments of 1978. The intent is to safeguard patient funds from misuse by facilities, and to assure that personal funds held by the the facilities are fully accounted for and made available to patients when they need or want them.

Anomaly detection applied to a materials control and accounting database

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Whiteson, R.; Spanks, L.; Yarbro, T.

An important component of the national mission of reducing the nuclear danger includes accurate recording of the processing and transportation of nuclear materials. Nuclear material storage facilities, nuclear chemical processing plants, and nuclear fuel fabrication facilities collect and store large amounts of data describing transactions that involve nuclear materials. To maintain confidence in the integrity of these data, it is essential to identify anomalies in the databases. Anomalous data could indicate error, theft, or diversion of material. Yet, because of the complex and diverse nature of the data, analysis and evaluation are extremely tedious. This paper describes the authors workmore » in the development of analysis tools to automate the anomaly detection process for the Material Accountability and Safeguards System (MASS) that tracks and records the activities associated with accountable quantities of nuclear material at Los Alamos National Laboratory. Using existing guidelines that describe valid transactions, the authors have created an expert system that identifies transactions that do not conform to the guidelines. Thus, this expert system can be used to focus the attention of the expert or inspector directly on significant phenomena.« less

Improving the Transparency of IAEA Safeguards Reporting

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Toomey, Christopher; Hayman, Aaron M.; Wyse, Evan T.

2011-07-17

In 2008, the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI) indicated that the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR) has not kept pace with the evolution of safeguards and provided the IAEA with a set of recommendations for improvement. The SIR is the primary mechanism for providing an overview of safeguards implementation in a given year and reporting on the annual safeguards findings and conclusions drawn by the Secretariat. As the IAEA transitions to State-level safeguards approaches, SIR reporting must adapt to reflect these evolutionary changes. This evolved report will better reflect the IAEA's transition to amore » more qualitative and information-driven approach, based upon State-as-a-whole considerations. This paper applies SAGSI's recommendations to the development of multiple models for an evolved SIR and finds that an SIR repurposed as a 'safeguards portal' could significantly enhance information delivery, clarity, and transparency. In addition, this paper finds that the 'portal concept' also appears to have value as a standardized information presentation and analysis platform for use by Country Officers, for continuity of knowledge purposes, and the IAEA Secretariat in the safeguards conclusion process. Accompanying this paper is a fully functional prototype of the 'portal' concept, built using commercial software and IAEA Annual Report data.« less

Exploring the Application of Shared Ledger Technology to Safeguards and other National Security Topics

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Frazar, Sarah L.; Winters, Samuel T.; Kreyling, Sean J.

In 2016, the Office of International Nuclear Safeguards at the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) within the Department of Energy (DOE) commissioned the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) to explore the potential implications of the digital currency bitcoin and its underlying technologies on the safeguards system. The authors found that one category of technologies referred to as Shared Ledger Technology (SLT) offers a spectrum of benefits to the safeguards system. While further research is needed to validate assumptions and findings in the paper, preliminary analysis suggests that both the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Member States can use SLTmore » to promote efficient, effective, accurate, and timely reporting, and increase transparency in the safeguards system without sacrificing confidentiality of safeguards data. This increased transparency and involvement of Member States in certain safeguards transactions could lead to increased trust and cooperation among States and the public, which generates a number of benefits. This paper describes these benefits and the analytical framework for assessing SLT applications for specific safeguards problems. The paper will also describe other national security areas where SLT could provide benefits.« less

Strengthened IAEA Safeguards-Imagery Analysis: Geospatial Tools for Nonproliferation Analysis

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Pabian, Frank V

2012-08-14

This slide presentation focuses on the growing role and importance of imagery analysis for IAEA safeguards applications and how commercial satellite imagery, together with the newly available geospatial tools, can be used to promote 'all-source synergy.' As additional sources of openly available information, satellite imagery in conjunction with the geospatial tools can be used to significantly augment and enhance existing information gathering techniques, procedures, and analyses in the remote detection and assessment of nonproliferation relevant activities, facilities, and programs. Foremost of the geospatial tools are the 'Digital Virtual Globes' (i.e., GoogleEarth, Virtual Earth, etc.) that are far better than previouslymore » used simple 2-D plan-view line drawings for visualization of known and suspected facilities of interest which can be critical to: (1) Site familiarization and true geospatial context awareness; (2) Pre-inspection planning; (3) Onsite orientation and navigation; (4) Post-inspection reporting; (5) Site monitoring over time for changes; (6) Verification of states site declarations and for input to State Evaluation reports; and (7) A common basis for discussions among all interested parties (Member States). Additionally, as an 'open-source', such virtual globes can also provide a new, essentially free, means to conduct broad area search for undeclared nuclear sites and activities - either alleged through open source leads; identified on internet BLOGS and WIKI Layers, with input from a 'free' cadre of global browsers and/or by knowledgeable local citizens (a.k.a.: 'crowdsourcing'), that can include ground photos and maps; or by other initiatives based on existing information and in-house country knowledge. They also provide a means to acquire ground photography taken by locals, hobbyists, and tourists of the surrounding locales that can be useful in identifying and discriminating between relevant and non-relevant facilities and their associated infrastructure. The digital globes also provide highly accurate terrain mapping for better geospatial context and allow detailed 3-D perspectives of all sites or areas of interest. 3-D modeling software (i.e., Google's SketchUp6 newly available in 2007) when used in conjunction with these digital globes can significantly enhance individual building characterization and visualization (including interiors), allowing for better assessments including walk-arounds or fly-arounds and perhaps better decision making on multiple levels (e.g., the best placement for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) video monitoring cameras).« less

75 FR 7337 - Certifications Pursuant to Section 104 of the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-02-19

... Agreement Between India and the International Atomic Energy Agency Memorandum for the Secretary of State... Government of India and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards to Civilian Nuclear Facilities, as approved by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency on...

10 CFR 1.44 - Office of New Reactors.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 10 Energy 1 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Office of New Reactors. 1.44 Section 1.44 Energy NUCLEAR... Office of New Reactors. The Office of New Reactors— (a) Develops, promulgates and implements regulations... safeguarding of nuclear reactor facilities licensed under part 52 of this chapter prior to initial commencement...

10 CFR 1.44 - Office of New Reactors.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 10 Energy 1 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Office of New Reactors. 1.44 Section 1.44 Energy NUCLEAR... Office of New Reactors. The Office of New Reactors— (a) Develops, promulgates and implements regulations... safeguarding of nuclear reactor facilities licensed under part 52 of this chapter prior to initial commencement...

10 CFR 95.51 - Retrieval of classified matter following suspension or revocation of access authorization.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

...) FACILITY SECURITY CLEARANCE AND SAFEGUARDING OF NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION AND RESTRICTED DATA Control of Information § 95.51 Retrieval of classified matter following suspension or revocation of access... 10 Energy 2 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Retrieval of classified matter following suspension or...

10 CFR 95.51 - Retrieval of classified matter following suspension or revocation of access authorization.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

...) FACILITY SECURITY CLEARANCE AND SAFEGUARDING OF NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION AND RESTRICTED DATA Control of Information § 95.51 Retrieval of classified matter following suspension or revocation of access... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Retrieval of classified matter following suspension or...

10 CFR 95.51 - Retrieval of classified matter following suspension or revocation of access authorization.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

...) FACILITY SECURITY CLEARANCE AND SAFEGUARDING OF NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION AND RESTRICTED DATA Control of Information § 95.51 Retrieval of classified matter following suspension or revocation of access... 10 Energy 2 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Retrieval of classified matter following suspension or...

10 CFR 95.51 - Retrieval of classified matter following suspension or revocation of access authorization.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

...) FACILITY SECURITY CLEARANCE AND SAFEGUARDING OF NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION AND RESTRICTED DATA Control of Information § 95.51 Retrieval of classified matter following suspension or revocation of access... 10 Energy 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Retrieval of classified matter following suspension or...

10 CFR 95.51 - Retrieval of classified matter following suspension or revocation of access authorization.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

...) FACILITY SECURITY CLEARANCE AND SAFEGUARDING OF NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION AND RESTRICTED DATA Control of Information § 95.51 Retrieval of classified matter following suspension or revocation of access... 10 Energy 2 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Retrieval of classified matter following suspension or...

76 FR 48184 - Exelon Nuclear, Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Unit 1; Exemption From Certain Security...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-08-08

... nuclear reactor facility. PBAPS Unit 1 was a high-temperature, gas-cooled reactor that was operated from... the safeguards contingency plan.'' Part 73 of 10 CFR, ``Physical Protection of Plant and Materials... physical protection system which will have capabilities for the protection of special nuclear material at...

75 FR 458 - Notice; Applications and Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses Involving Proposed No...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-01-05

... Unclassified Non-Safeguards Information and Order Imposing Procedures for Access to Sensitive Unclassified Non... procedures described below. To comply with the procedural requirements of E-Filing, at least ten (10) days... equipment lineup, accident scenario, or interaction mode not reviewed and approved as part of the design and...

10 CFR 73.57 - Requirements for criminal history records checks of individuals granted unescorted access to a...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... fingerprints for those individuals who will have access to Safeguards Information. (3) Before receiving its... applicant for a combined license) may submit fingerprints for those individuals who will require unescorted... section shall fingerprint each individual who is permitted unescorted access to the nuclear power facility...

10 CFR 75.24 - Retention of records.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 10 Energy 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Retention of records. 75.24 Section 75.24 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) SAFEGUARDS ON NUCLEAR MATERIAL-IMPLEMENTATION OF US/IAEA AGREEMENT Material Accounting and Control for Facilities § 75.24 Retention of records. The records referred to in §§ 75.22 and...

10 CFR 75.24 - Retention of records.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Retention of records. 75.24 Section 75.24 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) SAFEGUARDS ON NUCLEAR MATERIAL-IMPLEMENTATION OF US/IAEA AGREEMENT Material Accounting and Control for Facilities § 75.24 Retention of records. The records referred to in §§ 75.22 and...

10 CFR 1.44 - Office of New Reactors.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... 10 Energy 1 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Office of New Reactors. 1.44 Section 1.44 Energy NUCLEAR... safeguarding of nuclear reactor facilities licensed under part 52 of this chapter prior to initial commencement... Office of New Reactors. The Office of New Reactors— (a) Develops, promulgates and implements regulations...

10 CFR 1.44 - Office of New Reactors.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... 10 Energy 1 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Office of New Reactors. 1.44 Section 1.44 Energy NUCLEAR... safeguarding of nuclear reactor facilities licensed under part 52 of this chapter prior to initial commencement... Office of New Reactors. The Office of New Reactors— (a) Develops, promulgates and implements regulations...

10 CFR 1.44 - Office of New Reactors.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... 10 Energy 1 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Office of New Reactors. 1.44 Section 1.44 Energy NUCLEAR... safeguarding of nuclear reactor facilities licensed under part 52 of this chapter prior to initial commencement... Office of New Reactors. The Office of New Reactors— (a) Develops, promulgates and implements regulations...

International Safeguards and the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Olsen, Khris B.; Smith, Leon E.; Frazar, Sarah L.

Established in 1965, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory’s (PNNL) strong technical ties and shared heritage with the nearby U.S. Department of Energy Hanford Site were central to the early development of expertise in nuclear fuel cycle signatures, separations chemistry, plutonium chemistry, environmental monitoring, modeling and analysis of reactor systems, and nuclear material safeguards and security. From these Hanford origins, PNNL has grown into a multi-program science and engineering enterprise that utilizes this diversity to strengthen the international safeguards regime. Today, PNNL supports the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in its mission to provide assurances to the international community that nations domore » not use nuclear materials and equipment outside of peaceful uses. PNNL also serves in the IAEA’s Network of Analytical Laboratories (NWAL) by providing analysis of environmental samples gathered around the world. PNNL is involved in safeguards research and development activities in support of many U.S. Government programs such as the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Office of Research and Development, NNSA Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control, and the U.S. Support Program to IAEA Safeguards. In addition to these programs, PNNL invests internal resources including safeguards-specific training opportunities for staff, and laboratory-directed research and development funding to further ideas that may grow into new capabilities. This paper and accompanying presentation highlight some of PNNL’s contributions in technology development, implementation concepts and approaches, policy, capacity building, and human capital development, in the field of international safeguards.« less

Improving Transparency in the Reporting of Safeguards Implementation: FY11 Update

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Toomey, Christopher; Odlaug, Christopher S.; Wyse, Evan T.

2011-09-30

In 2008, the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI) indicated that the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR) has not kept pace with the evolution of safeguards and provided the IAEA with a set of recommendations for improvement. The SIR is the primary mechanism for providing an overview of safeguards implementation in a given year and reporting on the annual safeguards findings and conclusions drawn by the Secretariat. As the IAEA transitions to State-level safeguards approaches, SIR reporting must adapt to reflect these evolutionary changes. This evolved report will better reflect the IAEA's transition to amore » more qualitative and information-driven approach, based upon State-as-a-whole considerations. This paper applies SAGSI's recommendations to the development of multiple models for an evolved SIR and finds that an SIR repurposed as a 'safeguards portal' could significantly enhance information delivery, clarity, and transparency. In addition, this paper finds that the 'portal concept' also appears to have value as a standardized information presentation and analysis platform for use by Country Officers, for continuity of knowledge purposes, and the IAEA Secretariat in the safeguards conclusion process. Accompanying this paper is a fully functional prototype of the 'portal' concept, built using commercial software and IAEA Annual Report data and available for viewing at http://safeguardsportal.pnnl.gov.« less

Advanced integrated safeguards using front-end-triggering devices

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Howell, J.A.; Whitty, W.J.

This report addresses potential uses of front-end-triggering devices for enhanced safeguards. Such systems incorporate video surveillance as well as radiation and other sensors. Also covered in the report are integration issues and analysis techniques.

ASNC upgrade for nuclear material accountancy of ACPF

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Seo, Hee; Ahn, Seong-Kyu; Lee, Chaehun; Oh, Jong-Myeong; Yoon, Seonkwang

2018-02-01

A safeguards neutron coincidence counter for nuclear material accountancy of the Advanced spent-fuel Conditioning Process Facility (ACPF), known as the ACP Safeguards Neutron Counter (ASNC), was upgraded to improve its remote-handling and maintenance capabilities. Based on the results of the previous design study, the neutron counter was completely rebuilt, and various detector parameters for neutron coincidence counting (i.e., high-voltage plateau, efficiency profile, dead time, die-away time, gate length, doubles gate fraction, and stability) were experimentally determined. The measurement data showed good agreement with the MCNP simulation results. To the best of the authors' knowledge, the ASNC is the only safeguards neutron coincidence counter in the world that is installed and operated in a hot-cell. The final goals to be achieved were (1) to evaluate the uncertainty level of the ASNC in nuclear material accountancy of the process materials of the oxide-reduction process for spent fuels and (2) to evaluate the applicability of the neutron coincidence counting technique within a strong radiation field (e.g., in a hot-cell environment).

Monte Carlo simulations of safeguards neutron counter for oxide reduction process feed material

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Seo, Hee; Lee, Chaehun; Oh, Jong-Myeong; An, Su Jung; Ahn, Seong-Kyu; Park, Se-Hwan; Ku, Jeong-Hoe

2016-10-01

One of the options for spent-fuel management in Korea is pyroprocessing whose main process flow is the head-end process followed by oxide reduction, electrorefining, and electrowining. In the present study, a well-type passive neutron coincidence counter, namely, the ACP (Advanced spent fuel Conditioning Process) safeguards neutron counter (ASNC), was redesigned for safeguards of a hot-cell facility related to the oxide reduction process. To this end, first, the isotopic composition, gamma/neutron emission yield and energy spectrum of the feed material ( i.e., the UO2 porous pellet) were calculated using the OrigenARP code. Then, the proper thickness of the gammaray shield was determined, both by irradiation testing at a standard dosimetry laboratory and by MCNP6 simulations using the parameters obtained from the OrigenARP calculation. Finally, the neutron coincidence counter's calibration curve for 100- to 1000-g porous pellets, in consideration of the process batch size, was determined through simulations. Based on these simulation results, the neutron counter currently is under construction. In the near future, it will be installed in a hot cell and tested with spent fuel materials.

Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence Measurements on ^237Np for Security and Safeguards Applications

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Angell, C. T.; Joshi, T.; Yee, Ryan; Norman, E. B.; Kulp, W. D.; Warren, G. A.; Korbly, S.; Klimenko, A.; Wilson, C.; Copping, R.; Shuh, D. K.

2009-10-01

The smuggling of nuclear material and the diversion of fissile material for covert weapon programs both present grave risks to world security. Methods are needed to detect nuclear material smuggled in cargo, and for proper material accountability in civilian fuel re-processing facilities. Nuclear resonance fluorescence (NRF) is a technique that can address both needs. It is a non-destructive active interrogation method that provides isotope-specific information. It works by using a γ-ray beam to resonantly excite levels in a nucleus and observing the γ-rays emitted whose energy and intensity are characteristic of that isotope. ^237Np presents significant safeguard challenges; it is fissile yet currently has fewer safeguard restrictions. NRF measurements on ^237Np will expand the nuclear database and will permit designing interrogation and assay systems. Measurements were made using the bremsstrahlung beam at the HVRL at MIT on a 7 g target of ^237Np with two incident electron energies of 2.8 and 3.1 MeV. Results will be presented with discussion of the relevant nuclear structure necessary to predict levels in other actinides.

DOE/DHS INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEM CYBER SECURITY PROGRAMS: A MODEL FOR USE IN NUCLEAR FACILITY SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Robert S. Anderson; Mark Schanfein; Trond Bjornard

2011-07-01

Many critical infrastructure sectors have been investigating cyber security issues for several years especially with the help of two primary government programs. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National SCADA Test Bed and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Control Systems Security Program have both implemented activities aimed at securing the industrial control systems that operate the North American electric grid along with several other critical infrastructure sectors (ICS). These programs have spent the last seven years working with industry including asset owners, educational institutions, standards and regulating bodies, and control system vendors. The programs common mission is tomore » provide outreach, identification of cyber vulnerabilities to ICS and mitigation strategies to enhance security postures. The success of these programs indicates that a similar approach can be successfully translated into other sectors including nuclear operations, safeguards, and security. The industry regulating bodies have included cyber security requirements and in some cases, have incorporated sets of standards with penalties for non-compliance such as the North American Electric Reliability Corporation Critical Infrastructure Protection standards. These DOE and DHS programs that address security improvements by both suppliers and end users provide an excellent model for nuclear facility personnel concerned with safeguards and security cyber vulnerabilities and countermeasures. It is not a stretch to imagine complete surreptitious collapse of protection against the removal of nuclear material or even initiation of a criticality event as witnessed at Three Mile Island or Chernobyl in a nuclear ICS inadequately protected against the cyber threat.« less

Model of a Generic Natural Uranium Conversion Plant ? Suggested Measures to Strengthen International Safeguards

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Raffo-Caiado, Ana Claudia; Begovich, John M; Ferrada, Juan J

This is the final report that closed a joint collaboration effort between DOE and the National Nuclear Energy Commission of Brazil (CNEN). In 2005, DOE and CNEN started a collaborative effort to evaluate measures that can strengthen the effectiveness of international safeguards at a natural uranium conversion plant (NUCP). The work was performed by DOE s Oak Ridge National Laboratory and CNEN. A generic model of a NUCP was developed and typical processing steps were defined. Advanced instrumentation and techniques for verification purposes were identified and investigated. The scope of the work was triggered by the International Atomic Energy Agencymore » s 2003 revised policy concerning the starting point of safeguards at uranium conversion facilities. Prior to this policy only the final products of the uranium conversion plant were considered to be of composition and purity suitable for use in the nuclear fuel cycle and therefore, subject to the IAEA safeguards control. DOE and CNEN have explored options for implementing the IAEA policy, although Brazil understands that the new policy established by the IAEA is beyond the framework of the Quadripartite Agreement of which it is one of the parties, together with Argentina, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) and the IAEA. Two technical papers on this subject were published at the 2005 and 2008 INMM Annual Meetings.« less

Delayed Gamma-ray Spectroscopy for Safeguards Applications

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Mozin, Vladimir

The delayed gamma-ray assay technique utilizes an external neutron source (D-D, D-T, or electron accelerator-driven), and high-resolution gamma-ray spectrometers to perform characterization of SNM materials behind shielding and in complex configurations such as a nuclear fuel assembly. High-energy delayed gamma-rays (2.5 MeV and above) observed following the active interrogation, provide a signature for identification of specific fissionable isotopes in a mixed sample, and determine their relative content. Potential safeguards applications of this method are: 1) characterization of fresh and spent nuclear fuel assemblies in wet or dry storage; 2) analysis of uranium enrichment in shielded or non-characterized containers or inmore » the presence of a strong radioactive background and plutonium contamination; 3) characterization of bulk and waste and product streams at SNM processing plants. Extended applications can include warhead confirmation and warhead dismantlement confirmation in the arms control area, as well as SNM diagnostics for the emergency response needs. In FY16 and prior years, the project has demonstrated the delayed gamma-ray measurement technique as a robust SNM assay concept. A series of empirical and modeling studies were conducted to characterize its response sensitivity, develop analysis methodologies, and analyze applications. Extensive experimental tests involving weapons-grade Pu, HEU and depleted uranium samples were completed at the Idaho Accelerator Center and LLNL Dome facilities for various interrogation time regimes and effects of the neutron source parameters. A dedicated delayed gamma-ray response modeling technique was developed and its elements were benchmarked in representative experimental studies, including highresolution gamma-ray measurements of spent fuel at the CLAB facility in Sweden. The objective of the R&D effort in FY17 is to experimentally demonstrate the feasibility of the delayed gamma-ray interrogation of shielded SNM samples with portable neutron sources suitable for field applications.« less

49 CFR 195.575 - Which facilities must I electrically isolate and what inspections, tests, and safeguards are...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-10-01

... reasonable to foresee fault currents or an unusual risk of lightning, you must protect the pipeline against... metallic structures, unless you electrically interconnect and cathodically protect the pipeline and the... isolation of a portion of a pipeline is necessary to facilitate the application of corrosion control. (c...

49 CFR 195.575 - Which facilities must I electrically isolate and what inspections, tests, and safeguards are...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-10-01

... reasonable to foresee fault currents or an unusual risk of lightning, you must protect the pipeline against... metallic structures, unless you electrically interconnect and cathodically protect the pipeline and the... isolation of a portion of a pipeline is necessary to facilitate the application of corrosion control. (c...

49 CFR 195.575 - Which facilities must I electrically isolate and what inspections, tests, and safeguards are...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-10-01

... reasonable to foresee fault currents or an unusual risk of lightning, you must protect the pipeline against... metallic structures, unless you electrically interconnect and cathodically protect the pipeline and the... isolation of a portion of a pipeline is necessary to facilitate the application of corrosion control. (c...

Wayfinding: a quality factor in human design approach to healthcare facilities.

PubMed

Del Nord, R

1999-01-01

The specific aim of this paper is the systematic analysis of interactions and reciprocal conditions existing between the physical space of hospital buildings and the different categories of individuals that come in contact with them. The physical and environmental facilities of hospital architecture often influence the therapeutic character of space and the employees. If the values of the individual are to be safeguarded in this context, priority needs to be given to such factors as communication, privacy, etc. This would mean the involvement of other professional groups such as psychologists, sociologists, ergonomists, etc. at the hospital building planning stage. This paper will outline the result of some research conducted at the University Research Center "TESIS" of Florence to provide better understanding of design strategies applied to reduce the pathology of spaces within the healthcare environment. The case studies will highlight the parameters and the possible architectural solutions to wayfinding and the humanization of spaces, with particular emphasis on lay-outs, technologies, furniture and finishing design.

An Operator Perspective from a Facility Evaluation of an RFID-Based UF6 Cylinder Accounting and Tracking System

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Martyn, Rose; Fitzgerald, Peter; Stehle, Nicholas D

An operational field test of a Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID) system for tracking and accounting UF6 cylinders was conducted at the Global Nuclear Fuel Americas (GNF) fuel fabrication plant in 2009. The Cylinder Accountability and Tracking System (CATS) was designed and deployed by Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and evaluated in cooperation with GNF. The system required that passive RFID be attached to several UF6 30B cylinders as they were received at the site; then the cylinders were tracked as they proceeded to interim storage, to processing in an autoclave, and eventually to disposition from the site. This CATS deployment alsomore » provided a direct integration of scale data from the site accountability scales. The integration of this information into the tracking data provided an attribute for additional safeguards for evaluation. The field test provided insight into the advantages and challenges of using RFID at an operating nuclear facility. The RFID system allowed operators to interact with the technology and demonstrated the survivability of the tags and reader equipment in the process environment. This paper will provide the operator perspective on utilizing RFID technology for locating cylinders within the facility, thereby tracking the cylinders for process and for Material Control & Accounting functions. The paper also will present the operator viewpoint on RFID implemented as an independent safeguards system.« less

Training in Tbilisi nuclear facility provides new sampling perspectives for IAEA inspectors

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Brim, Cornelia P.

2016-06-08

Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control- (NPAC-) sponsored training in a “cold” nuclear facility in Tbilisi, Georgia provides International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors with a new perspective on environmental sampling strategies. Sponsored by the Nuclear Safeguards program under the NPAC, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) experts have been conducting an annual weeklong class for IAEA inspectors in a closed nuclear facility since 2011. The Andronikashvili Institute of Physics and the Republic of Georgia collaborate with PNNL to provide the training, and the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Embassy in Tbilisi and the U.S. Mission to International Organizations inmore » Vienna provide logistical support.« less

Ion Mobility Spectrometer Field Test

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Smith, Nicholas; McLain, Derek; Steeb, Jennifer

The Morpho Saffran Itemizer 4DX Ion Mobility Spectrometer previously used to detect uranium signatures in FY16 was used at the former New Brunswick Facility, a past uranium facility located on site at Argonne National Laboratory. This facility was chosen in an attempt to detect safeguards relevant signatures and has a history of processing uranium at various enrichments, chemical forms, and purities; various chemicals such as nitric acid, uranium fluorides, phosphates and metals are present at various levels. Several laboratories were sampled for signatures of nuclear activities around the laboratory. All of the surfaces that were surveyed were below background levelsmore » of the radioanalytical instrumentation and determined to be radiologically clean.« less

PWR and BWR spent fuel assembly gamma spectra measurements

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Vaccaro, S.; Tobin, S. J.; Favalli, A.; Grogan, B.; Jansson, P.; Liljenfeldt, H.; Mozin, V.; Hu, J.; Schwalbach, P.; Sjöland, A.; Trellue, H.; Vo, D.

