5 CFR 1604.3 - Contribution elections.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... special pay (including bonuses). However, the service member must elect to contribute to the TSP from basic pay in order to contribute to the TSP from incentive pay and special pay (including bonuses). A service member may elect to contribute from special pay or incentive pay (including bonuses) in...

32 CFR 113.3 - Definitions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... and reenlistment bonuses). (iii) Incentive pay. (iv) Accrued leave payments (basic pay portion only... pay). (ii) Retainer pay. (iii) Separation pay, Voluntary Separation Incentive (VSI), and Special...) Federal and State employment and income tax withholding (amount limited only to that which is necessary to...

Presidential Compensation in Public Higher Education Institutions: Is There Pay for Performance?

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

He, Lerong; Callahan, Charles, III

2017-01-01

This paper discusses the theoretical background of the pay-for-performance incentive as well as its implication for administrators in higher education institutions. Using pay data of a large state university system in the U.S., the paper finds that presidents in public research universities receive significantly higher pay than their counterparts…

Policies for Managing Reductions in Military End Strength: Using Incentive Pays to Draw Down the Force

DTIC Science & Technology

2016-01-01

Michael G. Mattock, James Hosek, Beth J. Asch Policies for Managing Reductions in Military End Strength Using Incentive Pays to Draw Down the...5 Voluntary Separation Incentive and...Using Incentives to Draw Down the Force

Performance-Based Pay in the Federal Government. Research Brief

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

National Center on Performance Incentives, 2008

2008-01-01

In "Performance-Based Pay in the Federal Government"--a paper presented at the February 2008 National Center on Performance Incentives research to policy conference--Steve Nelson discusses the evolution of employee pay systems in the federal government, from the inception of the General Schedule to continuing interest in creating more…

Teacher Incentive Pay Programs in the United States: Union Influence and District Characteristics

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Liang, Guodong; Zhang, Ying; Huang, Haigen; Qiao, Zhaogang

2015-01-01

This study examined the characteristics of teacher incentive pay programs in the United States. Using the 2007-08 SASS data set, it found an inverse relationship between union influence and districts' incentive pay offerings. Large and ethnically diverse districts in urban areas that did not meet the requirements for Adequate Yearly Progress as…

Effect of provider and patient reminders, deployment of nurse practitioners, and financial incentives on cervical and breast cancer screening rates.

PubMed

Kaczorowski, Janusz; Hearps, Stephen J C; Lohfeld, Lynne; Goeree, Ron; Donald, Faith; Burgess, Ken; Sebaldt, Rolf J

2013-06-01

To evaluate the effect of the Provider and Patient Reminders in Ontario: Multi-Strategy Prevention Tools (P-PROMPT) reminder and recall system and pay-for-performance incentives on the delivery rates of cervical and breast cancer screening in primary care practices in Ontario, with or without deployment of nurse practitioners (NPs). Before-and-after comparisons of the time-appropriate delivery rates of cervical and breast cancer screening using the automated and NP-augmented strategies of the P-PROMPT reminder and recall system. Southwestern Ontario. A total of 232 physicians from 24 primary care network or family health network groups across 110 different sites eligible for pay-for-performance incentives. The P-PROMPT project combined pay-for-performance incentives with provider and patient reminders and deployment of NPs to enhance the delivery of preventive care services. The mean delivery rates at the practice level of time-appropriate mammograms and Papanicolaou tests completed within the previous 30 months. Before-and-after comparisons of time-appropriate delivery rates (< 30 months) of cancer screening showed the rates of Pap tests and mammograms for eligible women significantly increased over a 1-year period by 6.3% (P < .001) and 5.3% (P < .001), respectively. The NP-augmented strategy achieved comparable rate increases to the automated strategy alone in the delivery rates of both services. The use of provider and patient reminders and pay-for-performance incentives resulted in increases in the uptake of Pap tests and mammograms among eligible primary care patients over a 1-year period in family practices in Ontario.

Employee Compensation.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Osif, Bonnie A.; Harwood, Richard L.

1995-01-01

Presents an overview of selected literature about employee compensation. Highlights include the foundations of reward and recognition systems, incentive plans, problems with merit pay, a historical perspective on performance pay, evaluation criteria and processes, self-rating, job motivation and satisfaction, employee attitudes, collective…

Research notes : pay adjustment system for AC pavements.

DOT National Transportation Integrated Search

1991-10-01

Oregon's use of statistical pay adjustments (contractor incentives) in AC pavements began in 1985 as part of a nationwide trend toward End Result Specifications (ERS's). Oregon State Highway Division (OSHD) management became concerned that the State ...

5 CFR 1604.2 - Definitions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... contributions that are made from compensation subject to the Federal income tax exclusion at 26 U.S.C. 112 for..., incentive pay, and special pay (including bonuses). Employing agency means the organization that employs an... employee contributions made from recurring incentive pay and special pay (including bonuses) as defined in...

Review of Related Literature and Research: History of Merit Pay, Differentiated Staffing, and Incentive Pay Programs.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Guernsey, Marsha A.

This paper reviews selected literature pertaining to merit pay, differentiated staffing, and incentive pay programs. The first section reviews the history of these alternatives to the single salary schedule, beginning with an account of two experimental merit pay plans in the early 20th century. During the 1920s, merit pay plans gave way to the…

5 CFR 575.112 - Internal monitoring requirements and revocation or suspension of authority.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... agency's headquarters level before paying a recruitment incentive to such employees; or (2) Revoke or... paying a recruitment incentive to such employees. ... MANAGEMENT CIVIL SERVICE REGULATIONS RECRUITMENT, RELOCATION, AND RETENTION INCENTIVES; SUPERVISORY...

The New York Times readers' opinions about paying people to take their medicine.

PubMed

Park, James D; Metlay, Jessica; Asch, Jeremy M; Asch, David A

2012-12-01

There has been considerable interest in using financial incentives to help people improve their health. However, paying people to improve their health touches on strongly held views about personal responsibility. The New York Times printed two articles in June 2010 about patient financial incentives, which resulted in 394 comments from their online audience. The authors systematically analyzed those online responses to news media in order to understand the range of themes that were expressed regarding the use of financial incentives to improve health. The New York Times online readers revealed a broad range of attitudes about paying individuals to be healthy. Many comments reflected disdain for financial incentives, describing them as "absurd" or "silly." Other comments reflected the notion that financial incentives reward individuals for being irresponsible toward their health. Many individuals communicated concerns that paying individuals for healthy behaviors may weaken their internal drive to be healthy. A smaller set of comments conveyed support for financial incentives, recognizing it as a small sum to pay to prevent or offset higher costs related to chronic diseases. Although a measurable group of individuals supported financial incentives, most readers revealed negative perceptions of these approaches and an appeal for greater personal responsibility for individual health. Despite experimental success of financial incentives, negative perceptions may limit their public acceptability and uptake.

5 CFR 575.103 - Eligible categories of employees.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... INCENTIVES Recruitment Incentives § 575.103 Eligible categories of employees. (a) Except as provided in § 575.104, an Executive agency may pay a recruitment incentive to an employee appointed or placed in the... § 575.104, a legislative agency may pay a recruitment incentive to an employee appointed or placed in a...

State Adoption of Incentives to Promote Evidence-Based Practices in Behavioral Health Systems.

PubMed

Stewart, Rebecca E; Marcus, Steven C; Hadley, Trevor R; Hepburn, Brian M; Mandell, David S

2018-06-01

Despite the critical role behavioral health care payers can play in creating an incentive to use evidence-based practices (EBPs), little research has examined which incentives are used in public mental health systems, the largest providers of mental health care in the United States. The authors surveyed state mental health directors from 44 states about whether they used any of seven strategies to increase the use of EBPs. Participants also ranked attributes of each incentive on the basis of key characteristics of diffusion of innovation theory (perceived advantage, simplicity, compatibility, observability, and gradually implementable) and perceived effectiveness. Almost three-quarters of state directors endorsed using at least one financial incentive; most paid for training and technical assistance. Few used other incentives. Strategies perceived as simple and compatible were more readily adopted. Enhanced rates and paying for better outcomes were perceived as the most effective but were the least deployed, suggesting that simplicity and organizational compatibility may be the most decisive factors when choosing incentives. Payers are not using the incentives they perceive as most effective, and they are mostly using only one strategy for reasons of simplicity and compatibility. Future work should focus on barriers to measurement that likely hinder the adoption and implementation of paying for better outcomes and enhanced reimbursement rates, with the ultimate goal of measuring the effectiveness of incentives on EBP implementation efforts.

Teacher Evaluation, Pay for Performance, and Learning around Instruction: Between Dissonant Incentives and Resonant Procedures

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Mintrop, Rick; Ordenes, Miguel; Coghlan, Erin; Pryor, Laura; Madero, Cristobal

2018-01-01

Purpose: The study examines why the logic of a performance management system, supported by the federal Teacher Incentive Fund, might be faulty. It does this by exploring the nuances of the interplay between teaching evaluations as formative and summative, the use of procedures, tools, and artifacts obligated by the local Teacher Incentive Fund…

Teacher Work Motivation in the Era of Extrinsic Incentives: Performance Goals and Pro-Social Commitments in the Service of Equity

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Mintrop, Rick; Ordenes, Miguel

2017-01-01

Mindful of the withering of high-stakes accountability and disappointing data from pay for performance evaluations in the US, we ask why management by extrinsic incentives and organizational goal setting may have been far less powerful than designers of accountability and extrinsic incentive systems had expected. We explore how…

Self-Solicited Feedback: Effects of Hourly Pay and Individual Monetary Incentive Pay

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Slowiak, Julie M.; Dickinson, Alyce M.; Huitema, Bradley E.

2011-01-01

The frequency of feedback solicitation under hourly pay and individual monetary incentive pay conditions was examined. A between-subjects design was used with 30 college students in the two groups. Participants attended three experimental sessions and entered the cash value of simulated bank checks presented on a computer screen. Performance was…

76 FR 1096 - Pay Under the General Schedule and Recruitment, Relocation, and Retention Incentives

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-01-07

... RIN 3206-AM13 Pay Under the General Schedule and Recruitment, Relocation, and Retention Incentives... instructions for submitting comments. Mail: Jerome D. Mikowicz, Deputy Associate Director, Pay and Leave...-0824; or by e-mail at pay[email protected] . SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The U.S. Office of...

Teacher Pay for Performance: Experimental Evidence from the Project on Incentives in Teaching

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Springer, Matthew G.; Hamilton, Laura; McCaffrey, Daniel F.; Ballou, Dale; Le, Vi-Nhuan; Pepper, Matthew; Lockwood, J. R.; Stecher, Brian M.

2010-01-01

In an effort to explore the impact of performance incentives in education, the National Center on Performance Incentives (NCPI) partnered with the Metropolitan Nashville Public Schools (MNPS) to conduct the Project on Incentives in Teaching, or POINT. The study examines the effects on student outcomes of paying eligible teachers bonuses of up to…

Cost-effectiveness of hospital pay-for-performance incentives.

PubMed

Nahra, Tammie A; Reiter, Kristin L; Hirth, Richard A; Shermer, Janet E; Wheeler, John R C

2006-02-01

One increasingly popular mechanism for stimulating quality improvements is pay-for-performance, or incentive, programs. This article examines the cost-effectiveness of a hospital incentive system for heart-related care, using a principal-agent model, where the insurer is the principal and hospitals are the agents. Four-year incentive system costsfor the payer were dollar 22,059,383, composed primarily of payments to the participating hospitals, with approximately 5 percent in administrative costs. Effectiveness is measured in stages, beginning with improvements in the processes of heart care. Care process improvements are converted into quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) gained, with reference to literatures on clinical effectiveness and survival. An estimated 24,418 patients received improved care, resulting in a range of QALYs from 733 to 1,701, depending on assumptions about clinical effectiveness. Cost per QALY was found to be between dollar 12,967 and dollar 30,081, a level well under consensus measures of the value of a QALY.

Person-based differences in pay reactions: A compensation-activation theory and integrative conceptual review.

PubMed

Fulmer, Ingrid Smithey; Shaw, Jason D

2018-06-07

Compensation research has focused traditionally on how pay design characteristics (e.g., pay level, individual or group incentives) relate to average employee outcomes and, in toto, on how these outcomes affect organizational performance. Recently, scholars have begun to pay more attention to how individuals vary in the strength of their reactions to pay. Empirical research in several disciplines examines how the interplay of pay systems and person-based characteristics (psychological individual differences, demographics, and relative performance or position in a group) relate to important work-related outcomes. We develop a compensation-activation theory that frames compensation design characteristics as workplace "situations" providing cues that activate individuals' corresponding fundamental social motives made salient due to chronic or transient person-based characteristics. Where activation occurs, stronger-than-average responses to the compensation "situation" are expected. Using the theory as a lens, we synthesize and reinterpret existing research on person-based reactions to pay characteristics, including sorting, incentive/motivational effects, and effects on collective pay system reactions and unit/organizational outcomes. We conclude with a research agenda aimed at refining compensation-activation theory and advancing the study of compensation as it affects individual and organizational outcomes. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved).

Evaluation of the Teacher Incentive Fund: Implementation and Impacts of Pay-for-Performance after Two Years

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Chiang, Hanley; Wellington, Alison; Hallgren, Kristin; Speroni, Cecilia; Herrmann, Mariesa; Glazerman, Steven; Constantine, Jill

2016-01-01

Recent efforts to attract and retain effective educators and to improve teaching practices have focused on reforming evaluation and compensation systems for teachers and principals. In 2006, Congress established the Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF), which provides grants to support performance-based compensation systems for teachers and principals in…

Early Implementation Experiences of the 2010 Teacher Incentive Fund Grantees. NCEE Study Snapshot. NCEE 2014-4021

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

National Center for Education Evaluation and Regional Assistance, 2014

2014-01-01

The Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) provides grants to support performance-based compensation systems for teachers and principals in high-need schools. The study measures the impact of pay-for-performance bonuses as part of a comprehensive compensation system within a large, multisite random assignment study design. The treatment schools were to…

Evaluation of the Teacher Incentive Fund: Implementation and Early Impacts of Pay-for-Performance after One Year

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Max, Jeffrey; Constantine, Jill; Wellington, Alison; Hallgren, Kristin; Glazerman, Steven; Chiang, Hanley; Speroni, Cecilia

2015-01-01

Recent efforts to attract and retain effective educators and to improve teaching practices have focused on reforming evaluation and compensation systems for teachers and principals. In 2006, Congress established the Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF), which provides grants to support performance-based compensation systems for teachers and principals in…

Workforce Downsizing and Restructuring in the Department of Defense: The Voluntary Separation Incentive Payment Program Versus Involuntary Separation

DTIC Science & Technology

2016-01-01

Workforce Downsizing and Restructuring in the Department of Defense The Voluntary Separation Incentive Payment Program Versus Involuntary...Voluntary Separation Incentive Payment (VSIP). The purposes of this research are to place VSIP in context relative to involuntary separation, determine...5 CHAPTER TWO Review of Severance Pay, Voluntary Separation Incentive Pay, and Voluntary

Compensation Reform and Design Preferences of Teacher Incentive Fund Grantees. Policy Paper

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Heyburn, Sara; Lewis, Jessica; Ritter, Gary

2010-01-01

In U.S. K-12 public education, incentive pay for educators remains firmly fixed as a high-interest policy topic and has recently become a popular reform initiative in many school systems. The Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF), created in 2006 by the U.S. Department of Education, is at the forefront of this policy movement and has provided hundreds of…

A Legal Perspective on Performance-Based Pay for Teachers. Working Paper 2008-10

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Ryan, James E.

2008-01-01

Merit pay is now in the midst of a renaissance. Hundreds of school districts are experimenting with some type of performance-based pay system. At least six states have statewide or pilot programs, and the federal government has spent close to $100 million on the Teacher Incentive Fund. Whether such programs will last, encourage the start of…

Perspectives on Performance-Based Incentive Plans.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Duttweiler, Patricia Cloud; Ramos-Cancel, Maria L.

This document is a synthesis of the current literature on performance-based incentive systems for teachers and administrators. Section one provides an introduction to the reform movement and to performance-based pay initiatives; a definition of terms; a brief discussion of funding sources; a discussion of compensation strategies; a description of…

Evaluation of the Teacher Incentive Fund: Implementation and Impacts of Pay-for-Performance after Two Years. Executive Summary. NCEE 2015-4021

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Chiang, Hanley; Wellington, Alison; Hallgren, Kristin; Speroni, Cecilia; Herrmann, Mariesa; Glazerman, Steven; Constantine, Jill

2015-01-01

Recent efforts to attract and retain effective educators and to improve teaching practices have focused on reforming evaluation and compensation systems for teachers and principals. In 2006, Congress established the Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF), which provides grants to support performance-based compensation systems for teachers and principals in…

Participating physician preferences regarding a pay-for-performance incentive design: a discrete choice experiment.

PubMed

Chen, Tsung-Tai; Lai, Mei-Shu; Chung, Kuo-Piao

2016-02-01

To determine whether the magnitude of incentives or other design attributes should be prioritized and the most important attributes, according to physicians, of the diabetes P4P (pay-for-performance) program design. We implemented a discrete choice experiment (DCE) to elicit the P4P incentive design-related preferences of physicians. All of the physicians (n = 248) who participated in the diabetes P4P program located in the supervisory area of the northern regional branch of the Bureau of National Health Insurance in 2009 were included. The response rate was ∼ 60%. Our research found that the bonus type of incentive was the most important attribute, followed by the incentive structure and the investment magnitude. Physicians may feel that good P4P designs are more important than the magnitude of the investment by the insurer. The two most important P4P designs include providing the bonus type of incentive and using pay-for-excellence plus pay-for-improvement. © The Author 2015. Published by Oxford University Press in association with the International Society for Quality in Health Care; all rights reserved.

Who Chooses Incentivized Pay Structures? Exploring the Link between Performance and Preferences for Compensation Reform in the Teacher Labor Market

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Goldhaber, Dan; Bignell, Wes; Farley, Amy; Walch, Joe; Cowan, James

2016-01-01

We report on research examining the revealed preferences of teachers in Denver Public Schools who were given the opportunity to select between remaining on a traditional salary schedule and opting into one of the nation's high-profile pay reform systems, Denver's Professional Compensation System for Teachers. The incentive structure creates…

Cost savings in a hospital clinical laboratory with a pay-for-performance incentive program for supervisors.

PubMed

Winkelman, J W; Aitken, J L; Wybenga, D R

1991-01-01

A pay-for-performance incentive program for clinical laboratory supervisors was developed and implemented at Brigham and Women's Hospital (Boston, Mass). It provides monetary rewards to personnel who directly produce cost savings in their area of responsibility. This reward system is new to the hospital laboratory but is commonly used in industry. Substantial true cost savings over and above previously established stringent budgets were achieved, 11% of which was returned to first-line supervisors in the form of a bonus. The program expanded the scope of professionalism for supervisors to include fiscal management.

Team Pay for Performance: Experimental Evidence from Round Rock's Project on Incentives in Teaching

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

McCaffrey, Daniel F.; Pane, John F.; Springer, Matthew G.; Burns, Susan F.; Haas, Ann

2011-01-01

This paper presents the results of a rigorous experiment examining the impact of pay for performance on student achievement and instructional practice. This study, conducted by the National Center on Performance Incentives, examines a pay-for-performance program in Round Rock (Texas) which distributed performance awards to teachers based on a…

Teacher Incentive Pay Programs: Characteristics and Association with Instructional Practices

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Liang, Guodong

2011-01-01

This dissertation research examined the characteristics of teacher incentive pay programs in the state of Missouri and across the nation in the United States. The purposes of this study were (a) to examine the characteristics of districts that offered performance-related pay (PRP) programs and teachers who received PRP awards in 2007 using the…

A one year pay-as-you-speed trial with economic incentives for not speeding.

PubMed

Stigson, Helena; Hagberg, Jan; Kullgren, Anders; Krafft, Maria

2014-01-01

The objective was to identify whether it was possible to change driver behavior by economic incentives and thereby reduce crash risk. Furthermore, the objective was to evaluate the participants' attitudes toward the pay-as-you-speed (PAYS) concept. A one-year PAYS trial with economic incentives for keeping speed limits using intelligent speed assistance (ISA) was conducted in Sweden during 2011-2012. The full incentive was a 30 percent discount off the insurance premium. The participants were private insurance customers and were randomized into a test group (initial n = 152, final n = 128) and a control group (initial n = 98, final n = 68). When driving, the drivers in the test group were informed and warned visually when the speed limit was exceeded. They could also follow their driving results on a personal website. The control group was not given any feedback at all. To reflect the impact of the PAYS concept the proportion of distance driven above the speed limit was compared between the 2 groups. The introduction of a PAYS concept shows that the test group significantly reduced the proportion of distance driven above the speed limit. The proportion of driving at a speed exceeding 5 km/h over the speed limit was 6 percent for the test group and 14 percent for the control group. It also showed that the effect was higher the higher the violation of speed. The result remained constant over time. It was shown that a PAYS concept is an effective way to reduce speed violations. Hence, it has the possibility to reduce crash severity and thereby to save lives. This could be an important step toward a safer road transport system. The majority of the participants were in favor of the concept, which indicates the potential of a new insurance product in the future.

Sustainability of quality improvement following removal of pay-for-performance incentives.

PubMed

Benzer, Justin K; Young, Gary J; Burgess, James F; Baker, Errol; Mohr, David C; Charns, Martin P; Kaboli, Peter J

2014-01-01

Although pay-for-performance (P4P) has become a central strategy for improving quality in US healthcare, questions persist about the effectiveness of these programs. A key question is whether quality improvement that occurs as a result of P4P programs is sustainable, particularly if incentives are removed. To investigate sustainability of performance levels following removal of performance-based incentives. Observational cohort study that capitalized on a P4P program within the Veterans Health Administration (VA) that included adoption and subsequent removal of performance-based incentives for selected inpatient quality measures. The study sample comprised 128 acute care VA hospitals where performance was assessed between 2004 and 2010. VA system managers set annual performance goals in consultation with clinical leaders, and report performance scores to medical centers on a quarterly basis. These scores inform performance-based incentives for facilities and their managers. Bonuses are distributed based on the attainment of these performance goals. Seven quality of care measures for acute coronary syndrome, heart failure, and pneumonia linked to performance-based incentives. Significant improvements in performance were observed for six of seven quality of care measures following adoption of performance-based incentives and were maintained up to the removal of the incentive; subsequently, the observed performance levels were sustained. This is a quasi-experimental study without a comparison group; causal conclusions are limited. The maintenance of performance levels after removal of a performance-based incentive has implications for the implementation of Medicare's value-based purchasing initiative and other P4P programs. Additional research is needed to better understand human and system-level factors that mediate sustainability of performance-based incentives.

Pay as You Speed, ISA with incentive for not speeding: results and interpretation of speed data.

PubMed

Lahrmann, Harry; Agerholm, Niels; Tradisauskas, Nerius; Berthelsen, Kasper K; Harms, Lisbeth

2012-09-01

To simulate a market introduction of Intelligent Speed Adaptation (ISA) and to study the effect of a Pay as You Speed (PAYS) concept, a field trial with 153 drivers was conducted during 2007-2009. The participants drove under PAYS conditions for a shorter or a longer period. The PAYS concept consisted of informative ISA linked with economic incentive for not speeding, measured through automatic count of penalty points whenever the speed limit was exceeded. The full incentive was set to 30% of a participant's insurance premium. The participants were exposed to different treatments, with and without incentive crossed with informative ISA present or absent. The results showed that ISA is an efficient tool for reducing speeding particularly on rural roads. The analysis of speed data demonstrated that the proportion of distance driven above the speed where the ISA equipment responded (PDA) was a sensitive measure for reflecting the effect of ISA, whereas mean free flow speed and the 85th percentile speed, were less sensitive to ISA effects. The PDA increased a little over time but still remained at a low level; however, when ISA was turned off, the participants' speeding relapsed to the baseline level. Both informative ISA and incentive ISA reduced the PDA, but there was no statistically significant interaction. Informative reduced it more than the incentive. Copyright © 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Study Casts Cold Water on Bonus Pay

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Sawchuk, Stephen

2010-01-01

The most rigorous experimental study of performance-based teacher compensation ever conducted in the United States shows that a nationally watched bonus-pay system had no overall impact on student achievement--results that are certain to set off a firestorm of debate. The study, known as POINT for the Project on Incentives in Teaching, was a…

Merit Pay for Teachers. ERS Report.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Educational Research Service, Arlington, VA.

This report is one of three companion reports of the results of a study on merit pay and incentive plans for teachers, and for administrators and support personnel as well. The data in these studies are reported separately by four school system enrollment groups (large, medium, small, and very small) and, in many tables, by eight geographic…

Rewarding Teachers: Issues and Incentives.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Newcombe, Ellen

This paper discusses some of the issues behind the current debate on merit pay for teachers. A brief history is presented of performance-based compensation systems. The difficulties in arriving at a consensus on a valid definition of merit pay are pointed out, and examples are presented of various merit plans, such as master teaching plans, career…

Teacher Pay for Performance: Experimental Evidence from the Project on Incentives in Teaching. [Executive Summary

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Springer, Matthew G.; Hamilton, Laura; McCaffrey, Daniel F.; Ballou, Dale; Le, Vi-Nhuan; Pepper, Matthew; Lockwood, J. R.; Stecher, Brian M.

2013-01-01

The Project on Incentives in Teaching (POINT) was a three-year study conducted in the Metropolitan Nashville School System from 2006-07 through 2008-09, in which middle school mathematics teachers voluntarily participated in a controlled experiment to assess the effect of financial rewards for teachers whose students showed unusually large gains…

Impacts of Performance Pay under the Teacher Incentive Fund: Study Design Report

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Glazerman, Steven; Chiang, Hanley; Wellington, Alison; Constantine, Jill; Player, Dan

2011-01-01

The body of research on the design, implementation, and effects of performance-based compensation systems has influenced the design and evaluation of the 2010 Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) grants. In the sections presented here, the authors describe the key components of 2010 TIF grants and the conceptual framework for the evaluation. The remainder…

Focus on Teacher Pay and Incentives: Recent Legislative Actions and Update on Salary Averages. Challenge to Lead

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Gaines; Gale F.

2007-01-01

Teacher pay continues to be a hot issue for states, particularly since it is likely the largest expenditure in education budgets. This paper summarizes the latest on average salaries in the Southern Regional Education Board (SREB) states, including an update on recent incentive pay programs, pilot projects, and other legislative actions that…

5 CFR 575.101 - Purpose.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... payment of recruitment incentives. An agency may pay a recruitment incentive to a newly appointed employee... Administrative Personnel OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT CIVIL SERVICE REGULATIONS RECRUITMENT, RELOCATION, AND RETENTION INCENTIVES; SUPERVISORY DIFFERENTIALS; AND EXTENDED ASSIGNMENT INCENTIVES Recruitment Incentives...

Incentive Pay for Remotely Piloted Aircraft Career Fields

DTIC Science & Technology

2012-01-01

Fields C.1. Mathematical Symbols for Non-Stochastic Values and Shock Terms...78 C.2. Mathematical Symbols for Taste and Compensation . . . . . . . . . . . 79 xiii Summary Background and...manning requirement, even with the current incentive pays and reenlistment bonuses. 2 The mathematical foundations, data, and estimation methods for the

When and Why Do University Managers Use Publication Incentive Payments?

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Opstrup, Niels

2017-01-01

Pay-for-performance schemes have become a widespread management strategy in the public sector. However, not much is known about the rationales that trigger the adoption of performance-related pay provisions. This article examines managerial and organisational features of university departments in Denmark that use publication incentive payments.…

22 CFR 34.4 - Definitions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-04-01

... debt in full satisfaction of the entire amount of the debt. (d) Creditor agency means the Federal... remains from an employee's current basic pay, special pay, incentive pay, retired pay, retainer pay, or in the case of an employee not entitled to basic pay, other authorized pay remaining after required...

29 CFR 1650.110 - Implementation of salary offset.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... Labor Regulations Relating to Labor (Continued) EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION DEBT COLLECTION... established pay intervals from an employee's current pay account, unless the employee and the Commission agree... only from basic pay, special pay, incentive pay, retired pay, retainer pay or in the case of an...

Incentive-Based Primary Care: Cost and Utilization Analysis.

PubMed

Hollander, Marcus J; Kadlec, Helena

2015-01-01

In its fee-for-service funding model for primary care, British Columbia, Canada, introduced incentive payments to general practitioners as pay for performance for providing enhanced, guidelines-based care to patients with chronic conditions. Evaluation of the program was conducted at the health care system level. To examine the impact of the incentive payments on annual health care costs and hospital utilization patterns in British Columbia. The study used Ministry of Health administrative data for Fiscal Year 2010-2011 for patients with diabetes, congestive heart failure, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and/or hypertension. In each disease group, cost and utilization were compared across patients who did, and did not, receive incentive-based care. Health care costs (eg, primary care, hospital) and utilization measures (eg, hospital days, readmissions). After controlling for patients' age, sex, service needs level, and continuity of care (defined as attachment to a general practice), the incentives reduced the net annual health care costs, in Canadian dollars, for patients with hypertension (by approximately Can$308 per patient), chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (by Can$496), and congestive heart failure (by Can$96), but not diabetes (incentives cost about Can$148 more per patient). The incentives were also associated with fewer hospital days, fewer admissions and readmissions, and shorter lengths of hospital stays for all 4 groups. Although the available literature on pay for performance shows mixed results, we showed that the funding model used in British Columbia using incentive payments for primary care might reduce health care costs and hospital utilization.

41 CFR 105-56.025 - Definitions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... GSA provides financial support services to the other agency on a reimbursable basis. Financial support... programs, including contributions to the Thrift Savings Plan (TSP); premiums for life (excluding amounts...) Pay means basic pay, special pay, incentive pay, retired pay, retainer pay, or in the case of an...

Teacher Incentive Pay and Educational Outcomes: Evidence from the NYC Bonus Program. Program on Education Policy and Governance Working Papers Series. PEPG 10-07

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Goodman, Sarena; Turner, Lesley

2010-01-01

Teacher compensation schemes are often criticized for lacking a performance-based component. Proponents of merit pay argue that linking teacher salaries to student achievement will incentivize teachers to focus on raising student achievement and stimulate innovation across the school system as a whole. In this paper, we utilize a policy experiment…

The Best Laid Plans: Pay for Performance Incentive Programs for School Leaders

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Goff, Peter; Goldring, Ellen; Canney, Melissa

2016-01-01

In an era of heightened accountability and limited fiscal resources, school districts have sought novel ways to increase the effectiveness of their principals in an effort to increase student proficiency. To address these needs, some districts have turned to pay-for-performance programs, aligning leadership goals with financial incentives to…

Characteristics of Teacher Incentive Pay Programs: A Statewide District Survey

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Liang, Guodong; Akiba, Motoko

2015-01-01

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to examine the characteristics of teacher incentive pay programs used by midsize to large school districts in Missouri. Design/methodology/approach: This study primarily used the Teacher Compensation Programs (TCP) survey data. The TCP survey was developed by the authors to understand the nature and…

5 CFR 575.108 - Approval criteria and written determination.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... REGULATIONS RECRUITMENT, RELOCATION, AND RETENTION INCENTIVES; SUPERVISORY DIFFERENTIALS; AND EXTENDED ASSIGNMENT INCENTIVES Recruitment Incentives § 575.108 Approval criteria and written determination. (a) For each determination to pay a recruitment incentive under this subpart, an agency must document in...

Implementation and Impacts of Pay-for-Performance: The 2010 Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) Grantees after Three Years. NCEE Study Snapshot. NCEE 2016-2006

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Wellington, Alison; Chiang, Hanley; Hallgren, Kristin; Speroni, Cecilia; Herrmann, Mariesa; Burkander, Paul

2016-01-01

The Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) provides grants to support performance-based compensation systems for teachers and principals in high-need schools. The goal of the grants is to increase the number of high-performing teachers in high-need schools by rewarding educators for improving students' achievement. The report on which this snapshot is based…

45 CFR 708.3 - Definitions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... Regulations Relating to Public Welfare (Continued) COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS COLLECTION BY SALARY OFFSET FROM... position or its elimination, the Director of Human Resources. (e) Disposable pay means that part of current basic pay, special pay, incentive pay, retired pay, retainer pay, or in the case of an employee not...

Paying for quality not quantity: a wisconsin health maintenance organization proposes an incentive model for reimbursement of chiropractic services.

PubMed

Pursel, Kevin J; Jacobson, Martin; Stephenson, Kathy

2012-07-01

The purpose of this study is to describe a reimbursement model that was developed by one Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) to transition from fee-for-service to add a combination of pay for performance and reporting model of reimbursement for chiropractic care. The previous incentive program used by the HMO provided best-practice education and additional reimbursement incentives for achieving the National Committee for Quality Assurance Back Pain Recognition Program (NCQA-BPRP) recognition status. However, this model had not leveled costs between doctors of chiropractic (DCs). Therefore, the HMO management aimed to develop a reimbursement model to incentivize providers to embrace existing best-practice models and report existing quality metrics. The development goals included the following: it should (1) be as financially predictable as the previous system, (2) cost no more on a per-member basis, (3) meet the coverage needs of its members, and (4) be able to be operationalized. The model should also reward DCs who embraced best practices with compensation, not simply tied to providing more procedures, the new program needed to (1) cause little or no disruption in current billing, (2) be grounded achievable and defined expectations for improvement in quality, and (3) be voluntary, without being unduly punitive, should the DC choose not to participate in the program. The generated model was named the Comprehensive Chiropractic Quality Reimbursement Methodology (CCQRM; pronounced "Quorum"). In this hybrid model, additional reimbursement, beyond pay-for-procedures will be based on unique payment interpretations reporting selected, existing Physician Quality Reporting System (PQRS) codes, meaningful use of electronic health records, and achieving NCQA-BPRP recognition. This model aims to compensate providers using pay-for-performance, pay-for-quality reporting, pay-for-procedure methods. The CCQRM reimbursement model was developed to address the current needs of one HMO that aims to transition from fee-for-service to a pay-for-performance and quality reporting for reimbursement for chiropractic care. This model is theoretically based on the combination of a fee-for-service payment, pay for participation (NCQA Back Pain Recognition Program payment), meaningful use of electronic health record payment, and pay for reporting (PQRS-BPMG payment). Evaluation of this model needs to be implemented to determine if it will achieve its intended goals. Copyright © 2012 National University of Health Sciences. Published by Mosby, Inc. All rights reserved.

Incentives for Better Performance in Health Care

PubMed Central

Abduljawad, Asaad; Al-Assaf, Assaf F.

2011-01-01

Incentives for better performance in health care have several modes and methods. They are designed to motivate and encourage people to perform well and improve their outcomes. They may include monetary or non-monetary incentives and may be applied to consumers, individual providers or institutions. One such model is the Pay-for-Performance system. In this system, beneficiaries are compared with one another based on a set of performance indicators and those that achieve a high level of performance are rewarded financially. This system is meant to recognise and primarily to reward high performers. Its goal is to encourage beneficiaries to strive for better performance. This system has been applied in several countries and for several recipients and settings. Early indications show that this system has had mixed effects on performance. PMID:21969891

The Effect of Incentives and Meta-incentives on the Evolution of Cooperation.

PubMed

Okada, Isamu; Yamamoto, Hitoshi; Toriumi, Fujio; Sasaki, Tatsuya

2015-05-01

Although positive incentives for cooperators and/or negative incentives for free-riders in social dilemmas play an important role in maintaining cooperation, there is still the outstanding issue of who should pay the cost of incentives. The second-order free-rider problem, in which players who do not provide the incentives dominate in a game, is a well-known academic challenge. In order to meet this challenge, we devise and analyze a meta-incentive game that integrates positive incentives (rewards) and negative incentives (punishments) with second-order incentives, which are incentives for other players' incentives. The critical assumption of our model is that players who tend to provide incentives to other players for their cooperative or non-cooperative behavior also tend to provide incentives to their incentive behaviors. In this paper, we solve the replicator dynamics for a simple version of the game and analytically categorize the game types into four groups. We find that the second-order free-rider problem is completely resolved without any third-order or higher (meta) incentive under the assumption. To do so, a second-order costly incentive, which is given individually (peer-to-peer) after playing donation games, is needed. The paper concludes that (1) second-order incentives for first-order reward are necessary for cooperative regimes, (2) a system without first-order rewards cannot maintain a cooperative regime, (3) a system with first-order rewards and no incentives for rewards is the worst because it never reaches cooperation, and (4) a system with rewards for incentives is more likely to be a cooperative regime than a system with punishments for incentives when the cost-effect ratio of incentives is sufficiently large. This solution is general and strong in the sense that the game does not need any centralized institution or proactive system for incentives.

The Effect of Incentives and Meta-incentives on the Evolution of Cooperation

PubMed Central

Okada, Isamu; Yamamoto, Hitoshi; Toriumi, Fujio; Sasaki, Tatsuya

2015-01-01

Although positive incentives for cooperators and/or negative incentives for free-riders in social dilemmas play an important role in maintaining cooperation, there is still the outstanding issue of who should pay the cost of incentives. The second-order free-rider problem, in which players who do not provide the incentives dominate in a game, is a well-known academic challenge. In order to meet this challenge, we devise and analyze a meta-incentive game that integrates positive incentives (rewards) and negative incentives (punishments) with second-order incentives, which are incentives for other players’ incentives. The critical assumption of our model is that players who tend to provide incentives to other players for their cooperative or non-cooperative behavior also tend to provide incentives to their incentive behaviors. In this paper, we solve the replicator dynamics for a simple version of the game and analytically categorize the game types into four groups. We find that the second-order free-rider problem is completely resolved without any third-order or higher (meta) incentive under the assumption. To do so, a second-order costly incentive, which is given individually (peer-to-peer) after playing donation games, is needed. The paper concludes that (1) second-order incentives for first-order reward are necessary for cooperative regimes, (2) a system without first-order rewards cannot maintain a cooperative regime, (3) a system with first-order rewards and no incentives for rewards is the worst because it never reaches cooperation, and (4) a system with rewards for incentives is more likely to be a cooperative regime than a system with punishments for incentives when the cost-effect ratio of incentives is sufficiently large. This solution is general and strong in the sense that the game does not need any centralized institution or proactive system for incentives. PMID:25974684

"The New York Times" Readers' Opinions about Paying People to Take Their Medicine

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Park, James D.; Metlay, Jessica; Asch, Jeremy M.; Asch, David A.

2012-01-01

Background: There has been considerable interest in using financial incentives to help people improve their health. However, paying people to improve their health touches on strongly held views about personal responsibility. Method: "The New York Times" printed two articles in June 2010 about patient financial incentives, which resulted in 394…

District Awards for Teacher Excellence: Research Brief

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

National Center on Performance Incentives, 2010

2010-01-01

Since 2008 Texas's District Awards for Teacher Excellence (D.A.T.E.) program has provided grants to districts for the implementation of locally designed incentive pay plans. The 2010-11 school year is the third year of the D.A.T.E. incentive pay plans with approximately $197 million in annual state funding. This research brief summarizes the key…

Paying to Learn: The Effect of Financial Incentives on Elementary School Test Scores. NBER Working Paper No. 16333

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Bettinger, Eric P.

2010-01-01

Policymakers and academics are increasingly interested in applying financial incentives to individuals in education. This paper presents evidence from a pay for performance program taking place in Coshocton, Ohio. Since 2004, Coshocton has provided cash payments to students in grades three through six for successful completion of their…

No Substitute for Quality.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Russo, Alexander

2001-01-01

School leaders are trying pay incentives, consortia, and temp firms to assuage their need for qualified substitute teachers. Five coping strategies include making the job more attractive, increasing the candidate pool, hiring some permanent subs, using automated calling systems, and examining systemic issues. Substitutes are unionizing in some…

Incentive-Based Primary Care: Cost and Utilization Analysis

PubMed Central

Hollander, Marcus J; Kadlec, Helena

2015-01-01

Context: In its fee-for-service funding model for primary care, British Columbia, Canada, introduced incentive payments to general practitioners as pay for performance for providing enhanced, guidelines-based care to patients with chronic conditions. Evaluation of the program was conducted at the health care system level. Objective: To examine the impact of the incentive payments on annual health care costs and hospital utilization patterns in British Columbia. Design: The study used Ministry of Health administrative data for Fiscal Year 2010–2011 for patients with diabetes, congestive heart failure, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and/or hypertension. In each disease group, cost and utilization were compared across patients who did, and did not, receive incentive-based care. Main Outcome Measures: Health care costs (eg, primary care, hospital) and utilization measures (eg, hospital days, readmissions). Results: After controlling for patients’ age, sex, service needs level, and continuity of care (defined as attachment to a general practice), the incentives reduced the net annual health care costs, in Canadian dollars, for patients with hypertension (by approximately Can$308 per patient), chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (by Can$496), and congestive heart failure (by Can$96), but not diabetes (incentives cost about Can$148 more per patient). The incentives were also associated with fewer hospital days, fewer admissions and readmissions, and shorter lengths of hospital stays for all 4 groups. Conclusion: Although the available literature on pay for performance shows mixed results, we showed that the funding model used in British Columbia using incentive payments for primary care might reduce health care costs and hospital utilization. PMID:26263389

78 FR 49359 - Pay Under the General Schedule and Recruitment, Relocation, and Retention Incentives

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-08-14

.... Agencies may, in their agency retention incentive plans, require documentation of private-sector job offers... Schedule and Recruitment, Relocation, and Retention Incentives AGENCY: U.S. Office of Personnel Management... to improve oversight of recruitment and retention incentive determinations; add succession planning...

Nursing home administrators' opinions of pay for performance.

PubMed

Castle, Nicholas G; Engberg, John; Ferguson-Rome, Jamie C; Sonon, Kristen

2014-01-01

The research presented here provides some descriptive information of nursing home pay for performance (P4P) initiatives and an examination of the opinions of nursing home administrators (NHAs) about P4P. Opinions on three common elements of P4P were examined: the incentive format, program format, and quality format. Information came from a mail survey of 2,426 NHAs. Most of the summary scores show that few NHAs gave positive responses to P4P. Very few NHAs believed that P4P would increase their revenues. NHAs were skeptical that P4P systems were for quality improvement and instead believed they were developed for purposes of cost reduction. Relatively few NHAs believed that P4P would improve quality of care. Given that we have limited experience with setting performance goals and incentive formats for NHAs, the findings presented may prove useful in modeling future P4P systems.

Pay for Performance.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

LaFee, Scott

1999-01-01

Top school administrators and school boards across the country are increasingly employing a private-sector incentive: bonus pay for improved (school) performance. Connecticut, Texas, and North Carolina have merit-pay clauses in superintendents' contracts. This article discusses pay-for-performance criteria, increased job expectations, and ethical…

Making Teacher Incentives Work: Lessons from North Carolina's Teacher Bonus Program. Education Outlook. No. 5

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Ahn, Thomas; Vigdor, Jacob L.

2011-01-01

North Carolina has operated one of the country's largest pay-for-performance teacher-bonus programs since the late 1990s. New research shows that a North Carolina-style incentive-pay program has the potential to improve student learning by encouraging teachers to exert more effort on the job. The North Carolina model avoids three pitfalls…

41 CFR 105-56.015 - Definitions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

..., State and local income taxes; Social Security taxes, including Medicare taxes; Federal retirement... deducted for supplemental coverage) and health insurance benefits; Internal Revenue Service (IRS) tax..., incentive pay, retired pay, retainer pay, or in the case of an individual not entitled to basic pay, other...

Using Patient-Reported Information to Improve Clinical Practice.

PubMed

Schlesinger, Mark; Grob, Rachel; Shaller, Dale

2015-12-01

To assess what is known about the relationship between patient experience measures and incentives designed to improve care, and to identify how public policy and medical practices can promote patient-valued outcomes in health systems with strong financial incentives. Existing literature (gray and peer-reviewed) on measuring patient experience and patient-reported outcomes, identified from Medline and Cochrane databases; evaluations of pay-for-performance programs in the United States, Europe, and the Commonwealth countries. We analyzed (1) studies of pay-for-performance, to identify those including metrics for patient experience, and (2) studies of patient experience and of patient-reported outcomes to identify evidence of influence on clinical practice, whether through public reporting or private reporting to clinicians. First, we identify four forms of "patient-reported information" (PRI), each with distinctive roles shaping clinical practice: (1) patient-reported outcomes measuring self-assessed physical and mental well-being, (2) surveys of patient experience with clinicians and staff, (3) narrative accounts describing encounters with clinicians in patients' own words, and (4) complaints/grievances signaling patients' distress when treatment or outcomes fall short of expectations. Because these forms vary in crucial ways, each must be distinctively measured, deployed, and linked with financial incentives. Second, although the literature linking incentives to patients experience is limited, implementing pay-for-performance systems appears to threaten certain patient-valued aspects of health care. But incentives can be made compatible with the outcomes patients value if: (a) a sufficient portion of incentives is tied to patient-reported outcomes and experiences, (b) incentivized forms of PRI are complemented by other forms of patient feedback, and (c) health care organizations assist clinicians to interpret and respond to PRI. Finally, we identify roles for the public and private sectors in financing PRI and orchestrating an appropriate balance among its four forms. Unless public policies are attentive to patients' perspectives, stronger financial incentives for clinicians can threaten aspects of care that patients most value. Certain policy parameters are already clear, but additional research is required to clarify how best to collect patient narratives in varied settings, how to report narratives to consumers in conjunction with quantified metrics, and how to promote a "culture of learning" at the practice level that incorporates patient feedback. © Health Research and Educational Trust.

Advanced quality systems : probabilistic optimization for profit (Prob.O.Prof) software

DOT National Transportation Integrated Search

2009-04-01

Contractors constantly have to make decisions regarding how to maximize profit and minimize risk on paving projects. With more and more States adopting incentive/disincentive pay adjustment provisions for quality, as measured by various acceptance qu...

Pay-for-Performance Incentives: Holy Grail or Sippy Cup?

PubMed

Caveney, Brian J

2016-01-01

The health care system is slowly evolving from fee-for-service care to other forms of payment. Pay-for-performance contracts based on quality, patient satisfaction, and utilization are an important development along the continuum. The metrics are not perfect and do not always nudge clinicians to improve their performance, but many outcomes are likely to improve. ©2016 by the North Carolina Institute of Medicine and The Duke Endowment. All rights reserved.

Recommendations for Improving the Career Opportunities of Teachers in the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools: A Constructive Alternative to Merit Pay.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Schlechty, Phillip; And Others

1984-01-01

Offers recommendations for developing a system of teacher staffing and evaluation that would improve teacher performance and the state of education in general. Discusses incentive and reward systems, performance evaluation, career advancement and enrichment, and other issues. (KH)

Sensitivity Analysis for an Assignment Incentive Pay in the U.S. Navy Enlisted Personnel Assignment Process in a Simulation Environment

DTIC Science & Technology

2004-03-01

Assignment Sub-Process.........................................................................................12 2. Possible Improvements By A Market ...COMPENSATION STARTEGY .............................................17 A. THE RIGHT COMPENSATION SYSTEM ...............................................17 B. AN...5. Market -Based Labor Markets (From: Gates, 2001).........................................13 Figure 6. What should a compensation system do? (From

Military Neurosurgery: A Range of Service Options.

PubMed

Menger, Richard P; Wolf, Michael E; Lang, Richard W; Smith, Donald R; Nanda, Anil; Letarte, Peter; Rosner, Michael K

2016-06-01

The pathway to military neurosurgical practice can include a number of accession options. This article is an objective comparison of fiscal, tangible, and intangible benefits provided through different military neurosurgery career paths. Neurosurgeons may train through active duty, reserve, or civilian pathways. These modalities were evaluated on the basis of economic data during residency and the initial 3 years afterwards. When available, military base pay, basic allowance for housing and subsistence, variable special pay, board certified pay, incentive pay, multiyear special pay, reserve drill pay, civilian salary, income tax, and other tax incentives were analyzed using publically available data. Civilians had lower residency pay, higher starting salaries, increased taxes, malpractice insurance cost, and increased overhead. Active duty service saw higher residency pay, lower starting salary, tax incentives, increased benefits, and almost no associated overhead including malpractice coverage. Reserve service saw a combination of civilian benefits with supplementation of reserve drill pay in return for weekend drill and the possibility of deployment and activation. Being a neurosurgeon in the military is extremely rewarding. From a financial perspective, ignoring intangibles, this article shows most entry pathways with initially modest differences between the cumulative salaries of active duty and civilian career paths and with higher overall compensation available from the reserve service option. These pathways become increasingly discrepant over time as civilian pay greatly exceeds that of military neurosurgeons. We hope that those curious about or considering serving in the United States military benefit from our accounting and review of these comparative paths. FAP, Financial Assistance ProgramNADDS, Navy Active Duty Delay for SpecialistsTMS, Training in Medical Specialties.

Merit Pay in Arkansas: An Evaluation of the Cobra Pride Incentive Program in the Fountain Lake School District

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Jensen, Nathan C.

2012-01-01

Starting in the 2010-11, administrators at the Fountain Lake School District implemented the Cobra Pride Incentive Program (CPIP), a merit pay program designed to financially reward all school employees with year-end bonuses primarily for significant improvements in student achievement. At the conclusion of the 2010-11 school year, over $800,000…

District Awards for Teacher Excellence (D.A.T.E.) Program: Final Evaluation Report. [Executive Summary

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Springer, Matthew G.; Lewis, Jessica L.; Ehlert, Mark W.; Podgursky, Michael J.; Crader, Gary D.; Taylor, Lori L.; Gronberg, Timothy J.; Jansen, Dennis W.; Lopez, Omar S.; Stuit, David A.

2010-01-01

District Awards for Teacher Excellence (D.A.T.E.) is a state-funded program in Texas that provides grants to districts for the implementation of locally-designed incentive pay plans. All districts in the state are eligible to receive grants, but participation is voluntary. D.A.T.E. incentive pay plans were first implemented in Texas districts…

District Awards for Teacher Excellence (D.A.T.E.) Program: Final Evaluation Report. Policy Evaluation Report

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Springer, Matthew G.; Lewis, Jessica L.; Ehlert, Mark W.; Podgursky, Michael J.; Crader, Gary D.; Taylor, Lori L.; Gronberg, Timothy J.; Jansen, Dennis W.; Lopez, Omar S.; Stuit, David A.

2010-01-01

District Awards for Teacher Excellence (D.A.T.E.) is a state-funded program in Texas that provides grants to districts for the implementation of locally-designed incentive pay plans. All districts in the state are eligible to receive grants, but participation is voluntary. D.A.T.E. incentive pay plans were first implemented in Texas districts…

Designing a Better Navy Aviation Retention Bonus

DTIC Science & Technology

2017-03-01

5 A. AVIATOR CAREER PROGRESSION ...................................................5 1. Flight...7  Figure 3.  Aviation Officer Career Progression...ABBREVIATIONS ACCP Aviation Career Continuation Pay ACIP Aviation Career Incentive Pay ACP Aviation Continuation Pay ACRB Aviation Command Retention Bonus

Behavioural economics: Cash incentives avert deforestation

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Cárdenas, Juan Camilo

2017-10-01

There is tension in developing countries between financial incentives to clear forests and climate regulation benefits of preserving trees. Now research shows that paying private forest owners in Uganda reduced deforestation, adding to the debate on the use of monetary incentives in forest conservation.

Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (7th). Compensation Structure. Major Topical Summary (MTS) 1

DTIC Science & Technology

1992-08-01

professional sports franchises , fast food restaurants , or a widget factory as well as the uniformed services. The 7’ QRMC identified two additional...1990 ................. C-8 Figure C-7. Basic Pay as a Percentage of RMC, by Grade, 1991 ................... C-11 Figure C-8. Current Enlisted BAS vs ... independent survey. "* A separate but simplified system of special and incentive pays. "* Expense reimbursements. "* Other allowances and so-called fringe

The effect of performance-related pay of hospital doctors on hospital behaviour: a case study from Shandong, China

PubMed Central

Liu, Xingzhu; Mills, Anne

2005-01-01

Background With the recognition that public hospitals are often productively inefficient, reforms have taken place worldwide to increase their administrative autonomy and financial responsibility. Reforms in China have been some of the most radical: the government budget for public hospitals was fixed, and hospitals had to rely on charges to fill their financing gap. Accompanying these changes was the widespread introduction of performance-related pay for hospital doctors – termed the "bonus" system. While the policy objective was to improve productivity and cost recovery, it is likely that the incentive to increase the quantity of care provided would operate regardless of whether the care was medically necessary. Methods The primary concerns of this study were to assess the effects of the bonus system on hospital revenue, cost recovery and productivity, and to explore whether various forms of bonus pay were associated with the provision of unnecessary care. The study drew on longitudinal data on revenue and productivity from six panel hospitals, and a detailed record review of 2303 tracer disease patients (1161 appendicitis patients and 1142 pneumonia patients) was used to identify unnecessary care. Results The study found that bonus system change over time contributed significantly to the increase in hospital service revenue and hospital cost recovery. There was an increase in unnecessary care and in the probability of admission when the bonus system switched from one with a weaker incentive to increase services to one with a stronger incentive, suggesting that improvement in the financial health of public hospitals was achieved at least in part through the provision of more unnecessary care and drugs and through admitting more patients. Conclusion There was little evidence that the performance-related pay system as designed by the sample of Chinese public hospitals was socially desirable. Hospitals should be monitored more closely by the government, and regulations applied to limit opportunistic behaviour. Otherwise, the containment of government financing for public facilities may result in an increase in the provision of unnecessary care, an increase in health costs to society, and a waste in social resources. PMID:16253137

Demographic Change, Social Security Systems, and Savings1

PubMed Central

Bloom, David E.; Canning, David; Mansfield, Richard K.; Moore, Michael

2009-01-01

In theory, improvements in healthy life expectancy should generate increases in the average age of retirement, with little effect on savings rates. In many countries, however, retirement incentives in social security programs prevent retirement ages from keeping pace with changes in life expectancy, leading to an increased need for life-cycle savings. Analyzing a cross-country panel of macroeconomic data, we find that increased longevity raises aggregate savings rates in countries with universal pension coverage and retirement incentives, though the effect disappears in countries with pay-as-you-go systems and high replacement rates. PMID:19865594

Procurement and Retention of Navy Physicians. Report No. CNS 1030.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Devine, Eugene J.

