Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the crew equipment subsystem
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Sinclair, Susan; Graham, L.; Richard, Bill; Saxon, H.
1987-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical (PCIs) items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The independent analysis results coresponding to the Orbiter crew equipment hardware are documented. The IOA analysis process utilized available crew equipment hardware drawings and schematics for defining hardware assemblies, components, and hardware items. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. Of the 352 failure modes analyzed, 78 were determined to be PCIs.
Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the pyrotechnics subsystem
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Robinson, W. W.
1988-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Pyrotechnics hardware. The IOA analysis process utilized available pyrotechnics hardware drawings and schematics for defining hardware assemblies, components, and hardware items. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode.
Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the communication and tracking subsystem
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Gardner, J. R.; Robinson, W. M.; Trahan, W. H.; Daley, E. S.; Long, W. C.
1987-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Communication and Tracking hardware. The IOA analysis process utilized available Communication and Tracking hardware drawings and schematics for defining hardware assemblies, components, and hardware items. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode.
Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the remote manipulator system
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Tangorra, F.; Grasmeder, R. F.; Montgomery, A. D.
1987-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items (PCIs). To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The independent analysis results for the Orbiter Remote Manipulator System (RMS) are documented. The RMS hardware and software are primarily required for deploying and/or retrieving up to five payloads during a single mission, capture and retrieve free-flying payloads, and for performing Manipulator Foot Restraint operations. Specifically, the RMS hardware consists of the following components: end effector; displays and controls; manipulator controller interface unit; arm based electronics; and the arm. The IOA analysis process utilized available RMS hardware drawings, schematics and documents for defining hardware assemblies, components and hardware items. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. Of the 574 failure modes analyzed, 413 were determined to be PCIs.
Orbiter subsystem hardware/software interaction analysis. Volume 8: Forward reaction control system
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Becker, D. D.
1980-01-01
The results of the orbiter hardware/software interaction analysis for the AFT reaction control system are presented. The interaction between hardware failure modes and software are examined in order to identify associated issues and risks. All orbiter subsystems and interfacing program elements which interact with the orbiter computer flight software are analyzed. The failure modes identified in the subsystem/element failure mode and effects analysis are discussed.
Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the mechanical actuation subsystem
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Bacher, J. L.; Montgomery, A. D.; Bradway, M. W.; Slaughter, W. T.
1987-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Mechanical Actuation System (MAS) hardware. Specifically, the MAS hardware consists of the following components: Air Data Probe (ADP); Elevon Seal Panel (ESP); External Tank Umbilical (ETU); Ku-Band Deploy (KBD); Payload Bay Doors (PBD); Payload Bay Radiators (PBR); Personnel Hatches (PH); Vent Door Mechanism (VDM); and Startracker Door Mechanism (SDM). The IOA analysis process utilized available MAS hardware drawings and schematics for defining hardware assemblies, components, and hardware items. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode.
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Brown, K. L.; Bertsch, P. J.
1986-01-01
Results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Electrical Power Generation (EPG)/Fuel Cell Powerplant (FCP) hardware. The EPG/FCP hardware is required for performing functions of electrical power generation and product water distribution in the Orbiter. Specifically, the EPG/FCP hardware consists of the following divisions: (1) Power Section Assembly (PSA); (2) Reactant Control Subsystem (RCS); (3) Thermal Control Subsystem (TCS); and (4) Water Removal Subsystem (WRS). The IOA analysis process utilized available EPG/FCP hardware drawings and schematics for defining hardware assemblies, components, and hardware items. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode.
Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the guidance, navigation, and control subsystem
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Trahan, W. H.; Odonnell, R. A.; Pietz, K. C.; Hiott, J. M.
1986-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) is presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GNC) Subsystem hardware are documented. The function of the GNC hardware is to respond to guidance, navigation, and control software commands to effect vehicle control and to provide sensor and controller data to GNC software. Some of the GNC hardware for which failure modes analysis was performed includes: hand controllers; Rudder Pedal Transducer Assembly (RPTA); Speed Brake Thrust Controller (SBTC); Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU); Star Tracker (ST); Crew Optical Alignment Site (COAS); Air Data Transducer Assembly (ADTA); Rate Gyro Assemblies; Accelerometer Assembly (AA); Aerosurface Servo Amplifier (ASA); and Ascent Thrust Vector Control (ATVC). The IOA analysis process utilized available GNC hardware drawings, workbooks, specifications, schematics, and systems briefs for defining hardware assemblies, components, and circuits. Each hardware item was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode.
Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the purge, vent and drain subsystem
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Bynum, M. C., III
1987-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter PV and D (Purge, Vent and Drain) Subsystem hardware. The PV and D Subsystem controls the environment of unpressurized compartments and window cavities, senses hazardous gases, and purges Orbiter/ET Disconnect. The subsystem is divided into six systems: Purge System (controls the environment of unpressurized structural compartments); Vent System (controls the pressure of unpressurized compartments); Drain System (removes water from unpressurized compartments); Hazardous Gas Detection System (HGDS) (monitors hazardous gas concentrations); Window Cavity Conditioning System (WCCS) (maintains clear windows and provides pressure control of the window cavities); and External Tank/Orbiter Disconnect Purge System (prevents cryo-pumping/icing of disconnect hardware). Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. Four of the sixty-two failure modes analyzed were determined as single failures which could result in the loss of crew or vehicle. A possible loss of mission could result if any of twelve single failures occurred. Two of the criticality 1/1 failures are in the Window Cavity Conditioning System (WCCS) outer window cavity, where leakage and/or restricted flow will cause failure to depressurize/repressurize the window cavity. Two criticality 1/1 failures represent leakage and/or restricted flow in the Orbiter/ET disconnect purge network which prevent cryopumping/icing of disconnect hardware. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode.
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Saiidi, M. J.; Duffy, R. E.; Mclaughlin, T. D.
1986-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis/Critical Items List (FMEA/CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Atmospheric Revitalization and Pressure Control Subsystem (ARPCS) are documented. The ARPCS hardware was categorized into the following subdivisions: (1) Atmospheric Make-up and Control (including the Auxiliary Oxygen Assembly, Oxygen Assembly, and Nitrogen Assembly); and (2) Atmospheric Vent and Control (including the Positive Relief Vent Assembly, Negative Relief Vent Assembly, and Cabin Vent Assembly). The IOA analysis process utilized available ARPCS hardware drawings and schematics for defining hardware assemblies, components, and hardware items. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode.
Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the DPS subsystem
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Lowery, H. J.; Haufler, W. A.; Pietz, K. C.
1986-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis/Critical Items List (FMEA/CIL) is presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to independently determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. The independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Data Processing System (DPS) hardware are documented. The DPS hardware is required for performing critical functions of data acquisition, data manipulation, data display, and data transfer throughout the Orbiter. Specifically, the DPS hardware consists of the following components: Multiplexer/Demultiplexer (MDM); General Purpose Computer (GPC); Multifunction CRT Display System (MCDS); Data Buses and Data Bus Couplers (DBC); Data Bus Isolation Amplifiers (DBIA); Mass Memory Unit (MMU); and Engine Interface Unit (EIU). The IOA analysis process utilized available DPS hardware drawings and schematics for defining hardware assemblies, components, and hardware items. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. Due to the extensive redundancy built into the DPS the number of critical items are few. Those identified resulted from premature operation and erroneous output of the GPCs.
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Patton, Jeff A.
1986-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C)/Electrical Power Generation (EPG) hardware. The EPD and C/EPG hardware is required for performing critical functions of cryogenic reactant storage, electrical power generation and product water distribution in the Orbiter. Specifically, the EPD and C/EPG hardware consists of the following components: Power Section Assembly (PSA); Reactant Control Subsystem (RCS); Thermal Control Subsystem (TCS); Water Removal Subsystem (WRS); and Power Reactant Storage and Distribution System (PRSDS). The IOA analysis process utilized available EPD and C/EPG hardware drawings and schematics for defining hardware assemblies, components, and hardware items. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode.
Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the body flap subsystem
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Wilson, R. E.; Riccio, J. R.
1986-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items (PCIs). To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The independent analysis results for the Orbiter Body Flap (BF) subsystem hardware are documented. The BF is a large aerosurface located at the trailing edge of the lower aft fuselage of the Orbiter. The proper function of the BF is essential during the dynamic flight phases of ascent and entry. During the ascent phase of flight, the BF trails in a fixed position. For entry, the BF provides elevon load relief, trim control, and acts as a heat shield for the main engines. Specifically, the BF hardware comprises the following components: Power Drive Unit (PDU), rotary actuators, and torque tubes. The IOA analysis process utilized available BF hardware drawings and schematics for defining hardware assemblies, components, and hardware items. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. Of the 35 failure modes analyzed, 19 were determined to be PCIs.
Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the active thermal control subsystem
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Sinclair, S. K.; Parkman, W. E.
1987-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical (PCIs) items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Active Thermal Control Subsystem (ATCS) are documented. The major purpose of the ATCS is to remove the heat, generated during normal Shuttle operations from the Orbiter systems and subsystems. The four major components of the ATCS contributing to the heat removal are: Freon Coolant Loops; Radiator and Flow Control Assembly; Flash Evaporator System; and Ammonia Boiler System. In order to perform the analysis, the IOA process utilized available ATCS hardware drawings and schematics for defining hardware assemblies, components, and hardware items. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. Of the 310 failure modes analyzed, 101 were determined to be PCIs.
Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the hydraulics/water spray boiler subsystem
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Duval, J. D.; Davidson, W. R.; Parkman, William E.
1986-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items (PCIs). To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results for the Orbiter Hydraulics/Water Spray Boiler Subsystem. The hydraulic system provides hydraulic power to gimbal the main engines, actuate the main engine propellant control valves, move the aerodynamic flight control surfaces, lower the landing gear, apply wheel brakes, steer the nosewheel, and dampen the external tank (ET) separation. Each hydraulic system has an associated water spray boiler which is used to cool the hydraulic fluid and APU lubricating oil. The IOA analysis process utilized available HYD/WSB hardware drawings, schematics and documents for defining hardware assemblies, components, and hardware items. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. Of the 430 failure modes analyzed, 166 were determined to be PCIs.
Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the orbital maneuvering system
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Prust, C. D.; Paul, D. J.; Burkemper, V. J.
1987-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The independent analysis results for the Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS) hardware are documented. The OMS provides the thrust to perform orbit insertion, orbit circularization, orbit transfer, rendezvous, and deorbit. The OMS is housed in two independent pods located one on each side of the tail and consists of the following subsystems: Helium Pressurization; Propellant Storage and Distribution; Orbital Maneuvering Engine; and Electrical Power Distribution and Control. The IOA analysis process utilized available OMS hardware drawings and schematics for defining hardware assemblies, components, and hardware items. Each level of hardware was evaluted and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was asigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode.
Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the displays and controls subsystem
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Trahan, W. H.; Prust, E. E.
1987-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Displays and Controls (D and C) subsystem hardware. The function of the D and C hardware is to provide the crew with the monitor, command, and control capabilities required for management of all normal and contingency mission and flight operations. The D and C hardware for which failure modes analysis was performed consists of the following: Acceleration Indicator (G-METER); Head Up Display (HUD); Display Driver Unit (DDU); Alpha/Mach Indicator (AMI); Horizontal Situation Indicator (HSI); Attitude Director Indicator (ADI); Propellant Quantity Indicator (PQI); Surface Position Indicator (SPI); Altitude/Vertical Velocity Indicator (AVVI); Caution and Warning Assembly (CWA); Annunciator Control Assembly (ACA); Event Timer (ET); Mission Timer (MT); Interior Lighting; and Exterior Lighting. Each hardware item was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode.
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Robinson, W. W.
1987-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C)/Remote Manipulator System (RMS) hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained in the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the results of the independent analysis of the EPD and C/RMS (both port and starboard) hardware. The EPD and C/RMS subsystem hardware provides the electrical power and power control circuitry required to safely deploy, operate, control, and stow or guillotine and jettison two (one port and one starboard) RMSs. The EPD and C/RMS subsystem is subdivided into the four following functional divisions: Remote Manipulator Arm; Manipulator Deploy Control; Manipulator Latch Control; Manipulator Arm Shoulder Jettison; and Retention Arm Jettison. The IOA analysis process utilized available EPD and C/RMS hardware drawings and schematics for defining hardware assemblies, components, and hardware items. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based on the severity of the effect for each failure mode.
Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the manned maneuvering unit
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Bailey, P. S.
1986-01-01
Results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items (PCIs). To preserve indepedence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results corresponding to the Manned Maneuvering Unit (MMU) hardware. The MMU is a propulsive backpack, operated through separate hand controllers that input the pilot's translational and rotational maneuvering commands to the control electronics and then to the thrusters. The IOA analysis process utilized available MMU hardware drawings and schematics for defining hardware subsystems, assemblies, components, and hardware items. Final levels of detail were evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the worst case severity of the effect for each identified failure mode. The IOA analysis of the MMU found that the majority of the PCIs identified are resultant from the loss of either the propulsion or control functions, or are resultant from inability to perform an immediate or future mission. The five most severe criticalities identified are all resultant from failures imposed on the MMU hand controllers which have no redundancy within the MMU.
Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the elevon subsystem
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Wilson, R. E.; Riccio, J. R.
1986-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results for the Orbiter Elevon system hardware. The elevon actuators are located at the trailing edge of the wing surface. The proper function of the elevons is essential during the dynamic flight phases of ascent and entry. In the ascent phase of flight, the elevons are used for relieving high wing loads. For entry, the elevons are used to pitch and roll the vehicle. Specifically, the elevon system hardware comprises the following components: flow cutoff valve; switching valve; electro-hydraulic (EH) servoactuator; secondary delta pressure transducer; bypass valve; power valve; power valve check valve; primary actuator; primary delta pressure transducer; and primary actuator position transducer. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. Of the 25 failure modes analyzed, 18 were determined to be PCIs.
Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the nose wheel steering subsystem
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Mediavilla, Anthony Scott
1986-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The independent analysis results for the Orbiter Nose Wheel Steering (NWS) hardware are documented. The NWS hardware provides primary directional control for the Orbiter vehicle during landing rollout. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. The original NWS design was envisioned as a backup system to differential braking for directional control of the Orbiter during landing rollout. No real effort was made to design the NWS system as fail operational. The brakes have much redundancy built into their design but the poor brake/tire performance has forced the NSTS to upgrade NWS to the primary mode of directional control during rollout. As a result, a large percentage of the NWS system components have become Potential Critical Items (PCI).
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Schmeckpeper, K. R.
1987-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C) hardware. The EPD and C hardware performs the functions of distributing, sensing, and controlling 28 volt DC power and of inverting, distributing, sensing, and controlling 117 volt 400 Hz AC power to all Orbiter subsystems from the three fuel cells in the Electrical Power Generation (EPG) subsystem. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. Of the 1671 failure modes analyzed, 9 single failures were determined to result in loss of crew or vehicle. Three single failures unique to intact abort were determined to result in possible loss of the crew or vehicle. A possible loss of mission could result if any of 136 single failures occurred. Six of the criticality 1/1 failures are in two rotary and two pushbutton switches that control External Tank and Solid Rocket Booster separation. The other 6 criticality 1/1 failures are fuses, one each per Aft Power Control Assembly (APCA) 4, 5, and 6 and one each per Forward Power Control Assembly (FPCA) 1, 2, and 3, that supply power to certain Main Propulsion System (MPS) valves and Forward Reaction Control System (RCS) circuits.
Fracture - An Unforgiving Failure Mode
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Goodin, James Ronald
2006-01-01
During the 2005 Conference for the Advancement for Space Safety, after a typical presentation of safety tools, a Russian in the audience simply asked, "How does that affect the hardware?" Having participated in several International System Safety Conferences, I recalled that most attention is dedicated to safety tools and little, if any, to hardware. The intent of this paper on the hazard of fracture and failure modes associated with fracture is my attempt to draw attention to the grass roots of system safety - improving hardware robustness and resilience.
Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the auxiliary power unit
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Barnes, J. E.
1988-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter APU hardware. The IOA product for the APU analysis, covering both APU hardware and APU electrical components, consisted of 344 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 178 potential critical items being identified. A comparison was made of the IOA product to the NASA APU hardware FMEA/CIL baseline which consisted of 184 FMEAs and 57 CIL items. The comparison identified 72 discrepancies.
Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the landing/deceleration subsystem
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Compton, J. M.; Beaird, H. G.; Weissinger, W. D.
1987-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Landing/Deceleration Subsystem hardware. The Landing/Deceleration Subsystem is utilized to allow the Orbiter to perform a safe landing, allowing for landing-gear deploy activities, steering and braking control throughout the landing rollout to wheel-stop, and to allow for ground-handling capability during the ground-processing phase of the flight cycle. Specifically, the Landing/Deceleration hardware consists of the following components: Nose Landing Gear (NLG); Main Landing Gear (MLG); Brake and Antiskid (B and AS) Electrical Power Distribution and Controls (EPD and C); Nose Wheel Steering (NWS); and Hydraulics Actuators. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. Due to the lack of redundancy in the Landing/Deceleration Subsystems there is a high number of critical items.
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Wilson, R. E.; Riccio, J. R.
1986-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The independent analysis results for the Ascent Thrust Vector Control (ATVC) Actuator hardware are documented. The function of the Ascent Thrust Vector Control Actuators (ATVC) is to gimbal the main engines to provide for attitude and flight path control during ascent. During first stage flight, the SRB nozzles provide nearly all the steering. After SRB separation, the Orbiter is steered by gimbaling of its main engines. There are six electrohydraulic servoactuators, one pitch and one yaw for each of the three main engines. Each servoactuator is composed of four electrohydraulic servovalve assemblies, one second stage power spool valve assembly, one primary piston assembly and a switching valve. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. Critical failures resulting in loss of ATVC were mainly due to loss of hydraulic fluid, fluid contamination and mechanical failures.
A Summary of Taxonomies of Digital System Failure Modes Provided by the DigRel Task Group
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Chu T. L.; Yue M.; Postma, W.
2012-06-25
Recently, the CSNI directed WGRisk to set up a task group called DIGREL to initiate a new task on developing a taxonomy of failure modes of digital components for the purposes of PSA. It is an important step towards standardized digital I&C reliability assessment techniques for PSA. The objective of this paper is to provide a comparison of the failure mode taxonomies provided by the participants. The failure modes are classified in terms of their levels of detail. Software and hardware failure modes are discussed separately.
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Prust, Chet D.; Haufler, W. A.; Marino, A. J.
1988-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS) hardware and Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C), generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter OMS hardware. The IOA analysis defined the OMS as being comprised of the following subsystems: helium pressurization, propellant storage and distribution, Orbital Maneuvering Engine, and EPD and C. The IOA product for the OMS analysis consisted of 284 hardware and 667 EPD and C failure mode worksheets that resulted in 160 hardware and 216 EPD and C potential critical items (PCIs) being identified. A comparison was made of the IOA product to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline which consisted of 101 hardware and 142 EPD and C CIL items.
Improving the treatment planning and delivery process of Xoft electronic skin brachytherapy.
Manger, Ryan; Rahn, Douglas; Hoisak, Jeremy; Dragojević, Irena
2018-05-14
To develop an improved Xoft electronic skin brachytherapy process and identify areas of further improvement. A multidisciplinary team conducted a failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) by developing a process map and a corresponding list of failure modes. The failure modes were scored for their occurrence, severity, and detectability, and a risk priority number (RPN) was calculated for each failure mode as the product of occurrence, severity, and detectability. Corrective actions were implemented to address the higher risk failure modes, and a revised process was generated. The RPNs of the failure modes were compared between the initial process and final process to assess the perceived benefits of the corrective actions. The final treatment process consists of 100 steps and 114 failure modes. The FMEA took approximately 20 person-hours (one physician, three physicists, and two therapists) to complete. The 10 most dangerous failure modes had RPNs ranging from 336 to 630. Corrective actions were effective at addressing most failure modes (10 riskiest RPNs ranging from 189 to 310), yet the RPNs were higher than those published for alternative systems. Many of these high-risk failure modes remained due to hardware design limitations. FMEA helps guide process improvement efforts by emphasizing the riskiest steps. Significant risks are apparent when using a Xoft treatment unit for skin brachytherapy due to hardware limitations such as the lack of several interlocks, a short source lifespan, and variability in source output. The process presented in this article is expected to reduce but not eliminate these risks. Copyright © 2018 American Brachytherapy Society. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the life support and airlock support subsystems
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Arbet, Jim; Duffy, R.; Barickman, K.; Saiidi, Mo J.
1987-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Life Support System (LSS) and Airlock Support System (ALSS). Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. The LSS provides for the management of the supply water, collection of metabolic waste, management of waste water, smoke detection, and fire suppression. The ALSS provides water, oxygen, and electricity to support an extravehicular activity in the airlock.
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Becker, D. D.
1980-01-01
The orbiter subsystems and interfacing program elements which interact with the orbiter computer flight software are analyzed. The failure modes identified in the subsystem/element failure mode and effects analysis are examined. Potential interaction with the software is examined through an evaluation of the software requirements. The analysis is restricted to flight software requirements and excludes utility/checkout software. The results of the hardware/software interaction analysis for the forward reaction control system are presented.
Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the EPD and C/remote manipulator system FMEA/CIL
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Robinson, W. W.
1988-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C)/Remote Manipulator System (RMS) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA analysis of the EPD and C/RMS hardware initially generated 345 failure mode worksheets and identified 117 Potential Critical Items (PCIs) before starting the assessment process. These analysis results were compared to the proposed NASA Post 51-L baseline of 132 FMEAs and 66 CIL items.
Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the auxiliary power unit
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Barnes, J. E.
1986-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Auxiliary Power Unit (APU). The APUs are required to provide power to the Orbiter hydraulics systems during ascent and entry flight phases for aerosurface actuation, main engine gimballing, landing gear extension, and other vital functions. For analysis purposes, the APU system was broken down into ten functional subsystems. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. A preponderance of 1/1 criticality items were related to failures that allowed the hydrazine fuel to escape into the Orbiter aft compartment, creating a severe fire hazard, and failures that caused loss of the gas generator injector cooling system.
Procedure for Failure Mode, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA)
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
1966-01-01
This document provides guidelines for the accomplishment of Failure Mode, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) on the Apollo program. It is a procedure for analysis of hardware items to determine those items contributing most to system unreliability and crew safety problems.
Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): FMEA/CIL assessment
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Saiidi, Mo J.; Swain, L. J.; Compton, J. M.
1988-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. Direction was given by the Orbiter and GFE Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis and assessment using the instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206. The IOA analysis features a top-down approach to determine hardware failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, the anlaysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA and prime contractor FMEA/CIL documentation. The assessment process compares the independently derived failure modes and criticality assignments to the proposed NASA Post 51-L FMEA/CIL documentation. When possible, assessment issues are discussed and resolved with the NASA subsystem managers. The assessment results for each subsystem are summarized. The most important Orbiter assessment finding was the previously unknown stuck autopilot push-button criticality 1/1 failure mode, having a worst case effect of loss of crew/vehicle when a microwave landing system is not active.
Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the Orbiter Experiment (OEX) subsystem
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Compton, J. M.
1988-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Orbiter Experiments (OEX) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. The results of that comparison for the Orbiter OEX hardware are documented. The IOA product for the OEX analysis consisted of 82 failure mode worksheets that resulted in two potential critical items being identified.
Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the reaction control system, volume 1
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Prust, Chet D.; Hartman, Dan W.
1988-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the aft and forward Reaction Control System (RCS) hardware, and Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C), generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter RCS hardware and EPD and C systems. The IOA product for the RCS analysis consisted of 208 hardware and 2064 EPD and C failure mode worksheets that resulted in 141 hardware and 449 EPD and C potential critical items (PCIs) being identified. A comparison was made of the IOA product to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. After comparison and discussions with the NASA subsystem manager, 96 hardware issues, 83 of which concern CIL items or PCIs, and 280 EPD and C issues, 158 of which concern CIL items or PCIs, and 280 EPD and C issues, 158 of which concern CIL items or PCIs, remain unresolved. Volume 1 contains the subsystem description, assessment results, and some of the IOA worksheets.
Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the Orbiter Experiment (OEX) subsystem
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Compton, J. M.
1987-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Experiments hardware. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. The Orbiter Experiments (OEX) Program consists of a multiple set of experiments for the purpose of gathering environmental and aerodynamic data to develop more accurate ground models for Shuttle performance and to facilitate the design of future spacecraft. This assessment only addresses currently manifested experiments and their support systems. Specifically this list consists of: Shuttle Entry Air Data System (SEADS); Shuttle Upper Atmosphere Mass Spectrometer (SUMS); Forward Fuselage Support System for OEX (FFSSO); Shuttle Infrared Laced Temperature Sensor (SILTS); Aerodynamic Coefficient Identification Package (ACIP); and Support System for OEX (SSO). There are only two potential critical items for the OEX, since the experiments only gather data for analysis post mission and are totally independent systems except for power. Failure of any experiment component usually only causes a loss of experiment data and in no way jeopardizes the crew or mission.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Hoisak, J; Manger, R; Dragojevic, I
Purpose: To perform a failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) of the process for treating superficial skin cancers with the Xoft Axxent electronic brachytherapy (eBx) system, given the recent introduction of expanded quality control (QC) initiatives at our institution. Methods: A process map was developed listing all steps in superficial treatments with Xoft eBx, from the initial patient consult to the completion of the treatment course. The process map guided the FMEA to identify the failure modes for each step in the treatment workflow and assign Risk Priority Numbers (RPN), calculated as the product of the failure mode’s probability ofmore » occurrence (O), severity (S) and lack of detectability (D). FMEA was done with and without the inclusion of recent QC initiatives such as increased staffing, physics oversight, standardized source calibration, treatment planning and documentation. The failure modes with the highest RPNs were identified and contrasted before and after introduction of the QC initiatives. Results: Based on the FMEA, the failure modes with the highest RPN were related to source calibration, treatment planning, and patient setup/treatment delivery (Fig. 1). The introduction of additional physics oversight, standardized planning and safety initiatives such as checklists and time-outs reduced the RPNs of these failure modes. High-risk failure modes that could be mitigated with improved hardware and software interlocks were identified. Conclusion: The FMEA analysis identified the steps in the treatment process presenting the highest risk. The introduction of enhanced QC initiatives mitigated the risk of some of these failure modes by decreasing their probability of occurrence and increasing their detectability. This analysis demonstrates the importance of well-designed QC policies, procedures and oversight in a Xoft eBx programme for treatment of superficial skin cancers. Unresolved high risk failure modes highlight the need for non-procedural quality initiatives such as improved planning software and more robust hardware interlock systems.« less
Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the main propulsion subsystem FMEA/CIL, volume 2
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Holden, K. A.
1988-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Main Propulsion System (MPS) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were than compared to available data from the Rockwell Downey/NASA JSC FMEA/CIL review. Volume 2 continues the presentation of IOA worksheets for MPS hardware items.
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Long, W. C.
1988-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed and analysis of the Communication and Tracking hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter Communication and Tracking hardware. Volume 2 continues the presentation of IOA worksheets.
Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the reaction control system, volume 3
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Prust, Chet D.; Hartman, Dan W.
1988-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the aft and forward Reaction Control System (RCS) hardware and Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C), generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter RCS hardware and EPD and C systems. Volume 3 continues the presentation of IOA worksheets.
Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the reaction control system, volume 2
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Prust, Chet D.; Hartman, Dan W.
1988-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the aft and forward Reaction Control System (RCS) hardware and Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C), generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter RCS hardware and EPD and C systems. Volume 2 continues the presentation of IOA worksheets.
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Arbet, J. D.; Duffy, R. E.; Barickman, K.; Saiidi, M. J.
1988-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Life Support and Airlock Support Systems (LSS and ALSS) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. The discrepancies were flagged for potential future resolution. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter LSS and ALSS hardware. The IOA product for the LSS and ALSS analysis consisted of 511 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 140 potential critical items. Comparison was made to the NASA baseline which consisted of 456 FMEAs and 101 CIL items. The IOA analysis identified 39 failure modes, 6 of which were classified as CIL items, for components not covered by the NASA FMEAs. It was recommended that these failure modes be added to the NASA FMEA baseline. The overall assessment produced agreement on all but 301 FMEAs which caused differences in 111 CIL items.
Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the active thermal control system
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Sinclair, S. K.
1988-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Active Thermal Control System (ATCS) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the available NASA FMEA/CIL data. Discrepancies from the comparison were documented, and where enough information was available, recommendations for resolution of the discrepancies were made. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter ATCS hardware. The IOA product for the ATCS independent analysis consisted of 310 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 101 potential critical items (PCI) being identified. A comparison was made to the available NASA data which consisted of 252 FMEAs and 109 CIL items.
Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the crew equipment subsystem
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Saxon, H.; Richard, Bill; Sinclair, S. K.
1988-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Crew Equipment hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter Crew Equipment hardware. The IOA product for the Crew Equipment analysis consisted of 352 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 78 potential critical items being identified. Comparison was made to the NASA baseline which consisted of 351 FMEAs and 82 CIL items.
Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the extravehicular mobility unit
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Raffaelli, Gary G.
1986-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items (PCIs). To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results corresponding to the Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) hardware. The EMU is an independent anthropomorphic system that provides environmental protection, mobility, life support, and communications for the Shuttle crewmember to perform Extravehicular Activity (EVA) in Earth orbit. Two EMUs are included on each baseline Orbiter mission, and consumables are provided for three two-man EVAs. The EMU consists of the Life Support System (LSS), Caution and Warning System (CWS), and the Space Suit Assembly (SSA). Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. The majority of these PCIs are resultant from failures which cause loss of one or more primary functions: pressurization, oxygen delivery, environmental maintenance, and thermal maintenance. It should also be noted that the quantity of PCIs would significantly increase if the SOP were to be treated as an emergency system rather than as an unlike redundant element.
Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the reaction control system, volume 4
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Prust, Chet D.; Hartman, Dan W.
1988-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the aft and forward Reaction Control System (RCS) hardware and Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C), generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter RCS hardware and EPD and C systems. Volume 4 continues the presentation of IOA worksheets and contains the potential critical items list.
Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the nose wheel steering subsystem
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Mediavilla, Anthony Scott
1988-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Nose Wheel Steering (NWS) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed NASA post 51-L FMEA/CIL baseline. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter NWS hardware.
Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the mechanical actuation subsystem, volume 1
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Bradway, M. W.; Slaughter, W. T.
1988-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine draft failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline that was available. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison was provided through additional analysis as required. These discrepancies were flagged as issues, and recommendations were made based on the FMEA data available at the time. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter Mechanical Actuation System (MAS) hardware. Specifically, the MAS hardware consists of the following components: Air Data Probe (ADP); Elevon Seal Panel (ESP); External Tank Umbilical (ETU); Ku-Band Deploy (KBD); Payload Bay Doors (PBD); Payload Bay Radiators (PBR); Personnel Hatches (PH); Vent Door Mechanism (VDM); and Startracker Door Mechanism (SDM). Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode.
Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the orbiter main propulsion system
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Mcnicoll, W. J.; Mcneely, M.; Holden, K. A.; Emmons, T. E.; Lowery, H. J.
1987-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items (PCIs). To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The independent analysis results for the Orbiter Main Propulsion System (MPS) hardware are documented. The Orbiter MPS consists of two subsystems: the Propellant Management Subsystem (PMS) and the Helium Subsystem. The PMS is a system of manifolds, distribution lines and valves by which the liquid propellants pass from the External Tank (ET) to the Space Shuttle Main Engines (SSMEs) and gaseous propellants pass from the SSMEs to the ET. The Helium Subsystem consists of a series of helium supply tanks and their associated regulators, check valves, distribution lines, and control valves. The Helium Subsystem supplies helium that is used within the SSMEs for inflight purges and provides pressure for actuation of SSME valves during emergency pneumatic shutdowns. The balance of the helium is used to provide pressure to operate the pneumatically actuated valves within the PMS. Each component was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticalities were assigned based on the worst possible effect of each failure mode. Of the 690 failure modes analyzed, 349 were determined to be PCIs.
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Ames, B. E.
1988-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) is presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Electrical Power Generation/Power Reactant Storage and Distribution (EPG/PRSD) subsystem hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baselines with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. The results of that comparison are documented for the Orbiter EPG/PRSD hardware. The comparison produced agreement on all but 27 FMEAs and 9 CIL items. The discrepancy between the number of IOA findings and NASA FMEAs can be partially explained by the different approaches used by IOA and NASA to group failure modes together to form one FMEA. Also, several IOA items represented inner tank components and ground operations failure modes which were not in the NASA baseline.
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Gotch, S. M.
1986-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NAA FMEA/CIL documentation. The independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Electrical Power Generation (EPG)/Power Reactants Storage and Distribution (PRSD) System Hardware is documented. The EPG/PRSD hardware is required for performing critical functions of cryogenic hydrogen and oxygen storage and distribution to the Fuel Cell Powerplants (FCP) and Atmospheric Revitalization Pressure Control Subsystem (ARPCS). Specifically, the EPG/PRSD hardware consists of the following: Hydryogen (H2) tanks; Oxygen (O2) tanks; H2 Relief Valve/Filter Packages (HRVFP); O2 Relief Valve/Filter Packages (ORVFP); H2 Valve Modules (HVM); O2 Valve Modules (OVM); and O2 and H2 lines, components, and fittings.
Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the remote manipulator system FMEA/CIL
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Tangorra, F.; Grasmeder, R. F.; Montgomery, A. D.
1988-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Remote Manipulator System (RMS) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were than compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. The results of that comparison for the Orbiter RMS hardware are documented. The IOA product for the RMS analysis consisted of 604 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 458 potential critical items being identified. Comparison was made to the NASA baseline which consisted of 45 FMEAs and 321 CIL items. This comparison produced agreement on all but 154 FMEAs which caused differences in 137 CIL items.
Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the hydraulics/water spray boiler subsystem
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Bynum, M. C.; Duval, J. D.; Parkman, W. E.; Davidson, W. R.
1988-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Hydraulics/Water Spray Boiler (HYD/WSB) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter HYD/WSB hardware. The IOA product for the HYD/WSB analysis consisted of 447 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 183 potential critical items being identified. Comparison was made to the NASA baseline which consisted of 364 FMEAs and 111 CIL items. This comparison produced agreement on all but 68 FMEAs which caused differences in 23 CIL items.
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Mccants, C. N.; Bearrow, M.
1988-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Electrical Power Distribution and Control/Electrical Power Generation (EPD and C/EPG) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison was provided through additional analysis as required. The results of that comparison is documented for the Orbiter EPD and C/EPG hardware. The IOA product for the EPD and C/EPG analysis consisted of 263 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 42 potential critical items being identified. Comparison was made to the NASA baseline which consisted of 211 FMEA and 47 CIL items.
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Trahan, W. H.; Odonnell, R. A.; Pietz, K. C.; Drapela, L. J.
1988-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Guidance, Navigation, and Control System (GNC) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. The results of that comparison for the Orbiter GNC hardware is documented. The IOA product for the GNC analysis consisted of 141 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 24 potential critical items being identified. Comparison was made to the NASA baseline which consisted of 148 FMEAs and 36 CIL items. This comparison produced agreement on all but 56 FMEAs which caused differences in zero CIL items.
Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the body flap subsystem FMEA/CIL
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Wilson, R. E.
1988-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Body Flap (BF) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter BF hardware. The IOA product for the BF analysis consisted of 43 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 19 potential critical items being identified. Comparison was made to the NASA baseline which consisted of 34 FMEAs and 15 CIL items. This comparison produced agreement on all CIL items. Based on the Pre 51-L baseline, all non-CIL FMEAs were also in agreement.
Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the elevon actuator subsystem FMEA/CIL
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Wilson, R. E.
1988-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Elevon Subsystem hardware, generating draft failure modes, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter Elevon hardware. The IOA product for the Elevon analysis consisted of 25 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 17 potential critical items being identified. Comparison was made to the NASA FMEA/CIL, which consisted of 23 FMEAs and 13 CIL items. This comparison produced agreement on all CIL items. Based on the Pre 51-L baseline, all non-CIL FMEAs were also in agreement.
Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of instrumental subsystem FMEA/CIL
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Gardner, J. R.; Addis, A. W.
1988-01-01
The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL). The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Instrumentation hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. The results of that comparison for the Orbiter Instrumentation hardware are documented. The IOA product for Instrumentation analysis consisted of 107 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 22 critical items being identified. Comparison was made to the Pre 51-L NASA baseline with 14 Post 51-L FMEAs added, which consists of 96 FMEAs and 18 CIL items. This comparison produced agreement on all but 25 FMEAs which caused differences in 5 CIL items.
Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the reaction control system, volume 5
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Prust, Chet D.; Hartman, Dan W.
1988-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the aft and forward Reaction Control System (RCS) hardware and Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C), generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter RCS hardware and EPD and C systems. Volume 5 contains detailed analysis and superseded analysis worksheets and the NASA FMEA to IOA worksheet cross reference and recommendations.
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Long, W. C.
1988-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed and analysis of the Communication and Tracking hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter Communication and Tracking hardware. Volume 3 continues the presentation of IOA worksheets and contains the potential critical items list, detailed analysis, and the NASA FMEA to IOA worksheet cross reference and recommendations.
Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the extravehicular mobility unit, volume 1
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Raffaelli, Gary G.
1988-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort performed an independent analysis of the Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) hardware and system, generating draft failure modes criticalities and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were than compared to the most recent proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison was provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter EMU hardware.
Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the data processing system FMEA/CIL
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Lowery, H. J.; Haufler, W. A.
1986-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Data Processing System (DPS) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. The results of that comparison is documented for the Orbiter DPS hardware.
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Schmeckpeper, K. R.
1987-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C) hardware. The EPD and C hardware performs the functions of distributing, sensing, and controlling 28 volt DC power and of inverting, distributing, sensing, and controlling 117 volt 400 Hz AC power to all Orbiter subsystems from the three fuel cells in the Electrical Power Generation (EPG) subsystem. Volume 2 continues the presentation of IOA analysis worksheets and contains the potential critical items list.
49 CFR Appendix C to Part 236 - Safety Assurance Criteria and Processes
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... system (all its elements including hardware and software) must be designed to assure safe operation with... unsafe errors in the software due to human error in the software specification, design, or coding phases... (hardware or software, or both) are used in combination to ensure safety. If a common mode failure exists...
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Brown, K. L.; Bertsch, P. J.
1987-01-01
Results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Electrical Power Generation/Fuel Cell Powerplant (EPG/FCP) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison was provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter EPG/FCP hardware.
Model-OA wind turbine generator - Failure modes and effects analysis
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Klein, William E.; Lali, Vincent R.
1990-01-01
The results failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) conducted for wind-turbine generators are presented. The FMEA was performed for the functional modes of each system, subsystem, or component. The single-point failures were eliminated for most of the systems. The blade system was the only exception. The qualitative probability of a blade separating was estimated at level D-remote. Many changes were made to the hardware as a result of this analysis. The most significant change was the addition of the safety system. Operational experience and need to improve machine availability have resulted in subsequent changes to the various systems, which are also reflected in this FMEA.
Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the rudder/speed brake subsystem FMEA/CIL
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Wilson, R. E.
1988-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Rudder/Speed Brake (RSB) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline along with the proposed Post 51-L CIL updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison was provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter RSB hardware. The IOA product for the RSB analysis consisted of 38 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 27 potential critical items being identified. Comparison was made to the NASA baseline which consisted of 34 FMEAs and 18 CIL items. This comparison produced agreement on all CIL items. Based on the Pre 51-L baseline, all non-CIL FMEAs were also in agreement.
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Schmeckpeper, K. R.
1988-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA first completed an analysis of the Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter EPD and C hardware. The IOA product for the EPD and C analysis consisted of 1671 failure mode analysis worksheets that resulted in 468 potential critical items being identified. Comparison was made to the proposed NASA Post 51-L baseline which consisted of FMEAs and 158 CIL items. Volume 1 contains the EPD and C subsystem description, analysis results, ground rules and assumptions, and some of the IOA worksheets.
Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the manned maneuvering unit
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Huynh, M.; Duffy, R. E.; Saiidi, M. J.
1988-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Manned Maneuvering Unit (MMU) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contain within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed Martin Marietta FMEA/CIL Post 51-L updates. A discussion of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. These discrepancies were flagged as issues, and recommendations were made based on the FMEA data available at the time. The results of this comparison for the Orbiter MMU hardware are documented. The IOA product for the MMU analysis consisted of 204 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 95 potential critical items being identified. Comparison was made to the NASA baseline which consisted of 179 FMEAs and 110 CIL items. This comparison produced agreement on all 121 FMEAs which caused differences in 92 CIL items.
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Odonnell, R. A.; Weissinger, D.
1988-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Landing/Deceleration (LDG/DEC) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter LDG/DEC hardware. The IOA product for the LDG/DEC analysis consisted of 259 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 124 potential critical items being identified. Comparison was made to the NASA baseline which consisted of 267 FMEA's and 120 CIL items. This comparison produced agreement on all but 75 FMEA's which caused differences in 51 CIL items.
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Wilson, R. E.
1988-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Ascent Thrust Vector Control Actuator (ATVD) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter ATVC hardware. The IOA product for the ATVC actuator analysis consisted of 25 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 16 potential critical items being identified. Comparison was made to the NASA baseline which consisted of 21 FMEAs and 13 CIL items. This comparison produced agreement on all CIL items. Based on the Pre 51-L baseline, all non-CIL FMEAs were also in agreement.
Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the mechanical actuation subsystem, volume 2
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Bradway, M. W.; Slaughter, W. T.
1988-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine draft failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline that was available. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison was provided through additional analysis as required. These discrepancies were flagged as issues, and recommendations were made based on the FMEA data available at the time. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter Mechanical Actuation System (MAS) hardware. Specifically, the MAS hardware consists of the following components: Air Data Probe (ADP); Elevon Seal Panel (ESP); External Tank Umbilical (ETU); Ku-Band Deploy (KBD); Payload Bay Doors (PBD); Payload Bay Radiators (PBR); Personnel Hatches (PH); Vent Door Mechanism (VDM); and Startracker Door Mechanism (SDM). Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. Volume 2 continues the presentation of IOA analysis worksheets and contains the potential critical items list, detailed analysis, and NASA FMEA/CIL to IOA worksheet cross reference and recommendations.
Automatisms in EMIR instrument to improve operation, safety and maintenance
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Fernández Izquierdo, Patricia; Núñez Cagigal, Miguel; Barreto Rodríguez, Roberto; Martínez Rey, Noelia; Santana Tschudi, Samuel; Barreto Cabrera, Maria; Patrón Recio, Jesús; Garzón López, Francisco
2014-08-01
EMIR is the NIR imager and multiobject spectrograph being built as a common user instrument for the 10-m class GTC. Big cryogenic instruments demand a reliable design and a specific hardware and software to increase its safety and productivity. EMIR vacuum, cooling and heating systems are monitored and partially controlled by a Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) in industrial format with a touch screen. The PLC aids the instrument operator in the maintenance tasks recovering autonomously vacuum if required or proposing preventive maintenance actions. The PLC and its associated hardware improve EMIR safety having immediate reactions against eventual failure modes in the instrument or in external supplies, including hardware failures during the heating procedure or failure in the PLC itself. EMIR PLC provides detailed information periodically about status and alarms of vacuum and cooling components or external supplies.
A case study in nonconformance and performance trend analysis
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Maloy, Joseph E.; Newton, Coy P.
1990-01-01
As part of NASA's effort to develop an agency-wide approach to trend analysis, a pilot nonconformance and performance trending analysis study was conducted on the Space Shuttle auxiliary power unit (APU). The purpose of the study was to (1) demonstrate that nonconformance analysis can be used to identify repeating failures of a specific item (and the associated failure modes and causes) and (2) determine whether performance parameters could be analyzed and monitored to provide an indication of component or system degradation prior to failure. The nonconformance analysis of the APU did identify repeating component failures, which possibly could be reduced if key performance parameters were monitored and analyzed. The performance-trending analysis verified that the characteristics of hardware parameters can be effective in detecting degradation of hardware performance prior to failure.
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Schmeckpeper, K. R.
1988-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA first completed an analysis of the Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter EPD and C hardware. Volume 2 continues the presentation of IOA worksheets.
Automated Mixed Traffic Vehicle (AMTV) technology and safety study
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Johnston, A. R.; Peng, T. K. C.; Vivian, H. C.; Wang, P. K.
1978-01-01
Technology and safety related to the implementation of an Automated Mixed Traffic Vehicle (AMTV) system are discussed. System concepts and technology status were reviewed and areas where further development is needed are identified. Failure and hazard modes were also analyzed and methods for prevention were suggested. The results presented are intended as a guide for further efforts in AMTV system design and technology development for both near term and long term applications. The AMTV systems discussed include a low speed system, and a hybrid system consisting of low speed sections and high speed sections operating in a semi-guideway. The safety analysis identified hazards that may arise in a properly functioning AMTV system, as well as hardware failure modes. Safety related failure modes were emphasized. A risk assessment was performed in order to create a priority order and significant hazards and failure modes were summarized. Corrective measures were proposed for each hazard.
Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the purge, vent and drain subsystem
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Bynum, M. C., III
1988-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Purge, Vent and Drain (PV and D) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter PV and D hardware. The PV and D Subsystem controls the environment of unpressurized compartments and window cavities, senses hazardous gases, and purges Orbiter/ET disconnect.
Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the orbital maneuvering subsystem, volume 2
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Haufler, W. A.
1988-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS) hardware and electrical power distribution and control (EPD and C), generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter OMS hardware and EPD and C systems. Volume 2 continues the presentation of IOA worksheets and contains the critical items list and the NASA FMEA to IOA worksheet cross reference and recommendations.
Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the extravehicular mobility unit, volume 2
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Raffaelli, Gary G.
1988-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort performed an independent analysis of the Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) hardware and system, generating draft failure modes criticalities and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the most recent proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison was provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter EMU hardware. Volume 2 continues the presentation of IOA analysis worksheets and contains the potential critical items list and NASA FMEA to IOA worksheet cross references and recommendations.
Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the instrumentation subsystem
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Howard, B. S.
1986-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The independent analysis results for the Instrumentation Subsystem are documented. The Instrumentation Subsystem (SS) consists of transducers, signal conditioning equipment, pulse code modulation (PCM) encoding equipment, tape recorders, frequency division multiplexers, and timing equipment. For this analysis, the SS is broken into two major groupings: Operational Instrumentation (OI) equipment and Modular Auxiliary Data System (MADS) equipment. The OI equipment is required to acquire, condition, scale, digitize, interleave/multiplex, format, and distribute operational Orbiter and payload data and voice for display, recording, telemetry, and checkout. It also must provide accurate timing for time critical functions for crew and payload specialist use. The MADS provides additional instrumentation to measure and record selected pressure, temperature, strain, vibration, and event data for post-flight playback and analysis. MADS data is used to assess vehicle responses to the flight environment and to permit correlation of such data from flight to flight. The IOA analysis utilized available SS hardware drawings and schematics for identifying hardware assemblies and components and their interfaces. Criticality for each item was assigned on the basis of the worst-case effect of the failure modes identified.
Using failure mode and effects analysis to plan implementation of smart i.v. pump technology.
Wetterneck, Tosha B; Skibinski, Kathleen A; Roberts, Tanita L; Kleppin, Susan M; Schroeder, Mark E; Enloe, Myra; Rough, Steven S; Hundt, Ann Schoofs; Carayon, Pascale
2006-08-15
Failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) was used to evaluate a smart i.v. pump as it was implemented into a redesigned medication-use process. A multidisciplinary team conducted a FMEA to guide the implementation of a smart i.v. pump that was designed to prevent pump programming errors. The smart i.v. pump was equipped with a dose-error reduction system that included a pre-defined drug library in which dosage limits were set for each medication. Monitoring for potential failures and errors occurred for three months postimplementation of FMEA. Specific measures were used to determine the success of the actions that were implemented as a result of the FMEA. The FMEA process at the hospital identified key failure modes in the medication process with the use of the old and new pumps, and actions were taken to avoid errors and adverse events. I.V. pump software and hardware design changes were also recommended. Thirteen of the 18 failure modes reported in practice after pump implementation had been identified by the team. A beneficial outcome of FMEA was the development of a multidisciplinary team that provided the infrastructure for safe technology implementation and effective event investigation after implementation. With the continual updating of i.v. pump software and hardware after implementation, FMEA can be an important starting place for safe technology choice and implementation and can produce site experts to follow technology and process changes over time. FMEA was useful in identifying potential problems in the medication-use process with the implementation of new smart i.v. pumps. Monitoring for system failures and errors after implementation remains necessary.
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Long, W. C.
1988-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed and analysis of the Communication and Tracking hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter Communication and Tracking hardware. The IOA product for the Communication and Tracking consisted of 1,108 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 298 critical items being identified. Comparison was made to the NASA baseline which consists of 697 FMEAs and 239 CIL items. The comparison determined if there were any results which had been found by IOA but were not in the NASA baseline. This comparison produced agreement on all but 407 FMEAs which caused differences in 294 CIL items. Volume 1 contains the subsystem description, assessment results, ground rules and assumptions, and some of the IOA worksheets.
Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the backup flight system FMEA/CIL
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Prust, E. E.; Ewell, J. J., Jr.; Hinsdale, L. W.
1988-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Backup Flight System (BFS) hardware, generating draft failure modes and Potential Critical Items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed NASA Post 51-L FMEA/CIL baseline. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter BFS hardware. The IOA product for the BFS analysis consisted of 29 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 21 Potential Critical Items (PCI) being identified. This product was originally compared with the proposed NASA BFS baseline and subsequently compared with the applicable Data Processing System (DPS), Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C), and Displays and Controls NASA CIL items. The comparisons determined if there were any results which had been found by the IOA but were not in the NASA baseline. The original assessment determined there were numerous failure modes and potential critical items in the IOA analysis that were not contained in the NASA BFS baseline. Conversely, the NASA baseline contained three FMEAs (IMU, ADTA, and Air Data Probe) for CIL items that were not identified in the IOA product.
Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): FMEA/CIL assessment
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Hinsdale, L. W.; Swain, L. J.; Barnes, J. E.
1988-01-01
The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL). Direction was given by the Orbiter and GFE Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis and assessment using the instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206. The IOA analysis featured a top-down approach to determine hardware failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, the analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL documentation. The assessment process compared the independently derived failure modes and criticality assignments to the proposed NASA post 51-L FMEA/CIL documentation. When possible, assessment issues were discussed and resolved with the NASA subsystem managers. Unresolved issues were elevated to the Orbiter and GFE Projects Office manager, Configuration Control Board (CCB), or Program Requirements Control Board (PRCB) for further resolution. The most important Orbiter assessment finding was the previously unknown stuck autopilot push-button criticality 1/1 failure mode. The worst case effect could cause loss of crew/vehicle when the microwave landing system is not active. It is concluded that NASA and Prime Contractor Post 51-L FMEA/CIL documentation assessed by IOA is believed to be technically accurate and complete. All CIL issues were resolved. No FMEA issues remain that have safety implications. Consideration should be given, however, to upgrading NSTS 22206 with definitive ground rules which more clearly spell out the limits of redundancy.
ALS rocket engine combustion devices design and demonstration
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Arreguin, Steve
1989-01-01
Work performed during Phase one is summarized and the significant technical and programmatic accomplishments occurring during this period are documented. Besides a summary of the results, methodologies, trade studies, design, fabrication, and hardware conditions; the following are included: the evolving Maintainability Plan, Reliability Program Plan, Failure Summary and Analysis Report, and the Failure Mode and Effect Analysis.
Evaluation of wheelchair seating system crashworthiness: "drop hook"-type seat attachment hardware.
Bertocci, G; Ha, D; Deemer, E; Karg, P
2001-04-01
To evaluate the crashworthiness of commercially available hardware that attaches seat surfaces to the wheelchair frame. A low cost static crashworthiness test procedure that simulates a frontal impact motor vehicle crash. Safety testing laboratory. Eleven unique sets of drop-hook hardware made of carbon steel (4), stainless steel (4), and aluminum (3). Replicated seat-loading conditions associated with a 20g/48 kph frontal impact. Test criterion for seat loading was 16,680 N (3750 lb). Failure load and deflection of seat surface. None of the hardware sets tested met the crashworthiness test criterion. All failed at less than 50% of the load that seating hardware could be exposed to in a 20g/48 kph frontal impact. The primary failure mode was excessive deformation, leading to an unstable seat support surface. Results suggest that commercially available seating drop hooks may be unable to withstand loading associated with a frontal crash and may not be the best option for use with transport wheelchairs.
Demonstration Advanced Avionics System (DAAS), Phase 1
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Bailey, A. J.; Bailey, D. G.; Gaabo, R. J.; Lahn, T. G.; Larson, J. C.; Peterson, E. M.; Schuck, J. W.; Rodgers, D. L.; Wroblewski, K. A.
1981-01-01
Demonstration advanced anionics system (DAAS) function description, hardware description, operational evaluation, and failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) are provided. Projected advanced avionics system (PAAS) description, reliability analysis, cost analysis, maintainability analysis, and modularity analysis are discussed.
Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the rudder/speed brake subsystem
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Wilson, R. E.; Riccio, J. R.
1986-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The independent analysis results for the Orbiter Rudder/Speedbrake Actuation Mechanism is documented. The function of the Rudder/Speedbrake (RSB) is to provide directional control and to provide a means of energy control during entry. The system consists of two panels on a vertical hinge mounted on the aft part of the vertical stabilizer. These two panels move together to form a rudder but split apart to make a speedbrake. The Rudder/Speedbrake Actuation Mechanism consists of the following elements: (1) Power Drive Unit (PDU) which is composed of hydraulic valve module and a hydraulic motor-powered gearbox which contains differentials and mixer gears to provide PDU torque output; (2) four geared rotary actuators which apply the PDU generated torque to the rudder/speedbrake panels; and (3) ten torque shafts which join the PDU to the rotary actuators and interconnect the four rotary actuators. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failures and causes. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. Critical RSB failures which result in potential loss of vehicle control were mainly due to loss of hydraulic fluid, fluid contaminators, and mechanical failures in gears and shafts.
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Barickman, K.
1988-01-01
The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL). The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Life Support and Airlock Support Systems (LSS and ALSS) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. The discrepancies were flagged for potential future resolution. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter LSS and ALSS hardware. Volume 2 continues the presentation of IOA worksheets and contains the critical items list and NASA FMEA to IOA worksheet cross reference and recommendations.
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Schmeckpeper, K. R.
1988-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA first completed an analysis of the Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter EPD and C hardware. Volume 3 continues the presentation of IOA worksheets and contains the potential critical items list and the NASA FMEA to IOA worksheet cross reference and recommendations.
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Saiidi, M. J.
1988-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the atmospheric Revitalization Pressure Control Subsystem (ARPCS) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL proposed Post 51-L updates based upon the CCB/PRCB presentations and an informal criticality summary listing. A discussion of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. These discrepancies were flagged as issues, and recommendations were made based on the FMEA data available at the time. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter ARPCS hardware.
Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the main propulsion subsystem FMEA/CIL, volume 3
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Holden, K. A.
1988-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Main Propulsion System (MPS) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to available data from the Rockwell Downey/NASA JSC FMEA/CIL review. Volume 3 continues the presentation of IOA worksheets and includes the potential critical items list.
Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the main propulsion subsystem FMEA/CIL, volume 4
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Slaughter, B. C.
1988-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Main Propulsion System (MPS) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were than compared to available data from the Rockwell Downey/NASA JSC FMEA/CIL review. Volume 4 contains the IOA analysis worksheets and the NASA FMEA to IOA worksheet cross reference and recommendations.
Model 0A wind turbine generator FMEA
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Klein, William E.; Lalli, Vincent R.
1989-01-01
The results of Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) conducted for the Wind Turbine Generators are presented. The FMEA was performed for the functional modes of each system, subsystem, or component. The single-point failures were eliminated for most of the systems. The blade system was the only exception. The qualitative probability of a blade separating was estimated at level D-remote. Many changes were made to the hardware as a result of this analysis. The most significant change was the addition of the safety system. Operational experience and need to improve machine availability have resulted in subsequent changes to the various systems which are also reflected in this FMEA.
Development and Application of a Portable Health Algorithms Test System
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Melcher, Kevin J.; Fulton, Christopher E.; Maul, William A.; Sowers, T. Shane
2007-01-01
This paper describes the development and initial demonstration of a Portable Health Algorithms Test (PHALT) System that is being developed by researchers at the NASA Glenn Research Center (GRC). The PHALT System was conceived as a means of evolving the maturity and credibility of algorithms developed to assess the health of aerospace systems. Comprising an integrated hardware-software environment, the PHALT System allows systems health management algorithms to be developed in a graphical programming environment; to be tested and refined using system simulation or test data playback; and finally, to be evaluated in a real-time hardware-in-the-loop mode with a live test article. In this paper, PHALT System development is described through the presentation of a functional architecture, followed by the selection and integration of hardware and software. Also described is an initial real-time hardware-in-the-loop demonstration that used sensor data qualification algorithms to diagnose and isolate simulated sensor failures in a prototype Power Distribution Unit test-bed. Success of the initial demonstration is highlighted by the correct detection of all sensor failures and the absence of any real-time constraint violations.
Semiannual Technical Summary, 1 April-30 September 1993
1993-12-01
Hardware failure 11 Jul 2200 - Hardware failure 12 Jul - 0531 Hardware failure 12 Jul 0744 - 1307 Hardware service 1OAug 0821 - 1514 Line failure 29 Aug...1000 - Line failure 30 Aug - 1211 Line failure 08 Sep 1518 - Line failure 09 Sep - 0428 Line failure 10 Sep 0821 - 1030 Hardware failure 18 Sep 0817...reair. Between 8 September 1306 hrs and 9 September 0428 hre all communications systems wene affected (13.5 hrs). Reduced 01B performance started 10
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Gibbel, Mark; Larson, Timothy
2000-01-01
An Engineering-of-Failure approach to designing and executing an accelerated product qualification test was performed to support a risk assessment of a "work-around" necessitated by an on-orbit failure of another piece of hardware on the Mars Global Surveyor spacecraft. The proposed work-around involved exceeding the previous qualification experience both in terms of extreme cold exposure level and in terms of demonstrated low cycle fatigue life for the power shunt assemblies. An analysis was performed to identify potential failure sites, modes and associated failure mechanisms consistent with the new use conditions. A test was then designed and executed which accelerated the failure mechanisms identified by analysis. Verification of the resulting failure mechanism concluded the effort.