2016-10-01

A project to research the application of nondestructive assay (NDA) to spent fuel assemblies is underway. The research team comprises the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), embodied by the European Commission, DG Energy, Directorate EURATOM Safeguards; the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company (SKB); two universities; and several United States national laboratories. The Next Generation of Safeguards Initiative-Spent Fuel project team is working to achieve the following technical goals more easily and efficiently than in the past using nondestructive assay measurements of spent fuel assemblies: (1) verify the initial enrichment, burnup, and cooling time of facility declaration; (2) detect the diversion or replacement of pins, (3) estimate the plutonium mass, (4) estimate the decay heat, and (5) determine the reactivity of spent fuel assemblies. This study focuses on spectrally resolved gamma-ray measurements performed on a diverse set of 50 assemblies [25 pressurized water reactor (PWR) assemblies and 25 boiling water reactor (BWR) assemblies]; these same 50 assemblies will be measured with neutron-based NDA instruments and a full-length calorimeter. Given that encapsulation/repository and dry storage safeguards are the primarily intended applications, the analysis focused on the dominant gamma-ray lines of 137Cs, 154Eu, and 134Cs because these isotopes will be the primary gamma-ray emitters during the time frames of interest to these applications. This study addresses the impact on the measured passive gamma-ray signals due to the following factors: burnup, initial enrichment, cooling time, assembly type (eight different PWR and six different BWR fuel designs), presence of gadolinium rods, and anomalies in operating history. To compare the measured results with theory, a limited number of ORIGEN-ARP simulations were performed.

PWR and BWR spent fuel assembly gamma spectra measurements

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Vaccaro, S.; Tobin, Stephen J.; Favalli, Andrea

A project to research the application of nondestructive assay (NDA) to spent fuel assemblies is underway. The research team comprises the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), embodied by the European Commission, DG Energy, Directorate EURATOM Safeguards; the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company (SKB); two universities; and several United States national laboratories. The Next Generation of Safeguards Initiative–Spent Fuel project team is working to achieve the following technical goals more easily and efficiently than in the past using nondestructive assay measurements of spent fuel assemblies: (1) verify the initial enrichment, burnup, and cooling time of facility declaration; (2) detectmore » the diversion or replacement of pins, (3) estimate the plutonium mass, (4) estimate the decay heat, and (5) determine the reactivity of spent fuel assemblies. This study focuses on spectrally resolved gamma-ray measurements performed on a diverse set of 50 assemblies [25 pressurized water reactor (PWR) assemblies and 25 boiling water reactor (BWR) assemblies]; these same 50 assemblies will be measured with neutron-based NDA instruments and a full-length calorimeter. Given that encapsulation/repository and dry storage safeguards are the primarily intended applications, the analysis focused on the dominant gamma-ray lines of 137Cs, 154Eu, and 134Cs because these isotopes will be the primary gamma-ray emitters during the time frames of interest to these applications. This study addresses the impact on the measured passive gamma-ray signals due to the following factors: burnup, initial enrichment, cooling time, assembly type (eight different PWR and six different BWR fuel designs), presence of gadolinium rods, and anomalies in operating history. As a result, to compare the measured results with theory, a limited number of ORIGEN-ARP simulations were performed.« less

PWR and BWR spent fuel assembly gamma spectra measurements

DOE PAGES

Vaccaro, S.; Tobin, Stephen J.; Favalli, Andrea; ...

2016-07-17

A project to research the application of nondestructive assay (NDA) to spent fuel assemblies is underway. The research team comprises the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), embodied by the European Commission, DG Energy, Directorate EURATOM Safeguards; the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company (SKB); two universities; and several United States national laboratories. The Next Generation of Safeguards Initiative–Spent Fuel project team is working to achieve the following technical goals more easily and efficiently than in the past using nondestructive assay measurements of spent fuel assemblies: (1) verify the initial enrichment, burnup, and cooling time of facility declaration; (2) detectmore » the diversion or replacement of pins, (3) estimate the plutonium mass, (4) estimate the decay heat, and (5) determine the reactivity of spent fuel assemblies. This study focuses on spectrally resolved gamma-ray measurements performed on a diverse set of 50 assemblies [25 pressurized water reactor (PWR) assemblies and 25 boiling water reactor (BWR) assemblies]; these same 50 assemblies will be measured with neutron-based NDA instruments and a full-length calorimeter. Given that encapsulation/repository and dry storage safeguards are the primarily intended applications, the analysis focused on the dominant gamma-ray lines of 137Cs, 154Eu, and 134Cs because these isotopes will be the primary gamma-ray emitters during the time frames of interest to these applications. This study addresses the impact on the measured passive gamma-ray signals due to the following factors: burnup, initial enrichment, cooling time, assembly type (eight different PWR and six different BWR fuel designs), presence of gadolinium rods, and anomalies in operating history. As a result, to compare the measured results with theory, a limited number of ORIGEN-ARP simulations were performed.« less

Nonproliferation Uncertainties, a Major Barrier to Used Nuclear Fuel Recycle in the United States

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Collins, Emory D; Ehinger, Michael H

2011-01-01

A study and comparison of the goals and understandings of nonproliferation authorities with those of used nuclear fuel (UNF) recycle advocates have uncovered (1) some of the basic reasons for the creation of uncertainties by each of the parties, (2) why these uncertainties have become a major barrier to a decision to recycle UNF components in the United States, and (3) what steps can be taken to clarify these uncertainties. Recent papers and viewpoints expressed by nonproliferation authorities and technical consultants were reviewed, summarized, and compared with results of recent fuel cycle systems analyses made at Oak Ridge National Laboratory.more » 1 Similarities and differences were identified, including both technical and policy factors. Nonproliferation authorities and a few UNF recycle advocates have recognized that the reprocessing technologies used for UNF component recycle do not offer significant nonproliferation differences; thus, the methods used can be chosen on some other basis, such as process efficiency, maturity, and/or economics. This paper reviews the safeguards implications beyond the simple assessment of UNF recycle technology selection. Differences in understanding that led to uncertainty barriers to UNF recycle include (1) the vulnerability of unseparated UNF, (2) the effects of time factors on production and accumulation of fissile plutonium isotopes and decay of the ?self-protecting radiation barrier,? (3) the chemistry of UNF components and relative ease of separation, and (4) the significant differences in commercialscale ?safeguards-by-design? UNF recycle facilities and smaller-scale covert operations. Application of safeguards-by-design and engineered safeguards can provide the defense-in-depth necessary for sufficient safeguards. Establishing these requirements for governing acceptable commercial UNF component recycle is essential.« less

KSC-04pd1653

NASA Image and Video Library

2004-08-05

KENNEDY SPACE CENTER, FLA. - Dave Saleeba, assistant administrator with the Office of Security Management and Safeguards at NASA Headquarters, speaks to guests at the ribbon cutting for the Enhanced Firing Range on Schwartz Rd. at Kennedy Space Center. NASA’s Federal Law Enforcement Training Academy’s firing range has been upgraded to include a “rifle-grade” shoot house, a portable, tactical “shoot-back” trailer for cover and concealment drills, automated running targets and a new classroom facility. They are added to the existing three firearms ranges, “pistol-grade” shoot house, obstacle course and rappel tower. NASA’s Security Management and Safeguards Office funded the enhancements in order to improve ability to train the KSC security force and to support local, state and federal law enforcement agencies in Homeland Security.

OR14-V-Uncertainty-PD2La Uncertainty Quantification for Nuclear Safeguards and Nondestructive Assay Final Report

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Nicholson, Andrew D.; Croft, Stephen; McElroy, Robert Dennis

2017-08-01

The various methods of nondestructive assay (NDA) of special nuclear material (SNM) have applications in nuclear nonproliferation, including detection and identification of illicit SNM at border crossings and quantifying SNM at nuclear facilities for safeguards. No assay method is complete without “error bars,” which provide one way of expressing confidence in the assay result. Consequently, NDA specialists typically provide error bars and also partition total uncertainty into “random” and “systematic” components so that, for example, an error bar can be developed for the total mass estimate in multiple items. Uncertainty Quantification (UQ) for NDA has always been important, but itmore » is recognized that greater rigor is needed and achievable using modern statistical methods.« less

Spent fuel measurements. passive neutron albedo reactivity (PNAR) and photon signatures

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Eigenbrodt, Julia; Menlove, Howard Olsen

2016-03-29

The International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) safeguards technical objective is the timely detection of a diversion of a significant quantity of nuclear material from peaceful activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection. An important IAEA task towards meeting this objective is the ability to accurately and reliably measure spent nuclear fuel (SNF) to verify reactor operating parameters and verify that the fuel has not been removed from reactors or SNF storage facilities. This dissertation analyzes a method to improvemore » the state-of-the-art of nuclear material safeguards measurements using two combined measurement techniques: passive neutron albedo reactivity (PNAR) and passive spectral photon measurements.« less

Downgrade of the Savannah River Sites FB-Line

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

SADOWSKI, ED; YOURCHAK, RANDY; PRETZELLO MARJI

2005-07-05

This paper will discuss the Safeguards & Security (S&S) activities that resulted in the downgrade of the Savannah River Site's FB-Line (FBL) from a Category I Material Balance Area (MBA) in a Material Access Area (MAA) to a Category IV MBA in a Property Protection Area (PPA). The Safeguards activities included measurement of final product items, transferal of nuclear material to other Savannah River Site (SRS) facilities, discard of excess nuclear material items, and final measurements of holdup material. The Security activities included relocation and destruction of classified documents and repositories, decertification of a classified computer, access control changes, updatesmore » to planning documents, deactivation and removal of security systems, Human Reliability Program (HRP) removals, and information security training for personnel that will remain in the FBL PPA.« less

The US Support Program to IAEA Safeguards Priority of Training and Human Resources

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Queirolo,A.

2008-06-13

The U.S. Support Program to IAEA Safeguards (USSP) priority of training and human resources is aimed at providing the Department of Safeguards with an appropriate mixture of regular staff and extrabudgetary experts who are qualified to meet the IAEA's technical needs and to provide personnel with appropriate instruction to improve the technical basis and specific skills needed to perform their job functions. The equipment and methods used in inspection activities are unique, complex, and evolving. New and experienced safeguards inspectors need timely and effective training to perform required tasks and to learn new skills prescribed by new safeguards policies ormore » agreements. The role of the inspector has changed from that of strictly an accountant to include that of a detective. New safeguards procedures are being instituted, and therefore, experienced inspectors must be educated on these new procedures. The USSP also recognizes the need for training safeguards support staff, particularly those who maintain and service safeguards equipment (SGTS), and those who perform information collection and analysis (SGIM). The USSP is committed to supporting the IAEA with training to ensure the effectiveness of all staff members and will continue to offer its assistance in the development and delivery of basic, refresher, and advanced training courses. This paper will discuss the USSP ongoing support in the area of training and IAEA staffing.« less

LANL robotics site overview

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Beugelsdijk, T.J.

1990-11-01

This paper reports on robotics applications at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. The topics of the paper include the ROBOCAL project to assay all nuclear materials entering and leaving the process floor at the Los Alamos Plutonium Facility, the isotope detector fabrication project, a plutonium dissolution robotic system, a safeguards waste automated measurement instrument, and DNA filter array construction. This report consists of overheads only.

10 CFR Appendix Q to Part 50 - Pre-Application Early Review of Site Suitability Issues

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 10 Energy 1 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Pre-Application Early Review of Site Suitability Issues Q... FACILITIES Pt. 50, App. Q Appendix Q to Part 50—Pre-Application Early Review of Site Suitability Issues This... Reactor Safeguards of requests for early review of one or more site suitability issues relating to the...

10 CFR Appendix Q to Part 50 - Pre-Application Early Review of Site Suitability Issues

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 10 Energy 1 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Pre-Application Early Review of Site Suitability Issues Q... FACILITIES Pt. 50, App. Q Appendix Q to Part 50—Pre-Application Early Review of Site Suitability Issues This... Reactor Safeguards of requests for early review of one or more site suitability issues relating to the...

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Keepin, G.R.

Over the years the Los Alamos safeguards program has developed, tested, and implemented a broad range of passive and active nondestructive analysis (NDA) instruments (based on gamma and x-ray detection and neutron counting) that are now widely employed in safeguarding nuclear materials of all forms. Here very briefly, the major categories of gamma ray and neutron based NDA techniques, give some representative examples of NDA instruments currently in use, and cite a few notable instances of state-of-the-art NDA technique development. Historical aspects and a broad overview of the safeguards program are also presented.

"Safeguarding" Sports Coaching: Foucault, Genealogy and Critique

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Garratt, Dean; Piper, Heather; Taylor, Bill

2013-01-01

This paper offers a genealogical account of safeguarding in sport. Drawing specifically on Foucault's work, it examines the "politics of touch" in relation to the social and historical formation of child protection policy in sports coaching. While the analysis has some resonance with the context of coaching as a whole, for illustrative…

KSC-04pd1655

NASA Image and Video Library

2004-08-05

KENNEDY SPACE CENTER, FLA. - At the ribbon cutting for the Enhanced Firing Range on Schwartz Rd. at Kennedy Space Center, Dave Saleeba practices firing on the new range. Saleeba is assistant administrator with the Office of Security Management and Safeguards at NASA Headquarters and was a guest speaker at the ceremony. NASA’s Federal Law Enforcement Training Academy’s firing range has been upgraded to include a “rifle-grade” shoot house, a portable, tactical “shoot-back” trailer for cover and concealment drills, automated running targets and a new classroom facility. They are added to the existing three firearms ranges, “pistol-grade” shoot house, obstacle course and rappel tower. NASA’s Security Management and Safeguards Office funded the enhancements in order to improve ability to train the KSC security force and to support local, state and federal law enforcement agencies in Homeland Security.

NACA Zero Power Reactor Facility Hazards Summary

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

1957-01-01

The Lewis Flight Propulsion Laboratory of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics proposes to build a zero power research reactor facility which will be located in the laboratory grounds near Clevelaurd, Ohio. The purpose of this report is to inform the Advisory Commit tee on Reactor Safeguards of the U. S. Atomic Energy Commission in re gard to the design of the reactor facility, the cha,acteristics of th e site, and the hazards of operation at this location, The purpose o f this reactor is to perform critical experiments, to measure reactiv ity effects, to serve as a neutron source, and to serve as a training tool. The reactor facility is described. This is followed by a discu ssion of the nuclear characteristics and the control system. Site cha racteristics are then discussed followed by a discussion of the exper iments which may be conducted in the facility. The potential hazards of the facility are then considered, particularly, the maximum credib le accident. Finally, the administrative procedure is discussed.

Combating Terrorism: The Legality, Utility and Morality of Coercion

DTIC Science & Technology

2012-03-20

Terrorism (GWOT). These techniques … became confused at Abu Ghraib and were implemented without proper authorities or safeguards.”29 In short, the... Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th Military Intelligence Brigade (Unclassified), 8. 30 Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency, 108. The most dangerous...Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18 USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT COMBATING TERRORISM : THE LEGALITY, UTILITY AND MORALITY OF

Development of self-interrogation neutron resonance densitometry (sinrd) to measure the fissile content in nuclear fuel

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

LaFleur, Adrienne Marie

The development of non-destructive assay (NDA) capabilities to directly measure the fissile content in spent fuel is needed to improve the timely detection of the diversion of significant quantities of fissile material. Currently, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) does not have effective NDA methods to verify spent fuel and recover continuity of knowledge in the event of a containment and surveillance systems failure. This issue has become increasingly critical with the worldwide expansion of nuclear power, adoption of enhanced safeguards criteria for spent fuel verification, and recent efforts by the IAEA to incorporate an integrated safeguards regime. In order to address these issues, the use of Self-Interrogation Neutron Resonance Densitometry (SINRD) has been developed to improve existing nuclear safeguards and material accountability measurements. The following characteristics of SINRD were analyzed: (1) ability to measure the fissile content in Light Water Reactors (LWR) fuel assemblies and (2) sensitivity and penetrability of SINRD to the removal of fuel pins from an assembly. The Monte Carlo Neutral Particle eXtended (MCNPX) transport code was used to simulate SINRD for different geometries. Experimental measurements were also performed with SINRD and were compared to MCNPX simulations of the experiment to verify the accuracy of the MCNPX model of SINRD. Based on the results from these simulations and measurements, we have concluded that SINRD provides a number of improvements over current IAEA verification methods. These improvements include: (1) SINRD provides absolute measurements of burnup independent of the operator's declaration. (2) SINRD is sensitive to pin removal over the entire burnup range and can verify the diversion of 6% of fuel pins within 3o from LWR spent LEU and MOX fuel. (3) SINRD is insensitive to the boron concentration and initial fuel enrichment and can therefore be used at multiple spent fuel storage facilities. (4) The calibration of SINRD at one reactor facility carries over to reactor sites in different countries because it uses the ratio of fission chambers (FCs) that are not facility dependent. (5) SINRD can distinguish fresh and 1-cycle spent MOX fuel from 3- and 4-cycles spent LEU fuel without using reactor burnup codes.

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Harris, L.; Owel, W.R.

This paper discusses the VISA (Vulnerability of Integrated Safeguards Analysis) method, developed in 1976-77 for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and which has been adapted more recently to a broader range of uses. The performance of VISA systems is evaluated in terms of how they perform as an integrated safeguards/security system. The resulting method has been designated VISA-2. 7 refs.

Material Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT): Modeling and Simulation Roadmap

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Cipiti, Benjamin; Dunn, Timothy; Durbin, Samual

The development of sustainable advanced nuclear fuel cycles is a long-term goal of the Office of Nuclear Energy’s (DOE-NE) Fuel Cycle Technologies program. The Material Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) campaign is supporting research and development (R&D) of advanced instrumentation, analysis tools, and integration methodologies to meet this goal. This advanced R&D is intended to facilitate safeguards and security by design of fuel cycle facilities. The lab-scale demonstration of a virtual facility, distributed test bed, that connects the individual tools being developed at National Laboratories and university research establishments, is a key program milestone for 2020. These tools willmore » consist of instrumentation and devices as well as computer software for modeling. To aid in framing its long-term goal, during FY16, a modeling and simulation roadmap is being developed for three major areas of investigation: (1) radiation transport and sensors, (2) process and chemical models, and (3) shock physics and assessments. For each area, current modeling approaches are described, and gaps and needs are identified.« less

The changing face of Hanford security 1990--1994

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Thielman, J.

The meltdown of the Cold War was a shock to the systems built to cope with it. At the DOE`s Hanford Site in Washington State, a world-class safeguards and security system was suddenly out of step with the times. The level of protection for nuclear and classified materials was exceptional. But the cost was high and the defense facilities that funded security were closing down. The defense mission had created an umbrella of security over the sprawling Hanford Site. Helicopters designed to ferry special response teams to any trouble spot on the 1,456 square-kilometer site made the umbrella analogy almostmore » literally true. Facilities were grouped into areas, fenced off like a military base, and entrance required a badge check for everyone. Within the fence, additional rings of protection were set up around security interests or targets. The security was effective, but costly to operate and inconvenient for employees and visitors alike. Moreover, the umbrella meant that virtually all employees needed a security clearance just to get to work, whether they worked on classified or unclassified projects. Clearly, some fundamental rethinking of safeguards and security was needed. The effort to meet that challenge is the story of transition at Hanford and documented here.« less

KSC-04pd1654

NASA Image and Video Library

2004-08-05

KENNEDY SPACE CENTER, FLA. - At the ribbon cutting for the Enhanced Firing Range on Schwartz Rd. at Kennedy Space Center, Dave Saleeba (left with weapon) and Center Director Jim Kennedy (right, with weapon) practice firing on the new range. Saleeba is assistant administrator with the Office of Security Management and Safeguards at NASA Headquarters and was a guest speaker at the ceremony. NASA’s Federal Law Enforcement Training Academy’s firing range has been upgraded to include a “rifle-grade” shoot house, a portable, tactical “shoot-back” trailer for cover and concealment drills, automated running targets and a new classroom facility. They are added to the existing three firearms ranges, “pistol-grade” shoot house, obstacle course and rappel tower. NASA’s Security Management and Safeguards Office funded the enhancements in order to improve ability to train the KSC security force and to support local, state and federal law enforcement agencies in Homeland Security.

KSC-04PD-1654

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

2004-01-01

KENNEDY SPACE CENTER, FLA. At the ribbon cutting for the Enhanced Firing Range on Schwartz Rd. at Kennedy Space Center, Dave Saleeba (left with weapon) and Center Director Jim Kennedy (right, with weapon) practice firing on the new range. Saleeba is assistant administrator with the Office of Security Management and Safeguards at NASA Headquarters and was a guest speaker at the ceremony. NASAs Federal Law Enforcement Training Academys firing range has been upgraded to include a rifle-grade shoot house, a portable, tactical shoot-back trailer for cover and concealment drills, automated running targets and a new classroom facility. They are added to the existing three firearms ranges, pistol-grade shoot house, obstacle course and rappel tower. NASAs Security Management and Safeguards Office funded the enhancements in order to improve ability to train the KSC security force and to support local, state and federal law enforcement agencies in Homeland Security.

RH-LLW Disposal Facility Project CD-2/3 to Design/Build Proposal Reconciliation Report

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Annette L. Schafer

2012-06-01

A reconciliation plan was developed and implemented to address potential gaps and responses to gaps between the design/build vendor proposals and the Critical Decision-2/3 approval request package for the Remote-Handled Low Level Waste Disposal Facility Project. The plan and results of the plan implementation included development of a reconciliation team comprised of subject matter experts from Battelle Energy Alliance and the Department of Energy Idaho Operations Office, identification of reconciliation questions, reconciliation by the team, identification of unresolved/remaining issues, and identification of follow-up actions and subsequent approvals of responses. The plan addressed the potential for gaps to exist in themore » following areas: • Department of Energy Order 435.1, “Radioactive Waste Management,” requirements, including the performance assessment, composite analysis, monitoring plan, performance assessment/composite analysis maintenance plan, and closure plan • Environmental assessment supporting the National Environmental Policy Act • Nuclear safety • Safeguards and security • Emplacement operations • Requirements for commissioning • General project implementation. The reconciliation plan and results of the plan implementation are provided in a business-sensitive project file. This report provides the reconciliation plan and non-business sensitive summary responses to identified gaps.« less

International Internships in Nuclear Safeguards and Security: Challenges and Successes

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Duncan, Cristen L.; Heinberg, Cynthia L.; Killinger, Mark H.

2010-04-20

All students in the Russian safeguards and security degree programs at the National Research Nuclear University MEPhI and Tomsk Polytechnic University, sponsored by the Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A) Education Project, take part in a domestic internship at a Russian enterprise or facility. In addition, a select few students are placed in an international internship. These internships provide students with a better view of how MPC&A and nonproliferation in general are addressed outside of Russia. The possibility of an international internship is a significant incentive for students to enroll in the safeguards and security degree programs. The U.S. membersmore » of the MPC&A Education Project team interview students who have been nominated by their professors. These students must have initiative and reasonable English skills. The project team and professors then select students to be tentatively placed in various international internships during the summer or fall of their final year of study. Final arrangements are then made with the host organizations. This paper describes the benefits of the joint United States/Russia cooperation for next-generation workforce development, some of the international internships that have been carried out, the benefits of these international internships, and lessons learned in implementing them.« less

Improvement of INVS Measurement Uncertainty for Pu and U-Pu Nitrate Solution

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Swinhoe, Martyn Thomas; Menlove, Howard Olsen; Marlow, Johnna Boulds

2017-04-27

In the Tokai Reprocessing Plant (TRP) and the Plutonium Conversion Development Facility (PCDF), a large amount of plutonium nitrate solution which is recovered from light water reactor (LWR) and advanced thermal reactor (ATR), FUGEN are being stored. Since the solution is designated as a direct use material, the periodical inventory verification and flow verification are being conducted by Japan Safeguard Government Office (JSGO) and International Atomic Agency (IAEA).

Comparison of experimental results of a Quad-CZT array detector, a NaI(Tl), a LaBr3(Ce), and a HPGe for safeguards applications

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Kwak, S.-W.; Choi, J.; Park, S. S.; Ahn, S. H.; Park, J. S.; Chung, H.

2017-11-01

A compound semiconductor detector, CdTe (or CdZnTe), has been used in various areas including nuclear safeguards applications. To address its critical drawback, low detection efficiency, which leads to a long measurement time, a Quad-CZT array-based gamma-ray spectrometer in our previous study has been developed by combining four individual CZT detectors. We have re-designed the developed Quad-CZT array system to make it more simple and compact for a hand-held gamma-ray detector. The objective of this paper aims to compare the improved Quad-CZT array system with the traditional gamma-ray spectrometers (NaI(Tl), LaBr3(Ce), HPGe); these detectors currently have been the most commonly used for verification of nuclear materials. Nuclear materials in different physical forms in a nuclear facility of Korea were measured by the Quad-CZT array system and the existing gamma-ray detectors. For measurements of UO2 pellets and powders, and fresh fuel rods, the Quad-CZT array system turned out to be superior to the NaI(Tl) and LaBr3(Ce). For measurements of UF6 cylinders with a thick wall, the Quad-CZT array system and HPGe gave similar accuracy under the same measurement time. From the results of the field tests conducted, we can conclude that the improved Quad-CZT array system would be used as an alternative to HPGes and scintillation detectors for the purpose of increasing effectivenss and efficiency of safeguards applications. This is the first paper employing a multi-element CZT array detector for measurement of nuclear materials—particularly uranium in a UF6 cylinder—in a real nuclear facility. The present work also suggests that the multi-CZT array system described in this study would be one promising method to address a serious weakness of CZT-based radiation detection.

Secure Video Surveillance System (SVSS) for unannounced safeguards inspections.