This study is designed to provide a better understanding of the Navy's health-care system and the impact of a draft-free system in attracting an adequate number of physicians. The medical scholarship, proposed variable incentive, and present continuation pay scales are evaluated from the standpoint of financial attractiveness to the physician…

Quality-based financial incentives in health care: can we improve quality by paying for it?

PubMed

Conrad, Douglas A; Perry, Lisa

2009-01-01

This article asks whether financial incentives can improve the quality of health care. A conceptual framework drawn from microeconomics, agency theory, behavioral economics, and cognitive psychology motivates a set of propositions about incentive effects on clinical quality. These propositions are evaluated through a synthesis of extant peer-reviewed empirical evidence. Comprehensive financial incentives--balancing rewards and penalties; blending structure, process, and outcome measures; emphasizing continuous, absolute performance standards; tailoring the size of incremental rewards to increasing marginal costs of quality improvement; and assuring certainty, frequency, and sustainability of incentive payoffs--offer the prospect of significantly enhancing quality beyond the modest impacts of prevailing pay-for-performance (P4P) programs. Such organizational innovations as the primary care medical home and accountable health care organizations are expected to catalyze more powerful quality incentive models: risk- and quality-adjusted capitation, episode of care payments, and enhanced fee-for-service payments for quality dimensions (e.g., prevention) most amenable to piece-rate delivery.

Effect of modest pay-for-performance financial incentive on time-to-discharge summary dictation among medical residents.

PubMed

Wolk, Adam; Wang, Erwin; Horak, Bernard; Cloonan, Patricia; Adams, Michael; Moore, Eileen; Jaipaul, Chitra Komal; Brown, Gabrielle; Dasgupta, Dabanjan; Deluca, Danielle; Grossman, Mila

2013-01-01

Evaluate the effect of a modest financial incentive on time-to-discharge summary dictation among medicine residents. Pay-for-performance incentives are used in a number of health care settings. Studies are lacking on their use with medical residents and other trainees. Timely completion of discharge summaries is necessary for effective follow-up after hospitalization, and residents perform the majority of discharge summary dictations in academic medical centers. Medicine residents with the lowest average discharge-to-dictation time during their 1-month inpatient medicine ward rotation were rewarded with a $50 gift card. Discharge data were captured using an autopopulating electronic database. The average discharge-to-dictation time was reduced from 7.44 to 1.84 days, representing a 75.3% decrease. Almost 90% of discharge summary dictations were performed on the day of discharge. A modest financial incentive resulted in a marked improvement in the time-to-discharge summary dictation by medicine residents. Pay-for-performance programs may be an effective strategy for improving the quality and efficiency of patient care in academic medical centers.

Using the lessons of behavioral economics to design more effective pay-for-performance programs.

PubMed

Mehrotra, Ateev; Sorbero, Melony E S; Damberg, Cheryl L

2010-07-01

To describe improvements in the design of pay-for-performance (P4P) programs that reflect the psychology of how people respond to incentives. Investigation of the behavioral economics literature. We describe 7 ways to improve P4P program design in terms of frequency and types of incentive payments. After discussing why P4P incentives can have unintended adverse consequences, we outline potential ways to mitigate these. Although P4P incentives are increasingly popular, the healthcare literature shows that these have had minimal effect. Design improvements in P4P programs can enhance their effectiveness. Lessons from behavioral economics may greatly enhance the design and effectiveness of P4P programs in healthcare, but future work is needed to demonstrate this empirically.

5 CFR 575.104 - Ineligible categories of employees.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... INCENTIVES Recruitment Incentives § 575.104 Ineligible categories of employees. An agency may not pay a recruitment incentive to an employee in— (a) A position to which an individual is appointed by the President... 5 Administrative Personnel 1 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Ineligible categories of employees. 575...

Agency Theory, Incentives, and Student Loans.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Rudner, Lawrence M.

Using agency theory, this paper analyzes schools, particularly career schools, in the Stafford Loan Program for student incentive to graduate and pay off their loans. Agency theory focuses on the roles of information and incentives when a principal and an agent cooperate with respect to the utilization of resources. The analysis examines the…

30 CFR 1218.305 - How do I pay advanced royalties I owe under BLM regulations?

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-07-01

... 30 Mineral Resources 3 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false How do I pay advanced royalties I owe under BLM... CREDITS AND INCENTIVES Geothermal Resources § 1218.305 How do I pay advanced royalties I owe under BLM regulations? If you pay advanced royalties under 43 CFR 3212.15(a)(1) to retain your lease: (a) You must pay...

Performance pay improves engagement, progress, and satisfaction in computer-based job skills training of low-income adults

PubMed Central

Koffarnus, Mikhail N.; DeFulio, Anthony; Sigurdsson, Sigurdur O.; Silverman, Kenneth

2018-01-01

Advancing the education of low-income adults could increase employment and income, but adult education programs have not successfully engaged low-income adults. Monetary reinforcement may be effective in promoting progress in adult education. This experiment evaluated the benefits of providing incentives for performance in a job-skills training program for low-income, unemployed adults. Participants worked on Typing and Keypad programs for 7 months. Participants randomly assigned to Group A (n=23) earned hourly and productivity pay on the Typing program (Productivity Pay), but earned only equalized hourly pay on the Keypad program (Hourly Pay). Group B (n=19) participants had the opposite contingencies. Participants worked more on, advanced further on, and preferred their productivity pay program. These results show that monetary incentives can increase performance in a job-skills training program, and indicate that payment in adult education programs should be delivered contingent on performance in the training program instead of simply on attendance. PMID:24114155

Performance pay improves engagement, progress, and satisfaction in computer-based job skills training of low-income adults.

PubMed

Koffarnus, Mikhail N; DeFulio, Anthony; Sigurdsson, Sigurdur O; Silverman, Kenneth

2013-01-01

Advancing the education of low-income adults could increase employment and income, but adult education programs have not successfully engaged low-income adults. Monetary reinforcement may be effective in promoting progress in adult education. This experiment evaluated the benefits of providing incentives for performance in a job-skills training program for low-income, unemployed adults. Participants worked on typing and keypad programs for 7 months. Participants randomly assigned to Group A (n = 23) earned hourly and productivity pay on the typing program (productivity pay), but earned only equalized hourly pay on the keypad program (hourly pay). Group B (n = 19) participants had the opposite contingencies. Participants worked more on, advanced further on, and preferred their productivity pay program. These results show that monetary incentives can increase performance in a job-skills training program, and indicate that payment in adult education programs should be delivered contingent on performance in the training program instead of simply on attendance. © Society for the Experimental Analysis of Behavior.

The Logic of Teacher Incentives.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Barro, Stephen M.

Widely endorsed national reports on educational reform have proposed career ladders and merit pay to raise the quality of the teaching force, and hence contribute to educational excellence. This report contends that careful analysis of proposed changes of teacher reward systems has been omitted. The issues requiring attention involve incentive…

Promoting Instructional Excellence through a Teacher Reward System: Herzberg's Theory Applied.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Frase, Larry E.; And Others

1982-01-01

An Arizona school district's program to reward teaching excellence uses as an incentive, instead of merit pay, something that will enhance the teacher's ability to assist children in the classroom. Rewards include attendance at conferences or computers and other classroom instructional materials. (Author/JM)

20 CFR 363.1 - Authorization for garnishment of remuneration for employment paid by the Board.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-04-01

..., pay, or otherwise, and includes, but is not limited to, severance pay, sick pay, and incentive pay...: (1) Amounts required by law to be deducted, including but not limited to Federal employment taxes and... properly withheld for Federal, state, or local income tax purposes, if the withholding of such amounts is...

Merit Pay for Teachers. The Best of ERIC on Educational Management, Number 74.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

ERIC Clearinghouse on Educational Management, Eugene, OR.

Included in this annotated bibliography of 11 publications on merit pay are reports covering various approaches to merit increases and the successes of a merit pay program in California's Round Valley School District, an Educational Research Service review of current research and practice on merit and incentive pay for teachers, an ERIC…

78 FR 76410 - Request for Information on Strategies To Accelerate the Testing and Adoption of Pay for Success...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-12-17

... To Accelerate the Testing and Adoption of Pay for Success (PFS) Financing Models AGENCY: Office of... Strategies to Accelerate the Testing and Adoption of Pay for Success (PFS) Financing Models. The President's... Camacho, Attention: Pay for Success Incentive Fund RFI, U.S. Department of the Treasury, 1500 Pennsylvania...

WWC Quick Review of the Manuscript "Paying for A's: An Early Exploration of Student Reward and Incentive Programs in Charter Schools"

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

What Works Clearinghouse, 2008

2008-01-01

This review examined a study designed to evaluate whether offering student reward and incentive programs in charter schools affects academic achievement. The study measured effects by comparing changes in average grade-level test scores in schools that had incentive programs to changes in schools that did not have incentive programs. The study…

Motivation and Organizational Incentives for High Vitality Teachers: A Qualitative Perspective.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Sederberg, Charles H.; Clark, Shirley M.

1990-01-01

Minnesota teachers of the year (N=18) were interviewed to identify motivation and organizational incentives for exemplary classroom performance. Values and role behaviors of high-vitality teachers differ from those assumed by rational management models calling for incentives such as increased academic preparation, career ladders, and merit pay.…

38 CFR 36.4319 - Servicer loss-mitigation options and incentives.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-07-01

... 38 Pensions, Bonuses, and Veterans' Relief 2 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Servicer loss-mitigation... Reporting § 36.4319 Servicer loss-mitigation options and incentives. (a) The Secretary will pay a servicer in tiers one, two, or three an incentive payment for each of the following successful loss-mitigation...

38 CFR 36.4319 - Servicer loss-mitigation options and incentives.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-07-01

... 38 Pensions, Bonuses, and Veterans' Relief 2 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Servicer loss-mitigation... Reporting § 36.4319 Servicer loss-mitigation options and incentives. (a) The Secretary will pay a servicer in tiers one, two, or three an incentive payment for each of the following successful loss-mitigation...

38 CFR 36.4319 - Servicer loss-mitigation options and incentives.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-07-01

... 38 Pensions, Bonuses, and Veterans' Relief 2 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Servicer loss-mitigation... Reporting § 36.4319 Servicer loss-mitigation options and incentives. (a) The Secretary will pay a servicer in tiers one, two, or three an incentive payment for each of the following successful loss-mitigation...

38 CFR 36.4319 - Servicer loss-mitigation options and incentives.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-07-01

... 38 Pensions, Bonuses, and Veterans' Relief 2 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Servicer loss-mitigation... Reporting § 36.4319 Servicer loss-mitigation options and incentives. (a) The Secretary will pay a servicer in tiers one, two, or three an incentive payment for each of the following successful loss-mitigation...

Reforming Teacher Pay

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Burns, Susan Freeman; Gardner, Catherine D.

2010-01-01

A recent Google search for information regarding performance pay in education produced 6.1 million results. This number should come as no surprise given the current level of interest in incentives as a popular reform option in public education. Supporters believe pay-for-performance programs encourage less effective teachers to improve and will…

Toward a More Comprehensive Model of Teacher Pay. Research Brief

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

National Center on Performance Incentives, 2008

2008-01-01

In "Toward a More Comprehensive Model of Teacher Pay"--a paper presented at the February 2008 National Center on Performance Incentives research to policy conference--Julia Koppich examines recent policy initiatives implementing new approaches to teacher pay. Her discussion focuses on four current initiatives: ProComp in Denver, Toledo…

The response of physician groups to P4P incentives.

PubMed

Mehrotra, Ateev; Pearson, Steven D; Coltin, Kathryn L; Kleinman, Ken P; Singer, Janice A; Rabson, Barbra; Schneider, Eric C

2007-05-01

Despite substantial enthusiasm among insurers and federal policy makers for pay-for-performance incentives, little is known about the current scope of these incentives or their influence on the delivery of care. To assess the scope and magnitude of pay-for-performance (P4P) incentives among physician groups and to examine whether such incentives are associated with quality improvement initiatives. Structured telephone survey of leaders of physician groups delivering primary care in Massachusetts. ASSESSED METHODS: Prevalence of P4P incentives among physician groups tied to specific measures of quality or utilization and prevalence of physician group quality improvement initiatives. Most group leaders (89%) reported P4P incentives in at least 1 commercial health plan contract. Incentives were tied to performance on Health Employer Data and Information Set (HEDIS) quality measures (89% of all groups), utilization measures (66%), use of information technology (52%), and patient satisfaction (37%). Among the groups with P4P and knowledge of all revenue streams, the incentives accounted for 2.2% (range, 0.3%-8.8%) of revenue. P4P incentives tied to HEDIS quality measures were positively associated with groups' quality improvement initiatives (odds ratio, 1.6; P = .02). Thirty-six percent of group leaders with P4P incentives reported that they were very important or moderately important to the group's financial success. P4P incentives are now common among physician groups in Massachusetts, and these incentives most commonly reward higher clinical quality or lower utilization of care. Although the scope and magnitude of incentives are still modest for many groups, we found an association between P4P incentives and the use of quality improvement initiatives.

Paying health workers for performance in Battagram district, Pakistan

PubMed Central

2011-01-01

Background There is a growing interest in using pay-for-performance mechanisms in low and middle-income countries in order to improve the performance of health care providers. However, at present there is a dearth of independent evaluations of such approaches which can guide understanding of their potential and risks in differing contexts. This article presents the results of an evaluation of a project managed by an international non-governmental organisation in one district of Pakistan. It aims to contribute to learning about the design and implementation of pay-for-performance systems and their impact on health worker motivation. Methods Quantitative analysis was conducted of health management information system (HMIS) data, financial records, and project documents covering the period 2007-2010. Key informant interviews were carried out with stakeholders at all levels. At facility level, in-depth interviews were held, as were focus group discussions with staff and community members. Results The wider project in Battagram had contributed to rebuilding district health services at a cost of less than US$4.5 per capita and achieved growth in outputs. Staff, managers and clients were appreciative of the gains in availability and quality of services. However, the role that the performance-based incentive (PBI) component played was less clear--PBI formed a relatively small component of pay, and did not increase in line with outputs. There was little evidence from interviews and data that the conditional element of the PBIs influenced behaviour. They were appreciated as a top-up to pay, but remained low in relative terms, and only slightly and indirectly related to individual performance. Moreover, they were implemented independently of the wider health system and presented a clear challenge for longer term integration and sustainability. Conclusions Challenges for performance-based pay approaches include the balance of rewarding individual versus team efforts; reflecting process and outcome indicators; judging the right level of incentives; allowing for very different starting points and situations; designing a system which is simple enough for participants to comprehend; and the tension between independent monitoring and integration in a national system. Further documentation of process and cost-effectiveness, and careful examination of the wider impacts of paying for performance, are still needed. PMID:21982330

Performance-based financial incentives for diabetes care: an effective strategy?

PubMed

Latham, Lesley P; Marshall, Emily Gard

2015-02-01

The use of financial incentives provided to primary care physicians who achieve target management or clinical outcomes has been advocated to support the fulfillment of care recommendations for patients with diabetes. This article explores the characteristics of incentive models implemented in the context of universal healthcare systems in the United Kingdom, Australia, Taiwan and Canada; the extent to which these interventions have been successful in improving diabetes outcomes; and the key challenges and concerns around implementing incentive models. Research in the effect of incentives in the United Kingdom demonstrates some improvements in process outcomes and achievement of cholesterol, blood pressure and glycated hemoglobin (A1C) targets. Evidence of the efficacy of programs implemented outside of the United Kingdom is very limited but suggests that physicians participating in these enhanced billing incentive programs were already completing the guideline-recommended care prior to the introduction of the incentive. A shift to pay-for-performance programs may have important implications for professionalism and patient-centred care. In the absence of definitive evidence that financial incentives drive the quality of diabetes management at the level of primary care, policy makers should proceed with caution. It is important to look beyond simply modifying physicians' behaviours and address the factors and systemic barriers that make it challenging for patients and physicians to manage diabetes in partnership. Copyright © 2015 Canadian Diabetes Association. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Collective Bargaining in Education and Pay for Performance. Research Brief

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

National Center on Performance Incentives, 2008

2008-01-01

In "Collective Bargaining in Education and Pay for Performance"--a paper presented at the National Center on Performance Incentives research to policy conference in February--Jane Hannaway and Andrew J. Rotherham examine the interplay between the emerging policy focus on teacher pay for performance and the response of teacher unions.…

Teaching to the Tails: Teacher Performance Pay and the Distribution of Student Achievement

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Loyalka, Prashant; Sylvia, Sean; Liu, Chengfang; Chu, James; Rozelle, Scott

2015-01-01

Growing evidence suggests that teachers in developing countries often have weak or misaligned incentives for improving student outcomes. In response, policymakers and researchers have proposed performance pay as a way to improve student outcomes by tying concrete measures like achievement scores to teacher pay. While evidence from randomized…

Incentive payments are not related to expected health gain in the pay for performance scheme for UK primary care: cross-sectional analysis

PubMed Central

2012-01-01

Background The General Medical Services primary care contract for the United Kingdom financially rewards performance in 19 clinical areas, through the Quality and Outcomes Framework. Little is known about how best to determine the size of financial incentives in pay for performance schemes. Our aim was to test the hypothesis that performance indicators with larger population health benefits receive larger financial incentives. Methods We performed cross sectional analyses to quantify associations between the size of financial incentives and expected health gain in the 2004 and 2006 versions of the Quality and Outcomes Framework. We used non-parametric two-sided Spearman rank correlation tests. Health gain was measured in expected lives saved in one year and in quality adjusted life years. For each quality indicator in an average sized general practice we tested for associations first, between the marginal increase in payment and the health gain resulting from a one percent point improvement in performance and second, between total payment and the health gain at the performance threshold for maximum payment. Results Evidence for lives saved or quality adjusted life years gained was found for 28 indicators accounting for 41% of the total incentive payments. No statistically significant associations were found between the expected health gain and incentive gained from a marginal 1% increase in performance in either the 2004 or 2006 version of the Quality and Outcomes Framework. In addition no associations were found between the size of financial payment for achievement of an indicator and the expected health gain at the performance threshold for maximum payment measured in lives saved or quality adjusted life years. Conclusions In this subgroup of indicators the financial incentives were not aligned to maximise health gain. This disconnection between incentive and expected health gain risks supporting clinical activities that are only marginally effective, at the expense of more effective activities receiving lower incentives. When designing pay for performance programmes decisions about the size of the financial incentive attached to an indicator should be informed by information on the health gain to be expected from that indicator. PMID:22507660

45 CFR 307.10 - Functional requirements for computerized support enforcement systems in operation by October 1...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-10-01

... if the State has chosen to pay such incentives; (7) Maintaining accounts receivable on all amounts... interfacing with State financial management and expenditure information; (9) Accepting electronic case...) Providing management information on all IV-D cases under the State plan from initial referral or application...

45 CFR 307.10 - Functional requirements for computerized support enforcement systems in operation by October 1...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-10-01

... if the State has chosen to pay such incentives; (7) Maintaining accounts receivable on all amounts... interfacing with State financial management and expenditure information; (9) Accepting electronic case...) Providing management information on all IV-D cases under the State plan from initial referral or application...

45 CFR 307.10 - Functional requirements for computerized support enforcement systems in operation by October 1...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-10-01

... if the State has chosen to pay such incentives; (7) Maintaining accounts receivable on all amounts... interfacing with State financial management and expenditure information; (9) Accepting electronic case...) Providing management information on all IV-D cases under the State plan from initial referral or application...

Retention, Incentives, and DoD Experience Under the 40-Year Military Pay Table

DTIC Science & Technology

2016-01-01

year table, effective April 2007, added longevity increases after YOS 26 for officers in O-6 and above, warrant officers in W- 4 and W-5, and enlisted...realized basic pay increases after YOS 30, while both O-8s and O-9s received pay increases after YOS 28. Figure 2.2 shows basic pay for officers in O- 4 ...8 2.2. Basic Pay, Officers, O- 4 to O-6

Carrots and sticks: impact of an incentive/disincentive employee flexible credit benefit plan on health status and medical costs.

PubMed

Stein, A D; Karel, T; Zuidema, R

1999-01-01

Employee wellness programs aim to assist in controlling employer costs by improving the health status and fitness of employees, potentially increasing productivity, decreasing absenteeism, and reducing medical claims. Most such programs offer no disincentive for nonparticipation. We evaluated an incentive/disincentive program initiated by a large teaching hospital in western Michigan. The HealthPlus Health Quotient program is an incentive/disincentive approach to health promotion. The employer's contribution to the cafeteria plan benefit package is adjusted based on results of an annual appraisal of serum cholesterol, blood pressure, tobacco use, body fat, physical fitness, motor vehicle safety, nutrition, and alcohol consumption. The adjustment (health quotient [HQ]) can range from -$25 to +$25 per pay period. We examined whether appraised health improved between 1993 and 1996 and whether the HQ predicted medical claims. Mean HQ increased slightly (+$0.47 per pay period in 1993 to +$0.89 per pay period in 1996). Individuals with HQs of less than -$10 per pay period incurred approximately twice the medical claims of the other groups (test for linear trend, p = .003). After adjustment, medical claims of employees in the worst category (HQ < -$10 per pay period) were $1078 (95% confidence interval $429-$1728) greater than those for the neutral (HQ between -$2 and +$2 per pay period) category. A decrease in HQ of at least $6 per pay period from 1993 to 1995 was associated with $956 (95% confidence interval $264-$1647) greater costs in 1996 than was a stable HQ. The HealthPlus Health Quotient program is starting to yield benefits. Most employees are impacted minimally, but savings are accruing to the employer from reductions in medical claims paid and in days lost to illness and disability.

Paying hospitals for quality: can we buy better care?

PubMed

Hall, Jane P; van Gool, Kees C

2016-11-21

Economic theory predicts that changing financial rewards will change behaviour. This is valid in terms of service use; higher costs reduce health care use. It should follow that paying more for quality should improve quality; however, the research evidence thus far is equivocal, particularly in terms of better health outcomes. One reason is that "financial incentives" encompass a range of payment types and sizes of reward. The design of financial incentives should take into account the desired change and the context of existing payment structures, as well as other strategies for improving quality; further, financial incentives should be fair in rewarding effort. Financial incentives may have unintended consequences, including rewarding hospitals for selecting patients with lower risks, diverting attention from the overall patient population to specific conditions, gaming, and "crowding out" or displacing intrinsic motivation. Managers and clinicians can only respond to financial incentives if they have the data, tools and skills to effect changes. Australia should not adopt widespread use of financial incentives for improving quality in health care without careful consideration of their design and context, the potential for unintended effects (particularly beyond their immediate targets), and evaluation of outcomes. The relative cost-effectiveness of financial incentives compared with, or in concert with, other strategies should also be considered.

Value-Added and Other Methods for Measuring School Performance: An Analysis of Performance Measurement Strategies in Teacher Incentive Fund Proposals. Research Brief

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

National Center on Performance Incentives, 2008

2008-01-01

In "Value-Added and Other Methods for Measuring School Performance: An Analysis of Performance Measurement Strategies in Teacher Incentive Fund Proposals"--a paper presented at the February 2008 National Center on Performance Incentives research to policy conference--Robert Meyer and Michael Christian examine select performance-pay plans…

Home-based radiology transcription and a productivity pay plan.

PubMed

Kerr, K

1997-01-01

Shands Hospital in Gainesville, Fla., decided to evaluate the way it provided transcription services in its radiology department. It identified four goals: increased productivity, decreased operating expense, finding much needed space in the radiology department and increasing employee morale. The department performs 165,000 procedures annually, with 66 radiologists, 29 faculty, and 37 residents and fellows on staff. Six FTEs comprised the transcription pool in the radiology department, with transcription their only duty. Transcriptionists were paid an hourly rate based on their years of service, not their productivity. Evaluation and measurement studies were undertaken by the hospital's management systems engineering department. The transcriptionists' hours were then changed to provide coverage during the periods of heaviest dictation. The productivity level of the transcription staff was also measured and various methods of measurement reviewed. The goal was a pure incentive pay plan that would reward employees for every increase in productivity. The incentive pay plan was phased in over a three-month period. Transcriptionists were paid for work performed, with no base pay beyond minimum wage. The move to home-based transcription was planned. The necessary equipment was identified and various issues specific to working at home were addressed. Approximately six months later, the transcriptionists were set up to work at home. The astounding results achieved are presented: 28% increase in productivity, operational cost savings exceeding $25,000 and a space savings of 238 square feet.

Horses or unicorns: can paying for performance make quality competition routine?

PubMed

Sage, William M; Kalyan, Dev N

2006-06-01

The competitive benefits of pay-for-performance (P4P) financial incentives are widely assumed. These incentives can affect health care through several mechanisms, however, not all of which involve competition. This insight has three implications. First, federal antitrust enforcement should continue to scrutinize P4P arrangements. Second, government needs to play a larger role in P4P than through antitrust oversight. Third, widespread enthusiasm for a particular health policy reform does not relieve policy makers of the obligation to understand its theoretical basis.

Pay-for-performance in nursing homes.

PubMed

Briesacher, Becky A; Field, Terry S; Baril, Joann; Gurwitz, Jerry H

2009-01-01

Information on the impact of pay-for-performance programs is lacking in the nursing home setting. This literature review (1980-2007) identified 13 prior examples of pay-for-performance programs in the nursing home setting: 7 programs were active as of 2007, while 6 had been terminated. The programs were mostly short-lived, varied considerably in the choice of performance measures and pay incentives, and evaluations of the impact were rare.

5 CFR 575.209 - Payment of relocation incentives.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... pay periods equals 546 days, and 546 days divided by 365 days equals 1.50 years. (c)(1) An authorized... pay a relocation incentive— (1) As an initial lump-sum payment at the commencement of the service... employee in a service period may not exceed 25 percent of the annual rate of basic pay of the employee at...

Salaries and incomes of health workers in sub-Saharan Africa.

PubMed

McCoy, David; Bennett, Sara; Witter, Sophie; Pond, Bob; Baker, Brook; Gow, Jeff; Chand, Sudeep; Ensor, Tim; McPake, Barbara

2008-02-23

Public-sector health workers are vital to the functioning of health systems. We aimed to investigate pay structures for health workers in the public sector in sub-Saharan Africa; the adequacy of incomes for health workers; the management of public-sector pay; and the fiscal and macroeconomic factors that impinge on pay policy for the public sector. Because salary differentials affect staff migration and retention, we also discuss pay in the private sector. We surveyed historical trends in the pay of civil servants in Africa over the past 40 years. We used some empirical data, but found that accurate and complete data were scarce. The available data suggested that pay structures vary across countries, and are often structured in complex ways. Health workers also commonly use other sources of income to supplement their formal pay. The pay and income of health workers varies widely, whether between countries, by comparison with cost of living, or between the public and private sectors. To optimise the distribution and mix of health workers, policy interventions to address their pay and incomes are needed. Fiscal constraints to increased salaries might need to be overcome in many countries, and non-financial incentives improved.

Preferences for policy attributes and willingness to pay for water quality improvements under uncertainty

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Mullen, Jeffrey D.; Calhoun, Kayla C.; Colson, Gregory J.

2017-04-01

When exploring environmental policy options, sometimes neither the current state of the environmental good being analyzed nor the effectiveness of the proposed policy is known with certainty. This is the case with privately owned, residential, onsite wastewater treatment systems (septic systems)—there is ample evidence that they can contribute to water quality impairment, but their contribution is generally stochastic in nature and the efficacy of technological solutions is uncertain. Furthermore, the benefits of ameliorating water quality impairments are public in nature. Septic system owners are legally responsible for maintaining their systems, but requiring them to upgrade otherwise properly functioning tanks is outside the scope of water quality regulations. An incentive structure is necessary to induce private homeowners to invest in septic upgrades that deliver both private benefits in addition to the positive externality for the wider public and environment. The question for policy makers is how these private incentives should be financed, and whether public support can be garnered. Results of a choice experiment in Gwinnett County, Georgia, accounting for both sources of uncertainty—the current state of water quality and the efficacy of the intervention—in the design of water quality policy are presented. We find baseline water quality conditions and policy efficacy significantly affect public support for a policy transferring public funds to private homeowners, in terms of both sentiment and willingness to pay. The manner in which costs are shared across stakeholders also affects the selection of a policy option, but not willingness to pay for it.

Motivating the Army Acquisition Workforce

DTIC Science & Technology

2016-04-07

this research study attempts to determine whether the AAW is primarily motivated by monetary incentives or by nonmonetary incentives . This study...analyzes and summarizes motivation theory and strategies through a literature review. The researcher also conducted secondary research using the 2015...most common or well- 2 known form of motivating employees is through financial incentives like a pay raise or a cash bonus. However, managers have a

Get the Science Right when Paying for Nature’s Services

EPA Science Inventory

Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) mechanisms leverage economic and social incentives to shape how people influence natural processes and achieve conservation and sustainability goals. Beneficiaries of nature's goods and services pay owners or stewards of ecosystems that produ...

Characterization and effectiveness of pay-for-performance in ophthalmology: a systematic review.

PubMed

Herbst, Tim; Emmert, Martin

2017-06-05

To identify, characterize and compare existing pay-for-performance approaches and their impact on the quality of care and efficiency in ophthalmology. A systematic evidence-based review was conducted. English, French and German written literature published between 2000 and 2015 were searched in the following databases: Medline (via PubMed), NCBI web site, Scopus, Web of Knowledge, Econlit and the Cochrane Library. Empirical as well as descriptive articles were included. Controlled clinical trials, meta-analyses, randomized controlled studies as well as observational studies were included as empirical articles. Systematic characterization of identified pay-for-performance approaches (P4P approaches) was conducted according to the "Model for Implementing and Monitoring Incentives for Quality" (MIMIQ). Methodological quality of empirical articles was assessed according to the Critical Appraisal Skills Programme (CASP) checklists. Overall, 13 relevant articles were included. Eleven articles were descriptive and two articles included empirical analyses. Based on these articles, four different pay-for-performance approaches implemented in the United States were identified. With regard to quality and incentive elements, systematic comparison showed numerous differences between P4P approaches. Empirical studies showed isolated cost or quality effects, while a simultaneous examination of these effects was missing. Research results show that experiences with pay-for-performance approaches in ophthalmology are limited. Identified approaches differ with regard to quality and incentive elements restricting comparability. Two empirical studies are insufficient to draw strong conclusions about the effectiveness and efficiency of these approaches.

Incentive Design and Quality Improvements: Evidence from State Medicaid Nursing Home Pay-for-Performance Programs.

PubMed

Konetzka, R Tamara; Skira, Meghan M; Werner, Rachel M

2018-01-01

Pay-for-performance (P4P) programs have become a popular policy tool aimed at improving health care quality. We analyze how incentive design affects quality improvements in the nursing home setting, where several state Medicaid agencies have implemented P4P programs that vary in incentive structure. Using the Minimum Data Set and the Online Survey, Certification, and Reporting data from 2001 to 2009, we examine how the weights put on various performance measures that are tied to P4P bonuses, such as clinical outcomes, inspection deficiencies, and staffing levels, affect improvements in those measures. We find larger weights on clinical outcomes often lead to larger improvements, but small weights can lead to no improvement or worsening of some clinical outcomes. We find a qualifier for P4P eligibility based on having few or no severe inspection deficiencies is more effective at decreasing inspection deficiencies than using weights, suggesting simple rules for participation may incent larger improvement.

Incentive Design and Quality Improvements: Evidence from State Medicaid Nursing Home Pay-for-Performance Programs

PubMed Central

Konetzka, R. Tamara; Skira, Meghan M.; Werner, Rachel M.

2017-01-01

Pay-for-performance (P4P) programs have become a popular policy tool aimed at improving health care quality. We analyze how incentive design affects quality improvements in the nursing home setting, where several state Medicaid agencies have implemented P4P programs that vary in incentive structure. Using the Minimum Data Set and the Online Survey, Certification, and Reporting data from 2001 to 2009, we examine how the weights put on various performance measures that are tied to P4P bonuses, such as clinical outcomes, inspection deficiencies, and staffing levels, affect improvements in those measures. We find larger weights on clinical outcomes often lead to larger improvements, but small weights can lead to no improvement or worsening of some clinical outcomes. We find a qualifier for P4P eligibility based on having few or no severe inspection deficiencies is more effective at decreasing inspection deficiencies than using weights, suggesting simple rules for participation may incent larger improvement. PMID:29594189

A new prize system for drug innovation.

PubMed

Gandjour, Afschin; Chernyak, Nadja

2011-10-01

We propose a new prize (reward) system for drug innovation which pays a price based on the value of health benefits accrued over time. Willingness to pay for a unit of health benefit is determined based on the cost-effectiveness ratio of palliative/nursing care. We solve the problem of limited information on the value of health benefits by mathematically relating reward size to the uncertainty of information including information on potential drug overuse. The proposed prize system offers optimal incentives to invest in research and development because it rewards the innovator for the social value of drug innovation. The proposal is envisaged as a non-voluntary alternative to the current patent system and reduces excessive marketing of innovators and generic drug producers. Copyright © 2011 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.

Impact of a pay-for-performance incentive on support for smoking cessation and on smoking prevalence among people with diabetes.

PubMed

Millett, Christopher; Gray, Jeremy; Saxena, Sonia; Netuveli, Gopalakrishnan; Majeed, Azeem

2007-06-05

Many people with diabetes continue to smoke despite being at high risk of cardiovascular disease. We examined the impact of a pay-for-performance incentive in the United Kingdom introduced in 2004 as part of the new general practitioner contract to improve support for smoking cessation and to reduce the prevalence of smoking among people with chronic diseases such as diabetes. We performed a population-based longitudinal study of the recorded delivery of cessation advice and the prevalence of smoking using electronic records of patients with diabetes obtained from participating general practices. The survey was carried out in an ethnically diverse part of southwest London before (June-October 2003) and after (November 2005-January 2006) the introduction of a pay-for-performance incentive. Significantly more patients with diabetes had their smoking status ever recorded in 2005 than in 2003 (98.8% v. 90.0%, p <0.001). The proportion of patients with documented smoking cessation advice also increased significantly over this period, from 48.0% to 83.5% (p < 0.001). The prevalence of smoking decreased significantly from 20.0% to 16.2% (p < 0.001). The reduction over the study period was lower among women (adjusted odds ratio 0.71, 95% confidence interval 0.53-0.95) but was not significantly different in the most and least affluent groups. In 2005, smoking rates continued to differ significantly with age (10.6%-25.1%), sex (women, 11.5%; men, 20.6%) and ethnic background (4.9%-24.9%). The introduction of a pay-for-performance incentive in the United Kingdom increased the provision of support for smoking cessation and was associated with a reduction in smoking prevalence among patients with diabetes in primary health care settings. Health care planners in other countries may wish to consider introducing similar incentive schemes for primary care physicians.

The New Moral Darwinism

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Rury, John L.

1986-01-01

Reviews "Losing Ground: American Social Policy, 1950-1980" by Charles Murray. Murray believes federal social welfare programs sap the moral fiber of poor Americans by eliminating a negative incentive for them to work at low paying jobs. Criticizes Murray's position, citing the importance of positive as well as negative incentives for…

Health spending trends in the 1980's: Adjusting to financial incentives

PubMed Central

Arnett, Ross H.; Cowell, Carol S.; Davidoff, Lawrence M.; Freeland, Mark S.

1985-01-01

Health expenditure growth is projected to moderate considerably during 1983-90, reaching $660 billion in 1990 and consuming over 11 percent of the gross national product. During 1973-83, spending for health care more than tripled, increasing from $103 billion to $355 billion and moving from 7.8 percent to 10.8 percent of the gross national product. Government spending for health care is projected to reach $284 billion by 1990, with the Federal Government paying 73 percent. The Medicare Prospective Payment System, private sector initiatives, and State and local government actions are providing incentives to substantially increase competition and cost effectiveness in health care provision. PMID:10311158

Developing physician pay arrangements: the cash and care equation.

PubMed

Levitch, J H

1998-11-01

Developing physician compensation packages that help a healthcare organization meet its business objectives while satisfying physician pay expectations requires new ways of linking pay to physician performance. Such compensation arrangements specifically should include pay tied to defined performance standards, compensation linked to group performance, performance incentives based on realistic, achievable goals, work performance measured by common criteria, and similar pay ensured for similar work. Final pay arrangements also should include items that are sometimes overlooked, such as fully delineated job responsibilities, performance measures aligned correctly with performance areas, and the value of benefits considered in the cash compensation levels.

Minnesota's Nursing Facility Performance-Based Incentive Payment Program: An Innovative Model for Promoting Care Quality

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Cooke, Valerie; Arling, Greg; Lewis, Teresa; Abrahamson, Kathleen A.; Mueller, Christine; Edstrom, Lisa

2010-01-01

Purpose: Minnesota's Nursing Facility Performance-Based Incentive Payment Program (PIPP) supports provider-initiated projects aimed at improving care quality and efficiency. PIPP moves beyond conventional pay for performance. It seeks to promote implementation of evidence-based practices, encourage innovation and risk taking, foster collaboration…

Incentives Alone Not Enough to Prod Teacher Effectiveness

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Sawchuk, Stephen

2009-01-01

Policy experts are renewing questions about the role of school culture and leadership in the drive to improve teaching effectiveness in the most-challenging school environments. As states and districts increasingly explore tactics like performance-based pay, incentive programs, and bonuses to attract the best teachers to troubled schools, experts…

The Efficacy of Institutionally Dispensed Rewards in Elementary School Teaching.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Kasten, Katherine Lewellyn

1984-01-01

Teachers' attitudes towards incentives should be analyzed before programs involving such incentives as merit pay or master teachers are implemented. Elementary school teachers were interviewed to help identify the value and effectiveness of institutional rewards. The interaction between personal life events and career choices was also examined.…

Do Work Incentives Have Unintended Consequences? Measuring "Entry Effects" in the Self-Sufficiency Project.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Berlin, Gordon; Bancroft, Wendy; Card, David; Lin, Winston; Robins, Philip K.

The Self-Sufficiency Project (SSP) is a Canadian social demonstration and research project designed to test an employment alternative to welfare. The SSP makes work pay by offering generous earnings supplements to long-term, single-parent welfare recipients who find full-time jobs and leave Canada's Income Assistance (IA) welfare system. The SSP's…

32 CFR 716.3 - Special situations.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... of a Reserve component who performs active duty, active duty for training, or inactive-duty training..., including special pay and incentive pay if appropriate, while performing such duties. (b) Death occurring while traveling to and from active duty for training and inactive-duty training. Any member of a Reserve...

Male Labor Force Participation and Social Security in Mexico.

PubMed

Aguila, Emma

2014-04-01

Labor-force participation among Mexican males in their early retirement years (60 to 64 years of age) has decreased in recent decades, from 94.6 percent in 1960 to 65.2 percent in 2010. Similar trends are evident elsewhere in Latin America, and have occurred in the developed world. Such trends pose challenges to financial sustainability of social security systems as working-age populations decrease and those in retirement increase both because of demographic trends and decisions to take early retirement. In this study, we find that the Mexican social security system provides incentives to retire early. The retirement incentives of the Mexican social security system affect retirement behavior, and may be one of the main contributors to early retirement decisions, particularly for lower-income populations. We simulated the effect of the reform from a Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) to the new Personal Retirement Accounts (PRA) system and we find that the PRA system also provides incentives to early retirement. Further analysis is needed to assess the financial sustainability of the social security system and financial security in old age for the largest cohorts in Mexico that will begin to retire by 2040.

Male Labor Force Participation and Social Security in Mexico

PubMed Central

Aguila, Emma

2014-01-01

Labor-force participation among Mexican males in their early retirement years (60 to 64 years of age) has decreased in recent decades, from 94.6 percent in 1960 to 65.2 percent in 2010. Similar trends are evident elsewhere in Latin America, and have occurred in the developed world. Such trends pose challenges to financial sustainability of social security systems as working-age populations decrease and those in retirement increase both because of demographic trends and decisions to take early retirement. In this study, we find that the Mexican social security system provides incentives to retire early. The retirement incentives of the Mexican social security system affect retirement behavior, and may be one of the main contributors to early retirement decisions, particularly for lower-income populations. We simulated the effect of the reform from a Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) to the new Personal Retirement Accounts (PRA) system and we find that the PRA system also provides incentives to early retirement. Further analysis is needed to assess the financial sustainability of the social security system and financial security in old age for the largest cohorts in Mexico that will begin to retire by 2040. PMID:25328441

Military Compensation: Additional Actions Are Needed to Better Manage Special and Incentive Pay Programs

DTIC Science & Technology

2017-02-01

services largely applied key principles of effective human capital management in the design of their S&I pay programs for nuclear propulsion...aviation, and cybersecurity occupations. However, the application of these key principles varied by service and occupation. Only the Navy’s S&I pay...programs for nuclear propulsion and aviation fully addressed all seven principles ; programs for other occupations and services generally exhibited a

Characteristics and Determinants of Teacher-Designed Pay for Performance Plans: Evidence from Texas' Governor's Educator Excellence Grant (GEEG) Program. Working Paper 2008-26

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Taylor, Lori L.; Springer, Matthew G.; Ehlert, Mark

2008-01-01

This study describes the teacher pay for performance plans designed and implemented by the public schools participating in the Governor's Educator Excellence Grant (GEEG) program in Texas. GEEG is a federally funded, incentive pay program that awarded non-competitive grants, ranging from $60,000 to $220,000 each year for three years, to 99 Texas…

Teamwork Key for Pilot Plans on Teacher Pay

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Sawchuk, Stephen

2008-01-01

A variety of federally financed grants based on performance pay are providing insights into how districts and teachers can collaborate to implement sustainable programs designed to improve teaching and learning. The question of whether those Teacher Incentive Fund grants will yield measurably higher student achievement, applicant pools with…

The Politics of Teacher Pay Reforms. Research Brief

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

National Center on Performance Incentives, 2008

2008-01-01

In "The Politics of Teacher Pay Reforms"--a paper presented at the National Center on Performance Incentives research to policy conference in February--Dan Goldhaber, a research professor at the Center for Reinventing Public Education at the University of Washington and an affiliated scholar with the Urban Institute's Education Policy…

Evaluating the impact of a new pay system on nurses in the UK.

PubMed

Buchan, James; Ball, Jane

2011-01-01

This study examines the impact of implementing a new pay system (Agenda for Change) on nursing staff in the National Health Service (NHS) in the UK. This new pay system covered approximately 400,000 nursing staff. Its objectives were to improve the delivery of patient care as well as staff recruitment, retention and motivation. The new system aimed to provide a simplified approach to pay determination, with a more systematic use of agreed job descriptions and job evaluation to 'price' individual jobs, linked to a new career development framework. Secondary analysis of survey data. Analysis of results of large-scale surveys of members of the Royal College of Nursing of the United Kingdom (RCN) to assess the response of nurses to questions about the implementation process itself and their attitude to pay levels. The results demonstrated that there was some positive change after implementation of Agenda for Change in 2006, mainly some time after implementation, and that the process of implementation itself raised expectations that were not fully met for all nurses. There were clear indications of differential impact and reported experiences, with some categories of nurse being less satisfied with the process of implementation. The overall message is that a national pay system has strengths and weaknesses compared to the local systems used in other countries and that these benefits can only be maximised by effective communication, adequate funding and consistent management of the system. How nurses' pay is determined and delivered can be a major satisfier and incentive to nurses if the process is well managed and can be a factor in supporting clinical practice, performance and innovation. This study highlights that a large-scale national exercise to reform the pay system for nurses is a major undertaking, carries risk and will take significant time to implement effectively. © 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Focus on Teacher Pay and Incentives: Recent Legislative Actions and Update on Salary Averages

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Gaines, Gale F.

2004-01-01

One indicator of progress in the Challenge to Lead goals refers to teacher compensation: Salaries, benefits and incentives are competitive in the marketplace. They are aimed at recognized expertise, student performance, state needs and taking on additional or different roles to improve curriculum and instruction." Most Southern Regional Education…

Do you know the fair market value of quality?

PubMed

Johnson, Jen

2009-10-01

To develop a physician compensation package that includes fair-market-value incentive payments for their efforts to improve healthcare quality, a hospital first needs to: Evaluate current market data on quality incentive payments. Be familiar with the existing regulatory guidelines related to paying for quality. Understand the requirements for complying with the regulations.

Performance Incentives: Their Growing Impact on American K-12 Education

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Springer, Matthew G., Ed.

2009-01-01

The concept of "pay for performance" for public school teachers is once again growing in popularity and use. U.S. education is now at a critical juncture that requires thoughtful and informed consideration of this policy innovation. "Performance Incentives" offers the most up-to-date and complete analysis yet of the…

Time-bound promotions in Indian medical institutes: a mirage?

PubMed

Sukhlecha, Anupama

2016-01-01

Incentives, pay hikes and timely promotions enhance the job performance of an employee. In medical institutes, too, satisfied teachers would train students in a better way leading to better equipped doctors and ultimately, greater patient satisfaction. A study in Malaysia links high levels of satisfaction of employees with good salary, promotions, and incentives.

Incentives, Teachers, and Gender at Work

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Robert, Sarah A.

2013-01-01

Incentive pay programs have become panacea for a multitude of educational challenges. When aimed at teachers the assumption is that rewards entice them to work in particular ways or particular schools. However, the assumption is based on an economic formula that does not take into consideration the gendered nature of policy processes. This study…

Increasing Educator Effectiveness: Lessons Learned from Teacher Incentive Fund Sites

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Eckert, Jonathan

2013-01-01

Created by the U.S. Congress in 2006, the Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) represents the first federal initiative targeted directly at state and district efforts to introduce performance measures into educator compensation. TIF responds to a growing body of evidence that existing pay structures do not respond to labor force realities or adequately…

Commentary on the reimbursement paradox.

PubMed

Reaven, Nancy L; Rosenbloom, Judy

2009-07-01

Reimbursement policies are a critical step in the incorporation of new technologies and therapies into the clinical armamentarium. Reimbursement is an umbrella concept describing the process to manage and pay for healthcare services, including benefit coverage, coding, and payment processes. The technologies and services used in therapeutic temperature management are not directly reimbursed, leading to challenges by hospitals and physicians that the services are too expensive to use. The reimbursement models used in the United States make it increasingly difficult for new technologies and therapies to gain direct reimbursement, part of a strategy by insurers, including Medicare and private insurance companies, to manage access to health care services. Insurers, physicians, hospitals, and other providers face conflicting financial incentives in current reimbursement systems. Aligning the financial incentives underlying reimbursement systems is necessary to adequately support new technologies of merit.

An analysis of China's physician salary payment system.

PubMed

Ran, Li-mei; Luo, Kai-jian; Wu, Yun-cheng; Yao, Lan; Feng, You-mei

2013-04-01

Physician payment system (PPS) is a principal incentive system to motivate doctors to provide excellent care for patients. During the past decade, physician remuneration in China has not been in proportional to physician's average work load and massive responsibilities. This paper reviewed the constitution of the PPS in China, and further discussed the problems and issues to be addressed with respect to pay for performance. Our study indicated that the lower basic salary and bonus distribution tied to "profits" was the major contributor to the physician's profit-driven incentive and the potential cause for the speedy growth of health expenditures. We recommend that government funding to hospitals should be increased to fully cover physicians' basic salary, a flexible human resource and talent management mechanism needs to be established that severs personal interest between physicians and hospitals, and modern performance assessment and multiplexed payment systems should be piloted to encourage physicians to get the more legitimate compensation.

Defense AT and L Magazine. Volume 45, Number 2, March-April 2016

DTIC Science & Technology

2016-03-01

preferred contract type (Fixed Price Incentive Firm and Cost Plus Incentive Fee may be effective) 5. Provide sufficient contract length for the...example would be an incentive on pay- load margin for our medium launch vehicle, where the mini - mum requirement is 100 pounds of margin and the...involving a mini -UAV initiative with Indian industry partners. In discussing the Make in India initiative, U.S. officials note that it requires time

Effect of pay for performance on the management and outcomes of hypertension in the United Kingdom: interrupted time series study

PubMed Central

Serumaga, Brian; Ross-Degnan, Dennis; Avery, Anthony J; Elliott, Rachel A; Majumdar, Sumit R; Zhang, Fang

2011-01-01

Objective To assess the impact of a pay for performance incentive on quality of care and outcomes among UK patients with hypertension in primary care. Design Interrupted time series. Setting The Health Improvement Network (THIN) database, United Kingdom. Participants 470 725 patients with hypertension diagnosed between January 2000 and August 2007. Intervention The UK pay for performance incentive (the Quality and Outcomes Framework), which was implemented in April 2004 and included specific targets for general practitioners to show high quality care for patients with hypertension (and other diseases). Main outcome measures Centiles of systolic and diastolic blood pressures over time, rates of blood pressure monitoring, blood pressure control, and treatment intensity at monthly intervals for baseline (48 months) and 36 months after the implementation of pay for performance. Cumulative incidence of major hypertension related outcomes and all cause mortality for subgroups of newly treated (treatment started six months before pay for performance) and treatment experienced (started treatment in year before January 2001) patients to examine different stages of illness. Results After accounting for secular trends, no changes in blood pressure monitoring (level change 0.85, 95% confidence interval −3.04 to 4.74, P=0.669 and trend change −0.01, −0.24 to 0.21, P=0.615), control (−1.19, −2.06 to 1.09, P=0.109 and −0.01, −0.06 to 0.03, P=0.569), or treatment intensity (0.67, −1.27 to 2.81, P=0.412 and 0.02, −0.23 to 0.19, P=0.706) were attributable to pay for performance. Pay for performance had no effect on the cumulative incidence of stroke, myocardial infarction, renal failure, heart failure, or all cause mortality in both treatment experienced and newly treated subgroups. Conclusions Good quality of care for hypertension was stable or improving before pay for performance was introduced. Pay for performance had no discernible effects on processes of care or on hypertension related clinical outcomes. Generous financial incentives, as designed in the UK pay for performance policy, may not be sufficient to improve quality of care and outcomes for hypertension and other common chronic conditions. PMID:21266440

Heterogeneity in the Effects of Reward- and Deposit-based Financial Incentives on Smoking Cessation.

PubMed

Halpern, Scott D; French, Benjamin; Small, Dylan S; Saulsgiver, Kathryn; Harhay, Michael O; Audrain-McGovern, Janet; Loewenstein, George; Asch, David A; Volpp, Kevin G

2016-10-15

Targeting different smoking cessation programs to smokers most likely to quit when using them could reduce the burden of lung disease. To identify smokers most likely to quit using pure reward-based financial incentives or incentive programs requiring refundable deposits to become eligible for rewards. We conducted prespecified secondary analyses of a randomized trial in which 2,538 smokers were assigned to an $800 reward contingent on sustained abstinence from smoking, a refundable $150 deposit plus a $650 reward, or usual care. Using logistic regression, we identified characteristics of smokers that were most strongly associated with accepting their assigned intervention and ceasing smoking for 6 months. We assessed modification of the acceptance, efficacy, and effectiveness of reward and deposit programs by 11 prospectively selected demographic, smoking-related, and psychological factors. Predictors of sustained smoking abstinence differed among participants assigned to reward- versus deposit-based incentives. However, greater readiness to quit and less steep discounting of future rewards were consistently among the most important predictors. Deposit-based programs were uniquely effective relative to usual care among men, higher-income participants, and participants who more commonly failed to pay their bills (all interaction P values < 0.10). Relative to rewards, deposits were more effective among black persons (P = 0.022) and those who more commonly failed to pay their bills (P = 0.082). Relative to rewards, deposits were more commonly accepted by higher-income participants, men, white persons, and those who less commonly failed to pay their bills (all P < 0.05). Heterogeneity among smokers in their acceptance and response to different forms of incentives suggests potential benefits of targeting behavior-change interventions based on patient characteristics. Clinical trial registered with www.clinicaltrials.gov (NCT 01526265).

Fee-for-Service Is Dead. Long Live Fee for Service?

PubMed

Greene, Jan

2017-09-01

The move to a value-based payment system was supposed to end perverse incentives that pay doctors more for delivering often unnecessary services. But things are changing slowly and the market is still 95% fee for service. There's talk of reworking the Medicare fee schedule so docs are paid more for the things that work, and less for those that don't.

Is what's good for the patient good for the hospital? Aligning incentives and the business case for nursing.

PubMed

Needleman, Jack

2008-05-01

This article examines the social and business case for quality related to nursing and the need to restructure incentives to align the interests of the hospital and payers with the interests of the patients. Increasing the proportion of nurses who are registered nurses is associated with net cost savings. Increasing both nursing hours and the proportion of nurses who are registered nurses would result in improved quality and fewer deaths (creating a social case for improved staffing) but would be associated with small cost increases. Cost offsets associated with reduced turnover because of higher staffing would reduce the net cost increase but not result in savings. Under current reimbursement systems, hospitals that increase nurse staffing to improve patient outcomes will likely lose money as a result. Current proposals for pay for performance would create limited incentives for improving hospital nursing care.

Impact of a Pay-for-Performance Program on Care for Black Patients with Hypertension: Important Answers in the Era of the Affordable Care Act.

