48 CFR 1609.7101-1 - Community-rated carrier incentive performance elements.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-10-01
... incentive performance elements. 1609.7101-1 Section 1609.7101-1 Federal Acquisition Regulations System... performance elements. (a) Customer Service. This element is intended to assist OPM in achieving the goal of... and other measures as required contractually between OPM and the carrier. (This element will be...
48 CFR 1609.7101-1 - Community-rated carrier incentive performance elements.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-10-01
... incentive performance elements. 1609.7101-1 Section 1609.7101-1 Federal Acquisition Regulations System... performance elements. (a) Customer Service. This element is intended to assist OPM in achieving the goal of... and other measures as required contractually between OPM and the carrier. (This element will be...
48 CFR 1609.7101-1 - Community-rated carrier incentive performance elements.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-10-01
... incentive performance elements. 1609.7101-1 Section 1609.7101-1 Federal Acquisition Regulations System... performance elements. (a) Customer Service. This element is intended to assist OPM in achieving the goal of... and other measures as required contractually between OPM and the carrier. (This element will be...
48 CFR 2937.602 - Elements of performance-based contracting.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... objectively measurable incentives (e.g., Firm-Fixed-Price, Fixed-Price-Incentive-Fee, or Cost-Plus-Incentive-Fee) is appropriate. However, when contractor performance (e.g., cost control, schedule, or quality/technical) is best evaluated subjectively using qualitative measures, a Cost-Plus-Award-Fee contract may be...
Custers, Thomas; Klazinga, Niek S; Brown, Adalsteinn D
2007-01-01
There is increasing evidence that health care systems can create better value for money by improving performance and setting the right incentives. Worldwide this has led to an emergence of financial and non-financial incentive structures as a strategy to improve performance. The role of incentives is not only to motivate high performance through the alignment of results and rewards (financial/non-financial as well as direct/indirect) but also to enable health care providers to perform better by mitigating financial barriers that typically result from funding schemes. Various incentive structures in health care, identified in the scientific literature, are described in this article and available evidence on effectiveness and side effects is summarized. Literature shows that there is no single best approach to create an incentive yet and that the ability of financial and non-financial incentives to achieve desired results depends on a number of circumstantial elements. Several incentive schemes that can be used by health care insurers or local health authorities are discussed and concrete examples are provided. Decision-making on incentive schemes requires a careful design with the involvement of those targeted by incentives.
Working under a clinic-level quality incentive: primary care clinicians' perceptions.
Greene, Jessica; Kurtzman, Ellen T; Hibbard, Judith H; Overton, Valerie
2015-01-01
A key consideration in designing pay-for-performance programs is determining what entity the incentive should be awarded to-individual clinicians or to groups of clinicians working in teams. Some argue that team-level incentives, in which clinicians who are part of a team receive the same incentive based on the team's performance, are most effective; others argue for the efficacy of clinician-level incentives. This study examines primary care clinicians' perceptions of a team-based quality incentive awarded at the clinic level. This research was conducted with Fairview Health Services, where 40% of the primary care compensation model was based on clinic-level quality performance. We conducted 48 in-depth interviews to explore clinicians' perceptions of the clinic-level incentive, as well as an online survey of 150 clinicians (response rate 56%) to investigate which entity the clinicians would consider optimal to target for quality incentives. Clinicians reported the strengths of the clinic-based quality incentive were quality improvement for the team and less patient "dumping," or shifting patients with poor outcomes to other clinicians. The weaknesses were clinicians' lack of control and colleagues riding the coattails of higher performers. There were mixed reports on the model's impact on team dynamics. Although clinicians reported greater interaction with colleagues, some described an increase in tension. Most clinicians surveyed (73%) believed that there should be a mix of clinic and individual-level incentives to maintain collaboration and recognize individual performance. The study highlights the important advantages and disadvantages of using incentives based upon clinic-level performance. Future research should test whether hybrid incentives that mix group and individual incentives can maintain some of the best elements of each design while mitigating the negative impacts. © 2015 Annals of Family Medicine, Inc.
The Development of an Incentive Pay System for Use at Sue Bennett College.
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
McLendon, Sandra F.
This paper reports on a study designed to assist in the development of an incentive pay system at Kentucky's Sue Bennett College that would be utilized to recognize merit and performance through increases in faculty salaries. Study procedures to determine the system's elements involved a literature search, a solicitation of input from the Faculty…
Analysis of alternative strategies for energy conservation in new buildings
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Fang, J. M.; Tawil, J.
1980-12-01
The policy instruments considered include: greater reliance on market forces; research and development; information, education and demonstration programs; tax incentives and sanctions; mortgage and finance programs; and regulations and standards. The analysis starts with an explanation of the barriers to energy conservation in the residential and commercial sectors. Individual policy instruments are described and evaluated with respect to energy conservation, economic efficiency, equity, political impacts, and implementation and other transitional impacts. Five possible strategies are identified: (1) increased reliance on the market place; (2) energy consumption tax and supply subsidies; (3) Building Energy Performance Standards (BEPS) with no sanctions and no incentives; (4) BEPS with sanctions and incentives (price control); and (5) BEPS with sanctions and incentives (no price controls). A comparative analysis is performed. Elements are proposed for inclusion in a comprehensive strategy for conservation in new buildings.
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Klein, Alyson
2009-01-01
U.S. Secretary of Education Arne Duncan said last week that he envisions a significant new emphasis on federal incentives for high-performing schools, districts, and states in the renewal of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), expected to be taken up by Congress as early as next year. Duncan said the Department of Education is…
Improving the cost effectiveness of financial incentives in managing travel demand management (TDM).
DOT National Transportation Integrated Search
2013-10-01
Providing financial incentives to commuters to use alternative modes is a common element of managing transportation demand. Although these incentives have become common during the past two decades as elements of transportation demand management (TDM)...
Custers, Thomas; Hurley, Jeremiah; Klazinga, Niek S; Brown, Adalsteinn D
2008-01-01
Background The Ontario health care system is devolving planning and funding authority to community based organizations and moving from steering through rules and regulations to steering on performance. As part of this transformation, the Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care (MOHLTC) are interested in using incentives as a strategy to ensure alignment – that is, health service providers' goals are in accord with the goals of the health system. The objective of the study was to develop a decision framework to assist policymakers in choosing and designing effective incentive systems. Methods The first part of the study was an extensive review of the literature to identify incentives models that are used in the various health care systems and their effectiveness. The second part was the development of policy principles to ensure that the used incentive models are congruent with the values of the Ontario health care system. The principles were developed by reviewing the Ontario policy documents and through discussions with policymakers. The validation of the principles and the suggested incentive models for use in Ontario took place at two meetings. The first meeting was with experts from the research and policy community, the second with senior policymakers from the MOHLTC. Based on the outcome of those two meetings, the researchers built a decision framework for incentives. The framework was send to the participants of both meetings and four additional experts for validation. Results We identified several models that have proven, with a varying degree of evidence, to be effective in changing or enabling a health provider's performance. Overall, the literature suggests that there is no single best approach to create incentives yet and the ability of financial and non-financial incentives to achieve results depends on a number of contextual elements. After assessing the initial set of incentive models on their congruence with the four policy principles we defined nine incentive models to be appropriate for use in Ontario and potentially other health care systems that want to introduce incentives to improve performance. Subsequently, the models were incorporated in the resulting decision framework. Conclusion The design of an incentive must reflect the values and goals of the health care system, be well matched to the performance objectives and reflect a range of contextual factors that can influence the effectiveness of even well-designed incentives. As a consequence, a single policy recommendation around incentives is inappropriate. The decision framework provides health care policymakers and purchasers with a tool to support the selection of an incentive model that is the most appropriate to improve the targeted performance. PMID:18371198
Quality Measures for Dialysis: Time for a Balanced Scorecard
2016-01-01
Recent federal legislation establishes a merit-based incentive payment system for physicians, with a scorecard for each professional. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services evaluate quality of care with clinical performance measures and have used these metrics for public reporting and payment to dialysis facilities. Similar metrics may be used for the future merit-based incentive payment system. In nephrology, most clinical performance measures measure processes and intermediate outcomes of care. These metrics were developed from population studies of best practice and do not identify opportunities for individualizing care on the basis of patient characteristics and individual goals of treatment. The In-Center Hemodialysis (ICH) Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems (CAHPS) survey examines patients' perception of care and has entered the arena to evaluate quality of care. A balanced scorecard of quality performance should include three elements: population-based best clinical practice, patient perceptions, and individually crafted patient goals of care. PMID:26316622
Characterization and effectiveness of pay-for-performance in ophthalmology: a systematic review.
Herbst, Tim; Emmert, Martin
2017-06-05
To identify, characterize and compare existing pay-for-performance approaches and their impact on the quality of care and efficiency in ophthalmology. A systematic evidence-based review was conducted. English, French and German written literature published between 2000 and 2015 were searched in the following databases: Medline (via PubMed), NCBI web site, Scopus, Web of Knowledge, Econlit and the Cochrane Library. Empirical as well as descriptive articles were included. Controlled clinical trials, meta-analyses, randomized controlled studies as well as observational studies were included as empirical articles. Systematic characterization of identified pay-for-performance approaches (P4P approaches) was conducted according to the "Model for Implementing and Monitoring Incentives for Quality" (MIMIQ). Methodological quality of empirical articles was assessed according to the Critical Appraisal Skills Programme (CASP) checklists. Overall, 13 relevant articles were included. Eleven articles were descriptive and two articles included empirical analyses. Based on these articles, four different pay-for-performance approaches implemented in the United States were identified. With regard to quality and incentive elements, systematic comparison showed numerous differences between P4P approaches. Empirical studies showed isolated cost or quality effects, while a simultaneous examination of these effects was missing. Research results show that experiences with pay-for-performance approaches in ophthalmology are limited. Identified approaches differ with regard to quality and incentive elements restricting comparability. Two empirical studies are insufficient to draw strong conclusions about the effectiveness and efficiency of these approaches.
Quality Measures for Dialysis: Time for a Balanced Scorecard.
Kliger, Alan S
2016-02-05
Recent federal legislation establishes a merit-based incentive payment system for physicians, with a scorecard for each professional. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services evaluate quality of care with clinical performance measures and have used these metrics for public reporting and payment to dialysis facilities. Similar metrics may be used for the future merit-based incentive payment system. In nephrology, most clinical performance measures measure processes and intermediate outcomes of care. These metrics were developed from population studies of best practice and do not identify opportunities for individualizing care on the basis of patient characteristics and individual goals of treatment. The In-Center Hemodialysis (ICH) Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems (CAHPS) survey examines patients' perception of care and has entered the arena to evaluate quality of care. A balanced scorecard of quality performance should include three elements: population-based best clinical practice, patient perceptions, and individually crafted patient goals of care. Copyright © 2016 by the American Society of Nephrology.
48 CFR 1609.7101-1 - Community-rated carrier incentive performance elements.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-10-01
... “Enrollment Instructions” in the FEHB Supplemental Literature Guidelines in the FEHB contract. The contracting officer will evaluate this item based on the carrier's ability to accept electronic data transmission from the OPM designated electronic enrollment system and issue ID cards timely. (ii) Enrollment...
48 CFR 16.403-2 - Fixed-price incentive (successive targets) contracts.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... (successive targets) contracts. 16.403-2 Section 16.403-2 Federal Acquisition Regulations System FEDERAL... Fixed-price incentive (successive targets) contracts. (a) Description. (1) A fixed-price incentive (successive targets) contract specifies the following elements, all of which are negotiated at the outset: (i...
48 CFR 16.403-2 - Fixed-price incentive (successive targets) contracts.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-10-01
... (successive targets) contracts. 16.403-2 Section 16.403-2 Federal Acquisition Regulations System FEDERAL... Fixed-price incentive (successive targets) contracts. (a) Description. (1) A fixed-price incentive (successive targets) contract specifies the following elements, all of which are negotiated at the outset: (i...
48 CFR 1609.7101-1 - Community-rated carrier incentive performance elements.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
.... In order for information to be available to our customers in time for the annual Open Season... Open Season choices in selecting a health plan. In evaluating this item, the contracting officer will... officer will evaluate this item based on the carrier's ability to accept electronic data transmission from...
Wang, Ping; Lu, Zhengnan; Sun, Jihong
2018-02-08
Background : New energy has become a key trend for global energy industry development. Talent plays a very critical role in the enhancement of new energy enterprise competitiveness. As a key component of talent, managers have been attracting more and more attention. The increase in job performance relies on, to a certain extent, incentive mechanism. Based on the Two-factor Theory, differences in influences and effects of different incentives on management performance have been checked in this paper from an empirical perspective. Methods : This paper selects the middle and low level managers in new energy enterprises as research samples and classifies the managers' performance into task performance, contextual performance and innovation performance. It uses manager performance questionnaires and intrinsic-extrinsic incentive factor questionnaires to investigate and study the effects and then uses Amos software to analyze the inner link between the intrinsic-extrinsic incentives and job performance. Results : Extrinsic incentives affect task performance and innovation performance positively. Intrinsic incentives impose active significant effects on task performance, contextual performance, and innovation performance. The intrinsic incentive plays a more important role than the extrinsic incentive. Conclusions : Both the intrinsic-extrinsic incentives affect manager performance positively and the intrinsic incentive plays a more important role than the extrinsic incentive. Several suggestions to management should be given based on these results.
48 CFR 1852.216-88 - Performance incentive.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 6 2013-10-01 2013-10-01 false Performance incentive... 1852.216-88 Performance incentive. As prescribed in 1816.406-70(f), insert the following clause: Performance Incentive (JAN 1997) (a) A performance incentive applies to the following hardware item(s...
48 CFR 1852.216-88 - Performance incentive.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 6 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Performance incentive... 1852.216-88 Performance incentive. As prescribed in 1816.406-70(f), insert the following clause: Performance Incentive (JAN 1997) (a) A performance incentive applies to the following hardware item(s...
Nursing home administrators' opinions of pay for performance.
Castle, Nicholas G; Engberg, John; Ferguson-Rome, Jamie C; Sonon, Kristen
2014-01-01
The research presented here provides some descriptive information of nursing home pay for performance (P4P) initiatives and an examination of the opinions of nursing home administrators (NHAs) about P4P. Opinions on three common elements of P4P were examined: the incentive format, program format, and quality format. Information came from a mail survey of 2,426 NHAs. Most of the summary scores show that few NHAs gave positive responses to P4P. Very few NHAs believed that P4P would increase their revenues. NHAs were skeptical that P4P systems were for quality improvement and instead believed they were developed for purposes of cost reduction. Relatively few NHAs believed that P4P would improve quality of care. Given that we have limited experience with setting performance goals and incentive formats for NHAs, the findings presented may prove useful in modeling future P4P systems.
Wang, Ping; Lu, Zhengnan; Sun, Jihong
2018-01-01
Background: New energy has become a key trend for global energy industry development. Talent plays a very critical role in the enhancement of new energy enterprise competitiveness. As a key component of talent, managers have been attracting more and more attention. The increase in job performance relies on, to a certain extent, incentive mechanism. Based on the Two-factor Theory, differences in influences and effects of different incentives on management performance have been checked in this paper from an empirical perspective. Methods: This paper selects the middle and low level managers in new energy enterprises as research samples and classifies the managers’ performance into task performance, contextual performance and innovation performance. It uses manager performance questionnaires and intrinsic-extrinsic incentive factor questionnaires to investigate and study the effects and then uses Amos software to analyze the inner link between the intrinsic-extrinsic incentives and job performance. Results: Extrinsic incentives affect task performance and innovation performance positively. Intrinsic incentives impose active significant effects on task performance, contextual performance, and innovation performance. The intrinsic incentive plays a more important role than the extrinsic incentive. Conclusions: Both the intrinsic-extrinsic incentives affect manager performance positively and the intrinsic incentive plays a more important role than the extrinsic incentive. Several suggestions to management should be given based on these results. PMID:29419730
48 CFR 1852.216-88 - Performance incentive.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 6 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 true Performance incentive. 1852... 1852.216-88 Performance incentive. As prescribed in 1816.406-70(f), insert the following clause: Performance Incentive (JAN 1997) (a) A performance incentive applies to the following hardware item(s...
48 CFR 16.402-2 - Performance incentives.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2012-10-01 2012-10-01 false Performance incentives. 16... CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES TYPES OF CONTRACTS Incentive Contracts 16.402-2 Performance incentives. (a) Performance incentives may be considered in connection with specific product characteristics (e.g...
48 CFR 16.402-2 - Performance incentives.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2014-10-01 2014-10-01 false Performance incentives. 16... CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES TYPES OF CONTRACTS Incentive Contracts 16.402-2 Performance incentives. (a) Performance incentives may be considered in connection with specific product characteristics (e.g...
48 CFR 16.402-2 - Performance incentives.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Performance incentives. 16... CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES TYPES OF CONTRACTS Incentive Contracts 16.402-2 Performance incentives. (a) Performance incentives may be considered in connection with specific product characteristics (e.g...
Financial Incentives to Enable Clean Energy Deployment: Policy Overview and Good Practices
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Cox, Sadie
Financial incentives have been widely implemented by governments around the world to support scaled up deployment of renewable energy and energy efficiency technologies and practices. As of 2015, at least 48 countries have adopted financial incentives to support renewable energy and energy efficiency deployment. Broader clean energy strategies and plans provide a crucial foundation for financial incentives that often complement regulatory policies such as renewable energy targets, standards, and other mandates. This policy brief provides a primer on key financial incentive design elements, lessons from different country experiences, and curated support resources for more detailed and country-specific financial incentive designmore » information.« less
Mannion, Russell; Goddard, Maria; Kuhn, Michael; Bate, Angela
2005-01-01
This article examines the incentive effects of delegating operational and financial decision making from central government to local healthcare providers. It addresses the economic consequences of a contemporary policy initiative in the English National Health Service (NHS)-earned autonomy. This policy entails awarding operational autonomy to 'front-line' organisations that are assessed to be meeting national performance targets. In doing so, it introduces new types of incentives into the healthcare system, changes the nature of established agency relationships and represents a novel approach to performance management. Theoretical elements of a principal-agent model are used to examine the impact of decentralization in the context of the results of an empirical study that elicited the perceptions of senior hospital managers regarding the incentive effects of earned autonomy. A multi-method approach was adopted. In order to capture the breadth of policy impact, we conducted a national postal questionnaire survey of all Chief Executives in acute-care hospital Trusts in England (n = 173). To provide added depth and richness to our understanding of the impact and incentive effects of earned autonomy at an organisational level, we interviewed senior managers in a purposeful sample of eight acute-care hospital Trusts. This theoretical framework and our empirical work suggest that some aspects of the earned autonomy as currently implemented in the NHS serve to weaken the potential incentive effect of decentralization. In particular, the nature of the freedoms is such that many senior managers do not view autonomy as a particularly valuable prize. This suggests that incentives associated with the policy will be insufficiently powerful to motivate providers to deliver better performance. We also found that principal commitment may be a problem in the NHS. Some hospital managers reported that they already enjoyed a large degree of autonomy, regardless of their current performance ratings. We also found evidence that the objectives of providers may differ from those of both the central government and local purchasers. There is, therefore, a risk that granting greater autonomy will allow providers to pursue their own objectives which, whilst not self-serving, may still jeopardize the achievement of strategic goals. It is apparent that the design and implementation features of decentralizing policies such as earned autonomy require careful attention if an optimal balance is to be struck between central oversight and local autonomy in the delivery of healthcare.
Brown, Denver M Y; Bray, Steven R
2017-12-01
Physical performance is impaired following cognitive control exertion. Incentives can ameliorate adverse carryover effects of cognitive control exertion but have not been investigated for physical endurance. This study examined the effect of monetary incentives on physical performance and muscle activation following exposure to a mentally fatiguing, cognitive control task. Participants (N = 82) performed two isometric endurance handgrip trials separated by a 12-min cognitive control manipulation using a 2 (high cognitive control [HCC]/low cognitive control [LCC]) × 2 (incentive/no incentive) design. Mental fatigue was significantly higher in the HCC conditions. Performance decreased in the HCC/no incentive condition but was unaffected in the HCC/incentive condition, which did not differ from the low cognitive control conditions. Electromyography data revealed increased muscle activation in the HCC/no incentive condition, which was also attenuated in the HCC/incentive condition. Findings show that incentives counteract the negative effects of HCC on physical endurance and alter central drive to motor units.
Intrinsic motivation and extrinsic incentives jointly predict performance: a 40-year meta-analysis.
Cerasoli, Christopher P; Nicklin, Jessica M; Ford, Michael T
2014-07-01
More than 4 decades of research and 9 meta-analyses have focused on the undermining effect: namely, the debate over whether the provision of extrinsic incentives erodes intrinsic motivation. This review and meta-analysis builds on such previous reviews by focusing on the interrelationship among intrinsic motivation, extrinsic incentives, and performance, with reference to 2 moderators: performance type (quality vs. quantity) and incentive contingency (directly performance-salient vs. indirectly performance-salient), which have not been systematically reviewed to date. Based on random-effects meta-analytic methods, findings from school, work, and physical domains (k = 183, N = 212,468) indicate that intrinsic motivation is a medium to strong predictor of performance (ρ = .21-45). The importance of intrinsic motivation to performance remained in place whether incentives were presented. In addition, incentive salience influenced the predictive validity of intrinsic motivation for performance: In a "crowding out" fashion, intrinsic motivation was less important to performance when incentives were directly tied to performance and was more important when incentives were indirectly tied to performance. Considered simultaneously through meta-analytic regression, intrinsic motivation predicted more unique variance in quality of performance, whereas incentives were a better predictor of quantity of performance. With respect to performance, incentives and intrinsic motivation are not necessarily antagonistic and are best considered simultaneously. Future research should consider using nonperformance criteria (e.g., well-being, job satisfaction) as well as applying the percent-of-maximum-possible (POMP) method in meta-analyses. PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2014 APA, all rights reserved.
Performance-Based Regulation In A High Distributed Energy Resources Future
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Newton Lowry, Mark; Woolf, Tim; Schwartz, Lisa C.
Performance-based regulation (PBR) of utilities has emerged as an important ratemaking option in the last 25 years. It has been implemented in numerous jurisdictions across the United States and is common in many other advanced industrialized countries. PBR’s appeal lies chiefly in its ability to strengthen utility performance incentives relative to traditional cost-of-service regulation (COSR). Some forms of PBR can streamline regulation and provide utilities with greater operating flexibility. Ideally, the benefits of better performance are shared by the utility and its customers. The shortcomings of traditional COSR in providing electric utilities with incentives that are aligned with certain regulatorymore » goals are becoming increasingly clear. In particular, COSR can provide strong incentives to increase electricity sales and utility rate base. Further, some parties express concern that traditional COSR does not provide utilities with appropriate financial incentives to address evolving industry challenges such as changing customer demands for electricity services, increased levels of distributed energy resources (DERs), and growing pressure to mitigate carbon dioxide emissions. In addition, attention to potential new regulatory models to support the “utility of the future” has renewed interest in PBR. This report describes key elements of PBR and explains some of the advantages and disadvantages of various PBR options. We present pertinent issues from the perspectives of utilities and customers. In practice, these different perspectives are not diametrically opposed. Nonetheless, this framework is useful for illustrating how various aspects of PBR may be viewed by those key groups. Regulators have a unique perspective, in that they must balance consumer, utility, and other interests with the goal of achieving a result that is in the overall public interest.« less
Theory and Practice in the Design of Physician Payment Incentives
Robinson, James C.
2001-01-01
Combining the economic literature on principal-agent relationships with examples of marketplace innovations allows analysis of the evolution of methods for paying physicians. Agency theory and the economic principles of performance-based compensation are applied in the context of imperfect information, risk aversion, multiple interrelated tasks, and team production efficiencies. Fee-for-service and capitation are flawed methods of motivating physicians to achieve specific goals. Payment innovations that blend elements of fee-for-service, capitation, and case rates can preserve the advantages and attenuate the disadvantages of each. These innovations include capitation with fee-for-service carve-outs, department budgets with individual fee-for-service or “contact” capitation, and case rates for defined episodes of illness. The context within which payment incentives are embedded, includes such nonprice mechanisms as screening and monitoring and such organizational relationships as employment and ownership. The analysis has implications for health services research and public policy with respect to physician payment incentives. PMID:11439463
Results-Based Financing in Mozambique's Central Medical Store: A Review After 1 Year.
Spisak, Cary; Morgan, Lindsay; Eichler, Rena; Rosen, James; Serumaga, Brian; Wang, Angela
2016-03-01
Public health commodity supply chains are typically weak in low-income countries, partly because they have many disparate yet interdependent functions and components. Approaches to strengthening supply chains in such settings have often fallen short-they address technical weaknesses, but not the incentives that motivate staff to perform better. We reviewed the first year of a results-based financing (RBF) program in Mozambique, which began in January 2013. The program aimed to improve the performance of the central medical store-Central de Medicamentos e Artigos Medicos (CMAM)-by realigning incentives. We completed in-depth interviews and focus group discussions with 33 key informants, including representatives from CMAM and donor agencies, and collected quantitative data on performance measures and use of funds. The RBF agreement linked CMAM performance payments to quarterly results on 5 performance indicators related to supply planning, distribution planning, and warehouse management. RBF is predicated on the theory that a combination of carrot and stick-i.e., shared financial incentives, plus increased accountability for results-will spur changes in behavior. Important design elements: (1) indicators were measured against quarterly targets, and payments were made only for indicators that met those targets; (2) targets were set based on documented performance, at levels that could be reasonably attained, yet pushed for improvement; (3) payment was shared with and dependent on all staff, encouraging teamwork and collaboration; (4) results were validated by verifiable data sources; and (5) CMAM had discretion over how to use the funds. We found that CMAM's performance continually improved over baseline and that CMAM achieved many of its performance targets, for example, timely submission of quarterly supply and distribution planning reports. Warehouse indicators, such as inventory management and order fulfillment, proved more challenging but were nonetheless positive. By linking payments to periodic verified results, and giving CMAM discretion over how to spend the funds, the RBF agreement motivated the workforce; focused attention on results; strengthened data collection; encouraged teamwork and innovation; and ultimately strengthened the central supply chain. Policy makers and program managers can use performance incentives to catalyze and leverage existing investments. To further strengthen the approach, such incentive programs can shift attention from quantity to quality indicators, improve verification processes, and aim to institutionalize the approach. © Mukuria et al.
Results-Based Financing in Mozambique’s Central Medical Store: A Review After 1 Year
Spisak, Cary; Morgan, Lindsay; Eichler, Rena; Rosen, James; Serumaga, Brian; Wang, Angela
2016-01-01
ABSTRACT Background: Public health commodity supply chains are typically weak in low-income countries, partly because they have many disparate yet interdependent functions and components. Approaches to strengthening supply chains in such settings have often fallen short—they address technical weaknesses, but not the incentives that motivate staff to perform better. Methods: We reviewed the first year of a results-based financing (RBF) program in Mozambique, which began in January 2013. The program aimed to improve the performance of the central medical store—Central de Medicamentos e Artigos Medicos (CMAM)—by realigning incentives. We completed in-depth interviews and focus group discussions with 33 key informants, including representatives from CMAM and donor agencies, and collected quantitative data on performance measures and use of funds. Implementation: The RBF agreement linked CMAM performance payments to quarterly results on 5 performance indicators related to supply planning, distribution planning, and warehouse management. RBF is predicated on the theory that a combination of carrot and stick—i.e., shared financial incentives, plus increased accountability for results—will spur changes in behavior. Important design elements: (1) indicators were measured against quarterly targets, and payments were made only for indicators that met those targets; (2) targets were set based on documented performance, at levels that could be reasonably attained, yet pushed for improvement; (3) payment was shared with and dependent on all staff, encouraging teamwork and collaboration; (4) results were validated by verifiable data sources; and (5) CMAM had discretion over how to use the funds. Findings: We found that CMAM’s performance continually improved over baseline and that CMAM achieved many of its performance targets, for example, timely submission of quarterly supply and distribution planning reports. Warehouse indicators, such as inventory management and order fulfillment, proved more challenging but were nonetheless positive. By linking payments to periodic verified results, and giving CMAM discretion over how to spend the funds, the RBF agreement motivated the workforce; focused attention on results; strengthened data collection; encouraged teamwork and innovation; and ultimately strengthened the central supply chain. Conclusion: Policy makers and program managers can use performance incentives to catalyze and leverage existing investments. To further strengthen the approach, such incentive programs can shift attention from quantity to quality indicators, improve verification processes, and aim to institutionalize the approach. PMID:27016552
Sustainability of quality improvement following removal of pay-for-performance incentives.
Benzer, Justin K; Young, Gary J; Burgess, James F; Baker, Errol; Mohr, David C; Charns, Martin P; Kaboli, Peter J
2014-01-01
Although pay-for-performance (P4P) has become a central strategy for improving quality in US healthcare, questions persist about the effectiveness of these programs. A key question is whether quality improvement that occurs as a result of P4P programs is sustainable, particularly if incentives are removed. To investigate sustainability of performance levels following removal of performance-based incentives. Observational cohort study that capitalized on a P4P program within the Veterans Health Administration (VA) that included adoption and subsequent removal of performance-based incentives for selected inpatient quality measures. The study sample comprised 128 acute care VA hospitals where performance was assessed between 2004 and 2010. VA system managers set annual performance goals in consultation with clinical leaders, and report performance scores to medical centers on a quarterly basis. These scores inform performance-based incentives for facilities and their managers. Bonuses are distributed based on the attainment of these performance goals. Seven quality of care measures for acute coronary syndrome, heart failure, and pneumonia linked to performance-based incentives. Significant improvements in performance were observed for six of seven quality of care measures following adoption of performance-based incentives and were maintained up to the removal of the incentive; subsequently, the observed performance levels were sustained. This is a quasi-experimental study without a comparison group; causal conclusions are limited. The maintenance of performance levels after removal of a performance-based incentive has implications for the implementation of Medicare's value-based purchasing initiative and other P4P programs. Additional research is needed to better understand human and system-level factors that mediate sustainability of performance-based incentives.
Chib, Vikram S.; De Martino, Benedetto; Shimojo, Shinsuke; O'Doherty, John P.
2012-01-01
Summary Employers often make payment contingent on performance in order to motivate workers. We used fMRI with a novel incentivized skill task to examine the neural processes underlying behavioral responses to performance-based pay. We found that individuals' performance increased with increasing incentives; however, very high incentive levels led to the paradoxical consequence of worse performance. Between initial incentive presentation and task execution, striatal activity rapidly switched between activation and deactivation in response to increasing incentives. Critically, decrements in performance and striatal deactivations were directly predicted by an independent measure of behavioral loss aversion. These results suggest that incentives associated with successful task performance are initially encoded as a potential gain; however, when actually performing a task, individuals encode the potential loss that would arise from failure. PMID:22578508
Effects of Strategy Training and Incentives on Students' Performance, Confidence, and Calibration
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Gutierrez, Antonio P.; Schraw, Gregory
2015-01-01
This study examined the effect of strategy instruction and incentives on performance, confidence, and calibration accuracy. Individuals (N = 107) in randomly assigned treatment groups received a multicomponent strategy instruction intervention, financial incentives for high performance, or both. The authors predicted that incentives would improve…
Applied economics: The use of monetary incentives to modulate behavior.
Strang, S; Park, S Q; Strombach, T; Kenning, P
2016-01-01
According to standard economic theory higher monetary incentives will lead to higher performance and higher effort independent of task, context, or individual. In many contexts this standard economic advice is implemented. Monetary incentives are, for example, used to enhance performance at workplace or to increase health-related behavior. However, the fundamental positive impact of monetary incentives has been questioned by psychologists as well as behavioral economists during the last decade, arguing that monetary incentives can sometimes even backfire. In this chapter, studies from proponents as well as opponents of monetary incentives will be presented. Specifically, the impact of monetary incentives on performance, prosocial, and health behavior will be discussed. Furthermore, variables determining whether incentives have a positive or negative impact will be identified. © 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
48 CFR 1816.402-2 - Performance incentives.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 6 2013-10-01 2013-10-01 false Performance incentives. 1816.402-2 Section 1816.402-2 Federal Acquisition Regulations System NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE... Performance incentives. ...
48 CFR 1816.402-2 - Performance incentives.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 6 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Performance incentives. 1816.402-2 Section 1816.402-2 Federal Acquisition Regulations System NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE... Performance incentives. ...
48 CFR 1816.402-2 - Performance incentives.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 6 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 true Performance incentives. 1816.402-2 Section 1816.402-2 Federal Acquisition Regulations System NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE... Performance incentives. ...
Teacher Pay for Performance: Experimental Evidence from the Project on Incentives in Teaching
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Springer, Matthew G.; Hamilton, Laura; McCaffrey, Daniel F.; Ballou, Dale; Le, Vi-Nhuan; Pepper, Matthew; Lockwood, J. R.; Stecher, Brian M.
2010-01-01
In an effort to explore the impact of performance incentives in education, the National Center on Performance Incentives (NCPI) partnered with the Metropolitan Nashville Public Schools (MNPS) to conduct the Project on Incentives in Teaching, or POINT. The study examines the effects on student outcomes of paying eligible teachers bonuses of up to…
48 CFR 3416.402-2 - Performance incentives.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 7 2014-10-01 2014-10-01 false Performance incentives. 3416.402-2 Section 3416.402-2 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION...-2 Performance incentives. (b) Award-term contracting may be used for performance-based contracts or...
48 CFR 3416.402-2 - Performance incentives.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 7 2013-10-01 2012-10-01 true Performance incentives. 3416.402-2 Section 3416.402-2 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION...-2 Performance incentives. (b) Award-term contracting may be used for performance-based contracts or...
48 CFR 3416.402-2 - Performance incentives.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 7 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Performance incentives. 3416.402-2 Section 3416.402-2 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION...-2 Performance incentives. (b) Award-term contracting may be used for performance-based contracts or...
48 CFR 3416.402-2 - Performance incentives.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 7 2012-10-01 2012-10-01 false Performance incentives. 3416.402-2 Section 3416.402-2 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION...-2 Performance incentives. (b) Award-term contracting may be used for performance-based contracts or...
The Effects of Incentives on Workplace Performance: A Meta-Analytic Review of Research Studies
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Condly, Steven J.; Clark, Richard E.; Stolovitch, Harold D.
2003-01-01
A meta-analytic review of all adequately designed field and laboratory research on the use of incentives to motivate performance is reported. Of approximately 600 studies, 45 qualified. The overall average effect of all incentive programs in all work settings and on all work tasks was a 22% gain in performance. Team-directed incentives had a…
Personal incentives as determinants of adolescent health behavior: the meaning of behavior.
Spruijt-Metz, D
1995-09-01
It has been suggested that prevailing theories do not fully incorporate the less rational, more emotional elements of adolescent health and risk behavior. To address this limitation, the perceived incentives construct from Tappe's Model of Personal Investment is split into intrinsic and extrinsic incentives, with the intrinsic incentives representing personal meanings of adolescent health and risk behaviors. Intrinsic incentives were operationalized using transcripts from focus group interviews for three behavioral domains: sleeping habits, eating habits at lunch and eating habits after school. The ensuing questionnaire was completed by 416 Dutch secondary school students with a mean age of 14 years. Intrinsic incentives, or the personal meaning with which behavior is imbued, predicted health and risk behaviors well in all three behavioral domains. The implications of these results for further research and for the development of health education programs are discussed.
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Siregar, K.; Siregar, S. F.
2018-02-01
This research is design employee performance assessment by considering work result of employee based on competency. Relevant competencies are identified according to Spencer’s competence of employees that subsequently processed by Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) method. The results of weighting AHP indicate the highest priority order of criteria, there are; concern of customer satisfaction (0.1325), group work (0.1324) and technical expertise (0.0826). The weight of the criteria is used to design the Work Performance Value (WPV) to be used as the basis for calculating the incentive index. The higher incentive index of an employee, the greater amount of incentives was earned. The calculation of incentives is made to four employees of chopsticks production. From employee incentives A, B, C and D, employee D has the highest incentive index and increment of IDR 2,700,675 compared to previous incentive system. The incentive division system based on the Work Performance Values (WPV) of this proposal reflects a real incentive so that the incapacity of incentive can be reduced.
45 CFR 305.31 - Amount of incentive payment.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... PROGRAM PERFORMANCE MEASURES, STANDARDS, FINANCIAL INCENTIVES, AND PENALTIES § 305.31 Amount of incentive... establishment, support order, and current collections performance measures and 75 percent of the State's collections base for the fiscal year for the arrearage collections and cost-effectiveness performance measures...
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
National Center on Performance Incentives, 2008
2008-01-01
In "Value-Added and Other Methods for Measuring School Performance: An Analysis of Performance Measurement Strategies in Teacher Incentive Fund Proposals"--a paper presented at the February 2008 National Center on Performance Incentives research to policy conference--Robert Meyer and Michael Christian examine select performance-pay plans…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Wickramasinghe, Vathsala; Dabere, Sampath
2012-01-01
The objective of the study is to investigate the effect of performance-based financial incentives on work performance. The study hypothesized that the design features of performance-based financial incentive schemes themselves may influence individuals' work performance. For the study, survey methodology was used and 93 technical-level employees…
Toward Incentives for Military Transformation: A Review of Economic Models of Compensation
2005-01-01
This document and trademark( s ) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic...Transformation. A Review of Economic Models of Compensation 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR( S ) 5d. PROJECT...NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME( S ) AND ADDRESS(ES) Rand Corporation,National Defense Research Institute
48 CFR 216.402-2 - Technical performance incentives.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 3 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Technical performance incentives. 216.402-2 Section 216.402-2 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEFENSE ACQUISITION... Contracts 216.402-2 Technical performance incentives. See PGI 216.402-2 for guidance on establishing...
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Johnson, Douglas A.; Dickinson, Alyce M.; Huitema, Bradley E.
2008-01-01
We examined whether objective feedback would enhance performance when individuals were paid monetary incentives. A two-by-two factorial design was used, with 123 college students assigned to incentive pay without feedback, incentive pay with feedback, fixed pay without feedback, or fixed pay with feedback. Participants attended six sessions and…
48 CFR 1816.402-270 - NASA technical performance incentives.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 6 2013-10-01 2013-10-01 false NASA technical performance incentives. 1816.402-270 Section 1816.402-270 Federal Acquisition Regulations System NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND....402-270 NASA technical performance incentives. (a) Pursuant to the guidelines in 1816.402, NASA has...
48 CFR 1816.402-270 - NASA technical performance incentives.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 6 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 true NASA technical performance incentives. 1816.402-270 Section 1816.402-270 Federal Acquisition Regulations System NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND....402-270 NASA technical performance incentives. (a) Pursuant to the guidelines in 1816.402, NASA has...
48 CFR 1816.402-270 - NASA technical performance incentives.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 6 2014-10-01 2014-10-01 false NASA technical performance incentives. 1816.402-270 Section 1816.402-270 Federal Acquisition Regulations System NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND....402-270 NASA technical performance incentives. (a) Pursuant to the guidelines in 1816.402, NASA has...
48 CFR 1816.402-270 - NASA technical performance incentives.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 6 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false NASA technical performance incentives. 1816.402-270 Section 1816.402-270 Federal Acquisition Regulations System NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND....402-270 NASA technical performance incentives. (a) Pursuant to the guidelines in 1816.402, NASA has...
48 CFR 1816.402-270 - NASA technical performance incentives.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 6 2012-10-01 2012-10-01 false NASA technical performance incentives. 1816.402-270 Section 1816.402-270 Federal Acquisition Regulations System NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND....402-270 NASA technical performance incentives. (a) Pursuant to the guidelines in 1816.402, NASA has...
Harris, David J; Hilliard, Paul E; Jewell, Elizabeth S; Brummett, Chad M
2015-01-01
Effective use of postoperative incentive spirometry improves patient outcomes but is limited by pain after thoracic and upper abdominal surgery. Thoracic epidurals are frequently used to provide analgesia and attenuate postoperative pulmonary dysfunction. We hypothesized that, in patients with thoracic epidurals for thoracic and abdominal surgery, high pain scores would be associated with poorer incentive spirometry performance, even when accounting for other variables. Retrospective study of 468 patients who underwent upper abdominal or thoracic surgery using postoperative thoracic epidural analgesia between June 1, 2009, and August 31, 2013, at a single tertiary academic center. The association between incentive spirometry performance and pain was assessed as the primary outcome. Other independent predictors of incentive spirometry performance were also identified. Postoperative incentive spirometry performance was found to be inversely proportional to pain score, which correlated significantly stronger with deep breathing pain compared with pain at rest (-0.33 vs -0.14 on postoperative day 1; -0.23 vs -0.12 on postoperative day 2). Pain with deep breathing was independently associated with poorer incentive spirometry performance in the multivariable linear regression model (P < 0.0001), as was increasing age, female sex, thoracic surgery, and higher American Society of Anesthesiologists (ASA) physical status score. The present study suggests that pain with deep breathing is more indicative of thoracic epidural efficacy than is pain at rest. Furthermore, incentive spirometry performance could be used as another indicator of thoracic epidural efficacy. This may be particularly useful in patients reporting high pain scores postoperatively.
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Panlilio, Leigh V.; Weiss, Stanley J.
2005-01-01
In earlier studies with rats, the effectiveness of the auditory element of a tone--light discriminative stimulus was enhanced when the conditioned incentive value of the compound was negative rather than positive. The present experiment systematically replicated these results in pigeons trained to press a treadle in the presence of a tone--light…
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Gosman, Nathaniel
For energy utilities faced with expanded jurisdictional energy efficiency requirements and pursuing demand-side management (DSM) incentive programs in the large industrial sector, performance incentive programs can be an effective means to maximize the reliability of planned energy savings. Performance incentive programs balance the objectives of high participation rates with persistent energy savings by: (1) providing financial incentives and resources to minimize constraints to investment in energy efficiency, and (2) requiring that incentive payments be dependent on measured energy savings over time. As BC Hydro increases its DSM initiatives to meet the Clean Energy Act objective to reduce at least 66 per cent of new electricity demand with DSM by 2020, the utility is faced with a higher level of DSM risk, or uncertainties that impact the costeffective acquisition of planned energy savings. For industrial DSM incentive programs, DSM risk can be broken down into project development and project performance risks. Development risk represents the project ramp-up phase and is the risk that planned energy savings do not materialize due to low customer response to program incentives. Performance risk represents the operational phase and is the risk that planned energy savings do not persist over the effective measure life. DSM project development and performance risks are, in turn, a result of industrial economic, technological and organizational conditions, or DSM risk factors. In the BC large industrial sector, and characteristic of large industrial sectors in general, these DSM risk factors include: (1) capital constraints to investment in energy efficiency, (2) commodity price volatility, (3) limited internal staffing resources to deploy towards energy efficiency, (4) variable load, process-based energy saving potential, and (5) a lack of organizational awareness of an operation's energy efficiency over time (energy performance). This research assessed the capacity of alternative performance incentive program models to manage DSM risk in BC. Three performance incentive program models were assessed and compared to BC Hydro's current large industrial DSM incentive program, Power Smart Partners -- Transmission Project Incentives, itself a performance incentive-based program. Together, the selected program models represent a continuum of program design and implementation in terms of the schedule and level of incentives provided, the duration and rigour of measurement and verification (M&V), energy efficiency measures targeted and involvement of the private sector. A multi criteria assessment framework was developed to rank the capacity of each program model to manage BC large industrial DSM risk factors. DSM risk management rankings were then compared to program costeffectiveness, targeted energy savings potential in BC and survey results from BC industrial firms on the program models. The findings indicate that the reliability of DSM energy savings in the BC large industrial sector can be maximized through performance incentive program models that: (1) offer incentives jointly for capital and low-cost operations and maintenance (O&M) measures, (2) allow flexible lead times for project development, (3) utilize rigorous M&V methods capable of measuring variable load, process-based energy savings, (4) use moderate contract lengths that align with effective measure life, and (5) integrate energy management software tools capable of providing energy performance feedback to customers to maximize the persistence of energy savings. While this study focuses exclusively on the BC large industrial sector, the findings of this research have applicability to all energy utilities serving large, energy intensive industrial sectors.
2012-01-01
Background The General Medical Services primary care contract for the United Kingdom financially rewards performance in 19 clinical areas, through the Quality and Outcomes Framework. Little is known about how best to determine the size of financial incentives in pay for performance schemes. Our aim was to test the hypothesis that performance indicators with larger population health benefits receive larger financial incentives. Methods We performed cross sectional analyses to quantify associations between the size of financial incentives and expected health gain in the 2004 and 2006 versions of the Quality and Outcomes Framework. We used non-parametric two-sided Spearman rank correlation tests. Health gain was measured in expected lives saved in one year and in quality adjusted life years. For each quality indicator in an average sized general practice we tested for associations first, between the marginal increase in payment and the health gain resulting from a one percent point improvement in performance and second, between total payment and the health gain at the performance threshold for maximum payment. Results Evidence for lives saved or quality adjusted life years gained was found for 28 indicators accounting for 41% of the total incentive payments. No statistically significant associations were found between the expected health gain and incentive gained from a marginal 1% increase in performance in either the 2004 or 2006 version of the Quality and Outcomes Framework. In addition no associations were found between the size of financial payment for achievement of an indicator and the expected health gain at the performance threshold for maximum payment measured in lives saved or quality adjusted life years. Conclusions In this subgroup of indicators the financial incentives were not aligned to maximise health gain. This disconnection between incentive and expected health gain risks supporting clinical activities that are only marginally effective, at the expense of more effective activities receiving lower incentives. When designing pay for performance programmes decisions about the size of the financial incentive attached to an indicator should be informed by information on the health gain to be expected from that indicator. PMID:22507660
The response of physician groups to P4P incentives.
Mehrotra, Ateev; Pearson, Steven D; Coltin, Kathryn L; Kleinman, Ken P; Singer, Janice A; Rabson, Barbra; Schneider, Eric C
2007-05-01
Despite substantial enthusiasm among insurers and federal policy makers for pay-for-performance incentives, little is known about the current scope of these incentives or their influence on the delivery of care. To assess the scope and magnitude of pay-for-performance (P4P) incentives among physician groups and to examine whether such incentives are associated with quality improvement initiatives. Structured telephone survey of leaders of physician groups delivering primary care in Massachusetts. ASSESSED METHODS: Prevalence of P4P incentives among physician groups tied to specific measures of quality or utilization and prevalence of physician group quality improvement initiatives. Most group leaders (89%) reported P4P incentives in at least 1 commercial health plan contract. Incentives were tied to performance on Health Employer Data and Information Set (HEDIS) quality measures (89% of all groups), utilization measures (66%), use of information technology (52%), and patient satisfaction (37%). Among the groups with P4P and knowledge of all revenue streams, the incentives accounted for 2.2% (range, 0.3%-8.8%) of revenue. P4P incentives tied to HEDIS quality measures were positively associated with groups' quality improvement initiatives (odds ratio, 1.6; P = .02). Thirty-six percent of group leaders with P4P incentives reported that they were very important or moderately important to the group's financial success. P4P incentives are now common among physician groups in Massachusetts, and these incentives most commonly reward higher clinical quality or lower utilization of care. Although the scope and magnitude of incentives are still modest for many groups, we found an association between P4P incentives and the use of quality improvement initiatives.
Using incentives to achieve A/R goals.
Kivimaki, John
2007-09-01
Offering incentives to patient accounts staff can motivate them to meet--and even exceed--hospital and department goals. Tying incentives to goals and key performance indicators shows staff why the goals are important to the success of A/R performance.
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Florida State Legislature, Tallahassee. Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability.
This report addresses the Florida Community College System's (FCCS) performance based on measures established by the General Appropriations Act. Discussed are: (1) FCCS' performance on the measures used in the performance-based budgeting (PBB) incentive fund; (2) improvements that can be made to the PBB incentive fund; and (3) changes to community…
The ABCs of HIPCs (health insurance purchasing cooperatives).
Wicks, E K; Curtis, R E; Haugh, K
1993-01-01
HIPCs, or health care purchasing cooperatives, are attracting widespread interest as a key element of the managed competition approach to health reform. HIPCs perform several useful roles for individuals and small employers unable to obtain health insurance coverage in the current system by spreading risk more evenly and purchasing coverage in a given region or market area. While HIPCs are generally associated with managed competition, they are also compatible with reform strategies that require employers to pay for coverage or those that provide incentives for expanded coverage.
Determining your organization's 'risk capability'.
Hannah, Bill; Hancock, Melinda
2014-05-01
An assessment of a provider's level of risk capability should focus on three key elements: Business intelligence, including sophisticated analytical models that can offer insight into the expected cost and quality of care for a given population. Clinical enterprise maturity, marked by the ability to improve health outcomes and to manage utilization and costs to drive change. Revenue transformation, emphasizing the need for a revenue cycle platform that allows for risk acceptance and management and that provides incentives for performance against defined objectives.
Ham, C.; Maynard, A.
1994-01-01
The purpose of the present NHS reforms is to introduce a managed market; developing some of the incentives for greater efficiency that are often found in markets while still being able to regulate proceedings to prevent market failures. If government intervenes too much there will be no incentive to improve efficiency and streamline operations: too little intervention may result in some areas having inadequate health service cover or monopoly powers abusing their position. Effective management of the NHS market requires eight core elements: openness of information, control of labour and capital markets, regulation of mergers and takeovers, arbitrating in disputes, protection of unprofitable functions such as research and development, overseeing national provision of health services, protection of basic principles of the NHS, and handling of closures and redundancy. Management of the market would best be performed by the NHS management executive and health authority purchasers acting within a framework set by politicians. Images p846-a p847-a PMID:8167496
Effects of incentives on psychosocial performances in simulated space-dwelling groups
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Hienz, Robert D.; Brady, Joseph V.; Hursh, Steven R.; Gasior, Eric D.; Spence, Kevin R.; Emurian, Henry H.
Prior research with individually isolated 3-person crews in a distributed, interactive, planetary exploration simulation examined the effects of communication constraints and crew configuration changes on crew performance and psychosocial self-report measures. The present report extends these findings to a model of performance maintenance that operationalizes conditions under which disruptive affective responses by crew participants might be anticipated to emerge. Experiments evaluated the effects of changes in incentive conditions on crew performance and self-report measures in simulated space-dwelling groups. Crews participated in a simulated planetary exploration mission that required identification, collection, and analysis of geologic samples. Results showed that crew performance effectiveness was unaffected by either positive or negative incentive conditions, while self-report measures were differentially affected—negative incentive conditions produced pronounced increases in negative self-report ratings and decreases in positive self-report ratings, while positive incentive conditions produced increased positive self-report ratings only. Thus, incentive conditions associated with simulated spaceflight missions can significantly affect psychosocial adaptation without compromising task performance effectiveness in trained and experienced crews.
The Impact of Social Pressure and Monetary Incentive on Cognitive Control.