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Galdoz, Erwin G.; Pinkalla, Mark

2010-09-01

The Secure Video Surveillance System (SVSS) is a collaborative effort between the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC). The joint project addresses specific requirements of redundant surveillance systems installed in two South American nuclear facilities as a tool to support unannounced inspections conducted by ABACC and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The surveillance covers the critical time (as much as a few hours) between the notification of an inspection and the access of inspectors to the location in facility where surveillance equipment is installed.more » ABACC and the IAEA currently use the EURATOM Multiple Optical Surveillance System (EMOSS). This outdated system is no longer available or supported by the manufacturer. The current EMOSS system has met the project objective; however, the lack of available replacement parts and system support has made this system unsustainable and has increased the risk of an inoperable system. A new system that utilizes current technology and is maintainable is required to replace the aging EMOSS system. ABACC intends to replace one of the existing ABACC EMOSS systems by the Secure Video Surveillance System. SVSS utilizes commercial off-the shelf (COTS) technologies for all individual components. Sandia National Laboratories supported the system design for SVSS to meet Safeguards requirements, i.e. tamper indication, data authentication, etc. The SVSS consists of two video surveillance cameras linked securely to a data collection unit. The collection unit is capable of retaining historical surveillance data for at least three hours with picture intervals as short as 1sec. Images in .jpg format are available to inspectors using various software review tools. SNL has delivered two SVSS systems for test and evaluation at the ABACC Safeguards Laboratory. An additional 'proto-type' system remains at SNL for software and hardware testing. This paper will describe the capabilities of the new surveillance system, application and requirements, and the design approach.« less

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Rowe, Nathan C; Younkin, James R; Pickett, Chris A

Radio-Frequency (RF) devices have revolutionized many aspects of modern industrial processes. RF technology can enable wireless communication for tag identification, sensor communication, and asset tracking. Radio-frequency identification (RFID) is a technology that utilizes wireless communication to interrogate and identify an electronic tag attached to an item in order to identify the item. The technology can come in many forms: passive or active tags, low to ultra-wideband frequencies, small paper-thin tags to brick-sized units, and simple tags or highly integrated sensor packages. RF technology, and specifically RFID, has been applied widely in commercial markets for inventory, supply chain management, and assetmore » tracking. Several recent studies have demonstrated the safeguards benefits of utilizing RFID versus conventional inventory tagging methods for tracking nuclear material. These studies have indicated that the RF requirements for safeguards functions are more stringent than the RF requirements for other inventory tracking and accounting applications. Additionally, other requirements must be addressed, including environmental and operating conditions, authentication, and tag location and attachment. Facility restrictions on radio spectrum, method of tag attachment, and sensitivity of the data collected impact the tag selection and system design. More important, the intended use of the system must be considered. The requirements for using RF to simply replace or supplement container identifiers such as bar codes that facilitate the inventory function will differ greatly from the requirements for deploying RF for unattended monitoring applications. Several studies have investigated these considerations to advance commercial RF devices for safeguards use, and a number of system concepts have been developed. This paper will provide an overview of past studies and current technologies, and will investigate the requirements, existing gaps, and several potential next steps for advancing RF techniques for safeguards use.« less

Beyond the permissibility of embryonic and stem cell research: substantive requirements and procedural safeguards.

PubMed

Isasi, Rosario M; Knoppers, Bartha M

2006-10-01

This report provides a comparative analysis of the regulation of embryonic stem cells and cloning research in 50 countries. The development of international stem cell consortia involving the exchange of materials, data and knowledge presumes 'policy know-how' on the varying positions and governing regulations of the various partners; knowledge is essential for the feasibility of such international collaborative projects. Across the spectrum of restrictive-to-liberal policies, requirements regarding the justification for or the setting of substantive limits on (i) embryo use and/or (ii) destruction in research are often present. These goals justify the regulation, the control and even the prohibition of embryonic stem cell and cloning research. Moreover, irrespective of whether a country adopts a restrictive or a liberal approach, there is significant symmetry in both the substantive and the procedural requirements. Procedural safeguards provide another layer of protection and control over the research. In reality, such safeguards may have a greater systemic impact than the substantive requirements. They can be subdivided into three broad categories: (i) safeguards relating to the stage of embryonic development, (ii) safeguards relating to the donors of blastocysts, gametes, embryos and somatic cells and (iii) requirements for research governance.

Cloud computing can simplify HIT infrastructure management.

PubMed

Glaser, John

2011-08-01

Software as a Service (SaaS), built on cloud computing technology, is emerging as the forerunner in IT infrastructure because it helps healthcare providers reduce capital investments. Cloud computing leads to predictable, monthly, fixed operating expenses for hospital IT staff. Outsourced cloud computing facilities are state-of-the-art data centers boasting some of the most sophisticated networking equipment on the market. The SaaS model helps hospitals safeguard against technology obsolescence, minimizes maintenance requirements, and simplifies management.

Development of a Compton camera for safeguards applications in a pyroprocessing facility

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Park, Jin Hyung; Kim, Young Su; Kim, Chan Hyeong; Seo, Hee; Park, Se-Hwan; Kim, Ho-Dong

2014-11-01

The Compton camera has a potential to be used for localizing nuclear materials in a large pyroprocessing facility due to its unique Compton kinematics-based electronic collimation method. Our R&D group, KAERI, and Hanyang University have made an effort to develop a scintillation-detector-based large-area Compton camera for safeguards applications. In the present study, a series of Monte Carlo simulations was performed with Geant4 in order to examine the effect of the detector parameters and the feasibility of using a Compton camera to obtain an image of the nuclear material distribution. Based on the simulation study, experimental studies were performed to assess the possibility of Compton imaging in accordance with the type of the crystal. Two different types of Compton cameras were fabricated and tested with a pixelated type of LYSO (Ce) and a monolithic type of NaI(Tl). The conclusions of this study as a design rule for a large-area Compton camera can be summarized as follows: 1) The energy resolution, rather than position resolution, of the component detector was the limiting factor for the imaging resolution, 2) the Compton imaging system needs to be placed as close as possible to the source location, and 3) both pixelated and monolithic types of crystals can be utilized; however, the monolithic types, require a stochastic-method-based position-estimating algorithm for improving the position resolution.

Determining initial enrichment, burnup, and cooling time of pressurized-water reactor spent fuel assemblies by analyzing passive gamma spectra measured at the Clab interim-fuel storage facility in Sweden

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Favalli, Andrea; Vo, D.; Grogan, Brandon R.

The purpose of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI)–Spent Fuel (SF) project is to strengthen the technical toolkit of safeguards inspectors and/or other interested parties. The NGSI–SF team is working to achieve the following technical goals more easily and efficiently than in the past using nondestructive assay measurements of spent fuel assemblies: (1) verify the initial enrichment, burnup, and cooling time of facility declaration; (2) detect the diversion or replacement of pins; (3) estimate the plutonium mass [which is also a function of the variables in (1)]; (4) estimate the decay heat; and (5) determine the reactivity of spent fuelmore » assemblies. Since August 2013, a set of measurement campaigns has been conducted at the Central Interim Storage Facility for Spent Nuclear Fuel (Clab), in collaboration with Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company (SKB). One purpose of the measurement campaigns was to acquire passive gamma spectra with high-purity germanium and lanthanum bromide scintillation detectors from Pressurized Water Reactor and Boiling Water Reactor spent fuel assemblies. The absolute 137Cs count rate and the 154Eu/ 137Cs, 134Cs/ 137Cs, 106Ru/ 137Cs, and 144Ce/ 137Cs isotopic ratios were extracted; these values were used to construct corresponding model functions (which describe each measured quantity’s behavior over various combinations of burnup, cooling time, and initial enrichment) and then were used to determine those same quantities in each measured spent fuel assembly. Furthermore, the results obtained in comparison with the operator declared values, as well as the methodology developed, are discussed in detail in the paper.« less

Determining initial enrichment, burnup, and cooling time of pressurized-water reactor spent fuel assemblies by analyzing passive gamma spectra measured at the Clab interim-fuel storage facility in Sweden

DOE PAGES

Favalli, Andrea; Vo, D.; Grogan, Brandon R.; ...

2016-02-26

The purpose of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI)–Spent Fuel (SF) project is to strengthen the technical toolkit of safeguards inspectors and/or other interested parties. The NGSI–SF team is working to achieve the following technical goals more easily and efficiently than in the past using nondestructive assay measurements of spent fuel assemblies: (1) verify the initial enrichment, burnup, and cooling time of facility declaration; (2) detect the diversion or replacement of pins; (3) estimate the plutonium mass [which is also a function of the variables in (1)]; (4) estimate the decay heat; and (5) determine the reactivity of spent fuelmore » assemblies. Since August 2013, a set of measurement campaigns has been conducted at the Central Interim Storage Facility for Spent Nuclear Fuel (Clab), in collaboration with Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company (SKB). One purpose of the measurement campaigns was to acquire passive gamma spectra with high-purity germanium and lanthanum bromide scintillation detectors from Pressurized Water Reactor and Boiling Water Reactor spent fuel assemblies. The absolute 137Cs count rate and the 154Eu/ 137Cs, 134Cs/ 137Cs, 106Ru/ 137Cs, and 144Ce/ 137Cs isotopic ratios were extracted; these values were used to construct corresponding model functions (which describe each measured quantity’s behavior over various combinations of burnup, cooling time, and initial enrichment) and then were used to determine those same quantities in each measured spent fuel assembly. Furthermore, the results obtained in comparison with the operator declared values, as well as the methodology developed, are discussed in detail in the paper.« less

An Assessment of the Attractiveness of Material Associated with a MOX Fuel Cycle from a Safeguards Perspective

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Bathke, Charles G; Wallace, Richard K; Ireland, John R

2009-01-01

This paper is an extension to earlier studies that examined the attractiveness of materials mixtures containing special nuclear materials (SNM) and alternate nuclear materials (ANM) associated with the PUREX, UREX, coextraction, THOREX, and PYROX reprocessing schemes. This study extends the figure of merit (FOM) for evaluating attractiveness to cover a broad range of proliferant State and sub-national group capabilities. This study also considers those materials that will be recycled and burned, possibly multiple times, in LWRs [e.g., plutonium in the form of mixed oxide (MOX) fuel]. The primary conclusion of this study is that all fissile material needs to bemore » rigorously safeguarded to detect diversion by a State and provided the highest levels of physical protection to prevent theft by sub-national groups; no 'silver bullet' has been found that will permit the relaxation of current international safeguards or national physical security protection levels. This series of studies has been performed at the request of the United States Department of Energy (DOE) and is based on the calculation of 'attractiveness levels' that are expressed in terms consistent with, but normally reserved for nuclear materials in DOE nuclear facilities. The expanded methodology and updated findings are presented. Additionally, how these attractiveness levels relate to proliferation resistance and physical security are discussed.« less

AN ASSESSMENT OF THE ATTRACTIVENESS OF MATERIAL ASSOCIATED WITH A MOX FUEL CYCLE FROM A SAFEGUARDS PERSPECTIVE

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Bathke, C. G.; Ebbinghaus, B. B.; Sleaford, Brad W.

2009-07-09

This paper is an extension to earlier studies [1,2] that examined the attractiveness of materials mixtures containing special nuclear materials (SNM) and alternate nuclear materials (ANM) associated with the PUREX, UREX, coextraction, THOREX, and PYROX reprocessing schemes. This study extends the figure of merit (FOM) for evaluating attractiveness to cover a broad range of proliferant State and sub-national group capabilities. This study also considers those materials that will be recycled and burned, possibly multiple times, in LWRs [e.g., plutonium in the form of mixed oxide (MOX) fuel]. The primary conclusion of this study is that all fissile material needs tomore » be rigorously safeguarded to detect diversion by a State and provided the highest levels of physical protection to prevent theft by sub-national groups; no “silver bullet” has been found that will permit the relaxation of current international safeguards or national physical security protection levels. This series of studies has been performed at the request of the United States Department of Energy (DOE) and is based on the calculation of "attractiveness levels" that are expressed in terms consistent with, but normally reserved for nuclear materials in DOE nuclear facilities [3]. The expanded methodology and updated findings are presented. Additionally, how these attractiveness levels relate to proliferation resistance and physical security are discussed.« less

An analytical chemistry laboratory's experiences under Department of Energy Order 5633. 3 - a status report

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Bingham, C.D.

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) order 5633.3, Control and Accountability of Nuclear Materials, initiated substantial changes to the requirements for operations involving nuclear materials. In the opinion of this author, the two most significant changes are the clarification of and the increased emphasis on the concept of graded safeguards and the implementation of performance requirements. Graded safeguards recognizes that some materials are more attractive than others to potential adversary actions and, thus, should be afforded a higher level of integrated safeguards effort. An analytical chemistry laboratory, such as the New Brunswick Laboratory (NBL), typically has a small total inventorymore » of special nuclear materials compared to, for example, a production or manufacturing facility. The NBL has a laboratory information management system (LIMS) that not only provides the sample identification and tracking but also incorporates the essential features of MC A required of NBL operations. As a consequence of order 5633.3, NBL had to modify LIMS to accommodate material attractiveness information for the logging process, to reflect changes in the attractiveness as the material was processed through the laboratory, and to enable inventory information to be accumulated by material attractiveness as the material was processed through the laboratory, and to enable inventory information to be accumulated by material attractiveness codes.« less

ANA position statement on privatization and for-profit conversion. American Nurses Association.

PubMed

1998-01-01

The American Nurses Association (ANA) believes that the health of communities benefits from a mix of health care facilities, including both public and nonprofit private facilities where feasible. ANA is concerned by the rate of conversion of nonprofit facilities and plans to for-profit status. Privatization of public facilities and the conversion of nonprofit facilities and health plans to for-profit status requires careful public oversight to ensure continued access to affordable, quality services, including a maintenance of uncompensated care; a fair accounting of the assets of the entity being privatized or converted; and an assurance that converted assets are used to maintain and improve access to affordable, safe and quality health care services. The rights and benefits of employees must be carefully safe-guarded in any privatization or conversion move. All hospitals, regardless of ownership or tax status, should be held accountable for the delivery of safe, quality services, and should be required to disclose data regarding staffing, patient outcomes, cost and delivery of uncompensated care. Continued data collection will be necessary to guide further development of public policy to address privatization and for-profit conversion.

Acoustical criteria for hospital patient rooms: Resolving competing requirements

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Brooks, Bennett M.

2003-10-01

The acoustical criteria for patient rooms in hospitals, nursing homes, and rehabilitation facilities may be based on several needs. One important requirement is that noise levels in the room be conducive to restful sleep. Also, caregivers must have easy auditory and visual access to the patients, and be able to hear vital sign monitor alarms. This often means that patient rooms are located near central nurse stations and that patient room doors are left open. Further, the recently published federal privacy standards developed by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HSS) under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) require that ``appropriate physical safeguards'' be put in place to protect the confidentiality of patient health information. The simultaneous and competing requirements for speech privacy, caregiver access, and good sleeping conditions present a serious acoustical challenge to health care facility designers. Specific facility design issues and potential solution strategies are presented.

The USGS National Wildlife Health Center: Advancing wildlife and ecosystem health

USGS Publications Warehouse

Moede Rogall, Gail; Sleeman, Jonathan M.

2017-01-11

In 1975, the Federal government responded to the need for establishing national expertise in wildlife health by creating the National Wildlife Health Center (NWHC), a facility within the Department of the Interior; the NWHC is the only national center dedicated to wildlife disease detection, control, and prevention. Its mission is to provide national leadership to safeguard wildlife and ecosystem health through active partnerships and exceptional science. Comparisons are often made between the NWHC, which strives to protect the health of our Nation’s wildlife, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), which strive to protect public health. The NWHC, a science center of the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) with specialized laboratories, works to safeguard the Nation’s wildlife from diseases by studying the causes and drivers of these threats, and by developing strategies to prevent and manage them. In addition to the main campus, located in Madison, Wisconsin, the NWHC also operates the Honolulu Field Station that addresses wildlife health issues in Hawaii and the Pacific Region.

Toxicological safeguards in the manned Mars missions

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Coleman, Martin E.

1986-01-01

Safeguards against toxic chemical exposures during manned Mars missions (MMMs) will be important for the maintenance of crew health and the accomplishment of mission objectives. Potential sources include offgassing, thermodegradation or combustion of materials, metabolic products of crew members, and escape of chemical from containment. Spacecraft maximum allowable concentration (SMAC) limits will have to be established for potential contaminants during the MMMs. The following factors will be used in establishing these limits: duration of mission, simultaneous exposure to other contaminants, deconditioning of crew members after long periods of reduced gravity, and simultaneous exposure to ionizing radiation. Atmospheric contaminant levels in all compartments of the transit spacecraft and Manned Mars Station (MMS) will be monitored at frequent intervals with a real time analyzer. This analyzer will be highly automated, requiring minimal crew time and expertise. The atmospheric analyzer will find other usages during the MMMs such as analyzing Martian atmospheres and soils, exhaled breath and body fluids of crew members, and reaction products in chemical processing facilities.

Precision Information Environment (PIE) for International Safeguards: Pre-Demonstration Development Use Cases

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Gastelum, Zoe N.; Henry, Michael J.

2013-11-13

In FY2013, the PIE International Safeguards team demonstrated our development progress to U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) staff from the Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24, our client) and the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development (NA-22). Following the demonstration, the team was asked by our client to complete additional development prior to a planned demonstration at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), scheduled tentatively for January or spring of 2014. The team discussed four potential areas for development (in priority order), and will develop them as time and funding permit prior to an IAEA demonstration. Themore » four capability areas are: 1. Addition of equipment manuals to PIE-accessible files 2. Optical character recognition (OCR) of photographed text 3. Barcode reader with information look-up from a database 4. Add Facilities to Data Model 5. Geospatial capabilities with information integration Each area will be described below in a use case.« less

Minor isotope safeguards techniques (MIST): Analysis and visualization of gas centrifuge enrichment plant process data using the MSTAR model

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Shephard, Adam M.; Thomas, Benjamin R.; Coble, Jamie B.; Wood, Houston G.

2018-05-01

This paper presents a development related to the use of minor isotope safeguards techniques (MIST) and the MSTAR cascade model as it relates to the application of international nuclear safeguards at gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs). The product of this paper is a derivation of the universal and dimensionless MSTAR cascade model. The new model can be used to calculate the minor uranium isotope concentrations in GCEP product and tails streams or to analyze, visualize, and interpret GCEP process data as part of MIST. Applications of the new model include the detection of undeclared feed and withdrawal streams at GCEPs when used in conjunction with UF6 sampling and/or other isotopic measurement techniques.

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Pepper S. E.; Carbonaro J.; Hoffheins, B

The U.S. Support Program to IAEA Safeguards (USSP) has funded more than 25 Junior Professional Officer (JPO) positions in the IAEA Department of Safeguards since 2005. JPOs are college graduates with zero to two years’ work experience who work alongside experienced IAEA staff members for one to two years and assist with basic, yet essential work while obtaining valuable experience. They contribute to equipment development, testing, integration, open source information collection and analysis, and software and database development. This paper will study the trends in career progression for the JPOs who have completed assignments with the IAEA in the Departmentmore » of Safeguards. Brookhaven National Laboratory, in its role in managing the USSP, has compiled information that can be analyzed for this purpose.« less

A generalized method for characterization of 235U and 239Pu content using short-lived fission product gamma spectroscopy

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Knowles, Justin; Skutnik, Steven; Glasgow, David; Kapsimalis, Roger

2016-10-01

Rapid nondestructive assay methods for trace fissile material analysis are needed in both nuclear forensics and safeguards communities. To address these needs, research at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory High Flux Isotope Reactor Neutron Activation Analysis facility has developed a generalized nondestructive assay method to characterize materials containing fissile isotopes. This method relies on gamma-ray emissions from short-lived fission products and makes use of differences in fission product yields to identify fissile compositions of trace material samples. Although prior work has explored the use of short-lived fission product gamma-ray measurements, the proposed method is the first to provide a complete characterization of isotopic identification, mass ratios, and absolute mass determination. Successful single fissile isotope mass recoveries of less than 6% recovery bias have been conducted on standards of 235U and 239Pu as low as 12 ng in less than 10 minutes. Additionally, mixtures of fissile isotope standards containing 235U and 239Pu have been characterized as low as 198 ng of fissile mass with less than 7% recovery bias. The generalizability of this method is illustrated by evaluating different fissile isotopes, mixtures of fissile isotopes, and two different irradiation positions in the reactor. It is anticipated that this method will be expanded to characterize additional fissile nuclides, utilize various irradiation facilities, and account for increasingly complex sample matrices.

Characteristics of suicide hotspots on the Belgian railway network.

PubMed

Debbaut, Kevin; Krysinska, Karolina; Andriessen, Karl

2014-01-01

In 2004, railway suicide accounted for 5.3% of all suicides in Belgium. In 2008, Infrabel (Manager of the Belgian Railway Infrastructure) introduced a railway suicide prevention programme, including identification of suicide hotspots, i.e., areas of the railway network with an elevated incidence of suicide. The study presents an analysis of 43 suicide hotspots based on Infrabel data collected during field visits and semi-structured interviews conducted in mental health facilities in the vicinity of the hotspots. Three major characteristics of the hotspots were accessibility, anonymity, and vicinity of a mental health institution. The interviews identified several risk and protective factors for railway suicide, including the training of staff, introduction of a suicide prevention policy, and the role of the media. In conclusion, a comprehensive railway suicide prevention programme should continuously safeguard and monitor hotspots, and should be embedded in a comprehensive suicide prevention programme in the community.

Feasibility study of a gamma camera for monitoring nuclear materials in the PRIDE facility

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Jo, Woo Jin; Kim, Hyun-Il; An, Su Jung; Lee, Chae Young; Song, Han-Kyeol; Chung, Yong Hyun; Shin, Hee-Sung; Ahn, Seong-Kyu; Park, Se-Hwan

2014-05-01

The Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) has been developing pyroprocessing technology, in which actinides are recovered together with plutonium. There is no pure plutonium stream in the process, so it has an advantage of proliferation resistance. Tracking and monitoring of nuclear materials through the pyroprocess can significantly improve the transparency of the operation and safeguards. An inactive engineering-scale integrated pyroprocess facility, which is the PyRoprocess Integrated inactive DEmonstration (PRIDE) facility, was constructed to demonstrate engineering-scale processes and the integration of each unit process. the PRIDE facility may be a good test bed to investigate the feasibility of a nuclear material monitoring system. In this study, we designed a gamma camera system for nuclear material monitoring in the PRIDE facility by using a Monte Carlo simulation, and we validated the feasibility of this system. Two scenarios, according to locations of the gamma camera, were simulated using GATE (GEANT4 Application for Tomographic Emission) version 6. A prototype gamma camera with a diverging-slat collimator was developed, and the simulated and experimented results agreed well with each other. These results indicate that a gamma camera to monitor the nuclear material in the PRIDE facility can be developed.

[Atomic Energy Control Board] annual report 1997--1998. Research report number INFO-9999-1 (in English;French)

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

NONE

1998-11-01

The Board`s mission is to ensure that the use of nuclear energy in Canada does not pose undue risk to health, safety, security and the environment. The annual report of the Board presents information on regulatory requirements; nuclear facilities, from uranium mines to nuclear power plants and related operations; regulation of nuclear materials; radioactive waste management; compliance monitoring; research; non-proliferation, safeguards and security; international activities, and public information. A financial statement is also included.

Device costs go under the knife. With four hospitals having won HHS' approval for gain-sharing to shave supply costs, some observers say it's just the beginning.

PubMed

Becker, Cinda

2005-02-21

HHS' inspector general's office recently had some good news for four hospitals--they can use gain-sharing programs to help cut spending on devices. Joane Goodroe, left, is the consultant who helped the facilities devise proposals with safeguards that could satisfy the feds' worries about violating antikickback laws. "This is about paying physicians to take on the extra job of of reducing costs," Goodroe says.

Shock Test Program. Shock Isolation Design Manual for SAFEGUARD TSE Systems and Equipment.

DTIC Science & Technology

1973-08-01

under the direction of the Huntsville Division, Corps of Engineers. Much of the information in Part I and Part II is extracted from " Development of...49 3.2.2 Configuration Development 1-50 3.2.3 Suspension Arrangements 1-51 TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) Page 3.2.4 Platform Design 1-56 3.2.5 Elastic...shock isolation systems were considered in the design of the early NIKE-X facilities. As more descriptive prediction methods were developed and employed

Technical Training Workshop on International Safeguards: An Introduction to Safeguards for Emerging Nuclear States

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Frazar, Sarah L.; Gastelum, Zoe N.; Olson, Jarrod

2009-10-06

The U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) hosted a workshop from May 4-22, 2009, on the fundamental elements of international safeguards. Entitled "A Technical Training Workshop on International Safeguards," the workshop introduced post-graduate students from Malaysia, Vietnam, Indonesia, Thailand, Morocco, Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia to the fundamental issues and best practices associated with international safeguards and encouraged them to explore potential career paths in safeguards. Workshops like these strengthen the international safeguards regime by promoting the development of a "safeguards culture" among young nuclear professionals within nascent nuclear countries. While this concept of safeguards culture is sometimes hardmore » to define and even harder to measure, this paper will demonstrate that the promotion of safeguards cultures through workshops like these justifies the investment of U.S. taxpayer dollars.« less

The feasibility of introducing an adult safeguarding measure for inclusion in the Adult Social Care Outcomes Framework (ASCOF): findings from a pilot study.