PubMed

Petersen, Laura A; Ramos, Kate Simpson; Pietz, Kenneth; Woodard, LeChauncy D

2017-06-01

Evaluate the effect of a pay-for-performance intervention on the quality of hypertension care provided to black patients and determine whether it produced risk selection. Primary data collected between 2007 and 2009 from Veterans Affairs physicians and their primary care panels. Nested study within a cluster randomized controlled trial of three types of financial incentives and no incentives (control). We compared the proportion of physicians' black patients meeting hypertension performance measures for baseline and final performance periods. We measured risk selection by comparing the proportion of patients who switched providers, patient visit frequency, and panel turnover. Due to limited power, we prespecified in the analysis plan combining the three incentive groups and oversampling black patients. Data collected electronically and by chart review. The proportion of black patients who achieved blood pressure control or received an appropriate response to uncontrolled blood pressure in the final period was 6.3 percent (95 percent confidence interval, 0.8-11.7 percent) greater for physicians who received an incentive than for controls. There was no difference between intervention and controls in the proportion of patients who switched providers, visit frequency, or panel turnover. A pay-for-performance intervention improved blood pressure control or appropriate response to uncontrolled blood pressure in black patients and did not produce risk selection. © Published 2016. This article is a U.S. Government work and is in the public domain in the USA.

Pension-Spiking, Free-Riding, and the Effects of Pension Reform on Teachers’ Earnings*

PubMed Central

Fitzpatrick, Maria D.

2017-01-01

In many states, local school districts are responsible for setting the earnings that determines the size of pensions, but are not required to make contributions to cover the resulting state pension fund liabilities. In this paper, I document evidence that this intergovernmental incentive inherent in public sector defined benefit pension systems distorts the amount and timing of income for public school teachers. I use the introduction of a policy that required experience-rating on earnings increases above a certain limit in a differences-in-differences framework to identify whether districts are willing to pay the full costs of their earnings promises. Because of the design of the policy, overall earnings of teachers near retirement did not change. Instead, districts that previously provided one-time pay increases shifted to smaller increments spread out over several years. In addition, some districts that did not practice pension-spiking prior to the reform appear to begin providing payments up to the new, lower limit, perhaps due to increased salience of the fiscal incentive. Therefore, the policy was ineffective at decreasing pension costs. PMID:28983134

Pension-Spiking, Free-Riding, and the Effects of Pension Reform on Teachers' Earnings.

PubMed

Fitzpatrick, Maria D

2017-04-01

In many states, local school districts are responsible for setting the earnings that determines the size of pensions, but are not required to make contributions to cover the resulting state pension fund liabilities. In this paper, I document evidence that this intergovernmental incentive inherent in public sector defined benefit pension systems distorts the amount and timing of income for public school teachers. I use the introduction of a policy that required experience-rating on earnings increases above a certain limit in a differences-in-differences framework to identify whether districts are willing to pay the full costs of their earnings promises. Because of the design of the policy, overall earnings of teachers near retirement did not change. Instead, districts that previously provided one-time pay increases shifted to smaller increments spread out over several years. In addition, some districts that did not practice pension-spiking prior to the reform appear to begin providing payments up to the new, lower limit, perhaps due to increased salience of the fiscal incentive. Therefore, the policy was ineffective at decreasing pension costs.

An Evaluation of Performance Thresholds in Nursing Home Pay-for-Performance.

PubMed

Werner, Rachel M; Skira, Meghan; Konetzka, R Tamara

2016-12-01

Performance thresholds are commonly used in pay-for-performance (P4P) incentives, where providers receive a bonus payment for achieving a prespecified target threshold but may produce discontinuous incentives, with providers just below the threshold having the strongest incentive to improve and providers either far below or above the threshold having little incentive. We investigate the effect of performance thresholds on provider response in the setting of nursing home P4P. The Minimum Data Set (MDS) and Online Survey, Certification, and Reporting (OSCAR) datasets. Difference-in-differences design to test for changes in nursing home performance in three states that implemented threshold-based P4P (Colorado, Georgia, and Oklahoma) versus three comparator states (Arizona, Tennessee, and Arkansas) between 2006 and 2009. We find that those farthest below the threshold (i.e., the worst-performing nursing homes) had the largest improvements under threshold-based P4P while those farthest above the threshold worsened. This effect did not vary with the percentage of Medicaid residents in a nursing home. Threshold-based P4P may provide perverse incentives for nursing homes above the performance threshold, but we do not find evidence to support concerns about the effects of performance thresholds on low-performing nursing homes. © Health Research and Educational Trust.

Act No. 89-905 of 19 December 1989 promoting the return to employment and the struggle against professional exclusion.

PubMed

1989-01-01

Among other things, this Act establishes 2 employment incentives to induce employers to hire various categories of the unemployed. The 1st incentive is aimed at persons facing special difficulties in access to employment, in particular, persons out of work for a long period of time and beneficiaries of a "solidarity" allowance or minimum income of work force insertion, with preference given to single women, especially widows. This incentive gives an employer the right to monetary payments, to having the state pay for training, and to exemption from payment of contributions for social insurance, accidents in the workplace, and family allowances if the employer enters into a contract with the State to promote the professional work force insertion of targeted persons. The 2nd incentive is aimed at the same categories of persons, as well as persons out of work over the age of 50 and young persons from 16 to 25 years old, with preference again given to single women, particularly widows. This incentive obligates the state to pay all or part of salaries, training costs, and social service contributions associated with employees given work by certain employers in the public sector and nonprofit employers in the private sector.

Improving on-time surgical starts: the impact of implementing pre-OR timeouts and performance pay.

PubMed

Martin, Luke; Langell, John

2017-11-01

Operating room (OR) time is expensive. Underutilized OR time negatively impacts efficiency and is an unnecessary cost for hospitals. The purpose of this study was to evaluate the impact of a pre-OR timeout and performance pay incentive on the frequency of on-time, first surgical starts. At a single Veterans Affairs Medical Center, we implemented a pre-OR timeout in the form of a safety-briefing checklist and a modest performance pay incentive for on-time starts (>90% compliance) for attending surgeons. Data were collected on all first-start cases beginning before implementation in 2008 and continued through 2015. Each year, an average of 960 first starts occurred across nine surgical divisions. Before implementation of either the timeout or pay incentive, only 15% of cases started on time, and by 2015, greater than 72% were on time (P < 0.001). Over the study period, there were significant improvements in on-time starts (P = 0.01), of delays <15 min (P = 0.01), and of delays 16 to 30 min (P = 0.04). The trends for delays of 31 to 60 min or >60 min were not significant (P = 0.31; P = 0.81). Assuming a loss of 7 min per case for delays <15 min and 20 min per case for delays of 16 to 30 min, the total OR time saved from implementing these measures was 37,556 min. At an estimated cost of $20/min, gross savings from this project were $751,120. Implementation of a pre-OR timeout and performance pay for on-time starts significantly improves OR utilization and reduces unnecessary costs. Published by Elsevier Inc.

Rewarding Educators. Info Brief. Number 53

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Fuller, Dan; Fitzgerald, Kevin; Allen, Rick

2008-01-01

The issue of merit and incentive pay for educators has champions and critics among educators and policymakers. Proponents cite the need to increase pay for effective teachers who improve student achievement and the need to get the best, most effective educators into high-need districts. Critics cite concerns such as a breakdown in cooperation at…

Performance Pay Path to Improvement

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Gratz, Donald B.

2011-01-01

The primary goal of performance pay for the past decade has been higher test scores, and the most prominent strategy has been to increase teacher performance through financial incentives. If teachers are rewarded for success, according to this logic, they will try harder. If they try harder, more children will achieve higher test scores. The…

Principals' Group Seeks Influence on Incentive Pay

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Samuels, Christina A.

2008-01-01

School districts that want to start pay-for-performance programs for school leaders should look beyond high-stakes student tests as the primary measure for awarding bonuses, a position paper released last week by the National Association of Secondary School Principals says. Gerald N. Tirozzi, the executive director of the Reston, Virginia-based…

Merit Pay and Job Enlargement as Reforms: Incentives, Implementation, and Teacher Response.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Firestone, William A.

1991-01-01

Based on intensive case studies of two school districts, this study compared two teacher work reforms: merit pay and job enlargement. Interviews with 64 teachers and 53 administrators, supplemented by over 1,300 survey responses, indicate the efficacy of each approach and the potential advantages of job enlargement. (SLD)

Credentials versus Performance: Review of the Teacher Performance Pay Research

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Podgursky, Michael; Springer, Matthew G.

2007-01-01

In this article we examine the economic case for merit or performance-based pay for K-12 teachers. We review several areas of germane research. The direct evaluation literature on these incentive plans is slender; highly diverse in terms of methodology, targeted populations, and programs evaluated; and primarily focused on short-run motivational…

Incentives for health.

PubMed

Anderson, Peter; Harrison, Oliver; Cooper, Cary; Jané-Llopis, Eva

2011-08-01

This article discusses incentives to help make healthy choices the easy choices for individuals, operating at the levels of the individual, producers and service providers, and governments. Whereas paying individuals directly to be healthier seems to have a limited effect, offering financial incentives through health insurance improves health. Changing the environment to make healthier choices more accessible acts as an incentive to improve health. Employers can provide incentives to improve the health of their employees. Producers and service providers can take voluntary action to make their products less harmful, and they can be nudged into marketing healthier products within a regulatory environment. International agreements and monitoring systems can incentivize governments to do more for health. Lessons from climate change adaptation suggest that multilevel governance and policy integration are greater obstacles to policy change and implementation than knowing what has to be done. Policy change and implementation are triggered by many drivers, many of which are side effects of other policy pressures rather than of the direct policy goal itself. Effective action to reduce noncommunicable diseases will require leveraging social networks into a new ways of thinking about health; making better health prestigious and aspirational, and giving health and wellness a brand that encourages positive behavior change.

Time to Pay Up: Analyzing the Motivational Potential of Financial Awards in a TIF Program

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Rice, Jennifer King; Malen, Betty; Jackson, Cara; Hoyer, Kathleen Mulvaney

2015-01-01

The effectiveness of educator incentive programs rests on the assumption that the potential rewards for participants will motivate them to behave in certain ways (e.g., choose certain jobs, expend greater effort, engage in capacity-building professional development). Some researchers have examined the impact of financial incentives on teacher…

The Determinants of School District Salary Incentives: An Empirical Analysis of, Where and Why

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Martin, Stephanie M.

2010-01-01

Most public school districts in the United States use a salary schedule to determine compensation for teachers within the district. However, some school districts have implemented incentive pay schemes that allow flexibility at the school or even individual teacher level. These compensation schemes in some ways may more closely approximate a…

The role of disease management in pay-for-performance programs for improving the care of chronically ill patients.

PubMed

Beich, Jeff; Scanlon, Dennis P; Ulbrecht, Jan; Ford, Eric W; Ibrahim, Ibrahim A

2006-02-01

To date, pay-for-performance programs targeting the care of persons with chronic conditions have primarily been directed at physicians and provide an alternative to health plan-sponsored chronic disease management (DM) programs. Both approaches require similar infrastructure, and each has its own advantages and disadvantages for program implementation. Pay-for-performance programs use incentives based on patient outcomes; however, an alternative system might incorporate measures of structure and process. Using a conceptual framework, the authors explore the variation in 50 diabetes DM programs using data from the 2002 National Business Coalition on Health's eValue8 Request for Information (RFI). The authors raise issues relevant to the assignment of accountability for patient outcomes to either health plans or physicians. They analyze the association between RFI scores measuring structures and processes, and HEDIS diabetes intermediate outcome measures. Finally, the strengths and weaknesses of using the RFI scores as an alternative metric for pay-for-performance programs are discussed.

Implementing Pay-for-Performance in the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit

PubMed Central

Profit, Jochen; Zupancic, John A. F.; Gould, Jeffrey B.; Petersen, Laura A.

2011-01-01

Pay-for-performance initiatives in medicine are proliferating rapidly. Neonatal intensive care is a likely target for these efforts because of the high cost, available databases, and relative strength of evidence for at least some measures of quality. Pay-for-performance may improve patient care but requires valid measurements of quality to ensure that financial incentives truly support superior performance. Given the existing uncertainty with respect to both the effectiveness of pay-for-performance and the state of quality measurement science, experimentation with pay-for-performance initiatives should proceed with caution and in controlled settings. In this article, we describe approaches to measuring quality and implementing pay-for-performance in the NICU setting. PMID:17473099

The long-term effect of premier pay for performance on patient outcomes.

PubMed

Jha, Ashish K; Joynt, Karen E; Orav, E John; Epstein, Arnold M

2012-04-26

Pay for performance has become a central strategy in the drive to improve health care. We assessed the long-term effect of the Medicare Premier Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration (HQID) on patient outcomes. We used Medicare data to compare outcomes between the 252 hospitals participating in the Premier HQID and 3363 control hospitals participating in public reporting alone. We examined 30-day mortality among more than 6 million patients who had acute myocardial infarction, congestive heart failure, or pneumonia or who underwent coronary-artery bypass grafting (CABG) between 2003 and 2009. At baseline, the composite 30-day mortality was similar for Premier and non-Premier hospitals (12.33% and 12.40%, respectively; difference, -0.07 percentage points; 95% confidence interval [CI], -0.40 to 0.26). The rates of decline in mortality per quarter at the two types of hospitals were also similar (0.04% and 0.04%, respectively; difference, -0.01 percentage points; 95% CI, -0.02 to 0.01), and mortality remained similar after 6 years under the pay-for-performance system (11.82% for Premier hospitals and 11.74% for non-Premier hospitals; difference, 0.08 percentage points; 95% CI, -0.30 to 0.46). We found that the effects of pay for performance on mortality did not differ significantly among conditions for which outcomes were explicitly linked to incentives (acute myocardial infarction and CABG) and among conditions not linked to incentives (congestive heart failure and pneumonia) (P=0.36 for interaction). Among hospitals that were poor performers at baseline, mortality was similar in the two groups of hospitals at the start of the study (15.12% and 14.73%; difference, 0.39 percentage points; 95% CI, -0.36 to 1.15), with similar rates of improvement per quarter (0.10% and 0.07%; difference, -0.03 percentage points; 95% CI, -0.08 to 0.02) and similar mortality rates at the end of the study (13.37% and 13.21%; difference, 0.15 percentage points; 95% CI, -0.70 to 1.01). We found no evidence that the largest hospital-based pay-for-performance program led to a decrease in 30-day mortality. Expectations of improved outcomes for programs modeled after Premier HQID should therefore remain modest.

Employer contribution and premium growth in health insurance.

PubMed

Liu, Yiyan; Jin, Ginger Zhe

2015-01-01

We study whether employer premium contribution schemes could impact the pricing behavior of health plans and contribute to rising premiums. Using 1991-2011 data before and after a 1999 premium subsidy policy change in the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP), we find that the employer premium contribution scheme has a differential impact on health plan pricing based on two market incentives: 1) consumers are less price sensitive when they only need to pay part of the premium increase, and 2) each health plan has an incentive to increase the employer's premium contribution to that plan. Both incentives are found to contribute to premium growth. Counterfactual simulation shows that average premium would have been 10% less than observed and the federal government would have saved 15% per year on its premium contribution had the subsidy policy change not occurred in the FEHBP. We discuss the potential of similar incentives in other government-subsidized insurance systems such as the Medicare Part D and the Health Insurance Marketplace under the Affordable Care Act. Copyright © 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Managing pay for performance: aligning social science research with budget predictability.

PubMed

Rosenau, Pauline Vaillancourt; Lal, Lincy S; Lako, Christiaan

2012-01-01

Managers and policymakers are seeking practical guidelines for assessing the outcomes of emerging pay-for-performance (P4P) programs. Evaluations of P4P programs published to date are mixed-some are confusing-and methodological problems with them are common. This article first identifies and summarizes obstacles to implementing effective P4P programs. Second, it describes results from social science research going back several decades to support evidence-based P4P best practices. Among the findings from this research, the zero-sum and "earn it back" P4P incentive systems have important drawbacks and may be counterproductive, neither reducing health system costs nor improving quality. The research suggests that punishing participants for low performance may further reduce individuals' performance, especially when involvement is required. We suggest that optimal P4P systems are those that reward all participants for performance improvements. Third, the article links P4P design to budgetary considerations. P4P program designs that provide incentives while improving quality and reducing costs are critical if budget neutrality is a priority for the organization and its resources are limited. In these types of P4P designs, cost calculations are straightforward: The greater the participation, the higher the savings. The article concludes by recommending an evidence-based P4P approach for practitioners that can be implemented without large upfront investment. More research on this topic is also advised.

Pay-for-performance in disease management: a systematic review of the literature.

PubMed

de Bruin, Simone R; Baan, Caroline A; Struijs, Jeroen N

2011-10-14

Pay-for-performance (P4P) is increasingly implemented in the healthcare system to encourage improvements in healthcare quality. P4P is a payment model that rewards healthcare providers for meeting pre-established targets for delivery of healthcare services by financial incentives. Based on their performance, healthcare providers receive either additional or reduced payment. Currently, little is known about P4P schemes intending to improve delivery of chronic care through disease management. The objectives of this paper are therefore to provide an overview of P4P schemes used to stimulate delivery of chronic care through disease management and to provide insight into their effects on healthcare quality and costs. A systematic PubMed search was performed for English language papers published between 2000 and 2010 describing P4P schemes related to the implementation of disease management. Wagner's chronic care model was used to make disease management operational. Eight P4P schemes were identified, introduced in the USA (n = 6), Germany (n = 1), and Australia (n = 1). Five P4P schemes were part of a larger scheme of interventions to improve quality of care, whereas three P4P schemes were solely implemented. Most financial incentives were rewards, selective, and granted on the basis of absolute performance. More variation was found in incented entities and the basis for providing incentives. Information about motivation, certainty, size, frequency, and duration of the financial incentives was generally limited. Five studies were identified that evaluated the effects of P4P on healthcare quality. Most studies showed positive effects of P4P on healthcare quality. No studies were found that evaluated the effects of P4P on healthcare costs. The number of P4P schemes to encourage disease management is limited. Hardly any information is available about the effects of such schemes on healthcare quality and costs. © 2011 de Bruin et al; licensee BioMed Central Ltd.

Pay-for-performance in disease management: a systematic review of the literature

PubMed Central

2011-01-01

Background Pay-for-performance (P4P) is increasingly implemented in the healthcare system to encourage improvements in healthcare quality. P4P is a payment model that rewards healthcare providers for meeting pre-established targets for delivery of healthcare services by financial incentives. Based on their performance, healthcare providers receive either additional or reduced payment. Currently, little is known about P4P schemes intending to improve delivery of chronic care through disease management. The objectives of this paper are therefore to provide an overview of P4P schemes used to stimulate delivery of chronic care through disease management and to provide insight into their effects on healthcare quality and costs. Methods A systematic PubMed search was performed for English language papers published between 2000 and 2010 describing P4P schemes related to the implementation of disease management. Wagner's chronic care model was used to make disease management operational. Results Eight P4P schemes were identified, introduced in the USA (n = 6), Germany (n = 1), and Australia (n = 1). Five P4P schemes were part of a larger scheme of interventions to improve quality of care, whereas three P4P schemes were solely implemented. Most financial incentives were rewards, selective, and granted on the basis of absolute performance. More variation was found in incented entities and the basis for providing incentives. Information about motivation, certainty, size, frequency, and duration of the financial incentives was generally limited. Five studies were identified that evaluated the effects of P4P on healthcare quality. Most studies showed positive effects of P4P on healthcare quality. No studies were found that evaluated the effects of P4P on healthcare costs. Conclusion The number of P4P schemes to encourage disease management is limited. Hardly any information is available about the effects of such schemes on healthcare quality and costs. PMID:21999234

An Incentive Pay Plan for Advanced Practice Registered Nurses: Impact On Provider and Organizational Outcomes.

PubMed

Rhodes, Catherine A; Bechtle, Mavis; McNett, Molly

2015-01-01

Advanced practice registered nurses (APRNs) are integral to the provision of quality, cost-effective health care throughout the continuum of care. To promote job satisfaction and ultimately decrease turnover, an APRN incentive plan based on productivity and quality was formulated. Clinical productivity in the incentive plan was measured by national benchmarks for work relative value units for nonphysician providers. After the first year of implementation, APRNs were paid more for additional productivity and quality and the institution had an increase in patient visits and charges. The incentive plan is a win-win for hospitals that employ APRNs.

Incentive Pay Programs Do Not Affect Teacher Motivation or Reported Practices: Results from Three Randomized Studies

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Yuan, Kun; Le, Vi-Nhuan; McCaffrey, Daniel F.; Marsh, Julie A.; Hamilton, Laura S.; Stecher, Brian M.; Springer, Matthew G.

2013-01-01

This study drew on teacher survey responses from randomized experiments exploring three different pay-for-performance programs to examine the extent to which these programs motivated teachers to improve student achievement and the impact of such programs on teachers' instruction, number of hours worked, job stress, and collegiality. Results showed…

Characteristics and Determinants of Teacher-Designed Pay for Performance Plans: Evidence from Texas' Governor's Educator Excellence Grant (GEEG) Program. Research Brief

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

National Center on Performance Incentives, 2008

2008-01-01

In "Characteristics and Determinants of Teacher-Designed Pay for Performance Plans: Evidence from Texas' Governor's Educator Excellence Grant (GEEG) Program"--a paper presented at the February 2008 National Center on Performance Incentives research to policy conference--Lori Taylor, Matthew Springer, and Mark Ehlert describe the teacher…

Association of patient case-mix adjustment, hospital process performance rankings, and eligibility for financial incentives.

PubMed

Mehta, Rajendra H; Liang, Li; Karve, Amrita M; Hernandez, Adrian F; Rumsfeld, John S; Fonarow, Gregg C; Peterson, Eric D

2008-10-22

While most comparisons of hospital outcomes adjust for patient characteristics, process performance comparisons typically do not. To evaluate the degree to which hospital process performance ratings and eligibility for financial incentives are altered after accounting for hospitals' patient demographics, clinical characteristics, and mix of treatment opportunities. Using data from the American Heart Association's Get With the Guidelines program between January 2, 2000, and March 28, 2008, we analyzed hospital process performance based on the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services' defined core measures for acute myocardial infarction. Hospitals were initially ranked based on crude composite process performance and then ranked again after accounting for hospitals' patient demographics, clinical characteristics, and eligibility for measures using a hierarchical model. We then compared differences in hospital performance rankings and pay-for-performance financial incentive categories (top 20%, middle 60%, and bottom 20% institutions). Hospital process performance ranking and pay-for-performance financial incentive categories. A total of 148,472 acute myocardial infarction patients met the study criteria from 449 centers. Hospitals for which crude composite acute myocardial infarction performance was in the bottom quintile (n = 89) were smaller nonacademic institutions that treated a higher percentage of patients from racial or ethnic minority groups and also patients with greater comorbidities than hospitals ranked in the top quintile (n = 90). Although there was overall agreement on hospital rankings based on observed vs adjusted composite scores (weighted kappa, 0.74), individual hospital ranking changed with adjustment (median, 22 ranks; range, 0-214; interquartile range, 9-40). Additionally, 16.5% of institutions (n = 74) changed pay-for-performance financial status categories after accounting for patient and treatment opportunity mix. Our findings suggest that accounting for hospital differences in patient characteristics and treatment opportunities is associated with modest changes in hospital performance rankings and eligibility for financial benefits in pay-for-performance programs for treatment of myocardial infarction.

Focus on Teacher Pay and Incentives: Recent Legislative Actions and Update on Salary Averages. Challenge to Lead

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Gaines, Gale F.

2004-01-01

Is your state making progress toward having a high-quality teacher in every classroom? How will you know? One indicator of progress in the Challenge to Lead goals refers to teacher compensation: "Salaries, benefits and incentives are competitive in the marketplace. They are aimed at recognized expertise, student performance, state needs and taking…

Evaluating recreational hunting as an incentive for habitat conservation on private land in California

Treesearch

Luke T. Macaulay

2015-01-01

Private land plays a crucial role in the conservation of biodiversity in California, yet these lands are the least protected and most prone to environmental degradation. In 1930, Aldo Leopold recognized the potential to better conserve private land by an incentive scheme where recreational users would pay landowners for access to conserved wildlife habitat. While...

No Evidence That Incentive Pay for Teacher Teams Improves Student Outcomes: Results from a Randomized Trial. Research Brief

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Adamson, David M.

2012-01-01

Researchers examined whether rewarding teams of teachers for student performance had an effect on student achievement or teacher practices or attitudes in a demonstration project in Round Rock, Texas. They found that the intervention had no effect in any of these areas. Students taught by teacher teams who were offered incentives scored slightly…

Higher Education: Stronger Federal Oversight Needed to Enforce Ban on Incentive Payments to School Recruiters. Report to Congressional Committees. GAO-11-10

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Iritani, Katherine M.

2010-01-01

In 1992, Congress banned schools participating in federal student aid programs from paying commissions, bonuses, or other financial incentives to individuals based on their success in enrolling students or securing their financial aid. The ban applies to all postsecondary schools, including private for-profit, public, and private nonprofit…

WWC Quick Review of the Report "Teacher Pay for Performance: Experimental Evidence from the Project on Incentives in Teaching"

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

What Works Clearinghouse, 2011

2011-01-01

The study examined whether offering financial incentives to teachers of fifth- through eighth-grade math students improved their students' achievement on the math section of the Tennessee Comprehensive Assessment Program. The study took place in the Metropolitan Nashville Public School District during the 2006-07 through 2008-09 school years. It…

Economic incentive in community nursing: attraction, rejection or indifference?

PubMed Central

Kingma, Mireille

2003-01-01

Background It is hard to imagine any period in time when economic issues were more visible in health sector decision-making. The search for measures that maximize available resources has never been greater than within the present decade. A staff payroll represents 60%-70% of budgeted health service funds. The cost-effective use of human resources is thus an objective of paramount importance. Using incentives and disincentives to direct individuals' energies and behaviour is common practice in all work settings, of which the health care system is no exception. The range and influence of economic incentives/disincentives affecting community nurses are the subject of this discussion paper. The tendency by nurses to disregard, and in many cases, deny a direct impact of economic incentives/disincentives on their motivation and professional conduct is of particular interest. The goal of recent research was to determine if economic incentives/disincentives in community nursing exist, whether they have a perceivable impact and in what areas. Conclusion Understanding the value system of community nurses and how they respond to economic incentives/disincentives facilitates the development of reward systems more likely to be relevant and strategic. If nurse rewards are to become more effective organizational tools, the data suggest that future initiatives should: • Improve nurses' salary/income relativities (e.g. comparable pay/rates); • Provide just compensation for job-related expenses (e.g. petrol, clothing); • Introduce promotional opportunities within the clinical area, rewarding skill and competence development; • Make available a range of financed rewards. - Direct (e.g. subsidized education, additional leave, insurance benefits); - Indirect (e.g. better working conditions, access to professional support network, greater participation in decision-making bodies). PMID:12904253

Beyond Measurement and Reward: Methods of Motivating Quality Improvement and Accountability.

PubMed

Berenson, Robert A; Rice, Thomas

2015-12-01

The article examines public policies designed to improve quality and accountability that do not rely on financial incentives and public reporting of provider performance. Payment policy should help temper the current "more is better" attitude of physicians and provider organizations. Incentive neutrality would better support health professionals' intrinsic motivation to act in their patients' best interests to improve overall quality than would pay-for-performance plans targeted to specific areas of clinical care. Public policy can support clinicians' intrinsic motivation through approaches that support systematic feedback to clinicians and provide concrete opportunities to collaborate to improve care. Some programs administered by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, including Partnership for Patients and Conditions of Participation, deserve more attention; they represent available, but largely ignored, approaches to support providers to improve quality and protect beneficiaries against substandard care. Public policies related to quality improvement should focus more on methods of enhancing professional intrinsic motivation, while recognizing the potential role of organizations to actively promote and facilitate that motivation. Actually achieving improvement, however, will require a reexamination of the role played by financial incentives embedded in payments and the unrealistic expectations placed on marginal incentives in pay-for-performance schemes. © Health Research and Educational Trust.

How does the pharmaceutical industry influence prescription? A qualitative study of provider payment incentives and drug remunerations in hospitals in Shanghai.

PubMed

Yang, Wei

2016-10-01

Over-prescription has become one major problem in China's health care sector. Incorporating interview data from hospitals in Shanghai, this paper provided empirical evidence on how the process of over-prescription was carried out in day-to-day clinical settings, and demonstrates various mechanisms that allow over-prescription to continue vigorously in the context of the Chinese health care system. In particular, this study identified four levels of incentives that over-prescription was carried out: hospital, medical department, doctors and pharmaceutical companies. Due to the insufficient funding from the government and rising operational costs, hospitals had to rely on the sales of drugs and provision of medical services to survive. This funding pressure then transferred to specific revenue targets for medical departments. A combination of incentives, including drug remunerations, bonus system, low pay and high workloads motivated over-prescription at doctor level. At pharmaceutical company level, high profits of pharmaceuticals products as well as lack of emphasis on efficacy of drugs led to under-table payments and illicit drug remunerations. The study argued that the way that the Chinese health care system operates was based on the profit-seeking principle rather than on fulfilling its social functions, and called for a systematic reform of provider incentives to eradicating the problem of over-prescription.

The dual impact of ecology and management on social incentives in marine common-pool resource systems.

PubMed

Klein, E S; Barbier, M R; Watson, J R

2017-08-01

Understanding how and when cooperative human behaviour forms in common-pool resource systems is critical to illuminating social-ecological systems and designing governance institutions that promote sustainable resource use. Before assessing the full complexity of social dynamics, it is essential to understand, concretely and mechanistically, how resource dynamics and human actions interact to create incentives and pay-offs for social behaviours. Here, we investigated how such incentives for information sharing are affected by spatial dynamics and management in a common-pool resource system. Using interviews with fishermen to inform an agent-based model, we reveal generic mechanisms through which, for a given ecological setting characterized by the spatial dynamics of the resource, the two 'human factors' of information sharing and management may heterogeneously impact various members of a group for whom theory would otherwise predict the same strategy. When users can deplete the resource, these interactions are further affected by the management approach. Finally, we discuss the implications of alternative motivations, such as equity among fishermen and consistency of the fleet's output. Our results indicate that resource spatial dynamics, form of management and level of depletion can interact to alter the sociality of people in common-pool resource systems, providing necessary insight for future study of strategic decision processes.

Neural Mechanisms Underlying Paradoxical Performance for Monetary Incentives Are Driven by Loss Aversion

PubMed Central

Chib, Vikram S.; De Martino, Benedetto; Shimojo, Shinsuke; O'Doherty, John P.

2012-01-01

Summary Employers often make payment contingent on performance in order to motivate workers. We used fMRI with a novel incentivized skill task to examine the neural processes underlying behavioral responses to performance-based pay. We found that individuals' performance increased with increasing incentives; however, very high incentive levels led to the paradoxical consequence of worse performance. Between initial incentive presentation and task execution, striatal activity rapidly switched between activation and deactivation in response to increasing incentives. Critically, decrements in performance and striatal deactivations were directly predicted by an independent measure of behavioral loss aversion. These results suggest that incentives associated with successful task performance are initially encoded as a potential gain; however, when actually performing a task, individuals encode the potential loss that would arise from failure. PMID:22578508

Impact of caregiver incentives on child health: Evidence from an experiment with Anganwadi workers in India.

PubMed

Singh, Prakarsh; Masters, William A

2017-09-01

This paper tests the effectiveness of performance pay and bonuses among government childcare workers in India. In a controlled study of 160 ICDS centers serving over 4000 children, we randomly assign workers to either fixed bonuses or payments based on the nutritional status of children in their care, and also collect data from a control group receiving only standard salaries. In all three study arms mothers receive nutrition information. We find that performance pay reduces underweight prevalence by about 5 percentage points over 3 months, and height improves by about one centimeter. Impacts on weight continue when incentives are renewed and return to parallel trends thereafter. Fixed bonuses are less expensive but lead to smaller and less precisely estimated effects than performance pay, especially for children near malnutrition thresholds. Both treatments improve worker effort and communication with mothers, who in turn feed a more calorific diet to children at home. Copyright © 2017 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

A Case for Enlisted Unmanned Aerial System Operators

DTIC Science & Technology

2009-02-25

operational units with the young pilots that are coming in.”27 This is not a new phenomenon, as the Air Force has experienced on and off pilot shortages...underpinning for the increasingly complex leadership and managerial tasks expected from Senior Officers. But as previously discussed, history has definitively...the pilot shortage and economic incentives such as Aviaiton Continuation Pay designed to encourage pilots to stay in the Air Force. When three

What's good for the goose is good for the gander. Guiding principles for the use of financial incentives in health behaviour change.

PubMed

Lynagh, Marita C; Sanson-Fisher, Rob W; Bonevski, Billie

2013-03-01

The use of financial incentives or pay-for-performance programs for health care providers has triggered emerging interest in the use of financial incentives for encouraging health behaviour change. This paper aims to identify key conditions under which the use of financial incentives for improvements in public health outcomes is most likely to be effective and appropriate. We review recent systematic reviews on their effectiveness in changing health behaviour and identify existing moral concerns concerning personal financial incentives. Current evidence indicates that incentives can be effective in driving health behaviour change under certain provisos, while a number of misgivings continue to be deliberated on. We outline a number of key principles for consideration in decisions about the potential use of incentives in leading to public health improvements. These key principles can assist policy makers in making decisions on the use of financial incentives directed at achieving improvements in public health.

Evaluation of the Teacher Incentive Fund: Implementation and Impacts of Pay-for-Performance after Three Years. NCEE 2016-4004

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Wellington, Alison; Chiang, Hanley; Hallgren, Kristin; Speroni, Cecilia; Herrmann, Mariesa; Burkander, Paul

2016-01-01

Research indicates that effective teachers are critical to raising student achievement. However, there is little evidence about the best ways to improve teacher effectiveness, or how schools that serve the students most in need can attract and retain effective teachers. Traditional salary schedules, which pay teachers based on their years of…

Consumer-choice health plan (first of two parts). Inflation and inequity in health care today: alternatives for cost control and an analysis of proposals for national health insurance.

PubMed

Enthoven, A C

1978-03-23

The financing system for medical costs in this country suffers from severe inflation and inequity. The tax-supported system of fee for service for doctors, third-party intermediaries and cost reimbursement for hospitals produces inflation by rewarding cost-increasing behavior and failing to provide incentives for economy. The system is inequitable because the government pays more on behalf of those who choose more costly systems of care, because tax benefits subsidize the health insurance of the well-to-do, while not helping many low-income people, and because employment health insurance does not guarantee continuity of coverage and is regressive in its financing. Analysis of previous proposals for national health insurance shows none to be capable of solving most of these problems. Direct economic regulation by government will not improve the situation. Cost controls through incentives and regulated competition in the private sector are most likely to be effective.

Using Incentives to Align Individual Choice with Organiztional Objectives

DTIC Science & Technology

2009-10-01

International Personality Item Pool – facet level items - Subject pool » University Students – 1st generation college – 18-24 years old, smaller sample 30... Services , Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be...organizational objectives • 4 sets of experiments - Multi-attribute Auction » Precursor to Assignment Incentive Pay (AIP) - Cafeteria Style

Bonus Awards for Teachers in Texas' Performance Pay Program: Findings from the First Round of TEEG Schools. Research Brief

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

National Center on Performance Incentives, 2009

2009-01-01

A recent report published by the National Center on Performance Incentives (NCPI) presents findings from the second-year of a multi-year evaluation of the Texas Educator Excellence Grant (TEEG) program, a statewide educator incentive program that operated in Texas. As part of this evaluation report, researchers examined how first-year TEEG schools…

Use of Provider-Level Dashboards and Pay-for-Performance in Venous Thromboembolism Prophylaxis*

PubMed Central

Michtalik, Henry J.; Carolan, Howard T.; Haut, Elliott R.; Lau, Brandyn D.; Streiff, Michael B.; Finkelstein, Joseph; Pronovost, Peter J.; Durkin, Nowella; Brotman, Daniel J.

2014-01-01

Background Despite safe and cost-effective venous thromboembolism (VTE) prevention measures, VTE prophylaxis rates are often suboptimal. Healthcare reform efforts emphasize transparency through programs to report performance, and payment incentives through programs to pay-for-performance. Objective To sequentially examine an individualized physician dashboard and pay-for-performance program to improve VTE prophylaxis rates amongst hospitalists. Design Retrospective analysis of 3144 inpatient admissions. After a baseline observation period, VTE prophylaxis compliance was compared during both interventions. Setting 1060-bed tertiary care medical center. Participants 38 part- and full-time academic hospitalists. Interventions A Web-based hospitalist dashboard provided VTE prophylaxis feedback. After 6 months of feedback only, a pay-for-performance program was incorporated, with graduated payouts for compliance rates of 80-100%. Measurements Prescription of American College of Chest Physicians guideline-compliant VTE prophylaxis and subsequent pay-for-performance payments. Results Monthly VTE prophylaxis compliance rates were 86% (95% CI: 85, 88), 90% (95% CI: 88, 93), and 94% (95% CI: 93, 96) during the baseline, dashboard, and combined dashboard/pay-for-performance periods, respectively. Compliance significantly improved with the use of the dashboard (p=0.01) and addition of the pay-for-performance program (p=0.01). The highest rate of improvement occurred with the dashboard (1.58%/month; p=0.01). Annual individual physician performance payments ranged from $53 to $1244 (mean $633; SD ±350). Conclusions Direct feedback using dashboards was associated with significantly improved compliance, with further improvement after incorporating an individual physician pay-for-performance program. Real-time dashboards and physician-level incentives may assist hospitals in achieving higher safety and quality benchmarks. PMID:25545690

Use of provider-level dashboards and pay-for-performance in venous thromboembolism prophylaxis.

PubMed

Michtalik, Henry J; Carolan, Howard T; Haut, Elliott R; Lau, Brandyn D; Streiff, Michael B; Finkelstein, Joseph; Pronovost, Peter J; Durkin, Nowella; Brotman, Daniel J

2015-03-01

Despite safe and cost-effective venous thromboembolism (VTE) prevention measures, VTE prophylaxis rates are often suboptimal. Healthcare reform efforts emphasize transparency through programs to report performance and payment incentives through pay-for-performance programs. To sequentially examine an individualized physician dashboard and pay-for-performance program to improve VTE prophylaxis rates among hospitalists. Retrospective analysis of 3144 inpatient admissions. After a baseline observation period, VTE prophylaxis compliance was compared during both interventions. A 1060-bed tertiary care medical center. Thirty-eight part-time and full-time academic hospitalists. A Web-based hospitalist dashboard provided VTE prophylaxis feedback. After 6 months of feedback only, a pay-for-performance program was incorporated, with graduated payouts for compliance rates of 80% to 100%. Prescription of American College of Chest Physicians' guideline-compliant VTE prophylaxis and subsequent pay-for-performance payments. Monthly VTE prophylaxis compliance rates were 86% (95% confidence interval [CI]: 85-88), 90% (95% CI: 88-93), and 94% (95% CI: 93-96) during the baseline, dashboard, and combined dashboard/pay-for-performance periods, respectively. Compliance significantly improved with the use of the dashboard (P = 0.01) and addition of the pay-for-performance program (P = 0.01). The highest rate of improvement occurred with the dashboard (1.58%/month; P = 0.01). Annual individual physician performance payments ranged from $53 to $1244 (mean $633; standard deviation ±$350). Direct feedback using dashboards was associated with significantly improved compliance, with further improvement after incorporating an individual physician pay-for-performance program. Real-time dashboards and physician-level incentives may assist hospitals in achieving higher safety and quality benchmarks. © 2014 Society of Hospital Medicine.

Heterogeneity in the Effects of Reward- and Deposit-based Financial Incentives on Smoking Cessation

PubMed Central

French, Benjamin; Small, Dylan S.; Saulsgiver, Kathryn; Harhay, Michael O.; Audrain-McGovern, Janet; Loewenstein, George; Asch, David A.; Volpp, Kevin G.

2016-01-01

Rationale: Targeting different smoking cessation programs to smokers most likely to quit when using them could reduce the burden of lung disease. Objectives: To identify smokers most likely to quit using pure reward-based financial incentives or incentive programs requiring refundable deposits to become eligible for rewards. Methods: We conducted prespecified secondary analyses of a randomized trial in which 2,538 smokers were assigned to an $800 reward contingent on sustained abstinence from smoking, a refundable $150 deposit plus a $650 reward, or usual care. Measurements and Main Results: Using logistic regression, we identified characteristics of smokers that were most strongly associated with accepting their assigned intervention and ceasing smoking for 6 months. We assessed modification of the acceptance, efficacy, and effectiveness of reward and deposit programs by 11 prospectively selected demographic, smoking-related, and psychological factors. Predictors of sustained smoking abstinence differed among participants assigned to reward- versus deposit-based incentives. However, greater readiness to quit and less steep discounting of future rewards were consistently among the most important predictors. Deposit-based programs were uniquely effective relative to usual care among men, higher-income participants, and participants who more commonly failed to pay their bills (all interaction P values < 0.10). Relative to rewards, deposits were more effective among black persons (P = 0.022) and those who more commonly failed to pay their bills (P = 0.082). Relative to rewards, deposits were more commonly accepted by higher-income participants, men, white persons, and those who less commonly failed to pay their bills (all P < 0.05). Conclusions: Heterogeneity among smokers in their acceptance and response to different forms of incentives suggests potential benefits of targeting behavior-change interventions based on patient characteristics. Clinical trial registered with www.clinicaltrials.gov (NCT 01526265). PMID:27064456

Medicare and Medicaid: Conflicting Incentives for Long-Term Care

PubMed Central

Grabowski, David C

2007-01-01

The structure of Medicare and Medicaid creates conflicting incentives regarding dually eligible beneficiaries without coordinating their care. Both Medicare and Medicaid have an interest in limiting their costs, and neither has an incentive to take responsibility for the management or quality of care. Examples of misaligned incentives are Medicare's cost-sharing rules, cost shifting within home health care and nursing homes, and cost shifting across chronic and acute care settings. Several policy initiatives—capitation, pay-for-performance, and the shift of the dually eligible population's Medicaid costs to the federal government—may address these conflicting incentives, but all have strengths and weaknesses. With the aging baby boom generation and projected federal and state budget shortfalls, this issue will be a continuing focus of policymakers in the coming decades. PMID:18070331

Structuring economic incentives to reduce emissions from deforestation within Indonesia.

PubMed

Busch, Jonah; Lubowski, Ruben N; Godoy, Fabiano; Steininger, Marc; Yusuf, Arief A; Austin, Kemen; Hewson, Jenny; Juhn, Daniel; Farid, Muhammad; Boltz, Frederick

2012-01-24

We estimate and map the impacts that alternative national and subnational economic incentive structures for reducing emissions from deforestation (REDD+) in Indonesia would have had on greenhouse gas emissions and national and local revenue if they had been in place from 2000 to 2005. The impact of carbon payments on deforestation is calibrated econometrically from the pattern of observed deforestation and spatial variation in the benefits and costs of converting land to agriculture over that time period. We estimate that at an international carbon price of $10/tCO(2)e, a "mandatory incentive structure," such as a cap-and-trade or symmetric tax-and-subsidy program, would have reduced emissions by 163-247 MtCO(2)e/y (20-31% below the without-REDD+ reference scenario), while generating a programmatic budget surplus. In contrast, a "basic voluntary incentive structure" modeled after a standard payment-for-environmental-services program would have reduced emissions nationally by only 45-76 MtCO(2)e/y (6-9%), while generating a programmatic budget shortfall. By making four policy improvements--paying for net emission reductions at the scale of an entire district rather than site-by-site; paying for reductions relative to reference levels that match business-as-usual levels; sharing a portion of district-level revenues with the national government; and sharing a portion of the national government's responsibility for costs with districts--an "improved voluntary incentive structure" would have been nearly as effective as a mandatory incentive structure, reducing emissions by 136-207 MtCO(2)e/y (17-26%) and generating a programmatic budget surplus.

An under-met and over-met expectations model of employee reactions to merit raises.

PubMed

Schaubroeck, John; Shaw, Jason D; Duffy, Michelle K; Mitra, Atul

2008-03-01

The authors developed a model of how raise expectations influence the relationship between merit pay raises and employee reactions and tested it using a sample of hospital employees. Pay-for-performance (PFP) perceptions were consistently related to personal reactions (e.g., pay raise happiness, pay-level satisfaction, and turnover intentions). Merit pay raises were strongly related to reactions only among employees with high raise expectations and high PFP perceptions. The interactive effects of under-met/over-met expectations and PFP perceptions were mediated by the extent to which participants saw the raise as generous and they were happy with the raises they received. The authors discuss the implications of these findings for expectation-fulfillment theories, merit pay research, and the administration of incentives. Copyright 2008 APA

Auction Mechanisms For Allocating Individualized Non-monetary Retention Incentives in Complex Decision Environments: Evaluation Via Laboratory Experimentation

DTIC Science & Technology

2010-03-01

MILITARY COMPENSATION .....................7 1. Basic Pay and Allowances ......................8 2. Other Monetary and Non-Monetary Benefits ......9...3. Deferred Benefits ............................10 4. Special Pays and Bonuses .....................10 C. THE SRB PROGRAM (MARINE CORPS...or flexible benefits packages, to military personnel. Much of the thesis builds on this prior research. Chapter II provides an overview of

5 CFR 575.507 - What is the maximum extended assignment incentive that may be paid for a period of service?

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... greater of— (1) An amount equal to 25 percent of the annual rate of basic pay of the employee at the... periods equals 546 days, and 546 days divided by 365 days equals 1.50 years. ... rate employees who do not have a scheduled annual rate of basic pay, the annual rate in paragraph (a...

A Comparison of Individual and School Level Approaches to Merit Pay: A Case Study of the Dade County Public Schools.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Provenzo, Eugene F., Jr.; And Others

This policy study discusses two models of merit pay programs enacted in Florida: the Florida Meritorious Teacher Program and the Quality Instruction Incentives Program (QUIIP). Using the Motivation-Hygiene Theory (Herzberg et al.) as a theoretical framework, each program was analyzed from the perspective of how it worked as a motivator and source…

Evaluation of the Teacher Incentive Fund: Implementation and Impacts of Pay-for-Performance after Three Years. Executive Summary. NCEE 2016-4005

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Wellington, Alison; Chiang, Hanley; Hallgren, Kristin; Speroni, Cecilia; Herrmann, Mariesa; Burkander, Paul

2016-01-01

Research indicates that effective teachers are critical to raising student achievement. However, there is little evidence about the best ways to improve teacher effectiveness, or how schools that serve the students most in need can attract and retain effective teachers. Traditional salary schedules, which pay teachers based on their years of…

Focus on Teacher Pay and Incentives: 2005 Legislative Actions and Update on Salary Averages. Challenge to Lead Series

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Gaines, Gale F.

2005-01-01

As the largest part of K-12 spending, teacher pay is often the focus of deliberations during legislative sessions. Compensation is an important part of attracting and retaining high-quality teachers. Most teachers continue to be paid based primarily on years of experience and degree level, although some states tie a small portion of compensation…

[Pay for performance (P4P). Long-term effects and perspectives].

PubMed

Schrappe, M; Gültekin, N

2011-02-01

After 10 years of experience and research, a wide array of results on evaluation and long-term effects of pay for performance (P4P) programs have been published. These data do not only give insight into most of the problems of implementation, but also into aspects which, in part, may attenuate the high expectations at the beginning of the discussion. P4P programs exhibit a ceiling effect, some improvements are reversed after incentives are cancelled, and improvements show opportunity costs as absent improvements for indicators, which are not object to financial incentives (in some cases for the same disease). These observations can be explained by the hypothesis that P4P programs have characteristics of fee-for-service reimbursement, if symmetric information is available for insurance and provider. P4P programs are local instruments. While integration of healthcare is considered as an important issue, they should be combined with programs and incentives which foster further vertical and horizontal integration. For Germany, further research in the implementation and effects of P4P programs is necessary.

On Supplementing “Foot in the Door” Incentives for eHealth Program Engagement

PubMed Central

2014-01-01

Financial health incentives, such as paying people to lose weight, are being widely implemented by Western nations and large corporations. A growing number of studies have tested the impact of incentives on health behaviors, though few have evaluated the approach on a population-scale. In this issue of the Journal of Medical Internet Research, Liu et al add to the evidence-base by examining whether a single incentive can motivate enrollment and engagement in a preventive eHealth program in a sample of 142,726 Canadian adults. While the incentives increased enrollment significantly (by a factor of about 28), a very high level of program attrition was noted (90%). The “foot in the door” incentive technique employed was insufficient; enrollees received incentives for signing-up for, but not for engaging with, the eHealth program. To supplement this technique and drive sustained behavior change, several theoretically- and empirically-based strategies are proposed. Specifically, incentives indexed to behavioral achievements over time are highlighted as one approach to boost engagement in this population in the future. PMID:25092221

Structuring economic incentives to reduce emissions from deforestation within Indonesia

PubMed Central

Busch, Jonah; Lubowski, Ruben N.; Godoy, Fabiano; Steininger, Marc; Yusuf, Arief A.; Austin, Kemen; Hewson, Jenny; Juhn, Daniel; Farid, Muhammad; Boltz, Frederick

2012-01-01

We estimate and map the impacts that alternative national and subnational economic incentive structures for reducing emissions from deforestation (REDD+) in Indonesia would have had on greenhouse gas emissions and national and local revenue if they had been in place from 2000 to 2005. The impact of carbon payments on deforestation is calibrated econometrically from the pattern of observed deforestation and spatial variation in the benefits and costs of converting land to agriculture over that time period. We estimate that at an international carbon price of $10/tCO2e, a “mandatory incentive structure,” such as a cap-and-trade or symmetric tax-and-subsidy program, would have reduced emissions by 163–247 MtCO2e/y (20–31% below the without-REDD+ reference scenario), while generating a programmatic budget surplus. In contrast, a “basic voluntary incentive structure” modeled after a standard payment-for-environmental-services program would have reduced emissions nationally by only 45–76 MtCO2e/y (6–9%), while generating a programmatic budget shortfall. By making four policy improvements—paying for net emission reductions at the scale of an entire district rather than site-by-site; paying for reductions relative to reference levels that match business-as-usual levels; sharing a portion of district-level revenues with the national government; and sharing a portion of the national government's responsibility for costs with districts—an “improved voluntary incentive structure” would have been nearly as effective as a mandatory incentive structure, reducing emissions by 136–207 MtCO2e/y (17–26%) and generating a programmatic budget surplus. PMID:22232665

The Role of Special and Incentive Pays in Retaining Military Mental Health Care Providers

DTIC Science & Technology

2017-01-01

visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make... dental , optometry, veterinary, psychiatric nurse practitioner, and clinical or counseling psychology programs (GoArmy.com, no date). It pays school...reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please

Pay for performance in the natural gas industry

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Geske, L.D.

1989-08-17

An effective way for a gas utility to gain flexibility in dealing with the new gas market is through the implementation of an employee compensation program - especially for management-level employees - that ties their pay to the attainment of the company's strategic goals. A survey of several gas utilities with pay-for-performance programs reported several advantages of the programs: they direct management's focus onto key areas that affect bottom-line performance, help build team effort, give the company the ability to change direction rapidly, and aid in keeping talented employees. Most companies agreed that the minimum incentive payout was 12-15% ofmore » base pay levels for adequate motivation.« less

Using provider performance incentives to increase HIV testing and counseling services in Rwanda.

PubMed

de Walque, Damien; Gertler, Paul J; Bautista-Arredondo, Sergio; Kwan, Ada; Vermeersch, Christel; de Dieu Bizimana, Jean; Binagwaho, Agnès; Condo, Jeanine

2015-03-01

Paying for performance provides financial rewards to medical care providers for improvements in performance measured by utilization and quality of care indicators. In 2006, Rwanda began a pay for performance scheme to improve health services delivery, including HIV/AIDS services. Using a prospective quasi-experimental design, this study examines the scheme's impact on individual and couples HIV testing. We find a positive impact of pay for performance on HIV testing among married individuals (10.2 percentage points increase). Paying for performance also increased testing by both partners by 14.7 percentage point among discordant couples in which only one of the partners is an AIDS patient. Copyright © 2014. Published by Elsevier B.V.

The ABCs of HIPCs (health insurance purchasing cooperatives).

PubMed

Wicks, E K; Curtis, R E; Haugh, K

1993-01-01

HIPCs, or health care purchasing cooperatives, are attracting widespread interest as a key element of the managed competition approach to health reform. HIPCs perform several useful roles for individuals and small employers unable to obtain health insurance coverage in the current system by spreading risk more evenly and purchasing coverage in a given region or market area. While HIPCs are generally associated with managed competition, they are also compatible with reform strategies that require employers to pay for coverage or those that provide incentives for expanded coverage.

Calculations of financial incentives for providers in a pay-for-performance program: Manual review versus data from structured fields in electronic health records

PubMed Central

Urech, Tracy H.; Woodard, LeChauncy D.; Virani, Salim S.; Dudley, R. Adams; Lutschg, Meghan Z.; Petersen, Laura A.

2015-01-01

Background Hospital report cards and financial incentives linked to performance require clinical data that are reliable, appropriate, timely, and cost-effective to process. Pay-for-performance plans are transitioning to automated electronic health record (EHR) data as an efficient method to generate data needed for these programs. Objective To determine how well data from automated processing of structured EHR fields (AP-EHR) reflect data from manual chart review and the impact of these data on performance rewards. Research Design Cross-sectional analysis of performance measures used in a cluster randomized trial assessing the impact of financial incentives on guideline-recommended care for hypertension. Subjects A total of 2,840 patients with hypertension assigned to participating physicians at 12 Veterans Affairs hospital-based outpatient clinics. Fifty-two physicians and 33 primary care personnel received incentive payments. Measures Overall, positive and negative agreement indices and Cohen's kappa were calculated for assessments of guideline-recommended antihypertensive medication use, blood pressure (BP) control, and appropriate response to uncontrolled BP. Pearson's correlation coefficient was used to assess how similar participants’ calculated earnings were between the data sources. Results By manual chart review data, 72.3% of patients were considered to have received guideline-recommended antihypertensive medications compared to 65.0% by AP-EHR review (k=0.51). Manual review indicated 69.5% of patients had controlled BP compared to 66.8% by AP-EHR review (k=0.87). Compared to 52.2% of patients per the manual review, 39.8% received an appropriate response by AP-EHR review (k=0.28). Participants’ incentive payments calculated using the two methods were highly correlated (r≥0.98). Using the AP-EHR data to calculate earnings, participants’ payment changes ranged from a decrease of $91.00 (−30.3%) to an increase of $18.20 (+7.4%) for medication use (IQR, −14.4% to 0%) and a decrease of $100.10 (−31.4%) to an increase of $36.40 (+15.4%) for BP control or appropriate response to uncontrolled BP (IQR, −11.9% to −6.1%). Conclusions Pay-for-performance plans that use only EHR data should carefully consider the measures and the structure of the EHR before data collection and financial incentive disbursement. For this study, we feel that a 10% difference in the total amount of incentive earnings disbursed based on AP-EHR data compared to manual review is acceptable given the time and resources required to abstract data from medical records. PMID:26340661

The case of the unpopular pay plan.