Ličen, Mina; Hartmann, Frank; Repovš, Grega; Slapničar, Sergeja
2016-01-01
We compare the effects of two prominent organizational control mechanisms-social pressure and monetary incentive-on cognitive control. Cognitive control underlies the human ability to regulate thoughts and actions in the pursuit of behavioral goals. Previous studies show that monetary incentives can contribute to goal-oriented behavior by activating proactive control. There is, however, much less evidence of how social pressure affects cognitive control and task performance. In a within-subject experimental design, we tested 47 subjects performing the AX-CPT task to compare the activation of cognitive control modes under social pressure and monetary incentive beyond mere instructions to perform better. Our results indicate that instructing participants to improve their performance on its own leads to a significant shift from a reactive to a proactive control mode and that both social pressure and monetary incentive further enhance performance.
Patients with rib fractures: use of incentive spirometry volumes to guide care.
Brown, Sheree D; Walters, Madonna R
2012-01-01
Rib fractures pose significant risk to trauma patients. Effective pain control and the ability to take deep breaths are crucial for optimal recovery, and these are key elements in current clinical guidelines. These guidelines use incentive spirometry volumes along with other assessment values to guide patient care. However, despite current guidelines, nurses do not routinely document inspired respiratory volumes. This article provides trauma nurses with the rationale for documenting and tracking incentive spirometry volumes to improve outcomes for patients with rib fractures. This promotes early detection of respiratory decline and early interventions to improve pain control and pulmonary function.
Shiels, Keri; Hawk, Larry W; Lysczek, Cynthia L; Tannock, Rosemary; Pelham, William E; Spencer, Sarah V; Gangloff, Brian P; Waschbusch, Daniel A
2008-08-01
Working memory is one of several putative core neurocognitive processes in attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). The present work seeks to determine whether visual-spatial working memory is sensitive to motivational incentives, a laboratory analogue of behavioral treatment. Participants were 21 children (ages 7-10) with a diagnosis of ADHD-combined type. Participants completed a computerized spatial span task designed to assess storage of visual-spatial information (forward span) and manipulation of the stored information (backward span). The spatial span task was completed twice on the same day, once with a performance-based incentive (trial-wise feedback and points redeemable for prizes) and once without incentives. Participants performed significantly better on the backward span when rewarded for correct responses, compared to the no incentive condition. However, incentives had no effect on performance during the forward span. These findings may suggest the use of motivational incentives improved manipulation, but not storage, of visual-spatial information among children with ADHD. Possible explanations for the differential incentive effects are discussed, including the possibility that incentives prevented a vigilance decrement as task difficulty and time on task increased.
Humans Integrate Monetary and Liquid Incentives to Motivate Cognitive Task Performance
Yee, Debbie M.; Krug, Marie K.; Allen, Ariel Z.; Braver, Todd S.
2016-01-01
It is unequivocal that a wide variety of incentives can motivate behavior. However, few studies have explicitly examined whether and how different incentives are integrated in terms of their motivational influence. The current study examines the combined effects of monetary and liquid incentives on cognitive processing, and whether appetitive and aversive incentives have distinct influences. We introduce a novel task paradigm, in which participants perform cued task-switching for monetary rewards that vary parametrically across trials, with liquid incentives serving as post-trial performance feedback. Critically, the symbolic meaning of the liquid was held constant (indicating successful reward attainment), while liquid valence was blocked. In the first experiment, monetary rewards combined additively with appetitive liquid feedback to improve subject task performance. Aversive liquid feedback counteracted monetary reward effects in low monetary reward trials, particularly in a subset of participants who tended to avoid responding under these conditions. Self-report motivation ratings predicted behavioral performance above and beyond experimental effects. A follow-up experiment replicated the predictive power of motivation ratings even when only appetitive liquids were used, suggesting that ratings reflect idiosyncratic subjective values of, rather than categorical differences between, the liquid incentives. Together, the findings indicate an integrative relationship between primary and secondary incentives and potentially dissociable influences in modulating motivational value, while informing hypotheses regarding candidate neural mechanisms. PMID:26834668
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Logan, Jeffrey S
Performance-based regulations (PBRs) provide a regulatory framework to connect goals, targets, and measures to utility performance or executive compensation. Well-designed PBRs provide incentives for utility performance, benefiting consumers and utility owners alike. This report considers the role of both PBRs and more discrete performance incentive mechanisms (PIMs) in 21st century power sector transformation. Innovative technologies are transforming the way electricity is generated, delivered, and consumed. PBRs have the potential to realign utility, investor, and consumer incentives and mitigate emerging challenges to the utility business model, renewable integration, and even cyber security.The goals of PBRs in the form of multi-year ratemore » plans are in many respects the same in terms of providing reasonably priced and reliable service to customers. However, today's technologies have changed, and there is more emphasis on clean energy. Thus, the pathways and the potential outcomes are different than they were in the 20th century when centralized generator stations and large infrastructure additions dominated the utility landscape. Given unprecedented changes underway in the electricity sector, PBRs - by specifying expectations of utility performance and outcomes for consumers, while staying agnostic to the exact means of delivery - constitute a form of prescient regulation that harnesses disruption. PBRs are one tool in a broader toolbox in the transition toward flexible regulatory and market structures that rewards utilities that adapt or evolve in reaction to market and technology change. PBRs and PIMs have great value for the electric industry when designed well and can be applied to many different situations. How exactly PBR mechanisms are most effectively enacted will vary based on the utility ownership model, institutional arrangements, and a variety of other local factors. PBRs should be tailored to the needs and goals of each jurisdiction, and perhaps each utility, to most effectively achieve the needs of a 21st century power grid in that jurisdiction. Presented in three volumes, this report highlights the lessons learned from their evolving history, explores essential elements of their design and implementation as well as considerations for how they may be best applied, and examines leading examples of PBRs from the United Kingdom, New York, Denmark, Mexico, and South Africa. The full report, 'Next-Generation Performance Based Regulation - Emphasizing Utility Performance to Unleash Power Sector Innovation,' published in September 2017, can be accessed at https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy17osti/68512.pdf.« less
20 CFR 641.750 - Will there be performance-related incentives?
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-04-01
... 20 Employees' Benefits 3 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false Will there be performance-related incentives? 641.750 Section 641.750 Employees' Benefits EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF... incentive awards. The Department will exercise this authority at its discretion. ...
Incentive Funding Meets Incentive-Based Budgeting: Can They Coexist?
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Lang, Daniel W.
2016-01-01
Two major developments in the financial management of higher education have occurred more or less contemporaneously: incentive or performance funding on the part of government and incentive-based budgeting on the part of institutions. Both are based on fiscal incentives. Despite their several inherent and interconnected similarities, incentive…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
National Center on Performance Incentives, 2008
2008-01-01
A recent report published by the National Center on Performance Incentives (NCPI) presents findings from the first-year evaluation of the Governor's Educator Excellence Grant (GEEG) program, one of several statewide performance incentive programs in Texas. The report provides an overview of changes to teacher behavior and instructional practices…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
National Center on Performance Incentives, 2008
2008-01-01
A recent report published by the National Center on Performance Incentives (NCPI) presents findings from the first-year evaluation of the Texas Educator Excellence Grant (TEEG) program, one of several statewide educator incentive programs in Texas. This report provides an overview of over 1,000 schools' locally designed TEEG performance incentive…
Issues in Perspective. Critical Issues Papers 1-17.
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Duttweiler, Patricia Cloud
The papers in this collection are based on the document "Perspectives on Performance-Based Incentive Plans" and offer brief overviews of the following critical issues in education: (1) performance-based incentive plans; (2) needed organizational changes; (3) successful and unsuccessful teacher incentive plans; (4) compensation strategies and…
Dambacher, Michael; Hübner, Ronald; Schlösser, Jan
2011-01-01
The influence of monetary incentives on performance has been widely investigated among various disciplines. While the results reveal positive incentive effects only under specific conditions, the exact nature, and the contribution of mediating factors are largely unexplored. The present study examined influences of payoff schemes as one of these factors. In particular, we manipulated penalties for errors and slow responses in a speeded categorization task. The data show improved performance for monetary over symbolic incentives when (a) penalties are higher for slow responses than for errors, and (b) neither slow responses nor errors are punished. Conversely, payoff schemes with stronger punishment for errors than for slow responses resulted in worse performance under monetary incentives. The findings suggest that an emphasis of speed is favorable for positive influences of monetary incentives, whereas an emphasis of accuracy under time pressure has the opposite effect. PMID:21980316
Embi, Peter J.; Tsevat, Joel
2013-01-01
Recent nationwide initiatives to accelerate clinical and translational research, including comparative effectiveness research, increasingly will require clinician participation in research-related activities at the point-of-care, activities such as participant recruitment for clinical research studies and systematic data collection. A key element to the success of such initiatives that has not yet been adequately addressed is how to provide incentives to clinicians for the time and effort that such participation will require. Models to calculate the value of clinical care services are commonly used to compensate clinicians, and similar models have been proposed to calculate and compensate researchers’ efforts. However, to the authors’ knowledge, no such model has been proposed for calculating the value of research-related activities performed by non-investigator clinicians, be they in academic or community settings. In this commentary, the authors propose a new model for doing just that. They describe how such a relative research unit model could be used to provide both direct and indirect incentives for clinician participation in research activities. Direct incentives could include financial compensation, while indirect incentives could include credit towards promotion and tenure and towards the maintenance of specialty board certification. The authors discuss the principles behind this relative research unit approach as well as ethical, funding, and other considerations to fully developing and deploying such a model, across academic environments first and then more broadly across the health care community. PMID:22201633
48 CFR 48.105 - Relationship to other incentives.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-10-01
... should not be rewarded both as value engineering shares and under performance, design-to-cost, or similar incentives of the contract. To that end, when performance, design-to-cost, or similar targets are set and... CONTRACT MANAGEMENT VALUE ENGINEERING Policies and Procedures 48.105 Relationship to other incentives...
48 CFR 48.105 - Relationship to other incentives.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-10-01
... should not be rewarded both as value engineering shares and under performance, design-to-cost, or similar incentives of the contract. To that end, when performance, design-to-cost, or similar targets are set and... CONTRACT MANAGEMENT VALUE ENGINEERING Policies and Procedures 48.105 Relationship to other incentives...
48 CFR 48.105 - Relationship to other incentives.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-10-01
... should not be rewarded both as value engineering shares and under performance, design-to-cost, or similar incentives of the contract. To that end, when performance, design-to-cost, or similar targets are set and... CONTRACT MANAGEMENT VALUE ENGINEERING Policies and Procedures 48.105 Relationship to other incentives...
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Shojima, Taiki; Ikkai, Yoshitomo; Komoda, Norihisa
An incentive attached peer to peer (P2P) electronic coupon system is proposed in which users forward e-coupons to potential users by providing incentives to those mediators. A service provider needs to acquire distribution history for incentive payment by recording UserIDs (UIDs) in the e-coupons, since this system is intended for pure P2P environment. This causes problems of dishonestly altering distribution history. In order to solve such problems, distribution history is realized in a couple of queues structure. They are the UID queue, and the public key queue. Each element of the UID queue at the initial state consists of index, a secret key, and a digital signature. In recording one's UID, the encrypted UID is enqueued to the UID queue with a new digital signature created by a secret key of the dequeued element, so that each UID cannot be altered. The public key queue provides the functionality of validating digital signatures on mobile devices. This method makes it possible both each UID and sequence of them to be certificated. The availability of the method is evaluated by quantifying risk reduction using Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). And it's recognized that the method is better than common encryption methods.
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Elqadri, Zaenal Mustafa; Priyono; Suci, Rahayu Puji; Chandra, Teddy
2015-01-01
This study aims to identify and examine the importance of leadership style, motivation, and incentives to improve employee performance. Variables examined as factors that affect performance of employees were style of leadership (X1), motivation (X2), and the provision of incentives (X3). The population of this study was all employees in the Sales…
Diaz, Adrian; Merath, Katiuscha; Bagante, Fabio; Chen, Qinyu; Akgul, Ozgur; Beal, Eliza; Idrees, Jay; Olsen, Griffin; Gani, Faiz; Pawlik, Timothy M
2018-05-15
The Affordable Care Act established a Center for Medicare/Medicaid Services based 10% reimbursement bonus for general surgeons in Health Professional Shortage Areas. We sought to assess the impact of the Affordable Care Act Surgery Incentive Payment on surgical procedures performed in Health Professional Shortage Areas. Hospital utilization data from the California Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2015, were used to categorize hospitals according to Health Professional Shortage Area location. A difference-in-differences analysis measured the effect of the Surgery Incentive Payment on year-to-year differences for inpatient and outpatient surgical procedures by hospital type pre- (2006-2010) versus post- (2011-2015) Surgery Incentive Payment implementation. Among 409 unique hospitals that performed surgical procedures for at least 1 year of the study period, 2 performed surgery in a designated Health Professional Shortage Area. The two Health Professional Shortage Area -designated hospitals were located in a rural area, were non-teaching hospitals, and had 196 and 202 hospital beds, respectively. After the enactment of the Surgery Incentive Payment, while non- Health Professional Shortage Areas had only a modest relative decrease in total inpatient procedures (Pre-Surgery Incentive Payment: 4,666,938 versus Post-Surgery Incentive Payment: 4,451,612; Δ-4.6%), the proportional decrease in inpatient surgical procedures at Health Professional Shortage Area hospitals was more marked (Pre-Surgery Incentive Payment: 25,830 versus Post-Surgery Incentive Payment: 21,503; Δ-16.7%). In contrast, Health Professional Shortage Area hospitals proportionally had a greater increase in total outpatient procedures (Pre-Surgery Incentive Payment: 17,840 versus Post-Surgery Incentive Payment: 22,375: Δ+25.4%) versus non- Health Professional Shortage Area hospitals (Pre-Surgery Incentive Payment: 5,863,300 versus Post-Surgery Incentive Payment: 6,156,138; Δ+4.9%). Based on the difference-in-differences analysis, the increase in the trend of surgical procedures at Health Professional Shortage Area hospitals was much more notable after Surgery Incentive Payment implementation (Δ+75.2%). The Medicare Surgery Incentive Payment program was associated with an increase in the number of surgical procedures performed at Health Professional Shortage Area hospitals relative to non-Health Professional Shortage Area hospitals during the study period, reversing the trend from negative to positive. Copyright © 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Financial incentives for quality in breast cancer care.
Tisnado, Diana M; Rose-Ash, Danielle E; Malin, Jennifer L; Adams, John L; Ganz, Patricia A; Kahn, Katherine L
2008-07-01
To examine the use of financial incentives related to performance on quality measures reported by oncologists and surgeons associated with a population-based cohort of patients with breast cancer in Los Angeles County, California, and to explore the physician and practice characteristics associated with the use of these incentives among breast cancer care providers. Cross-sectional observational study. Physician self-reported financial arrangements from a survey of 348 medical oncologists, radiation oncologists, and surgeons caring for patients with breast cancer in Los Angeles County (response rate, 76%). Physicians were asked whether they were subject to financial incentives for quality (ie, patient satisfaction surveys and adherence to practice guidelines). We examined the prevalence and correlates of incentives and performed multivariate logistic regression analyses to assess predictors of incentives, controlling for other covariates. Twenty percent of respondents reported incentives based on patient satisfaction, and 15% reported incentives based on guideline adherence. The use of incentives for quality in this cohort of oncologists and surgeons was modest and was primarily associated with staff- or group-model health maintenance organization (HMO) settings. In other settings, important predictors were partial physician ownership interest, large practice size, and capitation. Most cancer care providers in Los Angeles County outside of staff- or group-model HMOs are not subject to explicit financial incentives based on quality-of-care measures. Those who are, seem more likely to be associated with large practice settings. New approaches are needed to direct financial incentives for quality toward specialists outside of staff- or group-model HMOs if pay-for-performance programs are to succeed in influencing care.
Boonen, Lieke H H M; Schut, Frederik T; Koolman, Xander
2008-03-01
Consumer channeling is an important element in the insurer-provider bargaining process. Health insurers can influence provider choice by offering insurance contracts with restricted provider networks. Alternatively, they can offer contracts with unrestricted access and use incentives to motivate consumers to visit preferred providers. Little is known, however, about the effectiveness of this alternative strategy of consumer channeling. Using data from two natural experiments in the Dutch pharmacy market, we examine how consumers respond to incentives used by health insurers to influence their choice of provider. We find that consumers are sensitive to rather small incentives and that temporary incentives may sort a long-term effect on provider choice. In addition, we find that both consumer and provider characteristics determine whether consumers are willing to switch to preferred pharmacies.
Age-related influence of contingencies on a saccade task
Jazbec, Sandra; Hardin, Michael G.; Schroth, Elizabeth; McClure, Erin; Pine, Daniel S.; Ernst, Monique
2009-01-01
Adolescence is characterized by increased risk-taking and sensation-seeking, presumably brought about by developmental changes within reward-mediating brain circuits. A better understanding of the neural mechanisms underlying reward-seeking during adolescence can have critical implications for the development of strategies to enhance adolescent performance in potentially dangerous situations. Yet little research has investigated the influence of age on the modulation of behavior by incentives with neuroscience-based methods. A monetary reward antisaccade task (the RST) was used with 23 healthy adolescents and 30 healthy adults. Performance accuracy, latency and peak velocity of saccade responses (prosaccades and antisaccades) were analyzed. Performance accuracy across all groups was improved by incentives (obtain reward, avoid punishment) for both, prosaccades and antisaccades. However, modulation of antisaccade errors (direction errors) by incentives differed between groups: adolescents modulated saccade latency and peak velocity depending on contingencies, with incentives aligning their performance to that of adults; adults did not show a modulation by incentives. These findings suggest that incentives modulate a global measure of performance (percent direction errors) in adults and adolescents, and exert a more powerful influence on the control of incorrect motor responses in adolescents than in adults. These findings suggest that this task can be used in neuroimaging studies as a probe of the influence of incentives on cognitive control from a developmental perspective as well as in health and disease. PMID:16733706
Age-related influence of contingencies on a saccade task.
Jazbec, Sandra; Hardin, Michael G; Schroth, Elizabeth; McClure, Erin; Pine, Daniel S; Ernst, Monique
2006-10-01
Adolescence is characterized by increased risk-taking and sensation-seeking, presumably brought about by developmental changes within reward-mediating brain circuits. A better understanding of the neural mechanisms underlying reward-seeking during adolescence can have critical implications for the development of strategies to enhance adolescent performance in potentially dangerous situations. Yet little research has investigated the influence of age on the modulation of behavior by incentives with neuroscience-based methods. A monetary reward antisaccade task (the RST) was used with 23 healthy adolescents and 30 healthy adults. Performance accuracy, latency and peak velocity of saccade responses (prosaccades and antisaccades) were analyzed. Performance accuracy across all groups was improved by incentives (obtain reward, avoid punishment) for both, prosaccades and antisaccades. However, modulation of antisaccade errors (direction errors) by incentives differed between groups: adolescents modulated saccade latency and peak velocity depending on contingencies, with incentives aligning their performance to that of adults; adults did not show a modulation by incentives. These findings suggest that incentives modulate a global measure of performance (percent direction errors) in adults and adolescents, and exert a more powerful influence on the control of incorrect motor responses in adolescents than in adults. These findings suggest that this task can be used in neuroimaging studies as a probe of the influence of incentives on cognitive control from a developmental perspective as well as in health and disease.
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Mabogoane, Thabo; Patel, Firoz
2006-01-01
This article argues that incentives can help increase teacher performance and retention. Incentives send out a clear signal of what an education system expects from its teachers; at the same time teachers do respond to incentives inherent in the education system. Many education systems have weak incentives and therefore fail to signal to teachers…
Hsieh, Shulan; Li, Tzu-Hsien; Tsai, Ling-Ling
2010-04-01
To examine whether monetary incentives attenuate the negative effects of sleep deprivation on cognitive performance in a flanker task that requires higher-level cognitive-control processes, including error monitoring. Twenty-four healthy adults aged 18 to 23 years were randomly divided into 2 subject groups: one received and the other did not receive monetary incentives for performance accuracy. Both subject groups performed a flanker task and underwent electroencephalographic recordings for event-related brain potentials after normal sleep and after 1 night of total sleep deprivation in a within-subject, counterbalanced, repeated-measures study design. Monetary incentives significantly enhanced the response accuracy and reaction time variability under both normal sleep and sleep-deprived conditions, and they reduced the effects of sleep deprivation on the subjective effort level, the amplitude of the error-related negativity (an error-related event-related potential component), and the latency of the P300 (an event-related potential variable related to attention processes). However, monetary incentives could not attenuate the effects of sleep deprivation on any measures of behavior performance, such as the response accuracy, reaction time variability, or posterror accuracy adjustments; nor could they reduce the effects of sleep deprivation on the amplitude of the Pe, another error-related event-related potential component. This study shows that motivation incentives selectively reduce the effects of total sleep deprivation on some brain activities, but they cannot attenuate the effects of sleep deprivation on performance decrements in tasks that require high-level cognitive-control processes. Thus, monetary incentives and sleep deprivation may act through both common and different mechanisms to affect cognitive performance.
Higher incentives can impair performance: neural evidence on reinforcement and rationality
Achtziger, Anja; Hügelschäfer, Sabine; Steinhauser, Marco
2015-01-01
Standard economic thinking postulates that increased monetary incentives should increase performance. Human decision makers, however, frequently focus on past performance, a form of reinforcement learning occasionally at odds with rational decision making. We used an incentivized belief-updating task from economics to investigate this conflict through measurements of neural correlates of reward processing. We found that higher incentives fail to improve performance when immediate feedback on decision outcomes is provided. Subsequent analysis of the feedback-related negativity, an early event-related potential following feedback, revealed the mechanism behind this paradoxical effect. As incentives increase, the win/lose feedback becomes more prominent, leading to an increased reliance on reinforcement and more errors. This mechanism is relevant for economic decision making and the debate on performance-based payment. PMID:25816816
Financial Incentives and Physician Practice Participation in Medicare's Value-Based Reforms.
Markovitz, Adam A; Ramsay, Patricia P; Shortell, Stephen M; Ryan, Andrew M
2017-07-26
To evaluate whether greater experience and success with performance incentives among physician practices are related to increased participation in Medicare's voluntary value-based payment reforms. Publicly available data from Medicare's Physician Compare (n = 1,278; January 2012 to November 2013) and nationally representative physician practice data from the National Survey of Physician Organizations 3 (NSPO3; n = 907,538; 2013). We used regression analysis to examine practice-level relationships between prior exposure to performance incentives and participation in key Medicare value-based payment reforms: accountable care organization (ACO) programs, the Physician Quality Reporting System ("Physician Compare"), and the Meaningful Use of Health Information Technology program ("Meaningful Use"). Prior experience and success with financial incentives were measured as (1) the percentage of practices' revenue from financial incentives for quality or efficiency; and (2) practices' exposure to public reporting of quality measures. We linked physician participation data from Medicare's Physician Compare to the NSPO3 survey. There was wide variation in practices' exposure to performance incentives, with 64 percent exposed to financial incentives, 45 percent exposed to public reporting, and 2.2 percent of practice revenue coming from financial incentives. For each percentage-point increase in financial incentives, there was a 0.9 percentage-point increase in the probability of participating in ACOs (standard error [SE], 0.1, p < .001) and a 0.8 percentage-point increase in the probability of participating in Meaningful Use (SE, 0.1, p < .001), controlling for practice characteristics. Financial incentives were not associated with participation in Physician Compare. Among ACO participants, a 1 percentage-point increase in incentives was associated with a 0.7 percentage-point increase in the probability of being "very well" prepared to utilize cost and quality data (SE, 0.1, p < .001). Physicians organizations' prior experience and success with performance incentives were related to participation in Medicare ACO arrangements and participation in the meaningful use criteria but not to participation in Physician Compare. We conclude that Medicare must complement financial incentives with additional efforts to address the needs of practices with less experience with such incentives to promote value-based payment on a broader scale. © Health Research and Educational Trust.
[Pay for performance explained by transaction costs theory].
Gorbaneff, Yuri; Cortes, Ariel; Torres, Sergio; Yepes, Francisco
2011-01-01
To evaluate the ability of transaction costs theory to explain incentives in the health care chain. We performed a case study of CPS, a health insurance company in Bogota (Colombia), which preferred not to publish its name. CPS moves in the environment of high transaction costs and uses the hybrid form of governance at the outpatient level. Incentive intensity, administrative control and the contract all agree with the theory. At the hospital level, the market is used, despite greater uncertainty. Because of the discrete form (1.0) of the incentives and the absence of administrative control, it is difficult for CPS to relate payment to hospital performance. Transaction costs theory explains the configuration of incentives. Another contribution made by this theory to the literature is the criterion to differentiate between the market and the hybrid. We propose that the market uses discrete-type (1.0) incentives, while the hybrid uses continuous, commission-like incentives. Copyright © 2011 SESPAS. Published by Elsevier Espana. All rights reserved.
The Best Laid Plans: Designing Incentive Programs for School Leaders. WCER Working Paper No. 2014-7
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Goff, Peter; Goldring, Ellen; Canney, Melissa
2014-01-01
Notable attention and effort has been directed toward improving educator productivity through the use of performance incentives. Little of this work has focused on incentive systems for school leaders (principals) and less yet examines performance pay systems used in practice. This research uses 34 funded grants from the federal Teacher Incentive…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Glazerman, Steven; Protik, Ali; Teh, Bing-ru; Bruch, Julie; Max, Jeffrey
2013-01-01
One way to improve struggling schools' access to effective teachers is to use selective transfer incentives. Such incentives offer bonuses for the highest-performing teachers to move into schools serving the most disadvantaged students. In this report, we provide evidence from a randomized experiment that tested whether such a policy intervention…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
National Center on Performance Incentives, 2008
2008-01-01
A recent report published by the National Center on Performance Incentives (NCPI) presents findings from the first-year evaluation of the Governor's Educator Excellence Grant (GEEG) program, one of several statewide educator incentive programs in Texas. Findings are based on surveys administered to GEEG teachers during the 2006-07 school year, the…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
National Center on Performance Incentives, 2008
2008-01-01
A recent report published by the National Center on Performance Incentives (NCPI) presents findings from the first-year evaluation of the Governor's Educator Excellence Grant (GEEG) program, one of several statewide educator incentive programs in Texas. In this report, the authors provide an overview of 99 schools' locally designed educator…
An Evaluation of Performance Thresholds in Nursing Home Pay-for-Performance.
Werner, Rachel M; Skira, Meghan; Konetzka, R Tamara
2016-12-01
Performance thresholds are commonly used in pay-for-performance (P4P) incentives, where providers receive a bonus payment for achieving a prespecified target threshold but may produce discontinuous incentives, with providers just below the threshold having the strongest incentive to improve and providers either far below or above the threshold having little incentive. We investigate the effect of performance thresholds on provider response in the setting of nursing home P4P. The Minimum Data Set (MDS) and Online Survey, Certification, and Reporting (OSCAR) datasets. Difference-in-differences design to test for changes in nursing home performance in three states that implemented threshold-based P4P (Colorado, Georgia, and Oklahoma) versus three comparator states (Arizona, Tennessee, and Arkansas) between 2006 and 2009. We find that those farthest below the threshold (i.e., the worst-performing nursing homes) had the largest improvements under threshold-based P4P while those farthest above the threshold worsened. This effect did not vary with the percentage of Medicaid residents in a nursing home. Threshold-based P4P may provide perverse incentives for nursing homes above the performance threshold, but we do not find evidence to support concerns about the effects of performance thresholds on low-performing nursing homes. © Health Research and Educational Trust.
Demurie, Ellen; Roeyers, Herbert; Baeyens, Dieter; Sonuga-Barke, Edmund
2012-12-01
The current study compared the effects of reward anticipation on task performance in children and adolescents (8-16 years old) using monetary and various social rewards. Eighty-five typically developing children undertook the Monetary Incentive Delay (MID) task. Of these 44 also undertook the Social Incentive Delay (SID-basic) task where social reward was operationalized as a smiling face and spoken compliments. Forty-one children participated in the SID-plus where points were added to a pictogram with written compliments. In a preparatory validation study participants were asked howmuch they liked the SID-basic rewards.Results showed that there was an effect of reward size on accuracy and RT in both the MID task and SID-plus, but not SID-basic. Subjective value of the SID-basic rewards was rated higher with hypothesized increasing reward intensity. In conclusion, although the social rewards in SID-basic were liked by children andadolescents in the validation study, they had no effect on the behaviour. Only when points were added (SID-plus), anticipated social reward affected task performance. Thus our results highlight (i) the difference between likeability andreinforcing quality and (ii) the need for a quantifiable element to rewards for themto be reinforcing for children. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Teacher Incentive through Performance Contracting: A Programmatic Approach
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Quarles, Royce W.
1974-01-01
Describes an instructional program which applied the incentive theories of performance contracting--but with individualized, diagnostic-based instruction both designed and conducted by the teachers. (RB)
Health care consumerism: incentives, behavior change and uncertainties.
Domaszewicz, Sander; Havlin, Linda; Connolly, Susan
2010-01-01
Employers affected by the recession's 2009 peak must press for cost containment in 2010, especially in health care benefits. Encouraging employee consumerism--through consumer-directed health plans and other strategies--can be enhanced by incentives, but federal efforts at health care reform add some element of uncertainty to the consumer-directed solution. This article provides some lessons to guide the course of action for employers considering implementing a consumerist approach to improve employee health and control the cost trend.
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Mintrop, Rick; Ordenes, Miguel; Coghlan, Erin; Pryor, Laura; Madero, Cristobal
2018-01-01
Purpose: The study examines why the logic of a performance management system, supported by the federal Teacher Incentive Fund, might be faulty. It does this by exploring the nuances of the interplay between teaching evaluations as formative and summative, the use of procedures, tools, and artifacts obligated by the local Teacher Incentive Fund…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
National Center on Performance Incentives, 2008
2008-01-01
A recent report published by the National Center on Performance Incentives (NCPI) presents findings from the first-year evaluation of the Texas Educator Excellence Grant (TEEG) program, one of several statewide educator incentive programs in Texas. Findings are based on the responses of full-time instructional personnel at over 1,000 TEEG schools…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Glazerman, Steven; Protik, Ali; Teh, Bing-ru; Bruch, Julie; Max, Jeffrey
2013-01-01
One way to improve struggling schools' access to effective teachers is to use selective transfer incentives. Such incentives offer bonuses for the highest-performing teachers to move into schools serving the most disadvantaged students. In this report, we provide evidence from a randomized experiment that tested whether such a policy intervention…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Mintrop, Rick; Ordenes, Miguel
2017-01-01
Mindful of the withering of high-stakes accountability and disappointing data from pay for performance evaluations in the US, we ask why management by extrinsic incentives and organizational goal setting may have been far less powerful than designers of accountability and extrinsic incentive systems had expected. We explore how…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Taylor, Lori L.; Springer, Matthew G.
2009-01-01
Pay for performance is a popular public education reform, and millions of dollars are currently being targeted for pay for performance programs. These reforms are popular because economic and management theories suggest that well-designed incentive pay programs could improve teacher effectiveness. There is little evidence about the characteristics…
Hospitals as learning organizations: fostering innovation through interactive learning.
Dias, Casimiro; Escoval, Ana
2015-01-01
The article aims to provide an analytical understanding of hospitals as "learning organizations." It further analyzes the development of learning organizations as a way to enhance innovation and performance in the hospital sector. The article pulls together primary data on organizational flexibility, innovation, and performance from 95 administrators from hospital boards in Portugal, collected through a survey, interviews with hospital's boards, and a nominal group technique with a panel of experts on health systems. Results show that a combination of several organizational traits of the learning organization enhances its capacity for innovation development. The logistic model presented reveals that hospitals classified as "advanced learning organizations" have 5 times more chance of developing innovation than "basic learning organizations." Empirical findings further pointed out incentives, standards, and measurement requirements as key elements for integration of service delivery systems and expansion of the current capacity for structured and real-time learning in the hospital sector. The major implication arising from this study is that policy needs to combine instruments that promote innovation opportunities and incentives, with instruments stimulating the further development of the core components of learning organizations. Such a combination of policy instruments has the potential to ensure a wide external cooperation through a learning infrastructure.
Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014
2011-02-04
... being considered include: Alternative A Current Condition: Key elements are corridors open year round, annual allocation cap of 93,971, and no quiet technology incentive. Current tours for helicopters and... to quiet technology aircraft. Alternative F Modified Current Condition: Key elements are similar to...
The Motivation-Cognition Interface in Learning and Decision-Making.
Maddox, W Todd; Markman, Arthur B
2010-04-01
In this article we discuss how incentive motivations and task demands affect performance. We present a three-factor framework that suggests that performance is determined from the interaction of global incentives, local incentives, and the psychological processes needed to achieve optimal task performance. We review work that examines the implications of the motivation-cognition interface in classification, choice and on phenomena such as stereotype threat and performance pressure. We show that under some conditions stereotype threat and pressure accentuate performance. We discuss the implications of this work for neuropsychological assessment, and outline a number of challenges for future research.
Value affect of construction incentive payments on pavement performance.
DOT National Transportation Integrated Search
2009-08-01
The Michigan Department of Transportation (MDOT) has been using monetary incentive payments : for many years to improve contractors conformance with specifications and their overall : workmanship. It was envisioned that incentive/disincentive (I/D...
What to do? The effects of discrepancies, incentives, and time on dynamic goal prioritization.
Schmidt, Aaron M; DeShon, Richard P
2007-07-01
This study examined factors that influence the dynamic pursuit of multiple goals over time. As hypothesized, goal-performance discrepancies were significantly related to subsequent time allocation. Greater distance from a given goal resulted in greater time subsequently allocated to that goal. In addition, the incentives offered for goal attainment determined the relative influence of discrepancies for each goal. When the incentives for each goal were equivalent, progress toward each goal exhibited equal influence, with greater time allocated to whichever goal was furthest from completion at the time. However, with an incentive available for only 1 of the 2 goals, time allocation was largely determined by progress toward the rewarded goal. Likewise, when incentives for each task differed in their approach-avoidance framing, progress toward the avoidance-framed goal was a stronger predictor of subsequent allocation than was progress toward the approach-framed goal. Finally, the influence of goal-performance discrepancies differed as a function of the time remaining for goal pursuit. The implications for future work on dynamic goal prioritization and the provision of performance incentives are discussed.
2011-01-01
Background Despite compelling evidence of the benefits of treatment and well-accepted guidelines for treatment, hypertension is controlled in less than one-half of United States citizens. Methods/design This randomized controlled trial tests whether explicit financial incentives promote the translation of guideline-recommended care for hypertension into clinical practice and improve blood pressure (BP) control in the primary care setting. Using constrained randomization, we assigned 12 Veterans Affairs hospital outpatient clinics to four study arms: physician-level incentive; group-level incentive; combination of physician and group incentives; and no incentives (control). All participants at the hospital (cluster) were assigned to the same study arm. We enrolled 83 full-time primary care physicians and 42 non-physician personnel. The intervention consisted of an educational session about guideline-recommended care for hypertension, five audit and feedback reports, and five disbursements of incentive payments. Incentive payments rewarded participants for chart-documented use of guideline-recommended antihypertensive medications, BP control, and appropriate responses to uncontrolled BP during a prior four-month performance period over the 20-month intervention. To identify potential unintended consequences of the incentives, the study team interviewed study participants, as well as non-participant primary care personnel and leadership at study sites. Chart reviews included data collection on quality measures not related to hypertension. To evaluate the persistence of the effect of the incentives, the study design includes a washout period. Discussion We briefly describe the rationale for the interventions being studied, as well as the major design choices. Rigorous research designs such as the one described here are necessary to determine whether performance-based payment arrangements such as financial incentives result in meaningful quality improvements. Trial Registration http://www.clinicaltrials.gov NCT00302718 PMID:21967830
Anand, R.
2016-01-01
Objective. To evaluate the effects of diaphragmatic breathing exercises and flow and volume-oriented incentive spirometry on pulmonary function and diaphragm excursion in patients undergoing laparoscopic abdominal surgery. Methodology. We selected 260 patients posted for laparoscopic abdominal surgery and they were block randomization as follows: 65 patients performed diaphragmatic breathing exercises, 65 patients performed flow incentive spirometry, 65 patients performed volume incentive spirometry, and 65 patients participated as a control group. All of them underwent evaluation of pulmonary function with measurement of Forced Vital Capacity (FVC), Forced Expiratory Volume in the first second (FEV1), Peak Expiratory Flow Rate (PEFR), and diaphragm excursion measurement by ultrasonography before the operation and on the first and second postoperative days. With the level of significance set at p < 0.05. Results. Pulmonary function and diaphragm excursion showed a significant decrease on the first postoperative day in all four groups (p < 0.001) but was evident more in the control group than in the experimental groups. On the second postoperative day pulmonary function (Forced Vital Capacity) and diaphragm excursion were found to be better preserved in volume incentive spirometry and diaphragmatic breathing exercise group than in the flow incentive spirometry group and the control group. Pulmonary function (Forced Vital Capacity) and diaphragm excursion showed statistically significant differences between volume incentive spirometry and diaphragmatic breathing exercise group (p < 0.05) as compared to that flow incentive spirometry group and the control group. Conclusion. Volume incentive spirometry and diaphragmatic breathing exercise can be recommended as an intervention for all patients pre- and postoperatively, over flow-oriented incentive spirometry for the generation and sustenance of pulmonary function and diaphragm excursion in the management of laparoscopic abdominal surgery. PMID:27525116
Alaparthi, Gopala Krishna; Augustine, Alfred Joseph; Anand, R; Mahale, Ajith
2016-01-01
Objective. To evaluate the effects of diaphragmatic breathing exercises and flow and volume-oriented incentive spirometry on pulmonary function and diaphragm excursion in patients undergoing laparoscopic abdominal surgery. Methodology. We selected 260 patients posted for laparoscopic abdominal surgery and they were block randomization as follows: 65 patients performed diaphragmatic breathing exercises, 65 patients performed flow incentive spirometry, 65 patients performed volume incentive spirometry, and 65 patients participated as a control group. All of them underwent evaluation of pulmonary function with measurement of Forced Vital Capacity (FVC), Forced Expiratory Volume in the first second (FEV1), Peak Expiratory Flow Rate (PEFR), and diaphragm excursion measurement by ultrasonography before the operation and on the first and second postoperative days. With the level of significance set at p < 0.05. Results. Pulmonary function and diaphragm excursion showed a significant decrease on the first postoperative day in all four groups (p < 0.001) but was evident more in the control group than in the experimental groups. On the second postoperative day pulmonary function (Forced Vital Capacity) and diaphragm excursion were found to be better preserved in volume incentive spirometry and diaphragmatic breathing exercise group than in the flow incentive spirometry group and the control group. Pulmonary function (Forced Vital Capacity) and diaphragm excursion showed statistically significant differences between volume incentive spirometry and diaphragmatic breathing exercise group (p < 0.05) as compared to that flow incentive spirometry group and the control group. Conclusion. Volume incentive spirometry and diaphragmatic breathing exercise can be recommended as an intervention for all patients pre- and postoperatively, over flow-oriented incentive spirometry for the generation and sustenance of pulmonary function and diaphragm excursion in the management of laparoscopic abdominal surgery.
Petersen, Laura A; Urech, Tracy; Simpson, Kate; Pietz, Kenneth; Hysong, Sylvia J; Profit, Jochen; Conrad, Douglas; Dudley, R Adams; Lutschg, Meghan Z; Petzel, Robert; Woodard, Lechauncy D
2011-10-03
Despite compelling evidence of the benefits of treatment and well-accepted guidelines for treatment, hypertension is controlled in less than one-half of United States citizens. This randomized controlled trial tests whether explicit financial incentives promote the translation of guideline-recommended care for hypertension into clinical practice and improve blood pressure (BP) control in the primary care setting. Using constrained randomization, we assigned 12 Veterans Affairs hospital outpatient clinics to four study arms: physician-level incentive; group-level incentive; combination of physician and group incentives; and no incentives (control). All participants at the hospital (cluster) were assigned to the same study arm. We enrolled 83 full-time primary care physicians and 42 non-physician personnel. The intervention consisted of an educational session about guideline-recommended care for hypertension, five audit and feedback reports, and five disbursements of incentive payments. Incentive payments rewarded participants for chart-documented use of guideline-recommended antihypertensive medications, BP control, and appropriate responses to uncontrolled BP during a prior four-month performance period over the 20-month intervention. To identify potential unintended consequences of the incentives, the study team interviewed study participants, as well as non-participant primary care personnel and leadership at study sites. Chart reviews included data collection on quality measures not related to hypertension. To evaluate the persistence of the effect of the incentives, the study design includes a washout period. We briefly describe the rationale for the interventions being studied, as well as the major design choices. Rigorous research designs such as the one described here are necessary to determine whether performance-based payment arrangements such as financial incentives result in meaningful quality improvements. http://www.clinicaltrials.govNCT00302718.
Designing Incentives for Public School Teachers: Evidence from a Texas Incentive Pay Program
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Springer, Matthew G.; Taylor, Lori L.
2016-01-01
Pay-for-performance is a popular public education reform, but there is little evidence about the characteristics of a well-designed incentive pay plan for teachers. Some of the literature suggests that effective incentive plans must offer relatively large awards to induce behavioral changes. On the other hand, the experimental economics literature…
42 CFR § 414.1320 - MIPS performance period.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2017-10-01
... (CONTINUED) MEDICARE PROGRAM (CONTINUED) PAYMENT FOR PART B MEDICAL AND OTHER HEALTH SERVICES Merit-Based Incentive Payment System and Alternative Payment Model Incentive § 414.1320 MIPS performance period. (a) For purposes of the 2019 MIPS payment year, the performance period for all performance categories and...
48 CFR 48.105 - Relationship to other incentives.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-10-01
... incentives of the contract. To that end, when performance, design-to-cost, or similar targets are set and incentivized, the targets of such incentives affected by the VECP are not to be adjusted because of the...
Koffarnus, Mikhail N; Wong, Conrad J; Fingerhood, Michael; Svikis, Dace S; Bigelow, George E; Silverman, Kenneth
2013-01-01
The current study examined whether monetary incentives could increase engagement and achievement in a job-skills training program for unemployed, homeless, alcohol-dependent adults. Participants (n=124) were randomized to a no-reinforcement group (n=39), during which access to the training program was provided but no incentives were given; a training reinforcement group (n=42), during which incentives were contingent on attendance and performance; or an abstinence and training reinforcement group (n=43), during which incentives were contingent on attendance and performance, but access was granted only if participants demonstrated abstinence from alcohol. abstinence and training reinforcement and training reinforcement participants advanced further in training and attended more hours than no-reinforcement participants. Monetary incentives were effective in promoting engagement and achievement in a job-skills training program for individuals who often do not take advantage of training programs. © Society for the Experimental Analysis of Behavior.
Petticrew, Mark; Calnan, Mike; Nazareth, Irwin
2010-01-01
Background Nonresponse to questionnaires can affect the validity of surveys and introduce bias. Offering financial incentives can increase response rates to postal questionnaires, but the effect of financial incentives on response rates to online surveys is less clear. Objective As part of a survey, we aimed to test whether knowledge of a financial incentive would increase the response rate to an online questionnaire. Methods A randomized controlled trial of 485 UK-based principal investigators of publicly funded health services and population health research. Participants were contacted by email and invited to complete an online questionnaire via an embedded URL. Participants were randomly allocated to groups with either “knowledge of” or “no knowledge of” a financial incentive (£10 Amazon gift voucher) to be provided on completion of the survey. At the end of the study, gift vouchers were given to all participants who completed the questionnaire regardless of initial randomization status. Four reminder emails (sent from the same email address as the initial invitation) were sent out to nonrespondents at one, two, three, and four weeks; a fifth postal reminder was also undertaken. The primary outcome measure for the trial was the response rate one week after the second reminder. Response rate was also measured at the end of weeks one, two, three, four, and five, and after a postal reminder was sent. Results In total, 243 (50%) questionnaires were returned (232 completed, 11 in which participation was declined). One week after the second reminder, the response rate in the “knowledge” group was 27% (66/244) versus 20% (49/241) in the “no knowledge” group (χ21 = 3.0, P = .08). The odds ratio for responding among those with knowledge of an incentive was 1.45 (95% confidence interval [CI] 0.95 - 2.21). At the third reminder, participants in the “no knowledge” group were informed about the incentive, ending the randomized element of the study. However we continued to follow up all participants, and from reminder three onwards, no significant differences were observed in the response rates of the two groups. Conclusions Knowledge of a financial incentive did not significantly increase the response rate to an online questionnaire. Future surveys should consider including a randomized element to further test the utility of offering incentives of other types and amounts to participate in online questionnaires. Trial Registration ISRCTN59912797; http://www.controlled-trials.com/ISRCTN59912797 (Archived by WebCite at http://www.webcitation.org/5iPPLbT7s) PMID:20457556
Implementing health care reform in Israel: organizational response to perceived incentives.
Gross, Revital
2003-08-01
Devising new incentives was a main element of health care reform in Israel, which created a regulated market that embodies many principles of managed competition. This study examined sick fund directors' perceptions of the new incentives and their strategic responses to these incentives, enabling the testing of how managed competition works in practice. The methodology used was a multiple case study of Israel's four sick funds. Data were gathered through in-depth interviews with 160 senior officials, analysis of national health insurance legislation, and analysis of published and unpublished archival documents, newspaper articles, public statements of senior managers, and other published data on the sick funds' behavior. The study revealed discrepancies between planned and perceived incentives and highlighted the effect of the latter on strategy formulation. Analysis of sick fund strategies showed that their responses to managed competition incentives deviated from theoretical expectations, compromising some of the objectives of the reform. The study also shows that contextual features account for the specific model of managed competition that was implemented and for the specific strategies employed by the sick funds. The study concludes by highlighting the need to build a process that will enable policy makers to consider local contextual factors when planning and implementing reform, involving health care providers in designing incentives, continuously monitoring processes and outcomes in the reformed system, and allowing for flexibility in policy making.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Barbose, Galen; Wiser, Ryan; Bolinger, Mark
Increasing levels of financial support for customer-sited photovoltaic (PV) systems, provided through publicly-funded incentive programs, has heightened concerns about the long-term performance of these systems. Given the barriers that customers face to ensuring that their PV systems perform well, and the responsibility that PV incentive programs bear to ensure that public funds are prudently spent, these programs should, and often do, play a critical role in ensuring that PV systems receiving incentives perform well. To provide a point of reference for assessing the current state of the art, and to inform program design efforts going forward, we examine the approachesmore » to encouraging PV system performance used by 32 prominent PV incentive programs in the U.S. We identify eight general strategies or groups of related strategies that these programs have used to address performance issues, and highlight important differences in the implementation of these strategies among programs.« less
Higher incentives can impair performance: neural evidence on reinforcement and rationality.
Achtziger, Anja; Alós-Ferrer, Carlos; Hügelschäfer, Sabine; Steinhauser, Marco
2015-11-01
Standard economic thinking postulates that increased monetary incentives should increase performance. Human decision makers, however, frequently focus on past performance, a form of reinforcement learning occasionally at odds with rational decision making. We used an incentivized belief-updating task from economics to investigate this conflict through measurements of neural correlates of reward processing. We found that higher incentives fail to improve performance when immediate feedback on decision outcomes is provided. Subsequent analysis of the feedback-related negativity, an early event-related potential following feedback, revealed the mechanism behind this paradoxical effect. As incentives increase, the win/lose feedback becomes more prominent, leading to an increased reliance on reinforcement and more errors. This mechanism is relevant for economic decision making and the debate on performance-based payment. © The Author (2015). Published by Oxford University Press. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com.
The Impact of Social Pressure and Monetary Incentive on Cognitive Control
Ličen, Mina; Hartmann, Frank; Repovš, Grega; Slapničar, Sergeja
2016-01-01
We compare the effects of two prominent organizational control mechanisms—social pressure and monetary incentive—on cognitive control. Cognitive control underlies the human ability to regulate thoughts and actions in the pursuit of behavioral goals. Previous studies show that monetary incentives can contribute to goal-oriented behavior by activating proactive control. There is, however, much less evidence of how social pressure affects cognitive control and task performance. In a within-subject experimental design, we tested 47 subjects performing the AX-CPT task to compare the activation of cognitive control modes under social pressure and monetary incentive beyond mere instructions to perform better. Our results indicate that instructing participants to improve their performance on its own leads to a significant shift from a reactive to a proactive control mode and that both social pressure and monetary incentive further enhance performance. PMID:26903901
A Study on the Self-Adaption Incentive Performance Salary
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Zhang, Chuanming; Wang, Yang
In project managing, the performance salary management mode is often used to motivate project managers and other similar staff to improve performance or reduce the cost. But the engineering activities who own a lot of internal and external uncertain factors can not be known by the principle. It is difficult for to develop a suitable incentive target to project managers etch. This paper thinks that the manager self master the maximum of information on engineering activities. So this paper sets up an incentive model: the project managers themselves report performance objectives; owner gives the managers reward or punishment combined with their reported performance and actual performance. The model to ensure that the project manager is only accurate self reported its results to get the maximum profit. At the same time, it cans incentive managers to improve performance or reduce the cost. This paper focuses on setting up the model, analyzing the model parameters. And cite an example analyze them.
Squitieri, Lee; Chung, Kevin C
2017-07-01
In 2017, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services began requiring all eligible providers to participate in the Quality Payment Program or face financial reimbursement penalty. The Quality Payment Program outlines two paths for provider participation: the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System and Advanced Alternative Payment Models. For the first performance period beginning in January of 2017, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services estimates that approximately 83 to 90 percent of eligible providers will not qualify for participation in an Advanced Alternative Payment Model and therefore must participate in the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System program. The Merit-Based Incentive Payment System path replaces existing quality-reporting programs and adds several new measures to evaluate providers using four categories of data: (1) quality, (2) cost/resource use, (3) improvement activities, and (4) advancing care information. These categories will be combined to calculate a weighted composite score for each provider or provider group. Composite Merit-Based Incentive Payment System scores based on 2017 performance data will be used to adjust reimbursed payment in 2019. In this article, the authors provide relevant background for understanding value-based provider performance measurement. The authors also discuss Merit-Based Incentive Payment System reporting requirements and scoring methodology to provide plastic surgeons with the necessary information to critically evaluate their own practice capabilities in the context of current performance metrics under the Quality Payment Program.
Chiew, Kimberly S.; Braver, Todd S.
2013-01-01
Motivational manipulations, such as the presence of performance-contingent reward incentives, can have substantial influences on cognitive control. Previous evidence suggests that reward incentives may enhance cognitive performance specifically through increased preparatory, or proactive, control processes. The present study examined reward influences on cognitive control dynamics in the AX-Continuous Performance Task (AX-CPT), using high-resolution pupillometry. In the AX-CPT, contextual cues must be actively maintained over a delay in order to appropriately respond to ambiguous target probes. A key feature of the task is that it permits dissociable characterization of preparatory, proactive control processes (i.e., utilization of context) and reactive control processes (i.e., target-evoked interference resolution). Task performance profiles suggested that reward incentives enhanced proactive control (context utilization). Critically, pupil dilation was also increased on reward incentive trials during context maintenance periods, suggesting trial-specific shifts in proactive control, particularly when context cues indicated the need to overcome the dominant target response bias. Reward incentives had both transient (i.e., trial-by-trial) and sustained (i.e., block-based) effects on pupil dilation, which may reflect distinct underlying processes. The transient pupillary effects were present even when comparing against trials matched in task performance, suggesting a unique motivational influence of reward incentives. These results suggest that pupillometry may be a useful technique for investigating reward motivational signals and their dynamic influence on cognitive control. PMID:23372557
48 CFR 16.402-2 - Performance incentives.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Performance incentives. 16.402-2 Section 16.402-2 Federal Acquisition Regulations System FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION... appropriate in major systems contracts, both in development (when performance objectives are known and the...