PubMed

Norrie, Caroline; Manthorpe, Jill; Cartwright, Cher; Rayat, Pritpal

2016-06-30

There are currently no national measures in England reporting the experiences of people who have been involved with adult safeguarding services following concerns that they may be at risk of abuse or neglect. The Health and Social Care Information Centre (HSCIC) aimed to develop a new adult safeguarding outcome measure (survey) for local authorities (LAs) that could be added to the Adult Social Care Outcomes Framework (ASCOF). The ASCOF is a national collection of social care outcomes performance indicators collected from the perspective of people receiving partial or total funding from a LA for care services. An outcome measure (a face-to-face interview based survey consisting of 7 questions) was piloted in 40 LAs with 382 adults at risk (or their representative) who had been the subject of a safeguarding investigation. The aim was to investigate the feasibility of the survey in three domains: i) if a statistically representative sample of adults at risk (or their family, friend, carer or advocate) could be recruited; ii) analysis of survey responses and its acceptability to participants iii) feedback from LAs about the survey's administration. Overall the survey results met statistical confidence; however the individual results for adults at risk did not, due to the high proportion of representatives who responded because adults at risk were unable. Responses to the survey were generally positive; 72 % of participants felt that the help received during the safeguarding investigation had made them or the adult at risk (if reporting as a proxy) feel 'quite a bit' or 'a lot safer'. These results are the most robust data collected in England on the perspectives of adults at risk and their representatives on safeguarding services. Participants reported they appreciated being asked for feedback. LAs suggested survey administration improvements. This survey is one way LAs can meet their new legal requirement under the Care Act 2014 to 'seek feedback' from adults at risk about adult safeguarding services. The survey findings provide the first robust evidence that safeguarding services in the main meet their goals of promoting feelings of safety among adults at risk.

Sensitivity analysis of high resolution gamma-ray detection for safeguards monitoring at natural uranium conversion facilities

DOE PAGES

Dewji, Shaheen A.; Croft, Stephen; Hertel, Nolan E.

2016-12-16

Under the policies proposed by recent International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) circulars and policy papers, implementation of safeguards exists when any purified aqueous uranium solution or uranium oxides suitable for isotopic enrichment or fuel fabrication exists. Under IAEA Policy Paper 18, the starting point for nuclear material under safeguards was reinterpreted, suggesting that purified uranium compounds should be subject to safeguards procedures no later than the first point in the conversion process. In response to this technical need, a combination of simulation models and experimental measurements were employed in previous work to develop and validate gamma-ray nondestructive assay monitoring systemsmore » in a natural uranium conversion plant (NUCP). In particular, uranyl nitrate (UO 2(NO 3) 2) solution exiting solvent extraction was identified as a key measurement point (KMP). Passive nondestructive assay techniques using high resolution gamma-ray spectroscopy were evaluated to determine their viability as a technical means for drawing safeguards conclusions at NUCPs, and if the IAEA detection requirements of 1 significant quantity (SQ) can be met in a timely manner. Building upon the aforementioned previous validation work on detector sensitivity to varying concentrations of uranyl nitrate via a series of dilution measurements, this work investigates detector response parameter sensitivities to gamma-ray signatures of uranyl nitrate. The full energy peak efficiency of a detection system is dependent upon the sample, geometry, absorption, and intrinsic efficiency parameters. Perturbation of these parameters translates into corresponding variations of the 185.7 keV peak area of the 235U in uranyl nitrate. Such perturbations in the assayed signature impact the quality or versatility of the safeguards conclusions drawn. Given the potentially high throughput of uranyl nitrate in NUCPs, the ability to assay 1 SQ of material requires uncertainty «1%. Accounting for material self-shielding properties, pipe thickness, and source-detector orientation is instrumental in determining the robustness of gamma-ray detection in the process monitoring of uranyl nitrate in NUCPs. Monte Carlo models and ray-tracing models were employed to determine the sensitivity of the detected 185.7 keV photon to self-shielding properties, pipe thickness, and source-detector geometry. Considering the implementation of the detection of 1 SQ, diversion of 1 SQ becomes essentially undetectable given the systematic uncertainty, in addition to considerations such as propagating uncertainties due to pipe offset/position, as well as minor variations in pipe thickness. Consequently, pipe thickness was the most sensitive variable in affecting full energy efficiency of the 185.7 keV signature peak with up to 8% variation in efficiency for ±0.5 mm changes in Schedule 40 304L stainless steel piping. Furthermore, computation of the attenuation correction factor of the uranyl nitrate solution [CF(AT) (i.e. εsample)] using Parker's method using with the approximation for the geometrical factor κ≈π/4 was validated through experimental, Monte Carlo and ray-tracing calculations for a uranyl nitrate filled transfer pipe segment. Furthermore, quantifying sensitivity in detector position, as well as voiding effects due to bubbly flow or laminar flow with an air gap in the uranyl nitrate becomes increasingly important as considerations from (static) design-scale measurements translate into (dynamic) field operations tests.« less

Sensitivity analysis of high resolution gamma-ray detection for safeguards monitoring at natural uranium conversion facilities

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Dewji, Shaheen A.; Croft, Stephen; Hertel, Nolan E.

Under the policies proposed by recent International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) circulars and policy papers, implementation of safeguards exists when any purified aqueous uranium solution or uranium oxides suitable for isotopic enrichment or fuel fabrication exists. Under IAEA Policy Paper 18, the starting point for nuclear material under safeguards was reinterpreted, suggesting that purified uranium compounds should be subject to safeguards procedures no later than the first point in the conversion process. In response to this technical need, a combination of simulation models and experimental measurements were employed in previous work to develop and validate gamma-ray nondestructive assay monitoring systemsmore » in a natural uranium conversion plant (NUCP). In particular, uranyl nitrate (UO 2(NO 3) 2) solution exiting solvent extraction was identified as a key measurement point (KMP). Passive nondestructive assay techniques using high resolution gamma-ray spectroscopy were evaluated to determine their viability as a technical means for drawing safeguards conclusions at NUCPs, and if the IAEA detection requirements of 1 significant quantity (SQ) can be met in a timely manner. Building upon the aforementioned previous validation work on detector sensitivity to varying concentrations of uranyl nitrate via a series of dilution measurements, this work investigates detector response parameter sensitivities to gamma-ray signatures of uranyl nitrate. The full energy peak efficiency of a detection system is dependent upon the sample, geometry, absorption, and intrinsic efficiency parameters. Perturbation of these parameters translates into corresponding variations of the 185.7 keV peak area of the 235U in uranyl nitrate. Such perturbations in the assayed signature impact the quality or versatility of the safeguards conclusions drawn. Given the potentially high throughput of uranyl nitrate in NUCPs, the ability to assay 1 SQ of material requires uncertainty «1%. Accounting for material self-shielding properties, pipe thickness, and source-detector orientation is instrumental in determining the robustness of gamma-ray detection in the process monitoring of uranyl nitrate in NUCPs. Monte Carlo models and ray-tracing models were employed to determine the sensitivity of the detected 185.7 keV photon to self-shielding properties, pipe thickness, and source-detector geometry. Considering the implementation of the detection of 1 SQ, diversion of 1 SQ becomes essentially undetectable given the systematic uncertainty, in addition to considerations such as propagating uncertainties due to pipe offset/position, as well as minor variations in pipe thickness. Consequently, pipe thickness was the most sensitive variable in affecting full energy efficiency of the 185.7 keV signature peak with up to 8% variation in efficiency for ±0.5 mm changes in Schedule 40 304L stainless steel piping. Furthermore, computation of the attenuation correction factor of the uranyl nitrate solution [CF(AT) (i.e. εsample)] using Parker's method using with the approximation for the geometrical factor κ≈π/4 was validated through experimental, Monte Carlo and ray-tracing calculations for a uranyl nitrate filled transfer pipe segment. Furthermore, quantifying sensitivity in detector position, as well as voiding effects due to bubbly flow or laminar flow with an air gap in the uranyl nitrate becomes increasingly important as considerations from (static) design-scale measurements translate into (dynamic) field operations tests.« less

Sensitivity analysis of high resolution gamma-ray detection for safeguards monitoring at natural uranium conversion facilities

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Dewji, S. A.; Croft, S.; Hertel, N. E.

2017-03-01

Under the policies proposed by recent International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) circulars and policy papers, implementation of safeguards exists when any purified aqueous uranium solution or uranium oxides suitable for isotopic enrichment or fuel fabrication exists. Under IAEA Policy Paper 18, the starting point for nuclear material under safeguards was reinterpreted, suggesting that purified uranium compounds should be subject to safeguards procedures no later than the first point in the conversion process. In response to this technical need, a combination of simulation models and experimental measurements were employed in previous work to develop and validate gamma-ray nondestructive assay monitoring systems in a natural uranium conversion plant (NUCP). In particular, uranyl nitrate (UO2(NO3)2) solution exiting solvent extraction was identified as a key measurement point (KMP). Passive nondestructive assay techniques using high resolution gamma-ray spectroscopy were evaluated to determine their viability as a technical means for drawing safeguards conclusions at NUCPs, and if the IAEA detection requirements of 1 significant quantity (SQ) can be met in a timely manner. Building upon the aforementioned previous validation work on detector sensitivity to varying concentrations of uranyl nitrate via a series of dilution measurements, this work investigates detector response parameter sensitivities to gamma-ray signatures of uranyl nitrate. The full energy peak efficiency of a detection system is dependent upon the sample, geometry, absorption, and intrinsic efficiency parameters. Perturbation of these parameters translates into corresponding variations of the 185.7 keV peak area of the 235U in uranyl nitrate. Such perturbations in the assayed signature impact the quality or versatility of the safeguards conclusions drawn. Given the potentially high throughput of uranyl nitrate in NUCPs, the ability to assay 1 SQ of material requires uncertainty «1%. Accounting for material self-shielding properties, pipe thickness, and source-detector orientation is instrumental in determining the robustness of gamma-ray detection in the process monitoring of uranyl nitrate in NUCPs. Monte Carlo models and ray-tracing models were employed to determine the sensitivity of the detected 185.7 keV photon to self-shielding properties, pipe thickness, and source-detector geometry. Considering the implementation of the detection of 1 SQ, diversion of 1 SQ becomes essentially undetectable given the systematic uncertainty, in addition to considerations such as propagating uncertainties due to pipe offset/position, as well as minor variations in pipe thickness. Consequently, pipe thickness was the most sensitive variable in affecting full energy efficiency of the 185.7 keV signature peak with up to 8% variation in efficiency for ±0.5 mm changes in Schedule 40 304L stainless steel piping. Furthermore, computation of the attenuation correction factor of the uranyl nitrate solution [CF(AT) (i.e. εsample)] using Parker's method using with the approximation for the geometrical factor κ≈π/4 was validated through experimental, Monte Carlo and ray-tracing calculations for a uranyl nitrate filled transfer pipe segment. Quantifying sensitivity in detector position, as well as voiding effects due to bubbly flow or laminar flow with an air gap in the uranyl nitrate becomes increasingly important as considerations from (static) design-scale measurements translate into (dynamic) field operations tests.

Biosecurity and Health Monitoring at the Zebrafish International Resource Center

PubMed Central

Varga, Zoltán M.; Kent, Michael L.

2016-01-01

Abstract The Zebrafish International Resource Center (ZIRC) is a repository and distribution center for mutant, transgenic, and wild-type zebrafish. In recent years annual imports of new zebrafish lines to ZIRC have increased tremendously. In addition, after 15 years of research, we have identified some of the most virulent pathogens affecting zebrafish that should be avoided in large production facilities, such as ZIRC. Therefore, while importing a high volume of new lines we prioritize safeguarding the health of our in-house fish colony. Here, we describe the biosecurity and health-monitoring program implemented at ZIRC. This strategy was designed to prevent introduction of new zebrafish pathogens, minimize pathogens already present in the facility, and ensure a healthy zebrafish colony for in-house uses and shipment to customers. PMID:27031282

On-Line Enrichment Monitor (OLEM) Phase II Final Report Techniques and Equipment for Safeguards at Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Younkin, James R.; Garner, James R.

2017-04-01

Over the last five years, OLEM has been a collaborative development effort involving the IAEA, LANL, ORNL, URENCO, and the NNSA. The collective team has completed the following: design and modelling, software development, hardware integration, testing with the ORNL UF6 Flow Loop, a field trial at the Urenco facility in Almelo, the Netherlands, and a Demonstration at the Urenco USA facility in Eunice, New Mexico. This combined effort culminated in the deployment of several OLEM collection nodes in Iran. These OLEM units are one unattended monitoring system component of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action allowing the International Atomic Energymore » Agency to verify Iran’s compliance with the enrichment production aspects of the agreement.« less

The organisation of interagency training to safeguard children in England: a case study using realistic evaluation

PubMed Central

Patsios, Demi; Carpenter, John

2010-01-01

Background Joint training for interagency working is carried out by Local Safeguarding Children Boards in England to promote effective local working to safeguard and promote the welfare of children. Purpose This paper reports on the findings of the outputs and outcomes of interagency training to safeguard children in eight Local Safeguarding Children Boards. Methods A review of Local Safeguarding Children Board documentation, observations of Local Safeguarding Children Board training sub-group meetings and a series of interviews with training key stakeholders in each Local Safeguarding Children Board were used to assess how partner agencies in the Local Safeguarding Children Boards carried out their statutory responsibilities to organise interagency training. ‘Realistic Evaluation’ was used to evaluate the mechanisms by which a central government mandate produced particular inter-agency training outputs (number of courses, training days) and joint working outcomes (effective partnerships), within particular Local Safeguarding Children Board contexts. Results The ‘mandated partnership’ imposed on Local Safeguarding Children Boards by central government left little choice but for partner agencies to work together to deliver joint training, which in turn affected the dynamics of working partnerships across the various sites. The effectiveness of the training sub group determined the success of the organisation and delivery of training for joint working. Despite having a central mandate, Local Safeguarding Children Boards had heterogeneous funding and training arrangements. These resulted in significant variations in the outputs in terms of the number of courses per ‘children in need’ in the locality and in the cost per course. Conclusions Interagency training which takes account of the context of the Local Safeguarding Children Board is more likely to produce better trained staff, effective partnership working, and lead to better integrated safeguarding children services. PMID:21290000

75 FR 44818 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on ESBWR

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-07-29

...-Drop and Thermal-Hydraulic Analysis for ESBWR Fuel Racks,'' NEDC- 33374P, ``Safety Analysis Report for Fuel Storage Racks Criticality Analysis for ESBWR Plants,'' NEDE-33083P, ``TRACG Application for ESBWR...

Fiscal Year 2014 Annual Report on BNLs Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Human Capital Development Activities

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Pepper, Susan E.

2014-10-10

Brookhaven National Laboratory’s (BNL’s) Nonproliferation and National Security Department contributes to the National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Nonproliferation and International Security Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) through university engagement, safeguards internships, safeguards courses, professional development, recruitment, and other activities aimed at ensuring the next generation of international safeguards professionals is adequately prepared to support the U.S. safeguards mission. This report is a summary of BNL s work under the NGSI program in Fiscal Year 2014.

Uranium Enrichment Safeguards

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Demuth, Scott F.; Trahan, Alexis Chanel

2017-06-26

DIV of facility layout, material flows, and other information provided in the DIQ. Material accountancy through an annual PIV and a number of interim inventory verifications, including UF6 cylinder identification and counting, NDA of cylinders, and DA on a sample collection of UF6. Application of C/S technologies utilizing seals and tamper-indicating devices (TIDs) on cylinders, containers, storage rooms, and IAEA instrumentation to provide continuity of knowledge between inspection. Verification of the absence of undeclared material and operations, especially HEU production, through SNRIs, LFUA of cascade halls, and environmental swipe sampling

Developing an SSAC Self-Assessment Tool for Operators and Regulators

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Frazar, Sarah L.; Innes-Jones, Gemma; Hamilton, Ian

Enabling an SSAC to understand why it is performing inefficiently can help it allocate resources more effectively to better support IAEA safeguards implementation. In collaboration with international consulting firm, Environmental Resources Management (ERM) and a U.S. based nuclear fuel cycle facility, the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) has been developing a framework for a future self-assessment tool for nuclear operators and regulators. This paper will describe the effort to date, with particular emphasis on the steps the team took to align the framework with relevant IAEA self-assessment tools.

Safer environment makes sense for all.

PubMed

Frith, Sue

2011-06-01

Sue Frith, deputy head of the NHS Security Management Service (NHS SMS), explains the organisation's important role in advising, and supporting, security staff at NHS hospitals in dealing with incidents ranging from verbal abuse to serious violence and aggression. Arguing that security in the NHS is "everyone's business", she explains both a range of processes and initiatives,already in place to safeguard people and assets, and discusses recent developments, such as a new incident reporting website, designed to help keep patients, staff, visitors, and property, at healthcare facilities safe and secure.

Integrating UF6 Cylinder RF Tracking With Continuous Load Cell Monitoring for Verifying Declared UF6 Feed and Withdrawal Operations Verifying Declared UF6 Feed and Withdrawal Operations

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Krichinsky, Alan M; Miller, Paul; Pickett, Chris A

2009-01-01

Oak Ridge National Laboratory is demonstrating the integration of UF6 cylinder tracking, using RF technology, with continuous load cell monitoring (CLCM) at mock UF6 feed and withdrawal (F&W) stations. CLCM and cylinder tracking are two of several continuous-monitoring technologies that show promise in providing integrated safeguards of F&W operations at enrichment plants. Integrating different monitoring technologies allows advanced, automated event processing to screen innocuous events thereby minimizing false alerts to independent inspectors. Traditionally, international inspectors rely on batch verification of material inputs and outputs derived from operator declarations and periodic on-site inspections at uranium enrichment plants or other nuclear processingmore » facilities. Continuously monitoring F&W activities between inspections while providing filtered alerts of significant operational events will substantially increase the amount of valuable information available to inspectors thereby promising to enhance the effectiveness of safeguards and to improve efficiency in conducting on-site inspections especially at large plants for ensuring that all operations are declared.« less

Succession planning for technical experts

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Kirk, Bernadette Lugue; Cain, Ronald A.; Dewji, Shaheen A.

This report describes a methodology for identifying, evaluating, and mitigating the loss of key technical skills at nuclear operations facilities. The methodology can be adapted for application within regulatory authorities and research and development organizations, and can be directly applied by international engagement partners of the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). The resultant product will be of direct benefit to two types of NNSA missions: (1) domestic human capital development programs tasked to provide focused technical expertise to succeed an aging nuclear operations workforce, and (2) international safeguards programs charged with maintaining operational safeguards for developing/existing nuclearmore » power program in nations where minimal available resources must be used effectively. This report considers succession planning and the critical skills necessary to meet an institution’s goals and mission. Closely tied to succession planning are knowledge management and mentorship. In considering succession planning, critical skill sets are identified and are greatly dependent on the subject matter expert in question. This report also provides examples of critical skills that are job specific.« less

Ultra-High Rate Measurements of Spent Fuel Gamma-Ray Emissions

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Rodriguez, Douglas; Vandevender, Brent; Wood, Lynn; Glasgow, Brian; Taubman, Matthew; Wright, Michael; Dion, Michael; Pitts, Karl; Runkle, Robert; Campbell, Luke; Fast, James

2014-03-01

Presently there are over 200,000 irradiated spent nuclear fuel (SNF) assemblies in the world, each containing a concerning amount of weapons-usable material. Both facility operators and safeguards inspectors want to improve composition determination. Current measurements are expensive and difficult so new methods are developed through models. Passive measurements are limited since a few specific decay products and the associated down-scatter overwhelm the gamma rays of interest. Active interrogation methods produce gamma rays beyond 3 MeV, minimizing the impact of the passive emissions that drop off sharply above this energy. New devices like the Ultra-High Rate Germanium (UHRGe) detector are being developed to advance these novel measurement methods. Designed for reasonable resolution at 106 s-1 output rates (compared to ~ 1 - 10 e 3 s-1 standards), SNF samples were directly measured using UHRGe and compared to models. Model verification further enables using Los Alamos National Laboratory SNF assembly models, developed under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative, to determine emission and signal expectations. Measurement results and future application requirements for UHRGe will be discussed.

An Expert Elicitation of the Proliferation Resistance of Using Small Modular Reactors (SMR) for the Expansion of Civilian Nuclear Systems.

PubMed

Siegel, Jonas; Gilmore, Elisabeth A; Gallagher, Nancy; Fetter, Steve

2018-02-01

To facilitate the use of nuclear energy globally, small modular reactors (SMRs) may represent a viable alternative or complement to large reactor designs. One potential benefit is that SMRs could allow for more proliferation resistant designs, manufacturing arrangements, and fuel-cycle practices at widespread deployment. However, there is limited work evaluating the proliferation resistance of SMRs, and existing proliferation assessment approaches are not well suited for these novel arrangements. Here, we conduct an expert elicitation of the relative proliferation resistance of scenarios for future nuclear energy deployment driven by Generation III+ light-water reactors, fast reactors, or SMRs. Specifically, we construct the scenarios to investigate relevant technical and institutional features that are postulated to enhance the proliferation resistance of SMRs. The experts do not consistently judge the scenario with SMRs to have greater overall proliferation resistance than scenarios that rely on conventional nuclear energy generation options. Further, the experts disagreed on whether incorporating a long-lifetime sealed core into an SMR design would strengthen or weaken proliferation resistance. However, regardless of the type of reactor, the experts judged that proliferation resistance would be enhanced by improving international safeguards and operating several multinational fuel-cycle facilities rather than supporting many more national facilities. © 2017 Society for Risk Analysis.

10 CFR Appendix G to Part 73 - Reportable Safeguards Events

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... vulnerability in a safeguard system that could allow unauthorized or undetected access to a protected area... the safeguards event log. (a) Any failure, degradation, or discovered vulnerability in a safeguards...

Passive gamma analysis of the boiling-water-reactor assemblies

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Vo, D.; Favalli, A.; Grogan, B.; Jansson, P.; Liljenfeldt, H.; Mozin, V.; Schwalbach, P.; Sjöland, A.; Tobin, S.; Trellue, H.; Vaccaro, S.

2016-09-01

This research focused on the analysis of a set of stationary passive gamma measurements taken on the spent nuclear fuel assemblies from a boiling water reactor (BWR) using pulse height analysis data acquisition. The measurements were performed on 25 different BWR assemblies in 2014 at Sweden's Central Interim Storage Facility for Spent Nuclear Fuel (Clab). This study was performed as part of the Next Generation of Safeguards Initiative-Spent Fuel project to research the application of nondestructive assay (NDA) to spent fuel assemblies. The NGSI-SF team is working to achieve the following technical goals more easily and efficiently than in the past using nondestructive assay (NDA) measurements of spent fuel assemblies: (1) verify the initial enrichment, burnup, and cooling time of facility declaration; (2) detect the diversion or replacement of pins, (3) estimate the plutonium mass, (4) estimate the decay heat, and (5) determine the reactivity of spent fuel assemblies. The final objective of this project is to quantify the capability of several integrated NDA instruments to meet the aforementioned goals using the combined signatures of neutrons, gamma rays, and heat. This report presents a selection of the measured data and summarizes an analysis of the results. Specifically, trends in the count rates measured for spectral lines from the following isotopes were analyzed as a function of the declared burnup and cooling time: 137Cs, 154Eu, 134Cs, and to a lesser extent, 106Ru and 144Ce. From these measured count rates, predictive algorithms were developed to enable the estimation of the burnup and cooling time. Furthermore, these algorithms were benchmarked on a set of assemblies not included in the standard assemblies set used by this research team.

Passive gamma analysis of the boiling-water-reactor assemblies

DOE PAGES

Vo, D.; Favalli, A.; Grogan, B.; ...

2016-09-01

This research focused on the analysis of a set of stationary passive gamma measurements taken on the spent nuclear fuel assemblies from a boiling water reactor (BWR) using pulse height analysis data acquisition. The measurements were performed on 25 different BWR assemblies in 2014 at Sweden’s Central Interim Storage Facility for Spent Nuclear Fuel (Clab). This study was performed as part of the Next Generation of Safeguards Initiative–Spent Fuel project to research the application of nondestructive assay (NDA) to spent fuel assemblies. The NGSI–SF team is working to achieve the following technical goals more easily and efficiently than in themore » past using nondestructive assay (NDA) measurements of spent fuel assemblies: (1) verify the initial enrichment, burnup, and cooling time of facility declaration; (2) detect the diversion or replacement of pins, (3) estimate the plutonium mass, (4) estimate the decay heat, and (5) determine the reactivity of spent fuel assemblies. The final objective of this project is to quantify the capability of several integrated NDA instruments to meet the aforementioned goals using the combined signatures of neutrons, gamma rays, and heat. This report presents a selection of the measured data and summarizes an analysis of the results. Specifically, trends in the count rates measured for spectral lines from the following isotopes were analyzed as a function of the declared burnup and cooling time: 137Cs, 154Eu, 134Cs, and to a lesser extent, 106Ru and 144Ce. From these measured count rates, predictive algorithms were developed to enable the estimation of the burnup and cooling time. Furthermore, these algorithms were benchmarked on a set of assemblies not included in the standard assemblies set used by this research team.« less

Onsite Gaseous Centrifuge Enrichment Plant UF6 Cylinder Destructive Analysis

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Anheier, Norman C.; Cannon, Bret D.; Qiao, Hong

2012-07-17

The IAEA safeguards approach for gaseous centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs) includes measurements of gross, partial, and bias defects in a statistical sampling plan. These safeguard methods consist principally of mass and enrichment nondestructive assay (NDA) verification. Destructive assay (DA) samples are collected from a limited number of cylinders for high precision offsite mass spectrometer analysis. DA is typically used to quantify bias defects in the GCEP material balance. Under current safeguards measures, the operator collects a DA sample from a sample tap following homogenization. The sample is collected in a small UF6 sample bottle, then sealed and shipped under IAEAmore » chain of custody to an offsite analytical laboratory. Current practice is expensive and resource intensive. We propose a new and novel approach for performing onsite gaseous UF6 DA analysis that provides rapid and accurate assessment of enrichment bias defects. DA samples are collected using a custom sampling device attached to a conventional sample tap. A few micrograms of gaseous UF6 is chemically adsorbed onto a sampling coupon in a matter of minutes. The collected DA sample is then analyzed onsite using Laser Ablation Absorption Ratio Spectrometry-Destructive Assay (LAARS-DA). DA results are determined in a matter of minutes at sufficient accuracy to support reliable bias defect conclusions, while greatly reducing DA sample volume, analysis time, and cost.« less

Developing the Next Generation of International Safeguards and Nonproliferation Experts: Highlights of Select Activities at the National Laboratories

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Reed, J; Mathews, C; Kirk, B

2010-03-31

With many safeguards experts in the United States at or near retirement age, and with the growing and evolving mission of international safeguards, attracting and educating a new generation of safeguards experts is an important element of maintaining a credible and capable international safeguards system. The United States National Laboratories, with their rich experience in addressing the technical and policy challenges of international safeguards, are an important resource for attracting, educating, and training future safeguards experts. This presentation highlights some of the safeguards education and professional development activities underway at the National Laboratories. These include university outreach, summer courses, internships,more » mid-career transition, knowledge retention, and other projects. The presentation concludes with thoughts on the challenge of interdisciplinary education and the recruitment of individuals with the right balance of skills and backgrounds are recruited to meet tomorrow's needs.« less

An expanded safeguards role for the DOE safeguards analytical laboratory

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Bingham, C.D.