PubMed

Ehrenfeld, T; Coil, M; Berwick, D; Nyberg, T; Beer, M

1992-01-01

Three years after launching the team-based Quality For All program, Top Chemical Company CEO Sam Verde was searching for a team-based compensation system that would reflect his company's new philosophy. With a committee gathered to discuss the issue, Verde confronts the fact that changing pay plans is an issue few people can agree on. "Very simply," explains vice president for compensation Gilbert Porterfield, "the plan is designed to give employees working on teams real incentives for constant improvement and overall excellence. The variable aspect of the system pays employees for the performance of their group." This doesn't sit well with the others. "It's going to punish teams like mine for the failings of others instead of rewarding us for the work we do and have already done," says packaging team representative Ruth Gibson. Another committee member feels that team-based anything is a "motivational happy land that doesn't square with how people really work." While Verde likes the proposed pay plan, he has doubts over whether his employees will accept the risk. Upper management has no problem basing 60% of its pay on TopChem's performance. But getting line employees to risk part of their salaries--even as little as 4%--on the ups and downs of the chemical industry may be more trouble than it's worth. Four experts on compensation reveal where Top Chemical went wrong in its plan and how Sam Verde might bring about change successfully.

Incentives in Rheumatology: the Potential Contribution of Physician Responses to Financial Incentives, Public Reporting, and Treatment Guidelines to Health Care Sustainability.

PubMed

Harrison, Mark; Milbers, Katherine; Mihic, Tamara; Anis, Aslam H

2016-07-01

Concerns about the sustainability of current health care expenditure are focusing attention on the cost, quality and value of health care provision. Financial incentives, for example pay-for-performance (P4P), seek to reward quality and value in health care provision. There has long been an expectation that P4P schemes are coming to rheumatology. We review the available evidence about the use of incentives in this setting and provide two emerging examples of P4P schemes which may shape the future of service provision in rheumatology. Currently, there is limited and equivocal evidence in rheumatology about the impact of incentive schemes. However, reporting variation in the quality and provision of rheumatology services has highlighted examples of inefficiencies in the delivery of care. If financial incentives can improve the delivery of timely and appropriate care for rheumatology patients, then they may have an important role to play in the sustainability of health care provision.

[Pay for performance explained by transaction costs theory].

PubMed

Gorbaneff, Yuri; Cortes, Ariel; Torres, Sergio; Yepes, Francisco

2011-01-01

To evaluate the ability of transaction costs theory to explain incentives in the health care chain. We performed a case study of CPS, a health insurance company in Bogota (Colombia), which preferred not to publish its name. CPS moves in the environment of high transaction costs and uses the hybrid form of governance at the outpatient level. Incentive intensity, administrative control and the contract all agree with the theory. At the hospital level, the market is used, despite greater uncertainty. Because of the discrete form (1.0) of the incentives and the absence of administrative control, it is difficult for CPS to relate payment to hospital performance. Transaction costs theory explains the configuration of incentives. Another contribution made by this theory to the literature is the criterion to differentiate between the market and the hybrid. We propose that the market uses discrete-type (1.0) incentives, while the hybrid uses continuous, commission-like incentives. Copyright © 2011 SESPAS. Published by Elsevier Espana. All rights reserved.

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Maurer, D.

In January 1986, the Becon Construction Company - an open-shop contractor based in Houston, Texas - mobilized a work force to a construction project location at the Belridge Oil Field, near Bakersfield, California. The construction craftsmen and helpers in Becon's work force were expected to improve their level of productivity as the work proceeded because of the knowledge and skills that they would acquire as a result of the repetitive nature of the work. As it was originally organized, the Becon HOTS project represented almost a pure laboratory environment in which to collect data concerning the learning effect on workermore » productivity as well as to statistically isolate the impact on productivity of such external factors as weather, absenteeism, turnover, and especially work methods improvement techniques and pay incentives. From the outset of the HOTS project, the project manager had established an accurate system to quantitatively measure and compare the total manhours that each crew - civil, mechanical, electrical, and prefabrication -- performed at individual HOTS construction locations. Additionally, it was initially assumed that the project manager would be relatively free to implement changes to the job site conditions involving incentive pay and work methods improvement. The subsequent effect of these changes on the productivity of separate work crews could then be evaluated in terms of measured manhours per crew per HOTS.« less

A pay-for-performance system for civil service doctors: the Indonesian experiment.

PubMed

Chernichovsky, D; Bayulken, C

1995-07-01

In 1980 the Government of Indonesia proposed the introduction of a pay-for-performance system, the Functional Position System (FPS), for certain occupational categories of civil servants to provide a career development path and stimulate productivity (Government of Indonesia. Government Ordinance No. 3, 1980 Concerning Appointment to Civil Service Rank. Jakarta, 1980). The FPS, a bold pay concept in the civil service, links pay to skills and performance. In 1987, instructions were issued for doctors to be included in the system (Government of Indonesia, Credit Scores for Doctors. Circular Issued by the Ministry of Health and the Agency for Administration of the Civil Service No. 614/MENKES/E/VIII/1987 and No. 16/SE/1987). In this paper we evaluate how well the system-which in principle could be applicable to both developed and developing economies--can meet its stated objectives for Indonesian doctors working in the community, and for Indonesian health policy objectives as stated in the country's last five-year development plan "Repelita V" (Government of Indonesia. The Fifth Five-year Development Plan (Repelita V) 1989-1994. Jakarta, Indonesia, 1989). The FPS is particularly innovative in the Indonesian environment where wages are low and comparatively uniform, reflecting a philosophy of 'shared poverty', and vary primarily by seniority. The FPS has, however, several conceptual and practical shortcomings. The design of the reward system disregards effort or time inputs, as well as other inputs needed per unit of reward. Consequently, the FPS can not be used as an effective incentive system promoting professional excellence and health policy objectives. Practically, the system hardly provides an effective alternative for career development among community physicians.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 250 WORDS)

Do case-mix adjusted nursing home reimbursements actually reflect costs? Minnesota's experience.

PubMed

Nyman, J A; Connor, R A

1994-07-01

Some states have adopted Medicaid reimbursement systems that pay nursing homes according to patient type. These case-mix adjusted reimbursements are intended in part to eliminate the incentive in prospective systems to exclude less profitable patients. This study estimates the marginal costs of different patient types under Minnesota's case-mix system and compares them to their corresponding reimbursements. We find that estimated costs do not match reimbursement rates, again making some patient types less profitable than others. Further, in confirmation of our estimates, we find that the percentage change in patient days between 1986 and 1990 is explained by our profitability estimates.

Rideability issues for asphalt and concrete specification modifications.

DOT National Transportation Integrated Search

2007-12-01

Concerns have been raised regarding the differences between the incentive/disincentive determination procedures as well as pay adjustments for rideability between asphalt and concrete projects. This report will attempt to do the following: : 1. Addre...

75 FR 8854 - Teacher Incentive Fund Program

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-02-26

...The Secretary of Education (Secretary) proposes priorities, requirements, definitions, and selection criteria under the Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) program. These proposed priorities, requirements, definitions, and selection criteria are designed to be used in two separate and distinct TIF grant competitions: The Main TIF competition, which will provide TIF funding to eligible entities to support their implementation of performance-based compensation systems (PBCSs) in accordance with the priorities, the Main TIF requirements, the definitions, and the selection criteria proposed in this document, and the TIF Evaluation competition, which will provide, in accordance with the priorities, the Main TIF requirements, the definitions, and the selection criteria as well as the Evaluation requirements proposed in this document, TIF funding to help pay for the costs of implementing these eligible entities' PBCS in exchange for an agreement to participate in the national evaluation. The Secretary may use these proposed TIF priorities, requirements, definitions, and selection criteria in fiscal year (FY) 2010 and subsequent years. We intend the proposed priorities, requirements, definitions, and selection criteria to improve student achievement in high-need schools by creating incentives for effective teachers and principals in these schools.

The new "Indigenous health" incentive payment: issues and challenges.

PubMed

Couzos, Sophie; Delaney Thiele, Dea

2010-02-01

Paying incentives above the baseline Medicare Benefits Schedule to health services for the additional work required to meet the health needs of Aboriginal people or Torres Strait Islanders might mitigate inequalities of care, but evidence supporting this is lacking. The proposed "Indigenous health" incentive payment to reduce Aboriginal health disadvantage, which is largely aimed at increasing the responsiveness of mainstream general practices, provides an opportunity to examine the assumptions behind this and other recent health reform bids. Contentious implementation issues include: the ineligibility of several Aboriginal community controlled health services (ACCHSs) to receive this payment; determining Aboriginality and the potential for misappropriation of payments; the difficulty accounting for practice population diversity and patient mobility; and concerns about the benefits or otherwise to the Aboriginal community. Evaluation of the measure will present problems: to attribute outcomes, an evaluation must disaggregate outcomes by type of service provider (general practice or ACCHS). If these challenges are not addressed, this initiative may end up merely funding coordination of care for those Aboriginal people and Torres Strait Islanders who are already regular users of the health system.

Premium-Based Financial Incentives Did Not Promote Workplace Weight Loss In A 2013-15 Study.

PubMed

Patel, Mitesh S; Asch, David A; Troxel, Andrea B; Fletcher, Michele; Osman-Koss, Rosemary; Brady, Jennifer; Wesby, Lisa; Hilbert, Victoria; Zhu, Jingsan; Wang, Wenli; Volpp, Kevin G

2016-01-01

Employers commonly use adjustments to health insurance premiums as incentives to encourage healthy behavior, but the effectiveness of those adjustments is controversial. We gave 197 obese participants in a workplace wellness program a weight loss goal equivalent to 5 percent of their baseline weight. They were randomly assigned to a control arm, with no financial incentive for achieving the goal, or to one of three intervention arms offering an incentive valued at $550. Two intervention arms used health insurance premium adjustments, beginning the following year (delayed) or in the first pay period after achieving the goal (immediate). A third arm used a daily lottery incentive separate from premiums. At twelve months there were no statistically significant differences in mean weight change either between the control group (whose members had a mean gain of 0.1 pound) and any of the incentive groups (delayed premium adjustment, -1.2 pound; immediate premium adjustment, -1.4 pound; daily lottery incentive, -1.0 pound) or among the intervention groups. The apparent failure of the incentives to promote weight loss suggests that employers that encourage weight reduction through workplace wellness programs should test alternatives to the conventional premium adjustment approach by using alternative incentive designs, larger incentives, or both. Project HOPE—The People-to-People Health Foundation, Inc.

Paying physician group practices for quality: A statewide quasi-experiment.

PubMed

Conrad, Douglas A; Grembowski, David; Perry, Lisa; Maynard, Charles; Rodriguez, Hector; Martin, Diane

2013-12-01

This article presents the results of a unique quasi-experiment of the effects of a large-scale pay-for-performance (P4P) program implemented by a leading health insurer in Washington state during 2001-2007. The authors received external funding to provide an objective impact evaluation of the program. The program was unique in several respects: (1) It was designed dynamically, with two discrete intervention periods-one in which payment incentives were based on relative performance (the "contest" period) and a second in which payment incentives were based on absolute performance compared to achievable benchmarks. (2) The program was designed in collaboration with large multispecialty group practices, with an explicit run-in period to test the quality metrics. Public reporting of the quality scorecard for all participating medical groups was introduced 1 year before the quality incentive payment program's inception, and continued throughout 2002-2007. (3) The program was implemented in stages with distinct medical groups. A control group of comparable group practices also was assembled, and difference-in-differences methodology was applied to estimate program effects. Case mix measures were included in all multivariate analyses. The regression design permitted a contrast of intervention effects between the "contest" approach in the sub-period of 2003-2004 and the absolute standard, "achievable benchmarks of care" approach in sub-period 2005-2007. Most of the statistically significant quality incentive program coefficients were small and negative (opposite to program intent). A consistent pattern of differential intervention impact in the sub-periods did not emerge. Cumulatively, the probit regression estimates indicate that neither the quality scorecard nor the quality incentive payment program had a significant positive effect on general clinical quality. Based on key informant interviews with medical leaders, practicing physicians, and administrators of the participating groups, the authors conclude that several factors likely combined to dampen program effects: (1) modest size of the incentive; (2) use of rewards only, rather than a balance of rewards and penalties; (3) targeting incentive payments to the group, thus potentially weakening incentive effects at the individual level. Copyright © 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Integrating cobenefits produced with water quality BMPs into credits markets: Conceptualization and experimental illustration for EPRI's Ohio River Basin Trading

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Liu, Pengfei; Swallow, Stephen K.

2016-05-01

This paper develops a method that incorporates the public value for environmental cobenefits when a conservation buyer can purchase water quality credits based on nonmarket valuation results. We demonstrate this approach through an experiment with adult students in a classroom laboratory environment. Our application contributes to the study of individual preference and willingness to pay for cobenefits associated with the production of water quality credits in relation to the Ohio River Basin Trading Project. We use three different methods to elicit individuals' willingness to pay (WTP), including (1) a hypothetical referendum, (2) a real referendum lacking incentive compatibility, and (3) a real choice with incentive compatibility. Methodologically, our WTP estimates suggest individuals are more sensitive to the cost changes and reveal the lowest value in the real choice with incentive compatibility. Practically, we find individuals value certain cobenefits and credits as public goods. Incorporating public value toward cobenefits may improve the overall efficiency of a water quality trading market. Based on our specification of a planner's welfare function, results suggest a substantial welfare improvement after identifying an optimal allocation of a buyer's budget across credits derived from agricultural management practices producing different portfolios of cobenefits.

Inexpensive health care reform: the mathematics of medicine.

PubMed

Forsyth, Roger A

2010-02-01

There is data to support the hypothesis that US healthcare reform will require systemic changes in their delivery system rather than a segment-by-segment approach to improving individual components such as administrative or pharmaceutical costs or illness-by-illness programs such as comparative effectiveness or disease management. Mathematically, personnel costs provide the largest potential for savings. These costs are reflected in utilization rates. However, when governments or insurers try to control utilization, shortages or dissatisfaction ensue. Therefore, reform should be structured to encourage individually initiated reductions in utilization. This can be facilitated by changing from employer-paid comprehensive group policies of variable coverage to a three-part, standardized, individually purchased, group policy with a targeted deductible and co-pays that provide disincentives to over-utilization and incentives (refunds on unused contributions) to reduce utilization. There will be a public health policy (maternal, infant, and immunizations) that will be very inexpensive and not subject to any disincentives, a catastrophic policy with a deductible and enhanced but diminishing co-pays, and a Health Savings Account that pre-positions funds to cover the deductible and co-pays. These changes will lead to a reduction in administrative costs. The excess capacity created will provide care for the currently uninsured. Savings will be refunded to individuals thereby generating taxes that can pay for needed subsidies. Reform can be inexpensive if it puts the mathematics before the politics.

Influence of pay-for-performance programs on information technology use among child health providers: the devil is in the details.

PubMed

Menachemi, Nir; Struchen-Shellhorn, Wendy; Brooks, Robert G; Simpson, Lisa

2009-01-01

Pay-for-performance programs are used to promote improved health care quality, often through increased use of health information technology. However, little is known about whether pay-for-performance programs influence the adoption of health information technology, especially among child health providers. This study explored how various pay-for-performance compensation methods are related to health information technology use. Survey data from 1014 child health providers practicing in Florida were analyzed by using univariate and multivariate techniques. Questions asked about the adoption of electronic health records and personal digital assistants, as well as types of activities that affected child health provider compensation or income. The most common reported method to affect respondents' compensation was traditional productivity or billing (78%). Of the pay-for-performance-related methods of compensation, child health providers indicated that measures of clinical care (41%), patient surveys and experience (34%), the use of health information technology (29%), and quality bonuses or incentives (27%) were a major or minor factor in their compensation. In multivariate logistic regression analyses, only pay-for-performance programs that compensated directly for health information technology use were associated with an increased likelihood of electronic health record system adoption. Pay-for-performance programs linking measures of clinical quality to compensation were positively associated with personal digital assistant use among child health providers. Pay-for-performance programs that do not directly emphasize health information technology use do not influence the adoption of electronic health records among Florida physicians treating children. Understanding how different pay-for-performance compensation methods incentivize health information technology adoption is important for improving quality.

Paying for College: The Newest Ideas.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Hansen, Janet S.

1988-01-01

The Michigan Education Trust, in which parents prepay a tuition contract for their child's college education, and the proposed Kentucky Trust, a tuition savings plan, are compared with focus on such issues as risks, incentives, and tax implications. (MSE)

Results from the first 4 years of pay for performance.

PubMed

DeVore, Susan D

2010-01-01

Some of the lessons hospitals that have participated in the Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration project have learned include: the need to tie in quality-of-care initiatives to the organization's strategic plan and to incentive plans for all employees, from executives on down; the value in allowing hospital physicians to "own" quality improvement initiatives; the importance of making results of the initiative available to all staff; the benefit of creating best-practice teams to address improvements in specific clinical areas.

Evaluation of Aviation Career Pay Incentives Among the Naval Aviation Enterprise Utilizing Auction Mechanisms

DTIC Science & Technology

2015-03-01

the cm1·ent program has failed to meet targeted retention across conununities while ove1paying nearly $5,300,000 dming FY-2013, according to Eric...Kelso. This thesis examines the potential improvements of applying unif01m-price auction, Quality Adjusted Discount (QUAD), and Combinatorial Retention ...responses, we developed individual quality scores and reservation prices to apply three auction mechanisms to the retention goals and costs of the

Impacts of pay for performance on the quality of primary care

PubMed Central

Allen, T; Mason, T; Whittaker, W

2014-01-01

Increasingly, financial incentives are being used in health care as a result of increasing demand for health care coupled with fiscal pressures. Financial incentive schemes are one approach by which the system may incentivize providers of health care to improve productivity and/or adapt to better quality provision. Pay for performance (P4P) is an example of a financial incentive which seeks to link providers’ payments to some measure of performance. This paper provides a discussion of the theoretical underpinnings of P4P, gives an overview of the health P4P evidence base, and provide a detailed case study of a particularly large scheme from the English National Health Service. Lessons are then drawn from the evidence base. Overall, we find that the evidence for the effectiveness of P4P for improving quality of care in primary care is mixed. This is to some extent due to the fact that the P4P schemes used in primary care are also mixed. There are many different schemes that incentivize different aspects of care in different ways and in different settings, making evaluation problematic. The Quality and Outcomes Framework in the United Kingdom is the largest example of P4P in primary care. Evidence suggests incentivized quality initially improved following the introduction of the Quality and Outcomes Framework, but this was short-lived. If P4P in primary care is to have a long-term future, the question about scheme effectiveness (perhaps incorporating the identification and assessment of potential risk factors) needs to be answered robustly. This would require that new schemes be designed from the onset to support their evaluation: control and treatment groups, coupled with before and after data. PMID:25061341

P4P4P: An Agenda for Research on Pay for Performance for Patients

PubMed Central

Volpp, Kevin G.; Pauly, Mark V.; Loewenstein, George; Bangsberg, David

2012-01-01

Unhealthy behaviors are a major cause of poor health outcomes and high health care costs. In this Commentary, we describe an agenda for research to guide broader use of patient-targeted financial incentives either in conjunction with provider-targeted financial incentives (P4P) or in clinical contexts where provider-targeted approaches are unlikely to be effective. We discuss evidence of proven effectiveness and limitations of the existing evidence, reasons for underutilization of these approaches, and options for operationalizing wider use. Patient-targeted incentives have great potential, and systematic testing will help determine how they can best be used to improve population health. PMID:19124872

Financial arrangements for health systems in low-income countries: an overview of systematic reviews

PubMed Central

Wiysonge, Charles S; Paulsen, Elizabeth; Lewin, Simon; Ciapponi, Agustín; Herrera, Cristian A; Opiyo, Newton; Pantoja, Tomas; Rada, Gabriel; Oxman, Andrew D

2017-01-01

Background One target of the Sustainable Development Goals is to achieve "universal health coverage, including financial risk protection, access to quality essential health-care services and access to safe, effective, quality and affordable essential medicines and vaccines for all". A fundamental concern of governments in striving for this goal is how to finance such a health system. This concern is very relevant for low-income countries. Objectives To provide an overview of the evidence from up-to-date systematic reviews about the effects of financial arrangements for health systems in low-income countries. Secondary objectives include identifying needs and priorities for future evaluations and systematic reviews on financial arrangements, and informing refinements in the framework for financial arrangements presented in the overview. Methods We searched Health Systems Evidence in November 2010 and PDQ-Evidence up to 17 December 2016 for systematic reviews. We did not apply any date, language, or publication status limitations in the searches. We included well-conducted systematic reviews of studies that assessed the effects of financial arrangements on patient outcomes (health and health behaviours), the quality or utilisation of healthcare services, resource use, healthcare provider outcomes (such as sick leave), or social outcomes (such as poverty, employment, or financial burden of patients, e.g. out-of-pocket payment, catastrophic disease expenditure) and that were published after April 2005. We excluded reviews with limitations important enough to compromise the reliability of the findings. Two overview authors independently screened reviews, extracted data, and assessed the certainty of evidence using GRADE. We prepared SUPPORT Summaries for eligible reviews, including key messages, 'Summary of findings' tables (using GRADE to assess the certainty of the evidence), and assessments of the relevance of findings to low-income countries. Main results We identified 7272 reviews and included 15 in this overview, on: collection of funds (2 reviews), insurance schemes (1 review), purchasing of services (1 review), recipient incentives (6 reviews), and provider incentives (5 reviews). The reviews were published between 2008 and 2015; focused on 13 subcategories; and reported results from 276 studies: 115 (42%) randomised trials, 11 (4%) non-randomised trials, 23 (8%) controlled before-after studies, 51 (19%) interrupted time series, 9 (3%) repeated measures, and 67 (24%) other non-randomised studies. Forty-three per cent (119/276) of the studies included in the reviews took place in low- and middle-income countries. Collection of funds: the effects of changes in user fees on utilisation and equity are uncertain (very low-certainty evidence). It is also uncertain whether aid delivered under the Paris Principles (ownership, alignment, harmonisation, managing for results, and mutual accountability) improves health outcomes compared to aid delivered without conforming to those principles (very low-certainty evidence). Insurance schemes: community-based health insurance may increase service utilisation (low-certainty evidence), but the effects on health outcomes are uncertain (very low-certainty evidence). It is uncertain whether social health insurance improves utilisation of health services or health outcomes (very low-certainty evidence). Purchasing of services: it is uncertain whether increasing salaries of public sector healthcare workers improves the quantity or quality of their work (very low-certainty evidence). Recipient incentives: recipient incentives may improve adherence to long-term treatments (low-certainty evidence), but it is uncertain whether they improve patient outcomes. One-time recipient incentives probably improve patient return for start or continuation of treatment (moderate-certainty evidence) and may improve return for tuberculosis test readings (low-certainty evidence). However, incentives may not improve completion of tuberculosis prophylaxis, and it is uncertain whether they improve completion of treatment for active tuberculosis. Conditional cash transfer programmes probably lead to an increase in service utilisation (moderate-certainty evidence), but their effects on health outcomes are uncertain. Vouchers may improve health service utilisation (low-certainty evidence), but the effects on health outcomes are uncertain (very low-certainty evidence). Introducing a restrictive cap may decrease use of medicines for symptomatic conditions and overall use of medicines, may decrease insurers' expenditures on medicines (low-certainty evidence), and has uncertain effects on emergency department use, hospitalisations, and use of outpatient care (very low-certainty evidence). Reference pricing, maximum pricing, and index pricing for drugs have mixed effects on drug expenditures by patients and insurers as well as the use of brand and generic drugs. Provider incentives: the effects of provider incentives are uncertain (very low-certainty evidence), including: the effects of provider incentives on the quality of care provided by primary care physicians or outpatient referrals from primary to secondary care, incentives for recruiting and retaining health professionals to serve in remote areas, and the effects of pay-for-performance on provider performance, the utilisation of services, patient outcomes, or resource use in low-income countries. Authors' conclusions Research based on sound systematic review methods has evaluated numerous financial arrangements relevant to low-income countries, targeting different levels of the health systems and assessing diverse outcomes. However, included reviews rarely reported social outcomes, resource use, equity impacts, or undesirable effects. We also identified gaps in primary research because of uncertainty about applicability of the evidence to low-income countries. Financial arrangements for which the effects are uncertain include external funding (aid), caps and co-payments, pay-for-performance, and provider incentives. Further studies evaluating the effects of these arrangements are needed in low-income countries. Systematic reviews should include all outcomes that are relevant to decision-makers and to people affected by changes in financial arrangements. Financial arrangements for health systems in low-income countries What is the aim of this overview? The aim of this Cochrane Overview is to provide a broad summary of what is known about the effects of financial arrangements for health systems in low-income countries. This overview is based on 15 systematic reviews. Each of these systematic reviews searched for studies that evaluated different types of financial arrangements within the scope of the review question. The reviews included a total of 276 studies. This overview is one of a series of four Cochrane Overviews that evaluate different health system arrangements. Main results What are the effects of different ways of collecting funds to pay for health services? Two reviews looked for studies that addressed this question and found the following. - The effects of changes in user fees on utilisation and equity are uncertain (very low-certainty evidence). - It is uncertain whether aid delivered under Paris Principles (ownership, alignment, harmonisation, managing for results, and mutual accountability) improves health compared to aid delivered without conforming to those principles (very low-certainty evidence). What are the effects of different types of insurance schemes? One systematic review looked for studies that addressed this question and found the following. - Community-based health insurance may increase people's use of services (low-certainty evidence), but the effects on people's health are uncertain. It is uncertain whether social health insurance increases people's use of services (very low-certainty evidence). What are the effects of different ways of paying for health services? One systematic review looked for studies that addressed this question and found the following. - It is uncertain whether increasing salaries of public sector healthcare workers improves the quantity or quality of their work. What are the effects of different types of financial incentives for recipients of care? Six systematic reviews looked for studies that addressed this question and found the following. - Giving healthcare recipients incentives may improve their adherence to long-term treatments (low-certainty evidence), but it is uncertain whether they improve people's health. - Giving healthcare recipients one-time incentives probably leads more people to return to start or continue treatment for tuberculosis (moderate-certainty evidence). The certainty of the evidence for other types of recipient incentives for tuberculosis is low or very low. - Conditional cash transfer programmes (giving money to recipients of care on the condition that they take a specified action to improve their health) probably increase people's use of services (moderate-certainty evidence), but have mixed effect on people's health. - Vouchers may improve people's use of health services (low-certainty evidence) but have mixed effects on people's health (low-certainty evidence). - A combination of a ceiling and co-insurance probably slightly decreases the overall use of medicines (moderate-certainty evidence) and may increase health service utilisation (low-certainty evidence). The certainty of the evidence for the effects of other combinations of caps, co-insurance, co-payments, and ceilings is low or very low. - Limits on how much insurers pay for different groups of drugs (reference pricing, maximum pricing, and index pricing) have mixed effects on drug expenditures by patients and insurers as well as the use of brand and generic drugs. What are the effects of different types of financial incentives for health workers? Five systematic reviews looked for studies that addressed this question and found the following. - We are uncertain whether pay-for-performance improves health worker performance, people's use of services, people's health, or resource use in low-income countries (very low-certainty evidence). - We are uncertain whether financial incentives for health workers improve the quality of care provided by primary care physicians or outpatient referrals from primary to secondary care (very low-certainty evidence). - There is no rigorous research evaluating incentives (e.g. bursaries or scholarships linked to future practice location, rural allowances) for recruiting health workers to serve in remote areas. It is uncertain whether giving health workers incentives lead more of them to stay in underserved areas (very low-certainty evidence). - No studies assessed the effects of financial interventions on the movement of health workers between public and private organisations in low- and middle-income countries. How up to date is this overview? The overview authors searched for systematic reviews published up to 17 December 2016. PMID:28891235

What cognitive psychologists should find interesting about tax.

PubMed

Hill, Claire A

2010-04-01

People have to pay taxes, and usually they do--even though they would rather not. What determines whether and how much they decide to pay depends on more than a cost-benefit calculation. Results from the literature at the intersection of economics and psychology suggest that many factors are relevant, including people's perceptions of how the money is being spent, and who (else) is being asked to pay taxes. The results also suggest ways in which government may be able to use framing and various biases to influence payment of and attitudes toward tax. But much remains unknown, including, importantly, the extent to which tax incentives influence behavior.

The impact of primary care reform on health system performance in Canada: a systematic review.

PubMed

Carter, Renee; Riverin, Bruno; Levesque, Jean-Frédéric; Gariepy, Geneviève; Quesnel-Vallée, Amélie

2016-07-30

We aimed to synthesize the evidence of a causal effect and draw inferences about whether Canadian primary care reforms improved health system performance based on measures of health service utilization, processes of care, and physician productivity. We searched the Embase, PubMed and Web of Science databases for records from 2000 to September 2015. We based our risk of bias assessment on the Grading of Recommendations Assessment, Development and Evaluation guidelines. Full-text studies were synthesized and organized according to the three outcome categories: health service utilization, processes of care, and physician costs and productivity. We found moderate quality evidence that team-based models of care led to reductions in emergency department use, but the evidence was mixed for hospital admissions. We also found low quality evidence that team-based models, blended capitation models and pay-for-performance incentives led to small and sometimes non-significant improvements in processes of care. Studies examining new payment models on physician costs and productivity were of high methodological quality and provided a coherent body of evidence assessing enhanced fee-for-service and blended capitation payment models. A small number of studies suggested that team-based models contributed to reductions in emergency department use in Quebec and Alberta. Regarding processes of diabetes care, studies found higher rates of testing for blood glucose levels, retinopathy and cholesterol in Alberta's team-based primary care model and in practices eligible for pay-for-performance incentives in Ontario. However pay-for-performance in Ontario was found to have null to moderate effects on other prevention and screening activities. Although blended capitation payment in Ontario contributed to decreases in the number of services delivered and patients seen per day, the number of enrolled patients and number of days worked in a year was similar to that of enhanced fee-for-service practices.

Health information technology impact on productivity.

PubMed

Eastaugh, Steven R

2012-01-01

Managers work to achieve the greatest output for the least input effort, better balancing all factors of delivery to achieve the most with the smallest resource effort. Documentation of actual health information technology (HIT) cost savings has been elusive. Information technology and linear programming help to control hospital costs without harming service quality or staff morale. This study presents production function results from a study of hospital output during the period 2008-2011. The results suggest that productivity varies widely among the 58 hospitals as a function of staffing patterns, methods of organization, and the degree of reliance on information support systems. Financial incentives help to enhance productivity. Incentive pay for staff based on actual productivity gains is associated with improved productivity. HIT can enhance the marginal value product of nurses and staff, so that they concentrate their workday around patient care activities. The implementation of electronic health records (EHR) was associated with a 1.6 percent improvement in productivity.

Improving Education in the Developing World: What Have We Learned from Randomized Evaluations?

PubMed Central

Kremer, Michael; Holla, Alaka

2013-01-01

Across a range of contexts, reductions in education costs and provision of subsidies can boost school participation, often dramatically. Decisions to attend school seem subject to peer effects and time-inconsistent preferences. Merit scholarships, school health programs, and information about returns to education can all cost-effectively spur school participation. However, distortions in education systems, such as weak teacher incentives and elite-oriented curricula, undermine learning in school and much of the impact of increasing existing educational spending. Pedagogical innovations designed to address these distortions (such as technology-assisted instruction, remedial education, and tracking by achievement) can raise test scores at a low cost. Merely informing parents about school conditions seems insufficient to improve teacher incentives, and evidence on merit pay is mixed, but hiring teachers locally on short-term contracts can save money and improve educational outcomes. School vouchers can cost-effectively increase both school participation and learning. PMID:23946865

You can't pay me to quit: the failure of financial incentives for smoking cessation in head and neck cancer patients.

PubMed

Ghosh, A; Philiponis, G; Bewley, A; Ransom, E R; Mirza, N

2016-03-01

A prospective randomised study was conducted at a tertiary care hospital to evaluate the effects of financial incentives for smoking cessation targeted at a high-risk population. Patients with a past history of head and neck cancer were voluntarily enrolled over a two-year period. They were randomised to a cash incentives or no incentive group. Subjects were offered enrolment in smoking cessation courses. Smoking by-product levels were assessed at 30 days, 3 months and 6 months. Subjects in the incentive group received $150 if smoking cessation was confirmed. Over 2 years, 114 patients with an established diagnosis of head and neck cancer were offered enrolment. Twenty-four enrolled and 14 attended the smoking cessation classes. Only two successfully quit smoking at six months. Both these patients were in the financially incentivised group and received $150 at each test visit. Providing a financial incentive for smoking cessation to a population already carrying a diagnosis of head and neck cancer in order to promote a positive behaviour change was unsuccessful.

Financial Incentives Differentially Regulate Neural Processing of Positive and Negative Emotions during Value-Based Decision-Making

PubMed Central

Farrell, Anne M.; Goh, Joshua O. S.; White, Brian J.

2018-01-01

Emotional and economic incentives often conflict in decision environments. To make economically desirable decisions then, deliberative neural processes must be engaged to regulate automatic emotional reactions. In this functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study, we evaluated how fixed wage (FW) incentives and performance-based (PB) financial incentives, in which pay is proportional to outcome, differentially regulate positive and negative emotional reactions to hypothetical colleagues that conflicted with the economics of available alternatives. Neural activity from FW to PB incentive contexts decreased for positive emotional stimuli but increased for negative stimuli in middle temporal, insula, and medial prefrontal regions. In addition, PB incentives further induced greater responses to negative than positive emotional decisions in the frontal and anterior cingulate regions involved in emotion regulation. Greater response to positive than negative emotional features in these regions also correlated with lower frequencies of economically desirable choices. Our findings suggest that whereas positive emotion regulation involves a reduction of responses in valence representation regions, negative emotion regulation additionally engages brain regions for deliberative processing and signaling of incongruous events. PMID:29487519

Financial Incentives Differentially Regulate Neural Processing of Positive and Negative Emotions during Value-Based Decision-Making.

PubMed

Farrell, Anne M; Goh, Joshua O S; White, Brian J

2018-01-01

Emotional and economic incentives often conflict in decision environments. To make economically desirable decisions then, deliberative neural processes must be engaged to regulate automatic emotional reactions. In this functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study, we evaluated how fixed wage (FW) incentives and performance-based (PB) financial incentives, in which pay is proportional to outcome, differentially regulate positive and negative emotional reactions to hypothetical colleagues that conflicted with the economics of available alternatives. Neural activity from FW to PB incentive contexts decreased for positive emotional stimuli but increased for negative stimuli in middle temporal, insula, and medial prefrontal regions. In addition, PB incentives further induced greater responses to negative than positive emotional decisions in the frontal and anterior cingulate regions involved in emotion regulation. Greater response to positive than negative emotional features in these regions also correlated with lower frequencies of economically desirable choices. Our findings suggest that whereas positive emotion regulation involves a reduction of responses in valence representation regions, negative emotion regulation additionally engages brain regions for deliberative processing and signaling of incongruous events.

Provider and Patient Directed Financial Incentives to Improve Care and Outcomes for Patients with Diabetes

PubMed Central

Lorincz, Ilona S.; Lawson, Brittany C. T.

2012-01-01

Incentive programs directed at both providers and patients have become increasingly widespread. Pay-for-performance (P4P) where providers receive financial incentives to carry out specific care or improve clinical outcomes has been widely implemented. The existing literature indicates they probably spur initial gains which then level off or partially revert if incentives are withdrawn. The literature also indicates that process measures are easier to influence through P4P programs but that intermediate outcomes such as glucose, blood pressure, and cholesterol control are harder to influence, and the long term impact of P4P programs on health is largely unknown. Programs directed at patients show greater promise as a means to influence patient behavior and intermediate outcomes such as weight loss; however, the evidence for long term effects are lacking. In combination, both patient and provider incentives are potentially powerful tools but whether they are cost-effective has yet to be determined. PMID:23225214

Managing imperfect competition by pay for performance and reference pricing.

PubMed

Mak, Henry Y

2018-01-01

I study a managed health service market where differentiated providers compete for consumers by choosing multiple service qualities, and where copayments that consumers pay and payments that providers receive for services are set by a payer. The optimal regulation scheme is two-sided. On the demand side, it justifies and clarifies value-based reference pricing. On the supply side, it prescribes pay for performance when consumers misperceive service benefits or providers have intrinsic quality incentives. The optimal bonuses are expressed in terms of demand elasticities, service technology, and provider characteristics. However, pay for performance may not outperform prospective payment when consumers are rational and providers are profit maximizing, or when one of the service qualities is not contractible. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Should we pay the student? A randomised trial of financial incentives in medical education.

PubMed

Raupach, Tobias; Brown, Jamie; Wieland, Anna; Anders, Sven; Harendza, Sigrid

2013-09-01

Financial incentives are effective in moderating physician and patient behaviour, but they have not been studied in the context of medical education. This study assessed whether financial incentives can motivate students to acquire electrocardiogram (ECG) interpretation skills. Students enrolled for a cardio-respiratory teaching module (n = 121) were randomised to an intervention (financial incentive) or a control (book voucher raffle) condition. All students took three validated exams of ECG interpretation skills (at module entry, module exit and seven weeks later). Only the exit exam was financially incentivised in the intervention group. The primary outcome was the proportion of students who correctly identified ≥60% of clinically important diagnoses in the exit exam. Financial incentives more than doubled the odds of correctly identifying ≥60% of diagnoses in the exit exam (adjusted odds ratio 2.44, 95% confidence interval 1.05-5.67) and significantly increased student learning time. However, there was no significant effect on performance levels in the retention exam. Financial incentives increase reported learning time and examination results in the short-term. The lack of a sustained effect on performance suggests that financial incentives may foster a superficial or strategic rather than a deep approach to learning.

Reward Merit with Praise.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Andrews, Hans A.

1987-01-01

Describes the efforts of two educational institutions to reward teaching excellence using positive feedback rather than merit pay incentives. An Arizona district, drawing on Herzberg's motivation theories, offers highly individualized rewards ranging from computers to conference money, while an Illinois community college bestows engraved plaques…

Impact of a smoothness incentive.

DOT National Transportation Integrated Search

2006-01-01

Smoothness, the absence of bumps and dips in the riding surface of a pavement, improves the quality of the ride and is believed to prolong the life of the pavement. This research addressed the impact of potential pay adjustments for smoothness on mai...

Paying people to lose weight: the effectiveness of financial incentives provided by health insurers for the prevention and management of overweight and obesity - a systematic review.

PubMed

Ananthapavan, J; Peterson, A; Sacks, G

2018-05-01

Curbing the obesity epidemic is likely to require a suite of interventions targeting the obesogenic environment as well as individual behaviour. Evidence suggests that the effectiveness of behaviour modification programmes can be enhanced by financial incentives that immediately reward weight loss behaviour. This systematic review investigated the effectiveness of incentives with a focus on assessing the relative effectiveness of incentives that target different behaviours as well as factors of importance when implementing these programmes in real-world settings (health insurer settings). A narrative review of the academic and grey literature including a variety of study designs was undertaken. Twenty studies met inclusion criteria and were assessed using the Effective Public Health Practice Project Quality Assessment Tool for Quantitative Studies. Results suggest that incentivizing weight loss is effective in the short term while the incentives are in place. There are various incentive designs, and although the relative effectiveness of each of these on weight loss is not clear, it appears that positive incentives increase the uptake into programmes and may reduce dropouts. As with other weight loss initiatives, there is a need to explore ways to maintain weight loss in the longer term - incentives for weight maintenance could play a role. © 2017 World Obesity Federation.

Promotion of Academic Staff.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Moses, Ingrid

1986-01-01

A study of attitudes toward institutional promotion policy and practices among 104 faculty at an Australian university revealed that staff perceive their institution as actively encouraging research, and especially publication, through rewards and incentives but paying only lip service to teaching, without adequate rewards or recognition. (MSE)

Financial incentives, quality improvement programs, and the adoption of clinical information technology.

PubMed

Robinson, James C; Casalino, Lawrence P; Gillies, Robin R; Rittenhouse, Diane R; Shortell, Stephen S; Fernandes-Taylor, Sara

2009-04-01

Physician use of clinical information technology (CIT) is important for the management of chronic illness, but has lagged behind expectations. We studied the role of health insurers' financial incentives (including pay-for-performance) and quality improvement initiatives in accelerating adoption of CIT in large physician practices. National survey of all medical groups and independent practice association (IPA) physician organizations with 20 or more physicians in the United States in 2006 to 2007. The response rate was 60.3%. Use of 19 CIT capabilities was measured. Multivariate statistical analysis of financial and organizational factors associated with adoption and use of CIT. Use of information technology varied across physician organizations, including electronic access to laboratory test results (medical groups, 49.3%; IPAs, 19.6%), alerts for potential drug interactions (medical groups, 33.9%; IPAs, 9.5%), electronic drug prescribing (medical groups, 41.9%; IPAs, 25.1%), and physician use of e-mail with patients (medical groups, 34.2%; IPAs, 29.1%). Adoption of CIT was stronger for physician organizations evaluated by external entities for pay-for-performance and public reporting purposes (P = 0.042) and for those participating in quality improvement initiatives (P < 0.001). External incentives and participation in quality improvement initiatives are associated with greater use of CIT by large physician practices.

New business models for antibiotic innovation.

PubMed

So, Anthony D; Shah, Tejen A

2014-05-01

The increase in antibiotic resistance and the dearth of novel antibiotics have become a growing concern among policy-makers. A combination of financial, scientific, and regulatory challenges poses barriers to antibiotic innovation. However, each of these three challenges provides an opportunity to develop pathways for new business models to bring novel antibiotics to market. Pull-incentives that pay for the outputs of research and development (R&D) and push-incentives that pay for the inputs of R&D can be used to increase innovation for antibiotics. Financial incentives might be structured to promote delinkage of a company's return on investment from revenues of antibiotics. This delinkage strategy might not only increase innovation, but also reinforce rational use of antibiotics. Regulatory approval, however, should not and need not compromise safety and efficacy standards to bring antibiotics with novel mechanisms of action to market. Instead regulatory agencies could encourage development of companion diagnostics, test antibiotic combinations in parallel, and pool and make transparent clinical trial data to lower R&D costs. A tax on non-human use of antibiotics might also create a disincentive for non-therapeutic use of these drugs. Finally, the new business model for antibiotic innovation should apply the 3Rs strategy for encouraging collaborative approaches to R&D in innovating novel antibiotics: sharing resources, risks, and rewards.

Patient-centered medical home initiatives expanded in 2009-13: providers, patients, and payment incentives increased.

PubMed

Edwards, Samuel T; Bitton, Asaf; Hong, Johan; Landon, Bruce E

2014-10-01

Patient-centered medical home initiatives are central to many efforts to reform the US health care delivery system. To better understand the extent and nature of these initiatives, in 2013 we performed a nationwide cross-sectional survey of initiatives that included payment reform incentives in their models, and we compared the results to those of a similar survey we conducted in 2009. We found that the number of initiatives featuring payment reform incentives had increased from 26 in 2009 to 114 in 2013. The number of patients covered by these initiatives had increased from nearly five million to almost twenty-one million. We also found that the proportion of time-limited initiatives--those with a planned end date--was 20 percent in 2013, a decrease from 77 percent in 2009. Finally, we found that the dominant payment model for patient-centered medical homes remained fee-for-service payments augmented by per member per month payments and pay-for-performance bonuses. However, those payments and bonuses were higher in 2013 than they were in 2009, and the use of shared-savings models was greater. The patient-centered medical home model is likely to continue both to become more common and to play an important role in delivery system reform. Project HOPE—The People-to-People Health Foundation, Inc.

Working under a clinic-level quality incentive: primary care clinicians' perceptions.

PubMed

Greene, Jessica; Kurtzman, Ellen T; Hibbard, Judith H; Overton, Valerie

2015-01-01

A key consideration in designing pay-for-performance programs is determining what entity the incentive should be awarded to-individual clinicians or to groups of clinicians working in teams. Some argue that team-level incentives, in which clinicians who are part of a team receive the same incentive based on the team's performance, are most effective; others argue for the efficacy of clinician-level incentives. This study examines primary care clinicians' perceptions of a team-based quality incentive awarded at the clinic level. This research was conducted with Fairview Health Services, where 40% of the primary care compensation model was based on clinic-level quality performance. We conducted 48 in-depth interviews to explore clinicians' perceptions of the clinic-level incentive, as well as an online survey of 150 clinicians (response rate 56%) to investigate which entity the clinicians would consider optimal to target for quality incentives. Clinicians reported the strengths of the clinic-based quality incentive were quality improvement for the team and less patient "dumping," or shifting patients with poor outcomes to other clinicians. The weaknesses were clinicians' lack of control and colleagues riding the coattails of higher performers. There were mixed reports on the model's impact on team dynamics. Although clinicians reported greater interaction with colleagues, some described an increase in tension. Most clinicians surveyed (73%) believed that there should be a mix of clinic and individual-level incentives to maintain collaboration and recognize individual performance. The study highlights the important advantages and disadvantages of using incentives based upon clinic-level performance. Future research should test whether hybrid incentives that mix group and individual incentives can maintain some of the best elements of each design while mitigating the negative impacts. © 2015 Annals of Family Medicine, Inc.

Feasibility Study of Residential Grid-Connected Solar Photovoltaic Systems in the State of Indiana

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Al-Odeh, Mahmoud

This study aims to measure the financial viability of installing and using a residential grid-connected PV system in the State of Indiana while predicting its performance in eighteen geographical locations within the state over the system's expected lifetime. The null hypothesis of the study is that installing a PV system for a single family residence in the State of Indiana will not pay for itself within 25 years. Using a systematic approach consisting of six steps, data regarding the use of renewable energy in the State of Indiana was collected from the website of the US Department of Energy to perform feasibility analysis of the installation and use of a standard-sized residential PV system. The researcher was not able to reject the null hypothesis that installing a PV system for a single family residence in the State of Indiana will not pay for itself within 25 years. This study found that the standard PV system does not produce a positive project balance and does not pay for itself within 25 years (the life time of the system) assuming the average cost of a system. The government incentive programs are not enough to offset the cost of installing the system against the cost of the electricity that would not be purchased from the utility company. It can be concluded that the cost of solar PV is higher than the market valuation of the power it produces; thus, solar PV did not compete on the cost basis with the traditional competitive energy sources. Reducing the capital cost will make the standard PV system economically viable in Indiana. The study found that the capital cost for the system should be reduced by 15% - 56%.

Financial incentives for quality in breast cancer care.

PubMed

Tisnado, Diana M; Rose-Ash, Danielle E; Malin, Jennifer L; Adams, John L; Ganz, Patricia A; Kahn, Katherine L

2008-07-01

To examine the use of financial incentives related to performance on quality measures reported by oncologists and surgeons associated with a population-based cohort of patients with breast cancer in Los Angeles County, California, and to explore the physician and practice characteristics associated with the use of these incentives among breast cancer care providers. Cross-sectional observational study. Physician self-reported financial arrangements from a survey of 348 medical oncologists, radiation oncologists, and surgeons caring for patients with breast cancer in Los Angeles County (response rate, 76%). Physicians were asked whether they were subject to financial incentives for quality (ie, patient satisfaction surveys and adherence to practice guidelines). We examined the prevalence and correlates of incentives and performed multivariate logistic regression analyses to assess predictors of incentives, controlling for other covariates. Twenty percent of respondents reported incentives based on patient satisfaction, and 15% reported incentives based on guideline adherence. The use of incentives for quality in this cohort of oncologists and surgeons was modest and was primarily associated with staff- or group-model health maintenance organization (HMO) settings. In other settings, important predictors were partial physician ownership interest, large practice size, and capitation. Most cancer care providers in Los Angeles County outside of staff- or group-model HMOs are not subject to explicit financial incentives based on quality-of-care measures. Those who are, seem more likely to be associated with large practice settings. New approaches are needed to direct financial incentives for quality toward specialists outside of staff- or group-model HMOs if pay-for-performance programs are to succeed in influencing care.

Investigating financial incentives for maternal health: an introduction.

PubMed

Stanton, Mary Ellen; Higgs, Elizabeth S; Koblinsky, Marge

2013-12-01

Projection of current trends in maternal and neonatal mortality reduction shows that many countries will fall short of the UN Millennium Development Goal 4 and 5. Underutilization of maternal health services contributes to this poor progress toward reducing maternal and neonatal morbidity and mortality. Moreover, the quality of services continues to lag in many countries, with a negative effect on the health of women and their babies, including deterring women from seeking care. To enhance the use and provision of quality maternal care, countries and donors are increasingly using financial incentives. This paper introduces the JHPN Supplement, in which each paper reviews the evidence of the effectiveness of a specific financial incentive instrument with the aim of improving the use and quality of maternal healthcare and impact. The US Agency for International Development and the US National Institutes of Health convened a US Government Evidence Summit on Enhancing Provision and Use of Maternal Health Services through Financial Incentives on 24-25 April 2012 in Washington, DC. The Summit brought together leading global experts in finance, maternal health, and health systems from governments, academia, development organizations, and foundations to assess the evidence on whether financial incentives significantly and substantially increase provision, use and quality of maternal health services, and the contextual factors that impact the effectiveness of these incentives. Evidence review teams evaluated the multidisciplinary evidence of various financial mechanisms, including supply-side incentives (e.g. performance-based financing, user fees, and various insurance mechanisms) and demand-side incentives (e.g. conditional cash transfers, vouchers, user fee exemptions, and subsidies for care-seeking). At the Summit, the teams presented a synthesis of evidence and initial recommendations on practice, policy, and research for discussion. The Summit enabled structured feedback on recommendations which the teams included in their final papers appearing in this Supplement. Papers in this Supplement review the evidence for a specific financial incentive mechanism (e.g. pay for performance, conditional cash transfer) to improve the use and quality of maternal healthcare and makes recommendations for programmes and future research. While data on programmes using financial incentives for improved use and indications of the quality of maternal health services support specific conclusions and recommendations, including those for future research, data linking the use of financial incentives with improved health outcomes are minimal.

Payment models to support population health management.

PubMed

Huerta, Timothy R; Hefner, Jennifer L; McAlearney, Ann Scheck

2014-01-01

To survey the policy-driven financial controls currently being used to drive physician change in the care of populations. This paper offers a review of current health care payment models and discusses the impact of each on the potential success of PHM initiatives. We present the benefits of a multi-part model, combining visit-based fee-for-service reimbursement with a monthly "care coordination payment" and a performance-based payment system. A multi-part model removes volume-based incentives and promotes efficiency. However, it is predicated on a pay-for-performance framework that requires standardized measurement. Application of this model is limited due to the current lack of standardized measurement of quality goals that are linked to payment incentives. Financial models dictated by health system payers are inextricably linked to the organization and management of health care. There is a need for better measurements and realistic targets as part of a comprehensive system of measurement assessment that focuses on practice redesign, with the goal of standardizing measurement of the structure and process of redesign. Payment reform is a necessary component of an accurate measure of the associations between practice transformation and outcomes important to both patients and society.

Gender differences in the incentive salience of adult and infant faces.

PubMed

Hahn, Amanda C; Xiao, Dengke; Sprengelmeyer, Reiner; Perrett, David I

2013-01-01

Facial appearance can motivate behaviour and elicit activation of brain circuits putatively involved in reward. Gender differences have been observed for motivation to view beauty in adult faces--heterosexual women are motivated by beauty in general, while heterosexual men are motivated to view opposite-sex beauty alone. Although gender differences have been observed in sensitivity to infant cuteness, infant faces appear to hold equal incentive salience among men and women. In the present study, we investigated the incentive salience of attractiveness and cuteness in adult and infant faces, respectively. We predicted that, given alternative viewing options, gender differences would emerge for motivation to view infant faces. Heterosexual participants completed a "pay-per-view" key-press task, which allowed them to control stimulus duration. Gender differences were found such that infants held greater incentive salience among women, although both sexes differentiated infant faces based on cuteness. Among adult faces, men exerted more effort than women to view opposite-sex faces. These findings suggest that, contrary to previous reports, gender differences do exist in the incentive salience of infant faces as well as opposite-sex faces.

Incentive Analysis for Clean Water Act Reauthorization: Point Source/Nonpoint Source Trading for Nutrient Discharge Reductions (1992)

EPA Pesticide Factsheets

Paper focuses on trading schemes in which regulated point sources are allowed to avoid upgrading their pollution control technology to meet water quality-based effluent limits if they pay for equivalent (or greater) reductions in nonpoint source pollution.

Contingent valuation and incentives

Treesearch

Patricia A. Champ; Nicholas E. Flores; Thomas C. Brown; James Chivers

2002-01-01

We empirically investigate the effect of the payment mechanism on contingent values by asking a willingness-to-pay question with one of three different payment mechanisms: individual contribution, contribution with provision point, and referendum. We find statistical evidence of more affirmative responses in the referendum treatment relative to the individual...

In Praise of Monetary Motivation.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Piamonte, John S.

1979-01-01

Although management has built remuneration policies on the belief that money does not motivate personnel, the author states that the best way to encourage high performance is still money if administered correctly. He discusses behavior theories, incentive/contingency principles, the weaknesses of many merit pay schemes, and factors in employee…

Public reporting and pay-for-performance: safety-net hospital executives' concerns and policy suggestions.