45 CFR 305.34 - Payment of incentives.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... PROGRAM PERFORMANCE MEASURES, STANDARDS, FINANCIAL INCENTIVES, AND PENALTIES § 305.34 Payment of... performance data submitted by December 31st by the State and other States for that fiscal year. A positive or...
Clayton, Byron C.
2015-01-01
Successful corporate acquisitions require its managers to achieve substantial performance improvements in order to sufficiently cover acquisition premiums, the expected return of debt and equity investors, and the additional resources needed to capture synergies and accelerate growth. Acquirers understand that achieving the performance improvements necessary to cover these costs and create value for investors will most likely require a significant effort from mergers and acquisitions (M&A) management teams. This understanding drives the common and longstanding practice of offering hefty performance incentive packages to key managers, assuming that financial incentives will induce in-role and extra-role behaviors that drive organizational change and growth. The present study debunks the assumptions of this common M&A practice, providing quantitative evidence that shared vision and autonomous motivation are far more effective drivers of managerial performance than financial incentives. PMID:25610406
Clayton, Byron C
2014-01-01
Successful corporate acquisitions require its managers to achieve substantial performance improvements in order to sufficiently cover acquisition premiums, the expected return of debt and equity investors, and the additional resources needed to capture synergies and accelerate growth. Acquirers understand that achieving the performance improvements necessary to cover these costs and create value for investors will most likely require a significant effort from mergers and acquisitions (M&A) management teams. This understanding drives the common and longstanding practice of offering hefty performance incentive packages to key managers, assuming that financial incentives will induce in-role and extra-role behaviors that drive organizational change and growth. The present study debunks the assumptions of this common M&A practice, providing quantitative evidence that shared vision and autonomous motivation are far more effective drivers of managerial performance than financial incentives.
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Finkelstein, Martin
The incentive grant approach in higher Education is a resource allocation strategy that may have significant positive impact on educational performance. This document covers: (1) the incentive grant approach to resource allocation; (2) the evolution during the past 15 years of types of incentive grant programs and the contrasting roles played by…
Greenberg, J; Pyszczynski, T; Paisley, C
1984-11-01
We conducted an experiment to assess the effect of extrinsic incentives on the use of test anxiety as a self-handicapping strategy. We hypothesized that although reports of anxiety may be greater when such symptoms can serve a defensive function, this effect occurs only when extrinsic incentives are low and not under conditions of high extrinsic incentive. Eighty-four male undergraduates anticipated taking a test of intellectual abilities and either were led to believe that test anxiety has no effect on test performance or were given no particular information about the relation between test anxiety and performance. Subjects were offered either +5 or +25 for obtaining the highest score on the test. Consistent with predictions, no-information subjects reported greater test anxiety before the test than did those who believed that test anxiety was unrelated to performance, but only when the extrinsic incentive for performance was low. However, these subjects did not report greater cognitive interference or exhibit lower test scores than did subjects in other conditions. It is tentatively suggested that the defensive strategy used by these subjects consisted of altering perceptions of anxiety, rather than anxiety itself. The implications of the absence of self-handicapping under high incentive conditions are discussed.
Causey, Kayla B; Bjorklund, David F
2014-11-01
Prospective memory (PM) is remembering to perform an action in the future and is crucial to achieving goal-directed activities in everyday life. Doing so requires that an intention is encoded, retained during a delay interval, and retrieved at the appropriate time of execution. We examined PM ability in preschool children by manipulating factors related to agency and incentive. We further explored how metacognition, executive functioning, and theory of mind-factors known to account for individual differences in PM-influenced performance on these PM tasks. A sample of 31 preschool children were asked to carry out a delayed intention or to remind an adult to carry out an intention that was of high or low incentive to the children. Findings indicated that individual differences in theory of mind were related to individual differences in preschoolers' performance on low-incentive PM tasks, independent of executive functioning contributions, whereas individual differences in executive functioning were related to performance on the high-incentive tasks. These findings suggest that changes in theory of mind and executive functioning are important to consider in models of PM and that different PM tasks (e.g., high vs. low incentive) may involve different cognitive requirements for young children. Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Hospital responses to pay-for-performance incentives.
Reiter, Kristin L; Nahra, Tammie A; Alexander, Jeffrey A; Wheeler, John R C
2006-05-01
Not-for-profit hospitals are complex organizations and, therefore, may face unique challenges in responding to financial incentives for quality. In this research, we explore the types of behavioural changes made by not-for-profit Michigan hospitals in response to a pay-for-performance system for quality. We also identify factors that motivate or facilitate changes in effort. We apply a conceptual framework based on agency theory to motivate our research questions. Using data derived from structured interviews and surveys administered to 86 hospitals participating in a pay-for-performance system, we compare hospitals reporting and not reporting behavioural changes. Separate analyses are performed for hospitals reporting structure-related changes and hospitals reporting process-related changes. Our findings confirm that hospitals respond to incentive payments; however, our findings also reveal that hospital responses are not universal. Rather, involvement by boards of trustees, willingness to exert leverage with physicians, and financial and competitive motivations are all associated with hospitals' behavioural responses to incentives. Results of this research will help inform payers and hospital managers considering the use of incentives about the nature of hospitals' responses.
Aligning provider incentives to improve primary healthcare delivery in the United States
DeVoe, JE; Stenger, R
2016-01-01
Background The United States (US) is reforming primary care delivery systems, including the implementation of ‘patient-centered medical homes.’ Alignment of provider incentives with desired outcomes will likely be important to the success of these delivery system reforms. Methods This critical review uses a theoretical framework from game-theory models to discuss some of the dominant primary care provider payment models and how they create ‘prisoner’s dilemmas’ that have stalled past reform efforts. It then uses this framework to illustrate, hypothetically, how advantages from different models could be blended together to encourage cooperation and improve the quality of primary care services delivered, thus providing an escape from current prisoner’s dilemmas faced by providers. Findings Improvements in primary care delivery will largely hinge on blended payment mechanisms that can effectively combine the advantageous elements of fee-for-service, capitation, and incentive payments into a balanced equation that enables providers to escape the perverse financial incentives of current payment mechanisms and overcome collective action problems. Conclusions If balanced appropriately, a blend of guaranteed payment and selective incentives designed to encourage primary care providers to deliver high quality care, efficient and equitable care and to eliminate incentives towards over-servicing could reach outcomes leading to shared benefits for everyone involved. PMID:27942388
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Barbose, Galen; Wiser, Ryan; Bolinger, Mark
In the U.S., the increasing financial support for customer-sited photovoltaic (PV) systems provided through publicly-funded incentive programs has heightened concerns about the long-term performance of these systems. Given the barriers that customers face to ensuring that their PV systems perform well, and the responsibility that PV incentive programs bear to ensure that public funds are prudently spent, these programs should, and often do, play a critical role in addressing PV system performance. To provide a point of reference for assessing the current state of the art, and to inform program design efforts going forward, we examine the approaches to encouragingmore » PV system performance used by 32 prominent PV incentive programs in the U.S. We identify eight general strategies or groups of related strategies that these programs have used to address factors that affect performance, and describe key implementation details. Based on this review, we then offer recommendations for how PV incentive programs can be effectively designed to mitigate potential performance issues.« less
Paying for performance: Performance incentives increase desire for the reward object.
Hur, Julia D; Nordgren, Loran F
2016-09-01
The current research examines how exposure to performance incentives affects one's desire for the reward object. We hypothesized that the flexible nature of performance incentives creates an attentional fixation on the reward object (e.g., money), which leads people to become more desirous of the rewards. Results from 5 laboratory experiments and 1 large-scale field study provide support for this prediction. When performance was incentivized with monetary rewards, participants reported being more desirous of money (Study 1), put in more effort to earn additional money in an ensuing task (Study 2), and were less willing to donate money to charity (Study 4). We replicated the result with nonmonetary rewards (Study 5). We also found that performance incentives increased attention to the reward object during the task, which in part explains the observed effects (Study 6). A large-scale field study replicated these findings in a real-world setting (Study 7). One laboratory experiment failed to replicate (Study 3). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved).
Rewards and Performance Incentives.
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Zigon, Jack
1994-01-01
Discusses rewards and performance incentives for employees, including types of rewards; how rewards help in managing; dysfunctional awards; selecting the right reward; how to find rewards that fit; and delivering rewards effectively. Examples are included. (three references) (LRW)
Team Pay for Performance: Experimental Evidence from Round Rock's Project on Incentives in Teaching
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
McCaffrey, Daniel F.; Pane, John F.; Springer, Matthew G.; Burns, Susan F.; Haas, Ann
2011-01-01
This paper presents the results of a rigorous experiment examining the impact of pay for performance on student achievement and instructional practice. This study, conducted by the National Center on Performance Incentives, examines a pay-for-performance program in Round Rock (Texas) which distributed performance awards to teachers based on a…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
What Works Clearinghouse, 2014
2014-01-01
The 2013 study, "Incentives, Selection, and Teacher Performance: Evidence from IMPACT" examined the effects of "IMPACT," a teacher evaluation system used in the District of Columbia Public Schools, on teacher retention and performance. "IMPACT" assigns each teacher a single performance score based on classroom…
Zafeiriou, Athina; Gendolla, Guido H E
2017-09-01
Based on previous research on implicit effects on effort-related cardiovascular response and evidence that aging is associated with cognitive difficulties, we tested whether the mere activation of the aging stereotype can systematically influence young individuals' effort-mobilization during cognitive performance. Young participants performed an objectively difficult short-term memory task during which they processed elderly vs. youth primes and expected low vs. high incentive for success. When participants processed elderly primes during the task, we expected cardiovascular response to be weak in the low-incentive condition and strong in the high-incentive condition. Unaffected by incentive, effort in the youth-prime condition should fall in between the two elderly-prime cells. Effects on cardiac pre-ejection period (PEP) and heart rate (HR) largely supported these predictions. The present findings show for the first time that the mere activation of the aging stereotype can systematically influence effort mobilization during cognitive performance-even in young adults. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Weindler, J; Kiefer, R T
2001-06-01
The study evaluated the impact of the additional imposed work of breathing (WBimp) generated by two different spirometers on postoperative incentive spirometry performance in patients at high risk and moderate risk for postoperative pulmonary complications (PPCs). Additionally, we investigated whether maximal inspiratory pressure (PImax) is an easy estimate of the WBimp imposed by incentive spirometers. Prospective, randomized, single-blind clinical trial. ICU of a university hospital. Thirty male patients were assigned to a group at high risk for PPCs (group A; inspiratory capacity [IC], < 1.6 L) or to a group at moderate risk for PPCs (group B; IC, 1.6 to 2.5 L) after upper-abdominal, thoracic, or two-cavity surgery. On the first or second postoperative day WBimp, IC, and PImax were recorded without spirometers (baseline) and during incentive spirometry with the Mediflo spirometer (Medimex; Hamburg, Germany) (high WBimp) and the Coach spirometer (Kendall; Neustadt, Germany) (low WBimp) using a pneumotachograph. In group A, the baseline and the ICs for both spirometers only differed slightly. In group B, the IC was significantly reduced for the Mediflo (p < 0.05), which imposed a WBimp twice as high as the Coach (p < 0.01). PImax was significantly increased for both the Mediflo and the Coach (p < 0.01). PImax was positively correlated with WBimp (r = 0.8). Incentive spirometers differ considerably in their additional Wbimp with a potential impact on the efficacy of postoperative incentive spirometry performance. PImax might be an easy clinical estimate for the WBimp during incentive spirometry. Incentive spirometers with low WBimp permit increased maximal sustained inspiration and, thus, enhanced incentive spirometry performance, and, therefore, it might be more suitable for use in postoperative respiratory care.
Hardin, Michael G; Schroth, Elizabeth; Pine, Daniel S; Ernst, Monique
2007-05-01
Developmental changes in cognitive and affective processes contribute to adolescent risk-taking behavior, emotional intensification, and psychopathology. The current study examined adolescent development of cognitive control processes and their modulation by incentive, in health and psychopathology. Predictions include 1) better cognitive control in adults than adolescents, and in healthy adolescents than anxious and depressed adolescents, and 2) a stronger influence of incentives in adolescents than adults, and in healthy adolescents than their depressed and anxious counterparts. Antisaccadic eye movement parameters, which provide a measure of cognitive control, were collected during a reward antisaccade task that included parameterized incentive levels. Participants were 20 healthy adults, 30 healthy adolescents, 16 adolescents with an anxiety disorder, and 11 adolescents with major depression. Performance accuracy and saccade latency were analyzed to test both developmental and psychopathology hypotheses. Development and psychopathology group differences in cognitive control were found. Specifically, adults performed better than healthy adolescents, and healthy adolescents than anxious and depressed adolescents. Incentive improved accuracy for all groups; however, incremental increases were not sufficiently large to further modulate performance. Incentives also affected saccade latencies, pushing healthy adolescent latencies to adult levels, while being less effective in adolescents with depression or anxiety. This latter effect was partially mediated by anxiety symptom severity. Current findings evidence the modulation of cognitive control processes by incentives. While seen in both healthy adults and healthy adolescents, this modulatory effect was stronger in youth. While anxious and depressed adolescents exhibited improved cognitive control under incentives, this effect was smaller than that in healthy adolescents. These findings suggest differential incentive and/or cognitive control processing in anxiety and depression, and across development. Differences could result from disorder specific, or combined developmental and pathological mechanisms.
Incentive-related modulation of cognitive control in healthy, anxious, and depressed adolescents
Hardin, Michael G.; Schroth, Elizabeth; Pine, Daniel S.; Ernst, Monique
2009-01-01
Background Developmental changes in cognitive and affective processes contribute to adolescent risk-taking behavior, emotional intensification, and psychopathology. The current study examined adolescent development of cognitive control processes and their modulation by incentive, in health and psychopathology. Predictions include 1) better cognitive control in adults than adolescents, and in healthy adolescents than anxious and depressed adolescents, and 2) a stronger influence of incentives in adolescents than adults, and in healthy adolescents than their depressed and anxious counterparts. Methods Antisaccadic eye movement parameters, which provide a measure of cognitive control, were collected during a reward antisaccade task that included parameterized incentive levels. Participants were 20 healthy adults, 30 healthy adolescents, 16 adolescents with an anxiety disorder, and 11 adolescents with major depression. Performance accuracy and saccade latency were analyzed to test both developmental and psychopathology hypotheses. Results Development and psychopathology group differences in cognitive control were found. Specifically, adults performed better than healthy adolescents, and healthy adolescents than anxious and depressed adolescents. Incentive improved accuracy for all groups; however, incremental increases were not sufficiently large to further modulate performance. Incentives also affected saccade latencies, pushing healthy adolescent latencies to adult levels, while being less effective in adolescents with depression or anxiety. This latter effect was partially mediated by anxiety symptom severity. Conclusions Current findings evidence the modulation of cognitive control processes by incentives. While seen in both healthy adults and healthy adolescents, this modulatory effect was stronger in youth. While anxious and depressed adolescents exhibited improved cognitive control under incentives, this effect was smaller than that in healthy adolescents. These findings suggest differential incentive and/or cognitive control processing in anxiety and depression, and across development. Differences could result from disorder specific, or combined developmental and pathological mechanisms. PMID:17501725
Incentives for Better Performance in Health Care
Abduljawad, Asaad; Al-Assaf, Assaf F.
2011-01-01
Incentives for better performance in health care have several modes and methods. They are designed to motivate and encourage people to perform well and improve their outcomes. They may include monetary or non-monetary incentives and may be applied to consumers, individual providers or institutions. One such model is the Pay-for-Performance system. In this system, beneficiaries are compared with one another based on a set of performance indicators and those that achieve a high level of performance are rewarded financially. This system is meant to recognise and primarily to reward high performers. Its goal is to encourage beneficiaries to strive for better performance. This system has been applied in several countries and for several recipients and settings. Early indications show that this system has had mixed effects on performance. PMID:21969891
Quality-based financial incentives in health care: can we improve quality by paying for it?
Conrad, Douglas A; Perry, Lisa
2009-01-01
This article asks whether financial incentives can improve the quality of health care. A conceptual framework drawn from microeconomics, agency theory, behavioral economics, and cognitive psychology motivates a set of propositions about incentive effects on clinical quality. These propositions are evaluated through a synthesis of extant peer-reviewed empirical evidence. Comprehensive financial incentives--balancing rewards and penalties; blending structure, process, and outcome measures; emphasizing continuous, absolute performance standards; tailoring the size of incremental rewards to increasing marginal costs of quality improvement; and assuring certainty, frequency, and sustainability of incentive payoffs--offer the prospect of significantly enhancing quality beyond the modest impacts of prevailing pay-for-performance (P4P) programs. Such organizational innovations as the primary care medical home and accountable health care organizations are expected to catalyze more powerful quality incentive models: risk- and quality-adjusted capitation, episode of care payments, and enhanced fee-for-service payments for quality dimensions (e.g., prevention) most amenable to piece-rate delivery.
45 CFR 305.32 - Requirements applicable to calculations.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... HUMAN SERVICES PROGRAM PERFORMANCE MEASURES, STANDARDS, FINANCIAL INCENTIVES, AND PENALTIES § 305.32... necessary to calculate performance for incentives and penalties for a fiscal year must be submitted to the... fiscal year. Only data submitted as of December 31st will be used to determine the State's performance...
Perspectives on Performance-Based Incentive Plans.
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Duttweiler, Patricia Cloud; Ramos-Cancel, Maria L.
This document is a synthesis of the current literature on performance-based incentive systems for teachers and administrators. Section one provides an introduction to the reform movement and to performance-based pay initiatives; a definition of terms; a brief discussion of funding sources; a discussion of compensation strategies; a description of…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Cooke, Valerie; Arling, Greg; Lewis, Teresa; Abrahamson, Kathleen A.; Mueller, Christine; Edstrom, Lisa
2010-01-01
Purpose: Minnesota's Nursing Facility Performance-Based Incentive Payment Program (PIPP) supports provider-initiated projects aimed at improving care quality and efficiency. PIPP moves beyond conventional pay for performance. It seeks to promote implementation of evidence-based practices, encourage innovation and risk taking, foster collaboration…
Koffman, D M; Lee, J W; Hopp, J W; Emont, S L
1998-01-01
To determine the effectiveness of a multicomponent smoking cessation program supplemented by incentives and team competition. A quasi-experimental design was employed to compare the effectiveness of three different smoking cessation programs, each assigned to separate worksite. The study was conducted from 1990 to 1991 at three aerospace industry worksites in California. All employees who were current, regular tobacco users were eligible to participate in the program offered at their site. The multicomponent program included a self-help package, telephone counseling, and other elements. The incentive-competition program included the multicomponent program plus cash incentives and team competition for the first 5 months of the program. The traditional program offered a standard smoking cessation program. Self-reported questionnaires and carbon monoxide tests of tobacco use or abstinence were used over a 12-month period. The incentive-competition program had an abstinence rate of 41% at 6 months (n = 68), which was significantly better than the multicomponent program (23%, n = 81) or the traditional program (8%, n = 36). At 12 months, the quit rates for the incentive and multicomponent-programs were statistically indistinguishable (37% vs. 30%), but remained higher than the traditional program (11%). Chi-square tests, t-tests, and logistic regression were used to compare smoking abstinence across the three programs. Offering a multicomponent program with telephone counseling may be just as effective for long-term smoking cessation as such a program plus incentives and competition, and more effective than a traditional program.
Using performance-based pay to improve the quality of teachers.
Lavy, Victor
2007-01-01
Tying teachers' pay to their classroom performance should, says Victor Lavy, improve the current educational system both by clarifying teaching goals and by attracting and retaining the most productive teachers. But implementing pay for performance poses many practical challenges, because measuring individual teachers' performance is difficult. Lavy reviews evidence on individual and school-based incentive programs implemented in recent years both in the United States and abroad. Lavy himself evaluated two carefully designed programs in Israel and found significant gains in student and teacher performance. He observes that research evidence suggests, although not conclusively, that pay-for-performance incentives can improve teachers' performance, although they can also lead to unintended and undesired consequences, such as teachers' directing their efforts exclusively to rewarded activities. Lavy also offers general guidelines for designing effective programs. He emphasizes that the system must measure true performance in a way that minimizes random variation as well as undesired and unintended consequences. It must align performance with ultimate outcomes and must be monitored closely to discourage gaming if not outright fraud in measured output. Goals should be attainable. Incentives should balance individual rewards with school incentives, fostering a cooperative culture but not at the expense of free riding. All teachers should be eligible for the incentive offered, but only a subset of teachers should be rewarded in practice. If too many teachers are rewarded, teachers may not need to exert much extra effort to benefit. Many of the practical challenges faced by performance-related pay, Lavy says, can be addressed through careful design of the system. He emphasizes that setting up a performance-related pay system that works is not a one-time task. Even with the best preparation, initial implementation is likely to be problematic. But if the effort is seen as ongoing, it should be possible to make progress gradually in developing incentives that motivate the desired teaching behaviors and that will be perceived by teachers as fair and accurate.
Aryankhesal, Aidin; Sheldon, Trevor A; Mannion, Russell; Mahdipour, Saeade
2015-07-01
Performance measurement systems are increasingly used to reward and improve provider performance. However, such initiatives may also inadvertently induce a range of unintended and dysfunctional side-effects. This study explores the unintended and adverse consequences induced by the Iranian national hospital grading programme, which incorporates financial incentives for meeting nationally defined standards. We interviewed key informants across four key groups with a legitimate interest in healthcare performance: four purposively selected hospitals; four health insurance organizations; the Iranian hospital accreditation body; and one grading agency. The transcribed interviews and field notes were analysed thematically, and subsequently, member checking was conducted. Seven dysfunctional consequences were identified: misrepresentation of data by hospitals; increased anxiety and stress among hospital employees; tunnel vision; financial pressures on poorly graded hospitals; incentives to purchase unnecessary equipment; erosion of public trust; and restricting access to hospital services by patients. These were caused by the way the grading system was implemented: poor standards of audit; the way in which the audit process was conducted; and the timing of audits. The pay for performance element of the grading system and the focus on structural aspects in the standards made improvement in grading particularly difficult for those hospitals that had been assessed as under-performing. Although the Iranian hospital grading system has resulted in a significant increase in the adoption of national standards, it has nevertheless induced a range of perverse outcomes. To mitigate these requires further refinement and recalibration of the system. © The Author(s) 2015.
Luo, Renfu; Zhang, Linxiu; Sylvia, Sean; Shi, Yaojiang; Foo, Patricia; Zhao, Qiran; Martorell, Reynaldo; Medina, Alexis; Rozelle, Scott
2012-01-01
Objectives To test the impact of provider performance pay for anaemia reduction in rural China. Design A cluster randomised trial of information, subsidies, and incentives for school principals to reduce anaemia among their students. Enumerators and study participants were not informed of study arm assignment. Setting 72 randomly selected rural primary schools across northwest China. Participants 3553 fourth and fifth grade students aged 9-11 years. All fourth and fifth grade students in sample schools participated in the study. Interventions Sample schools were randomly assigned to a control group, with no intervention, or one of three treatment arms: (a) an information arm, in which principals received information about anaemia; (b) a subsidy arm, in which principals received information and unconditional subsidies; and (c) an incentive arm, in which principals received information, subsidies, and financial incentives for reducing anaemia among students. Twenty seven schools were assigned to the control arm (1816 students at baseline, 1623 at end point), 15 were assigned to the information arm (659 students at baseline, 596 at end point), 15 to the subsidy arm (726 students at baseline, 667 at end point), and 15 to the incentive arm (743 students at baseline, 667 at end point). Main outcome measures Student haemoglobin concentrations. Results Mean student haemoglobin concentration rose by 1.5 g/L (95% CI –1.1 to 4.1) in information schools, 0.8 g/L (–1.8 to 3.3) in subsidy schools, and 2.4 g/L (0 to 4.9) in incentive schools compared with the control group. This increase in haemoglobin corresponded to a reduction in prevalence of anaemia (Hb <115 g/L) of 24% in incentive schools. Interactions with pre-existing incentives for principals to achieve good academic performance led to substantially larger gains in the information and incentive arms: when combined with incentives for good academic performance, associated effects on student haemoglobin concentration were 9.8 g/L (4.1 to 15.5) larger in information schools and 8.6 g/L (2.1 to 15.1) larger in incentive schools. Conclusions Financial incentives for health improvement were modestly effective. Understanding interactions with other motives and pre-existing incentives is critical. Trial registration number ISRCTN76158086. PMID:22842354
Tambor, Marzena; Pavlova, Milena; Golinowska, Stanisława; Arsenijevic, Jelena; Groot, Wim
2016-09-05
To motivate people to lead a healthier life and to engage in disease prevention, explicit financial incentives, such as monetary rewards for attaining health-related targets (e.g. smoking cessation, weight loss or increased physical activity) or disincentives for reverting to unhealthy habits, are applied. A review focused on financial incentives for health promotion among older people is lacking. Attention to this group is necessary because older people may respond differently to financial incentives, e.g. because of differences in opportunity costs and health perceptions. To outline how explicit financial incentives for healthy lifestyle and disease prevention work among older persons, this study reviews the recent evidence on this topic. We applied the method of systematic literature review and we searched in PUBMED, ECONLIT and COCHRANE LIBRARY for studies focused on explicit financial incentives targeted at older adults to promote health and stimulate primary prevention as well as screening. The publications selected as relevant were analyzed based on directed (relational) content analysis. The results are presented in a narrative manner complemented with an appendix table that describes the study details. We assessed the design of the studies reported in the publications in a qualitative manner. We also checked the quality of our review using the PRISMA 2009 checklist. We identified 15 studies on the role of explicit financial incentives in changing health-related behavior of older people. They include both, quantitative studies on the effectiveness of financial rewards as well as qualitative studies on the acceptability of financial incentives. The quantitative studies are characterized by a great diversity of designs and provide mixed results on the effects of explicit financial incentives. The results of the qualitative studies indicate limited trust of older people in the use of explicit financial incentives for health promotion and prevention. More research is needed on the effects of explicit financial incentives for prevention and promotion among older people before their broader use can be recommended. Overall, the design of the financial incentive system may be a crucial element in their acceptability.
Modulation of working memory function by motivation through loss-aversion
Krawczyk, Daniel C.; D’Esposito, Mark
2012-01-01
Cognitive performance is affected by motivation. Few studies, however, have investigated the neural mechanisms of the influence of motivation through potential monetary punishment on working memory. We employed functional MRI during a delayed recognition task that manipulated top-down control demands with added monetary incentives to some trials in the form of potential losses of bonus money. Behavioral performance on the task was influenced by loss-threatening incentives in the form of faster and more accurate performance. As shown previously, we found enhancement of activity for relevant stimuli occurs throughout all task periods (e.g. stimulus encoding, maintenance, and response) in both prefrontal and visual association cortex. Further, these activation patterns were enhanced for trials with possible monetary loss relative to non-incentive trials. During the incentive cue, the amygdala and striatum showed significantly greater activation when money was at a possible loss on the trial. We also evaluated patterns of functional connectivity between regions responsive to monetary consequences and prefrontal areas responsive to the task. This analysis revealed greater delay period connectivity between and the left insula and prefrontal cortex with possible monetary loss relative to non-incentive trials. Overall, these results reveal that incentive motivation can modulate performance on working memory tasks through top-down signals via amplification of activity within prefrontal and visual association regions selective to processing the perceptual inputs of the stimuli to be remembered. PMID:22113962
Yé, Maurice; Diboulo, Eric; Kagoné, Moubassira; Sié, Ali; Sauerborn, Rainer; Loukanova, Svetla
2016-01-01
One promising way to improve the motivation of healthcare providers and the quality of healthcare services is performance-based incentives (PBIs) also referred as performance-based financing. Our study aims to explore healthcare providers' preferences for an incentive scheme based on local resources, which aimed at improving the quality of maternal and child health care in the Nouna Health District. A qualitative and quantitative survey was carried out in 2010 involving 94 healthcare providers within 34 health facilities. In addition, in-depth interviews involving a total of 33 key informants were conducted at health facility levels. Overall, 85% of health workers were in favour of an incentive scheme based on the health district's own financial resources (95% CI: [71.91; 88.08]). Most health workers (95 and 96%) expressed a preference for financial incentives (95% CI: [66.64; 85.36]) and team-based incentives (95% CI: [67.78; 86.22]), respectively. The suggested performance indicators were those linked to antenatal care services, prevention of mother-to-child human immunodeficiency virus transmission, neonatal care, and immunization. The early involvement of health workers and other stakeholders in designing an incentive scheme proved to be valuable. It ensured their effective participation in the process and overall acceptance of the scheme at the end. This study is an important contribution towards the designing of effective PBI schemes.
Yé, Maurice; Diboulo, Eric; Kagoné, Moubassira; Sié, Ali; Sauerborn, Rainer; Loukanova, Svetla
2016-01-01
Background One promising way to improve the motivation of healthcare providers and the quality of healthcare services is performance-based incentives (PBIs) also referred as performance-based financing. Our study aims to explore healthcare providers’ preferences for an incentive scheme based on local resources, which aimed at improving the quality of maternal and child health care in the Nouna Health District. Design A qualitative and quantitative survey was carried out in 2010 involving 94 healthcare providers within 34 health facilities. In addition, in-depth interviews involving a total of 33 key informants were conducted at health facility levels. Results Overall, 85% of health workers were in favour of an incentive scheme based on the health district's own financial resources (95% CI: [71.91; 88.08]). Most health workers (95 and 96%) expressed a preference for financial incentives (95% CI: [66.64; 85.36]) and team-based incentives (95% CI: [67.78; 86.22]), respectively. The suggested performance indicators were those linked to antenatal care services, prevention of mother-to-child human immunodeficiency virus transmission, neonatal care, and immunization. Conclusions The early involvement of health workers and other stakeholders in designing an incentive scheme proved to be valuable. It ensured their effective participation in the process and overall acceptance of the scheme at the end. This study is an important contribution towards the designing of effective PBI schemes. PMID:26739784
Chapter 15: Using System Dynamics to Model Industry's Developmental Response to Energy Policy
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Bush, Brian; Inman, Daniel; Newes, Emily
In this chapter we explore the potential development of the biofuels industry using the Biomass Scenario Model (BSM), a system dynamics model developed at the National Renewable Energy Laboratory through the support of the U.S. Department of Energy. The BSM is designed to analyze the implications of policy on the development of the supply chain for biofuels in the United States. It explicitly represents the behavior of decision makers such as farmers, investors, fueling station owners, and consumers. We analyze several illustrative case studies that explore a range of policies and discuss how incentives interact with individual parts of themore » supply chain as well as the industry as a whole. The BSM represents specific incentives that are intended to approximate policy in the form of selected laws and regulations. Through characterizing the decision making behaviors of economic actors within the supply chain that critically influence the adoption rate of new biofuels production technologies and demonstrating synergies among policies, we find that incentives with coordinated impacts on each major element of the supply chain catalyze net effects of decision maker behavior such that the combined incentives are greater than the summed effects of individual incentives in isolation.« less
Teacher Incentives in Developing Countries: Experimental Evidence from India. Research Brief
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
National Center on Performance Incentives, 2008
2008-01-01
In "Teacher Incentives in Developing Countries: Experimental Evidence from India"--a paper presented at the National Center on Performance Incentives research to policy conference in February--Karthik Muralidharan (Harvard University) and Venkatesh Sundararaman (The World Bank) present findings from a randomized experiment conducted in…
A Survey: The Principal Elements of Safety Programs of Nine Major American Shipyards
1991-01-01
Urine Breath Q 39. Subst. abuse Hearing Chest X-Ray Spirometry Q 40. Yes Q 41. Yes Q 42. Yes Q 43. Yes Q 44. Yes < Pipe Wire rope Chain Wood 8 YARD 1...Maintenance Safety Other 1. . 2. 3. 4. Q 71. Yes Q 72. Company Yard 14 Which of the following do you use as incentives to worker safety? (“1” is the...accident recording form? * * * * * * * * 8 This form is unique to your. . . * * * * * * 6 * * * * 4 Incentive programs and awareness programs
Judah, Gaby; Darzi, Ara; Vlaev, Ivo; Gunn, Laura; King, Derek; King, Dominic; Valabhji, Jonathan; Bicknell, Colin
2018-05-23
Conflicting evidence exists regarding the impact of financial incentives on encouraging attendance at medical screening appointments. The primary aim was to determine whether financial incentives increase attendance at diabetic eye screening in persistent non-attenders. A three-armed randomised controlled trial was conducted in London in 2015. 1051 participants aged over 16 years, who had not attended eye screening appointments for 2 years or more, were randomised (1.4:1:1 randomisation ratio) to receive the usual invitation letter (control), an offer of £10 cash for attending screening (fixed incentive) or a 1 in 100 chance of winning £1000 (lottery incentive) if they attend. The primary outcome was the proportion of invitees attending screening, and a comparative analysis was performed to assess group differences. Pairwise comparisons of attendance rates were performed, using a conservative Bonferroni correction for independent comparisons. 34/435 (7.8%) of control, 17/312 (5.5%) of fixed incentive and 10/304 (3.3%) of lottery incentive groups attended. Participants who received any incentive were significantly less likely to attend their appointment compared with controls (risk ratio (RR)=0.56; 95% CI 0.34 to 0.92). Those in the probabilistic incentive group (RR=0.42; 95% CI 0.18 to 0.98), but not the fixed incentive group (RR=1.66; 95% CI 0.65 to 4.21), were significantly less likely to attend than those in the control group. Financial incentives, particularly lottery-based incentives, attract fewer patients to diabetic eye screening than standard invites in this population. Financial incentives should not be used to promote screening unless tested in context, as they may negatively affect attendance rates. © Article author(s) (or their employer(s) unless otherwise stated in the text of the article) 2018. All rights reserved. No commercial use is permitted unless otherwise expressly granted.
Should we pay the student? A randomised trial of financial incentives in medical education.
Raupach, Tobias; Brown, Jamie; Wieland, Anna; Anders, Sven; Harendza, Sigrid
2013-09-01
Financial incentives are effective in moderating physician and patient behaviour, but they have not been studied in the context of medical education. This study assessed whether financial incentives can motivate students to acquire electrocardiogram (ECG) interpretation skills. Students enrolled for a cardio-respiratory teaching module (n = 121) were randomised to an intervention (financial incentive) or a control (book voucher raffle) condition. All students took three validated exams of ECG interpretation skills (at module entry, module exit and seven weeks later). Only the exit exam was financially incentivised in the intervention group. The primary outcome was the proportion of students who correctly identified ≥60% of clinically important diagnoses in the exit exam. Financial incentives more than doubled the odds of correctly identifying ≥60% of diagnoses in the exit exam (adjusted odds ratio 2.44, 95% confidence interval 1.05-5.67) and significantly increased student learning time. However, there was no significant effect on performance levels in the retention exam. Financial incentives increase reported learning time and examination results in the short-term. The lack of a sustained effect on performance suggests that financial incentives may foster a superficial or strategic rather than a deep approach to learning.
Changes in Incentives, Rewards and Sanctions.
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Lonsdale, Alan
1993-01-01
A review of the literature over the past decade reflects substantial changes in rewards, incentives, and sanctions used with college faculty. These changes parallel changes in the public sector generally. Increasing emphasis on formal evaluation and on use of money as an incentive and reward for performance is noted. (MSE)
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Stecher, Brian M.; Camm, Frank; Damberg, Cheryl L.; Hamilton, Laura S.; Mullen, Kathleen J.; Nelson, Christopher; Sorensen, Paul; Wachs, Martin; Yoh, Allison; Zellman, Gail L.
2010-01-01
Performance-based accountability systems (PBASs), which link incentives to measured performance as a means of improving services to the public, have gained popularity. While PBASs can vary widely across sectors, they share three main components: goals, incentives, and measures. Research suggests that PBASs influence provider behaviors, but little…
Performance Incentives: Their Growing Impact on American K-12 Education
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Springer, Matthew G., Ed.
2009-01-01
The concept of "pay for performance" for public school teachers is once again growing in popularity and use. U.S. education is now at a critical juncture that requires thoughtful and informed consideration of this policy innovation. "Performance Incentives" offers the most up-to-date and complete analysis yet of the…
Incentives, Selection, and Teacher Performance: Evidence from IMPACT
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Dee, Thomas S.; Wyckoff, James
2015-01-01
Teachers in the United States are compensated largely on the basis of fixed schedules that reward experience and credentials. However, there is a growing interest in whether performance-based incentives based on rigorous teacher evaluations can improve teacher retention and performance. The evidence available to date has been mixed at best. This…
Incentives and Their Dynamics in Public Sector Performance Management Systems
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Heinrich, Carolyn J.; Marschke, Gerald
2010-01-01
We use the principal-agent model as a focal theoretical frame for synthesizing what we know, both theoretically and empirically, about the design and dynamics of the implementation of performance management systems in the public sector. In this context, we review the growing body of evidence about how performance measurement and incentive systems…
48 CFR 215.404-71-2 - Performance risk.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-10-01
... incentive range when contract performance includes the introduction of new, significant technological innovation. Use the technology incentive range only for the most innovative contract efforts. Innovation may... reliability, or reduced costs; or (B) New products or systems that contain significant technological advances...
Strand, Michael T; Hawk, Larry W; Bubnik, Michelle; Shiels, Keri; Pelham, William E; Waxmonsky, James G
2012-10-01
Working memory (WM) is considered a core deficit in Attention-Deficit/ Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), with numerous studies demonstrating impaired WM among children with ADHD. We tested the degree to which WM in children with ADHD was improved by performance-based incentives, an analog of behavioral intervention. In two studies, WM performance was assessed using a visuo-spatial n-back task. Study 1 compared children (ages 9-12 years) with ADHD-Combined type (n = 24) to a group of typically developing (TD) children (n = 32). Study 1 replicated WM deficits among children with ADHD. Incentives improved WM, particularly among children with ADHD. The provision of incentives reduced the ADHD-control group difference by approximately half but did not normalize WM. Study 2 examined the separate and combined effects of incentives and stimulant medication among 17 children with ADHD-Combined type. Both incentives and a moderate dose of long-acting methylphenidate (MPH; ~0.3 mg/kg t.i.d. equivalent) robustly improved WM relative to the no-incentive, placebo condition. The combination of incentives and medication improved WM significantly more than either incentives or MPH alone. These studies indicate that contingencies markedly improve WM among children with ADHD-Combined type, with effect sizes comparable to a moderate dose of stimulant medication. More broadly, this work calls attention to the role of motivation in studying cognitive deficits in ADHD and in testing multifactorial models of ADHD.
Optimisation of Healthcare Contracts: Tensions Between Standardisation and Innovation
Mikkers, Misja; Ryan, Padhraig
2016-01-01
An important determinant of health system performance is contracting. Providers often respond to financial incentives, despite the ethical underpinnings of medicine, and payers can craft contracts to influence performance. Yet contracting is highly imperfect in both single-payer and multi-payer health systems. Arguably, in a competitive, multi-payer environment, contractual innovation may occur more rapidly than in a single-payer system. This innovation in contract design could enhance performance. However, contractual innovation often fails to improve performance as payer incentives are misaligned with public policy objectives. Numerous countries seek to improve healthcare contracts, but thus far no health system has demonstrably crafted the necessary blend of incentives to stimulate optimal contracting. PMID:26927400
Profit incentives and the hospital industry: are we expecting too much?
Register, C A; Sharp, A M; Bivin, D G
1985-01-01
In the recent past, a great deal of faith has been placed in the idea that the performance of the hospital industry could be improved significantly by relying more heavily on profit incentives. This article considers the effect of profit incentives on hospital behavior and finds that the existence of profit incentives has not led the for-profit hospitals in the sample to behave in significantly different economic fashions than the nonprofits. PMID:3924860
Performance-based financial incentives for diabetes care: an effective strategy?
Latham, Lesley P; Marshall, Emily Gard
2015-02-01
The use of financial incentives provided to primary care physicians who achieve target management or clinical outcomes has been advocated to support the fulfillment of care recommendations for patients with diabetes. This article explores the characteristics of incentive models implemented in the context of universal healthcare systems in the United Kingdom, Australia, Taiwan and Canada; the extent to which these interventions have been successful in improving diabetes outcomes; and the key challenges and concerns around implementing incentive models. Research in the effect of incentives in the United Kingdom demonstrates some improvements in process outcomes and achievement of cholesterol, blood pressure and glycated hemoglobin (A1C) targets. Evidence of the efficacy of programs implemented outside of the United Kingdom is very limited but suggests that physicians participating in these enhanced billing incentive programs were already completing the guideline-recommended care prior to the introduction of the incentive. A shift to pay-for-performance programs may have important implications for professionalism and patient-centred care. In the absence of definitive evidence that financial incentives drive the quality of diabetes management at the level of primary care, policy makers should proceed with caution. It is important to look beyond simply modifying physicians' behaviours and address the factors and systemic barriers that make it challenging for patients and physicians to manage diabetes in partnership. Copyright © 2015 Canadian Diabetes Association. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Motivation and Organizational Incentives for High Vitality Teachers: A Qualitative Perspective.
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Sederberg, Charles H.; Clark, Shirley M.
1990-01-01
Minnesota teachers of the year (N=18) were interviewed to identify motivation and organizational incentives for exemplary classroom performance. Values and role behaviors of high-vitality teachers differ from those assumed by rational management models calling for incentives such as increased academic preparation, career ladders, and merit pay.…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Mertler, Craig A.
This study attempted to (1) expand the dichotomous classification scheme typically used by educators and researchers to describe teaching incentives and (2) offer administrators and teachers an alternative framework within which to develop incentive systems. Elementary, middle, and high school teachers in Ohio rated 10 commonly instituted teaching…
Chen, Tsung-Tai; Lai, Mei-Shu; Chung, Kuo-Piao
2016-02-01
To determine whether the magnitude of incentives or other design attributes should be prioritized and the most important attributes, according to physicians, of the diabetes P4P (pay-for-performance) program design. We implemented a discrete choice experiment (DCE) to elicit the P4P incentive design-related preferences of physicians. All of the physicians (n = 248) who participated in the diabetes P4P program located in the supervisory area of the northern regional branch of the Bureau of National Health Insurance in 2009 were included. The response rate was ∼ 60%. Our research found that the bonus type of incentive was the most important attribute, followed by the incentive structure and the investment magnitude. Physicians may feel that good P4P designs are more important than the magnitude of the investment by the insurer. The two most important P4P designs include providing the bonus type of incentive and using pay-for-excellence plus pay-for-improvement. © The Author 2015. Published by Oxford University Press in association with the International Society for Quality in Health Care; all rights reserved.
Rollins, K E; Aggarwal, S; Fletcher, A; Knight, A; Rigg, K; Williams, A R; Bhattacharjya, S
2013-05-01
This study aimed to assess the impact of early incentive spirometry on the incidence of chest infection in patients undergoing laparoscopic donor nephrectomy. A retrospective review on all consecutive laparoscopic donor nephrectomies (LDN) performed at a single institution from January 2008 to August 2012 was performed. We performed 84 LDN. Seventy patients had epidural analgesia continued for 48 hours postoperatively and 14 had a combination of spinal followed by oral analgesia. Incentive spirometry was introduced from July 2010 and 45 of the 84 donors used the spirometer as taught, both pre- and postoperatively. We performed 84 LDN; 39 patients did not receive incentive spirometers and had postoperative chest physiotherapy started on postoperative day 1. Of the 45 patients given incentive spirometers, 44 started using their spirometers as taught, after recovery once they were settled in the ward, 1 patient started the exercises the following day. In the group who received no spirometer, 5 patients had a chest infection. In the group of patients who started using their spirometers in the early perioperative period (44/45), no patient developed a chest infection. One patient in this group was excluded from the analysis because he started spirometer exercises on postoperative day 1. This patient did develop a chest infection. Our results suggest that early introduction of incentive spirometry after LDN significantly reduces the incidence of chest infection (P < .05); however, this benefit may be lost if the introduction of spirometry is delayed. Copyright © 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
20 CFR 666.230 - How does the Department determine the amounts for Incentive Grant awards?
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-04-01
... under WIA section 136(g)(2) resulting from funds withheld for poor performance by States; and (4) The... ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR PERFORMANCE ACCOUNTABILITY UNDER TITLE I OF THE WORKFORCE INVESTMENT ACT Incentives and Sanctions for State Performance § 666.230 How does the Department determine the amounts for...
Incentives, Selection, and Teacher Performance: Evidence from IMPACT. NBER Working Paper No. 19529
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Dee, Thomas; Wyckoff, James
2013-01-01
Teachers in the United States are compensated largely on the basis of fixed schedules that reward experience and credentials. However, there is a growing interest in whether performance-based incentives based on rigorous teacher evaluations can improve teacher retention and performance. The evidence available to date has been mixed at best. This…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
What Works Clearinghouse, 2014
2014-01-01
"Transfer Incentives for High-Performing Teachers: Final Results from a Multisite Experiment," examined the impact of the Talent Transfer Initiative (TTI) on both student achievement and teacher retention in 10 school districts across seven states. The initiative gave bonuses to high-performing teachers for them to transfer to and stay…
Staffing a Low-Performing School: Behavioral Responses to Selective Teacher Transfer Incentives
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Protik, Ali; Glazerman, Steven; Bruch, Julie; Teh, Bing-ru
2015-01-01
We examine behavioral responses to an incentive program that offers high-performing teachers in ten school districts across the country $20,000 to transfer into the district's hardest-to-staff schools. We discuss behavioral responses to the program on high-performing teachers' willingness to transfer (supply) and the effect of the transfer offer…
Changing the focus of Brownfields cleanups
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Cichon, E.
The Brownfields Tax Incentive proposed by President Clinton illustrates the remarkable evolution in the government`s view of contaminated property remediation. The current program, spearheaded by the president`s Brownfields Initiative, reflects a significant shift of emphasis. Remedial programs now pinpoint the end use of the affected property as the ultimate objective, with the required cleanup of impacted media regarded as only one of several elements. In place of enforcement, government now is employing incentives--from federal policies limiting landowner liability to proposed tax incentives--to eliminate traditional obstacles to the remediation and reuse of contaminated land. Some three dozen Brownfields Initiative pilot projectsmore » have been launched across the country. These first-generation brownfields remediation efforts demonstrate that to realize the program`s regulatory and economic advantages, practical and cost-effective remedial efforts are required.« less
Mandatory high-risk pooling: an approach to reducing incentives for cream skimming.
van Barneveld, E M; van Vliet, R C; van de Ven, W P
1996-01-01
Risk-adjusted capitation payments (RACPs) to competing health insurers are an essential element of market-oriented health care reforms in The Netherlands. Crude RACPs are inadequate, especially because they encourage insurers to select against people expected to be unprofitable--a practice called cream skimming. However, implementing improved RACPs does not appear to be straightforward. This paper analyzes an approach that, given a system of crude RACPs, reduces insurers' incentives for cream skimming in the market for individual health insurance, while preserving incentives for efficiency and cost containment. Under the proposed system of Mandatory High-Risk Pooling (MHRP), each insurer would be allowed to periodically predetermine a small fraction of its members whose costs would be (partially) pooled. The pool would be financed with mandatory, flat-rate contributions. The results suggest that MHRP is a promising supplement to RACPs.
Schofield, Heather; Loewenstein, George; Kopsic, Jessica; Volpp, Kevin G
2015-12-01
This study examines the impact of individually oriented, purely altruistic, and a hybrid of competitive and cooperative monetary reward incentives on older adults' completion of cognitive exercises and cognitive function. We find that all three incentive structures approximately double the number of exercises completed during the six-week active experimental period relative to a no incentive control condition. However, the altruistic and cooperative/competitive incentives led to different patterns of participation, with significantly higher inter-partner correlations in utilization of the software, as well as greater persistence once incentives were removed. Provision of all incentives significantly improved performance on the incentivized exercises. However, results of an independent cognitive testing battery suggest no generalizable gains in cognitive function resulted from the training. Copyright © 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Wolk, Adam; Wang, Erwin; Horak, Bernard; Cloonan, Patricia; Adams, Michael; Moore, Eileen; Jaipaul, Chitra Komal; Brown, Gabrielle; Dasgupta, Dabanjan; Deluca, Danielle; Grossman, Mila
2013-01-01
Evaluate the effect of a modest financial incentive on time-to-discharge summary dictation among medicine residents. Pay-for-performance incentives are used in a number of health care settings. Studies are lacking on their use with medical residents and other trainees. Timely completion of discharge summaries is necessary for effective follow-up after hospitalization, and residents perform the majority of discharge summary dictations in academic medical centers. Medicine residents with the lowest average discharge-to-dictation time during their 1-month inpatient medicine ward rotation were rewarded with a $50 gift card. Discharge data were captured using an autopopulating electronic database. The average discharge-to-dictation time was reduced from 7.44 to 1.84 days, representing a 75.3% decrease. Almost 90% of discharge summary dictations were performed on the day of discharge. A modest financial incentive resulted in a marked improvement in the time-to-discharge summary dictation by medicine residents. Pay-for-performance programs may be an effective strategy for improving the quality and efficiency of patient care in academic medical centers.
Effects of Social Incentives on Task Performance in the Elderly
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Levendusky, Philip G.
1978-01-01
The performance of 60 elderly volunteers on two cancellation tasks was examined under one of three experimental conditions: social praise, social reproof, or no comment. The clear implications from these data are that social incentives may well facilitate behavioral change in the aged. (Author)
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
...), ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES PROGRAM PERFORMANCE MEASURES, STANDARDS, FINANCIAL INCENTIVES, AND PENALTIES § 305.0 Scope. This part implements the incentive system...
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Jeong, Dong Wook
2009-01-01
Many states provide incentives to students, teachers, and schools for the participation and success of students on Advanced Placement (AP) examinations administered by the College Board. The purpose of this article is to examine whether these incentives help students enroll and succeed in AP exams. An analysis of nationally representative AP exam…
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2017-10-01
...) HEALTH CARE INFRASTRUCTURE AND MODEL PROGRAMS EPISODE PAYMENT MODEL General Provisions § 512.2... model means the model testing CR incentive payments for CR/ICR service use made in accordance with... performance year means one of the years in which the CR incentive payment model is being tested. Performance...
42 CFR § 414.1360 - Data submission criteria for the improvement activities performance category.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2017-10-01
... & MEDICAID SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (CONTINUED) MEDICARE PROGRAM (CONTINUED) PAYMENT FOR PART B MEDICAL AND OTHER HEALTH SERVICES Merit-Based Incentive Payment System and Alternative Payment Model Incentive § 414.1360 Data submission criteria for the improvement activities performance...
42 CFR § 414.1350 - Cost performance category.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2017-10-01
... SERVICES (CONTINUED) MEDICARE PROGRAM (CONTINUED) PAYMENT FOR PART B MEDICAL AND OTHER HEALTH SERVICES Merit-Based Incentive Payment System and Alternative Payment Model Incentive § 414.1350 Cost performance... category comprises: (1) 0 percent of a MIPS eligible clinician's final score for MIPS payment year 2019. (2...