The New Brunswick Laboratory (NBL) is a Government-owned, Government-operated (GOGO) laboratory, with the mission to provide and maintain a nuclear material measurements and standards laboratory. The functional responsibilities of NBL serve as a technical response to the statutory responsibility of the Department of Energy (DOE) to assure the safeguarding of nuclear materials. In the execution of its mission, NBL carries out activities in six safeguards-related programs: measurement development, measurement evaluation, measurement services, safeguards assessment, reference and calibration materials and site-specific assistance. These program activities have been implemented by NBL for many years; their relative emphases, however, have been changed recentlymore » to address the priorities defined by the DOE Office of Safeguards and Security, Defense Programs (OSS/DP). As a consequence, NBL operations are in the ''mainstream'' of domestic safeguards activities. This expanded safeguards role for NBL is discussed in this paper.« less

Keeping the focus on children: the challenges of safeguarding children affected by domestic abuse.

PubMed

Peckover, Sue; Trotter, Fiona

2015-07-01

Safeguarding children affected by domestic abuse is a key responsibility for all professionals working with children and families, but can be difficult to achieve in practice. Despite a policy emphasis on early intervention and child-centred work, limited attention has been paid to how professionals in universal and additional support services address this important area of work. This paper reports findings from qualitative research undertaken in one local authority area in the north of England during 2011 which examines the challenges facing professionals in safeguarding children affected by domestic abuse. Six mixed professional focus groups were held, attended by a total of 23 participants. Discussion focused upon participants' awareness of domestic abuse, how they assessed and met children and young peoples' needs, and their views about service provision and safeguarding processes. Data were transcribed and thematic analysis undertaken. The themes presented in this paper--embodied recognition, someone else's job, service gaps, skills deficits, and focusing upon children and young people--illustrate the scope and limitations of professionals' work with children and young people affected by domestic abuse. Areas for practice improvement are discussed. © 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

EMERGY ANALYSIS AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS A COMPARATIVE STUDY

EPA Science Inventory

Our mission at USEPA is to protect human health and safeguard the natural environment. We aim to base our environmental regulations and policies on sound scientific and, where appropriate, economic analyses. Although EPA has conducted analysis of the impact of regulations on ...

Annual Report FY2013-- A Kinematically Complete, Interdisciplinary, and Co-Institutional Measurement of the 19F(α,n) Cross-section for Nuclear Safeguards Science

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Peters, William A; Smith, Michael Scott; Clement, Ryan

2013-10-01

The goal of this proposal is to enable neutron detection for precision Non-Destructive Assays (NDAs) of actinide-fluoride samples. Neutrons are continuously generated from a UFx matrix in a container or sample as a result of the interaction of alpha particles from uranium-decay α particles with fluorine nuclei in the matrix. Neutrons from 19F(α,n)22Na were once considered a poorly characterized background for assays of UFx samples via 238U spontaneous fission neutron detection [SMI2010B]. However, the yield of decay-α-driven neutrons is critical for 234,235U LEU and HEU assays, as it can used to determine both the total amount of uranium and themore » enrichment [BER2010]. This approach can be extremely valuable in a variety of safeguard applications, such as cylinder monitoring in underground uranium storage facilities, nuclear criticality safety studies, nuclear materials accounting, and other nonproliferation applications. The success of neutron-based assays critically depends on an accurate knowledge of the cross section of the (α,n) reaction that generates the neutrons. The 40% uncertainty in the 19F(α,n)22Na cross section currently limits the precision of such assays, and has been identified as a key factor in preventing accurate enrichment determinations [CRO2003]. The need for higher quality cross section data for (α,n) reactions has been a recurring conclusion in reviews of the nuclear data needs to support safeguards. The overarching goal of this project is to enable neutron detection to be used for precision Non- Destructive Assays (NDAs) of actinide-fluoride samples. This will significantly advance safeguards verification at existing declared facilities, nuclear materials accounting, process control, nuclear criticality safety monitoring, and a variety of other nonproliferation applications. To reach this goal, Idaho National Laboratory (INL), in partnership with Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), Rutgers University (RU), and the University of Notre Dame (UND), will focus on three specific items: (1) making a precision (better than 10 %) determination of the absolute cross section of the 19F(α,n)22Na reaction as a function of energy; (2) determining the spectrum of neutrons and γ-rays emitted from 19F(α,n)22Na over an energy range pertinent to NDA; and (3) performing simulations with this new cross section to extract the neutron yield (neutrons/gram/second) and resulting neutron- and gamma ray-spectra when α particles interact with fluorine nuclei in actinide samples, to aid in the design and reduce uncertainty of future NDA measurements and simulations.« less

Development of a Dual-Particle Imaging System for Nonproliferation Applications

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Poitrasson-Riviere, Alexis Pierre Valere

A rising concern in our society is preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and fissionable material. This prevention can be incorporated at multiple levels, from the use of nuclear safeguards in nuclear facilities to the detection of threat objects in the field. At any level, systems used for such tasks need to be specially designed for use with Special Nuclear Material (SNM) which is defined by the NRC as plutonium and uranium enriched in U-233 or U-235 isotopes. These radioactive materials have the particularity of emitting both fast neutrons and gamma rays; thus, systems able to detect both particles simultaneously are particularly desirable. In the field of nuclear nonproliferation and safeguards, detection systems capable of accurately imaging various sources of radiation can greatly simplify any monitoring or detection task. The localization of the radiation sources can allow users of the system to focus their efforts on the areas of interest, whether it be for radiation detection or radiation characterization. This thesis describes the development of a dual-particle imaging system at the University of Michigan to address these technical challenges. The imaging system relies on the use of organic liquid scintillators that can detect both fast neutrons and gamma rays, and inorganic NaI(Tl) scintillators that are not very sensitive to neutrons yet yield photoelectric absorptions from gamma rays. A prototype of the imaging system has been constructed and operated. The system will aid the remote monitoring of nuclear materials within facilities, and it has the scalability for standoff detection in the field. A software suite has been developed to analyze measured data in real time, in an effort to obtain a system as close to field-ready as possible. The system's performance has been tested with various materials of interest, such as MOX and plutonium metal, measured at the PERLA facility of the Joint Research Center in Ispra, Italy. The robust and versatile imaging system is an attractive alternative to the current imaging systems.

The Mailbox Computer System for the IAEA verification experiment on HEU downlending at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Aronson, A.L.; Gordon, D.M.

IN APRIL 1996, THE UNITED STATES (US) ADDED THE PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT TO THE LIST OF FACILITIES ELIGIBLE FOR THE APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA) SAFEGUARDS. AT THAT TIME, THE US PROPOSED THAT THE IAEA CARRY OUT A ''VERIFICATION EXPERIMENT'' AT THE PLANT WITH RESPECT TO DOOWNBLENDING OF ABOUT 13 METRIC TONS OF HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM (HEU) IN THE FORM OF URANIUM HEXAFLUROIDE (UF6). DURING THE PERIOD DECEMBER 1997 THROUGH JULY 1998, THE IAEA CARRIED OUT THE REQUESTED VERIFICATION EXPERIMENT. THE VERIFICATION APPROACH USED FOR THIS EXPERIMENT INCLUDED, AMONG OTHER MEASURES, THE ENTRY OF PROCESS-OPERATIONAL DATA BYmore » THE FACILITY OPERATOR ON A NEAR-REAL-TIME BASIS INTO A ''MAILBOX'' COMPUTER LOCATED WITHIN A TAMPER-INDICATING ENCLOSURE SEALED BY THE IAEA.« less

Recent advancements in bioremediation of dye: Current status and challenges.

PubMed

Vikrant, Kumar; Giri, Balendu Shekhar; Raza, Nadeem; Roy, Kangkan; Kim, Ki-Hyun; Rai, Birendra Nath; Singh, Ram Sharan

2018-04-01

The rampant industrialization and unchecked growth of modern textile production facilities coupled with the lack of proper treatment facilities have proliferated the discharge of effluents enriched with toxic, baleful, and carcinogenic pollutants including dyes, heavy metals, volatile organic compounds, odorants, and other hazardous materials. Therefore, the development of cost-effective and efficient control measures against such pollution is imperative to safeguard ecosystems and natural resources. In this regard, recent advances in biotechnology and microbiology have propelled bioremediation as a prospective alternative to traditional treatment methods. This review was organized to address bioremediation as a practical option for the treatment of dyes by evaluating its performance and typical attributes. It further highlights the current hurdles and future prospects for the abatement of dyes via biotechnology-based remediation techniques. Copyright © 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

16 CFR 314.3 - Standards for safeguarding customer information.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 16 Commercial Practices 1 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Standards for safeguarding customer... OF CONGRESS STANDARDS FOR SAFEGUARDING CUSTOMER INFORMATION § 314.3 Standards for safeguarding customer information. (a) Information security program. You shall develop, implement, and maintain a...

Safeguards Considerations for Thorium Fuel Cycles

DOE PAGES

Worrall, Louise G.; Worrall, Andrew; Flanagan, George F.; ...

2016-04-21

We report that by around 2025, thorium-based fuel cycles are likely to be deployed internationally. States such as China and India are pursuing research, development, and deployment pathways toward a number of commercial-scale thorium fuel cycles, and they are already building test reactors and the associated fuel cycle infrastructure. In the future, the potential exists for these emerging programs to sell, export, and deploy thorium fuel cycle technology in other states. Without technically adequate international safeguards protocols and measures in place, any future potential clandestine misuse of these fuel cycles could go undetected, compromising the deterrent value of these protocolsmore » and measures. The development of safeguards approaches for thorium-based fuel cycles is therefore a matter of some urgency. Yet, the focus of the international safeguards community remains mainly on safeguarding conventional 235U- and 239Pu-based fuel cycles while the safeguards challenges of thorium-uranium fuel cycles remain largely uninvestigated. This raises the following question: Is the International Atomic Energy Agency and international safeguards system ready for thorium fuel cycles? Furthermore, is the safeguards technology of today sufficiently mature to meet the verification challenges posed by thorium-based fuel cycles? In defining these and other related research questions, the objectives of this paper are to identify key safeguards considerations for thorium-based fuel cycles and to call for an early dialogue between the international safeguards and the nuclear fuel cycle communities to prepare for the potential safeguards challenges associated with these fuel cycles. In this paper, it is concluded that directed research and development programs are required to meet the identified safeguards challenges and to take timely action in preparation for the international deployment of thorium fuel cycles.« less

Keeping the Momentum and Nuclear Forensics at Los Alamos National Laboratory

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Steiner, Robert Ernest; Dion, Heather M.; Dry, Donald E.

LANL has 70 years of experience in nuclear forensics and supports the community through a wide variety of efforts and leveraged capabilities: Expanding the understanding of nuclear forensics, providing training on nuclear forensics methods, and developing bilateral relationships to expand our understanding of nuclear forensic science. LANL remains highly supportive of several key organizations tasked with carrying forth the Nuclear Security Summit messages: IAEA, GICNT, and INTERPOL. Analytical chemistry measurements on plutonium and uranium matrices are critical to numerous programs including safeguards accountancy verification measurements. Los Alamos National Laboratory operates capable actinide analytical chemistry and material science laboratories suitable formore » nuclear material and environmental forensic characterization. Los Alamos National Laboratory uses numerous means to validate and independently verify that measurement data quality objectives are met. Numerous LANL nuclear facilities support the nuclear material handling, preparation, and analysis capabilities necessary to evaluate samples containing nearly any mass of an actinide (attogram to kilogram levels).« less

ISMP Medication Error Report Analysis

PubMed Central

Cohen, Michael R.; Smetzer, Judy L.

2017-01-01

These medication errors have occurred in health care facilities at least once. They will happen again—perhaps where you work. Through education and alertness of personnel and procedural safeguards, they can be avoided. You should consider publishing accounts of errors in your newsletters and/or presenting them at your inservice training programs. Your assistance is required to continue this feature. The reports described here were received through the Institute for Safe Medication Practices (ISMP) Medication Errors Reporting Program. Any reports published by ISMP will be anonymous. Comments are also invited; the writers' names will be published if desired. ISMP may be contacted at the address shown below. Errors, close calls, or hazardous conditions may be reported directly to ISMP through the ISMP Web site (www.ismp.org), by calling 800-FAIL-SAFE, or via e-mail at ismpinfo@ismp.org. ISMP guarantees the confidentiality and security of the information received and respects reporters' wishes as to the level of detail included in publications. PMID:28179735

ISMP Medication Error Report Analysis

PubMed Central

Cohen, Michael R.; Smetzer, Judy L.

2017-01-01

These medication errors have occurred in health care facilities at least once. They will happen again—perhaps where you work. Through education and alertness of personnel and procedural safeguards, they can be avoided. You should consider publishing accounts of errors in your newsletters and/or presenting them at your in-service training programs. Your assistance is required to continue this feature. The reports described here were received through the Institute for Safe Medication Practices (ISMP) Medication Errors Reporting Program. Any reports published by ISMP will be anonymous. Comments are also invited; the writers’ names will be published if desired. ISMP may be contacted at the address shown below. Errors, close calls, or hazardous conditions may be reported directly to ISMP through the ISMP Web site (www.ismp.org), by calling 800-FAIL-SAFE, or via e-mail at ismpinfo@ismp.org. ISMP guarantees the confidentiality and security of the information received and respects reporters’ wishes as to the level of detail included in publications. PMID:29276260

ISMP Medication Error Report Analysis

PubMed Central

Cohen, Michael R.; Smetzer, Judy L.

2016-01-01

These medication errors have occurred in health care facilities at least once. They will happen again—perhaps where you work. Through education and alertness of personnel and procedural safeguards, they can be avoided. You should consider publishing accounts of errors in your newsletters and/or presenting them at your inservice training programs. Your assistance is required to continue this feature. The reports described here were received through the Institute for Safe Medication Practices (ISMP) Medication Errors Reporting Program. Any reports published by ISMP will be anonymous. Comments are also invited; the writers' names will be published if desired. ISMP may be contacted at the address shown below. Errors, close calls, or hazardous conditions may be reported directly to ISMP through the ISMP Web site (www.ismp.org), by calling 800-FAIL-SAFE, or via e-mail at ismpinfo@ismp.org. ISMP guarantees the confidentiality and security of the information received and respects reporters' wishes as to the level of detail included in publications. PMID:28057945

ISMP Medication Error Report Analysis

PubMed Central

Cohen, Michael R.; Smetzer, Judy L.

2016-01-01

ABSTRACT These medication errors have occurred in health care facilities at least once. They will happen again—perhaps where you work. Through education and alertness of personnel and procedural-safeguards, they can be avoided. You should consider publishing accounts of errors in your newsletters and/or presenting them at your inservice training programs. Your assistance is required to continue this feature. The reports described here were receivedthrough the Institute for Safe Medication Practices (ISMP) Medication Errors Reporting Program. Any reports published by ISMP will be anonymous. Comments are also invited; the writers' names will be published if desired. ISMP may be contacted at the address shown below. Errors, close calls, or hazardous conditions may be reported directly to ISMP through the ISMP Web site (www.ismp.org), by calling 800-FAIL-SAFE, or via e-mail at ismpinfo@ismp.org. ISMP guarantees the confidentiality and security of the information received and respects reporters' wishes as to the level of detail included in publications. PMID:27928183

Strategic analysis for safeguards systems: a feasibility study. Volume 2. Appendix

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Goldman, A J

1984-12-01

This appendix provides detailed information regarding game theory (strategic analysis) and its potential role in safeguards to supplement the main body of this report. In particualr, it includes an extensive, though not comprehensive review of literature on game theory and on other topics that relate to the formulation of a game-theoretic model (e.g. the payoff functions). The appendix describes the basic form and components of game theory models, and the solvability of various models. It then discusses three basic issues related to the use of strategic analysis in material accounting: (1) its understandability; (2) its viability in regulatory settings; andmore » (3) difficulties in the use of mixed strategies. Each of the components of a game theoretic model are then discussed and related to the present context.« less

76 FR 64126 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards; Procedures for Meetings

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-10-17

... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards; Procedures for Meetings.... Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC's) Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) pursuant to the... specified in the Federal Register Notice, care of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear...

78 FR 67205 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards; Procedures for Meetings

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-11-08

... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards; Procedures for Meetings.... Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC's) Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) pursuant to the... specified in the Federal Register Notice, care of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear...

Safeguards and security research and development: Progress report, October 1994--September 1995

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Rutherford, D.R.; Henriksen, P.W.

The primary goal of the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Technology Development Program, International Safeguards, and other Safeguards and Security Programs is to continue to be the center of excellence in the field of Safeguards and Security. This annual report for 1995 describes those scientific and engineering projects that contribute to all of the aforementioned programs. The authors have presented the information in a different format from previous annual reports. Part I is devoted to Nuclear Material Measurement Systems. Part II contains projects that are specific to Integrated Safeguards Systems. Part III highlights Safeguards Systems Effectiveness Evaluations and Part IVmore » is a compilation of highlights from Information Assurance projects. Finally Part V highlights work on the projects at Los Alamos for International Safeguards. The final part of this annual report lists titles and abstracts of Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Technology Development reports, technical journal articles, and conference papers that were presented and published in 1995. This is the last annual report in this format. The authors wish to thank all of the individuals who have contributed to this annual report and made it so successful over the years.« less

34 CFR 300.150 - SEA implementation of procedural safeguards.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-07-01

... 34 Education 2 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false SEA implementation of procedural safeguards. 300.150... EDUCATION OF CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES State Eligibility Sea Responsibility for General Supervision and Implementation of Procedural Safeguards § 300.150 SEA implementation of procedural safeguards. The SEA (and any...

34 CFR 300.150 - SEA implementation of procedural safeguards.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-07-01

... 34 Education 2 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false SEA implementation of procedural safeguards. 300.150... EDUCATION OF CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES State Eligibility Sea Responsibility for General Supervision and Implementation of Procedural Safeguards § 300.150 SEA implementation of procedural safeguards. The SEA (and any...

34 CFR 300.150 - SEA implementation of procedural safeguards.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-07-01

... 34 Education 2 2014-07-01 2013-07-01 true SEA implementation of procedural safeguards. 300.150... EDUCATION OF CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES State Eligibility Sea Responsibility for General Supervision and Implementation of Procedural Safeguards § 300.150 SEA implementation of procedural safeguards. The SEA (and any...

34 CFR 300.150 - SEA implementation of procedural safeguards.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-07-01

... 34 Education 2 2011-07-01 2010-07-01 true SEA implementation of procedural safeguards. 300.150... EDUCATION OF CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES State Eligibility Sea Responsibility for General Supervision and Implementation of Procedural Safeguards § 300.150 SEA implementation of procedural safeguards. The SEA (and any...

34 CFR 300.150 - SEA implementation of procedural safeguards.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... 34 Education 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false SEA implementation of procedural safeguards. 300.150... EDUCATION OF CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES State Eligibility Sea Responsibility for General Supervision and Implementation of Procedural Safeguards § 300.150 SEA implementation of procedural safeguards. The SEA (and any...

7 CFR 400.408 - Safeguards and storage.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... 7 Agriculture 6 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Safeguards and storage. 400.408 Section 400.408... and Storage of Social Security Account Numbers and Employer Identification Numbers § 400.408 Safeguards and storage. Records must be maintained in secured storage with proper safeguards sufficient to...

7 CFR 400.408 - Safeguards and storage.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 7 Agriculture 6 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Safeguards and storage. 400.408 Section 400.408... and Storage of Social Security Account Numbers and Employer Identification Numbers § 400.408 Safeguards and storage. Records must be maintained in secured storage with proper safeguards sufficient to...

7 CFR 400.408 - Safeguards and storage.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... 7 Agriculture 6 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Safeguards and storage. 400.408 Section 400.408... and Storage of Social Security Account Numbers and Employer Identification Numbers § 400.408 Safeguards and storage. Records must be maintained in secured storage with proper safeguards sufficient to...

10 CFR 71.11 - Protection of Safeguards Information.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... public health and safety or the common defense and security, shall protect Safeguards Information against... 10 Energy 2 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Protection of Safeguards Information. 71.11 Section 71.11... General Provisions § 71.11 Protection of Safeguards Information. Each licensee, certificate holder, or...

10 CFR 71.11 - Protection of Safeguards Information.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... public health and safety or the common defense and security, shall protect Safeguards Information against... 10 Energy 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Protection of Safeguards Information. 71.11 Section 71.11... General Provisions § 71.11 Protection of Safeguards Information. Each licensee, certificate holder, or...

10 CFR 71.11 - Protection of Safeguards Information.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... public health and safety or the common defense and security, shall protect Safeguards Information against... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Protection of Safeguards Information. 71.11 Section 71.11... General Provisions § 71.11 Protection of Safeguards Information. Each licensee, certificate holder, or...

10 CFR 71.11 - Protection of Safeguards Information.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... public health and safety or the common defense and security, shall protect Safeguards Information against... 10 Energy 2 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Protection of Safeguards Information. 71.11 Section 71.11... General Provisions § 71.11 Protection of Safeguards Information. Each licensee, certificate holder, or...

10 CFR 75.7 - Notification of IAEA safeguards.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 10 Energy 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Notification of IAEA safeguards. 75.7 Section 75.7 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) SAFEGUARDS ON NUCLEAR MATERIAL-IMPLEMENTATION OF US/IAEA AGREEMENT General Provisions § 75.7 Notification of IAEA safeguards. (a) The licensee must inform the NRC...

10 CFR 75.7 - Notification of IAEA safeguards.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Notification of IAEA safeguards. 75.7 Section 75.7 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) SAFEGUARDS ON NUCLEAR MATERIAL-IMPLEMENTATION OF US/IAEA AGREEMENT General Provisions § 75.7 Notification of IAEA safeguards. (a) The licensee must inform the NRC...

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory safeguards and security quarterly progress report to the US Department of Energy quarter ending September 30, 1994

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Davis, G.; Mansur, D.L.; Ruhter, W.D.

1994-10-01

This report presents the details of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory safeguards and securities program. This program is focused on developing new technology, such as x- and gamma-ray spectrometry, for measurement of special nuclear materials. This program supports the Office of Safeguards and Securities in the following five areas; safeguards technology, safeguards and decision support, computer security, automated physical security, and automated visitor access control systems.

Nuclear materials safeguards for the future

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Tape, J.W.

Basic concepts of domestic and international safeguards are described, with an emphasis on safeguards systems for the fuel cycles of commercial power reactors. Future trends in institutional and technical measures for nuclear materials safeguards are outlined. The conclusion is that continued developments in safeguards approaches and technology, coupled with institutional measures that facilitate the global management and protection of nuclear materials, are up to the challenge of safeguarding the growing inventories of nuclear materials in commercial fuel cycles in technologically advanced States with stable governments that have signed the nonproliferation treaty. These same approaches also show promise for facilitating internationalmore » inspection of excess weapons materials and verifying a fissile materials cutoff convention.« less

What if? The one question every administrator should ask. Use HIPAA rules as a blueprint for broader safety, security.

PubMed

Redling, Bob

2007-08-01

Are you doing enough to control security and privacy at your practice? Could you cope if your organization suffered a disaster that destroyed facilities, business documents and patient records? Although Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) security and privacy rules focus on patient health information, they also point the way to a more comprehensive approach to managing risk. By using HIPAA rules as a blueprint, you can design policies and procedures to address everything from safeguarding financial information to protecting the personal safety of patients, physicians and staff.

Applied Nuclear Accountability Systems: A Case Study in the System Architecture and Development of NuMAC

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Campbell, Andrea Beth

2004-07-01

This is a case study of the NuMAC nuclear accountability system developed at a private fuel fabrication facility. This paper investigates nuclear material accountability and safeguards by researching expert knowledge applied in the system design and development. Presented is a system developed to detect and deter the theft of weapons grade nuclear material. Examined is the system architecture that includes: issues for the design and development of the system; stakeholder issues; how the system was built and evolved; software design, database design, and development tool considerations; security and computing ethics. (author)

Materials and Methods for Streamlined Laboratory Analysis of Environmental Samples, FY 2016 Report

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Addleman, Raymond S.; Naes, Benjamin E.; McNamara, Bruce K.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) relies upon laboratory analysis of environmental samples (typically referred to as “swipes”) collected during on-site inspections of safeguarded facilities to support the detection and deterrence of undeclared activities. Unfortunately, chemical processing and assay of the samples is slow and expensive. A rapid, effective, and simple extraction process and analysis method is needed to provide certified results with improved timeliness at reduced costs (principally in the form of reduced labor), while maintaining or improving sensitivity and efficacy. To address these safeguard needs the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) explored and demonstrated improved methods for environmentalmore » sample (ES) analysis. Improvements for both bulk and particle analysis were explored. To facilitate continuity and adoption, the new sampling materials and processing methods will be compatible with existing IAEA protocols for ES analysis. PNNL collaborated with Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), which performed independent validation of the new bulk analysis methods and compared performance to traditional IAEA’s Network of Analytical Laboratories (NWAL) protocol. ORNL efforts are reported separately. This report describes PNNL’s FY 2016 progress, which was focused on analytical application supporting environmental monitoring of uranium enrichment plants and nuclear fuel processing. In the future the technology could be applied to other safeguard applications and analytes related to fuel manufacturing, reprocessing, etc. PNNL’s FY 2016 efforts were broken into two tasks and a summary of progress, accomplishments and highlights are provided below. Principal progress and accomplishments on Task 1, Optimize Materials and Methods for ICP-MS Environmental Sample Analysis, are listed below. • Completed initial procedure for rapid uranium extraction from ES swipes based upon carbonate-peroxide chemistry (delivered to ORNL for evaluation). • Explored improvements to carbonate-peroxide rapid uranium extraction chemistry. • Evaluated new sampling materials and methods (in collaboration with ORNL). • Demonstrated successful ES extractions from standard and novel swipes for a wide range uranium compounds of interest including UO 2F 2 and UO 2(NO 3) 2, U 3O 8 and uranium ore concentrate. • Completed initial discussions with commercial suppliers of PTFE swipe materials. • Submitted one manuscript for publication. Two additional drafts are being prepared. Principal progress and accomplishments on Task 2, Optimize Materials and Methods for Direct SIMS Environmental Sample Analysis, are listed below. • Designed a SIMS swipe sample holder that retrofits into existing equipment and provides simple, effective, and rapid mounting of ES samples for direct assay while enabling automation and laboratory integration. • Identified preferred conductive sampling materials with better performance characteristics. • Ran samples on the new PNNL NWAL equivalent Cameca 1280 SIMS system. • Obtained excellent agreement between isotopic ratios for certified materials and direct SIMS assay of very low levels of LEU and HEU UO 2F 2 particles on carbon fiber sampling material. Sample activities range from 1 to 500 CPM (uranium mass on sample is dependent upon specific isotope ratio but is frequently in the subnanogram range). • Found that the presence of the UF molecular ions, as measured by SIMS, provides chemical information about the particle that is separate from the uranium isotopics and strongly suggests that those particles originated from an UF6 enrichment activity. • Submitted one manuscript for publication. Another manuscript is in preparation.« less

The Use of Performance Metrics for the Assessment of Safeguards Effectiveness at the State Level

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Bachner K. M.; George Anzelon, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA Yana Feldman, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA Mark Goodman,Department of State, Washington, DC Dunbar Lockwood, National Nuclear Security Administration, Washington, DC Jonathan B. Sanborn, JBS Consulting, LLC, Arlington, VA.