PubMed

Goldman, L Elizabeth; Henderson, Stuart; Dohan, Daniel P; Talavera, Jason A; Dudley, R Adams

2007-01-01

Safety-net hospitals (SNHs) may gain little financial benefit from the rapidly spreading adoption of public reporting and pay-for-performance, but may feel compelled to participate (and bear the costs of data collection) to meet public expectations of transparency and accountability. To better understand the concerns that SNH administrators have regarding public reporting and pay-for-performance, we interviewed 37 executives at randomly selected California SNHs. The main concerns noted by SNH executives were that human and financial resource constraints made it difficult for SNHs to accurately measure their performance. Additionally, some executives felt that market-driven public reporting and pay-for-performance may focus on clinical areas and incentive structures that may not be high-priority clinical areas for SNHs. Executives at SNHs suggested several policy responses to these concerns-such as offering training programs for SNH data collectors-that could be relatively inexpensive and might improve the cost-benefit ratio of public reporting and pay-for-performance programs.

What is the empirical basis for paying for quality in health care?

PubMed

Rosenthal, Meredith B; Frank, Richard G

2006-04-01

Despite more than a decade of bench-marking and public reporting of quality problems in the health care sector, changes in medical practice have been slow to materialize. To accelerate quality improvement, many private and public payers have begun to offer financial incentives to physicians and hospitals based on their performance on clinical and service quality measures. The authors review the empirical literature on paying for quality in health care and comparable interventions in other sectors. They find little evidence to support the effectiveness of paying for quality. The absence of findings for an effect may be attributable to the small size of the bonuses studied and the fact that payers often accounted for only a fraction of the targeted provider's panel. Even in non-health settings, however, where the institutional features are more favorable to a positive impact, the literature contains mixed results on the effectiveness of analogous pay-for-performance schemes.

A Bluff-Bidding Exercise

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Meister, J. Patrick

2011-01-01

Consider an auction in which one potential buyer wishes to participate, but the other potential buyer would rather the bidding not start. However, once bidding starts, the reluctant firm participates (submits "bluff bids") simply to make the eventual winner pay more. This incentive exists when the marginal effect of the winning bid is to increase…

Performance-Based Funding in Public Schools.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Foster, Charles A.; Marquart, Deanna J.

This report examines three performance-based funding (PBF) plans: (1) merit pay for teachers and/or administrators; (2) career ladders; and (3) formula-driven incentive payments to schools. The report contends that present-day problems in public schools result largely from the organizational structure of the educational enterprise. Being based on…

Myths and Realities of Academic Labor Markets.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Fairweather, James S.

1995-01-01

Examines national data on 4,481 full-time college and university faculty to develop a pay model derived from competing propositions (market segmentation, single national market, and incentive-based perspectives) concerning salary's role in faculty rewards. Findings suggest a blend of market segmentation with a national market perspective rewarding…

30 CFR 218.307 - How do I pay royalties due for my existing leases that qualify for near-term production...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... 3212, your royalty due on the production BLM determines to be qualified for a production incentive under 43 CFR 3212.23 and 3212.24 is 50 percent of the amount of the total royalty that would otherwise...

Where's the Beef in Administrator Pay?

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Cunningham, William G.; Sperry, J. Brent

2001-01-01

Salary differences between educators and business leaders range from tens of thousands of dollars for principals to millions for superintendents. Employees valuing monetary incentives will not be attracted to or remain in the education field. Wealthy taxpayers get too many breaks. Progressive income taxes should replace skewed property taxes. (MLH)

5 CFR 531.503 - Purpose of quality step increases.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 5 Administrative Personnel 1 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Purpose of quality step increases. 531... PAY UNDER THE GENERAL SCHEDULE Quality Step Increases § 531.503 Purpose of quality step increases. The purpose of quality step increases is to provide appropriate incentives and recognition for excellence in...

Paying for Pollution: Water Quality and Effluent Charges. Proceedings from a Conference (Chicago, Illinois, May 19, 1977).

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Conservation Foundation, Washington, DC.

This publication gives the proceedings from a 1977 conference sponsored by the Conservation Foundation. Participants discuss the appropriate means to control water pollution, emphasizing the use of effluent charges as economic incentive for polluters to clean up their waters. (MA)

A Graphical Approach to the Standard Principal-Agent Model.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Zhou, Xianming

2002-01-01

States the principal-agent theory is difficult to teach because of its technical complexity and intractability. Indicates the equilibrium in the contract space is defined by the incentive parameter and insurance component of pay under a linear contract. Describes a graphical approach that students with basic knowledge of algebra and…

Blunting the Spear: Why Good People Get Out

DTIC Science & Technology

2013-06-01

enterprise to fill MCE, LRE, FTU, and additional billets. 17 Hardison, Mattock, Lytell, Incentive Pay for RPA, xiv. 18 Lolita C. Baldor, “Next Top...Air Force Website, 17 January 2013. 169 (Accessed 22 January 2013). Baldor, Lolita C. “Next Top Guns? Air Force faces Shortage of Drone Pilots

The influence of welfare systems on pay-for-performance programs for general practitioners: A critical review.

PubMed

Ammi, Mehdi; Fortier, Grant

2017-04-01

While pay-for-performance (P4P) programs are increasingly common tools used to foster quality and efficiency in primary care, the evidence concerning their effectiveness is at best mixed. In this article, we explore the influence of welfare systems on four P4P-related dimensions: the level of healthcare funders' commitment to P4Ps (by funding and length of program operation), program design (specifically target-based vs. participation-based program), physicians' acceptance of the program and program effects. Using Esping-Andersen's typology, we examine P4P for general practitioners (GPs) in thirteen European and North American countries and find that welfare systems contribute to explain variations in P4P experiences. Overall, liberal systems exhibited the most enthusiastic adoption of P4P, with significant physician acceptance, generous incentives and positive but modest program effects. Social democratic countries showed minimal interest in P4P for GPs, with the exception of Sweden. Although corporatist systems adopted performance pay, these countries experienced mixed results, with strong physician opposition. In response to this opposition, health care funders tended to favour participation-based over target-based P4P. We demonstrate how the interaction of decommodification and social stratification in each welfare regime influences these countries' experiences with P4P for GPs, directly for funders' commitment, program design and physicians' acceptance, and indirectly for program effects, hence providing a framework for analyzing P4P in other contexts or care settings. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Paying for performance: Performance incentives increase desire for the reward object.

PubMed

Hur, Julia D; Nordgren, Loran F

2016-09-01

The current research examines how exposure to performance incentives affects one's desire for the reward object. We hypothesized that the flexible nature of performance incentives creates an attentional fixation on the reward object (e.g., money), which leads people to become more desirous of the rewards. Results from 5 laboratory experiments and 1 large-scale field study provide support for this prediction. When performance was incentivized with monetary rewards, participants reported being more desirous of money (Study 1), put in more effort to earn additional money in an ensuing task (Study 2), and were less willing to donate money to charity (Study 4). We replicated the result with nonmonetary rewards (Study 5). We also found that performance incentives increased attention to the reward object during the task, which in part explains the observed effects (Study 6). A large-scale field study replicated these findings in a real-world setting (Study 7). One laboratory experiment failed to replicate (Study 3). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved).

Teacher labor markets in developing countries.

PubMed

Vegas, Emiliana

2007-01-01

Emiliana Vegas surveys strategies used by the world's developing countries to fill their classrooms with qualified teachers. With their low quality of education and wide gaps in student outcomes, schools in developing countries strongly resemble hard-to-staff urban U.S. schools. Their experience with reform may thus provide insights for U.S. policymakers. Severe budget constraints and a lack of teacher training capacity have pushed developing nations to try a wide variety of reforms, including using part-time or assistant teachers, experimenting with pay incentives, and using school-based management. The strategy of hiring teachers with less than full credentials has had mixed results. One successful program in India hired young women who lacked teaching certificates to teach basic literacy and numeracy skills to children whose skills were seriously lagging. After two years, student learning increased, with the highest gains among the least able students. As in the United States, says Vegas, teaching quality and student achievement in the developing world are sensitive to teacher compensation. As average teacher salaries in Chile more than doubled over the past decade, higher-quality students entered teacher education programs. And when Brazil increased educational funding and distributed resources more equitably, school enrollment increased and the gap in student test scores narrowed. Experiments with performance-based pay have had mixed results. In Bolivia a bonus for teaching in rural areas failed to produce higher-quality teachers. And in Mexico a system to reward teachers for improved student outcomes failed to change teacher performance. But Vegas explains that the design of teacher incentives is critical. Effective incentive schemes must be tightly coupled with desired behaviors and generous enough to give teachers a reason to make the extra effort. School-based management reforms give decisionmaking authority to the schools. Such reforms in Central America have reduced teacher absenteeism, increased teacher work hours, increased homework assignments, and improved parent-teacher relationships. These changes, says Vegas, are especially promising in schools where educational quality is low.

Implementation Processes and Pay for Performance in Healthcare: A Systematic Review.

PubMed

Kondo, Karli K; Damberg, Cheryl L; Mendelson, Aaron; Motu'apuaka, Makalapua; Freeman, Michele; O'Neil, Maya; Relevo, Rose; Low, Allison; Kansagara, Devan

2016-04-01

Over the last decade, various pay-for-performance (P4P) programs have been implemented to improve quality in health systems, including the VHA. P4P programs are complex, and their effects may vary by design, context, and other implementation processes. We conducted a systematic review and key informant (KI) interviews to better understand the implementation factors that modify the effectiveness of P4P. We searched PubMed, PsycINFO, and CINAHL through April 2014, and reviewed reference lists. We included trials and observational studies of P4P implementation. Two investigators abstracted data and assessed study quality. We interviewed P4P researchers to gain further insight. Among 1363 titles and abstracts, we selected 509 for full-text review, and included 41 primary studies. Of these 41 studies, 33 examined P4P programs in ambulatory settings, 7 targeted hospitals, and 1 study applied to nursing homes. Related to implementation, 13 studies examined program design, 8 examined implementation processes, 6 the outer setting, 18 the inner setting, and 5 provider characteristics. Results suggest the importance of considering underlying payment models and using statistically stringent methods of composite measure development, and ensuring that high-quality care will be maintained after incentive removal. We found no conclusive evidence that provider or practice characteristics relate to P4P effectiveness. Interviews with 14 KIs supported limited evidence that effective P4P program measures should be aligned with organizational goals, that incentive structures should be carefully considered, and that factors such as a strong infrastructure and public reporting may have a large influence. There is limited evidence from which to draw firm conclusions related to P4P implementation. Findings from studies and KI interviews suggest that P4P programs should undergo regular evaluation and should target areas of poor performance. Additionally, measures and incentives should align with organizational priorities, and programs should allow for changes over time in response to data and provider input.

'Fracking', Induced Seismicity and the Critical Earth

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Leary, P.; Malin, P. E.

2012-12-01

Issues of 'fracking' and induced seismicity are reverse-analogous to the equally complex issues of well productivity in hydrocarbon, geothermal and ore reservoirs. In low hazard reservoir economics, poorly producing wells and low grade ore bodies are many while highly producing wells and high grade ores are rare but high pay. With induced seismicity factored in, however, the same distribution physics reverses the high/low pay economics: large fracture-connectivity systems are hazardous hence low pay, while high probability small fracture-connectivity systems are non-hazardous hence high pay. Put differently, an economic risk abatement tactic for well productivity and ore body pay is to encounter large-scale fracture systems, while an economic risk abatement tactic for 'fracking'-induced seismicity is to avoid large-scale fracture systems. Well productivity and ore body grade distributions arise from three empirical rules for fluid flow in crustal rock: (i) power-law scaling of grain-scale fracture density fluctuations; (ii) spatial correlation between spatial fluctuations in well-core porosity and the logarithm of well-core permeability; (iii) frequency distributions of permeability governed by a lognormality skewness parameter. The physical origin of rules (i)-(iii) is the universal existence of a critical-state-percolation grain-scale fracture-density threshold for crustal rock. Crustal fractures are effectively long-range spatially-correlated distributions of grain-scale defects permitting fluid percolation on mm to km scales. The rule is, the larger the fracture system the more intense the percolation throughput. As percolation pathways are spatially erratic and unpredictable on all scales, they are difficult to model with sparsely sampled well data. Phenomena such as well productivity, induced seismicity, and ore body fossil fracture distributions are collectively extremely difficult to predict. Risk associated with unpredictable reservoir well productivity and ore body distributions can be managed by operating in a context which affords many small failures for a few large successes. In reverse view, 'fracking' and induced seismicity could be rationally managed in a context in which many small successes can afford a few large failures. However, just as there is every incentive to acquire information leading to higher rates of productive well drilling and ore body exploration, there are equal incentives for acquiring information leading to lower rates of 'fracking'-induced seismicity. Current industry practice of using an effective medium approach to reservoir rock creates an uncritical sense that property distributions in rock are essentially uniform. Well-log data show that the reverse is true: the larger the length scale the greater the deviation from uniformity. Applying the effective medium approach to large-scale rock formations thus appears to be unnecessarily hazardous. It promotes the notion that large scale fluid pressurization acts against weakly cohesive but essentially uniform rock to produce large-scale quasi-uniform tensile discontinuities. Indiscriminate hydrofacturing appears to be vastly more problematic in reality than as pictured by the effective medium hypothesis. The spatial complexity of rock, especially at large scales, provides ample reason to find more controlled pressurization strategies for enhancing in situ flow.

Pay for performance: will dentistry follow?

PubMed

Voinea-Griffin, Andreea; Fellows, Jeffrey L; Rindal, Donald B; Barasch, Andrei; Gilbert, Gregg H; Safford, Monika M

2010-04-28

"Pay for performance" is an incentive system that has been gaining acceptance in medicine and is currently being considered for implementation in dentistry. However, it remains unclear whether pay for performance can effect significant and lasting changes in provider behavior and quality of care. Provider acceptance will likely increase if pay for performance programs reward true quality. Therefore, we adopted a quality-oriented approach in reviewing those factors which could influence whether it will be embraced by the dental profession. The factors contributing to the adoption of value-based purchasing were categorized according to the Donabedian quality of care framework. We identified the dental insurance market, the dental profession position, the organization of dental practice, and the dental patient involvement as structural factors influencing the way dental care is practiced and paid for. After considering variations in dental care and the early stage of development for evidence-based dentistry, the scarcity of outcome indicators, lack of clinical markers, inconsistent use of diagnostic codes and scarcity of electronic dental records, we concluded that, for pay for performance programs to be successfully implemented in dentistry, the dental profession and health services researchers should: 1) expand the knowledge base; 2) increase considerably evidence-based clinical guidelines; and 3) create evidence-based performance measures tied to existing clinical practice guidelines. In this paper, we explored factors that would influence the adoption of value-based purchasing programs in dentistry. Although none of these factors were essential deterrents for the implementation of pay for performance programs in medicine, the aggregate seems to indicate that significant changes are needed before this type of program could be considered a realistic option in dentistry.

Selfish play increases during high-stakes NBA games and is rewarded with more lucrative contracts.

PubMed

Uhlmann, Eric Luis; Barnes, Christopher M

2014-01-01

High-stakes team competitions can present a social dilemma in which participants must choose between concentrating on their personal performance and assisting teammates as a means of achieving group objectives. We find that despite the seemingly strong group incentive to win the NBA title, cooperative play actually diminishes during playoff games, negatively affecting team performance. Thus team cooperation decreases in the very high stakes contexts in which it is most important to perform well together. Highlighting the mixed incentives that underlie selfish play, personal scoring is rewarded with more lucrative future contracts, whereas assisting teammates to score is associated with reduced pay due to lost opportunities for personal scoring. A combination of misaligned incentives and psychological biases in performance evaluation bring out the "I" in "team" when cooperation is most critical.

Selfish Play Increases during High-Stakes NBA Games and Is Rewarded with More Lucrative Contracts

PubMed Central

Uhlmann, Eric Luis; Barnes, Christopher M.

2014-01-01

High-stakes team competitions can present a social dilemma in which participants must choose between concentrating on their personal performance and assisting teammates as a means of achieving group objectives. We find that despite the seemingly strong group incentive to win the NBA title, cooperative play actually diminishes during playoff games, negatively affecting team performance. Thus team cooperation decreases in the very high stakes contexts in which it is most important to perform well together. Highlighting the mixed incentives that underlie selfish play, personal scoring is rewarded with more lucrative future contracts, whereas assisting teammates to score is associated with reduced pay due to lost opportunities for personal scoring. A combination of misaligned incentives and psychological biases in performance evaluation bring out the “I” in “team” when cooperation is most critical. PMID:24763384

Individual payments as a longer-term incentive in online panels.

PubMed

Göritz, Anja S; Wolff, Hans-Georg; Goldstein, Daniel G

2008-11-01

Does it pay to pay online panel members? A three-wave longitudinal experiment was conducted with an online panel to examine whether per person payments, paid through an online intermediary, influence response and retention rates. In the payment condition, participants were promised payment for participation at each wave, whereas control participants were not offered any payment. The promise of a payment had a negative effect on response in Wave 1, but a positive effect on response in Wave 2. Payment had no significant effect on retention. Completing a given wave was an indicator for responding to a subsequent invitation.

Unions Assail Teacher Ideas in NCLB Draft

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Klein, Alyson; Hoff, David J.

2007-01-01

This article reports on two national teachers' unions that have mounted a vigorous lobbying campaign to rewrite language linking teacher bonuses to student test scores and other incentive-pay provisions contained in a draft bill for reauthorizing the No Child Left Behind Act. Members of the National Education Association circulated in the halls of…

75 FR 70132 - New Incentive Programs and Other Changes for Domestic Mailing Services

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-11-17

... pieces that are part of full-service Intelligent Mail [supreg] automation mailings entered at PostalOne... conditions. Reply pieces must bear an Intelligent Mail barcode as of May 1, 2011. This new program provides... time of mailing, mailers pay the applicable 2-ounce price for these pieces. All commercial (presorted...

41 CFR 302-3.2 - As a new appointee or student trainee what relocation expenses may my agency pay or reimburse me...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... (part 302-8 of this chapter)1 5. Transportation of a mobile home or boat used as a primary residence in.... Extended storage of household goods (part 302-8 of this chapter) 4. Home marketing incentives only when...

78 FR 10228 - Self-Regulatory Organizations; Chicago Board Options Exchange, Incorporated; Notice of Filing and...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-02-13

... transaction fee for XSP index options. Currently, the Exchange has a $0.18 customer transaction fee per... customer transaction fees for transactions in XSP index options. Eliminating the customer transaction fee... opportunity to pay lower fees for such transactions and provide greater incentives for customers to trade XSP...

The Condition of the Infrastructure of New York Schools: Who Pays and Who Benefits?

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Crampton, Faith E.

1991-01-01

Insufficient resource allocation to facilities maintenance and decisions to defer maintenance are contributors to a backlog of deferred maintenance nationwide. Focuses on the infrastructure of New York schools and suggests incentives at the state level to ensure adequate attention is given to plant maintenance. (eight references) (MLF)

Value-Added and Other Methods for Measuring School Performance. Working Paper 2008-17

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Meyer, Robert H.; Christian, Michael S.

2008-01-01

One of the central challenges of designing and implementing a performance pay program is developing an approach for determining which schools, teachers, and administrators have performed well enough to have earned a bonus. The U.S. Department of Education's Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) program provides grantees substantial latitude to create…

25 CFR 166.907 - Who can be an intern?

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-04-01

... 25 Indians 1 2011-04-01 2011-04-01 false Who can be an intern? 166.907 Section 166.907 Indians..., Education Assistance, Recruitment, and Training § 166.907 Who can be an intern? (a) Natural resources or... bonus pay incentive, up to 25 percent (%) of the intern's base salary, may be provided to...

25 CFR 166.907 - Who can be an intern?

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-04-01

... 25 Indians 1 2013-04-01 2013-04-01 false Who can be an intern? 166.907 Section 166.907 Indians..., Education Assistance, Recruitment, and Training § 166.907 Who can be an intern? (a) Natural resources or... bonus pay incentive, up to 25 percent (%) of the intern's base salary, may be provided to...

25 CFR 166.907 - Who can be an intern?

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-04-01

... 25 Indians 1 2012-04-01 2011-04-01 true Who can be an intern? 166.907 Section 166.907 Indians..., Education Assistance, Recruitment, and Training § 166.907 Who can be an intern? (a) Natural resources or... bonus pay incentive, up to 25 percent (%) of the intern's base salary, may be provided to...

25 CFR 166.907 - Who can be an intern?

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-04-01

... 25 Indians 1 2014-04-01 2014-04-01 false Who can be an intern? 166.907 Section 166.907 Indians..., Education Assistance, Recruitment, and Training § 166.907 Who can be an intern? (a) Natural resources or... bonus pay incentive, up to 25 percent (%) of the intern's base salary, may be provided to...

Motivation and Effective Management of Student Assistants in Academic Libraries.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Banks, Julie

1991-01-01

Discussion of student assistants in academic libraries focuses on a study of 40 academic libraries in Texas with church affiliations that investigated ways to motivate student assistants to shelve more productively. Student attitudes are discussed, and it is concluded that a small across-the-board pay incentive is an effective motivator. (17…

A Nation at Risk to Win the Future: The State of Public Education in the U.S.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Scott, Timothy

2011-01-01

Mounting evidence is exposing how merit pay incentives, charter schools, vocational curriculum, and high-stakes testing regimes do not fulfill their purported objectives, and instead are enormously detrimental to students, education workers, marginalized groups, social equality and ultimately the collective good. While the wealthy continue to…

Commitment Approach to Motivating Community Recycling: New Zealand Curbside Trial.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Bryce, Wendy J.; And Others

1997-01-01

In a New Zealand community, 200 households made commitment to recycle and 201 did not; 198 were asked to pay for recycling bins, 203 were not. A control group received only recycling information. Verbal commitment significantly increased participation. Difficulties in administering the financial incentive made it impossible to determine effect on…

Restoring and Maintaining Riparian Habitat on Private Pastureland

Treesearch

Nancy Reichard

1989-01-01

Protecting riparian habitat from livestock grazing on private land is a complex task that requires paying attention to sociological and economic as well as physical and biological factors. Six livestock exclusion fencing projects on private property in northwestern California are described. The importance of long term maintenance and the need for landowner incentives...

What Are Achievement Gains Worth--to Teachers?

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Marsh, Julie A.; McCaffrey, Daniel F.

2011-01-01

In 2007, New York City schools commenced a school-level pay-for-performance program for teachers and staff in about 200 schools. The authors found that the program didn't improve schools or student outcomes. Why? Because the program failed to create conditions that theory suggests are necessary for performance-based incentive programs to change…

Health spending in the 1980's: Integration of clinical practice patterns with management

PubMed Central

Freeland, Mark S.; Schendler, Carol E.

1984-01-01

Health care spending in the United States more than tripled between 1972 and 1982, increasing from $94 billion to $322 billion. This growth substantially outpaced overall growth in the economy. National health expenditures are projected to reach approximately $690 billion in 1990 and consume roughly 12 percent of the gross national product. Government spending for health care is projected to reach $294 billion by 1990, with the Federal Government paying 72 percent. The Medicare prospective payment system and increasing competition in the health services sector are providing incentives to integrate clinical practice patterns with improved management practices. PMID:10310595

Financial Incentives to Increase Advance Care Planning Among Medicaid Beneficiaries: Lessons Learned From Two Pragmatic Randomized Trials.

PubMed

Barnato, Amber E; Moore, Robert; Moore, Charity G; Kohatsu, Neal D; Sudore, Rebecca L

2017-07-01

Medicaid populations have low rates of advance care planning (ACP). Potential policy interventions include financial incentives. To test the effectiveness of patient plus provider financial incentive compared with provider financial incentive alone for increasing ACP discussions among Medicaid patients. Between April 2014 and July 2015, we conducted two sequential assessor-blinded pragmatic randomized trials in a health plan that pays primary care providers (PCPs) $100 to discuss ACP: 1) a parallel cluster trial (provider-delivered patient incentive) and 2) an individual-level trial (mail-delivered patient incentive). Control and intervention arms included encouragement to complete ACP, instructions for using an online ACP tool, and (in the intervention arm) $50 for completing the online ACP tool and a small probability of $1000 (i.e., lottery) for discussing ACP with their PCP. The primary outcome was provider-reported ACP discussion within three months. In the provider-delivered patient incentive study, 38 PCPs were randomized to the intervention (n = 18) or control (n = 20) and given 10 patient packets each to distribute. Using an intention-to-treat analysis, there were 27 of 180 ACP discussions (15%) in the intervention group and 5 of 200 (2.5%) in the control group (P = .0391). In the mail-delivered patient incentive study, there were 5 of 187 ACP discussions (2.7%) in the intervention group and 5 of 189 (2.6%) in the control group (P = .99). ACP rates were low despite an existing provider financial incentive. Adding a provider-delivered patient financial incentive, but not a mail-delivered patient incentive, modestly increased ACP discussions. PCP encouragement combined with a patient incentive may be more powerful than either encouragement or incentive alone. Copyright © 2017 American Academy of Hospice and Palliative Medicine. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Design, rationale, and baseline characteristics of a cluster randomized controlled trial of pay for performance for hypertension treatment: study protocol

PubMed Central

2011-01-01

Background Despite compelling evidence of the benefits of treatment and well-accepted guidelines for treatment, hypertension is controlled in less than one-half of United States citizens. Methods/design This randomized controlled trial tests whether explicit financial incentives promote the translation of guideline-recommended care for hypertension into clinical practice and improve blood pressure (BP) control in the primary care setting. Using constrained randomization, we assigned 12 Veterans Affairs hospital outpatient clinics to four study arms: physician-level incentive; group-level incentive; combination of physician and group incentives; and no incentives (control). All participants at the hospital (cluster) were assigned to the same study arm. We enrolled 83 full-time primary care physicians and 42 non-physician personnel. The intervention consisted of an educational session about guideline-recommended care for hypertension, five audit and feedback reports, and five disbursements of incentive payments. Incentive payments rewarded participants for chart-documented use of guideline-recommended antihypertensive medications, BP control, and appropriate responses to uncontrolled BP during a prior four-month performance period over the 20-month intervention. To identify potential unintended consequences of the incentives, the study team interviewed study participants, as well as non-participant primary care personnel and leadership at study sites. Chart reviews included data collection on quality measures not related to hypertension. To evaluate the persistence of the effect of the incentives, the study design includes a washout period. Discussion We briefly describe the rationale for the interventions being studied, as well as the major design choices. Rigorous research designs such as the one described here are necessary to determine whether performance-based payment arrangements such as financial incentives result in meaningful quality improvements. Trial Registration http://www.clinicaltrials.gov NCT00302718 PMID:21967830

Using financial incentives to improve value in orthopaedics.

PubMed

Lansky, David; Nwachukwu, Benedict U; Bozic, Kevin J

2012-04-01

A variety of reforms to traditional approaches to provider payment and benefit design are being implemented in the United States. There is increasing interest in applying these financial incentives to orthopaedics, although it is unclear whether and to what extent they have been implemented and whether they increase quality or reduce costs. We reviewed and discussed physician- and patient-oriented financial incentives being implemented in orthopaedics, key challenges, and prerequisites to payment reform and value-driven payment policy in orthopaedics. We searched the MEDLINE database using as search terms various provider payment and consumer incentive models. We retrieved a total of 169 articles; none of these studies met the inclusion criteria. For incentive models known to the authors to be in use in orthopaedics but for which no peer-reviewed literature was found, we searched Google for further information. Provider financial incentives reviewed include payments for reporting, performance, and patient safety and episode payment. Patient incentives include tiered networks, value-based benefit design, reference pricing, and value-based purchasing. Reform of financial incentives for orthopaedic surgery is challenged by (1) lack of a payment/incentive model that has demonstrated reductions in cost trends and (2) the complex interrelation of current pay schemes in today's fragmented environment. Prerequisites to reform include (1) a reliable and complete data infrastructure; (2) new business structures to support cost sharing; and (3) a retooling of patient expectations. There is insufficient literature reporting the effects of various financial incentive models under implementation in orthopaedics to know whether they increase quality or reduce costs. National concerns about cost will continue to drive experimentation, and all anticipated innovations will require improved collaboration and data collection and reporting.

Design, rationale, and baseline characteristics of a cluster randomized controlled trial of pay for performance for hypertension treatment: study protocol.

PubMed

Petersen, Laura A; Urech, Tracy; Simpson, Kate; Pietz, Kenneth; Hysong, Sylvia J; Profit, Jochen; Conrad, Douglas; Dudley, R Adams; Lutschg, Meghan Z; Petzel, Robert; Woodard, Lechauncy D

2011-10-03

Despite compelling evidence of the benefits of treatment and well-accepted guidelines for treatment, hypertension is controlled in less than one-half of United States citizens. This randomized controlled trial tests whether explicit financial incentives promote the translation of guideline-recommended care for hypertension into clinical practice and improve blood pressure (BP) control in the primary care setting. Using constrained randomization, we assigned 12 Veterans Affairs hospital outpatient clinics to four study arms: physician-level incentive; group-level incentive; combination of physician and group incentives; and no incentives (control). All participants at the hospital (cluster) were assigned to the same study arm. We enrolled 83 full-time primary care physicians and 42 non-physician personnel. The intervention consisted of an educational session about guideline-recommended care for hypertension, five audit and feedback reports, and five disbursements of incentive payments. Incentive payments rewarded participants for chart-documented use of guideline-recommended antihypertensive medications, BP control, and appropriate responses to uncontrolled BP during a prior four-month performance period over the 20-month intervention. To identify potential unintended consequences of the incentives, the study team interviewed study participants, as well as non-participant primary care personnel and leadership at study sites. Chart reviews included data collection on quality measures not related to hypertension. To evaluate the persistence of the effect of the incentives, the study design includes a washout period. We briefly describe the rationale for the interventions being studied, as well as the major design choices. Rigorous research designs such as the one described here are necessary to determine whether performance-based payment arrangements such as financial incentives result in meaningful quality improvements. http://www.clinicaltrials.govNCT00302718.

An assessment of the safe delivery incentive program at a tertiary level hospital in Nepal.

PubMed

Baral, G

2012-05-01

Maternity incentive program of Nepal known as Safe Delivery Incentive Program (SDIP) was introduced nationwide in 2005 with the intention of increasing utilization of professional care at childbirth. The program provided both childbirth service as well as 'cash' to women giving birth in a health facility in addition to incentives to health provider for each delivery attended, either at home or the facility. Due to a lack of uniformity in its implementation and administrative delays, the program was reformed and even extended to many not-for-profit health institutions in early 2007, and implemented as a 'Safer Mother Program' popularly known as "Aama-Suraksha-Karyakram" since January 2009. This is a system research with observational and analytical components. Plausibility design is selected to evaluate the performance-based funding (PBF) as a system level intervention of maternity care using two instruments: Pay-For-Performance and Conditional-Cash-Transfer. It uses interrupted time-series to control for the natural trend. Research tools used are interviews, the focus group discussions and literature review. Numerical data are presented in simple graphs. While online random number generator was used partly, the purposive sampling was used for qualitative data. There is a gross discrepancy in non-targeted service delivery at the tertiary level health facility. Overflooding of maternity cases has hampered gynecological admission and surgical management delaying subspecialty care and junior physicians' training. With the same number and quality of physical facility and human resource, the additional program has put more strains to service providers and administrators. There should be adequate planning and preparation at all levels of health facilities; implementing a new program should not adversely affect another existing service delivery system. For the optional implementation, hospital organogram should be revised; and physical facilities and the low-risk birthing-centers with referral linkages should be expanded.

Practice Innovation, Health Care Utilization and Costs in a Network of Federally Qualified Health Centers and Hospitals for Medicaid Enrollees.

PubMed

Johnson, Tricia J; Jones, Art; Lulias, Cheryl; Perry, Anthony

2018-06-01

State Medicaid programs need cost-effective strategies to provide high-quality care that is accessible to individuals with low incomes and limited resources. Integrated delivery systems have been formed to provide care across the continuum, but creating a shared vision for improving community health can be challenging. Medical Home Network was created as a network of primary care providers and hospital systems providing care to Medicaid enrollees, guided by the principles of egalitarian governance, practice-level care coordination, real-time electronic alerts, and pay-for-performance incentives. This analysis of health care utilization and costs included 1,189,195 Medicaid enrollees. After implementation of Medical Home Network, a risk-adjusted increase of $9.07 or 4.3% per member per month was found over the 2 years of implementation compared with an increase of $17.25 or 9.3% per member per month, before accounting for the cost of care management fees and other financial incentives, for Medicaid enrollees within the same geographic area with a primary care provider outside of Medical Home Network. After accounting for care coordination fees paid to providers, the net risk-adjusted cost reduction was $11.0 million.

Physician Quality Reporting System Program Updates and the Impact on Emergency Medicine Practice.

PubMed

Wiler, Jennifer L; Granovsky, Michael; Cantrill, Stephen V; Newell, Richard; Venkatesh, Arjun K; Schuur, Jeremiah D

2016-03-01

In 2007, the Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services (CMS) created a novel payment program to create incentives for physician's to focus on quality of care measures and report quality performance for the first time. Initially termed "The Physician Voluntary Reporting Program," various Congressional actions, including the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 (TRHCA) and Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008 (MIPPA) further strengthened and ensconced this program, eventually leading to the quality program termed today as the Physician Quality Reporting System (PQRS). As a result of passage of the Affordable Care Act of 2010, the PQRS program has expanded to include both the "traditional PQRS" reporting program and the newer "Value Modifier" program (VM). For the first time, these programs were designed to include pay-for-performance incentives for all physicians providing care to Medicare beneficiaries and to measure the cost of care. The recent passage of the Medicare Access and Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) Reauthorization Act in March of 2015 includes changes to these payment programs that will have an even more profound impact on emergency care providers. We describe the implications of these important federal policy changes for emergency physicians.

Family physicians' suggestions to improve the documentation, coding, and billing system: a study from the residency research network of Texas.

PubMed

Young, Richard A; Bayles, Bryan; Hill, Jason H; Kumar, Kaparabonya A; Burge, Sandra

2014-06-01

The study's aim was to ascertain family physicians' suggestions on how to improve the commonly used US evaluation and management (E/M) rules for primary care. A companion paper published in Family Medicine's May 2014 journal describes our study methods (Fam Med 2014;46(5):378-84). Study subjects supported preserving the overall SOAP note structure. They especially suggested eliminating bullet counting in the E/M rules. For payment reform, respondents stated that brief or simple work should be paid less than long or complex work, and that family physicians should be paid for important tasks they currently are not, such as spending extra time with patients, phone and email clinical encounters, and extra paperwork. Subjects wanted shared savings when their decisions and actions created system efficiencies and savings. Some supported recent payment reforms such as monthly retainer fees and pay-for-performance bonuses. Others expressed skepticism about the negative consequences of each. Aligned incentives among all stakeholders was another common theme. Family physicians wanted less burdensome documentation requirements. They wanted to be paid more for complex work and work that does not include traditional face-to-face clinic visits, and they wanted the incentives of other stakeholders in the health care systems to be aligned with their priorities.

Neural Mechanisms Underlying Motivation of Mental Versus Physical Effort

PubMed Central

Daunizeau, Jean; Pessiglione, Mathias

2012-01-01

Mental and physical efforts, such as paying attention and lifting weights, have been shown to involve different brain systems. These cognitive and motor systems, respectively, include cortical networks (prefronto-parietal and precentral regions) as well as subregions of the dorsal basal ganglia (caudate and putamen). Both systems appeared sensitive to incentive motivation: their activity increases when we work for higher rewards. Another brain system, including the ventral prefrontal cortex and the ventral basal ganglia, has been implicated in encoding expected rewards. How this motivational system drives the cognitive and motor systems remains poorly understood. More specifically, it is unclear whether cognitive and motor systems can be driven by a common motivational center or if they are driven by distinct, dedicated motivational modules. To address this issue, we used functional MRI to scan healthy participants while performing a task in which incentive motivation, cognitive, and motor demands were varied independently. We reasoned that a common motivational node should (1) represent the reward expected from effort exertion, (2) correlate with the performance attained, and (3) switch effective connectivity between cognitive and motor regions depending on task demand. The ventral striatum fulfilled all three criteria and therefore qualified as a common motivational node capable of driving both cognitive and motor regions of the dorsal striatum. Thus, we suggest that the interaction between a common motivational system and the different task-specific systems underpinning behavioral performance might occur within the basal ganglia. PMID:22363208

The influence of performance-based payment on childhood immunisation coverage.

PubMed

Merilind, Eero; Salupere, Rauno; Västra, Katrin; Kalda, Ruth

2015-06-01

Pay-for-performance, also called the quality system (QS) in Estonia, was implemented in 2006 and one indicator for achievement is the childhood immunisation coverage rate. The WHO vaccination coverage in Europe for diphtheria, tetanus and pertussis, and measles in children aged around one year old should meet or exceed 90 per cent. The study was conducted using a database from the Estonian Health Insurance Fund. The study compared childhood immunisation coverage rates of all Estonian family physicians in two groups, joined and not joined to the quality system during the observation period 2006-2012. Immunisation coverage was calculated as the percentage of persons in the target age group who received a vaccine dose by a given age. The target level of immunisations in Estonia is set at 90 per cent and higher. Immunisation coverage rates of family doctors (FD) in Estonia showed significant differences between two groups of doctors: joined to the quality system and not joined. Doctors joined to the quality system met the 90 per cent vaccination criterion more frequently compared to doctors not joined to the quality system. Doctors not joined to the quality system were below the 90 per cent vaccination criterion in all vaccinations listed in the Estonian State Immunisation Schedule. Pay-for-performance as a financial incentive encourages higher levels of childhood immunisations. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.

Salary discrepancies between practicing male and female physician assistants.

PubMed

Coplan, Bettie; Essary, Alison C; Virden, Thomas B; Cawley, James; Stoehr, James D

2012-01-01

Salary discrepancies between male and female physicians are well documented; however, gender-based salary differences among clinically practicing physician assistants (PAs) have not been studied since 1992 (Willis, 1992). Therefore, the objectives of the current study are to evaluate the presence of salary discrepancies between clinically practicing male and female PAs and to analyze the effect of gender on income and practice characteristics. Using data from the 2009 American Academy of Physician Assistants' (AAPA) Annual Census Survey, we evaluated the salaries of PAs across multiple specialties. Differences between men and women were compared for practice characteristics (specialty, experience, etc) and salary (total pay, base pay, on-call pay, etc) in orthopedic surgery, emergency medicine, and family practice. Men reported working more years as a PA in their current specialty, working more hours per month on-call, providing more direct care to patients, and more funding available from their employers for professional development (p < .001, all comparisons). In addition, men reported a higher total income, base pay, overtime pay, administrative pay, on-call pay, and incentive pay based on productivity and performance (p < .001, all comparisons). Multivariate analysis of covariance and analysis of variance revealed that men reported higher total income (p < .0001) and base pay (p = .001) in orthopedic surgery, higher total income (p = .011) and base pay (p = .005) in emergency medicine, and higher base pay in family practice (p < .001), independent of clinical experience or workload. These results suggest that certain salary discrepancies remain between employed male and female PAs regardless of specialty, experience, or other practice characteristics. Copyright © 2012. Published by Elsevier Inc.

The Use of Enhanced Appointment Access Strategies by Medical Practices.

PubMed

Rodriguez, Hector P; Knox, Margae; Hurley, Vanessa; Rittenhouse, Diane R; Shortell, Stephen M

2016-06-01

Strategies to enhance appointment access are being adopted by medical practices as part of patient-centered medical home (PCMH) implementation, but little is known about the use of these strategies nationally. We examine practice use of open access scheduling and after-hours care. Data were analyzed from the Third National Study of Physician Organizations (NSPO3) to examine which enhanced appointment access strategies are more likely to be used by practices with more robust PCMH capabilities and with greater external incentives. Logistic regression estimated the effect of PCMH capabilities and external incentives on practice use of open access scheduling and after-hours care. Physician organizations with >20% primary care physicians (n=1106). PCMH capabilities included team-based care, health information technology capabilities, quality improvement orientation, and patient experience orientation. External incentives included public reporting, pay-for-performance (P4P), and accountable care organization participation. A low percentage of practices (19.8%) used same-day open access scheduling, while after-hours care (56.1%) was more common. In adjusted analyses, system-owned practices and practices with greater use of team-based care, health information technology capabilities, and public reporting were more likely to use open access scheduling. Accountable care organization-affiliated practices and practices with greater use of public reporting and P4P were more likely to provide after-hours care. Open access scheduling may be most effectively implemented by practices with robust PCMH capabilities. External incentives appear to influence practice adoption of after-hours care. Expanding open access scheduling and after-hours care will require distinct policies and supports.

Rewarding healthy behaviors--pay patients for performance.

PubMed

Wu, Joanne

2012-01-01

Despite a considerable investment of resources into pay for performance, preliminary studies have found that it may not be significantly more effective in improving health outcome measures when compared with voluntary quality improvement programs. Because patient behaviors ultimately affect health outcomes, I would propose a novel pay-for-performance program that rewards patients directly for achieving evidence-based health goals. These rewards would be in the form of discounts towards co-payments for doctor's visits, procedures, and medications, thereby potentially reducing cost and compliance issues. A pilot study recruiting patients with diabetes or hypertension, diseases with clear and objective outcome measures, would be useful to examine true costs, savings, and health outcomes of such a reward program. Offering incentives to patients for reaching health goals has the potential to foster a stronger partnership between doctors and patients and improve health outcomes.

The impact of enhanced incentives on vocational rehabilitation outcomes for dually diagnosed veterans.

PubMed

Drebing, Charles E; Van Ormer, E Alice; Krebs, Christopher; Rosenheck, Robert; Rounsaville, Bruce; Herz, Lawrence; Penk, Walter

2005-01-01

This study evaluated the efficacy of adding contingency management techniques to vocational rehabilitation (VR) to improve treatment outcome as measured by entry into competitive employment. Nineteen dually diagnosed veterans who entered VR in the Veterans' Administration's compensated work therapy (CWT) program were randomly assigned to CWT (n = 8) or to CWT with enhanced incentives (n = 11). Over the first 16 weeks of rehabilitation, those in the incentives condition could earn up to dollar 1,006 in cash for meeting two sets of clinical goals: (a) remaining abstinent from drugs and alcohol and (b) taking steps to obtain and maintain a competitive job. Results indicate that relative to participants in the CWT-only group, those in the incentives condition engaged in more job-search activities, were more likely to remain abstinent from drugs and alcohol, were more likely to obtain competitive employment, and earned an average of 68% more in wages. These results suggest that rehabilitation outcomes may be enhanced by restructuring traditional work-for-pay contingencies to include direct financial rewards for meeting clinical goals.

The Impact of Enhanced Incentives on Vocational Rehabilitation Outcomes for Dually Diagnosed Veterans

PubMed Central

2005-01-01

This study evaluated the efficacy of adding contingency management techniques to vocational rehabilitation (VR) to improve treatment outcome as measured by entry into competitive employment. Nineteen dually diagnosed veterans who entered VR in the Veterans' Administration's compensated work therapy (CWT) program were randomly assigned to CWT (n  =  8) or to CWT with enhanced incentives (n  =  11). Over the first 16 weeks of rehabilitation, those in the incentives condition could earn up to $1,006 in cash for meeting two sets of clinical goals: (a) remaining abstinent from drugs and alcohol and (b) taking steps to obtain and maintain a competitive job. Results indicate that relative to participants in the CWT-only group, those in the incentives condition engaged in more job-search activities, were more likely to remain abstinent from drugs and alcohol, were more likely to obtain competitive employment, and earned an average of 68% more in wages. These results suggest that rehabilitation outcomes may be enhanced by restructuring traditional work-for-pay contingencies to include direct financial rewards for meeting clinical goals. PMID:16270845

Metabolic incentives for dishonest signals of strength in the fiddler crab Uca vomeris.

PubMed

Bywater, Candice L; White, Craig R; Wilson, Robbie S

2014-08-15

To reduce the potential costs of combat, animals may rely upon signals to resolve territorial disputes. Signals also provide a means for individuals to appear better than they actually are, deceiving opponents and gaining access to resources that would otherwise be unattainable. However, other than resource gains, incentives for dishonest signalling remain unexplored. In this study, we tested the idea that unreliable signallers pay lower metabolic costs for their signals, and that energetic savings could represent an incentive for cheating. We focused on two-toned fiddler crabs (Uca vomeris), a species that frequently uses its enlarged claws as signals of dominance to opponents. Previously, we found that regenerated U. vomeris claws are often large but weak (i.e. unreliable). Here, we found that the original claws of male U. vomeris consumed 43% more oxygen than weaker, regenerated claws, suggesting that muscle quantity drives variation in metabolic costs. Therefore, it seems that metabolic savings could provide a powerful incentive for dishonesty within fiddler crabs. © 2014. Published by The Company of Biologists Ltd.

A National Study To Assess Payments and Benefits to Cooperating Teachers Working with Teacher Training Programs.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Barker, Bruce O.; And Others

The major purpose of this study was to find out how much money colleges and universities pay public school cooperating teachers who supervise student teachers, education students' early field experiences, or pre-student teaching. Two secondary purposes were to determine what other incentives, besides monetary remuneration, are granted and the role…

Teacher Attitudes toward the Consequences of Pay for Performance Incentives

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Winkler, Harry Dale

2010-01-01

Research indicates that teachers play a very important role in the academic achievement of students (Sanders & Rivers, 2002). One study states, "The quality of teaching has been shown to relate directly to students' ability to succeed in school, the workplace, and in life" (Koppich, 2008). Even though a low number of studies have found a small…

The Effects of Incentives on Families' Long-Term Outcome in a Parenting Program

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Heinrichs, Nina; Jensen-Doss, Amanda

2010-01-01

To examine the impact of paying for participation in a preventive parenting program on treatment outcomes, 197 families with preschool-aged children were randomized to paid or unpaid conditions. Although both groups improved on nearly all measures, paid families showed less improvement on 3 of 10 variables, including father-reported child…

Alternative Compensation Terminology: Considerations for Education Stakeholders, Policymakers, and the Media. Emerging Issues. Report No. 2

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Rowland, Cortney; Potemski, Amy

2009-01-01

Schools, districts, and states across the nation are changing the way educators are paid. Through the Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) and other publicly and independently funded programs, educators at every level are designing and implementing modified pay and reward structures for teachers and principals. Sometimes these initiatives are called…

Performance Pay Improves Engagement, Progress, and Satisfaction in Computer-Based Job Skills Training of Low-Income Adults

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Koffarnus, Mikhail N.; DeFulio, Anthony; Sigurdsson, Sigurdur O.; Silverman, Kenneth

2013-01-01

Advancing the education of low-income adults could increase employment and income, but adult education programs have not successfully engaged low-income adults. Monetary reinforcement may be effective in promoting progress in adult education. This experiment evaluated the benefits of providing incentives for performance in a job-skills training…

Green Pays Its Way--Performance-Based Fees.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Burns, Cameron M.; Eubank, Huston

2002-01-01

Reports that giving building and design professionals a financial incentive to create high-efficiency schools has proven to be a winning strategy for both the firms that design and build schools and the students who learn in them. Discusses a group of educators who had heard about the effects of natural lighting and ventilation on student and…

College Bound: Efforts to Recruit American Indian Males to College Are Working

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Stuart, Reginald

2012-01-01

The ambitious efforts to recruit American Indian males are working, despite an abundance of hurdles, including lack of money to pay for college, few peer and mentor incentives and important family obligations that don't seem to leave much time for pursuits like college. American Indian male enrollment at tribal colleges and universities has risen…

An Evaluation of the Chicago Teacher Advancement Program (Chicago TAP) after Four Years. Final Report

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Glazerman, Steven; Seifullah, Allison

2012-01-01

In 2007, using funds from the federal Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) and private foundations, the Chicago Public Schools (CPS) began piloting its version of a schoolwide reform model called the Teacher Advancement Program (TAP). Under the TAP model, teachers can earn extra pay and take on increased responsibilities through promotion (to mentor…

An Evaluation of the Teacher Advancement Program (TAP) in Chicago: Year Two Impact Report

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Glazerman, Steven; Seifullah, Allison

2010-01-01

In 2007, the Chicago Public Schools (CPS) began implementing a schoolwide reform called the Teacher Advancement Program (TAP) using funds from the federal Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) and private foundations. Under the TAP model, teachers can earn extra pay and responsibilities through promotion to mentor or master teacher as well as annual…

The Future Train Wreck: Paying for Medical Costs for Higher Education's Retirees

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Biggs, John H.

2006-01-01

Trustees and administrators today confront one of two problems with post-retirement medical care. First, if institutions provide no support for their retirees' medical care, they implicitly offer a powerful incentive for senior faculty to stay on. The compensation and opportunity costs of this effect are obviously very high. But, second, if they…

Development of Art Appreciation in 11-14 Year-Old Students

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Duh, Matjaž; Zupancic, Tomaž; Cagran, Branka

2014-01-01

Modern art curricula derive from the assumption that visual arts education can be of a high quality only if productive and receptive artistic activities are implemented. In art education practice, we are able to follow incentives for artistic expression but pay less attention to developing art appreciation that is based on developing as subtle…

24 CFR 960.255 - Self-sufficiency incentives-Disallowance of increase in annual income.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-04-01

... beginning on the date a member of a qualified family is first employed or the family first experiences an... first employed or the family first experiences an increase in annual income attributable to employment...) Purchasing a home; (ii) Paying education costs of family members; (iii) Moving out of public or assisted...

Predicting the deforestation-trend under different carbon-prices

PubMed Central

Kindermann, Georg E; Obersteiner, Michael; Rametsteiner, Ewald; McCallum, Ian

2006-01-01

Background Global carbon stocks in forest biomass are decreasing by 1.1 Gt of carbon annually, owing to continued deforestation and forest degradation. Deforestation emissions are partly offset by forest expansion and increases in growing stock primarily in the extra-tropical north. Innovative financial mechanisms would be required to help reducing deforestation. Using a spatially explicit integrated biophysical and socio-economic land use model we estimated the impact of carbon price incentive schemes and payment modalities on deforestation. One payment modality is adding costs for carbon emission, the other is to pay incentives for keeping the forest carbon stock intact. Results Baseline scenario calculations show that close to 200 mil ha or around 5% of todays forest area will be lost between 2006 and 2025, resulting in a release of additional 17.5 GtC. Today's forest cover will shrink by around 500 million hectares, which is 1/8 of the current forest cover, within the next 100 years. The accumulated carbon release during the next 100 years amounts to 45 GtC, which is 15% of the total carbon stored in forests today. Incentives of 6 US$/tC for vulnerable standing biomass payed every 5 year will bring deforestation down by 50%. This will cause costs of 34 billion US$/year. On the other hand a carbon tax of 12 $/tC harvested forest biomass will also cut deforestation by half. The tax income will, if enforced, decrease from 6 billion US$ in 2005 to 4.3 billion US$ in 2025 and 0.7 billion US$ in 2100 due to decreasing deforestation speed. Conclusion Avoiding deforestation requires financial mechanisms that make retention of forests economically competitive with the currently often preferred option to seek profits from other land uses. Incentive payments need to be at a very high level to be effective against deforestation. Taxes on the other hand will extract budgetary revenues from the regions which are already poor. A combination of incentives and taxes could turn out to be a viable solution for this problem. Increasing the value of forest land and thereby make it less easily prone to deforestation would act as a strong incentive to increase productivity of agricultural and fuelwood production, which could be supported by revenues generated by the deforestation tax. PMID:17150095

Predicting the deforestation-trend under different carbon-prices.

PubMed

Kindermann, Georg E; Obersteiner, Michael; Rametsteiner, Ewald; McCallum, Ian

2006-12-06

Global carbon stocks in forest biomass are decreasing by 1.1 Gt of carbon annually, owing to continued deforestation and forest degradation. Deforestation emissions are partly offset by forest expansion and increases in growing stock primarily in the extra-tropical north. Innovative financial mechanisms would be required to help reducing deforestation. Using a spatially explicit integrated biophysical and socio-economic land use model we estimated the impact of carbon price incentive schemes and payment modalities on deforestation. One payment modality is adding costs for carbon emission, the other is to pay incentives for keeping the forest carbon stock intact. Baseline scenario calculations show that close to 200 mil ha or around 5% of today's forest area will be lost between 2006 and 2025, resulting in a release of additional 17.5 GtC. Today's forest cover will shrink by around 500 million hectares, which is 1/8 of the current forest cover, within the next 100 years. The accumulated carbon release during the next 100 years amounts to 45 GtC, which is 15% of the total carbon stored in forests today. Incentives of 6 US$/tC for vulnerable standing biomass payed every 5 year will bring deforestation down by 50%. This will cause costs of 34 billion US$/year. On the other hand a carbon tax of 12 $/tC harvested forest biomass will also cut deforestation by half. The tax income will, if enforced, decrease from 6 billion US$ in 2005 to 4.3 billion US$ in 2025 and 0.7 billion US$ in 2100 due to decreasing deforestation speed. Avoiding deforestation requires financial mechanisms that make retention of forests economically competitive with the currently often preferred option to seek profits from other land uses. Incentive payments need to be at a very high level to be effective against deforestation. Taxes on the other hand will extract budgetary revenues from the regions which are already poor. A combination of incentives and taxes could turn out to be a viable solution for this problem. Increasing the value of forest land and thereby make it less easily prone to deforestation would act as a strong incentive to increase productivity of agricultural and fuelwood production, which could be supported by revenues generated by the deforestation tax.

Evaluating a Pay-for-Performance Program for Medicaid Children in an Accountable Care Organization.