20 CFR 628.325 - Incentive grants, capacity building, and technical assistance.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-04-01
..., exceeding title II performance standards (section 106(b)(7)). (2) Incentive grant funds under this section... give consideration to recognizing the performance of service providers within the State. (5) SDA's... capacity building and technical assistance efforts aimed at improving the competencies of the personnel who...
When and Why Do University Managers Use Publication Incentive Payments?
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Opstrup, Niels
2017-01-01
Pay-for-performance schemes have become a widespread management strategy in the public sector. However, not much is known about the rationales that trigger the adoption of performance-related pay provisions. This article examines managerial and organisational features of university departments in Denmark that use publication incentive payments.…
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-04-01
... 20 Employees' Benefits 3 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false What are the time frames under which States submit performance progress reports and apply for incentive grants? 666.205 Section 666.205 Employees... the time frames under which States submit performance progress reports and apply for incentive grants...
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
What Works Clearinghouse, 2015
2015-01-01
For the 2013 study, "Transfer Incentives for High-Performing Teachers: Final Results from a Multisite Randomized Experiment," researchers examined the impact of the Talent Transfer Initiative (TTI) on students' reading and mathematics achievement in 10 school districts. The TTI enabled principals of low-performing schools to provide…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Gutierrez de Blume, Antonio P.
2017-01-01
This study investigated the influence of strategy training instruction and an extrinsic incentive on American fourth- and fifth-grade students' (N = 35) performance, confidence in performance, and calibration accuracy. Using an experimental design, children were randomized to either an experimental group (strategy training and an extrinsic…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Max, Jeffrey; Constantine, Jill; Wellington, Alison; Hallgren, Kristin; Glazerman, Steven; Chiang, Hanley; Speroni, Cecilia
2014-01-01
The Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) provides grants to support performance-based compensation systems for teachers and principals in high-need schools. The study measures the impact of pay-for-performance bonuses as part of a comprehensive compensation system within a large, multisite random assignment study design. The treatment schools were to…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Chiang, Hanley; Wellington, Alison; Hallgren, Kristin; Speroni, Cecilia; Herrmann, Mariesa; Glazerman, Steven; Constantine, Jill
2015-01-01
The Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) provides grants to support performance-based compensation systems for teachers and principals in high-need schools. The study measures the impact of pay-for-performance bonuses as part of a comprehensive compensation system within a large, multisite random assignment study design. The treatment schools were to…
Using Behavioral Economics to Design Physician Incentives That Deliver High-Value Care.
Emanuel, Ezekiel J; Ubel, Peter A; Kessler, Judd B; Meyer, Gregg; Muller, Ralph W; Navathe, Amol S; Patel, Pankaj; Pearl, Robert; Rosenthal, Meredith B; Sacks, Lee; Sen, Aditi P; Sherman, Paul; Volpp, Kevin G
2016-01-19
Behavioral economics provides insights about the development of effective incentives for physicians to deliver high-value care. It suggests that the structure and delivery of incentives can shape behavior, as can thoughtful design of the decision-making environment. This article discusses several principles of behavioral economics, including inertia, loss aversion, choice overload, and relative social ranking. Whereas these principles have been applied to motivate personal health decisions, retirement planning, and savings behavior, they have been largely ignored in the design of physician incentive programs. Applying these principles to physician incentives can improve their effectiveness through better alignment with performance goals. Anecdotal examples of successful incentive programs that apply behavioral economics principles are provided, even as the authors recognize that its application to the design of physician incentives is largely untested, and many outstanding questions exist. Application and rigorous evaluation of infrastructure changes and incentives are needed to design payment systems that incentivize high-quality, cost-conscious care.
Lynagh, Marita C; Sanson-Fisher, Rob W; Bonevski, Billie
2013-03-01
The use of financial incentives or pay-for-performance programs for health care providers has triggered emerging interest in the use of financial incentives for encouraging health behaviour change. This paper aims to identify key conditions under which the use of financial incentives for improvements in public health outcomes is most likely to be effective and appropriate. We review recent systematic reviews on their effectiveness in changing health behaviour and identify existing moral concerns concerning personal financial incentives. Current evidence indicates that incentives can be effective in driving health behaviour change under certain provisos, while a number of misgivings continue to be deliberated on. We outline a number of key principles for consideration in decisions about the potential use of incentives in leading to public health improvements. These key principles can assist policy makers in making decisions on the use of financial incentives directed at achieving improvements in public health.
Incentive-Based Primary Care: Cost and Utilization Analysis.
Hollander, Marcus J; Kadlec, Helena
2015-01-01
In its fee-for-service funding model for primary care, British Columbia, Canada, introduced incentive payments to general practitioners as pay for performance for providing enhanced, guidelines-based care to patients with chronic conditions. Evaluation of the program was conducted at the health care system level. To examine the impact of the incentive payments on annual health care costs and hospital utilization patterns in British Columbia. The study used Ministry of Health administrative data for Fiscal Year 2010-2011 for patients with diabetes, congestive heart failure, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and/or hypertension. In each disease group, cost and utilization were compared across patients who did, and did not, receive incentive-based care. Health care costs (eg, primary care, hospital) and utilization measures (eg, hospital days, readmissions). After controlling for patients' age, sex, service needs level, and continuity of care (defined as attachment to a general practice), the incentives reduced the net annual health care costs, in Canadian dollars, for patients with hypertension (by approximately Can$308 per patient), chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (by Can$496), and congestive heart failure (by Can$96), but not diabetes (incentives cost about Can$148 more per patient). The incentives were also associated with fewer hospital days, fewer admissions and readmissions, and shorter lengths of hospital stays for all 4 groups. Although the available literature on pay for performance shows mixed results, we showed that the funding model used in British Columbia using incentive payments for primary care might reduce health care costs and hospital utilization.
Financial incentives and physician commitment to guideline-recommended hypertension management.
Hysong, Sylvia J; Simpson, Kate; Pietz, Kenneth; SoRelle, Richard; Broussard Smitham, Kristen; Petersen, Laura A
2012-10-01
To examine the impact of financial incentives on physician goal commitment to guideline-recommended hypertension care. Clinic-level cluster-randomized trial with 4 arms: individual, group, or combined incentives, and control. A total of 83 full-time primary care physicians at 12 Veterans Affairs medical centers completed web-based surveys measuring their goal commitment to guideline-recommended hypertension care every 4 months and telephone interviews at months 8 and 16. Intervention arm participants received performance-based incentives every 4 months for 5 periods. All participants received guideline education at baseline and audit and feedback every 4 months. Physician goal commitment did not vary over time or across arms. Participants reported patient nonadherence was a perceived barrier and consistent follow-up was a perceived facilitator to successful hypertension care, suggesting that providers may perceive hypertension management as more of a patient responsibility (external locus of control). Financial incentives may constitute an insufficiently strong intervention to influence goal commitment when providers attribute performance to external forces beyond their control.
Hysong, Sylvia J.; Simpson, Kate; Pietz, Kenneth; SoRelle, Richard; Broussard, Kristen; Petersen, Laura A.
2014-01-01
Objective To examine the impact of financial incentives on physician goal commitment to guideline-recommended hypertension care. Study design Clinic-level cluster-randomized controlled trial with four arms: control, individual-, group-, or combined incentives. Intervention arm participants received performance-based incentives every four months for five periods. All participants received guideline education at baseline and audit and feedback every four months. Methods 83 full-time primary care physicians at 12 VA Medical Centers completed web-based survey responses to Hollenbeck’s goal commitment scale every four months and telephone interviews at months 8 and 16. Results Physician goal commitment did not vary over time or across arms. Participants reported patient non-adherence and consistent follow-up as perceived barriers and facilitators to successful hypertension care, suggesting providers may perceive hypertension management as more of a patient responsibility (external locus of control). Conclusions Financial incentives may constitute an insufficiently strong intervention to influence goal commitment when providers attribute performance to external forces beyond their control. PMID:23145846
Using the lessons of behavioral economics to design more effective pay-for-performance programs.
Mehrotra, Ateev; Sorbero, Melony E S; Damberg, Cheryl L
2010-07-01
To describe improvements in the design of pay-for-performance (P4P) programs that reflect the psychology of how people respond to incentives. Investigation of the behavioral economics literature. We describe 7 ways to improve P4P program design in terms of frequency and types of incentive payments. After discussing why P4P incentives can have unintended adverse consequences, we outline potential ways to mitigate these. Although P4P incentives are increasingly popular, the healthcare literature shows that these have had minimal effect. Design improvements in P4P programs can enhance their effectiveness. Lessons from behavioral economics may greatly enhance the design and effectiveness of P4P programs in healthcare, but future work is needed to demonstrate this empirically.
McMahon, Shannon A; Brenner, Stephan; Lohmann, Julia; Makwero, Christopher; Torbica, Aleksandra; Mathanga, Don P; Muula, Adamson S; De Allegri, Manuela
2016-08-19
Gaps remain in understanding how performance-based incentive (PBI) programs affect quality of care and service quantity, whether programs are cost effective and how programs could be tailored to meet client and provider needs while remaining operationally viable. In 2014, Malawi's Ministry of Health launched the Service Delivery Integration-PBI (SSDI-PBI) program. The program is unique in that no portion of performance bonuses are paid to individual health workers, and it shifts responsibility for infrastructure and equipment procurement from facility staff to implementing partners. This protocol outlines an approach that analyzes processes and outcomes, considers expected and unexpected consequences of the program and frames the program's outputs relative to its costs. Findings from this evaluation will inform the intended future scale-up of PBI in Malawi. This study employs a prospective controlled before-and-after triangulation design to assess effects of the PBI program by analyzing quantitative and qualitative data from intervention and control facilities. Guided by a theoretical framework, the evaluation consists of four main components: service provision, health worker motivation, implementation processes and costing. Quality and access outcomes are assessed along four dimensions: (1) structural elements (related to equipment, drugs, staff); (2) process elements (providers' compliance with standards); (3) outputs (service utilization); (4) experiential elements (experiences of service delivery). The costing component includes costs related to start-up, ongoing management, and the cost of incentives themselves. The cost analysis considers costs incurred within the Ministry of Health, funders, and the implementing agency. The evaluation relies on primary data (including interviews and surveys) and secondary data (including costing and health management information system data). Through the lens of a PBI program, we illustrate how complex interventions can be evaluated via not only primary, mixed-methods data collection, but also through a wealth of secondary data from program implementers (including monitoring, evaluation and financial data), and the health system (including service utilization and service readiness data). We also highlight the importance of crafting a theory and using theory to inform the nature of data collected. Finally, we highlight the need to be responsive to stakeholders in order to enhance a study's relevance.
When Payment Undermines the Pitch.
Barasch, Alixandra; Berman, Jonathan Z; Small, Deborah A
2016-10-01
Studies on crowding out document that incentives sometimes backfire-decreasing motivation in prosocial tasks. In the present research, we demonstrated an additional channel through which incentives can be harmful. Incentivized advocates for a cause are perceived as less sincere than nonincentivized advocates and are ultimately less effective in persuading other people to donate. Further, the negative effects of incentives hold only when the incentives imply a selfish motive; advocates who are offered a matching incentive (i.e., who are told that the donations they successfully solicit will be matched), which is not incompatible with altruism, perform just as well as those who are not incentivized. Thus, incentives may affect prosocial outcomes in ways not previously investigated: by crowding out individuals' sincerity of expression and thus their ability to gain support for a cause.
Wynn, Barbara O; Timbie, Justin W; Sorbero, Melony E
2011-01-01
Since 2004, significant changes have been made to the California workers' compensation (WC) system. The Commission on Health and Safety and Workers' Compensation (CHSWC) asked the RAND Corporation to examine the impact that these changes have on the medical care provided to injured workers. This study synthesizes findings from interviews and available information regarding the implementation of the changes affecting WC medical care and identifies areas in which additional changes might increase the quality and efficiency of care delivered under the WC system. To improve incentives for efficiently providing medically appropriate care, California should revise its fee schedule allowances for services provided by hospitals to inpatients, freestanding ambulatory surgery centers, and physicians, create nonmonetary incentives for providing medically appropriate care in the medical provider network (MPN) context through more-selective contracting with providers and reducing medical review requirements for high-performing physicians; reduce incentives for inappropriate prescribing practices by curtailing in-office physician dispensing; and implement pharmacy benefit network regulations. To increase accountability for performance, California should revise the MPN certification process to place accountability for meeting MPN standards on the entity contracting with the physician network; strengthen Division of Workers' Compensation (DWC) authorities to provide intermediate sanctions for failure to comply with MPN requirements; and modify the Labor Code to remove payers and MPNs from the definition of individually identifiable data so that performance on key measures can be publicly available. To facilitate monitoring and oversight, California should provide DWC with more flexibility to add needed data elements to medical data reporting and provide penalties for a claim administrator failing to comply with the data-reporting requirements; require that medical cost-containment expenses be reported by category of cost; compile information on the types of medical services that are subject to UR denials and expedited hearings; and expand ongoing monitoring of system performance. Finally, to increase administrative efficiency, California should use an external medical review organization to review medical-necessity determinations, and it should explore best practices of other WC programs and health programs in carrying out medical cost-containment activities.
Acceptability of Financial Incentives for Health Behaviours: A Discrete Choice Experiment.
Giles, Emma L; Becker, Frauke; Ternent, Laura; Sniehotta, Falko F; McColl, Elaine; Adams, Jean
2016-01-01
Healthy behaviours are important determinants of health and disease, but many people find it difficult to perform these behaviours. Systematic reviews support the use of personal financial incentives to encourage healthy behaviours. There is concern that financial incentives may be unacceptable to the public, those delivering services and policymakers, but this has been poorly studied. Without widespread acceptability, financial incentives are unlikely to be widely implemented. We sought to answer two questions: what are the relative preferences of UK adults for attributes of financial incentives for healthy behaviours? Do preferences vary according to the respondents' socio-demographic characteristics? We conducted an online discrete choice experiment. Participants were adult members of a market research panel living in the UK selected using quota sampling. Preferences were examined for financial incentives for: smoking cessation, regular physical activity, attendance for vaccination, and attendance for screening. Attributes of interest (and their levels) were: type of incentive (none, cash, shopping vouchers or lottery tickets); value of incentive (a continuous variable); schedule of incentive (same value each week, or value increases as behaviour change is sustained); other information provided (none, written information, face-to-face discussion, or both); and recipients (all eligible individuals, people living in low-income households, or pregnant women). Cash or shopping voucher incentives were preferred as much as, or more than, no incentive in all cases. Lower value incentives and those offered to all eligible individuals were preferred. Preferences for additional information provided alongside incentives varied between behaviours. Younger participants and men were more likely to prefer incentives. There were no clear differences in preference according to educational attainment. Cash or shopping voucher-type financial incentives for healthy behaviours are not necessarily less acceptable than no incentives to UK adults.
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Frengki; Hubeis, Aida Vitayala; Affandi, M. Joko
2017-01-01
There are several ways that can be done to improve employee performance, among others, by motivating employees and improving work discipline. Increased motivation and discipline can be pursued by the provision of incentive. This study aims to analyze the influence of incentive on Andalas University's employee motivation and discipline and analyze…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Fryer, Roland G.
2011-01-01
Financial incentives for teachers to increase student performance is an increasingly popular education policy around the world. This paper describes a school-based randomized trial in over two-hundred New York City public schools designed to better understand the impact of teacher incentives on student achievement. I find no evidence that teacher…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
National Center for Education Evaluation and Regional Assistance, 2015
2015-01-01
The Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) provides grants to support performance-based compensation systems for teachers and principals in high-need schools. The study measures the impact of pay-for-performance bonuses as part of a comprehensive compensation system within a large, multisite random assignment study design. The treatment schools were to…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Chiang, Hanley; Speroni, Cecilia; Herrmann, Mariesa; Hallgren, Kristin; Burkander, Paul; Wellington, Alison
2017-01-01
The Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) provides grants to support performance-based compensation systems for teachers and principals in high-need schools. The study measures the impact of pay-for-performance bonuses as part of a comprehensive compensation system within a large, multisite random assignment study design. The treatment schools were to…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Chiang, Hanley; Speroni, Cecilia; Herrmann, Mariesa; Hallgren, Kristin; Burkander, Paul; Wellington, Alison
2017-01-01
The Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) provides grants to support performance-based compensation systems for teachers and principals in high-need schools. The study measures the impact of pay-for-performance bonuses as part of a comprehensive compensation system within a large, multisite random assignment study design. The treatment schools were to…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Max, Jeffrey; Constantine, Jill; Wellington, Alison; Hallgren, Kristin; Glazerman, Steven; Chiang, Hanley; Speroni, Cecilia
2014-01-01
The Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) provides grants to support performance-based compensation systems for teachers and principals in high-need schools. The study measures the impact of pay-for-performance bonuses as part of a comprehensive compensation system within a large, multisite random assignment study design. The treatment schools were to…
Giving University Students Incentives to Do Homework Improves Their Performance
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Radhakrishnan, Phanikiran; Lam, Dianne; Ho, Geoffrey
2009-01-01
Past research has focused on either the positive influence of incentives on homework completion (Cullen, Cullen, Hayhow, & Plouffe, 1975) or the positive influence of homework completion on academic performance (Cooper, Robinson, & Patall, 2006). Our study is one of the first to integrate these two streams of research to examine whether higher…
The Best Laid Plans: Pay for Performance Incentive Programs for School Leaders
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Goff, Peter; Goldring, Ellen; Canney, Melissa
2016-01-01
In an era of heightened accountability and limited fiscal resources, school districts have sought novel ways to increase the effectiveness of their principals in an effort to increase student proficiency. To address these needs, some districts have turned to pay-for-performance programs, aligning leadership goals with financial incentives to…
Sarin, Enisha; Lunsford, Sarah Smith; Sooden, Ankur; Rai, Sanjay; Livesley, Nigel
2016-01-01
Incentives play an important role in motivating community health workers (CHWs). In India, accredited social health activists (ASHAs) are female CHWs who provide a range of services, including those specific to reproductive, maternal, neonatal, child, and adolescent health. Qualitative interviews were conducted with 49 ASHAs and one of their family members (husband, mother-in-law, sister-in-law, or son) from Gurdaspur and Mewat districts to explore the role of family, community, and health system in supporting ASHAs in their work. Thematic analysis revealed that incentives were both empowering and a source of distress for ASHAs and their families. Earning income and contributing to the household's financial wellbeing inspired a sense of financial independence and self-confidence for ASHAs, especially with respect to relations with their husbands and parents-in-law. In spite of the empowering effects of the incentives, they were a cause of distress. Low incentive rates relative to the level of effort required to complete ASHA responsibilities, compounded by irregular and incomplete payment, put pressure on families. ASHAs dedicated much of their time and own resources to perform their duties, drawing them away from their household responsibilities. Communication around incentives from supervisors may have led ASHAs to prioritize and promote those services that yielded higher incentives, as opposed to focusing on the most appropriate services for the client. ASHAs and their families maintained hope that their positions would eventually bring in a regular salary, which contributed to retention of ASHAs. Incentives, therefore, are both motivating and inspiring as well as a cause dissatisfaction among ASHAs and their families. Recommendations include revising the incentive scheme to be responsive to the time and effort required to complete tasks and the out-of-pocket costs incurred while working as an ASHA; improve communication to ASHAs on incentives and responsibilities; and ensure timely and complete payment of incentives to ASHAs. The findings from this study contribute to the existing literature on incentivized CHW programs and help throw added light on the role incentives play in family dynamics which affects performance of CHW.
Konetzka, R Tamara; Skira, Meghan M; Werner, Rachel M
2018-01-01
Pay-for-performance (P4P) programs have become a popular policy tool aimed at improving health care quality. We analyze how incentive design affects quality improvements in the nursing home setting, where several state Medicaid agencies have implemented P4P programs that vary in incentive structure. Using the Minimum Data Set and the Online Survey, Certification, and Reporting data from 2001 to 2009, we examine how the weights put on various performance measures that are tied to P4P bonuses, such as clinical outcomes, inspection deficiencies, and staffing levels, affect improvements in those measures. We find larger weights on clinical outcomes often lead to larger improvements, but small weights can lead to no improvement or worsening of some clinical outcomes. We find a qualifier for P4P eligibility based on having few or no severe inspection deficiencies is more effective at decreasing inspection deficiencies than using weights, suggesting simple rules for participation may incent larger improvement.
Konetzka, R. Tamara; Skira, Meghan M.; Werner, Rachel M.
2017-01-01
Pay-for-performance (P4P) programs have become a popular policy tool aimed at improving health care quality. We analyze how incentive design affects quality improvements in the nursing home setting, where several state Medicaid agencies have implemented P4P programs that vary in incentive structure. Using the Minimum Data Set and the Online Survey, Certification, and Reporting data from 2001 to 2009, we examine how the weights put on various performance measures that are tied to P4P bonuses, such as clinical outcomes, inspection deficiencies, and staffing levels, affect improvements in those measures. We find larger weights on clinical outcomes often lead to larger improvements, but small weights can lead to no improvement or worsening of some clinical outcomes. We find a qualifier for P4P eligibility based on having few or no severe inspection deficiencies is more effective at decreasing inspection deficiencies than using weights, suggesting simple rules for participation may incent larger improvement. PMID:29594189
Chao, Melody Manchi; Visaria, Sujata; Mukhopadhyay, Anirban; Dehejia, Rajeev
2017-10-01
The current study draws on the motivational model of achievement which has been guiding research on the growth mindset intervention (Dweck & Leggett, 1988) and examines how this intervention interacts with incentive systems to differentially influence performance for high- and low-achieving students in Indian schools that serve low-SES communities. Although, as expected, the growth mindset intervention did interact with incentive systems and prior achievement to influence subsequent academic performance, the existing growth mindset framework cannot fully account for the observed effects. Specifically, we found that the growth mindset intervention did facilitate performance through persistence, but only when the incentive system imparted individuals with a sense of autonomy. Such a facilitation effect was only found among those students who had high prior achievement, but not among those who had underperformed. When the incentive did not impart a sense of autonomy, the growth mindset intervention undermined the performance of those who had high initial achievement. To reconcile these discrepancies and to advance understanding of the impacts of psychological interventions on achievement outcomes, we discuss how the existing theory can be extended and integrated with an identity-based motivation framework (Oyserman & Destin, 2010). We also discuss the implications of our work for future research and practice. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2017 APA, all rights reserved).
The effect of task demand and incentive on neurophysiological and cardiovascular markers of effort.
Fairclough, Stephen H; Ewing, Kate
2017-09-01
According to motivational intensity theory, effort is proportional to the level of task demand provided that success is possible and successful performance is deemed worthwhile. The current study represents a simultaneous manipulation of demand (working memory load) and success importance (financial incentive) to investigate neurophysiological (EEG) and cardiovascular measures of effort. A 2×2 repeated-measures study was conducted where 18 participants performed a n-back task under three conditions of demand: easy (1-back), hard (4-back) and very hard (7-back). In addition, participants performed these tasks in the presence of performance-contingent financial incentive or in a no-incentive (pilot trial) condition. Three bands of EEG activity were quantified: theta (4-7Hz), lower-alpha (7.5-10Hz) and upper-alpha (10.5-13Hz). Fronto-medial activity in the theta band and activity in the upper-alpha band at frontal, central and parietal sites were sensitive to demand and indicated greatest effort when the task was challenging and success was possible. Mean systolic blood pressure and activity in the lower-alpha band at parietal sites were also sensitive to demand but also increased in the incentive condition across all levels of task demand. The results of the study largely support the predictions of motivational intensity using neurophysiological markers of effort. Copyright © 2017. Published by Elsevier B.V.
Patel, Mitesh S; Asch, David A; Rosin, Roy; Small, Dylan S; Bellamy, Scarlett L; Eberbach, Kimberly; Walters, Karen J; Haff, Nancy; Lee, Samantha M; Wesby, Lisa; Hoffer, Karen; Shuttleworth, David; Taylor, Devon H; Hilbert, Victoria; Zhu, Jingsan; Yang, Lin; Wang, Xingmei; Volpp, Kevin G
2016-07-01
More than half of adults in the United States do not attain the minimum recommended level of physical activity to achieve health benefits. The optimal design of financial incentives to promote physical activity is unknown. To compare the effectiveness of individual versus team-based financial incentives to increase physical activity. Randomized, controlled trial comparing three interventions to control. Three hundred and four adult employees from an organization in Philadelphia formed 76 four-member teams. All participants received daily feedback on performance towards achieving a daily 7000 step goal during the intervention (weeks 1- 13) and follow-up (weeks 14- 26) periods. The control arm received no other intervention. In the three financial incentive arms, drawings were held in which one team was selected as the winner every other day during the 13-week intervention. A participant on a winning team was eligible as follows: $50 if he or she met the goal (individual incentive), $50 only if all four team members met the goal (team incentive), or $20 if he or she met the goal individually and $10 more for each of three teammates that also met the goal (combined incentive). Mean proportion of participant-days achieving the 7000 step goal during the intervention. Compared to the control group during the intervention period, the mean proportion achieving the 7000 step goal was significantly greater for the combined incentive (0.35 vs. 0.18, difference: 0.17, 95 % confidence interval [CI]: 0.07-0.28, p <0.001) but not for the individual incentive (0.25 vs 0.18, difference: 0.08, 95 % CI: -0.02-0.18, p = 0.13) or the team incentive (0.17 vs 0.18, difference: -0.003, 95 % CI: -0.11-0.10, p = 0.96). The combined incentive arm participants also achieved the goal at significantly greater rates than the team incentive (0.35 vs. 0.17, difference: 0.18, 95 % CI: 0.08-0.28, p < 0.001), but not the individual incentive (0.35 vs. 0.25, difference: 0.10, 95 % CI: -0.001-0.19, p = 0.05). Only the combined incentive had greater mean daily steps than control (difference: 1446, 95 % CI: 448-2444, p ≤ 0.005). There were no significant differences between arms during the follow-up period (weeks 14- 26). Financial incentives rewarded for a combination of individual and team performance were most effective for increasing physical activity. Clinicaltrials.gov identifier: NCT02001194.
42 CFR § 414.1365 - Subcategories for the improvement activities performance category.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2017-10-01
..., DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (CONTINUED) MEDICARE PROGRAM (CONTINUED) PAYMENT FOR PART B MEDICAL AND OTHER HEALTH SERVICES Merit-Based Incentive Payment System and Alternative Payment Model Incentive...
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Wellington, Alison; Chiang, Hanley; Hallgren, Kristin; Speroni, Cecilia; Herrmann, Mariesa; Burkander, Paul
2016-01-01
The Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) provides grants to support performance-based compensation systems for teachers and principals in high-need schools. The goal of the grants is to increase the number of high-performing teachers in high-need schools by rewarding educators for improving students' achievement. The report on which this snapshot is based…
Lauvergeon, S; Burnand, B; Peytremann-Bridevaux, I
2013-10-01
A reorganization of healthcare systems is required to meet the challenge of the increasing prevalence of chronic diseases, e.g. diabetes. In North-America and Europe, several countries have thus developed national or regional chronic disease management programs. In Switzerland, such initiatives have only emerged recently. In 2010, the canton of Vaud set up the "Diabetes Cantonal Program", within the framework of which we conducted a study designed to ascertain the opinions of both diabetic patients and healthcare professionals on the elements that could be integrated into this program, the barriers and facilitators to its development, and the incentives that could motivate these actors to participate. We organized eight focus-groups: one with diabetic patients and one with healthcare professionals in the four sanitary areas of the canton of Vaud. The discussions were recorded, transcribed and submitted to a thematic content analysis. Patients and healthcare professionals were rather in favour of the implementation of a cantonal program, although patients were more cautious concerning its necessity. All participants envisioned a set of elements that could be integrated to this program. They also considered that the program could be developed more easily if it were adapted to patients' and professionals' needs and if it used existing structures and professionals. The difficulty to motivate both patients and professionals to participate was mentioned as a barrier to the development of this program however. Quality or financial incentives could therefore be created to overcome this potential problem. The identification of the elements to consider, barriers, facilitators and incentives to participate to a chronic disease management program, obtained by exploring the opinions of patients and healthcare professionals, should favour its further development and implementation. Copyright © 2013. Published by Elsevier Masson SAS.
Incentive-Based Primary Care: Cost and Utilization Analysis
Hollander, Marcus J; Kadlec, Helena
2015-01-01
Context: In its fee-for-service funding model for primary care, British Columbia, Canada, introduced incentive payments to general practitioners as pay for performance for providing enhanced, guidelines-based care to patients with chronic conditions. Evaluation of the program was conducted at the health care system level. Objective: To examine the impact of the incentive payments on annual health care costs and hospital utilization patterns in British Columbia. Design: The study used Ministry of Health administrative data for Fiscal Year 2010–2011 for patients with diabetes, congestive heart failure, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and/or hypertension. In each disease group, cost and utilization were compared across patients who did, and did not, receive incentive-based care. Main Outcome Measures: Health care costs (eg, primary care, hospital) and utilization measures (eg, hospital days, readmissions). Results: After controlling for patients’ age, sex, service needs level, and continuity of care (defined as attachment to a general practice), the incentives reduced the net annual health care costs, in Canadian dollars, for patients with hypertension (by approximately Can$308 per patient), chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (by Can$496), and congestive heart failure (by Can$96), but not diabetes (incentives cost about Can$148 more per patient). The incentives were also associated with fewer hospital days, fewer admissions and readmissions, and shorter lengths of hospital stays for all 4 groups. Conclusion: Although the available literature on pay for performance shows mixed results, we showed that the funding model used in British Columbia using incentive payments for primary care might reduce health care costs and hospital utilization. PMID:26263389
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Chiang, Hanley; Wellington, Alison; Hallgren, Kristin; Speroni, Cecilia; Herrmann, Mariesa; Glazerman, Steven; Constantine, Jill
2016-01-01
Recent efforts to attract and retain effective educators and to improve teaching practices have focused on reforming evaluation and compensation systems for teachers and principals. In 2006, Congress established the Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF), which provides grants to support performance-based compensation systems for teachers and principals in…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
National Center for Education Evaluation and Regional Assistance, 2014
2014-01-01
The Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) provides grants to support performance-based compensation systems for teachers and principals in high-need schools. The study measures the impact of pay-for-performance bonuses as part of a comprehensive compensation system within a large, multisite random assignment study design. The treatment schools were to…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Max, Jeffrey; Constantine, Jill; Wellington, Alison; Hallgren, Kristin; Glazerman, Steven; Chiang, Hanley; Speroni, Cecilia
2015-01-01
Recent efforts to attract and retain effective educators and to improve teaching practices have focused on reforming evaluation and compensation systems for teachers and principals. In 2006, Congress established the Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF), which provides grants to support performance-based compensation systems for teachers and principals in…
Impacts of Performance Pay under the Teacher Incentive Fund: Study Design Report
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Glazerman, Steven; Chiang, Hanley; Wellington, Alison; Constantine, Jill; Player, Dan
2011-01-01
The body of research on the design, implementation, and effects of performance-based compensation systems has influenced the design and evaluation of the 2010 Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) grants. In the sections presented here, the authors describe the key components of 2010 TIF grants and the conceptual framework for the evaluation. The remainder…
Andriole, Katherine P; Prevedello, Luciano M; Dufault, Allen; Pezeshk, Parham; Bransfield, Robert; Hanson, Richard; Doubilet, Peter M; Seltzer, Steven E; Khorasani, Ramin
2010-03-01
Radiology report signature time (ST) can be a substantial component of total report turnaround time. Poor turnaround time resulting from lengthy ST can adversely affect patient care. The combination of technology adoption with financial incentive was evaluated to determine if ST improvement can be augmented and sustained. This prospective study was performed at a 751-bed, urban, tertiary care adult teaching hospital. Test-site imaging volume approximated 48,000 examinations per month. The radiology department has 100 trainees and 124 attending radiologists serving multiple institutions. Over a study period of 4 years and 4 months, three interventions focused on radiologist signature performance were implemented: 1) a notification paging application that alerted radiologists when reports were ready for signature, 2) a picture archiving and communications systems (PACS)-integrated speech recognition report generation system, and 3) a departmental financial incentive to reward radiologists semiannually for ST performance. Signature time was compared before and after the interventions. Wilcoxon and linear regression statistical analyses were used to assess the significance of trends. Technology adoption (paging plus speech recognition) reduced median ST from >5 to <1 hour (P < .001) and 80th-percentile ST from >24 to 15 to 18 hours (P < .001). Subsequent addition of a financial incentive further improved 80th-percentile ST to 4 to 8 hours (P < .001). The gains in median and 80th-percentile ST were sustained over the final 31 months of the study period. Technology interventions coupled with financial incentive can result in synergistic and sustainable improvement in radiologist report-signing behavior. The addition of a financial incentive leads to better performance than that achievable through technology alone.
McGuire, Thomas G
2010-01-01
This commentary on R. F. Averill et al. (2010) addresses their idea of risk and quality adjusting fee-for-service payments to primary care physicians in order to improve the efficiency of primary care and take a step toward financing a "medical home"for patients. I show how their idea can create incentives for efficient practice styles. Pairing this with an active beneficiary choice of primary care physician with an enrollment fee would make the idea easier to implement and provide an incentive and the financing for elements of service not covered by procedure-based fees.
Vainieri, Milena; Lungu, Daniel Adrian; Nuti, Sabina
2018-01-30
Pay for performance (P4P) programs have been widely analysed in literature, and the results regarding their impact on performance are mixed. Moreover, in the real-life setting, reward schemes are designed combining multiple elements altogether, yet, it is not clear what happens when they are applied using different combinations. To provide insights on how P4P programs are influenced by 5 key elements: whom, what, how, how many targets, and how much to reward. A qualitative longitudinal analysis of 10 years of P4P reward schemes adopted by the regional administrations of Tuscany and Lombardy (Italy) was conducted. The effects of the P4P features on performance are discussed considering both overall and specific indicators. Both regions applied financial reward schemes for General Managers by linking the variable pay to performance. While Tuscany maintained a relatively stable financial incentive design and governance tools, Lombardy changed some elements of the design and introduced, in 2012, a P4P program aimed to reward the providers. The main differences between the 2 cases regard the number of targets (how many), the type (what), and the method applied to set targets (how). Considering the overall performance obtained by the 2 regions, it seems that whom, how, and how much to reward are not relevant in the success of P4P programs; instead, the number (how many) and the type (what) of targets set may influence the performance improvement processes driven by financial reward schemes. © 2018 The Authors. The International Journal of Health Planning and Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Van Barneveld, E M; Lamers, L M; van Vliet, R C; van de Ven, W P
1998-07-01
Risk-adjusted capitation payments (RACPs) to competing health insurers are an essential element of market-oriented health care reforms in many countries. RACPs based on demographic variables only are insufficient, because they leave ample room for cream skimming. However, the implementation of improved RACPs does not appear to be straightforward. A solution might be to supplement imperfect RACPs with a form of mandatory pooling that reduces the incentives for cream skimming. In a previous paper it was concluded that high-risk pooling (HRP), is a promising supplement to RACPs. The purpose of this paper is to compare HRP with two other main variants of mandatory pooling. These variants are called excess-of-loss (EOL) and proportional pooling (PP). Each variant includes ex post compensations to insurers for some members which depend to various degrees on actually incurred costs. Therefore, these pooling variants reduce the incentives for cream skimming which are inherent in imperfect RACPs, but they also reduce the incentives for efficiency and cost containment. As a rough measure of the latter incentives we use the percentage of total costs for which an insurer is at risk. This paper analyzes which of the three main pooling variants yields the greatest reduction of incentives for cream skimming given such a percentage. The results show that HRP is the most effective of the three pooling variants.
Xu, Wanying; Zhou, Chuanbin; Lan, Yajun; Jin, Jiasheng; Cao, Aixin
2015-05-01
Municipal solid waste (MSW) management (MSWM) is most important and challenging in large urban communities. Sound community-based waste management systems normally include waste reduction and material recycling elements, often entailing the separation of recyclable materials by the residents. To increase the efficiency of source separation and recycling, an incentive-based source separation model was designed and this model was tested in 76 households in Guiyang, a city of almost three million people in southwest China. This model embraced the concepts of rewarding households for sorting organic waste, government funds for waste reduction, and introducing small recycling enterprises for promoting source separation. Results show that after one year of operation, the waste reduction rate was 87.3%, and the comprehensive net benefit under the incentive-based source separation model increased by 18.3 CNY tonne(-1) (2.4 Euros tonne(-1)), compared to that under the normal model. The stakeholder analysis (SA) shows that the centralized MSW disposal enterprises had minimum interest and may oppose the start-up of a new recycling system, while small recycling enterprises had a primary interest in promoting the incentive-based source separation model, but they had the least ability to make any change to the current recycling system. The strategies for promoting this incentive-based source separation model are also discussed in this study. © The Author(s) 2015.
42 CFR § 414.1335 - Data submission criteria for the quality performance category.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2017-10-01
..., DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (CONTINUED) MEDICARE PROGRAM (CONTINUED) PAYMENT FOR PART B MEDICAL AND OTHER HEALTH SERVICES Merit-Based Incentive Payment System and Alternative Payment Model Incentive...
Haff, Nancy; Patel, Mitesh S; Lim, Raymond; Zhu, Jingsan; Troxel, Andrea B; Asch, David A; Volpp, Kevin G
2015-01-01
To evaluate the use of behavioral economics to design financial incentives to promote health behavior change and to explore associations with demographic characteristics. Studies performed by the Center for Health Incentives and Behavioral Economics at the University of Pennsylvania published between January 2006 and March 2014. Randomized, controlled trials with available participant-level data. Studies that did not use financial incentives to promote health behavior change were excluded. Participant-level data from seven studies were pooled. Meta-analysis on the pooled sample using a random-effects model with interaction terms to examine treatment effects and whether they varied by incentive structure or demographic characteristics. The pooled study sample comprised 1403 participants, of whom 35% were female, 70% were white, 24% were black, and the mean age was 48 years (standard deviation 11.2 years). In the fully adjusted model, participants offered financial incentives had higher odds of behavior change (odds ratio [OR]: 3.96; p < .01) when compared to control. There were no significant interactions between financial incentives and gender, age, race, income, or education. When further adjusting for incentive structure, blacks had higher odds than whites of achieving behavior change (OR: 1.67; p < .05) with a conditional payment. Compared to lower-income participants, higher-income participants had lower odds of behavior change (OR: 0.46; p = .01) with a regret lottery. Financial incentives designed using concepts from behavioral economics were effective for promoting health behavior change. There were no large and consistent relationships between the effectiveness of financial incentives and observable demographic characteristics. Second-order examinations of incentive structure suggest potential relationships among the effectiveness of financial incentives, incentive structure, and the demographic characteristics of race and income.
Chu, Hsuan-Lien; Wang, Chen-Chin; Dai, Yu-Tzu
2009-01-01
The health care industry is under pressure from government and private entities as well as from market conditions to contain costs. In an effort to respond to these pressures, the case hospital in this study implemented a Balanced Scorecard (BSC) in January 2003 and integrated it with the hospital's formal incentive plan for non-physicians in January 2005. The nursing department's performance improved in the 2 years following the introduction of the plan. This study contributes to the literature by demonstrating the performance improvement that results from integrating the BSC with an incentive plan in the nursing field. The results provide insight into the current BSC performance metrics applied by the case nursing department, and could be used as guidelines by other health care organizations that wish to implement BSC-based incentive plans.
Selfish play increases during high-stakes NBA games and is rewarded with more lucrative contracts.
Uhlmann, Eric Luis; Barnes, Christopher M
2014-01-01
High-stakes team competitions can present a social dilemma in which participants must choose between concentrating on their personal performance and assisting teammates as a means of achieving group objectives. We find that despite the seemingly strong group incentive to win the NBA title, cooperative play actually diminishes during playoff games, negatively affecting team performance. Thus team cooperation decreases in the very high stakes contexts in which it is most important to perform well together. Highlighting the mixed incentives that underlie selfish play, personal scoring is rewarded with more lucrative future contracts, whereas assisting teammates to score is associated with reduced pay due to lost opportunities for personal scoring. A combination of misaligned incentives and psychological biases in performance evaluation bring out the "I" in "team" when cooperation is most critical.
Selfish Play Increases during High-Stakes NBA Games and Is Rewarded with More Lucrative Contracts
Uhlmann, Eric Luis; Barnes, Christopher M.
2014-01-01
High-stakes team competitions can present a social dilemma in which participants must choose between concentrating on their personal performance and assisting teammates as a means of achieving group objectives. We find that despite the seemingly strong group incentive to win the NBA title, cooperative play actually diminishes during playoff games, negatively affecting team performance. Thus team cooperation decreases in the very high stakes contexts in which it is most important to perform well together. Highlighting the mixed incentives that underlie selfish play, personal scoring is rewarded with more lucrative future contracts, whereas assisting teammates to score is associated with reduced pay due to lost opportunities for personal scoring. A combination of misaligned incentives and psychological biases in performance evaluation bring out the “I” in “team” when cooperation is most critical. PMID:24763384
Organizational change: Incentives and resistance
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Bishop, Peter C.
1992-01-01
Topics concerning Space Exploration Initiative technical interchange are presented in viewgraph form and include the following: models of change, elements of the current period, the signs of change, leaders' contribution, paradigms - our worldview, paradigm change, the effects of revealing paradigms, a checklist for change, and organizational control.
Reward Motivation Enhances Task Coding in Frontoparietal Cortex
Etzel, Joset A.; Cole, Michael W.; Zacks, Jeffrey M.; Kay, Kendrick N.; Braver, Todd S.
2016-01-01
Reward motivation often enhances task performance, but the neural mechanisms underlying such cognitive enhancement remain unclear. Here, we used a multivariate pattern analysis (MVPA) approach to test the hypothesis that motivation-related enhancement of cognitive control results from improved encoding and representation of task set information. Participants underwent two fMRI sessions of cued task switching, the first under baseline conditions, and the second with randomly intermixed reward incentive and no-incentive trials. Information about the upcoming task could be successfully decoded from cue-related activation patterns in a set of frontoparietal regions typically associated with task control. More critically, MVPA classifiers trained on the baseline session had significantly higher decoding accuracy on incentive than non-incentive trials, with decoding improvement mediating reward-related enhancement of behavioral performance. These results strongly support the hypothesis that reward motivation enhances cognitive control, by improving the discriminability of task-relevant information coded and maintained in frontoparietal brain regions. PMID:25601237
Manchikanti, Laxmaiah; Helm Ii, Standiford; Benyamin, Ramsin M; Hirsch, Joshua A
2016-01-01
The Merit-based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) was created by the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015 (MACRA) to improve the health of all Americans by providing incentives and policies to improve patient health outcomes. MIPS combines 3 existing programs, Meaningful Use (MU), now called Advancing Care Information (ACI), contributing 25% of the composite score; Physician Quality Reporting System (PQRS), changed to Quality, contributing 50% of the composite score; and Value-based Payment (VBP) system to Resource Use or cost, contributing 10% of the composite score. Additionally, Clinical Practice Improvement Activities (CPIA), contributing 15% of the composite score, create multiple strategic goals to design incentives that drive movement toward delivery system reform principles with inclusion of Advanced Alternative Payment Models (APMs). Under the present proposal, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) has estimated approximately 30,000 to 90,000 providers from a total of over 761,000 providers will be exempt from MIPS. About 87% of solo practitioners and 70% of practitioners in groups of less than 10 will be subjected to negative payments or penalties ranging from 4% to 9%. In addition, MIPS also will affect a provider's reputation by making performance measures accessible to consumers and third-party physician rating Web sites.The MIPS composite performance scoring method, at least in theory, utilizes weights for each performance category, exceptional performance factors to earn bonuses, and incorporates the special circumstances of small practices.In conclusion, MIPS has the potential to affect practitioners negatively. Interventional Pain Medicine practitioners must understand the various MIPS measures and how they might participate in order to secure a brighter future. Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015, merit-based incentive payment system, quality performance measures, resource use, clinical practice improvement activities, advancing care information performance category.
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Willett, Michael S.
2013-01-01
The purpose of this exploratory longitudinal case study was to examine how the implementation of an Incentive Based Budgeting (IBB) system (i.e., Responsibility-Centered Management [RCM]) affected selected institutional performance indicators at the campus level and two comparable schools at a large Mid-Western public University. The value of…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Chiang, Hanley; Wellington, Alison; Hallgren, Kristin; Speroni, Cecilia; Herrmann, Mariesa; Glazerman, Steven; Constantine, Jill
2015-01-01
Recent efforts to attract and retain effective educators and to improve teaching practices have focused on reforming evaluation and compensation systems for teachers and principals. In 2006, Congress established the Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF), which provides grants to support performance-based compensation systems for teachers and principals in…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Rothstein, Richard
2008-01-01
Accountability and performance incentive plans in education are compromised by goal distortion, gaming, and corruption. Education policy makers who design such plans have paid insufficient attention to similar experiences in other fields. This paper describes institutions in health care, job training and welfare administration, and in the private…
Practice and Incentive Effects on Learner Performance: Aircraft Instrument Comprehension Task.
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Tenpas, Barbara G.; Higgins, Norman C.
To study the effects of practice and incentive on learner performance on the aircraft instrument comprehension task, 48 third-year Air Force cadets were chosen as subjects. The subjects were expected to be able to identify which one of four pictures of aircraft in flight most nearly corresponded to the position indicated on a panel of attitude and…
Dykema, Jennifer; Stevenson, John; Kniss, Chad; Kvale, Katherine; González, Kim; Cautley, Eleanor
2012-05-01
From 2009 to 2010, an experiment was conducted to increase response rates among African American mothers in the Wisconsin Pregnancy Risk Assessment Monitoring System (PRAMS). Sample members were randomly assigned to groups that received a prepaid, cash incentive of $5 (n = 219); a coupon for diapers valued at $6 (n = 210); or no incentive (n = 209). Incentives were included with the questionnaire, which was mailed to respondents. We examined the effects of the incentives on several outcomes, including response rates, cost effectiveness, survey response distributions, and item nonresponse. Response rates were significantly higher for the cash group than for the coupon (42.5 vs. 32.4%, P < .05) or no incentive group (42.5 vs. 30.1%, P < .01); the coupon and no incentive groups performed similarly. While absolute costs were the highest for the cash group, the cost per completed survey was the lowest. The incentives had limited effects on response distributions for specific survey questions. Although respondents completing the survey by mail in the cash and coupon groups exhibited a trend toward being less likely to have missing data, the effect was not significant. Compared to a coupon or no incentive, a small cash incentive significantly improved response rates and was cost effective among African American respondents in Wisconsin PRAMS. Incentives had only limited effects, however, on survey response distributions, and no significant effects on item nonresponse.
Captivate: Building Blocks for Implementing Active Learning
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Kitchens, Brent; Means, Tawnya; Tan, Yinliang
2018-01-01
In this study, the authors propose a set of key elements that impact the success of an active learning implementation: content delivery, active learning methods, physical environment, technology enhancement, incentive alignment, and educator investment. Through a range of metrics the authors present preliminary evidence that students in courses…
Role of contingency in striatal response to incentive in adolescents with anxiety.
Benson, Brenda E; Guyer, Amanda E; Nelson, Eric E; Pine, Daniel S; Ernst, Monique
2015-03-01
This study examines the effect of contingency on reward function in anxiety. We define contingency as the aspect of a situation in which the outcome is determined by one's action-that is, when there is a direct link between one's action and the outcome of the action. Past findings in adolescents with anxiety or at risk for anxiety have revealed hypersensitive behavioral and neural responses to higher value rewards with correct performance. This hypersensitivity to highly valued (salient) actions suggests that the value of actions is determined not only by outcome magnitude, but also by the degree to which the outcome is contingent on correct performance. Thus, contingency and incentive value might each modulate reward responses in unique ways in anxiety. Using fMRI with a monetary reward task, striatal response to cue anticipation is compared in 18 clinically anxious and 20 healthy adolescents. This task manipulates orthogonally reward contingency and incentive value. Findings suggest that contingency modulates the neural response to incentive magnitude differently in the two groups. Specifically, during the contingent condition, right-striatal response tracks incentive value in anxious, but not healthy, adolescents. During the noncontingent condition, striatal response is bilaterally stronger to low than to high incentive in anxious adolescents, while healthy adolescents exhibit the expected opposite pattern. Both contingency and reward magnitude differentiate striatal activation in anxious versus healthy adolescents. These findings may reflect exaggerated concern about performance and/or alterations of striatal coding of reward value in anxious adolescents. Abnormalities in reward function in anxiety may have treatment implications.
Yamaguti, Wellington Pereira dos Santos; Sakamoto, Eliana Takahama; Panazzolo, Danilo; Peixoto, Corina da Cunha; Cerri, Giovanni Guido; Albuquerque, André Luis Pereira
2010-01-01
To compare the diaphragmatic mobility of healthy subjects during incentive spirometry with a volume-oriented device, during incentive spirometry with a flow-oriented device, and during diaphragmatic breathing. To compare men and women in terms of diaphragmatic mobility during these three types of breathing exercises. We evaluated the pulmonary function and diaphragmatic mobility of 17 adult healthy volunteers (9 women and 8 men). Diaphragmatic mobility was measured via ultrasound during diaphragmatic breathing and during the use of the two types of incentive spirometers. Diaphragmatic mobility was significantly greater during the use of the volume-oriented incentive spirometer than during the use of the flow-oriented incentive spirometer (70.16 ± 12.83 mm vs. 63.66 ± 10.82 mm; p = 0.02). Diaphragmatic breathing led to a greater diaphragmatic mobility than did the use of the flow-oriented incentive spirometer (69.62 ± 11.83 mm vs. 63.66 ± 10.82 mm; p = 0.02). During all three types of breathing exercises, the women showed a higher mobility/FVC ratio than did the men. Incentive spirometry with a volume-oriented device and diaphragmatic breathing promoted greater diaphragmatic mobility than did incentive spirometry with a flow-oriented device. Women performed better on the three types of breathing exercises than did men.
Financial incentives and maternal health: where do we go from here?
Morgan, Lindsay; Stanton, Mary Ellen; Higgs, Elizabeth S; Balster, Robert L; Bellows, Ben W; Brandes, Neal; Comfort, Alison B; Eichler, Rena; Glassman, Amanda; Hatt, Laurel E; Conlon, Claudia M; Koblinsky, Marge
2013-12-01
Health financing strategies that incorporate financial incentives are being applied in many low- and middle-income countries, and improving maternal and neonatal health is often a central goal. As yet, there have been few reviews of such programmes and their impact on maternal health. The US Government Evidence Summit on Enhancing Provision and use of Maternal Health Services through Financial Incentives was convened on 24-25 April 2012 to address this gap. This article, the final in a series assessing the effects of financial incentives--performance-based incentives (PBIs), insurance, user fee exemption programmes, conditional cash transfers, and vouchers--summarizes the evidence and discusses issues of context, programme design and implementation, cost-effectiveness, and sustainability. We suggest key areas to consider when designing and implementing financial incentive programmes for enhancing maternal health and highlight gaps in evidence that could benefit from additional research. Although the methodological rigor of studies varies, the evidence, overall, suggests that financial incentives can enhance demand for and improve the supply of maternal health services. Definitive evidence demonstrating a link between incentives and improved health outcomes is lacking; however, the evidence suggests that financial incentives can increase the quantity and quality of maternal health services and address health systems and financial barriers that prevent women from accessing and providers from delivering quality, lifesaving maternal healthcare.