In the ongoing evolution of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards at the state level, many safeguards implementation principles have been emphasized: effectiveness, efficiency, non-discrimination, transparency, focus on sensitive materials, centrality of material accountancy for detecting diversion, independence, objectivity, and grounding in technical considerations, among others. These principles are subject to differing interpretations and prioritizations and sometimes conflict. This paper is an attempt to develop metrics and address some of the potential tradeoffs inherent in choices about how various safeguards policy principles are implemented. The paper carefully defines effective safeguards, including in the context of safeguards approaches that take accountmore » of the range of state-specific factors described by the IAEA Secretariat and taken note of by the Board in September 2014, and (2) makes use of performance metrics to help document, and to make transparent, how safeguards implementation would meet such effectiveness requirements.« less

Best Practices for NPT Transit Matching

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Gilligan, Kimberly V.; Whitaker, J. Michael; Oakberg, John A.

2016-09-01

Transit matching is the process for relating or matching reports of shipments and receipts submitted to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Transit matching is a component used by the IAEA in drawing safeguards conclusions and performing investigative analysis. Transit matching is part of IAEA safeguards activities and the State evaluation process, and it is included in the annual Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR). Annually, the IAEA currently receives reports of ~900,000 nuclear material transactions, of which ~500,000 are for domestic and foreign transfers. Of these the IAEA software can automatically match (i.e., machine match) about 95% of the domestic transfersmore » and 25% of the foreign transfers. Given the increasing demands upon IAEA resources, it is highly desirable for the machine-matching process to match as many transfers as possible. Researchers at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) have conducted an investigation funded by the National Nuclear Security Administration through the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative to identify opportunities to strengthen IAEA transit matching. Successful matching, and more specifically machine matching, is contingent on quality data from the reporting States. In February 2016, ORNL hosted representatives from three States, the IAEA, and Euratom to share results from past studies and to discuss the processes, policies, and procedures associated with State reporting for transit matching. Drawing on each entity's experience and knowledge, ORNL developed a best practices document to be shared with the international safeguards community to strengthen transit matching. This paper shares the recommendations that resulted from this strategic meeting and the next steps being taken to strengthen transit matching.« less

42 CFR 431.305 - Types of information to be safeguarded.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-10-01

... 42 Public Health 4 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Types of information to be safeguarded. 431.305... Information on Applicants and Recipients § 431.305 Types of information to be safeguarded. (a) The agency must have criteria that govern the types of information about applicants and recipients that are safeguarded...

10 CFR 1.13 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 10 Energy 1 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. 1.13 Section 1... Headquarters Panels, Boards, and Committees § 1.13 Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. The Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) was established by section 29 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as...

10 CFR 1.13 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 10 Energy 1 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. 1.13 Section 1... Headquarters Panels, Boards, and Committees § 1.13 Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. The Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) was established by section 29 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as...

FY16 Safeguards Technology Cart-Portable Mass Spectrometer Project Final Report

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Thompson, Cyril V.; Whitten, William B.

The Oak Ridge National Laboratory project for the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Safeguards Technology Development Subprogram has been involved in the development of a cart portable mass spectrometer based on a Thermo ITQ ion trap mass spectrometer (referred to simply as the ITQ) for the field analysis of 235U/238U ratios in UF6. A recent discovery of the project was that combining CO2 with UF6 and introducing the mixture to the mass spectrometer (MS) appeared to increase the ionization efficiency and, thus, reduce the amount of UF6 needed for an analysis while also reducing the corrosive effects of the sample. However,more » initial experimentation indicated that mixing parameters should be closely controlled to ensure reproducible results. To this end, a sample manifold (SM) that would ensure the precise mixing of UF6 and CO2 was designed and constructed. A number of experiments were outlined and conducted to determine optimum MS and SM conditions which would provide the most stable isotope ratio analysis. The principal objective of the project was to provide a retrofit ITQ mass spectrometer operating with a SM capable of achieving a variation in precision of less than 1% over 1 hour of sampling. This goal was achieved by project end with a variation in precision of 0.5 to 0.8% over 1 hour of sampling.« less

Polyatomic interferences on high precision uranium isotope ratio measurements by MC-ICP-MS: Applications to environmental sampling for nuclear safeguards

DOE PAGES

Pollington, Anthony D.; Kinman, William S.; Hanson, Susan K.; ...

2015-09-04

Modern mass spectrometry and separation techniques have made measurement of major uranium isotope ratios a routine task; however accurate and precise measurement of the minor uranium isotopes remains a challenge as sample size decreases. One particular challenge is the presence of isobaric interferences and their impact on the accuracy of minor isotope 234U and 236U measurements. Furthermore, we present techniques used for routine U isotopic analysis of environmental nuclear safeguards samples and evaluate polyatomic interferences that negatively impact accuracy as well as methods to mitigate their impacts.

MO200: a model for evaluation safeguards through material accountability for a 200 tonne per year mixed-oxide fuel-rod fabrication plant

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Sandborn, R.H.

1976-01-01

M0200, a computer simulation model, was used to investigate the safeguarding of plutonium dioxide. The computer program operating the model was constructed so that replicate runs could provide data for statistical analysis of the distributions of the randomized variables. The plant model was divided into material balance areas associated with definable unit processes. Indicators of plant operations studied were modified end-of-shift material balances, end-of-blend errors formed by closing material balances between blends, and cumulative sums of the differences between actual and expected performances. (auth)

From the Lab to the real world : sources of error in UF {sub 6} gas enrichment monitoring

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Lombardi, Marcie L.

2012-03-01

Safeguarding uranium enrichment facilities is a serious concern for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Safeguards methods have changed over the years, most recently switching to an improved safeguards model that calls for new technologies to help keep up with the increasing size and complexity of today’s gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs). One of the primary goals of the IAEA is to detect the production of uranium at levels greater than those an enrichment facility may have declared. In order to accomplish this goal, new enrichment monitors need to be as accurate as possible. This dissertation will look at themore » Advanced Enrichment Monitor (AEM), a new enrichment monitor designed at Los Alamos National Laboratory. Specifically explored are various factors that could potentially contribute to errors in a final enrichment determination delivered by the AEM. There are many factors that can cause errors in the determination of uranium hexafluoride (UF{sub 6}) gas enrichment, especially during the period when the enrichment is being measured in an operating GCEP. To measure enrichment using the AEM, a passive 186-keV (kiloelectronvolt) measurement is used to determine the {sup 235}U content in the gas, and a transmission measurement or a gas pressure reading is used to determine the total uranium content. A transmission spectrum is generated using an x-ray tube and a “notch” filter. In this dissertation, changes that could occur in the detection efficiency and the transmission errors that could result from variations in pipe-wall thickness will be explored. Additional factors that could contribute to errors in enrichment measurement will also be examined, including changes in the gas pressure, ambient and UF{sub 6} temperature, instrumental errors, and the effects of uranium deposits on the inside of the pipe walls will be considered. The sensitivity of the enrichment calculation to these various parameters will then be evaluated. Previously, UF{sub 6} gas enrichment monitors have required empty pipe measurements to accurately determine the pipe attenuation (the pipe attenuation is typically much larger than the attenuation in the gas). This dissertation reports on a method for determining the thickness of a pipe in a GCEP when obtaining an empty pipe measurement may not be feasible. This dissertation studies each of the components that may add to the final error in the enrichment measurement, and the factors that were taken into account to mitigate these issues are also detailed and tested. The use of an x-ray generator as a transmission source and the attending stability issues are addressed. Both analytical calculations and experimental measurements have been used. For completeness, some real-world analysis results from the URENCO Capenhurst enrichment plant have been included, where the final enrichment error has remained well below 1% for approximately two months.« less

UMTRA project list of reportable occurrences

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Not Available

1994-04-01

This UMTRA Project List of Reportable occurrences is provided to facilitate efficient categorization of reportable occurrences. These guidelines have been established in compliance with DOE minimum reporting requirements under DOE Order 5000.3B. Occurrences are arranged into nine groups relating to US Department of Energy (DOE) Uranium Mill Tailings Remedial Action (UMTRA) Project operations for active sites. These nine groupings are provided for reference to determined whether an occurrence meets reporting requirement criteria in accordance with the minimum reporting requirements. Event groups and significance categories that cannot or will not occur, and that do not apply to UMTRA Project operations, aremore » omitted. Occurrence categorization shall be as follows: Group 1. Facility Condition; Group 2. Environmental; Group 3. Personnel Safety; Group 4. Personnel Radiation Protection; Group 5. Safeguards and Security; Group 6. Transportation; Group 7. Value Basis Reporting; Group 8. Facility Status; and Group 9. Cross-Category Items.« less

Mini-mast CSI testbed user's guide

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Tanner, Sharon E.; Pappa, Richard S.; Sulla, Jeffrey L.; Elliott, Kenny B.; Miserentino, Robert; Bailey, James P.; Cooper, Paul A.; Williams, Boyd L., Jr.; Bruner, Anne M.

1992-01-01

The Mini-Mast testbed is a 20 m generic truss highly representative of future deployable trusses for space applications. It is fully instrumented for system identification and active vibrations control experiments and is used as a ground testbed at NASA-Langley. The facility has actuators and feedback sensors linked via fiber optic cables to the Advanced Real Time Simulation (ARTS) system, where user defined control laws are incorporated into generic controls software. The object of the facility is to conduct comprehensive active vibration control experiments on a dynamically realistic large space structure. A primary goal is to understand the practical effects of simplifying theoretical assumptions. This User's Guide describes the hardware and its primary components, the dynamic characteristics of the test article, the control law implementation process, and the necessary safeguards employed to protect the test article. Suggestions for a strawman controls experiment are also included.

SAFEGUARDS REPORT FOR THE NORTHROP PULSE RADIATION FACILITY

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Feinauer, E.; Thomas, R.D.

1961-03-22

Ae description is given of the Northrop pulse Radiation Facility, (NPRF), which consists of a TRlGA Mark-F reactor and associated supporting equipment. The NPRF was designed to operate in the following modes: Mode 1-100 kw steady-state operation; Mode II--Pulsed operation up to a maximum transient giving a maximum measured fuel element temperature of 470 deg C, which corresponds to an energy release of about 18 Mw-sec (approximately 1.9% sigma K/ K). The movable reactor will be operated in three general areas in the pool: adjacent to the exposure room; adjacent to the beam ponts; or at intermediate positions. Based onmore » the analyses presented and operating experience with the prototype TRIGA Mark F and other TRlGA reactors, it is concluded that operation of the NPRF does not present any undue hazard to the health and safety of the operating personnel or the public. (auth)« less

10 CFR 150.17a - Compliance with requirements of US/IAEA Safeguards Agreement.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 10 Energy 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Compliance with requirements of US/IAEA Safeguards... Authority in Agreement States § 150.17a Compliance with requirements of US/IAEA Safeguards Agreement. (a... shall take other action as may be necessary to implement the US/IAEA Safeguards Agreement, as described...

10 CFR 150.17a - Compliance with requirements of US/IAEA Safeguards Agreement.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Compliance with requirements of US/IAEA Safeguards... Authority in Agreement States § 150.17a Compliance with requirements of US/IAEA Safeguards Agreement. (a... shall take other action as may be necessary to implement the US/IAEA Safeguards Agreement, as described...

Training to raise staff awareness about safeguarding children.

PubMed

Fleming, Jane

2015-04-01

To improve outcomes for children and young people health organisations are required to train all staff in children's safeguarding. This creates difficulties for large complex organisations where most staff provide services to the adult population. Heart of England NHS Foundation Trust is a large acute and community trust that had difficulties in engaging staff in children's safeguarding training. Compliance rates for clinical staff who were trained in children's safeguarding were low and needed to be addressed. This article sets out why safeguarding training is important for all staff and how the trust achieved staff engagement and improved compliance rates. To evaluate, maintain and develop safeguarding knowledge, understanding, skills, attitude and behaviour further resources are planned to allow access to learning resources in a variety of formats.

Integrated Process Monitoring based on Systems of Sensors for Enhanced Nuclear Safeguards Sensitivity and Robustness

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Humberto E. Garcia

This paper illustrates safeguards benefits that process monitoring (PM) can have as a diversion deterrent and as a complementary safeguards measure to nuclear material accountancy (NMA). In order to infer the possible existence of proliferation-driven activities, the objective of NMA-based methods is often to statistically evaluate materials unaccounted for (MUF) computed by solving a given mass balance equation related to a material balance area (MBA) at every material balance period (MBP), a particular objective for a PM-based approach may be to statistically infer and evaluate anomalies unaccounted for (AUF) that may have occurred within a MBP. Although possibly being indicativemore » of proliferation-driven activities, the detection and tracking of anomaly patterns is not trivial because some executed events may be unobservable or unreliably observed as others. The proposed similarity between NMA- and PM-based approaches is important as performance metrics utilized for evaluating NMA-based methods, such as detection probability (DP) and false alarm probability (FAP), can also be applied for assessing PM-based safeguards solutions. To this end, AUF count estimates can be translated into significant quantity (SQ) equivalents that may have been diverted within a given MBP. A diversion alarm is reported if this mass estimate is greater than or equal to the selected value for alarm level (AL), appropriately chosen to optimize DP and FAP based on the particular characteristics of the monitored MBA, the sensors utilized, and the data processing method employed for integrating and analyzing collected measurements. To illustrate the application of the proposed PM approach, a protracted diversion of Pu in a waste stream was selected based on incomplete fuel dissolution in a dissolver unit operation, as this diversion scenario is considered to be problematic for detection using NMA-based methods alone. Results demonstrate benefits of conducting PM under a system-centric strategy that utilizes data collected from a system of sensors and that effectively exploits known characterizations of sensors and facility operations in order to significantly improve anomaly detection, reduce false alarm, and enhance assessment robustness under unreliable partial sensor information.« less

Nuclear exports: the perilous enterprise

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Thomas, G.

1977-03-01

A representative of the Sierra Club proposes that the United States can at least provide an opportunity for a break in the trend toward nuclear proliferation and may be able to offer the moral and economic persuasion for a worldwide moratorium. The combination of plutonium toxicity and its use in making nuclear explosives, together with the number of countries who have recently entered the nuclear community, indicate an increasing problem in limiting nuclear power to peaceful purposes. The ease with which plutonium can be diverted from power-generating plants into the hands of terrorists and unstable rulers limits the security options.more » The non-proliferation agreements are felt to have created additional problems by making it possible for non-signers of the treaty to have less-stringent safeguards than the signers. The International Atomic Energy Agency is considered to be effective only in a bookkeeping and monitoring capacity, while competition between nuclear suppliers may lead them to relax standards. The author feels that efforts to negotiate voluntary restraints on exporters could offer guarantees of fuel services and other nuclear assistance to those countries agreeing to forego nuclear explosives and reprocessing facilities and accepting safeguards restraints and export restrictions. (DCK)« less

The Attractiveness of Materials in Advanced Nuclear Fuel Cycles for Various Proliferation and Theft Scenarios

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Bathke, C. G.; Wallace, R. K.; Ireland, J. R.

2010-09-01

This paper is an extension to earlier studies1,2 that examined the attractiveness of materials mixtures containing special nuclear materials (SNM) and alternate nuclear materials (ANM) associated with the PUREX, UREX, COEX, THOREX, and PYROX reprocessing schemes. This study extends the figure of merit (FOM) for evaluating attractiveness to cover a broad range of proliferant state and sub-national group capabilities. The primary conclusion of this study is that all fissile material needs to be rigorously safeguarded to detect diversion by a state and provided the highest levels of physical protection to prevent theft by sub-national groups; no “silver bullet” has beenmore » found that will permit the relaxation of current international safeguards or national physical security protection levels. This series of studies has been performed at the request of the United States Department of Energy (DOE) and is based on the calculation of "attractiveness levels" that are expressed in terms consistent with, but normally reserved for nuclear materials in DOE nuclear facilities.3 The expanded methodology and updated findings are presented. Additionally, how these attractiveness levels relate to proliferation resistance and physical security are discussed.« less

The attractiveness of materials in advanced nuclear fuel cycles for various proliferation and theft scenarios

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Bathke, Charles G; Wallace, Richard K; Ireland, John R

2009-01-01

This paper is an extension to earlier studies that examined the attractiveness of materials mixtures containing special nuclear materials (SNM) and alternate nuclear materials (ANM) associated with the PUREX, UREX, COEX, THOREX, and PYROX reprocessing schemes. This study extends the figure of merit (FOM) for evaluating attractiveness to cover a broad range of proliferant state and sub-national group capabilities. The primary conclusion of this study is that all fissile material needs to be rigorously safeguarded to detect diversion by a state and provided the highest levels of physical protection to prevent theft by sub-national groups; no 'silver bullet' has beenmore » found that will permit the relaxation of current international safeguards or national physical security protection levels. This series of studies has been performed at the request of the United States Department of Energy (DOE) and is based on the calculation of 'attractiveness levels' that are expressed in terms consistent with, but normally reserved for nuclear materials in DOE nuclear facilities. The expanded methodology and updated findings are presented. Additionally, how these attractiveness levels relate to proliferation resistance and physical security are discussed.« less

Cyberbiosecurity: An Emerging New Discipline to Help Safeguard the Bioeconomy

PubMed Central

Murch, Randall S.; So, William K.; Buchholz, Wallace G.; Raman, Sanjay; Peccoud, Jean

2018-01-01

Cyberbiosecurity is being proposed as a formal new enterprise which encompasses cybersecurity, cyber-physical security and biosecurity as applied to biological and biomedical-based systems. In recent years, an array of important meetings and public discussions, commentaries and publications have occurred that highlight numerous vulnerabilities. While necessary first steps, they do not provide a systematized structure for effectively promoting communication, education and training, elucidation and prioritization for analysis, research, development, test and evaluation and implementation of scientific, technological, standards of practice, policy, or even regulatory or legal considerations for protecting the bioeconomy. Further, experts in biosecurity and cybersecurity are generally not aware of each other's domains, expertise, perspectives, priorities, or where mutually supported opportunities exist for which positive outcomes could result. Creating, promoting and advancing a new discipline can assist with formal, beneficial and continuing engagements. Recent key activities and publications that inform the creation of Cyberbiosecurity are briefly reviewed, as is the expansion of Cyberbiosecurity to include biomanufacturing which is supported by a rigorous analysis of a biomanufacturing facility. Recommendations are provided to initialize Cyberbiosecurity and place it on a trajectory to establish a structured and sustainable discipline, forum and enterprise. PMID:29675411

Cyberbiosecurity: An Emerging New Discipline to Help Safeguard the Bioeconomy.

PubMed

Murch, Randall S; So, William K; Buchholz, Wallace G; Raman, Sanjay; Peccoud, Jean

2018-01-01

Cyberbiosecurity is being proposed as a formal new enterprise which encompasses cybersecurity, cyber-physical security and biosecurity as applied to biological and biomedical-based systems. In recent years, an array of important meetings and public discussions, commentaries and publications have occurred that highlight numerous vulnerabilities. While necessary first steps, they do not provide a systematized structure for effectively promoting communication, education and training, elucidation and prioritization for analysis, research, development, test and evaluation and implementation of scientific, technological, standards of practice, policy, or even regulatory or legal considerations for protecting the bioeconomy. Further, experts in biosecurity and cybersecurity are generally not aware of each other's domains, expertise, perspectives, priorities, or where mutually supported opportunities exist for which positive outcomes could result. Creating, promoting and advancing a new discipline can assist with formal, beneficial and continuing engagements. Recent key activities and publications that inform the creation of Cyberbiosecurity are briefly reviewed, as is the expansion of Cyberbiosecurity to include biomanufacturing which is supported by a rigorous analysis of a biomanufacturing facility. Recommendations are provided to initialize Cyberbiosecurity and place it on a trajectory to establish a structured and sustainable discipline, forum and enterprise.

Susceptibility of mouse minute virus to inactivation by heat in two cell culture media types.

PubMed

Schleh, Marc; Romanowski, Peter; Bhebe, Prince; Zhang, Li; Chinniah, Shivanthi; Lawrence, Bill; Bashiri, Houman; Gaduh, Asri; Rajurs, Viveka; Rasmussen, Brian; Chuck, Alice; Dehghani, Houman

2009-01-01

Viral contaminations of biopharmaceutical manufacturing cell culture facilities are a significant threat and one for which having a risk mitigation strategy is highly desirable. High temperature, short time (HTST) mammalian cell media treatment may potentially safeguard manufacturing facilities from such contaminations. HTST is thought to inactivate virions by denaturing proteins of the viral capsid, and there is evidence that HTST provides ample virucidal efficacy against nonenveloped or naked viruses such as mouse minute virus (MMV), a parvovirus. The aim of the studies presented herein was to further delineate the susceptibility of MMV, known to have contaminated mammalian cell manufacturing facilities, to heat by exposing virus-spiked cell culture media to a broad range of temperatures and for various times of exposure. The results of these studies show that HTST is capable of inactivating MMV by three orders of magnitude or more. Thus, we believe that HTST is a useful technology for the purposes of providing a barrier to adventitious contamination of mammalian cell culture processes in the biopharmaceutical industry. 2009 American Institute of Chemical Engineers

Application of process monitoring to anomaly detection in nuclear material processing systems via system-centric event interpretation of data from multiple sensors of varying reliability

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Garcia, Humberto E.; Simpson, Michael F.; Lin, Wen-Chiao

In this paper, we apply an advanced safeguards approach and associated methods for process monitoring to a hypothetical nuclear material processing system. The assessment regarding the state of the processing facility is conducted at a systemcentric level formulated in a hybrid framework. This utilizes architecture for integrating both time- and event-driven data and analysis for decision making. While the time-driven layers of the proposed architecture encompass more traditional process monitoring methods based on time series data and analysis, the event-driven layers encompass operation monitoring methods based on discrete event data and analysis. By integrating process- and operation-related information and methodologiesmore » within a unified framework, the task of anomaly detection is greatly improved. This is because decision-making can benefit from not only known time-series relationships among measured signals but also from known event sequence relationships among generated events. This available knowledge at both time series and discrete event layers can then be effectively used to synthesize observation solutions that optimally balance sensor and data processing requirements. The application of the proposed approach is then implemented on an illustrative monitored system based on pyroprocessing and results are discussed.« less

LANL Safeguards and Security Assurance Program. Revision 6

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

NONE

1995-04-03

The Safeguards and Security (S and S) Assurance Program provides a continuous quality improvement approach to ensure effective, compliant S and S program implementation throughout the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Any issues identified through the various internal and external assessments are documented, tracked and closed using the Safeguards and Security Issue Management Program. The Laboratory utilizes an integrated S and S systems approach to protect US Department of Energy (DOE) interests from theft or diversion of special nuclear material (SNM), sabotage, espionage, loss or theft of classified/controlled matter or government property, and other hostile acts that may cause unacceptable impactsmore » on national security, health and safety of employees and the public, and the environment. This document explains the basis, scope, and conduct of the S and S process to include: self-assessments, issue management, risk assessment, and root cause analysis. It also provides a discussion of S and S topical areas, roles and responsibilities, process flow charts, minimum requirements, methodology, terms, and forms.« less

Incorporating delayed neutrons into the point-model equations routinely used for neutron coincidence counting in nuclear safeguards

DOE PAGES

Croft, Stephen; Favalli, Andrea

2016-09-21

Here, we extend the familiar Bӧhnel point-model equations, which are routinely used to interpret neutron coincidence counting rates, by including the contribution of delayed neutrons. After developing the necessary equations we use them to show, by providing some numerical results, what the quantitative impact of neglecting delayed neutrons is across the full range of practical nuclear safeguards applications. The influence of delayed neutrons is predicted to be small for the types of deeply sub-critical assay problems which concern the nuclear safeguards community, smaller than uncertainties arising from other factors. This is most clearly demonstrated by considering the change in themore » effective (α,n)-to-spontaneous fission prompt-neutron ratio that the inclusion of delayed neutrons gives rise to. That the influence of delayed neutrons is small is fortunate, and our results justify the long standing practice of simply neglecting them in the analysis of field measurements.« less

The DOE/Gosatomnadzor collaboration, Project 3: Providing equipment and support for Gosatomnadzor inspection activities in Russia

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Hoida, H.W.; Lanier, R.; Schultz, F.