PubMed

Gleeson, Sean; Kelleher, Kelly; Gardner, William

2016-03-01

Pay for performance (P4P) is a mechanism by which purchasers of health care offer greater financial rewards to physicians for improving processes or outcomes of care. To our knowledge, P4P has not been studied within the context of a pediatric accountable care organization (ACO). To determine whether P4P promotes pediatric performance improvement in primary care physicians. This retrospective cohort study was conducted from January 1, 2010, to December 31, 2013. A differences-in-differences design was used to test whether P4P improved physician performance in an ACO serving Medicaid children. Data were obtained from 2966 physicians and 323,812 patients. Three groups of physicians were identified: (1) community physicians who received the P4P incentives, (2) nonincentivized community physicians, and (3) nonincentivized physicians employed at a hospital. Pay for performance. Healthcare Effectiveness Data Information Set measure rates for preventive care, chronic care, and acute care primary care services. We examined 21 quality measures, 14 of which were subject to P4P incentives. There were 203 incentivized physicians, 2590 nonincentivized physicians, and 173 nonincentivized hospital physicians. Among them, the incentivized community physicians had greater improvements in performance than the nonincentivized community physicians on 2 of 2 well visits (largest difference was for adolescent well care: odds ratio, 1.05; 99.88% CI, 1.02-1.08), 3 of 10 immunization-incentivized measures (largest difference was for inactivated polio vaccine: odds ratio, 1.14; 99.88% CI, 1.07-1.21), and 2 nonincentivized measures (largest difference was for rotavirus: odds ratio, 1.11; 99.88% CI, 1.04-1.18). The employed physician group at the hospital had greater improvements in performance than the incentivized community physicians on 8 of 14 incentivized measures and 1 of 7 nonincentivized measures (largest difference was for hepatitis A vaccine: odds ratio, 0.34; 99.88% CI, 0.31-0.37). Pay for performance resulted in modest changes in physician performance in a pediatric ACO, but other interventions at the disposal of the ACO may have been even more effective. Further research is required to find methods to enhance quality improvements across large distributed pediatric health systems.

Human resource management in post-conflict health systems: review of research and knowledge gaps.

PubMed

Roome, Edward; Raven, Joanna; Martineau, Tim

2014-01-01

In post-conflict settings, severe disruption to health systems invariably leaves populations at high risk of disease and in greater need of health provision than more stable resource-poor countries. The health workforce is often a direct victim of conflict. Effective human resource management (HRM) strategies and policies are critical to addressing the systemic effects of conflict on the health workforce such as flight of human capital, mismatches between skills and service needs, breakdown of pre-service training, and lack of human resource data. This paper reviews published literatures across three functional areas of HRM in post-conflict settings: workforce supply, workforce distribution, and workforce performance. We searched published literatures for articles published in English between 2003 and 2013. The search used context-specific keywords (e.g. post-conflict, reconstruction) in combination with topic-related keywords based on an analytical framework containing the three functional areas of HRM (supply, distribution, and performance) and several corresponding HRM topic areas under these. In addition, the framework includes a number of cross-cutting topics such as leadership and governance, finance, and gender. The literature is growing but still limited. Many publications have focused on health workforce supply issues, including pre-service education and training, pay, and recruitment. Less is known about workforce distribution, especially governance and administrative systems for deployment and incentive policies to redress geographical workforce imbalances. Apart from in-service training, workforce performance is particularly under-researched in the areas of performance-based incentives, management and supervision, work organisation and job design, and performance appraisal. Research is largely on HRM in the early post-conflict period and has relied on secondary data. More primary research is needed across the areas of workforce supply, workforce distribution, and workforce performance. However, this should apply a longer-term focus throughout the different post-conflict phases, while paying attention to key cross-cutting themes such as leadership and governance, gender equity, and task shifting. The research gaps identified should enable future studies to examine how HRM could be used to meet both short and long term objectives for rebuilding health workforces and thereby contribute to achieving more equitable and sustainable health systems outcomes after conflict.

U.S. Physicians’ Views on Financing Options to Expand Health Insurance Coverage: A National Survey

PubMed Central

Woolhandler, Steffie; Bose-Kolanu, Anjali; Germann, Antonio; Bor, David H.; Himmelstein, David U.

2009-01-01

BACKGROUND Physician opinion can influence the prospects for health care reform, yet there are few recent data on physician views on reform proposals or access to medical care in the United States. OBJECTIVE To assess physician views on financing options for expanding health care coverage and on access to health care. DESIGN AND PARTICIPANTS Nationally representative mail survey conducted between March 2007 and October 2007 of U.S. physicians engaged in direct patient care. MEASUREMENTS Rated support for reform options including financial incentives to induce individuals to purchase health insurance and single-payer national health insurance; rated views of several dimensions of access to care. MAIN RESULTS 1,675 of 3,300 physicians responded (50.8%). Only 9% of physicians preferred the current employer-based financing system. Forty-nine percent favored either tax incentives or penalties to encourage the purchase of medical insurance, and 42% preferred a government-run, taxpayer-financed single-payer national health insurance program. The majority of respondents believed that all Americans should receive needed medical care regardless of ability to pay (89%); 33% believed that the uninsured currently have access to needed care. Nearly one fifth of respondents (19.3%) believed that even the insured lack access to needed care. Views about access were independently associated with support for single-payer national health insurance. CONCLUSIONS The vast majority of physicians surveyed supported a change in the health care financing system. While a plurality support the use of financial incentives, a substantial proportion support single payer national health insurance. These findings challenge the perception that fundamental restructuring of the U.S. health care financing system receives little acceptance by physicians. PMID:19184240

Less Intense Postacute Care, Better Outcomes For Enrollees In Medicare Advantage Than Those In Fee-For-Service

PubMed Central

Huckfeldt, Peter J.; Escarce, Jose J.; Rabideau, Brendan; Karaca-Mandic, Pinar; Sood, Neeraj

2017-01-01

Traditional fee-for-service (FFS) Medicare’s prospective payment systems for postacute care provide little incentive to coordinate care or control costs. In contrast, Medicare Advantage plans pay for postacute care out of monthly capitated payments and thus have stronger incentives to use it efficiently. We compared the use of postacute care in skilled nursing and inpatient rehabilitation facilities by enrollees in Medicare Advantage and FFS Medicare after hospital discharge for three high-volume conditions: lower extremity joint replacement, stroke, and heart failure. After accounting for differences in patient characteristics at discharge, we found lower intensity of postacute care for Medicare Advantage patients compared to FFS Medicare patients discharged from the same hospital, across all three conditions. Medicare Advantage patients also exhibited better outcomes than their FFS Medicare counterparts, including lower rates of hospital readmission and higher rates of return to the community. These findings suggest that payment reforms such as bundling in FFS Medicare may reduce the intensity of postacute care without adversely affecting patient health. PMID:28069851

Less Intense Postacute Care, Better Outcomes For Enrollees In Medicare Advantage Than Those In Fee-For-Service.

PubMed

Huckfeldt, Peter J; Escarce, José J; Rabideau, Brendan; Karaca-Mandic, Pinar; Sood, Neeraj

2017-01-01

Traditional fee-for-service (FFS) Medicare's prospective payment systems for postacute care provide little incentive to coordinate care or control costs. In contrast, Medicare Advantage plans pay for postacute care out of monthly capitated payments and thus have stronger incentives to use it efficiently. We compared the use of postacute care in skilled nursing and inpatient rehabilitation facilities by enrollees in Medicare Advantage and FFS Medicare after hospital discharge for three high-volume conditions: lower extremity joint replacement, stroke, and heart failure. After accounting for differences in patient characteristics at discharge, we found lower intensity of postacute care for Medicare Advantage patients compared to FFS Medicare patients discharged from the same hospital, across all three conditions. Medicare Advantage patients also exhibited better outcomes than their FFS Medicare counterparts, including lower rates of hospital readmission and higher rates of return to the community. These findings suggest that payment reforms such as bundling in FFS Medicare may reduce the intensity of postacute care without adversely affecting patient health. Project HOPE—The People-to-People Health Foundation, Inc.

"Mind the gap!" Evaluation of the performance gap attributable to exception reporting and target thresholds in the new GMS contract: National database analysis.

PubMed

Fleetcroft, Robert; Steel, Nicholas; Cookson, Richard; Howe, Amanda

2008-06-17

The 2003 revision of the UK GMS contract rewards general practices for performance against clinical quality indicators. Practices can exempt patients from treatment, and can receive maximum payment for less than full coverage of eligible patients. This paper aims to estimate the gap between the percentage of maximum incentive gained and the percentage of patients receiving indicated care (the pay-performance gap), and to estimate how much of the gap is attributable respectively to thresholds and to exception reporting. Analysis of Quality Outcomes Framework data in the National Primary Care Database and exception reporting data from the Information Centre from 8407 practices in England in 2005 - 6. The main outcome measures were the gap between the percentage of maximum incentive gained and the percentage of patients receiving indicated care at the practice level, both for individual indicators and a combined composite score. An additional outcome was the percentage of that gap attributable respectively to exception reporting and maximum threshold targets set at less than 100%. The mean pay-performance gap for the 65 aggregated clinical indicators was 13.3% (range 2.9% to 48%). 52% of this gap (6.9% of eligible patients) is attributable to thresholds being set at less than 100%, and 48% to patients being exception reported. The gap was greater than 25% in 9 indicators: beta blockers and cholesterol control in heart disease; cholesterol control in stroke; influenza immunization in asthma; blood pressure, sugar and cholesterol control in diabetes; seizures in epilepsy and treatment of hypertension. Threshold targets and exception reporting introduce an incentive ceiling, which substantially reduces the percentage of eligible patients that UK practices need to treat in order to receive maximum incentive payments for delivering that care. There are good clinical reasons for exception reporting, but after unsuitable patients have been exempted from treatment, there is no reason why all maximum thresholds should not be 100%, whilst retaining the current lower thresholds to provide incentives for lower performing practices.

Can paying for results help to achieve the Millennium Development Goals? Overview of the effectiveness of results-based financing.

PubMed

Oxman, Andrew D; Fretheim, Atle

2009-05-01

Results-based financing and pay-for-performance refer to the transfer of money or material goods conditional on taking a measurable action or achieving a predetermined performance target. Results-based financing is widely advocated for achieving health goals, including the Millennium Development Goals. We undertook an overview of systematic reviews of the effectiveness of RBF. We searched the Cochrane Library, EMBASE, and MEDLINE (up to August 2007). We also searched for related articles in PubMed, checked the reference lists of retrieved articles, and contacted key informants. We included reviews with a methods section that addressed the effects of any results-based financing in the health sector targeted at patients, providers, organizations, or governments. We summarized the characteristics and findings of each review using a structured format. We found 12 systematic reviews that met our inclusion criteria. Based on the findings of these reviews, financial incentives targeting recipients of health care and individual healthcare professionals are effective in the short run for simple and distinct, well-defined behavioral goals. There is less evidence that financial incentives can sustain long-term changes. Conditional cash transfers to poor and disadvantaged groups in Latin America are effective at increasing the uptake of some preventive services. There is otherwise very limited evidence of the effects of results-based financing in low- or middle-income countries. Results-based financing can have undesirable effects, including motivating unintended behaviors, distortions (ignoring important tasks that are not rewarded with incentives), gaming (improving or cheating on reporting rather than improving performance), widening the resource gap between rich and poor, and dependency on financial incentives. There is limited evidence of the effectiveness of results-based financing and almost no evidence of the cost-effectiveness of results-based financing. Based on the available evidence and likely mechanisms through which financial incentives work, they are more likely to influence discrete individual behaviors in the short run and less likely to create sustained changes. © 2009 Blackwell Publishing Asia Pty Ltd and Chinese Cochrane Center, West China Hospital of Sichuan University.

Optimizing diabetes management: managed care strategies.

PubMed

Tzeel, E Albert

2013-06-01

Both the prevalence of type 2 diabetes mellitus (DM) and its associated costs have been rising over time and are projected to continue to escalate. Therefore, type 2 DM (T2DM) management costs represent a potentially untenable strain on the healthcare system unless substantial, systemic changes are made. Managed care organizations (MCOs) are uniquely positioned to attempt to make the changes necessary to reduce the burdens associated with T2DM by developing policies that align with evidence-based DM management guidelines and other resources. For example, MCOs can encourage members to implement healthy lifestyle choices, which have been shown to reduce DM-associated mortality and delay comorbidities. In addition, MCOs are exploring the strengths and weaknesses of several different benefit plan designs. Value-based insurance designs, sometimes referred to as value-based benefit designs, use both direct and indirect data to invest in incentives that change behaviors through health information technologies, communications, and services to improve health, productivity, quality, and financial trends. Provider incentive programs, sometimes referred to as "pay for performance," represent a payment/delivery paradigm that places emphasis on rewarding value instead of volume to align financial incentives and quality of care. Accountable care organizations emphasize an alignment between reimbursement and implementation of best practices through the use of disease management and/ or clinical pathways and health information technologies. Consumer-directed health plans, or high-deductible health plans, combine lower premiums with high annual deductibles to encourage members to seek better value for health expenditures. Studies conducted to date on these different designs have produced mixed results.

What New York City's Experiment with Schoolwide Performance Bonuses Tells Us about Pay for Performance. Research Brief

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Li, Jennifer

2011-01-01

In the 2007-2008 school year, the New York City Department of Education (NYCDOE) and the United Federation of Teachers (UFT) implemented the Schoolwide Performance Bonus Program (SPBP). With funding from The Fund for Public Schools and the National Center on Performance Incentives, researchers from the RAND Corporation and Vanderbilt University…

Public Law 100-461, Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1989, 1 October 1988.

PubMed

1988-01-01

This Act does the following among other things: 1) prohibits using funds appropriated under the Act to lobby for abortion and 2) prohibits making development assistance funds available 1) to pay for abortions as a method of family planning (FP) or to motivate or coerce any person to perform abortions; 2) to pay for involuntary sterilization as a method of FP or to coerce or provide any financial incentive to any person to undergo sterilization; 3) to pay for biomedical research that relates to the methods of, or performance of, abortions or involuntary sterilization as a means of FP; or 4) to any country or organization if the use of such funds by such country or organization would violate any of the abortion or involuntary sterilization provisions. It also reaffirms the commitment of the US Congress to population, development assistance, and the need for informed voluntary FP. full text

Incentives and control in primary health care: findings from English pay-for-performance case studies.

PubMed

McDonald, Ruth; Harrison, Stephen; Checkland, Kath

2008-01-01

The authors' aim was to investigate mechanisms and perceptions of control following the implementation of a new "pay-for-performance" contract (the new General Medical Services, or GMS, contract) in general practice. This article was based on an in-depth qualitative case study approach in two general practices in England. A distinction is emerging amongst ostensibly equal partners between those general practitioners conducting and those subject to surveillance. Attitudes towards the contract were largely positive, although discontent was higher in the practice which employed a more intensive surveillance regime and greater amongst nurses than doctors. The sample was small and opportunistic. Further research is required to examine the longer-term effects as new contractual arrangements evolve. Increased surveillance and feedback mechanisms associated with new pay-for-performance schemes have the potential to constrain and shape clinical practice. The paper highlights the emergence of new tensions within and between existing professional groupings.

Using social marketing to manage population health performance.

PubMed

Rothschild, Michael L

2010-09-01

Population health can be affected by implementing pay-for-performance measures with key players. From a social marketing perspective, people (both consumers and managers) have choices and will do what they perceive enhances their own self-interest. The bottom-up focus of social marketing begins with an understanding of the people whose behaviors are targeted. Desired behavior results when people perceive that they will get more value than the cost of behaving and when the resulting offer is perceived to be better than what is obtainable through alternative choices. Incentives should be offered to consumers; managers should receive motivation for their own behavior and understand how to motivate relevant consumers. Pay can be monetary or nonmonetary, tangible or intangible. Everyone is paid for performance. Some are paid well enough to behave as desired; others are offered a poor rate of pay and choose not to behave.

Measuring Preferences for a Diabetes Pay-for-Performance for Patient (P4P4P) Program using a Discrete Choice Experiment.

PubMed

Chen, Tsung-Tai; Tung, Tao-Hsin; Hsueh, Ya-Seng Arthur; Tsai, Ming-Han; Liang, Hsiu-Mei; Li, Kay-Lun; Chung, Kuo-Piao; Tang, Chao-Hsiun

2015-07-01

To elicit a patient's willingness to participate in a diabetes pay-for-performance for patient (P4P4P) program using a discrete choice experiment method. The survey was conducted in March 2013. Our sample was drawn from patients with diabetes at five hospitals in Taiwan (International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision, Clinical Modification code 250). The sample size was 838 patients. The discrete choice experiment questionnaire included the attributes monthly cash rewards, exercise time, diet control, and program duration. We estimated a bivariate probit model to derive willingness-to-accept levels after accounting for the characteristics (e.g., severity and comorbidity) of patients with diabetes. The preferred program was a 3-year program involving 30 minutes of exercise per day and flexible diet control. Offering an incentive of approximately US $67 in cash per month appears to increase the likelihood that patients with diabetes will participate in the preferred P4P4P program by approximately 50%. Patients with more disadvantageous characteristics (e.g., elderly, low income, greater comorbidity, and severity) could have less to gain from participating in the program and thus require a higher monetary incentive to compensate for the disutility caused by participating in the program's activities. Our result demonstrates that a modest financial incentive could increase the likelihood of program participation after accounting for the attributes of the P4P4P program and patients' characteristics. Copyright © 2015 International Society for Pharmacoeconomics and Outcomes Research (ISPOR). Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Physician Quality Reporting System Program Updates and the Impact on Emergency Medicine Practice

PubMed Central

Wiler, Jennifer L.; Granovsky, Michael; Cantrill, Stephen V.; Newell, Richard; Venkatesh, Arjun K.; Schuur, Jeremiah D.

2016-01-01

In 2007, the Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services (CMS) created a novel payment program to create incentives for physician’s to focus on quality of care measures and report quality performance for the first time. Initially termed “The Physician Voluntary Reporting Program,” various Congressional actions, including the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 (TRHCA) and Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008 (MIPPA) further strengthened and ensconced this program, eventually leading to the quality program termed today as the Physician Quality Reporting System (PQRS). As a result of passage of the Affordable Care Act of 2010, the PQRS program has expanded to include both the “traditional PQRS” reporting program and the newer “Value Modifier” program (VM). For the first time, these programs were designed to include pay-for-performance incentives for all physicians providing care to Medicare beneficiaries and to measure the cost of care. The recent passage of the Medicare Access and Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) Reauthorization Act in March of 2015 includes changes to these payment programs that will have an even more profound impact on emergency care providers. We describe the implications of these important federal policy changes for emergency physicians. PMID:26973757

Using the deductible for patient channeling: did preferred providers gain patient volume?

PubMed

van der Geest, Stéphanie A; Varkevisser, Marco

2016-06-01

In market-based health care systems, channeling patients to designated preferred providers can increase payer's bargaining clout, other things being equal. In the unique setting of the new Dutch health care system with regulated competition, this paper evaluates the impact of a 1-year natural experiment with patient channeling on providers' market shares. In 2009 a large regional Dutch health insurer designated preferred providers for two different procedures (cataract surgery and varicose veins treatment) and gave its enrollees a positive financial incentive for choosing them. That is, patients were exempted from paying their deductible when they went to a preferred provider. Using claims data over the period 2007-2009, we apply a difference-in-difference approach to study the impact of this channeling strategy on the allocation of patients across individual providers. Our estimation results show that, in the year of the experiment, preferred providers of varicose veins treatment on average experienced a significant increase in patient volume relative to non-preferred providers. However, for cataract surgery no significant effect is found. Possible explanations for the observed difference between both procedures may be the insurer's selection of preferred providers and the design of the channeling incentive resulting in different expected financial benefits for both patient groups.

State - Level Regulation's Effectiveness in Addressing Global Climate Change and Promoting Solar Energy Deployment

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Peterman, Carla Joy

Paper 1, Local Solutions to Global Problems: Climate Change Policies and Regulatory Jurisdiction, considers the efficacy of various types of environmental regulations when they are applied locally to pollutants whose damages extend beyond the jurisdiction of the local regulators. Local regulations of a global pollutant may be ineffective if producers and consumers can avoid them by transacting outside the reach of the local regulator. In many cases, this may involve the physical relocation of the economic activity, a problem often referred to as "leakage." This paper highlights another way in which local policies can be circumvented: through the shuffling of who buys from whom. The paper maintains that the problems of reshuffling are exacerbated when the options for compliance with the regulations are more flexible. Numerical analyses is presented demonstrating that several proposed policies to limit greenhouse gas emissions from the California electricity sector may have very little effect on carbon emissions if they are applied only within that state. Paper 1 concludes that although local subsidies for energy efficiency, renewable electricity, and transportation biofuels constitute attempts to pick technology winners, they may be the only mechanisms that local jurisdictions, acting alone, have at their disposal to address climate change. Paper 2, Pass-Through of Solar PV Incentives to Consumers: The Early Years of California's Solar PV Incentives, examines the pass through of incentives to California solar PV system owners. The full post-subsidy price consumers pay for solar power is a key metric of the success of solar PV incentive programs and of overall PV market performance. This study examines the early years of California's most recent wave of distributed solar PV incentives (2000-2008) to determine the pass-through of incentives. Examination of this period is both intellectually and pragmatically important due to the high level of incentives provided and subsequent high cost to ratepayers; policymakers' expectations that price declines accrue to consumers; and market structure characteristics that might contribute to incomplete pass-through. This analysis shows that incentive passthrough in the California residential solar PV programs was incomplete. Consumer prices declined 54 cents for every additional dollar of incentive received. A large share of the incentive is captured by the solar PV contractor or other actors in the solar PV supply chain. The finding of incomplete pass-through is persistent across specifications. The analysis also identifies a lower degree of incentive pass-through for consumers in the highest income zip codes. Whether expectations of incentives' pass-through align with reality is critically important in the beginning years of emerging clean energy technology programs since this can affect the likelihood of future government investments and public support. Given the often-held policy assumption that consumer prices are declining in response to incentives, it is useful for policymakers to understand the circumstances under which such an assumption may not hold. Paper 3, Testing the Boundaries of the Solar Photovoltaic Learning System, tests how the choice of experience curves' geographic and technology assumptions affect solar PV experience curve results. Historically, solar PV experience curves have assumed one experience curve represents both module and non-module learning and that this learning happens at a global scale. These assumptions may be inaccurate for solar PV since the learning system, and technology and geographic boundaries, are likely different between PV modules and non-module components. Using 2004 to 2008 PV system price data from 13 states, and a longer time series of PV price data for California, some evidence is found that cumulative capacity at the state level is a better predictor of non-module costs than U.S. or global capacity. This paper explores, but is unable to significantly determine, how knowledge spillovers from neighboring states can influence a state's non-module costs. Given data limitations, and limitations to the two-factor experience model methodology itself, it is not possible to conclusively determine the correct geographic boundary for the non-module learning system. Throughout the paper ways in which the experience curve model and data can be augmented to achieve a better estimation are discussed. 2.

Choosing the right incentive strategy for research and development in neglected diseases.

PubMed Central

Maurer, Stephen M.

2006-01-01

For the first time in history, worldwide neglected disease budgets may be large enough to deliver a new drug every few years. That said, sponsors will only succeed if they extract maximum value from every dollar spent. This paper reviews possible cost-containment strategies and provides an evidence-based framework for choosing between them. Current proposals can be categorized as "end-to-end" proposals which require the sponsor to set a single reward for companies that complete the entire drug discovery process or "pay-as-you-go" schemes in which sponsors offer repeated rewards as drug candidates progress through the pipeline. A generic weakness of end-to-end proposals is that rewards are likely to be 20-30% higher than they would be in an equivalent pay-as-you-go programme. However, the benefits of pay-as-you-go programmes may be lost if commercial pharmaceutical companies are substantially better at choosing successful programmes than are their non-profit counterparts. The efficiency of pay-as-you-go methods depends on sponsors' willingness to withdraw funding from failed drug discovery programmes. PMID:16710547

Early Claiming of Social Security Benefits and Labor Supply Behavior of Older Americans.

PubMed

Benítez-Silva, Hugo; Heiland, Frank

2008-12-01

The labor supply incentives provided by the early retirement rules of the United States Social Security Old Age benefits program are of growing importance as the Normal Retirement Age (NRA) increases to 67, and the labor force participation of Older Americans starts to increase. These incentives allow individuals who claim benefits before the NRA but continue to work, or return to the labor force, to increase their future rate of benefit pay by having benefits withheld. Since the adjustment of the benefit rate takes place only after the NRA is reached, benefits received before the NRA can become actuarially unfair for those who continue to work after claiming. Consistent with these incentives, estimates from bivariate models of the monthly labor force exit and claiming hazards using data from the Health and Retirement Study indicate that early claimers who do not withdraw from the labor force around the time they claim are increasingly likely to stay in the labor force.

Early Claiming of Social Security Benefits and Labor Supply Behavior of Older Americans†

PubMed Central

Benítez-Silva, Hugo; Heiland, Frank

2010-01-01

The labor supply incentives provided by the early retirement rules of the United States Social Security Old Age benefits program are of growing importance as the Normal Retirement Age (NRA) increases to 67, and the labor force participation of Older Americans starts to increase. These incentives allow individuals who claim benefits before the NRA but continue to work, or return to the labor force, to increase their future rate of benefit pay by having benefits withheld. Since the adjustment of the benefit rate takes place only after the NRA is reached, benefits received before the NRA can become actuarially unfair for those who continue to work after claiming. Consistent with these incentives, estimates from bivariate models of the monthly labor force exit and claiming hazards using data from the Health and Retirement Study indicate that early claimers who do not withdraw from the labor force around the time they claim are increasingly likely to stay in the labor force. PMID:20811509

Impact of audit and feedback and pay-for-performance interventions on pediatric hospitalist discharge communication with primary care providers.

PubMed

Tejedor-Sojo, Javier; Creek, Tracy; Leong, Traci

2015-01-01

The study team sought to improve hospitalist communication with primary care providers (PCPs) at discharge through interventions consisting of (a) audit and feedback and (b) inclusion of a discharge communication measure in the incentive compensation for pediatric hospitalists. The setting was a 16-physician pediatric hospitalist group within a tertiary pediatric hospital. Discharge summaries were selected randomly for documentation of communication with PCPs. At baseline, 57% of charts had documented communication with PCPs, increasing to 84% during the audit and feedback period. Following the addition of a financial incentive, documentation of communication with PCPs increased to 93% and was sustained during the combined intervention period. The number of physicians meeting the study's performance goal increased from 1 to 14 by the end of the study period. A financial incentive coupled with an audit and feedback tool was effective at modifying physician behavior, achieving focused, measurable quality improvement gains. © 2014 by the American College of Medical Quality.

Theory and Practice in the Design of Physician Payment Incentives

PubMed Central

Robinson, James C.

2001-01-01

Combining the economic literature on principal-agent relationships with examples of marketplace innovations allows analysis of the evolution of methods for paying physicians. Agency theory and the economic principles of performance-based compensation are applied in the context of imperfect information, risk aversion, multiple interrelated tasks, and team production efficiencies. Fee-for-service and capitation are flawed methods of motivating physicians to achieve specific goals. Payment innovations that blend elements of fee-for-service, capitation, and case rates can preserve the advantages and attenuate the disadvantages of each. These innovations include capitation with fee-for-service carve-outs, department budgets with individual fee-for-service or “contact” capitation, and case rates for defined episodes of illness. The context within which payment incentives are embedded, includes such nonprice mechanisms as screening and monitoring and such organizational relationships as employment and ownership. The analysis has implications for health services research and public policy with respect to physician payment incentives. PMID:11439463

Public hospital care: equal for all or equal for some? Evidence from the Philippines.

PubMed

James, Chris D; Peabody, John; Hanson, Kara; Solon, Orville

2015-03-01

In low- and middle-income countries, government budgets are rarely sufficient to cover a public hospital's operating costs. Shortfalls are typically financed through a combination of health insurance contributions and user charges. The mixed nature of this financing arrangement potentially creates financial incentives to treat patients with equal health need unequally. Using data from the Philippines, the authors analyzed whether doctors respond to such incentives. After controlling for a patient's condition, they found that patients using insurance, paying more for hospital accommodation, and being treated in externally monitored hospitals were likely to receive more care. This highlights the worrying possibility that public hospital patients with equal health needs are not always equally treated. © 2011 APJPH.

Paying for performance in healthcare organisations

PubMed Central

McDonald, Ruth

2014-01-01

Aligning Financial Incentives (FIs) to health policy goals is becoming increasingly popular. In many cases, such initiatives have failed to deliver anticipated benefits. Attributing this to the actions of self-interested and resistant professionals is not an entirely helpful approach. It is important to avoid simplistic assumptions to build knowledge of how and why schemes are implemented in practice to inform future policy in this area. PMID:24639977

Show them the money. Healthcare providers say it will take more than vision to turn the government's health IT plans into reality.

PubMed

Morrissey, John

2004-07-26

The much-anticipated healthcare IT plan laid out by David Brailer last week won some points for vision from providers, but they're still wondering where the money will come from. One possibility is incentives, like the "pay for performance" strategy being touted by the CMS' Mark McClellan, left.

Public attitudes toward programs designed to enhance forest related benefits on private lands

Treesearch

Donald F. Dennis; Mark J. Twery; Michael A. Rechlin; Bruce Hansen

2003-01-01

Public agencies may at times provide education, technical help, tax incentives, or other forms of aid to private landowners to help them enhance their land in ways that benefit the public. Since public funds are used to pay these expenses, it is important that program goals be correlated with underlying public values and concerns. We used a conjoint ranking survey to...

Paying for performance in healthcare organisations.

PubMed

McDonald, Ruth

2014-02-01

Aligning Financial Incentives (FIs) to health policy goals is becoming increasingly popular. In many cases, such initiatives have failed to deliver anticipated benefits. Attributing this to the actions of self-interested and resistant professionals is not an entirely helpful approach. It is important to avoid simplistic assumptions to build knowledge of how and why schemes are implemented in practice to inform future policy in this area.

78 FR 60998 - Strategies To Accelerate the Testing and Adoption of Pay for Success (PFS) Financing Models

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-10-02

.... What is the purpose of the new PFS Incentive Fund? Over the past three years, multiple states and local...\\ THE BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2014--See page 978 of the President's FY 2014 Budget Appendix (see http... and social impact bonds. \\3\\ THE BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2014--See page 978 of the President's FY 2014...

Financial arrangements for health systems in low-income countries: an overview of systematic reviews.

PubMed

Wiysonge, Charles S; Paulsen, Elizabeth; Lewin, Simon; Ciapponi, Agustín; Herrera, Cristian A; Opiyo, Newton; Pantoja, Tomas; Rada, Gabriel; Oxman, Andrew D

2017-09-11

One target of the Sustainable Development Goals is to achieve "universal health coverage, including financial risk protection, access to quality essential health-care services and access to safe, effective, quality and affordable essential medicines and vaccines for all". A fundamental concern of governments in striving for this goal is how to finance such a health system. This concern is very relevant for low-income countries. To provide an overview of the evidence from up-to-date systematic reviews about the effects of financial arrangements for health systems in low-income countries. Secondary objectives include identifying needs and priorities for future evaluations and systematic reviews on financial arrangements, and informing refinements in the framework for financial arrangements presented in the overview. We searched Health Systems Evidence in November 2010 and PDQ-Evidence up to 17 December 2016 for systematic reviews. We did not apply any date, language, or publication status limitations in the searches. We included well-conducted systematic reviews of studies that assessed the effects of financial arrangements on patient outcomes (health and health behaviours), the quality or utilisation of healthcare services, resource use, healthcare provider outcomes (such as sick leave), or social outcomes (such as poverty, employment, or financial burden of patients, e.g. out-of-pocket payment, catastrophic disease expenditure) and that were published after April 2005. We excluded reviews with limitations important enough to compromise the reliability of the findings. Two overview authors independently screened reviews, extracted data, and assessed the certainty of evidence using GRADE. We prepared SUPPORT Summaries for eligible reviews, including key messages, 'Summary of findings' tables (using GRADE to assess the certainty of the evidence), and assessments of the relevance of findings to low-income countries. We identified 7272 reviews and included 15 in this overview, on: collection of funds (2 reviews), insurance schemes (1 review), purchasing of services (1 review), recipient incentives (6 reviews), and provider incentives (5 reviews). The reviews were published between 2008 and 2015; focused on 13 subcategories; and reported results from 276 studies: 115 (42%) randomised trials, 11 (4%) non-randomised trials, 23 (8%) controlled before-after studies, 51 (19%) interrupted time series, 9 (3%) repeated measures, and 67 (24%) other non-randomised studies. Forty-three per cent (119/276) of the studies included in the reviews took place in low- and middle-income countries. Collection of funds: the effects of changes in user fees on utilisation and equity are uncertain (very low-certainty evidence). It is also uncertain whether aid delivered under the Paris Principles (ownership, alignment, harmonisation, managing for results, and mutual accountability) improves health outcomes compared to aid delivered without conforming to those principles (very low-certainty evidence). Insurance schemes: community-based health insurance may increase service utilisation (low-certainty evidence), but the effects on health outcomes are uncertain (very low-certainty evidence). It is uncertain whether social health insurance improves utilisation of health services or health outcomes (very low-certainty evidence). Purchasing of services: it is uncertain whether increasing salaries of public sector healthcare workers improves the quantity or quality of their work (very low-certainty evidence). Recipient incentives: recipient incentives may improve adherence to long-term treatments (low-certainty evidence), but it is uncertain whether they improve patient outcomes. One-time recipient incentives probably improve patient return for start or continuation of treatment (moderate-certainty evidence) and may improve return for tuberculosis test readings (low-certainty evidence). However, incentives may not improve completion of tuberculosis prophylaxis, and it is uncertain whether they improve completion of treatment for active tuberculosis. Conditional cash transfer programmes probably lead to an increase in service utilisation (moderate-certainty evidence), but their effects on health outcomes are uncertain. Vouchers may improve health service utilisation (low-certainty evidence), but the effects on health outcomes are uncertain (very low-certainty evidence). Introducing a restrictive cap may decrease use of medicines for symptomatic conditions and overall use of medicines, may decrease insurers' expenditures on medicines (low-certainty evidence), and has uncertain effects on emergency department use, hospitalisations, and use of outpatient care (very low-certainty evidence). Reference pricing, maximum pricing, and index pricing for drugs have mixed effects on drug expenditures by patients and insurers as well as the use of brand and generic drugs. Provider incentives: the effects of provider incentives are uncertain (very low-certainty evidence), including: the effects of provider incentives on the quality of care provided by primary care physicians or outpatient referrals from primary to secondary care, incentives for recruiting and retaining health professionals to serve in remote areas, and the effects of pay-for-performance on provider performance, the utilisation of services, patient outcomes, or resource use in low-income countries. Research based on sound systematic review methods has evaluated numerous financial arrangements relevant to low-income countries, targeting different levels of the health systems and assessing diverse outcomes. However, included reviews rarely reported social outcomes, resource use, equity impacts, or undesirable effects. We also identified gaps in primary research because of uncertainty about applicability of the evidence to low-income countries. Financial arrangements for which the effects are uncertain include external funding (aid), caps and co-payments, pay-for-performance, and provider incentives. Further studies evaluating the effects of these arrangements are needed in low-income countries. Systematic reviews should include all outcomes that are relevant to decision-makers and to people affected by changes in financial arrangements.

Paying for antiretroviral adherence: is it unethical when the patient is an adolescent?

PubMed

Healy, Justin; Hope, Rebecca; Bhabha, Jacqueline; Eyal, Nir

2017-03-01

With the expansion of antiretroviral treatment programmes, many children and adolescents with HIV in sub-Saharan Africa could expect to live healthy lives. Yet adolescents have the highest levels of poor antiretroviral adherence and of loss to follow-up compared with other age groups. This can lead to increased morbidity and mortality, to the development of drug-resistant strains, and to high societal costs. While financial incentives have been extensively used to promote medication adherence among adults, their use among adolescents remains rare. And while there is a large body of ethical literature exploring financial incentives among adults, little philosophical thought has gone into their use among adolescents. This paper explores three oft-mentioned ethical worries about financial incentives for health behaviours and it asks whether these concerns are more serious in the context of incentives for improving adolescent adherence. The three worries are that such incentives would unduly coerce adolescents' decision-making, would compromise distributive justice and would crowd out intrinsic motivations and non-monetary values. Our tentative conclusion is that more empirical investigation of these concerns is necessary, and that at this point they are not compelling enough to rule out trials in which adolescents are incentivised for antiretroviral adherence. Published by the BMJ Publishing Group Limited. For permission to use (where not already granted under a licence) please go to http://www.bmj.com/company/products-services/rights-and-licensing/.

Pay Matters: The Piece Rate and Health in the Developing World.

PubMed

Davis, Mary E

Piece rate pay remains a common form of compensation in developing-world industries. While the piece rate may boost productivity, it has been shown to have unintended consequences for occupational safety and health, including increased accident and injury risk. This paper explores the relationship between worker pay and physical and emotional health, and questions the modern day business case for piece rate pay in the developing world. The relationship between piece rate and self-reported measures of physical and emotional health is estimated using a large survey of garment workers in 109 Vietnamese factories between 2010 and 2014. A random effects logit model controls for factory and year, predicting worker health as a function of pay type, demographics, and factory characteristics. Workers paid by the piece report worse physical and emotional health than workers paid by the hour (OR = 1.38-1.81). Wage incentives provide the most consistently significant evidence of all demographic and factory-level variables, including the factory's own performance on occupational safety and health compliance measures. These results highlight the importance of how workers are paid to understanding the variability in worker health outcomes. More research is needed to better understand the business case supporting the continued use of piece rate pay in the developing world. Copyright © 2016 The Author. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Effectiveness of provider incentives for anaemia reduction in rural China: a cluster randomised trial

PubMed Central

Luo, Renfu; Zhang, Linxiu; Sylvia, Sean; Shi, Yaojiang; Foo, Patricia; Zhao, Qiran; Martorell, Reynaldo; Medina, Alexis; Rozelle, Scott

2012-01-01

Objectives To test the impact of provider performance pay for anaemia reduction in rural China. Design A cluster randomised trial of information, subsidies, and incentives for school principals to reduce anaemia among their students. Enumerators and study participants were not informed of study arm assignment. Setting 72 randomly selected rural primary schools across northwest China. Participants 3553 fourth and fifth grade students aged 9-11 years. All fourth and fifth grade students in sample schools participated in the study. Interventions Sample schools were randomly assigned to a control group, with no intervention, or one of three treatment arms: (a) an information arm, in which principals received information about anaemia; (b) a subsidy arm, in which principals received information and unconditional subsidies; and (c) an incentive arm, in which principals received information, subsidies, and financial incentives for reducing anaemia among students. Twenty seven schools were assigned to the control arm (1816 students at baseline, 1623 at end point), 15 were assigned to the information arm (659 students at baseline, 596 at end point), 15 to the subsidy arm (726 students at baseline, 667 at end point), and 15 to the incentive arm (743 students at baseline, 667 at end point). Main outcome measures Student haemoglobin concentrations. Results Mean student haemoglobin concentration rose by 1.5 g/L (95% CI –1.1 to 4.1) in information schools, 0.8 g/L (–1.8 to 3.3) in subsidy schools, and 2.4 g/L (0 to 4.9) in incentive schools compared with the control group. This increase in haemoglobin corresponded to a reduction in prevalence of anaemia (Hb <115 g/L) of 24% in incentive schools. Interactions with pre-existing incentives for principals to achieve good academic performance led to substantially larger gains in the information and incentive arms: when combined with incentives for good academic performance, associated effects on student haemoglobin concentration were 9.8 g/L (4.1 to 15.5) larger in information schools and 8.6 g/L (2.1 to 15.1) larger in incentive schools. Conclusions Financial incentives for health improvement were modestly effective. Understanding interactions with other motives and pre-existing incentives is critical. Trial registration number ISRCTN76158086. PMID:22842354

The dysfunctional consequences of a performance measurement system: the case of the Iranian national hospital grading programme.

PubMed

Aryankhesal, Aidin; Sheldon, Trevor A; Mannion, Russell; Mahdipour, Saeade

2015-07-01

Performance measurement systems are increasingly used to reward and improve provider performance. However, such initiatives may also inadvertently induce a range of unintended and dysfunctional side-effects. This study explores the unintended and adverse consequences induced by the Iranian national hospital grading programme, which incorporates financial incentives for meeting nationally defined standards. We interviewed key informants across four key groups with a legitimate interest in healthcare performance: four purposively selected hospitals; four health insurance organizations; the Iranian hospital accreditation body; and one grading agency. The transcribed interviews and field notes were analysed thematically, and subsequently, member checking was conducted. Seven dysfunctional consequences were identified: misrepresentation of data by hospitals; increased anxiety and stress among hospital employees; tunnel vision; financial pressures on poorly graded hospitals; incentives to purchase unnecessary equipment; erosion of public trust; and restricting access to hospital services by patients. These were caused by the way the grading system was implemented: poor standards of audit; the way in which the audit process was conducted; and the timing of audits. The pay for performance element of the grading system and the focus on structural aspects in the standards made improvement in grading particularly difficult for those hospitals that had been assessed as under-performing. Although the Iranian hospital grading system has resulted in a significant increase in the adoption of national standards, it has nevertheless induced a range of perverse outcomes. To mitigate these requires further refinement and recalibration of the system. © The Author(s) 2015.

State adoption of nursing home pay-for-performance.

PubMed

Werner, Rachel M; Tamara Konetzka, R; Liang, Kevin

2010-06-01

Whereas numerous policies have been adopted to improve quality of care in nursing homes over the past several decades-with varying degrees of success-health care payment has been a largely untapped but potentially powerful policy tool to improve quality of care. Recently, however, payers have invested significant resources in the development and implementation of pay-for-performance (P4P) programs for nursing homes. The authors present results from a survey of state Medicaid agencies documenting the use and structure of P4P in nursing homes. Although the number of states that are implementing nursing home P4P is growing, the structure of these incentives varies across states, and little evidence exists to guide the planning or implementation of these initiatives.

Pay-for-performance: too much of a good thing? A conversation with Martin Roland. Interview by Robert Galvin.

PubMed

Roland, Martin

2006-01-01

As the United States moves down the road of pay-for-performance (P4P), concerns about unintended consequences are foremost in the minds of policymakers. Initial results from the world's most ambitious P4P program, the United Kingdom's Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF), indicate that while quality improvements exceeded expectations, so too did the amount of funds paid out, straining the National Health Service (NHS) budget. Martin Roland, one of the leading U.K. health services researchers and an adviser to the QOF, gives his views on what went right and what went wrong, and he offers his advice to the United States about using financial incentives to improve quality.

Cost-effectiveness of diabetes pay-for-performance incentive designs.

PubMed

Hsieh, Hui-Min; Tsai, Shu-Ling; Shin, Shyi-Jang; Mau, Lih-Wen; Chiu, Herng-Chia

2015-02-01

Taiwan's National Health Insurance (NHI) Program implemented a diabetes pay-for-performance program (P4P) based on process-of-care measures in 2001. In late 2006, that P4P program was revised to also include achievement of intermediate health outcomes. This study examined to what extent these 2 P4P incentive designs have been cost-effective and what the difference in effect may have been. Analyzing data using 3 population-based longitudinal databases (NHI's P4P dataset, NHI's claims database, and Taiwan's death registry), we compared costs and effectiveness between P4P and non-P4P diabetes patient groups in each phase. Propensity score matching was used to match comparable control groups for intervention groups. Outcomes included life-years, quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs), program intervention costs, cost-savings, and incremental cost-effectiveness ratios. QALYs for P4P patients and non-P4P patients were 2.08 and 1.99 in phase 1 and 2.08 and 2.02 in phase 2. The average incremental intervention costs per QALYs was TWD$335,546 in phase 1 and TWD$298,606 in phase 2. The average incremental all-cause medical costs saved by the P4P program per QALYs were TWD$602,167 in phase 1 and TWD$661,163 in phase 2. The findings indicated that both P4P programs were cost-effective and the resulting return on investment was 1.8:1 in phase 1 and 2.0:1 in phase 2. We conclude that the diabetes P4P program in both phases enabled the long-term cost-effective use of resources and cost-savings regardless of whether a bonus for intermediate outcome improvement was added to a process-based P4P incentive design.

Incentive Magnitude, Job Satisfaction, Perceived Stress, and Performance: Interrelationships in an Organizational Simulation

DTIC Science & Technology

1987-07-01

scale developed by Szilagyi and Wallace (1980), and three items adapted from the Survey of Organizations (Taylor & Bowers, 1972). The Szilagyi and...Counselors keep busy. (June 1, 1983). The Wall Street Journal, pp. 1, 24. Szilagyi , A. D., Jr., & Wallace , M. J., Jr. (1980). Organizational... Wallace scale contains the five-factor structure most commonly associated with job satisfaction: the work itself, pay, promotion, supervision, and co

Endogenous risk-taking and physical appearance of sex workers.

PubMed

Egger, Peter H; Lindenblatt, Andreas

2015-12-01

Previous research found that physical appearance affects the risk-taking of sex workers through offering unprotected services. This paper utilizes a large individual-level data set covering 16,583 pay-for-sex contracts in 2011 and 2012 by 2,517 female suppliers in Germany. Results based on instrumental variables suggest that the incentive for risk-taking is about twice as high than when assuming random assignment of risk-taking.

Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (5th). Volume 3. Special and Incentive Pays.

DTIC Science & Technology

1984-01-01

Airlines, Inc. ..- Professional Pilot Magazine President’s Private Sector Survey Cost Control Group REHAB , Inc. "p Taylor Diving and Salvage Co...compensation to per- * 0 , sonnel performing duty involving highly toxic pesticides. Duty requiring the use of pesticides of high acute toxicity...The compounding effects of continual exposure to jumping result . in spinal disc, knee, shoulder, ankle , and general bone problems. Doctors

Can Pay Incentives Improve the Recruitment of Teachers in America's Hard-to-Staff Schools? "A Research Summary": Policy Matters

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Wheeler, Justin; Glennie, Elizabeth

2007-01-01

The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB) has increased concern about the staffing difficulties faced by schools that serve a high percentage of low-achieving students. NCLB requires each student be taught in all core academic subjects by a highly-qualified teacher by the 2005-06 school year. The law defines highly-qualified teachers as those…

WWC Review of the Report "Teacher Incentive Pay and Educational Outcomes: Evidence from the New York City Bonus Program"

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

What Works Clearinghouse, 2012

2012-01-01

The study reviewed in this paper examined the effects of offering a school-wide teacher performance bonus program on students' reading and mathematics achievement. The study sample included 309 high-poverty New York City public schools serving students in grades K-8 from 2007-08 to 2008-09. Of these schools, 181 were randomly chosen to be offered…

Human Capital: Further Actions Needed to Enhance DOD’s Civilian Strategic Workforce Plan

DTIC Science & Technology

2010-09-27

requirement to identify any incentives needed to attract and retain qualified senior leaders— including offering benefits to senior leaders that are...comparable to the benefits provided to general officers. Additionally, DOD’s workforce plan addresses the requirement to identify steps that the...including compensation and benefit enhancements, such as restoration of locality pay and guaranteed cost of living increases, which are necessary

Identifying the Cost of Non-monetary Incentives (ICONIC)

DTIC Science & Technology

2009-12-01

topics. a. Inspection Optimization Model The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) developed a linear programming model designed for a state air...and other special pays that can distort the environment and amenities that the next assignment offers.23 The primary objective of this work is to...Government Printing Office, 2005). http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06125.pdf (accessed September 28, 2008). Van Boening, Mark, Tanja F. Blackstone

Improving customer service. It's not just what's in the box.

PubMed

Redling, Robert

2003-08-01

Patient satisfaction scores can plummet when medical emergencies throw schedules into disarray or a receptionist ignores a patient at the front desk. Patients' expectations of good customer service have been shaped by technological conveniences and the concerted efforts of retailers, restaurants and other service providers. Physician leaders and administrators can improve customer service by paying more attention to organizational culture, physician behavior, staff incentives, hiring practices and team-building.

Pay for performance programs in Australia: a need for guiding principles.

PubMed

Scott, Ian A

2008-11-01

Pay-for-performance (P4P) programs which reward clinical providers with incentive payments based on one or more measures of quality of care are now common in the United States and the United Kingdom and it is likely they will attract increasing interest in Australia. However, empirical evidence demonstrating effectiveness of such programs is limited and many existing programs have not had rigorous outcome evaluation. To maximise success, future P4P programs should incorporate the lessons and insights obtained from previous experience. Based on a review of published trials, program evaluations and position statements, the following principles that may guide future program design and implementation were synthesised: 1) formulate a rationale and a business case for P4P; 2) use established evidence-based performance measures; 3) use rigorous and verifiable methods of data collection and analysis; 4) define performance targets using absolute and relative thresholds; 5) use rewards that are sufficient, equitable and transparent; 6) address appropriateness of provider responses and avoid perverse incentives; 7) implement communication and feedback strategies; 8) use existing organisational structures to implement P4P programs; 9) attribute credit for performance to participants in ways that foster population-based perspectives; and 10) invest in outcomes and health service research. Recommendations flowing from these principles relevant to Australian settings are provided.

Incentivizing Blood Donation: Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis to Test Titmuss’ Hypotheses

PubMed Central

2013-01-01

Objectives: Titmuss hypothesized that paying blood donors would reduce the quality of the blood donated and would be economically inefficient. We report here the first systematic review to test these hypotheses, reporting on both financial and nonfinancial incentives. Method: Studies deemed eligible for inclusion were peer-reviewed, experimental studies that presented data on the quantity (as a proxy for efficiency) and quality of blood donated in at least two groups: those donating blood when offered an incentive, and those donating blood with no offer of an incentive. The following were searched: MEDLINE, EMBASE and PsycINFO using OVID SP, CINAHL via EBSCO and CENTRAL, the Cochrane Library, Econlit via EBSCO, JSTOR Health and General Science Collection, and Google. Results: The initial search yielded 1100 abstracts, which resulted in 89 full papers being assessed for eligibility, of which seven studies, reported in six papers, met the inclusion criteria. The included studies involved 93,328 participants. Incentives had no impact on the likelihood of donation (OR = 1.22 CI 95% 0.91–1.63; p = .19). There was no difference between financial and nonfinancial incentives in the quantity of blood donated. Of the two studies that assessed quality of blood, one found no effect and the other found an adverse effect from the offer of a free cholesterol test (β = 0.011 p < .05). Conclusion: The limited evidence suggests that Titmuss’ hypothesis of the economic inefficiency of incentives is correct. There is insufficient evidence to assess their likely impact on the quality of the blood provided. PMID:24001244

Value-based insurance design: aligning incentives and evidence in pulmonary medicine.

PubMed

Fendrick, A Mark; Zank, Daniel C

2013-11-01

When consumers are required to pay the same out-of-pocket amount for pulmonary services for which clinical benefits depend on patient characteristics, clinical indication, and provider choice, there is an enormous potential for both underutilization and overutilization. Unlike most current one-size-fits-all health plan designs, value-based insurance design (V-BID) explicitly acknowledges clinical heterogeneity across the continuum of care. By adding clinical nuance to benefit design, V-BID seeks to align consumer and provider incentives with value, encouraging the use of high-value services and discouraging the use of low-value interventions. This article describes the concept of V-BID; creates a framework for its development in pulmonary medicine; and outlines how this concept aligns with research, care delivery, and payment reform initiatives.

The topography of generosity: asymmetric evaluations of prosocial actions.

PubMed

Klein, Nadav; Epley, Nicholas

2014-12-01

Prosociality is considered a virtue. Those who care for others are admired, whereas those who care only for themselves are despised. For one's reputation, it pays to be nice. Does it pay to be even nicer? Four experiments assess reputational inferences across the entire range of prosocial outcomes in zero-sum interactions, from completely selfish to completely selfless actions. We observed consistent nonlinear evaluations: Participants evaluated selfish actions more negatively than equitable actions, but they did not evaluate selfless actions markedly more favorably than equitable actions. This asymptotic pattern reflected monotonic evaluations for increasingly selfish actions and insensitivity to increasingly selfless actions. It pays to be nice but not to be really nice. Additional experiments suggest that this pattern stems partly from failing to make spontaneous comparisons between varying degrees of selflessness. We suggest that these reputational incentives could guide social norms, encouraging equitable actions but discouraging extremely selfless actions. PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2014 APA, all rights reserved.

Household's willingness to pay for arsenic safe drinking water in Bangladesh.

PubMed

Khan, Nasreen Islam; Brouwer, Roy; Yang, Hong

2014-10-01

This study examines willingness to pay (WTP) in Bangladesh for arsenic (As) safe drinking water across different As-risk zones, applying a double bound discrete choice value elicitation approach. The study aims to provide a robust estimate of the benefits of As safe drinking water supply, which is compared to the results from a similar study published almost 10 years ago using a single bound estimation procedure. Tests show that the double bound valuation design does not suffer from anchoring or incentive incompatibility effects. Health risk awareness levels are high and households are willing to pay on average about 5 percent of their disposable average annual household income for As safe drinking water. Important factors influencing WTP include the bid amount to construct communal deep tubewell for As safe water supply, the risk zone where respondents live, household income, water consumption, awareness of water source contamination, whether household members are affected by As contamination, and whether they already take mitigation measures. Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Human resource management in post-conflict health systems: review of research and knowledge gaps

PubMed Central

2014-01-01

In post-conflict settings, severe disruption to health systems invariably leaves populations at high risk of disease and in greater need of health provision than more stable resource-poor countries. The health workforce is often a direct victim of conflict. Effective human resource management (HRM) strategies and policies are critical to addressing the systemic effects of conflict on the health workforce such as flight of human capital, mismatches between skills and service needs, breakdown of pre-service training, and lack of human resource data. This paper reviews published literatures across three functional areas of HRM in post-conflict settings: workforce supply, workforce distribution, and workforce performance. We searched published literatures for articles published in English between 2003 and 2013. The search used context-specific keywords (e.g. post-conflict, reconstruction) in combination with topic-related keywords based on an analytical framework containing the three functional areas of HRM (supply, distribution, and performance) and several corresponding HRM topic areas under these. In addition, the framework includes a number of cross-cutting topics such as leadership and governance, finance, and gender. The literature is growing but still limited. Many publications have focused on health workforce supply issues, including pre-service education and training, pay, and recruitment. Less is known about workforce distribution, especially governance and administrative systems for deployment and incentive policies to redress geographical workforce imbalances. Apart from in-service training, workforce performance is particularly under-researched in the areas of performance-based incentives, management and supervision, work organisation and job design, and performance appraisal. Research is largely on HRM in the early post-conflict period and has relied on secondary data. More primary research is needed across the areas of workforce supply, workforce distribution, and workforce performance. However, this should apply a longer-term focus throughout the different post-conflict phases, while paying attention to key cross-cutting themes such as leadership and governance, gender equity, and task shifting. The research gaps identified should enable future studies to examine how HRM could be used to meet both short and long term objectives for rebuilding health workforces and thereby contribute to achieving more equitable and sustainable health systems outcomes after conflict. PMID:25295071

Medicine as a business.