49 CFR 350.317 - What are Incentive Funds and how may they be used?
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-10-01
... States that achieve reduction in CMV-involved fatal accidents, CMV fatal accident rate, or that meet specified CMV safety performance criteria. Incentive Funds may be used for any eligible activity or item...
49 CFR 350.317 - What are Incentive Funds and how may they be used?
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-10-01
... States that achieve reduction in CMV-involved fatal accidents, CMV fatal accident rate, or that meet specified CMV safety performance criteria. Incentive Funds may be used for any eligible activity or item...
49 CFR 350.317 - What are Incentive Funds and how may they be used?
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-10-01
... States that achieve reduction in CMV-involved fatal accidents, CMV fatal accident rate, or that meet specified CMV safety performance criteria. Incentive Funds may be used for any eligible activity or item...
49 CFR 350.317 - What are Incentive Funds and how may they be used?
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... States that achieve reduction in CMV-involved fatal accidents, CMV fatal accident rate, or that meet specified CMV safety performance criteria. Incentive Funds may be used for any eligible activity or item...
49 CFR 350.317 - What are Incentive Funds and how may they be used?
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-10-01
... States that achieve reduction in CMV-involved fatal accidents, CMV fatal accident rate, or that meet specified CMV safety performance criteria. Incentive Funds may be used for any eligible activity or item...
Medicare and Medicaid: Conflicting Incentives for Long-Term Care
Grabowski, David C
2007-01-01
The structure of Medicare and Medicaid creates conflicting incentives regarding dually eligible beneficiaries without coordinating their care. Both Medicare and Medicaid have an interest in limiting their costs, and neither has an incentive to take responsibility for the management or quality of care. Examples of misaligned incentives are Medicare's cost-sharing rules, cost shifting within home health care and nursing homes, and cost shifting across chronic and acute care settings. Several policy initiatives—capitation, pay-for-performance, and the shift of the dually eligible population's Medicaid costs to the federal government—may address these conflicting incentives, but all have strengths and weaknesses. With the aging baby boom generation and projected federal and state budget shortfalls, this issue will be a continuing focus of policymakers in the coming decades. PMID:18070331
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Strand, Michael T.; Hawk, Larry W., Jr.; Bubnik, Michelle; Shiels, Keri; Pelham, William E., Jr.; Waxmonsky, James G.
2012-01-01
Working memory (WM) is considered a core deficit in Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), with numerous studies demonstrating impaired WM among children with ADHD. We tested the degree to which WM in children with ADHD was improved by performance-based incentives, an analog of behavioral intervention. In two studies, WM performance was…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
National Center on Performance Incentives, 2009
2009-01-01
A recent report published by the National Center on Performance Incentives (NCPI) presents findings from the second-year of a multi-year evaluation of the Texas Educator Excellence Grant (TEEG) program, a statewide educator incentive program that operated in Texas. As part of this evaluation report, researchers examined how first-year TEEG schools…
Share, David A; Mason, Margaret H
2012-09-01
Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan partnered with providers across the state to create an innovative, "fee for value" physician incentive program that would deliver high-quality, efficient care. The Physician Group Incentive Program rewards physician organizations-formal groups of physicians and practices that can accept incentive payments on behalf of their members-based on the number of quality and utilization measures they adopt, such as generic drug dispensing rates, and on their performance on these measures across their patient populations. Physicians also receive payments for implementing a range of patient-centered medical home capabilities, such as patient registries, and they receive higher fees for office visits for incorporating these capabilities into routine practice while also improving performance. Taken together, the incentive dollars, fee increases, and care management payments amount to a potential increase in reimbursement of 40 percent or more from Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan for practices designated as high-performing patient-centered medical homes. At the same time, we estimate that implementing the patient-centered medical home capabilities was associated with $155 million in lower medical costs in program year 2011 for Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan members. We intend to devote a higher percentage of reimbursement over time to communities of caregivers that offer high-value, system-based care, and a lower percentage of reimbursement to individual physicians on a service-specific basis.
Changing Higher Education Practice in Malaysia: The Conundrum of Incentives
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Wan, Chang Da; Chapman, David; Hutcheson, Sigrid; Lee, Molly; Austin, Ann; Md. Zain, Ahmad Nurulazam
2017-01-01
International university rankings are a widely used measure of higher education excellence. Since publication rates are an important element in most ranking systems, pushing faculty to increase their publication in top-tier international journals is viewed by many government and university officials as an important strategy for improving ratings…
Assessment of the Incentives, Disincentives, and Alternatives for Steel Industry CO2 Reduction
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Paul T. Leuchte; DR. John Stubbles; Professor Fruehan
This report presents the results of the third element of a trilogy of studies sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy's Office of Industrial Technologies on the consumption of energy and the emissions of carbon dioxide in the U.S. steel industry
Students' Exploratory Thinking about a Nonroutine Calculus Task
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Nabb, Keith
2013-01-01
In this article on introductory calculus, intriguing questions are generated that can ignite an appreciation for the subject of mathematics. These questions open doors to advanced mathematical thinking and harness many elements of research-oriented mathematics. Such questions also offer greater incentives for students to think and reflect.…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Zielinski, Dave
2000-01-01
Reasons people do not complete online training courses include (1) no incentives, (2) lack of connectedness, (3) learner preference for instructor-led courses, (4) poor course design, (5) "some is enough," and (6) lack of perks. Course delivery must consider three elements: the technology, course design, and the learning environment. (JOW)
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Milligan, Michael; Bloom, Aaron P; Townsend, Aaron
Defining flexibility has been a challenge that a number of industry members and researchers have attempted to address in recent years. With increased variability and uncertainty of variable generation (VG), the resources on the system will have to be more flexible to adjust output, so that power output ranges, power ramp rates, and energy duration sustainability are sufficient to meet the needs of balancing supply with demand at various operational timescales. This chapter discusses whether existing market designs provide adequate incentives for resources to offer their flexibility into the market to meet the increased levels of variability and uncertainty introducedmore » by VG in the short-term operational time frame. It presents a definition of flexibility and discusses how increased levels of VG require increased needs for flexibility on power systems. Following this introductory material, the chapter examines how existing market designs ensure that resources have the right incentives to provide increased flexibility, and then discusses a number of emerging market design elements that impact flexibility incentives.« less
Paying physician group practices for quality: A statewide quasi-experiment.
Conrad, Douglas A; Grembowski, David; Perry, Lisa; Maynard, Charles; Rodriguez, Hector; Martin, Diane
2013-12-01
This article presents the results of a unique quasi-experiment of the effects of a large-scale pay-for-performance (P4P) program implemented by a leading health insurer in Washington state during 2001-2007. The authors received external funding to provide an objective impact evaluation of the program. The program was unique in several respects: (1) It was designed dynamically, with two discrete intervention periods-one in which payment incentives were based on relative performance (the "contest" period) and a second in which payment incentives were based on absolute performance compared to achievable benchmarks. (2) The program was designed in collaboration with large multispecialty group practices, with an explicit run-in period to test the quality metrics. Public reporting of the quality scorecard for all participating medical groups was introduced 1 year before the quality incentive payment program's inception, and continued throughout 2002-2007. (3) The program was implemented in stages with distinct medical groups. A control group of comparable group practices also was assembled, and difference-in-differences methodology was applied to estimate program effects. Case mix measures were included in all multivariate analyses. The regression design permitted a contrast of intervention effects between the "contest" approach in the sub-period of 2003-2004 and the absolute standard, "achievable benchmarks of care" approach in sub-period 2005-2007. Most of the statistically significant quality incentive program coefficients were small and negative (opposite to program intent). A consistent pattern of differential intervention impact in the sub-periods did not emerge. Cumulatively, the probit regression estimates indicate that neither the quality scorecard nor the quality incentive payment program had a significant positive effect on general clinical quality. Based on key informant interviews with medical leaders, practicing physicians, and administrators of the participating groups, the authors conclude that several factors likely combined to dampen program effects: (1) modest size of the incentive; (2) use of rewards only, rather than a balance of rewards and penalties; (3) targeting incentive payments to the group, thus potentially weakening incentive effects at the individual level. Copyright © 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
A Global Review of Incentive Programs to Accelerate Energy-Efficient Appliances and Equipment
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
de la Rue du Can, Stephane; Phadke, Amol; Leventis, Greg
Incentive programs are an essential policy tool to move the market toward energy-efficient products. They offer a favorable complement to mandatory standards and labeling policies by accelerating the market penetration of energy-efficient products above equipment standard requirements and by preparing the market for increased future mandatory requirements. They sway purchase decisions and in some cases production decisions and retail stocking decisions toward energy-efficient products. Incentive programs are structured according to their regulatory environment, the way they are financed, by how the incentive is targeted, and by who administers them. This report categorizes the main elements of incentive programs, using casemore » studies from the Major Economies Forum to illustrate their characteristics. To inform future policy and program design, it seeks to recognize design advantages and disadvantages through a qualitative overview of the variety of programs in use around the globe. Examples range from rebate programs administered by utilities under an Energy-Efficiency Resource Standards (EERS) regulatory framework (California, USA) to the distribution of Eco-Points that reward customers for buying efficient appliances under a government recovery program (Japan). We found that evaluations have demonstrated that financial incentives programs have greater impact when they target highly efficient technologies that have a small market share. We also found that the benefits and drawbacks of different program design aspects depend on the market barriers addressed, the target equipment, and the local market context and that no program design surpasses the others. The key to successful program design and implementation is a thorough understanding of the market and effective identification of the most important local factors hindering the penetration of energy-efficient technologies.« less
Aligning incentives in supply chains.
Narayanan, V G; Raman, Ananth
2004-11-01
Most companies don't worry about the behavior of their supply chain partners. Instead, they expect the supply chain to work efficiently without interference, as if guided by Adam Smith's famed invisible hand. In their study of more than 50 supply networks, V.G. Narayanan and Ananth Raman found that companies often looked out for their own interests and ignored those of their network partners. Consequently, supply chains performed poorly. Those results aren't shocking when you consider that supply chains extend across several functions and many companies, each with its own priorities and goals. Yet all those functions and firms must pull in the same direction for a chain to deliver goods and services to consumers quickly and cost-effectively. According to the authors, a supply chain works well only if the risks, costs, and rewards of doing business are distributed fairly across the network. In fact, misaligned incentives are often the cause of excess inventory, stock-outs, incorrect forecasts, inadequate sales efforts, and even poor customer service. The fates of all supply chain partners are interlinked: If the firms work together to serve consumers, they will all win. However, they can do that only if incentives are aligned. Companies must acknowledge that the problem of incentive misalignment exists and then determine its root cause and align or redesign incentives. They can improve alignment by, for instance, adopting revenue-sharing contracts, using technology to track previously hidden information, or working with intermediaries to build trust among network partners. It's also important to periodically reassess incentives, because even top-performing networks find that changes in technology or business conditions alter the alignment of incentives.
Making business decisions using trend information
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Prevette, S.S., Westinghouse Hanford, Richland, WA
1997-11-24
Performance Measures, and the trend information that results from their analyses, can help managers in their decision making process. The business decisions that are to be discussed are: Assignment of limited Resources, Funding, Budget; Contractor Rewards/Incentives; Where to focus Process Improvement, Reengineering efforts; When to ask ``What Happened?!!``; Determine if a previous decision was effectively implemented. Trending can provide an input for rational Business Decisions. Key Element is determination of whether or not a significant trend exists - segregating Common Cause from Special Cause. The Control Chart is the tool for accomplishment of trending and determining if you are meetingmore » your Business Objectives. Eliminate Numerical Targets; the goal is Significant Improvement. Profound Knowledge requires integrating data results with gut feeling.« less
DOT National Transportation Integrated Search
2014-02-01
The Michigan Department of Transportation (MDOT) has been using monetary incentive payments for many : years to accelerate highway construction work, resulting in reduced delays to the traveling public. It was : envisioned that incentive/disincentive...
Kaczorowski, Janusz; Hearps, Stephen J C; Lohfeld, Lynne; Goeree, Ron; Donald, Faith; Burgess, Ken; Sebaldt, Rolf J
2013-06-01
To evaluate the effect of the Provider and Patient Reminders in Ontario: Multi-Strategy Prevention Tools (P-PROMPT) reminder and recall system and pay-for-performance incentives on the delivery rates of cervical and breast cancer screening in primary care practices in Ontario, with or without deployment of nurse practitioners (NPs). Before-and-after comparisons of the time-appropriate delivery rates of cervical and breast cancer screening using the automated and NP-augmented strategies of the P-PROMPT reminder and recall system. Southwestern Ontario. A total of 232 physicians from 24 primary care network or family health network groups across 110 different sites eligible for pay-for-performance incentives. The P-PROMPT project combined pay-for-performance incentives with provider and patient reminders and deployment of NPs to enhance the delivery of preventive care services. The mean delivery rates at the practice level of time-appropriate mammograms and Papanicolaou tests completed within the previous 30 months. Before-and-after comparisons of time-appropriate delivery rates (< 30 months) of cancer screening showed the rates of Pap tests and mammograms for eligible women significantly increased over a 1-year period by 6.3% (P < .001) and 5.3% (P < .001), respectively. The NP-augmented strategy achieved comparable rate increases to the automated strategy alone in the delivery rates of both services. The use of provider and patient reminders and pay-for-performance incentives resulted in increases in the uptake of Pap tests and mammograms among eligible primary care patients over a 1-year period in family practices in Ontario.
Harrison, Mark; Milbers, Katherine; Mihic, Tamara; Anis, Aslam H
2016-07-01
Concerns about the sustainability of current health care expenditure are focusing attention on the cost, quality and value of health care provision. Financial incentives, for example pay-for-performance (P4P), seek to reward quality and value in health care provision. There has long been an expectation that P4P schemes are coming to rheumatology. We review the available evidence about the use of incentives in this setting and provide two emerging examples of P4P schemes which may shape the future of service provision in rheumatology. Currently, there is limited and equivocal evidence in rheumatology about the impact of incentive schemes. However, reporting variation in the quality and provision of rheumatology services has highlighted examples of inefficiencies in the delivery of care. If financial incentives can improve the delivery of timely and appropriate care for rheumatology patients, then they may have an important role to play in the sustainability of health care provision.
Investigating financial incentives for maternal health: an introduction.
Stanton, Mary Ellen; Higgs, Elizabeth S; Koblinsky, Marge
2013-12-01
Projection of current trends in maternal and neonatal mortality reduction shows that many countries will fall short of the UN Millennium Development Goal 4 and 5. Underutilization of maternal health services contributes to this poor progress toward reducing maternal and neonatal morbidity and mortality. Moreover, the quality of services continues to lag in many countries, with a negative effect on the health of women and their babies, including deterring women from seeking care. To enhance the use and provision of quality maternal care, countries and donors are increasingly using financial incentives. This paper introduces the JHPN Supplement, in which each paper reviews the evidence of the effectiveness of a specific financial incentive instrument with the aim of improving the use and quality of maternal healthcare and impact. The US Agency for International Development and the US National Institutes of Health convened a US Government Evidence Summit on Enhancing Provision and Use of Maternal Health Services through Financial Incentives on 24-25 April 2012 in Washington, DC. The Summit brought together leading global experts in finance, maternal health, and health systems from governments, academia, development organizations, and foundations to assess the evidence on whether financial incentives significantly and substantially increase provision, use and quality of maternal health services, and the contextual factors that impact the effectiveness of these incentives. Evidence review teams evaluated the multidisciplinary evidence of various financial mechanisms, including supply-side incentives (e.g. performance-based financing, user fees, and various insurance mechanisms) and demand-side incentives (e.g. conditional cash transfers, vouchers, user fee exemptions, and subsidies for care-seeking). At the Summit, the teams presented a synthesis of evidence and initial recommendations on practice, policy, and research for discussion. The Summit enabled structured feedback on recommendations which the teams included in their final papers appearing in this Supplement. Papers in this Supplement review the evidence for a specific financial incentive mechanism (e.g. pay for performance, conditional cash transfer) to improve the use and quality of maternal healthcare and makes recommendations for programmes and future research. While data on programmes using financial incentives for improved use and indications of the quality of maternal health services support specific conclusions and recommendations, including those for future research, data linking the use of financial incentives with improved health outcomes are minimal.
Participant Satisfaction with a Food Benefit Program with Restrictions and Incentives.
Rydell, Sarah A; Turner, Rachael M; Lasswell, Tessa A; French, Simone A; Oakes, J Michael; Elbel, Brian; Harnack, Lisa J
2018-02-01
Policy makers are considering changes to the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP). Proposed changes include financially incentivizing the purchase of healthier foods and prohibiting the use of funds for purchasing foods high in added sugars. SNAP participant perspectives may be useful in understanding the consequences of these proposed changes. To determine whether food restrictions and/or incentives are acceptable to food benefit program participants. Data were collected as part of an experimental trial in which lower-income adults were randomly assigned to one of four financial food benefit conditions: (1) Incentive: 30% financial incentive on eligible fruits and vegetables purchased using food benefits; (2) Restriction: not allowed to buy sugar-sweetened beverages, sweet baked goods, or candies with food benefits; (3) Incentive plus Restriction; or (4) Control: no incentive/restriction. Participants completed closed- and open-ended questions about their perceptions on completion of the 12-week program. Adults eligible or nearly eligible for SNAP were recruited between 2013 and 2015 by means of events or flyers in the Minneapolis/St Paul, MN, metropolitan area. Of the 279 individuals who completed baseline measures, 265 completed follow-up measures and are included in these analyses. χ 2 analyses were conducted to assess differences in program satisfaction. Responses to open-ended questions were qualitatively analyzed using principles of content analysis. There were no statistically significant or meaningful differences between experimental groups in satisfaction with the program elements evaluated in the study. Most participants in all conditions found the food program helpful in buying nutritious foods (94.1% to 98.5%) and in buying the kinds of foods they wanted (85.9% to 95.6%). Qualitative data suggested that most were supportive of restrictions, although a few were dissatisfied. Participants were uniformly supportive of incentives. Findings suggest a food benefit program that includes incentives for purchasing fruits and vegetables and/or restrictions on the use of program funds for purchasing foods high in added sugars appears to be acceptable to most participants. Copyright © 2018 Academy of Nutrition and Dietetics. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
2011-01-24
Performance Metrics Community Based Medical Homes Slide 8 of 10 2011 MHS Conference Increase our primary care market share Net increase in primary... Sharing Knowledge: Achieving Breakthrough Performance 2011 Military Health System Conference Army Incentives for the PCMH 24 January 2011 Mr. Ken...enroll as soon as fully staffed Operate at economic advantage to DoD Improve ER/ UCC usage rates Improve utilization rates Business Rules Army
Urech, Tracy H.; Woodard, LeChauncy D.; Virani, Salim S.; Dudley, R. Adams; Lutschg, Meghan Z.; Petersen, Laura A.
2015-01-01
Background Hospital report cards and financial incentives linked to performance require clinical data that are reliable, appropriate, timely, and cost-effective to process. Pay-for-performance plans are transitioning to automated electronic health record (EHR) data as an efficient method to generate data needed for these programs. Objective To determine how well data from automated processing of structured EHR fields (AP-EHR) reflect data from manual chart review and the impact of these data on performance rewards. Research Design Cross-sectional analysis of performance measures used in a cluster randomized trial assessing the impact of financial incentives on guideline-recommended care for hypertension. Subjects A total of 2,840 patients with hypertension assigned to participating physicians at 12 Veterans Affairs hospital-based outpatient clinics. Fifty-two physicians and 33 primary care personnel received incentive payments. Measures Overall, positive and negative agreement indices and Cohen's kappa were calculated for assessments of guideline-recommended antihypertensive medication use, blood pressure (BP) control, and appropriate response to uncontrolled BP. Pearson's correlation coefficient was used to assess how similar participants’ calculated earnings were between the data sources. Results By manual chart review data, 72.3% of patients were considered to have received guideline-recommended antihypertensive medications compared to 65.0% by AP-EHR review (k=0.51). Manual review indicated 69.5% of patients had controlled BP compared to 66.8% by AP-EHR review (k=0.87). Compared to 52.2% of patients per the manual review, 39.8% received an appropriate response by AP-EHR review (k=0.28). Participants’ incentive payments calculated using the two methods were highly correlated (r≥0.98). Using the AP-EHR data to calculate earnings, participants’ payment changes ranged from a decrease of $91.00 (−30.3%) to an increase of $18.20 (+7.4%) for medication use (IQR, −14.4% to 0%) and a decrease of $100.10 (−31.4%) to an increase of $36.40 (+15.4%) for BP control or appropriate response to uncontrolled BP (IQR, −11.9% to −6.1%). Conclusions Pay-for-performance plans that use only EHR data should carefully consider the measures and the structure of the EHR before data collection and financial incentive disbursement. For this study, we feel that a 10% difference in the total amount of incentive earnings disbursed based on AP-EHR data compared to manual review is acceptable given the time and resources required to abstract data from medical records. PMID:26340661
Tomich, Georgia Miranda; França, Danielle Corrêa; Diniz, Marco Túlio Costa; Britto, Raquel Rodrigues; Sampaio, Rosana Ferreira; Parreira, Verônica Franco
2010-01-01
To evaluate breathing pattern and thoracoabdominal motion during breathing exercises. Twenty-four patients with class II or III obesity (18 women; 6 men) were studied on the second postoperative day after gastroplasty. The mean age was 37 +/- 11 years, and the mean BMI was 44 +/- 3 kg/m(2). Diaphragmatic breathing, incentive spirometry with a flow-oriented device and incentive spirometry with a volume-oriented device were performed in random order. Respiratory inductive plethysmography was used in order to measure respiratory variables and thoracoabdominal motion. Comparisons among the three exercises showed significant differences: tidal volume was higher during incentive spirometry (with the flow-oriented device or with the volume-oriented device) than during diaphragmatic breathing; the respiratory rate was lower during incentive spirometry with the volume-oriented device than during incentive spirometry with the flow-oriented device; and minute ventilation was higher during incentive spirometry (with the flow-oriented device or with the volume-oriented device) than during diaphragmatic breathing. Rib cage motion did not vary during breathing exercises, although there was an increase in thoracoabdominal asynchrony, especially during incentive spirometry with the flow-oriented device. Among the breathing exercises evaluated, incentive spirometry with the volume-oriented device provided the best results, because it allowed slower, deeper inhalation.
Financial Incentives and Maternal Health: Where Do We Go from Here?
Stanton, Mary Ellen; Higgs, Elizabeth S.; Balster, Robert L.; Bellows, Ben W.; Brandes, Neal; Comfort, Alison B.; Eichler, Rena; Glassman, Amanda; Hatt, Laurel E.; Conlon, Claudia M.; Koblinsky, Marge
2013-01-01
Health financing strategies that incorporate financial incentives are being applied in many low- and middle-income countries, and improving maternal and neonatal health is often a central goal. As yet, there have been few reviews of such programmes and their impact on maternal health. The US Government Evidence Summit on Enhancing Provision and use of Maternal Health Services through Financial Incentives was convened on 24-25 April 2012 to address this gap. This article, the final in a series assessing the effects of financial incentives—performance-based incentives (PBIs), insurance, user fee exemption programmes, conditional cash transfers, and vouchers—summarizes the evidence and discusses issues of context, programme design and implementation, cost-effectiveness, and sustainability. We suggest key areas to consider when designing and implementing financial incentive programmes for enhancing maternal health and highlight gaps in evidence that could benefit from additional research. Although the methodological rigor of studies varies, the evidence, overall, suggests that financial incentives can enhance demand for and improve the supply of maternal health services. Definitive evidence demonstrating a link between incentives and improved health outcomes is lacking; however, the evidence suggests that financial incentives can increase the quantity and quality of maternal health services and address health systems and financial barriers that prevent women from accessing and providers from delivering quality, lifesaving maternal healthcare.
77 FR 35795 - Applications for New Awards; Teacher Incentive Fund
Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014
2012-06-14
... personnel may include, for example, school counselors, media specialists, or para-educators. Performance... by the State as a priority school pursuant to the State's approved request for Elementary and... Incentive Fund AGENCY: Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Department of Education. ACTION: Notice...
Cost-effectiveness of hospital pay-for-performance incentives.
Nahra, Tammie A; Reiter, Kristin L; Hirth, Richard A; Shermer, Janet E; Wheeler, John R C
2006-02-01
One increasingly popular mechanism for stimulating quality improvements is pay-for-performance, or incentive, programs. This article examines the cost-effectiveness of a hospital incentive system for heart-related care, using a principal-agent model, where the insurer is the principal and hospitals are the agents. Four-year incentive system costsfor the payer were dollar 22,059,383, composed primarily of payments to the participating hospitals, with approximately 5 percent in administrative costs. Effectiveness is measured in stages, beginning with improvements in the processes of heart care. Care process improvements are converted into quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) gained, with reference to literatures on clinical effectiveness and survival. An estimated 24,418 patients received improved care, resulting in a range of QALYs from 733 to 1,701, depending on assumptions about clinical effectiveness. Cost per QALY was found to be between dollar 12,967 and dollar 30,081, a level well under consensus measures of the value of a QALY.
Financial versus Non-Financial Incentives for Improving Patient Experience.
Lee, Thomas H
2015-05-01
Delivering compassionate and coordinated care is a goal for all health care providers. Humans are not always consistent, though, both individually and collectively, and this is why everyone needs incentives to be at their best and to try to always be improving. The endlessly interesting question in patient experience is, what should those incentives look like? Should they be financial or nonfinancial? Dr. Thomas H. Lee explores what is most effective in regard to engaging and motivating physicians. While different approaches will work in different organizational cultures, financial incentives have their role in performance improvement. Compassionate coordinated care should be a social norm and be pursued by all health care organizations.
Incentives and provider payment methods.
Barnum, H; Kutzin, J; Saxenian, H
1995-01-01
The mode of payment creates powerful incentives affecting provider behavior and the efficiency, equity and quality outcomes of health finance reforms. This article examines provider incentives as well as administrative costs, and institutional conditions for successful implementation associated with provider payment alternatives. The alternatives considered are budget reforms, capitation, fee-for-service, and case-based reimbursement. We conclude that competition, whether through a regulated private sector or within a public system, has the potential to improve the performance of any payment method. All methods generate both adverse and beneficial incentives. Systems with mixed forms of provider payment can provide tradeoffs to offset the disadvantages of individual modes. Low-income countries should avoid complex payment systems requiring higher levels of institutional development.
Beyond Measurement and Reward: Methods of Motivating Quality Improvement and Accountability.
Berenson, Robert A; Rice, Thomas
2015-12-01
The article examines public policies designed to improve quality and accountability that do not rely on financial incentives and public reporting of provider performance. Payment policy should help temper the current "more is better" attitude of physicians and provider organizations. Incentive neutrality would better support health professionals' intrinsic motivation to act in their patients' best interests to improve overall quality than would pay-for-performance plans targeted to specific areas of clinical care. Public policy can support clinicians' intrinsic motivation through approaches that support systematic feedback to clinicians and provide concrete opportunities to collaborate to improve care. Some programs administered by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, including Partnership for Patients and Conditions of Participation, deserve more attention; they represent available, but largely ignored, approaches to support providers to improve quality and protect beneficiaries against substandard care. Public policies related to quality improvement should focus more on methods of enhancing professional intrinsic motivation, while recognizing the potential role of organizations to actively promote and facilitate that motivation. Actually achieving improvement, however, will require a reexamination of the role played by financial incentives embedded in payments and the unrealistic expectations placed on marginal incentives in pay-for-performance schemes. © Health Research and Educational Trust.
Leung, Gabriel M.; Yu, Philip L. H.; Wong, Irene O. L.; Johnston, Janice M.; Tin, Keith Y. K.
2003-01-01
Objective: Given the slow adoption of medical informatics in Hong Kong and Asia, we sought to understand the contributory barriers and potential incentives associated with information technology implementation. Design and Measurements: A representative sample of 949 doctors (response rate = 77.0%) was asked through a postal survey to rank a list of nine barriers associated with clinical computerization according to self-perceived importance. They ranked seven incentives or catalysts that may influence computerization. We generated mean rank scores and used multidimensional preference analysis to explore key explanatory dimensions of these variables. A hierarchical cluster analysis was performed to identify homogenous subgroups of respondents. We further determined the relationships between the sets of barriers and incentives/catalysts collectively using canonical correlation. Results: Time costs, lack of technical support and large capital investments were the biggest barriers to computerization, whereas improved office efficiency and better-quality care were ranked highest as potential incentives to computerize. Cost vs. noncost, physician-related vs. patient-related, and monetary vs. nonmonetary factors were the key dimensions explaining the barrier variables. Similarly, within-practice vs external and “push” vs “pull” factors accounted for the incentive variables. Four clusters were identified for barriers and three for incentives/catalysts. Canonical correlation revealed that respondents who were concerned with the costs of computerization also perceived financial incentives and government regulation to be important incentives/catalysts toward computerization. Those who found the potential interference with communication important also believed that the promise of improved care from computerization to be a significant incentive. Conclusion: This study provided evidence regarding common barriers associated with clinical computerization. Our findings also identified possible incentive strategies that may be employed to accelerate uptake of computer systems. PMID:12595409
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Texas Education Agency, Austin.
The essential elements of the Texas Experience-Based Career Education (EBCE) network are described and examined to determine where Texas is in terms of institutionalizing EBCE. First described are the identification of incentives for both institutional and individual participation in the statewide effort and the plans to communicate knowledge…
Attracting and Retaining Exemplary Teachers. Challenge for the Future.
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Connecticut State Dept. of Education, Hartford.
The Connecticut State Incentives Project to Identify and Reward Exemplary Teaching began with a twofold purpose: first, to provide assistance to seven local districts in developing plans to identify and reward exemplary teaching, and second, to enable the Connecticut State Department of Education to share the common elements of these plans with…
How Will Welfare Reform Affect Childbearing and Family Structure Decisions? Discussion Paper.
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Peters, H. Elizabeth; Plotnick, Robert D.; Jeong, Se-Ook
This paper summarizes changes in key elements of welfare policy and in closely related policies on child support enforcement and sex education and family planning programs. Drawing on a conceptual framework that highlights how incentives created by public policy can affect demographic behaviors, the paper concludes that, as Congress intended,…
42 CFR § 414.1330 - Quality performance category.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2017-10-01
... SERVICES (CONTINUED) MEDICARE PROGRAM (CONTINUED) PAYMENT FOR PART B MEDICAL AND OTHER HEALTH SERVICES Merit-Based Incentive Payment System and Alternative Payment Model Incentive § 414.1330 Quality... comprise: (1) 60 percent of a MIPS eligible clinician's final score for MIPS payment year 2019. (2) 50...
Rewarding safe behavior: strategies for change.
Fell-Carlson, Deborah
2004-12-01
Effective, sustainable safety incentives are integrated into a performance management system designed to encourage long term behavior change. Effective incentive program design integrates the fundamental considerations of compensation (i.e., valence, instrumentality, expectancy, equity) with behavior change theory in the context of a strong merit based performance management system. Clear expectations are established and communicated from the time applicants apply for the position. Feedback and social recognition are leveraged and used as rewards, in addition to financial incentives built into the compensation system and offered periodically as short term incentives. Rewards are tied to specific objectives intended to influence specific behaviors. Objectives are designed to challenge employees, providing opportunities to grow and enhance their sense of belonging. Safety contests and other awareness activities are most effective when used to focus safety improvement efforts on specific behaviors or processes, for a predetermined period of time, in the context of a comprehensive safety system. Safety incentive programs designed around injury outcomes can result in unintended, and undesirable, consequences. Safety performance can be leveraged by integrating safety into corporate cultural indicators. Symbols of safety remind employees of corporate safety goals and objectives (e.g., posted safety goals and integrating safety into corporate mission and vision). Rites and ceremonies provide opportunities for social recognition and feedback and demonstrate safety is a corporate value. Feedback opportunities, rewards, and social recognition all provide content for corporate legends, those stories embellished over time, that punctuate the overall system of organizational norms, and provide examples of the organizational safety culture in action.
Kok, Maryse C; Broerse, Jacqueline E W; Theobald, Sally; Ormel, Hermen; Dieleman, Marjolein; Taegtmeyer, Miriam
2017-09-02
Health systems are social institutions, in which health worker performance is shaped by transactional processes between different actors.This analytical assessment unravels the complex web of factors that influence the performance of community health workers (CHWs) in low- and middle-income countries. It examines their unique intermediary position between the communities they serve and actors in the health sector, and the complexity of the health systems in which they operate. The assessment combines evidence from the international literature on CHW programmes with research outcomes from the 5-year REACHOUT consortium, undertaking implementation research to improve CHW performance in six contexts (two in Asia and four in Africa). A conceptual framework on CHW performance, which explicitly conceptualizes the interface role of CHWs, is presented. Various categories of factors influencing CHW performance are distinguished in the framework: the context, the health system and intervention hardware and the health system and intervention software. Hardware elements of CHW interventions comprise the supervision systems, training, accountability and communication structures, incentives, supplies and logistics. Software elements relate to the ideas, interests, relationships, power, values and norms of the health system actors. They influence CHWs' feelings of connectedness, familiarity, self-fulfilment and serving the same goals and CHWs' perceptions of support received, respect, competence, honesty, fairness and recognition.The framework shines a spotlight on the need for programmes to pay more attention to ideas, interests, relationships, power, values and norms of CHWs, communities, health professionals and other actors in the health system, if CHW performance is to improve.
Mehta, Shivan J; Feingold, Jordyn; Vandertuyn, Matthew; Niewood, Tess; Cox, Catherine; Doubeni, Chyke A; Volpp, Kevin G; Asch, David A
2017-11-01
Behavioral economic approaches could increase uptake for colorectal cancer screening. We performed a randomized controlled trial of 2245 employees to determine whether an email containing a phone number for scheduling (control), an email with the active choice to opt in or opt out (active choice), or the active choice email plus a $100 incentive (financial incentive) increased colonoscopy completion within 3 months. Higher proportions of participants in the financial incentive group underwent screening (3.7%) than in the control (1.6%) or active choice groups (1.5%) (P = .01 and P < .01). We found no difference in uptake of screening between the active choice and control groups (P = .88). The $100 conditional incentive modestly but significantly increased colonoscopy use. ClinicalTrials.gov no: NCT02660671. Copyright © 2017 AGA Institute. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Incentive spirometry following thoracic surgery: what should we be doing?
Agostini, Paula; Singh, Sally
2009-06-01
Thoracic surgery may cause reduced respiratory function and pulmonary complications, with associated increased risk of mortality. Postoperative physiotherapy aims to reverse atelectasis and secretion retention, and may include incentive spirometry. To review the evidence for incentive spirometry, examining the physiological basis, equipment and its use following thoracic surgery. MEDLINE was searched from 1950 to January 2008, EMBASE was searched from 1980 to January 2008, and CINAHL was searched from 1982 to January 2008, all using the OVID interface. The search term was: '[incentive spirometry.mp]'. The Cochrane Library was searched using the terms 'incentive spirometry' and 'postoperative physiotherapy'. The Chartered Society of Physiotherapy Resource Centre was also searched, and a hand search was performed to follow-up references from the retrieved studies. Non-scientific papers were excluded, as were papers that did not relate to thoracic surgery or the postoperative treatment of patients with incentive spirometry. Initially, 106 studies were found in MEDLINE, 99 in EMBASE and 42 in CINAHL. Eight references were found in the Cochrane Library and one paper in the Chartered Society of Physiotherapy Resource Centre. Four studies and one systematic review investigating the effects of postoperative physiotherapy and incentive spirometry in thoracic surgery patients were selected and reviewed. Physiological evidence suggests that incentive spirometry may be appropriate for lung re-expansion following major thoracic surgery. Based on sparse literature, postoperative physiotherapy regimes with, or without, the use of incentive spirometry appear to be effective following thoracic surgery compared with no physiotherapy input.
Wassum, Kate M.; Ostlund, Sean B.; Balleine, Bernard W.; Maidment, Nigel T.
2011-01-01
Here we attempted to clarify the role of dopamine signaling in reward seeking. In Experiment 1, we assessed the effects of the dopamine D1/D2 receptor antagonist flupenthixol (0.5 mg/kg i.p.) on Pavlovian incentive motivation and found that flupenthixol blocked the ability of a conditioned stimulus to enhance both goal approach and instrumental performance (Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer). In Experiment 2 we assessed the effects of flupenthixol on reward palatability during post-training noncontingent re-exposure to the sucrose reward in either a control 3-h or novel 23-h food-deprived state. Flupenthixol, although effective in blocking the Pavlovian goal approach, was without effect on palatability or the increase in reward palatability induced by the upshift in motivational state. This noncontingent re-exposure provided an opportunity for instrumental incentive learning, the process by which rats encode the value of a reward for use in updating reward-seeking actions. Flupenthixol administered prior to the instrumental incentive learning opportunity did not affect the increase in subsequent off-drug reward-seeking actions induced by that experience. These data suggest that although dopamine signaling is necessary for Pavlovian incentive motivation, it is not necessary for changes in reward experience, or for the instrumental incentive learning process that translates this experience into the incentive value used to drive reward-seeking actions, and provide further evidence that Pavlovian and instrumental incentive learning processes are dissociable. PMID:21693635
Care coordination in accountable care organizations: moving beyond structure and incentives.
Press, Matthew J; Michelow, Marilyn D; MacPhail, Lucy H
2012-12-01
Accountable care organizations (ACOs) are considered by many to be a key component of healthcare delivery system improvement. One expectation is that the structural elements of the ACO model, including clinical integration and financial accountability, will lead to better coordination of care for patients. But, while structure and incentives may facilitate the delivery of coordinated care, they will not necessarily ensure that care coordination is done well. For that, physicians and other healthcare providers within ACOs must possess and utilize specific skills, particularly in the areas of collaboration, communication, and teamwork. In this article, we present strategies in 3 domains--training, support tools, and organizational culture--that ACOs can implement to foster the development of these skills and support their use in clinical practice.
48 CFR 1552.216-78 - Award term incentive plan.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... evaluation of performance, and, together with Agency need and availability of funding, serves as the basis... the acceptable quality levels (AQL) for the evaluated tasks, both individual and aggregate, for that... incentive period. [identify the most significant tasks. Describe the AQL for each task as well as an overall...
Incentives Alone Not Enough to Prod Teacher Effectiveness
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Sawchuk, Stephen
2009-01-01
Policy experts are renewing questions about the role of school culture and leadership in the drive to improve teaching effectiveness in the most-challenging school environments. As states and districts increasingly explore tactics like performance-based pay, incentive programs, and bonuses to attract the best teachers to troubled schools, experts…
42 CFR § 414.1445 - Identification of other payer advanced APMs.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2017-10-01
... AND HUMAN SERVICES (CONTINUED) MEDICARE PROGRAM (CONTINUED) PAYMENT FOR PART B MEDICAL AND OTHER HEALTH SERVICES Merit-Based Incentive Payment System and Alternative Payment Model Incentive § 414.1445... determination prior to the QP Performance Period to identify Medicaid Medical Home Models and Medicaid APMs. (b...
42 CFR § 414.1375 - Advancing care information performance category.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2017-10-01
... HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (CONTINUED) MEDICARE PROGRAM (CONTINUED) PAYMENT FOR PART B MEDICAL AND OTHER HEALTH SERVICES Merit-Based Incentive Payment System and Alternative Payment Model Incentive § 414.1375... final score for MIPS payment year 2019 and each MIPS payment year thereafter. (b) Reporting for the...
42 CFR § 414.1355 - Improvement activities performance category.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2017-10-01
... AND HUMAN SERVICES (CONTINUED) MEDICARE PROGRAM (CONTINUED) PAYMENT FOR PART B MEDICAL AND OTHER HEALTH SERVICES Merit-Based Incentive Payment System and Alternative Payment Model Incentive § 414.1355... comprises: (1) 15 percent of a MIPS eligible clinician's final score for MIPS payment year 2019 and for each...
42 CFR § 414.1340 - Data completeness criteria for the quality performance category.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2017-10-01
..., DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (CONTINUED) MEDICARE PROGRAM (CONTINUED) PAYMENT FOR PART B MEDICAL AND OTHER HEALTH SERVICES Merit-Based Incentive Payment System and Alternative Payment Model Incentive... that meet the measure's denominator criteria, regardless of payer for MIPS payment year 2019. (2) At...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... Acquisition Regulations System DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AGENCY SUPPLEMENTARY REGULATIONS DOE MANAGEMENT AND.... Financial incentives for timely mission accomplishment or cost effectiveness shall never compromise or..., undue risk to the common defense and security. In addition, this category includes performance failures...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-10-01
... Acquisition Regulations System DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AGENCY SUPPLEMENTARY REGULATIONS DOE MANAGEMENT AND.... Financial incentives for timely mission accomplishment or cost effectiveness shall never compromise or..., undue risk to the common defense and security. In addition, this category includes performance failures...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-10-01
... Acquisition Regulations System DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AGENCY SUPPLEMENTARY REGULATIONS DOE MANAGEMENT AND.... Financial incentives for timely mission accomplishment or cost effectiveness shall never compromise or..., undue risk to the common defense and security. In addition, this category includes performance failures...
Occupational safety and health management in the construction industry: a review.
Jaafar, Mohd Hafiidz; Arifin, Kadir; Aiyub, Kadaruddin; Razman, Muhammad Rizal; Ishak, Muhammad Izzuddin Syakir; Samsurijan, Mohamad Shaharudin
2017-09-11
The construction industry plays a significant role in contributing to the economy and development globally. During the process of construction, various hazards coupled with the unique nature of the industry contribute to high fatality rates. This review refers to previous published studies and related Malaysian legislation documents. Four main elements consisting of human, worksite, management and external elements which cause occupational accidents and illnesses were identified. External and management elements are the underlying causes contributing to occupational safety and health (OSH), while human and worksite elements are more apparent causes of occupational accidents and illnesses. An effective OSH management approach is required to contain all hazards at construction sites. An approach to OSH management constructed by elements of policy, process, personnel and incentive developed in previous work is explored. Changes to the sub-elements according to previous studies and the related Malaysian legislation are also covered in this review.
Patel, Mitesh S; Asch, David A; Rosin, Roy; Small, Dylan S; Bellamy, Scarlett L; Heuer, Jack; Sproat, Susan; Hyson, Chris; Haff, Nancy; Lee, Samantha M; Wesby, Lisa; Hoffer, Karen; Shuttleworth, David; Taylor, Devon H; Hilbert, Victoria; Zhu, Jingsan; Yang, Lin; Wang, Xingmei; Volpp, Kevin G
2016-03-15
Financial incentive designs to increase physical activity have not been well-examined. To test the effectiveness of 3 methods to frame financial incentives to increase physical activity among overweight and obese adults. Randomized, controlled trial. (ClinicalTrials.gov: NCT 02030119). University of Pennsylvania. 281 adult employees (body mass index ≥27 kg/m2). 13-week intervention. Participants had a goal of 7000 steps per day and were randomly assigned to a control group with daily feedback or 1 of 3 financial incentive programs with daily feedback: a gain incentive ($1.40 given each day the goal was achieved), lottery incentive (daily eligibility [expected value approximately $1.40] if goal was achieved), or loss incentive ($42 allocated monthly upfront and $1.40 removed each day the goal was not achieved). Participants were followed for another 13 weeks with daily performance feedback but no incentives. Primary outcome was the mean proportion of participant-days that the 7000-step goal was achieved during the intervention. Secondary outcomes included the mean proportion of participant-days achieving the goal during follow-up and the mean daily steps during intervention and follow-up. The mean proportion of participant-days achieving the goal was 0.30 (95% CI, 0.22 to 0.37) in the control group, 0.35 (CI, 0.28 to 0.42) in the gain-incentive group, 0.36 (CI, 0.29 to 0.43) in the lottery-incentive group, and 0.45 (CI, 0.38 to 0.52) in the loss-incentive group. In adjusted analyses, only the loss-incentive group had a significantly greater mean proportion of participant-days achieving the goal than control (adjusted difference, 0.16 [CI, 0.06 to 0.26]; P = 0.001), but the adjusted difference in mean daily steps was not significant (861 [CI, 24 to 1746]; P = 0.056). During follow-up, daily steps decreased for all incentive groups and were not different from control. Single employer. Financial incentives framed as a loss were most effective for achieving physical activity goals. National Institute on Aging.
Kotani, Toshiaki; Akazawa, Tsutomu; Sakuma, Tsuyoshi; Nagaya, Shigeyuki; Sonoda, Masaru; Tanaka, Yuji; Katogi, Takehide; Nemoto, Tetsuharu; Minami, Shohei
2015-06-01
To investigate the effectiveness of incentive spirometry on respiratory motion in healthy subjects using cine breathing magnetic resonance imaging (MRI). Ten non-smoking healthy subjects without any history of respiratory disease were studied. Subjects were asked to perform pulmonary training using incentive spirometry every day for two weeks. To assess the effectiveness of this training, pulmonary function tests and cine breathing MRI were performed before starting pulmonary training and two weeks after its completion. After training, there were significant improvements in vital capacity (VC) from 3.58±0.8 L to 3.74±0.8 L and in %VC from 107.4±10.8 to 112.1±8.2. Significant changes were observed in the right diaphragm motion, right chest wall motion, and left chest wall motion, which were increased from 55.7±9.6 mm to 63.4±10.2 mm, from 15.6±6.1 mm to 23.4±10.4 mm, and from 16.3±7.6 mm to 22.0±9.8 mm, respectively. Two weeks of training using incentive spirometry provided improvements in pulmonary function and respiratory motion, which suggested that incentive spirometry may be a useful preoperative modality for improving pulmonary function during the perioperative period.
Neural substrates of social facilitation effects on incentive-based performance
Chib, Vikram S; Adachi, Ryo; O’Doherty, John P
2018-01-01
Abstract Throughout our lives we must perform tasks while being observed by others. Previous studies have shown that the presence of an audience can cause increases in an individual’s performance as compared to when they are not being observed—a phenomenon called ‘social facilitation’. However, the neural mechanisms underlying this effect, in the context of skilled-task performance for monetary incentives, are not well understood. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging to monitor brain activity while healthy human participants performed a skilled-task during conditions in which they were paid based on their performance and observed and not observed by an audience. We found that during social facilitation, social signals represented in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) enhanced reward value computations in ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC). We also found that functional connectivity between dmPFC and ventral striatum was enhanced when participants exhibited social facilitation effects, indicative of a means by which social signals serve to modulate brain regions involved in regulating behavioral motivation. These findings illustrate how neural processing of social judgments gives rise to the enhanced motivational state that results in social facilitation of incentive-based performance. PMID:29648653
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Eriksson, Leif G.; Dials, George E.; George, Critz H.
2013-07-01
In February 2009, the Obama Administration announced it would abandon USA's only candidate SNF/HLW-disposal facility since 1987. In 2010, all related activities were stopped and the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future was established 'to recommend a new strategy for managing the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle', which it did in January 2012, emphasizing eight key elements. However, Key Element 1, 'A new, consent-based approach to siting future nuclear facilities', is qualitative/indeterminate rather than quantitative/measurable. It is thus highly-susceptible to semantic permutations that could extend rather than, as intended, expedite the siting of future nuclear facilities unlessmore » it also defines: a) Whose consent is needed?; and b) What constitutes consent? The following 'generic', radiation-risk- and societal-equity-based criteria address these questions: 1. Identify areas affected by projected radiation and other health risks from: a. The proposed nuclear facility (facility stakeholders); and b. The related nuclear-materials-transportation routes (transportation stakeholders); then 2. Surround each stakeholder area with a buffer zone and use this enlarged foot print to identify: a. Stakeholder hosts; and b. Areas not hosting any stakeholder category (interested parties). 3. Define 'consent-based' as being at least 60 percent of the 'population' in the respective stakeholder category and apply this yardstick to both 'in favor' and 'against' votes. Although criteria 1 and 2 also need facility-based definitions to make Key Element 1 measurable, the described siting approach, augmented by related facility-host incentives, would expedite the schedule and reduce the cost for achieving Key Elements 4-6 and 8, politics permitting. (authors)« less
Farrell, Anne M.; Goh, Joshua O. S.; White, Brian J.
2018-01-01
Emotional and economic incentives often conflict in decision environments. To make economically desirable decisions then, deliberative neural processes must be engaged to regulate automatic emotional reactions. In this functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study, we evaluated how fixed wage (FW) incentives and performance-based (PB) financial incentives, in which pay is proportional to outcome, differentially regulate positive and negative emotional reactions to hypothetical colleagues that conflicted with the economics of available alternatives. Neural activity from FW to PB incentive contexts decreased for positive emotional stimuli but increased for negative stimuli in middle temporal, insula, and medial prefrontal regions. In addition, PB incentives further induced greater responses to negative than positive emotional decisions in the frontal and anterior cingulate regions involved in emotion regulation. Greater response to positive than negative emotional features in these regions also correlated with lower frequencies of economically desirable choices. Our findings suggest that whereas positive emotion regulation involves a reduction of responses in valence representation regions, negative emotion regulation additionally engages brain regions for deliberative processing and signaling of incongruous events. PMID:29487519
Farrell, Anne M; Goh, Joshua O S; White, Brian J
2018-01-01
Emotional and economic incentives often conflict in decision environments. To make economically desirable decisions then, deliberative neural processes must be engaged to regulate automatic emotional reactions. In this functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study, we evaluated how fixed wage (FW) incentives and performance-based (PB) financial incentives, in which pay is proportional to outcome, differentially regulate positive and negative emotional reactions to hypothetical colleagues that conflicted with the economics of available alternatives. Neural activity from FW to PB incentive contexts decreased for positive emotional stimuli but increased for negative stimuli in middle temporal, insula, and medial prefrontal regions. In addition, PB incentives further induced greater responses to negative than positive emotional decisions in the frontal and anterior cingulate regions involved in emotion regulation. Greater response to positive than negative emotional features in these regions also correlated with lower frequencies of economically desirable choices. Our findings suggest that whereas positive emotion regulation involves a reduction of responses in valence representation regions, negative emotion regulation additionally engages brain regions for deliberative processing and signaling of incongruous events.