1997-12-31

Project 3 consists of two subprojects: Project 3.1 -- providing Materials Control and Accounting (MC and A) equipment to GAN inspectors; and Project 3.2 -- the development of Russian indigenous MC and A equipment capability for GAN. The objective of Project 3.1 is to provide equipment for use by GAN inspectors during independent inspections of facilities that contain direct-use material. To accomplish this, Project 3.1 develops the initial training for GAN instructors on the instruments provided by the US and contracts with Safety Limited, a GAN contractor for developing methodologies and procedures for using the equipment and acceptance checkout andmore » delivery. The equipment deliveries were divided into three phases to fit within the DOE budget and priority constraints. With the equipment delivered to the inspectors, Phase 1 is complete. Phase 2 has been started by purchasing and checking out neutron coincidence counting (NCC) equipment at Los Alamos. The GAN instructors have been trained on NCCs, cherenkov vision devices (CVDs), ultrasonic thickness gages (UTGs), and tamper indicating devices (TIDs) at Los Alamos. Phase 3 has been delayed to fiscal year 1999 (FY99) due to budget constraints. Project 3.2 addresses the important issue of sustainability for safeguards equipment in Russia. GAN`s Project 3.2 will help establish indigenous equipment for Russian safeguards. The initial review of Russian manufacturing capabilities for safeguards equipment has been completed and recommendations have been made. To this end, the authors are encouraging US vendors to collaborate with Russian institutes and have contracted with the All-Russia Research Institute of Automatics (VINIIA) and Aquila Technologies to fabricate a Russian Active-Well Coincidence Counter (AWCC) from US parts.« less

The Triangle of the Space Launch System Operations

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Fayolle, Eric

2010-09-01

Firemen know it as “fire triangle”, mathematicians know it as “golden triangle”, sailormen know it as “Bermuda triangle”, politicians know it as “Weimar triangle”… This article aims to present a new aspect of that shape geometry in the space launch system world: “the triangle of the space launch system operations”. This triangle is composed of these three following topics, which have to be taken into account for any space launch system operation processing: design, safety and operational use. Design performance is of course taking into account since the early preliminary phase of a system development. This design performance is matured all along the development phases, thanks to consecutives iterations in order to respect the financial and timing constraints imposed to the development of the system. This process leads to a detailed and precise design to assess the required performance. Then, the operational use phase brings its batch of constraints during the use of the system. This phase is conducted by specific procedures for each operation. Each procedure has sequences for each sub-system, which have to be conducted in a very precise chronological way. These procedures can be processed by automatic way or manual way, with the necessity or not of the implication of operators, and in a determined environment. Safeguard aims to verify the respect of the specific constraints imposed to guarantee the safety of persons and property, the protection of public health and the environment. Safeguard has to be taken into account above the operational constraints of any space operation, without forgetting the highest safety level for the operators of the space operation, and of course without damaging the facilities or without disturbing the external environment. All space operations are the result of a “win-win” compromise between these three topics. Contrary to the fire triangle where one of the topics has to be suppressed in order to avoid the combustion, no topics at all should be suppressed in the triangle of the space launch system operations. Indeed, if safeguard is not considered since the beginning of the development phase, this development will not take into account safeguard constraints. Then, the operational phase will become very difficult because unavailable, to respect safety rules required for the operational use phase of the system. Taking into account safeguard constraints in late project phases will conduct to very high operational constraints, sometimes quite disturbing for the operator, even blocking to be able to consider the operational use phase as mature and optimized. On the contrary, if design performance is not taken into account in order to favor safeguard aspect in the operational use phase, system design will not be optimized, what will lead to high planning and timing impacts. The examples detailed in this article show the compromise for what each designer should confront with during the development of any system dealing with the safety of persons and property, the protection of public health and the environment.

Nuclear Security: Target Analysis-rev

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Singh, Surinder Paul; Gibbs, Philip W.; Bultz, Garl A.

2014-03-01

The objectives of this presentation are to understand target identification, including roll-up and protracted theft; evaluate target identification in the SNRI; recognize the target characteristics and consequence levels; and understand graded safeguards.

CDC Vital Signs: Preventing Norovirus Outbreaks

MedlinePlus

... source of norovirus outbreaks using genome sequencing and analysis. State and local governments can Adopt and enforce all provisions of the FDA model Food Code to better safeguard food. Investigate norovirus outbreaks ...

Assessment of the knowledge of United Arab Emirates dentists of Child Maltreatment, protection and safeguarding.

PubMed

Al Hajeri, H; Al Halabi, M; Kowash, M; Khamis, A H; Welbury, R; Hussein, I

2018-06-01

Child safeguarding is society's responsibility. Dentists are uniquely positioned to recognise Child Abuse and Neglect (CAN) in dental practice and the wider society. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) introduced a child protection law in 2016. We aimed to assess the awareness of UAE dentists of child maltreatment, protection and safeguarding. Study Design A cross-sectional survey. We surveyed 381 UAE dentists about the knowledge and practice of CAN and safeguarding issues using a self-administered anonymous questionnaire. Statistical analysis was carried out using Chi-square, t-test, ANOVA and Pearson's correlation test and statistical significance was set as p <0.05. Over 39 % (n=152) of the responders suspected CAN; male dentists suspected more CAN than females (p=0.015). Orthodontists, paediatric dentists (p<0.001) and female dentists (p=0.001) were more knowledgeable about diagnosing CAN. Paediatric dentists attended more CAN-related postgraduate training (p<0.001) than other specialties. Over 90% (n=346) believed that CAN should be addressed, 58.1% (n=224) and 54.1% (n=206) had CAN undergraduate and postgraduate training respectively but 53.5% (n=204) were unaware of local child protection guidelines. Dentists barriers to child protection reporting were; fear of family violence (59.6%, n=227), lack of knowledge of referral process (60.2%, n=228) and lack of diagnosis certainty (54.9%, n=206). UAE dentists qualified in Western and Asian countries had fewer barriers for child protection reporting (p=0.022) than the Arab and Gulf Cooperation Council qualified dentists. A large minority of UAE dentists suspected CAN. Factors influencing child protection reporting were identified. Dentists' gender, specialty, and country of qualification affected their knowledge of CAN and practice of safeguarding. Child protection training is recommended.

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Barrett, Christopher A.; Martinez, Alonzo; McNamara, Bruce K.

International Atom Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguard verification measures in gaseous centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs) rely on environmental sampling, non-destructive assay (NDA), and destructive assay (DA) sampling and analysis to determine uranium enrichment. UF6 bias defect measurements are made by DA sampling and analysis to assure that enrichment is consistent with declarations. DA samples are collected from a limited number of cylinders for high precision, offsite mass spectrometer analysis. Samples are typically drawn from a sampling tap into a UF6 sample bottle, then packaged, sealed, and shipped under IAEA chain of custody to an offsite analytical laboratory. Future DA safeguard measuresmore » may require improvements in efficiency and effectiveness as GCEP capacities increase and UF6 shipping regulations become increasingly more restrictive. The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) DA sampler concept and Laser Ablation Absorption Ratio Spectrometry (LAARS) assay method are under development to potentially provide DA safeguard tools that increase inspection effectiveness and reduce sample shipping constraints. The PNNL DA sampler concept uses a handheld sampler to collect DA samples for either onsite LAARS assay or offsite laboratory analysis. The DA sampler design will use a small sampling planchet that is coated with an adsorptive film to collect controlled quantities of UF6 gas directly from a cylinder or process sampling tap. Development efforts are currently underway at PNNL to enhance LAARS assay performance to allow high-precision onsite bias defect measurements. In this paper, we report on the experimental investigation to develop adsorptive films for the PNNL DA sampler concept. These films are intended to efficiently capture UF6 and then stabilize the collected DA sample prior to onsite LAARS or offsite laboratory analysis. Several porous material composite films were investigated, including a film designed to maximize the chemical adsorption and binding of gaseous UF6 onto the sampling planchet.« less

INF and IAEA: A comparative analysis of verification strategy

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Scheinman, L.; Kratzer, M.

1992-07-01

This is the final report of a study on the relevance and possible lessons of Intermediate Range Nuclear Force (INF) verification to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) international safeguards activities.

US-ROK Action Sheet 34: Safeguards Application of a Hand-held Mechanically Cooled Germanium Spectrometer

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Dreyer, J.; Burks, M.; Ham, Y.

2015-10-20

This report summarizes results of Action Sheet 34 - for the cooperative efforts on the field testing and evaluation of a high-resolution, hand-held, gamma-ray spectrometer, known as SPG (Spectroscopic Planar Germanium), for safeguards application such as short notice inspections, UF6 analysis, enrichment determination, and other potential applications. The Spectroscopic Planar Germanium (SPG) has been demonstrated IAEA Physical Inventory Verification (PIV) in South Korea. This field test was a success and the feedback provided by KINAC, IAEA, and national laboratory staff was used to direct efforts to improve the instrument this year. Key points in this report include measurement results frommore » PIV, analysis of spectra with commercially available Ortec U235 and PC-FRAM, and completion of tripod and tungsten collimator and integration of user feedback.« less

4. View toward north, south face ("C" wall) of perimeter ...

Library of Congress Historic Buildings Survey, Historic Engineering Record, Historic Landscapes Survey

4. View toward north, south face ("C" wall) of perimeter acquisition radar building showing entry (former docking facility) on left, behind satellite dish. On the bottom right can be seen the knockout panel provided for a future tunnel that was never used. The two "holes" above are referred to as bird screens, the upper air intake, on the fifth level, incorporates a plenium chamber (#510e), as does the lower (#2M8A) air exhaust, located on the second level mezzanine - Stanley R. Mickelsen Safeguard Complex, Perimeter Acquisition Radar Building, Limited Access Area, between Limited Access Patrol Road & Service Road A, Nekoma, Cavalier County, ND

Poster presentation Sandia helicopter acoustic detector

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Arlowe, H.D.

1981-01-01

In reviewing the safeguards plans for several proposed fuel cycle facilities, the advantages of a short-range helicopter detector became apparent. The main buildings of these new designs are generally hardened so as to provide significant delay to a helicopter-borne adversary team. Under these circumstances the sensor is only required to detect helicopters which are in their final landing phase and at close range (less than 75 meters). This paper describes the Sandia detector, which is designed to only look at spectral lines between 20 and 40 Hz, and depends upon the harmonic content of the rotor pulses for detecting themore » lower rotor speed helicopters. 1 ref.« less

Report: Hospital waste management--awareness and practices: a study of three states in India.

PubMed

Rao, P Hanumantha

2008-06-01

The study was conducted in Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra and Uttar Pradesh in India. Hospitals/nursing homes and private medical practitioners in urban as well as rural areas and those from the private as well as the government sector were covered. Information on (a) awareness of bio-medical waste management rules, (b) training undertaken and (c) practices with respect to segregation, use of colour coding, sharps management, access to common waste management facilities and disposal was collected. Awareness of Bio-medical Waste Management Rules was better among hospital staff in comparison with private medical practitioners and awareness was marginally higher among those in urban areas in comparison with those in rural areas. Training gained momentum only after the dead-line for compliance was over. Segregation and use of colour codes revealed gaps, which need correction. About 70% of the healthcare facilities used a needle cutter/destroyer for sharps management. Access to Common Waste Management facilities was low at about 35%. Dumping biomedical waste on the roads outside the hospital is still prevalent and access to Common Waste facilities is still limited. Surveillance, monitoring and penal machinery was found to be deficient and these require strengthening to improve compliance with the Bio-medical Waste Management Rules and to safeguard the health of employees, patients and communities.

University of Texas Safeguards by Design Problem Statement

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Rauch, Eric Benton; Scherer, Carolynn P.; Ruggiero, Christy E.

This document describes the problem statement that students at the University of Texas will use for their senior level capstone design class. The purpose of this project is to introduce students to Safeguards by Design concepts as part of their capstone design course at the culmination of their degree program. This work is supported by Los Alamos National Laboratory with FY17 and FY18 programmatic funding from the U. S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), through the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN), Office of International Nuclear Safeguards (INS), Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), Human Resource Developmentmore » Program, Safeguards by Design Project.« less

INF and IAEA: A comparative analysis of verification strategy. [Final report

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Scheinman, L.; Kratzer, M.

1992-07-01

This is the final report of a study on the relevance and possible lessons of Intermediate Range Nuclear Force (INF) verification to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) international safeguards activities.

32 CFR 2001.40 - General.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-07-01

... crucial nature of the information; analysis of known and anticipated threats; vulnerability; and... Defense Other Regulations Relating to National Defense INFORMATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT OFFICE, NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION CLASSIFIED NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Safeguarding § 2001.40 General...

32 CFR 2001.40 - General.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-07-01

... crucial nature of the information; analysis of known and anticipated threats; vulnerability; and... Defense Other Regulations Relating to National Defense INFORMATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT OFFICE, NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION CLASSIFIED NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Safeguarding § 2001.40 General...

32 CFR 2001.40 - General.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... crucial nature of the information; analysis of known and anticipated threats; vulnerability; and... Defense Other Regulations Relating to National Defense INFORMATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT OFFICE, NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION CLASSIFIED NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Safeguarding § 2001.40 General...

32 CFR 2001.40 - General.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-07-01

... crucial nature of the information; analysis of known and anticipated threats; vulnerability; and... Defense Other Regulations Relating to National Defense INFORMATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT OFFICE, NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION CLASSIFIED NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Safeguarding § 2001.40 General...

32 CFR 2001.40 - General.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-07-01

... crucial nature of the information; analysis of known and anticipated threats; vulnerability; and... Defense Other Regulations Relating to National Defense INFORMATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT OFFICE, NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION CLASSIFIED NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Safeguarding § 2001.40 General...

Modeling and Simulation for Safeguards and Nonproliferation Workshop

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Gilligan, Kimberly V.; Kirk, Bernadette Lugue

2015-01-01

The Modeling and Simulation for Safeguards and Nonproliferation Workshop was held December 15–18, 2014, at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. This workshop was made possible by the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Human Capital Development (NGSI HCD) Program. The idea of the workshop was to move beyond the tried-and-true boot camp training of nonproliferation concepts to spend several days on the unique perspective of applying modeling and simulation (M&S) solutions to safeguards challenges.

45 CFR 164.530 - Administrative requirements.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-10-01

... workforce on the policies and procedures with respect to protected health information required by this... administrative, technical, and physical safeguards to protect the privacy of protected health information. (2)(i) Implementation specification: Safeguards. A covered entity must reasonably safeguard protected health information...

45 CFR 164.530 - Administrative requirements.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-10-01

... workforce on the policies and procedures with respect to protected health information required by this... administrative, technical, and physical safeguards to protect the privacy of protected health information. (2)(i) Implementation specification: Safeguards. A covered entity must reasonably safeguard protected health information...

5 CFR 2500.9 - Safeguarding.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 5 Administrative Personnel 3 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Safeguarding. 2500.9 Section 2500.9 Administrative Personnel OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT INFORMATION SECURITY REGULATION § 2500.9 Safeguarding. The Office of Administration shall protect information in its custody...

32 CFR 154.68 - Safeguarding procedures.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-07-01

... 32 National Defense 1 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Safeguarding procedures. 154.68 Section 154.68 National Defense Department of Defense OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE SECURITY DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE... Safeguarding procedures. Personnel security investigative reports and personnel security determination...

5 CFR 2500.9 - Safeguarding.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 5 Administrative Personnel 3 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safeguarding. 2500.9 Section 2500.9 Administrative Personnel OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT INFORMATION SECURITY REGULATION § 2500.9 Safeguarding. The Office of Administration shall protect information in its custody...

Measurement of the 19F(α,n)22Na Cross Section for Nuclear Safeguards Science

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Lowe, Marcus; Smith, M. S.; Pain, S.; Febbraro, M.; Pittman, S.; Chipps, K. A.; Thompson, S. J.; Grinder, M.; Grzywacz, R.; Smith, K.; Thornsberry, C.; Thompson, P.; Peters, W. A.; Waddell, D.; Blanchard, R.; Carls, A.; Shadrick, S.; Engelhardt, A.; Hertz-Kintish, D.; Allen, N.; Sims, H.

2015-10-01

Enriched uranium is commonly stored in fluoride matrices such as UF6. Alpha decays of uranium in UF6 will create neutrons via the 19F(α,n)22Na reaction. An improved cross section for this reaction will enable improved nondestructive assays of uranium content in storage cylinders at material enrichment facilities. To determine this reaction cross section, we have performed experiments using both forward and inverse kinematic techniques at the University of Notre Dame (forward) and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (inverse). Both experiments utilized the Versatile Array of Neutron Detectors at Low Energy (VANDLE) for neutron detection. The ORNL experiment also used a new ionization chamber for 22Na particle identification. Gating on the 22Na nuclei detected drastically reduced the background counts in the neutron time-of-flight spectra. The latest analysis and results will be presented for 19F beam energies ranging from 20-37 MeV. This work is funded in part by the DOE Office of Nuclear Physics, the National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation R&D, and the NSF.

ISMP Medication Error Report Analysis: Understanding Human Over-reliance on Technology It's Exelan, Not Exelon Crash Cart Drug Mix-up Risk with Entering a "Test Order".

PubMed

Cohen, Michael R; Smetzer, Judy L

2017-01-01

These medication errors have occurred in health care facilities at least once. They will happen again-perhaps where you work. Through education and alertness of personnel and procedural safeguards, they can be avoided. You should consider publishing accounts of errors in your newsletters and/or presenting them at your inservice training programs. Your assistance is required to continue this feature. The reports described here were received through the Institute for Safe Medication Practices (ISMP) Medication Errors Reporting Program. Any reports published by ISMP will be anonymous. Comments are also invited; the writers' names will be published if desired. ISMP may be contacted at the address shown below. Errors, close calls, or hazardous conditions may be reported directly to ISMP through the ISMP Web site (www.ismp.org), by calling 800-FAIL-SAFE, or via e-mail at ismpinfo@ismp.org. ISMP guarantees the confidentiality and security of the information received and respects reporters' wishes as to the level of detail included in publications.

Health Information Security in Hospitals: the Application of Security Safeguards.

PubMed

Mehraeen, Esmaeil; Ayatollahi, Haleh; Ahmadi, Maryam

2016-02-01

A hospital information system has potentials to improve the accessibility of clinical information and the quality of health care. However, the use of this system has resulted in new challenges, such as concerns over health information security. This paper aims to assess the status of information security in terms of administrative, technical and physical safeguards in the university hospitals. This was a survey study in which the participants were information technology (IT) managers (n=36) who worked in the hospitals affiliated to the top ranked medical universities (university A and university B). Data were collected using a questionnaire. The content validity of the questionnaire was examined by the experts and the reliability of the questionnaire was determined using Cronbach's coefficient alpha (α=0.75). The results showed that the administrative safeguards were arranged at a medium level. In terms of the technical safeguards and the physical safeguards, the IT managers rated them at a strong level. According to the results, among three types of security safeguards, the administrative safeguards were assessed at the medium level. To improve it, developing security policies, implementing access control models and training users are recommended.

75 FR 21046 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-04-22

... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards In accordance with the... on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) will hold a meeting on May 6-8, 2010, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville....: Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) Owners Group (BWROG) Topical Report NEDC-33347P, ``Containment Overpressure...

5 CFR 293.106 - Safeguarding information about individuals.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 5 Administrative Personnel 1 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safeguarding information about individuals. 293.106 Section 293.106 Administrative Personnel OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT CIVIL SERVICE REGULATIONS PERSONNEL RECORDS Basic Policies on Maintenance of Personnel Records § 293.106 Safeguarding...

Source Recertification, Refurbishment, and Transfer Logistics

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Gastelum, Zoe N.; Duckworth, Leesa L.; Greenfield, Bryce A.

2013-09-01

The 2012 Gap Analysis of Department of Energy Radiological Sealed Sources, Standards, and Materials for Safeguards Technology Development [1] report, and the subsequent Reconciliation of Source Needs and Surpluses across the U.S. Department of Energy National Laboratory Complex [2] report, resulted in the identification of 33 requests for nuclear or radiological sealed sources for which there was potentially available, suitable material from within the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) complex to fill the source need. Available, suitable material was defined by DOE laboratories as material slated for excess, or that required recertification or refurbishment before being used for safeguards technologymore » development. This report begins by outlining the logistical considerations required for the shipment of nuclear and radiological materials between DOE laboratories. Then, because of the limited need for transfer of matching sources, the report also offers considerations for an alternative approach – the shipment of safeguards equipment between DOE laboratories or technology testing centers. Finally, this report addresses repackaging needs for the two source requests for which there was available, suitable material within the DOE complex.« less

The U.S./IAEA Workshop on Software Sustainability for Safeguards Instrumentation: Report to the NNSA DOE Office of International Nuclear Safeguards (NA-241)

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Pepper, Susan E.; Pickett, Chris A.; Queirolo, Al

The U.S Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) convened a workshop on Software Sustainability for Safeguards Instrumentation in Vienna, Austria, May 6-8, 2014. Safeguards instrumentation software must be sustained in a changing environment to ensure existing instruments can continue to perform as designed, with improved security. The approaches to the development and maintenance of instrument software used in the past may not be the best model for the future and, therefore, the organizers’ goal was to investigate these past approaches and to determine an optimalmore » path forward. The purpose of this report is to provide input for the DOE NNSA Office of International Nuclear Safeguards (NA-241) and other stakeholders that can be utilized when making decisions related to the development and maintenance of software used in the implementation of international nuclear safeguards. For example, this guidance can be used when determining whether to fund the development, upgrade, or replacement of a particular software product. The report identifies the challenges related to sustaining software, and makes recommendations for addressing these challenges, supported by summaries and detailed notes from the workshop discussions. In addition the authors provide a set of recommendations for institutionalizing software sustainability practices in the safeguards community. The term “software sustainability” was defined for this workshop as ensuring that safeguards instrument software and algorithm functionality can be maintained efficiently throughout the instrument lifecycle, without interruption and providing the ability to continue to improve that software as needs arise.« less

THE NEXT GENERATION SAFEGUARDS PROFESSIONAL NETWORK: PROGRESS AND NEXT STEPS

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Zhernosek, Alena V; Lynch, Patrick D; Scholz, Melissa A

2011-01-01

President Obama has repeatedly stated that the United States must ensure that the international safeguards regime, as embodied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has 'the authority, information, people, and technology it needs to do its job.' The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) works to implement the President's vision through the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), a program to revitalize the U.S. DOE national laboratories safeguards technology and human capital base so that the United States can more effectively support the IAEA and ensure that it meets current and emerging challenges to the internationalmore » safeguards system. In 2009, in response to the human capital development goals of NGSI, young safeguards professionals within the Global Nuclear Security Technology Division at Oak Ridge National Laboratory launched the Next Generation Safeguards Professional Network (NGSPN). The purpose of this initiative is to establish working relationships and to foster collaboration and communication among the next generation of safeguards leaders. The NGSPN is an organization for, and of, young professionals pursuing careers in nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation - as well as mid-career professionals new to the field - whether working within the U.S. DOE national laboratory complex, U.S. government agencies, academia, or industry or at the IAEA. The NGSPN is actively supported by the NNSA, boasts more than 70 members, maintains a website and newsletter, and has held two national meetings as well as an NGSPN session and panel at the July 2010 Institute of Nuclear Material Management Annual Meeting. This paper discusses the network; its significance, goals and objectives; developments and progress to date; and future plans.« less

Policy Safeguards and the Legitimacy of Highway Interdiction

DTIC Science & Technology

2016-12-01

17 B. BIAS WITHIN LAW ENFORCEMENT ..............................................19 C. STATISTICAL DATA GATHERING...32 3. Controlling Discretion .................................................................36 4. Statistical Data Collection for Traffic Stops...49 A. DESCRIPTION OF STATISTICAL DATA COLLECTED ...............50 B. DATA ORGANIZATION AND ANALYSIS

National and International Security Applications of Cryogenic Detectors—Mostly Nuclear Safeguards

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Rabin, Michael W.

2009-12-01

As with science, so with security—in both arenas, the extraordinary sensitivity of cryogenic sensors enables high-confidence detection and high-precision measurement even of the faintest signals. Science applications are more mature, but several national and international security applications have been identified where cryogenic detectors have high potential payoff. International safeguards and nuclear forensics are areas needing new technology and methods to boost speed, sensitivity, precision and accuracy. Successfully applied, improved nuclear materials analysis will help constrain nuclear materials diversion pathways and contribute to treaty verification. Cryogenic microcalorimeter detectors for X-ray, gamma-ray, neutron, and alpha-particle spectrometry are under development with these aims in mind. In each case the unsurpassed energy resolution of microcalorimeters reveals previously invisible spectral features of nuclear materials. Preliminary results of quantitative analysis indicate substantial improvements are still possible, but significant work will be required to fully understand the ultimate performance limits.

Image segmentation for uranium isotopic analysis by SIMS: Combined adaptive thresholding and marker controlled watershed approach

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Willingham, David G.; Naes, Benjamin E.; Heasler, Patrick G.

A novel approach to particle identification and particle isotope ratio determination has been developed for nuclear safeguard applications. This particle search approach combines an adaptive thresholding algorithm and marker-controlled watershed segmentation (MCWS) transform, which improves the secondary ion mass spectrometry (SIMS) isotopic analysis of uranium containing particle populations for nuclear safeguards applications. The Niblack assisted MCWS approach (a.k.a. SEEKER) developed for this work has improved the identification of isotopically unique uranium particles under conditions that have historically presented significant challenges for SIMS image data processing techniques. Particles obtained from five NIST uranium certified reference materials (CRM U129A, U015, U150, U500more » and U850) were successfully identified in regions of SIMS image data 1) where a high variability in image intensity existed, 2) where particles were touching or were in close proximity to one another and/or 3) where the magnitude of ion signal for a given region was count limited. Analysis of the isotopic distributions of uranium containing particles identified by SEEKER showed four distinct, accurately identified 235U enrichment distributions, corresponding to the NIST certified 235U/238U isotope ratios for CRM U129A/U015 (not statistically differentiated), U150, U500 and U850. Additionally, comparison of the minor uranium isotope (234U, 235U and 236U) atom percent values verified that, even in the absence of high precision isotope ratio measurements, SEEKER could be used to segment isotopically unique uranium particles from SIMS image data. Although demonstrated specifically for SIMS analysis of uranium containing particles for nuclear safeguards, SEEKER has application in addressing a broad set of image processing challenges.« less

Detecting errors and anomalies in computerized materials control and accountability databases

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Whiteson, R.; Hench, K.; Yarbro, T.