PubMed

Matthews, Merrill

2004-09-01

There is a growing debate over whether medicine should function like a business, guided, as businesses are, by concerns such as profits and customer satisfaction. Of course, for-profit businesses already permeate medicine, and those businesses are not confused about their priorities: providing high quality goods and services people want, at affordable prices. These companies know that they must do well in order to continue doing good. Critics of the business model argue that the profit motive makes health care too expensive and that only by nationalizing the health care system can doctors provide high quality care at an affordable cost to society. However, a survey of journals and newspaper articles about the Canadian health care system, often cited as an anti-business model for U.S. reform, reveals that quality has suffered significantly under that system. Patients wait in long lines for health care, and sometimes cannot get help at all. This paper argues that incentives in the U.S. health care system are complicated, and that health care needs to work more like a business--not less. Doctors don't know whom they are serving--patients, insurers, employers or the government--because it is usually someone other than the patient who it paying the bill. The way to get the incentives structured properly is to allow patients to control more of their health care dollars--perhaps through a system of Medical Savings Accounts. Following the business model is the only way to ensure that medicine provides high quality services at affordable prices--just like every other sector of the economy.

Work hours and turnover intention among hospital physicians in Taiwan: does income matter?

PubMed

Tsai, Yu-Hsuan; Huang, Nicole; Chien, Li-Yin; Chiang, Jen-Huai; Chiou, Shu-Ti

2016-11-21

Physician shortage has become an urgent and critical challenge to many countries. According to the workforce dynamic model, long work hours may be one major pressure point to the attrition of physicians. Financial incentive is a common tool to human power retention. Therefore, this large-scale physician study investigated how pay satisfaction may influence the relationship between work hours and hospital physician's turnover intention. Data were obtained from a nationwide survey of full-time hospital staff members working at 100 hospitals in Taiwan. The analysis sample comprised 2423 full-time physicians. Dependent variable was degree of the physicians' turnover intention to leave the current hospital. The pay satisfaction was assessed by physicians themselves. We employed ordinal logistic regression models to analyze the association between the number of work hours and turnover intention. To consider the cluster effect of hospitals, we used the "gllamm" command in the statistical software package Stata Version 12.1. The results show that 351 (14.5%) of surveyed physicians reported strong intention to leave current hospital. The average work hours per week among hospital physicians was 59.8 h. As expected, work hours exhibited an independent relationship with turnover intention. More importantly, pay satisfaction could not effectively moderate the positive relationship between work hours and intentions to leave current hospital. The findings show that overtime work is prevalent among hospital physicians in Taiwan. Both the Taiwanese government and hospitals must take action to address the emerging problem of physician high turnover rate. Furthermore, hospitals should not consider relying solely on financial incentives to solve the problem. This study encouraged tackling work hour problem, which would lead to the possibility of solving high turnover intention among hospital physicians in Taiwan.

The business case for pediatric asthma quality improvement in low-income populations: examining a provider-based pay-for-reporting intervention.

PubMed

Reiter, Kristin L; Lemos, Kristin Andrews; Williams, Charlotte E; Esposito, Dominick; Greene, Sandra B

2015-06-01

To measure the return on investment (ROI) for a pediatric asthma pay-for-reporting intervention initiated by a Medicaid managed care plan in New York State. Practice-level, randomized prospective evaluation. Twenty-five primary care practices providing care to children enrolled in the Monroe Plan for Medical Care (the Monroe Plan). Practices were randomized to either treatment (13 practices, 11 participated) or control (12 practices). For each of its eligible members assigned to a treatment group practice, the Monroe plan paid a low monthly incentive fee to the practice. To receive the incentive, treatment group practices were required to conduct, and report to the Monroe Plan, the results of chart audits on eligible members. Chart audits were conducted by practices every 6 months. After each chart audit, the Monroe Plan provided performance feedback to each practice comparing its adherence to asthma care guidelines with averages from all other treatment group practices. Control practices continued with usual care. Intervention implementation and operating costs and per member, per month claims costs. ROI was measured by net present value (discounted cash flow analysis). The ROI to the Monroe Plan was negative, primarily due to high intervention costs and lack of reductions in spending on emergency department and hospital utilization for children in treatment relative to control practices. A pay-for-reporting, chart audit intervention is unlikely to achieve the meaningful reductions in utilization of high-cost services that would be necessary to produce a financial ROI in 2.5 years. © The Author 2015. Published by Oxford University Press in association with the International Society for Quality in Health Care; all rights reserved.

Public Reporting and Demand Rationing: Evidence from the Nursing Home Industry.

PubMed

He, Daifeng; Konetzka, R Tamara

2015-11-01

This paper examines an under-explored unintended consequence of public reporting: the potential for demand rationing. Public reporting, although intended to increase consumer access to high-quality products, may have provided the perverse incentive for high-quality providers facing fixed capacity and administrative pricing to avoid less profitable types of residents. Using data from the nursing home industry before and after the implementation of the public reporting system in 2002, we find that high-quality nursing homes facing capacity constraints reduced admissions of less profitable Medicaid residents while increasing the more profitable Medicare and private-pay admissions, relative to low-quality nursing homes facing no capacity constraints. These effects, although small in magnitude, are consistent with provider rationing of demand on the basis of profitability and underscore the important role of institutional details in designing effective public reporting systems for regulated industries. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Ethnic Disparities in Diabetes Management and Pay-for-Performance in the UK: The Wandsworth Prospective Diabetes Study

PubMed Central

Millett, Christopher; Gray, Jeremy; Saxena, Sonia; Netuveli, Gopalakrishnan; Khunti, Kamlesh; Majeed, Azeem

2007-01-01

Background Pay-for-performance rewards health-care providers by paying them more if they succeed in meeting performance targets. A new contract for general practitioners in the United Kingdom represents the most radical shift towards pay-for-performance seen in any health-care system. The contract provides an important opportunity to address disparities in chronic disease management between ethnic and socioeconomic groups. We examined disparities in management of people with diabetes and intermediate clinical outcomes within a multiethnic population in primary care before and after the introduction of the new contract in April 2004. Methods and Findings We conducted a population-based longitudinal survey, using electronic general practice records, in an ethnically diverse part of southwest London. Outcome measures were prescribing levels and achievement of national treatment targets (HbA1c ≤ 7.0%; blood pressure [BP] < 140/80 mm Hg; total cholesterol ≤ 5 mmol/l or 193 mg/dl). The proportion of patients reaching treatment targets for HbA1c, BP, and total cholesterol increased significantly after the implementation of the new contract. The extents of these increases were broadly uniform across ethnic groups, with the exception of the black Caribbean patient group, which had a significantly lower improvement in HbA1c (adjusted odds ratio [AOR] 0.75, 95% confidence interval [CI] 0.57–0.97) and BP control (AOR 0.65, 95% CI 0.53–0.81) relative to the white British patient group. Variations in prescribing and achievement of treatment targets between ethnic groups present in 2003 were not attenuated in 2005. Conclusions Pay-for-performance incentives have not addressed disparities in the management and control of diabetes between ethnic groups. Quality improvement initiatives must place greater emphasis on minority communities to avoid continued disparities in mortality from cardiovascular disease and the other major complications of diabetes. PMID:17564486

Ethnic disparities in diabetes management and pay-for-performance in the UK: the Wandsworth Prospective Diabetes Study.

PubMed

Millett, Christopher; Gray, Jeremy; Saxena, Sonia; Netuveli, Gopalakrishnan; Khunti, Kamlesh; Majeed, Azeem

2007-06-01

Pay-for-performance rewards health-care providers by paying them more if they succeed in meeting performance targets. A new contract for general practitioners in the United Kingdom represents the most radical shift towards pay-for-performance seen in any health-care system. The contract provides an important opportunity to address disparities in chronic disease management between ethnic and socioeconomic groups. We examined disparities in management of people with diabetes and intermediate clinical outcomes within a multiethnic population in primary care before and after the introduction of the new contract in April 2004. We conducted a population-based longitudinal survey, using electronic general practice records, in an ethnically diverse part of southwest London. Outcome measures were prescribing levels and achievement of national treatment targets (HbA1c < or = 7.0%; blood pressure [BP] < 140/80 mm Hg; total cholesterol < or = 5 mmol/l or 193 mg/dl). The proportion of patients reaching treatment targets for HbA1c, BP, and total cholesterol increased significantly after the implementation of the new contract. The extents of these increases were broadly uniform across ethnic groups, with the exception of the black Caribbean patient group, which had a significantly lower improvement in HbA1c (adjusted odds ratio [AOR] 0.75, 95% confidence interval [CI] 0.57-0.97) and BP control (AOR 0.65, 95% CI 0.53-0.81) relative to the white British patient group. Variations in prescribing and achievement of treatment targets between ethnic groups present in 2003 were not attenuated in 2005. Pay-for-performance incentives have not addressed disparities in the management and control of diabetes between ethnic groups. Quality improvement initiatives must place greater emphasis on minority communities to avoid continued disparities in mortality from cardiovascular disease and the other major complications of diabetes.

[Compliance with process indicators in people with type 2 diabetes and linking incentives in Primary Care].

PubMed

Pascual de la Pisa, Beatriz; Márquez Calzada, Cristina; Cuberos Sánchez, Carla; Cruces Jiménez, José Miguel; Fernández Gamaza, Manuel; Martínez Martínez, María Isabel

2015-03-01

Pay-for-performance programs to improve the quality of health care are extending gradually, particularly en Primary Health Care. Our aim was to explore the relationship between the degree of compliance with the process indicators (PrI) of type 2 diabetes (T2DM) in Primary Care and linkage to incentives. Cross-sectional, descriptive, observational study. Six Primary Health Care centers in Seville Aljarafe District randomly selected and stratified by population size. From 3.647 adults included in Integrated Healthcare Process of T2DM during 2008, 366 patients were included according sample size calculation by stratified random sampling. PrI: eye and feet examination, glycated hemoglobin, lipid profile, microalbuminuria and electrocardiogram. Confounding: Age, gender, characteristics town for patients and professional variables. The mean age was 66.36 years (standard deviation [DE]: 11,56); 48.9% were women. PrI with better compliance were feet examination, glycated hemoglobin and lipid profile (59.6%, 44.3% and 44%, respectively). 2.7% of patients had simultaneous compliance of the six PrI and 11.74% of patients three PrI linkage to incentives. Statistical association was observed in the compliance of the PrI incentives linked or not (P=.001). The degree of compliance with the PrI for screening chronic complications of T2DM is mostly low but this was higher on indicators linked to incentives. Copyright © 2013 Elsevier España, S.L.U. All rights reserved.

A Study of Age Demographics across the Aviation and Missile Materiel Enterprise

DTIC Science & Technology

2016-03-31

Voluntary Separation Incentive Pay (VSIP) and Voluntary Early Retirement Authority ( VERA ) (Lytell, et al., 2015). History that Shaped the...MATERIEL ENTERPRISE DEMOGRAPHICS 10 skillsets or job series. The VERA , VSIP and retention allowances are tools that are most commonly used to help...control the desired “shape” of the workforce. VERA and VSIP are tools that shape the attrition rates and can be tailored towards specified series or

Paying the piper: additional considerations of the theoretical, ethical and moral basis of financial incentives for health behaviour change.

PubMed

Stephens, Christine

2014-02-01

Lynagh, Sanson-Fisher and Bonevski's article entitled "What's good for the goose is good for the gander. Guiding principles for the use of financial incentives in health behaviour change" (Int J Behav Med 20:114-120, 2012) reviews evidence for the use of financial incentives for encouraging health behaviour change. Their discussion of the practical and moral issues involved is a timely contribution which will encourage consideration of the implications of such interventions. In this response to their paper, I suggest that there are also broader aspects that we must consider before developing principles for public policy intervention. First, we must include good theories that explain in a great deal more depth what we mean by health-related behaviours, and secondly, we need to understand the location of these behaviours in social life and within structural inequalities. To ignore these fundamental aspects of health is to risk increasing social injustice and worsening health inequalities, a facet of the morality of health promotion activities which is not touched upon by the Lynagh et al. paper.

Legitimacy, trustee incentives, and board processes: the case of public and private non-profit nursing homes.

PubMed

Dewaelheyns, Nico; Eeckloo, Kristof; Van Hulle, Cynthia

2011-01-01

Using a unique data set, this study explores how type of ownership (government/private) is related to processes of governance. The findings suggest that the neo-institutional perspective and the self-interest rationale of the agency perspective are helpful in explaining processes of governance in both government- and privately owned non-profit organizations. Due to adverse incentives and the quest for legitimacy, supervising governance bodies within local government-owned non-profit institutions pay relatively less attention to the development of high quality supervising bodies and delegate little to management. Our findings also indicate that governance processes in private institutions are more aligned with the business model and that this alignment is likely driven by a concern to improve decision making. By contrast, our data also suggest that in local government-owned institutions re-election concerns of politicians-trustees are an important force in the governance processes of these institutions. In view of these adverse incentives - in contrast to the case of private organizations - a governance code is unlikely to entail much improvement in government-owned organizations. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

New thinking on how to link executive pay with performance.

PubMed

Rappaport, A

1999-01-01

As the stock market began its ascent in the mid-1990s, executive pay--always the subject of heated debate--mounted along with it. That's because among the largest U.S. companies, stock options now account for more than half of total CEO compensation and about 30% of senior operating managers' pay. One problem became particularly clear during the bull market's astonishing run: even below-average performers reap huge gains from stock options when the market is rising rapidly. The author proposes steps to close the gap between existing compensation practices and those needed to promote higher levels of achievement at all levels of the corporation. For top managers, he recommends replacing conventional stock options with options that are tied to a market or peer index. Below-average performers would not be rewarded under such plans; superior performers could, depending on the way plans were structured, receive even more. He notes that managers at the business unit level should not be judged on the company's stock price--over which they have little control--and advocates an approach that accurately measures the value added by each unit. Finally, he suggests how certain indicators of value can be used to measure the contribution of frontline managers and employees. The concept of pay for performance has gained wide acceptance, but the link between incentive pay and superior performance is still too weak. Reforms must be adopted at all levels of the organization. Shareholders will applaud changes in pay schemes that motivate companies to deliver more value.

Physician and patient willingness to pay for electronic cardiovascular disease management.

PubMed

Deal, Ken; Keshavjee, Karim; Troyan, Sue; Kyba, Robert; Holbrook, Anne Marie

2014-07-01

Cardiovascular disease (CVD) is an important target for electronic decision support. We examined the potential sustainability of an electronic CVD management program using a discrete choice experiment (DCE). Our objective was to estimate physician and patient willingness-to-pay (WTP) for the current and enhanced programs. Focus groups, expert input and literature searches decided the attributes to be evaluated for the physician and patient DCEs, which were carried out using a Web-based program. Hierarchical Bayes analysis estimated preference coefficients for each respondent and latent class analysis segmented each sample. Simulations were used to estimate WTP for each of the attributes individually and for an enhanced vascular management system. 144 participants (70 physicians, 74 patients) completed the DCE. Overall, access speed to updated records and monthly payments for a nurse coordinator were the main determinants of physician choices. Two distinctly different segments of physicians were identified - one very sensitive to monthly subscription fee and speed of updating the tracker with new patient data and the other very sensitive to the monthly cost of the nurse coordinator and government billing incentives. Patient choices were most significantly influenced by the yearly subscription cost. The estimated physician WTP was slightly above the estimated threshold for sustainability while the patient WTP was below. Current willingness to pay for electronic cardiovascular disease management should encourage innovation to provide economies of scale in program development, delivery and maintenance to meet sustainability thresholds. Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.

Value: A Framework for Radiation Oncology

PubMed Central

Teckie, Sewit; McCloskey, Susan A.; Steinberg, Michael L.

2014-01-01

In the current health care system, high costs without proportional improvements in quality or outcome have prompted widespread calls for change in how we deliver and pay for care. Value-based health care delivery models have been proposed. Multiple impediments exist to achieving value, including misaligned patient and provider incentives, information asymmetries, convoluted and opaque cost structures, and cultural attitudes toward cancer treatment. Radiation oncology as a specialty has recently become a focus of the value discussion. Escalating costs secondary to rapidly evolving technologies, safety breaches, and variable, nonstandardized structures and processes of delivering care have garnered attention. In response, we present a framework for the value discussion in radiation oncology and identify approaches for attaining value, including economic and structural models, process improvements, outcome measurement, and cost assessment. PMID:25113759

A nudge too far? A nudge at all? On paying people to be healthy.

PubMed

Oliver, Adam

2012-01-01

Paying people to engage in healthy behaviours, such as adhering to medications, quitting smoking and losing weight, has been linked to the nudge agenda. However, "user financial incentives" (UFI) can only be classified as nudges if they meet a strict set of requirements. Perhaps more importantly, UFI have thus far showed some promise only for "single shot" behaviour change, such as that associated with many acts of medical adherence, and have been generally unfruitful in effecting the sustained behaviour change that is necessary to influence broader lifestyle decisions, such as those associated with smoking and weight. Possibly more importantly still, the legitimacy of government-sponsored interventions intended to influence directly broad lifestyle behaviours, providing that those behaviours are not unduly harming others, ought to be scrutinized

The effect of financial incentives on the quality of health care provided by primary care physicians.

PubMed

Scott, Anthony; Sivey, Peter; Ait Ouakrim, Driss; Willenberg, Lisa; Naccarella, Lucio; Furler, John; Young, Doris

2011-09-07

The use of blended payment schemes in primary care, including the use of financial incentives to directly reward 'performance' and 'quality' is increasing in a number of countries. There are many examples in the US, and the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QoF) for general practitioners (GPs) in the UK is an example of a major system-wide reform. Despite the popularity of these schemes, there is currently little rigorous evidence of their success in improving the quality of primary health care, or of whether such an approach is cost-effective relative to other ways to improve the quality of care. The aim of this review is to examine the effect of changes in the method and level of payment on the quality of care provided by primary care physicians (PCPs) and to identify:i) the different types of financial incentives that have improved quality;ii) the characteristics of patient populations for whom quality of care has been improved by financial incentives; andiii) the characteristics of PCPs who have responded to financial incentives. We searched the Cochrane Effective Practice and Organisation of Care (EPOC) Trials Register, Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials (CENTRAL) and Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews (CDSR) (The Cochrane Library), MEDLINE, HealthSTAR, EMBASE, CINAHL, PsychLIT, and ECONLIT. Searches of Internet-based economics and health economics working paper collections were also conducted. Finally, studies were identified through the reference lists of retrieved articles, websites of key organisations, and from direct contact with key authors in the field. Articles were included if they were published from 2000 to August 2009. Randomised controlled trials (RCT), controlled before and after studies (CBA), and interrupted time series analyses (ITS) evaluating the impact of different financial interventions on the quality of care delivered by primary healthcare physicians (PCPs). Quality of care was defined as patient reported outcome measures, clinical behaviours, and intermediate clinical and physiological measures. Two review authors independently extracted data and assessed study quality, in consultation with two other review authors where there was disagreement. For each included study, we reported the estimated effect sizes and confidence intervals. Seven studies were included in this review. Three of the studies evaluated single-threshold target payments, one examined a fixed fee per patient achieving a specified outcome, one study evaluated payments based on the relative ranking of medical groups' performance (tournament-based pay), one study examined a mix of tournament-based pay and threshold payments, and one study evaluated changing from a blended payments scheme to salaried payment. Three cluster RCTs examined smoking cessation; one CBA examined patients' assessment of the quality of care; one CBA examined cervical screening, mammography screening, and HbA1c; one ITS focused on four outcomes in diabetes; and one controlled ITS (a difference-in-difference design) examined cervical screening, mammography screening, HbA1c, childhood immunisation, chlamydia screening, and appropriate asthma medication. Six of the seven studies showed positive but modest effects on quality of care for some primary outcome measures, but not all. One study found no effect on quality of care. Poor study design led to substantial risk of bias in most studies. In particular, none of the studies addressed issues of selection bias as a result of the ability of primary care physicians to select into or out of the incentive scheme or health plan. The use of financial incentives to reward PCPs for improving the quality of primary healthcare services is growing. However, there is insufficient evidence to support or not support the use of financial incentives to improve the quality of primary health care. Implementation should proceed with caution and incentive schemes should be more carefully designed before implementation. In addition to basing incentive design more on theory, there is a large literature discussing experiences with these schemes that can be used to draw out a number of lessons that can be learned and that could be used to influence or modify the design of incentive schemes. More rigorous study designs need to be used to account for the selection of physicians into incentive schemes. The use of instrumental variable techniques should be considered to assist with the identification of treatment effects in the presence of selection bias and other sources of unobserved heterogeneity. In randomised trials, care must be taken in using the correct unit of analysis and more attention should be paid to blinding. Studies should also examine the potential unintended consequences of incentive schemes by having a stronger theoretical basis, including a broader range of outcomes, and conducting more extensive subgroup analysis. Studies should more consistently describe i) the type of payment scheme at baseline or in the control group, ii) how payments to medical groups were used and distributed within the groups, and iii) the size of the new payments as a percentage of total revenue. Further research comparing the relative costs and effects of financial incentives with other behaviour change interventions is also required.

Assessment of systems for paying health care providers in Vietnam: implications for equity, efficiency and expanding effective health coverage.

PubMed

Phuong, Nguyen Khanh; Oanh, Tran Thi Mai; Phuong, Hoang Thi; Tien, Tran Van; Cashin, Cheryl

2015-01-01

Provider payment arrangements are currently a core concern for Vietnam's health sector and a key lever for expanding effective coverage and improving the efficiency and equity of the health system. This study describes how different provider payment systems are designed and implemented in practice across a sample of provinces and districts in Vietnam. Key informant interviews were conducted with over 100 health policy-makers, purchasers and providers using a structured interview guide. The results of the different payment methods were scored by respondents and assessed against a set of health system performance criteria. Overall, the public health insurance agency, Vietnam Social Security (VSS), is focused on managing expenditures through a complicated set of reimbursement policies and caps, but the incentives for providers are unclear and do not consistently support Vietnam's health system objectives. The results of this study are being used by the Ministry of Health and VSS to reform the provider payment systems to be more consistent with international definitions and good practices and to better support Vietnam's health system objectives.

After the revolution: DRGs at age 30.

PubMed

Quinn, Kevin

2014-03-18

1 October 2013 marked 30 years since Medicare began paying hospitals by diagnosis-related group (DRG), arguably the most influential innovation in the history of health care financing. Initially developed as a tool for hospital management, DRGs became the basis of the inpatient prospective payment system that Medicare implemented in 1983. The strong incentives were revolutionary in their impact. Medicare spending growth slowed sharply, and, more remarkable, hospitals posted record profits. After the link between cost and payment was broken, hospitals moved quickly to cut costs. Nevertheless, a literature survey concluded that none of the worst fears about adverse effects on patients were realized. Diagnosis-related groups have also come to define "the product of a hospital" for purposes of benchmarking and risk adjustment. The acceptance of DRG algorithms owes much to their categorical approach, clinical focus, and transparency. The 2 most commonly used algorithms, Medicare DRGs and All Patient Refined (APR) DRGs, typically explain more than 40% of cost variance in inpatient stays, although with considerable range by care category. Because Medicare DRGs are unsuitable for obstetrics, pediatrics, and neonatology, some payers prefer APR DRGs. Diagnosis-related groups have proven to be a suitable basis for payment, as evidenced by widespread use. Common issues include mitigation of adverse incentives, appropriate payment for extremely costly stays, applicability to certain hospitals and care categories, and growing complexity. The DRG experience offers lessons about the effectiveness of financial incentives, the likelihood of adverse effects, the usefulness of case-mix measures, the risks of growing complexity, and the example that sensible policy need not be the domain of any one political party or other entity.

Incentive pricing and cost recovery at the basin scale.

PubMed

Ward, Frank A; Pulido-Velazquez, Manuel

2009-01-01

Incentive pricing programs have potential to promote economically efficient water use patterns and provide a revenue source to compensate for environmental damages. However, incentive pricing may impose disproportionate costs and aggravate poverty where high prices are levied for basic human needs. This paper presents an analysis of a two-tiered water pricing system that sets a low price for subsistence needs, while charging a price equal to marginal cost, including environmental cost, for discretionary uses. This pricing arrangement can promote efficient and sustainable water use patterns, goals set by the European Water Framework Directive, while meeting subsistence needs of poor households. Using data from the Rio Grande Basin of North America, a dynamic nonlinear program, maximizes the basin's total net economic and environmental benefits subject to several hydrological and institutional constraints. Supply costs, environmental costs, and resource costs are integrated in a model of a river basin's hydrology, economics, and institutions. Three programs are compared: (1) Law of the River, in which water allocations and prices are determined by rules governing water transfers; (2) marginal cost pricing, in which households pay the full marginal cost of supplying treated water; (3) two-tiered pricing, in which households' subsistence water needs are priced cheaply, while discretionary uses are priced at efficient levels. Compared to the Law of the River and marginal cost pricing, two-tiered pricing performs well for efficiency and adequately for sustainability and equity. Findings provide a general framework for formulating water pricing programs that promote economically and environmentally efficient water use programs while also addressing other policy goals.

Blood Donation, Payment, and Non-Cash Incentives: Classical Questions Drawing Renewed Interest

PubMed Central

Buyx, Alena M.

2009-01-01

Summary Blood is scarce, and ensuring a sufficient blood supply remains difficult for many countries. Payment for blood as a strategy to increase donations has remained highly controversial for decades, and the debate about ethical issues in paying donors has become somewhat stuck. At least from a policy perspective, it is important to find a compromise which allows for devising and implementing acceptable and successful policies to increase the blood supply. In this paper, such a compromise is developed both from a theoretical and empirical perspective, namely implementing well-designed non-cash incentives which cut across the rigid dichotomy of altruistic donations versus payment for donations. In order for this compromise to work, more attention to donation motives, the choice architecture, and the setting in blood donation needs to be paid. PMID:21076552

PAYING FOR PERFORMANCE: THE POWER OF INCENTIVES OVER HABITS

PubMed Central

Sindelar, Jody L.

2010-01-01

New evidence suggests that individuals do not always make rational decisions, especially with regard to health habits. Smoking, misuse of alcohol, overeating and illicit drug use are leading causes of morbidity and mortality. Thus, influencing health habits is critical for improving overall health and well-being. This editorial argues that economists should take a more active role in shaping individuals’ health habits. Two recent innovations in economic theory pave the way. One change is that some economists now view rationality as bounded and willpower in short supply. Another, related to the first, is a more accepting perspective on paternalism, authorizing economists to help individuals make better choices when the neoclassical model breaks down. Findings from psychology offer incentive-based approaches; specifically, contingency management (CM). Economists could use this approach as a basis for developing public and private policies. PMID:18348117

Using pay for performance incentives (P4P) to improve management of suspected malaria fevers in rural Kenya: a cluster randomized controlled trial.

PubMed

Menya, Diana; Platt, Alyssa; Manji, Imran; Sang, Edna; Wafula, Rebeccah; Ren, Jing; Cheruiyot, Olympia; Armstrong, Janice; Neelon, Brian; O'Meara, Wendy Prudhomme

2015-10-16

Inappropriate treatment of non-malaria fevers with artemisinin-based combination therapies (ACTs) is a growing concern, particularly in light of emerging artemisinin resistance, but it is a behavior that has proven difficult to change. Pay for performance (P4P) programs have generated interest as a mechanism to improve health service delivery and accountability in resource-constrained health systems. However, there has been little experimental evidence to establish the effectiveness of P4P in developing countries. We tested a P4P strategy that emphasized parasitological diagnosis and appropriate treatment of suspected malaria, in particular reduction of unnecessary consumption of ACTs. A random sample of 18 health centers was selected and received a refresher workshop on malaria case management. Pre-intervention baseline data was collected from August to September 2012. Facilities were subsequently randomized to either the comparison (n = 9) or intervention arm (n = 9). Between October 2012 and November 2013, facilities in the intervention arm received quarterly incentive payments based on seven performance indicators. Incentives were for use by facilities rather than as payments to individual providers. All non-pregnant patients older than 1 year of age who presented to a participating facility and received either a malaria test or artemether-lumefantrine (AL) were eligible to be included in the analysis. Our primary outcome was prescription of AL to patients with a negative malaria diagnostic test (n = 11,953). Our secondary outcomes were prescription of AL to patients with laboratory-confirmed malaria (n = 2,993) and prescription of AL to patients without a malaria diagnostic test (analyzed at the cluster level, n = 178 facility-months). In the final quarter of the intervention period, the proportion of malaria-negative patients in the intervention arm who received AL was lower than in the comparison arm (7.3% versus 10.9%). The improvement from baseline to quarter 4 in the intervention arm was nearly three times that of the comparison arm (ratio of adjusted odds ratios for baseline to quarter 4 = 0.36, 95% CI: 0.24-0.57). The rate of prescription of AL to patients without a test was five times lower in the intervention arm (adjusted incidence rate ratio = 0.18, 95% CI: 0.07-0.48). Prescription of AL to patients with confirmed infection was not significantly different between the groups over the study period. Facility-based incentives coupled with training may be more effective than training alone and could complement other quality improvement approaches. This study was registered with ClinicalTrials.gov (NCT01809873) on 11 March 2013.

Medicaid nursing home pay for performance: where do we stand?

PubMed

Arling, Greg; Job, Carol; Cooke, Valerie

2009-10-01

Nursing home pay-for-performance (P4P) programs are intended to maximize the value obtained from public and private expenditures by measuring and rewarding better nursing home performance. We surveyed the 6 states with operational P4P systems in 2007. We describe key features of six Medicaid nursing home P4P systems and make recommendations for further development of nursing home P4P. We surveyed the six states with operational P4P systems in 2007. The range of performance measures employed by the states is quite broad: staffing level and satisfaction, findings from the regulatory system, clinical quality indicators, resident quality of life or satisfaction with care, family satisfaction, access to care for special populations, and efficiency. The main data sources for the measures are the Minimum Data Set (MDS), nursing home inspections, special surveys of nursing home residents, consumers or employees, and facility cost reports or other administrative systems. The most common financial incentive for better performance is a percentage bonus or an add-on to a facility's per diem rate. The bonus is generally proportional to a facility performance score, which consists of simple or weighted sums of scores on individual measures. States undertaking nursing home P4P programs should involve key stakeholders at all stages of P4P system design and implementation. Performance measures should be comprehensive, valid and reliable, risk adjusted where appropriate, and communicated clearly to providers and consumers. The P4P system should encourage provider investment in better care yet recognize state fiscal restraints. Consumer report cards, quality improvement initiatives, and the regulatory process should complement and reinforce P4P. Finally, the P4P system should be transparent and continuously evaluated.

Using Economic Experiments to Test the Effect of Reliability Pricing and Self-Sizing on the Private Provision of a Public Good Results: The Case of Constructing Water Conveyance Infrastructure to Mitigate Water Quantity and Quality Concerns in the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Kaplan, J.; Howitt, R. E.; Kroll, S.

2016-12-01

Public financing of public projects is becoming more difficult with growing political and financial pressure to reduce the size and scope of government action. Private provision is possible but is often doomed by under-provision. If however, market-like mechanisms could be incorporated into the solicitation of funds to finance the provision of the good, because, for example, the good is supplied stochastically and is divisible, then we would expect fewer incentives to free ride and greater efficiency in providing the public good. In a controlled computer-based economic experiment, we evaluate two market-like conditions (reliability pricing allocation and self-sizing of the good) that are designed to reduce under-provision. The results suggest that financing an infrastructure project when the delivery is allocated based on reliability pricing rather than historical allocation results in significantly greater price formation efficiency and less free riding whether the project is of a fixed size determined by external policy makers or determined endogenously by the sum of private contributions. When reliability pricing and self-sizing (endogenous) mechanism are used in combination free-riding is reduced the greatest among the tested treatments. Furthermore, and as expected, self-sizing when combined with historical allocations results in the worst level of free-riding. This setting for this treatment creates an incentive to undervalue willingness to pay since very low contributions still return positive earnings as long as enough contributions are raised for a single unit. If everyone perceives everyone else is undervaluing their contribution the incentive grows stronger and we see the greatest degree of free riding among the treatments. Lastly, the results from the analysis suggested that the rebate rule may have encouraged those with willingness to pay values less than the cost of the project to feel confident when contributing more than their willingness to pay and to do so when they faced the endogenously-sized, reliability pricing solicitation since a rebate would likely return them positive earnings. In subsequent research we would like to explore the role of the rebate rule in the effectiveness of reliability pricing and self-sizing in increasing price-formation efficiency and reduce free riding.

Impact of patient-centered medical home assignment on emergency room visits among uninsured patients in a county health system.

PubMed

Roby, Dylan H; Pourat, Nadereh; Pirritano, Matthew J; Vrungos, Shelley M; Dajee, Himmet; Castillo, Dan; Kominski, Gerald F

2010-08-01

The Medical Services Initiative program--a safety net-based system of care--in Orange County included assignment of uninsured, low-income residents to a patient-centered medical home. The medical home provided case management, a team-based approach for treating disease, and increased access to primary and specialty care among other elements of a patient-centered medical home. Providers were paid an enhanced fee and pay-for-performance incentives to ensure delivery of comprehensive treatment. Medical Services Initiative enrollees who were assigned to a medical home for longer time periods were less likely to have any emergency room (ER) visits or multiple ER visits. Switching medical homes three or more times was associated with enrollees being more likely to have any ER visits or multiple ER visits. The findings provide evidence that successful implementation of the patient-centered medical home model in a county-based safety net system is possible and can reduce unnecessary ER use.

20 CFR 638.519 - Incentives system.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-04-01

... 20 Employees' Benefits 3 2011-04-01 2011-04-01 false Incentives system. 638.519 Section 638.519... TITLE IV-B OF THE JOB TRAINING PARTNERSHIP ACT Center Operations § 638.519 Incentives system. The center operator shall establish and maintain its own incentives system for students in accordance with procedures...

Recognising Behaviour that Increases Learning: The Possible Role of Incentives in the Teaching Profession. Research Article

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Mabogoane, Thabo; Patel, Firoz

2006-01-01

This article argues that incentives can help increase teacher performance and retention. Incentives send out a clear signal of what an education system expects from its teachers; at the same time teachers do respond to incentives inherent in the education system. Many education systems have weak incentives and therefore fail to signal to teachers…

Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act

THOMAS, 111th Congress

Rep. Mollohan, Alan B. [D-WV-1

2009-06-12

03/18/2010 Became Public Law No: 111-147. (TXT | PDF) (All Actions) Notes: Pursuant to H.Res. 976, the House modified the Commerce-Justice-Science Appropriations Act, 2010, H.R. 2847, substituting the "Jobs for Main Street Act, 2010" as Division A of the Act and the "Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2009" as Division B. (Regular appropriations for FY2010 for... Tracker: This bill has the status Became LawHere are the steps for Status of Legislation:

Health plans keeping drug cost increases in check with programs that promote generics.

PubMed

2002-07-01

To counter the massive amount of drug company detailing and marketing that is partly responsible for driving up pharmaceutical costs, health plans and some independent practice associations are promoting the use of generics to physicians in their networks. While most physicians in capitated contracts don't directly benefit from the movement to encourage generics unless they have pharmacy risk, some health plans are paying physicians financial incentives to increase generic prescribing.

Pay 'em to play--and stay.

PubMed

Mertz, Marc G

2005-04-01

A 70-bed community hospital purchased all of the local primary care practices in the community - and then saw the largest group's profits take a nose-dive. The employed physicians had little incentive to work hard and see more patients. Hospital leaders evaluated their options for the practice and decided to redesign the physician compensation plan. The resulting approach aligned the physicians' goals with those of the practice, motivated them to see more patients and produced more revenue for the organization.

Measuring emergency physicians' work: factoring in clinical hours, patients seen, and relative value units into 1 metric.

PubMed

Silich, Bert A; Yang, James J

2012-05-01

Measuring workplace performance is important to emergency department management. If an unreliable model is used, the results will be inaccurate. Use of inaccurate results to make decisions, such as how to distribute the incentive pay, will lead to rewarding the wrong people and will potentially demoralize top performers. This article demonstrates a statistical model to reliably measure the work accomplished, which can then be used as a performance measurement.

An Econometric Analysis of Volunteer Enlistments of Service and Cost Effectiveness Comparison of Service Incentive Programs

DTIC Science & Technology

1974-10-01

FIRST-TERM VOLUNTEER ENLISTMENTS WITH RESPECT TO UNEMPLOY - MENT RATES AND RECRUITING STRENGTH 3 Introduction 3 Findings of Previous Studies 4...variation in the dependent variable (volunteers per QMA) is not explained by the variation in the independent variables (relative wages, unemploy ...variable and one equation with an unemploy - ment variable. He found that the pay elasticity decreased from 1.77 to 1.01 with the addition of the

Wildlife Abundance and Diversity as Indicators of Tourism Potential in Northern Botswana.

PubMed

Winterbach, Christiaan W; Whitesell, Carolyn; Somers, Michael J

2015-01-01

Wildlife tourism can provide economic incentives for conservation. Due to the abundance of wildlife and the presence of charismatic species some areas are better suited to wildlife tourism. Our first objective was to develop criteria based on wildlife abundance and diversity to evaluate tourism potential in the Northern Conservation Zone of Botswana. Secondly we wanted to quantify and compare tourism experiences in areas with high and low tourism potential. We used aerial survey data to estimate wildlife biomass and diversity to determine tourism potential, while data from ground surveys quantified the tourist experience. Areas used for High Paying Low Volume tourism had significantly higher mean wildlife biomass and wildlife diversity than the areas avoided for this type of tourism. Only 22% of the Northern Conservation Zone has intermediate to high tourism potential. The areas with high tourism potential, as determined from the aerial survey data, provided tourists with significantly better wildlife sightings (ground surveys) than the low tourism potential areas. Even Low Paying tourism may not be economically viable in concessions that lack areas with intermediate to high tourism potential. The largest part of the Northern Conservation Zone has low tourism potential, but low tourism potential is not equal to low conservation value. Alternative conservation strategies should be developed to complement the economic incentive provided by wildlife-based tourism in Botswana.

Wildlife Abundance and Diversity as Indicators of Tourism Potential in Northern Botswana

PubMed Central

Winterbach, Christiaan W.; Whitesell, Carolyn; Somers, Michael J.

2015-01-01

Wildlife tourism can provide economic incentives for conservation. Due to the abundance of wildlife and the presence of charismatic species some areas are better suited to wildlife tourism. Our first objective was to develop criteria based on wildlife abundance and diversity to evaluate tourism potential in the Northern Conservation Zone of Botswana. Secondly we wanted to quantify and compare tourism experiences in areas with high and low tourism potential. We used aerial survey data to estimate wildlife biomass and diversity to determine tourism potential, while data from ground surveys quantified the tourist experience. Areas used for High Paying Low Volume tourism had significantly higher mean wildlife biomass and wildlife diversity than the areas avoided for this type of tourism. Only 22% of the Northern Conservation Zone has intermediate to high tourism potential. The areas with high tourism potential, as determined from the aerial survey data, provided tourists with significantly better wildlife sightings (ground surveys) than the low tourism potential areas. Even Low Paying tourism may not be economically viable in concessions that lack areas with intermediate to high tourism potential. The largest part of the Northern Conservation Zone has low tourism potential, but low tourism potential is not equal to low conservation value. Alternative conservation strategies should be developed to complement the economic incentive provided by wildlife-based tourism in Botswana. PMID:26308859

The Impact of an Incentive on the Use of an Online Self-Directed Wellness and Self-Management Program

PubMed Central

Greene, Jessica

2014-01-01

Background Those who pay for health care are increasingly looking for strategies to influence individuals to take a more active role in managing their health. Incenting health plan members and/or employees to participate in wellness programs is a widely used approach. Objective In this study, we examine financial incentives to health plan members to participate in an online self-management/wellness program—US $20 for completing the patient activation measure (PAM) and an additional US $40 for completing 8 learning modules. We examined whether the characteristics of plan members differed by the degree to which they responded to the incentives. Further, we examined whether participation in the wellness program was associated with improvements in PAM scores and changes in health care utilization. Methods This retrospective study compared demographic characteristics and change in PAM scores and health utilization for 144,625 health plan members in 2011. Four groups were compared: (1) those who were offered the incentives but chose not to participate (n=128,634), (2) those who received the initial incentive (PAM only) but did not complete 8 topics (n=7099), (3) those who received both incentives (completing 8 topics but no more) (n=2693), and (4) those who received both incentives and continued using the online program beyond what was required by the incentives (n=6249). Results The vast majority of health plan members did not participate in the program (88.91%, 128,634/144,675). Of those who participated, only 7099 of 16,041 (44.25%) completed the PAM for the first incentive, 2693 (16.79%) completed 8 topics for the second incentive, and 6249 (38.96%) received both incentives and continued using the program beyond the incentive requirements. Nonparticipants were more likely to be men and to have lower health risk scores on average than the other three groups of participants (P<.001). In multivariate regression models, those who used the online program (8 topics or beyond) increased their PAM score by approximately 1 point more than those who only took the PAM and did not use the wellness program (P<.03). In addition, emergency department visits were lower for all groups who responded to any level of the incentive as compared to those who did not (P<.01). No differences were found in other types of utilization. Conclusions The incentive was not sufficient to spark most health plan members to use the wellness program. However, the fact that many program participants went beyond the incentive in their use of the online wellness program suggests that the users of the online program found value in using it, and it was their own internal motivation that stimulated this additional use. Providing an incentive for program participation may be an effective pathway for working with less activated patients, particularly if the program is tailored to the needs of the less activated. PMID:25280348

Motivators and hygiene factors among physicians responding to explicit incentives to improve the value of care.

PubMed

Waddimba, Anthony C; Burgess, James F; Young, Gary J; Beckman, Howard B; Meterko, Mark

2013-01-01

Physician's dissatisfaction is reported to be increasing, especially in primary care. The transition from fee-for-service to outcome-based reimbursements may make matters worse. To investigate influences of provider attitudes and practice settings on job satisfaction/dissatisfaction during transition to quality-based payment models, we assessed self-reported satisfaction/dissatisfaction with practice in a Rochester (New York)-area physician practice association in the process of implementing pay-for-performance. We linked cross-sectional data for 215 survey respondents on satisfaction ratings and behavioral attitudes with medical record data on their clinical behavior and practices, and census data on their catchment population. Factors associated with the odds of being satisfied or dissatisfied were determined via predictive multivariable logistic regression modeling. Dissatisfied physicians were more likely to have larger-than-average patient panels, lower autonomy and/or control, and beliefs that quality incentives were hindering patient care. Satisfied physicians were more likely to have a higher sense of autonomy and control, smaller patient volumes, and a less complex patient mix. Efforts to maintain or improve satisfaction among physicians should focus on encouraging professional autonomy during transitions from volume-based to quality/outcomes-based payment systems. An optimum balance between accountability and autonomy/control might maximize both health care quality and job satisfaction.

The effect of professional culture on intrinsic motivation among physicians in an academic medical center.

PubMed

Janus, Katharina

2014-01-01

Today, most healthcare organizations aim to manage professionals' motivation through monetary incentives, such as pay for performance. However, addressing motivation extrinsically can involve negative effects, such as disturbed teamwork, gaming the system, and crowd-out of intrinsic motivation. To offset these side effects, it is crucial to support professionals' intrinsic motivation actively, which is largely determined by enjoyment- and obligation-based social norms that derive from professionals' culture. For this study, a professional culture questionnaire was designed and validated, the results of which uncovered three factors: relationship to work, relationship to colleagues, and relationship to organization. These factors served as independent variables for regression analyses. Second, Amabile's validated work preference inventory was used to measure intrinsic motivation as a dependent variable. The regression analysis was controlled for sex, age, and experience. The study revealed that relationship to work had the strongest (and a positive) impact on intrinsic motivation in general and on Amabile's intrinsic subscales, enjoyment and challenge. Relationship to organization had a negative impact on intrinsic motivation and both subscales, and relationship to colleagues showed a low positive significance for the intrinsic scale only. Healthcare organizations have mostly focused on targeting professionals' extrinsic motivation. However, managing dimensions of professional culture can help support professionals' intrinsic motivation without incurring the side effects of monetary incentives.

The ESRD Quality Incentive Program—Can We Bridge the Chasm?

PubMed Central

Weiner, Daniel

2017-01-01

The ESRD Quality Incentive Program (QIP) is the first mandatory federal pay for performance program launched on January 1, 2012. The QIP is tied to the ESRD prospective payment system and mandated by the Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008, which directed the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services to expand the payment bundle for renal dialysis services and legislated that payment be tied to quality measures. The QIP links 2% of the payment that a dialysis facility receives for Medicare patients on dialysis to the facility’s performance on quality of care measures. Quality measures are evaluated annually for inclusion on the basis of importance, validity, and performance gap. Other quality assessment programs overlap with the QIP; all have substantial effects on provision of care as clinicians, patients, regulators, and dialysis organizations scramble to keep up with the frequent release of wide-ranging regulations. In this review, we provide an overview of quality assessment and quality measures, focusing on the ESRD QIP, its effect on care, and its potential future directions. We conclude that a patient-centered, individualized, and parsimonious approach to quality assessment needs to be maintained to allow the nephrology community to further bridge the quality chasm in dialysis care. PMID:28298324

Practical implications of incentive systems are utilized by dental franchises.

PubMed

Yavner, S B

1989-01-01

The success of any dental practice depends, among other factors, on the critical role of staff employees. In order to encourage desired staff behaviors, incentive systems can be designed for employee dentists, assistants/hygienists and managers. A survey of dental franchises was conducted in 1987 for the purpose of examining their incentive control systems. The specific incentives employed by these dental franchises for their employees are analyzed. The implications of these incentive systems used by dental franchise organizations for all dental practices are then discussed.

Implementation of electronic medical records

PubMed Central

Greiver, Michelle; Barnsley, Jan; Glazier, Richard H.; Moineddin, Rahim; Harvey, Bart J.

2011-01-01

Abstract Objective To study the effect of electronic medical record (EMR) implementation on preventive services covered by Ontario’s pay-for-performance program. Design Prospective double-cohort study. Participants Twenty-seven community-based family physicians. Setting Toronto, Ont. Intervention Eighteen physicians implemented EMRs, while 9 physicians continued to use paper records. Main outcome measure Provision of 4 preventive services affected by pay-for-performance incentives (Papanicolaou tests, screening mammograms, fecal occult blood testing, and influenza vaccinations) in the first 2 years of EMR implementation. Results After adjustment, combined preventive services for the EMR group increased by 0.7%, a smaller increase than that seen in the non-EMR group (P = .55, 95% confidence interval −2.8 to 3.9). Conclusion When compared with paper records, EMR implementation had no significant effect on the provision of the 4 preventive services studied. PMID:21998246

Comparing mandated health care reforms: the Affordable Care Act, accountable care organizations, and the Medicare ESRD program.

PubMed

Watnick, Suzanne; Weiner, Daniel E; Shaffer, Rachel; Inrig, Jula; Moe, Sharon; Mehrotra, Rajnish

2012-09-01

In addition to extending health insurance coverage, the Affordable Care Act of 2010 aims to improve quality of care and contain costs. To this end, the act allowed introduction of bundled payments for a range of services, proposed the creation of accountable care organizations (ACOs), and established the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation to test new care delivery and payment models. The ACO program began April 1, 2012, along with demonstration projects for bundled payments for episodes of care in Medicaid. Yet even before many components of the Affordable Care Act are fully in place, the Medicare ESRD Program has instituted legislatively mandated changes for dialysis services that resemble many of these care delivery reform proposals. The ESRD program now operates under a fully bundled, case-mix adjusted prospective payment system and has implemented Medicare's first-ever mandatory pay-for-performance program: the ESRD Quality Incentive Program. As ACOs are developed, they may benefit from the nephrology community's experience with these relatively novel models of health care payment and delivery reform. Nephrologists are in a position to assure that the ACO development will benefit from the ESRD experience. This article reviews the new ESRD payment system and the Quality Incentive Program, comparing and contrasting them with ACOs. Better understanding of similarities and differences between the ESRD program and the ACO program will allow the nephrology community to have a more influential voice in shaping the future of health care delivery in the United States.

Contingency Contracting in Support of Conus Disasters: A Case Study of the 1994 Northridge Earthquake, 2005 Hurricane Katrina and 2012 Hurricane Sandy

DTIC Science & Technology

2014-06-01

Northridge earthquake response. The City of Los Angeles and the State of California required contracts to address recycling of demolition materials to the...materials directly recycled and material removed from the site on the enclosed recycling log found within this Contract. Documentation includes...related to recycling disaster debris:  “Incentive payment: The City will pay tipping fees using the existing authorization letter; however, only source

The Effects of Incentive Programs on Clinical Productivity and Quality

DTIC Science & Technology

2009-02-04

outcome, such as a hemoglobin A1c ( HbA1c ) test result of 9% or less for a diabetic. Some models pay the bonus based on the overall number of tests...importance of accurate documentation. A final issue is related to P4P programs that provide bonuses for outcome measures, such as decreased HbA1c ...Diabetics with LDL  • Diabetics with HbA1c testing • Diabetics with HbA1c ɡ 41 Lt Gen Eric B

Designing Military Pay. Contributions and Implications of the Economics Literature

DTIC Science & Technology

1993-01-01

34Time, Salary, and Incentive Payoffs in Labor Contracts," Journal of Labor Economics , VoL 9, No. 1, 1991, pp. 25-44. Foulkes, Fred K., Personnel...Edward Lazear, "The Excess Sensitivity of Layoffs and Quits to Demand," Journal of Labor Economics , VoL 2, No. 2,1984, pp. 233-257. Hashimoto, Masanori...34 Research in Labor Economics , VoL 9, Ronald Ehrenberg, ed., Ithaca, New York: JAI Press, Cornell University, 1988, pp. 225-256. Mellow, Wesley, "Employer Size

Are state renewable feed-in tariff initiatives truly throttled by Federal statutes after the FERC California decision?

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Yaffe, David P.

For the last few years, several local and state governments have adopted ''feed-in tariffs'' to promote development of dispersed, small-scale renewable generation through incentive pricing. Most FITs are intended to stimulate development of small solar or renewable energy facilities. In July, FERC issued a decision restating that the Federal Power Act and PURPA 210, not state (or local) legislation, govern the price that local utilities may pay under FITs. (author)

Reducing the Size of the Federal Civilian Work Force

DTIC Science & Technology

1993-12-01

the government incurs as it without the early-retirement program . waits for employees to leave. The estimate also includes $5,400 for retraining and...federal program , as may any concerted effort to reduce employment jy plac- employees of any age who have at least 25 years of ing a freeze on hiring...severance pay they could receive. A key assumption in estimating the costs of a The primary purpose of incentives is to help to program that offers employees

Do financial incentives trump clinical guidance? Hip Replacement in England and Scotland.

PubMed

Papanicolas, Irene; McGuire, Alistair

2015-12-01

Following devolution in 1999 England and Scotland's National Health Services diverged, resulting in major differences in hospital payment. England introduced a case payment mechanism from 2003/4, while Scotland continued to pay through global budgets. We investigate the impact this change had on activity for Hip Replacement. We examine the financial reimbursement attached to uncemented Hip Replacement in England, which has been more generous than for its cemented counterpart, although clinical guidance from the National Institute for Clinical Excellence recommends the later. In Scotland this financial differential does not exist. We use a difference-in-difference estimator, using Scotland as a control, to test whether the change in reimbursement across the two countries had an influence on treatment. Our results indicate that financial incentives are directly linked to the faster uptake of the more expensive, uncemented Hip Replacement in England, which ran against the clinical guidance. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

The Moderating Effect of Job Satisfaction on Physicians' Motivation to Adhere to Financially Incentivized Clinical Practice Guidelines.

PubMed

Waddimba, Anthony C; Beckman, Howard B; Mahoney, Thomas L; Burgess, James F

2017-04-01

We examined moderating effects of professional satisfaction on physicians' motivation to adhere to diabetes guidelines associated with pay-for-performance incentives. We merged cross-sectional survey data on attitudes, from 156 primary physicians, with prospective medical record-sourced data on guideline adherence and census data on ambulatory-care population characteristics. We examined moderating effects by testing theory-driven models for satisfied versus discontented physicians, using partial least squares structural equation modeling. Results show that attitudes motivated, while norms suppressed, adherence to guidelines among discontented physicians. Separate models for satisfied versus discontented physicians revealed motivational differences. Satisfied physicians disregarded intrinsic and extrinsic influences and biases. Discontented physicians, alienated by social pressure, favored personal inclinations. To improve adherence to guidelines among discontented physicians, incentives should align with personal attitudes and incorporate promotional campaigns countering resentment of peer and organizational pressure.

Unconscious affective reactions to masked happy versus angry faces influence consumption behavior and judgments of value.