Dellve, Lotta; Hadzibajramovic, Emina; Ahlborg, Gunnar
2011-09-01
This paper is a report of a cohort study of healthcare workers' work attendance, and its long-term consequences' on health, burnout, work ability and performance. Concepts and measures of work attendance have varied in the scientific literature. Attending work in spite of being sick can have serious consequences on health. There is little knowledge on which individual and work-related conditions that increase work attendance and the long-term impact on health and performance. Prospective analyses of three measures of work attendance i.e. sickness attendance, uninterrupted long-term attendance and balanced attendance (≤7 days of sick leave per year and no sickness attendance) were done using questionnaire data from a 2-year cohort study (2004-2006) of randomly selected healthcare workers (n = 2624). Incentives (e.g. effort-reward balance, social support, meaningfulness) and requirements (e.g. time-pressure, dutifulness, high responsibility) to attend work as well as general health, burnout, sick leave, work ability and performance were assessed. There was a positive relation between balanced work attendance and incentives, whereas high sickness attendance was associated with requirements. Follow up after 2 years showed that balanced attendance was associated with sustained health and performance while sickness attendance was associated with poor health, burnout, sick-leave and decreased performance. It is important to distinguish between measures of work attendance as they differ in relation to incentives, and health- and performance-related consequences. Sickness attendance seems to be an important risk indicator. A balanced work attendance should be promoted for sustained health and performance in healthcare organisations. © 2011 The Authors. Journal of Advanced Nursing © 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Petersen, Laura A; Ramos, Kate Simpson; Pietz, Kenneth; Woodard, LeChauncy D
2017-06-01
Evaluate the effect of a pay-for-performance intervention on the quality of hypertension care provided to black patients and determine whether it produced risk selection. Primary data collected between 2007 and 2009 from Veterans Affairs physicians and their primary care panels. Nested study within a cluster randomized controlled trial of three types of financial incentives and no incentives (control). We compared the proportion of physicians' black patients meeting hypertension performance measures for baseline and final performance periods. We measured risk selection by comparing the proportion of patients who switched providers, patient visit frequency, and panel turnover. Due to limited power, we prespecified in the analysis plan combining the three incentive groups and oversampling black patients. Data collected electronically and by chart review. The proportion of black patients who achieved blood pressure control or received an appropriate response to uncontrolled blood pressure in the final period was 6.3 percent (95 percent confidence interval, 0.8-11.7 percent) greater for physicians who received an incentive than for controls. There was no difference between intervention and controls in the proportion of patients who switched providers, visit frequency, or panel turnover. A pay-for-performance intervention improved blood pressure control or appropriate response to uncontrolled blood pressure in black patients and did not produce risk selection. © Published 2016. This article is a U.S. Government work and is in the public domain in the USA.
Investigating Group Contingencies to Promote Brief Abstinence from Cigarette Smoking
Meredith, Steven E.; Dallery, Jesse
2013-01-01
In contingency management (CM), monetary incentives are contingent on evidence of drug abstinence. Typically, incentives (e.g., “vouchers” exchangeable for goods or services) are contingent on individual performance. We programmed vouchers contingent on group performance to investigate whether these contingencies would promote brief abstinence from cigarette smoking. Thirty-two participants were divided into small teams (n = 3 per team). During three 5-day within-subject experimental conditions, participants submitted video recordings of breath carbon monoxide (CO) measures twice daily via Mōtiv8 Systems™, an Internet-based remote monitoring application. During the interdependent contingency condition, participants earned vouchers each time they and their teammates submitted breath CO samples indicative of abstinence (i.e., negative samples). During the independent contingency condition, participants earned vouchers each time they submitted negative samples, regardless of their teammates' performance. During the no vouchers condition, no monetary incentives were contingent on abstinence. In addition, half of the participants (n = 16) could communicate with their teammates through an online peer support forum. Although forum access did not appear to promote smoking abstinence, monetary incentives did promote brief abstinence. Significantly more negative samples were submitted when vouchers were contingent on individual performance (56%) or team performance (53%) relative to when no vouchers were available (35%; F = 6.9, p = 0.002). The results show that interdependent contingencies can promote brief abstinence from cigarette smoking. Moreover, the results suggest that these contingencies may help lower treatment costs and promote social support. PMID:23421358
Modulation of working memory function by motivation through loss-aversion.
Krawczyk, Daniel C; D'Esposito, Mark
2013-04-01
Cognitive performance is affected by motivation. Few studies, however, have investigated the neural mechanisms of the influence of motivation through potential monetary punishment on working memory. We employed functional MRI during a delayed recognition task that manipulated top-down control demands with added monetary incentives to some trials in the form of potential losses of bonus money. Behavioral performance on the task was influenced by loss-threatening incentives in the form of faster and more accurate performance. As shown previously, we found enhancement of activity for relevant stimuli occurs throughout all task periods (e.g., stimulus encoding, maintenance, and response) in both prefrontal and visual association cortex. Further, these activation patterns were enhanced for trials with possible monetary loss relative to nonincentive trials. During the incentive cue, the amygdala and striatum showed significantly greater activation when money was at a possible loss on the trial. We also evaluated patterns of functional connectivity between regions responsive to monetary consequences and prefrontal areas responsive to the task. This analysis revealed greater delay period connectivity between and the left insula and prefrontal cortex with possible monetary loss relative to nonincentive trials. Overall, these results reveal that incentive motivation can modulate performance on working memory tasks through top-down signals via amplification of activity within prefrontal and visual association regions selective to processing the perceptual inputs of the stimuli to be remembered. Copyright © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Mehta, Rajendra H; Liang, Li; Karve, Amrita M; Hernandez, Adrian F; Rumsfeld, John S; Fonarow, Gregg C; Peterson, Eric D
2008-10-22
While most comparisons of hospital outcomes adjust for patient characteristics, process performance comparisons typically do not. To evaluate the degree to which hospital process performance ratings and eligibility for financial incentives are altered after accounting for hospitals' patient demographics, clinical characteristics, and mix of treatment opportunities. Using data from the American Heart Association's Get With the Guidelines program between January 2, 2000, and March 28, 2008, we analyzed hospital process performance based on the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services' defined core measures for acute myocardial infarction. Hospitals were initially ranked based on crude composite process performance and then ranked again after accounting for hospitals' patient demographics, clinical characteristics, and eligibility for measures using a hierarchical model. We then compared differences in hospital performance rankings and pay-for-performance financial incentive categories (top 20%, middle 60%, and bottom 20% institutions). Hospital process performance ranking and pay-for-performance financial incentive categories. A total of 148,472 acute myocardial infarction patients met the study criteria from 449 centers. Hospitals for which crude composite acute myocardial infarction performance was in the bottom quintile (n = 89) were smaller nonacademic institutions that treated a higher percentage of patients from racial or ethnic minority groups and also patients with greater comorbidities than hospitals ranked in the top quintile (n = 90). Although there was overall agreement on hospital rankings based on observed vs adjusted composite scores (weighted kappa, 0.74), individual hospital ranking changed with adjustment (median, 22 ranks; range, 0-214; interquartile range, 9-40). Additionally, 16.5% of institutions (n = 74) changed pay-for-performance financial status categories after accounting for patient and treatment opportunity mix. Our findings suggest that accounting for hospital differences in patient characteristics and treatment opportunities is associated with modest changes in hospital performance rankings and eligibility for financial benefits in pay-for-performance programs for treatment of myocardial infarction.
Bärnighausen, Till; Bloom, David E
2009-06-26
In many countries worldwide, health worker shortages are one of the main constraints in achieving population health goals. Financial-incentive programmes for return of service, whereby participants receive payments in return for a commitment to practise for a period of time in a medically underserved area, can alleviate local and regional health worker shortages through a number of mechanisms. First, they can redirect the flow of those health workers who would have been educated without financial incentives from well-served to underserved areas. Second, they can add health workers to the pool of workers who would have been educated without financial incentives and place them in underserved areas. Third, financial-incentive programmes may improve the retention in underserved areas of those health workers who participate in a programme, but who would have worked in an underserved area without any financial incentives. Fourth, the programmes may increase the retention of all health workers in underserved areas by reducing the strength of some of the reasons why health workers leave such areas, including social isolation, lack of contact with colleagues, lack of support from medical specialists and heavy workload. We draw on studies of financial-incentive programmes and other initiatives with similar objectives to discuss seven management functions that are essential for the long-term success of financial-incentive programmes: financing (programmes may benefit from innovative donor financing schemes, such as endowment funds, international financing facilities or compensation payments); promotion (programmes should use tested communication channels in order to reach secondary school graduates and health workers); selection (programmes may use selection criteria to ensure programme success and to achieve supplementary policy goals); placement (programmes should match participants to areas in order to maximize participant satisfaction and retention); support (programmes should prepare participants for the time in an underserved area, stay in close contact with participants throughout the different phases of enrolment and help participants by assigning them mentors, establishing peer support systems or financing education courses relevant to work in underserved areas); enforcement (programmes may use community-based monitoring or outsource enforcement to existing institutions); and evaluation (in order to broaden the evidence on the effectiveness of financial incentives in increasing the health workforce in underserved areas, programmes in developing countries should evaluate their performance; in order to improve the strength of the evidence on the effectiveness of financial incentives, controlled experiments should be conducted where feasible). In comparison to other interventions to increase the supply of health workers to medically underserved areas, financial-incentive programmes have advantages--unlike initiatives using non-financial incentives, they establish legally enforceable commitments to work in underserved areas and, unlike compulsory service policies, they will not be opposed by health workers--as well as disadvantages--unlike initiatives using non-financial incentives, they may not improve the working and living conditions in underserved areas (which are important determinants of health workers' long-term retention) and, unlike compulsory service policies, they cannot guarantee that they will supply health workers to underserved areas who would not have worked in such areas without financial incentives. Financial incentives, non-financial incentives, and compulsory service are not mutually exclusive and may positively affect each other's performance.
Bärnighausen, Till; Bloom, David E
2009-01-01
In many countries worldwide, health worker shortages are one of the main constraints in achieving population health goals. Financial-incentive programmes for return of service, whereby participants receive payments in return for a commitment to practise for a period of time in a medically underserved area, can alleviate local and regional health worker shortages through a number of mechanisms. First, they can redirect the flow of those health workers who would have been educated without financial incentives from well-served to underserved areas. Second, they can add health workers to the pool of workers who would have been educated without financial incentives and place them in underserved areas. Third, financial-incentive programmes may improve the retention in underserved areas of those health workers who participate in a programme, but who would have worked in an underserved area without any financial incentives. Fourth, the programmes may increase the retention of all health workers in underserved areas by reducing the strength of some of the reasons why health workers leave such areas, including social isolation, lack of contact with colleagues, lack of support from medical specialists and heavy workload. We draw on studies of financial-incentive programmes and other initiatives with similar objectives to discuss seven management functions that are essential for the long-term success of financial-incentive programmes: financing (programmes may benefit from innovative donor financing schemes, such as endowment funds, international financing facilities or compensation payments); promotion (programmes should use tested communication channels in order to reach secondary school graduates and health workers); selection (programmes may use selection criteria to ensure programme success and to achieve supplementary policy goals); placement (programmes should match participants to areas in order to maximize participant satisfaction and retention); support (programmes should prepare participants for the time in an underserved area, stay in close contact with participants throughout the different phases of enrolment and help participants by assigning them mentors, establishing peer support systems or financing education courses relevant to work in underserved areas); enforcement (programmes may use community-based monitoring or outsource enforcement to existing institutions); and evaluation (in order to broaden the evidence on the effectiveness of financial incentives in increasing the health workforce in underserved areas, programmes in developing countries should evaluate their performance; in order to improve the strength of the evidence on the effectiveness of financial incentives, controlled experiments should be conducted where feasible). In comparison to other interventions to increase the supply of health workers to medically underserved areas, financial-incentive programmes have advantages – unlike initiatives using non-financial incentives, they establish legally enforceable commitments to work in underserved areas and, unlike compulsory service policies, they will not be opposed by health workers – as well as disadvantages – unlike initiatives using non-financial incentives, they may not improve the working and living conditions in underserved areas (which are important determinants of health workers' long-term retention) and, unlike compulsory service policies, they cannot guarantee that they will supply health workers to underserved areas who would not have worked in such areas without financial incentives. Financial incentives, non-financial incentives, and compulsory service are not mutually exclusive and may positively affect each other's performance. PMID:19558682
Using financial incentives to improve value in orthopaedics.
Lansky, David; Nwachukwu, Benedict U; Bozic, Kevin J
2012-04-01
A variety of reforms to traditional approaches to provider payment and benefit design are being implemented in the United States. There is increasing interest in applying these financial incentives to orthopaedics, although it is unclear whether and to what extent they have been implemented and whether they increase quality or reduce costs. We reviewed and discussed physician- and patient-oriented financial incentives being implemented in orthopaedics, key challenges, and prerequisites to payment reform and value-driven payment policy in orthopaedics. We searched the MEDLINE database using as search terms various provider payment and consumer incentive models. We retrieved a total of 169 articles; none of these studies met the inclusion criteria. For incentive models known to the authors to be in use in orthopaedics but for which no peer-reviewed literature was found, we searched Google for further information. Provider financial incentives reviewed include payments for reporting, performance, and patient safety and episode payment. Patient incentives include tiered networks, value-based benefit design, reference pricing, and value-based purchasing. Reform of financial incentives for orthopaedic surgery is challenged by (1) lack of a payment/incentive model that has demonstrated reductions in cost trends and (2) the complex interrelation of current pay schemes in today's fragmented environment. Prerequisites to reform include (1) a reliable and complete data infrastructure; (2) new business structures to support cost sharing; and (3) a retooling of patient expectations. There is insufficient literature reporting the effects of various financial incentive models under implementation in orthopaedics to know whether they increase quality or reduce costs. National concerns about cost will continue to drive experimentation, and all anticipated innovations will require improved collaboration and data collection and reporting.
Lagarde, Mylene; Pagaiya, Nonglak; Tangcharoensathian, Viroj; Blaauw, Duane
2013-12-01
This study investigates heterogeneity in Thai doctors' job preferences at the beginning of their career, with a view to inform the design of effective policies to retain them in rural areas. A discrete choice experiment was designed and administered to 198 young doctors. We analysed the data using several specifications of a random parameter model to account for various sources of preference heterogeneity. By modelling preference heterogeneity, we showed how sensitivity to different incentives varied in different sections of the population. In particular, doctors from rural backgrounds were more sensitive than others to a 45% salary increase and having a post near their home province, but they were less sensitive to a reduction in the number of on-call nights. On the basis of the model results, the effects of two types of interventions were simulated: introducing various incentives and modifying the population structure. The results of the simulations provide multiple elements for consideration for policy-makers interested in designing effective interventions. They also underline the interest of modelling preference heterogeneity carefully. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Reading Incentive Programs with Pizzazz
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Hall, Michelle
2009-01-01
This article illustrates how the use of the basic elements of a story can help create an event that will stimulate imagination and encourage further reading. Margaret Robison, the librarian at the Virginia School for the Deaf and the Blind (VSDB) in Staunton, Virginia, decided that for Teen Read Week she would use a popular series as a bridge to…
Millett, Christopher; Gray, Jeremy; Saxena, Sonia; Netuveli, Gopalakrishnan; Majeed, Azeem
2007-06-05
Many people with diabetes continue to smoke despite being at high risk of cardiovascular disease. We examined the impact of a pay-for-performance incentive in the United Kingdom introduced in 2004 as part of the new general practitioner contract to improve support for smoking cessation and to reduce the prevalence of smoking among people with chronic diseases such as diabetes. We performed a population-based longitudinal study of the recorded delivery of cessation advice and the prevalence of smoking using electronic records of patients with diabetes obtained from participating general practices. The survey was carried out in an ethnically diverse part of southwest London before (June-October 2003) and after (November 2005-January 2006) the introduction of a pay-for-performance incentive. Significantly more patients with diabetes had their smoking status ever recorded in 2005 than in 2003 (98.8% v. 90.0%, p <0.001). The proportion of patients with documented smoking cessation advice also increased significantly over this period, from 48.0% to 83.5% (p < 0.001). The prevalence of smoking decreased significantly from 20.0% to 16.2% (p < 0.001). The reduction over the study period was lower among women (adjusted odds ratio 0.71, 95% confidence interval 0.53-0.95) but was not significantly different in the most and least affluent groups. In 2005, smoking rates continued to differ significantly with age (10.6%-25.1%), sex (women, 11.5%; men, 20.6%) and ethnic background (4.9%-24.9%). The introduction of a pay-for-performance incentive in the United Kingdom increased the provision of support for smoking cessation and was associated with a reduction in smoking prevalence among patients with diabetes in primary health care settings. Health care planners in other countries may wish to consider introducing similar incentive schemes for primary care physicians.
Pay-for-performance in disease management: a systematic review of the literature.
de Bruin, Simone R; Baan, Caroline A; Struijs, Jeroen N
2011-10-14
Pay-for-performance (P4P) is increasingly implemented in the healthcare system to encourage improvements in healthcare quality. P4P is a payment model that rewards healthcare providers for meeting pre-established targets for delivery of healthcare services by financial incentives. Based on their performance, healthcare providers receive either additional or reduced payment. Currently, little is known about P4P schemes intending to improve delivery of chronic care through disease management. The objectives of this paper are therefore to provide an overview of P4P schemes used to stimulate delivery of chronic care through disease management and to provide insight into their effects on healthcare quality and costs. A systematic PubMed search was performed for English language papers published between 2000 and 2010 describing P4P schemes related to the implementation of disease management. Wagner's chronic care model was used to make disease management operational. Eight P4P schemes were identified, introduced in the USA (n = 6), Germany (n = 1), and Australia (n = 1). Five P4P schemes were part of a larger scheme of interventions to improve quality of care, whereas three P4P schemes were solely implemented. Most financial incentives were rewards, selective, and granted on the basis of absolute performance. More variation was found in incented entities and the basis for providing incentives. Information about motivation, certainty, size, frequency, and duration of the financial incentives was generally limited. Five studies were identified that evaluated the effects of P4P on healthcare quality. Most studies showed positive effects of P4P on healthcare quality. No studies were found that evaluated the effects of P4P on healthcare costs. The number of P4P schemes to encourage disease management is limited. Hardly any information is available about the effects of such schemes on healthcare quality and costs. © 2011 de Bruin et al; licensee BioMed Central Ltd.
Pay-for-performance in disease management: a systematic review of the literature
2011-01-01
Background Pay-for-performance (P4P) is increasingly implemented in the healthcare system to encourage improvements in healthcare quality. P4P is a payment model that rewards healthcare providers for meeting pre-established targets for delivery of healthcare services by financial incentives. Based on their performance, healthcare providers receive either additional or reduced payment. Currently, little is known about P4P schemes intending to improve delivery of chronic care through disease management. The objectives of this paper are therefore to provide an overview of P4P schemes used to stimulate delivery of chronic care through disease management and to provide insight into their effects on healthcare quality and costs. Methods A systematic PubMed search was performed for English language papers published between 2000 and 2010 describing P4P schemes related to the implementation of disease management. Wagner's chronic care model was used to make disease management operational. Results Eight P4P schemes were identified, introduced in the USA (n = 6), Germany (n = 1), and Australia (n = 1). Five P4P schemes were part of a larger scheme of interventions to improve quality of care, whereas three P4P schemes were solely implemented. Most financial incentives were rewards, selective, and granted on the basis of absolute performance. More variation was found in incented entities and the basis for providing incentives. Information about motivation, certainty, size, frequency, and duration of the financial incentives was generally limited. Five studies were identified that evaluated the effects of P4P on healthcare quality. Most studies showed positive effects of P4P on healthcare quality. No studies were found that evaluated the effects of P4P on healthcare costs. Conclusion The number of P4P schemes to encourage disease management is limited. Hardly any information is available about the effects of such schemes on healthcare quality and costs. PMID:21999234
Focus on Teacher Pay and Incentives: Recent Legislative Actions and Update on Salary Averages
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Gaines, Gale F.
2004-01-01
One indicator of progress in the Challenge to Lead goals refers to teacher compensation: Salaries, benefits and incentives are competitive in the marketplace. They are aimed at recognized expertise, student performance, state needs and taking on additional or different roles to improve curriculum and instruction." Most Southern Regional Education…
Self-Solicited Feedback: Effects of Hourly Pay and Individual Monetary Incentive Pay
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Slowiak, Julie M.; Dickinson, Alyce M.; Huitema, Bradley E.
2011-01-01
The frequency of feedback solicitation under hourly pay and individual monetary incentive pay conditions was examined. A between-subjects design was used with 30 college students in the two groups. Participants attended three experimental sessions and entered the cash value of simulated bank checks presented on a computer screen. Performance was…
Clark's Triangle and Fiscal Incentives: Implications for Colleges'
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Lang, Dan
2015-01-01
For nearly 35 year's Burton Clark's triangle has been used as a paradigm for describing, assessing, and comparing systems of postsecondary education (Clark, 1998, 2004). Two major developments in the fiscal management of post-secondary education occurred more or less contemporaneously: incentive or performance funding on the part of the state and…
Time-bound promotions in Indian medical institutes: a mirage?
Sukhlecha, Anupama
2016-01-01
Incentives, pay hikes and timely promotions enhance the job performance of an employee. In medical institutes, too, satisfied teachers would train students in a better way leading to better equipped doctors and ultimately, greater patient satisfaction. A study in Malaysia links high levels of satisfaction of employees with good salary, promotions, and incentives.
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Groom, Madeleine J.; Liddle, Elizabeth B.; Scerif, Gaia; Liddle, Peter F.; Batty, Martin J.; Liotti, Mario; Hollis, Chris P.
2013-01-01
Background: Children with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) are characterised by developmentally inappropriate levels of hyperactivity, impulsivity and/or inattention and are particularly impaired when performing tasks that require a high level of cognitive control. Methylphenidate (MPH) and motivational incentives may help improve…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Watson, Jeffery; Witham, Peter; St. Louis, Timothy
2010-01-01
The U.S. Department of Education Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) seeks to transform education compensation systems so that principal and teacher performance (measured through classroom productivity measures) connects to compensation. Classroom-level productivity measures require robust student-teacher linkage data. Organizations such as the…
Increasing Educator Effectiveness: Lessons Learned from Teacher Incentive Fund Sites
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Eckert, Jonathan
2013-01-01
Created by the U.S. Congress in 2006, the Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) represents the first federal initiative targeted directly at state and district efforts to introduce performance measures into educator compensation. TIF responds to a growing body of evidence that existing pay structures do not respond to labor force realities or adequately…
Reward Motivation Enhances Task Coding in Frontoparietal Cortex.
Etzel, Joset A; Cole, Michael W; Zacks, Jeffrey M; Kay, Kendrick N; Braver, Todd S
2016-04-01
Reward motivation often enhances task performance, but the neural mechanisms underlying such cognitive enhancement remain unclear. Here, we used a multivariate pattern analysis (MVPA) approach to test the hypothesis that motivation-related enhancement of cognitive control results from improved encoding and representation of task set information. Participants underwent two fMRI sessions of cued task switching, the first under baseline conditions, and the second with randomly intermixed reward incentive and no-incentive trials. Information about the upcoming task could be successfully decoded from cue-related activation patterns in a set of frontoparietal regions typically associated with task control. More critically, MVPA classifiers trained on the baseline session had significantly higher decoding accuracy on incentive than non-incentive trials, with decoding improvement mediating reward-related enhancement of behavioral performance. These results strongly support the hypothesis that reward motivation enhances cognitive control, by improving the discriminability of task-relevant information coded and maintained in frontoparietal brain regions. © The Author 2015. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com.
Avoiding unintended incentives in ACO payment models.
Douven, Rudy; McGuire, Thomas G; McWilliams, J Michael
2015-01-01
One goal of the Medicare Shared Savings Program for accountable care organizations (ACOs) is to reduce Medicare spending for ACOs' patients relative to the organizations' spending history. However, we found that current rules for setting ACO spending targets (or benchmarks) diminish ACOs' incentives to generate savings and may even encourage higher instead of lower Medicare spending. Spending in the three years before ACOs enter or renew a contract is weighted unequally in the benchmark calculation, with a high weight of 0.6 given to the year just before a new contract starts. Thus, ACOs have incentives to increase spending in that year to inflate their benchmark for future years and thereby make it easier to obtain shared savings from Medicare in the new contract period. We suggest strategies to improve incentives for ACOs, including changes to the weights used to determine benchmarks and new payment models that base an ACO's spending target not only on its own past performance but also on the performance of other ACOs or Medicare providers. Project HOPE—The People-to-People Health Foundation, Inc.
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Rebak, Raul B.
2018-02-01
The US has currently a fleet of 99 nuclear power light water reactors which generate approximately 20% of the electricity consumed in the country. Near 90% of the reactors are at least 30 years old. There are incentives to make the existing reactors safer by using accident tolerant fuels (ATF). Compared to the standard UO2-zirconium-based system, ATF need to tolerate loss of active cooling in the core for a considerably longer time while maintaining or improving the fuel performance during normal operation conditions. Ferritic iron-chromium-aluminum (FeCrAl) alloys have been identified as an alternative to replace current zirconium alloys. They contain Fe (base) + 10-22 Cr + 4-6 Al and may contain smaller amounts of other elements such as molybdenum and traces of others. FeCrAl alloys offer outstanding resistance to attack by superheated steam by developing an alumina oxide on the surface in case of a loss of coolant accident like at Fukushima. FeCrAl alloys also perform well under normal operation conditions both in boiling water reactors and pressurized water reactors because they are protected by a thin oxide rich in chromium. Under normal operation condition, the key element is Cr and under accident conditions it is Al.
Lunardi, Adriana C; Porras, Desiderio C; Barbosa, Renata Cc; Paisani, Denise M; Marques da Silva, Cibele C B; Tanaka, Clarice; Carvalho, Celso R F
2014-03-01
Aging causes physiological and functional changes that impair pulmonary function. Incentive spirometry is widely used for lung expansion, but the effects of volume-oriented incentive spirometry (VIS) versus flow-oriented incentive spirometry (FIS) on chest wall volumes, inspiratory muscle activity, and thoracoabdominal synchrony in the elderly are poorly understood. We compared VIS and FIS in elderly subjects and healthy adult subjects. Sixteen elderly subjects (9 women, mean ± SD age 70.6 ± 3.9 y, mean ± SD body mass index 23.8 ± 2.5 kg/m(2)) and 16 healthy adults (8 women, mean ± age 25.9 ± 4.3 y, mean ± body mass index 23.6 ± 2.4 kg/m(2)) performed quiet breathing, VIS, and FIS in randomized sequence. Chest wall kinematics (via optoelectronic plethysmography) and inspiratory muscle activity (via surface electromyography) were assessed simultaneously. Synchrony between the superior thorax and abdominal motion was calculated (phase angle). In the elderly subjects both types of incentive spirometry increased chest wall volumes similarly, whereas in the healthy adult subjects VIS increased the chest wall volume more than did FIS. FIS and VIS triggered similar lower thoracoabdominal synchrony in the elderly subjects, whereas in the healthy adults FIS induced lower synchrony than did VIS. FIS required more muscle activity in the elderly subjects to create an increase in chest wall volume. Incentive spirometry performance is influenced by age, and the differences between elderly and healthy adults response should be considered in clinical practice.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Byers, Conleigh; Levin, Todd; Botterud, Audun
A review of capacity markets in the United States in the context of increasing levels of variable renewable energy finds substantial differences with respect to incentives for operational performance, methods to calculate qualifying capacity for variable renewable energy and energy storage, and demand curves for capacity. The review also reveals large differences in historical capacity market clearing prices. The authors conclude that electricity market design must continue to evolve to achieve cost-effective policies for resource adequacy.
Sokol, Gil; Vilozni, Daphna; Hakimi, Ran; Lavie, Moran; Sarouk, Ifat; Bat-El Bar; Dagan, Adi; Ofek, Miryam; Efrati, Ori
2015-12-01
Forced expiration may assist secretion movement by manipulating airway dynamics in patients with cystic fibrosis (CF). Expiratory resistive breathing via a handheld incentive spirometer has the potential to control the expiratory flow via chosen resistances (1-8 mm) and thereby mobilize secretions and improve lung function. Our objective was to explore the short-term effect of using a resistive-breathing incentive spirometer on lung function in subjects with CF compared with the autogenic drainage technique. This was a retrospective study. Subjects with CF performed 30-45 min of either the resistive-breathing incentive spirometer (n = 40) or autogenic drainage (n = 32) technique on separate days. The spirometer encourages the patient to exhale as long as possible while maintaining a low lung volume. The autogenic drainage technique includes repetitive inspiratory and expiratory maneuvers at various tidal breathing magnitudes while exhalation is performed in a sighing manner. Spirometry was performed before and 20-30 min after the therapy. Use of a resistive-breathing incentive spirometer improved FVC and FEV1 by 5-42% in 26 subjects. The forced expiratory flow during the middle half of the FVC maneuver (FEF25-75%) improved by >20% in 9 (22%) subjects. FVC improved the most in subjects with an FEV1 of 40-60% of predicted. Improvements negatively correlated with baseline percent-of-predicted FVC values provided improvements were above 10% (r(2) = 0.28). Values improved in a single subjects using the autogenic drainage technique. These 2 techniques may allow lower thoracic pressures and assist in the prevention of central airway collapse. The resistive-breathing incentive spirometer is a self-administered simple method that may aid airway clearance and has the potential to improve lung function as measured by FVC, FEV1, and FEF25-75% in patients with CF. Copyright © 2015 by Daedalus Enterprises.
The Relationship between Incentives to Learn and Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Wu, Wenling
This paper empirically explores lots of students in college for their hierarchy of needs and incentives to learn, and finds the linear relationship between them. With the survey, it's be found that there are some kinds of factors influence the students needs order. The paper gives several diagrams to show these important factors which affect the college students' hierarchy of needs most. The paper also finds the change of the student' hierarchy of needs will affect the variety of incentives to learn. Then the paper develops a model for qualitative analyze this relationship. Numerical examples are used to demonstrate the performance of the model. With this model the correct and useful methods can be easily selected for students to incentive according to their types of hierarchy of needs.
Lorincz, Ilona S.; Lawson, Brittany C. T.
2012-01-01
Incentive programs directed at both providers and patients have become increasingly widespread. Pay-for-performance (P4P) where providers receive financial incentives to carry out specific care or improve clinical outcomes has been widely implemented. The existing literature indicates they probably spur initial gains which then level off or partially revert if incentives are withdrawn. The literature also indicates that process measures are easier to influence through P4P programs but that intermediate outcomes such as glucose, blood pressure, and cholesterol control are harder to influence, and the long term impact of P4P programs on health is largely unknown. Programs directed at patients show greater promise as a means to influence patient behavior and intermediate outcomes such as weight loss; however, the evidence for long term effects are lacking. In combination, both patient and provider incentives are potentially powerful tools but whether they are cost-effective has yet to be determined. PMID:23225214
Financial incentives and measurement improved physicians' quality of care in the Philippines.
Peabody, John; Shimkhada, Riti; Quimbo, Stella; Florentino, Jhiedon; Bacate, Marife; McCulloch, Charles E; Solon, Orville
2011-04-01
The merits of using financial incentives to improve clinical quality have much appeal, yet few studies have rigorously assessed the potential benefits. The uncertainty surrounding assessments of quality can lead to poor policy decisions, possibly resulting in increased cost with little or no quality improvement, or missed opportunities to improve care. We conducted an experiment involving physicians in thirty Philippine hospitals that overcomes many of the limitations of previous studies. We measured clinical performance and then examined whether modest bonuses equal to about 5 percent of a physician's salary, as well as system-level incentives that increased compensation to hospitals and across groups of physicians, led to improvements in the quality of care. We found that both the bonus and system-level incentives improved scores in a quality measurement system used in our study by ten percentage points. Our findings suggest that when careful measurement is combined with the types of incentives we studied, there may be a larger impact on quality than previously recognized.
Use of incentive spirometry in portable chest radiography.
McEntee, Mark F; Houssein, Nariman; Al-azawi, Dhafir
2014-01-01
The degree of lung inflation seen on a chest radiograph is dependent on the point during the patient's respiratory cycle at which the radiographer exposes the image receptor. Exposing the image receptor at the exact peak of inflation can be difficult because of the limited time available in which to capture the inspiratory pause. An incentive spirometer can indicate the moment of peak inhalation. This study tested whether images taken with and without an incentive spirometer display different levels of image quality. This is a paired, prospective, single-blinded study of 30 patients undergoing portable chest radiography. The radiographs were acquired with and without the use of an incentive spirometer. Visual grading analysis was performed using the 1996 European Guidelines on Quality Criteria for Diagnostic Radiographic Images. The mean patient age was 53 years. Sixty images were acquired, 30 with the use of incentive spirometry and 30 without. The most common indication for portable chest radiography was "postlung lobectomy." Scoring on the radiologist's ability to see the sixth rib, spine, trachea, and cardiac border was not affected significantly by the use of incentive spirometry. Use of an incentive spirometer was associated with significant improvement in ability to see the 10th rib (P ≤ .004), vascular pattern (P ≤ .001), retrocardiac lung (P ≤ .013), and the costophrenic angles (P ≤ .005). This study introduces a technique to improve the quality of portable chest radiographs. The use of incentive spirometry improved inspiratory depth and image quality for portable chest radiographs.
Payne, Velma L; Hysong, Sylvia J
2016-07-13
Audit and feedback (A&F) is a strategy that has been used in various disciplines for performance and quality improvement. There is limited research regarding medical professionals' acceptance of clinical-performance feedback and whether feedback impacts clinical practice. The objectives of our research were to (1) investigate aspects of A&F that impact physicians' acceptance of performance feedback; (2) determine actions physicians take when receiving feedback; and (3) determine if feedback impacts physicians' patient-management behavior. In this qualitative study, we employed grounded theory methods to perform a secondary analysis of semi-structured interviews with 12 VA primary care physicians. We analyzed a subset of interview questions from the primary study, which aimed to determine how providers of high, low and moderately performing VA medical centers use performance feedback to maintain and improve quality of care, and determine perceived utility of performance feedback. Based on the themes emergent from our analysis and their observed relationships, we developed a model depicting aspects of the A&F process that impact feedback acceptance and physicians' patient-management behavior. The model is comprised of three core components - Reaction, Action and Impact - and depicts elements associated with feedback recipients' reaction to feedback, action taken when feedback is received, and physicians modifying their patient-management behavior. Feedback characteristics, the environment, external locus-of-control components, core values, emotion and the assessment process induce or deter reaction, action and impact. Feedback characteristics (content and timeliness), and the procedural justice of the assessment process (unjust penalties) impact feedback acceptance. External locus-of-control elements (financial incentives, competition), the environment (patient volume, time constraints) and emotion impact patient-management behavior. Receiving feedback generated intense emotion within physicians. The underlying source of the emotion was the assessment process, not the feedback. The emotional response impacted acceptance, impelled action or inaction, and impacted patient-management behavior. Emotion intensity was associated with type of action taken (defensive, proactive, retroactive). Feedback acceptance and impact have as much to do with the performance assessment process as it does the feedback. In order to enhance feedback acceptance and the impact of feedback, developers of clinical performance systems and feedback interventions should consider multiple design elements.
Akazawa, Tsutomu; Sakuma, Tsuyoshi; Nagaya, Shigeyuki; Sonoda, Masaru; Tanaka, Yuji; Katogi, Takehide; Nemoto, Tetsuharu; Minami, Shohei
2015-01-01
Objective To investigate the effectiveness of incentive spirometry on respiratory motion in healthy subjects using cine breathing magnetic resonance imaging (MRI). Methods Ten non-smoking healthy subjects without any history of respiratory disease were studied. Subjects were asked to perform pulmonary training using incentive spirometry every day for two weeks. To assess the effectiveness of this training, pulmonary function tests and cine breathing MRI were performed before starting pulmonary training and two weeks after its completion. Results After training, there were significant improvements in vital capacity (VC) from 3.58±0.8 L to 3.74±0.8 L and in %VC from 107.4±10.8 to 112.1±8.2. Significant changes were observed in the right diaphragm motion, right chest wall motion, and left chest wall motion, which were increased from 55.7±9.6 mm to 63.4±10.2 mm, from 15.6±6.1 mm to 23.4±10.4 mm, and from 16.3±7.6 mm to 22.0±9.8 mm, respectively. Conclusion Two weeks of training using incentive spirometry provided improvements in pulmonary function and respiratory motion, which suggested that incentive spirometry may be a useful preoperative modality for improving pulmonary function during the perioperative period. PMID:26161341
Incentive spirometry for the tracheostomy patient.
Goldstein, Gregg H; Iloreta, Alfred Marc; Ojo, Bukola; Malkin, Benjamin D
2012-12-01
To determine the feasibility of developing and using a customized incentive spirometer device for patients who have undergone a tracheostomy procedure. The authors performed a prospective case series approved by the institutional review board. Academic medical center. Patients were eligible for participation if they were older than 18 years and had a new tracheostomy. Spirometry exercises were performed using a protocol adapted from the American Academy of Respiratory Care guidelines. Patient data were recorded, including age, sex, tobacco use, surgical procedure, time under general anesthesia, length of hospital stay, and time until ambulation. The details of the spirometry exercises were also recorded along with any complications that occurred. An incentive spirometer was adapted for use with tracheostomy patients and received an investigational device exemption from the Food and Drug Administration. A total of 10 patients were enrolled (mean age 60 years). Sixty percent were current or former tobacco users, the mean anesthesia time was 9 hours, and 70% underwent a microvascular free flap reconstruction. Patients used the incentive spirometer for a mean of 1.6 days during the postoperative period, averaging 3.3 sessions per day and 6.8 breaths per session. The device was well tolerated by patients, and there were no complications associated with its use. This study supports the feasibility of using a customized incentive spirometer for tracheostomy patients and establishes a safety profile for the device to be used in future studies.
Kang, Guanlan; Zhou, Xiaolin; Wei, Ping
2015-09-01
The present study investigated the effect of reward expectation and spatial orientation on the processing of emotional facial expressions, using a spatial cue-target paradigm. A colored cue was presented at the left or right side of the central fixation point, with its color indicating the monetary reward stakes of a given trial (incentive vs. non-incentive), followed by the presentation of an emotional facial target (angry vs. neutral) at a cued or un-cued location. Participants were asked to discriminate the emotional expression of the target, with the cue-target stimulus onset asynchrony being 200-300 ms in Experiment 1 and 950-1250 ms in Experiment 2a (without a fixation cue) and Experiment 2b (with a fixation cue), producing a spatial facilitation effect and an inhibition of return effect, respectively. The results of all the experiments revealed faster reaction times in the monetary incentive condition than in the non-incentive condition, demonstrating the effect of reward to facilitate task performance. An interaction between reward expectation and the emotion of the target was evident in all the three experiments, with larger reward effects for angry faces than for neutral faces. This interaction was not affected by spatial orientation. These findings demonstrate that incentive motivation improves task performance and increases sensitivity to angry faces, irrespective of spatial orienting and reorienting processes.
Do Monetary Incentives Matter in Classroom Experiments? Effects on Course Performance
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Rousu, Matthew C.; Corrigan, Jay R.; Harris, David; Hayter, Jill K.; Houser, Scott; Lafrancois, Becky A.; Onafowora, Olugbenga; Colson, Gregory; Hoffer, Adam
2015-01-01
Using 641 principles of economics students across four universities, the authors examine whether providing monetary incentives in a prisoner's dilemma game enhances student learning as measured by a set of common exam questions. Subjects either play a two-player prisoner's dilemma game for real money, play the same game with no money at stake…
Reading Incentives that Work: No-Cost Strategies to Motivate Kids to Read and Love It!
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Small, Ruth V.
2009-01-01
In education, it is possible to find dozens of examples of "forced" reading incentive programs that categorize student reading levels, provide limited reading lists coordinated with those reading levels, assess student reading through computer-based tests, and award tangible prizes when they pass the test. Those who perform best get the most…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Glazerman, Steven; Protik, Ali; Teh, Bing-ru; Bruch, Julie; Seftor, Neil
2012-01-01
This report describes the implementation and intermediate impacts of an intervention designed to provide incentives for a school district's highest-performing teachers to work in its lowest-achieving schools. The report is part of a larger study in which random assignment was used to form two equivalent groups of classrooms organized into teacher…
Teacher Incentive Pay Programs: Characteristics and Association with Instructional Practices
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Liang, Guodong
2011-01-01
This dissertation research examined the characteristics of teacher incentive pay programs in the state of Missouri and across the nation in the United States. The purposes of this study were (a) to examine the characteristics of districts that offered performance-related pay (PRP) programs and teachers who received PRP awards in 2007 using the…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Springer, Matthew G.; Hamilton, Laura; McCaffrey, Daniel F.; Ballou, Dale; Le, Vi-Nhuan; Pepper, Matthew; Lockwood, J. R.; Stecher, Brian M.
2013-01-01
The Project on Incentives in Teaching (POINT) was a three-year study conducted in the Metropolitan Nashville School System from 2006-07 through 2008-09, in which middle school mathematics teachers voluntarily participated in a controlled experiment to assess the effect of financial rewards for teachers whose students showed unusually large gains…
The Effects of Varying Schedules of Incentive Delivery on Technical Training.
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Pritchard, Robert D.; And Others
The research reported here was initiated and designed to assess the impact of various schedules of incentive delivery (schedules of reinforcement) on performance and attitudes in an Air Force-related setting. Civilian subjects matching the characteristics of Air Force trainees were hired to work for four weeks, one week under each of four…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Chen, Qihui; Okediji, Tade O.
2014-01-01
In this article, the authors illustrate how incentives can improve student performance in introductory economics courses. They implemented a policy experiment in a large introductory economics class in which they reminded students who scored below an announced cutoff score on the midterm exam about the risk of failing the course. The authors…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Rice, Jennifer King; Malen, Betty; Baumann, Paul; Chen, Elke; Dougherty, Amy; Hyde, Laura; Jackson, Cara; Jacobson, Reuben; McKithen, Clarissa
2012-01-01
While education accountability systems emphasize teacher quality as a prerequisite for student learning, education administrators have struggled to staff low-performing schools with effective teachers. Fueled in part by the federal Teacher Incentive Fund, compensation reforms have gained center stage status among strategies aimed at improving…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Bettinger, Eric P.
2010-01-01
Policymakers and academics are increasingly interested in applying financial incentives to individuals in education. This paper presents evidence from a pay for performance program taking place in Coshocton, Ohio. Since 2004, Coshocton has provided cash payments to students in grades three through six for successful completion of their…
Schmitt, Hannah; Kray, Jutta; Ferdinand, Nicola K.
2017-01-01
A number of aging studies suggest that older adults process positive and negative information differently. For instance, the socioemotional selectivity theory postulates that older adults preferably process positive information in service of emotional well-being (Reed and Carstensen, 2012). Moreover, recent research has started to investigate whether incentives like gains or losses can influence cognitive control in an ongoing task. In an earlier study (Schmitt et al., 2015), we examined whether incentive cues, indicating potential monetary gains, losses, or neutral outcomes for good performance in the following trial, would influence older adults’ ability to exert cognitive control. Cognitive control was measured in an AX-Continuous-Performance-Task (AX-CPT) in which participants had to select their responses to probe stimuli depending on a preceding context cue. In this study, we did not find support for a positivity effect in older adults, but both gains and losses led to enhanced context processing. As the trial-wise presentation mode may be too demanding on cognitive resources for such a bias to occur, the main goal of the present study was to examine whether motivational mindsets, induced by block-wise presentation of incentives, would result in a positivity effect. For this reason, we examined 17 older participants (65–76 years) in the AX-CPT using a block-wise presentation of incentive cues and compared them to 18 older adults (69–78 years) with the trial-wise presentation mode from our earlier study (Schmitt et al., 2015). Event-related potentials were recorded to the onset of the motivational cue and during the AX-CPT. Our results show that (a) older adults initially process cues signaling potential losses more strongly, but later during the AX-CPT invest more cognitive resources in preparatory processes like context updating in conditions with potential gains, and (b) block-wise and trial-wise presentation of incentive cues differentially influenced cognitive control. When incentives were presented block-wise, the above described valence effects were consistently found. In contrast, when incentives were presented trial-wise, the effects were mixed and salience as well as valence effects can be obtained. Hence, how positive and negative incentive cues influence cognitive control in older adults is dependent on demands of cue processing. PMID:29170649
Schmitt, Hannah; Kray, Jutta; Ferdinand, Nicola K
2017-01-01
A number of aging studies suggest that older adults process positive and negative information differently. For instance, the socioemotional selectivity theory postulates that older adults preferably process positive information in service of emotional well-being (Reed and Carstensen, 2012). Moreover, recent research has started to investigate whether incentives like gains or losses can influence cognitive control in an ongoing task. In an earlier study (Schmitt et al., 2015), we examined whether incentive cues, indicating potential monetary gains, losses, or neutral outcomes for good performance in the following trial, would influence older adults' ability to exert cognitive control. Cognitive control was measured in an AX-Continuous-Performance-Task (AX-CPT) in which participants had to select their responses to probe stimuli depending on a preceding context cue. In this study, we did not find support for a positivity effect in older adults, but both gains and losses led to enhanced context processing. As the trial-wise presentation mode may be too demanding on cognitive resources for such a bias to occur, the main goal of the present study was to examine whether motivational mindsets, induced by block-wise presentation of incentives, would result in a positivity effect. For this reason, we examined 17 older participants (65-76 years) in the AX-CPT using a block-wise presentation of incentive cues and compared them to 18 older adults (69-78 years) with the trial-wise presentation mode from our earlier study (Schmitt et al., 2015). Event-related potentials were recorded to the onset of the motivational cue and during the AX-CPT. Our results show that (a) older adults initially process cues signaling potential losses more strongly, but later during the AX-CPT invest more cognitive resources in preparatory processes like context updating in conditions with potential gains, and (b) block-wise and trial-wise presentation of incentive cues differentially influenced cognitive control. When incentives were presented block-wise, the above described valence effects were consistently found. In contrast, when incentives were presented trial-wise, the effects were mixed and salience as well as valence effects can be obtained. Hence, how positive and negative incentive cues influence cognitive control in older adults is dependent on demands of cue processing.
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Mollicone, D.; Freibauer, A.; Schulze, E. D.; Braatz, S.; Grassi, G.; Federici, S.
2007-10-01
Carbon emissions from deforestation and degradation account for about 20% of global anthropogenic emissions. Strategies and incentives for reduced emissions from deforestation and degradation (REDD) have emerged as one of the most active areas in the international climate change negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). While the current negotiations focus on a REDD mechanism in developing countries, it should be recognized that risks of carbon losses from forests occur in all climate zones and also in industrialized countries. A future climate change agreement would be more effective if it included all carbon losses and gains from land use in all countries and climate zones. The REDD mechanism will be an important step towards reducing emissions from land use change in developing countries, but needs to be followed by steps in other land use systems and regions. A national approach to REDD and significant coverage globally are needed to deal with the risk that deforestation and degradation activities are displaced rather than avoided. Favourable institutional and governance conditions need to be established that guarantee in the long-term a stable incentive and control system for maintaining forest carbon stocks. Ambitious emission reductions from deforestation and forest degradation need sustained financial incentives, which go beyond positive incentives for reduced emissions but also give incentives for sustainable forest management. Current data limitations need—and can be—overcome in the coming years to allow accurate accounting of reduced emissions from deforestation and degradation. A proper application of the conservativeness approach in the REDD context could allow a simplified reporting of emissions from deforestation in a first phase, consistent with the already agreed UNFCCC reporting principles.
Technology, Incentives, or Both? Factors Related to Level of Hospital Health Information Exchange.
Lin, Sunny C; Everson, Jordan; Adler-Milstein, Julia
2018-02-28
To assess whether the level of health information exchange (HIE) in U.S. hospitals is related to technology capabilities, incentives to exchange, or both. A total of 1,812 hospitals attesting to stage 2 of Medicare's Meaningful Use Incentive Program through April 2016. Hospital-level, multivariate OLS regression with state fixed effects was used to analyze the relationship between technology capability and incentives measures, and percent of care transitions with summary of care records (SCRs) sent electronically to subsequent providers. Stage 2 hospitals reported sending SCRs electronically for an average of 41 percent (median = 33 percent) of transitions. HIE level is related to four capability measures, one incentive measure, and one measure that is related to both capability and incentive. Percent of transitions with SCRs sent electronically was 3 percentage points higher (95 percent CI: 0.1-5.1) for hospitals with a third-party HIE vendor, 3 percentage points higher (95 percent CI: 0.5-5.4) for hospitals with an EHR vendor as their HIE vendor, and 3 percentage points higher (95 percent CI: 0.4-5.4) for hospitals that automatically alert primary care providers. The direction and statistical significance of the relationships between specific EHR vendor and electronic SCR transmission level varied by vendor. Nonprofits and government hospitals performed 5 percentage points higher (95 percent CI: 1.5-9.1) and 8 percentage points higher (95 percent CI: 3.4-12.3) than for-profits. Hospitals in systems performed 3 percentage points higher (95 percent CI: 0.8-6.1). The overall level of HIE is low, with hospitals sending an SCR electronically for less than half of patient transitions. Specific hospital characteristics related to both technology capabilities and incentives were associated with higher levels of HIE. © Health Research and Educational Trust.
Petersen, Laura A.; Simpson, Kate; Pietz, Kenneth; Urech, Tracy H.; Hysong, Sylvia J.; Profit, Jochen; Conrad, Douglas A.; Dudley, R. Adams; Woodard, LeChauncy D.
2014-01-01
Importance Pay for performance is intended to align incentives to promote high quality care, but results have been contradictory. Objective To test the effect of explicit financial incentives to reward guideline-recommended hypertension care. Design, Setting, and Participants Cluster randomized controlled trial of 12 Veterans Affairs hospital-based outpatient clinics with five performance periods and a 12-month washout. We enrolled 83 primary care physicians and 42 non-physician personnel (e.g., nurses, pharmacists) working with physicians to deliver hypertension care. Interventions Clinics randomized to one of four groups: physician-level (individual) incentives; practice-level incentives; individual- plus practice-level incentives (combined); or none. Intervention participants received up to five payments every four months; all participants could access feedback reports. Main outcome measures For each four-month period, the number of hypertensive patients among a random sample who achieved guideline-recommended blood pressure thresholds or received an appropriate response to uncontrolled blood pressure; and/or been prescribed guideline-recommended medications and the number who developed hypotension. Results Mean (standard deviation) total payments over the study were $4,270 ($459), $2,672 ($153), and $1,648 ($248) for the combined, individual, and practice-level interventions, respectively. The adjusted change over the study in patients meeting the combined blood pressure/appropriate response measure was 8.84 percentage points (95% confidence interval [CI], 4.20–11.80) for the individual-level, 3.70 (95% CI, 0.24–7.68) for the practice-level, 5.54 (95% CI, 1.92–9.52) for the combined, and 0.47 (95% CI, −3.12–4.04) for the control groups. For medications, the change was 9.07 (95% CI, 4.52–13.44), 4.98 (95% CI, 0.64–10.08), 7.26 (95% CI, 2.92–12.48), and 4.35 (95% CI, −0.28–9.28) percentage points, respectively. The adjusted estimated difference in the change between the proportion of patients with blood pressure control/appropriate response for individual incentive and control groups was 8.36 percentage points (95% CI, 2.40–13.00; P=.005). Use of guideline-recommended medications did not significantly change compared to controls, nor did the incidence of hypotension. The effect of the incentive was not sustained after a washout. Conclusions and Relevance Individual financial incentives, but not practice-level or combined incentives, resulted in greater blood pressure control or appropriate response to uncontrolled blood pressure; none of the incentives resulted in greater use of guideline-recommended medications or increased incidence of hypotension compared to controls. Further research is needed to understand the factors that contributed to our findings. Trial registration NCT00302718; www.clinicaltrials.gov PMID:24026599
Neural-Net Processing of Characteristic Patterns From Electronic Holograms of Vibrating Blades
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Decker, Arthur J.