Failure mode and effect analysis-based quality assurance for dynamic MLC tracking systems
Sawant, Amit; Dieterich, Sonja; Svatos, Michelle; Keall, Paul
2010-01-01
Purpose: To develop and implement a failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA)-based commissioning and quality assurance framework for dynamic multileaf collimator (DMLC) tumor tracking systems. Methods: A systematic failure mode and effect analysis was performed for a prototype real-time tumor tracking system that uses implanted electromagnetic transponders for tumor position monitoring and a DMLC for real-time beam adaptation. A detailed process tree of DMLC tracking delivery was created and potential tracking-specific failure modes were identified. For each failure mode, a risk probability number (RPN) was calculated from the product of the probability of occurrence, the severity of effect, and the detectibility of the failure. Based on the insights obtained from the FMEA, commissioning and QA procedures were developed to check (i) the accuracy of coordinate system transformation, (ii) system latency, (iii) spatial and dosimetric delivery accuracy, (iv) delivery efficiency, and (v) accuracy and consistency of system response to error conditions. The frequency of testing for each failure mode was determined from the RPN value. Results: Failures modes with RPN≥125 were recommended to be tested monthly. Failure modes with RPN<125 were assigned to be tested during comprehensive evaluations, e.g., during commissioning, annual quality assurance, and after major software∕hardware upgrades. System latency was determined to be ∼193 ms. The system showed consistent and accurate response to erroneous conditions. Tracking accuracy was within 3%–3 mm gamma (100% pass rate) for sinusoidal as well as a wide variety of patient-derived respiratory motions. The total time taken for monthly QA was ∼35 min, while that taken for comprehensive testing was ∼3.5 h. Conclusions: FMEA proved to be a powerful and flexible tool to develop and implement a quality management (QM) framework for DMLC tracking. The authors conclude that the use of FMEA-based QM ensures efficient allocation of clinical resources because the most critical failure modes receive the most attention. It is expected that the set of guidelines proposed here will serve as a living document that is updated with the accumulation of progressively more intrainstitutional and interinstitutional experience with DMLC tracking. PMID:21302802
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Drake, R. L.; Duvoisin, P. F.; Asthana, A.; Mather, T. W.
1971-01-01
High speed automated identification and design of dynamic systems, both linear and nonlinear, are discussed. Special emphasis is placed on developing hardware and techniques which are applicable to practical problems. The basic modeling experiment and new results are described. Using the improvements developed successful identification of several systems, including a physical example as well as simulated systems, was obtained. The advantages of parameter signature analysis over signal signature analysis in go-no go testing of operational systems were demonstrated. The feasibility of using these ideas in failure mode prediction in operating systems was also investigated. An improved digital controlled nonlinear function generator was developed, de-bugged, and completely documented.
Digital Fly-By-Wire Flight Control Validation Experience
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Szalai, K. J.; Jarvis, C. R.; Krier, G. E.; Megna, V. A.; Brock, L. D.; Odonnell, R. N.
1978-01-01
The experience gained in digital fly-by-wire technology through a flight test program being conducted by the NASA Dryden Flight Research Center in an F-8C aircraft is described. The system requirements are outlined, along with the requirements for flight qualification. The system is described, including the hardware components, the aircraft installation, and the system operation. The flight qualification experience is emphasized. The qualification process included the theoretical validation of the basic design, laboratory testing of the hardware and software elements, systems level testing, and flight testing. The most productive testing was performed on an iron bird aircraft, which used the actual electronic and hydraulic hardware and a simulation of the F-8 characteristics to provide the flight environment. The iron bird was used for sensor and system redundancy management testing, failure modes and effects testing, and stress testing in many cases with the pilot in the loop. The flight test program confirmed the quality of the validation process by achieving 50 flights without a known undetected failure and with no false alarms.
Demonstration Advanced Avionics System (DAAS). Phase 1 report
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
1981-01-01
An integrated avionics system which provides expanded functional capabilities that significantly enhance the utility and safety of general aviation at a cost commensurate with the general aviation market is discussed. Displays and control were designed so that the pilot can use the system after minimum training. Functional and hardware descriptions, operational evaluation and failure modes effects analysis are included.
Effects of AEA Cell-Bypass-Switch Closure on Charged EOS-Aqua NiH2 Cell
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Keys, Denney; Rao, Gopalakrishna M.; Sullivan, David; Wannemacher, Harry
2001-01-01
The nominal performance of AEA CBPD under simulated EOS-Aqua/Aura flight hardware configuration has been demonstrated. There is no evidence of cell rupture or excessive heat production during or after CBPD switch activation under simulated high cell impedance (open-circuit cell failure mode). Inadvertent CBPD switch activation with a charged cell (low impedance path) intermittently closes and opens up the switch, therefore the device may or may not provide protection against future open-circuit cell failure. Further testing with switches F01 and F02 may provide clarification. The formation of a continuous low impedance path (a homogeneous low melting point alloy), has been confirmed - which is the expected mode of operation.
AEA Cell-Bypass-Switch Activation: An Update
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Keys, Denney; Rao, Gopalakrishna M.; Wannemacher, Harry
2002-01-01
The objectives of this project included the following: (1) verify the performance of AEA cell bypass protection device (CBPD) under simulated EOS-Aqua/Aura flight hardware configuration; (2) assess the safety of the hardware under an inadvertent firing of CBPD switch, as well as the closing of CBPD; and (3) confirm that the mode of operation of CBPD switch is the formation of a continuous low impedance path (a homogeneous low melting point alloy). The nominal performance of AEA CBPD under flight operating conditions (vacuum except zero-G, and high impedance cell) has been demonstrated. There is no evidence of cell rupture or excessive heat production during or after CBPD switch activation under simulated high cell impedance (open-circuit cell failure mode). The formation of a continuous low impedance path (a homogeneous low melting point alloy) has been confirmed.
Failure Mode/Mechanism Distributions
1991-09-01
circuits , hybrids, discrete semiconductors, microwave devices, optoelectronics and nonelectronic parts employed in military, space, industrial and...FMEA may be performed as a hardware analysis, a functional analysis, or a combination analysis and is ideally initiated at the part, circuit or...by a single replaceable module , a separate FMEA could be performed on the internal functions of the module , viewing the module as a system. The level
An Intelligent Hierarchical Decision Architecture for Operational Test and Evaluation
1996-05-01
Results .......................................... 60 3.4 CONTRIBUTION...FCM Fuzzy Cognitive Map FMEA Failure Modes and Effects Analysis HWIL Hardware-in-the-Loop IBL Increase in Break Locks xiv IDA Institute for Defense... 60 .5 .40 3 .25 0.21 0.26 Figure 8 PROD-ALL COMMFFY Compositional Method .65 . 7 5 . 60 M 0.67 Figure 9 PROD-MAX COMMFFY Compositional Method 49
Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the reaction control system, volume 1
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Burkemper, V. J.; Haufler, W. A.; Odonnell, R. A.; Paul, D. J.
1987-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results for the Reaction Control System (RCS). The purpose of the RCS is to provide thrust in and about the X, Y, Z axes for External Tank (ET) separation; orbit insertion maneuvers; orbit translation maneuvers; on-orbit attitude control; rendezvous; proximity operations (payload deploy and capture); deorbit maneuvers; and abort attitude control. The RCS is situated in three independent modules, one forward in the orbiter nose and one in each OMS/RCS pod. Each RCS module consists of the following subsystems: Helium Pressurization Subsystem; Propellant Storage and Distribution Subsystem; Thruster Subsystem; and Electrical Power Distribution and Control Subsystem. Of the failure modes analyzed, 307 could potentially result in a loss of life and/or loss of vehicle.
On Using Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS) Electronic Products in Space
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Culpepper, William X.
2002-01-01
NASA's Johnson Space Center (JSC) has utilized COTS products in its programs since the early 1990's. Recently it has become evident that, of all failure modes possible, radiation will probably dominate; sometimes to the point of driving system architecture. It is now imperative that radiation susceptibility be addressed when writing the system requirements. Susceptibility assessment, e.g. testing, must begin early in the design phase to establish performance and continue through the hardware qualification program to prove satisfaction of the original requirements(s). Examples of requirements, testing, and architecture versus failure rate will be given.
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Genge, Gary G.
1991-01-01
The probabilistic design approach currently receiving attention for structural failure modes has been adapted for obtaining measured bearing wear limits in the Space Shuttle Main Engine high-pressure oxidizer turbopump. With the development of the shaft microtravel measurements to determine bearing health, an acceptance limit was neeed that protects against all known faiure modes yet is not overly conservative. This acceptance criteria limit has been successfully determined using probabilistic descriptions of preflight hardware geometry, empirical bearing wear data, mission requirements, and measurement tool precision as an input for a Monte Carlo simulation. The result of the simulation is a frequency distribution of failures as a function of preflight acceptance limits. When the distribution is converted into a reliability curve, a conscious risk management decision is made concerning the acceptance limit.
Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the reaction control system, volume 3
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Burkemper, V. J.; Haufler, W. A.; Odonnell, R. A.; Paul, D. J.
1987-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results for the Reaction Control System (RCS). The RCS is situated in three independent modules, one forward in the orbiter nose and one in each OMS/RCS pod. Each RCS module consists of the following subsystems: Helium Pressurization Subsystem; Propellant Storage and Distribution Subsystem; Thruster Subsystem; and Electrical Power Distribution and Control Subsystem. Volume 3 continues the presentation of IOA analysis worksheets and the potential critical items list.
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Harper, R. E.; Alger, L. S.; Babikyan, C. A.; Butler, B. P.; Friend, S. A.; Ganska, R. J.; Lala, J. H.; Masotto, T. K.; Meyer, A. J.; Morton, D. P.
1992-01-01
Described here is the Army Fault Tolerant Architecture (AFTA) hardware architecture and components and the operating system. The architectural and operational theory of the AFTA Fault Tolerant Data Bus is discussed. The test and maintenance strategy developed for use in fielded AFTA installations is presented. An approach to be used in reducing the probability of AFTA failure due to common mode faults is described. Analytical models for AFTA performance, reliability, availability, life cycle cost, weight, power, and volume are developed. An approach is presented for using VHSIC Hardware Description Language (VHDL) to describe and design AFTA's developmental hardware. A plan is described for verifying and validating key AFTA concepts during the Dem/Val phase. Analytical models and partial mission requirements are used to generate AFTA configurations for the TF/TA/NOE and Ground Vehicle missions.
Preloaded joint analysis methodology for space flight systems
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Chambers, Jeffrey A.
1995-01-01
This report contains a compilation of some of the most basic equations governing simple preloaded joint systems and discusses the more common modes of failure associated with such hardware. It is intended to provide the mechanical designer with the tools necessary for designing a basic bolted joint. Although the information presented is intended to aid in the engineering of space flight structures, the fundamentals are equally applicable to other forms of mechanical design.
Analysis and test of low profile aluminum aerospace tank dome
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Ahmed, R.; Wilhelm, J. M.
1993-12-01
In order to increase the structural performance of cryogenic tanks, the aerospace industry is beginning to employ low-profile bulkheads in new generation launch vehicle designs. This report details the analysis and test of one such dome made from 2219 aluminum. Such domes have two potential failure modes under internal pressure, general tensile failure and hoop compression buckling (in regions near the equator). The test determined the buckling load and ultimate tensile load of the hardware and showed that both compared well with the analysis predictions. This effort was conducted under the auspices of NASA and the General Dynamics Cryogenic Tank Technology Program (CTTP).
Analysis and test of low profile aluminum aerospace tank dome
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Ahmed, R.; Wilhelm, J. M.
1993-01-01
In order to increase the structural performance of cryogenic tanks, the aerospace industry is beginning to employ low-profile bulkheads in new generation launch vehicle designs. This report details the analysis and test of one such dome made from 2219 aluminum. Such domes have two potential failure modes under internal pressure, general tensile failure and hoop compression buckling (in regions near the equator). The test determined the buckling load and ultimate tensile load of the hardware and showed that both compared well with the analysis predictions. This effort was conducted under the auspices of NASA and the General Dynamics Cryogenic Tank Technology Program (CTTP).
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Hayes, Richard; Beets, Tim; Beno, Joseph; Booth, John; Cornell, Mark; Good, John; Heisler, James; Hill, Gary; Kriel, Herman; Penney, Charles; Rafal, Marc; Savage, Richard; Soukup, Ian; Worthington, Michael; Zierer, Joseph
2012-09-01
In support of the Hobby-Eberly Telescope Dark Energy Experiment (HETDEX), the Center for Electromechanics at The University of Texas at Austin was tasked with developing the new Tracker and control system to support the HETDEX Wide-Field Upgrade. The tracker carries the 3,100 kg Prime Focus Instrument Package and Wide Field Corrector approximately 13 m above the 10 m diameter primary mirror. Its safe and reliable operation by a sophisticated control system, over a 20 year life time is a paramount requirement for the project. To account for all potential failures and potential hazards, to both the equipment and personnel involved, an extensive Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) was completed early in the project. This task required participation of all the stakeholders over a multi-day meeting with numerous follow up exchanges. The event drove a number of significant design decisions and requirements that might not have been identified this early in the project without this process. The result is a system that has multiple layers of active and passive safety systems to protect the tens of millions of dollars of hardware involved and the people who operate it. This paper will describe the background of the FMEA process, how it was utilized on HETDEX, the critical outcomes, how the required safety systems were implemented, and how they have worked in operation. It should be of interest to engineers, designers, and managers engaging in complex multi-disciplinary and parallel engineering projects that involve automated hardware and control systems with potentially hazardous operating scenarios.
Restoring Redundancy to the MAP Propulsion System
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
O'Donnell, James R., Jr.; Davis, Gary T.; Ward, David K.; Bauer, Frank H. (Technical Monitor)
2002-01-01
The Microwave Anisotropy Probe (MAP) is a follow-on to the Differential Microwave Radiometer (DMR) instrument on the Cosmic Background Explorer (COBE). Due to the MAP project's limited mass, power, and financial resources, a traditional reliability concept including fully redundant components was not feasible. The MAP design employs selective hardware redundancy, along with backup software modes and algorithms, to improve the odds of mission success. In particular, MAP's propulsion system, which is used for orbit maneuvers and momentum management, uses eight thrusters positioned and oriented in such a way that its thruster-based attitude control modes can maintain three-axis attitude control in the event of the failure of any one thruster.
Mathematical models for space shuttle ground systems
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Tory, E. G.
1985-01-01
Math models are a series of algorithms, comprised of algebraic equations and Boolean Logic. At Kennedy Space Center, math models for the Space Shuttle Systems are performed utilizing the Honeywell 66/80 digital computers, Modcomp II/45 Minicomputers and special purpose hardware simulators (MicroComputers). The Shuttle Ground Operations Simulator operating system provides the language formats, subroutines, queueing schemes, execution modes and support software to write, maintain and execute the models. The ground systems presented consist primarily of the Liquid Oxygen and Liquid Hydrogen Cryogenic Propellant Systems, as well as liquid oxygen External Tank Gaseous Oxygen Vent Hood/Arm and the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) High Bay Cells. The purpose of math modeling is to simulate the ground hardware systems and to provide an environment for testing in a benign mode. This capability allows the engineers to check out application software for loading and launching the vehicle, and to verify the Checkout, Control, & Monitor Subsystem within the Launch Processing System. It is also used to train operators and to predict system response and status in various configurations (normal operations, emergency and contingent operations), including untried configurations or those too dangerous to try under real conditions, i.e., failure modes.
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Monaghan, Mark W.; Gillespie, Amanda M.
2013-01-01
During the shuttle era NASA utilized a failure reporting system called the Problem Reporting and Corrective Action (PRACA) it purpose was to identify and track system non-conformance. The PRACA system over the years evolved from a relatively nominal way to identify system problems to a very complex tracking and report generating data base. The PRACA system became the primary method to categorize any and all anomalies from corrosion to catastrophic failure. The systems documented in the PRACA system range from flight hardware to ground or facility support equipment. While the PRACA system is complex, it does possess all the failure modes, times of occurrence, length of system delay, parts repaired or replaced, and corrective action performed. The difficulty is mining the data then to utilize that data in order to estimate component, Line Replaceable Unit (LRU), and system reliability analysis metrics. In this paper, we identify a methodology to categorize qualitative data from the ground system PRACA data base for common ground or facility support equipment. Then utilizing a heuristic developed for review of the PRACA data determine what reports identify a credible failure. These data are the used to determine inter-arrival times to perform an estimation of a metric for repairable component-or LRU reliability. This analysis is used to determine failure modes of the equipment, determine the probability of the component failure mode, and support various quantitative differing techniques for performing repairable system analysis. The result is that an effective and concise estimate of components used in manned space flight operations. The advantage is the components or LRU's are evaluated in the same environment and condition that occurs during the launch process.
Failure detection and fault management techniques for flush airdata sensing systems
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Whitmore, Stephen A.; Moes, Timothy R.; Leondes, Cornelius T.
1992-01-01
Methods based on chi-squared analysis are presented for detecting system and individual-port failures in the high-angle-of-attack flush airdata sensing system on the NASA F-18 High Alpha Research Vehicle. The HI-FADS hardware is introduced, and the aerodynamic model describes measured pressure in terms of dynamic pressure, angle of attack, angle of sideslip, and static pressure. Chi-squared analysis is described in the presentation of the concept for failure detection and fault management which includes nominal, iteration, and fault-management modes. A matrix of pressure orifices arranged in concentric circles on the nose of the aircraft indicate the parameters which are applied to the regression algorithms. The sensing techniques are applied to the F-18 flight data, and two examples are given of the computed angle-of-attack time histories. The failure-detection and fault-management techniques permit the matrix to be multiply redundant, and the chi-squared analysis is shown to be useful in the detection of failures.
Online Cable Tester and Rerouter
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Lewis, Mark; Medelius, Pedro
2012-01-01
Hardware and algorithms have been developed to transfer electrical power and data connectivity safely, efficiently, and automatically from an identified damaged/defective wire in a cable to an alternate wire path. The combination of online cable testing capabilities, along with intelligent signal rerouting algorithms, allows the user to overcome the inherent difficulty of maintaining system integrity and configuration control, while autonomously rerouting signals and functions without introducing new failure modes. The incorporation of this capability will increase the reliability of systems by ensuring system availability during operations.
High temperature thermocouple and heat flux gauge using a unique thin film-hardware hot juncture
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Liebert, C. H.; Holanda, R.; Hippensteele, S. A.; Andracchio, C. A.
1984-01-01
A special thin film-hardware material thermocouple (TC) and heat flux gauge concept for a reasonably high temperature and high flux flat plate heat transfer experiment was fabricated and tested to gauge temperatures of 911 K. This concept was developed for minimal disturbance of boundary layer temperature and flow over the plates and minimal disturbance of heat flux through the plates. Comparison of special heat flux gauge Stanton number output at steady-state conditions with benchmark literature data was good and agreement was within a calculated uncertainty of the measurement system. Also, good agreement of special TC and standard TC outputs was obtained and the results are encouraging. Oxidation of thin film thermoelements was a primary failure mode after about 5 of operation.
High-temperature thermocouple and heat flux gauge using a unique thin film-hardware hot junction
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Liebert, C. H.; Holanda, R.; Hippensteele, S. A.; Andracchio, C. A.
1985-01-01
A special thin film-hardware material thermocouple (TC) and heat flux gauge concept for a reasonably high temperature and high flux flat plate heat transfer experiment was fabricated and tested to gauge temperatures of 911 K. This concept was developed for minimal disturbance of boundary layer temperature and flow over the plates and minimal disturbance of heat flux through the plates. Comparison of special heat flux gauge Stanton number output at steady-state conditions with benchmark literature data was good and agreement was within a calculated uncertainty of the measurement system. Also, good agreement of special TC and standard TC outputs was obtained and the results are encouraging. Oxidation of thin film thermoelements was a primary failure mode after about 5 of operation.
UAS-Systems Integration, Validation, and Diagnostics Simulation Capability
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Buttrill, Catherine W.; Verstynen, Harry A.
2014-01-01
As part of the Phase 1 efforts of NASA's UAS-in-the-NAS Project a task was initiated to explore the merits of developing a system simulation capability for UAS to address airworthiness certification requirements. The core of the capability would be a software representation of an unmanned vehicle, including all of the relevant avionics and flight control system components. The specific system elements could be replaced with hardware representations to provide Hardware-in-the-Loop (HWITL) test and evaluation capability. The UAS Systems Integration and Validation Laboratory (UAS-SIVL) was created to provide a UAS-systems integration, validation, and diagnostics hardware-in-the-loop simulation capability. This paper discusses how SIVL provides a robust and flexible simulation framework that permits the study of failure modes, effects, propagation paths, criticality, and mitigation strategies to help develop safety, reliability, and design data that can assist with the development of certification standards, means of compliance, and design best practices for civil UAS.
ACIS Door Failure Investigation and Mitigation Procedures
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Podgorski, William A.; Tice, Neil W.; Plucinsky, Paul P.
2000-01-01
NASA's Chandra X-ray Observatory (formerly AXAF) was launched on July 23, 1999 and is currently in orbit performing scientific studies. Chandra is the third of NASA's Great Observatories to be launched, following the Hubble Space Telescope and the Compton Gamma Ray Observatory. One of four primary science instruments on Chandra, and one of only two focal plane instruments, is the Advanced CCD Imaging Spectrometer, or ACIS. The ACIS focal plane and Optical Blocking Filter (OBF) must be launched under vacuum, so a tightly sealed, functioning door and venting subsystem were implemented. The door was opened two and one-half weeks after launch (after most out-gassing of composite materials) and allowed X-rays to be imaged by the ACIS CCD's in the focal plane. A failure of this door to open on-orbit would have eliminated all ACIS capabilities, severely degrading mission science. During the final pre-flight thermal-vacuum test of the fully integrated Chandra Observatory at TRW, the ACIS door failed to open when commanded to do so. This paper describes the efforts, under considerable time pressure, by NASA, its contractors and outside review teams to investigate the failure and to develop modified hardware and procedures which would correct the problem. Of interest is the fact that the root cause of the test failure was never clearly identified despite massive effort. We ultimately focussed on hardware and procedures designed to mitigate the effects of potential, but unproven, failure modes. We describe a frequent real-world engineering situation in which one must proceed on the best basis possible in the absence of the complete set of facts.
Correlation study between vibrational environmental and failure rates of civil helicopter components
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Alaniz, O.
1979-01-01
An investigation of two selected helicopter types, namely, the Models 206A/B and 212, is reported. An analysis of the available vibration and reliability data for these two helicopter types resulted in the selection of ten components located in five different areas of the helicopter and consisting primarily of instruments, electrical components, and other noncritical flight hardware. The potential for advanced technology in suppressing vibration in helicopters was assessed. The are still several unknowns concerning both the vibration environment and the reliability of helicopter noncritical flight components. Vibration data for the selected components were either insufficient or inappropriate. The maintenance data examined for the selected components were inappropriate due to variations in failure mode identification, inconsistent reporting, or inaccurate informaton.
Fault tolerance in a supercomputer through dynamic repartitioning
Chen, Dong; Coteus, Paul W.; Gara, Alan G.; Takken, Todd E.
2007-02-27
A multiprocessor, parallel computer is made tolerant to hardware failures by providing extra groups of redundant standby processors and by designing the system so that these extra groups of processors can be swapped with any group which experiences a hardware failure. This swapping can be under software control, thereby permitting the entire computer to sustain a hardware failure but, after swapping in the standby processors, to still appear to software as a pristine, fully functioning system.
AirSTAR Hardware and Software Design for Beyond Visual Range Flight Research
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Laughter, Sean; Cox, David
2016-01-01
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Airborne Subscale Transport Aircraft Research (AirSTAR) Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) is a facility developed to study the flight dynamics of vehicles in emergency conditions, in support of aviation safety research. The system was upgraded to have its operational range significantly expanded, going beyond the line of sight of a ground-based pilot. A redesign of the airborne flight hardware was undertaken, as well as significant changes to the software base, in order to provide appropriate autonomous behavior in response to a number of potential failures and hazards. Ground hardware and system monitors were also upgraded to include redundant communication links, including ADS-B based position displays and an independent flight termination system. The design included both custom and commercially available avionics, combined to allow flexibility in flight experiment design while still benefiting from tested configurations in reversionary flight modes. A similar hierarchy was employed in the software architecture, to allow research codes to be tested, with a fallback to more thoroughly validated flight controls. As a remotely piloted facility, ground systems were also developed to ensure the flight modes and system state were communicated to ground operations personnel in real-time. Presented in this paper is a general overview of the concept of operations for beyond visual range flight, and a detailed review of the airborne hardware and software design. This discussion is held in the context of the safety and procedural requirements that drove many of the design decisions for the AirSTAR UAS Beyond Visual Range capability.
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Al Hassan, Mohammad; Britton, Paul; Hatfield, Glen Spencer; Novack, Steven D.
2017-01-01
Today's launch vehicles complex electronic and avionics systems heavily utilize Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) integrated circuits (IC) for their superb speed and reconfiguration capabilities. Consequently, FPGAs are prevalent ICs in communication protocols such as MILSTD- 1553B and in control signal commands such as in solenoid valve actuations. This paper will identify reliability concerns and high level guidelines to estimate FPGA total failure rates in a launch vehicle application. The paper will discuss hardware, hardware description language, and radiation induced failures. The hardware contribution of the approach accounts for physical failures of the IC. The hardware description language portion will discuss the high level FPGA programming languages and software/code reliability growth. The radiation portion will discuss FPGA susceptibility to space environment radiation.
Kim, Dong Seong; Park, Jong Sou
2014-01-01
It is important to assess availability of virtualized systems in IT business infrastructures. Previous work on availability modeling and analysis of the virtualized systems used a simplified configuration and assumption in which only one virtual machine (VM) runs on a virtual machine monitor (VMM) hosted on a physical server. In this paper, we show a comprehensive availability model using stochastic reward nets (SRN). The model takes into account (i) the detailed failures and recovery behaviors of multiple VMs, (ii) various other failure modes and corresponding recovery behaviors (e.g., hardware faults, failure and recovery due to Mandelbugs and aging-related bugs), and (iii) dependency between different subcomponents (e.g., between physical host failure and VMM, etc.) in a virtualized servers system. We also show numerical analysis on steady state availability, downtime in hours per year, transaction loss, and sensitivity analysis. This model provides a new finding on how to increase system availability by combining both software rejuvenations at VM and VMM in a wise manner. PMID:25165732
Backup Attitude Control Algorithms for the MAP Spacecraft
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
ODonnell, James R., Jr.; Andrews, Stephen F.; Ericsson-Jackson, Aprille J.; Flatley, Thomas W.; Ward, David K.; Bay, P. Michael
1999-01-01
The Microwave Anisotropy Probe (MAP) is a follow-on to the Differential Microwave Radiometer (DMR) instrument on the Cosmic Background Explorer (COBE) spacecraft. The MAP spacecraft will perform its mission, studying the early origins of the universe, in a Lissajous orbit around the Earth-Sun L(sub 2) Lagrange point. Due to limited mass, power, and financial resources, a traditional reliability concept involving fully redundant components was not feasible. This paper will discuss the redundancy philosophy used on MAP, describe the hardware redundancy selected (and why), and present backup modes and algorithms that were designed in lieu of additional attitude control hardware redundancy to improve the odds of mission success. Three of these modes have been implemented in the spacecraft flight software. The first onboard mode allows the MAP Kalman filter to be used with digital sun sensor (DSS) derived rates, in case of the failure of one of MAP's two two-axis inertial reference units. Similarly, the second onboard mode allows a star tracker only mode, using attitude and derived rate from one or both of MAP's star trackers for onboard attitude determination and control. The last backup mode onboard allows a sun-line angle offset to be commanded that will allow solar radiation pressure to be used for momentum management and orbit stationkeeping. In addition to the backup modes implemented on the spacecraft, two backup algorithms have been developed in the event of less likely contingencies. One of these is an algorithm for implementing an alternative scan pattern to MAP's nominal dual-spin science mode using only one or two reaction wheels and thrusters. Finally, an algorithm has been developed that uses thruster one shots while in science mode for momentum management. This algorithm has been developed in case system momentum builds up faster than anticipated, to allow adequate momentum management while minimizing interruptions to science. In this paper, each mode and algorithm will be discussed, and simulation results presented.
Automated Diagnosis Of Conditions In A Plant-Growth Chamber
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Clinger, Barry R.; Damiano, Alfred L.
1995-01-01
Biomass Production Chamber Operations Assistant software and hardware constitute expert system that diagnoses mechanical failures in controlled-environment hydroponic plant-growth chamber and recommends corrective actions to be taken by technicians. Subjects of continuing research directed toward development of highly automated closed life-support systems aboard spacecraft to process animal (including human) and plant wastes into food and oxygen. Uses Microsoft Windows interface to give technicians intuitive, efficient access to critical data. In diagnostic mode, system prompts technician for information. When expert system has enough information, it generates recovery plan.
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Stiffler, J. J.; Bryant, L. A.; Guccione, L.
1979-01-01
A computer program to aid in accessing the reliability of fault tolerant avionics systems was developed. A simple mathematical expression was used to evaluate the reliability of any redundant configuration over any interval during which the failure rates and coverage parameters remained unaffected by configuration changes. Provision was made for convolving such expressions in order to evaluate the reliability of a dual mode system. A coverage model was also developed to determine the various relevant coverage coefficients as a function of the available hardware and software fault detector characteristics, and subsequent isolation and recovery delay statistics.
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Douay, N.
2011-10-01
In the frame of GALILEO In-Orbit Validation program which is composed of 4 satellites, Thales Alenia Space France has designed, developed and tested the Electrical Power Subsystem. Besides some classical design choices like: -50V regulated main power bus provided by the PCDU manufactured by Terma (DK), -Solar array, manufactured by Dutch-Space (NL), using Ga-As triple junction technology from Azur Space Power Solar GmbH, -SAFT (FR) Lithium-ion Battery for which cell package balancing function is required, -Solar Array Drive Mechanism, provided by RUAG Space Switzerland, to transfer the power. This subsystem features a fully autonomous, failure tolerant, battery charge management able to operate even after a complete unavailability of the on-board software. The battery charge management is implemented such that priority is always given to satisfy the satellite main bus needs in order to maintain the main bus regulation under MEA control. This battery charge management principle provides very high reliability and operational robustness. So, the paper describes : -the battery charge management concept using a combination of PCDU hardware and relevant battery lines monitoring, -the functional aspect of the single point failure free S4R (Sequential Switching Shunt Switch Regulator) and associated performances, -the failure modes isolated and passivated by this architecture. The paper will address as well the autonomous balancing function characteristics and performances.
An experimental evaluation of software redundancy as a strategy for improving reliability
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Eckhardt, Dave E., Jr.; Caglayan, Alper K.; Knight, John C.; Lee, Larry D.; Mcallister, David F.; Vouk, Mladen A.; Kelly, John P. J.
1990-01-01
The strategy of using multiple versions of independently developed software as a means to tolerate residual software design faults is suggested by the success of hardware redundancy for tolerating hardware failures. Although, as generally accepted, the independence of hardware failures resulting from physical wearout can lead to substantial increases in reliability for redundant hardware structures, a similar conclusion is not immediate for software. The degree to which design faults are manifested as independent failures determines the effectiveness of redundancy as a method for improving software reliability. Interest in multi-version software centers on whether it provides an adequate measure of increased reliability to warrant its use in critical applications. The effectiveness of multi-version software is studied by comparing estimates of the failure probabilities of these systems with the failure probabilities of single versions. The estimates are obtained under a model of dependent failures and compared with estimates obtained when failures are assumed to be independent. The experimental results are based on twenty versions of an aerospace application developed and certified by sixty programmers from four universities. Descriptions of the application, development and certification processes, and operational evaluation are given together with an analysis of the twenty versions.
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Slaughter, B. C.
1988-01-01
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Main Propulsion System (MPS) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to available data from the Rockwell Downey/NASA JSC FMEA/CIL review. The Orbiter MPS is composed of the Propellant Management Subsystem (PMS) consisting of the liquid oxygen (LO2) and liquid hydrogen (LH2) subsystems and the helium subsystem. The PMS is a system of manifolds, distribution lines, and valves by which the liquid propellants pass from the External Tank to the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME). The helium subsystem consists of a series of helium supply tanks and their associated regulators, control valves, and distribution lines. Volume 1 contains the MPS description, assessment results, ground rules and assumptions, and some of the IOA worksheets.
Reliability and quality assurance on the MOD 2 wind system
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Mason, W. E. B.; Jones, B. G.
1981-01-01
The Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance (R&QA) approach developed for the largest wind turbine generator, the Mod 2, is described. The R&QA approach assures that the machine is not hazardous to the public or to the operating personnel, is operated unattended on a utility grid, demonstrates reliable operation, and helps establish the quality assurance and maintainability requirements for future wind turbine projects. The significant guideline consisted of a failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) during the design phase, hardware inspections during parts fabrication, and three simple documents to control activities during machine construction and operation.
Experience with modified aerospace reliability and quality assurance method for wind turbines
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Klein, W. E.
1982-01-01
The SR&QA approach assures that the machine is not hazardous to the public or operating personnel, can operate unattended on a utility grid, demonstrates reliability operation, and helps establish the quality assurance and maintainability requirements for future wind turbine projects. The approach consisted of modified failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) during the design phase, minimal hardware inspection during parts fabrication, and three simple documents to control activities during machine construction and operation. Five years experience shows that this low cost approach works well enough that it should be considered by others for similar projects.
Safety considerations in the design and operation of large wind turbines
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Reilly, D. H.
1979-01-01
The engineering and safety techniques used to assure the reliable and safe operation of large wind turbine generators utilizing the Mod 2 Wind Turbine System Program as an example is described. The techniques involve a careful definition of the wind turbine's natural and operating environments, use of proven structural design criteria and analysis techniques, an evaluation of potential failure modes and hazards, and use of a fail safe and redundant component engineering philosophy. The role of an effective quality assurance program, tailored to specific hardware criticality, and the checkout and validation program developed to assure system integrity are described.
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Peeples, Steven
2015-01-01
A three degree of freedom (DOF) spherical actuator is proposed that will replace functions requiring three single DOF actuators in robotic manipulators providing space and weight savings while reducing the overall failure rate. Exploration satellites, Space Station payload manipulators, and rovers requiring pan, tilt, and rotate movements need an actuator for each function. Not only does each actuator introduce additional failure modes and require bulky mechanical gimbals, each contains many moving parts, decreasing mean time to failure. A conventional robotic manipulator is shown in figure 1. Spherical motors perform all three actuation functions, i.e., three DOF, with only one moving part. Given a standard three actuator system whose actuators have a given failure rate compared to a spherical motor with an equal failure rate, the three actuator system is three times as likely to fail over the latter. The Jet Propulsion Laboratory reliability studies of NASA robotic spacecraft have shown that mechanical hardware/mechanism failures are more frequent and more likely to significantly affect mission success than are electronic failures. Unfortunately, previously designed spherical motors have been unable to provide the performance needed by space missions. This inadequacy is also why they are unavailable commercially. An improved patentable spherically actuated motor (SAM) is proposed to provide the performance and versatility required by NASA missions.
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Al Hassan, Mohammad; Britton, Paul; Hatfield, Glen Spencer; Novack, Steven D.
2017-01-01
Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) integrated circuits (IC) are one of the key electronic components in today's sophisticated launch and space vehicle complex avionic systems, largely due to their superb reprogrammable and reconfigurable capabilities combined with relatively low non-recurring engineering costs (NRE) and short design cycle. Consequently, FPGAs are prevalent ICs in communication protocols and control signal commands. This paper will identify reliability concerns and high level guidelines to estimate FPGA total failure rates in a launch vehicle application. The paper will discuss hardware, hardware description language, and radiation induced failures. The hardware contribution of the approach accounts for physical failures of the IC. The hardware description language portion will discuss the high level FPGA programming languages and software/code reliability growth. The radiation portion will discuss FPGA susceptibility to space environment radiation.
Framework for a space shuttle main engine health monitoring system
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Hawman, Michael W.; Galinaitis, William S.; Tulpule, Sharayu; Mattedi, Anita K.; Kamenetz, Jeffrey
1990-01-01
A framework developed for a health management system (HMS) which is directed at improving the safety of operation of the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) is summarized. An emphasis was placed on near term technology through requirements to use existing SSME instrumentation and to demonstrate the HMS during SSME ground tests within five years. The HMS framework was developed through an analysis of SSME failure modes, fault detection algorithms, sensor technologies, and hardware architectures. A key feature of the HMS framework design is that a clear path from the ground test system to a flight HMS was maintained. Fault detection techniques based on time series, nonlinear regression, and clustering algorithms were developed and demonstrated on data from SSME ground test failures. The fault detection algorithms exhibited 100 percent detection of faults, had an extremely low false alarm rate, and were robust to sensor loss. These algorithms were incorporated into a hierarchical decision making strategy for overall assessment of SSME health. A preliminary design for a hardware architecture capable of supporting real time operation of the HMS functions was developed. Utilizing modular, commercial off-the-shelf components produced a reliable low cost design with the flexibility to incorporate advances in algorithm and sensor technology as they become available.
Remote maintenance monitoring system
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Simpkins, Lorenz G. (Inventor); Owens, Richard C. (Inventor); Rochette, Donn A. (Inventor)
1992-01-01
A remote maintenance monitoring system retrofits to a given hardware device with a sensor implant which gathers and captures failure data from the hardware device, without interfering with its operation. Failure data is continuously obtained from predetermined critical points within the hardware device, and is analyzed with a diagnostic expert system, which isolates failure origin to a particular component within the hardware device. For example, monitoring of a computer-based device may include monitoring of parity error data therefrom, as well as monitoring power supply fluctuations therein, so that parity error and power supply anomaly data may be used to trace the failure origin to a particular plane or power supply within the computer-based device. A plurality of sensor implants may be rerofit to corresponding plural devices comprising a distributed large-scale system. Transparent interface of the sensors to the devices precludes operative interference with the distributed network. Retrofit capability of the sensors permits monitoring of even older devices having no built-in testing technology. Continuous real time monitoring of a distributed network of such devices, coupled with diagnostic expert system analysis thereof, permits capture and analysis of even intermittent failures, thereby facilitating maintenance of the monitored large-scale system.
Robotic and Human-Tended Collaborative Drilling Automation for Subsurface Exploration
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Glass, Brian; Cannon, Howard; Stoker, Carol; Davis, Kiel
2005-01-01
Future in-situ lunar/martian resource utilization and characterization, as well as the scientific search for life on Mars, will require access to the subsurface and hence drilling. Drilling on Earth is hard - an art form more than an engineering discipline. Human operators listen and feel drill string vibrations coming from kilometers underground. Abundant mass and energy make it possible for terrestrial drilling to employ brute-force approaches to failure recovery and system performance issues. Space drilling will require intelligent and autonomous systems for robotic exploration and to support human exploration. Eventual in-situ resource utilization will require deep drilling with probable human-tended operation of large-bore drills, but initial lunar subsurface exploration and near-term ISRU will be accomplished with lightweight, rover-deployable or standalone drills capable of penetrating a few tens of meters in depth. These lightweight exploration drills have a direct counterpart in terrestrial prospecting and ore-body location, and will be designed to operate either human-tended or automated. NASA and industry now are acquiring experience in developing and building low-mass automated planetary prototype drills to design and build a pre-flight lunar prototype targeted for 2011-12 flight opportunities. A successful system will include development of drilling hardware, and automated control software to operate it safely and effectively. This includes control of the drilling hardware, state estimation of both the hardware and the lithography being drilled and state of the hole, and potentially planning and scheduling software suitable for uncertain situations such as drilling. Given that Humans on the Moon or Mars are unlikely to be able to spend protracted EVA periods at a drill site, both human-tended and robotic access to planetary subsurfaces will require some degree of standalone, autonomous drilling capability. Human-robotic coordination will be important, either between a robotic drill and humans on Earth, or a human-tended drill and its visiting crew. The Mars Analog Rio Tinto Experiment (MARTE) is a current project that studies and simulates the remote science operations between an automated drill in Spain and a distant, distributed human science team. The Drilling Automation for Mars Exploration (DAME) project, by contrast: is developing and testing standalone automation at a lunar/martian impact crater analog site in Arctic Canada. The drill hardware in both projects is a hardened, evolved version of the Advanced Deep Drill (ADD) developed by Honeybee Robotics for the Mars Subsurface Program. The current ADD is capable of 20m, and the DAME project is developing diagnostic and executive software for hands-off surface operations of the evolved version of this drill. The current drill automation architecture being developed by NASA and tested in 2004-06 at analog sites in the Arctic and Spain will add downhole diagnosis of different strata, bit wear detection, and dynamic replanning capabilities when unexpected failures or drilling conditions are discovered in conjunction with simulated mission operations and remote science planning. The most important determinant of future 1unar and martian drilling automation and staffing requirements will be the actual performance of automated prototype drilling hardware systems in field trials in simulated mission operations. It is difficult to accurately predict the level of automation and human interaction that will be needed for a lunar-deployed drill without first having extensive experience with the robotic control of prototype drill systems under realistic analog field conditions. Drill-specific failure modes and software design flaws will become most apparent at this stage. DAME will develop and test drill automation software and hardware under stressful operating conditions during several planned field campaigns. Initial results from summer 2004 tests show seven identifi distinct failure modes of the drill: cuttings-removal issues with low-power drilling into permafrost, and successful steps at executive control and initial automation.
Laser Peening Effects on Friction Stir Welding
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Hatameleh, Omar
2009-01-01
The laser peening process can result in considerable improvement to crack initiation, propagation, and mechanical properties in FSW which equates to longer hardware service life Processed hardware safety is improved by producing higher failure tolerant hardware, and reducing risk. Lowering hardware maintenance cost produces longer hardware service life, and lower hardware down time. Application of this proposed technology will result in substantial benefits and savings throughout the life of the treated components
Protoflight photovoltaic power module system-level tests in the space power facility
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Rivera, Juan C.; Kirch, Luke A.
1989-01-01
Work Package Four, which includes the NASA-Lewis and Rocketdyne, has selected an approach for the Space Station Freedom Photovoltaic (PV) Power Module flight certification that combines system level qualification and acceptance testing in the thermal vacuum environment: The protoflight vehicle approach. This approach maximizes ground test verification to assure system level performance and to minimize risk of on-orbit failures. The preliminary plans for system level thermal vacuum environmental testing of the protoflight PV Power Module in the NASA-Lewis Space Power Facility (SPF), are addressed. Details of the facility modifications to refurbish SPF, after 13 years of downtime, are briefly discussed. The results of an evaluation of the effectiveness of system level environmental testing in screening out incipient part and workmanship defects and unique failure modes are discussed. Preliminary test objectives, test hardware configurations, test support equipment, and operations are presented.
Proximity operations considerations affecting spacecraft design
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Staas, Steven K.
1991-01-01
Proximity operations can be defined as the maneuvering of two or more spacecraft within 1 nautical mile range, with relative velocity less than 10 feet per second. The passive vehicle is nontranslating and should provide for maintenance of the desired approach attitude. It must accommodate the active (translating) vehicle induced structural loads and performance characteristics (mating hardware tolerances), and support sensor compatibility (transponder, visual targets, etc.). The active vehicle must provide adequate sensor systems (relative state information, field-of-view, redundancy), flight control hardware (thruster sizing, minimal cross-coupling, performance margins, redundancy) and software (reconfigurable, attitude/rate modes, translation and rotation fine control authority) characteristic, and adequate non-propulsive consumables such as power. Operational concerns must be considered. These include the following: (1) the desired approach trajectory and relative orientation; (2) the active vehicle thruster plume effects (forces, torques, contamination) on the passive vehicle; and (3) procedures for contingencies such as loss of communications, sensor or propulsion failures, and target vehicle loss of control.
A Two-Wheel Observing Mode for the MAP Spacecraft
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Starin, Scott R.; ODonnell, James R., Jr.
2001-01-01
The Microwave Anisotropy Probe (MAP) is a follow-on to the Differential Microwave Radiometer (DMR) instrument on the Cosmic Background Explorer (COBE). Due to the MAP project's limited mass, power, and budget, a traditional reliability concept including fully redundant components was not feasible. The MAP design employs selective hardware redundancy, along with backup software modes and algorithms, to improve the odds of mission success. This paper describes the effort to develop a backup control mode, known as Observing II, that will allow the MAP science mission to continue in the event of a failure of one of its three reaction wheel assemblies. This backup science mode requires a change from MAP's nominal zero-momentum control system to a momentum-bias system. In this system, existing thruster-based control modes are used to establish a momentum bias about the sun line sufficient to spin the spacecraft up to the desired scan rate. Natural spacecraft dynamics exhibits spin and nutation similar to the nominal MAP science mode with different relative rotation rates, so the two reaction wheels are used to establish and maintain the desired nutation angle from the sun line. Detailed descriptions of the ObservingII control algorithm and simulation results will be presented, along with the operational considerations of performing the rest of MAP's necessary functions with only two wheels.
Advanced Technology Blade testing on the XV-15 Tilt Rotor Research Aircraft
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Wellman, Brent
1992-01-01
The XV-15 Tilt Rotor Research Aircraft has just completed the first series of flight tests with the Advanced Technology Blade (ATB) rotor system. The ATB are designed specifically for flight research and provide the ability to alter blade sweep and tip shape. A number of problems were encountered from first installation through envelope expansion to airplane mode flight that required innovative solutions to establish a suitable flight envelope. Prior to operation, the blade retention hardware had to be requalified to a higher rated centrifugal load, because the blade weight was higher than expected. Early flights in the helicopter mode revealed unacceptably high vibratory control system loads which required a temporary modification of the rotor controls to achieve higher speed flight and conversion to airplane mode. The airspeed in airplane mode was limited, however, because of large static control loads. Furthermore, analyses based on refined ATB blade mass and inertia properties indicated a previously unknown high-speed blade mode instability, also requiring airplane-mode maximum airspeed to be restricted. Most recently, a structural failure of an ATB cuff (root fairing) assembly retention structure required a redesign of the assembly. All problems have been addressed and satisfactory solutions have been found to allow continued productive flight research of the emerging tilt rotor concept.
Hardware test program for evaluation of baseline range/range rate sensor concept
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
1985-01-01
The Hardware Test Program for evaluation of the baseline range/range rate sensor concept was initiated 11 September 1984. This ninth report covers the period 12 May through 11 June 1885. A contract amendment adding a second phase has extended the Hardware Test Program through 10 December 1985. The objective of the added program phase is to establish range and range measurement accuracy and radar signature characteristics for a typical spacecraft target. Phase I of the Hardware Test Program was designed to reduce the risks associated with the Range/Range Rate (R/R) Sensor baseline design approach. These risks are associated with achieving the sensor performance required for the two modes of operation, the Interrupted CW (ICW) mode for initial acquisition and tracking to close-in ranges, and the CW mode, providing coverage during the final docking maneuver. The risks associated with these modes of operation have to do with the realization of adequate sensitivity to operate to their individual maximum ranges.
Reliability Growth in Space Life Support Systems
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Jones, Harry W.
2014-01-01
A hardware system's failure rate often increases over time due to wear and aging, but not always. Some systems instead show reliability growth, a decreasing failure rate with time, due to effective failure analysis and remedial hardware upgrades. Reliability grows when failure causes are removed by improved design. A mathematical reliability growth model allows the reliability growth rate to be computed from the failure data. The space shuttle was extensively maintained, refurbished, and upgraded after each flight and it experienced significant reliability growth during its operational life. In contrast, the International Space Station (ISS) is much more difficult to maintain and upgrade and its failure rate has been constant over time. The ISS Carbon Dioxide Removal Assembly (CDRA) reliability has slightly decreased. Failures on ISS and with the ISS CDRA continue to be a challenge.
Evaluation of methods for determining hardware projected life
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
1971-01-01
An investigation of existing methods of predicting hardware life is summarized by reviewing programs having long life requirements, current research efforts on long life problems, and technical papers reporting work on life predicting techniques. The results indicate that there are no accurate quantitative means to predict hardware life for system level hardware. The effectiveness of test programs and the cause of hardware failures is considered.
Effect of system workload on operating system reliability - A study on IBM 3081
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Iyer, R. K.; Rossetti, D. J.
1985-01-01
This paper presents an analysis of operating system failures on an IBM 3081 running VM/SP. Three broad categories of software failures are found: error handling, program control or logic, and hardware related; it is found that more than 25 percent of software failures occur in the hardware/software interface. Measurements show that results on software reliability cannot be considered representative unless the system workload is taken into account. The overall CPU execution rate, although measured to be close to 100 percent most of the time, is not found to correlate strongly with the occurrence of failures. Possible reasons for the observed workload failure dependency, based on detailed investigations of the failure data, are discussed.
1976-04-15
System, Dual-System, Single-Mode, and Dual-Mode configurations. Tests were conducted to determine the feasibility of incorporating modular hardware on a...and 11-1/2 feet OFF-CENTER with the BAK-12 configured in the Single and Dual Mode to determine the effect of engaging the aircraft arresting-hook...cable OFF-CENTER. 90,000- pound deadload arrestments were conducted ON-CENTER in the Dual Mode to determine system performance with high-energy
Evaluation of control parameters for Spray-In-Air (SIA) aqueous cleaning for shuttle RSRM hardware
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Davis, S. J.; Deweese, C. D.
1995-01-01
HD-2 grease is deliberately applied to Shuttle Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM) D6AC steel hardware parts as a temporary protective coating for storage and shipping. This HD-2 grease is the most common form of surface contamination on RSRM hardware and must be removed prior to subsequent surface treatment. Failure to achieve an acceptable level of cleanliness (HD-2 calcium grease removal) is a common cause of defect incidence. Common failures from ineffective cleaning include poor adhesion of surface coatings, reduced bond performance of structural adhesives, and failure to pass cleanliness inspection standards. The RSRM hardware is currently cleaned and refurbished using methyl chloroform (1,1,1-trichloroethane). This chlorinated solvent is mandated for elimination due to its ozone depleting characteristics. This report describes an experimental study of an aqueous cleaning system (which uses Brulin 815 GD) as a replacement for methyl chloroform. Evaluation of process control parameters for this cleaner are discussed as well as cleaning mechanisms for a spray-in-air process.
DEPEND - A design environment for prediction and evaluation of system dependability
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Goswami, Kumar K.; Iyer, Ravishankar K.
1990-01-01
The development of DEPEND, an integrated simulation environment for the design and dependability analysis of fault-tolerant systems, is described. DEPEND models both hardware and software components at a functional level, and allows automatic failure injection to assess system performance and reliability. It relieves the user of the work needed to inject failures, maintain statistics, and output reports. The automatic failure injection scheme is geared toward evaluating a system under high stress (workload) conditions. The failures that are injected can affect both hardware and software components. To illustrate the capability of the simulator, a distributed system which employs a prediction-based, dynamic load-balancing heuristic is evaluated. Experiments were conducted to determine the impact of failures on system performance and to identify the failures to which the system is especially susceptible.
Design and Integration of an Actuated Nose Strake Control System
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Flick, Bradley C.; Thomson, Michael P.; Regenie, Victoria A.; Wichman, Keith D.; Pahle, Joseph W.; Earls, Michael R.
1996-01-01
Aircraft flight characteristics at high angles of attack can be improved by controlling vortices shed from the nose. These characteristics have been investigated with the integration of the actuated nose strakes for enhanced rolling (ANSER) control system into the NASA F-18 High Alpha Research Vehicle. Several hardware and software systems were developed to enable performance of the research goals. A strake interface box was developed to perform actuator control and failure detection outside the flight control computer. A three-mode ANSER control law was developed and installed in the Research Flight Control System. The thrust-vectoring mode does not command the strakes. The strakes and thrust-vectoring mode uses a combination of thrust vectoring and strakes for lateral- directional control, and strake mode uses strakes only for lateral-directional control. The system was integrated and tested in the Dryden Flight Research Center (DFRC) simulation for testing before installation in the aircraft. Performance of the ANSER system was monitored in real time during the 89-flight ANSER flight test program in the DFRC Mission Control Center. One discrepancy resulted in a set of research data not being obtained. The experiment was otherwise considered a success with the majority of the research objectives being met.
Experiences with Extra-Vehicular Activities in Response to Critical ISS Contingencies
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Van Cise, E. A.; Kelly, B. J.; Radigan, J. P.; Cranmer, C. W.
2016-01-01
The maturation of the International Space Station (ISS) design from the proposed Space Station Freedom to today's current implementation resulted in external hardware redundancy vulnerabilities in the final design. Failure to compensate for or respond to these vulnerabilities could put the ISS in a posture to where it could no longer function as a habitable space station. In the first years of ISS assembly, these responses were to largely be addressed by the continued resupply and Extra-Vehicular Activity (EVA) capabilities of the Space Shuttle. Even prior to the decision to retire the Space Shuttle, it was realized that ISS needed to have its own capability to be able to rapidly repair or replace external hardware without needing to wait for the next cargo resupply mission. As documented in a previous publicatoin5, in 2006 development was started to baseline Extra- Vehicular Activity (EVA, or spacewalk) procedures to replace hardware components whose failure would expose some of the ISS vulnerabilities should a second failure occur. This development work laid the groundwork for the onboard crews and the ground operations and engineering teams to be ready to replace any of this failed hardware. In 2010, this development work was put to the test when one of these pieces of hardware failed. This paper will provide a brief summary of the planning and processes established in the original Contingency EVA development phase. It will then review how those plans and processes were implemented in 2010, highlighting what went well as well as where there were deficiencies between theory and reality. This paper will show that the original approach and analyses, though sound, were not as thorough as they should have been in the realm of planning for next worse failures, for documenting Programmatic approval of key assumptions, and not pursuing sufficient engineering analysis prior to the failure of the hardware. The paper will further highlight the changes made to the Contingency EVA preparation team structure, approach, goals, and the resources allocated to its work after the 2010 events. Finally, the authors will overview the implementation of these updates in addressing failures onboard the ISS in 2012, 2013, and 2014. The successful use of the updated approaches, and the application of the approaches to other spacewalks, will demonstrate the effectiveness of this additional work and make a case for putting significant time and resources into pre-failure planning and analysis for critical hardware items on human-tended spacecraft.
Experiences with Extra-Vehicular Activities in Response to Critical ISS Contingencies
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Van Cise, E. A.; Kelly, B. J.; Radigan, J. P.; Cranmer, C. W.
2016-01-01
The maturation of the International Space Station (ISS) design from the proposed Space Station Freedom to today's current implementation resulted in external hardware redundancy vulnerabilities in the final design. Failure to compensate for or respond to these vulnerabilities could put the ISS in a posture where it could no longer function as a habitable space station. In the first years of ISS assembly, these responses were to largely be addressed by the continued resupply and Extra-Vehicular Activity (EVA) capabilities of the Space Shuttle. Even prior to the decision to retire the Space Shuttle, it was realized that ISS needed to have its own capability to be able to rapidly repair or replace external hardware without needing to wait for the next cargo resupply mission. As documented in a previous publication, in 2006 development was started to baseline Extra-Vehicular Activity (EVA, or spacewalk) procedures to replace hardware components whose failure would expose some of the ISS vulnerabilities should a second failure occur. This development work laid the groundwork for the onboard crews and the ground operations and engineering teams to be ready to replace any of this failed hardware. In 2010, this development work was put to the test when one of these pieces of hardware failed. This paper will provide a brief summary of the planning and processes established in the original Contingency EVA development phase. It will then review how those plans and processes were implemented in 2010, highlighting what went well as well as where there were deficiencies between theory and reality. This paper will show that the original approach and analyses, though sound, were not as thorough as they should have been in the realm of planning for next worse failures, for documenting Programmatic approval of key assumptions, and not pursuing sufficient engineering analysis prior to the failure of the hardware. The paper will further highlight the changes made to the Contingency EVA preparation team structure, approach, goals, and the resources allocated to its work after the 2010 events. Finally, the authors will overview the implementation of these updates in addressing failures onboard the ISS in 2012, 2013, and 2014. The successful use of the updated approaches, and the application of the approaches to other spacewalks, will demonstrate the effectiveness of this additional work and make a case for putting significant time and resources into pre-failure planning and analysis for critical hardware items on human-tended spacecraft.
Developing an Integration Infrastructure for Distributed Engine Control Technologies
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Culley, Dennis; Zinnecker, Alicia; Aretskin-Hariton, Eliot; Kratz, Jonathan
2014-01-01
Turbine engine control technology is poised to make the first revolutionary leap forward since the advent of full authority digital engine control in the mid-1980s. This change aims squarely at overcoming the physical constraints that have historically limited control system hardware on aero-engines to a federated architecture. Distributed control architecture allows complex analog interfaces existing between system elements and the control unit to be replaced by standardized digital interfaces. Embedded processing, enabled by high temperature electronics, provides for digitization of signals at the source and network communications resulting in a modular system at the hardware level. While this scheme simplifies the physical integration of the system, its complexity appears in other ways. In fact, integration now becomes a shared responsibility among suppliers and system integrators. While these are the most obvious changes, there are additional concerns about performance, reliability, and failure modes due to distributed architecture that warrant detailed study. This paper describes the development of a new facility intended to address the many challenges of the underlying technologies of distributed control. The facility is capable of performing both simulation and hardware studies ranging from component to system level complexity. Its modular and hierarchical structure allows the user to focus their interaction on specific areas of interest.
Comparative Modal Analysis of Sieve Hardware Designs
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Thompson, Nathaniel
2012-01-01
The CMTB Thwacker hardware operates as a testbed analogue for the Flight Thwacker and Sieve components of CHIMRA, a device on the Curiosity Rover. The sieve separates particles with a diameter smaller than 150 microns for delivery to onboard science instruments. The sieving behavior of the testbed hardware should be similar to the Flight hardware for the results to be meaningful. The elastodynamic behavior of both sieves was studied analytically using the Rayleigh Ritz method in conjunction with classical plate theory. Finite element models were used to determine the mode shapes of both designs, and comparisons between the natural frequencies and mode shapes were made. The analysis predicts that the performance of the CMTB Thwacker will closely resemble the performance of the Flight Thwacker within the expected steady state operating regime. Excitations of the testbed hardware that will mimic the flight hardware were recommended, as were those that will improve the efficiency of the sieving process.
Integrated Vehicle Ground Vibration Testing in Support of Launch Vehicle Loads and Controls Analysis
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Tuma, Margaret L.; Chenevert, Donald J.
2009-01-01
NASA has conducted dynamic tests on each major launch vehicle during the past 45 years. Each test provided invaluable data to correlate and correct analytical models. GVTs result in hardware changes to Saturn and Space Shuttle, ensuring crew and vehicle safety. Ares I IVGT will provide test data such as natural frequencies, mode shapes, and damping to support successful Ares I flights. Testing will support controls analysis by providing data to reduce model uncertainty. Value of testing proven by past launch vehicle successes and failures. Performing dynamic testing on Ares vehicles will provide confidence that the launch vehicles will be safe and successful in their missions.