The Automated MC and A Database Assessment project is aimed at improving anomaly and error detection in materials control and accountability (MC and A) databases and increasing confidence in the data that they contain. Anomalous data resulting in poor categorization of nuclear material inventories greatly reduces the value of the database information to users. Therefore it is essential that MC and A data be assessed periodically for anomalies or errors. Anomaly detection can identify errors in databases and thus provide assurance of the integrity of data. An expert system has been developed at Los Alamos National Laboratory that examines thesemore » large databases for anomalous or erroneous data. For several years, MC and A subject matter experts at Los Alamos have been using this automated system to examine the large amounts of accountability data that the Los Alamos Plutonium Facility generates. These data are collected and managed by the Material Accountability and Safeguards System, a near-real-time computerized nuclear material accountability and safeguards system. This year they have expanded the user base, customizing the anomaly detector for the varying requirements of different groups of users. This paper describes the progress in customizing the expert systems to the needs of the users of the data and reports on their results.« less

Estimating alarm thresholds and the number of components in mixture distributions

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Burr, Tom; Hamada, Michael S.

2012-09-01

Mixtures of probability distributions arise in many nuclear assay and forensic applications, including nuclear weapon detection, neutron multiplicity counting, and in solution monitoring (SM) for nuclear safeguards. SM data is increasingly used to enhance nuclear safeguards in aqueous reprocessing facilities having plutonium in solution form in many tanks. This paper provides background for mixture probability distributions and then focuses on mixtures arising in SM data. SM data can be analyzed by evaluating transfer-mode residuals defined as tank-to-tank transfer differences, and wait-mode residuals defined as changes during non-transfer modes. A previous paper investigated impacts on transfer-mode and wait-mode residuals of event marking errors which arise when the estimated start and/or stop times of tank events such as transfers are somewhat different from the true start and/or stop times. Event marking errors contribute to non-Gaussian behavior and larger variation than predicted on the basis of individual tank calibration studies. This paper illustrates evidence for mixture probability distributions arising from such event marking errors and from effects such as condensation or evaporation during non-transfer modes, and pump carryover during transfer modes. A quantitative assessment of the sample size required to adequately characterize a mixture probability distribution arising in any context is included.

The Coming Nuclear Renaissance for Next Generation Safeguards Specialists--Maximizing Potential and Minimizing the Risks

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Eipeldauer, Mary D

2009-01-01

This document is intended to provide an overview of the workshop entitled 'The Coming Nuclear Renaissance for the Next Generation Safeguards Experts-Maximizing Benefits While Minimizing Proliferation Risks', conducted at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) in partnership with the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) and the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL). This document presents workshop objectives; lists the numerous participant universities and individuals, the nuclear nonproliferation lecture topics covered, and the facilities tours taken as part of the workshop; and discusses the university partnership sessions and proposed areas for collaboration between the universities and ORNL for 2009. Appendix A contains themore » agenda for the workshop; Appendix B lists the workshop attendees and presenters with contact information; Appendix C contains graphics of the evaluation form results and survey areas; and Appendix D summarizes the responses to the workshop evaluation form. The workshop was an opportunity for ORNL, Y-12, and SRNL staff with more than 30 years combined experience in nuclear nonproliferation to provide a comprehensive overview of their expertise for the university professors and their students. The overall goal of the workshop was to emphasize nonproliferation aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle and to identify specific areas where the universities and experts from operations and national laboratories could collaborate.« less

Assessing State Nuclear Weapons Proliferation: Using Bayesian Network Analysis of Social Factors

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Coles, Garill A.; Brothers, Alan J.; Olson, Jarrod

A Bayesian network (BN) model of social factors can support proliferation assessments by estimating the likelihood that a state will pursue a nuclear weapon. Social factors including political, economic, nuclear capability, security, and national identity and psychology factors may play as important a role in whether a State pursues nuclear weapons as more physical factors. This paper will show how using Bayesian reasoning on a generic case of a would-be proliferator State can be used to combine evidence that supports proliferation assessment. Theories and analysis by political scientists can be leveraged in a quantitative and transparent way to indicate proliferationmore » risk. BN models facilitate diagnosis and inference in a probabilistic environment by using a network of nodes and acyclic directed arcs between the nodes whose connections, or absence of, indicate probabilistic relevance, or independence. We propose a BN model that would use information from both traditional safeguards and the strengthened safeguards associated with the Additional Protocol to indicate countries with a high risk of proliferating nuclear weapons. This model could be used in a variety of applications such a prioritization tool and as a component of state safeguards evaluations. This paper will discuss the benefits of BN reasoning, the development of Pacific Northwest National Laboratory’s (PNNL) BN state proliferation model and how it could be employed as an analytical tool.« less

Self-Injurious Behavior and Functional Analysis: Where Are the Descriptions of Participant Protections?

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Weeden, Marc; Mahoney, Amanda; Poling, Alan

2010-01-01

This study examined the reporting of participant protections in studies involving functional analysis and self-injurious behavior and published from 1994 through 2008. Results indicated that session termination criteria were rarely reported and other specific participant safeguards were seldom described. The absence of such information in no way…

75 FR 8154 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-02-23

... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards In accordance with the... on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) will hold a meeting on March 4-6, 2010, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville....-12 p.m.: New Advanced Reactor Designs (Open)--The Committee will hear presentations by and hold...

17 CFR 160.30 - Procedures to safeguard customer records and information.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-04-01

... customer records and information. 160.30 Section 160.30 Commodity and Securities Exchanges COMMODITY... Date § 160.30 Procedures to safeguard customer records and information. Every futures commission... physical safeguards for the protection of customer records and information. These policies and procedures...

5 CFR 293.107 - Special safeguards for automated records.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 5 Administrative Personnel 1 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Special safeguards for automated records. 293.107 Section 293.107 Administrative Personnel OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT CIVIL SERVICE REGULATIONS PERSONNEL RECORDS Basic Policies on Maintenance of Personnel Records § 293.107 Special safeguards...

7 CFR 947.55 - Safeguards.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 7 Agriculture 8 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safeguards. 947.55 Section 947.55 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued) AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERVICE (Marketing Agreements... safeguards to prevent shipments pursuant to § 947.54 from entering channels of trade and other outlets for...

Termination of Safeguards for Accountable Nuclear Materials at the Idaho National Laboratory

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Michael Holzemer; Alan Carvo

2012-04-01

Termination of safeguards ends requirements of Nuclear Material Control and Accountability (MC&A) and thereby removes the safeguards basis for applying physical protection requirements for theft and diversion of nuclear material, providing termination requirements are met as described. Department of Energy (DOE) M 470.4 6 (Nuclear Material Control and Accountability [8/26/05]) stipulates: 1. Section A, Chapter I (1)( q) (1): Safeguards can be terminated on nuclear materials provided the following conditions are met: (a) 'If the material is special nuclear material (SNM) or protected as SNM, it must be attractiveness level E and have a measured value.' (b) 'The material hasmore » been determined by DOE line management to be of no programmatic value to DOE.' (c) 'The material is transferred to the control of a waste management organization where the material is accounted for and protected in accordance with waste management regulations. The material must not be collocated with other accountable nuclear materials.' Requirements for safeguards termination depend on the safeguards attractiveness levels of the material. For attractiveness level E, approval has been granted from the DOE Idaho Operations Office (DOE ID) to Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC (BEA) Safeguards and Security (S&S). In some cases, it may be necessary to dispose of nuclear materials of attractiveness level D or higher. Termination of safeguards for such materials must be approved by the Departmental Element (this is the DOE Headquarters Office of Nuclear Energy) after consultation with the Office of Security.« less

76 FR 79229 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards; Notice of Meeting

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-12-21

... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards; Notice of Meeting In... Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) will hold a meeting on January 19-20, 2012, 11545 Rockville... Cooling Systems for Light- Water Nuclear Power Reactors'' (Open)--The Committee will hear presentations by...

47 CFR 64.2009 - Safeguards required for use of customer proprietary network information.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... 47 Telecommunication 3 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Safeguards required for use of customer proprietary network information. 64.2009 Section 64.2009 Telecommunication FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION... Proprietary Network Information § 64.2009 Safeguards required for use of customer proprietary network...

47 CFR 64.2009 - Safeguards required for use of customer proprietary network information.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-10-01

... 47 Telecommunication 3 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Safeguards required for use of customer proprietary network information. 64.2009 Section 64.2009 Telecommunication FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION... Proprietary Network Information § 64.2009 Safeguards required for use of customer proprietary network...

47 CFR 64.2010 - Safeguards on the disclosure of customer proprietary network information.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-10-01

... 47 Telecommunication 3 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Safeguards on the disclosure of customer proprietary network information. 64.2010 Section 64.2010 Telecommunication FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION... Proprietary Network Information § 64.2010 Safeguards on the disclosure of customer proprietary network...

10 CFR 1304.114 - Responsibility for maintaining adequate safeguards.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 10 Energy 4 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Responsibility for maintaining adequate safeguards. 1304.114 Section 1304.114 Energy NUCLEAR WASTE TECHNICAL REVIEW BOARD PRIVACY ACT OF 1974 § 1304.114 Responsibility for maintaining adequate safeguards. The Board has the responsibility for maintaining adequate...

10 CFR 1304.114 - Responsibility for maintaining adequate safeguards.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... 10 Energy 4 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Responsibility for maintaining adequate safeguards. 1304.114 Section 1304.114 Energy NUCLEAR WASTE TECHNICAL REVIEW BOARD PRIVACY ACT OF 1974 § 1304.114 Responsibility for maintaining adequate safeguards. The Board has the responsibility for maintaining adequate...

10 CFR 1304.114 - Responsibility for maintaining adequate safeguards.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... 10 Energy 4 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Responsibility for maintaining adequate safeguards. 1304.114 Section 1304.114 Energy NUCLEAR WASTE TECHNICAL REVIEW BOARD PRIVACY ACT OF 1974 § 1304.114 Responsibility for maintaining adequate safeguards. The Board has the responsibility for maintaining adequate...

10 CFR 1304.114 - Responsibility for maintaining adequate safeguards.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... 10 Energy 4 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Responsibility for maintaining adequate safeguards. 1304.114 Section 1304.114 Energy NUCLEAR WASTE TECHNICAL REVIEW BOARD PRIVACY ACT OF 1974 § 1304.114 Responsibility for maintaining adequate safeguards. The Board has the responsibility for maintaining adequate...

15 CFR 740.11 - Governments, international organizations, and international inspections under the Chemical...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... use. The IAEA is an international organization that establishes and administers safeguards designed to.... Euratom establishes and administers safeguards designed to ensure that special nuclear materials and other... or Euratom international safeguards use provided that IAEA or Euratom maintains control of or...

14 CFR 1212.605 - Safeguarding information in systems of records.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 5 2011-01-01 2010-01-01 true Safeguarding information in systems of records. 1212.605 Section 1212.605 Aeronautics and Space NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION PRIVACY ACT-NASA REGULATIONS Instructions for NASA Employees § 1212.605 Safeguarding information in...

77 FR 51496 - Federal Acquisition Regulation; Basic Safeguarding of Contractor Information Systems

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2012-08-24

... Federal Acquisition Regulation; Basic Safeguarding of Contractor Information Systems AGENCY: Department of... Acquisition Regulation (FAR) to add a new subpart and contract clause for the basic safeguarding of contractor... information) that will be resident on or transiting through contractor information systems. DATES: Interested...

Development and Psychometric Evaluation of the Instrument: Attitudes Towards Organ Donor Advocacy Scale (ATODAS)

PubMed Central

Flodén, Anne; Lennerling, Annette; Fridh, Isabell; Rizell, Magnus; Forsberg, Anna

2011-01-01

The consequences of advocacy in nursing are critical when caring for a potential organ donor. No specific instrument has been available to measure attitudes toward organ donor advocacy. The aim of this study was to develop and psychometrically evaluate an instrument for measuring intensive and critical care (ICU) nurses’ attitudes toward organ donor advocacy. The study was conducted in two stages: instrument development and instrument evaluation and refinement. A questionnaire was developed (Attitude Toward Organ Donor Advocacy Scale (ATODAS)), which was sent to half of all nurses working in ICUs (general-, neuro-, thoracic- or paediatric-) in Sweden (n=1180). The final response rate was 42.5% (n=502). In order to explore validity and reliability, the expected scale dimensionality of the questionnaire was examined both by explorative principal component analysis (with oblique, varimax rotation) and by confirmatory multi-trait analysis. The confirmatory factor analysis indicated that the ATODAS could best be explained by five factors; Attitudes toward championing organ donation at a structural hospital level; Attitudes toward championing organ donation at a political and research level; Attitudes toward actively and personally safeguarding the will and wishes of the potential organ donor, Attitudes toward safeguarding the potential donor’s will and wishes by a professional approach and Attitudes toward safeguarding the will and wishes of the relatives. This initial testing indicated that the ATODAS has good psychometric properties and can be used in future research to explore if interventions may influence attitudes and behaviors related to organ donor advocacy. PMID:22046210

Data Mining Techniques to Estimate Plutonium, Initial Enrichment, Burnup, and Cooling Time in Spent Fuel Assemblies

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Trellue, Holly Renee; Fugate, Michael Lynn; Tobin, Stephen Joesph

The Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control (NPAC), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has sponsored a multi-laboratory, university, international partner collaboration to (1) detect replaced or missing pins from spent fuel assemblies (SFA) to confirm item integrity and deter diversion, (2) determine plutonium mass and related plutonium and uranium fissile mass parameters in SFAs, and (3) verify initial enrichment (IE), burnup (BU), and cooling time (CT) of facility declaration for SFAs. A wide variety of nondestructive assay (NDA) techniques were researched to achieve these goals [Veal, 2010 andmore » Humphrey, 2012]. In addition, the project includes two related activities with facility-specific benefits: (1) determination of heat content and (2) determination of reactivity (multiplication). In this research, a subset of 11 integrated NDA techniques was researched using data mining solutions at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) for their ability to achieve the above goals.« less

ENGINEERING AND CONSTRUCTING THE HALLAM NUCLEAR POWER FACILITY REACTOR STRUCTURE

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Mahlmeister, J E; Haberer, W V; Casey, D F

1960-12-15

The Hallam Nuclear Power Facility reactor structure, including the cavity liner, is described, and the design philosophy and special design requirements which were developed during the preliminary and final engineering phases of the project are explained. The structure was designed for 600 deg F inlet and 1000 deg F outlet operating sodium temperatures and fabricated of austenitic and ferritic stainless steels. Support for the reactor core components and adequate containment for biological safeguards were readily provided even though quite conservative design philosophy was used. The calculated operating characteristics, including heat generation, temperature distributions and stress levels for full-power operation, aremore » summarized. Ship fabrication and field installation experiences are also briefly related. Results of this project have established that the sodium graphite reactor permits practical and economical fabrication and field erection procedures; considerably higher operating design temperatures are believed possible without radical design changes. Also, larger reactor structures can be similarly constructed for higher capacity (300 to 1000 Mwe) nuclear power plants. (auth)« less

Results from a Field Trial of the Radio Frequency Based Cylinder Accountability and Tracking System at the Global Nuclear Fuel Americas Fuel Fabrication Facility

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Fitzgerald, Peter; Laughter, Mark D; Martyn, Rose

The Cylinder Accountability and Tracking System (CATS) is a tool designed for use by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to improve overall inspector efficiency through real-time unattended monitoring of cylinder movements, site specific rules-based event detection, and the capability to integrate many types of monitoring technologies. The system is based on the tracking of cylinder movements using (radio frequency) RF tags, and the collection of data, such as accountability weights, that can be associated with the cylinders. This presentation will cover the installation and evaluation of the CATS at the Global Nuclear Fuels (GNF) fuel fabrication facility in Wilmington,more » NC. This system was installed to evaluate its safeguards applicability, operational durability under operating conditions, and overall performance. An overview of the system design and elements specific to the GNF deployment will be presented along with lessons learned from the installation process and results from the field trial.« less

Quantitative Digital Autoradiography for Environmental Swipe Sample Prioritization: System design, Characterization, and Initial Measurements

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

McDonald, Benjamin S.; Zalavadia, Mital A.; Miller, Brian W.

Environmental sampling and sample analyses by the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Network of Analytical Laboratories (NWAL) is a critical technical tool used to detect facility misuse under a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear material activities under an Additional Protocol. Currently all environmental swipe samples (ESS) are screened using gamma spectrometry and x-ray fluorescence to estimate the amount of U and/or Pu in the ESS, to guide further analysis, and to assist in the shipment of ESS to the NWAL. Quantitative Digital Autoradiography for Environmental Samples (QDARES) is being developed to complement existing techniquesmore » through the use of a portable, real-time, high-spatial-resolution camera called the Ionizing-radiation Quantum Imaging Detector (iQID). The iQID constructs a spatial map of radionuclides within a sample or surface in real-time as charged particles (betas) and photons (gamma/x-rays) are detected and localized on an event-by-event basis. Knowledge of the location and nature of radioactive hot spots on the ESS could provide information for subsequent laboratory analysis. As a nondestructive technique, QDARES does not compromise the ESS chain of custody or subsequent laboratory analysis. In this paper we will present the system design and construction, characterization measurements with calibration sources, and initial measurements of ESS.« less

An unattended verification station for UF6 cylinders: Field trial findings

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Smith, L. E.; Miller, K. A.; McDonald, B. S.; Webster, J. B.; Zalavadia, M. A.; Garner, J. R.; Stewart, S. L.; Branney, S. J.; Todd, L. C.; Deshmukh, N. S.; Nordquist, H. A.; Kulisek, J. A.; Swinhoe, M. T.

2017-12-01

In recent years, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has pursued innovative techniques and an integrated suite of safeguards measures to address the verification challenges posed by the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle. Among the unattended instruments currently being explored by the IAEA is an Unattended Cylinder Verification Station (UCVS), which could provide automated, independent verification of the declared relative enrichment, 235U mass, total uranium mass, and identification for all declared uranium hexafluoride cylinders in a facility (e.g., uranium enrichment plants and fuel fabrication plants). Under the auspices of the United States and European Commission Support Programs to the IAEA, a project was undertaken to assess the technical and practical viability of the UCVS concept. The first phase of the UCVS viability study was centered on a long-term field trial of a prototype UCVS system at a fuel fabrication facility. A key outcome of the study was a quantitative performance evaluation of two nondestructive assay (NDA) methods being considered for inclusion in a UCVS: Hybrid Enrichment Verification Array (HEVA), and Passive Neutron Enrichment Meter (PNEM). This paper provides a description of the UCVS prototype design and an overview of the long-term field trial. Analysis results and interpretation are presented with a focus on the performance of PNEM and HEVA for the assay of over 200 "typical" Type 30B cylinders, and the viability of an "NDA Fingerprint" concept as a high-fidelity means to periodically verify that material diversion has not occurred.

Postirradiation Testing Laboratory (327 Building)

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Kammenzind, D.E.

A Standards/Requirements Identification Document (S/RID) is the total list of the Environment, Safety and Health (ES and H) requirements to be implemented by a site, facility, or activity. These requirements are appropriate to the life cycle phase to achieve an adequate level of protection for worker and public health and safety, and the environment during design, construction, operation, decontamination and decommissioning, and environmental restoration. S/RlDs are living documents, to be revised appropriately based on change in the site`s or facility`s mission or configuration, a change in the facility`s life cycle phase, or a change to the applicable standards/requirements. S/RIDs encompassmore » health and safety, environmental, and safety related safeguards and security (S and S) standards/requirements related to the functional areas listed in the US Department of Energy (DOE) Environment, Safety and Health Configuration Guide. The Fluor Daniel Hanford (FDH) Contract S/RID contains standards/requirements, applicable to FDH and FDH subcontractors, necessary for safe operation of Project Hanford Management Contract (PHMC) facilities, that are not the direct responsibility of the facility manager (e.g., a site-wide fire department). Facility S/RIDs contain standards/requirements applicable to a specific facility that are the direct responsibility of the facility manager. S/RlDs are prepared by those responsible for managing the operation of facilities or the conduct of activities that present a potential threat to the health and safety of workers, public, or the environment, including: Hazard Category 1 and 2 nuclear facilities and activities, as defined in DOE 5480.23. Selected Hazard Category 3 nuclear, and Low Hazard non-nuclear facilities and activities, as agreed upon by RL. The Postirradiation Testing Laboratory (PTL) S/RID contains standards/ requirements that are necessary for safe operation of the PTL facility, and other building/areas that are the direct responsibility of the specific facility manager. The specific DOE Orders, regulations, industry codes/standards, guidance documents and good industry practices that serve as the basis for each element/subelement are identified and aligned with each subelement.« less

30 CFR 77.1013 - Air drills; safeguards.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... 30 Mineral Resources 1 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Air drills; safeguards. 77.1013 Section 77.1013... Control § 77.1013 Air drills; safeguards. Air shall be turned off and bled from the air hoses before hand-held air drills are moved from one working area to another. ...

14 CFR § 1212.605 - Safeguarding information in systems of records.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 5 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Safeguarding information in systems of records. § 1212.605 Section § 1212.605 Aeronautics and Space NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE... Technology Security Officer for electronic records maintained in automated systems. Safeguards must insure...

77 FR 69900 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards; Notice of Meeting

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2012-11-21

... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards; Notice of Meeting In... Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) will hold a meeting on December 6-8, 2012, 11545 Rockville... Recommendations (SECY-12-0064), (3) Venting Systems for Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs) with Mark I and Mark II...

77 FR 64563 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards; Notice of Meeting

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2012-10-22

... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards; Notice of Meeting In... Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) will hold a meeting on November 1-3, 2012, 11545 Rockville...-Term Core Cooling Approach for the Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR) Design for South Texas Project...

10 CFR 54.25 - Report of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 10 Energy 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Report of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. 54.25 Section 54.25 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) REQUIREMENTS FOR RENEWAL OF... Reactor Safeguards. Each renewal application will be referred to the Advisory Committee on Reactor...

10 CFR 54.25 - Report of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Report of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. 54.25 Section 54.25 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) REQUIREMENTS FOR RENEWAL OF... Reactor Safeguards. Each renewal application will be referred to the Advisory Committee on Reactor...

75 FR 3501 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-01-21

... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards In accordance with the purposes of Sections 29 and 182b of the Atomic Energy Act (42 U.S.C. 2039, 2232b), the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) will hold a meeting on February 4-6, 2010, 11545 Rockville Pike...

78 FR 79020 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Reliability...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-12-27

... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Reliability & PRA; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Reliability & PRA will hold a..., 2013. Cayetano Santos, Chief, Technical Support Branch, Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. [FR...

30 CFR 77.1013 - Air drills; safeguards.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-07-01

... 30 Mineral Resources 1 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Air drills; safeguards. 77.1013 Section 77.1013... Control § 77.1013 Air drills; safeguards. Air shall be turned off and bled from the air hoses before hand-held air drills are moved from one working area to another. ...

30 CFR 77.1013 - Air drills; safeguards.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-07-01

... 30 Mineral Resources 1 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Air drills; safeguards. 77.1013 Section 77.1013... Control § 77.1013 Air drills; safeguards. Air shall be turned off and bled from the air hoses before hand-held air drills are moved from one working area to another. ...

32 CFR 635.2 - Safeguarding official information.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... 32 National Defense 4 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 true Safeguarding official information. 635.2 Section 635.2 National Defense Department of Defense (Continued) DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY (CONTINUED) LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS LAW ENFORCEMENT REPORTING Records Administration § 635.2 Safeguarding official information. (a) Military police...

30 CFR 77.1013 - Air drills; safeguards.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-07-01

... 30 Mineral Resources 1 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Air drills; safeguards. 77.1013 Section 77.1013... Control § 77.1013 Air drills; safeguards. Air shall be turned off and bled from the air hoses before hand-held air drills are moved from one working area to another. ...

30 CFR 77.1013 - Air drills; safeguards.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-07-01

... 30 Mineral Resources 1 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Air drills; safeguards. 77.1013 Section 77.1013... Control § 77.1013 Air drills; safeguards. Air shall be turned off and bled from the air hoses before hand-held air drills are moved from one working area to another. ...

42 CFR 438.58 - Conflict of interest safeguards.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... 42 Public Health 4 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Conflict of interest safeguards. 438.58 Section 438... (CONTINUED) MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS MANAGED CARE State Responsibilities § 438.58 Conflict of interest... safeguards against conflict of interest on the part of State and local officers and employees and agents of...

Preliminary Safeguards Assessment for the Pebble-Bed Fluoride High-Temperature Reactor (PB-FHR) Concept

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Disser, Jay; Arthur, Edward; Lambert, Janine

2016-09-01

This report examines a preliminary design for a pebble bed fluoride salt-cooled high temperature reactor (PB-FHR) concept, assessing it from an international safeguards perspective. Safeguards features are defined, in a preliminary fashion, and suggestions are made for addressing further nuclear materials accountancy needs.

40 CFR 2.211 - Safeguarding of business information; penalty for wrongful disclosure.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... for his or her private gain or advantage, any business information which came into his or her... any security procedures for handling and safeguarding business information which are contained in any... 40 Protection of Environment 1 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Safeguarding of business information...

Changing Landscapes in Safeguarding Babies and Young Children in England

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Lumsden, Eunice

2014-01-01

The importance of safeguarding children from violence is internationally recognised. However, detecting, intervening and protecting children from abuse both within the family and in institutions is complex. This paper specifically focuses on safeguarding in England and how workforce reform in the early years offers the opportunity to forge new…

48 CFR 52.239-1 - Privacy or Security Safeguards.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-10-01

... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 2 2014-10-01 2014-10-01 false Privacy or Security....239-1 Privacy or Security Safeguards. As prescribed in 39.107, insert a clause substantially the same as the following: Privacy or Security Safeguards (AUG 1996) (a) The Contractor shall not publish or...