1999-01-01
Finite-element-model-trained artificial neural networks can be used to process efficiently the characteristic patterns or mode shapes from electronic holograms of vibrating blades. The models used for routine design may not yet be sufficiently accurate for this application. This document discusses the creation of characteristic patterns; compares model generated and experimental characteristic patterns; and discusses the neural networks that transform the characteristic patterns into strain or damage information. The current potential to adapt electronic holography to spin rigs, wind tunnels and engines provides an incentive to have accurate finite element models lor training neural networks.
Cohn, Moran D; Veltman, Dick J; Pape, Louise E; van Lith, Koen; Vermeiren, Robert R J M; van den Brink, Wim; Doreleijers, Theo A H; Popma, Arne
2015-11-01
Children with early-onset disruptive behavior disorder (DBD), especially those with callous-unemotional traits, are at risk of developing persistent and severe adult antisocial behavior. One possible underlying mechanism for persistence is deficient reward and loss sensitivity, i.e., deficient incentive processing. However, little is known about the relation between deficient incentive processing and persistence of antisocial behavior into adulthood or its relation with callous-unemotional and other psychopathic traits. In this study, we investigate the relationship between the neural correlates of incentive processing and both DBD persistence and psychopathic traits. In a sample of 128 adolescents (mean age 17.7) with a history of criminal offending before age 12, functional magnetic resonance imaging was performed during a monetary incentive delay task designed to assess neural responses during incentive processing. Neural activation during incentive processing was then associated with DBD persistence and psychopathic traits, measured with the Youth Psychopathic Traits Inventory. Compared with both healthy control subjects and youths who had desisted from DBD, persistent DBD subjects showed lower neural responses in the ventral striatum during reward outcomes and higher neural responses in the amygdala during loss outcomes. Callous-unemotional traits were related to lower neural responses in the amygdala during reward outcomes, while other psychopathic traits were not related to incentive processing. In the current study, aberrant incentive processing is related to persistence of childhood antisocial behavior into late adolescence and to callous-unemotional traits. This mechanism may underlie treatment resistance in a subgroup of antisocial youth and provide a target for intervention. Copyright © 2015 Society of Biological Psychiatry. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Barbose, Galen; Wiser, Ryan; Bolinger, Mark
Some stakeholders continue to voice concerns about the performance of customer-sited photovoltaic (PV) systems, particularly because these systems typically receive financial support through ratepayer- or publicly-funded programs. Although much remains to be understood about the extent and specific causes of poor PV system performance, several studies of the larger programs and markets have shed some light on the issue. An evaluation of the California Energy Commission (CEC)'s Emerging Renewables Program, for example, found that 7% of systems, in a sample of 95, had lower-than-expected power output due to shading or soiling (KEMA 2005). About 3% of a larger sample ofmore » 140 systems were not operating at all or were operating well below expected output, due to failed equipment, faulty installation workmanship, and/or a lack of basic maintenance. In a recent evaluation of the other statewide PV incentive program in California, the Self-Generation Incentive Program, 9 of 52 projects sampled were found to have annual capacity factors less than 14.5%, although reasons for these low capacity factors generally were not identified (Itron 2005). Studies of PV systems in Germany and Japan, the two largest PV markets worldwide, have also revealed some performance problems associated with issues such as shading, equipment and installation defects, inverter failure, and deviations from module manufacturers' specifications (Otani et al. 2004, Jahn & Nasse 2004). Although owners of PV systems have an inherent incentive to ensure that their systems perform well, many homeowners and building operators may lack the necessary information and expertise to carry out this task effectively. Given this barrier, and the responsibility of PV incentive programs to ensure that public funds are prudently spent, these programs should (and often do) play a critical role in promoting PV system performance. Performance-based incentives (PBIs), which are based on actual energy production rather than the rated capacity of the modules or system, are often suggested as one possible strategy. Somewhat less recognized are the many other program design options also available, each with its particular advantages and disadvantages. To provide a point of reference for assessing the current state of the art, and to inform program design efforts going forward, we examine the approaches to encouraging PV system performance - including, but not limited to, PBIs - used by 32 prominent PV incentive programs in the U.S. (see Table 1).1 We focus specifically on programs that offer an explicit subsidy payment for customer-sited PV installations. PV support programs that offer other forms of financial support or that function primarily as a mechanism for purchasing renewable energy credits (RECs) through energy production-based payments are outside the scope of our review.2 The information presented herein is derived primarily from publicly available sources, including program websites and guidebooks, programs evaluations, and conference papers, as well as from a limited number of personal communications with program staff. The remainder of this report is organized as follows. The next section presents a simple conceptual framework for understanding the issues that affect PV system performance and provides an overview of the eight general strategies to encourage performance used among the programs reviewed in this report. The subsequent eight sections discuss in greater detail each of these program design strategies and describe how they have been implemented among the programs surveyed. Based on this review, we then offer a series of recommendations for how PV incentive programs can effectively promote PV system performance.« less
Squitieri, Lee; Chung, Kevin C
2017-07-01
In 2015, the U.S. Congress passed the Medicare Access and Children's Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act, which effectively repealed the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services sustainable growth rate formula and established the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Quality Payment Program. The Medicare Access and Children's Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act represents an unparalleled acceleration toward value-based payment models and a departure from traditional volume-driven fee-for-service reimbursement. The Quality Payment Program includes two paths for provider participation: the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System and Advanced Alternative Payment Models. The Merit-Based Incentive Payment System pathway replaces existing quality reporting programs and adds several new measures to create a composite performance score for each provider (or provider group) that will be used to adjust reimbursed payment. The advanced alternative payment model pathway is available to providers who participate in qualifying Advanced Alternative Payment Models and is associated with an initial 5 percent payment incentive. The first performance period for the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System opens January 1, 2017, and closes on December 31, 2017, and is associated with payment adjustments in January of 2019. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services estimates that the majority of providers will begin participation in 2017 through the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System pathway, but aims to have 50 percent of payments tied to quality or value through Advanced Alternative Payment Models by 2018. In this article, the authors describe key components of the Medicare Access and Children's Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act to providers navigating through the Quality Payment Program and discuss how plastic surgeons may optimize their performance in this new value-based payment program.
Horses or unicorns: can paying for performance make quality competition routine?
Sage, William M; Kalyan, Dev N
2006-06-01
The competitive benefits of pay-for-performance (P4P) financial incentives are widely assumed. These incentives can affect health care through several mechanisms, however, not all of which involve competition. This insight has three implications. First, federal antitrust enforcement should continue to scrutinize P4P arrangements. Second, government needs to play a larger role in P4P than through antitrust oversight. Third, widespread enthusiasm for a particular health policy reform does not relieve policy makers of the obligation to understand its theoretical basis.
Using Patient-Reported Information to Improve Clinical Practice.
Schlesinger, Mark; Grob, Rachel; Shaller, Dale
2015-12-01
To assess what is known about the relationship between patient experience measures and incentives designed to improve care, and to identify how public policy and medical practices can promote patient-valued outcomes in health systems with strong financial incentives. Existing literature (gray and peer-reviewed) on measuring patient experience and patient-reported outcomes, identified from Medline and Cochrane databases; evaluations of pay-for-performance programs in the United States, Europe, and the Commonwealth countries. We analyzed (1) studies of pay-for-performance, to identify those including metrics for patient experience, and (2) studies of patient experience and of patient-reported outcomes to identify evidence of influence on clinical practice, whether through public reporting or private reporting to clinicians. First, we identify four forms of "patient-reported information" (PRI), each with distinctive roles shaping clinical practice: (1) patient-reported outcomes measuring self-assessed physical and mental well-being, (2) surveys of patient experience with clinicians and staff, (3) narrative accounts describing encounters with clinicians in patients' own words, and (4) complaints/grievances signaling patients' distress when treatment or outcomes fall short of expectations. Because these forms vary in crucial ways, each must be distinctively measured, deployed, and linked with financial incentives. Second, although the literature linking incentives to patients experience is limited, implementing pay-for-performance systems appears to threaten certain patient-valued aspects of health care. But incentives can be made compatible with the outcomes patients value if: (a) a sufficient portion of incentives is tied to patient-reported outcomes and experiences, (b) incentivized forms of PRI are complemented by other forms of patient feedback, and (c) health care organizations assist clinicians to interpret and respond to PRI. Finally, we identify roles for the public and private sectors in financing PRI and orchestrating an appropriate balance among its four forms. Unless public policies are attentive to patients' perspectives, stronger financial incentives for clinicians can threaten aspects of care that patients most value. Certain policy parameters are already clear, but additional research is required to clarify how best to collect patient narratives in varied settings, how to report narratives to consumers in conjunction with quantified metrics, and how to promote a "culture of learning" at the practice level that incorporates patient feedback. © Health Research and Educational Trust.
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Gaines, Gale F.
2004-01-01
Is your state making progress toward having a high-quality teacher in every classroom? How will you know? One indicator of progress in the Challenge to Lead goals refers to teacher compensation: "Salaries, benefits and incentives are competitive in the marketplace. They are aimed at recognized expertise, student performance, state needs and taking…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Adamson, David M.
2012-01-01
Researchers examined whether rewarding teams of teachers for student performance had an effect on student achievement or teacher practices or attitudes in a demonstration project in Round Rock, Texas. They found that the intervention had no effect in any of these areas. Students taught by teacher teams who were offered incentives scored slightly…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Ahn, Thomas; Vigdor, Jacob L.
2011-01-01
North Carolina has operated one of the country's largest pay-for-performance teacher-bonus programs since the late 1990s. New research shows that a North Carolina-style incentive-pay program has the potential to improve student learning by encouraging teachers to exert more effort on the job. The North Carolina model avoids three pitfalls…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
What Works Clearinghouse, 2011
2011-01-01
The study examined whether offering financial incentives to teachers of fifth- through eighth-grade math students improved their students' achievement on the math section of the Tennessee Comprehensive Assessment Program. The study took place in the Metropolitan Nashville Public School District during the 2006-07 through 2008-09 school years. It…
Management of Social Incentives in Air Force Technical Training: A Field Experiment. Final Report.
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Hakel, Milton D.; And Others
The report is a study of the utility of social reinforcement for improving Air Force training. It was conducted through a field evaluation of social incentive instructional systems which would serve to improve student motivation, classroom performance, and attitudes. The participants included a total of 300 trainees from two Air Force bases; 25…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Holland, Barbara A.; Berdahl, Robert O.
This paper presents data from a 1989 survey of 48 state higher education executive officers regarding the use of fiscal enhancement programs as a strategy to influence higher education performance. The paper reports on the purposes and objectives most often funded through specific incentives, and on the key advantages and disadvantages of this…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Santibanez, Lucrecia; Martinez, Jose Felipe; Datar, Ashlesha; McEwan, Patrick J.; Setodji, Claude Messan; Basurto-Davila, Ricardo
2007-01-01
Mexico's Carrera Magisterial (CM) is one of the pioneer teacher incentive programs in the world. It was instituted in 1992 and designed jointly by the federal education authorities, state authorities, and the teachers' union as a horizontal promotion system that rewards teachers with salary bonuses on the basis of their performance. Teacher…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Weathers, Robert R., II; Hemmeter, Jeffrey
2011-01-01
SSDI beneficiaries lose their entire cash benefit if they perform work that is substantial gainful activity (SGA) after using Social Security work incentive programs. The complete loss of benefits might be a work disincentive for beneficiaries. We report results from a pilot project that replaces the complete loss of benefits with a gradual…
Lemak, Christy Harris; Nahra, Tammie A; Cohen, Genna R; Erb, Natalie D; Paustian, Michael L; Share, David; Hirth, Richard A
2015-04-01
As policy makers and others seek to reduce health care cost growth while improving health care quality, one approach gaining momentum is fee-for-value reimbursement. This payment strategy maintains the traditional fee-for-service arrangement but includes quality and spending incentives. We examined Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan's Physician Group Incentive Program, which uses a fee-for-value approach focused on primary care physicians. We analyzed the program's impact on quality and spending from 2008 to 2011 for over three million beneficiaries in over 11,000 physician practices. Participation in the incentive program was associated with approximately 1.1 percent lower total spending for adults (5.1 percent lower for children) and the same or improved performance on eleven of fourteen quality measures over time. Our findings contribute to the growing body of evidence about the potential effectiveness of models that align payment with cost and quality performance, and they demonstrate that it is possible to transform reimbursement within a fee-for-service framework to encourage and incentivize physicians to provide high-quality care, while also reducing costs. Project HOPE—The People-to-People Health Foundation, Inc.
Accountability and Primary Healthcare
Mukhi, Shaheena; Barnsley, Jan; Deber, Raisa B.
2014-01-01
This paper examines the accountability structures within primary healthcare (PHC) in Ontario; in particular, who is accountable for what and to whom, and the policy tools being used. Ontario has implemented a series of incremental reforms, using expenditure policy instruments, enforced through contractual agreements to provide a defined set of publicly financed services that are privately delivered, most often by family physicians. The findings indicate that reporting, funding, evaluation and governance accountability requirements vary across service provider models. Accountability to the funder and patients is most common. Agreements, incentives and compensation tools have been used but may be insufficient to ensure parties are being held responsible for their activities related to stated goals. Clear definitions of various governance structures, a cohesive approach to monitoring critical performance indicators and associated improvement strategies are important elements in operationalizing accountability and determining whether goals are being met. PMID:25305392
Clinical Decision Support in Electronic Prescribing: Recommendations and an Action Plan
Teich, Jonathan M.; Osheroff, Jerome A.; Pifer, Eric A.; Sittig, Dean F.; Jenders, Robert A.
2005-01-01
Clinical decision support (CDS) in electronic prescribing (eRx) systems can improve the safety, quality, efficiency, and cost-effectiveness of care. However, at present, these potential benefits have not been fully realized. In this consensus white paper, we set forth recommendations and action plans in three critical domains: (1) advances in system capabilities, including basic and advanced sets of CDS interventions and knowledge, supporting database elements, operational features to improve usability and measure performance, and management and governance structures; (2) uniform standards, vocabularies, and centralized knowledge structures and services that could reduce rework by vendors and care providers, improve dissemination of well-constructed CDS interventions, promote generally applicable research in CDS methods, and accelerate the movement of new medical knowledge from research to practice; and (3) appropriate financial and legal incentives to promote adoption. PMID:15802474
Reports of unintended consequences of financial incentives to improve management of hypertension.
Hysong, Sylvia J; SoRelle, Richard; Broussard Smitham, Kristen; Petersen, Laura A
2017-01-01
Given the increase in financial-incentive programs nationwide, many physicians and physician groups are concerned about potential unintended consequences of providing financial incentives to improve quality of care. However, few studies examine whether actual unintended consequences result from providing financial incentives to physicians. We sought to document the extent to which the unintended consequences discussed in the literature were observable in a randomized clinical trial (RCT) of financial incentives. We conducted a qualitative observational study nested within a larger RCT of financial incentives to improve hypertension care. We conducted 30-minute telephone interviews with primary care personnel at facilities participating in the RCT housed at12 geographically dispersed Veterans Affairs Medical Centers nationwide. Participants answered questions about unintended effects, clinic team dynamics, organizational impact on care delivery, study participation. We employed a blend of inductive and deductive qualitative techniques for analysis. Sixty-five participants were recruited from RCT enrollees and personnel not enrolled in the larger RCT, plus one primary care leader per site. Emergent themes included possible patient harm, emphasis on documentation over improving care, reduced professional morale, and positive spillover. All discussions of unintended consequences involving patient harm were only concerns, not actual events. Several unintended consequences concerned ancillary initiatives for quality improvement (e.g., practice guidelines and performance measurement systems) rather than financial incentives. Many unintended consequences of financial incentives noted were either only concerns or attributable to ancillary quality-improvement initiatives. Actual unintended consequences included improved documentation of care without necessarily improving actual care, and positive unintended consequences. Clinicaltrials.gov Identifier: NCT00302718.
Corepal, Rekesh; Tully, Mark A; Kee, Frank; Miller, Sarah J; Hunter, Ruth F
2018-05-01
Physical inactivity, an unhealthy diet, smoking, and alcohol consumption are key determinants of morbidity and mortality. These health behaviours often begin at a young age and track into adulthood, emphasising a need for interventions in children and young people. Previous research has demonstrated the potential effectiveness of behavioural incentive (BI) interventions in adults. However, little is known about their effectiveness in children and adolescents. Eight bibliographic databases were searched. Eligibility criteria included controlled trials using behavioural incentives (rewards provided contingent on successful performance of the target behaviour) as an intervention component for health behaviour change in children and adolescents. Intervention effects (standardised mean differences or odds ratios) were calculated and pooled by health behaviour, using a random effects model. Twenty-two studies were included (of n = 8392 identified), 19 of which were eligible for meta-analysis: physical activity (n = 8); healthier eating (n = 3); and smoking (n = 8). There was strong evidence that behavioural incentives may encourage healthier eating behaviours, some evidence that behavioural incentives were effective for encouraging physical activity behaviour, and limited evidence to support the use of behavioural incentives for smoking cessation and prevention in adolescents. Findings suggest that behavioural incentives may encourage uptake and initiation of healthy eating and physical activity in young people. However, this is a limited evidence base and a wide range of incentive designs have yet to be explored. Future research should further investigate the acceptability of these intervention approaches for young people. Copyright © 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Road simulation for four-wheel vehicle whole input power spectral density
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Wang, Jiangbo; Qiang, Baomin
2017-05-01
As the vibration of running vehicle mainly comes from road and influence vehicle ride performance. So the road roughness power spectral density simulation has great significance to analyze automobile suspension vibration system parameters and evaluate ride comfort. Firstly, this paper based on the mathematical model of road roughness power spectral density, established the integral white noise road random method. Then in the MATLAB/Simulink environment, according to the research method of automobile suspension frame from simple two degree of freedom single-wheel vehicle model to complex multiple degrees of freedom vehicle model, this paper built the simple single incentive input simulation model. Finally the spectrum matrix was used to build whole vehicle incentive input simulation model. This simulation method based on reliable and accurate mathematical theory and can be applied to the random road simulation of any specified spectral which provides pavement incentive model and foundation to vehicle ride performance research and vibration simulation.
Goyal, Vipin Kumar; Bhargava, Suresh Kumar; Baj, Birbal
2017-10-01
Fentanyl-induced cough (FIC) has a reported incidence of 13-65% on induction of anesthesia. Incentive spirometry (IS) creates forceful inspiration, while stretching pulmonary receptors. We postulated that spirometry just before the fentanyl (F) bolus would decrease the incidence and severity of FIC. This study enrolled 200 patients aged 18-60 years and with American Society of Anesthesiologists status I or II. The patients were allocated to two groups of 100 patients each depending on whether they received preoperative incentive spirometry before fentanyl administration. Patients in the F+IS group performed incentive spirometry 10 times just before an intravenous bolus of 3 µg/kg fentanyl in the operating room. The onset time and number of coughs after fentanyl injection were recorded as primary outcomes. Any significant changes in blood pressure, heart rate, or adverse effects of the drug were recorded as secondary outcomes. Patients in the F+IS group had a significantly lower incidence of FIC than in the F group (6% vs. 26%) (P < 0.05). The severity of cough in the F+IS group was also significantly lower than that in group F (mild, 5 vs. 17; moderate 1 vs. 7; severe, 0 vs. 2) (P < 0.05). The median onset time was comparable in both groups (9 s [range: 6-12 s] in both groups). Preoperative incentive spirometry significantly reduces the incidence and severity of FIC when performed just before fentanyl administration.
Bhargava, Suresh Kumar; Baj, Birbal
2017-01-01
Background Fentanyl-induced cough (FIC) has a reported incidence of 13–65% on induction of anesthesia. Incentive spirometry (IS) creates forceful inspiration, while stretching pulmonary receptors. We postulated that spirometry just before the fentanyl (F) bolus would decrease the incidence and severity of FIC. Methods This study enrolled 200 patients aged 18–60 years and with American Society of Anesthesiologists status I or II. The patients were allocated to two groups of 100 patients each depending on whether they received preoperative incentive spirometry before fentanyl administration. Patients in the F+IS group performed incentive spirometry 10 times just before an intravenous bolus of 3 µg/kg fentanyl in the operating room. The onset time and number of coughs after fentanyl injection were recorded as primary outcomes. Any significant changes in blood pressure, heart rate, or adverse effects of the drug were recorded as secondary outcomes. Results Patients in the F+IS group had a significantly lower incidence of FIC than in the F group (6% vs. 26%) (P < 0.05). The severity of cough in the F+IS group was also significantly lower than that in group F (mild, 5 vs. 17; moderate 1 vs. 7; severe, 0 vs. 2) (P < 0.05). The median onset time was comparable in both groups (9 s [range: 6–12 s] in both groups). Conclusions Preoperative incentive spirometry significantly reduces the incidence and severity of FIC when performed just before fentanyl administration. PMID:29046775
Tuck, Geoffrey N; Whitten, Athol R
2013-01-01
Annual draft systems are the principal method used by teams in major sporting leagues to recruit amateur players. These draft systems frequently take one of three forms: a lottery style draft, a weighted draft, or a reverse-order draft. Reverse-order drafts can create incentives for teams to deliberately under-perform, or tank, due to the perceived gain from obtaining quality players at higher draft picks. This paper uses a dynamic simulation model that captures the key components of a win-maximising sporting league, including the amateur player draft, draft choice error, player productivity, and between-team competition, to explore how competitive balance and incentives to under-perform vary according to league characteristics. We find reverse-order drafts can lead to some teams cycling between success and failure and to other teams being stuck in mid-ranking positions for extended periods of time. We also find that an incentive for teams to tank exists, but that this incentive decreases (i) as uncertainty in the ability to determine quality players in the draft increases, (ii) as the number of teams in the league reduces, (iii) as team size decreases, and (iv) as the number of teams adopting a tanking strategy increases. Simulation models can be used to explore complex stochastic dynamic systems such as sports leagues, where managers face difficult decisions regarding the structure of their league and the desire to maintain competitive balance.
Tuck, Geoffrey N.; Whitten, Athol R.
2013-01-01
Annual draft systems are the principal method used by teams in major sporting leagues to recruit amateur players. These draft systems frequently take one of three forms: a lottery style draft, a weighted draft, or a reverse-order draft. Reverse-order drafts can create incentives for teams to deliberately under-perform, or tank, due to the perceived gain from obtaining quality players at higher draft picks. This paper uses a dynamic simulation model that captures the key components of a win-maximising sporting league, including the amateur player draft, draft choice error, player productivity, and between-team competition, to explore how competitive balance and incentives to under-perform vary according to league characteristics. We find reverse-order drafts can lead to some teams cycling between success and failure and to other teams being stuck in mid-ranking positions for extended periods of time. We also find that an incentive for teams to tank exists, but that this incentive decreases (i) as uncertainty in the ability to determine quality players in the draft increases, (ii) as the number of teams in the league reduces, (iii) as team size decreases, and (iv) as the number of teams adopting a tanking strategy increases. Simulation models can be used to explore complex stochastic dynamic systems such as sports leagues, where managers face difficult decisions regarding the structure of their league and the desire to maintain competitive balance. PMID:24312243
Dopamine and incentive learning: a framework for considering antipsychotic medication effects.
Beninger, Richard J
2006-12-01
Hyperfunction of brain dopamine (DA) systems is associated with psychosis in schizophrenia and the medications used to treat schizophrenia are DA receptor blockers. DA also plays a critical role in incentive learning produced by rewarding stimuli. Using DA as the link, these results suggest that psychosis in schizophrenia can be understood from the point of view of excessive incentive learning. Incentive learning is mediated through the non-declarative memory system and may rely on the striatum or medial prefrontal cortex depending on the task. Typical and atypical antipsychotics differentially affect expression of the immediate early gene c-fos, producing greater activity in the striatum and medial prefrontal cortex, respectively. This led to the hypothesis that performance of schizophrenic patients on tasks that depend on the striatum or medial prefrontal cortex will be differentially affected by their antipsychotic medication. Results from a number of published papers supported this dissociation. Furthermore, the effects of two atypical drugs, clozapine and olanzapine, on c-fos expression were different from another atypical, risperidone that resembles the typical antipsychotics. Similarly, in tests of incentive learning, risperidone acted like the typical antipsychotics. Thus, typical and atypical antipsychotic drugs differed in the types of cognitive performance they affected and, furthermore, members of the atypical class differed in their effects on cognition. It remains the task of researchers and clinicians to sort out the symptoms associated with the endogenous illness from possible iatrogenic symptoms resulting from the antipsychotic medications used to treat schizophrenia.
Toward a Culture of Consequences: Performance-Based Accountability Systems for Public Services.
Stecher, Brian M; Camm, Frank; Damberg, Cheryl L; Hamilton, Laura S; Mullen, Kathleen J; Nelson, Christopher; Sorensen, Paul; Wachs, Martin; Yoh, Allison; Zellman, Gail L; Leuschner, Kristin J; Camm, Frank; Stecher, Brian M
2012-01-01
Performance-based accountability systems (PBASs), which link incentives to measured performance as a means of improving services to the public, have gained popularity. While PBASs can vary widely across sectors, they share three main components: goals, incentives, and measures. Research suggests that PBASs influence provider behaviors, but little is known about PBAS effectiveness at achieving performance goals or about government and agency experiences. This study examines nine PBASs that are drawn from five sectors: child care, education, health care, public health emergency preparedness, and transportation. In the right circumstances, a PBAS can be an effective strategy for improving service delivery. Optimum circumstances include having a widely shared goal, unambiguous observable measures, meaningful incentives for those with control over the relevant inputs and processes, few competing interests, and adequate resources to design, implement, and operate the PBAS. However, these conditions are rarely fully realized, so it is difficult to design and implement PBASs that are uniformly effective. PBASs represent a promising policy option for improving the quality of service-delivery activities in many contexts. The evidence supports continued experimentation with and adoption of this approach in appropriate circumstances. Even so, PBAS design and its prospects for success depend on the context in which it will operate. Also, ongoing system evaluation and monitoring are integral components of a PBAS; they inform refinements that improve system functioning over time. Empirical evidence of the effects of performance-based public management is scarce. This article also describes a framework used to evaluate a PBAS. Such a system identifies individuals or organizations that must change their behavior for the performance of an activity to improve, chooses an implicit or explicit incentive structure to motivate these organizations or individuals to change, and then chooses performance measures tailored to inform the incentive structure appropriately. The study focused on systems in the child care, education, health care, public health emergency preparedness, and transportation sectors, mainly in the United States. Analysts could use this framework to seek empirical information in other sectors and other parts of the world. Additional empirical information could help refine existing PBASs and, more broadly, improve decisions on where to initiate new PBASs, how to implement them, and then how to design, manage, and refine them over time.
Agarwal, Koki; Askew, Ian; Iriarte, Emma; Morgan, Lindsay; Watson, Julia
2013-01-01
Performance-based incentives (PBIs) aim to counteract weak providers’ performance in health systems of many developing countries by providing rewards that are directly linked to better health outcomes for mothers and their newborns. Translating funding into better health requires many actions by a large number of people. The actions span from community to the national level. While different forms of PBIs are being implemented in a number of countries to improve health outcomes, there has not been a systematic review of the evidence of their impact on the health of mothers and newborns. This paper analyzes and synthesizes the available evidence from published studies on the impact of supply-side PBIs on the quantity and quality of health services for mothers and newborns. This paper reviews evidence from published and grey literature that spans PBI for public-sector facilities, PBI in social insurance reforms, and PBI in NGO contracting. Some initiatives focus on safe deliveries, and others reward a broader package of results that include deliveries. The Evidence Review Team that focused on supply-side incentives for the US Government Evidence Summit on Enhancing Provision and Use of Maternal Health Services through Financial Incentives, reviewed published research reports and papers and added studies from additional grey literature that were deemed relevant. After collecting and reviewing 17 documents, nine studies were included in this review, three of which used before-after designs; four included comparison or control groups; one applied econometric methods to a five-year time series; and one reported results from a large-scale impact evaluation with randomly-assigned intervention and control facilities. The available evidence suggests that incentives that reward providers for institutional deliveries result in an increase in the number of institutional deliveries. There is some evidence that the content of antenatal care can improve with PBI. We found no direct evidence on the impact of PBI on neonatal health services or on mortality of mothers and newborns, although intention of the study was not to document impact on mortality. A number of studies describe approaches to rewarding quality as well as increases in the quantities of services provided, although how quality is defined and monitored is not always clear. Because incentives exist in all health systems, considering how to align the incentives of the many health workers and their supervisors so that they focus efforts on achieving health goals for mothers and newborns is critical if the health system is to perform more effectively and efficiently. A wide range of PBI models is being developed and tested, and there is still much to learn about what works best. Future studies should include a larger focus on rewarding quality and measuring its impact. Finally, more qualitative research to better understand PBI implementation and how various incentive models function in different settings is needed to help practitioners refine and improve their programmes.
Eichler, Rena; Agarwal, Koki; Askew, Ian; Iriarte, Emma; Morgan, Lindsay; Watson, Julia
2013-12-01
Performance-based incentives (PBIs) aim to counteract weak providers' performance in health systems of many developing countries by providing rewards that are directly linked to better health outcomes for mothers and their newborns. Translating funding into better health requires many actions by a large number of people. The actions span from community to the national level. While different forms of PBIs are being implemented in a number of countries to improve health outcomes, there has not been a systematic review of the evidence of their impact on the health of mothers and newborns. This paper analyzes and synthesizes the available evidence from published studies on the impact of supply-side PBIs on the quantity and quality of health services for mothers and newborns. This paper reviews evidence from published and grey literature that spans PBI for public-sector facilities, PBI in social insurance reforms, and PBI in NGO contracting. Some initiatives focus on safe deliveries, and others reward a broader package of results that include deliveries. The Evidence Review Team that focused on supply-side incentives for the US Government Evidence Summit on Enhancing Provision and Use of Maternal Health Services through Financial Incentives, reviewed published research reports and papers and added studies from additional grey literature that were deemed relevant. After collecting and reviewing 17 documents, nine studies were included in this review, three of which used before-after designs; four included comparison or control groups; one applied econometric methods to a five-year time series; and one reported results from a large-scale impact evaluation with randomly-assigned intervention and control facilities. The available evidence suggests that incentives that reward providers for institutional deliveries result in an increase in the number of institutional deliveries. There is some evidence that the content of antenatal care can improve with PBI. We found no direct evidence on the impact of PBI on neonatal health services or on mortality of mothers and newborns, although intention of the study was not to document impact on mortality. A number of studies describe approaches to rewarding quality as well as increases in the quantities of services provided, although how quality is defined and monitored is not always clear. Because incentives exist in all health systems, considering how to align the incentives of the many health workers and their supervisors so that they focus efforts on achieving health goals for mothers and newborns is critical if the health system is to perform more effectively and efficiently. A wide range of PBI models is being developed and tested, and there is still much to learn about what works best. Future studies should include a larger focus on rewarding quality and measuring its impact. Finally, more qualitative research to better understand PBI implementation and how various incentive models function in different settings is needed to help practitioners refine and improve their programmes.
Improving response rate and quality of survey data with a scratch lottery ticket incentive
2012-01-01
Background The quality of data collected in survey research is usually indicated by the response rate; the representativeness of the sample, and; the rate of completed questions (item-response). In attempting to improve a generally declining response rate in surveys considerable efforts are being made through follow-up mailings and various types of incentives. This study examines effects of including a scratch lottery ticket in the invitation letter to a survey. Method Questionnaires concerning oral health were mailed to a random sample of 2,400 adults. A systematically selected half of the sample (1,200 adults) received a questionnaire including a scratch lottery ticket. One reminder without the incentive was sent. Results The incentive increased the response rate and improved representativeness by reaching more respondents with lower education. Furthermore, it reduced item nonresponse. The initial incentive had no effect on the propensity to respond after the reminder. Conclusion When attempting to improve survey data, three issues become important: response rate, representativeness, and item-response. This study shows that including a scratch lottery ticket in the invitation letter performs well on all the three. PMID:22515335
Fleetcroft, Robert; Steel, Nicholas; Cookson, Richard; Howe, Amanda
2008-06-17
The 2003 revision of the UK GMS contract rewards general practices for performance against clinical quality indicators. Practices can exempt patients from treatment, and can receive maximum payment for less than full coverage of eligible patients. This paper aims to estimate the gap between the percentage of maximum incentive gained and the percentage of patients receiving indicated care (the pay-performance gap), and to estimate how much of the gap is attributable respectively to thresholds and to exception reporting. Analysis of Quality Outcomes Framework data in the National Primary Care Database and exception reporting data from the Information Centre from 8407 practices in England in 2005 - 6. The main outcome measures were the gap between the percentage of maximum incentive gained and the percentage of patients receiving indicated care at the practice level, both for individual indicators and a combined composite score. An additional outcome was the percentage of that gap attributable respectively to exception reporting and maximum threshold targets set at less than 100%. The mean pay-performance gap for the 65 aggregated clinical indicators was 13.3% (range 2.9% to 48%). 52% of this gap (6.9% of eligible patients) is attributable to thresholds being set at less than 100%, and 48% to patients being exception reported. The gap was greater than 25% in 9 indicators: beta blockers and cholesterol control in heart disease; cholesterol control in stroke; influenza immunization in asthma; blood pressure, sugar and cholesterol control in diabetes; seizures in epilepsy and treatment of hypertension. Threshold targets and exception reporting introduce an incentive ceiling, which substantially reduces the percentage of eligible patients that UK practices need to treat in order to receive maximum incentive payments for delivering that care. There are good clinical reasons for exception reporting, but after unsuitable patients have been exempted from treatment, there is no reason why all maximum thresholds should not be 100%, whilst retaining the current lower thresholds to provide incentives for lower performing practices.
Incentive Sensitivity as a Behavioral Marker of Clinical Remission From Major Depressive Episode.
Mauras, Thomas; Masson, Marc; Fossati, Philippe; Pessiglione, Mathias
2016-06-01
Reduction of goal-directed behaviors is frequently observed in depression and may be linked to dysfunction of incentive motivation process. To investigate whether incentive sensitivity could constitute a behavioral marker of clinical remission in major depression. A handgrip force measurement device was employed to assess the impact of incentive motivation and emotional manipulation on the effort produced by remitted patients (n = 20) compared to matched depressed patients (n = 22) and healthy controls (n = 26). Depressed and remitted patients fulfilled the major depressive disorder DSM-IV criteria for current episode and remission state, respectively. The study was performed between March and July 2013. Relative to patients with acute depression, patients after remission retrieved a normal sensitivity to incentives (t1,40 = 4.18, P < 1.5 × 10-4), but relative to healthy controls, they kept an abnormally high susceptibility to emotional arousal (t1,44 = 2.4, P = .02). Normalization of incentive sensitivity exhibited in the behavioral test was associated with improvement of apathy measured on the clinical scale. Using a simple behavioral paradigm at patients' bedside, we could identify the factors influencing effort production, so as to discriminate remitted patients from both depressed patients and healthy controls. © Copyright 2016 Physicians Postgraduate Press, Inc.
Alexander, Jeffrey A; Maeng, Daniel; Casalino, Lawrence P; Rittenhouse, Diane
2013-04-01
To examine the effect of public reporting (PR) and financial incentives tied to quality performance on the use of care management practices (CMPs) among small- and medium-sized physician groups. Survey data from The National Study of Small and Medium-sized Physician Practices were used. Primary data collection was also conducted to assess community-level PR activities. The final sample included 643 practices engaged in quality reporting; about half of these practices were subject to PR. We used a treatment effects model. The instrumental variables were the community-level variables that capture the level of PR activity in each community in which the practices operate. (1) PR is associated with increased use of CMPs, but the estimate is not statistically significant; (2) financial incentives are associated with greater use of CMPs; (3) practices' awareness/sensitivity to quality reports is positively related to their use of CMPs; and (4) combined PR and financial incentives jointly affect CMP use to a greater degree than either of these factors alone. Small- to medium-sized practices appear to respond to PR and financial incentives by greater use of CMPs. Future research needs to investigate the appropriate mix and type of incentive arrangements and quality reporting. © Health Research and Educational Trust.
[Incentives to attract and retain the health workforce in rural areas of Peru: a qualitative study].
Huicho, Luis; Canseco, Francisco Díez; Lema, Claudia; Miranda, J Jaime; Lescano, Andrés G
2012-04-01
The study aimed to identify the main incentives for attracting and retaining health workers in rural and remote health facilities in Ayacucho, Peru. In-depth interviews were performed with 80 physicians, obstetricians, nurses, and nurse technicians in the poorest areas (20 per group), plus 11 health managers. Ayacucho lacks systematic policies for attracting and retaining human resources. The main incentives, in order of relevance, were higher wages, opportunities for further training, longer/permanent contracts, better infrastructure and medical equipment, and more staff. Interviewees also mentioned improved housing conditions and food, the opportunity to be closer to family, and recognition by the health system. Health workers and policymakers share perceptions on key incentives to encourage work in rural areas. However, there are also singularities to be considered when designing specific strategies. Public initiatives thus need to be monitored and evaluated closely in order to ensure the intended impact.
Incentive relativity in middle aged rats.
Justel, N; Mustaca, A; Boccia, M; Ruetti, E
2014-01-24
Response to a reinforcer is affected by prior experience with different reward values of that reward, a phenomenon known as incentive relativity. Two different procedures to study this phenomenon are the incentive downshift (ID) and the consummatory anticipatory negative contrast (cANC), the former is an emotional-cognitive protocol and the latter cognitive one. Aged rodents, as also well described in aged humans, exhibit alterations in cognitive functions. The main goal of this work was to evaluate the effect of age in the incentive' assessment using these two procedures. The results indicated that aged rats had an adequate assessment of the rewards but their performance is not completely comparable to that of young subjects. They recover faster from the ID and they had a cognitive impairment in the cANC. The results are discussed in relation to age-related changes in memory and emotion. Copyright © 2013 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.
An Assessment of Causes of PEV Success Across U.S. Metro Areas
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Zhou, Y.; Santini, D.; Rood, M.
Using 2014 U.S. light duty PEV registrations by make and model, this paper assesses the causes of Plug-in Electric Vehicle (PEV) success across U.S. states focusing on areas that had incentive and utility programs supporting PEV adoption. Market segments investigated were (1) luxury/performance (>$60,000 list price), (2) mid-market ($40-50,000), (3) mass market (<$40.000), and (4) total. States with either exclusive or preferential BEV incentives are a focus. BEV-biased incentives proved to be very effective in promoting mass market BEVs. After controlling for these attributes, case studies for several utility service areas were conducted to gauge whether PEVs were more ormore » less successfully implemented via outreach by those utilities. These investigations suggest ways that utilities can successfully increase PEV registrations, after taking local climate and state incentives into consideration.« less
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Goomas, David T.; Ludwig, Timothy D.
2007-01-01
Under baseline conditions warehouse stockers (n = 23) could earn incentives if their team performed above the team quota of 18 cases stocked per hour. They were also subject to disciplinary action if they failed to regularly meet individual stocking quotas. In spite of these contingencies the stockers failed to receive bonus payments most of the…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Smidt, Thomas Brorsen; Pétursdóttir, Gyða Margrét; Einarsdóttir, Þorgerður
2017-01-01
It is suggested that the realization of work-life balance policies at the University of Iceland is compromised by an emphasis on neoliberal notions of growth and performance measurements in the form of new public management strategies. This is sustained by overt and covert incentive mechanisms, which in turn create a range of different gendered…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Holley, Marc Jacob
2009-01-01
Improving principal quality in Arkansas may be a partial solution to the public policy problem of low performing public schools. Just as policymakers in other states are beginning to explore incentive-based compensation policies to improve principal quality, education policymakers in Arkansas should look to these policies as a way to align goals…
Bertone, Maria Paola; Witter, Sophie
2015-07-28
Human resources for health represent an essential component of health systems and play a key role to accelerate progress towards universal health coverage. Many countries in sub-Saharan Africa face challenges regarding the availability, distribution and performance of health workers, which could be in part addressed by providing effective financial incentives. Based on an overview of the existing literature, the paper highlights the gaps in the existing research in low-income countries exploring the different components of health workers' incomes. It then proposes a novel approach to the analysis of financial incentives and delineates a research agenda, which could contribute to shed light on this topic. The article finds that, while there is ample research that investigates separately each of the incomes health workers may earn (for example, salary, fee-for-service payments, informal incomes, "top-ups" and per diems, dual practice and non-health activities), there is a dearth of studies which look at the health workers' "complex remuneration", that is, the whole of the financial incentives available. Little research exists which analyses simultaneously all revenues of health workers, quantifies the overall remuneration and explores its complexity, its multiple components and their features, as well as the possible interaction between income components. However, such a comprehensive approach is essential to fully comprehend health workers' incentives, by investigating the causes (at individual and system level) of the fragmentation in the income structure and the variability in income levels, as well as the consequences of the "complex remuneration" on motivation and performance. This proposition has important policy implications in terms of devising effective incentive packages as it calls for an active consideration of the role that "complex remuneration" plays in determining recruitment, retention and motivation patterns, as well as, more broadly, the performance of health systems. This paper argues that research focusing on the health workers' "complex remuneration" is critical to address some of the most challenging issues affecting human resources for health. An empirical research agenda is proposed to fill the gap in our understanding.
Neural basis of the undermining effect of monetary reward on intrinsic motivation
Murayama, Kou; Matsumoto, Madoka; Izuma, Keise; Matsumoto, Kenji
2010-01-01
Contrary to the widespread belief that people are positively motivated by reward incentives, some studies have shown that performance-based extrinsic reward can actually undermine a person's intrinsic motivation to engage in a task. This “undermining effect” has timely practical implications, given the burgeoning of performance-based incentive systems in contemporary society. It also presents a theoretical challenge for economic and reinforcement learning theories, which tend to assume that monetary incentives monotonically increase motivation. Despite the practical and theoretical importance of this provocative phenomenon, however, little is known about its neural basis. Herein we induced the behavioral undermining effect using a newly developed task, and we tracked its neural correlates using functional MRI. Our results show that performance-based monetary reward indeed undermines intrinsic motivation, as assessed by the number of voluntary engagements in the task. We found that activity in the anterior striatum and the prefrontal areas decreased along with this behavioral undermining effect. These findings suggest that the corticobasal ganglia valuation system underlies the undermining effect through the integration of extrinsic reward value and intrinsic task value. PMID:21078974
Neural basis of the undermining effect of monetary reward on intrinsic motivation.
Murayama, Kou; Matsumoto, Madoka; Izuma, Keise; Matsumoto, Kenji
2010-12-07
Contrary to the widespread belief that people are positively motivated by reward incentives, some studies have shown that performance-based extrinsic reward can actually undermine a person's intrinsic motivation to engage in a task. This "undermining effect" has timely practical implications, given the burgeoning of performance-based incentive systems in contemporary society. It also presents a theoretical challenge for economic and reinforcement learning theories, which tend to assume that monetary incentives monotonically increase motivation. Despite the practical and theoretical importance of this provocative phenomenon, however, little is known about its neural basis. Herein we induced the behavioral undermining effect using a newly developed task, and we tracked its neural correlates using functional MRI. Our results show that performance-based monetary reward indeed undermines intrinsic motivation, as assessed by the number of voluntary engagements in the task. We found that activity in the anterior striatum and the prefrontal areas decreased along with this behavioral undermining effect. These findings suggest that the corticobasal ganglia valuation system underlies the undermining effect through the integration of extrinsic reward value and intrinsic task value.
Effects of social incentives on task performance in the elderly.
Levendusky, P G
1978-07-01
The performance of 60 elderly volunteers (mean age = 74.5 years) on two cancellation tasks was examined under one of three experimental conditions: social praise, social reproof, or no comment. When compared with the no-comment group, subjects in the reproof condition showed response increments over baseline performance (p less than .05). Praise, when compared with no comment, failed to reach statistical significance. Results are interpreted in terms of the possible negative reinforcement, challenge, or informational properties of reproof. The clear implications from these data are that social incentives may well facilitate behavioral change in the aged and that there is a need for further examination of the effects of this variable.
Winkelman, J W; Aitken, J L; Wybenga, D R
1991-01-01
A pay-for-performance incentive program for clinical laboratory supervisors was developed and implemented at Brigham and Women's Hospital (Boston, Mass). It provides monetary rewards to personnel who directly produce cost savings in their area of responsibility. This reward system is new to the hospital laboratory but is commonly used in industry. Substantial true cost savings over and above previously established stringent budgets were achieved, 11% of which was returned to first-line supervisors in the form of a bonus. The program expanded the scope of professionalism for supervisors to include fiscal management.
Finite element modal analysis of a vehicle-borne lidar cabin
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Chen, Yafeng; Liu, Qiuwu; Wang, Jie; Hu, Shunxing; Huang, Jian
2018-02-01
Using SolidWorks software, the finite element modal analysis of a vehicle-borne pollution monitoring lidar cabin is carried out. The lidar cabin for the integrated lidar can ensure that the lidar system has good maneuverability and can effectively monitor the emission of air pollution. Since lidar is an integrated system of optics, mechanism, electricity and calculation, the performance of the cabin is directly related to the safety of the equipment and the lidar to work properly. Firstly, the cubic structure is modeled to simulate the cubic structure. Then, the model of the cabin model is analyzed by using the simulation plug-in, and the first 10 modes and natural frequencies are analyzed and recorded. The calculation results show that the cabin is dominated by bending vibration, and the amplitude area is concentrated in the opening of some windows and doors on each board. Therefore, we should increase the number of reinforcement bars or the strength of the skeleton in the vicinity of the door and window. At the same time, to avoid the resonance and ensure the precision of the optical elements and the electrical components and avoid structural damage of the cabin, the incentive frequency should be keep away from the natural frequency of the cabin. The vehicle-borne lidar system has been put into operation, and the analysis results have direct meaning to the transport of the cabin and the normal work.
Pavitt, Sue H; Baxter, Paul D; Brunton, Paul A; Douglas, Gail; Edlin, Richard; Gibson, Barry J; Godson, Jenny; Hall, Melanie; Porritt, Jenny; Robinson, Peter G; Vinall, Karen; Hulme, Claire
2014-01-01
Introduction In England, in 2006, new dental contracts devolved commissioning of dental services locally to Primary Care Trusts to meet the needs of their local population. The new national General Dental Services contracts (nGDS) were based on payment for Units of Dental Activity (UDAs) awarded in three treatment bands based on complexity of care. Recently, contract currency in UK dentistry is evolving from UDAs based on volume and case complexity towards ‘blended contracts’ that include incentives linked with key performance indicators such as quality and improved health outcome. Overall, evidence of the effectiveness of incentive-driven contracting of health providers is still emerging. The INCENTIVE Study aims to evaluate a blended contract model (incentive-driven) compared to traditional nGDS contracts on dental service delivery in practices in West Yorkshire, England. Methods and analysis The INCENTIVE model uses a mixed methods approach to comprehensively evaluate a new incentive-driven model of NHS dental service delivery. The study includes 6 dental surgeries located across three newly commissioned dental practices (blended contract) and three existing traditional practices (nGDS contracts). The newly commissioned practices have been matched to traditional practices by deprivation index, age profile, ethnicity, size of practice and taking on new patients. The study consists of three interlinked work packages: a qualitative study to explore stakeholder perspectives of the new service delivery model; an effectiveness study to assess the INCENTIVE model in reducing the risk of and amount of dental disease and enhance oral health-related quality of life in patients; and an economic study to assess cost-effectiveness of the INCENTIVE model in relation to clinical status and oral health-related quality of life. Ethics and dissemination The study has been approved by NRES Committee London, Bromley. The results of this study will be disseminated at national and international conferences and in international journals. PMID:25231492
Incentive effect on inhibitory control in adolescents with early-life stress: an antisaccade study.
Mueller, Sven C; Hardin, Michael G; Korelitz, Katherine; Daniele, Teresa; Bemis, Jessica; Dozier, Mary; Peloso, Elizabeth; Maheu, Francoise S; Pine, Daniel S; Ernst, Monique
2012-03-01
Early-life stress (ES) such as adoption, change of caregiver, or experience of emotional neglect may influence the way in which affected individuals respond to emotional stimuli of positive or negative valence. These modified responses may stem from a direct alteration of how emotional stimuli are coded, and/or the cognitive function implicated in emotion modulation, such as self-regulation or inhibition. These ES effects have been probed on tasks either targeting reward and inhibitory function. Findings revealed deficits in both reward processing and inhibitory control in ES youths. However, no work has yet examined whether incentives can improve automatic response or inhibitory control in ES youths. To determine whether incentives would only improve self-regulated voluntary actions or generalize to automated motoric responses, participants were tested on a mixed eye movement task that included reflex-like prosaccades and voluntary controlled antisaccade eye movements. Seventeen adopted children (10 females, mean age 11.3 years) with a documented history of neglect and 29 typical healthy youths (16 females, mean age 11.9 years) performed the mixed prosaccade/antisaccade task during monetary incentive conditions or during no-incentive conditions. Across both saccade types, ES adolescents responded more slowly than controls. As expected, control participants committed fewer errors on antisaccades during the monetary incentive condition relative to the no-incentive condition. By contrast, ES youths failed to show this incentive-related improvement on inhibitory control. No significant incentive effects were found with prepotent prosaccades trials in either group. Finally, co-morbid psychopathology did not modulate the findings. These data suggest that youths with experience of early stress exhibit deficient modulation of inhibitory control by reward processes, in tandem with a reward-independent deficit in preparation for both automatic and controlled responses. These data may be relevant to interventions in ES youths. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
Yé, M; Aninanya, G A; Sié, A; Kakoko, D C V; Chatio, S; Kagoné, M; Prytherch, H; Loukanova, S; Williams, J E; Sauerborn, R
2014-01-01
Performance-based incentives (PBIs) are currently receiving attention as a strategy for improving the quality of care that health providers deliver. Experiences from several African countries have shown that PBIs can trigger improvements, particularly in the area of maternal and neonatal health. The involvement of health workers in deciding how their performance should be measured is recommended. Only limited information is available about how such schemes can be made sustainable. This study explored the types of PBIs that rural health workers suggested, their ideas regarding the management and sustainability of such schemes, and their views on which indicators best lend themselves to the monitoring of performance. In this article the authors reported the findings from a cross-country survey conducted in Burkina Faso, Ghana and Tanzania. The study was exploratory with qualitative methodology. In-depth interviews were conducted with 29 maternal and neonatal healthcare providers, four district health managers and two policy makers (total 35 respondents) from one district in each of the three countries. The respondents were purposively selected from six peripheral health facilities. Care was taken to include providers who had a management role. By also including respondents from district and policy level a comparison of perspectives from different levels of the health system was facilitated. The data that was collected was coded and analysed with support of NVivo v8 software. The most frequently suggested PBIs amongst the respondents in Burkina Faso were training with per-diems, bonuses and recognition of work done. The respondents in Tanzania favoured training with per-diems, as well as payment of overtime, and timely promotion. The respondents in Ghana also called for training, including paid study leave, payment of overtime and recognition schemes for health workers or facilities. Respondents in the three countries supported the mobilisation of local resources to make incentive schemes more sustainable. There was a general view that it was easier to integrate the cost of non-financial incentives in local budgets. There were concerns about the fairness of such schemes from the provider level in all three countries. District managers were worried about the workload that would be required to manage the schemes. The providers themselves were less clear about which indicators best lent themselves to the purpose of performance monitoring. District managers and policy makers most commonly suggested indicators that were in line with national maternal and neonatal healthcare indicators. The study showed that health workers have considerable interest in performance-based incentive schemes and are concerned about their sustainability. There is a need to further explore the use of non-financial incentives in PBI schemes, as such incentives were considered to stand a greater chance of being integrated into local budgets. Ensuring participation of healthcare providers in the design of such schemes is likely to achieve buy-in and endorsement from the health workers involved. However, input from managers and policy makers is essential to keep expectations realistic and to ensure the indicators selected fit the purpose and are part of routine reporting systems.