A Framework for Creating a Function-based Design Tool for Failure Mode Identification
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Arunajadai, Srikesh G.; Stone, Robert B.; Tumer, Irem Y.; Clancy, Daniel (Technical Monitor)
2002-01-01
Knowledge of potential failure modes during design is critical for prevention of failures. Currently industries use procedures such as Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Fault Tree analysis, or Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality analysis (FMECA), as well as knowledge and experience, to determine potential failure modes. When new products are being developed there is often a lack of sufficient knowledge of potential failure mode and/or a lack of sufficient experience to identify all failure modes. This gives rise to a situation in which engineers are unable to extract maximum benefits from the above procedures. This work describes a function-based failure identification methodology, which would act as a storehouse of information and experience, providing useful information about the potential failure modes for the design under consideration, as well as enhancing the usefulness of procedures like FMEA. As an example, the method is applied to fifteen products and the benefits are illustrated.
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Khan, P.; Epp, L.
2006-01-01
Results of prototype hardware activities related to a 120-W, 32-GHz (Ka-band) solid-state power amplifier (SSPA) architecture study are presented. Spurious mode suppression and the power-handling capability of a prototype 24-way radial combiner and a prototype 2-way septum binary combiner were investigated. Experimental data indicate that a commercial absorptive filter, designed to pass the circular TE01 mode, effectively suppressed the higher-order modes generated by a narrowband, flower-petal-type mode transducer. However, the same filter was not effective in suppressing higher-order modes generated by the broadband Marie mode transducer that is used in the prototype waveguide radial combiner. Should greater filtering be required by a particular SSPA application, a broadband mode filter that can suppress specifically those higher-order modes that are generated by the Marie transducer will need to be developed. A back-to-back configuration of the prototype radial combiner was tested with drive power up to approximately 50 W. No anomalous behavior was observed. Power measurements of the septum combiner indicate that up to 10-W radio frequency (RF) can be dissipated in the integrated resistive element before a permanent performance shift is observed. Thus, a given adder (a single-stage, 2-way combiner) can safely combine two 20-W sources, and the adder will not be damaged in the event of a source failure. This result is used to calculate the maximum source power that can be safely combined as a function of the number of sources combined and the number of source failures allowed in a multi-stage combiner. The analysis shows that SSPA power >140 W can be generated by power combining 16 sources producing 10 W each. In this configuration, up to three sources could fail with the guarantee that the combiner would not be damaged. Finally, a modified prototype septum combiner design was verified. The improved design reduced the assembly time from over 2 hours to about 15 minutes per adder.
Hardware and software reliability estimation using simulations
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Swern, Frederic L.
1994-01-01
The simulation technique is used to explore the validation of both hardware and software. It was concluded that simulation is a viable means for validating both hardware and software and associating a reliability number with each. This is useful in determining the overall probability of system failure of an embedded processor unit, and improving both the code and the hardware where necessary to meet reliability requirements. The methodologies were proved using some simple programs, and simple hardware models.
Catastrophic Fault Recovery with Self-Reconfigurable Chips
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Zheng, Will Hua; Marzwell, Neville I.; Chau, Savio N.
2006-01-01
Mission critical systems typically employ multi-string redundancy to cope with possible hardware failure. Such systems are only as fault tolerant as there are many redundant strings. Once a particular critical component exhausts its redundant spares, the multi-string architecture cannot tolerate any further hardware failure. This paper aims at addressing such catastrophic faults through the use of 'Self-Reconfigurable Chips' as a last resort effort to 'repair' a faulty critical component.
49 CFR 238.105 - Train electronic hardware and software safety.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... and software system safety as part of the pre-revenue service testing of the equipment. (d)(1... safely by initiating a full service brake application in the event of a hardware or software failure that... 49 Transportation 4 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Train electronic hardware and software safety. 238...
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Davis, D. J.; Linse, D. J.; Suikat, R.; Entz, D. P.
1986-01-01
The continued investigation of the design of Ride Quality Augmentation Systems (RQAS) for commuter aircraft is described. The purpose of these RQAS is the reduction of the vertical and lateral acceleration response of the aircraft due to atmospheric turbulence by the application of active control. The current investigations include the refinement of the sample data feedback control laws based on the control-rate-weighting and output-weighting optimal control design techniqes. These control designs were evaluated using aircraft time simulations driven by Dryden spectra turbulence. Fixed gain controllers were tested throughout the aircrft operating envelope. The preliminary design of the hardware modifications necessary to implement and test the RQAS on a commuter aircraft is included. These include a separate surface elevator and the flap modifications to provide both direct lift and roll control. A preliminary failure mode investigation was made for the proposed configuration. The results indicate that vertical acceleration reductions of 45% and lateral reductions of more than 50% are possible. A fixed gain controller appears to be feasible with only minor response degradation.
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Culpepper, William X.; ONeill, Pat; Nicholson, Leonard L.
2000-01-01
An internuclear cascade and evaporation model has been adapted to estimate the LET spectrum generated during testing with 200 MeV protons. The model-generated heavy ion LET spectrum is compared to the heavy ion LET spectrum seen on orbit. This comparison is the basis for predicting single event failure rates from heavy ions using results from a single proton test. Of equal importance, this spectra comparison also establishes an estimate of the risk of encountering a failure mode on orbit that was not detected during proton testing. Verification of the general results of the model is presented based on experiments, individual part test results, and flight data. Acceptance of this model and its estimate of remaining risk opens the hardware verification philosophy to the consideration of radiation testing with high energy protons at the board and box level instead of the more standard method of individual part testing with low energy heavy ions.
Intelligent Design and Intelligent Failure
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Jerman, Gregory
2015-01-01
Good Evening, my name is Greg Jerman and for nearly a quarter century I have been performing failure analysis on NASA's aerospace hardware. During that time I had the distinct privilege of keeping the Space Shuttle flying for two thirds of its history. I have analyzed a wide variety of failed hardware from simple electrical cables to cryogenic fuel tanks to high temperature turbine blades. During this time I have found that for all the time we spend intelligently designing things, we need to be equally intelligent about understanding why things fail. The NASA Flight Director for Apollo 13, Gene Kranz, is best known for the expression "Failure is not an option." However, NASA history is filled with failures both large and small, so it might be more accurate to say failure is inevitable. It is how we react and learn from our failures that makes the difference.
Reliability and Qualification of Hardware to Enhance the Mission Assurance of JPL/NASA Projects
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Ramesham, Rajeshuni
2010-01-01
Packaging Qualification and Verification (PQV) and life testing of advanced electronic packaging, mechanical assemblies (motors/actuators), and interconnect technologies (flip-chip), platinum temperature thermometer attachment processes, and various other types of hardware for Mars Exploration Rover (MER)/Mars Science Laboratory (MSL), and JUNO flight projects was performed to enhance the mission assurance. The qualification of hardware under extreme cold to hot temperatures was performed with reference to various project requirements. The flight like packages, assemblies, test coupons, and subassemblies were selected for the study to survive three times the total number of expected temperature cycles resulting from all environmental and operational exposures occurring over the life of the flight hardware including all relevant manufacturing, ground operations, and mission phases. Qualification/life testing was performed by subjecting flight-like qualification hardware to the environmental temperature extremes and assessing any structural failures, mechanical failures or degradation in electrical performance due to either overstress or thermal cycle fatigue. Experimental flight qualification test results will be described in this presentation.
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Wedeking, Gregory A.; Zierer, Joseph J.; Jackson, John R.
2010-07-01
The University of Texas, Center for Electromechanics (UT-CEM) is making a major upgrade to the robotic tracking system on the Hobby Eberly Telescope (HET) as part of theWide Field Upgrade (WFU). The upgrade focuses on a seven-fold increase in payload and necessitated a complete redesign of all tracker supporting structure and motion control systems, including the tracker bridge, ten drive systems, carriage frames, a hexapod, and many other subsystems. The cost and sensitivity of the scientific payload, coupled with the tracker system mass increase, necessitated major upgrades to personnel and hardware safety systems. To optimize kinematic design of the entire tracker, UT-CEM developed novel uses of constraints and drivers to interface with a commercially available CAD package (SolidWorks). For example, to optimize volume usage and minimize obscuration, the CAD software was exercised to accurately determine tracker/hexapod operational space needed to meet science requirements. To verify hexapod controller models, actuator travel requirements were graphically measured and compared to well defined equations of motion for Stewart platforms. To ensure critical hardware safety during various failure modes, UT-CEM engineers developed Visual Basic drivers to interface with the CAD software and quickly tabulate distance measurements between critical pieces of optical hardware and adjacent components for thousands of possible hexapod configurations. These advances and techniques, applicable to any challenging robotic system design, are documented and describe new ways to use commercially available software tools to more clearly define hardware requirements and help insure safe operation.
Lox/Gox related failures during Space Shuttle Main Engine development
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Cataldo, C. E.
1981-01-01
Specific rocket engine hardware and test facility system failures are described which were caused by high pressure liquid and/or gaseous oxygen reactions. The failures were encountered during the development and testing of the space shuttle main engine. Failure mechanisms are discussed as well as corrective actions taken to prevent or reduce the potential of future failures.
Risk Based Reliability Centered Maintenance of DOD Fire Protection Systems
1999-01-01
2.2.3 Failure Mode and Effect Analysis ( FMEA )............................ 2.2.4 Failure Mode Risk Characterization...Step 2 - System functions and functional failures definition Step 3 - Failure mode and effect analysis ( FMEA ) Step 4 - Failure mode risk...system). The Interface Location column identifies the location where the FMEA of the fire protection system began or stopped. For example, for the fire
Application of Function-Failure Similarity Method to Rotorcraft Component Design
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Roberts, Rory A.; Stone, Robert E.; Tumer, Irem Y.; Clancy, Daniel (Technical Monitor)
2002-01-01
Performance and safety are the top concerns of high-risk aerospace applications at NASA. Eliminating or reducing performance and safety problems can be achieved with a thorough understanding of potential failure modes in the designs that lead to these problems. The majority of techniques use prior knowledge and experience as well as Failure Modes and Effects as methods to determine potential failure modes of aircraft. During the design of aircraft, a general technique is needed to ensure that every potential failure mode is considered, while avoiding spending time on improbable failure modes. In this work, this is accomplished by mapping failure modes to specific components, which are described by their functionality. The failure modes are then linked to the basic functions that are carried within the components of the aircraft. Using this technique, designers can examine the basic functions, and select appropriate analyses to eliminate or design out the potential failure modes. The fundamentals of this method were previously introduced for a simple rotating machine test rig with basic functions that are common to a rotorcraft. In this paper, this technique is applied to the engine and power train of a rotorcraft, using failures and functions obtained from accident reports and engineering drawings.
Failure detection system risk reduction assessment
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Aguilar, Robert B. (Inventor); Huang, Zhaofeng (Inventor)
2012-01-01
A process includes determining a probability of a failure mode of a system being analyzed reaching a failure limit as a function of time to failure limit, determining a probability of a mitigation of the failure mode as a function of a time to failure limit, and quantifying a risk reduction based on the probability of the failure mode reaching the failure limit and the probability of the mitigation.
Deriving Function-failure Similarity Information for Failure-free Rotorcraft Component Design
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Roberts, Rory A.; Stone, Robert B.; Tumer, Irem Y.; Clancy, Daniel (Technical Monitor)
2002-01-01
Performance and safety are the top concerns of high-risk aerospace applications at NASA. Eliminating or reducing performance and safety problems can be achieved with a thorough understanding of potential failure modes in the design that lead to these problems. The majority of techniques use prior knowledge and experience as well as Failure Modes and Effects as methods to determine potential failure modes of aircraft. The aircraft design needs to be passed through a general technique to ensure that every potential failure mode is considered, while avoiding spending time on improbable failure modes. In this work, this is accomplished by mapping failure modes to certain components, which are described by their functionality. In turn, the failure modes are then linked to the basic functions that are carried within the components of the aircraft. Using the technique proposed in this paper, designers can examine the basic functions, and select appropriate analyses to eliminate or design out the potential failure modes. This method was previously applied to a simple rotating machine test rig with basic functions that are common to a rotorcraft. In this paper, this technique is applied to the engine and power train of a rotorcraft, using failures and functions obtained from accident reports and engineering drawings.
Integrated Hardware and Software for No-Loss Computing
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
James, Mark
2007-01-01
When an algorithm is distributed across multiple threads executing on many distinct processors, a loss of one of those threads or processors can potentially result in the total loss of all the incremental results up to that point. When implementation is massively hardware distributed, then the probability of a hardware failure during the course of a long execution is potentially high. Traditionally, this problem has been addressed by establishing checkpoints where the current state of some or part of the execution is saved. Then in the event of a failure, this state information can be used to recompute that point in the execution and resume the computation from that point. A serious problem arises when one distributes a problem across multiple threads and physical processors is that one increases the likelihood of the algorithm failing due to no fault of the scientist but as a result of hardware faults coupled with operating system problems. With good reason, scientists expect their computing tools to serve them and not the other way around. What is novel here is a unique combination of hardware and software that reformulates an application into monolithic structure that can be monitored in real-time and dynamically reconfigured in the event of a failure. This unique reformulation of hardware and software will provide advanced aeronautical technologies to meet the challenges of next-generation systems in aviation, for civilian and scientific purposes, in our atmosphere and in atmospheres of other worlds. In particular, with respect to NASA s manned flight to Mars, this technology addresses the critical requirements for improving safety and increasing reliability of manned spacecraft.
Morpheus 1.5A Lander Failure Investigation Results
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Munday, Steve; Olansen, John
2013-01-01
On August 9th, 2012, the Morpheus 1.5 Vertical Testbed (VTB) crashed during Free Flight 2 (FF2) at KSC SLF, resulting in the loss of 1.5 VTB hardware. JSC/KSC Morpheus team immediately executed the pre-rehearsed Emergency Action Plan to protect personnel and property, so damage was limited to 1.5 VTB hardware. JSC/KSC Morpheus team secured data and mapped & recovered debris. Project had pre-declared loss of VTB to be a test failure, not a mishap.
International Space Station (ISS) Low Pressure Intramodule Quick Disconnect Failures
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Lewis, John F.; Harris, Danny; Link, Dwight; Morrison, Russel
2004-01-01
A failure of an ISS intermodule Quick Disconnect (QD) during protoflight vibration testing of ISS regenerative Environmental Control and Life Support (ECLS) hardware led to the discovery of QD design, manufacturing, and test flaws which can yield the male QD susceptible to failure of the secondary housing seal and inadequate housing assembly locking mechanisms. Discovery of this failure had large implications when considering that currently there are 399 similar units on orbit and approximately 1100 units on the ground integrated into flight hardware. Discovery of the nature of the failure required testing and analysis and implementation of a recovery plan requiring part screening and review of element level and project hazard analysis to determine if secondary seals are required. Implementation also involves coordination with the Nodes and MPLM project offices, Regenerative ECLS Project, ISS Payloads, JAXA, ESA, and ISS Logistics and Maintenance.
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Telesman, J.; Smith, T. M.; Gabb, T. P.; Ring, A. J.
2018-06-01
Cyclic near-threshold fatigue crack growth (FCG) behavior of two disk superalloys was evaluated and was shown to exhibit an unexpected sudden failure mode transition from a mostly transgranular failure mode at higher stress intensity factor ranges to an almost completely intergranular failure mode in the threshold regime. The change in failure modes was associated with a crossover of FCG resistance curves in which the conditions that produced higher FCG rates in the Paris regime resulted in lower FCG rates and increased ΔK th values in the threshold region. High-resolution scanning and transmission electron microscopy were used to carefully characterize the crack tips at these near-threshold conditions. Formation of stable Al-oxide followed by Cr-oxide and Ti-oxides was found to occur at the crack tip prior to formation of unstable oxides. To contrast with the threshold failure mode regime, a quantitative assessment of the role that the intergranular failure mode has on cyclic FCG behavior in the Paris regime was also performed. It was demonstrated that even a very limited intergranular failure content dominates the FCG response under mixed mode failure conditions.
Patel, Teresa; Fisher, Stanley P.
2016-01-01
Objective This study aimed to utilize failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) to transform clinical insights into a risk mitigation plan for intrathecal (IT) drug delivery in pain management. Methods The FMEA methodology, which has been used for quality improvement, was adapted to assess risks (i.e., failure modes) associated with IT therapy. Ten experienced pain physicians scored 37 failure modes in the following categories: patient selection for therapy initiation (efficacy and safety concerns), patient safety during IT therapy, and product selection for IT therapy. Participants assigned severity, probability, and detection scores for each failure mode, from which a risk priority number (RPN) was calculated. Failure modes with the highest RPNs (i.e., most problematic) were discussed, and strategies were proposed to mitigate risks. Results Strategic discussions focused on 17 failure modes with the most severe outcomes, the highest probabilities of occurrence, and the most challenging detection. The topic of the highest‐ranked failure mode (RPN = 144) was manufactured monotherapy versus compounded combination products. Addressing failure modes associated with appropriate patient and product selection was predicted to be clinically important for the success of IT therapy. Conclusions The methodology of FMEA offers a systematic approach to prioritizing risks in a complex environment such as IT therapy. Unmet needs and information gaps are highlighted through the process. Risk mitigation and strategic planning to prevent and manage critical failure modes can contribute to therapeutic success. PMID:27477689
Failure mode and effects analysis: an empirical comparison of failure mode scoring procedures.
Ashley, Laura; Armitage, Gerry
2010-12-01
To empirically compare 2 different commonly used failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) scoring procedures with respect to their resultant failure mode scores and prioritization: a mathematical procedure, where scores are assigned independently by FMEA team members and averaged, and a consensus procedure, where scores are agreed on by the FMEA team via discussion. A multidisciplinary team undertook a Healthcare FMEA of chemotherapy administration. This included mapping the chemotherapy process, identifying and scoring failure modes (potential errors) for each process step, and generating remedial strategies to counteract them. Failure modes were scored using both an independent mathematical procedure and a team consensus procedure. Almost three-fifths of the 30 failure modes generated were scored differently by the 2 procedures, and for just more than one-third of cases, the score discrepancy was substantial. Using the Healthcare FMEA prioritization cutoff score, almost twice as many failure modes were prioritized by the consensus procedure than by the mathematical procedure. This is the first study to empirically demonstrate that different FMEA scoring procedures can score and prioritize failure modes differently. It found considerable variability in individual team members' opinions on scores, which highlights the subjective and qualitative nature of failure mode scoring. A consensus scoring procedure may be most appropriate for FMEA as it allows variability in individuals' scores and rationales to become apparent and to be discussed and resolved by the team. It may also yield team learning and communication benefits unlikely to result from a mathematical procedure.
Commercial Aircraft Maintenance Experience Relating to Engine External Hardware
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Soditus, Sharon M.
2006-01-01
Airlines are extremely sensitive to the amount of dollars spent on maintaining the external engine hardware in the field. Analysis reveals that many problems revolve around a central issue, reliability. Fuel and oil leakage due to seal failure and electrical fault messages due to wire harness failures play a major role in aircraft delays and cancellations (D&C's) and scheduled maintenance. Correcting these items on the line requires a large investment of engineering resources and manpower after the fact. The smartest and most cost effective philosophy is to build the best hardware the first time. The only way to do that is to completely understand and model the operating environment, study the field experience of similar designs and to perform extensive testing.
Analytical Method to Evaluate Failure Potential During High-Risk Component Development
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Tumer, Irem Y.; Stone, Robert B.; Clancy, Daniel (Technical Monitor)
2001-01-01
Communicating failure mode information during design and manufacturing is a crucial task for failure prevention. Most processes use Failure Modes and Effects types of analyses, as well as prior knowledge and experience, to determine the potential modes of failures a product might encounter during its lifetime. When new products are being considered and designed, this knowledge and information is expanded upon to help designers extrapolate based on their similarity with existing products and the potential design tradeoffs. This paper makes use of similarities and tradeoffs that exist between different failure modes based on the functionality of each component/product. In this light, a function-failure method is developed to help the design of new products with solutions for functions that eliminate or reduce the potential of a failure mode. The method is applied to a simplified rotating machinery example in this paper, and is proposed as a means to account for helicopter failure modes during design and production, addressing stringent safety and performance requirements for NASA applications.
Failure Mode Identification Through Clustering Analysis
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Arunajadai, Srikesh G.; Stone, Robert B.; Tumer, Irem Y.; Clancy, Daniel (Technical Monitor)
2002-01-01
Research has shown that nearly 80% of the costs and problems are created in product development and that cost and quality are essentially designed into products in the conceptual stage. Currently, failure identification procedures (such as FMEA (Failure Modes and Effects Analysis), FMECA (Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis) and FTA (Fault Tree Analysis)) and design of experiments are being used for quality control and for the detection of potential failure modes during the detail design stage or post-product launch. Though all of these methods have their own advantages, they do not give information as to what are the predominant failures that a designer should focus on while designing a product. This work uses a functional approach to identify failure modes, which hypothesizes that similarities exist between different failure modes based on the functionality of the product/component. In this paper, a statistical clustering procedure is proposed to retrieve information on the set of predominant failures that a function experiences. The various stages of the methodology are illustrated using a hypothetical design example.
System for detecting operating errors in a variable valve timing engine using pressure sensors
Wiles, Matthew A.; Marriot, Craig D
2013-07-02
A method and control module includes a pressure sensor data comparison module that compares measured pressure volume signal segments to ideal pressure volume segments. A valve actuation hardware remedy module performs a hardware remedy in response to comparing the measured pressure volume signal segments to the ideal pressure volume segments when a valve actuation hardware failure is detected.
On a common critical state in localized and diffuse failure modes
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Zhu, Huaxiang; Nguyen, Hien N. G.; Nicot, François; Darve, Félix
2016-10-01
Accurately modeling the critical state mechanical behavior of granular material largely relies on a better understanding and characterizing the critical state fabric in different failure modes, i.e. localized and diffuse failure modes. In this paper, a mesoscopic scale is introduced, in which the organization of force-transmission paths (force-chains) and cells encompassed by contacts (meso-loops) can be taken into account. Numerical drained biaxial tests using a discrete element method are performed with different initial void ratios, in order to investigate the critical state fabric on the meso-scale in both localized and diffuse failure modes. According to the displacement and strain fields extracted from tests, the failure mode and failure area of each specimen are determined. Then convergent critical state void ratios are observed in failure area of specimens. Different mechanical features of two kinds of meso-structures (force-chains and meso-loops) are investigated, to clarify whether there exists a convergent meso-structure inside the failure area of granular material, as the signature of critical state. Numerical results support a positive answer. Failure area of both localized and diffuse failure modes therefore exhibits the same fabric in critical state. Hence, these two failure modes prove to be homological with respect to the concept of the critical state.
High-Power Microwave Transmission and Mode Conversion Program
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Vernon, Ronald J.
2015-08-14
This is a final technical report for a long term project to develop improved designs and design tools for the microwave hardware and components associated with the DOE Plasma Fusion Program. We have developed basic theory, software, fabrication techniques, and low-power measurement techniques for the design of microwave hardware associated gyrotrons, microwave mode converters and high-power microwave transmission lines. Specifically, in this report we discuss our work on designing quasi-optical mode converters for single and multiple frequencies, a new method for the analysis of perturbed-wall waveguide mode converters, perturbed-wall launcher design for TE0n mode gyrotrons, quasi-optical traveling-wave resonator design formore » high-power testing of microwave components, and possible improvements to the HSX microwave transmission line.« less
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Schubert, L; Westerly, D; Vinogradskiy, Y
Purpose: Collisions between treatment equipment and patients are potentially catastrophic. Modern technology now commonly involves automated remote motion during imaging and treatment, yet a systematic assessment to identify and mitigate collision risks has yet to be performed. Failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) is a method of risk assessment that has been increasingly used in healthcare, yet can be resource intensive. This work presents an efficient approach to FMEA to identify collision risks and implement practical interventions within a modern radiation therapy department. Methods: Potential collisions (e.g. failure modes) were assessed for all treatment and simulation rooms by teams consistingmore » of physicists, therapists, and radiation oncologists. Failure modes were grouped into classes according to similar characteristics. A single group meeting was held to identify implementable interventions for the highest priority classes of failure modes. Results: A total of 60 unique failure modes were identified by 6 different teams of physicists, therapists, and radiation oncologists. Failure modes were grouped into four main classes: specific patient setups, automated equipment motion, manual equipment motion, and actions in QA or service mode. Two of these classes, unusual patient setups and automated machine motion, were identified as being high priority in terms severity of consequence and addressability by interventions. The two highest risk classes consisted of 33 failure modes (55% of the total). In a single one hour group meeting, 6 interventions were identified. Those interventions addressed 100% of the high risk classes of failure modes (55% of all failure modes identified). Conclusion: A class-based approach to FMEA was developed to efficiently identify collision risks and implement interventions in a modern radiation oncology department. Failure modes and interventions will be listed, and a comparison of this approach against traditional FMEA methods will be presented.« less
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Allgood, G.O.; Dress, W.B.; Kercel, S.W.
1999-06-01
The objective of this research, and subsequent testing, was to identify specific features of cavitation that could be used as a model-based descriptor in a context-dependent condition-based maintenance (CD-CBM) anticipatory prognostic and health assessment model. This descriptor is based on the physics of the phenomena, capturing the salient features of the process dynamics. The test methodology and approach were developed to make the cavitation features the dominant effect in the process and collected signatures. This would allow the accurate characterization of the salient cavitation features at different operational states. By developing such an abstraction, these attributes can be used asmore » a general diagnostic for a system or any of its components. In this study, the particular focus will be pumps. As many as 90% of pump failures are catastrophic. They seem to be operating normally and fail abruptly without warning. This is true whether the failure is sudden hardware damage requiring repair, such as a gasket failure, or a transition into an undesired operating mode, such as cavitation. This means that conventional diagnostic methods fail to predict 90% of incipient failures and that in addressing this problem, model-based methods can add value where it is actually needed.« less
Decomposition-Based Failure Mode Identification Method for Risk-Free Design of Large Systems
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Tumer, Irem Y.; Stone, Robert B.; Roberts, Rory A.; Clancy, Daniel (Technical Monitor)
2002-01-01
When designing products, it is crucial to assure failure and risk-free operation in the intended operating environment. Failures are typically studied and eliminated as much as possible during the early stages of design. The few failures that go undetected result in unacceptable damage and losses in high-risk applications where public safety is of concern. Published NASA and NTSB accident reports point to a variety of components identified as sources of failures in the reported cases. In previous work, data from these reports were processed and placed in matrix form for all the system components and failure modes encountered, and then manipulated using matrix methods to determine similarities between the different components and failure modes. In this paper, these matrices are represented in the form of a linear combination of failures modes, mathematically formed using Principal Components Analysis (PCA) decomposition. The PCA decomposition results in a low-dimensionality representation of all failure modes and components of interest, represented in a transformed coordinate system. Such a representation opens the way for efficient pattern analysis and prediction of failure modes with highest potential risks on the final product, rather than making decisions based on the large space of component and failure mode data. The mathematics of the proposed method are explained first using a simple example problem. The method is then applied to component failure data gathered from helicopter, accident reports to demonstrate its potential.
Risk analysis of analytical validations by probabilistic modification of FMEA.
Barends, D M; Oldenhof, M T; Vredenbregt, M J; Nauta, M J
2012-05-01
Risk analysis is a valuable addition to validation of an analytical chemistry process, enabling not only detecting technical risks, but also risks related to human failures. Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) can be applied, using a categorical risk scoring of the occurrence, detection and severity of failure modes, and calculating the Risk Priority Number (RPN) to select failure modes for correction. We propose a probabilistic modification of FMEA, replacing the categorical scoring of occurrence and detection by their estimated relative frequency and maintaining the categorical scoring of severity. In an example, the results of traditional FMEA of a Near Infrared (NIR) analytical procedure used for the screening of suspected counterfeited tablets are re-interpretated by this probabilistic modification of FMEA. Using this probabilistic modification of FMEA, the frequency of occurrence of undetected failure mode(s) can be estimated quantitatively, for each individual failure mode, for a set of failure modes, and the full analytical procedure. Copyright © 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Berruyer, M; Atkinson, S; Lebel, D; Bussières, J-F
2016-01-01
Insulin is a high-alert drug. The main objective of this descriptive cross-sectional study was to evaluate the risks associated with insulin use in healthcare centers. The secondary objective was to propose corrective measures to reduce the main risks associated with the most critical failure modes in the analysis. We conducted a failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) in obstetrics-gynecology, neonatology and pediatrics. Five multidisciplinary meetings occurred in August 2013. A total of 44 out of 49 failure modes were analyzed. Nine out of 44 (20%) failure modes were deemed critical, with a criticality score ranging from 540 to 720. Following the multidisciplinary meetings, everybody agreed that an FMEA was a useful tool to identify failure modes and their relative importance. This approach identified many corrective measures. This shared experience increased awareness of safety issues with insulin in our mother-child center. This study identified the main failure modes and associated corrective measures. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Masson SAS. All rights reserved.
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Al Hassan, Mohammad; Novack, Steven D.; Hatfield, Glen S.; Britton, Paul
2017-01-01
Today's launch vehicles complex electronic and avionic systems heavily utilize the Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) integrated circuit (IC). FPGAs are prevalent ICs in communication protocols such as MIL-STD-1553B, and in control signal commands such as in solenoid/servo valves actuations. This paper will demonstrate guidelines to estimate FPGA failure rates for a launch vehicle, the guidelines will account for hardware, firmware, and radiation induced failures. The hardware contribution of the approach accounts for physical failures of the IC, FPGA memory and clock. The firmware portion will provide guidelines on the high level FPGA programming language and ways to account for software/code reliability growth. The radiation portion will provide guidelines on environment susceptibility as well as guidelines on tailoring other launch vehicle programs historical data to a specific launch vehicle.
Mechanical Failure Mode of Metal Nanowires: Global Deformation versus Local Deformation
Ho, Duc Tam; Im, Youngtae; Kwon, Soon-Yong; Earmme, Youn Young; Kim, Sung Youb
2015-01-01
It is believed that the failure mode of metal nanowires under tensile loading is the result of the nucleation and propagation of dislocations. Such failure modes can be slip, partial slip or twinning and therefore they are regarded as local deformation. Here we provide numerical and theoretical evidences to show that global deformation is another predominant failure mode of nanowires under tensile loading. At the global deformation mode, nanowires fail with a large contraction along a lateral direction and a large expansion along the other lateral direction. In addition, there is a competition between global and local deformations. Nanowires loaded at low temperature exhibit global failure mode first and then local deformation follows later. We show that the global deformation originates from the intrinsic instability of the nanowires and that temperature is a main parameter that decides the global or local deformation as the failure mode of nanowires. PMID:26087445
Non-linear shipboard shock analysis of the Tomahawk missile shock isolation system
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Leifer, Joel; Gross, Michael
1987-01-01
The identification, quantification, computer modeling and verification of the Tomahawk nonlinear liquid spring shock isolation system in a surface ship Vertical Launch System (VLS) are discussed. The isolation system hardware and mode of operation is detailed in an effort to understand the nonlinearities. These nonlinearities are then quantified and modeled using the MSC/NASTRAN finite element code. The model was verified using experimental data from the Navel Ordnance Systems Center MIL-S-901 medium weight shock tests of August 1986. The model was then used to predict the Tomahawk response to the CG-53 USS Mobile Bay shock trials of May-June 1987. Results indicate that the model is an accurate mathematical representation of the physical system either functioning as designed or in an impaired condition due to spring failure.
Addressing failures in exascale computing
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Snir, Marc; Wisniewski, Robert W.; Abraham, Jacob A.
2014-05-01
We present here a report produced by a workshop on “Addressing Failures in Exascale Computing” held in Park City, Utah, August 4–11, 2012. The charter of this workshop was to establish a common taxonomy about resilience across all the levels in a computing system; discuss existing knowledge on resilience across the various hardware and software layers of an exascale system; and build on those results, examining potential solutions from both a hardware and software perspective and focusing on a combined approach. The workshop brought together participants with expertise in applications, system software, and hardware; they came from industry, government, andmore » academia; and their interests ranged from theory to implementation. The combination allowed broad and comprehensive discussions and led to this document, which summarizes and builds on those discussions.« less
Addressing Failures in Exascale Computing
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Snir, Marc; Wisniewski, Robert; Abraham, Jacob
2014-01-01
We present here a report produced by a workshop on Addressing failures in exascale computing' held in Park City, Utah, 4-11 August 2012. The charter of this workshop was to establish a common taxonomy about resilience across all the levels in a computing system, discuss existing knowledge on resilience across the various hardware and software layers of an exascale system, and build on those results, examining potential solutions from both a hardware and software perspective and focusing on a combined approach. The workshop brought together participants with expertise in applications, system software, and hardware; they came from industry, government, andmore » academia, and their interests ranged from theory to implementation. The combination allowed broad and comprehensive discussions and led to this document, which summarizes and builds on those discussions.« less
Fifty Years of Observing Hardware and Human Behavior
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
McMann, Joe
2011-01-01
During this half-day workshop, Joe McMann presented the lessons learned during his 50 years of experience in both industry and government, which included all U.S. manned space programs, from Mercury to the ISS. He shared his thoughts about hardware and people and what he has learned from first-hand experience. Included were such topics as design, testing, design changes, development, failures, crew expectations, hardware, requirements, and meetings.
Failure Mode, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA)
1993-04-01
Preliminary Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) of the Brayton Isotope Power System Ground Demonstration System, Report No. TID 27301...No. TID/SNA - 3015, Aeroject Nuclear Systems Co., Sacramento, California: 1970. 95. Taylor , J.R. A Formalization of Failure Mode Analysis of Control...Roskilde, Denmark: 1973. 96. Taylor , J.R. A Semi-Automatic Method for Oualitative Failure Mode Analysis. Report No. RISO-M-1707. Available from a
Data Applicability of Heritage and New Hardware for Launch Vehicle System Reliability Models
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Al Hassan Mohammad; Novack, Steven
2015-01-01
Many launch vehicle systems are designed and developed using heritage and new hardware. In most cases, the heritage hardware undergoes modifications to fit new functional system requirements, impacting the failure rates and, ultimately, the reliability data. New hardware, which lacks historical data, is often compared to like systems when estimating failure rates. Some qualification of applicability for the data source to the current system should be made. Accurately characterizing the reliability data applicability and quality under these circumstances is crucial to developing model estimations that support confident decisions on design changes and trade studies. This presentation will demonstrate a data-source classification method that ranks reliability data according to applicability and quality criteria to a new launch vehicle. This method accounts for similarities/dissimilarities in source and applicability, as well as operating environments like vibrations, acoustic regime, and shock. This classification approach will be followed by uncertainty-importance routines to assess the need for additional data to reduce uncertainty.
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Sin, Yongkun; Ayvazian, Talin; Brodie, Miles; Lingley, Zachary
2018-03-01
High-power single-mode (SM) and multi-mode (MM) InGaAs-AlGaAs strained quantum well (QW) lasers are critical components for both terrestrial and space satellite communications systems. Since these lasers predominantly fail by catastrophic and sudden degradation due to catastrophic optical damage (COD), it is especially crucial for space satellite applications to investigate reliability, failure modes, precursor signatures of failure, and degradation mechanisms of these lasers. Our group reported a new failure mode in MM and SM InGaAs-AlGaAs strained QW lasers in 2009 and 2016, respectively. Our group also reported in 2017 that bulk failure due to catastrophic optical bulk damage (COBD) is the dominant failure mode of both SM and MM lasers that were subject to long-term life-tests. For the present study, we continued our physics of failure investigation by performing long-term life-tests followed by failure mode analysis (FMA) using nondestructive and destructive micro-analytical techniques. We performed long-term accelerated life-tests on state-of-the-art SM and MM InGaAs- AlGaAs strained QW lasers under ACC mode. Our life-tests have accumulated over 25,000 test hours for SM lasers and over 35,000 test hours for MM lasers. We first employed electron beam induced current (EBIC) technique to identify failure modes of degraded SM lasers by observing dark line defects. All the SM failures that we studied showed catastrophic and sudden degradation and all of these failures were bulk failures. Since degradation mechanisms responsible for COBD are still not well understood, we also employed other techniques including focused ion beam (FIB) and high-resolution TEM to further study dark line defects and dislocations in post-aged lasers. Keywor
[Failure mode effect analysis applied to preparation of intravenous cytostatics].
Santos-Rubio, M D; Marín-Gil, R; Muñoz-de la Corte, R; Velázquez-López, M D; Gil-Navarro, M V; Bautista-Paloma, F J
2016-01-01
To proactively identify risks in the preparation of intravenous cytostatic drugs, and to prioritise and establish measures to improve safety procedures. Failure Mode Effect Analysis methodology was used. A multidisciplinary team identified potential failure modes of the procedure through a brainstorming session. The impact associated with each failure mode was assessed with the Risk Priority Number (RPN), which involves three variables: occurrence, severity, and detectability. Improvement measures were established for all identified failure modes, with those with RPN>100 considered critical. The final RPN (theoretical) that would result from the proposed measures was also calculated and the process was redesigned. A total of 34 failure modes were identified. The initial accumulated RPN was 3022 (range: 3-252), and after recommended actions the final RPN was 1292 (range: 3-189). RPN scores >100 were obtained in 13 failure modes; only the dispensing sub-process was free of critical points (RPN>100). A final reduction of RPN>50% was achieved in 9 failure modes. This prospective risk analysis methodology allows the weaknesses of the procedure to be prioritised, optimize use of resources, and a substantial improvement in the safety of the preparation of cytostatic drugs through the introduction of double checking and intermediate product labelling. Copyright © 2015 SECA. Published by Elsevier Espana. All rights reserved.
Attitude control system of the Delfi-n3Xt satellite
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Reijneveld, J.; Choukroun, D.
2013-12-01
This work is concerned with the development of the attitude control algorithms that will be implemented on board of the Delfi-n3xt nanosatellite, which is to be launched in 2013. One of the mission objectives is to demonstrate Sun pointing and three axis stabilization. The attitude control modes and the associated algorithms are described. The control authority is shared between three body-mounted magnetorquers (MTQ) and three orthogonal reaction wheels. The attitude information is retrieved from Sun vector measurements, Earth magnetic field measurements, and gyro measurements. The design of the control is achieved as a trade between simplicity and performance. Stabilization and Sun pointing are achieved via the successive application of the classical Bdot control law and a quaternion feedback control. For the purpose of Sun pointing, a simple quaternion estimation scheme is implemented based on geometric arguments, where the need for a costly optimal filtering algorithm is alleviated, and a single line of sight (LoS) measurement is required - here the Sun vector. Beyond the three-axis Sun pointing mode, spinning Sun pointing modes are also described and used as demonstration modes. The three-axis Sun pointing mode requires reaction wheels and magnetic control while the spinning control modes are implemented with magnetic control only. In addition, a simple scheme for angular rates estimation using Sun vector and Earth magnetic measurements is tested in the case of gyro failures. The various control modes performances are illustrated via extensive simulations over several orbits time spans. The simulated models of the dynamical space environment, of the attitude hardware, and the onboard controller logic are using realistic assumptions. All control modes satisfy the minimal Sun pointing requirements allowed for power generation.
Why Do Medial Unicompartmental Knee Arthroplasties Fail Today?
van der List, Jelle P; Zuiderbaan, Hendrik A; Pearle, Andrew D
2016-05-01
Failure rates are higher in medial unicompartmental knee arthroplasty (UKA) than total knee arthroplasty. To improve these failure rates, it is important to understand why medial UKA fail. Because individual studies lack power to show failure modes, a systematic review was performed to assess medial UKA failure modes. Furthermore, we compared cohort studies with registry-based studies, early with midterm and late failures and fixed-bearing with mobile-bearing implants. Databases of PubMed, EMBASE, and Cochrane and annual registries were searched for medial UKA failures. Studies were included when they reported >25 failures or when they reported early (<5 years), midterm (5-10 years), or late failures (>10 years). Thirty-seven cohort studies (4 level II studies and 33 level III studies) and 2 registry-based studies were included. A total of 3967 overall failures, 388 time-dependent failures, and 1305 implant design failures were identified. Aseptic loosening (36%) and osteoarthritis (OA) progression (20%) were the most common failure modes. Aseptic loosening (26%) was most common early failure mode, whereas OA progression was more commonly seen in midterm and late failures (38% and 40%, respectively). Polyethylene wear (12%) and instability (12%) were more common in fixed-bearing implants, whereas pain (14%) and bearing dislocation (11%) were more common in mobile-bearing implants. This level III systematic review identified aseptic loosening and OA progression as the major failure modes. Aseptic loosening was the main failure mode in early years and mobile-bearing implants, whereas OA progression caused most failures in late years and fixed-bearing implants. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Mechanics of dual-mode dilative failure in subaqueous sediment deposits
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
You, Yao; Flemings, Peter; Mohrig, David
2014-07-01
We introduce dual-mode dilative failure with flume experiments. Dual-mode dilative failure combines slow and steady release of sediments by breaching with periodic sliding, which rapidly releases an internally coherent wedge of sediments. It occurs in dilative sandy deposits. This periodic slope failure results from cyclic evolution of the excess pore pressure in the deposit. Sliding generates large, transient, negative excess pore pressure that strengthens the deposit and allows breaching to occur. During breaching, negative excess pore pressure dissipates, the deposit weakens, and ultimately sliding occurs once again. We show that the sliding frequency is proportional to the coefficient of consolidation. We find that thicker deposits are more susceptible to dual-mode dilative failure. Discovery of dual-mode dilative failure provides a new mechanism to consider when interpreting the sedimentary deposits linked to submarine slope failures.
Common Cause Failures and Ultra Reliability
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Jones, Harry W.
2012-01-01
A common cause failure occurs when several failures have the same origin. Common cause failures are either common event failures, where the cause is a single external event, or common mode failures, where two systems fail in the same way for the same reason. Common mode failures can occur at different times because of a design defect or a repeated external event. Common event failures reduce the reliability of on-line redundant systems but not of systems using off-line spare parts. Common mode failures reduce the dependability of systems using off-line spare parts and on-line redundancy.
Relating design and environmental variables to reliability
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Kolarik, William J.; Landers, Thomas L.
The combination of space application and nuclear power source demands high reliability hardware. The possibilities of failure, either an inability to provide power or a catastrophic accident, must be minimized. Nuclear power experiences on the ground have led to highly sophisticated probabilistic risk assessment procedures, most of which require quantitative information to adequately assess such risks. In the area of hardware risk analysis, reliability information plays a key role. One of the lessons learned from the Three Mile Island experience is that thorough analyses of critical components are essential. Nuclear grade equipment shows some reliability advantages over commercial. However, no statistically significant difference has been found. A recent study pertaining to spacecraft electronics reliability, examined some 2500 malfunctions on more than 300 aircraft. The study classified the equipment failures into seven general categories. Design deficiencies and lack of environmental protection accounted for about half of all failures. Within each class, limited reliability modeling was performed using a Weibull failure model.
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Saulsberry, Regor; Nichols, Charles; Waller, Jess
2012-01-01
Currently there are no integrated NDE methods for baselining and monitoring defect levels in fleet for Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels (COPVs) or related fracture critical composites, or for performing life-cycle maintenance inspections either in a traditional remove-and-inspect mode or in a more modern in situ inspection structural health monitoring (SHM) mode. Implicit in SHM and autonomous inspection is the existence of quantitative accept-reject criteria. To be effective, these criteria must correlate with levels of damage known to cause composite failure. Furthermore, implicit in SHM is the existence of effective remote sensing hardware and automated techniques and algorithms for interpretation of SHM data. SHM of facture critical composite structures, especially high pressure COPVs, is critical to the success of nearly every future NASA space exploration program as well as life extension of the International Space Station. It has been clearly stated that future NASA missions may not be successful without SHM [1]. Otherwise, crews will be busy addressing subsystem health issues and not focusing on the real NASA mission
Failure-Modes-And-Effects Analysis Of Software Logic
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Garcia, Danny; Hartline, Thomas; Minor, Terry; Statum, David; Vice, David
1996-01-01
Rigorous analysis applied early in design effort. Method of identifying potential inadequacies and modes and effects of failures caused by inadequacies (failure-modes-and-effects analysis or "FMEA" for short) devised for application to software logic.
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) Introductory Overview
2012-06-14
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis ( FMEA ) Introductory Overview TARDEC Systems Engineering Risk Management Team POC: Kadry Rizk or Gregor Ratajczak...2. REPORT TYPE Briefing Charts 3. DATES COVERED 01-05-2012 to 23-05-2012 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Failure Mode and Effects Analysis ( FMEA ) 5a...18 WELCOME Welcome to “An introductory overview of Failure Mode and Effects Analysis ( FMEA )”, A brief concerning the use and benefits of FMEA
Hardware enabled performance counters with support for operating system context switching
Salapura, Valentina; Wisniewski, Robert W.
2015-06-30
A device for supporting hardware enabled performance counters with support for context switching include a plurality of performance counters operable to collect information associated with one or more computer system related activities, a first register operable to store a memory address, a second register operable to store a mode indication, and a state machine operable to read the second register and cause the plurality of performance counters to copy the information to memory area indicated by the memory address based on the mode indication.
Analysis of particulates on tape lift samples
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Moision, Robert M.; Chaney, John A.; Panetta, Chris J.; Liu, De-Ling
2014-09-01
Particle counts on tape lift samples taken from a hardware surface exceeded threshold requirements in six successive tests despite repeated cleaning of the surface. Subsequent analysis of the particle size distributions of the failed tests revealed that the handling and processing of the tape lift samples may have played a role in the test failures. In order to explore plausible causes for the observed size distribution anomalies, scanning electron microscopy (SEM), energy dispersive X-ray spectroscopy (EDX), and time-of-flight secondary ion mass spectrometry (ToF-SIMS) were employed to perform chemical analysis on collected particulates. SEM/EDX identified Na and S containing particles on the hardware samples in a size range identified as being responsible for the test failures. ToF-SIMS was employed to further examine the Na and S containing particulates and identified the molecular signature of sodium alkylbenzene sulfonates, a common surfactant used in industrial detergent. The root cause investigation suggests that the tape lift test failures originated from detergent residue left behind on the glass slides used to mount and transport the tape following sampling and not from the hardware surface.
Top-down and bottom-up definitions of human failure events in human reliability analysis
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Boring, Ronald Laurids
2014-10-01
In the probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) used in the nuclear industry, human failure events (HFEs) are determined as a subset of hardware failures, namely those hardware failures that could be triggered by human action or inaction. This approach is top-down, starting with hardware faults and deducing human contributions to those faults. Elsewhere, more traditionally human factors driven approaches would tend to look at opportunities for human errors first in a task analysis and then identify which of those errors is risk significant. The intersection of top-down and bottom-up approaches to defining HFEs has not been carefully studied. Ideally, both approachesmore » should arrive at the same set of HFEs. This question is crucial, however, as human reliability analysis (HRA) methods are generalized to new domains like oil and gas. The HFEs used in nuclear PRAs tend to be top-down—defined as a subset of the PRA—whereas the HFEs used in petroleum quantitative risk assessments (QRAs) often tend to be bottom-up—derived from a task analysis conducted by human factors experts. The marriage of these approaches is necessary in order to ensure that HRA methods developed for top-down HFEs are also sufficient for bottom-up applications.« less
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Vile, D; Zhang, L; Cuttino, L
2016-06-15
Purpose: To create a quality assurance program based upon a risk-based assessment of a newly implemented SirSpheres Y-90 procedure. Methods: A process map was created for a newly implemented SirSpheres procedure at a community hospital. The process map documented each step of this collaborative procedure, as well as the roles and responsibilities of each member. From the process map, different potential failure modes were determined as well as any current controls in place. From this list, a full failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) was performed by grading each failure mode’s likelihood of occurrence, likelihood of detection, and potential severity.more » These numbers were then multiplied to compute the risk priority number (RPN) for each potential failure mode. Failure modes were then ranked based on their RPN. Additional controls were then added, with failure modes corresponding to the highest RPNs taking priority. Results: A process map was created that succinctly outlined each step in the SirSpheres procedure in its current implementation. From this, 72 potential failure modes were identified and ranked according to their associated RPN. Quality assurance controls and safety barriers were then added for failure modes associated with the highest risk being addressed first. Conclusion: A quality assurance program was created from a risk-based assessment of the SirSpheres process. Process mapping and FMEA were effective in identifying potential high-risk failure modes for this new procedure, which were prioritized for new quality assurance controls. TG 100 recommends the fault tree analysis methodology to design a comprehensive and effective QC/QM program, yet we found that by simply introducing additional safety barriers to address high RPN failure modes makes the whole process simpler and safer.« less
Intralaminar and Interlaminar Progressive Failure Analysis of Composite Panels with Circular Cutouts
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Goyal, Vinay K.; Jaunky, Navin; Johnson, Eric R.; Ambur, Damodar
2002-01-01
A progressive failure methodology is developed and demonstrated to simulate the initiation and material degradation of a laminated panel due to intralaminar and interlaminar failures. Initiation of intralaminar failure can be by a matrix-cracking mode, a fiber-matrix shear mode, and a fiber failure mode. Subsequent material degradation is modeled using damage parameters for each mode to selectively reduce lamina material properties. The interlaminar failure mechanism such as delamination is simulated by positioning interface elements between adjacent sublaminates. A nonlinear constitutive law is postulated for the interface element that accounts for a multi-axial stress criteria to detect the initiation of delamination, a mixed-mode fracture criteria for delamination progression, and a damage parameter to prevent restoration of a previous cohesive state. The methodology is validated using experimental data available in the literature on the response and failure of quasi-isotropic panels with centrally located circular cutouts loaded into the postbuckling regime. Very good agreement between the progressive failure analyses and the experimental results is achieved if the failure analyses includes the interaction of intralaminar and interlaminar failures.
Manger, Ryan P; Paxton, Adam B; Pawlicki, Todd; Kim, Gwe-Ya
2015-05-01
Surface image guided, Linac-based radiosurgery (SIG-RS) is a modern approach for delivering radiosurgery that utilizes optical stereoscopic imaging to monitor the surface of the patient during treatment in lieu of using a head frame for patient immobilization. Considering the novelty of the SIG-RS approach and the severity of errors associated with delivery of large doses per fraction, a risk assessment should be conducted to identify potential hazards, determine their causes, and formulate mitigation strategies. The purpose of this work is to investigate SIG-RS using the combined application of failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) and fault tree analysis (FTA), report on the effort required to complete the analysis, and evaluate the use of FTA in conjunction with FMEA. A multidisciplinary team was assembled to conduct the FMEA on the SIG-RS process. A process map detailing the steps of the SIG-RS was created to guide the FMEA. Failure modes were determined for each step in the SIG-RS process, and risk priority numbers (RPNs) were estimated for each failure mode to facilitate risk stratification. The failure modes were ranked by RPN, and FTA was used to determine the root factors contributing to the riskiest failure modes. Using the FTA, mitigation strategies were formulated to address the root factors and reduce the risk of the process. The RPNs were re-estimated based on the mitigation strategies to determine the margin of risk reduction. The FMEA and FTAs for the top two failure modes required an effort of 36 person-hours (30 person-hours for the FMEA and 6 person-hours for two FTAs). The SIG-RS process consisted of 13 major subprocesses and 91 steps, which amounted to 167 failure modes. Of the 91 steps, 16 were directly related to surface imaging. Twenty-five failure modes resulted in a RPN of 100 or greater. Only one of these top 25 failure modes was specific to surface imaging. The riskiest surface imaging failure mode had an overall RPN-rank of eighth. Mitigation strategies for the top failure mode decreased the RPN from 288 to 72. Based on the FMEA performed in this work, the use of surface imaging for monitoring intrafraction position in Linac-based stereotactic radiosurgery (SRS) did not greatly increase the risk of the Linac-based SRS process. In some cases, SIG helped to reduce the risk of Linac-based RS. The FMEA was augmented by the use of FTA since it divided the failure modes into their fundamental components, which simplified the task of developing mitigation strategies.
Risk assessment of failure modes of gas diffuser liner of V94.2 siemens gas turbine by FMEA method
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Mirzaei Rafsanjani, H.; Rezaei Nasab, A.
2012-05-01
Failure of welding connection of gas diffuser liner and exhaust casing is one of the failure modes of V94.2 gas turbines which are happened in some power plants. This defect is one of the uncertainties of customers when they want to accept the final commissioning of this product. According to this, the risk priority of this failure evaluated by failure modes and effect analysis (FMEA) method to find out whether this failure is catastrophic for turbine performance and is harmful for humans. By using history of 110 gas turbines of this model which are used in some power plants, the severity number, occurrence number and detection number of failure determined and consequently the Risk Priority Number (RPN) of failure determined. Finally, critically matrix of potential failures is created and illustrated that failure modes are located in safe zone.
An efficient scan diagnosis methodology according to scan failure mode for yield enhancement
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Kim, Jung-Tae; Seo, Nam-Sik; Oh, Ghil-Geun; Kim, Dae-Gue; Lee, Kyu-Taek; Choi, Chi-Young; Kim, InSoo; Min, Hyoung Bok
2008-12-01
Yield has always been a driving consideration during fabrication of modern semiconductor industry. Statistically, the largest portion of wafer yield loss is defective scan failure. This paper presents efficient failure analysis methods for initial yield ramp up and ongoing product with scan diagnosis. Result of our analysis shows that more than 60% of the scan failure dies fall into the category of shift mode in the very deep submicron (VDSM) devices. However, localization of scan shift mode failure is very difficult in comparison to capture mode failure because it is caused by the malfunction of scan chain. Addressing the biggest challenge, we propose the most suitable analysis method according to scan failure mode (capture / shift) for yield enhancement. In the event of capture failure mode, this paper describes the method that integrates scan diagnosis flow and backside probing technology to obtain more accurate candidates. We also describe several unique techniques, such as bulk back-grinding solution, efficient backside probing and signal analysis method. Lastly, we introduce blocked chain analysis algorithm for efficient analysis of shift failure mode. In this paper, we contribute to enhancement of the yield as a result of the combination of two methods. We confirm the failure candidates with physical failure analysis (PFA) method. The direct feedback of the defective visualization is useful to mass-produce devices in a shorter time. The experimental data on mass products show that our method produces average reduction by 13.7% in defective SCAN & SRAM-BIST failure rates and by 18.2% in wafer yield rates.
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Gan, Luping; Li, Yan-Feng; Zhu, Shun-Peng; Yang, Yuan-Jian; Huang, Hong-Zhong
2014-06-01
Failure mode, effects and criticality analysis (FMECA) and Fault tree analysis (FTA) are powerful tools to evaluate reliability of systems. Although single failure mode issue can be efficiently addressed by traditional FMECA, multiple failure modes and component correlations in complex systems cannot be effectively evaluated. In addition, correlated variables and parameters are often assumed to be precisely known in quantitative analysis. In fact, due to the lack of information, epistemic uncertainty commonly exists in engineering design. To solve these problems, the advantages of FMECA, FTA, fuzzy theory, and Copula theory are integrated into a unified hybrid method called fuzzy probability weighted geometric mean (FPWGM) risk priority number (RPN) method. The epistemic uncertainty of risk variables and parameters are characterized by fuzzy number to obtain fuzzy weighted geometric mean (FWGM) RPN for single failure mode. Multiple failure modes are connected using minimum cut sets (MCS), and Boolean logic is used to combine fuzzy risk priority number (FRPN) of each MCS. Moreover, Copula theory is applied to analyze the correlation of multiple failure modes in order to derive the failure probabilities of each MCS. Compared to the case where dependency among multiple failure modes is not considered, the Copula modeling approach eliminates the error of reliability analysis. Furthermore, for purpose of quantitative analysis, probabilities importance weight from failure probabilities are assigned to FWGM RPN to reassess the risk priority, which generalize the definition of probability weight and FRPN, resulting in a more accurate estimation than that of the traditional models. Finally, a basic fatigue analysis case drawn from turbine and compressor blades in aeroengine is used to demonstrate the effectiveness and robustness of the presented method. The result provides some important insights on fatigue reliability analysis and risk priority assessment of structural system under failure correlations.
Failure mode analysis to predict product reliability.
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Zemanick, P. P.
1972-01-01
The failure mode analysis (FMA) is described as a design tool to predict and improve product reliability. The objectives of the failure mode analysis are presented as they influence component design, configuration selection, the product test program, the quality assurance plan, and engineering analysis priorities. The detailed mechanics of performing a failure mode analysis are discussed, including one suggested format. Some practical difficulties of implementation are indicated, drawn from experience with preparing FMAs on the nuclear rocket engine program.
Free-Swinging Failure Tolerance for Robotic Manipulators
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
English, James
1997-01-01
Under this GSRP fellowship, software-based failure-tolerance techniques were developed for robotic manipulators. The focus was on failures characterized by the loss of actuator torque at a joint, called free-swinging failures. The research results spanned many aspects of the free-swinging failure-tolerance problem, from preparing for an expected failure to discovery of postfailure capabilities to establishing efficient methods to realize those capabilities. Developed algorithms were verified using computer-based dynamic simulations, and these were further verified using hardware experiments at Johnson Space Center.
Dual-mode capability for hardware-in-the-loop
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Vamivakas, A. N.; Jackson, Ron L.
2000-07-01
This paper details a Hardware-in-the-Loop Facility (HIL) developed for evaluation and verification of a missile system with dual mode capability. The missile has the capability of tracking and intercepting a target using either an RF antenna or an IR sensor. The testing of a dual mode system presents a significant challenge in the development of the HIL facility. An IR and RF target environment must be presented simultaneously to the missile under test. These targets, simulated by IR and RF sources, must be presented to the missile under test without interference from each other. The location of each source is critical in the development of the HIL facility. The requirements for building a HIL facility with dual mode capability and the methodology for testing the dual mode system are defined within this paper. Methods for the verification and validation of the facility are discussed.
Risk analysis by FMEA as an element of analytical validation.
van Leeuwen, J F; Nauta, M J; de Kaste, D; Odekerken-Rombouts, Y M C F; Oldenhof, M T; Vredenbregt, M J; Barends, D M
2009-12-05
We subjected a Near-Infrared (NIR) analytical procedure used for screening drugs on authenticity to a Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA), including technical risks as well as risks related to human failure. An FMEA team broke down the NIR analytical method into process steps and identified possible failure modes for each step. Each failure mode was ranked on estimated frequency of occurrence (O), probability that the failure would remain undetected later in the process (D) and severity (S), each on a scale of 1-10. Human errors turned out to be the most common cause of failure modes. Failure risks were calculated by Risk Priority Numbers (RPNs)=O x D x S. Failure modes with the highest RPN scores were subjected to corrective actions and the FMEA was repeated, showing reductions in RPN scores and resulting in improvement indices up to 5.0. We recommend risk analysis as an addition to the usual analytical validation, as the FMEA enabled us to detect previously unidentified risks.