PubMed

Winkielman, Piotr; Berridge, Kent C; Wilbarger, Julia L

2005-01-01

The authors explored three properties of basic, unconsciously triggered affective reactions: They can influence consequential behavior, they work without eliciting conscious feelings, and they interact with motivation. The authors investigated these properties by testing the influence of subliminally presented happy versus angry faces on pouring and consumption of beverage (Study 1), perception of beverage value (Study 2), and reports of conscious feelings (both studies). Consistent with incentive motivation theory, the impact of affective primes on beverage value and consumption was strongest for thirsty participants. Subliminal smiles caused thirsty participants to pour and consume more beverage (Study 1) and increased their willingness to pay and their wanting more beverage (Study 2). Subliminal frowns had the opposite effect. No feeling changes were observed, even in thirsty participants. The results suggest that basic affective reactions can be unconscious and interact with incentive motivation to influence assessment of value and behavior toward valenced objects.

48 CFR 731.774 - Overseas recruitment incentive.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 5 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Overseas recruitment incentive. 731.774 Section 731.774 Federal Acquisition Regulations System AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL... Organizations 731.774 Overseas recruitment incentive. USAID's policies regarding overseas recruitment incentives...

Incentive schemes in development of socio-economic systems

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Grachev, V. V.; Ivushkin, K. A.; Myshlyaev, L. P.

2018-05-01

The paper is devoted to the study of incentive schemes when developing socio-economic systems. The article analyzes the existing incentive schemes. It is established that the traditional incentive mechanisms do not fully take into account the specifics of the creation of each socio-economic system and, as a rule, are difficult to implement. The incentive schemes based on the full-scale simulation approach, which allow the most complete information from the existing projects of creation of socio-economic systems to be extracted, are proposed. The statement of the problem is given, the method and algorithm of the full-scale simulation study of the efficiency of incentive functions is developed. The results of the study are presented. It is shown that the use of quadratic and piecewise linear functions of incentive allows the time and costs for creating social and economic systems to be reduced by 10%-15%.

The political economy of healthcare reform in China: negotiating public and private.

PubMed

Daemmrich, Arthur

2013-01-01

China's healthcare system is experiencing significant growth from expanded government-backed insurance, greater public-sector spending on hospitals, and the introduction of private insurance and for-profit clinics. An incremental reform process has sought to develop market incentives for medical innovation and liberalize physician compensation and hospital finance while continuing to keep basic care affordable to a large population that pays for many components of care out-of-pocket. Additional changes presently under consideration by policymakers are likely to further restructure insurance and the delivery of care and will alter competitive dynamics in major healthcare industries, notably pharmaceuticals, medical devices, and diagnostic testing. This article describes the institutional history of China's healthcare system and identifies dilemmas emerging as the country negotiates divisions between public and private in healthcare. Building on this analysis, the article considers opportunities for public-private partnerships and greater systems integration to reconcile otherwise incommensurable approaches to rewarding innovation and improving access. The article concludes with observations on the public function of health insurance and its significance to further development of China's healthcare system.

Increased Health Information Technology Adoption and Use Among Small Primary Care Physician Practices Over Time: A National Cohort Study.

PubMed

Rittenhouse, Diane R; Ramsay, Patricia P; Casalino, Lawrence P; McClellan, Sean; Kandel, Zosha K; Shortell, Stephen M

2017-01-01

Implementation and meaningful use of health information technology (HIT) has been shown to facilitate delivery system transformation, yet implementation is far from universal. This study examined correlates of greater HIT implementation over time among a national cohort of small primary care practices in the United States. We used data from a 40-minute telephone panel survey of 566 small primary care practices having 8 or fewer physicians to investigate adoption and use of HIT in 2007-2010 and 2012-2013. We used generalized estimating equations (GEE) to estimate the association of practice characteristics and external incentives with the adoption and use of HIT. We studied 18 measures of HIT functionalities, including record keeping, clinical decision support, patient communication, and health information exchange with hospitals and pharmacies. Overall, use of 16 HIT functionalities increased significantly over time, whereas use of 2 decreased significantly. On average, compared with physician-owned practices, hospital-owned practices used 1.48 (95% CI, 1.07-1.88; P <.001) more HIT processes. And relative to smaller practices, practices with 3 to 8 physicians used 2.49 (95% CI, 2.26-2.72; P <.001) more HIT processes. Participation in pay-for-performance programs, participation in public reporting of clinical quality data, and a larger proportion of revenue from Medicare were also associated with greater adoption and use of HIT. The new Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act (MACRA) will provide payment incentives and technical support to speed HIT adoption and use by small practices. We found that external incentives were, indeed, positively associated with greater adoption and use of HIT. Our findings also support a strategy of targeting assistance to smaller physician practices and those that are physician owned. © 2017 Annals of Family Medicine, Inc.

A perverse quality incentive in surgery: implications of reimbursing surgeons less for doing laparoscopic surgery.

PubMed

Fader, Amanda N; Xu, Tim; Dunkin, Brian J; Makary, Martin A

2016-11-01

Surgery is one of the highest priced services in health care, and complications from surgery can be serious and costly. Recently, advances in surgical techniques have allowed surgeons to perform many common operations using minimally invasive methods that result in fewer complications. Despite this, the rates of open surgery remain high across multiple surgical disciplines. This is an expert commentary and review of the contemporary literature regarding minimally invasive surgery practices nationwide, the benefits of less invasive approaches, and how minimally invasive compared with open procedures are differentially reimbursed in the United States. We explore the incentive of the current surgeon reimbursement fee schedule and its potential implications. A surgeon's preference to perform minimally invasive compared with open surgery remains highly variable in the U.S., even after adjustment for patient comorbidities and surgical complexity. Nationwide administrative claims data across several surgical disciplines demonstrates that minimally invasive surgery utilization in place of open surgery is associated with reduced adverse events and cost savings. Reducing surgical complications by increasing adoption of minimally invasive operations has significant cost implications for health care. However, current U.S. payment structures may perversely incentivize open surgery and financially reward physicians who do not necessarily embrace newer or best minimally invasive surgery practices. Utilization of minimally invasive surgery varies considerably in the U.S., representing one of the greatest disparities in health care. Existing physician payment models must translate the growing body of research in surgical care into physician-level rewards for quality, including choice of operation. Promoting safe surgery should be an important component of a strong, value-based healthcare system. Resolving the potentially perverse incentives in paying for surgical approaches may help address disparities in surgical care, reduce the prevalent problem of variation, and help contain health care costs.

The Effects of Pay-for-Performance Programs on Health, Health Care Use, and Processes of Care: A Systematic Review.

PubMed

Mendelson, Aaron; Kondo, Karli; Damberg, Cheryl; Low, Allison; Motúapuaka, Makalapua; Freeman, Michele; O'Neil, Maya; Relevo, Rose; Kansagara, Devan

2017-03-07

The benefits of pay-for-performance (P4P) programs are uncertain. To update and expand a prior review examining the effects of P4P programs targeted at the physician, group, managerial, or institutional level on process-of-care and patient outcomes in ambulatory and inpatient settings. PubMed from June 2007 to October 2016; MEDLINE, PsycINFO, CINAHL, Business Economics and Theory, Business Source Elite, Scopus, Faculty of 1000, and Gartner Research from June 2007 to February 2016. Trials and observational studies in ambulatory and inpatient settings reporting process-of-care, health, or utilization outcomes. Two investigators extracted data, assessed study quality, and graded the strength of the evidence. Among 69 studies, 58 were in ambulatory settings, 52 reported process-of-care outcomes, and 38 reported patient outcomes. Low-strength evidence suggested that P4P programs in ambulatory settings may improve process-of-care outcomes over the short term (2 to 3 years), whereas data on longer-term effects were limited. Many of the positive studies were conducted in the United Kingdom, where incentives were larger than in the United States. The largest improvements were seen in areas where baseline performance was poor. There was no consistent effect of P4P on intermediate health outcomes (low-strength evidence) and insufficient evidence to characterize any effect on patient health outcomes. In the hospital setting, there was low-strength evidence that P4P had little or no effect on patient health outcomes and a positive effect on reducing hospital readmissions. Few methodologically rigorous studies; heterogeneous population and program characteristics and incentive targets. Pay-for-performance programs may be associated with improved processes of care in ambulatory settings, but consistently positive associations with improved health outcomes have not been demonstrated in any setting. U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs.

Association of practice size and pay-for-performance incentives with the quality of diabetes management in primary care.

PubMed

Vamos, Eszter P; Pape, Utz J; Bottle, Alex; Hamilton, Fiona Louise; Curcin, Vasa; Ng, Anthea; Molokhia, Mariam; Car, Josip; Majeed, Azeem; Millett, Christopher

2011-09-06

Not enough is known about the association between practice size and clinical outcomes in primary care. We examined this association between 1997 and 2005, in addition to the impact of the Quality and Outcomes Framework, a pay-for-performance incentive scheme introduced in the United Kingdom in 2004, on diabetes management. We conducted a retrospective open-cohort study using data from the General Practice Research Database. We enrolled 422 general practices providing care for 154,945 patients with diabetes. Our primary outcome measures were the achievement of national treatment targets for blood pressure, glycated hemoglobin (HbA(1c)) levels and total cholesterol. We saw improvements in the recording of process of care measures, prescribing and achieving intermediate outcomes in all practice sizes during the study period. We saw improvement in reaching national targets after the introduction of the Quality and Outcomes Framework. These improvements significantly exceeded the underlying trends in all practice sizes for achieving targets for cholesterol level and blood pressure, but not for HbA(1c) level. In 1997 and 2005, there were no significant differences between the smallest and largest practices in achieving targets for blood pressure (1997 odds ratio [OR] 0.98, 95% confidence interval [CI] 0.82 to 1.16; 2005 OR 0.92, 95% CI 0.80 to 1.06 in 2005), cholesterol level (1997 OR 0.94, 95% CI 0.76 to 1.16; 2005 OR 1.1, 95% CI 0.97 to 1.40) and glycated hemoglobin level (1997 OR 0.79, 95% CI 0.55 to 1.14; 2005 OR 1.05, 95% CI 0.93 to 1.19). We found no evidence that size of practice is associated with the quality of diabetes management in primary care. Pay-for-performance programs appear to benefit both large and small practices to a similar extent.

Accountable care around the world: a framework to guide reform strategies.

PubMed

McClellan, Mark; Kent, James; Beales, Stephen J; Cohen, Samuel I A; Macdonnell, Michael; Thoumi, Andrea; Abdulmalik, Mariam; Darzi, Ara

2014-09-01

Accountable care--a way to align health care payments with patient-focused reform goals--is currently being pursued in the United States, but its principles are also being applied in many other countries. In this article we review experiences with such reforms to offer a globally applicable definition of an accountable care system and propose a conceptual framework for characterizing and assessing accountable care reforms. The framework consists of five components: population, outcomes, metrics and learning, payments and incentives, and coordinated delivery. We describe how the framework applies to accountable care reforms that are already being implemented in Spain and Singapore. We also describe how it can be used to map progress through increasingly sophisticated levels of reforms. We recommend that policy makers pursuing accountable care reforms emphasize the following steps: highlight population health and wellness instead of just treating illness; pay for outcomes instead of activities; create a more favorable environment for collaboration and coordinated care; and promote interoperable data systems. Project HOPE—The People-to-People Health Foundation, Inc.

[Financial incentives for quality improvement].

PubMed

Belicza, Eva; Evetovits, Tamás

2010-05-01

Policy makers and payers of health care services devote increasing attention to improve quality of services by incentivising health care providers. These--so called--pay for performance (P4P) programmes have so far been introduced in few countries only and evidence on their effectiveness is still scarce. Therefore we do not know yet which instruments of these programmes are most effective and efficient in improving quality. The P4P systems implemented so far in primary care and in integrated delivery systems use indicators for measurement of performance and the basis for rewards. These indicators are mostly process indicators, but there are some outcome indicators as well. The desired quality improvement effects are most likely to be achieved with programmes that provide seizable financial rewards and cover the extra cost of quality improvement efforts as well. Administration of the programme has to be fully transparent and clear to all involved. It has to be based on scientific evidence and supported with sufficient dedicated funding. Conducting pilot studies is a precondition for large scale implementation.

Health and life insurance as an alternative to malpractice tort law

PubMed Central

2010-01-01

Background Tort law has legitimate social purposes of deterrence, punishment and compensation, but medical tort law does none of these well. Tort law could be counterproductive in medicine, encouraging costly defensive practices that harm some patients, restricting access to care in some settings and discouraging innovation. Discussion Patients might be better served by purchasing combined health and life insurance policies and waiving their right to pursue malpractice claims. The combined policy should encourage the insurer to profit by inexpensively delaying policyholders' deaths. A health and life insurer would attempt to minimize mortal risks to policyholders from any cause, including medical mistakes and could therefore pursue systematic quality improvement efforts. If policyholders trust the insurer to seek, develop and reward genuinely effective care; identify, deter and remediate poor care; and compensate survivors through the no-fault process of paying life insurance benefits, then tort law is largely redundant and the right to sue may be waived. If expensive defensive medicine can be avoided, that savings alone could pay for fairly large life insurance policies. Summary Insurers are maligned largely because of their logical response to incentives that are misaligned with the interests of patients and physicians in the United States. Patient, provider and insurer incentives could be realigned by combining health and life insurance, allowing the insurer to use its considerable information access and analytic power to improve patient care. This arrangement would address the social goals of malpractice torts, so that policyholders could rationally waive their right to sue. PMID:20525190

Health and life insurance as an alternative to malpractice tort law.

PubMed

Sumner, Walton

2010-06-02

Tort law has legitimate social purposes of deterrence, punishment and compensation, but medical tort law does none of these well. Tort law could be counterproductive in medicine, encouraging costly defensive practices that harm some patients, restricting access to care in some settings and discouraging innovation. Patients might be better served by purchasing combined health and life insurance policies and waiving their right to pursue malpractice claims. The combined policy should encourage the insurer to profit by inexpensively delaying policyholders' deaths. A health and life insurer would attempt to minimize mortal risks to policyholders from any cause, including medical mistakes and could therefore pursue systematic quality improvement efforts. If policyholders trust the insurer to seek, develop and reward genuinely effective care; identify, deter and remediate poor care; and compensate survivors through the no-fault process of paying life insurance benefits, then tort law is largely redundant and the right to sue may be waived. If expensive defensive medicine can be avoided, that savings alone could pay for fairly large life insurance policies. Insurers are maligned largely because of their logical response to incentives that are misaligned with the interests of patients and physicians in the United States. Patient, provider and insurer incentives could be realigned by combining health and life insurance, allowing the insurer to use its considerable information access and analytic power to improve patient care. This arrangement would address the social goals of malpractice torts, so that policyholders could rationally waive their right to sue.

Social Security, retirement incentives, and retirement behavior: an international perspective.

PubMed

Gruber, J; Wise, D

1999-05-01

Escalating rates of early retirement are imposing fiscal pressure on retirement systems around the world. In some developed countries, the labor-force participation rates of men ages 60-64 have fallen by 75 percent over the last three decades. One explanation for this striking decline is social security program provisions which create disincentives to continued labor-force participation by older workers. There are substantial differences among developed nations in the labor-force participation of older workers. While two-thirds of 60-year-old American males are working, only one-quarter of men that age are working in Belgium. Over the entire 55-65 age range, 63 percent of American males are working, compared with only 40 percent of French males and 33 percent of Belgians males. There is strong evidence that the early retirement provisions of social security systems in developed countries determine the modal age of retirement. There is a strong relationship between early retirement ages and labor-force withdrawal rates; for example, in France, 60 percent of those working at the early entitlement age of 60 leave the labor force at that age. The core of this analysis is the construction of "implicit tax/subsidy rates" on additional work at older ages through each nation's social security system. These rates measure the change in a worker's retirement wealth entitlement from delaying retirement for one year, relative to the amount that would have been earned over that year. The U.S. Social Security system has an actuarial adjustment for delayed benefits claiming and other features that avoid financial incentives to leave the labor force at age 62 for a married worker, there is a slight disincentive to work for single workers and high wage earners. However, at ages 65 and older there is a stronger incentive to leave the labor force, with implicit tax rates on work of 19 percent for married workers and 33 percent for single workers. By comparison, other nations do not have actuarially fair adjustments, and as a result impose substantial taxes on additional work at older ages. In several countries, implicit tax rates on work at older ages approach or exceed 100 percent. This is because by delaying retirement, workers forgo benefits which often replace close to their full wage, in addition to having to pay the high payroll taxes required to finance generous social security benefits. There is a striking correlation across nations between high implicit tax rates on additional work and low labor-force participation rates among older workers. This suggests that social security program incentives are an important determinant of retirement. These findings have important policy implications for reforming social security programs in the United States and abroad. Policymakers must consider how program reforms will affect incentives for continued work at older ages.

Ethnic disparities in coronary heart disease management and pay for performance in the UK.

PubMed

Millett, Christopher; Gray, Jeremy; Wall, Martin; Majeed, Azeem

2009-01-01

Few pay for performance schemes have been subject to rigorous evaluation, and their impact on disparities in chronic disease management is uncertain. To examine disparities in coronary heart disease management and intermediate clinical outcomes within a multiethnic population before and after the introduction of a major pay for performance initiative in April 2004. Comparison of two cross-sectional surveys using electronic general practice records. Thirty-two family practices in south London, United Kingdom (UK). Two thousand eight hundred and ninety-one individuals with coronary heart disease registered with participating practices in 2003 and 3,101 in 2005. Percentage achievement by ethnic group of quality indicators in the management of coronary heart disease The proportion of patients reaching national treatment targets increased significantly for blood pressure (51.2% to 58.9%) and total cholesterol (65.7% to 73.8%) after the implementation of a major pay for performance initiative in April 2004. Improvements in blood pressure control were greater in the black group compared to whites, with disparities evident at baseline being attenuated (black 54.8% vs. white 58.3% reaching target in 2005). Lower recording of blood pressure in the south Asian group evident in 2003 was attenuated in 2005. Statin prescribing remained significantly lower (p < 0.001) in the black group compared with the south Asian and white groups after the implementation of pay for performance (black 74.8%, south Asian 83.8%, white 80.2% in 2005). The introduction of pay for performance incentives in UK primary care has been associated with better and more equitable management of coronary heart disease across ethnic groups.

Impact of 'stretch' targets for cardiovascular disease management within a local pay-for-performance programme.

PubMed

Pape, Utz J; Huckvale, Kit; Car, Josip; Majeed, Azeem; Millett, Christopher

2015-01-01

Pay-for-performance programs are often aimed to improve the management of chronic diseases. We evaluate the impact of a local pay for performance programme (QOF+), which rewarded financially more ambitious quality targets ('stretch targets') than those used nationally in the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF). We focus on targets for intermediate outcomes in patients with cardiovascular disease and diabetes. A difference-in-difference approach is used to compare practice level achievements before and after the introduction of the local pay for performance program. In addition, we analysed patient-level data on exception reporting and intermediate outcomes utilizing an interrupted time series analysis. The local pay for performance program led to significantly higher target achievements (hypertension: p-value <0.001, coronary heart disease: p-values <0.001, diabetes: p-values <0.061, stroke: p-values <0.003). However, the increase was driven by higher rates of exception reporting (hypertension: p-value <0.001, coronary heart disease: p-values <0.03, diabetes: p-values <0.05) in patients with all conditions except for stroke. Exception reporting allows practitioners to exclude patients from target calculations if certain criteria are met, e.g. informed dissent of the patient for treatment. There were no statistically significant improvements in mean blood pressure, cholesterol or HbA1c levels. Thus, achievement of higher payment thresholds in the local pay for performance scheme was mainly attributed to increased exception reporting by practices with no discernable improvements in overall clinical quality. Hence, active monitoring of exception reporting should be considered when setting more ambitious quality targets. More generally, the study suggests a trade-off between additional incentive for better care and monitoring costs.

A family planning program that pays for itself.

PubMed

1987-07-01

In Japan, the condom is the method of choice of 82% of all contraceptive users. The Japan Family Planning Association covers about 3% of the total condom market through a well-organized social marketing scheme. Mobile guidance teams, equipped with a vehicle, supply contraceptives to health centers, independent midwives, and maternity hospitals in 17 prefectures and collect payment for condoms distributed after their previous visit. As an incentive, organizations and health institutions receive a commission for the condoms they supply. Japan's largest condom manufacturer provides supplies to the Family Planning Association at a very low price. The contraceptive social marketing program pays for its own promotion, and the Family Planning Association is able to support its other activities from the income it earns. The program was designed to complement rather than compete with commercial marketing channels such as pharmacies, which supply 60% of the 660 million condoms purchased in Japan each year.

CEO Compensation and Hospital Financial Performance

PubMed Central

Reiter, Kristin L.; Sandoval, Guillermo A.; Brown, Adalsteinn D.; Pink, George H.

2010-01-01

Growing interest in pay-for-performance and the level of CEO pay raises questions about the link between performance and compensation in the health sector. This study compares the compensation of non-profit hospital Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) in Ontario, Canada to the three longest reported and most used measures of hospital financial performance. Our sample consisted of 132 CEOs from 92 hospitals between 1999 and 2006. Unbalanced panel data were analyzed using fixed effects regression. Results suggest that CEO compensation was largely unrelated to hospital financial performance. Inflation-adjusted salaries appeared to increase over time independent of hospital performance, and hospital size was positively correlated with CEO compensation. The apparent upward trend in salary despite some declines in financial performance challenges the fundamental assumption underlying this paper, that is, financial performance is likely linked to CEO compensation in Ontario. Further research is needed to understand long-term performance related to compensation incentives. PMID:19605619

CEO compensation and hospital financial performance.

PubMed

Reiter, Kristin L; Sandoval, Guillermo A; Brown, Adalsteinn D; Pink, George H

2009-12-01

Growing interest in pay-for-performance and the level of chief executive officers' (CEOs') pay raises questions about the link between performance and compensation in the health sector. This study compares the compensation of nonprofit hospital CEOs in Ontario, Canada to the three longest reported and most used measures of hospital financial performance. Our sample consisted of 132 CEOs from 92 hospitals between 1999 and 2006. Unbalanced panel data were analyzed using fixed effects regression. Results suggest that CEO compensation was largely unrelated to hospital financial performance. Inflation-adjusted salaries appeared to increase over time independent of hospital performance, and hospital size was positively correlated with CEO compensation. The apparent upward trend in salary despite some declines in financial performance challenges the fundamental assumption underlying this article, that is, financial performance is likely linked to CEO compensation in Ontario. Further research is needed to understand long-term performance related to compensation incentives.

Are financial incentives cost-effective to support smoking cessation during pregnancy?

PubMed

Boyd, Kathleen A; Briggs, Andrew H; Bauld, Linda; Sinclair, Lesley; Tappin, David

2016-02-01

To investigate the cost-effectiveness of up to £400 worth of financial incentives for smoking cessation in pregnancy as an adjunct to routine health care. Cost-effectiveness analysis based on a Phase II randomized controlled trial (RCT) and a cost-utility analysis using a life-time Markov model. The RCT was undertaken in Glasgow, Scotland. The economic analysis was undertaken from the UK National Health Service (NHS) perspective. A total of 612 pregnant women randomized to receive usual cessation support plus or minus financial incentives of up to £400 vouchers (US $609), contingent upon smoking cessation. Comparison of usual support and incentive interventions in terms of cotinine-validated quitters, quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) and direct costs to the NHS. The incremental cost per quitter at 34-38 weeks pregnant was £1127 ($1716).This is similar to the standard look-up value derived from Stapleton & West's published ICER tables, £1390 per quitter, by looking up the Cessation in Pregnancy Incentives Trial (CIPT) incremental cost (£157) and incremental 6-month quit outcome (0.14). The life-time model resulted in an incremental cost of £17 [95% confidence interval (CI) = -£93, £107] and a gain of 0.04 QALYs (95% CI = -0.058, 0.145), giving an ICER of £482/QALY ($734/QALY). Probabilistic sensitivity analysis indicates uncertainty in these results, particularly regarding relapse after birth. The expected value of perfect information was £30 million (at a willingness to pay of £30 000/QALY), so given current uncertainty, additional research is potentially worthwhile. Financial incentives for smoking cessation in pregnancy are highly cost-effective, with an incremental cost per quality-adjusted life years of £482, which is well below recommended decision thresholds. © 2015 Society for the Study of Addiction.

5 CFR 9901.372 - Conversion or movement out of NSPS pay system.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

....372 Conversion or movement out of NSPS pay system. (a) General. (1) This section applies to the conversion or movement of employees out of the NSPS pay system to a different pay system. Under this section... system. When converting or moving an employee out of NSPS to another pay system, the pay-setting rules of...

Incentives for Organ Donation: Proposed Standards for an Internationally Acceptable System

PubMed Central

2012-01-01

Incentives for organ donation, currently prohibited in most countries, may increase donation and save lives. Discussion of incentives has focused on two areas: (1) whether or not there are ethical principles that justify the current prohibition and (2) whether incentives would do more good than harm. We herein address the second concern and propose for discussion standards and guidelines for an acceptable system of incentives for donation. We believe that if systems based on these guidelines were developed, harms would be no greater than those to today’s conventional donors. Ultimately, until there are trials of incentives, the question of benefits and harms cannot be satisfactorily answered. PMID:22176925

Impact of the HITECH Act on physicians' adoption of electronic health records.

PubMed

Mennemeyer, Stephen T; Menachemi, Nir; Rahurkar, Saurabh; Ford, Eric W

2016-03-01

The Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act has distributed billions of dollars to physicians as incentives for adopting certified electronic health records (EHRs) through the meaningful use (MU) program ultimately aimed at improving healthcare outcomes. The authors examine the extent to which the MU program impacted the EHR adoption curve that existed prior to the Act. Bass and Gamma Shifted Gompertz (G/SG) diffusion models of the adoption of "Any" and "Basic" EHR systems in physicians' offices using consistent data series covering 2001-2013 and 2006-2013, respectively, are estimated to determine if adoption was stimulated during either a PrePay (2009-2010) period of subsidy anticipation or a PostPay (2011-2013) period when payments were actually made. Adoption of Any EHR system may have increased by as much as 7 percentage points above the level predicted in the absence of the MU subsidies. This estimate, however, lacks statistical significance and becomes smaller or negative under alternative model specifications. No substantial effects are found for Basic systems. The models suggest that adoption was largely driven by "imitation" effects (q-coefficient) as physicians mimic their peers' technology use or respond to mandates. Small and often insignificant "innovation" effects (p-coefficient) are found suggesting little enthusiasm by physicians who are leaders in technology adoption. The authors find weak evidence of the impact of the MU program on EHR uptake. This is consistent with reports that many current EHR systems reduce physician productivity, lack data sharing capabilities, and need to incorporate other key interoperability features (e.g., application program interfaces). © The Author 2015. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Medical Informatics Association. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com.

Learning to dislike safe water products: results from a randomized controlled trial of the effects of direct and peer experience on willingness to pay.

PubMed

Luoto, Jill; Mahmud, Minhaj; Albert, Jeff; Luby, Stephen; Najnin, Nusrat; Unicomb, Leanne; Levine, David I

2012-06-05

Low-cost point-of-use (POU) safe water products have the potential to reduce waterborne illness, but adoption by the global poor remains low. We performed an eight-month randomized trial of four low-cost household water treatment products in Dhaka, Bangladesh. Intervention households (n = 600) received repeated educational messages about the importance of drinking safe water along with consecutive two-month free trials with each of four POU products in random order. Households randomly assigned to the control group (n = 200) did not receive free products or repeated educational messages. Households' willingness to pay for these products was quite low on average (as measured by bids in an incentive-compatible real-money auction), although a modest share was willing to pay the actual or expected retail price for low-cost chlorine-based products. Furthermore, contrary to our hypotheses that both one's own personal experience and the influence of one's peers would increase consumers' willingness to pay, direct experience significantly decreased mean bids by 18-55% for three of the four products and had no discernible effect on the fourth. Neighbor experience also did not increase bids. Widespread dissemination of safe water products is unlikely until we better understand the preferences and aspirations of these at-risk populations.

Pharmaceutical policies: effects of financial incentives for prescribers.

PubMed

Rashidian, Arash; Omidvari, Amir-Houshang; Vali, Yasaman; Sturm, Heidrun; Oxman, Andrew D

2015-08-04

The proportion of total healthcare expenditures spent on drugs has continued to grow in countries of all income categories. Policy-makers are under pressure to control pharmaceutical expenditures without adversely affecting quality of care. Financial incentives seeking to influence prescribers' behaviour include budgetary arrangements at primary care and hospital settings (pharmaceutical budget caps or targets), financial rewards for target behaviours or outcomes (pay for performance interventions) and reduced benefit margin for prescribers based on medicine sales and prescriptions (pharmaceutical reimbursement rate reduction policies). This is the first update of the original version of this review. To determine the effects of pharmaceutical policies using financial incentives to influence prescribers' practices on drug use, healthcare utilisation, health outcomes and costs (expenditures). We searched the Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials (CENTRAL) (searched 29/01/2015); MEDLINE, Ovid SP (searched 29/01/2015); EMBASE, Ovid SP (searched 29/01/2015); International Network for Rational Use of Drugs (INRUD) Bibliography (searched 29/01/2015); National Health Service (NHS) Economic Evaluation Database (searched 29/01/2015); EconLit - ProQuest (searched 02/02/2015); and Science Citation Index and Social Sciences Citation Index, Institute for Scientific Information (ISI) Web of Knowledge (citation search for included studies searched 10/02/2015). We screened the reference lists of relevant reports and contacted study authors and organisations to identify additional studies. We included policies that intend to affect prescribing by means of financial incentives for prescribers. Included in this category are pharmaceutical budget caps or targets, pay for performance and drug reimbursement rate reductions and other financial policies, if they were specifically targeted at prescribing or drug utilisation. Policies in this review were defined as laws, rules, regulations and financial and administrative orders made or implemented by payers such as national or local governments, non-government organisations, private or social insurers and insurance-like organisations. One of the following outcomes had to be reported: drug use, healthcare utilisation, health outcomes or costs. The study had to be a randomised or non-randomised trial, an interrupted time series (ITS) analysis, a repeated measures study or a controlled before-after (CBA) study. At least two review authors independently assessed eligibility for inclusion of studies and risks of bias using Cochrane Effective Practice and Organisation of Care (EPOC) criteria and extracted data from the included studies. For CBA studies, we reported relative effects (e.g. adjusted relative change). The review team re-analysed all ITS results. When possible, the review team also re-analysed CBA data as ITS data. Eighteen evaluations (six new studies) of pharmaceutical policies from six high-income countries met our inclusion criteria. Fourteen studies evaluated pharmaceutical budget policies in the UK (nine studies), two in Germany and Ireland and one each in Sweden and Taiwan. Three studies assessed pay for performance policies in the UK (two) and the Netherlands (one). One study from Taiwan assessed a reimbursement rate reduction policy. ITS analyses had some limitations. All CBA studies had serious limitations. No study from low-income or middle-income countries met the inclusion criteria.Pharmaceutical budgets may lead to a modest reduction in drug use (median relative change -2.8%; low-certainty evidence). We are uncertain of the effects of the policy on drug costs or healthcare utilisation, as the certainty of such evidence has been assessed as very low. Effects of this policy on health outcomes were not reported. Effects of pay for performance policies on drug use and health outcomes are uncertain, as the certainty of such evidence has been assessed as very low. Effects of this policy on drug costs and healthcare utilisation have not been measured. Effects of the reimbursement rate reduction policy on drug use and drug costs are uncertain, as the certainty of such evidence has been assessed as very low. No included study assessed the effects of this policy on healthcare utilisation or health outcomes. Administration costs of the policies were not reported in any of the included studies. Although financial incentives are considered an important element in strategies to change prescribing patterns, limited evidence of their effects can be found. Effects of policies, including pay for performance policies, in improving quality of care and health outcomes remain uncertain. Because pharmaceutical policies have uncertain effects, and because they might cause harm as well as benefit, proper evaluation of these policies is needed. Future studies should consider the impact of these policies on health outcomes, drug use and overall healthcare expenditures, as well as on drug expenditures.

A lesson in business: cost-effectiveness analysis of a novel financial incentive intervention for increasing physical activity in the workplace

PubMed Central

2013-01-01

Background Recently both the UK and US governments have advocated the use of financial incentives to encourage healthier lifestyle choices but evidence for the cost-effectiveness of such interventions is lacking. Our aim was to perform a cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) of a quasi-experimental trial, exploring the use of financial incentives to increase employee physical activity levels, from a healthcare and employer’s perspective. Methods Employees used a 'loyalty card’ to objectively monitor their physical activity at work over 12 weeks. The Incentive Group (n=199) collected points and received rewards for minutes of physical activity completed. The No Incentive Group (n=207) self-monitored their physical activity only. Quality of life (QOL) and absenteeism were assessed at baseline and 6 months follow-up. QOL scores were also converted into productivity estimates using a validated algorithm. The additional costs of the Incentive Group were divided by the additional quality adjusted life years (QALYs) or productivity gained to calculate incremental cost effectiveness ratios (ICERs). Cost-effectiveness acceptability curves (CEACs) and population expected value of perfect information (EVPI) was used to characterize and value the uncertainty in our estimates. Results The Incentive Group performed more physical activity over 12 weeks and by 6 months had achieved greater gains in QOL and productivity, although these mean differences were not statistically significant. The ICERs were £2,900/QALY and £2,700 per percentage increase in overall employee productivity. Whilst the confidence intervals surrounding these ICERs were wide, CEACs showed a high chance of the intervention being cost-effective at low willingness-to-pay (WTP) thresholds. Conclusions The Physical Activity Loyalty card (PAL) scheme is potentially cost-effective from both a healthcare and employer’s perspective but further research is warranted to reduce uncertainty in our results. It is based on a sustainable “business model” which should become more cost-effective as it is delivered to more participants and can be adapted to suit other health behaviors and settings. This comes at a time when both UK and US governments are encouraging business involvement in tackling public health challenges. PMID:24112295

A lesson in business: cost-effectiveness analysis of a novel financial incentive intervention for increasing physical activity in the workplace.

PubMed

Dallat, Mary Anne T; Hunter, Ruth F; Tully, Mark A; Cairns, Karen J; Kee, Frank

2013-10-10

Recently both the UK and US governments have advocated the use of financial incentives to encourage healthier lifestyle choices but evidence for the cost-effectiveness of such interventions is lacking. Our aim was to perform a cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) of a quasi-experimental trial, exploring the use of financial incentives to increase employee physical activity levels, from a healthcare and employer's perspective. Employees used a 'loyalty card' to objectively monitor their physical activity at work over 12 weeks. The Incentive Group (n=199) collected points and received rewards for minutes of physical activity completed. The No Incentive Group (n=207) self-monitored their physical activity only. Quality of life (QOL) and absenteeism were assessed at baseline and 6 months follow-up. QOL scores were also converted into productivity estimates using a validated algorithm. The additional costs of the Incentive Group were divided by the additional quality adjusted life years (QALYs) or productivity gained to calculate incremental cost effectiveness ratios (ICERs). Cost-effectiveness acceptability curves (CEACs) and population expected value of perfect information (EVPI) was used to characterize and value the uncertainty in our estimates. The Incentive Group performed more physical activity over 12 weeks and by 6 months had achieved greater gains in QOL and productivity, although these mean differences were not statistically significant. The ICERs were £2,900/QALY and £2,700 per percentage increase in overall employee productivity. Whilst the confidence intervals surrounding these ICERs were wide, CEACs showed a high chance of the intervention being cost-effective at low willingness-to-pay (WTP) thresholds. The Physical Activity Loyalty card (PAL) scheme is potentially cost-effective from both a healthcare and employer's perspective but further research is warranted to reduce uncertainty in our results. It is based on a sustainable "business model" which should become more cost-effective as it is delivered to more participants and can be adapted to suit other health behaviors and settings. This comes at a time when both UK and US governments are encouraging business involvement in tackling public health challenges.

Residential Solar Power and the Physics Teacher

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Carpenter, David

2007-10-01

The roof of my house sports one of the largest residential photovoltaic arrays in Ohio. It produces all of the electricity for my house and family of four. With state and federal incentives, it cost less to install than the price of a new car. It will pay for itself within the warrantee period. A picture of my house with solar panels is the background on my classroom computer. I am the physics teacher at Hayes High School in Delaware, Ohio. I don't need a formal curriculum. Sooner or later my students start asking questions. They even ask the exact same questions that adults do. The inverter for my PV system sends performance data to my computer. I post this on my website, which takes it into my classroom. This sparks conversation on a whole variety of topics, from sun angles to energy, electricity, technology and climate studies.

A mechanism to derive more truthful willingness to accept values for renewable energy systems.

PubMed

Radmehr, Mehrshad; Willis, Ken; Metcalf, Hugh

2018-01-01

This paper examines and compares households' willingness to accept (WTA)/willingness to pay (WTP) ratio for solar power equipment on their premises through both a novel experimental approach and conventional techniques. The experimental approach was administered by using a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak method and cheap talk, with open-ended questions of WTA/WTP. The results were quite striking. The ratio for the incentivised approach was 1.08:1; whereas for the conventional approach it was 3.5:1. The findings suggest that the hypothesis that WTP equals WTA cannot be rejected for the incentivised mechanism, and it appears to control for the individual's strategic behaviour bias as a treatment against over-estimating WTA and under-estimating WTP. The findings also provide some policy implications for Northern Cyprus: the government can set lower financial incentives to increase the solar power installed capacity on the island.

48 CFR 1816.402-2 - Performance incentives.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-10-01

... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 6 2013-10-01 2013-10-01 false Performance incentives. 1816.402-2 Section 1816.402-2 Federal Acquisition Regulations System NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE... Performance incentives. ...

48 CFR 1816.402-2 - Performance incentives.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-10-01

... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 6 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Performance incentives. 1816.402-2 Section 1816.402-2 Federal Acquisition Regulations System NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE... Performance incentives. ...

48 CFR 416.405 - Cost-reimbursement incentive contracts.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 4 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Cost-reimbursement incentive contracts. 416.405 Section 416.405 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEPARTMENT OF...-reimbursement incentive contracts. ...

48 CFR 1816.402-2 - Performance incentives.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 6 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 true Performance incentives. 1816.402-2 Section 1816.402-2 Federal Acquisition Regulations System NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE... Performance incentives. ...

Measuring Success in Health Care Value-Based Purchasing Programs

PubMed Central

Damberg, Cheryl L.; Sorbero, Melony E.; Lovejoy, Susan L.; Martsolf, Grant R.; Raaen, Laura; Mandel, Daniel

2014-01-01

Abstract Value-based purchasing (VBP) refers to a broad set of performance-based payment strategies that link financial incentives to health care providers' performance on a set of defined measures in an effort to achieve better value. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services is advancing the implementation of VBP across an array of health care settings in the Medicare program in response to requirements in the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, and policymakers are grappling with many decisions about how best to design and implement VBP programs so that they are successful in achieving stated goals. This article summarizes the current state of knowledge about VBP based on a review of the published literature, a review of publicly available documentation from VBP programs, and discussions with an expert panel composed of VBP program sponsors, health care providers and health systems, and academic researchers with VBP evaluation expertise. Three types of VBP models were the focus of the review: (1) pay-for-performance programs, (2) accountable care organizations, and (3) bundled payment programs. The authors report on VBP program goals and what constitutes success; the evidence on the impact of these programs; factors that characterize high– and low–performing providers in VBP programs; the measures, incentive structures, and benchmarks used by VBP programs; evidence on spillover effects and unintended consequences; and gaps in the knowledge base. PMID:28083347

U.S. pharmaceutical policy in a global marketplace

PubMed Central

Lakdawalla, Darius; Goldman, Dana P.; Michaud, Pierre-Carl; Sood, Neeraj; Lempert, Robert; Cong, Ze; de Vries, Han; Gutierrez, Italo

2013-01-01

Markets for innovative goods involve significant spillovers in a global economy. When US consumers pay higher prices for drugs, this stimulates innovation that benefits consumers all over the world. Conversely, when large European markets restrict prices and profits, foreign consumers bear some of the long-run cost in the form of less innovation. The result is a free-riding problem at a global level. These incentives are particularly strong for smaller markets, whose policies have relatively little impact on global innovation, but can have relatively large impacts on national pharmaceutical budgets. The result is a system in which the largest countries bear disproportionate burdens for stimulating innovation. Using a microsimulation approach, we estimate the impact of these incentive effects. The model’s baseline estimates demonstrates that the US adoption of European-style price controls would harm consumers in the US and Europe; over a 50-year period, it would cost $8 trillion in the US, and $5 trillion in Europe. Similarly, repealing European price controls would add $10 trillion to the wealth of US society, and $6 trillion to wealth in Europe. Even under the most conservative assumptions, adopting price controls generates at best a small benefit, but risks a large cost. On the other hand, reducing pharmaceutical copayments would increase wealth in both societies, a result which is robust to a wide variety of parameter values. PMID:19088101

Engaging nurses in smoking cessation: Challenges and opportunities in Turkey.

PubMed

Nichter, Mimi; Çarkoğlu, Aslı; Nichter, Mark; Özcan, Şeyda; Uysal, M Atilla

2018-02-01

This paper discusses the training of nurses in smoking cessation as part of routine patient care in Turkey. Formative research was carried out prior to training to identify challenges faced by smokers when trying to quit. Site visits to government hospitals and cessation clinics were conducted to observe health care provider-patient interactions involving behavior change. Four culturally sensitive cessation training workshops for nurses (n = 54) were conducted in Istanbul. Following training, nurses were debriefed on their experiences delivering cessation advice. Challenges to cessation counseling included lack of time and incentives for nurse involvement; lack of skills to deliver information about the harm of smoking and benefits of quitting; the medicalization of cessation through the use of pharmaceuticals; and hospital policy which devalues time spent on cessation activities. The pay-for-performance model currently adopted in hospitals has de-incentivized doctor participation in cessation clinics. Nurses play an important role in smoking cessation in many countries. In Turkey, hospital policy will require change so that cessation counseling can become a routine part of nursing practice, incentives for providing cessation are put in place, and task sharing between nurses and doctors is clarified. Nurses and doctors need to receive training in both the systemic harms of smoking and cessation counseling skills. Opportunities, challenges and lessons learned are highlighted. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Selecting effective incentive structures in health care: A decision framework to support health care purchasers in finding the right incentives to drive performance

PubMed Central

Custers, Thomas; Hurley, Jeremiah; Klazinga, Niek S; Brown, Adalsteinn D

2008-01-01

Background The Ontario health care system is devolving planning and funding authority to community based organizations and moving from steering through rules and regulations to steering on performance. As part of this transformation, the Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care (MOHLTC) are interested in using incentives as a strategy to ensure alignment – that is, health service providers' goals are in accord with the goals of the health system. The objective of the study was to develop a decision framework to assist policymakers in choosing and designing effective incentive systems. Methods The first part of the study was an extensive review of the literature to identify incentives models that are used in the various health care systems and their effectiveness. The second part was the development of policy principles to ensure that the used incentive models are congruent with the values of the Ontario health care system. The principles were developed by reviewing the Ontario policy documents and through discussions with policymakers. The validation of the principles and the suggested incentive models for use in Ontario took place at two meetings. The first meeting was with experts from the research and policy community, the second with senior policymakers from the MOHLTC. Based on the outcome of those two meetings, the researchers built a decision framework for incentives. The framework was send to the participants of both meetings and four additional experts for validation. Results We identified several models that have proven, with a varying degree of evidence, to be effective in changing or enabling a health provider's performance. Overall, the literature suggests that there is no single best approach to create incentives yet and the ability of financial and non-financial incentives to achieve results depends on a number of contextual elements. After assessing the initial set of incentive models on their congruence with the four policy principles we defined nine incentive models to be appropriate for use in Ontario and potentially other health care systems that want to introduce incentives to improve performance. Subsequently, the models were incorporated in the resulting decision framework. Conclusion The design of an incentive must reflect the values and goals of the health care system, be well matched to the performance objectives and reflect a range of contextual factors that can influence the effectiveness of even well-designed incentives. As a consequence, a single policy recommendation around incentives is inappropriate. The decision framework provides health care policymakers and purchasers with a tool to support the selection of an incentive model that is the most appropriate to improve the targeted performance. PMID:18371198

Effects of Individual Physician-Level and Practice-Level Financial Incentives on Hypertension Care: A Cluster Randomized Trial

PubMed Central

Petersen, Laura A.; Simpson, Kate; Pietz, Kenneth; Urech, Tracy H.; Hysong, Sylvia J.; Profit, Jochen; Conrad, Douglas A.; Dudley, R. Adams; Woodard, LeChauncy D.

2014-01-01

Importance Pay for performance is intended to align incentives to promote high quality care, but results have been contradictory. Objective To test the effect of explicit financial incentives to reward guideline-recommended hypertension care. Design, Setting, and Participants Cluster randomized controlled trial of 12 Veterans Affairs hospital-based outpatient clinics with five performance periods and a 12-month washout. We enrolled 83 primary care physicians and 42 non-physician personnel (e.g., nurses, pharmacists) working with physicians to deliver hypertension care. Interventions Clinics randomized to one of four groups: physician-level (individual) incentives; practice-level incentives; individual- plus practice-level incentives (combined); or none. Intervention participants received up to five payments every four months; all participants could access feedback reports. Main outcome measures For each four-month period, the number of hypertensive patients among a random sample who achieved guideline-recommended blood pressure thresholds or received an appropriate response to uncontrolled blood pressure; and/or been prescribed guideline-recommended medications and the number who developed hypotension. Results Mean (standard deviation) total payments over the study were $4,270 ($459), $2,672 ($153), and $1,648 ($248) for the combined, individual, and practice-level interventions, respectively. The adjusted change over the study in patients meeting the combined blood pressure/appropriate response measure was 8.84 percentage points (95% confidence interval [CI], 4.20–11.80) for the individual-level, 3.70 (95% CI, 0.24–7.68) for the practice-level, 5.54 (95% CI, 1.92–9.52) for the combined, and 0.47 (95% CI, −3.12–4.04) for the control groups. For medications, the change was 9.07 (95% CI, 4.52–13.44), 4.98 (95% CI, 0.64–10.08), 7.26 (95% CI, 2.92–12.48), and 4.35 (95% CI, −0.28–9.28) percentage points, respectively. The adjusted estimated difference in the change between the proportion of patients with blood pressure control/appropriate response for individual incentive and control groups was 8.36 percentage points (95% CI, 2.40–13.00; P=.005). Use of guideline-recommended medications did not significantly change compared to controls, nor did the incidence of hypotension. The effect of the incentive was not sustained after a washout. Conclusions and Relevance Individual financial incentives, but not practice-level or combined incentives, resulted in greater blood pressure control or appropriate response to uncontrolled blood pressure; none of the incentives resulted in greater use of guideline-recommended medications or increased incidence of hypotension compared to controls. Further research is needed to understand the factors that contributed to our findings. Trial registration NCT00302718; www.clinicaltrials.gov PMID:24026599

48 CFR 216.405 - Cost-reimbursement incentive contracts.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 3 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Cost-reimbursement incentive contracts. 216.405 Section 216.405 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEFENSE ACQUISITION... Contracts 216.405 Cost-reimbursement incentive contracts. ...

Relationship between organizational factors and performance among pay-for-performance hospitals.

PubMed

Vina, Ernest R; Rhew, David C; Weingarten, Scott R; Weingarten, Jason B; Chang, John T

2009-07-01

The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS)/Premier Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration (HQID) project aims to improve clinical performance through a pay-for-performance program. We conducted this study to identify the key organizational factors associated with higher performance. An investigator-blinded, structured telephone survey of eligible hospitals' (N = 92) quality improvement (QI) leaders was conducted among HQID hospitals in the top 2 or bottom 2 deciles submitting performance measure data from October 2004 to September 2005. The survey covered topics such as QI interventions, data feedback, physician leadership, support for QI efforts, and organizational culture. More top performing hospitals used clinical pathways for the treatment of AMI (49% vs. 15%, p < 0.01), HF (44% vs. 18%, p < 0.01), PN (38% vs. 13%, p < 0.01) and THR/TKR (56% vs. 23%, p < 0.01); organized into multidisciplinary teams to manage patients with AMI (93% vs. 77%, p < 0.05) and HF (93% vs. 69%, p < 0.01); used order sets for the treatment of THR/TKR (91% vs. 64%, p < 0.01); and implemented computerized physician order entry in the hospital (24.4% vs. 7.9%, p < 0.05). Finally, more top performers reported having adequate human resources for QI projects (p < 0.01); support of the nursing staff to increase adherence to quality indicators (p < 0.01); and an organizational culture that supported coordination of care (p < 0.01), pace of change (p < 0.01), willingness to try new projects (p < 0.01), and a focus on identifying system errors rather than blaming individuals (p < 0.05). Organizational structure, support, and culture are associated with high performance among hospitals participating in a pay-for-performance demonstration project. Multiple organizational factors remain important in optimizing clinical care.

48 CFR 16.402-2 - Performance incentives.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-10-01

... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2012-10-01 2012-10-01 false Performance incentives. 16... CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES TYPES OF CONTRACTS Incentive Contracts 16.402-2 Performance incentives. (a) Performance incentives may be considered in connection with specific product characteristics (e.g...

48 CFR 16.402-2 - Performance incentives.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-10-01

... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2014-10-01 2014-10-01 false Performance incentives. 16... CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES TYPES OF CONTRACTS Incentive Contracts 16.402-2 Performance incentives. (a) Performance incentives may be considered in connection with specific product characteristics (e.g...

48 CFR 1852.216-88 - Performance incentive.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-10-01

... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 6 2013-10-01 2013-10-01 false Performance incentive... 1852.216-88 Performance incentive. As prescribed in 1816.406-70(f), insert the following clause: Performance Incentive (JAN 1997) (a) A performance incentive applies to the following hardware item(s...

48 CFR 1852.216-88 - Performance incentive.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-10-01

... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 6 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Performance incentive... 1852.216-88 Performance incentive. As prescribed in 1816.406-70(f), insert the following clause: Performance Incentive (JAN 1997) (a) A performance incentive applies to the following hardware item(s...

48 CFR 16.402-2 - Performance incentives.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-10-01

... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Performance incentives. 16... CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES TYPES OF CONTRACTS Incentive Contracts 16.402-2 Performance incentives. (a) Performance incentives may be considered in connection with specific product characteristics (e.g...

Incentives for methane mitigation and energy-efficiency improvements in the case of Ukraine's natural gas transmission system

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Roshchanka, Volha; Evans, Meredydd

2014-06-01

Reducing methane losses is a concern for climate change policy and energy policy. The energy sector is the major source of anthropogenic methane emissions into the atmosphere in Ukraine. Reducing methane emissions and avoiding combustion can be very cost-effective, but various barriers prevent such energy-efficiency measures from taking place. To date, few examples of industry-wide improvements exist. One example of substantial investments into upgrading natural gas transmission system comes from Ukraine's natural gas transmission company, Ukrtransgaz. The company's investments into system upgrades, along with a 34% fall in throughput, resulted in reduction of Ukrtransgaz system's own consumption of natural gas by 68% in 2011 compared to the level in 2005. Evaluating reductions in methane emissions is challenging because of lack of accurate data and gaps in accounting methodologies. At the same time, Ukraine's transmission system has undergone improvements that, at the very least, have contained methane emissions, if not substantially reduced them. In this paper, we describe recent developments in Ukraine's natural gas transmission system and analyze the incentives that forced the sector to pay close attention to its methane losses. Ukraine is one of the most energy-intensive countries, among the largest natural gas consumers in the world, and a significant emitter of methane. The country is also dependent on imports of natural gas. A combination of several factors has created conditions for successful reductions in methane emissions and combustion. These factors include: an eightfold increase in the price of imported natural gas; comprehensive domestic environmental and energy policies, such as the Laws of Ukraine on Protecting the Natural Environment and on Air Protection; policies aimed at integration with European Union's energy market and accession to the Energy Community Treaty; and the country's participation in international cooperation on environment, such as through the Joint Implementation mechanism and the voluntary Global Methane Initiative. Learning about such case studies can help policymakers and sustainability professionals design better policies elsewhere.

Manager's Guide to the Implementation of Feedback, Goal Setting, and Incentive Systems. Final Report for Period September 1983--January 1987.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Pritchard, Robert D.; And Others

This manual is intended to assist operational managers in using feedback, goal-setting, and incentive systems. The first section presents background information on feedback, goal-setting, and incentive systems and on measuring productivity. It includes formal definitions of each system, examines the logic of why each system works, compares the…

Incentive Pass-through for Residential Solar Systems in California

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Dong, C. G.; Wiser, Ryan; Rai, Varun

2014-10-01

The deployment of solar photovoltaic (PV) systems has grown rapidly over the last decade, partly because of various government incentives. In the United States, among the largest and longest-running incentives have been those established in California. Building on past research, this report addresses the still-unanswered question: to what degree have the direct PV incentives in California been passed through from installers to consumers? This report helps address this question by carefully examining the residential PV market in California (excluding a certain class of third-party-owned PV systems) and applying both a structural-modeling approach and a reduced-form regression analysis to estimate themore » incentive pass-through rate. The results suggest an average pass-through rate of direct incentives of nearly 100%, though with regional differences among California counties. While these results could have multiple explanations, they suggest a relatively competitive market and well-functioning subsidy program. Further analysis is required to determine whether similar results broadly apply to other states, to other customer segments, to all third-party-owned PV systems, or to all forms of financial incentives for solar (considering not only direct state subsidies, but also utility electric bill savings and federal tax incentives).« less

48 CFR 216.403 - Fixed-price incentive contracts.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 3 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Fixed-price incentive contracts. 216.403 Section 216.403 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEFENSE ACQUISITION REGULATIONS... Contracts 216.403 Fixed-price incentive contracts. ...

The Incentive System in Higher Education

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Landfried, Klaus

2004-01-01

In this article, the author discusses the incentive system in German higher education. He states that the underdeveloped incentive and management mechanisms in German higher education result in mistaken allocations in the higher education system in general and in some individual institutions in particular. He believes that the only way to optimize…

48 CFR 1852.216-88 - Performance incentive.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 6 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 true Performance incentive. 1852... 1852.216-88 Performance incentive. As prescribed in 1816.406-70(f), insert the following clause: Performance Incentive (JAN 1997) (a) A performance incentive applies to the following hardware item(s...