Spaceflight Ground Support Equipment Reliability & System Safety Data
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Fernandez, Rene; Riddlebaugh, Jeffrey; Brinkman, John; Wilkinson, Myron
2012-01-01
Presented were Reliability Analysis, consisting primarily of Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), and System Safety Analysis, consisting of Preliminary Hazards Analysis (PHA), performed to ensure that the CoNNeCT (Communications, Navigation, and Networking re- Configurable Testbed) Flight System was safely and reliably operated during its Assembly, Integration and Test (AI&T) phase. A tailored approach to the NASA Ground Support Equipment (GSE) standard, NASA-STD-5005C, involving the application of the appropriate Requirements, S&MA discipline expertise, and a Configuration Management system (to retain a record of the analysis and documentation) were presented. Presented were System Block Diagrams of selected GSE and the corresponding FMEA, as well as the PHAs. Also discussed are the specific examples of the FMEAs and PHAs being used during the AI&T phase to drive modifications to the GSE (via "redlining" of test procedures, and the placement of warning stickers to protect the flight hardware) before being interfaced to the Flight System. These modifications were necessary because failure modes and hazards were identified during the analysis that had not been properly mitigated. Strict Configuration Management was applied to changes (whether due to upgrades or expired calibrations) in the GSE by revisiting the FMEAs and PHAs to reflect the latest System Block Diagrams and Bill Of Material. The CoNNeCT flight system has been successfully assembled, integrated, tested, and shipped to the launch site without incident. This demonstrates that the steps taken to safeguard the flight system when it was interfaced to the various GSE were successful.
WE-G-BRA-08: Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) for Gamma Knife Radiosurgery
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Xu, Y; Bhatnagar, J; Bednarz, G
2015-06-15
Purpose: To perform a failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) study for Gamma Knife (GK) radiosurgery processes at our institution based on our experience with the treatment of more than 13,000 patients. Methods: A team consisting of medical physicists, nurses, radiation oncologists, neurosurgeons at the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center and an external physicist expert was formed for the FMEA study. A process tree and a failure mode table were created for the GK procedures using the Leksell GK Perfexion and 4C units. Three scores for the probability of occurrence (O), the severity (S), and the probability of no detectionmore » (D) for failure modes were assigned to each failure mode by each professional on a scale from 1 to 10. The risk priority number (RPN) for each failure mode was then calculated (RPN = OxSxD) as the average scores from all data sets collected. Results: The established process tree for GK radiosurgery consists of 10 sub-processes and 53 steps, including a sub-process for frame placement and 11 steps that are directly related to the frame-based nature of the GK radiosurgery. Out of the 86 failure modes identified, 40 failure modes are GK specific, caused by the potential for inappropriate use of the radiosurgery head frame, the imaging fiducial boxes, the GK helmets and plugs, and the GammaPlan treatment planning system. The other 46 failure modes are associated with the registration, imaging, image transfer, contouring processes that are common for all radiation therapy techniques. The failure modes with the highest hazard scores are related to imperfect frame adaptor attachment, bad fiducial box assembly, overlooked target areas, inaccurate previous treatment information and excessive patient movement during MRI scan. Conclusion: The implementation of the FMEA approach for Gamma Knife radiosurgery enabled deeper understanding of the overall process among all professionals involved in the care of the patient and helped identify potential weaknesses in the overall process.« less
Ye, Qing; Pan, Hao; Liu, Changhua
2015-01-01
This research proposes a novel framework of final drive simultaneous failure diagnosis containing feature extraction, training paired diagnostic models, generating decision threshold, and recognizing simultaneous failure modes. In feature extraction module, adopt wavelet package transform and fuzzy entropy to reduce noise interference and extract representative features of failure mode. Use single failure sample to construct probability classifiers based on paired sparse Bayesian extreme learning machine which is trained only by single failure modes and have high generalization and sparsity of sparse Bayesian learning approach. To generate optimal decision threshold which can convert probability output obtained from classifiers into final simultaneous failure modes, this research proposes using samples containing both single and simultaneous failure modes and Grid search method which is superior to traditional techniques in global optimization. Compared with other frequently used diagnostic approaches based on support vector machine and probability neural networks, experiment results based on F 1-measure value verify that the diagnostic accuracy and efficiency of the proposed framework which are crucial for simultaneous failure diagnosis are superior to the existing approach. PMID:25722717
Comparison of mode of failure between primary and revision total knee arthroplasties.
Liang, H; Bae, J K; Park, C H; Kim, K I; Bae, D K; Song, S J
2018-04-01
Cognizance of common reasons for failure in primary and revision TKA, together with their time course, facilitates prevention. However, there have been few reports specifically comparing modes of failure for primary vs. revision TKA using a single prosthesis. The goal of the study was to compare the survival rates, modes of failure, and time periods associated with each mode of failure, of primary vs. revision TKA. The survival rates, modes of failure, time period for each mode of failure, and risk factors would differ between primary and revision TKA. Data from a consecutive cohort comprising 1606 knees (1174 patients) of primary TKA patients, and 258 knees (224 patients) of revision TKA patients, in all of whom surgery involved a P.F.C ® prosthesis (Depuy, Johnson & Johnson, Warsaw, IN), was retrospectively reviewed. The mean follow-up periods of primary and revision TKAs were 9.2 and 9.8 years, respectively. The average 10- and 15-year survival rates for primary TKA were 96.7% (CI 95%,±0.7%) and 85.4% (CI 95%,±2.0%), and for revision TKA 91.4% (CI 95%,±2.5%) and 80.5% (CI 95%,±4.5%). Common modes of failure included polyethylene wear, loosening, and infection. The most common mode of failure was polyethylene wear in primary TKA, and infection in revision TKA. The mean periods (i.e., latencies) of polyethylene wear and loosening did not differ between primary and revision TKAs, but the mean period of infection was significantly longer for revision TKA (1.2 vs. 4.8 years, P=0.003). Survival rates decreased with time, particularly more than 10 years post-surgery, for both primary and revision TKAs. Continuous efforts are required to prevent and detect the various modes of failure during long-term follow-up. Greater attention is necessary to detect late infection-induced failure following revision TKA. Case-control study, Level III. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Masson SAS. All rights reserved.
Mod 1 wind turbine generator failure modes and effects analysis
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
1979-01-01
A failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) was directed primarily at identifying those critical failure modes that would be hazardous to life or would result in major damage to the system. Each subsystem was approached from the top down, and broken down to successive lower levels where it appeared that the criticality of the failure mode warranted more detail analysis. The results were reviewed by specialists from outside the Mod 1 program, and corrective action taken wherever recommended.
Power Consumption and Calculation Requirement Analysis of AES for WSN IoT.
Hung, Chung-Wen; Hsu, Wen-Ting
2018-05-23
Because of the ubiquity of Internet of Things (IoT) devices, the power consumption and security of IoT systems have become very important issues. Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is a block cipher algorithm is commonly used in IoT devices. In this paper, the power consumption and cryptographic calculation requirement for different payload lengths and AES encryption types are analyzed. These types include software-based AES-CB, hardware-based AES-ECB (Electronic Codebook Mode), and hardware-based AES-CCM (Counter with CBC-MAC Mode). The calculation requirement and power consumption for these AES encryption types are measured on the Texas Instruments LAUNCHXL-CC1310 platform. The experimental results show that the hardware-based AES performs better than the software-based AES in terms of power consumption and calculation cycle requirements. In addition, in terms of AES mode selection, the AES-CCM-MIC64 mode may be a better choice if the IoT device is considering security, encryption calculation requirement, and low power consumption at the same time. However, if the IoT device is pursuing lower power and the payload length is generally less than 16 bytes, then AES-ECB could be considered.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
DiCostanzo, D; Ayan, A; Woollard, J
Purpose: To predict potential failures of hardware within the Varian TrueBeam linear accelerator in order to proactively replace parts and decrease machine downtime. Methods: Machine downtime is a problem for all radiation oncology departments and vendors. Most often it is the result of unexpected equipment failure, and increased due to lack of in-house clinical engineering support. Preventative maintenance attempts to assuage downtime, but often is ineffective at preemptively preventing many failure modes such as MLC motor failures, the need to tighten a gantry chain, or the replacement of a jaw motor, among other things. To attempt to alleviate downtime, softwaremore » was developed in house that determines the maximum value of each axis enumerated in the Truebeam trajectory log files. After patient treatments, this data is stored in a SQL database. Microsoft Power BI is used to plot the average maximum error of each day of each machine as a function of time. The results are then correlated with actual faults that occurred at the machine with the help of Varian service engineers. Results: Over the course of six months, 76,312 trajectory logs have been written into the database and plotted in Power BI. Throughout the course of analysis MLC motors have been replaced on three machines due to the early warning of the trajectory log analysis. The service engineers have also been alerted to possible gantry issues on one occasion due to the aforementioned analysis. Conclusion: Analyzing the trajectory log data is a viable and effective early warning system for potential failures of the TrueBeam linear accelerator. With further analysis and tightening of the tolerance values used to determine a possible imminent failure, it should be possible to pinpoint future issues more thoroughly and for more axes of motion.« less
A spacecraft integrated power/attitude control system
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Keckler, C. R.; Jacobs, K. L.
1974-01-01
A study to determine the viability and application of a system capable of performing the dual function of power storage/generation and attitude control has been conducted. Results from the study indicate that an integrated power/attitude control system (IPACS) can satisfy future mission requirements while providing significant savings in weight, volume, and cost over conventional systems. A failure-mode configuration of an IPACS was applied to a shuttle-launched RAM free-flyer and simulated using make-do hardware linked to a hybrid computer. Data from the simulation runs indicate that control interactions resulting from heavy power demands have minimal effect on system control effectiveness. The system was shown to be capable of meeting the stringent pointing requirements of 1 arc-second while operating under the influence of an orbital disturbance environment and during periods of momentum variations imposed by energy transfer requirements.
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Cao, Ri-hong; Cao, Ping; Lin, Hang; Pu, Cheng-zhi; Ou, Ke
2016-03-01
Joints and fissures with similar orientation or characteristics are common in natural rocks; the inclination and density of the fissures affect the mechanical properties and failure mechanism of the rock mass. However, the strength, crack coalescence pattern, and failure mode of rock specimens containing multi-fissures have not been studied comprehensively. In this paper, combining similar material testing and discrete element numerical method (PFC2D), the peak strength and failure characteristics of rock-like materials with multi-fissures are explored. Rock-like specimens were made of cement and sand and pre-existing fissures created by inserting steel shims into cement mortar paste and removing them during curing. The peak strength of multi-fissure specimens depends on the fissure angle α (which is measured counterclockwise from horizontal) and fissure number ( N f). Under uniaxial compressional loading, the peak strength increased with increasing α. The material strength was lowest for α = 25°, and highest for α = 90°. The influence of N f on the peak strength depended on α. For α = 25° and 45°, N f had a strong effect on the peak strength, while for higher α values, especially for the 90° sample, there were no obvious changes in peak strength with different N f. Under uniaxial compression, the coalescence modes between the fissures can be classified into three categories: S-mode, T-mode, and M-mode. Moreover, the failure mode can be classified into four categories: mixed failure, shear failure, stepped path failure, and intact failure. The failure mode of the specimen depends on α and N f. The peak strength and failure modes in the numerically simulated and experimental results are in good agreement.
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Sin, Yongkun; Lingley, Zachary; Brodie, Miles; Presser, Nathan; Moss, Steven C.
2017-02-01
High-power single-mode (SM) and multi-mode (MM) InGaAs-AlGaAs strained quantum well (QW) lasers are critical components for both telecommunications and space satellite communications systems. However, little has been reported on failure modes and degradation mechanisms of high-power SM and MM InGaAs-AlGaAs strained QW lasers although it is crucial to understand failure modes and underlying degradation mechanisms in developing these lasers that meet lifetime requirements for space satellite systems, where extremely high reliability of these lasers is required. Our present study addresses the aforementioned issues by performing long-term life-tests followed by failure mode analysis (FMA) and physics of failure investigation. We performed long-term accelerated life-tests on state-of-the-art SM and MM InGaAs-AlGaAs strained QW lasers under ACC (automatic current control) mode. Our life-tests have accumulated over 25,000 test hours for SM lasers and over 35,000 test hours for MM lasers. FMA was performed on failed SM lasers using electron beam induced current (EBIC). This technique allowed us to identify failure types by observing dark line defects. All the SM failures we studied showed catastrophic and sudden degradation and all of these failures were bulk failures. Our group previously reported that bulk failure or COBD (catastrophic optical bulk damage) is the dominant failure mode of MM InGaAs-AlGaAs strained QW lasers. Since degradation mechanisms responsible for COBD are still not well understood, we also employed other techniques including focused ion beam (FIB) processing and high-resolution TEM to further study dark line defects and dislocations in post-aged lasers. Our long-term life-test results and FMA results are reported.
Cycles till failure of silver-zinc cells with competing failure modes - Preliminary data analysis
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Sidik, S. M.; Leibecki, H. F.; Bozek, J. M.
1980-01-01
The data analysis of cycles to failure of silver-zinc electrochemical cells with competing failure modes is presented. The test ran 129 cells through charge-discharge cycles until failure; preliminary data analysis consisted of response surface estimate of life. Batteries fail through low voltage condition and an internal shorting condition; a competing failure modes analysis was made using maximum likelihood estimation for the extreme value life distribution. Extensive residual plotting and probability plotting were used to verify data quality and selection of model.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Younge, Kelly Cooper, E-mail: kyounge@med.umich.edu; Wang, Yizhen; Thompson, John
2015-04-01
Purpose: To improve the safety and efficiency of a new stereotactic radiosurgery program with the application of failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) performed by a multidisciplinary team of health care professionals. Methods and Materials: Representatives included physicists, therapists, dosimetrists, oncologists, and administrators. A detailed process tree was created from an initial high-level process tree to facilitate the identification of possible failure modes. Group members were asked to determine failure modes that they considered to be the highest risk before scoring failure modes. Risk priority numbers (RPNs) were determined by each group member individually and then averaged. Results: A totalmore » of 99 failure modes were identified. The 5 failure modes with an RPN above 150 were further analyzed to attempt to reduce these RPNs. Only 1 of the initial items that the group presumed to be high-risk (magnetic resonance imaging laterality reversed) was ranked in these top 5 items. New process controls were put in place to reduce the severity, occurrence, and detectability scores for all of the top 5 failure modes. Conclusions: FMEA is a valuable team activity that can assist in the creation or restructuring of a quality assurance program with the aim of improved safety, quality, and efficiency. Performing the FMEA helped group members to see how they fit into the bigger picture of the program, and it served to reduce biases and preconceived notions about which elements of the program were the riskiest.« less
Clinical risk analysis with failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) model in a dialysis unit.
Bonfant, Giovanna; Belfanti, Pietro; Paternoster, Giuseppe; Gabrielli, Danila; Gaiter, Alberto M; Manes, Massimo; Molino, Andrea; Pellu, Valentina; Ponzetti, Clemente; Farina, Massimo; Nebiolo, Pier E
2010-01-01
The aim of clinical risk management is to improve the quality of care provided by health care organizations and to assure patients' safety. Failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) is a tool employed for clinical risk reduction. We applied FMEA to chronic hemodialysis outpatients. FMEA steps: (i) process study: we recorded phases and activities. (ii) Hazard analysis: we listed activity-related failure modes and their effects; described control measures; assigned severity, occurrence and detection scores for each failure mode and calculated the risk priority numbers (RPNs) by multiplying the 3 scores. Total RPN is calculated by adding single failure mode RPN. (iii) Planning: we performed a RPNs prioritization on a priority matrix taking into account the 3 scores, and we analyzed failure modes causes, made recommendations and planned new control measures. (iv) Monitoring: after failure mode elimination or reduction, we compared the resulting RPN with the previous one. Our failure modes with the highest RPN came from communication and organization problems. Two tools have been created to ameliorate information flow: "dialysis agenda" software and nursing datasheets. We scheduled nephrological examinations, and we changed both medical and nursing organization. Total RPN value decreased from 892 to 815 (8.6%) after reorganization. Employing FMEA, we worked on a few critical activities, and we reduced patients' clinical risk. A priority matrix also takes into account the weight of the control measures: we believe this evaluation is quick, because of simple priority selection, and that it decreases action times.
A streamlined failure mode and effects analysis.
Ford, Eric C; Smith, Koren; Terezakis, Stephanie; Croog, Victoria; Gollamudi, Smitha; Gage, Irene; Keck, Jordie; DeWeese, Theodore; Sibley, Greg
2014-06-01
Explore the feasibility and impact of a streamlined failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) using a structured process that is designed to minimize staff effort. FMEA for the external beam process was conducted at an affiliate radiation oncology center that treats approximately 60 patients per day. A structured FMEA process was developed which included clearly defined roles and goals for each phase. A core group of seven people was identified and a facilitator was chosen to lead the effort. Failure modes were identified and scored according to the FMEA formalism. A risk priority number,RPN, was calculated and used to rank failure modes. Failure modes with RPN > 150 received safety improvement interventions. Staff effort was carefully tracked throughout the project. Fifty-two failure modes were identified, 22 collected during meetings, and 30 from take-home worksheets. The four top-ranked failure modes were: delay in film check, missing pacemaker protocol/consent, critical structures not contoured, and pregnant patient simulated without the team's knowledge of the pregnancy. These four failure modes had RPN > 150 and received safety interventions. The FMEA was completed in one month in four 1-h meetings. A total of 55 staff hours were required and, additionally, 20 h by the facilitator. Streamlined FMEA provides a means of accomplishing a relatively large-scale analysis with modest effort. One potential value of FMEA is that it potentially provides a means of measuring the impact of quality improvement efforts through a reduction in risk scores. Future study of this possibility is needed.
Digital avionics design and reliability analyzer
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
1981-01-01
The description and specifications for a digital avionics design and reliability analyzer are given. Its basic function is to provide for the simulation and emulation of the various fault-tolerant digital avionic computer designs that are developed. It has been established that hardware emulation at the gate-level will be utilized. The primary benefit of emulation to reliability analysis is the fact that it provides the capability to model a system at a very detailed level. Emulation allows the direct insertion of faults into the system, rather than waiting for actual hardware failures to occur. This allows for controlled and accelerated testing of system reaction to hardware failures. There is a trade study which leads to the decision to specify a two-machine system, including an emulation computer connected to a general-purpose computer. There is also an evaluation of potential computers to serve as the emulation computer.
A systems approach to solder joint fatigue in spacecraft electronic packaging
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Ross, R. G., Jr.
1991-01-01
Differential expansion induced fatigue resulting from temperature cycling is a leading cause of solder joint failures in spacecraft. Achieving high reliability flight hardware requires that each element of the fatigue issue be addressed carefully. This includes defining the complete thermal-cycle environment to be experienced by the hardware, developing electronic packaging concepts that are consistent with the defined environments, and validating the completed designs with a thorough qualification and acceptance test program. This paper describes a useful systems approach to solder fatigue based principally on the fundamental log-strain versus log-cycles-to-failure behavior of fatigue. This fundamental behavior has been useful to integrate diverse ground test and flight operational thermal-cycle environments into a unified electronics design approach. Each element of the approach reflects both the mechanism physics that control solder fatigue, as well as the practical realities of the hardware build, test, delivery, and application cycle.
Tensile failure criteria for fiber composite materials
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Rosen, B. W.; Zweben, C. H.
1972-01-01
The analysis provides insight into the failure mechanics of these materials and defines criteria which serve as tools for preliminary design material selection and for material reliability assessment. The model incorporates both dispersed and propagation type failures and includes the influence of material heterogeneity. The important effects of localized matrix damage and post-failure matrix shear stress transfer are included in the treatment. The model is used to evaluate the influence of key parameters on the failure of several commonly used fiber-matrix systems. Analyses of three possible failure modes were developed. These modes are the fiber break propagation mode, the cumulative group fracture mode, and the weakest link mode. Application of the new model to composite material systems has indicated several results which require attention in the development of reliable structural composites. Prominent among these are the size effect and the influence of fiber strength variability.
Health management system for rocket engines
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Nemeth, Edward
1990-01-01
The functional framework of a failure detection algorithm for the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) is developed. The basic algorithm is based only on existing SSME measurements. Supplemental measurements, expected to enhance failure detection effectiveness, are identified. To support the algorithm development, a figure of merit is defined to estimate the likelihood of SSME criticality 1 failure modes and the failure modes are ranked in order of likelihood of occurrence. Nine classes of failure detection strategies are evaluated and promising features are extracted as the basis for the failure detection algorithm. The failure detection algorithm provides early warning capabilities for a wide variety of SSME failure modes. Preliminary algorithm evaluation, using data from three SSME failures representing three different failure types, demonstrated indications of imminent catastrophic failure well in advance of redline cutoff in all three cases.
Detection of system failures in multi-axes tasks. [pilot monitored instrument approach
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Ephrath, A. R.
1975-01-01
The effects of the pilot's participation mode in the control task on his workload level and failure detection performance were examined considering a low visibility landing approach. It is found that the participation mode had a strong effect on the pilot's workload, the induced workload being lowest when the pilot acted as a monitoring element during a coupled approach and highest when the pilot was an active element in the control loop. The effects of workload and participation mode on failure detection were separated. The participation mode was shown to have a dominant effect on the failure detection performance, with a failure in a monitored (coupled) axis being detected significantly faster than a comparable failure in a manually controlled axis.
Steinberger, Dina M; Douglas, Stephen V; Kirschbaum, Mark S
2009-09-01
A multidisciplinary team from the University of Wisconsin Hospital and Clinics transplant program used failure mode and effects analysis to proactively examine opportunities for communication and handoff failures across the continuum of care from organ procurement to transplantation. The team performed a modified failure mode and effects analysis that isolated the multiple linked, serial, and complex information exchanges occurring during the transplantation of one solid organ. Failure mode and effects analysis proved effective for engaging a diverse group of persons who had an investment in the outcome in analysis and discussion of opportunities to improve the system's resilience for avoiding errors during a time-pressured and complex process.
Yang, F; Cao, N; Young, L; Howard, J; Logan, W; Arbuckle, T; Sponseller, P; Korssjoen, T; Meyer, J; Ford, E
2015-06-01
Though failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) is becoming more widely adopted for risk assessment in radiation therapy, to our knowledge, its output has never been validated against data on errors that actually occur. The objective of this study was to perform FMEA of a stereotactic body radiation therapy (SBRT) treatment planning process and validate the results against data recorded within an incident learning system. FMEA on the SBRT treatment planning process was carried out by a multidisciplinary group including radiation oncologists, medical physicists, dosimetrists, and IT technologists. Potential failure modes were identified through a systematic review of the process map. Failure modes were rated for severity, occurrence, and detectability on a scale of one to ten and risk priority number (RPN) was computed. Failure modes were then compared with historical reports identified as relevant to SBRT planning within a departmental incident learning system that has been active for two and a half years. Differences between FMEA anticipated failure modes and existing incidents were identified. FMEA identified 63 failure modes. RPN values for the top 25% of failure modes ranged from 60 to 336. Analysis of the incident learning database identified 33 reported near-miss events related to SBRT planning. Combining both methods yielded a total of 76 possible process failures, of which 13 (17%) were missed by FMEA while 43 (57%) identified by FMEA only. When scored for RPN, the 13 events missed by FMEA ranked within the lower half of all failure modes and exhibited significantly lower severity relative to those identified by FMEA (p = 0.02). FMEA, though valuable, is subject to certain limitations. In this study, FMEA failed to identify 17% of actual failure modes, though these were of lower risk. Similarly, an incident learning system alone fails to identify a large number of potentially high-severity process errors. Using FMEA in combination with incident learning may render an improved overview of risks within a process.
Modes of failure in disordered solids
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Roy, Subhadeep; Biswas, Soumyajyoti; Ray, Purusattam
2017-12-01
The two principal ingredients determining the failure modes of disordered solids are the strength of heterogeneity and the length scale of the region affected in the solid following a local failure. While the latter facilitates damage nucleation, the former leads to diffused damage—the two extreme natures of the failure modes. In this study, using the random fiber bundle model as a prototype for disordered solids, we classify all failure modes that are the results of interplay between these two effects. We obtain scaling criteria for the different modes and propose a general phase diagram that provides a framework for understanding previous theoretical and experimental attempts of interpolation between these modes. As the fiber bundle model is a long-standing model for interpreting various features of stressed disordered solids, the general phase diagram can serve as a guiding principle in anticipating the responses of disordered solids in general.
Stingray Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis: WEC Risk Registers
Ken Rhinefrank
2016-07-25
Analysis method to systematically identify all potential failure modes and their effects on the Stingray WEC system. This analysis is incorporated early in the development cycle such that the mitigation of the identified failure modes can be achieved cost effectively and efficiently. The FMECA can begin once there is enough detail to functions and failure modes of a given system, and its interfaces with other systems. The FMECA occurs coincidently with the design process and is an iterative process which allows for design changes to overcome deficiencies in the analysis.Risk Registers for major subsystems completed according to the methodology described in "Failure Mode Effects and Criticality Analysis Risk Reduction Program Plan.pdf" document below, in compliance with the DOE Risk Management Framework developed by NREL.
Nanowire failure: long = brittle and short = ductile.
Wu, Zhaoxuan; Zhang, Yong-Wei; Jhon, Mark H; Gao, Huajian; Srolovitz, David J
2012-02-08
Experimental studies of the tensile behavior of metallic nanowires show a wide range of failure modes, ranging from ductile necking to brittle/localized shear failure-often in the same diameter wires. We performed large-scale molecular dynamics simulations of copper nanowires with a range of nanowire lengths and provide unequivocal evidence for a transition in nanowire failure mode with change in nanowire length. Short nanowires fail via a ductile mode with serrated stress-strain curves, while long wires exhibit extreme shear localization and abrupt failure. We developed a simple model for predicting the critical nanowire length for this failure mode transition and showed that it is in excellent agreement with both the simulation results and the extant experimental data. The present results provide a new paradigm for the design of nanoscale mechanical systems that demarcates graceful and catastrophic failure. © 2012 American Chemical Society
A Proposal for the Creation of a Diagnostics and Power Port Standard
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Willeke, Thomas
2005-01-01
The contents of this paper discuss plans for communication failure due to lost hardware during Moon and Mars exploration missions. The author proposes a Diagnostics and Power Port (DPP) creation in the face of total communication failure. DDP would have a number of different power channels to replicate computer diagnostic abilities to find the root cause of failure.
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Steele, John; Metselaar, Carol; Peyton, Barbara; Rector, Tony; Rossato, Robert; Macias, Brian; Weigel, Dana; Holder, Don
2015-01-01
Water entered the Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) helmet during extravehicular activity (EVA) no. 23 aboard the International Space Station on July 16, 2013, resulting in the termination of the EVA approximately 1 hour after it began. It was estimated that 1.5 liters of water had migrated up the ventilation loop into the helmet, adversely impacting the astronaut's hearing, vision, and verbal communication. Subsequent on-board testing and ground-based test, tear-down, and evaluation of the affected EMU hardware components determined that the proximate cause of the mishap was blockage of all water separator drum holes with a mixture of silica and silicates. The blockages caused a failure of the water separator degassing function, which resulted in EMU cooling water spilling into the ventilation loop, migrating around the circulating fan, and ultimately pushing into the helmet. The root cause of the failure was determined to be ground-processing shortcomings of the Airlock Cooling Loop Recovery (ALCLR) Ion Filter Beds, which led to various levels of contaminants being introduced into the filters before they left the ground. Those contaminants were thereafter introduced into the EMU hardware on-orbit during ALCLR scrubbing operations. This paper summarizes the failure analysis results along with identified process, hardware, and operational corrective actions that were implemented as a result of findings from this investigation.
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Steele, John; Metselaar, Carol; Peyton, Barbara; Rector, Tony; Rossato, Robert; Macias, Brian; Weigel, Dana; Holder, Don
2015-01-01
During EVA (Extravehicular Activity) No. 23 aboard the ISS (International Space Station) on 07/16/2013 water entered the EMU (Extravehicular Mobility Unit) helmet resulting in the termination of the EVA (Extravehicular Activity) approximately 1-hour after it began. It was estimated that 1.5-L of water had migrated up the ventilation loop into the helmet, adversely impacting the astronauts hearing, vision and verbal communication. Subsequent on-board testing and ground-based TT and E (Test, Tear-down and Evaluation) of the affected EMU hardware components led to the determination that the proximate cause of the mishap was blockage of all water separator drum holes with a mixture of silica and silicates. The blockages caused a failure of the water separator function which resulted in EMU cooling water spilling into the ventilation loop, around the circulating fan, and ultimately pushing into the helmet. The root cause of the failure was determined to be ground-processing short-comings of the ALCLR (Airlock Cooling Loop Recovery) Ion Filter Beds which led to various levels of contaminants being introduced into the Filters before they left the ground. Those contaminants were thereafter introduced into the EMU hardware on-orbit during ALCLR scrubbing operations. This paper summarizes the failure analysis results along with identified process, hardware and operational corrective actions that were implemented as a result of findings from this investigation.
Free-Swinging Failure Tolerance for Robotic Manipulators. Degree awarded by Purdue Univ.
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
English, James
1997-01-01
Under this GSRP fellowship, software-based failure-tolerance techniques were developed for robotic manipulators. The focus was on failures characterized by the loss of actuator torque at a joint, called free-swinging failures. The research results spanned many aspects of the free-swinging failure-tolerance problem, from preparing for an expected failure to discovery of postfailure capabilities to establishing efficient methods to realize those capabilities. Developed algorithms were verified using computer-based dynamic simulations, and these were further verified using hardware experiments at Johnson Space Center.
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Kezirian, Michael T.
2010-01-01
Introducing composite vessels into the Space Shuttle Program represented a significant technical achievement. Each Orbiter vehicle contains 24 (nominally) Kevlar tanks for storage of pressurized helium (for propulsion) and nitrogen (for life support). The use of composite cylinders saved 752 pounds per Orbiter vehicle compared with all-metal tanks. The weight savings is significant considering each Shuttle flight can deliver 54,000 pounds of payload to the International Space Station. In the wake of the Columbia accident and the ensuing Return to Flight activities, the Space Shuttle Program, in 2005, re-examined COPV hardware certification. Incorporating COPV data that had been generated over the last 30 years and recognizing differences between initial Shuttle Program requirements and current operation, a new failure mode was identified, as composite stress rupture was deemed credible. The Orbiter Project undertook a comprehensive investigation to quantify and mitigate this risk. First, the engineering team considered and later deemed as unfeasible the option to replace existing all flight tanks. Second, operational improvements to flight procedures were instituted to reduce the flight risk and the danger to personnel. Third, an Orbiter reliability model was developed to quantify flight risk. Laser profilometry inspection of several flight COPVs identified deep (up to 20 mil) depressions on the tank interior. A comprehensive analysis was performed and it confirmed that these observed depressions were far less than the criterion which was established as necessary to lead to liner buckling. Existing fleet vessels were exonerated from this failure mechanism. Because full validation of the Orbiter Reliability Model was not possible given limited hardware resources, an Accelerated Stress Rupture Test of a flown flight vessel was performed to provide increased confidence. A Bayesian statistical approach was developed to evaluate possible test results with respect to the model credibility and thus flight rationale for continued operation of the Space Shuttle with existing flight hardware. A non-destructive evaluation (NDE) technique utilizing Raman Spectroscopy was developed to directly measure the overwrap residual stress state. Preliminary results provide optimistic results that patterns of fluctuation in fiber elastic strains over the outside vessel surface could be directly correlated with increased fiber stress ratios and thus reduced reliability.
Process-based quality management for clinical implementation of adaptive radiotherapy
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Noel, Camille E.; Santanam, Lakshmi; Parikh, Parag J.
Purpose: Intensity-modulated adaptive radiotherapy (ART) has been the focus of considerable research and developmental work due to its potential therapeutic benefits. However, in light of its unique quality assurance (QA) challenges, no one has described a robust framework for its clinical implementation. In fact, recent position papers by ASTRO and AAPM have firmly endorsed pretreatment patient-specific IMRT QA, which limits the feasibility of online ART. The authors aim to address these obstacles by applying failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) to identify high-priority errors and appropriate risk-mitigation strategies for clinical implementation of intensity-modulated ART. Methods: An experienced team of twomore » clinical medical physicists, one clinical engineer, and one radiation oncologist was assembled to perform a standard FMEA for intensity-modulated ART. A set of 216 potential radiotherapy failures composed by the forthcoming AAPM task group 100 (TG-100) was used as the basis. Of the 216 failures, 127 were identified as most relevant to an ART scheme. Using the associated TG-100 FMEA values as a baseline, the team considered how the likeliness of occurrence (O), outcome severity (S), and likeliness of failure being undetected (D) would change for ART. New risk priority numbers (RPN) were calculated. Failures characterized by RPN ≥ 200 were identified as potentially critical. Results: FMEA revealed that ART RPN increased for 38% (n = 48/127) of potential failures, with 75% (n = 36/48) attributed to failures in the segmentation and treatment planning processes. Forty-three of 127 failures were identified as potentially critical. Risk-mitigation strategies include implementing a suite of quality control and decision support software, specialty QA software/hardware tools, and an increase in specially trained personnel. Conclusions: Results of the FMEA-based risk assessment demonstrate that intensity-modulated ART introduces different (but not necessarily more) risks than standard IMRT and may be safely implemented with the proper mitigations.« less
Process-based quality management for clinical implementation of adaptive radiotherapy
Noel, Camille E.; Santanam, Lakshmi; Parikh, Parag J.; Mutic, Sasa
2014-01-01
Purpose: Intensity-modulated adaptive radiotherapy (ART) has been the focus of considerable research and developmental work due to its potential therapeutic benefits. However, in light of its unique quality assurance (QA) challenges, no one has described a robust framework for its clinical implementation. In fact, recent position papers by ASTRO and AAPM have firmly endorsed pretreatment patient-specific IMRT QA, which limits the feasibility of online ART. The authors aim to address these obstacles by applying failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) to identify high-priority errors and appropriate risk-mitigation strategies for clinical implementation of intensity-modulated ART. Methods: An experienced team of two clinical medical physicists, one clinical engineer, and one radiation oncologist was assembled to perform a standard FMEA for intensity-modulated ART. A set of 216 potential radiotherapy failures composed by the forthcoming AAPM task group 100 (TG-100) was used as the basis. Of the 216 failures, 127 were identified as most relevant to an ART scheme. Using the associated TG-100 FMEA values as a baseline, the team considered how the likeliness of occurrence (O), outcome severity (S), and likeliness of failure being undetected (D) would change for ART. New risk priority numbers (RPN) were calculated. Failures characterized by RPN ≥ 200 were identified as potentially critical. Results: FMEA revealed that ART RPN increased for 38% (n = 48/127) of potential failures, with 75% (n = 36/48) attributed to failures in the segmentation and treatment planning processes. Forty-three of 127 failures were identified as potentially critical. Risk-mitigation strategies include implementing a suite of quality control and decision support software, specialty QA software/hardware tools, and an increase in specially trained personnel. Conclusions: Results of the FMEA-based risk assessment demonstrate that intensity-modulated ART introduces different (but not necessarily more) risks than standard IMRT and may be safely implemented with the proper mitigations. PMID:25086527
Process-based quality management for clinical implementation of adaptive radiotherapy.
Noel, Camille E; Santanam, Lakshmi; Parikh, Parag J; Mutic, Sasa
2014-08-01
Intensity-modulated adaptive radiotherapy (ART) has been the focus of considerable research and developmental work due to its potential therapeutic benefits. However, in light of its unique quality assurance (QA) challenges, no one has described a robust framework for its clinical implementation. In fact, recent position papers by ASTRO and AAPM have firmly endorsed pretreatment patient-specific IMRT QA, which limits the feasibility of online ART. The authors aim to address these obstacles by applying failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) to identify high-priority errors and appropriate risk-mitigation strategies for clinical implementation of intensity-modulated ART. An experienced team of two clinical medical physicists, one clinical engineer, and one radiation oncologist was assembled to perform a standard FMEA for intensity-modulated ART. A set of 216 potential radiotherapy failures composed by the forthcoming AAPM task group 100 (TG-100) was used as the basis. Of the 216 failures, 127 were identified as most relevant to an ART scheme. Using the associated TG-100 FMEA values as a baseline, the team considered how the likeliness of occurrence (O), outcome severity (S), and likeliness of failure being undetected (D) would change for ART. New risk priority numbers (RPN) were calculated. Failures characterized by RPN ≥ 200 were identified as potentially critical. FMEA revealed that ART RPN increased for 38% (n = 48/127) of potential failures, with 75% (n = 36/48) attributed to failures in the segmentation and treatment planning processes. Forty-three of 127 failures were identified as potentially critical. Risk-mitigation strategies include implementing a suite of quality control and decision support software, specialty QA software/hardware tools, and an increase in specially trained personnel. Results of the FMEA-based risk assessment demonstrate that intensity-modulated ART introduces different (but not necessarily more) risks than standard IMRT and may be safely implemented with the proper mitigations.
SU-F-T-246: Evaluation of Healthcare Failure Mode And Effect Analysis For Risk Assessment
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Harry, T; University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, CA; Manger, R
Purpose: To evaluate the differences between the Veteran Affairs Healthcare Failure Modes and Effect Analysis (HFMEA) and the AAPM Task Group 100 Failure and Effect Analysis (FMEA) risk assessment techniques in the setting of a stereotactic radiosurgery (SRS) procedure were compared respectively. Understanding the differences in the techniques methodologies and outcomes will provide further insight into the applicability and utility of risk assessments exercises in radiation therapy. Methods: HFMEA risk assessment analysis was performed on a stereotactic radiosurgery procedure. A previous study from our institution completed a FMEA of our SRS procedure and the process map generated from this workmore » was used for the HFMEA. The process of performing the HFMEA scoring was analyzed, and the results from both analyses were compared. Results: The key differences between the two risk assessments are the scoring criteria for failure modes and identifying critical failure modes for potential hazards. The general consensus among the team performing the analyses was that scoring for the HFMEA was simpler and more intuitive then the FMEA. The FMEA identified 25 critical failure modes while the HFMEA identified 39. Seven of the FMEA critical failure modes were not identified by the HFMEA and 21 of the HFMEA critical failure modes were not identified by the FMEA. HFMEA as described by the Veteran Affairs provides guidelines on which failure modes to address first. Conclusion: HFMEA is a more efficient model for identifying gross risks in a process than FMEA. Clinics with minimal staff, time and resources can benefit from this type of risk assessment to eliminate or mitigate high risk hazards with nominal effort. FMEA can provide more in depth details but at the cost of elevated effort.« less
Task Decomposition in Human Reliability Analysis
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Boring, Ronald Laurids; Joe, Jeffrey Clark
2014-06-01
In the probabilistic safety assessments (PSAs) used in the nuclear industry, human failure events (HFEs) are determined as a subset of hardware failures, namely those hardware failures that could be triggered by human action or inaction. This approach is top-down, starting with hardware faults and deducing human contributions to those faults. Elsewhere, more traditionally human factors driven approaches would tend to look at opportunities for human errors first in a task analysis and then identify which of those errors is risk significant. The intersection of top-down and bottom-up approaches to defining HFEs has not been carefully studied. Ideally, both approachesmore » should arrive at the same set of HFEs. This question remains central as human reliability analysis (HRA) methods are generalized to new domains like oil and gas. The HFEs used in nuclear PSAs tend to be top-down— defined as a subset of the PSA—whereas the HFEs used in petroleum quantitative risk assessments (QRAs) are more likely to be bottom-up—derived from a task analysis conducted by human factors experts. The marriage of these approaches is necessary in order to ensure that HRA methods developed for top-down HFEs are also sufficient for bottom-up applications.« less
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Bazley, Jesse A.
2011-01-01
This presentation will discuss the International Space Station s (ISS) Regenerative Environmental Control and Life Support System (ECLSS) operations with discussion of the on-orbit lessons learned, specifically regarding the challenges that have been faced as the system has expanded with a growing ISS crew. Over the 10 year history of the ISS, there have been numerous challenges, failures, and triumphs in the quest to keep the crew alive and comfortable. Successful operation of the ECLSS not only requires maintenance of the hardware, but also management of the station resources in case of hardware failure or missed re-supply. This involves effective communication between the primary International Partners (NASA and Roskosmos) and the secondary partners (JAXA and ESA) in order to keep a reserve of the contingency consumables and allow for re-supply of failed hardware. The ISS ECLSS utilizes consumables storage for contingency usage as well as longer-term regenerative systems, which allow for conservation of the expensive resources brought up by re-supply vehicles. This long-term hardware, and the interactions with software, was a challenge for Systems Engineers when they were designed and require multiple operational workarounds in order to function continuously. On a day-to-day basis, the ECLSS provides big challenges to the on console controllers. Main challenges involve the utilization of the resources that have been brought up by the visiting vehicles prior to undocking, balance of contributions between the International Partners for both systems and resources, and maintaining balance between the many interdependent systems, which includes providing the resources they need when they need it. The current biggest challenge for ECLSS is the Regenerative ECLSS system, which continuously recycles urine and condensate water into drinking water and oxygen. These systems were brought to full functionality on STS-126 (ULF-2) mission. Through system failures and recovery, the ECLSS console has learned how to balance the water within the systems, store and use water for contingencies, and continue to work with the International Partners for short-term failures. Through these challenges and the system failures, the most important lesson learned has been the importance of redundancy and operational workarounds. It is only because of the flexibility of the hardware and the software that flight controllers have the opportunity to continue operating the system as a whole for mission success.
System for Anomaly and Failure Detection (SAFD) system development
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Oreilly, D.
1992-01-01
This task specified developing the hardware and software necessary to implement the System for Anomaly and Failure Detection (SAFD) algorithm, developed under Technology Test Bed (TTB) Task 21, on the TTB engine stand. This effort involved building two units; one unit to be installed in the Block II Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) Hardware Simulation Lab (HSL) at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), and one unit to be installed at the TTB engine stand. Rocketdyne personnel from the HSL performed the task. The SAFD algorithm was developed as an improvement over the current redline system used in the Space Shuttle Main Engine Controller (SSMEC). Simulation tests and execution against previous hot fire tests demonstrated that the SAFD algorithm can detect engine failure as much as tens of seconds before the redline system recognized the failure. Although the current algorithm only operates during steady state conditions (engine not throttling), work is underway to expand the algorithm to work during transient condition.
Failure mode and effects analysis drastically reduced potential risks in clinical trial conduct.
Lee, Howard; Lee, Heechan; Baik, Jungmi; Kim, Hyunjung; Kim, Rachel
2017-01-01
Failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) is a risk management tool to proactively identify and assess the causes and effects of potential failures in a system, thereby preventing them from happening. The objective of this study was to evaluate effectiveness of FMEA applied to an academic clinical trial center in a tertiary care setting. A multidisciplinary FMEA focus group at the Seoul National University Hospital Clinical Trials Center selected 6 core clinical trial processes, for which potential failure modes were identified and their risk priority number (RPN) was assessed. Remedial action plans for high-risk failure modes (RPN >160) were devised and a follow-up RPN scoring was conducted a year later. A total of 114 failure modes were identified with an RPN score ranging 3-378, which was mainly driven by the severity score. Fourteen failure modes were of high risk, 11 of which were addressed by remedial actions. Rescoring showed a dramatic improvement attributed to reduction in the occurrence and detection scores by >3 and >2 points, respectively. FMEA is a powerful tool to improve quality in clinical trials. The Seoul National University Hospital Clinical Trials Center is expanding its FMEA capability to other core clinical trial processes.
HETDEX tracker control system design and implementation
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Beno, Joseph H.; Hayes, Richard; Leck, Ron; Penney, Charles; Soukup, Ian
2012-09-01
To enable the Hobby-Eberly Telescope Dark Energy Experiment, The University of Texas at Austin Center for Electromechanics and McDonald Observatory developed a precision tracker and control system - an 18,000 kg robot to position a 3,100 kg payload within 10 microns of a desired dynamic track. Performance requirements to meet science needs and safety requirements that emerged from detailed Failure Modes and Effects Analysis resulted in a system of 13 precision controlled actuators and 100 additional analog and digital devices (primarily sensors and safety limit switches). Due to this complexity, demanding accuracy requirements, and stringent safety requirements, two independent control systems were developed. First, a versatile and easily configurable centralized control system that links with modeling and simulation tools during the hardware and software design process was deemed essential for normal operation including motion control. A second, parallel, control system, the Hardware Fault Controller (HFC) provides independent monitoring and fault control through a dedicated microcontroller to force a safe, controlled shutdown of the entire system in the event a fault is detected. Motion controls were developed in a Matlab-Simulink simulation environment, and coupled with dSPACE controller hardware. The dSPACE real-time operating system collects sensor information; motor commands are transmitted over a PROFIBUS network to servo amplifiers and drive motor status is received over the same network. To interface the dSPACE controller directly to absolute Heidenhain sensors with EnDat 2.2 protocol, a custom communication board was developed. This paper covers details of operational control software, the HFC, algorithms, tuning, debugging, testing, and lessons learned.
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Mock, Jason R.; Beno, Joe; Rafferty, Tom H.; Cornell, Mark E.
2010-07-01
To enable the Hobby-Eberly Telescope Wide Field Upgrade, the University of Texas Center for Electromechanics and McDonald Observatory are developing a precision tracker system - a 15,000 kg robot to position a 3,100 kg payload within 10 microns of a desired dynamic track. Performance requirements to meet science needs and safety requirements that emerged from detailed Failure Modes and Effects Analysis resulted in a system of 14 precision controlled actuators and 100 additional analog and digital devices (primarily sensors and safety limit switches). This level of system complexity and emphasis on fail-safe operation is typical of large modern telescopes and numerous industrial applications. Due to this complexity, demanding accuracy requirements, and stringent safety requirements, a highly versatile and easily configurable centralized control system that easily links with modeling and simulation tools during the hardware and software design process was deemed essential. The Matlab/Simulink simulation environment, coupled with dSPACE controller hardware, was selected for controls development and realization. The dSPACE real-time operating system collects sensor information; motor commands are transmitted over a PROFIBUS network to servo amplifiers and drive motor status is received over the same network. Custom designed position feedback loops, supplemented by feed forward force commands for enhanced performance, and algorithms to accommodate self-locking gearboxes (for safety), reside in dSPACE. To interface the dSPACE controller directly to absolute Heidenhain sensors with EnDat 2.2 protocol, a custom communication board was developed. This paper covers details of software and hardware, design choices and analysis, and supporting simulations (primarily Simulink).
Reliability achievement in high technology space systems
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Lindstrom, D. L.
1981-01-01
The production of failure-free hardware is discussed. The elements required to achieve such hardware are: technical expertise to design, analyze, and fully understand the design; use of high reliability parts and materials control in the manufacturing process; and testing to understand the system and weed out defects. The durability of the Hughes family of satellites is highlighted.
A streamlined failure mode and effects analysis
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Ford, Eric C., E-mail: eford@uw.edu; Smith, Koren; Terezakis, Stephanie
Purpose: Explore the feasibility and impact of a streamlined failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) using a structured process that is designed to minimize staff effort. Methods: FMEA for the external beam process was conducted at an affiliate radiation oncology center that treats approximately 60 patients per day. A structured FMEA process was developed which included clearly defined roles and goals for each phase. A core group of seven people was identified and a facilitator was chosen to lead the effort. Failure modes were identified and scored according to the FMEA formalism. A risk priority number,RPN, was calculated and usedmore » to rank failure modes. Failure modes with RPN > 150 received safety improvement interventions. Staff effort was carefully tracked throughout the project. Results: Fifty-two failure modes were identified, 22 collected during meetings, and 30 from take-home worksheets. The four top-ranked failure modes were: delay in film check, missing pacemaker protocol/consent, critical structures not contoured, and pregnant patient simulated without the team's knowledge of the pregnancy. These four failure modes hadRPN > 150 and received safety interventions. The FMEA was completed in one month in four 1-h meetings. A total of 55 staff hours were required and, additionally, 20 h by the facilitator. Conclusions: Streamlined FMEA provides a means of accomplishing a relatively large-scale analysis with modest effort. One potential value of FMEA is that it potentially provides a means of measuring the impact of quality improvement efforts through a reduction in risk scores. Future study of this possibility is needed.« less
SU-E-T-627: Failure Modes and Effect Analysis for Monthly Quality Assurance of Linear Accelerator
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Xie, J; Xiao, Y; Wang, J
2014-06-15
Purpose: To develop and implement a failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) on routine monthly Quality Assurance (QA) tests (physical tests part) of linear accelerator. Methods: A systematic failure mode and effect analysis method was performed for monthly QA procedures. A detailed process tree of monthly QA was created and potential failure modes were defined. Each failure mode may have many influencing factors. For each factor, a risk probability number (RPN) was calculated from the product of probability of occurrence (O), the severity of effect (S), and detectability of the failure (D). The RPN scores are in a range ofmore » 1 to 1000, with higher scores indicating stronger correlation to a given influencing factor of a failure mode. Five medical physicists in our institution were responsible to discuss and to define the O, S, D values. Results: 15 possible failure modes were identified and all RPN scores of all influencing factors of these 15 failue modes were from 8 to 150, and the checklist of FMEA in monthly QA was drawn. The system showed consistent and accurate response to erroneous conditions. Conclusion: The influencing factors of RPN greater than 50 were considered as highly-correlated factors of a certain out-oftolerance monthly QA test. FMEA is a fast and flexible tool to develop an implement a quality management (QM) frame work of monthly QA, which improved the QA efficiency of our QA team. The FMEA work may incorporate more quantification and monitoring fuctions in future.« less
Consistency of FMEA used in the validation of analytical procedures.
Oldenhof, M T; van Leeuwen, J F; Nauta, M J; de Kaste, D; Odekerken-Rombouts, Y M C F; Vredenbregt, M J; Weda, M; Barends, D M
2011-02-20
In order to explore the consistency of the outcome of a Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) in the validation of analytical procedures, an FMEA was carried out by two different teams. The two teams applied two separate FMEAs to a High Performance Liquid Chromatography-Diode Array Detection-Mass Spectrometry (HPLC-DAD-MS) analytical procedure used in the quality control of medicines. Each team was free to define their own ranking scales for the probability of severity (S), occurrence (O), and detection (D) of failure modes. We calculated Risk Priority Numbers (RPNs) and we identified the failure modes above the 90th percentile of RPN values as failure modes needing urgent corrective action; failure modes falling between the 75th and 90th percentile of RPN values were identified as failure modes needing necessary corrective action, respectively. Team 1 and Team 2 identified five and six failure modes needing urgent corrective action respectively, with two being commonly identified. Of the failure modes needing necessary corrective actions, about a third were commonly identified by both teams. These results show inconsistency in the outcome of the FMEA. To improve consistency, we recommend that FMEA is always carried out under the supervision of an experienced FMEA-facilitator and that the FMEA team has at least two members with competence in the analytical method to be validated. However, the FMEAs of both teams contained valuable information that was not identified by the other team, indicating that this inconsistency is not always a drawback. Copyright © 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Development of STS/Centaur failure probabilities liftoff to Centaur separation
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Hudson, J. M.
1982-01-01
The results of an analysis to determine STS/Centaur catastrophic vehicle response probabilities for the phases of vehicle flight from STS liftoff to Centaur separation from the Orbiter are presented. The analysis considers only category one component failure modes as contributors to the vehicle response mode probabilities. The relevant component failure modes are grouped into one of fourteen categories of potential vehicle behavior. By assigning failure rates to each component, for each of its failure modes, the STS/Centaur vehicle response probabilities in each phase of flight can be calculated. The results of this study will be used in a DOE analysis to ascertain the hazard from carrying a nuclear payload on the STS.
Extended Testability Analysis Tool
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Melcher, Kevin; Maul, William A.; Fulton, Christopher
2012-01-01
The Extended Testability Analysis (ETA) Tool is a software application that supports fault management (FM) by performing testability analyses on the fault propagation model of a given system. Fault management includes the prevention of faults through robust design margins and quality assurance methods, or the mitigation of system failures. Fault management requires an understanding of the system design and operation, potential failure mechanisms within the system, and the propagation of those potential failures through the system. The purpose of the ETA Tool software is to process the testability analysis results from a commercial software program called TEAMS Designer in order to provide a detailed set of diagnostic assessment reports. The ETA Tool is a command-line process with several user-selectable report output options. The ETA Tool also extends the COTS testability analysis and enables variation studies with sensor sensitivity impacts on system diagnostics and component isolation using a single testability output. The ETA Tool can also provide extended analyses from a single set of testability output files. The following analysis reports are available to the user: (1) the Detectability Report provides a breakdown of how each tested failure mode was detected, (2) the Test Utilization Report identifies all the failure modes that each test detects, (3) the Failure Mode Isolation Report demonstrates the system s ability to discriminate between failure modes, (4) the Component Isolation Report demonstrates the system s ability to discriminate between failure modes relative to the components containing the failure modes, (5) the Sensor Sensor Sensitivity Analysis Report shows the diagnostic impact due to loss of sensor information, and (6) the Effect Mapping Report identifies failure modes that result in specified system-level effects.
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Zheng, W.; Gao, J. M.; Wang, R. X.; Chen, K.; Jiang, Y.
2017-12-01
This paper put forward a new method of technical characteristics deployment based on Reliability Function Deployment (RFD) by analysing the advantages and shortages of related research works on mechanical reliability design. The matrix decomposition structure of RFD was used to describe the correlative relation between failure mechanisms, soft failures and hard failures. By considering the correlation of multiple failure modes, the reliability loss of one failure mode to the whole part was defined, and a calculation and analysis model for reliability loss was presented. According to the reliability loss, the reliability index value of the whole part was allocated to each failure mode. On the basis of the deployment of reliability index value, the inverse reliability method was employed to acquire the values of technology characteristics. The feasibility and validity of proposed method were illustrated by a development case of machining centre’s transmission system.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Mossahebi, S; Feigenberg, S; Nichols, E
Purpose: GammaPod™, the first stereotactic radiotherapy device for early stage breast cancer treatment, has been recently installed and commissioned at our institution. A multidisciplinary working group applied the failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) approach to perform a risk analysis. Methods: FMEA was applied to the GammaPod™ treatment process by: 1) generating process maps for each stage of treatment; 2) identifying potential failure modes and outlining their causes and effects; 3) scoring the potential failure modes using the risk priority number (RPN) system based on the product of severity, frequency of occurrence, and detectability (ranging 1–10). An RPN of highermore » than 150 was set as the threshold for minimal concern of risk. For these high-risk failure modes, potential quality assurance procedures and risk control techniques have been proposed. A new set of severity, occurrence, and detectability values were re-assessed in presence of the suggested mitigation strategies. Results: In the single-day image-and-treat workflow, 19, 22, and 27 sub-processes were identified for the stages of simulation, treatment planning, and delivery processes, respectively. During the simulation stage, 38 potential failure modes were found and scored, in terms of RPN, in the range of 9-392. 34 potential failure modes were analyzed in treatment planning with a score range of 16-200. For the treatment delivery stage, 47 potential failure modes were found with an RPN score range of 16-392. The most critical failure modes consisted of breast-cup pressure loss and incorrect target localization due to patient upper-body alignment inaccuracies. The final RPN score of these failure modes based on recommended actions were assessed to be below 150. Conclusion: FMEA risk analysis technique was applied to the treatment process of GammaPod™, a new stereotactic radiotherapy technology. Application of systematic risk analysis methods is projected to lead to improved quality of GammaPod™ treatments. Ying Niu and Cedric Yu are affiliated with Xcision Medical Systems.« less
Compendium of Mechanical Limit-States
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Kowal, Michael
1996-01-01
A compendium was compiled and is described to provide a diverse set of limit-state relationships for use in demonstrating the application of probabilistic reliability methods to mechanical systems. The different limit-state relationships can be used to analyze the reliability of a candidate mechanical system. In determining the limit-states to be included in the compendium, a comprehensive listing of the possible failure modes that could affect mechanical systems reliability was generated. Previous literature defining mechanical modes of failure was studied, and cited failure modes were included. From this, classifications for failure modes were derived and are described in some detail.
Wong, Kam Cheong
2016-04-06
Clinicians use various clinical reasoning tools such as Ishikawa diagram to enhance their clinical experience and reasoning skills. Failure mode and effects analysis, which is an engineering methodology in origin, can be modified and applied to provide inputs into an Ishikawa diagram. The human biliary system is used to illustrate a modified failure mode and effects analysis. The anatomical and physiological processes of the biliary system are reviewed. Failure is defined as an abnormality caused by infective, inflammatory, obstructive, malignancy, autoimmune and other pathological processes. The potential failures, their effect(s), main clinical features, and investigation that can help a clinician to diagnose at each anatomical part and physiological process are reviewed and documented in a modified failure mode and effects analysis table. Relevant medical and surgical cases are retrieved from the medical literature and weaved into the table. A total of 80 clinical cases which are relevant to the modified failure mode and effects analysis for the human biliary system have been reviewed and weaved into a designated table. The table is the backbone and framework for further expansion. Reviewing and updating the table is an iterative and continual process. The relevant clinical features in the modified failure mode and effects analysis are then extracted and included in the relevant Ishikawa diagram. This article illustrates an application of engineering methodology in medicine, and it sows the seeds of potential cross-pollination between engineering and medicine. Establishing a modified failure mode and effects analysis can be a teamwork project or self-directed learning process, or a mix of both. Modified failure mode and effects analysis can be deployed to obtain inputs for an Ishikawa diagram which in turn can be used to enhance clinical experiences and clinical reasoning skills for clinicians, medical educators, and students.
49 CFR Appendix A to Part 238 - Schedule of Civil Penalties 1
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-10-01
....15Movement of power brake defects: (b) Improper movement from Class I or IA brake test 5,000 7,500 (c... required design features 5,000 7,500 (e) Failure to comply with hardware and software safety program 5,000... test previously used equipment 7,500 11,000 (b)(1) Failure to develop plan 7,500 11,000 (b)(2) Failure...
49 CFR Appendix A to Part 238 - Schedule of Civil Penalties 1
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
....15Movement of power brake defects: (b) Improper movement from Class I or IA brake test 5,000 7,500 (c... required design features 5,000 7,500 (e) Failure to comply with hardware and software safety program 5,000... test previously used equipment 7,500 11,000 (b)(1) Failure to develop plan 7,500 11,000 (b)(2) Failure...
49 CFR Appendix A to Part 238 - Schedule of Civil Penalties 1
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-10-01
... movement from Class I or IA brake test 5,000 7,500 (c) Improper movement of en route defect 2,500 5,000 (2...) Failure to include required design features 5,000 7,500 (e) Failure to comply with hardware and software... properly test previously used equipment 7,500 11,000 (b)(1) Failure to develop plan 7,500 11,000 (b)(2...
Fokkinga, Wietske A; Kreulen, Cees M; Vallittu, Pekka K; Creugers, Nico H J
2004-01-01
This study sought to aggregate literature data on in vitro failure loads and failure modes of prefabricated fiber-reinforced composite (FRC) post systems and to compare them to those of prefabricated metal, custom-cast, and ceramic post systems. The literature was searched using MEDLINE from 1984 to 2003 for dental articles in English. Keywords used were (post or core or buildup or dowel) and (teeth or tooth). Additional inclusion/exclusion steps were conducted, each step by two independent readers: (1) Abstracts describing post-and-core techniques to reconstruct endodontically treated teeth and their mechanical and physical characteristics were included (descriptive studies or reviews were excluded); (2) articles that included FRC post systems were selected; (3) in vitro studies, single-rooted human teeth, prefabricated FRC posts, and composite as the core material were the selection criteria; and (4) failure loads and modes were extracted from the selected papers, and failure modes were dichotomized (distinction was made between "favorable failures," defined as reparable failures, and "unfavorable failures,"defined as irreparable [root] fractures). The literature search revealed 1,984 abstracts. Included were 244, 42, and 12 articles in the first, second, and third selection steps, respectively. Custom-cast post systems showed higher failure loads than prefabricated FRC post systems, whereas ceramic showed lower failure loads. Significantly more favorable failures occurred with prefabricated FRC post systems than with prefabricated and custom-cast metal post systems. The variable "post system" had a significant effect on mean failure loads. FRC post systems more frequently showed favorable failure modes than did metal post systems.
Composite Interlaminar Shear Fracture Toughness, G(sub 2c): Shear Measurement of Sheer Myth?
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
OBrien, T. Kevin
1997-01-01
The concept of G2c as a measure of the interlaminar shear fracture toughness of a composite material is critically examined. In particular, it is argued that the apparent G2c as typically measured is inconsistent with the original definition of shear fracture. It is shown that interlaminar shear failure actually consists of tension failures in the resin rich layers between plies followed by the coalescence of ligaments created by these failures and not the sliding of two planes relative to one another that is assumed in fracture mechanics theory. Several strain energy release rate solutions are reviewed for delamination in composite laminates and structural components where failures have been experimentally documented. Failures typically occur at a location where the mode 1 component accounts for at least one half of the total G at failure. Hence, it is the mode I and mixed-mode interlaminar fracture toughness data that will be most useful in predicting delamination failure in composite components in service. Although apparent G2c measurements may prove useful for completeness of generating mixed-mode criteria, the accuracy of these measurements may have very little influence on the prediction of mixed-mode failures in most structural components.
Architecture of a platform for hardware-in-the-loop simulation of flying vehicle control systems
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Belokon', S. A.; Zolotukhin, Yu. N.; Filippov, M. N.
2017-07-01
A hardware-software platform is presented, which is designed for the development and hardware-in-the-loop simulation of flying vehicle control systems. This platform ensures the construction of the mathematical model of the plant, development of algorithms and software for onboard radioelectronic equipment and ground control station, and visualization of the three-dimensional model of the vehicle and external environment of the cockpit in the simulator training mode.
Failure Atlas for Rolling Bearings in Wind Turbines
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Tallian, T. E.
2006-01-01
This Atlas is structured as a supplement to the book: T.E. Tallian: Failure Atlas for Hertz Contact Machine Elements, 2nd edition, ASME Press New York, (1999). The content of the atlas comprises plate pages from the book that contain bearing failure images, application data, and descriptions of failure mode, image, and suspected failure causes. Rolling bearings are a critical component of the mainshaft system, gearbox and generator in the rapidly developing technology of power generating wind turbines. The demands for long service life are stringent; the design load, speed and temperature regimes are demanding and the environmental conditions including weather,more » contamination, impediments to monitoring and maintenance are often unfavorable. As a result, experience has shown that the rolling bearings are prone to a variety of failure modes that may prevent achievement of design lives. Morphological failure diagnosis is extensively used in the failure analysis and improvement of bearing operation. Accumulated experience shows that the failure appearance and mode of failure causation in wind turbine bearings has many distinguishing features. The present Atlas is a first effort to collect an interpreted database of specifically wind turbine related rolling bearing failures and make it widely available. This Atlas is structured as a supplement to the book: T. E. Tallian: Failure Atlas for Hertz Contact Machine Elements, 2d edition, ASME Press New York, (1999). The main body of that book is a comprehensive collection of self-contained pages called Plates, containing failure images, bearing and application data, and three descriptions: failure mode, image and suspected failure causes. The Plates are sorted by main failure mode into chapters. Each chapter is preceded by a general technical discussion of the failure mode, its appearance and causes. The Plates part is supplemented by an introductory part, describing the appearance classification and failure classification systems used, and by several indexes. The present Atlas is intended as a supplement to the book. It has the same structure but contains only Plate pages, arranged in chapters, each with a chapter heading page giving a short definition of the failure mode illustrated. Each Plate page is self contained, with images, bearing and application data, and descriptions of the failure mode, the images and the suspected causes. Images are provided in two resolutions: The text page includes 6 by 9 cm images. In addition, high resolution image files are attached, to be retrieved by clicking on their 'push pin' icon. While the material in the present Atlas is self-contained, it is nonetheless a supplement to the book and the complete interpretation of the terse image descriptions and of the system underlying the failure code presupposes familiarity with the book. Since this Atlas is a supplement to the book, its chapter numbering follows that of the book. Not all failure modes covered in the book have been found among the observed wind turbines. For that reason, and because of the omission of introductory matter, the chapter numbers in this Atlas are not a continuous sequence.« less
75 FR 51931 - Airworthiness Directives; Dassault-Aviation Model FALCON 7X Airplanes
Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014
2010-08-24
... root cause: A leakage failure mode of Transient Voltage Suppressor (TVS) diodes used on Power... condition is a leakage failure mode of TVS diodes used on PDCU cards or GCU cards in the PPDB, which in... discovery of a common root cause: A leakage failure mode of Transient Voltage Suppressor (TVS) diodes used...
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Sawant, M.; Christou, A.
2012-12-01
While use of LEDs in Fiber Optics and lighting applications is common, their use in medical diagnostic applications is not very extensive. Since the precise value of light intensity will be used to interpret patient results, understanding failure modes [1-4] is very important. We used the Failure Modes and Effects Criticality Analysis (FMECA) tool to identify the critical failure modes of the LEDs. FMECA involves identification of various failure modes, their effects on the system (LED optical output in this context), their frequency of occurrence, severity and the criticality of the failure modes. The competing failure modes/mechanisms were degradation of: active layer (where electron-hole recombination occurs to emit light), electrodes (provides electrical contact to the semiconductor chip), Indium Tin Oxide (ITO) surface layer (used to improve current spreading and light extraction), plastic encapsulation (protective polymer layer) and packaging failures (bond wires, heat sink separation). A FMECA table is constructed and the criticality is calculated by estimating the failure effect probability (β), failure mode ratio (α), failure rate (λ) and the operating time. Once the critical failure modes were identified, the next steps were generation of prior time to failure distribution and comparing with our accelerated life test data. To generate the prior distributions, data and results from previous investigations were utilized [5-33] where reliability test results of similar LEDs were reported. From the graphs or tabular data, we extracted the time required for the optical power output to reach 80% of its initial value. This is our failure criterion for the medical diagnostic application. Analysis of published data for different LED materials (AlGaInP, GaN, AlGaAs), the Semiconductor Structures (DH, MQW) and the mode of testing (DC, Pulsed) was carried out. The data was categorized according to the materials system and LED structure such as AlGaInP-DH-DC, AlGaInP-MQW-DC, GaN-DH-DC, and GaN-DH-DC. Although the reported testing was carried out at different temperature and current, the reported data was converted to the present application conditions of the medical environment. Comparisons between the model data and accelerated test results carried out in the present are reported. The use of accelerating agent modeling and regression analysis was also carried out. We have used the Inverse Power Law model with the current density J as the accelerating agent and the Arrhenius model with temperature as the accelerating agent. Finally, our reported methodology is presented as an approach for analyzing LED suitability for the target medical diagnostic applications.
EOS-AM precision pointing verification
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Throckmorton, A.; Braknis, E.; Bolek, J.
1993-01-01
The Earth Observing System (EOS) AM mission requires tight pointing knowledge to meet scientific objectives, in a spacecraft with low frequency flexible appendage modes. As the spacecraft controller reacts to various disturbance sources and as the inherent appendage modes are excited by this control action, verification of precision pointing knowledge becomes particularly challenging for the EOS-AM mission. As presently conceived, this verification includes a complementary set of multi-disciplinary analyses, hardware tests and real-time computer in the loop simulations, followed by collection and analysis of hardware test and flight data and supported by a comprehensive data base repository for validated program values.
Teixeira, Flavia C; de Almeida, Carlos E; Saiful Huq, M
2016-01-01
The goal of this study was to evaluate the safety and quality management program for stereotactic radiosurgery (SRS) treatment processes at three radiotherapy centers in Brazil by using three industrial engineering tools (1) process mapping, (2) failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA), and (3) fault tree analysis. The recommendations of Task Group 100 of American Association of Physicists in Medicine were followed to apply the three tools described above to create a process tree for SRS procedure for each radiotherapy center and then FMEA was performed. Failure modes were identified for all process steps and values of risk priority number (RPN) were calculated from O, S, and D (RPN = O × S × D) values assigned by a professional team responsible for patient care. The subprocess treatment planning was presented with the highest number of failure modes for all centers. The total number of failure modes were 135, 104, and 131 for centers I, II, and III, respectively. The highest RPN value for each center is as follows: center I (204), center II (372), and center III (370). Failure modes with RPN ≥ 100: center I (22), center II (115), and center III (110). Failure modes characterized by S ≥ 7, represented 68% of the failure modes for center III, 62% for center II, and 45% for center I. Failure modes with RPNs values ≥100 and S ≥ 7, D ≥ 5, and O ≥ 5 were considered as high priority in this study. The results of the present study show that the safety risk profiles for the same stereotactic radiotherapy process are different at three radiotherapy centers in Brazil. Although this is the same treatment process, this present study showed that the risk priority is different and it will lead to implementation of different safety interventions among the centers. Therefore, the current practice of applying universal device-centric QA is not adequate to address all possible failures in clinical processes at different radiotherapy centers. Integrated approaches to device-centric and process specific quality management program specific to each radiotherapy center are the key to a safe quality management program.
Orbiter wheel and tire certification
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Campbell, C. C., Jr.
1985-01-01
The orbiter wheel and tire development has required a unique series of certification tests to demonstrate the ability of the hardware to meet severe performance requirements. Early tests of the main landing gear wheel using conventional slow roll testing resulted in hardware failures. This resulted in a need to conduct high velocity tests with crosswind effects for assurance that the hardware was safe for a limited number of flights. Currently, this approach and the conventional slow roll and static tests are used to certify the wheel/tire assembly for operational use.
Masini, Laura; Donis, Laura; Loi, Gianfranco; Mones, Eleonora; Molina, Elisa; Bolchini, Cesare; Krengli, Marco
2014-01-01
The aim of this study was to analyze the application of the failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) to intracranial stereotactic radiation surgery (SRS) by linear accelerator in order to identify the potential failure modes in the process tree and adopt appropriate safety measures to prevent adverse events (AEs) and near-misses, thus improving the process quality. A working group was set up to perform FMEA for intracranial SRS in the framework of a quality assurance program. FMEA was performed in 4 consecutive tasks: (1) creation of a visual map of the process; (2) identification of possible failure modes; (3) assignment of a risk probability number (RPN) to each failure mode based on tabulated scores of severity, frequency of occurrence and detectability; and (4) identification of preventive measures to minimize the risk of occurrence. The whole SRS procedure was subdivided into 73 single steps; 116 total possible failure modes were identified and a score of severity, occurrence, and detectability was assigned to each. Based on these scores, RPN was calculated for each failure mode thus obtaining values from 1 to 180. In our analysis, 112/116 (96.6%) RPN values were <60, 2 (1.7%) between 60 and 125 (63, 70), and 2 (1.7%) >125 (135, 180). The 2 highest RPN scores were assigned to the risk of using the wrong collimator's size and incorrect coordinates on the laser target localizer frame. Failure modes and effects analysis is a simple and practical proactive tool for systematic analysis of risks in radiation therapy. In our experience of SRS, FMEA led to the adoption of major changes in various steps of the SRS procedure.
FMEA of manual and automated methods for commissioning a radiotherapy treatment planning system.
Wexler, Amy; Gu, Bruce; Goddu, Sreekrishna; Mutic, Maya; Yaddanapudi, Sridhar; Olsen, Lindsey; Harry, Taylor; Noel, Camille; Pawlicki, Todd; Mutic, Sasa; Cai, Bin
2017-09-01
To evaluate the level of risk involved in treatment planning system (TPS) commissioning using a manual test procedure, and to compare the associated process-based risk to that of an automated commissioning process (ACP) by performing an in-depth failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA). The authors collaborated to determine the potential failure modes of the TPS commissioning process using (a) approaches involving manual data measurement, modeling, and validation tests and (b) an automated process utilizing application programming interface (API) scripting, preloaded, and premodeled standard radiation beam data, digital heterogeneous phantom, and an automated commissioning test suite (ACTS). The severity (S), occurrence (O), and detectability (D) were scored for each failure mode and the risk priority numbers (RPN) were derived based on TG-100 scale. Failure modes were then analyzed and ranked based on RPN. The total number of failure modes, RPN scores and the top 10 failure modes with highest risk were described and cross-compared between the two approaches. RPN reduction analysis is also presented and used as another quantifiable metric to evaluate the proposed approach. The FMEA of a MTP resulted in 47 failure modes with an RPN ave of 161 and S ave of 6.7. The highest risk process of "Measurement Equipment Selection" resulted in an RPN max of 640. The FMEA of an ACP resulted in 36 failure modes with an RPN ave of 73 and S ave of 6.7. The highest risk process of "EPID Calibration" resulted in an RPN max of 576. An FMEA of treatment planning commissioning tests using automation and standardization via API scripting, preloaded, and pre-modeled standard beam data, and digital phantoms suggests that errors and risks may be reduced through the use of an ACP. © 2017 American Association of Physicists in Medicine.
Post-Shuttle EVA Operations on ISS
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
West, Bill; Witt, Vincent; Chullen, Cinda
2010-01-01
The EVA hardware used to assemble and maintain the ISS was designed with the assumption that it would be returned to Earth on the Space Shuttle for ground processing, refurbishment, or failure investigation (if necessary). With the retirement of the Space Shuttle, a new concept of operations was developed to enable EVA hardware (EMU, Airlock Systems, EVA tools, and associated support equipment and consumables) to perform ISS EVAs until 2016 and possibly beyond to 2020. Shortly after the decision to retire the Space Shuttle was announced, NASA and the One EVA contractor team jointly initiated the EVA 2010 Project. Challenges were addressed to extend the operating life and certification of EVA hardware, secure the capability to launch EVA hardware safely on alternate launch vehicles, and protect EMU hardware operability on orbit for long durations.
NAC Off-Vehicle Brake Testing Project
2007-05-01
disc pads/rotors and drum shoe assemblies/ drums - Must use vehicle “OEM” brake /hub-end hardware, or ESA... brake component comparison analysis (primary)* - brake system design analysis - brake system component failure analysis - (*) limited to disc pads...e.g. disc pads/rotors, drum shoe assemblies/ drums . - Not limited to “OEM” brake /hub-end hardware as there is none ! - Weight transfer, plumbing,
Application of failure mode and effect analysis in an assisted reproduction technology laboratory.
Intra, Giulia; Alteri, Alessandra; Corti, Laura; Rabellotti, Elisa; Papaleo, Enrico; Restelli, Liliana; Biondo, Stefania; Garancini, Maria Paola; Candiani, Massimo; Viganò, Paola
2016-08-01
Assisted reproduction technology laboratories have a very high degree of complexity. Mismatches of gametes or embryos can occur, with catastrophic consequences for patients. To minimize the risk of error, a multi-institutional working group applied failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) to each critical activity/step as a method of risk assessment. This analysis led to the identification of the potential failure modes, together with their causes and effects, using the risk priority number (RPN) scoring system. In total, 11 individual steps and 68 different potential failure modes were identified. The highest ranked failure modes, with an RPN score of 25, encompassed 17 failures and pertained to "patient mismatch" and "biological sample mismatch". The maximum reduction in risk, with RPN reduced from 25 to 5, was mostly related to the introduction of witnessing. The critical failure modes in sample processing were improved by 50% in the RPN by focusing on staff training. Three indicators of FMEA success, based on technical skill, competence and traceability, have been evaluated after FMEA implementation. Witnessing by a second human operator should be introduced in the laboratory to avoid sample mix-ups. These findings confirm that FMEA can effectively reduce errors in assisted reproduction technology laboratories. Copyright © 2016 Reproductive Healthcare Ltd. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Failure mode and effects analysis drastically reduced potential risks in clinical trial conduct
Baik, Jungmi; Kim, Hyunjung; Kim, Rachel
2017-01-01
Background Failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) is a risk management tool to proactively identify and assess the causes and effects of potential failures in a system, thereby preventing them from happening. The objective of this study was to evaluate effectiveness of FMEA applied to an academic clinical trial center in a tertiary care setting. Methods A multidisciplinary FMEA focus group at the Seoul National University Hospital Clinical Trials Center selected 6 core clinical trial processes, for which potential failure modes were identified and their risk priority number (RPN) was assessed. Remedial action plans for high-risk failure modes (RPN >160) were devised and a follow-up RPN scoring was conducted a year later. Results A total of 114 failure modes were identified with an RPN score ranging 3–378, which was mainly driven by the severity score. Fourteen failure modes were of high risk, 11 of which were addressed by remedial actions. Rescoring showed a dramatic improvement attributed to reduction in the occurrence and detection scores by >3 and >2 points, respectively. Conclusions FMEA is a powerful tool to improve quality in clinical trials. The Seoul National University Hospital Clinical Trials Center is expanding its FMEA capability to other core clinical trial processes. PMID:29089745
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Dennis, L.B.
1994-12-01
This research extends the existing knowledge of cross-ply metal matrix composites (MMC) to include fatigue behavior under strain-controlled fully reversed loading. This study investigated fatigue life, failure modes and damage mechanisms of the SCS-6/Ti-15-3, (O/9O)2s, MMC. The laminate was subjected to fully reversed fatigue at elevated temperature (427 deg C) at various strain levels. Stress, strain and modulus data were analyzed to characterize the macro-mechanical behavior of the composite. Microscopy and fractography were accomplished to identify and characterize the damage mechanisms at the microscopic level. Failure modes varied according to the maximum applied strain level showing either mixed mode (i.e.more » combination of both fiber and matrix dominated modes) or matrix dominated fatigue failures. As expected, higher strain loadings resulted in more ductility of the matrix at failure, evidenced by fracture surface features. For testing of the same composite laminate, the fatigue life under strain controlled mode slightly increased, compared to its load-controlled mode counterpart, using the effective strain range comparison basis. However, the respective fatigue life curves converged in the high cycle region, suggesting that the matrix dominated failure mode produces equivalent predicted fatigue lives for both control modes.« less
Turbofan engine demonstration of sensor failure detection
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Merrill, Walter C.; Delaat, John C.; Abdelwahab, Mahmood
1991-01-01
In the paper, the results of a full-scale engine demonstration of a sensor failure detection algorithm are presented. The algorithm detects, isolates, and accommodates sensor failures using analytical redundancy. The experimental hardware, including the F100 engine, is described. Demonstration results were obtained over a large portion of a typical flight envelope for the F100 engine. They include both subsonic and supersonic conditions at both medium and full, nonafter burning, power. Estimated accuracy, minimum detectable levels of sensor failures, and failure accommodation performance for an F100 turbofan engine control system are discussed.
Distributed phased array architecture study
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Bourgeois, Brian
1987-01-01
Variations in amplifiers and phase shifters can cause degraded antenna performance, depending also on the environmental conditions and antenna array architecture. The implementation of distributed phased array hardware was studied with the aid of the DISTAR computer program as a simulation tool. This simulation provides guidance in hardware simulation. Both hard and soft failures of the amplifiers in the T/R modules are modeled. Hard failures are catastrophic: no power is transmitted to the antenna elements. Noncatastrophic or soft failures are modeled as a modified Gaussian distribution. The resulting amplitude characteristics then determine the array excitation coefficients. The phase characteristics take on a uniform distribution. Pattern characteristics such as antenna gain, half power beamwidth, mainbeam phase errors, sidelobe levels, and beam pointing errors were studied as functions of amplifier and phase shifter variations. General specifications for amplifier and phase shifter tolerances in various architecture configurations for C band and S band were determined.
Man-rated flight software for the F-8 DFBW program
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Bairnsfather, R. R.
1975-01-01
The design, implementation, and verification of the flight control software used in the F-8 DFBW program are discussed. Since the DFBW utilizes an Apollo computer and hardware, the procedures, controls, and basic management techniques employed are based on those developed for the Apollo software system. Program Assembly Control, simulator configuration control, erasable-memory load generation, change procedures and anomaly reporting are discussed. The primary verification tools--the all-digital simulator, the hybrid simulator, and the Iron Bird simulator--are described, as well as the program test plans and their implementation on the various simulators. Failure-effects analysis and the creation of special failure-generating software for testing purposes are described. The quality of the end product is evidenced by the F-8 DFBW flight test program in which 42 flights, totaling 58 hours of flight time, were successfully made without any DFCS inflight software, or hardware, failures.
High-throughput sequencing: a failure mode analysis.
Yang, George S; Stott, Jeffery M; Smailus, Duane; Barber, Sarah A; Balasundaram, Miruna; Marra, Marco A; Holt, Robert A
2005-01-04
Basic manufacturing principles are becoming increasingly important in high-throughput sequencing facilities where there is a constant drive to increase quality, increase efficiency, and decrease operating costs. While high-throughput centres report failure rates typically on the order of 10%, the causes of sporadic sequencing failures are seldom analyzed in detail and have not, in the past, been formally reported. Here we report the results of a failure mode analysis of our production sequencing facility based on detailed evaluation of 9,216 ESTs generated from two cDNA libraries. Two categories of failures are described; process-related failures (failures due to equipment or sample handling) and template-related failures (failures that are revealed by close inspection of electropherograms and are likely due to properties of the template DNA sequence itself). Preventative action based on a detailed understanding of failure modes is likely to improve the performance of other production sequencing pipelines.
Ahmad, Tariq; Fiuzat, Mona; Neely, Ben; Neely, Megan; Pencina, Michael J.; Kraus, William E.; Zannad, Faiez; Whellan, David J.; Donahue, Mark; Piña, Ileana L.; Adams, Kirkwood; Kitzman, Dalane W.; O’Connor, Christopher M.; Felker, G. Michael
2014-01-01
Objective To determine whether biomarkers of myocardial stress and fibrosis improve prediction of mode of death in patients with chronic heart failure. Background The two most common modes of death in patients with chronic heart failure are pump failure and sudden cardiac death. Prediction of mode of death may facilitate treatment decisions. The relationship between NT-proBNP, galectin-3, and ST2, biomarkers that reflect different pathogenic pathways in heart failure (myocardial stress and fibrosis), and mode of death is unknown. Methods HF-ACTION was a randomized controlled trial of exercise training vs. usual care in patients with chronic heart failure due to left ventricular systolic dysfunction (LVEF<35%). An independent clinical events committee prospectively adjudicated mode of death. NT-proBNP, galectin-3, and ST2 levels were assessed at baseline in 813 subjects. Associations between biomarkers and mode of death were assessed using cause-specific Cox-proportional hazards modeling, and interaction testing was used to measure differential association between biomarkers and pump failure versus sudden cardiac death. Discrimination and risk reclassification metrics were used to assess the added value of galectin-3 and ST2 in predicting mode of death risk beyond a clinical model that included NT-proBNP. Results After a median follow up of 2.5 years, there were 155 deaths: 49 from pump failure 42 from sudden cardiac death, and 64 from other causes. Elevations in all biomarkers were associated with increased risk of both pump failure and sudden cardiac death in both adjusted and unadjusted analyses. In each case, increases in the biomarker had a stronger association with pump failure than sudden cardiac death but this relationship was attenuated after adjustment for clinical risk factors. Clinical variables along with NT-proBNP levels were stronger predictors of pump failure (C statistic: 0.87) than sudden cardiac death (C statistic: 0.73). Addition of ST2 and galectin-3 led to improved net risk classification of 11% for sudden cardiac death, but not pump failure. Conclusions Clinical predictors along with NT-proBNP levels were strong predictors of pump failure risk, with insignificant incremental contributions of ST2 and galectin-3. Predictability of sudden cardiac death risk was less robust and enhanced by information provided by novel biomarkers. PMID:24952693
Failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) for Gamma Knife radiosurgery.
Xu, Andy Yuanguang; Bhatnagar, Jagdish; Bednarz, Greg; Flickinger, John; Arai, Yoshio; Vacsulka, Jonet; Feng, Wenzheng; Monaco, Edward; Niranjan, Ajay; Lunsford, L Dade; Huq, M Saiful
2017-11-01
Gamma Knife radiosurgery is a highly precise and accurate treatment technique for treating brain diseases with low risk of serious error that nevertheless could potentially be reduced. We applied the AAPM Task Group 100 recommended failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) tool to develop a risk-based quality management program for Gamma Knife radiosurgery. A team consisting of medical physicists, radiation oncologists, neurosurgeons, radiation safety officers, nurses, operating room technologists, and schedulers at our institution and an external physicist expert on Gamma Knife was formed for the FMEA study. A process tree and a failure mode table were created for the Gamma Knife radiosurgery procedures using the Leksell Gamma Knife Perfexion and 4C units. Three scores for the probability of occurrence (O), the severity (S), and the probability of no detection for failure mode (D) were assigned to each failure mode by 8 professionals on a scale from 1 to 10. An overall risk priority number (RPN) for each failure mode was then calculated from the averaged O, S, and D scores. The coefficient of variation for each O, S, or D score was also calculated. The failure modes identified were prioritized in terms of both the RPN scores and the severity scores. The established process tree for Gamma Knife radiosurgery consists of 10 subprocesses and 53 steps, including a subprocess for frame placement and 11 steps that are directly related to the frame-based nature of the Gamma Knife radiosurgery. Out of the 86 failure modes identified, 40 Gamma Knife specific failure modes were caused by the potential for inappropriate use of the radiosurgery head frame, the imaging fiducial boxes, the Gamma Knife helmets and plugs, the skull definition tools as well as other features of the GammaPlan treatment planning system. The other 46 failure modes are associated with the registration, imaging, image transfer, contouring processes that are common for all external beam radiation therapy techniques. The failure modes with the highest hazard scores are related to imperfect frame adaptor attachment, bad fiducial box assembly, unsecured plugs/inserts, overlooked target areas, and undetected machine mechanical failure during the morning QA process. The implementation of the FMEA approach for Gamma Knife radiosurgery enabled deeper understanding of the overall process among all professionals involved in the care of the patient and helped identify potential weaknesses in the overall process. The results of the present study give us a basis for the development of a risk based quality management program for Gamma Knife radiosurgery. © 2017 The Authors. Journal of Applied Clinical Medical Physics published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. on behalf of American Association of Physicists in Medicine.
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) Assistant Tool Feasibility Study
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Flores, Melissa; Malin, Jane T.
2013-01-01
An effort to determine the feasibility of a software tool to assist in Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) has been completed. This new and unique approach to FMEA uses model based systems engineering concepts to recommend failure modes, causes, and effects to the user after they have made several selections from pick lists about a component s functions and inputs/outputs. Recommendations are made based on a library using common failure modes identified over the course of several major human spaceflight programs. However, the tool could be adapted for use in a wide range of applications from NASA to the energy industry.
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) Assistant Tool Feasibility Study
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Flores, Melissa D.; Malin, Jane T.; Fleming, Land D.
2013-09-01
An effort to determine the feasibility of a software tool to assist in Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) has been completed. This new and unique approach to FMEA uses model based systems engineering concepts to recommend failure modes, causes, and effects to the user after they have made several selections from pick lists about a component's functions and inputs/outputs. Recommendations are made based on a library using common failure modes identified over the course of several major human spaceflight programs. However, the tool could be adapted for use in a wide range of applications from NASA to the energy industry.
Savannah River Site generic data base development
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Blanton, C.H.; Eide, S.A.
This report describes the results of a project to improve the generic component failure data base for the Savannah River Site (SRS). A representative list of components and failure modes for SRS risk models was generated by reviewing existing safety analyses and component failure data bases and from suggestions from SRS safety analysts. Then sources of data or failure rate estimates were identified and reviewed for applicability. A major source of information was the Nuclear Computerized Library for Assessing Reactor Reliability, or NUCLARR. This source includes an extensive collection of failure data and failure rate estimates for commercial nuclear powermore » plants. A recent Idaho National Engineering Laboratory report on failure data from the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant was also reviewed. From these and other recent sources, failure data and failure rate estimates were collected for the components and failure modes of interest. This information was aggregated to obtain a recommended generic failure rate distribution (mean and error factor) for each component failure mode.« less
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Thomas, Randy; Stueber, Thomas J.
2013-01-01
The System Identification (SysID) Rack is a real-time hardware-in-the-loop data acquisition (DAQ) and control instrument rack that was designed and built to support inlet testing in the NASA Glenn Research Center 10- by 10-Foot Supersonic Wind Tunnel. This instrument rack is used to support experiments on the Combined-Cycle Engine Large-Scale Inlet for Mode Transition Experiment (CCE? LIMX). The CCE?LIMX is a testbed for an integrated dual flow-path inlet configuration with the two flow paths in an over-and-under arrangement such that the high-speed flow path is located below the lowspeed flow path. The CCE?LIMX includes multiple actuators that are designed to redirect airflow from one flow path to the other; this action is referred to as "inlet mode transition." Multiple phases of experiments have been planned to support research that investigates inlet mode transition: inlet characterization (Phase-1) and system identification (Phase-2). The SysID Rack hardware design met the following requirements to support Phase-1 and Phase-2 experiments: safely and effectively move multiple actuators individually or synchronously; sample and save effector control and position sensor feedback signals; automate control of actuator positioning based on a mode transition schedule; sample and save pressure sensor signals; and perform DAQ and control processes operating at 2.5 KHz. This document describes the hardware components used to build the SysID Rack including their function, specifications, and system interface. Furthermore, provided in this document are a SysID Rack effectors signal list (signal flow); system identification experiment setup; illustrations indicating a typical SysID Rack experiment; and a SysID Rack performance overview for Phase-1 and Phase-2 experiments. The SysID Rack described in this document was a useful tool to meet the project objectives.
Programed asynchronous serial data interrogation in a two-computer system
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Schneberger, N. A.
1975-01-01
Technique permits redundant computers, with one unit in control mode and one in MONITOR mode, to interrogate the same serial data source. Its use for program-controlled serial data transfer results in extremely simple hardware and software mechanization.
Guyen, Olivier; Lewallen, David G; Cabanela, Miguel E
2008-07-01
The Osteonics constrained tripolar implant has been one of the most commonly used options to manage recurrent instability after total hip arthroplasty. Mechanical failures were expected and have been reported. The purpose of this retrospective review was to identify the observed modes of failure of this device. Forty-three failed Osteonics constrained tripolar implants were revised at our institution between September 1997 and April 2005. All revisions related to the constrained acetabular component only were considered as failures. All of the devices had been inserted for recurrent or intraoperative instability during revision procedures. Seven different methods of implantation were used. Operative reports and radiographs were reviewed to identify the modes of failure. The average time to failure of the forty-three implants was 28.4 months. A total of five modes of failure were observed: failure at the bone-implant interface (type I), which occurred in eleven hips; failure at the mechanisms holding the constrained liner to the metal shell (type II), in six hips; failure of the retaining mechanism of the bipolar component (type III), in ten hips; dislocation of the prosthetic head at the inner bearing of the bipolar component (type IV), in three hips; and infection (type V), in twelve hips. The mode of failure remained unknown in one hip that had been revised at another institution. The Osteonics constrained tripolar total hip arthroplasty implant is a complex device involving many parts. We showed that failure of this device can occur at most of its interfaces. It would therefore appear logical to limit its application to salvage situations.
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
McCarty, John P.; Lyles, Garry M.
1997-01-01
Propulsion system quality is defined in this paper as having high reliability, that is, quality is a high probability of within-tolerance performance or operation. Since failures are out-of-tolerance performance, the probability of failures and their occurrence is the difference between high and low quality systems. Failures can be described at 3 levels: the system failure (which is the detectable end of a failure), the failure mode (which is the failure process), and the failure cause (which is the start). Failure causes can be evaluated & classified by type. The results of typing flight history failures shows that most failures are in unrecognized modes and result from human error or noise, i.e. failures are when engineers learn how things really work. Although the study based on US launch vehicles, a sampling of failures from other countries indicates the finding has broad application. The parameters of the design of a propulsion system are not single valued, but have dispersions associated with the manufacturing of parts. Many tests are needed to find failures, if the dispersions are large relative to tolerances, which could contribute to the large number of failures in unrecognized modes.
EVALUATION OF SAFETY IN A RADIATION ONCOLOGY SETTING USING FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
Ford, Eric C.; Gaudette, Ray; Myers, Lee; Vanderver, Bruce; Engineer, Lilly; Zellars, Richard; Song, Danny Y.; Wong, John; DeWeese, Theodore L.
2013-01-01
Purpose Failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) is a widely used tool for prospectively evaluating safety and reliability. We report our experiences in applying FMEA in the setting of radiation oncology. Methods and Materials We performed an FMEA analysis for our external beam radiation therapy service, which consisted of the following tasks: (1) create a visual map of the process, (2) identify possible failure modes; assign risk probability numbers (RPN) to each failure mode based on tabulated scores for the severity, frequency of occurrence, and detectability, each on a scale of 1 to 10; and (3) identify improvements that are both feasible and effective. The RPN scores can span a range of 1 to 1000, with higher scores indicating the relative importance of a given failure mode. Results Our process map consisted of 269 different nodes. We identified 127 possible failure modes with RPN scores ranging from 2 to 160. Fifteen of the top-ranked failure modes were considered for process improvements, representing RPN scores of 75 and more. These specific improvement suggestions were incorporated into our practice with a review and implementation by each department team responsible for the process. Conclusions The FMEA technique provides a systematic method for finding vulnerabilities in a process before they result in an error. The FMEA framework can naturally incorporate further quantification and monitoring. A general-use system for incident and near miss reporting would be useful in this regard. PMID:19409731
A multidimensional anisotropic strength criterion based on Kelvin modes
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Arramon, Yves Pierre
A new theory for the prediction of multiaxial strength of anisotropic elastic materials was proposed by Biegler and Mehrabadi (1993). This theory is based on the premise that the total elastic strain energy of an anisotropic material subjected to multiaxial stress can be decomposed into dilatational and deviatoric modes. A multidimensional strength criterion may thus be formulated by postulating that the failure would occur when the energy stored in one of these modes has reached a critical value. However, the logic employed by these authors to formulate a failure criterion based on this theory could not be extended to multiaxial stress. In this thesis, an alternate criterion is presented which redresses the biaxial restriction by reformulating the surfaces of constant modal energy as surfaces of constant eigenstress magnitude. The resulting failure envelope, in a multidimensional stress space, is piecewise smooth. Each facet of the envelope is expected to represent the locus of failure data by a particular Kelvin mode. It is further shown that the Kelvin mode theory alone provides an incomplete description of the failure of some materials, but that this weakness can be addressed by the introduction of a set of complementary modes. A revised theory which combines both Kelvin and complementary modes is thus proposed and applied seven example materials: an isotropic concrete, tetragonal paperboard, two orthotropic softwoods, two orthotropic hardwoods and an orthotropic cortical bone. The resulting failure envelopes for these examples were plotted and, with the exception of concrete, shown to produce intuitively correct failure predictions.
Open source hardware and software platform for robotics and artificial intelligence applications
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Liang, S. Ng; Tan, K. O.; Lai Clement, T. H.; Ng, S. K.; Mohammed, A. H. Ali; Mailah, Musa; Azhar Yussof, Wan; Hamedon, Zamzuri; Yussof, Zulkifli
2016-02-01
Recent developments in open source hardware and software platforms (Android, Arduino, Linux, OpenCV etc.) have enabled rapid development of previously expensive and sophisticated system within a lower budget and flatter learning curves for developers. Using these platform, we designed and developed a Java-based 3D robotic simulation system, with graph database, which is integrated in online and offline modes with an Android-Arduino based rubbish picking remote control car. The combination of the open source hardware and software system created a flexible and expandable platform for further developments in the future, both in the software and hardware areas, in particular in combination with graph database for artificial intelligence, as well as more sophisticated hardware, such as legged or humanoid robots.
Study of a unified hardware and software fault-tolerant architecture
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Lala, Jaynarayan; Alger, Linda; Friend, Steven; Greeley, Gregory; Sacco, Stephen; Adams, Stuart
1989-01-01
A unified architectural concept, called the Fault Tolerant Processor Attached Processor (FTP-AP), that can tolerate hardware as well as software faults is proposed for applications requiring ultrareliable computation capability. An emulation of the FTP-AP architecture, consisting of a breadboard Motorola 68010-based quadruply redundant Fault Tolerant Processor, four VAX 750s as attached processors, and four versions of a transport aircraft yaw damper control law, is used as a testbed in the AIRLAB to examine a number of critical issues. Solutions of several basic problems associated with N-Version software are proposed and implemented on the testbed. This includes a confidence voter to resolve coincident errors in N-Version software. A reliability model of N-Version software that is based upon the recent understanding of software failure mechanisms is also developed. The basic FTP-AP architectural concept appears suitable for hosting N-Version application software while at the same time tolerating hardware failures. Architectural enhancements for greater efficiency, software reliability modeling, and N-Version issues that merit further research are identified.
Software Health Management: A Short Review of Challenges and Existing Techniques
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Pipatsrisawat, Knot; Darwiche, Adnan; Mengshoel, Ole J.; Schumann, Johann
2009-01-01
Modern spacecraft (as well as most other complex mechanisms like aircraft, automobiles, and chemical plants) rely more and more on software, to a point where software failures have caused severe accidents and loss of missions. Software failures during a manned mission can cause loss of life, so there are severe requirements to make the software as safe and reliable as possible. Typically, verification and validation (V&V) has the task of making sure that all software errors are found before the software is deployed and that it always conforms to the requirements. Experience, however, shows that this gold standard of error-free software cannot be reached in practice. Even if the software alone is free of glitches, its interoperation with the hardware (e.g., with sensors or actuators) can cause problems. Unexpected operational conditions or changes in the environment may ultimately cause a software system to fail. Is there a way to surmount this problem? In most modern aircraft and many automobiles, hardware such as central electrical, mechanical, and hydraulic components are monitored by IVHM (Integrated Vehicle Health Management) systems. These systems can recognize, isolate, and identify faults and failures, both those that already occurred as well as imminent ones. With the help of diagnostics and prognostics, appropriate mitigation strategies can be selected (replacement or repair, switch to redundant systems, etc.). In this short paper, we discuss some challenges and promising techniques for software health management (SWHM). In particular, we identify unique challenges for preventing software failure in systems which involve both software and hardware components. We then present our classifications of techniques related to SWHM. These classifications are performed based on dimensions of interest to both developers and users of the techniques, and hopefully provide a map for dealing with software faults and failures.
Global resilience analysis of water distribution systems.
Diao, Kegong; Sweetapple, Chris; Farmani, Raziyeh; Fu, Guangtao; Ward, Sarah; Butler, David
2016-12-01
Evaluating and enhancing resilience in water infrastructure is a crucial step towards more sustainable urban water management. As a prerequisite to enhancing resilience, a detailed understanding is required of the inherent resilience of the underlying system. Differing from traditional risk analysis, here we propose a global resilience analysis (GRA) approach that shifts the objective from analysing multiple and unknown threats to analysing the more identifiable and measurable system responses to extreme conditions, i.e. potential failure modes. GRA aims to evaluate a system's resilience to a possible failure mode regardless of the causal threat(s) (known or unknown, external or internal). The method is applied to test the resilience of four water distribution systems (WDSs) with various features to three typical failure modes (pipe failure, excess demand, and substance intrusion). The study reveals GRA provides an overview of a water system's resilience to various failure modes. For each failure mode, it identifies the range of corresponding failure impacts and reveals extreme scenarios (e.g. the complete loss of water supply with only 5% pipe failure, or still meeting 80% of demand despite over 70% of pipes failing). GRA also reveals that increased resilience to one failure mode may decrease resilience to another and increasing system capacity may delay the system's recovery in some situations. It is also shown that selecting an appropriate level of detail for hydraulic models is of great importance in resilience analysis. The method can be used as a comprehensive diagnostic framework to evaluate a range of interventions for improving system resilience in future studies. Copyright © 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.. All rights reserved.
First metatarsophalangeal joint arthrodesis: an evaluation of hardware failure.
Bennett, Gordon L; Kay, David B; Sabatta, James
2005-08-01
First metatarsophalangeal joint (MTPJ) arthrodesis is commonly used for the treatment of a variety of conditions affecting the hallux. We used a method incorporating a ball-and-cup preparation of the first metatarsal and proximal phalanx, followed by fixation of the arthrodesis with a lag screw and a dorsal plate (Synthes Modular Hand Set). Ninety-five consecutive patients had first MTPJ arthrodesis using fixation with the Synthes Modular Hand Set. All patients were evaluated preoperatively, at regular intervals postoperatively, and at final followup. The American Orthopaedic Foot and Ankle Society (AOFAS) forefoot scoring system was used preoperatively and at final followup. Solid fusion occurred in 93 of 107 feet (86.9%). In the 14 that did not fuse, either the screws or plate, or both, broke. Ten of the 14 feet were symptomatic, but only three required further operative treatment. There were no hardware problems or failures in patients who had solid fusions. Preoperative AOFAS scores were improved after surgery in all patients. A solid first MTPJ fusion results in excellent function and pain relief, but the Synthes Modular Hand Set implants do not appear to be strong enough in all patients for this application; nonunion at the arthrodesis site and failure of hardware occurred in 13% of arthrodeses. We no longer recommend this implant for this application.
Investigation of advanced fault insertion and simulator methods
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Dunn, W. R.; Cottrell, D.
1986-01-01
The cooperative agreement partly supported research leading to the open-literature publication cited. Additional efforts under the agreement included research into fault modeling of semiconductor devices. Results of this research are presented in this report which is summarized in the following paragraphs. As a result of the cited research, it appears that semiconductor failure mechanism data is abundant but of little use in developing pin-level device models. Failure mode data on the other hand does exist but is too sparse to be of any statistical use in developing fault models. What is significant in the failure mode data is that, unlike classical logic, MSI and LSI devices do exhibit more than 'stuck-at' and open/short failure modes. Specifically they are dominated by parametric failures and functional anomalies that can include intermittent faults and multiple-pin failures. The report discusses methods of developing composite pin-level models based on extrapolation of semiconductor device failure mechanisms, failure modes, results of temperature stress testing and functional modeling. Limitations of this model particularly with regard to determination of fault detection coverage and latency time measurement are discussed. Indicated research directions are presented.
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Zhu, Qi-Zhi
2017-02-01
A proper criterion describing when material fails is essential for deep understanding and constitutive modeling of rock damage and failure by microcracking. Physically, such a criterion should be the global effect of local mechanical response and microstructure evolution inside the material. This paper aims at deriving a new mechanisms-based failure criterion for brittle rocks, based on micromechanical unilateral damage-friction coupling analyses rather than on the basic results from the classical linear elastic fracture mechanics. The failure functions respectively describing three failure modes (purely tensile mode, tensile-shear mode as well as compressive-shear mode) are achieved in a unified upscaling framework and illustrated in the Mohr plane and also in the plane of principal stresses. The strength envelope is proved to be continuous and smooth with a compressive to tensile strength ratio dependent on material properties. Comparisons with experimental data are finally carried out. By this work, we also provide a theoretical evidence on the hybrid failure and the smooth transition from tensile failure to compressive-shear failure.
Ahmad, Tariq; Fiuzat, Mona; Neely, Benjamin; Neely, Megan L; Pencina, Michael J; Kraus, William E; Zannad, Faiez; Whellan, David J; Donahue, Mark P; Piña, Ileana L; Adams, Kirkwood F; Kitzman, Dalane W; O'Connor, Christopher M; Felker, G Michael
2014-06-01
The aim of this study was to determine whether biomarkers of myocardial stress and fibrosis improve prediction of the mode of death in patients with chronic heart failure. The 2 most common modes of death in patients with chronic heart failure are pump failure and sudden cardiac death. Prediction of the mode of death may facilitate treatment decisions. The relationship between amino-terminal pro-brain natriuretic peptide (NT-proBNP), galectin-3, and ST2, biomarkers that reflect different pathogenic pathways in heart failure (myocardial stress and fibrosis), and mode of death is unknown. HF-ACTION (Heart Failure: A Controlled Trial Investigating Outcomes of Exercise Training) was a randomized controlled trial of exercise training versus usual care in patients with chronic heart failure due to left ventricular systolic dysfunction (left ventricular ejection fraction ≤35%). An independent clinical events committee prospectively adjudicated mode of death. NT-proBNP, galectin-3, and ST2 levels were assessed at baseline in 813 subjects. Associations between biomarkers and mode of death were assessed using cause-specific Cox proportional hazards modeling, and interaction testing was used to measure differential associations between biomarkers and pump failure versus sudden cardiac death. Discrimination and risk reclassification metrics were used to assess the added value of galectin-3 and ST2 in predicting mode of death risk beyond a clinical model that included NT-proBNP. After a median follow-up period of 2.5 years, there were 155 deaths: 49 from pump failure, 42 from sudden cardiac death, and 64 from other causes. Elevations in all biomarkers were associated with increased risk for both pump failure and sudden cardiac death in both adjusted and unadjusted analyses. In each case, increases in the biomarker had a stronger association with pump failure than sudden cardiac death, but this relationship was attenuated after adjustment for clinical risk factors. Clinical variables along with NT-proBNP levels were stronger predictors of pump failure (C statistic: 0.87) than sudden cardiac death (C statistic: 0.73). Addition of ST2 and galectin-3 led to improved net risk classification of 11% for sudden cardiac death, but not pump failure. Clinical predictors along with NT-proBNP levels were strong predictors of pump failure risk, with insignificant incremental contributions of ST2 and galectin-3. Predictability of sudden cardiac death risk was less robust and enhanced by information provided by novel biomarkers. Copyright © 2014 American College of Cardiology Foundation. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Enhancements and Algorithms for Avionic Information Processing System Design Methodology.
1982-06-16
programming algorithm is enhanced by incorporating task precedence constraints and hardware failures. Stochastic network methods are used to analyze...allocations in the presence of random fluctuations. Graph theoretic methods are used to analyze hardware designs, and new designs are constructed with...There, spatial dynamic programming (SDP) was used to solve a static, deterministic software allocation problem. Under the current contract the SDP
Immersion Cooling of Electronics in DoD Installations
2016-05-01
2012). Bitcoin Mining Electronics Cooling Development In January 2013, inventor/consultant Mark Miyoshi began development of a two-phase cooling...system using Novec 649 to be used for cooling bitcoin mining hardware. After a short trial period, hardware power supply and logic-board failures...are reports of bitcoin mining companies vertically stacking two-phase immersion baths to improve the floor space density, but this approach is likely
Cycles till failure of silver-zinc cells with completing failures modes: Preliminary data analysis
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Sidik, S. M.; Leibecki, H. F.; Bozek, J. M.
1980-01-01
One hundred and twenty nine cells were run through charge-discharge cycles until failure. The experiment design was a variant of a central composite factorial in five factors. Preliminary data analysis consisted of response surface estimation of life. Batteries fail under two basic modes; a low voltage condition and an internal shorting condition. A competing failure modes analysis using maximum likelihood estimation for the extreme value life distribution was performed. Extensive diagnostics such as residual plotting and probability plotting were employed to verify data quality and choice of model.
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA): A Bibliography
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
2000-01-01
Failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) is a bottom-up analytical process that identifies process hazards, which helps managers understand vulnerabilities of systems, as well as assess and mitigate risk. It is one of several engineering tools and techniques available to program and project managers aimed at increasing the likelihood of safe and successful NASA programs and missions. This bibliography references 465 documents in the NASA STI Database that contain the major concepts, failure modes or failure analysis, in either the basic index of the major subject terms.
Failure analysis on optical fiber on swarm flight payload
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Bourcier, Frédéric; Fratter, Isabelle; Teyssandier, Florent; Barenes, Magali; Dhenin, Jérémie; Peyriguer, Marie; Petre-Bordenave, Romain
2017-11-01
Failure analysis on optical components is usually carried-out, on standard testing devices such as optical/electronic microscopes and spectrometers, on isolated but representative samples. Such analyses are not contactless and not totally non-invasive, so they cannot be used easily on flight models. Furthermore, for late payload or satellite integration/validation phases with tight schedule issues, it could be necessary to carry out a failure analysis directly on the flight hardware, in cleanroom.
Researchers at NREL Find Fewer Failures of PV Panels and Different
10, 2017 Overall failure rates for photovoltaic (PV) solar panels have fallen dramatically when Failures of PV Panels and Different Degradation Modes in Systems Installed after 2000 Researchers at NREL Find Fewer Failures of PV Panels and Different Degradation Modes in Systems Installed after 2000 April
Potential Damage to Flight Hardware from MIL-STD-462 CS02 Setup
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Harris, Patrick K.; Block, Nathan F.
2003-01-01
The MIL-STD-462 CS02 conducted susceptibility test setup includes an audio transformer, with the secondary used as an inductor, and a large capacitor. Together, these two components form an L-type low-pass filter to minimize the injected test signal input into the power source. Some flight hardware power input configurations are not compatible with this setup and break into oscillation when powered up. This, in turn, can damage flight hardware. Such an oscillation resulted in the catastrophic failure of an item tested in the Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) Large electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) Test Facility.
Potential Damage to Flight Hardware from MIL-STD-462 CS02 Setup
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Harris, Patrick K.; Block, Nathan F.
2002-01-01
The MIL-STD-462 CS02 conducted susceptibility test setup, performed during electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) testing, consists of an audio transformer with the secondary used as an inductor and a large capacitor. Together, these two components form an L-type low-pass filter to minimize the injected test signal input into the power source. Some flight hardware power input configurations are not compatible with this setup and break into oscillation when powered up. This can damage flight hardware and caused a catastrophic failure to an item tested in the Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) Large EMC Test Facility.
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
1972-01-01
A long life assurance program for the development of design, process, test, and application guidelines for achieving reliable spacecraft hardware was conducted. The study approach consisted of a review of technical data performed concurrently with a survey of the aerospace industry. The data reviewed included design and operating characteristics, failure histories and solutions, and similar documents. The topics covered by the guidelines are reported. It is concluded that long life hardware is achieved through meticulous attention to many details and no simple set of rules can suffice.
Evaluating the operational risks of biomedical waste using failure mode and effects analysis.
Chen, Ying-Chu; Tsai, Pei-Yi
2017-06-01
The potential problems and risks of biomedical waste generation have become increasingly apparent in recent years. This study applied a failure mode and effects analysis to evaluate the operational problems and risks of biomedical waste. The microbiological contamination of biomedical waste seldom receives the attention of researchers. In this study, the biomedical waste lifecycle was divided into seven processes: Production, classification, packaging, sterilisation, weighing, storage, and transportation. Twenty main failure modes were identified in these phases and risks were assessed based on their risk priority numbers. The failure modes in the production phase accounted for the highest proportion of the risk priority number score (27.7%). In the packaging phase, the failure mode 'sharp articles not placed in solid containers' had the highest risk priority number score, mainly owing to its high severity rating. The sterilisation process is the main difference in the treatment of infectious and non-infectious biomedical waste. The failure modes in the sterilisation phase were mainly owing to human factors (mostly related to operators). This study increases the understanding of the potential problems and risks associated with biomedical waste, thereby increasing awareness of how to improve the management of biomedical waste to better protect workers, the public, and the environment.
Detection of Failure in Asynchronous Motor Using Soft Computing Method
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Vinoth Kumar, K.; Sony, Kevin; Achenkunju John, Alan; Kuriakose, Anto; John, Ano P.
2018-04-01
This paper investigates the stator short winding failure of asynchronous motor also their effects on motor current spectrums. A fuzzy logic approach i.e., model based technique possibly will help to detect the asynchronous motor failure. Actually, fuzzy logic similar to humanoid intelligent methods besides expected linguistic empowering inferences through vague statistics. The dynamic model is technologically advanced for asynchronous motor by means of fuzzy logic classifier towards investigate the stator inter turn failure in addition open phase failure. A hardware implementation was carried out with LabVIEW for the online-monitoring of faults.
Jones, Ryan T; Handsfield, Lydia; Read, Paul W; Wilson, David D; Van Ausdal, Ray; Schlesinger, David J; Siebers, Jeffrey V; Chen, Quan
2015-01-01
The clinical challenge of radiation therapy (RT) for painful bone metastases requires clinicians to consider both treatment efficacy and patient prognosis when selecting a radiation therapy regimen. The traditional RT workflow requires several weeks for common palliative RT schedules of 30 Gy in 10 fractions or 20 Gy in 5 fractions. At our institution, we have created a new RT workflow termed "STAT RAD" that allows clinicians to perform computed tomographic (CT) simulation, planning, and highly conformal single fraction treatment delivery within 2 hours. In this study, we evaluate the safety and feasibility of the STAT RAD workflow. A failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) was performed on the STAT RAD workflow, including development of a process map, identification of potential failure modes, description of the cause and effect, temporal occurrence, and team member involvement in each failure mode, and examination of existing safety controls. A risk probability number (RPN) was calculated for each failure mode. As necessary, workflow adjustments were then made to safeguard failure modes of significant RPN values. After workflow alterations, RPN numbers were again recomputed. A total of 72 potential failure modes were identified in the pre-FMEA STAT RAD workflow, of which 22 met the RPN threshold for clinical significance. Workflow adjustments included the addition of a team member checklist, changing simulation from megavoltage CT to kilovoltage CT, alteration of patient-specific quality assurance testing, and allocating increased time for critical workflow steps. After these modifications, only 1 failure mode maintained RPN significance; patient motion after alignment or during treatment. Performing the FMEA for the STAT RAD workflow before clinical implementation has significantly strengthened the safety and feasibility of STAT RAD. The FMEA proved a valuable evaluation tool, identifying potential problem areas so that we could create a safer workflow. Copyright © 2015 American Society for Radiation Oncology. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Mayo, Jackson R.; Chen, Frank Xiaoxiao; Pebay, Philippe Pierre
2010-06-01
Effective failure prediction and mitigation strategies in high-performance computing systems could provide huge gains in resilience of tightly coupled large-scale scientific codes. These gains would come from prediction-directed process migration and resource servicing, intelligent resource allocation, and checkpointing driven by failure predictors rather than at regular intervals based on nominal mean time to failure. Given probabilistic associations of outlier behavior in hardware-related metrics with eventual failure in hardware, system software, and/or applications, this paper explores approaches for quantifying the effects of prediction and mitigation strategies and demonstrates these using actual production system data. We describe context-relevant methodologies for determining themore » accuracy and cost-benefit of predictors. While many research studies have quantified the expected impact of growing system size, and the associated shortened mean time to failure (MTTF), on application performance in large-scale high-performance computing (HPC) platforms, there has been little if any work to quantify the possible gains from predicting system resource failures with significant but imperfect accuracy. This possibly stems from HPC system complexity and the fact that, to date, no one has established any good predictors of failure in these systems. Our work in the OVIS project aims to discover these predictors via a variety of data collection techniques and statistical analysis methods that yield probabilistic predictions. The question then is, 'How good or useful are these predictions?' We investigate methods for answering this question in a general setting, and illustrate them using a specific failure predictor discovered on a production system at Sandia.« less
Failure Analysis of Fractured Poppet from Space Shuttle Orbiter Flow Control Valve
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Russell, Richard
2010-01-01
This slide presentation reviews the failure analysis of a fractured poppet from a flow control valve (FCV) used on the space shuttle. This presentation has focused on the laboratory analysis of the failed hardware. The use of Scanning electron fractography during the investigation led to the conclusion that the poppet failed due to fatigue cracking that, most likely, occurred under changing loading conditions. The initial investigation led to a more thorough test of poppets that had been retired, this testing led to the conclusion that the thumbnail cracks in the flight hardware had existed for the life of the shuttle program. This led to a program to develop an eddy current technique that was capable of detecting small very tight cracks.
Determination of Turbine Blade Life from Engine Field Data
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Zaretsky, Erwin V.; Litt, Jonathan S.; Hendricks, Robert C.; Soditus, Sherry M.
2013-01-01
It is probable that no two engine companies determine the life of their engines or their components in the same way or apply the same experience and safety factors to their designs. Knowing the failure mode that is most likely to occur minimizes the amount of uncertainty and simplifies failure and life analysis. Available data regarding failure mode for aircraft engine blades, while favoring low-cycle, thermal-mechanical fatigue (TMF) as the controlling mode of failure, are not definitive. Sixteen high-pressure turbine (HPT) T-1 blade sets were removed from commercial aircraft engines that had been commercially flown by a single airline and inspected for damage. Each set contained 82 blades. The damage was cataloged into three categories related to their mode of failure: (1) TMF, (2) Oxidation/erosion (O/E), and (3) Other. From these field data, the turbine blade life was determined as well as the lives related to individual blade failure modes using Johnson-Weibull analysis. A simplified formula for calculating turbine blade life and reliability was formulated. The L10 blade life was calculated to be 2427 cycles (11 077 hr). The resulting blade life attributed to O/E equaled that attributed to TMF. The category that contributed most to blade failure was Other. If there were no blade failures attributed to O/E and TMF, the overall blade L(sub 10) life would increase approximately 11 to 17 percent.
Klug, Tori; Shields, Katherine F; Cronk, Ryan; Kelly, Emma; Behnke, Nikki; Lee, Kristen; Bartram, Jamie
2017-05-01
Sufficient, safe, continuously available drinking water is important for human health and development, yet one in three handpumps in sub-Saharan Africa are non-functional at any given time. Community management, coupled with access to external technical expertise and spare parts, is a widely promoted model for rural water supply management. However, there is limited evidence describing how community management can address common hardware and management failures of rural water systems in sub-Saharan Africa. We identified hardware and management rehabilitation pathways using qualitative data from 267 interviews and 57 focus group discussions in Ghana, Kenya, and Zambia. Study participants were water committee members, community members, and local leaders in 18 communities (six in each study country) with water systems managed by a water committee and supported by World Vision (WV), an international non-governmental organization (NGO). Government, WV or private sector employees engaged in supporting the water systems were also interviewed. Inductive analysis was used to allow for pathways to emerge from the data, based on the perspectives and experiences of study participants. Four hardware rehabilitation pathways were identified, based on the types of support used in rehabilitation. Types of support were differentiated as community or external. External support includes financial and/or technical support from government or WV employees. Community actor understanding of who to contact when a hardware breakdown occurs and easy access to technical experts were consistent reasons for rapid rehabilitation for all hardware rehabilitation pathways. Three management rehabilitation pathways were identified. All require the involvement of community leaders and were best carried out when the action was participatory. The rehabilitation pathways show how available resources can be leveraged to restore hardware breakdowns and management failures for rural water systems in sub-Saharan Africa. Governments, NGOs, and private sector actors can better build capacity of community actors by focusing on their role in rehabilitating hardware and management and to ensure that they are able to quickly contact external support actors when needed for rehabilitation. Using qualitative and participatory methods allows for insight into rapid rehabilitation of hardware and management. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier GmbH. All rights reserved.
First incremental buy for Increment 2 of the Space Transportation System (STS)
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
1989-01-01
Thiokol manufactured and delivered 9 flight motors to KSC on schedule. All test flights were successful. All spent SRMs were recovered. Design, development, manufacture, and delivery of required transportation, handling, and checkout equipment to MSFC and to KSC were completed on schedule. All items of data required by DPD 400 were prepared and delivered as directed. In the system requirements and analysis area, the point of departure from Buy 1 to the operational phase was developed in significant detail with a complete set of transition documentation available. The documentation prepared during the Buy 1 program was maintained and updated where required. The following flight support activities should be continued through other production programs: as-built materials usage tracking on all flight hardware; mass properties reporting for all flight hardware until sample size is large enough to verify that the weight limit requirements were met; ballistic predictions and postflight performance assessments for all production flights; and recovered SRM hardware inspection and anomaly identification. In the safety, reliability, and quality assurance area, activities accomplished were assurance oriented in nature and specifically formulated to prevent problems and hardware failures. The flight program to date has adequately demonstrated the success of this assurance approach. The attention focused on details of design, analysis, manufacture, and inspection to assure the production of high-quality hardware has resulted in the absence of flight failures. The few anomalies which did occur were evaluated, design or manufacturing changes incorporated, and corrective actions taken to preclude recurrence.
The implementation and use of Ada on distributed systems with high reliability requirements
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Knight, J. C.; Gregory, S. T.; Urquhart, J. I. A.
1984-01-01
The use and implementation of Ada (a trade mark of the US Dept. of Defense) in distributed environments in which the hardware are assumed to be unreliable were investigated. The possibility that a distributed system is programmed entirely in Ada so that the individual tasks of the system are unconcerned with which processors they are executing on and failures occurring in the underlying hardware were examined.
Scanning electron microscope fractography of induced fatigue-damaged saline breast implants.
Brandon, H J; Jerina, K L; Savoy, T L; Wolf, C J
2006-01-01
Breast implant strength and durability is presently an important topic in biomaterials science. Research studies are being conducted to determine the mechanisms and rates of failure in order to assess the in vivo performance of breast implants. Fatigue life is a measure of breast implant durability since fatigue failure is a potential in vivo failure mechanism. This study describes the characterization of the fracture surface morphology of breast implant shell regions that have failed due to cyclic fatigue. Saline breast implants were fatigue tested to failure using a laboratory apparatus in which flat plates cyclically compressed the implants. The implants were unimplanted control devices of both textured and smooth saline implants. The failure surfaces of the fatigued shells were examined using scanning electron microscopy (SEM). The morphological features of the failure surfaces are described for implants with short and long fatigue lifetimes. The details of both the inside and outside surfaces of the shell at the failure location are described. Two different modes of failure were observed in both the textured and smooth shells. These modes depend on the magnitude of the cyclic load and corresponding number of fatigue cycles at failure. The first mode is a tear in the shell of about 18 mm in length, and the second mode is a pinhole approximately 1 mm in diameter. Details of the surface morphology for these two types of failure modes and shell thickness data are presented herein. There was no significant change in the crosslink density of the shell as a result of fatigue.
Hamilton Jr, David A; Reilly, Danielle; Wipf, Felix; Kamineni, Srinath
2015-01-01
AIM: To determine whether use of a precontoured olecranon plate provides adequate fixation to withstand supraphysiologic force in a comminuted olecranon fracture model. METHODS: Five samples of fourth generation composite bones and five samples of fresh frozen human cadaveric left ulnae were utilized for this study. The cadaveric specimens underwent dual-energy X-ray absorptiometry (DEXA) scanning to quantify the bone quality. The composite and cadaveric bones were prepared by creating a comminuted olecranon fracture and fixed with a pre-contoured olecranon plate with locking screws. Construct stiffness and failure load were measured by subjecting specimens to cantilever bending moments until failure. Fracture site motion was measured with differential variable resistance transducer spanning the fracture. Statistical analysis was performed with two-tailed Mann-Whitney-U test with Monte Carlo Exact test. RESULTS: There was a significant difference in fixation stiffness and strength between the composite bones and human cadaver bones. Failure modes differed in cadaveric and composite specimens. The load to failure for the composite bones (n = 5) and human cadaver bones (n = 5) specimens were 10.67 nm (range 9.40-11.91 nm) and 13.05 nm (range 12.59-15.38 nm) respectively. This difference was statistically significant (P ˂ 0.007, 97% power). Median stiffness for composite bones and human cadaver bones specimens were 5.69 nm/mm (range 4.69-6.80 nm/mm) and 7.55 nm/mm (range 6.31-7.72 nm/mm). There was a significant difference for stiffness (P ˂ 0.033, 79% power) between composite bones and cadaveric bones. No correlation was found between the DEXA results and stiffness. All cadaveric specimens withstood the physiologic load anticipated postoperatively. Catastrophic failure occurred in all composite specimens. All failures resulted from composite bone failure at the distal screw site and not hardware failure. There were no catastrophic fracture failures in the cadaveric specimens. Failure of 4/5 cadaveric specimens was defined when a fracture gap of 2 mm was observed, but 1/5 cadaveric specimens failed due to a failure of the triceps mechanism. All failures occurred at forces greater than that expected in postoperative period prior to healing. CONCLUSION: The pre-contoured olecranon plate provides adequate fixation to withstand physiologic force in a composite bone and cadaveric comminuted olecranon fracture model. PMID:26495247
UAV Swarm Behavior Modeling for Early Exposure of Failure Modes
2016-09-01
Systems Center Atlantic, for his patience with me through this two-year process. He worked with my schedule and was very understanding of the...emergence of new failure modes? The MP modeling environment provides a breakdown of all potential event traces. Given that the research questions call...for the revelation of potential failure modes, MP was selected as the modeling environment because it provides a substantial set of results and data
Simulation Assisted Risk Assessment: Blast Overpressure Modeling
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Lawrence, Scott L.; Gee, Ken; Mathias, Donovan; Olsen, Michael
2006-01-01
A probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) approach has been developed and applied to the risk analysis of capsule abort during ascent. The PRA is used to assist in the identification of modeling and simulation applications that can significantly impact the understanding of crew risk during this potentially dangerous maneuver. The PRA approach is also being used to identify the appropriate level of fidelity for the modeling of those critical failure modes. The Apollo launch escape system (LES) was chosen as a test problem for application of this approach. Failure modes that have been modeled and/or simulated to date include explosive overpressure-based failure, explosive fragment-based failure, land landing failures (range limits exceeded either near launch or Mode III trajectories ending on the African continent), capsule-booster re-contact during separation, and failure due to plume-induced instability. These failure modes have been investigated using analysis tools in a variety of technical disciplines at various levels of fidelity. The current paper focuses on the development and application of a blast overpressure model for the prediction of structural failure due to overpressure, including the application of high-fidelity analysis to predict near-field and headwinds effects.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Teixeira, Flavia C., E-mail: flavitiz@gmail.com; Almeida, Carlos E. de; Saiful Huq, M.
Purpose: The goal of this study was to evaluate the safety and quality management program for stereotactic radiosurgery (SRS) treatment processes at three radiotherapy centers in Brazil by using three industrial engineering tools (1) process mapping, (2) failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA), and (3) fault tree analysis. Methods: The recommendations of Task Group 100 of American Association of Physicists in Medicine were followed to apply the three tools described above to create a process tree for SRS procedure for each radiotherapy center and then FMEA was performed. Failure modes were identified for all process steps and values of riskmore » priority number (RPN) were calculated from O, S, and D (RPN = O × S × D) values assigned by a professional team responsible for patient care. Results: The subprocess treatment planning was presented with the highest number of failure modes for all centers. The total number of failure modes were 135, 104, and 131 for centers I, II, and III, respectively. The highest RPN value for each center is as follows: center I (204), center II (372), and center III (370). Failure modes with RPN ≥ 100: center I (22), center II (115), and center III (110). Failure modes characterized by S ≥ 7, represented 68% of the failure modes for center III, 62% for center II, and 45% for center I. Failure modes with RPNs values ≥100 and S ≥ 7, D ≥ 5, and O ≥ 5 were considered as high priority in this study. Conclusions: The results of the present study show that the safety risk profiles for the same stereotactic radiotherapy process are different at three radiotherapy centers in Brazil. Although this is the same treatment process, this present study showed that the risk priority is different and it will lead to implementation of different safety interventions among the centers. Therefore, the current practice of applying universal device-centric QA is not adequate to address all possible failures in clinical processes at different radiotherapy centers. Integrated approaches to device-centric and process specific quality management program specific to each radiotherapy center are the key to a safe quality management program.« less
A bivariate model for analyzing recurrent multi-type automobile failures
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Sunethra, A. A.; Sooriyarachchi, M. R.
2017-09-01
The failure mechanism in an automobile can be defined as a system of multi-type recurrent failures where failures can occur due to various multi-type failure modes and these failures are repetitive such that more than one failure can occur from each failure mode. In analysing such automobile failures, both the time and type of the failure serve as response variables. However, these two response variables are highly correlated with each other since the timing of failures has an association with the mode of the failure. When there are more than one correlated response variables, the fitting of a multivariate model is more preferable than separate univariate models. Therefore, a bivariate model of time and type of failure becomes appealing for such automobile failure data. When there are multiple failure observations pertaining to a single automobile, such data cannot be treated as independent data because failure instances of a single automobile are correlated with each other while failures among different automobiles can be treated as independent. Therefore, this study proposes a bivariate model consisting time and type of failure as responses adjusted for correlated data. The proposed model was formulated following the approaches of shared parameter models and random effects models for joining the responses and for representing the correlated data respectively. The proposed model is applied to a sample of automobile failures with three types of failure modes and up to five failure recurrences. The parametric distributions that were suitable for the two responses of time to failure and type of failure were Weibull distribution and multinomial distribution respectively. The proposed bivariate model was programmed in SAS Procedure Proc NLMIXED by user programming appropriate likelihood functions. The performance of the bivariate model was compared with separate univariate models fitted for the two responses and it was identified that better performance is secured by the bivariate model. The proposed model can be used to determine the time and type of failure that would occur in the automobiles considered here.
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Packard, Michael H.
2002-01-01
Probabilistic Structural Analysis (PSA) is now commonly used for predicting the distribution of time/cycles to failure of turbine blades and other engine components. These distributions are typically based on fatigue/fracture and creep failure modes of these components. Additionally, reliability analysis is used for taking test data related to particular failure modes and calculating failure rate distributions of electronic and electromechanical components. How can these individual failure time distributions of structural, electronic and electromechanical component failure modes be effectively combined into a top level model for overall system evaluation of component upgrades, changes in maintenance intervals, or line replaceable unit (LRU) redesign? This paper shows an example of how various probabilistic failure predictions for turbine engine components can be evaluated and combined to show their effect on overall engine performance. A generic model of a turbofan engine was modeled using various Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) tools (Quantitative Risk Assessment Software (QRAS) etc.). Hypothetical PSA results for a number of structural components along with mitigation factors that would restrict the failure mode from propagating to a Loss of Mission (LOM) failure were used in the models. The output of this program includes an overall failure distribution for LOM of the system. The rank and contribution to the overall Mission Success (MS) is also given for each failure mode and each subsystem. This application methodology demonstrates the effectiveness of PRA for assessing the performance of large turbine engines. Additionally, the effects of system changes and upgrades, the application of different maintenance intervals, inclusion of new sensor detection of faults and other upgrades were evaluated in determining overall turbine engine reliability.
Medication Safety of Five Oral Chemotherapies: A Proactive Risk Assessment
Weingart, Saul N.; Spencer, Justin; Buia, Stephanie; Duncombe, Deborah; Singh, Prabhjyot; Gadkari, Mrinalini; Connor, Maureen
2011-01-01
Purpose: Oral chemotherapies represent an emerging risk area in ambulatory oncology practice. To examine the hazards associated with five oral chemotherapies, we performed a proactive risk assessment. Methods: We convened interdisciplinary teams and conducted failure mode and effects analyses (FMEAs) for five oral chemotherapy agents: capecitabine, imatinib, temozolomide, 6-mercaptopurine, and an investigational agent. This involved the creation of process maps for each medication, identification of failure modes, selection of high-risk failure modes, and development of recommendations to mitigate these risks. We analyzed the number of steps and types of failure modes and compared this information across the study drugs. Results: Key vulnerabilities include patient education about drug handling and adverse effects, prescription writing, patient self-administration and medication adherence, and failure to monitor and manage toxicities. Many of these failure modes were common across the five oral chemotherapies, suggesting the presence of common targets for improvement. Streamlining the FMEA itself may promote the dissemination of this method. Conclusion: Each stage of the medication process poses risks to the safe use of oral chemotherapies. FMEAs may identify opportunities to improve medication safety and reduce the risk of patient harm. PMID:21532801
2010-09-01
The MasterNet project continued to expand in software and hardware complexity until its failure ( Szilagyi , n.d.). Despite all of the issues...were used for MasterNet ( Szilagyi , n.d.). Although executive management committed significant financial resources to MasterNet, Bank of America...implementation failure as well as project- management failure as a whole ( Szilagyi , n.d.). The lesson learned from this vignette is the importance of setting
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Williams, M. W.
Type 308 CRE stainless steel weld specimens were subjected to metallographic and fractographic analysis after failure in elevated-temperature (593/sup 0/C) creep-fatigue tests. The failure mode for specimens tested under continuous-cycle fatigue conditions was predominantly transgranular. When the test cycle was modified to include a hold time at the maximum tensile strain, the failure mode became predominantly interphase. Sigma phase was observed within the delta-ferrite regions in the weld. However, the presence of sigma phase did not appear to affect the failure mode.
ISS Ammonia Pump Failure, Recovery, and Lesson Learned A Hydrodynamic Bearing Perspective
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Bruckner, Robert J.; Manco, Richard A., II
2014-01-01
The design, development, and operation of long duration spaceflight hardware has become an evolutionary process in which meticulous attention to details and lessons learned from previous experiences play a critical role. Invaluable to this process is the ability to retrieve and examine spaceflight hardware that has experienced a premature failure. While these situations are rare and unfortunate, the failure investigation and recovery from the event serve a valuable purpose in advancing future space mechanism development. Such a scenario began on July 31, 2010 with the premature failure of an ammonia pump on the external active thermal control system of the International Space Station. The ground-based inspections of the returned pump and ensuing failure investigation revealed five potential bearing forces that were un-accounted for in the design phase and qualification testing of the pump. These forces could combine in a number of random orientations to overload the pump bearings leading to solid-surface contact, wear, and premature failure. The recovery plan identified one of these five forces as being related to the square of the operating speed of the pump and this fact was used to recover design life through a change in flight rules for the operation of the pump module. Through the course of the failure investigation, recovery, and follow-on assessment of pump wear life, design guidance has been developed to improve the life of future mechanically pumped thermal control systems for both human and robotic exploration missions.
Twiddler's syndrome in spinal cord stimulation.
Al-Mahfoudh, Rafid; Chan, Yuen; Chong, Hsu Pheen; Farah, Jibril Osman
2016-01-01
The aims are to present a case series of Twiddler's syndrome in spinal cord stimulators with analysis of the possible mechanism of this syndrome and discuss how this phenomenon can be prevented. Data were collected retrospectively between 2007 and 2013 for all patients presenting with failure of spinal cord stimulators. The diagnostic criterion for Twiddler's syndrome is radiological evidence of twisting of wires in the presence of failure of spinal cord stimulation. Our unit implants on average 110 spinal cord stimulators a year. Over the 5-year study period, all consecutive cases of spinal cord stimulation failure were studied. Three patients with Twiddler's syndrome were identified. Presentation ranged from 4 to 228 weeks after implantation. Imaging revealed repeated rotations and twisting of the wires of the spinal cord stimulators leading to hardware failure. To the best of our knowledge this is the first reported series of Twiddler's syndrome with implantable pulse generators (IPGs) for spinal cord stimulation. Hardware failure is not uncommon in spinal cord stimulation. Awareness and identification of Twiddler's syndrome may help prevent its occurrence and further revisions. This may be achieved by implanting the IPG in the lumbar region subcutaneously above the belt line. Psychological intervention may have a preventative role for those who are deemed at high risk of Twiddler's syndrome from initial psychological screening.
A.I.-based real-time support for high performance aircraft operations
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Vidal, J. J.
1985-01-01
Artificial intelligence (AI) based software and hardware concepts are applied to the handling system malfunctions during flight tests. A representation of malfunction procedure logic using Boolean normal forms are presented. The representation facilitates the automation of malfunction procedures and provides easy testing for the embedded rules. It also forms a potential basis for a parallel implementation in logic hardware. The extraction of logic control rules, from dynamic simulation and their adaptive revision after partial failure are examined. It uses a simplified 2-dimensional aircraft model with a controller that adaptively extracts control rules for directional thrust that satisfies a navigational goal without exceeding pre-established position and velocity limits. Failure recovery (rule adjusting) is examined after partial actuator failure. While this experiment was performed with primitive aircraft and mission models, it illustrates an important paradigm and provided complexity extrapolations for the proposed extraction of expertise from simulation, as discussed. The use of relaxation and inexact reasoning in expert systems was also investigated.
Compiler-Assisted Multiple Instruction Rollback Recovery Using a Read Buffer. Ph.D. Thesis
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Alewine, Neal Jon
1993-01-01
Multiple instruction rollback (MIR) is a technique to provide rapid recovery from transient processor failures and was implemented in hardware by researchers and slow in mainframe computers. Hardware-based MIR designs eliminate rollback data hazards by providing data redundancy implemented in hardware. Compiler-based MIR designs were also developed which remove rollback data hazards directly with data flow manipulations, thus eliminating the need for most data redundancy hardware. Compiler-assisted techniques to achieve multiple instruction rollback recovery are addressed. It is observed that data some hazards resulting from instruction rollback can be resolved more efficiently by providing hardware redundancy while others are resolved more efficiently with compiler transformations. A compiler-assisted multiple instruction rollback scheme is developed which combines hardware-implemented data redundancy with compiler-driven hazard removal transformations. Experimental performance evaluations were conducted which indicate improved efficiency over previous hardware-based and compiler-based schemes. Various enhancements to the compiler transformations and to the data redundancy hardware developed for the compiler-assisted MIR scheme are described and evaluated. The final topic deals with the application of compiler-assisted MIR techniques to aid in exception repair and branch repair in a speculative execution architecture.
Compression failure of composite laminates
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Pipes, R. B.
1983-01-01
This presentation attempts to characterize the compressive behavior of Hercules AS-1/3501-6 graphite-epoxy composite. The effect of varying specimen geometry on test results is examined. The transition region is determined between buckling and compressive failure. Failure modes are defined and analytical models to describe these modes are presented.
An improved method for risk evaluation in failure modes and effects analysis of CNC lathe
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Rachieru, N.; Belu, N.; Anghel, D. C.
2015-11-01
Failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) is one of the most popular reliability analysis tools for identifying, assessing and eliminating potential failure modes in a wide range of industries. In general, failure modes in FMEA are evaluated and ranked through the risk priority number (RPN), which is obtained by the multiplication of crisp values of the risk factors, such as the occurrence (O), severity (S), and detection (D) of each failure mode. However, the crisp RPN method has been criticized to have several deficiencies. In this paper, linguistic variables, expressed in Gaussian, trapezoidal or triangular fuzzy numbers, are used to assess the ratings and weights for the risk factors S, O and D. A new risk assessment system based on the fuzzy set theory and fuzzy rule base theory is to be applied to assess and rank risks associated to failure modes that could appear in the functioning of Turn 55 Lathe CNC. Two case studies have been shown to demonstrate the methodology thus developed. It is illustrated a parallel between the results obtained by the traditional method and fuzzy logic for determining the RPNs. The results show that the proposed approach can reduce duplicated RPN numbers and get a more accurate, reasonable risk assessment. As a result, the stability of product and process can be assured.
[Failure modes and effects analysis in the prescription, validation and dispensing process].
Delgado Silveira, E; Alvarez Díaz, A; Pérez Menéndez-Conde, C; Serna Pérez, J; Rodríguez Sagrado, M A; Bermejo Vicedo, T
2012-01-01
To apply a failure modes and effects analysis to the prescription, validation and dispensing process for hospitalised patients. A work group analysed all of the stages included in the process from prescription to dispensing, identifying the most critical errors and establishing potential failure modes which could produce a mistake. The possible causes, their potential effects, and the existing control systems were analysed to try and stop them from developing. The Hazard Score was calculated, choosing those that were ≥ 8, and a Severity Index = 4 was selected independently of the hazard Score value. Corrective measures and an implementation plan were proposed. A flow diagram that describes the whole process was obtained. A risk analysis was conducted of the chosen critical points, indicating: failure mode, cause, effect, severity, probability, Hazard Score, suggested preventative measure and strategy to achieve so. Failure modes chosen: Prescription on the nurse's form; progress or treatment order (paper); Prescription to incorrect patient; Transcription error by nursing staff and pharmacist; Error preparing the trolley. By applying a failure modes and effects analysis to the prescription, validation and dispensing process, we have been able to identify critical aspects, the stages in which errors may occur and the causes. It has allowed us to analyse the effects on the safety of the process, and establish measures to prevent or reduce them. Copyright © 2010 SEFH. Published by Elsevier Espana. All rights reserved.
Compiler-assisted multiple instruction rollback recovery using a read buffer
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Alewine, N. J.; Chen, S.-K.; Fuchs, W. K.; Hwu, W.-M.
1993-01-01
Multiple instruction rollback (MIR) is a technique that has been implemented in mainframe computers to provide rapid recovery from transient processor failures. Hardware-based MIR designs eliminate rollback data hazards by providing data redundancy implemented in hardware. Compiler-based MIR designs have also been developed which remove rollback data hazards directly with data-flow transformations. This paper focuses on compiler-assisted techniques to achieve multiple instruction rollback recovery. We observe that some data hazards resulting from instruction rollback can be resolved efficiently by providing an operand read buffer while others are resolved more efficiently with compiler transformations. A compiler-assisted multiple instruction rollback scheme is developed which combines hardware-implemented data redundancy with compiler-driven hazard removal transformations. Experimental performance evaluations indicate improved efficiency over previous hardware-based and compiler-based schemes.
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
1974-01-01
Future operational concepts for the space transportation system were studied in terms of space shuttle upper stage failure contingencies possible during deployment, retrieval, or space servicing of automated satellite programs. Problems anticipated during mission planning were isolated using a modified 'fault tree' technique, normally used in safety analyses. A comprehensive space servicing hazard analysis is presented which classifies possible failure modes under the catagories of catastrophic collision, failure to rendezvous and dock, servicing failure, and failure to undock. The failure contingencies defined are to be taken into account during design of the upper stage.
Determination of Turbine Blade Life from Engine Field Data
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Zaretsky, Erwin V.; Litt, Jonathan S.; Hendricks, Robert C.; Soditus, Sherry M.
2012-01-01
It is probable that no two engine companies determine the life of their engines or their components in the same way or apply the same experience and safety factors to their designs. Knowing the failure mode that is most likely to occur minimizes the amount of uncertainty and simplifies failure and life analysis. Available data regarding failure mode for aircraft engine blades, while favoring low-cycle, thermal mechanical fatigue as the controlling mode of failure, are not definitive. Sixteen high-pressure turbine (HPT) T-1 blade sets were removed from commercial aircraft engines that had been commercially flown by a single airline and inspected for damage. Each set contained 82 blades. The damage was cataloged into three categories related to their mode of failure: (1) Thermal-mechanical fatigue, (2) Oxidation/Erosion, and (3) "Other." From these field data, the turbine blade life was determined as well as the lives related to individual blade failure modes using Johnson-Weibull analysis. A simplified formula for calculating turbine blade life and reliability was formulated. The L(sub 10) blade life was calculated to be 2427 cycles (11 077 hr). The resulting blade life attributed to oxidation/erosion equaled that attributed to thermal-mechanical fatigue. The category that contributed most to blade failure was Other. If there were there no blade failures attributed to oxidation/erosion and thermal-mechanical fatigue, the overall blade L(sub 10) life would increase approximately 11 to 17 percent.
Evaluating the Performance of the NASA LaRC CMF Motion Base Safety Devices
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Gupton, Lawrence E.; Bryant, Richard B., Jr.; Carrelli, David J.
2006-01-01
This paper describes the initial measured performance results of the previously documented NASA Langley Research Center (LaRC) Cockpit Motion Facility (CMF) motion base hardware safety devices. These safety systems are required to prevent excessive accelerations that could injure personnel and damage simulator cockpits or the motion base structure. Excessive accelerations may be caused by erroneous commands or hardware failures driving an actuator to the end of its travel at high velocity, stepping a servo valve, or instantly reversing servo direction. Such commands may result from single order failures of electrical or hydraulic components within the control system itself, or from aggressive or improper cueing commands from the host simulation computer. The safety systems must mitigate these high acceleration events while minimizing the negative performance impacts. The system accomplishes this by controlling the rate of change of valve signals to limit excessive commanded accelerations. It also aids hydraulic cushion performance by limiting valve command authority as the actuator approaches its end of travel. The design takes advantage of inherent motion base hydraulic characteristics to implement all safety features using hardware only solutions.
Use of Failure Mode and Effects Analysis to Improve Emergency Department Handoff Processes.
Sorrentino, Patricia
2016-01-01
The purpose of this article is to describe a quality improvement process using failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) to evaluate systems handoff communication processes, improve emergency department (ED) throughput and reduce crowding through development of a standardized handoff, and, ultimately, improve patient safety. Risk of patient harm through ineffective communication during handoff transitions is a major reason for breakdown of systems. Complexities of ED processes put patient safety at risk. An increased incidence of submitted patient safety event reports for handoff communication failures between the ED and inpatient units solidified a decision to implement the use of FMEA to identify handoff failures to mitigate patient harm through redesign. The clinical nurse specialist implemented an FMEA. Handoff failure themes were created from deidentified retrospective reviews. Weekly meetings were held over a 3-month period to identify failure modes and determine cause and effect on the process. A functional block diagram process map tool was used to illustrate handoff processes. An FMEA grid was used to list failure modes and assign a risk priority number to quantify results. Multiple areas with actionable failures were identified. A majority of causes for high-priority failure modes were specific to communications. Findings demonstrate the complexity of transition and handoff processes. The FMEA served to identify and evaluate risk of handoff failures and provide a framework for process improvement. A focus on mentoring nurses to quality handoff processes so that it becomes habitual practice is crucial to safe patient transitions. Standardizing content and hardwiring within the system are best practice. The clinical nurse specialist is prepared to provide strong leadership to drive and implement system-wide quality projects.
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
1996-01-01
This Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is for the Advanced Microwave Sounding Unit-A (AMSU-A) instruments that are being designed and manufactured for the Meteorological Satellites Project (METSAT) and the Earth Observing System (EOS) integrated programs. The FMEA analyzes the design of the METSAT and EOS instruments as they currently exist. This FMEA is intended to identify METSAT and EOS failure modes and their effect on spacecraft-instrument and instrument-component interfaces. The prime objective of this FMEA is to identify potential catastrophic and critical failures so that susceptibility to the failures and their effects can be eliminated from the METSAT/EOS instruments.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Yang, F; Cao, N; Young, L
2014-06-15
Purpose: Though FMEA (Failure Mode and Effects Analysis) is becoming more widely adopted for risk assessment in radiation therapy, to our knowledge it has never been validated against actual incident learning data. The objective of this study was to perform an FMEA analysis of an SBRT (Stereotactic Body Radiation Therapy) treatment planning process and validate this against data recorded within an incident learning system. Methods: FMEA on the SBRT treatment planning process was carried out by a multidisciplinary group including radiation oncologists, medical physicists, and dosimetrists. Potential failure modes were identified through a systematic review of the workflow process. Failuremore » modes were rated for severity, occurrence, and detectability on a scale of 1 to 10 and RPN (Risk Priority Number) was computed. Failure modes were then compared with historical reports identified as relevant to SBRT planning within a departmental incident learning system that had been active for two years. Differences were identified. Results: FMEA identified 63 failure modes. RPN values for the top 25% of failure modes ranged from 60 to 336. Analysis of the incident learning database identified 33 reported near-miss events related to SBRT planning. FMEA failed to anticipate 13 of these events, among which 3 were registered with severity ratings of severe or critical in the incident learning system. Combining both methods yielded a total of 76 failure modes, and when scored for RPN the 13 events missed by FMEA ranked within the middle half of all failure modes. Conclusion: FMEA, though valuable, is subject to certain limitations, among them the limited ability to anticipate all potential errors for a given process. This FMEA exercise failed to identify a significant number of possible errors (17%). Integration of FMEA with retrospective incident data may be able to render an improved overview of risks within a process.« less
Compression failure of angle-ply laminates
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Peel, Larry D.; Hyer, Michael W.; Shuart, Mark J.
1991-01-01
The present work deals with modes and mechanisms of failure in compression of angle-ply laminates. Experimental results were obtained from 42 angle-ply IM7/8551-7a specimens with a lay-up of ((plus or minus theta)/(plus or minus theta)) sub 6s where theta, the off-axis angle, ranged from 0 degrees to 90 degrees. The results showed four failure modes, these modes being a function of off-axis angle. Failure modes include fiber compression, inplane transverse tension, inplane shear, and inplane transverse compression. Excessive interlaminar shear strain was also considered as an important mode of failure. At low off-axis angles, experimentally observed values were considerably lower than published strengths. It was determined that laminate imperfections in the form of layer waviness could be a major factor in reducing compression strength. Previously developed linear buckling and geometrically nonlinear theories were used, with modifications and enhancements, to examine the influence of layer waviness on compression response. The wavy layer is described by a wave amplitude and a wave length. Linear elastic stress-strain response is assumed. The geometrically nonlinear theory, in conjunction with the maximum stress failure criterion, was used to predict compression failure and failure modes for the angle-ply laminates. A range of wave length and amplitudes were used. It was found that for 0 less than or equal to theta less than or equal to 15 degrees failure was most likely due to fiber compression. For 15 degrees less than theta less than or equal to 35 degrees, failure was most likely due to inplane transverse tension. For 35 degrees less than theta less than or equal to 70 degrees, failure was most likely due to inplane shear. For theta less than 70 degrees, failure was most likely due to inplane transverse compression. The fiber compression and transverse tension failure modes depended more heavily on wave length than on wave amplitude. Thus using a single parameter, such as a ratio of wave amplitude to wave length, to describe waviness in a laminate would be inaccurate. Throughout, results for AS4/3502, studied previously, are included for comparison. At low off-axis angles, the AS4/3502 material system was found to be less sensitive to layer waviness than IM7/8551-7a. Analytical predictions were also obtained for laminates with waviness in only some of the layers. For this type of waviness, laminate compression strength could also be considered a function of which layers in the laminate were wavy, and where those wavy layers were. Overall, the geometrically nonlinear model correlates well with experimental results.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Cheong, S-K; Kim, J
Purpose: The aim of the study is the application of a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) to access the risks for patients undergoing a Low Dose Rate (LDR) Prostate Brachytherapy Treatment. Methods: FMEA was applied to identify all the sub processes involved in the stages of identifying patient, source handling, treatment preparation, treatment delivery, and post treatment. These processes characterize the radiation treatment associated with LDR Prostate Brachytherapy. The potential failure modes together with their causes and effects were identified and ranked in order of their importance. Three indexes were assigned for each failure mode: the occurrence rating (O),more » the severity rating (S), and the detection rating (D). A ten-point scale was used to score each category, ten being the number indicating most severe, most frequent, and least detectable failure mode, respectively. The risk probability number (RPN) was calculated as a product of the three attributes: RPN = O X S x D. The analysis was carried out by a working group (WG) at UPMC. Results: The total of 56 failure modes were identified including 32 modes before the treatment, 13 modes during the treatment, and 11 modes after the treatment. In addition to the protocols already adopted in the clinical practice, the prioritized risk management will be implanted to the high risk procedures on the basis of RPN score. Conclusion: The effectiveness of the FMEA method was established. The FMEA methodology provides a structured and detailed assessment method for the risk analysis of the LDR Prostate Brachytherapy Procedure and can be applied to other radiation treatment modes.« less
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Lalli, Vincent R. (Editor); Malec, Henry A. (Editor); Dillard, Richard B.; Wong, Kam L.; Barber, Frank J.; Barina, Frank J.
1992-01-01
Discussed here is failure physics, the study of how products, hardware, software, and systems fail and what can be done about it. The intent is to impart useful information, to extend the limits of production capability, and to assist in achieving low cost reliable products. A review of reliability for the years 1940 to 2000 is given. Next, a review of mathematics is given as well as a description of what elements contribute to product failures. Basic reliability theory and the disciplines that allow us to control and eliminate failures are elucidated.
Microstructure-failure mode correlations in braided composites
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Filatovs, G. J.; Sadler, Robert L.; El-Shiekh, Aly
1992-01-01
Explication of the fracture processes of braided composites is needed for modeling their behavior. Described is a systematic exploration of the relationship between microstructure, loading mode, and micro-failure mechanisms in carbon/epoxy braided composites. The study involved compression and fracture toughness tests and optical and scanning electron fractography, including dynamic in-situ testing. Principal failure mechanisms of low sliding, buckling, and unstable crack growth are correlated to microstructural parameters and loading modes; these are used for defining those microstructural conditions which are strength limiting.
Chapter 3: Photovoltaic Module Stability and Reliability
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Jordan, Dirk; Kurtz, Sarah
2017-01-01
Profits realized from investment in photovoltaic will benefit from decades of reliable operation. Service life prediction through accelerated tests is only possible if indoor tests duplicate power loss and failure modes observed in fielded systems. Therefore, detailing and quantifying power loss and failure modes is imperative. In the first section, we examine recent trends in degradation rates, the gradual power loss observed for different technologies, climates and other significant factors. In the second section, we provide a summary of the most commonly observed failure modes in fielded systems.
Plant, Richard R
2016-03-01
There is an ongoing 'replication crisis' across the field of psychology in which researchers, funders, and members of the public are questioning the results of some scientific studies and the validity of the data they are based upon. However, few have considered that a growing proportion of research in modern psychology is conducted using a computer. Could it simply be that the hardware and software, or experiment generator, being used to run the experiment itself be a cause of millisecond timing error and subsequent replication failure? This article serves as a reminder that millisecond timing accuracy in psychology studies remains an important issue and that care needs to be taken to ensure that studies can be replicated on current computer hardware and software.
Availability Estimate of a Conceptual ESM System.
1979-06-01
affect mission operation.t A functional block level failure modes and effects analysis ( FMEA ) performed on the filter resulted in an assessed failure rate...is based on an FMEA of failures that disable the function (see Appendix A). A further 29 examination of the filter piece-parts reveals that the driver...Digital-to-analog converter DC Direct current DF Direction finding ESM Electronic Support Measures FMEA Failure modes and effects analysis FMPO
Peridynamics for failure and residual strength prediction of fiber-reinforced composites
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Colavito, Kyle
Peridynamics is a reformulation of classical continuum mechanics that utilizes integral equations in place of partial differential equations to remove the difficulty in handling discontinuities, such as cracks or interfaces, within a body. Damage is included within the constitutive model; initiation and propagation can occur without resorting to special crack growth criteria necessary in other commonly utilized approaches. Predicting damage and residual strengths of composite materials involves capturing complex, distinct and progressive failure modes. The peridynamic laminate theory correctly predicts the load redistribution in general laminate layups in the presence of complex failure modes through the use of multiple interaction types. This study presents two approaches to obtain the critical peridynamic failure parameters necessary to capture the residual strength of a composite structure. The validity of both approaches is first demonstrated by considering the residual strength of isotropic materials. The peridynamic theory is used to predict the crack growth and final failure load in both a diagonally loaded square plate with a center crack, as well as a four-point shear specimen subjected to asymmetric loading. This study also establishes the validity of each approach by considering composite laminate specimens in which each failure mode is isolated. Finally, the failure loads and final failure modes are predicted in a laminate with various hole diameters subjected to tensile and compressive loads.
Ply-level failure analysis of a graphite/epoxy laminate under bearing-bypass loading
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Naik, R. A.; Crews, J. H., Jr.
1988-01-01
A combined experimental and analytical study was conducted to investigate and predict the failure modes of a graphite/epoxy laminate subjected to combined bearing and bypass loading. Tests were conducted in a test machine that allowed the bearing-bypass load ratio to be controlled while a single-fastener coupon was loaded to failure in either tension or compression. Onset and ultimate failure modes and strengths were determined for each test case. The damage-onset modes were studied in detail by sectioning and micrographing the damaged specimens. A two-dimensional, finite-element analysis was conducted to determine lamina strains around the bolt hole. Damage onset consisted of matrix cracks, delamination, and fiber failures. Stiffness loss appeared to be caused by fiber failures rather than by matrix cracking and delamination. An unusual offset-compression mode was observed for compressive bearing-bypass laoding in which the specimen failed across its width along a line offset from the hole. The computed lamina strains in the fiber direction were used in a combined analytical and experimental approach to predict bearing-bypass diagrams for damage onset from a few simple tests.
Ply-level failure analysis of a graphite/epoxy laminate under bearing-bypass loading
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Naik, R. A.; Crews, J. H., Jr.
1990-01-01
A combined experimental and analytical study was conducted to investigate and predict the failure modes of a graphite/epoxy laminate subjected to combined bearing and bypass loading. Tests were conducted in a test machine that allowed the bearing-bypass load ratio to be controlled while a single-fastener coupon was loaded to failure in either tension or compression. Onset and ultimate failure modes and strengths were determined for each test case. The damage-onset modes were studied in detail by sectioning and micrographing the damaged specimens. A two-dimensional, finite-element analysis was conducted to determine lamina strains around the bolt hole. Damage onset consisted of matrix cracks, delamination, and fiber failures. Stiffness loss appeared to be caused by fiber failures rather than by matrix cracking and delamination. An unusual offset-compression mode was observed for compressive bearing-bypass loading in which the specimen failed across its width along a line offset from the hole. The computed lamina strains in the fiber direction were used in a combined analytical and experimental approach to predict bearing-bypass diagrams for damage onset from a few simple tests.
Orbiter Autoland reliability analysis
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Welch, D. Phillip
1993-01-01
The Space Shuttle Orbiter is the only space reentry vehicle in which the crew is seated upright. This position presents some physiological effects requiring countermeasures to prevent a crewmember from becoming incapacitated. This also introduces a potential need for automated vehicle landing capability. Autoland is a primary procedure that was identified as a requirement for landing following and extended duration orbiter mission. This report documents the results of the reliability analysis performed on the hardware required for an automated landing. A reliability block diagram was used to evaluate system reliability. The analysis considers the manual and automated landing modes currently available on the Orbiter. (Autoland is presently a backup system only.) Results of this study indicate a +/- 36 percent probability of successfully extending a nominal mission to 30 days. Enough variations were evaluated to verify that the reliability could be altered with missions planning and procedures. If the crew is modeled as being fully capable after 30 days, the probability of a successful manual landing is comparable to that of Autoland because much of the hardware is used for both manual and automated landing modes. The analysis indicates that the reliability for the manual mode is limited by the hardware and depends greatly on crew capability. Crew capability for a successful landing after 30 days has not been determined yet.
GROVER: An autonomous vehicle for ice sheet research
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Trisca, G. O.; Robertson, M. E.; Marshall, H.; Koenig, L.; Comberiate, M. A.
2013-12-01
The Goddard Remotely Operated Vehicle for Exploration and Research or Greenland Rover (GROVER) is a science enabling autonomous robot specifically designed to carry a low-power, large bandwidth radar for snow accumulation mapping over the Greenland Ice Sheet. This new and evolving technology enables reduced cost and increased safety for polar research. GROVER was field tested at Summit, Greenland in May 2013. The robot traveled over 30 km and was controlled both by line of sight wireless and completely autonomously with commands and telemetry via the Iridium Satellite Network, from Summit as well as remotely from Boise, Idaho. Here we describe GROVER's unique abilities and design. The software stack features a modular design that can be adapted for any application that requires autonomous behavior, reliable communications using different technologies and low level control of peripherals. The modules are built to communicate using the publisher-subscriber design pattern to maximize data-reuse and allow for graceful failures at the software level, along with the ability to be loaded or unloaded on-the-fly, enabling the software to adopt different behaviors based on power constraints or specific processing needs. These modules can also be loaded or unloaded remotely for servicing and telemetry can be configured to contain any kind of information being generated by the sensors or scientific instruments. The hardware design protects the electronic components and the control system can change functional parameters based on sensor input. Power failure modes built into the hardware prevent the vehicle from running out of energy permanently by monitoring voltage levels and triggering software reboots when the levels match pre-established conditions. This guarantees that the control software will be operational as soon as there is enough charge to sustain it, giving the vehicle increased longevity in case of a temporary power loss. GROVER demonstrates that autonomous rovers can be a revolutionary tool for data collection, and that both the technology and the software are available and ready to be implemented to create scientific data collection platforms.
Accelerated fatigue durability of a high performance composite
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Rotem, A.
1982-01-01
The fatigue behavior of multidirectional graphite-epoxy laminates was analyzed theoretically and experimentally in an effort to establish an accelerated testing methodology. Analysis of the failure mechanism in fatigue of the laminates led to the determination of the failure mode governing fracture. The nonlinear, cyclic-dependent shear modulus was used to calculate the changing stress field in the laminate during the fatigue loading. Fatigue tests were performed at three different temperatures: 25 C, 74 C, and 114 C. The prediction of the S-N curves was made based on the artificial static strength artificial static strength at a reference temperature and the fatigue functions associated with them. The prediction of an S-N curve at other temperatures was performed using shifting factors determined for the specific failure mode. For multidirectional laminates, different S-N curves at different temperatures could be predicted using these shifting factors. Different S-N curves at different temperatures occur only when the fatigue failure mode is matrix dominated. It was found that whenever the fatigue failure mode is fiber dominated, temperature, over the range investigated, had no influence on the fatigue life. These results permit the prediction of long-time, low temperature fatigue behavior from data obtained in short time, high temperature testing, for laminates governed by a matrix failure mode.
CONFIG: Qualitative simulation tool for analyzing behavior of engineering devices
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Malin, Jane T.; Basham, Bryan D.; Harris, Richard A.
1987-01-01
To design failure management expert systems, engineers mentally analyze the effects of failures and procedures as they propagate through device configurations. CONFIG is a generic device modeling tool for use in discrete event simulation, to support such analyses. CONFIG permits graphical modeling of device configurations and qualitative specification of local operating modes of device components. Computation requirements are reduced by focussing the level of component description on operating modes and failure modes, and specifying qualitative ranges of variables relative to mode transition boundaries. Simulation processing occurs only when modes change or variables cross qualitative boundaries. Device models are built graphically, using components from libraries. Components are connected at ports by graphical relations that define data flow. The core of a component model is its state transition diagram, which specifies modes of operation and transitions among them.
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Lewis, John F.; Cole, Harold; Cronin, Gary; Gazda, Daniel B.; Steele, John
2006-01-01
Following the Colombia accident, the Extravehicular Mobility Units (EMU) onboard ISS were unused for several months. Upon startup, the units experienced a failure in the coolant system. This failure resulted in the loss of Extravehicular Activity (EVA) capability from the US segment of ISS. With limited on-orbit evidence, a team of chemists, engineers, metallurgists, and microbiologists were able to identify the cause of the failure and develop recovery hardware and procedures. As a result of this work, the ISS crew regained the capability to perform EVAs from the US segment of the ISS.
40 CFR 68.67 - Process hazard analysis.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-07-01
...) CHEMICAL ACCIDENT PREVENTION PROVISIONS Program 3 Prevention Program § 68.67 Process hazard analysis. (a... instrumentation with alarms, and detection hardware such as hydrocarbon sensors.); (4) Consequences of failure of...
40 CFR 68.67 - Process hazard analysis.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-07-01
...) CHEMICAL ACCIDENT PREVENTION PROVISIONS Program 3 Prevention Program § 68.67 Process hazard analysis. (a... instrumentation with alarms, and detection hardware such as hydrocarbon sensors.); (4) Consequences of failure of...
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Putcha, Chandra S.; Mikula, D. F. Kip; Dueease, Robert A.; Dang, Lan; Peercy, Robert L.
1997-01-01
This paper deals with the development of a reliability methodology to assess the consequences of using hardware, without failure analysis or corrective action, that has previously demonstrated that it did not perform per specification. The subject of this paper arose from the need to provide a detailed probabilistic analysis to calculate the change in probability of failures with respect to the base or non-failed hardware. The methodology used for the analysis is primarily based on principles of Monte Carlo simulation. The random variables in the analysis are: Maximum Time of Operation (MTO) and operation Time of each Unit (OTU) The failure of a unit is considered to happen if (OTU) is less than MTO for the Normal Operational Period (NOP) in which this unit is used. NOP as a whole uses a total of 4 units. Two cases are considered. in the first specialized scenario, the failure of any operation or system failure is considered to happen if any of the units used during the NOP fail. in the second specialized scenario, the failure of any operation or system failure is considered to happen only if any two of the units used during the MOP fail together. The probability of failure of the units and the system as a whole is determined for 3 kinds of systems - Perfect System, Imperfect System 1 and Imperfect System 2. in a Perfect System, the operation time of the failed unit is the same as that of the MTO. In an Imperfect System 1, the operation time of the failed unit is assumed as 1 percent of the MTO. In an Imperfect System 2, the operation time of the failed unit is assumed as zero. in addition, simulated operation time of failed units is assumed as 10 percent of the corresponding units before zero value. Monte Carlo simulation analysis is used for this study. Necessary software has been developed as part of this study to perform the reliability calculations. The results of the analysis showed that the predicted change in failure probability (P(sub F)) for the previously failed units is as high as 49 percent above the baseline (perfect system) for the worst case. The predicted change in system P(sub F) for the previously failed units is as high as 36% for single unit failure without any redundancy. For redundant systems, with dual unit failure, the predicted change in P(sub F) for the previously failed units is as high as 16%. These results will help management to make decisions regarding the consequences of using previously failed units without adequate failure analysis or corrective action.
PV Degradation Curves: Non-Linearities and Failure Modes
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Jordan, Dirk C.; Silverman, Timothy J.; Sekulic, Bill
Photovoltaic (PV) reliability and durability have seen increased interest in recent years. Historically, and as a preliminarily reasonable approximation, linear degradation rates have been used to quantify long-term module and system performance. The underlying assumption of linearity can be violated at the beginning of the life, as has been well documented, especially for thin-film technology. Additionally, non-linearities in the wear-out phase can have significant economic impact and appear to be linked to different failure modes. In addition, associating specific degradation and failure modes with specific time series behavior will aid in duplicating these degradation modes in accelerated tests and, eventually,more » in service life prediction. In this paper, we discuss different degradation modes and how some of these may cause approximately linear degradation within the measurement uncertainty (e.g., modules that were mainly affected by encapsulant discoloration) while other degradation modes lead to distinctly non-linear degradation (e.g., hot spots caused by cracked cells or solder bond failures and corrosion). The various behaviors are summarized with the goal of aiding in predictions of what may be seen in other systems.« less
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Ahn, Junkeon; Noh, Yeelyong; Park, Sung Ho; Choi, Byung Il; Chang, Daejun
2017-10-01
This study proposes a fuzzy-based FMEA (failure mode and effect analysis) for a hybrid molten carbonate fuel cell and gas turbine system for liquefied hydrogen tankers. An FMEA-based regulatory framework is adopted to analyze the non-conventional propulsion system and to understand the risk picture of the system. Since the participants of the FMEA rely on their subjective and qualitative experiences, the conventional FMEA used for identifying failures that affect system performance inevitably involves inherent uncertainties. A fuzzy-based FMEA is introduced to express such uncertainties appropriately and to provide flexible access to a risk picture for a new system using fuzzy modeling. The hybrid system has 35 components and has 70 potential failure modes, respectively. Significant failure modes occur in the fuel cell stack and rotary machine. The fuzzy risk priority number is used to validate the crisp risk priority number in the FMEA.
Utility of Failure Mode and Effect Analysis to Improve Safety in Suctioning by Orotracheal Tube.
Vázquez-Valencia, Agustín; Santiago-Sáez, Andrés; Perea-Pérez, Bernardo; Labajo-González, Elena; Albarrán-Juan, Maria Elena
2017-02-01
The objective of the study was to use the Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) tool to analyze the technique of secretion suctioning on patients with an endotracheal tube who were admitted into an intensive care unit. Brainstorming was carried out within the service to determine the potential errors most frequent in the process. After this, the FMEA was applied, including its stages, prioritizing risk in accordance with the risk prioritization number (RPN), selecting improvement actions in which they have an RPN of more than 300. We obtained 32 failure modes, of which 13 surpassed an RPN of 300. After our result, 21 improvement actions were proposed for those failure modes with RPN scores above 300. FMEA allows us to ascertain possible failures so as to later propose improvement actions for those which have an RPN of more than 300. Copyright © 2016 American Society of PeriAnesthesia Nurses. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Fast convergent frequency-domain MIMO equalizer for few-mode fiber communication systems
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
He, Xuan; Weng, Yi; Wang, Junyi; Pan, Z.
2018-02-01
Space division multiplexing using few-mode fibers has been extensively explored to sustain the continuous traffic growth. In few-mode fiber optical systems, both spatial and polarization modes are exploited to transmit parallel channels, thus increasing the overall capacity. However, signals on spatial channels inevitably suffer from the intrinsic inter-modal coupling and large accumulated differential mode group delay (DMGD), which causes spatial modes de-multiplex even harder. Many research articles have demonstrated that frequency domain adaptive multi-input multi-output (MIMO) equalizer can effectively compensate the DMGD and demultiplex the spatial channels with digital signal processing (DSP). However, the large accumulated DMGD usually requires a large number of training blocks for the initial convergence of adaptive MIMO equalizers, which will decrease the overall system efficiency and even degrade the equalizer performance in fast-changing optical channels. Least mean square (LMS) algorithm is always used in MIMO equalization to dynamically demultiplex the spatial signals. We have proposed to use signal power spectral density (PSD) dependent method and noise PSD directed method to improve the convergence speed of adaptive frequency domain LMS algorithm. We also proposed frequency domain recursive least square (RLS) algorithm to further increase the convergence speed of MIMO equalizer at cost of greater hardware complexity. In this paper, we will compare the hardware complexity and convergence speed of signal PSD dependent and noise power directed algorithms against the conventional frequency domain LMS algorithm. In our numerical study of a three-mode 112 Gbit/s PDM-QPSK optical system with 3000 km transmission, the noise PSD directed and signal PSD dependent methods could improve the convergence speed by 48.3% and 36.1% respectively, at cost of 17.2% and 10.7% higher hardware complexity. We will also compare the frequency domain RLS algorithm against conventional frequency domain LMS algorithm. Our numerical study shows that, in a three-mode 224 Gbit/s PDM-16-QAM system with 3000 km transmission, the RLS algorithm could improve the convergence speed by 53.7% over conventional frequency domain LMS algorithm.
Sounds of Failure: Passive Acoustic Measurements of Excited Vibrational Modes
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Brzinski, Theodore A.; Daniels, Karen E.
2018-05-01
Granular materials can fail through spontaneous events like earthquakes or brittle fracture. However, measurements and analytic models which forecast failure in this class of materials, while of both fundamental and practical interest, remain elusive. Materials including numerical packings of spheres, colloidal glasses, and granular materials have been known to develop an excess of low-frequency vibrational modes as the confining pressure is reduced. Here, we report experiments on sheared granular materials in which we monitor the evolving density of excited modes via passive monitoring of acoustic emissions. We observe a broadening of the distribution of excited modes coincident with both bulk and local plasticity, and evolution in the shape of the distribution before and after bulk failure. These results provide a new interpretation of the changing state of the material on its approach to stick-slip failure.
Sounds of Failure: Passive Acoustic Measurements of Excited Vibrational Modes.
Brzinski, Theodore A; Daniels, Karen E
2018-05-25
Granular materials can fail through spontaneous events like earthquakes or brittle fracture. However, measurements and analytic models which forecast failure in this class of materials, while of both fundamental and practical interest, remain elusive. Materials including numerical packings of spheres, colloidal glasses, and granular materials have been known to develop an excess of low-frequency vibrational modes as the confining pressure is reduced. Here, we report experiments on sheared granular materials in which we monitor the evolving density of excited modes via passive monitoring of acoustic emissions. We observe a broadening of the distribution of excited modes coincident with both bulk and local plasticity, and evolution in the shape of the distribution before and after bulk failure. These results provide a new interpretation of the changing state of the material on its approach to stick-slip failure.
Failure mode and effect analysis in blood transfusion: a proactive tool to reduce risks.
Lu, Yao; Teng, Fang; Zhou, Jie; Wen, Aiqing; Bi, Yutian
2013-12-01
The aim of blood transfusion risk management is to improve the quality of blood products and to assure patient safety. We utilize failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA), a tool employed for evaluating risks and identifying preventive measures to reduce the risks in blood transfusion. The failure modes and effects occurring throughout the whole process of blood transfusion were studied. Each failure mode was evaluated using three scores: severity of effect (S), likelihood of occurrence (O), and probability of detection (D). Risk priority numbers (RPNs) were calculated by multiplying the S, O, and D scores. The plan-do-check-act cycle was also used for continuous improvement. Analysis has showed that failure modes with the highest RPNs, and therefore the greatest risk, were insufficient preoperative assessment of the blood product requirement (RPN, 245), preparation time before infusion of more than 30 minutes (RPN, 240), blood transfusion reaction occurring during the transfusion process (RPN, 224), blood plasma abuse (RPN, 180), and insufficient and/or incorrect clinical information on request form (RPN, 126). After implementation of preventative measures and reassessment, a reduction in RPN was detected with each risk. The failure mode with the second highest RPN, namely, preparation time before infusion of more than 30 minutes, was shown in detail to prove the efficiency of this tool. FMEA evaluation model is a useful tool in proactively analyzing and reducing the risks associated with the blood transfusion procedure. © 2013 American Association of Blood Banks.
One Size Does Not Fit All: Human Failure Event Decomposition and Task Analysis
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Ronald Laurids Boring, PhD
2014-09-01
In the probabilistic safety assessments (PSAs) used in the nuclear industry, human failure events (HFEs) are determined as a subset of hardware failures, namely those hardware failures that could be triggered or exacerbated by human action or inaction. This approach is top-down, starting with hardware faults and deducing human contributions to those faults. Elsewhere, more traditionally human factors driven approaches would tend to look at opportunities for human errors first in a task analysis and then identify which of those errors is risk significant. The intersection of top-down and bottom-up approaches to defining HFEs has not been carefully studied. Ideally,more » both approaches should arrive at the same set of HFEs. This question remains central as human reliability analysis (HRA) methods are generalized to new domains like oil and gas. The HFEs used in nuclear PSAs tend to be top-down—defined as a subset of the PSA—whereas the HFEs used in petroleum quantitative risk assessments (QRAs) are more likely to be bottom-up—derived from a task analysis conducted by human factors experts. The marriage of these approaches is necessary in order to ensure that HRA methods developed for top-down HFEs are also sufficient for bottom-up applications. In this paper, I first review top-down and bottom-up approaches for defining HFEs and then present a seven-step guideline to ensure a task analysis completed as part of human error identification decomposes to a level suitable for use as HFEs. This guideline illustrates an effective way to bridge the bottom-up approach with top-down requirements.« less
Tethered Satellite System Contingency Investigation Board
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
1992-01-01
The Tethered Satellite System (TSS-1) was launched aboard the Space Shuttle Atlantis (STS-46) on July 31, 1992. During the attempted on-orbit operations, the Tethered Satellite System failed to deploy successfully beyond 256 meters. The satellite was retrieved successfully and was returned on August 6, 1992. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Associate Administrator for Space Flight formed the Tethered Satellite System (TSS-1) Contingency Investigation Board on August 12, 1992. The TSS-1 Contingency Investigation Board was asked to review the anomalies which occurred, to determine the probable cause, and to recommend corrective measures to prevent recurrence. The board was supported by the TSS Systems Working group as identified in MSFC-TSS-11-90, 'Tethered Satellite System (TSS) Contingency Plan'. The board identified five anomalies for investigation: initial failure to retract the U2 umbilical; initial failure to flyaway; unplanned tether deployment stop at 179 meters; unplanned tether deployment stop at 256 meters; and failure to move tether in either direction at 224 meters. Initial observations of the returned flight hardware revealed evidence of mechanical interference by a bolt with the level wind mechanism travel as well as a helical shaped wrap of tether which indicated that the tether had been unwound from the reel beyond the travel by the level wind mechanism. Examination of the detailed mission events from flight data and mission logs related to the initial failure to flyaway and the failure to move in either direction at 224 meters, together with known preflight concerns regarding slack tether, focused the assessment of these anomalies on the upper tether control mechanism. After the second meeting, the board requested the working group to complete and validate a detailed integrated mission sequence to focus the fault tree analysis on a stuck U2 umbilical, level wind mechanical interference, and slack tether in upper tether control mechanism and to prepare a detailed plan for hardware inspection, test, and analysis including any appropriate hardware disassembly.
Tethered Satellite System Contingency Investigation Board
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
1992-11-01
The Tethered Satellite System (TSS-1) was launched aboard the Space Shuttle Atlantis (STS-46) on July 31, 1992. During the attempted on-orbit operations, the Tethered Satellite System failed to deploy successfully beyond 256 meters. The satellite was retrieved successfully and was returned on August 6, 1992. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Associate Administrator for Space Flight formed the Tethered Satellite System (TSS-1) Contingency Investigation Board on August 12, 1992. The TSS-1 Contingency Investigation Board was asked to review the anomalies which occurred, to determine the probable cause, and to recommend corrective measures to prevent recurrence. The board was supported by the TSS Systems Working group as identified in MSFC-TSS-11-90, 'Tethered Satellite System (TSS) Contingency Plan'. The board identified five anomalies for investigation: initial failure to retract the U2 umbilical; initial failure to flyaway; unplanned tether deployment stop at 179 meters; unplanned tether deployment stop at 256 meters; and failure to move tether in either direction at 224 meters. Initial observations of the returned flight hardware revealed evidence of mechanical interference by a bolt with the level wind mechanism travel as well as a helical shaped wrap of tether which indicated that the tether had been unwound from the reel beyond the travel by the level wind mechanism. Examination of the detailed mission events from flight data and mission logs related to the initial failure to flyaway and the failure to move in either direction at 224 meters, together with known preflight concerns regarding slack tether, focused the assessment of these anomalies on the upper tether control mechanism. After the second meeting, the board requested the working group to complete and validate a detailed integrated mission sequence to focus the fault tree analysis on a stuck U2 umbilical, level wind mechanical interference, and slack tether in upper tether control mechanism and to prepare a detailed plan for hardware inspection, test, and analysis including any appropriate hardware disassembly.
Failure mechanism of hollow tree trunks due to cross-sectional flattening
Huang, Yan-San; Hsu, Fu-Lan; Lee, Chin-Mei
2017-01-01
Failure of hollow trees in urban areas is a worldwide concern, and it can be caused by different mechanisms, i.e. bending stresses or flattening-related failures. Here we derive a new analytical expression for predicting the bending moment for tangential cracking, and compare the breaking moment of various failure modes, including Brazier buckling, tangential cracking, shear failure and conventional bending failure, as a function of t/R ratio, where t and R are the trunk wall thickness and trunk radius, respectively, of a hollow tree. We use Taiwan red cypress as an example and show that its failure modes and the corresponding t/R ratios are: Brazier buckling (Mode I), tangential cracking followed by longitudinal splitting (Mode II) and conventional bending failure (Mode III) for 0 < t/R < 0.06, 0.06 < t/R < 0.27 and 0.27 < t/R < 1, respectively. The exact values of those ratios may vary within and among species, but the variation is much smaller than individual mechanical properties. Also, shear failure, another type of cracking due to maximum shear stress near the neutral axis of the tree trunk, is unlikely to occur since it requires much larger bending moments. Hence, we conclude that tangential cracking due to cross-sectional flattening, followed by longitudinal splitting, is dominant for hollow trunks. Our equations are applicable to analyse straight hollow tree trunks and plant stems, but are not applicable to those with side openings or those with only heart decay. Our findings provide insights for those managing trees in urban situations and those managing for conservation of hollow-dependent fauna in both urban and rural settings. PMID:28484616
Yousefinezhadi, Taraneh; Jannesar Nobari, Farnaz Attar; Goodari, Faranak Behzadi; Arab, Mohammad
2016-01-01
Introduction: In any complex human system, human error is inevitable and shows that can’t be eliminated by blaming wrong doers. So with the aim of improving Intensive Care Units (ICU) reliability in hospitals, this research tries to identify and analyze ICU’s process failure modes at the point of systematic approach to errors. Methods: In this descriptive research, data was gathered qualitatively by observations, document reviews, and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) with the process owners in two selected ICUs in Tehran in 2014. But, data analysis was quantitative, based on failures’ Risk Priority Number (RPN) at the base of Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) method used. Besides, some causes of failures were analyzed by qualitative Eindhoven Classification Model (ECM). Results: Through FMEA methodology, 378 potential failure modes from 180 ICU activities in hospital A and 184 potential failures from 99 ICU activities in hospital B were identified and evaluated. Then with 90% reliability (RPN≥100), totally 18 failures in hospital A and 42 ones in hospital B were identified as non-acceptable risks and then their causes were analyzed by ECM. Conclusions: Applying of modified PFMEA for improving two selected ICUs’ processes reliability in two different kinds of hospitals shows that this method empowers staff to identify, evaluate, prioritize and analyze all potential failure modes and also make them eager to identify their causes, recommend corrective actions and even participate in improving process without feeling blamed by top management. Moreover, by combining FMEA and ECM, team members can easily identify failure causes at the point of health care perspectives. PMID:27157162
ATS-6 engineering performance report. Volume 6: Scientific experiments
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Wales, R. O. (Editor)
1981-01-01
Evaluations include a very high resolution radiometer, a radio beacon experiment, environmental measurement experiments (EME), EME support hardware, EME anomalies and failures, EME results, and US/USSR magnetometer experiments.
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Jegley, Dawn C.; Lopez, Osvaldo F.
1991-01-01
Experimentally determined axial compressive failure loads, strains and failure modes of composite flat panels and cylinders are presented. A comparison of two types of filament wound flat graphite-epoxy panels indicates that the winding pattern can influence structural response. A comparison of hand laid-up tape and filament wound composite cylinders indicates that fabrication method may not significantly influence the failure mode or average failure strain of thick-walled (radius-to-thickness ratio less than 15) graphite-epoxy cylinders. The interaction of manufacturing-induced features (fiber cross-overs) and low-speed impact damage for graphite-epoxy specimens is also presented. Filament would flat panels with many fiber cross-overs exhibited lower failure strains than filament wound panels without fiber cross-overs for all impact speeds examined. Graphite-thermoplastic cylinders exhibited a significantly different failure mode from the graphite-epoxy cylinders.
Vaughn, Josh; Cohen, Eric; Vopat, Bryan G; Kane, Patrick; Abbood, Emily; Born, Christopher
2015-05-01
Hip fractures are becoming increasingly common resulting in significant morbidity, mortality and raising healthcare costs. Both short and long cephalomedullary devices are currently employed to treat intertrochanteric hip fractures. However, which device is optimal continues to be debated as each implant has unique characteristics and theoretical advantages. This study looked to identify rates of complications associated with both long and short cephalomedullary nails for the treatment of intertrochanteric hip fractures. We retrospectively reviewed charts from 2006 to 2011, and we identified 256 patients were identified with AO class 31.1-32.3 fractures. Sixty were treated with short nails and 196 with long nails. Radiographs and charts were then analysed for failures and hardware complications. Catastrophic failure and hardware complication rates were not statistically different between short or long cephalomedullary nails. The overall catastrophic failure rate was 3.1 %; there was a 5 % failure rate in the short-nail group compared with a 2.6 % failure rate in the long-nail group (p = 0.191). There was a 3.33 % secondary femur fracture rate in the short-nail group, compared with none in the long-nail cohort (p = 0.054). The rate of proximal fixation failure was 1.67 % for the short-nail group and 2.0 % in the long-nail group (p = 0.406). Our data suggests equivocal outcomes as measured by similar catastrophic failure rate between both short and long cephalomedullary nails for intertrochanteric femur fractures. However, there was an increased risk of secondary femur fracture with short cephalomedullary nails when compared to long nails that approached statistical significance.
Development, Demonstration, and Control of a Testbed for Multiterminal HVDC System
Li, Yalong; Shi, Xiaojie M.; Liu, Bo; ...
2016-10-21
This paper presents the development of a scaled four-terminal high-voltage direct current (HVDC) testbed, including hardware structure, communication architecture, and different control schemes. The developed testbed is capable of emulating typical operation scenarios including system start-up, power variation, line contingency, and converter station failure. Some unique scenarios are also developed and demonstrated, such as online control mode transition and station re-commission. In particular, a dc line current control is proposed, through the regulation of a converter station at one terminal. By controlling a dc line current to zero, the transmission line can be opened by using relatively low-cost HVDC disconnectsmore » with low current interrupting capability, instead of the more expensive dc circuit breaker. Utilizing the dc line current control, an automatic line current limiting scheme is developed. As a result, when a dc line is overloaded, the line current control will be automatically activated to regulate current within the allowable maximum value.« less
A Tamper-Resistant and Portable Healthcare Folder
Anciaux, Nicolas; Berthelot, Morgane; Braconnier, Laurent; Bouganim, Luc; De la Blache, Martine; Gardarin, Georges; Kesmarszky, Philippe; Lartigue, Sophie; Navarre, Jean-François; Pucheral, Philippe; Vandewalle, Jean-Jacques; Zeitouni, Karine
2008-01-01
Electronic health record (EHR) projects have been launched in most developed countries to increase the quality of healthcare while decreasing its cost. The benefits provided by centralizing the healthcare information in database systems are unquestionable in terms of information quality, availability, and protection against failure. Yet, patients are reluctant to give to a distant server the control over highly sensitive data (e.g., data revealing a severe or shameful disease). This paper capitalizes on a new hardware portable device, associating the security of a smart card to the storage capacity of a USB key, to give back to the patient the control over his medical data. This paper shows how this device can complement a traditional EHR server to (1) protect and share highly sensitive data among trusted parties and (2) provide a seamless access to the data even in disconnected mode. The proposed architecture is experimented in the context of a medicosocial network providing medical care and social services at home for elderly people. PMID:18615200
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Song, Lu-Kai; Wen, Jie; Fei, Cheng-Wei; Bai, Guang-Chen
2018-05-01
To improve the computing efficiency and precision of probabilistic design for multi-failure structure, a distributed collaborative probabilistic design method-based fuzzy neural network of regression (FR) (called as DCFRM) is proposed with the integration of distributed collaborative response surface method and fuzzy neural network regression model. The mathematical model of DCFRM is established and the probabilistic design idea with DCFRM is introduced. The probabilistic analysis of turbine blisk involving multi-failure modes (deformation failure, stress failure and strain failure) was investigated by considering fluid-structure interaction with the proposed method. The distribution characteristics, reliability degree, and sensitivity degree of each failure mode and overall failure mode on turbine blisk are obtained, which provides a useful reference for improving the performance and reliability of aeroengine. Through the comparison of methods shows that the DCFRM reshapes the probability of probabilistic analysis for multi-failure structure and improves the computing efficiency while keeping acceptable computational precision. Moreover, the proposed method offers a useful insight for reliability-based design optimization of multi-failure structure and thereby also enriches the theory and method of mechanical reliability design.
Numerical simulation of failure behavior of granular debris flows based on flume model tests.
Zhou, Jian; Li, Ye-xun; Jia, Min-cai; Li, Cui-na
2013-01-01
In this study, the failure behaviors of debris flows were studied by flume model tests with artificial rainfall and numerical simulations (PFC(3D)). Model tests revealed that grain sizes distribution had profound effects on failure mode, and the failure in slope of medium sand started with cracks at crest and took the form of retrogressive toe sliding failure. With the increase of fine particles in soil, the failure mode of the slopes changed to fluidized flow. The discrete element method PFC(3D) can overcome the hypothesis of the traditional continuous medium mechanic and consider the simple characteristics of particle. Thus, a numerical simulations model considering liquid-solid coupled method has been developed to simulate the debris flow. Comparing the experimental results, the numerical simulation result indicated that the failure mode of the failure of medium sand slope was retrogressive toe sliding, and the failure of fine sand slope was fluidized sliding. The simulation result is consistent with the model test and theoretical analysis, and grain sizes distribution caused different failure behavior of granular debris flows. This research should be a guide to explore the theory of debris flow and to improve the prevention and reduction of debris flow.
Evolution of the Hubble Space Telescope Safing Systems
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Pepe, Joyce; Myslinski, Michael
2006-01-01
The Hubble Space Telescope (HST) was launched on April 24 1990, with an expected lifespan of 15 years. Central to the spacecraft design was the concept of a series of on-orbit shuttle servicing missions permitting astronauts to replace failed equipment, update the scientific instruments and keep the HST at the forefront of astronomical discoveries. One key to the success of the Hubble mission has been the robust Safing systems designed to monitor the performance of the observatory and to react to keep the spacecraft safe in the event of equipment anomaly. The spacecraft Safing System consists of a range of software tests in the primary flight computer that evaluate the performance of mission critical hardware, safe modes that are activated when the primary control mode is deemed inadequate for protecting the vehicle, and special actions that the computer can take to autonomously reconfigure critical hardware. The HST Safing System was structured to autonomously detect electrical power system, data management system, and pointing control system malfunctions and to configure the vehicle to ensure safe operation without ground intervention for up to 72 hours. There is also a dedicated safe mode computer that constantly monitors a keep-alive signal from the primary computer. If this signal stops, the safe mode computer shuts down the primary computer and takes over control of the vehicle, putting it into a safe, low-power configuration. The HST Safing system has continued to evolve as equipment has aged, as new hardware has been installed on the vehicle, and as the operation modes have matured during the mission. Along with the continual refinement of the limits used in the safing tests, several new tests have been added to the monitoring system, and new safe modes have been added to the flight software. This paper will focus on the evolution of the HST Safing System and Safing tests, and the importance of this evolution to prolonging the science operations of the telescope.
Shuttle/TDRSS Ku-band downlink study
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Meyer, R.
1976-01-01
Assessing the adequacy of the baseline signal design approach, developing performance specifications for the return link hardware, and performing detailed design and parameter optimization tasks was accomplished by completing five specific study tasks. The results of these tasks show that the basic signal structure design is sound and that the goals can be met. Constraints placed on return link hardware by this structure allow reasonable specifications to be written so that no extreme technical risk areas in equipment design are foreseen. A third channel can be added to the PM mode without seriously degrading the other services. The feasibility of using only a PM mode was shown to exist, however, this will require use of some digital TV transmission techniques. Each task and its results are summarized.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Rusu, I; Thomas, T; Roeske, J
Purpose: To identify areas of improvement in our liver stereotactic body radiation therapy (SBRT) program, using failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA). Methods: A multidisciplinary group consisting of one physician, three physicists, one dosimetrist and two therapists was formed. A process map covering 10 major stages of the liver SBRT program from the initial diagnosis to post treatment follow-up was generated. A total of 102 failure modes, together with their causes and effects, were identified. The occurrence (O), severity (S) and lack of detectability (D) were independently scored. The ranking was done using the risk probability number (RPN) defined asmore » the product of average O, S and D numbers for each mode. The scores were normalized to remove inter-observer variability, while preserving individual ranking order. Further, a correlation analysis on the overall agreement on rank order of all failure modes resulted in positive values for successive pairs of evaluators. The failure modes with the highest RPN value were considered for further investigation. Results: The average normalized RPN values for all modes were 39 with a range of 9 to 103. The FMEA analysis resulted in the identification of the top 10 critical failures modes as: Incorrect CT-MR registration, MR scan not performed in treatment position, patient movement between CBCT acquisition and treatment, daily IGRT QA not verified, incorrect or incomplete ITV delineation, OAR contours not verified, inaccurate normal liver effective dose (Veff) calculation, failure of bolus tracking for 4D CT scan, setup instructions not followed for treatment and plan evaluation metrics missed. Conclusion: The application of FMEA to our liver SBRT program led to the identification and possible improvement of areas affecting patient safety.« less
Prediction of mode of death in heart failure: the Seattle Heart Failure Model.
Mozaffarian, Dariush; Anker, Stefan D; Anand, Inder; Linker, David T; Sullivan, Mark D; Cleland, John G F; Carson, Peter E; Maggioni, Aldo P; Mann, Douglas L; Pitt, Bertram; Poole-Wilson, Philip A; Levy, Wayne C
2007-07-24
Prognosis and mode of death in heart failure patients are highly variable in that some patients die suddenly (often from ventricular arrhythmia) and others die of progressive failure of cardiac function (pump failure). Prediction of mode of death may facilitate decisions about specific medications or devices. We used the Seattle Heart Failure Model (SHFM), a validated prediction model for total mortality in heart failure, to assess the mode of death in 10,538 ambulatory patients with New York Heart Association class II to IV heart failure and predominantly systolic dysfunction enrolled in 6 randomized trials or registries. During 16,735 person-years of follow-up, 2014 deaths occurred, which included 1014 sudden deaths and 684 pump-failure deaths. Compared with a SHFM score of 0, patients with a score of 1 had a 50% higher risk of sudden death, patients with a score of 2 had a nearly 3-fold higher risk, and patients with a score of 3 or 4 had a nearly 7-fold higher risk (P<0.001 for all comparisons; 1-year area under the receiver operating curve, 0.68). Stratification of risk of pump-failure death was even more pronounced, with a 4-fold higher risk with a score of 1, a 15-fold higher risk with a score of 2, a 38-fold higher risk with a score of 3, and an 88-fold higher risk with a score of 4 (P<0.001 for all comparisons; 1-year area under the receiver operating curve, 0.85). The proportion of deaths caused by sudden death versus pump-failure death decreased from a ratio of 7:1 with a SHFM score of 0 to a ratio of 1:2 with a SHFM score of 4 (P trend <0.001). The SHFM score provides information about the likely mode of death among ambulatory heart failure patients. Investigation is warranted to determine whether such information might predict responses to or cost-effectiveness of specific medications or devices in heart failure patients.
Automatic Monitoring System Design and Failure Probability Analysis for River Dikes on Steep Channel
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Chang, Yin-Lung; Lin, Yi-Jun; Tung, Yeou-Koung
2017-04-01
The purposes of this study includes: (1) design an automatic monitoring system for river dike; and (2) develop a framework which enables the determination of dike failure probabilities for various failure modes during a rainstorm. The historical dike failure data collected in this study indicate that most dikes in Taiwan collapsed under the 20-years return period discharge, which means the probability of dike failure is much higher than that of overtopping. We installed the dike monitoring system on the Chiu-She Dike which located on the middle stream of Dajia River, Taiwan. The system includes: (1) vertical distributed pore water pressure sensors in front of and behind the dike; (2) Time Domain Reflectometry (TDR) to measure the displacement of dike; (3) wireless floating device to measure the scouring depth at the toe of dike; and (4) water level gauge. The monitoring system recorded the variation of pore pressure inside the Chiu-She Dike and the scouring depth during Typhoon Megi. The recorded data showed that the highest groundwater level insides the dike occurred 15 hours after the peak discharge. We developed a framework which accounts for the uncertainties from return period discharge, Manning's n, scouring depth, soil cohesion, and friction angle and enables the determination of dike failure probabilities for various failure modes such as overtopping, surface erosion, mass failure, toe sliding and overturning. The framework was applied to Chiu-She, Feng-Chou, and Ke-Chuang Dikes on Dajia River. The results indicate that the toe sliding or overturning has the highest probability than other failure modes. Furthermore, the overall failure probability (integrate different failure modes) reaches 50% under 10-years return period flood which agrees with the historical failure data for the study reaches.
Pérez-González, A; González-Lluch, C; Sancho-Bru, J L; Rodríguez-Cervantes, P J; Barjau-Escribano, A; Forner-Navarro, L
2012-03-01
The aim of this study was to analyse the strength and failure mode of teeth restored with fibre posts under retention and flexural-compressive loads at different stages of the restoration and to analyse whether including a simulated ligament in the experimental setup has any effect on the strength or the failure mode. Thirty human maxillary central incisors were distributed in three different groups to be restored with simulation of different restoration stages (1: only post, 2: post and core, 3: post-core and crown), using Rebilda fibre posts. The specimens were inserted in resin blocks and loaded by means of a universal testing machine until failure under tension (stage 1) and 50º flexion (stages 2-3). Half the specimens in each group were restored using a simulated ligament between root dentine and resin block and the other half did not use this element. Failure in stage 1 always occurred at the post-dentine interface, with a mean failure load of 191·2 N. Failure in stage 2 was located mainly in the core or coronal dentine (mean failure load of 505·9 N). Failure in stage 3 was observed in the coronal dentine (mean failure load 397·4 N). Failure loads registered were greater than expected masticatory loads. Fracture modes were mostly reparable, thus indicating that this post is clinically valid at the different stages of restoration studied. The inclusion of the simulated ligament in the experimental system did not show a statistically significant effect on the failure load or the failure mode. © 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
1972-01-01
The guidelines for selecting hardware to be used in manned spacecraft to obtain a five year operational lifetime without maintenance were developed. An analysis was conducted on the design, application, failure mechanisms, manufacturing processes and controls, screen and burn-in techniques, and quality control of hardware items. The equipment considered for evaluation include: (1) electric motors and bearings; (2) accelerometers; (3) gyroscopes and bearings; (4) compressors and pumps, (5) magnetic tape recorders; (6) plumbing components and tubing; (7) check valves; (8) pressure regulators and solenoid valves; (9) thermal control valves; (10) pressure vessels and positive expulsion devices; (11) nickel cadmium batteries; and (12) transducers.
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Wanthal, Steven; Schaefer, Joseph; Justusson, Brian; Hyder, Imran; Engelstad, Stephen; Rose, Cheryl
2017-01-01
The Advanced Composites Consortium is a US Government/Industry partnership supporting technologies to enable timeline and cost reduction in the development of certified composite aerospace structures. A key component of the consortium's approach is the development and validation of improved progressive damage and failure analysis methods for composite structures. These methods will enable increased use of simulations in design trade studies and detailed design development, and thereby enable more targeted physical test programs to validate designs. To accomplish this goal with confidence, a rigorous verification and validation process was developed. The process was used to evaluate analysis methods and associated implementation requirements to ensure calculation accuracy and to gage predictability for composite failure modes of interest. This paper introduces the verification and validation process developed by the consortium during the Phase I effort of the Advanced Composites Project. Specific structural failure modes of interest are first identified, and a subset of standard composite test articles are proposed to interrogate a progressive damage analysis method's ability to predict each failure mode of interest. Test articles are designed to capture the underlying composite material constitutive response as well as the interaction of failure modes representing typical failure patterns observed in aerospace structures.
Optoelectronic Devices with Complex Failure Modes
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Johnston, A.
2000-01-01
This part of the NSREC-2000 Short Course discusses radiation effects in basic photonic devices along with effects in more complex optoelectronic devices where the overall radiation response depends on several factors, with the possibility of multiple failure modes.
Fastening hardware to honeycomb panels
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Kenger, A.
1979-01-01
Adhesive bonding reduces likelihood of skin failure due to excessive forces or torques by utilizing an adhesive to honeycomb skin. Concept is useful in other applications of composites such as aircraft, automobiles, and home appliances.
Raygot, C G; Chai, J; Jameson, D L
2001-01-01
This study was undertaken to characterize the fracture resistance and mode of fracture of endodontically treated incisors restored with cast post-and-core, prefabricated stainless steel post, or carbon fiber-reinforced composite post systems. Ten endodontically treated teeth restored with each technique were subjected to a compressive load delivered at a 130-degree angle to the long axis until the first sign of failure was noted. The fracture load and the mode of fracture were recorded. The failure loads registered in the three groups were not significantly different. Between 70%, and 80% of teeth from any of the three groups displayed fractures that were located above the simulated bone level. The use of carbon fiber-reinforced composite posts did not change the fracture resistance or the failure mode of endodontically treated central incisors compared to the use of metallic posts.
Analysis and design of ion-implanted bubble memory devices
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Wullert, J. R., II; Kryder, M. H.
1987-04-01
4-μm period ion-implanted contiguous disk bubble memory circuits, designed and fabricated at AT&T Bell Laboratories, Murray Hill, NJ, have been investigated. Quasistatic testing has provided information about both the operational bias field ranges and the exact failure modes. A variety of major loop layouts were investigated and two turns found to severely limit bias field margins are discussed. The generation process, using a hairpin nucleator, was tested and several interesting failure modes were uncovered. Propagation on four different minor loop paths was observed and each was found to have characteristic failure modes. The transfer processes, both into and out of the minor loops, were investigated at higher frequencies to avoid local heating due to long transfer pulses at low frequencies. Again specific failure modes were identified. Overall bias margins for the chip were 9% at 50 Oe drive field and were limited by transfer-in.
a New Method for Fmeca Based on Fuzzy Theory and Expert System
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Byeon, Yoong-Tae; Kim, Dong-Jin; Kim, Jin-O.
2008-10-01
Failure Mode Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) is one of most widely used methods in modern engineering system to investigate potential failure modes and its severity upon the system. FMECA evaluates criticality and severity of each failure mode and visualize the risk level matrix putting those indices to column and row variable respectively. Generally, those indices are determined subjectively by experts and operators. However, this process has no choice but to include uncertainty. In this paper, a method for eliciting expert opinions considering its uncertainty is proposed to evaluate the criticality and severity. In addition, a fuzzy expert system is constructed in order to determine the crisp value of risk level for each failure mode. Finally, an illustrative example system is analyzed in the case study. The results are worth considering in deciding the proper policies for each component of the system.
Stochastic availability analysis of operational data systems in the Deep Space Network
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Issa, T. N.
1991-01-01
Existing availability models of standby redundant systems consider only an operator's performance and its interaction with the hardware performance. In the case of operational data systems in the Deep Space Network (DSN), in addition to an operator system interface, a controller reconfigures the system and links a standby unit into the network data path upon failure of the operating unit. A stochastic (Markovian) process technique is used to model and analyze the availability performance and occurrence of degradation due to partial failures are quantitatively incorporated into the model. Exact expressions of the steady state availability and proportion degraded performance measures are derived for the systems under study. The interaction among the hardware, operator, and controller performance parameters and that interaction's effect on data availability are evaluated and illustrated for an operational data processing system.
Space Shuttle Hot Cabin Emergency Responses
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Stepaniak, P.; Effenhauser, R. K.; McCluskey, R.; Gillis, D. B.; Hamilton, D.; Kuznetz, L. H.
2005-01-01
Methods: Human thermal tolerance, countermeasures, and thermal model data were reviewed and compared to existing shuttle ECS failure temperature and humidity profiles for each failure mode. Increases in core temperature associated with cognitive impairment was identified, as was metabolic heat generation of crewmembers, temperature monitoring, and communication capabilities after partial power-down and other limiting factors. Orbiter landing strategies and a hydration and salt replacement protocol were developed to put wheels on deck in each failure mode prior to development of significant cognitive impairment or collapse of crewmembers. Thermal tradeoffs for use of the Advanced Crew Escape Suit (ACES), Liquid Cooling Garment, integrated G-suit and Quick Don Mask were examined. candidate solutions involved trade-offs or conflicts with cabin oxygen partial pressure limits, system power-downs to limit heat generation, risks of alternate and emergency landing sites or compromise of Mode V-VIII scenarios. Results: Rehydration and minimized cabin workloads are required in all failure modes. Temperature/humidity profiles increase rapidly in two failure modes, and deorbit is recommended without the ACES, ICU and g-suit. This latter configuration limits several shuttle approach and landing escape modes and requires communication modifications. Additional data requirements were identified and engineering simulations were recommended to develop more current shuttle temperature and humidity profiles. Discussion: After failure of the shuttle ECS, there is insufficient cooling capacity of the ACES to protect crewmembers from rising cabin temperature and humidity. The LCG is inadequate for cabin temperatures above 76 F. Current shuttle future life policy makes it unlikely that major engineering upgrades necessary to address this problem will occur.
Space Shuttle Stiffener Ring Foam Failure Analysis, a Non-Conventional Approach
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Howard, Philip M.
2015-01-01
The Space Shuttle Program made use of the excellent properties of rigid polyurethane foam for cryogenic tank insulation and as structural protection on the solid rocket boosters. When foam applications de-bond, classical methods of failure analysis did not provide root cause of the failure of the foam. Realizing that foam is the ideal media to document and preserve its own mode of failure, thin sectioning was seen as a logical approach for foam failure analysis to observe the three dimensional morphology of the foam cells. The cell foam morphology provided a much greater understanding of the failure modes than previously achieved.
Astronaut Sam Gemar works with Middeck O-Gravity Dynamics Experiment (MODE)
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
1994-01-01
Astronaut Charles D. (Sam) Gemar, mission specialist, works with the Middeck O-Gravity Dynamics Experiment (MODE) aboard the Earth-orbiting Space Shuttle Columbia. The reusable test facility is designed to study the nonlinear, gravity-dependent behavior of two types of space hardware - contained fluids and (as depicted here) large space structures - planned for future spacecraft.
Astronaut Pierre J. Thuot works with Middeck O-Gravity Dynamics Experiment (MODE)
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
1994-01-01
Astronaut Pierre J. Thuot, mission specialist, works with the Middeck O-Gravity Dynamics Experiment (MODE) aboard the Earth-orbiting Space Shuttle Columbia. The reusable test facility is designed to study the nonlinear, gravity-dependent behavior of two types of space hardware - contained fluids and (as depicted here) large space structures - planned for future spacecraft.
Lago, Paola; Bizzarri, Giancarlo; Scalzotto, Francesca; Parpaiola, Antonella; Amigoni, Angela; Putoto, Giovanni; Perilongo, Giorgio
2012-01-01
Objective Administering medication to hospitalised infants and children is a complex process at high risk of error. Failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) is a proactive tool used to analyse risks, identify failures before they happen and prioritise remedial measures. To examine the hazards associated with the process of drug delivery to children, we performed a proactive risk-assessment analysis. Design and setting Five multidisciplinary teams, representing different divisions of the paediatric department at Padua University Hospital, were trained to analyse the drug-delivery process, to identify possible causes of failures and their potential effects, to calculate a risk priority number (RPN) for each failure and plan changes in practices. Primary outcome To identify higher-priority potential failure modes as defined by RPNs and planning changes in clinical practice to reduce the risk of patients harm and improve safety in the process of medication use in children. Results In all, 37 higher-priority potential failure modes and 71 associated causes and effects were identified. The highest RPNs related (>48) mainly to errors in calculating drug doses and concentrations. Many of these failure modes were found in all the five units, suggesting the presence of common targets for improvement, particularly in enhancing the safety of prescription and preparation of endovenous drugs. The introductions of new activities in the revised process of administering drugs allowed reducing the high-risk failure modes of 60%. Conclusions FMEA is an effective proactive risk-assessment tool useful to aid multidisciplinary groups in understanding a process care and identifying errors that may occur, prioritising remedial interventions and possibly enhancing the safety of drug delivery in children. PMID:23253870
Lago, Paola; Bizzarri, Giancarlo; Scalzotto, Francesca; Parpaiola, Antonella; Amigoni, Angela; Putoto, Giovanni; Perilongo, Giorgio
2012-01-01
Administering medication to hospitalised infants and children is a complex process at high risk of error. Failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) is a proactive tool used to analyse risks, identify failures before they happen and prioritise remedial measures. To examine the hazards associated with the process of drug delivery to children, we performed a proactive risk-assessment analysis. Five multidisciplinary teams, representing different divisions of the paediatric department at Padua University Hospital, were trained to analyse the drug-delivery process, to identify possible causes of failures and their potential effects, to calculate a risk priority number (RPN) for each failure and plan changes in practices. To identify higher-priority potential failure modes as defined by RPNs and planning changes in clinical practice to reduce the risk of patients harm and improve safety in the process of medication use in children. In all, 37 higher-priority potential failure modes and 71 associated causes and effects were identified. The highest RPNs related (>48) mainly to errors in calculating drug doses and concentrations. Many of these failure modes were found in all the five units, suggesting the presence of common targets for improvement, particularly in enhancing the safety of prescription and preparation of endovenous drugs. The introductions of new activities in the revised process of administering drugs allowed reducing the high-risk failure modes of 60%. FMEA is an effective proactive risk-assessment tool useful to aid multidisciplinary groups in understanding a process care and identifying errors that may occur, prioritising remedial interventions and possibly enhancing the safety of drug delivery in children.
Plastic Pipe Failure, Risk, and Threat Analysis
DOT National Transportation Integrated Search
2009-04-29
The three primary failure modes that may be exhibited by polyethylene (PE) gas pipe materials were described in detail. The modes are: ductile rupture, slow crack growth (SCG), and rapid crack propagation (RCP). Short term mechanical tests were evalu...
Evolutionary Development of the Simulation by Logical Modeling System (SIBYL)
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Wu, Helen
1995-01-01
Through the evolutionary development of the Simulation by Logical Modeling System (SIBYL) we have re-engineered the expensive and complex IBM mainframe based Long-term Hardware Projection Model (LHPM) to a robust cost-effective computer based mode that is easy to use. We achieved significant cost reductions and improved productivity in preparing long-term forecasts of Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) hardware. The LHPM for the SSME is a stochastic simulation model that projects the hardware requirements over 10 years. SIBYL is now the primary modeling tool for developing SSME logistics proposals and Program Operating Plan (POP) for NASA and divisional marketing studies.
Prototype part task trainer: A remote manipulator system simulator
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Shores, David
1989-01-01
The Part Task Trainer program (PTT) is a kinematic simulation of the Remote Manipulator System (RMS) for the orbiter. The purpose of the PTT is to supply a low cost man-in-the-loop simulator, allowing the student to learn operational procedures which then can be used in the more expensive full scale simulators. PTT will allow the crew members to work on their arm operation skills without the need for other people running the simulation. The controlling algorithms for the arm were coded out of the Functional Subsystem Requirements Document to ensure realistic operation of the simulation. Relying on the hardware of the workstation to provide fast refresh rates for full shaded images allows the simulation to be run on small low cost stand alone work stations, removing the need to be tied into a multi-million dollar computer for the simulation. PTT will allow the student to make errors which in full scale mock up simulators might cause failures or damage hardware. On the screen the user is shown a graphical representation of the RMS control panel in the aft cockpit of the orbiter, along with a main view window and up to six trunion and guide windows. The dials drawn on the panel may be turned to select the desired mode of operation. The inputs controlling the arm are read from a chair with a Translational Hand Controller (THC) and a Rotational Hand Controller (RHC) attached to it.
Hubble Space Telescope Servicing Mission 3A Rendezvous Operations
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Lee, S.; Anandakrishnan, S.; Connor, C.; Moy, E.; Smith, D.; Myslinski, M.; Markley, L.; Vernacchio, A.
2001-01-01
The Hubble Space Telescope (HST) hardware complement includes six gas bearing, pulse rebalanced rate integrating gyros, any three of which are sufficient to conduct the science mission. After the loss of three gyros between April 1997 and April 1999 due to a known corrosion mechanism, NASA decided to split the third HST servicing mission into SM3A, accelerated to October 1999, and SM3B, scheduled for November 2001. SM3A was developed as a quick turnaround 'Launch on Need' mission to replace all six gyros. Loss of a fourth gyro in November 1999 caused HST to enter Zero Gyro Sunpoint (ZGSP) safemode, which uses sun sensors and magnetometers for attitude determination and momentum bias to maintain attitude stability during orbit night. Several instances of large attitude excursions during orbit night were observed, but ZGSP performance was adequate to provide power-positive sun pointing and to support low gain antenna communications. Body rates in ZGSP were estimated to exceed the nominal 0.1 deg/sec rendezvous limit, so rendezvous operations were restructured to utilize coarse, limited life, Retrieval Mode Gyros (RMGs) under Hardware Sunpoint (HWSP) safemode. Contingency procedures were developed to conduct the rendezvous in ZGSP in the event of RMGA or HWSP computer failure. Space Shuttle Mission STS-103 launched on December 19, 1999 after a series of weather and Shuttle-related delays. After successful rendezvous and grapple under HWSP/RMGA, the crew changed out all six gyros. Following deploy and systems checkout, HST returned to full science operations.
Multiprocessor system with multiple concurrent modes of execution
Ahn, Daniel; Ceze, Luis H; Chen, Dong; Gara, Alan; Heidelberger, Philip; Ohmacht, Martin
2013-12-31
A multiprocessor system supports multiple concurrent modes of speculative execution. Speculation identification numbers (IDs) are allocated to speculative threads from a pool of available numbers. The pool is divided into domains, with each domain being assigned to a mode of speculation. Modes of speculation include TM, TLS, and rollback. Allocation of the IDs is carried out with respect to a central state table and using hardware pointers. The IDs are used for writing different versions of speculative results in different ways of a set in a cache memory.
Multiprocessor system with multiple concurrent modes of execution
Ahn, Daniel; Ceze, Luis H.; Chen, Dong Chen; Gara, Alan; Heidelberger, Philip; Ohmacht, Martin
2016-11-22
A multiprocessor system supports multiple concurrent modes of speculative execution. Speculation identification numbers (IDs) are allocated to speculative threads from a pool of available numbers. The pool is divided into domains, with each domain being assigned to a mode of speculation. Modes of speculation include TM, TLS, and rollback. Allocation of the IDs is carried out with respect to a central state table and using hardware pointers. The IDs are used for writing different versions of speculative results in different ways of a set in a cache memory.
Control of Flexible Systems in the Presence of Failures
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Magahami, Peiman G.; Cox, David E.; Bauer, Frank H. (Technical Monitor)
2001-01-01
Control of flexible systems under degradation or failure of sensors/actuators is considered. A Linear Matrix Inequality framework is used to synthesize H(sub infinity)-based controllers, which provide good disturbance rejection while capable of tolerating real parameter uncertainties in the system model, as well as potential degradation or failure of the control system hardware. In this approach, a one-at-a-time failure scenario is considered, wherein no more than one sensor or actuator is allowed to fail at any given time. A numerical example involving control synthesis for a two-dimensional flexible system is presented to demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed approach.
Reusable Rocket Engine Maintenance Study
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Macgregor, C. A.
1982-01-01
Approximately 85,000 liquid rocket engine failure reports, obtained from 30 years of developing and delivering major pump feed engines, were reviewed and screened and reduced to 1771. These were categorized into 16 different failure modes. Failure propagation diagrams were established. The state of the art of engine condition monitoring for in-flight sensors and between flight inspection technology was determined. For the 16 failure modes, the potential measurands and diagnostic requirements were identified, assessed and ranked. Eight areas are identified requiring advanced technology development.
Preliminary Failure Modes and Effects Analysis of the US DCLL Test Blanket Module
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Lee C. Cadwallader
2010-06-01
This report presents the results of a preliminary failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) of a small tritium-breeding test blanket module design for the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor. The FMEA was quantified with “generic” component failure rate data, and the failure events are binned into postulated initiating event families and frequency categories for safety assessment. An appendix to this report contains repair time data to support an occupational radiation exposure assessment for test blanket module maintenance.
Preliminary Failure Modes and Effects Analysis of the US DCLL Test Blanket Module
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Lee C. Cadwallader
2007-08-01
This report presents the results of a preliminary failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) of a small tritium-breeding test blanket module design for the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor. The FMEA was quantified with “generic” component failure rate data, and the failure events are binned into postulated initiating event families and frequency categories for safety assessment. An appendix to this report contains repair time data to support an occupational radiation exposure assessment for test blanket module maintenance.
Cache Hardware Approaches to Multiple Independent Levels of Security (MILS)
2012-10-01
systems that require that several multicore processors be connected together in a single system. However, no such boards were available on the market ...available concerning each module. However, the availability of modules seems to significantly lag the time when the corresponding hardware hits the market ...version of real mode often referred to as “Unreal mode” can be entered by loading a Local Descriptor Table (LDT) and Global Descriptor Table (GDT
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Liu, Hu-Chen; Liu, Long; Li, Ping
2014-10-01
Failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) has shown its effectiveness in examining potential failures in products, process, designs or services and has been extensively used for safety and reliability analysis in a wide range of industries. However, its approach to prioritise failure modes through a crisp risk priority number (RPN) has been criticised as having several shortcomings. The aim of this paper is to develop an efficient and comprehensive risk assessment methodology using intuitionistic fuzzy hybrid weighted Euclidean distance (IFHWED) operator to overcome the limitations and improve the effectiveness of the traditional FMEA. The diversified and uncertain assessments given by FMEA team members are treated as linguistic terms expressed in intuitionistic fuzzy numbers (IFNs). Intuitionistic fuzzy weighted averaging (IFWA) operator is used to aggregate the FMEA team members' individual assessments into a group assessment. IFHWED operator is applied thereafter to the prioritisation and selection of failure modes. Particularly, both subjective and objective weights of risk factors are considered during the risk evaluation process. A numerical example for risk assessment is given to illustrate the proposed method finally.
Deng, Xinyang; Jiang, Wen
2017-09-12
Failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) is a useful tool to define, identify, and eliminate potential failures or errors so as to improve the reliability of systems, designs, and products. Risk evaluation is an important issue in FMEA to determine the risk priorities of failure modes. There are some shortcomings in the traditional risk priority number (RPN) approach for risk evaluation in FMEA, and fuzzy risk evaluation has become an important research direction that attracts increasing attention. In this paper, the fuzzy risk evaluation in FMEA is studied from a perspective of multi-sensor information fusion. By considering the non-exclusiveness between the evaluations of fuzzy linguistic variables to failure modes, a novel model called D numbers is used to model the non-exclusive fuzzy evaluations. A D numbers based multi-sensor information fusion method is proposed to establish a new model for fuzzy risk evaluation in FMEA. An illustrative example is provided and examined using the proposed model and other existing method to show the effectiveness of the proposed model.
Deng, Xinyang
2017-01-01
Failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) is a useful tool to define, identify, and eliminate potential failures or errors so as to improve the reliability of systems, designs, and products. Risk evaluation is an important issue in FMEA to determine the risk priorities of failure modes. There are some shortcomings in the traditional risk priority number (RPN) approach for risk evaluation in FMEA, and fuzzy risk evaluation has become an important research direction that attracts increasing attention. In this paper, the fuzzy risk evaluation in FMEA is studied from a perspective of multi-sensor information fusion. By considering the non-exclusiveness between the evaluations of fuzzy linguistic variables to failure modes, a novel model called D numbers is used to model the non-exclusive fuzzy evaluations. A D numbers based multi-sensor information fusion method is proposed to establish a new model for fuzzy risk evaluation in FMEA. An illustrative example is provided and examined using the proposed model and other existing method to show the effectiveness of the proposed model. PMID:28895905
Faught, Jacqueline Tonigan; Balter, Peter A; Johnson, Jennifer L; Kry, Stephen F; Court, Laurence E; Stingo, Francesco C; Followill, David S
2017-11-01
The objective of this work was to assess both the perception of failure modes in Intensity Modulated Radiation Therapy (IMRT) when the linac is operated at the edge of tolerances given in AAPM TG-40 (Kutcher et al.) and TG-142 (Klein et al.) as well as the application of FMEA to this specific section of the IMRT process. An online survey was distributed to approximately 2000 physicists worldwide that participate in quality services provided by the Imaging and Radiation Oncology Core - Houston (IROC-H). The survey briefly described eleven different failure modes covered by basic quality assurance in step-and-shoot IMRT at or near TG-40 (Kutcher et al.) and TG-142 (Klein et al.) tolerance criteria levels. Respondents were asked to estimate the worst case scenario percent dose error that could be caused by each of these failure modes in a head and neck patient as well as the FMEA scores: Occurrence, Detectability, and Severity. Risk probability number (RPN) scores were calculated as the product of these scores. Demographic data were also collected. A total of 181 individual and three group responses were submitted. 84% were from North America. Most (76%) individual respondents performed at least 80% clinical work and 92% were nationally certified. Respondent medical physics experience ranged from 2.5 to 45 yr (average 18 yr). A total of 52% of individual respondents were at least somewhat familiar with FMEA, while 17% were not familiar. Several IMRT techniques, treatment planning systems, and linear accelerator manufacturers were represented. All failure modes received widely varying scores ranging from 1 to 10 for occurrence, at least 1-9 for detectability, and at least 1-7 for severity. Ranking failure modes by RPN scores also resulted in large variability, with each failure mode being ranked both most risky (1st) and least risky (11th) by different respondents. On average MLC modeling had the highest RPN scores. Individual estimated percent dose errors and severity scores positively correlated (P < 0.01) for each FM as expected. No universal correlations were found between the demographic information collected and scoring, percent dose errors or ranking. Failure modes investigated overall were evaluated as low to medium risk, with average RPNs less than 110. The ranking of 11 failure modes was not agreed upon by the community. Large variability in FMEA scoring may be caused by individual interpretation and/or experience, reflecting the subjective nature of the FMEA tool. © 2017 American Association of Physicists in Medicine.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
De Silva, T; Ketcha, M; Siewerdsen, J H
Purpose: In image-guided spine surgery, mapping 3D preoperative images to 2D intraoperative images via 3D-2D registration can provide valuable assistance in target localization. However, the presence of surgical instrumentation, hardware implants, and soft-tissue resection/displacement causes mismatches in image content, confounding existing registration methods. Manual/semi-automatic methods to mask such extraneous content is time consuming, user-dependent, error prone, and disruptive to clinical workflow. We developed and evaluated 2 novel similarity metrics within a robust registration framework to overcome such challenges in target localization. Methods: An IRB-approved retrospective study in 19 spine surgery patients included 19 preoperative 3D CT images and 50 intraoperativemore » mobile radiographs in cervical, thoracic, and lumbar spine regions. A neuroradiologist provided truth definition of vertebral positions in CT and radiography. 3D-2D registration was performed using the CMA-ES optimizer with 4 gradient-based image similarity metrics: (1) gradient information (GI); (2) gradient correlation (GC); (3) a novel variant referred to as gradient orientation (GO); and (4) a second variant referred to as truncated gradient correlation (TGC). Registration accuracy was evaluated in terms of the projection distance error (PDE) of the vertebral levels. Results: Conventional similarity metrics were susceptible to gross registration error and failure modes associated with the presence of surgical instrumentation: for GI, the median PDE and interquartile range was 33.0±43.6 mm; similarly for GC, PDE = 23.0±92.6 mm respectively. The robust metrics GO and TGC, on the other hand, demonstrated major improvement in PDE (7.6 ±9.4 mm and 8.1± 18.1 mm, respectively) and elimination of gross failure modes. Conclusion: The proposed GO and TGC similarity measures improve registration accuracy and robustness to gross failure in the presence of strong image content mismatch. Such registration capability could offer valuable assistance in target localization without disruption of clinical workflow. G. Kleinszig and S. Vogt are employees of Siemens Healthcare.« less
Failure of a laminated composite under tension-compression fatigue loading
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Rotem, A.; Nelson, H. G.
1989-01-01
The fatigue behavior of composite laminates under tension-compression loading is analyzed and compared with behavior under tension-tension and compression-compression loading. It is shown that for meaningful fatigue conditions, the tension-compression case is the dominant one. Both tension and compression failure modes can occur under the reversed loading, and failure is dependent on the specific lay-up of the laminate and the difference between the tensile static strength and the absolute value of the compressive static strength. The use of a fatigue failure envelope for determining the fatigue life and mode of failure is proposed and demonstrated.
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Sin, Yongkun; Lingley, Zachary; Ayvazian, Talin; Brodie, Miles; Ives, Neil
2018-02-01
High-power single-mode (SM) and multi-mode (MM) InGaAs-AlGaAs strained quantum well (QW) lasers are critical components for both terrestrial and space satellite communications systems. Since these lasers predominantly fail by catastrophic and sudden degradation due to COD, it is especially crucial for space satellite applications to investigate reliability, failure modes, and degradation mechanisms of these lasers. Our group reported a new failure mode in MM and SM InGaAs-AlGaAs strained QW lasers in 2009 and 2016, respectively. Our group also reported in 2017 that bulk failure due to catastrophic optical bulk damage (COBD) is the dominant failure mode of both SM and MM lasers that were subject to long-term life-tests. For the present study, we report root causes investigation of COBD by performing long-term lifetests followed by failure mode analysis (FMA) using various micro-analytical techniques including electron beam induced current (EBIC), time-resolved electroluminescence (EL), focused ion beam (FIB), high-resolution transmission electron microscopy (TEM), and deep level transient spectroscopy (DLTS). Our life-tests with accumulated test hours of over 25,000 hours for SM lasers and over 35,000 hours for MM lasers generated a number of COBD failures with various failure times. EBIC techniques were employed to study dark line defects (DLDs) generated in SM COBD failures stressed under different test conditions. FIB and high-resolution TEM were employed to prepare cross sectional and plan view TEM specimens to study DLD areas (dislocations) in post-aged SM lasers. Time-resolved EL techniques were employed to study initiation and progressions of dark spots and dark lines in real time as MM lasers were aged. Lastly, to investigate precursor signatures of failure and degradation mechanisms responsible for COBD in both SM and MM lasers, we employed DLTS techniques to study a role that electron traps (non-radiative recombination centers) play in degradation of these lasers. Our in-depth root causes investigation results are reported.
Thermal barrier coating life prediction model
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Pilsner, B. H.; Hillery, R. V.; Mcknight, R. L.; Cook, T. S.; Kim, K. S.; Duderstadt, E. C.
1986-01-01
The objectives of this program are to determine the predominant modes of degradation of a plasma sprayed thermal barrier coating system, and then to develop and verify life prediction models accounting for these degradation modes. The program is divided into two phases, each consisting of several tasks. The work in Phase 1 is aimed at identifying the relative importance of the various failure modes, and developing and verifying life prediction model(s) for the predominant model for a thermal barrier coating system. Two possible predominant failure mechanisms being evaluated are bond coat oxidation and bond coat creep. The work in Phase 2 will develop design-capable, causal, life prediction models for thermomechanical and thermochemical failure modes, and for the exceptional conditions of foreign object damage and erosion.
Analysis of the STS-126 Flow Control Valve Structural-Acoustic Coupling Failure
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Jones, Trevor M.; Larko, Jeffrey M.; McNelis, Mark E.
2010-01-01
During the Space Transportation System mission STS-126, one of the main engine's flow control valves incurred an unexpected failure. A section of the valve broke off during liftoff. It is theorized that an acoustic mode of the flowing fuel, coupled with a structural mode of the valve, causing a high cycle fatigue failure. This report documents the analysis efforts conducted in an attempt to verify this theory. Hand calculations, computational fluid dynamics, and finite element methods are all implemented and analyses are performed using steady-state methods in addition to transient analysis methods. The conclusion of the analyses is that there is a critical acoustic mode that aligns with a structural mode of the valve
[Failure mode and effects analysis to improve quality in clinical trials].
Mañes-Sevilla, M; Marzal-Alfaro, M B; Romero Jiménez, R; Herranz-Alonso, A; Sanchez Fresneda, M N; Benedi Gonzalez, J; Sanjurjo-Sáez, M
The failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) has been used as a tool in risk management and quality improvement. The objective of this study is to identify the weaknesses in processes in the clinical trials area, of a Pharmacy Department (PD) with great research activity, in order to improve the safety of the usual procedures. A multidisciplinary team was created to analyse each of the critical points, identified as possible failure modes, in the development of clinical trial in the PD. For each failure mode, the possible cause and effect were identified, criticality was calculated using the risk priority number and the possible corrective actions were discussed. Six sub-processes were defined in the development of the clinical trials in PD. The FMEA identified 67 failure modes, being the dispensing and prescription/validation sub-processes the most likely to generate errors. All the improvement actions established in the AMFE were implemented in the Clinical Trials area. The FMEA is a useful tool in proactive risk management because it allows us to identify where we are making mistakes and analyze the causes that originate them, to prioritize and to adopt solutions to risk reduction. The FMEA improves process safety and quality in PD. Copyright © 2018 SECA. Publicado por Elsevier España, S.L.U. All rights reserved.
Risk management of key issues of FPSO
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Sun, Liping; Sun, Hai
2012-12-01
Risk analysis of key systems have become a growing topic late of because of the development of offshore structures. Equipment failures of offloading system and fire accidents were analyzed based on the floating production, storage and offloading (FPSO) features. Fault tree analysis (FTA), and failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) methods were examined based on information already researched on modules of relex reliability studio (RRS). Equipment failures were also analyzed qualitatively by establishing a fault tree and Boolean structure function based on the shortage of failure cases, statistical data, and risk control measures examined. Failure modes of fire accident were classified according to the different areas of fire occurrences during the FMEA process, using risk priority number (RPN) methods to evaluate their severity rank. The qualitative analysis of FTA gave the basic insight of forming the failure modes of FPSO offloading, and the fire FMEA gave the priorities and suggested processes. The research has practical importance for the security analysis problems of FPSO.
Providing Self-Healing Ability for Wireless Sensor Node by Using Reconfigurable Hardware
Yuan, Shenfang; Qiu, Lei; Gao, Shang; Tong, Yao; Yang, Weiwei
2012-01-01
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have received tremendous attention over the past ten years. In engineering applications of WSNs, a number of sensor nodes are usually spread across some specific geographical area. Some of these nodes have to work in harsh environments. Dependability of the Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) is very important for its successful applications in the engineering area. In ordinary research, when a node has a failure, it is usually discarded and the network is reorganized to ensure the normal operation of the WSN. Using appropriate WSN re-organization methods, though the sensor networks can be reorganized, this causes additional maintenance costs and sometimes still decreases the function of the networks. In those situations where the sensor networks cannot be reorganized, the performance of the whole WSN will surely be degraded. In order to ensure the reliable and low cost operation of WSNs, a method to develop a wireless sensor node with self-healing ability based on reconfigurable hardware is proposed in this paper. Two self-healing WSN node realization paradigms based on reconfigurable hardware are presented, including a redundancy-based self-healing paradigm and a whole FPAA/FPGA based self-healing paradigm. The nodes designed with the self-healing ability can dynamically change their node configurations to repair the nodes' hardware failures. To demonstrate these two paradigms, a strain sensor node is adopted as an illustration to show the concepts. Two strain WSN sensor nodes with self-healing ability are developed respectively according to the proposed self-healing paradigms. Evaluation experiments on self-healing ability and power consumption are performed. Experimental results show that the developed nodes can self-diagnose the failures and recover to a normal state automatically. The research presented can improve the robustness of WSNs and reduce the maintenance cost of WSNs in engineering applications. PMID:23202176
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Rotem, Assa
1990-01-01
Laminated composite materials tend to fail differently under tensile or compressive load. Under tension, the material accumulates cracks and fiber fractures, while under compression, the material delaminates and buckles. Tensile-compressive fatigue may cause either of these failure modes depending on the specific damage occurring in the laminate. This damage depends on the stress ratio of the fatigue loading. Analysis of the fatigue behavior of the composite laminate under tension-tension, compression-compression, and tension-compression had led to the development of a fatigue envelope presentation of the failure behavior. This envelope indicates the specific failure mode for any stress ratio and number of loading cycles. The construction of the fatigue envelope is based on the applied stress-cycles to failure (S-N) curves of both tensile-tensile and compressive-compressive fatigue. Test results are presented to verify the theoretical analysis.
Giardina, M; Castiglia, F; Tomarchio, E
2014-12-01
Failure mode, effects and criticality analysis (FMECA) is a safety technique extensively used in many different industrial fields to identify and prevent potential failures. In the application of traditional FMECA, the risk priority number (RPN) is determined to rank the failure modes; however, the method has been criticised for having several weaknesses. Moreover, it is unable to adequately deal with human errors or negligence. In this paper, a new versatile fuzzy rule-based assessment model is proposed to evaluate the RPN index to rank both component failure and human error. The proposed methodology is applied to potential radiological over-exposure of patients during high-dose-rate brachytherapy treatments. The critical analysis of the results can provide recommendations and suggestions regarding safety provisions for the equipment and procedures required to reduce the occurrence of accidental events.
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Hall, Steven R.; Walker, Bruce K.
1990-01-01
A new failure detection and isolation algorithm for linear dynamic systems is presented. This algorithm, the Orthogonal Series Generalized Likelihood Ratio (OSGLR) test, is based on the assumption that the failure modes of interest can be represented by truncated series expansions. This assumption leads to a failure detection algorithm with several desirable properties. Computer simulation results are presented for the detection of the failures of actuators and sensors of a C-130 aircraft. The results show that the OSGLR test generally performs as well as the GLR test in terms of time to detect a failure and is more robust to failure mode uncertainty. However, the OSGLR test is also somewhat more sensitive to modeling errors than the GLR test.
Failure Analysis at the Kennedy Space Center
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Salazar, Victoria L.; Wright, M. Clara
2010-01-01
History has shown that failures occur in every engineering endeavor, and what we learn from those failures contributes to the knowledge base to safely complete future missions. The necessity of failure analysis is at its apex at the end of one aged program and at the beginning of a new and untested program. The information that we gain through failure analysis corrects the deficiencies in the current vehicle to make the next generation of vehicles more efficient and safe. The Failure Analysis and Materials Evaluation Branch in the Materials Science Division at the Kennedy Space Center performs metallurgical, mechanical, electrical, and non-metallic materials failure analyses and accident investigations on both flight hardware and ground support equipment for the Space Shuttle, International Space Station, Constellation, and Launch Services Programs. This paper will explore a variety of failure case studies at the Kennedy Space Center and the lessons learned that can be applied in future programs.
Designing for Reliability and Robustness
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Svetlik, Randall G.; Moore, Cherice; Williams, Antony
2017-01-01
Long duration spaceflight has a negative effect on the human body, and exercise countermeasures are used on-board the International Space Station (ISS) to minimize bone and muscle loss, combatting these effects. Given the importance of these hardware systems to the health of the crew, this equipment must continue to be readily available. Designing spaceflight exercise hardware to meet high reliability and availability standards has proven to be challenging throughout the time the crewmembers have been living on ISS beginning in 2000. Furthermore, restoring operational capability after a failure is clearly time-critical, but can be problematic given the challenges of troubleshooting the problem from 220 miles away. Several best-practices have been leveraged in seeking to maximize availability of these exercise systems, including designing for robustness, implementing diagnostic instrumentation, relying on user feedback, and providing ample maintenance and sparing. These factors have enhanced the reliability of hardware systems, and therefore have contributed to keeping the crewmembers healthy upon return to Earth. This paper will review the failure history for three spaceflight exercise countermeasure systems identifying lessons learned that can help improve future systems. Specifically, the Treadmill with Vibration Isolation and Stabilization System (TVIS), Cycle Ergometer with Vibration Isolation and Stabilization System (CEVIS), and the Advanced Resistive Exercise Device (ARED) will be reviewed, analyzed, and conclusions identified so as to provide guidance for improving future exercise hardware designs. These lessons learned, paired with thorough testing, offer a path towards reduced system down-time.
Qualification of Engineering Camera for Long-Duration Deep Space Missions
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Ramesham, Rajeshuni; Maki, Justin N.; Pourangi, Ali M.; Lee, Steven W.
2012-01-01
Qualification and verification of advanced electronic packaging and interconnect technologies, and various other types of hardware elements for the Mars Exploration Rover s Spirit and Opportunity (MER)/Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) flight projects, has been performed to enhance the mission assurance. The qualification of hardware (engineering camera) under extreme cold temperatures has been performed with reference to various Mars-related project requirements. The flight-like packages, sensors, and subassemblies have been selected for the study to survive three times the total number of expected diurnal temperature cycles resulting from all environmental and operational exposures occurring over the life of the flight hardware, including all relevant manufacturing, ground operations, and mission phases. Qualification has been performed by subjecting above flight-like hardware to the environmental temperature extremes, and assessing any structural failures or degradation in electrical performance due to either overstress or thermal cycle fatigue. Engineering camera packaging designs, charge-coupled devices (CCDs), and temperature sensors were successfully qualified for MER and MSL per JPL design principles. Package failures were observed during qualification processes and the package redesigns were then made to enhance the reliability and subsequent mission assurance. These results show the technology certainly is promising for MSL, and especially for longterm extreme temperature missions to the extreme temperature conditions. The engineering camera has been completely qualified for the MSL project, with the proven ability to survive on Mars for 2010 sols, or 670 sols times three. Finally, the camera continued to be functional, even after 2010 thermal cycles.
Influence of Weathering Depth and Fracture Intensity to Cut-slope Movements
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Yoon, W. S.; Choi, J. W.; Jeong, U.; Kim, J. H.
2003-04-01
Generally, Failure modes in cut slopes are triggered by combination of various failure factors which have different effects on failure modes according to ground condition. It is, therefore, important to identify the behavioural characteristic of cut slope in that they reflect the failure mechanism. From the careful field investigation for 373 road cuts along the national highway in Korea, we analysed various types of failure modes for different ground conditions. The ground conditions which control failure modes of cut slopes and their related failure factors are dependent on weathering (or soil) depth and intensity of discontinuities in cut slopes. Firstly, the ratio of the soil depth and slope height (soil depth ratio; SR) is important parameter to classify ground conditions into soil-like masses and rock masses. When a SR value is greater than 0.4, sliding failures on discontinuities do not occur. In this case, weathering condition, slope gradient and external rainfall play a key role on failure factors of cut-slope. The proposed 0.4, therefore, is the critical SR value to identify the soil-like masses and rock masses. Secondly, Intensity of discontinuities is expressed by block size ratio (BR), which is defined by the ratio of block size index (Ib; ISRM (1978)) and slope height. For a rock slope (SR<0.4), when BR is greater than 0.01, key failure modes in a cut slope are wedge sliding, fall and topple. In this case, attitudes and shear strength of discontinuities play an important role on behaviour of cut-slope. When BR is less than 0.01, however, behaviour of cut slope shows circular sliding and surface failure like soil-like mass. To sum up, we could divide the ground conditions in cut-slope into 3 classes on the basis of SR (soil depth ratio) and BR (block size ratio); JRM (joint rock mass), HRM (highly fractured rock mass) and SLM (soil-like mass). Moreover, to evaluate the stability of cut-slope reasonably, it needs new evaluating categories having different weighting factors for each ground condition.
Lamey, M; Carlone, M; Alasti, H; Bissonnette, J P; Borg, J; Breen, S; Coolens, C; Heaton, R; Islam, M; van Proojen, M; Sharpe, M; Stanescu, T; Jaffray, D
2012-07-01
An online Magnetic Resonance guided Radiation Therapy (MRgRT) system is under development. The system is comprised of an MRI with the capability of travel between and into HDR brachytherapy and external beam radiation therapy vaults. The system will provide on-line MR images immediately prior to radiation therapy. The MR images will be registered to a planning image and used for image guidance. With the intention of system safety we have performed a failure modes and effects analysis. A process tree of the facility function was developed. Using the process tree as well as an initial design of the facility as guidelines possible failure modes were identified, for each of these failure modes root causes were identified. For each possible failure the assignment of severity, detectability and occurrence scores was performed. Finally suggestions were developed to reduce the possibility of an event. The process tree consists of nine main inputs and each of these main inputs consisted of 5 - 10 sub inputs and tertiary inputs were also defined. The process tree ensures that the overall safety of the system has been considered. Several possible failure modes were identified and were relevant to the design, construction, commissioning and operating phases of the facility. The utility of the analysis can be seen in that it has spawned projects prior to installation and has lead to suggestions in the design of the facility. © 2012 American Association of Physicists in Medicine.
Numerical methods for large eddy simulation of acoustic combustion instabilities
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Wall, Clifton T.
Acoustic combustion instabilities occur when interaction between the combustion process and acoustic modes in a combustor results in periodic oscillations in pressure, velocity, and heat release. If sufficiently large in amplitude, these instabilities can cause operational difficulties or the failure of combustor hardware. In many situations, the dominant instability is the result of the interaction between a low frequency acoustic mode of the combustor and the large scale hydrodynamics. Large eddy simulation (LES), therefore, is a promising tool for the prediction of these instabilities, since both the low frequency acoustic modes and the large scale hydrodynamics are well resolved in LES. Problems with the tractability of such simulations arise, however, due to the difficulty of solving the compressible Navier-Stokes equations efficiently at low Mach number and due to the large number of acoustic periods that are often required for such instabilities to reach limit cycles. An implicit numerical method for the solution of the compressible Navier-Stokes equations has been developed which avoids the acoustic CFL restriction, allowing for significant efficiency gains at low Mach number, while still resolving the low frequency acoustic modes of interest. In the limit of a uniform grid the numerical method causes no artificial damping of acoustic waves. New, non-reflecting boundary conditions have also been developed for use with the characteristic-based approach of Poinsot and Lele (1992). The new boundary conditions are implemented in a manner which allows for significant reduction of the computational domain of an LES by eliminating the need to perform LES in regions where one-dimensional acoustics significantly affect the instability but details of the hydrodynamics do not. These new numerical techniques have been demonstrated in an LES of an experimental combustor. The new techniques are shown to be an efficient means of performing LES of acoustic combustion instabilities and are shown to accurately predict the occurrence and frequency of the dominant mode of the instability observed in the experiment.
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Takahashi, Masakazu; Nanba, Reiji; Fukue, Yoshinori
This paper proposes operational Risk Management (RM) method using Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) for drug manufacturing computerlized system (DMCS). The quality of drug must not be influenced by failures and operational mistakes of DMCS. To avoid such situation, DMCS has to be conducted enough risk assessment and taken precautions. We propose operational RM method using FMEA for DMCS. To propose the method, we gathered and compared the FMEA results of DMCS, and develop a list that contains failure modes, failures and countermeasures. To apply this list, we can conduct RM in design phase, find failures, and conduct countermeasures efficiently. Additionally, we can find some failures that have not been found yet.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Phillips, Adam; Ulsh, Michael; Neyerlin, K. C.
In-line quality control diagnostics for roll-to-roll (R2R) manufacturing techniques will play a key role in the future commercialization of the polymer electrolyte membrane fuel cell (PEMFC) used in automotive applications. These diagnostics monitor the fabrication of the membrane electrode assembly (MEA), which detect and flag any non-uniformity that may potentially harm PEMFC performance and/or lifetime. This will require quantitative thresholds and a clear distinction between harmful defects and harmless coating irregularities. Thus, novel fuel cell hardware with quasi in-situ infrared (IR) thermography capabilities is utilized to understand how bare spots in the cathode electrode impact MEA lifetime. An accelerated stressmore » test (AST) simulates chemical and mechanical degradation modes seen in vehicular operation. The actual open circuit voltage and rate of change of this voltage are used as in-situ indicators for MEA failure, enabling capture of the progression of failure point development. Bare spot coating irregularities located at the center of the electrode were found to have no impact on MEA lifetime when compared to a pristine MEA. However, MEA lifetime was found to be considerably shortened when these same irregularities are located at the cathode inlet and, especially, the anode inlet regions of the fuel cell.« less
Phillips, Adam; Ulsh, Michael; Neyerlin, K. C.; ...
2018-03-02
In-line quality control diagnostics for roll-to-roll (R2R) manufacturing techniques will play a key role in the future commercialization of the polymer electrolyte membrane fuel cell (PEMFC) used in automotive applications. These diagnostics monitor the fabrication of the membrane electrode assembly (MEA), which detect and flag any non-uniformity that may potentially harm PEMFC performance and/or lifetime. This will require quantitative thresholds and a clear distinction between harmful defects and harmless coating irregularities. Thus, novel fuel cell hardware with quasi in-situ infrared (IR) thermography capabilities is utilized to understand how bare spots in the cathode electrode impact MEA lifetime. An accelerated stressmore » test (AST) simulates chemical and mechanical degradation modes seen in vehicular operation. The actual open circuit voltage and rate of change of this voltage are used as in-situ indicators for MEA failure, enabling capture of the progression of failure point development. Bare spot coating irregularities located at the center of the electrode were found to have no impact on MEA lifetime when compared to a pristine MEA. However, MEA lifetime was found to be considerably shortened when these same irregularities are located at the cathode inlet and, especially, the anode inlet regions of the fuel cell.« less
A review on mode-I interlaminar fracture toughness of fibre reinforced composites
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Nasuha, N.; Azmi, A. I.; Tan, C. L.
2017-10-01
Composite material has been growing rapidly throughout the year for its unique properties in comparisons with metal. Recently, there has been a growth on studying the way to reduce the delamination failure, which is the primary challenge on laminated fibre composite. This failure can degrade the strength of composite materials, hence loses its function. In this review, database search was performed using the keywords search on “interlaminar fracture toughness”, “double cantilever beam”, “delamination resistance” and “Mode-I GIC”. The searches were performed on Google Scholar, Scopus and Web of Science with further cross-referencing with other databases. Most relevant studies were selected for review and referencing by the author. This review paper gives a brief explanation on Mode-I interlaminar fracture toughness of composite material. This fracture mode is the most common modes on studying the delamination failure.
Ha, D; Bertocci, G; Deemer, E; van Roosmalen, L; Karg, P
2000-01-01
Automotive seats are tested for compliance with federal motor vehicle safety standards (FMVSS) to assure safety during impact. Many wheelchair users rely upon their wheelchairs to serve as vehicle seats. However, the crashworthiness of these wheelchairs during impact is often unknown. This study evaluated the crashworthiness of five combinations of wheelchair back support surfaces and attachment hardware using a static test procedure simulating crash loading conditions. The crashworthiness was tested by applying a simulated rearward load to each seat-back system. The magnitude of the applied load was established through computer simulation and biodynamic calculations. None of the five tested wheelchair back supports withstood the simulated crash loads. All failures were associated with attachment hardware.
Similarity constraints in testing of cooled engine parts
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Colladay, R. S.; Stepka, F. S.
1974-01-01
A study is made of the effect of testing cooled parts of current and advanced gas turbine engines at the reduced temperature and pressure conditions which maintain similarity with the engine environment. Some of the problems facing the experimentalist in evaluating heat transfer and aerodynamic performance when hardware is tested at conditions other than the actual engine environment are considered. Low temperature and pressure test environments can simulate the performance of actual size prototype engine hardware within the tolerance of experimental accuracy if appropriate similarity conditions are satisfied. Failure to adhere to these similarity constraints because of test facility limitations or other reasons, can result in a number of serious errors in projecting the performance of test hardware to engine conditions.
Babiker, Amir; Amer, Yasser S; Osman, Mohamed E; Al-Eyadhy, Ayman; Fatani, Solafa; Mohamed, Sarar; Alnemri, Abdulrahman; Titi, Maher A; Shaikh, Farheen; Alswat, Khalid A; Wahabi, Hayfaa A; Al-Ansary, Lubna A
2018-02-01
Implementation of clinical practice guidelines (CPGs) has been shown to reduce variation in practice and improve health care quality and patients' safety. There is a limited experience of CPG implementation (CPGI) in the Middle East. The CPG program in our institution was launched in 2009. The Quality Management department conducted a Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) for further improvement of CPGI. This is a prospective study of a qualitative/quantitative design. Our FMEA included (1) process review and recording of the steps and activities of CPGI; (2) hazard analysis by recording activity-related failure modes and their effects, identification of actions required, assigned severity, occurrence, and detection scores for each failure mode and calculated the risk priority number (RPN) by using an online interactive FMEA tool; (3) planning: RPNs were prioritized, recommendations, and further planning for new interventions were identified; and (4) monitoring: after reduction or elimination of the failure mode. The calculated RPN will be compared with subsequent analysis in post-implementation phase. The data were scrutinized from a feedback of quality team members using a FMEA framework to enhance the implementation of 29 adapted CPGs. The identified potential common failure modes with the highest RPN (≥ 80) included awareness/training activities, accessibility of CPGs, fewer advocates from clinical champions, and CPGs auditing. Actions included (1) organizing regular awareness activities, (2) making CPGs printed and electronic copies accessible, (3) encouraging senior practitioners to get involved in CPGI, and (4) enhancing CPGs auditing as part of the quality sustainability plan. In our experience, FMEA could be a useful tool to enhance CPGI. It helped us to identify potential barriers and prepare relevant solutions. © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Dehnavieh, Reza; Ebrahimipour, Hossein; Molavi-Taleghani, Yasamin; Vafaee-Najar, Ali; Noori Hekmat, Somayeh; Esmailzdeh, Hamid
2014-12-25
Pediatric emergency has been considered as a high risk area, and blood transfusion is known as a unique clinical measure, therefore this study was conducted with the purpose of assessing the proactive risk assessment of blood transfusion process in Pediatric Emergency of Qaem education- treatment center in Mashhad, by the Healthcare Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (HFMEA) methodology. This cross-sectional study analyzed the failure mode and effects of blood transfusion process by a mixture of quantitative-qualitative method. The proactive HFMEA was used to identify and analyze the potential failures of the process. The information of the items in HFMEA forms was collected after obtaining a consensus of experts' panel views via the interview and focus group discussion sessions. The Number of 77 failure modes were identified for 24 sub-processes enlisted in 8 processes of blood transfusion. Totally 13 failure modes were identified as non-acceptable risk (a hazard score above 8) in the blood transfusion process and were transferred to the decision tree. Root causes of high risk modes were discussed in cause-effect meetings and were classified based on the UK national health system (NHS) approved classifications model. Action types were classified in the form of acceptance (11.6%), control (74.2%) and elimination (14.2%). Recommendations were placed in 7 categories using TRIZ ("Theory of Inventive Problem Solving.") The re-engineering process for the required changes, standardizing and updating the blood transfusion procedure, root cause analysis of blood transfusion catastrophic events, patient identification bracelet, training classes and educational pamphlets for raising awareness of personnel, and monthly gathering of transfusion medicine committee have all been considered as executive strategies in work agenda in pediatric emergency.
Dehnavieh, Reza; Ebrahimipour, Hossein; Molavi-Taleghani, Yasamin; Vafaee-Najar, Ali; Hekmat, Somayeh Noori; Esmailzdeh, Hamid
2015-01-01
Introduction: Pediatric emergency has been considered as a high risk area, and blood transfusion is known as a unique clinical measure, therefore this study was conducted with the purpose of assessing the proactive risk assessment of blood transfusion process in Pediatric Emergency of Qaem education- treatment center in Mashhad, by the Healthcare Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (HFMEA) methodology. Methodology: This cross-sectional study analyzed the failure mode and effects of blood transfusion process by a mixture of quantitative-qualitative method. The proactive HFMEA was used to identify and analyze the potential failures of the process. The information of the items in HFMEA forms was collected after obtaining a consensus of experts’ panel views via the interview and focus group discussion sessions. Results: The Number of 77 failure modes were identified for 24 sub-processes enlisted in 8 processes of blood transfusion. Totally 13 failure modes were identified as non-acceptable risk (a hazard score above 8) in the blood transfusion process and were transferred to the decision tree. Root causes of high risk modes were discussed in cause-effect meetings and were classified based on the UK national health system (NHS) approved classifications model. Action types were classified in the form of acceptance (11.6%), control (74.2%) and elimination (14.2%). Recommendations were placed in 7 categories using TRIZ (“Theory of Inventive Problem Solving.”) Conclusion: The re-engineering process for the required changes, standardizing and updating the blood transfusion procedure, root cause analysis of blood transfusion catastrophic events, patient identification bracelet, training classes and educational pamphlets for raising awareness of personnel, and monthly gathering of transfusion medicine committee have all been considered as executive strategies in work agenda in pediatric emergency. PMID:25560332
Sghaireen, Mohd G
2015-06-01
The material of choice for implant-supported restorations is affected by esthetic requirements and type of abutment. This study compares the fracture resistance of different types of implant abutments and implant-supported restorations and their mode of failure. Forty-five Oraltronics Pitt-Easy implants (Oraltronics Dental Implant Technology GmbH, Bremen, Germany) (4 mm diameter, 10 mm length) were embedded in clear autopolymerizing acrylic resin. The implants were randomly divided into three groups, A, B and C, of 15 implants each. In group A, titanium abutments and metal-ceramic crowns were used. In group B, zirconia ceramic abutments and In-Ceram Alumina crowns were used. In group C, zirconia ceramic abutments and IPS Empress Esthetic crowns were used. Specimens were tested to failure by applying load at 130° from horizontal plane using an Instron Universal Testing Machine. Subsequently, the mode of failure of each specimen was identified. Fracture resistance was significantly different between groups (p < .05). The highest fracture loads were associated with metal-ceramic crowns supported by titanium abutments (p = .000). IPS Empress crowns supported by zirconia abutments had the lowest fracture loads (p = .000). Fracture modes of metal-ceramic crowns supported by titanium abutments included screw fracture and screw bending. Fracture of both crown and abutment was the dominant mode of failure of In-Ceram/IPS Empress crowns supported by zirconia abutments. Metal-ceramic crowns supported by titanium abutments were more resistant to fracture than In-Ceram crowns supported by zirconia abutments, which in turn were more resistant to fracture than IPS Empress crowns supported by zirconia abutments. In addition, failure modes of restorations supported by zirconia abutments were more catastrophic than those for restorations supported by titanium abutments. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO) Guidance, Navigation and Control (GN&C) Overview
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Garrick, Joseph; Simpson, James; Shah, Neerav
2010-01-01
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration s (NASA) Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO) launched on June 18, 2009 from the Cape Canaveral Air Force Station aboard an Atlas V launch vehicle and into a direct insertion trajectory to the oon. LRO, which was designed, built, and operated by the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, MD, is gathering crucial data on the lunar environment that will help astronauts prepare for long-duration lunar expeditions. The mission has a nominal life of 1 year as its seven instruments find safe landing sites, locate potential resources, characterize the radiation environment, and test new technology. To date, LRO has been operating well within the bounds of its requirements and has been collecting excellent science data images taken from the LRO Camera Narrow Angle Camera of the Apollo landing sites appeared on cable news networks. A significant amount of information on LRO s science instruments is provided at the LRO mission webpage. LRO s Guidance, Navigation and Control (GN&C) subsystem is made up of an onboard attitude control system (ACS) and a hardware suite of sensors and actuators. The LRO onboard ACS is a collection of algorithms based on high level and derived requirements, and reflect the science and operational events throughout the mission lifetime. The primary control mode is the Observing mode, which maintains the lunar pointing orientation and any offset pointing from this baseline. It is within this mode that all science instrument calibrations, slews and science data is collected. Because of a high accuracy requirement for knowledge and pointing, the Observing mode makes use of star tracker (ST) measurement data to determine an instantaneous attitude pointing. But even the star trackers alone do not meet the tight requirements, so a six-state Kalman Filter is employed to improve the noisy measurement data. The Observing mode obtains its rate information from an inertial reference unit (IRU) and in the event of an IRU failure, the rate data is be derived from the star tracker, but with degraded pointing performance. The Delta-V control mode responsibility is to maintain attitude pointing during the cruise trajectory, insertion burns and lunar orbit maintenance by adjustments made to the spacecraft s velocity magnitude and vector direction. The ACS also provides for a thruster based system momentum management algorithm (known as Delta-H) to maintain the system and wheel momentum to within acceptable levels. In the event an anomaly causes the LRO spacecraft to lose the ability to maintain its current attitude pointing, a Sun Safe mode is included in the ACS for the purpose of providing a known power and thermally safe coarse inertial sun attitude for an indefinite period of time, within the manageable limits of the reaction wheels. The Sun Safe mode is also the initial spacecraft control mode off of the launch vehicle and provides for a means to null tip-off rates immediately after separation. The nominal configuration is to use the IRU for rate information in the controller. In the event of a gyro failure a gyroless control mode was developed that computes rate information from the CSS data.
More About Software for No-Loss Computing
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Edmonds, Iarina
2007-01-01
A document presents some additional information on the subject matter of "Integrated Hardware and Software for No- Loss Computing" (NPO-42554), which appears elsewhere in this issue of NASA Tech Briefs. To recapitulate: The hardware and software designs of a developmental parallel computing system are integrated to effectuate a concept of no-loss computing (NLC). The system is designed to reconfigure an application program such that it can be monitored in real time and further reconfigured to continue a computation in the event of failure of one of the computers. The design provides for (1) a distributed class of NLC computation agents, denoted introspection agents, that effects hierarchical detection of anomalies; (2) enhancement of the compiler of the parallel computing system to cause generation of state vectors that can be used to continue a computation in the event of a failure; and (3) activation of a recovery component when an anomaly is detected.
Bone Plating in Patients with Type III Osteogenesis Imperfecta: Results and Complications
Enright, William J; Noonan, Kenneth J
2006-01-01
The results of bone plating in four children (6 femurs, 2 tibias) with osteogenesis imperfecta type III were analyzed. Average age at time of operation was 44 months. In three of the femurs, multiple platings were performed for a total of 13 bone platings in the eight bones studied. Average time to revision following plating was 27 months. Indications for revision included fracture (6), deformity (3), hardware failure (3), and nonunion (1). Other complications included one case of compartment syndrome. All eight bones were ultimately revised to elongating intramedullary Bailey-Dubow rods. Bone plating in skeletally immature patients with osteogenesis imperfecta does not provide better outcome than elongating rods. Complications from bone plating leading to revision, such as refracture or hardware failure, are higher than in those children managed with elongating rods, as previously reported in the literature. PMID:16789446
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Boland, S. W.; Kahn, P. B.
2012-12-01
The original Orbiting Carbon Observatory mission was lost in 2009 when the spacecraft failed to achieve orbit due to a launch vehicle failure. In 2010, NASA authorized a re-flight mission, known as the Orbiting Carbon Observatory-2 (OCO-2) mission, with direction to re-use the original hardware, designs, drawings, documents, and procedures wherever possible in order to minimize cost, schedule, and performance risk. During implementation, it was realized that some changes were required due to parts obsolescence, incorporation of lessons learned from the original OCO mission, and to provide optimal science return. In response to the OCO and Glory launch vehicle failures, a change in launch vehicle was also recently announced. A summary of changes, including those to hardware, orbit, and launch vehicle is provided, along with rationale, implementation approach, and impact (if any) on mission science.
An Evaluation of Alternative Delivery Modes for Information Services.
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Short, Craig; Christal, Melodie E.
The use of the floppy disk as an alternative mode for delivering Information Services reports was evaluated for fiscal year 1985 by the National Center for Higher Education Management Systems (NCHEMS). A 5.25 inch, 8/9 sector, 40 track ASCII floppy disk used under PC-DOS on the IBM PC and IBM PC compatible hardware was tested. Tabular data but not…
Astronaut Thuot and Gemar work with Middeck O-Gravity Dynamics Experiment (MODE)
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
1994-01-01
Astronauts Pierre J. Thuot (top) and Charles D. (Sam) Gemar show off the Middeck O-Gravity Dynamics Experiment (MODE) aboard the Earth-orbiting Space Shuttle Columbia. The reusable test facility is designed to study the non-linear gravity-dependent behavior of two types of space hardware - large space structures (as depicted here) and contained fluids - planned for future spacecraft.
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Smart, Christian
1998-01-01
During 1997, a team from Hernandez Engineering, MSFC, Rocketdyne, Thiokol, Pratt & Whitney, and USBI completed the first phase of a two year Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) of the Space Shuttle. The models for the Shuttle systems were entered and analyzed by a new QRA software package. This system, termed the Quantitative Risk Assessment System(QRAS), was designed by NASA and programmed by the University of Maryland. The software is a groundbreaking PC-based risk assessment package that allows the user to model complex systems in a hierarchical fashion. Features of the software include the ability to easily select quantifications of failure modes, draw Event Sequence Diagrams(ESDs) interactively, perform uncertainty and sensitivity analysis, and document the modeling. This paper illustrates both the approach used in modeling and the particular features of the software package. The software is general and can be used in a QRA of any complex engineered system. The author is the project lead for the modeling of the Space Shuttle Main Engines (SSMEs), and this paper focuses on the modeling completed for the SSMEs during 1997. In particular, the groundrules for the study, the databases used, the way in which ESDs were used to model catastrophic failure of the SSMES, the methods used to quantify the failure rates, and how QRAS was used in the modeling effort are discussed. Groundrules were necessary to limit the scope of such a complex study, especially with regard to a liquid rocket engine such as the SSME, which can be shut down after ignition either on the pad or in flight. The SSME was divided into its constituent components and subsystems. These were ranked on the basis of the possibility of being upgraded and risk of catastrophic failure. Once this was done the Shuttle program Hazard Analysis and Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) were used to create a list of potential failure modes to be modeled. The groundrules and other criteria were used to screen out the many failure modes that did not contribute significantly to the catastrophic risk. The Hazard Analysis and FMEA for the SSME were also used to build ESDs that show the chain of events leading from the failure mode occurence to one of the following end states: catastrophic failure, engine shutdown, or siccessful operation( successful with respect to the failure mode under consideration).
Failure mode and effects analysis of witnessing protocols for ensuring traceability during IVF.
Rienzi, Laura; Bariani, Fiorenza; Dalla Zorza, Michela; Romano, Stefania; Scarica, Catello; Maggiulli, Roberta; Nanni Costa, Alessandro; Ubaldi, Filippo Maria
2015-10-01
Traceability of cells during IVF is a fundamental aspect of treatment, and involves witnessing protocols. Failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) is a method of identifying real or potential breakdowns in processes, and allows strategies to mitigate risks to be developed. To examine the risks associated with witnessing protocols, an FMEA was carried out in a busy IVF centre, before and after implementation of an electronic witnessing system (EWS). A multidisciplinary team was formed and moderated by human factors specialists. Possible causes of failures, and their potential effects, were identified and risk priority number (RPN) for each failure calculated. A second FMEA analysis was carried out after implementation of an EWS. The IVF team identified seven main process phases, 19 associated process steps and 32 possible failure modes. The highest RPN was 30, confirming the relatively low risk that mismatches may occur in IVF when a manual witnessing system is used. The introduction of the EWS allowed a reduction in the moderate-risk failure mode by two-thirds (highest RPN = 10). In our experience, FMEA is effective in supporting multidisciplinary IVF groups to understand the witnessing process, identifying critical steps and planning changes in practice to enable safety to be enhanced. Copyright © 2015 Reproductive Healthcare Ltd. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Boyarnikov, A. V.; Boyarnikova, L. V.; Kozhushko, A. A.; Sekachev, A. F.
2017-08-01
In the article the process of verification (calibration) of oil metering units secondary equipment is considered. The purpose of the work is to increase the reliability and reduce the complexity of this process by developing a software and hardware system that provides automated verification and calibration. The hardware part of this complex carries out the commutation of the measuring channels of the verified controller and the reference channels of the calibrator in accordance with the introduced algorithm. The developed software allows controlling the commutation of channels, setting values on the calibrator, reading the measured data from the controller, calculating errors and compiling protocols. This system can be used for checking the controllers of the secondary equipment of the oil metering units in the automatic verification mode (with the open communication protocol) or in the semi-automatic verification mode (without it). The peculiar feature of the approach used is the development of a universal signal switch operating under software control, which can be configured for various verification methods (calibration), which allows to cover the entire range of controllers of metering units secondary equipment. The use of automatic verification with the help of a hardware and software system allows to shorten the verification time by 5-10 times and to increase the reliability of measurements, excluding the influence of the human factor.
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Satyanarayana, Arunkumar; Bogert, Philip B.; Chunchu, Prasad B.
2007-01-01
The influence of delamination on the progressing damage path and initial failure load in composite laminates is investigated. Results are presented from a numerical and an experimental study of center-notched tensile-loaded coupons. The numerical study includes two approaches. The first approach considers only intralaminar (fiber breakage and matrix cracking) damage modes in calculating the progression of the damage path. In the second approach, the model is extended to consider the effect of interlaminar (delamination) damage modes in addition to the intralaminar damage modes. The intralaminar damage is modeled using progressive damage analysis (PDA) methodology implemented with the VUMAT subroutine in the ABAQUS finite element code. The interlaminar damage mode has been simulated using cohesive elements in ABAQUS. In the experimental study, 2-3 specimens each of two different stacking sequences of center-notched laminates are tensile loaded. The numerical results from the two different modeling approaches are compared with each other and the experimentally observed results for both laminate types. The comparisons reveal that the second modeling approach, where the delamination damage mode is included together with the intralaminar damage modes, better simulates the experimentally observed damage modes and damage paths, which were characterized by splitting failures perpendicular to the notch tips in one or more layers. Additionally, the inclusion of the delamination mode resulted in a better prediction of the loads at which the failure took place, which were higher than those predicted by the first modeling approach which did not include delaminations.
Fatigue damage accumulation in various metal matrix composites
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Johnson, W. S.
1987-01-01
The purpose of this paper is to review some of the latest understanding of the fatigue behavior of continuous fiber reinforced metal matrix composites. The emphasis is on the development of an understanding of different fatigue damage mechanisms and why and how they occur. The fatigue failure modes in continuous fiber reinforced metal matrix composites are controlled by the three constituents of the system: fiber, matrix, and fiber/matrix interface. The relative strains to fatigue failure of the fiber and matrix will determine the failure mode. Several examples of matrix, fiber, and self-similar damage growth dominated fatigue damage are given for several metal matrix composite systems. Composite analysis, failure modes, and damage modeling are discussed. Boron/aluminum, silicon-carbide/aluminum, FP/aluminum, and borsic/titanium metal matrix composites are discussed.
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Bueno, R.; Chow, E.; Gershwin, S. B.; Willsky, A. S.
1975-01-01
The research is reported on the problems of failure detection and reliable system design for digital aircraft control systems. Failure modes, cross detection probability, wrong time detection, application of performance tools, and the GLR computer package are discussed.
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Li, Hui; Ou, Jinping
2008-07-01
A number of researchers have been focused on structural vibration control in the past three decades over the world and fruit achievements have been made. This paper introduces the recent advances in structural vibration control including passive, active and semiactive control in mainland China. Additionally, the co-author extends the structural vibration control to failure mode control. The research on the failure mode control is also involved in this paper. For passive control, this paper introduces full scale tests of buckling-restrained braces conducted to investigate the performance of the dampers and the second-editor of the Code of Seismic Design for Buildings. For active control, this paper introduces the HMD system for wind-induced vibration control of the Guangzhou TV tower. For semiactive control, the smart damping devices, algorithms for semi-active control, design methods and applications of semi-active control for structures are introduced in this paper. The failure mode control for bridges is also introduced.
Failure Maps for Rectangular 17-4PH Stainless Steel Sandwiched Foam Panels
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Raj, S. V.; Ghosn, L. J.
2007-01-01
A new and innovative concept is proposed for designing lightweight fan blades for aircraft engines using commercially available 17-4PH precipitation hardened stainless steel. Rotating fan blades in aircraft engines experience a complex loading state consisting of combinations of centrifugal, distributed pressure and torsional loads. Theoretical failure plastic collapse maps, showing plots of the foam relative density versus face sheet thickness, t, normalized by the fan blade span length, L, have been generated for rectangular 17-4PH sandwiched foam panels under these three loading modes assuming three failure plastic collapse modes. These maps show that the 17-4PH sandwiched foam panels can fail by either the yielding of the face sheets, yielding of the foam core or wrinkling of the face sheets depending on foam relative density, the magnitude of t/L and the loading mode. The design envelop of a generic fan blade is superimposed on the maps to provide valuable insights on the probable failure modes in a sandwiched foam fan blade.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Kang, D. I.; Han, S. H.
A PSA analyst has been manually determining fire-induced component failure modes and modeling them into the PSA logics. These can be difficult and time-consuming tasks as they need much information and many events are to be modeled. KAERI has been developing the IPRO-ZONE (interface program for constructing zone effect table) to facilitate fire PSA works for identifying and modeling fire-induced component failure modes, and to construct a one top fire event PSA model. With the output of the IPRO-ZONE, the AIMS-PSA, and internal event one top PSA model, one top fire events PSA model is automatically constructed. The outputs ofmore » the IPRO-ZONE include information on fire zones/fire scenarios, fire propagation areas, equipment failure modes affected by a fire, internal PSA basic events corresponding to fire-induced equipment failure modes, and fire events to be modeled. This paper introduces the IPRO-ZONE, and its application results to fire PSA of Ulchin Unit 3 and SMART(System-integrated Modular Advanced Reactor). (authors)« less
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Aggarwal, R.K.; Litton, R.W.; Cornell, C.A.
1996-12-31
The performance of more than 3,000 offshore platforms in the Gulf of Mexico was observed during the passage of Hurricane Andrew in August 1992. This event provided an opportunity to test the procedures used for platform analysis and design. A global bias was inferred for overall platform capacity and loads in the Andrew Joint Industry Project (JIP) Phase 1. It was predicted that the pile foundations of several platforms should have failed, but did not. These results indicated that the biases specific to foundation failure modes may be higher than those of jacket failure modes. The biases in predictions ofmore » foundation failure modes were therefore investigated further in this study. The work included capacity analysis and calibration of predictions with the observed behavior for 3 jacket platforms and 3 caissons using Bayesian updating. Bias factors for two foundation failure modes, lateral shear and overturning, were determined for each structure. Foundation capacity estimates using conventional methods were found to be conservatively biased overall.« less
Carbon Fiber Strand Tensile Failure Dynamic Event Characterization
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Johnson, Kenneth L.; Reeder, James
2016-01-01
There are few if any clear, visual, and detailed images of carbon fiber strand failures under tension useful for determining mechanisms, sequences of events, different types of failure modes, etc. available to researchers. This makes discussion of physics of failure difficult. It was also desired to find out whether the test article-to-test rig interface (grip) played a part in some failures. These failures have nothing to do with stress rupture failure, thus representing a source of waste for the larger 13-00912 investigation into that specific failure type. Being able to identify or mitigate any competing failure modes would improve the value of the 13-00912 test data. The beginnings of the solution to these problems lay in obtaining images of strand failures useful for understanding physics of failure and the events leading up to failure. Necessary steps include identifying imaging techniques that result in useful data, using those techniques to home in on where in a strand and when in the sequence of events one should obtain imaging data.
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Smetana, F. O.; Furniss, M. A.; Potter, T. R.
1974-01-01
Results of a number of experiments to illuminate the relative effectiveness and costs of computerized information retrieval in the interactive mode are reported. It was found that for equal time spent in preparing the search strategy, the batch and interactive modes gave approximately equal recall and relevance. The interactive mode however encourages the searcher to devote more time to the task and therefore usually yields improved output. Engineering costs as a result are higher in this mode. Estimates of associated hardware costs also indicate that operation in this mode is more expensive. Skilled RECON users like the rapid feedback and additional features offered by this mode if they are not constrained by considerations of cost.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Younge, K C; Lee, C I; Feng, M
2015-06-15
Purpose: To improve the safety and quality of a dual-vendor microsphere brachytherapy program with failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA). Methods: A multidisciplinary team including physicists, dosimetrists, a radiation oncologist, an interventional radiologist, and radiation safety personnel performed an FMEA for our dual-vendor microsphere brachytherapy program employing SIR-Spheres (Sirtex Medical Limited, Australia) and Theraspheres (BTG, England). We developed a program process tree and step-by-step instructions which were used to generate a comprehensive list of failure modes. These modes were then ranked according to severity, occurrence rate, and detectability. Risk priority numbers (RPNs) were calculated by multiplying these three scores together.more » Three different severity scales were created: one each for harmful effects to the patient, staff, or the institution. Each failure mode was ranked on one or more of these scales. Results: The group identified 164 failure modes for the microsphere program. 113 of these were ranked using the patient severity scale, 52 using the staff severity scale, and 50 using the institution severity scale. The highest ranked items on the patient severity scale were an error in the automated dosimetry worksheet (RPN = 297.5), and the incorrect target specified on the planning study (RPN = 135). Some failure modes ranked differently between vendors, especially those corresponding to dose vial preparation because of the different methods used. Based on our findings, we made several improvements to our QA program, including documentation to easily identify which product is being used, an additional hand calculation during planning, and reorganization of QA steps before treatment delivery. We will continue to periodically review and revise the FMEA. Conclusion: We have applied FMEA to our dual-vendor microsphere brachytherapy program to identify potential key weaknesses in the treatment chain. Our FMEA results were used to improve the effectiveness of our overall microsphere program.« less
Processing Mode Causally Influences Emotional Reactivity
Watkins, Ed; Moberly, Nicholas J.; Moulds, Michelle L.
2008-01-01
Three studies are reported showing that emotional responses to stress can be modified by systematic prior practice in adopting particular processing modes. Participants were induced to think about positive and negative scenarios in a mode either characteristic of or inconsistent with the abstract-evaluative mind-set observed in depressive rumination, via explicit instructions (Experiments 1 and 2) and via implicit induction of interpretative biases (Experiment 3), before being exposed to a failure experience. In all three studies, participants trained into the mode antithetical to depressive rumination demonstrated less emotional reactivity following failure than participants trained into the mode consistent with depressive rumination. These findings provide evidence consistent with the hypothesis that processing mode modifies emotional reactivity and support the processing-mode theory of rumination. PMID:18540752
Microcircuit failure analysis using the SEM. [Scanning Electron Microscopes
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Nicolas, D. P.
1974-01-01
The scanning electron microscope adds a new dimension to the knowledge that can be obtained from a failed microcircuit. When used with conventional techniques, SEM assists and clarifies the analysis, but it does not replace light microscopy. The most advantageous features for microcircuit analysis are long working distances and great depth of field. Manufacturer related failure modes of microcircuits are metallization defects, poor bonding, surface and particle contamination, and design and fabrication faults. User related failure modes are caused by abuse, such as overstress. The Physics of Failure Procedure followed by the Astrionics Laboratory in failure analysis is described, which is designed to obtain maximum information available from each step.
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Ratcliffe, James G.
2004-01-01
The edge crack torsion (ECT) test is designed to initiate mode III delamination growth in composite laminates. The test has undergone several design changes during its development. The objective of this paper was to determine the suitability of the current ECT test design a mode III fracture test. To this end, ECT tests were conducted on specimens manufactured from IM7/8552 and S2/8552 tape laminates. Three-dimensional finite element analyses were performed. The analysis results were used to calculate the distribution of mode I, mode II, and mode III strain energy release rate along the delamination front. The results indicated that mode IIIdominated delamination growth would be initiated from the specimen center. However, in specimens of both material types, the measured values of GIIIc exhibited significant dependence on delamination length. Load-displacement response of the specimens exhibited significant deviation from linearity before specimen failure. X-radiographs of a sample of specimens revealed that damage was initiated in the specimens prior to failure. Further inspection of the failure surfaces is required to identify the damage and determine that mode III delamination is initiated in the specimens.
Smartphone-Guided Needle Angle Selection During CT-Guided Procedures.
Xu, Sheng; Krishnasamy, Venkatesh; Levy, Elliot; Li, Ming; Tse, Zion Tsz Ho; Wood, Bradford John
2018-01-01
In CT-guided intervention, translation from a planned needle insertion angle to the actual insertion angle is estimated only with the physician's visuospatial abilities. An iPhone app was developed to reduce reliance on operator ability to estimate and reproduce angles. The iPhone app overlays the planned angle on the smartphone's camera display in real-time based on the smartphone's orientation. The needle's angle is selected by visually comparing the actual needle with the guideline in the display. If the smartphone's screen is perpendicular to the planned path, the smartphone shows the Bull's-Eye View mode, in which the angle is selected after the needle's hub overlaps the tip in the camera. In phantom studies, we evaluated the accuracies of the hardware, the Guideline mode, and the Bull's-Eye View mode and showed the app's clinical efficacy. A proof-of-concept clinical case was also performed. The hardware accuracy was 0.37° ± 0.27° (mean ± SD). The mean error and navigation time were 1.0° ± 0.9° and 8.7 ± 2.3 seconds for a senior radiologist with 25 years' experience and 1.5° ± 1.3° and 8.0 ± 1.6 seconds for a junior radiologist with 4 years' experience. The accuracy of the Bull's-Eye View mode was 2.9° ± 1.1°. Combined CT and smart-phone guidance was significantly more accurate than CT-only guidance for the first needle pass (p = 0.046), which led to a smaller final targeting error (mean distance from needle tip to target, 2.5 vs 7.9 mm). Mobile devices can be useful for guiding needle-based interventions. The hardware is low cost and widely available. The method is accurate, effective, and easy to implement.
Requirements analysis for a hardware, discrete-event, simulation engine accelerator
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Taylor, Paul J., Jr.
1991-12-01
An analysis of a general Discrete Event Simulation (DES), executing on the distributed architecture of an eight mode Intel PSC/2 hypercube, was performed. The most time consuming portions of the general DES algorithm were determined to be the functions associated with message passing of required simulation data between processing nodes of the hypercube architecture. A behavioral description, using the IEEE standard VHSIC Hardware Description and Design Language (VHDL), for a general DES hardware accelerator is presented. The behavioral description specifies the operational requirements for a DES coprocessor to augment the hypercube's execution of DES simulations. The DES coprocessor design implements the functions necessary to perform distributed discrete event simulations using a conservative time synchronization protocol.
Effects of soil-engineering properties on the failure mode of shallow landslides
McKenna, Jonathan Peter; Santi, Paul Michael; Amblard, Xavier; Negri, Jacquelyn
2012-01-01
Some landslides mobilize into flows, while others slide and deposit material immediately down slope. An index based on initial dry density and fine-grained content of soil predicted failure mode of 96 landslide initiation sites in Oregon and Colorado with 79% accuracy. These material properties can be used to identify potential sources for debris flows and for slides. Field data suggest that loose soils can evolve from dense soils that dilate upon shearing. The method presented herein to predict failure mode is most applicable for shallow (depth 8), with few to moderate fines (fine-grained content <18%), and with liquid limits <40.
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Stephan, Amy; Erikson, Carol A.
1991-01-01
As an initial attempt to introduce expert system technology into an onboard environment, a model based diagnostic system using the TRW MARPLE software tool was integrated with prototype flight hardware and its corresponding control software. Because this experiment was designed primarily to test the effectiveness of the model based reasoning technique used, the expert system ran on a separate hardware platform, and interactions between the control software and the model based diagnostics were limited. While this project met its objective of showing that model based reasoning can effectively isolate failures in flight hardware, it also identified the need for an integrated development path for expert system and control software for onboard applications. In developing expert systems that are ready for flight, artificial intelligence techniques must be evaluated to determine whether they offer a real advantage onboard, identify which diagnostic functions should be performed by the expert systems and which are better left to the procedural software, and work closely with both the hardware and the software developers from the beginning of a project to produce a well designed and thoroughly integrated application.
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Ramesham, Rajeshuni; Maki, Justin N.; Cucullu, Gordon C.
2008-01-01
Package Qualification and Verification (PQV) of advanced electronic packaging and interconnect technologies and various other types of qualification hardware for the Mars Exploration Rover/Mars Science Laboratory flight projects has been performed to enhance the mission assurance. The qualification of hardware (Engineering Camera and Platinum Resistance Thermometer, PRT) under extreme cold temperatures has been performed with reference to various project requirements. The flight-like packages, sensors, and subassemblies have been selected for the study to survive three times (3x) the total number of expected temperature cycles resulting from all environmental and operational exposures occurring over the life of the flight hardware including all relevant manufacturing, ground operations and mission phases. Qualification has been performed by subjecting above flight-like qual hardware to the environmental temperature extremes and assessing any structural failures or degradation in electrical performance due to either overstress or thermal cycle fatigue. Experiments of flight like hardware qualification test results have been described in this paper.
Contamination Examples and Lessons from Low Earth Orbit Experiments and Operational Hardware
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Pippin, Gary; Finckenor, Miria M.
2009-01-01
Flight experiments flown on the Space Shuttle, the International Space Station, Mir, Skylab, and free flyers such as the Long Duration Exposure Facility, the European Retrievable Carrier, and the EFFU, provide multiple opportunities for the investigation of molecular contamination effects. Retrieved hardware from the Solar Maximum Mission satellite, Mir, and the Hubble Space Telescope has also provided the means gaining insight into contamination processes. Images from the above mentioned hardware show contamination effects due to materials processing, hardware storage, pre-flight cleaning, as well as on-orbit events such as outgassing, mechanical failure of hardware in close proximity, impacts from man-made debris, and changes due to natural environment factors.. Contamination effects include significant changes to thermal and electrical properties of thermal control surfaces, optics, and power systems. Data from several flights has been used to develop a rudimentary estimate of asymptotic values for absorptance changes due to long-term solar exposure (4000-6000 Equivalent Sun Hours) of silicone-based molecular contamination deposits of varying thickness. Recommendations and suggestions for processing changes and constraints based on the on-orbit observed results will be presented.
Guidance, navigation, and control subsystem for the EOS-AM spacecraft
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Linder, David M.; Tolek, Joseph T.; Lombardo, John
1992-01-01
This paper presents the preliminary design of the Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GN&C) subsystem for the EOS-AM spacecraft and specifically focuses on the GN&C Normal Mode design. First, a brief description of the EOS-AM science mission, instruments, and system-level spacecraft design is provided. Next, an overview of the GN&C subsystem functional and performance requirements, hardware, and operating modes is presented. Then, the GN&C Normal Mode attitude determination, attitude control, and navigation systems are detailed. Finally, descriptions of the spacecraft's overall jitter performance and Safe Mode are provided.
The Management and Security Expert (MASE)
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Miller, Mark D.; Barr, Stanley J.; Gryphon, Coranth D.; Keegan, Jeff; Kniker, Catherine A.; Krolak, Patrick D.
1991-01-01
The Management and Security Expert (MASE) is a distributed expert system that monitors the operating systems and applications of a network. It is capable of gleaning the information provided by the different operating systems in order to optimize hardware and software performance; recognize potential hardware and/or software failure, and either repair the problem before it becomes an emergency, or notify the systems manager of the problem; and monitor applications and known security holes for indications of an intruder or virus. MASE can eradicate much of the guess work of system management.
Pilot interaction with automated airborne decision making systems
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Rouse, W. B.; Hammer, J. M.; Mitchell, C. M.; Morris, N. M.; Lewis, C. M.; Yoon, W. C.
1985-01-01
Progress was made in the three following areas. In the rule-based modeling area, two papers related to identification and significane testing of rule-based models were presented. In the area of operator aiding, research focused on aiding operators in novel failure situations; a discrete control modeling approach to aiding PLANT operators was developed; and a set of guidelines were developed for implementing automation. In the area of flight simulator hardware and software, the hardware will be completed within two months and initial simulation software will then be integrated and tested.
Weighting and Bayes Nets for Rollup of Surveillance Metrics
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Henson, Kriste; Sentz, Kari; Hamada, Michael
2012-04-30
The LANL IKE team proposes that the surveillance metrics for several data stream that are used to detect the same failure mode be weighted. Similarly, the failure mode metrics are weighted to obtain a subsystem metric. E.g., if there n data streams (nodes 1-n), the failure mode (node 0) metric is obtained as M{sub 0} = w{sub 1}M{sub 1} + {hor_ellipsis} + w{sub n}M{sub n}, where {Sigma}{sub i=1}{sup n} w{sub i} = 1. This proposal has been implemented with Bayes Nets using the Netica/IKE software by specifying an appropriate conditional probability table (CPT). This CPT is calculated using the samemore » form as (1), where the data stream metrics for the true (T) and false (F) states are replaced by 1 and 0, respectively. Then using this CPT, the failure mode metric calculated by Netica/IKE equals (1). This result has two nice features. First, the rollup Bayes nets is doing can be easily explained. Second, because Bayes Nets can implement this rollup using Netica/IKE, then data marshalling (allocating next year's budget) can be studied. A proof that the claim 'failure mode metric calculated by Netica/IKE equals (1)' for n = 2 and n = 3 follows as well as the sketch of a proof by induction for general n.« less
Magnezi, Racheli; Hemi, Asaf; Hemi, Rina
2016-01-01
Background Risk management in health care systems applies to all hospital employees and directors as they deal with human life and emergency routines. There is a constant need to decrease risk and increase patient safety in the hospital environment. The purpose of this article is to review the laboratory testing procedures for parathyroid hormone and adrenocorticotropic hormone (which are characterized by short half-lives) and to track failure modes and risks, and offer solutions to prevent them. During a routine quality improvement review at the Endocrine Laboratory in Tel Hashomer Hospital, we discovered these tests are frequently repeated unnecessarily due to multiple failures. The repetition of the tests inconveniences patients and leads to extra work for the laboratory and logistics personnel as well as the nurses and doctors who have to perform many tasks with limited resources. Methods A team of eight staff members accompanied by the Head of the Endocrine Laboratory formed the team for analysis. The failure mode and effects analysis model (FMEA) was used to analyze the laboratory testing procedure and was designed to simplify the process steps and indicate and rank possible failures. Results A total of 23 failure modes were found within the process, 19 of which were ranked by level of severity. The FMEA model prioritizes failures by their risk priority number (RPN). For example, the most serious failure was the delay after the samples were collected from the department (RPN =226.1). Conclusion This model helped us to visualize the process in a simple way. After analyzing the information, solutions were proposed to prevent failures, and a method to completely avoid the top four problems was also developed. PMID:27980440
Investigation of a ceramic matrix composite under strain controlled fatigue condition
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Gudaitis, J.J.; Mall, S.
The fatigue behavior along with damage mechanisms and failure modes of a fiber reinforced ceramic matrix composite with a cross-ply lay-up was investigated under strain controlled mode. Two fatigue conditions involving tension-tension and tension-compression cycling were employed. The strain range versus fatigue life curves for both fatigue conditions were in agreement with each other. However, damage mechanisms and failure modes were different for both cases.
Rodriguez-Gonzalez, Carmen Guadalupe; Martin-Barbero, Maria Luisa; Herranz-Alonso, Ana; Durango-Limarquez, Maria Isabel; Hernandez-Sampelayo, Paloma; Sanjurjo-Saez, Maria
2015-08-01
To critically evaluate the causes of preventable adverse drug events during the nurse medication administration process in inpatient units with computerized prescription order entry and profiled automated dispensing cabinets in order to prioritize interventions that need to be implemented and to evaluate the impact of specific interventions on the criticality index. This is a failure mode, effects and criticality analysis (FMECA) study. A multidisciplinary consensus committee composed of pharmacists, nurses and doctors evaluated the process of administering medications in a hospital setting in Spain. By analysing the process, all failure modes were identified and criticality was determined by rating severity, frequency and likelihood of failure detection on a scale of 1 to 10, using adapted versions of already published scales. Safety strategies were identified and prioritized. Through consensus, the committee identified eight processes and 40 failure modes, of which 20 were classified as high risk. The sum of the criticality indices was 5254. For the potential high-risk failure modes, 21 different potential causes were found resulting in 24 recommendations. Thirteen recommendations were prioritized and developed over a 24-month period, reducing total criticality from 5254 to 3572 (a 32.0% reduction). The recommendations with a greater impact on criticality were the development of an electronic medication administration record (-582) and the standardization of intravenous drug compounding in the unit (-168). Other improvements, such as barcode medication administration technology (-1033), were scheduled for a longer period of time because of lower feasibility. FMECA is a useful approach that can improve the medication administration process. © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Li, Xixi; He, Mei; Wang, Haiyan
2017-01-01
Abstract In this study, failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA), a proactive tool, was applied to reduce errors associated with the process which begins with assessment of patient and ends with treatment of complications. The aim of this study is to assess whether FMEA implementation will significantly reduce the incidence of catheter-related bloodstream infections (CRBSIs) in intensive care unit. The FMEA team was constructed. A team of 15 medical staff from different departments were recruited and trained. Their main responsibility was to analyze and score all possible processes of central venous catheterization failures. Failure modes with risk priority number (RPN) ≥100 (top 10 RPN scores) were deemed as high-priority-risks, meaning that they needed immediate corrective action. After modifications were put, the resulting RPN was compared with the previous one. A centralized nursing care system was designed. A total of 25 failure modes were identified. High-priority risks were “Unqualified medical device sterilization” (RPN, 337), “leukopenia, very low immunity” (RPN, 222), and “Poor hand hygiene Basic diseases” (RPN, 160). The corrective measures that we took allowed a decrease in the RPNs, especially for the high-priority risks. The maximum reduction was approximately 80%, as observed for the failure mode “Not creating the maximal barrier for patient.” The averaged incidence of CRBSIs was reduced from 5.19% to 1.45%, with 3 months of 0 infection rate. The FMEA can effectively reduce incidence of CRBSIs, improve the security of central venous catheterization technology, decrease overall medical expenses, and improve nursing quality. PMID:29390515
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis of bilateral same-day cataract surgery
Shorstein, Neal H.; Lucido, Carol; Carolan, James; Liu, Liyan; Slean, Geraldine; Herrinton, Lisa J.
2017-01-01
PURPOSE To systematically analyze potential process failures related to bilateral same-day cataract surgery toward the goal of improving patient safety. SETTING Twenty-one Kaiser Permanente surgery centers, Northern California, USA. DESIGN Retrospective cohort study. METHODS Quality experts performed a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) that included an evaluation of sterile processing, pharmaceuticals, perioperative clinic and surgical center visits, and biometry. Potential failures in human factors and communication (modes) were identified. Rates of endophthalmitis, toxic anterior segment syndrome (TASS), and unintended intraocular lens (IOL) implantation were assessed in eyes having bilateral same-day surgery from 2010 through 2014. RESULTS The study comprised 4754 eyes. The analysis identified 15 significant potential failure modes. These included lapses in instrument processing and compounding error of intracameral antibiotic that could lead to endophthalmitis or TASS and ambiguous documentation of IOL selection by surgeons, which could lead to unintended IOL implantation. Of the study sample, 1 eye developed endophthalmitis, 1 eye had unintended IOL implantation (rates, 2 per 10 000; 95% confidence intervals [CI] 0.1–12.0 per 10 000), and no eyes developed TASS (upper 95% CI, 8 per 10 000). Recommendations included improving oversight of cleaning and sterilization practices, separating lots of compounded drugs for each eye, and enhancing IOL verification procedures. CONCLUSIONS Potential failure modes and recommended actions in bilateral same-day cataract surgery were determined using a FMEA. These findings might help improve the reliability and safety of bilateral same-day cataract surgery based on current evidence and standards. PMID:28410711
Space tug propulsion system failure mode, effects and criticality analysis
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Boyd, J. W.; Hardison, E. P.; Heard, C. B.; Orourke, J. C.; Osborne, F.; Wakefield, L. T.
1972-01-01
For purposes of the study, the propulsion system was considered as consisting of the following: (1) main engine system, (2) auxiliary propulsion system, (3) pneumatic system, (4) hydrogen feed, fill, drain and vent system, (5) oxygen feed, fill, drain and vent system, and (6) helium reentry purge system. Each component was critically examined to identify possible failure modes and the subsequent effect on mission success. Each space tug mission consists of three phases: launch to separation from shuttle, separation to redocking, and redocking to landing. The analysis considered the results of failure of a component during each phase of the mission. After the failure modes of each component were tabulated, those components whose failure would result in possible or certain loss of mission or inability to return the Tug to ground were identified as critical components and a criticality number determined for each. The criticality number of a component denotes the number of mission failures in one million missions due to the loss of that component. A total of 68 components were identified as critical with criticality numbers ranging from 1 to 2990.
Sleeve Expansion of Bolt Holes in Railroad Rail : Volume I, Description and Planning
DOT National Transportation Integrated Search
1980-02-01
The most predominant failure mode of rails with bolt joints is a web crack initiating at the rail bolt hole. This failure mode is of a classical fatigue nature induced by web stress concentration around the bolt hole. This program was conducted to ap...
The Large Synoptic Survey Telescope
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Axelrod, T. S.
2006-07-01
The Large Synoptic Survey Telescope (LSST) is an 8.4 meter telescope with a 10 square degree field degree field and a 3 Gigapixel imager, planned to be on-sky in 2012. It is a dedicated all-sky survey instrument, with several complementary science missions. These include understanding dark energy through weak lensing and supernovae; exploring transients and variable objects; creating and maintaining a solar system map, with particular emphasis on potentially hazardous objects; and increasing the precision with which we understand the structure of the Milky Way. The instrument operates continuously at a rapid cadence, repetitively scanning the visible sky every few nights. The data flow rates from LSST are larger than those from current surveys by roughly a factor of 1000: A few GB/night are typical today. LSST will deliver a few TB/night. From a computing hardware perspective, this factor of 1000 can be dealt with easily in 2012. The major issues in designing the LSST data management system arise from the fact that the number of people available to critically examine the data will not grow from current levels. This has a number of implications. For example, every large imaging survey today is resigned to the fact that their image reduction pipelines fail at some significant rate. Many of these failures are dealt with by rerunning the reduction pipeline under human supervision, with carefully ``tweaked'' parameters to deal with the original problem. For LSST, this will no longer be feasible. The problem is compounded by the fact that the processing must of necessity occur on clusters with large numbers of CPU's and disk drives, and with some components connected by long-haul networks. This inevitably results in a significant rate of hardware component failures, which can easily lead to further software failures. Both hardware and software failures must be seen as a routine fact of life rather than rare exceptions to normality.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Ciocca, Mario, E-mail: mario.ciocca@cnao.it; Cantone, Marie-Claire; Veronese, Ivan
2012-02-01
Purpose: Failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) represents a prospective approach for risk assessment. A multidisciplinary working group of the Italian Association for Medical Physics applied FMEA to electron beam intraoperative radiation therapy (IORT) delivered using mobile linear accelerators, aiming at preventing accidental exposures to the patient. Methods and Materials: FMEA was applied to the IORT process, for the stages of the treatment delivery and verification, and consisted of three steps: 1) identification of the involved subprocesses; 2) identification and ranking of the potential failure modes, together with their causes and effects, using the risk probability number (RPN) scoring system,more » based on the product of three parameters (severity, frequency of occurrence and detectability, each ranging from 1 to 10); 3) identification of additional safety measures to be proposed for process quality and safety improvement. RPN upper threshold for little concern of risk was set at 125. Results: Twenty-four subprocesses were identified. Ten potential failure modes were found and scored, in terms of RPN, in the range of 42-216. The most critical failure modes consisted of internal shield misalignment, wrong Monitor Unit calculation and incorrect data entry at treatment console. Potential causes of failure included shield displacement, human errors, such as underestimation of CTV extension, mainly because of lack of adequate training and time pressures, failure in the communication between operators, and machine malfunctioning. The main effects of failure were represented by CTV underdose, wrong dose distribution and/or delivery, unintended normal tissue irradiation. As additional safety measures, the utilization of a dedicated staff for IORT, double-checking of MU calculation and data entry and finally implementation of in vivo dosimetry were suggested. Conclusions: FMEA appeared as a useful tool for prospective evaluation of patient safety in radiotherapy. The application of this method to IORT lead to identify three safety measures for risk mitigation.« less
Astronaut Sam Gemar works with Middeck O-Gravity Dynamics Experiment (MODE)
1994-03-04
STS062-23-017 (4-18 March 1994) --- Astronaut Charles D. (Sam) Gemar, mission specialist, works with Middeck 0-Gravity Dynamics Experiment (MODE) aboard the earth-orbiting Space Shuttle Columbia. The reusable test facility is designed to study the nonlinear, gravity-dependent behavior of two types of space hardware -- contained fluids and (as depicted here) large space structures -- planned for future spacecraft.
Protein-protein docking on hardware accelerators: comparison of GPU and MIC architectures
2015-01-01
Background The hardware accelerators will provide solutions to computationally complex problems in bioinformatics fields. However, the effect of acceleration depends on the nature of the application, thus selection of an appropriate accelerator requires some consideration. Results In the present study, we compared the effects of acceleration using graphics processing unit (GPU) and many integrated core (MIC) on the speed of fast Fourier transform (FFT)-based protein-protein docking calculation. The GPU implementation performed the protein-protein docking calculations approximately five times faster than the MIC offload mode implementation. The MIC native mode implementation has the advantage in the implementation costs. However, the performance was worse with larger protein pairs because of memory limitations. Conclusion The results suggest that GPU is more suitable than MIC for accelerating FFT-based protein-protein docking applications. PMID:25707855