Alternative Payment Models in Radiology: The Legislative and Regulatory Roadmap for Reform.
Silva, Ezequiel; McGinty, Geraldine B; Hughes, Danny R; Duszak, Richard
2016-10-01
The Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act (MACRA) replaces the sustainable growth rate with a payment system based on the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System and incentives for alternative payment model participation. It is important that radiologists understand the statutory requirements of MACRA. This includes the nature of the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System composite performance score and its impact on payments. The timeline for MACRA implementation is fairly aggressive and includes a robust effort to define episode groups, which include radiologic services. A number of organizations, including the ACR, are commenting on the structure of MACRA-directed initiatives. Copyright © 2016 American College of Radiology. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
P4P4P: An Agenda for Research on Pay for Performance for Patients
Volpp, Kevin G.; Pauly, Mark V.; Loewenstein, George; Bangsberg, David
2012-01-01
Unhealthy behaviors are a major cause of poor health outcomes and high health care costs. In this Commentary, we describe an agenda for research to guide broader use of patient-targeted financial incentives either in conjunction with provider-targeted financial incentives (P4P) or in clinical contexts where provider-targeted approaches are unlikely to be effective. We discuss evidence of proven effectiveness and limitations of the existing evidence, reasons for underutilization of these approaches, and options for operationalizing wider use. Patient-targeted incentives have great potential, and systematic testing will help determine how they can best be used to improve population health. PMID:19124872
Motivational incentives modulate age differences in visual perception.
Spaniol, Julia; Voss, Andreas; Bowen, Holly J; Grady, Cheryl L
2011-12-01
This study examined whether motivational incentives modulate age-related perceptual deficits. Younger and older adults performed a perceptual discrimination task in which bicolored stimuli had to be classified according to their dominating color. The valent color was associated with either a positive or negative payoff, whereas the neutral color was not associated with a payoff. Effects of incentives on perceptual efficiency and response bias were estimated using the diffusion model (Ratcliff, 1978). Perception of neutral stimuli showed age-related decline, whereas perception of valent stimuli, both positive and negative, showed no age difference. This finding is interpreted in terms of preserved top-down control over the allocation of perceptual processing resources in healthy aging.
2013-01-01
Background Recently both the UK and US governments have advocated the use of financial incentives to encourage healthier lifestyle choices but evidence for the cost-effectiveness of such interventions is lacking. Our aim was to perform a cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) of a quasi-experimental trial, exploring the use of financial incentives to increase employee physical activity levels, from a healthcare and employer’s perspective. Methods Employees used a 'loyalty card’ to objectively monitor their physical activity at work over 12 weeks. The Incentive Group (n=199) collected points and received rewards for minutes of physical activity completed. The No Incentive Group (n=207) self-monitored their physical activity only. Quality of life (QOL) and absenteeism were assessed at baseline and 6 months follow-up. QOL scores were also converted into productivity estimates using a validated algorithm. The additional costs of the Incentive Group were divided by the additional quality adjusted life years (QALYs) or productivity gained to calculate incremental cost effectiveness ratios (ICERs). Cost-effectiveness acceptability curves (CEACs) and population expected value of perfect information (EVPI) was used to characterize and value the uncertainty in our estimates. Results The Incentive Group performed more physical activity over 12 weeks and by 6 months had achieved greater gains in QOL and productivity, although these mean differences were not statistically significant. The ICERs were £2,900/QALY and £2,700 per percentage increase in overall employee productivity. Whilst the confidence intervals surrounding these ICERs were wide, CEACs showed a high chance of the intervention being cost-effective at low willingness-to-pay (WTP) thresholds. Conclusions The Physical Activity Loyalty card (PAL) scheme is potentially cost-effective from both a healthcare and employer’s perspective but further research is warranted to reduce uncertainty in our results. It is based on a sustainable “business model” which should become more cost-effective as it is delivered to more participants and can be adapted to suit other health behaviors and settings. This comes at a time when both UK and US governments are encouraging business involvement in tackling public health challenges. PMID:24112295
Dallat, Mary Anne T; Hunter, Ruth F; Tully, Mark A; Cairns, Karen J; Kee, Frank
2013-10-10
Recently both the UK and US governments have advocated the use of financial incentives to encourage healthier lifestyle choices but evidence for the cost-effectiveness of such interventions is lacking. Our aim was to perform a cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) of a quasi-experimental trial, exploring the use of financial incentives to increase employee physical activity levels, from a healthcare and employer's perspective. Employees used a 'loyalty card' to objectively monitor their physical activity at work over 12 weeks. The Incentive Group (n=199) collected points and received rewards for minutes of physical activity completed. The No Incentive Group (n=207) self-monitored their physical activity only. Quality of life (QOL) and absenteeism were assessed at baseline and 6 months follow-up. QOL scores were also converted into productivity estimates using a validated algorithm. The additional costs of the Incentive Group were divided by the additional quality adjusted life years (QALYs) or productivity gained to calculate incremental cost effectiveness ratios (ICERs). Cost-effectiveness acceptability curves (CEACs) and population expected value of perfect information (EVPI) was used to characterize and value the uncertainty in our estimates. The Incentive Group performed more physical activity over 12 weeks and by 6 months had achieved greater gains in QOL and productivity, although these mean differences were not statistically significant. The ICERs were £2,900/QALY and £2,700 per percentage increase in overall employee productivity. Whilst the confidence intervals surrounding these ICERs were wide, CEACs showed a high chance of the intervention being cost-effective at low willingness-to-pay (WTP) thresholds. The Physical Activity Loyalty card (PAL) scheme is potentially cost-effective from both a healthcare and employer's perspective but further research is warranted to reduce uncertainty in our results. It is based on a sustainable "business model" which should become more cost-effective as it is delivered to more participants and can be adapted to suit other health behaviors and settings. This comes at a time when both UK and US governments are encouraging business involvement in tackling public health challenges.
Microscopic predictions of fission yields based on the time dependent GCM formalism
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Regnier, D.; Dubray, N.; Schunck, N.; Verrière, M.
2016-03-01
Accurate knowledge of fission fragment yields is an essential ingredient of numerous applications ranging from the formation of elements in the r-process to fuel cycle optimization in nuclear energy. The need for a predictive theory applicable where no data is available, together with the variety of potential applications, is an incentive to develop a fully microscopic approach to fission dynamics. One of the most promising theoretical frameworks is the time-dependent generator coordinate method (TDGCM) applied under the Gaussian overlap approximation (GOA). Previous studies reported promising results by numerically solving the TDGCM+GOA equation with a finite difference technique. However, the computational cost of this method makes it difficult to properly control numerical errors. In addition, it prevents one from performing calculations with more than two collective variables. To overcome these limitations, we developed the new code FELIX-1.0 that solves the TDGCM+GOA equation based on the Galerkin finite element method. In this article, we briefly illustrate the capabilities of the solver FELIX-1.0, in particular its validation for n+239Pu low energy induced fission. This work is the result of a collaboration between CEA,DAM,DIF and LLNL on nuclear fission theory.
The rewarding value of good motor performance in the context of monetary incentives.
Lutz, Kai; Pedroni, Andreas; Nadig, Karin; Luechinger, Roger; Jäncke, Lutz
2012-07-01
Whether an agent receives positive task feedback or a monetary reward, neural activity in their striatum increases. In the latter case striatal activity reflects extrinsic reward processing, while in the former, striatal activity reflects the intrinsically rewarding effects of performing well. There can be a "hidden cost of reward", which is a detrimental effect of extrinsic on intrinsic reward value. This raises the question how these two types of reward interact. To address this, we applied a monetary incentive delay task: in all trials participants received feedback depending on their performance. In half of the trials they could additionally receive monetary reward if they performed well. This resulted in high performance trials, which were monetarily rewarded and high performance trials that were not. This made it possible to dissociate the neural correlates of performance feedback from the neural correlates of monetary reward that comes with high performance. Performance feedback alone elicits activation increases in the ventral striatum. This activation increases due to additional monetary reward. Neural response in the dorsal striatum on the other hand is only significantly increased by feedback when a monetary incentive is present. The quality of performance does not significantly influence dorsal striatum activity. In conclusion, our results indicate that the dorsal striatum is primarily sensitive to optional or actually received external rewards, whereas the ventral striatum may be coding intrinsic reward due to positive performance feedback. Thus the ventral striatum is suggested to be involved in the processing of intrinsically motivated behavior. Copyright © 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (5th). Executive Summary.
1984-01-01
COMBINATION Any proposed legislation to modify the current retire- ment system by reducing retired pay must stress the absolute requirement that a form of...Hazardous Duty Incentive Pays: — Parachute Duty — Flight Deck Duty -- Demolition Duty — Toxic Fuels and — Experimental Stress Duty Propellants — Non...3) Experimental Stress Duty Pay - an incentive for performance of hazardous duty while participating in acceleration/ deceleration testing, thermal
Pitchers, Kyle K; Flagel, Shelly B; O'Donnell, Elizabeth G; Woods, Leah C Solberg; Sarter, Martin; Robinson, Terry E
2015-02-01
There is considerable individual variation in the propensity of animals to attribute incentive salience to discrete reward cues, but to date most of this research has been conducted in male rats. The purpose of this study was to determine whether sex influences the propensity to attribute incentive salience to a food cue, using rats from two different outbred strains (Sprague-Dawley [SD] and Heterogeneous Stock [HS]). The motivational value of a food cue was assessed in two ways: (i) by the ability of the cue to elicit approach toward it and (ii) by its ability to act as a conditioned reinforcer. We found that female SD rats acquired Pavlovian conditioned approach behavior slightly faster than males, but no sex difference was detected in HS rats, and neither strain showed a sex difference in asymptotic performance of approach behavior. Moreover, female approach behavior did not differ across estrous cycle. Compared to males, females made more active responses during the test for conditioned reinforcement, although they made more inactive responses as well. We conclude that although there are small sex differences in performance on these tasks, these are probably not due to a notable sex difference in the propensity to attribute incentive salience to a food cue. Copyright © 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Henley, Amy J; DiGennaro Reed, Florence D; Reed, Derek D; Kaplan, Brent A
2016-09-01
Incentives are a popular method to achieve desired employee performance; however, research on optimal incentive magnitude is lacking. Behavioral economic demand curves model persistence of responding in the face of increasing cost and may be suitable to examine the reinforcing value of incentives on work performance. The present use-inspired basic study integrated an experiential human operant task within a crowdsourcing platform to evaluate the applicability of behavioral economics for quantifying changes in workforce attrition. Participants included 88 Amazon Mechanical Turk Workers who earned either a $0.05 or $0.10 incentive for completing a progressively increasing response requirement. Analyses revealed statistically significant differences in breakpoint between the two groups. Additionally, a novel translation of the Kaplan-Meier survival-curve analyses for use within a demand curve framework allowed for examination of elasticity of workforce attrition. Results indicate greater inelastic attrition in the $0.05 group. We discuss the benefits of a behavioral economic approach to modeling employee behavior, how the metrics obtained from the elasticity of workforce attrition analyses (e.g., P max ) may be used to set goals for employee behavior while balancing organizational costs, and how economy type may have influenced observed outcomes. © 2016 Society for the Experimental Analysis of Behavior.
48 CFR 37.602 - Performance work statement.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... on the use of measurable performance standards and financial incentives in a competitive environment... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Performance work statement... CATEGORIES OF CONTRACTING SERVICE CONTRACTING Performance-Based Acquisition 37.602 Performance work statement...
The Total Quality Management Implementation Plan of the DLA Office of Comptroller
1989-06-01
throughout the private and public sectors . Since embracing the concept in March 1988, the Office of the Secretary of Defense has directed all Defense...those in the Military Departments and private sector . The establishment of the DLA Finance Center in Columbus, Ohio, will promote standardization of...process and customer. o Worksite amenities and Quality of Worklife elements. o Adoption of incentive programs under which employees share the
The Navy’s Superior Supplier Incentive Program: Analysis of Supplier Proposed Benefits
2015-12-01
rather than “short-term, easy, expendable and replaceable sources of goods and services” (Carter & Choi, 2008, p. 2). Japanese automakers Toyota ...was the key element behind Toyota and Honda’s strategic successes. Under the supplier keiretsu, the automakers worked closely with the selected...suppliers to achieve mutually beneficial objectives. Toyota and Honda implemented the keiretsu model in their North American plants and achieved
Beyond Widgets -- Systems Incentive Programs for Utilities
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Regnier, Cindy; Mathew, Paul; Robinson, Alastair
Utility incentive programs remain one of the most significant means of deploying commercialized, but underutilized building technologies to scale. However, these programs have been largely limited to component-based products (e.g., lamps, RTUs). While some utilities do provide ‘custom’ incentive programs with whole building and system level technical assistance, these programs require deeper levels of analysis, resulting in higher program costs. This results in custom programs being restricted to utilities with greater resources, and are typically applied mainly to large or energy-intensive facilities, leaving much of the market without cost effective access and incentives for these solutions. In addition, with increasinglymore » stringent energy codes, cost effective component-based solutions that achieve significant savings are dwindling. Building systems (e.g., integrated façade, HVAC and/or lighting solutions) can deliver higher savings that translate into large sector-wide savings if deployed at the scale of these programs. However, systems application poses a number of challenges – baseline energy use must be defined and measured; the metrics for energy and performance must be defined and tested against; in addition, system savings must be validated under well understood conditions. This paper presents a sample of findings of a project to develop validated utility incentive program packages for three specific integrated building systems, in collaboration with Xcel Energy (CO, MN), ComEd, and a consortium of California Public Owned Utilities (CA POUs) (Northern California Power Agency(NCPA) and the Southern California Public Power Authority(SCPPA)). Furthermore, these program packages consist of system specifications, system performance, M&V protocols, streamlined assessment methods, market assessment and implementation guidance.« less
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Ross, Linda
2003-01-01
Recent work with automotive e-commerce clients led to the development of a performance analysis methodology called the Seven Performance Drivers, including: standards, incentives, capacity, knowledge and skill, measurement, feedback, and analysis. This methodology has been highly effective in introducing and implementing performance improvement.…
The role of nursing leadership in creating a mentoring culture in acute care environments.
Bally, Jill M G
2007-01-01
High rates of retirement among older nurses and horizontal violence among younger nurses heighten the importance of mentoring in the context of overall organizational stability and performance. Viewing the essentials of mentoring in the context of organizational culture and leadership as a long-term commitment and solution rather than a short-term task will lead to improved staff retention, satisfaction, and, ultimately, patient outcomes. Using Bass's four leadership initiatives, a culture for mentoring can be achieved through inspirational motivation, individualized consideration, idealized influence, and intellectual stimulation. Alignment of organizational and mentoring goals is essential to a successful approach given that the qualities associated with leadership and mentorship are closely aligned. Mentoring cultures also depend upon elements of a stable infrastructure such as managerial and executive support, scheduling flexibility, incentives, and recognition. Transformational leadership practices are key to achieving the sustainable effects of mentoring programs that are rooted deeply in organizational culture.
Using a new incentive mechanism to improve wastewater sector performance: the case study of Italy.
De Gisi, Sabino; Petta, Luigi; Farina, Roberto; De Feo, Giovanni
2014-01-01
The system of "Service Objectives", introduced by the Italian National Strategic Framework 2007-2013, is an innovative results-oriented programme concerning 4 thematic areas (education, care for the elderly and children, management of municipal solid wastes and integrated water service) in which the Ministry of Economic Development and eight Southern Italy districts are involved. The system was initially associated to an incentive mechanism which provided subsidies for a total amount of EUR 3 billion from the national Underdeveloped Areas Fund, according to the achievement of specific targets set for 11 service indicators in 2013. The indicators used for the integrated water service refer to the efficiency in water supply service as well as the coverage of wastewater treatment service. The aim of the study is to describe the activities carried out in Italy by the ENEA Agency in order to define a new performance indicator for wastewater treatment service taking into account the appropriateness and efficiency of existing plants equipment and, consequently, evaluating economic incentives. The proposed procedure takes into account both wastewater treatment demand and quality of wastewater treatment service offered to citizens. Input data, provided by the National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT), were elaborated in order to define appropriate parameters, with a multi-criteria analysis being used to define the new performance indicator. The applicability of the proposed procedure was verified considering all the 8 Southern Italy and Island districts (Abruzzo, Molise, Campania, Apulia, Basilicata, Calabria, Sicily and Sardinia) involved in the programme. The obtained results show that the quality of municipal wastewater may influence the calculation of the incentive amount. The performance indicators defined in this work might be conveniently extended to other contexts similar to the assessed geographical area (Southern Italy and Islands). Copyright © 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Couto, Thomaz Bittencourt; Kerrey, Benjamin T; Taylor, Regina G; FitzGerald, Michael; Geis, Gary L
2015-04-01
Pediatric emergencies require effective teamwork. These skills are developed and demonstrated in actual emergencies and in simulated environments, including simulation centers (in center) and the real care environment (in situ). Our aims were to compare teamwork performance across these settings and to identify perceived educational strengths and weaknesses between simulated settings. We hypothesized that teamwork performance in actual emergencies and in situ simulations would be higher than for in-center simulations. A retrospective, video-based assessment of teamwork was performed in an academic, pediatric level 1 trauma center, using the Team Emergency Assessment Measure (TEAM) tool (range, 0-44) among emergency department providers (physicians, nurses, respiratory therapists, paramedics, patient care assistants, and pharmacists). A survey-based, cross-sectional assessment was conducted to determine provider perceptions regarding simulation training. One hundred thirty-two videos, 44 from each setting, were reviewed. Mean total TEAM scores were similar and high in all settings (31.2 actual, 31.1 in situ, and 32.3 in-center, P = 0.39). Of 236 providers, 154 (65%) responded to the survey. For teamwork training, in situ simulation was considered more realistic (59% vs. 10%) and more effective (45% vs. 15%) than in-center simulation. In a video-based study in an academic pediatric institution, ratings of teamwork were relatively high among actual resuscitations and 2 simulation settings, substantiating the influence of simulation-based training on instilling a culture of communication and teamwork. On the basis of survey results, providers favored the in situ setting for teamwork training and suggested an expansion of our existing in situ program.
Pedroza, Claudia; Chapman, Sandra B.; Cook, Lori G.; Vásquez, Ana C.; Levin, Harvey S.
2011-01-01
Information regarding the remediation of event-based prospective memory (EB-PM) impairments following pediatric traumatic brain injury (TBI) is scarce. Addressing this, two levels of monetary incentives were used to improve EB-PM in children ages 7 to 16 years with orthopedic injuries (OI, n = 51), or moderate (n = 25), and severe (n = 39) TBI at approximately three months postinjury. The EB-PM task consisted of the child giving a specific verbal response to a verbal cue from the examiner while performing a battery of neuropsychological measures (ongoing task). Significant effects were found for Age-at-Test, Motivation Condition, Period, and Group. Within-group analyses indicated OI and moderate TBI groups performed significantly better under the high-versus low-incentive condition, but the severe TBI group demonstrated no significant improvement. These results indicate EB-PM can be significantly improved at three months postinjury in children with moderate, but not severe, TBI. PMID:21347945
Tejedor-Sojo, Javier; Creek, Tracy; Leong, Traci
2015-01-01
The study team sought to improve hospitalist communication with primary care providers (PCPs) at discharge through interventions consisting of (a) audit and feedback and (b) inclusion of a discharge communication measure in the incentive compensation for pediatric hospitalists. The setting was a 16-physician pediatric hospitalist group within a tertiary pediatric hospital. Discharge summaries were selected randomly for documentation of communication with PCPs. At baseline, 57% of charts had documented communication with PCPs, increasing to 84% during the audit and feedback period. Following the addition of a financial incentive, documentation of communication with PCPs increased to 93% and was sustained during the combined intervention period. The number of physicians meeting the study's performance goal increased from 1 to 14 by the end of the study period. A financial incentive coupled with an audit and feedback tool was effective at modifying physician behavior, achieving focused, measurable quality improvement gains. © 2014 by the American College of Medical Quality.
Hocking, Jane S; Temple-Smith, Meredith; van Driel, Mieke; Law, Matthew; Guy, Rebecca; Bulfone, Liliana; Wood, Anna; Low, Nicola; Donovan, Basil; Fairley, Christopher K; Kaldor, John; Gunn, Jane
2016-09-13
Financial incentives and audit plus feedback on performance are two strategies commonly used by governments to motivate general practitioners (GP) to undertake specific healthcare activities. However, in recent years, governments have reduced or removed incentive payments without evidence of the potential impact on GP behaviour and patient outcomes. This trial (known as ACCEPt-able) aims to determine whether preventive care activities in general practice are sustained when financial incentives and/or external audit plus feedback on preventive care activities are removed. The activity investigated is annual chlamydia testing for 16- to 29-year-old adults, a key preventive health strategy within this age group. ACCEPt-able builds on a large cluster randomised controlled trial (RCT) that evaluated a 3-year chlamydia testing intervention in general practice. GPs were provided with a support package to facilitate annual chlamydia testing of all sexually active 16- to 29-year-old patients. This package included financial incentive payments to the GP for each chlamydia test conducted and external audit plus feedback on each GP's chlamydia testing rates. ACCEPt-able is a factorial cluster RCT in which general practices are randomised to one of four groups: (i) removal of audit plus feedback-continue to receive financial incentive payments for each chlamydia test; (ii) removal of financial incentive payments-continue to receive audit plus feedback; (iii) removal of financial incentive payments and audit plus feedback; and (iv) continue financial incentive payments and audit plus feedback. The primary outcome is chlamydia testing rate measured as the proportion of sexually active 16- to 29-year-olds who have a GP consultation within a 12-month period and at least one chlamydia test. This will be the first RCT to examine the impact of removal of financial incentive payments and audit plus feedback on the chlamydia testing behaviour of GPs. This trial is particularly timely and will increase our understanding about the impact of financial incentives and audit plus feedback on GP behaviour when governments are looking for opportunities to control healthcare budgets and maximise clinical outcomes for money spent. The results of this trial will have implications for supporting preventive health measures beyond the content area of chlamydia. The trial has been registered on the Australian and New Zealand Clinical Trials Registry ( ACTRN12614000595617 ).
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Seaborg, Glenn T.
1980-12-01
The role of our heritage of chemical elements, natural and man-made, in determining our accomplishments throughout our history will be described. From the Stone Age, to the beginning of the recent era of understanding of their nature and until the present, mastery of the utilization of the elements has determined the destiny of nations. Whereas even a century ago all but a handful of the elements were mere chemical curiosities, almost all of this great heritage is beginning to be put to use. Today, with our advanced state of knowledge and the incentive of continuing our creative evolution of remaking and fully utilizing our environment, we have sufficient perspective to appreciate just how rich and important is our legacy of the chemical elements. And when the broad, rich, complex spectrum of properties of the pure elements falls short of our needs, we find that we can obtain an enormous variety of properties by combining or mixing them or synthesizing new elements using the Periodic Table as a guiding principle. Our future progress and well being will depend in large part on learning more about the chemical elements and their combinations. These new frontiers continue to be frontiers of the mind.
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Seaborg, Glenn T.
1980-03-01
The role of our heritage of chemical elements, natural and man-made, in determining our accomplishments throughout our history will be described. From the Stone Age, to the beginning of the recent era of understanding of their nature and until the present, mastery of the utilization of the elements has determined the destiny of nations." Whereas even a century ago all but a handful of the elements were mere chemical curiosities, almost all of this great heritage is beginning to be put to use. Today, with our advanced state of knowledge and the incentive of continuing our creative evolution of remaking and fully utilizing our environment, we have sufficient perspective to appreciate just how rich and important is our legacy of the chemical elements. And when the broad, rich, complex spectrum of properties of the pure elements falls short of our needs, we find that we can obtain an enormous variety of properties by combining or mixing them or synthesizing new elements using the Periodic Table as a guiding principle. Our future progress and well being will depend in large part on learning more about the chemical elements and their combinations. These new frontiers continue to be frontiers of the mind.
Agostini, Paula; Naidu, Babu; Cieslik, Hayley; Steyn, Richard; Rajesh, Pala Babu; Bishay, Ehab; Kalkat, Maninder Singh; Singh, Sally
2013-06-01
Following thoracotomy, patients frequently receive routine respiratory physiotherapy which may include incentive spirometry, a breathing technique characterised by deep breathing performed through a device offering visual feedback. This type of physiotherapy is recommended and considered important in the care of thoracic surgery patients, but high quality evidence for specific interventions such as incentive spirometry remains lacking. 180 patients undergoing thoracotomy and lung resection participated in a prospective single-blind randomised controlled trial. All patients received postoperative breathing exercises, airway clearance and early mobilisation; the control group performed thoracic expansion exercises and the intervention group performed incentive spirometry. No difference was observed between the intervention and control groups in the mean drop in forced expiratory volume in 1 s on postoperative day 4 (40% vs 41%, 95% CI -5.3% to 4.2%, p=0.817), the frequency of postoperative pulmonary complications (PPC) (12.5% vs 15%, 95% CI -7.9% to 12.9%, p=0.803) or in any other secondary outcome measure. A high-risk subgroup (defined by ≥2 independent risk factors; age ≥75 years, American Society of Anaesthesiologists score ≥3, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), smoking status, body mass index ≥30) also demonstrated no difference in outcomes, although a larger difference in the frequency of PPC was observed (14% vs 23%) with 95% CIs indicating possible benefit of intervention (-7.4% to 2.6%). Incentive spirometry did not improve overall recovery of lung function, frequency of PPC or length of stay. For patients at higher risk for the development of PPC, in particular those with COPD or current/recent ex-smokers, there were larger observed actual differences in the frequency of PPC in favour of the intervention, indicating that investigations regarding the physiotherapy management of these patients need to be developed further.
Effect of motivation on academic fluency performance in survivors of pediatric medulloblastoma.
Holland, Alice Ann; Hughes, Carroll W; Harder, Lana; Silver, Cheryl; Bowers, Daniel C; Stavinoha, Peter L
2016-01-01
It has been proposed previously that extrinsic motivation may enable survivors of childhood medulloblastoma to significantly improve aspects of neurocognitive performance. In healthy populations, enhanced motivation has been shown to promote academic fluency, a domain likely more relevant to the educational outcomes of pediatric medulloblastoma survivors than academic skill development. The present study investigates the effect of enhanced extrinsic motivation on fluent (i.e., accurate and efficient) academic performance in pediatric medulloblastoma survivors. Participants were 36 children, ages 7-18, who had completed treatment for medulloblastoma. Participants completed a neuropsychological battery that included administration of equivalent tasks on Forms A and B of the Woodcock-Johnson III Tests of Achievement. Half were randomly assigned to an incentive condition prior to the administration of Form B. Provision of a performance-based incentive resulted in statistically significant improvement, but not normalization of function, in performance on measures of academic fluency. No demographic, treatment-related, academic, neuropsychological, or self-perception variables predicted response to incentive. Findings suggest that academic performance of survivors may significantly improve under highly motivating conditions. In addition to implications for educational services, this finding raises the novel possibility that decreased motivation represents an inherent neuropsychological deficit in this population and provides a rationale for further investigation of factors affecting individual differences in motivational processes. Further, by examining effort in a context where effort is not inherently suspect, present findings also significantly contribute to the debate regarding the effects of effort and motivation on neuropsychological performance.
Cost of cancer care for patients undergoing chemotherapy: The Elements of Cancer Care study.
Ward, Robyn L; Laaksonen, Maarit A; van Gool, Kees; Pearson, Sallie-Anne; Daniels, Ben; Bastick, Patricia; Norman, Richard; Hou, Changhao; Haywood, Philip; Haas, Marion
2015-06-01
To determine the monthly treatment costs for each element of cancer care in patients receiving chemotherapy and to apportion the burden of cost by financing agent (Commonwealth, State government, private health insurer, patient). A cohort of 478 patients (54% breast, 33% colorectal and 13% non-small-cell lung cancer) were recruited from 12 centers representing metropolitan and regional settings in public and private sectors. Primary data were linked to secondary data held in New South Wales state (Admitted Patients and Emergency Department Data) and Commonwealth (Medicare and Pharmaceutical Benefits) databases. The monthly treatment costs of each element of care and the funding agent were calculated from secondary health data. Across all tumor types, the mean monthly treatment cost was $4162 (10%-90% quantiles $1018-$8098; range $2853 [adjuvant colorectal] to $5622 [metastatic lung]), with 54% of this cost borne by Commonwealth government, 26% by private health insurers, 14% by State government and 6% by patients. The mean monthly costs of treating metastatic disease were $1415 greater than those for adjuvant therapy. The mean monthly costs were contributed to by inpatient care ($1657, 40%), chemotherapy prescriptions ($1502, 36%), outpatient care ($452, 11%) and administration of chemotherapy ($364, 9%). All four funders have a shared incentive to reduce absolute monthly treatment costs since their proportional contribution is relatively constant for most tumor types and stages. There are opportunities to reduce cancer care costs by minimizing the risk of inpatient hospital admissions that arise from chemotherapy administration and by recognizing incentives for cost-shifting. © 2015 Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd.
Paying health workers for performance in Battagram district, Pakistan
2011-01-01
Background There is a growing interest in using pay-for-performance mechanisms in low and middle-income countries in order to improve the performance of health care providers. However, at present there is a dearth of independent evaluations of such approaches which can guide understanding of their potential and risks in differing contexts. This article presents the results of an evaluation of a project managed by an international non-governmental organisation in one district of Pakistan. It aims to contribute to learning about the design and implementation of pay-for-performance systems and their impact on health worker motivation. Methods Quantitative analysis was conducted of health management information system (HMIS) data, financial records, and project documents covering the period 2007-2010. Key informant interviews were carried out with stakeholders at all levels. At facility level, in-depth interviews were held, as were focus group discussions with staff and community members. Results The wider project in Battagram had contributed to rebuilding district health services at a cost of less than US$4.5 per capita and achieved growth in outputs. Staff, managers and clients were appreciative of the gains in availability and quality of services. However, the role that the performance-based incentive (PBI) component played was less clear--PBI formed a relatively small component of pay, and did not increase in line with outputs. There was little evidence from interviews and data that the conditional element of the PBIs influenced behaviour. They were appreciated as a top-up to pay, but remained low in relative terms, and only slightly and indirectly related to individual performance. Moreover, they were implemented independently of the wider health system and presented a clear challenge for longer term integration and sustainability. Conclusions Challenges for performance-based pay approaches include the balance of rewarding individual versus team efforts; reflecting process and outcome indicators; judging the right level of incentives; allowing for very different starting points and situations; designing a system which is simple enough for participants to comprehend; and the tension between independent monitoring and integration in a national system. Further documentation of process and cost-effectiveness, and careful examination of the wider impacts of paying for performance, are still needed. PMID:21982330
Bertone, Maria Paola; Witter, Sophie
2015-09-01
The need for evidence-based practice calls for research focussing not only on the effectiveness of interventions and their translation into policies, but also on implementation processes and the factors influencing them, in particular for complex health system policies. In this paper, we use the lens of one of the health system's 'building blocks', human resources for health (HRH), to examine the implementation of official policies on HRH incentives and the emergence of informal practices in three districts of Sierra Leone. Our mixed-methods research draws mostly from 18 key informant interviews at district level. Data are organised using a political economy framework which focuses on the dynamic interactions between structure (context, historical legacies, institutions) and agency (actors, agendas, power relations) to show how these elements affect the HRH incentive practices in each district. It appears that the official policies are re-shaped both by implementation challenges and by informal practices emerging at local level as the result of the district-level dynamics and negotiations between District Health Management Teams (DHMTs) and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs). Emerging informal practices take the form of selective supervision, salary supplementations and per diems paid to health workers, and aim to ensure a better fit between the actors' agendas and the incentive package. Importantly, the negotiations which shape such practices are characterised by a substantial asymmetry of power between DHMTs and NGOs. In conclusion, our findings reveal the influence of NGOs on the HRH incentive package and highlight the need to empower DHMTs to limit the discrepancy between policies defined at central level and practices in the districts, and to reduce inequalities in health worker remuneration across districts. For Sierra Leone, these findings are now more relevant than ever as new players enter the stage at district level, as part of the Ebola response and post-Ebola reconstruction. Copyright © 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.. All rights reserved.
Hasan, Abid; Jha, Kumar Neeraj
2013-01-01
Safety incentive and penalty (I/P) provisions in construction contracts are one of the most common forms of I/P. Contradictory opinions on the effectiveness of these provisions have been expressed in the literature. Statistics on safety provisions were collected from 32 construction projects, which include both types of contracts - those with safety I/P provisions and those without them. Although inclusion of safety I/P provisions in contracts helps in improving the overall safety performance in construction projects, further scope for improvement still exists. Literature review and structured personal interviews, coupled with a survey based on preliminary questionnaire, revealed that successful formulation and implementation of such provisions are dependent on 25 attributes which need the attention of both clients and contractors. A questionnaire-based survey was conducted to evaluate these attributes. The six factors extracted by carrying out factor analysis are: incentive distribution method, proper labour training, special attention to risky situations, role of safety committee and sub-contractors, specialised works and safety equipments, and right form of I/P. If taken care of, these attributes have the potential to improve the safety performance in construction projects. The results would be useful to clients and contractors in implementing the safety I/P provisions and thereby improving safety performance.
Learning to make Decisions: When Incentives help and Hinder
1989-06-01
environments but lenient environments are forgiving. It is assumed that incentives increase effort and attti-ion but do not have a direct effect on perfor...because of ceiling and floor effect in the former, there is little room for improvement; in the latter, little possibilit for decrements in performance. In...in exacting. These predictions are tested and validated in two experiments. A further experiment tests the effects of having subjects concentrate on
Nigenda, Gustavo H; González, Luz María
2009-01-01
Introduction Contracting out health services is a strategy that many health systems in the developing world are following, despite the lack of decisive evidence that this is the best way to improve quality, increase efficiency and expand coverage. A large body of literature has appeared in recent years focusing on the results of several contracting strategies, but very few papers have addressed aspects of the managerial process and how this can affect results. Case description This paper describes and analyses the perceptions and opinions of managers and workers about the benefits and challenges of the contracting model that has been in place for almost 10 years in the State of Jalisco, Mexico. Both qualitative and quantitative information was collected. An open-ended questionnaire was used to obtain information from a group of managers, while information provided by a self-selected group of workers was collected via a closed-ended questionnaire. The analysis contrasted the information obtained from each source. Discussion and Evaluation Findings show that perceptions of managers and workers vary for most of the items studied. For managers the model has been a success, as it has allowed for expansion of coverage based on a cost-effective strategy, while for workers the model also possesses positive elements but fails to provide fair labour relationships, which negatively affects their performance. Conclusion Perspectives of the two main groups of actors in Jalisco's contracting model are important in the design and adjustment of an adequate contracting model that includes managerial elements to give incentives to worker performance, a key element necessary to achieve the model's ultimate objectives. Lessons learnt from this study could be relevant for the experience of contracting models in other developing countries. PMID:19849831
The Role of Incentive Spirometry in Primary Spontaneous Pneumothorax.
Pribadi, Rabbinu R; Singh, Gurmeet; Rumende, Cleopas M
2016-01-01
Pneumothorax is the presence of air in the pleural space. Its management consists of noninvasive and invasive therapies and it is determined based on clinical manifestations, type and size of pneumothorax. We present a case of a patient with diagnosis of primary spontaneous pneumothorax treated with incentive spirometry (noninvasive therapy). A 20 year old man came to respirology clinic with chief complaint of shortness of breath. He was recently diagnosed with left pneumothorax based on previous chest X-ray in another health care facilities and was advised to undergo tube thoracostomy but he refused the procedure. On physical examination, vital signs were normal. Chest X-ray showed 33% of pneumothorax or 1.2 cm. He was asked to perform incentive spirometry therapy at home. During 12 days of therapy, shortness of breath slowly disappeared and on repeated chest X-ray, it showed minimal pneumothorax in the left upper hemithorax. Noninvasive treatment such as incentive spirometry can be considered in patient with minimal symptoms and no signs of life-threatening respiratory distress.
Developmental Effects of Incentives on Response Inhibition
Geier, Charles F.; Luna, Beatriz
2012-01-01
Inhibitory control and incentive processes underlie decision-making, yet few studies have explicitly examined their interaction across development. Here, the effects of potential rewards and losses on inhibitory control in sixty-four adolescents (13-17-year-olds) and forty-two young adults (18-29-year-olds) were examined using an incentivized antisaccade task. Notably, measures were implemented to minimize age-related differences in reward valuation and potentially confounding motivation effects. Incentives affected antisaccade metrics differently across the age groups. Younger adolescents generated more errors than adults on reward trials, but all groups performed well on loss trials. Adolescent saccade latencies also differed from adults across the range of reward trials. Overall, results suggest persistent immaturities in the integration of reward and inhibitory control processes across adolescence. PMID:22540668
Morton, Alec; Bevan, Gwyn
2008-02-01
The current paper reviews and contrasts a management science view of waiting for healthcare, which centres on queues as devices for buffering demand, with an economic view, which stresses the role of the incentive structure, in the context of English Accident and Emergency Departments. We demonstrate that the management science view provides insight into waiting time performance within a single facility but is limited in its ability to shed light on variations in performance across facilities. We argue, with reference to supporting data, that such variations may be explainable by a proper understanding of the incentive structure in A&E Departments.
48 CFR 970.1504-1-10 - Special considerations: Fee limitations.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-10-01
... performance incentives are of unusual difficulty or where the successful completion of the performance... be accompanied by a written justification with detailed supporting rationale as to how the specific...
48 CFR 970.1504-1-10 - Special considerations: Fee limitations.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-10-01
... performance incentives are of unusual difficulty or where the successful completion of the performance... be accompanied by a written justification with detailed supporting rationale as to how the specific...
48 CFR 970.1504-1-10 - Special considerations: Fee limitations.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-10-01
... performance incentives are of unusual difficulty or where the successful completion of the performance... be accompanied by a written justification with detailed supporting rationale as to how the specific...
48 CFR 970.1504-1-10 - Special considerations: Fee limitations.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-10-01
... performance incentives are of unusual difficulty or where the successful completion of the performance... be accompanied by a written justification with detailed supporting rationale as to how the specific...
48 CFR 970.1504-1-10 - Special considerations: Fee limitations.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... performance incentives are of unusual difficulty or where the successful completion of the performance... be accompanied by a written justification with detailed supporting rationale as to how the specific...
Regnier, D.; Dubray, N.; Schunck, N.; ...
2016-05-13
Here, accurate knowledge of fission fragment yields is an essential ingredient of numerous applications ranging from the formation of elements in the r process to fuel cycle optimization for nuclear energy. The need for a predictive theory applicable where no data are available, together with the variety of potential applications, is an incentive to develop a fully microscopic approach to fission dynamics.
Hong Kong and Beijing: Trip Report
1992-05-01
Kongs. He has grafted basic elements of capitalism (material incentives, individual enterprise and market economy) on to the four cardinal principles of...34let us try share ownership and stock markets -- if they fail, we shall discard them." His opponents charge that he is selling out to capitalism, but...stores, high-rises, bars and an Arnie Palmer golf course. This Special Economic Zone makes Mickey Mouse toys, Adidas sweat pants, Yashica cameras and a
13 CFR 308.3 - Planning performance awards.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-01-01
... 13 Business Credit and Assistance 1 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Planning performance awards. 308.3 Section 308.3 Business Credit and Assistance ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES § 308.3 Planning performance awards. (a) A Recipient of Investment Assistance awarded...
Distributed communication and psychosocial performance in simulated space dwelling groups
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Hienz, R. D.; Brady, J. V.; Hursh, S. R.; Ragusa, L. C.; Rouse, C. O.; Gasior, E. D.
2005-05-01
The present report describes the development and application of a distributed interactive multi-person simulation in a computer-generated planetary environment as an experimental test bed for modeling the human performance effects of variations in the types of communication modes available, and in the types of stress and incentive conditions underlying the completion of mission goals. The results demonstrated a high degree of interchangeability between communication modes (audio, text) when one mode was not available. Additionally, the addition of time pressure stress to complete tasks resulted in a reduction in performance effectiveness, and these performance reductions were ameliorated via the introduction of positive incentives contingent upon improved performances. The results obtained confirmed that cooperative and productive psychosocial interactions can be maintained between individually isolated and dispersed members of simulated spaceflight crews communicating and problem-solving effectively over extended time intervals without the benefit of one another's physical presence.
Park, Seejeen; Berry, Frances S
2013-09-01
Municipal solid waste (MSW) recycling performance, both nationally and in Florida, USA, has shown little improvement during the past decade. This research examines variations in the MSW recycling program performance in Florida counties in an attempt to identify effective recycling programs. After reviewing trends in the MSW management literature, we conducted an empirical analysis using cross-sectional multiple regression analysis. The findings suggest that the convenience-based hypothesis was supported by showing that curbside recycling had a positive effect on MSW recycling performance. Financial (cost-saving) incentive-based hypotheses were partially supported meaning that individual level incentives can influence recycling performance. Citizen environmental concern was found to positively affect the amount of county recycling, while education and political affiliation yielded no significant results. In conclusion, this article discusses the implications of the findings for both academic research and practice of MSW recycling programs.
Cholinergic control over attention in rats prone to attribute incentive salience to reward cues
Paolone, Giovanna; Angelakos, Christopher C.; Meyer, Paul J.; Robinson, Terry E.; Sarter, Martin
2013-01-01
Some rats (sign-trackers, ST) are especially prone to attribute incentive salience to reward cues, relative to others (goal-trackers, GT). Thus, reward cues are more likely to promote maladaptive reward-seeking behavior in ST than GT. Here, we asked whether ST and GT differ on another trait that can contribute to poor restraint over behavior evoked by reward cues. We report that, relative to GT, ST have poor control over attentional performance, due in part to insufficient cholinergic stimulation of cortical circuitry. We found that, relative to GT, ST showed poor performance on a sustained attention task (SAT). Furthermore, their performance fluctuated rapidly between periods of good to near-chance performance. This finding was reproduced using a separate cohort of rats. As demonstrated earlier, performance on the SAT was associated with increases in extracellular levels of cortical acetylcholine (ACh); however, SAT performance-associated increases in ACh levels were significantly attenuated in ST relative to GT. Consistent with the view that the modulatory effects of ACh involves stimulation of α4β2* nicotinic acetylcholine receptors (nAChRs), systemic administration of the partial nAChR agonist ABT-089 improved SAT performance in ST and abolished the difference between SAT-associated ACh levels in ST and GT. Neither the nonselective nAChR agonist nicotine nor the psychostimulant amphetamine improved SAT performance. These findings suggest that individuals who have a propensity to attribute high incentive salience to reward cues also exhibit relatively poor attentional control. A combination of these traits may render individuals especially vulnerable to disorders such as obesity and addiction. PMID:23658172
Girls in the boat: Sex differences in rowing performance and participation.
Keenan, Kevin G; Senefeld, Jonathon W; Hunter, Sandra K
2018-01-01
Men outperform women in many athletic endeavors due to physiological and anatomical differences (e.g. larger and faster muscle); however, the observed sex differences in elite athletic performance are typically larger than expected, and may reflect sex-related differences in opportunity or incentives. As collegiate rowing in the United States has been largely incentivized for women over the last 20 years, but not men, the purpose of this study was to examine sex differences in elite rowing performance over that timeframe. Finishing times from grand finale races for collegiate championship on-water performances (n = 480) and junior indoor performances (n = 1,280) were compared between men and women across 20 years (1997-2016), weight classes (heavy vs. lightweight) and finishing place. Participation of the numbers of men and women rowers were also quantified across years. Men were faster than women across all finishing places, weight classes and years of competition and performance declined across finishing place for both men and women (P<0.001). Interestingly, the reduction in performance time across finishing place was greater (P<0.001) for collegiate men compared to women in the heavyweight division. This result is opposite to other sports (e.g. running and swimming), and to lightweight rowing in this study, which provides women fewer incentives than in heavyweight rowing. Correspondingly, participation in collegiate rowing has increased by ~113 women per year (P<0.001), with no change (P = 0.899) for collegiate men. These results indicate that increased participation and incentives within collegiate rowing for women vs. men contribute to sex differences in athletic performance.
Girls in the boat: Sex differences in rowing performance and participation
Senefeld, Jonathon W.; Hunter, Sandra K.
2018-01-01
Men outperform women in many athletic endeavors due to physiological and anatomical differences (e.g. larger and faster muscle); however, the observed sex differences in elite athletic performance are typically larger than expected, and may reflect sex-related differences in opportunity or incentives. As collegiate rowing in the United States has been largely incentivized for women over the last 20 years, but not men, the purpose of this study was to examine sex differences in elite rowing performance over that timeframe. Finishing times from grand finale races for collegiate championship on-water performances (n = 480) and junior indoor performances (n = 1,280) were compared between men and women across 20 years (1997–2016), weight classes (heavy vs. lightweight) and finishing place. Participation of the numbers of men and women rowers were also quantified across years. Men were faster than women across all finishing places, weight classes and years of competition and performance declined across finishing place for both men and women (P<0.001). Interestingly, the reduction in performance time across finishing place was greater (P<0.001) for collegiate men compared to women in the heavyweight division. This result is opposite to other sports (e.g. running and swimming), and to lightweight rowing in this study, which provides women fewer incentives than in heavyweight rowing. Correspondingly, participation in collegiate rowing has increased by ~113 women per year (P<0.001), with no change (P = 0.899) for collegiate men. These results indicate that increased participation and incentives within collegiate rowing for women vs. men contribute to sex differences in athletic performance. PMID:29352279
13 CFR 308.2 - Performance awards.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-01-01
... 13 Business Credit and Assistance 1 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Performance awards. 308.2 Section... PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES § 308.2 Performance awards. (a) A Recipient of Investment Assistance under parts 305 or 307 of this chapter may receive a performance award in connection with an Investment made on or after...
13 CFR 308.2 - Performance awards.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-01-01
... 13 Business Credit and Assistance 1 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Performance awards. 308.2 Section... PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES § 308.2 Performance awards. (a) A Recipient of Investment Assistance under parts 305 or 307 of this chapter may receive a performance award in connection with an Investment made on or after...
13 CFR 308.2 - Performance awards.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-01-01
... 13 Business Credit and Assistance 1 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Performance awards. 308.2 Section... PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES § 308.2 Performance awards. (a) A Recipient of Investment Assistance under parts 305 or 307 of this chapter may receive a performance award in connection with an Investment made on or after...
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
LaFee, Scott
1999-01-01
Top school administrators and school boards across the country are increasingly employing a private-sector incentive: bonus pay for improved (school) performance. Connecticut, Texas, and North Carolina have merit-pay clauses in superintendents' contracts. This article discusses pay-for-performance criteria, increased job expectations, and ethical…
Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014
2012-11-13
..., including position management, performance management, employee recognition, staffing, recruitment, employee... management activities, including recruitment, selection, position management, performance management, designated performance and incentive awards and employee assistance programs and other services to ACF...
48 CFR 970.1100-1 - Performance-based contracting.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-10-01
... methods of accomplishing the work; use measurable (i.e., terms of quality, timeliness, quantity) performance standards and objectives and quality assurance surveillance plans; provide performance incentives... work and other documents used to establish work requirements. (d) Quality assurance surveillance plans...
48 CFR 970.1100-1 - Performance-based contracting.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-10-01
... methods of accomplishing the work; use measurable (i.e., terms of quality, timeliness, quantity) performance standards and objectives and quality assurance surveillance plans; provide performance incentives... work and other documents used to establish work requirements. (d) Quality assurance surveillance plans...
48 CFR 970.1100-1 - Performance-based contracting.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-10-01
... methods of accomplishing the work; use measurable (i.e., terms of quality, timeliness, quantity) performance standards and objectives and quality assurance surveillance plans; provide performance incentives... work and other documents used to establish work requirements. (d) Quality assurance surveillance plans...
Zhang, Jingwen; Brackbill, Devon; Yang, Sijia; Becker, Joshua; Herbert, Natalie; Centola, Damon
2016-12-01
To identify what features of online social networks can increase physical activity, we conducted a 4-arm randomized controlled trial in 2014 in Philadelphia, PA. Students (n = 790, mean age = 25.2) at an university were randomly assigned to one of four conditions composed of either supportive or competitive relationships and either with individual or team incentives for attending exercise classes. The social comparison condition placed participants into 6-person competitive networks with individual incentives. The social support condition placed participants into 6-person teams with team incentives. The combined condition with both supportive and competitive relationships placed participants into 6-person teams, where participants could compare their team's performance to 5 other teams' performances. The control condition only allowed participants to attend classes with individual incentives. Rewards were based on the total number of classes attended by an individual, or the average number of classes attended by the members of a team. The outcome was the number of classes that participants attended. Data were analyzed using multilevel models in 2014. The mean attendance numbers per week were 35.7, 38.5, 20.3, and 16.8 in the social comparison, the combined, the control, and the social support conditions. Attendance numbers were 90% higher in the social comparison and the combined conditions (mean = 1.9, SE = 0.2) in contrast to the two conditions without comparison (mean = 1.0, SE = 0.2) (p = 0.003). Social comparison was more effective for increasing physical activity than social support and its effects did not depend on individual or team incentives.
Khim, Keovathanak
2016-01-01
Financial incentives are widely used in performance-based financing (PBF) schemes, but their contribution to health workers' incomes and job motivation is poorly understood. Cambodia undertook health sector reform from the middle of 2009 and PBF was employed as a part of the reform process. This study examines job motivation for primary health workers (PHWs) under PBF reform in Cambodia and assesses the relationship between job motivation and income. A cross-sectional self-administered survey was conducted on 266 PHWs, from 54 health centers in the 15 districts involved in the reform. The health workers were asked to report all sources of income from public sector jobs and provide answers to 20 items related to job motivation. Factor analysis was conducted to identify the latent variables of job motivation. Factors associated with motivation were identified through multivariable regression. PHWs reported multiple sources of income and an average total income of US$190 per month. Financial incentives under the PBF scheme account for 42% of the average total income. PHWs had an index motivation score of 4.9 (on a scale from one to six), suggesting they had generally high job motivation that was related to a sense of community service, respect, and job benefits. Regression analysis indicated that income and the perception of a fair distribution of incentives were both statistically significant in association with higher job motivation scores. Financial incentives used in the reform formed a significant part of health workers' income and influenced their job motivation. Improving job motivation requires fixing payment mechanisms and increasing the size of incentives. PBF is more likely to succeed when income, training needs, and the desire for a sense of community service are addressed and institutionalized within the health system.
Impact of performance-based financing on primary health care services in Haiti.
Zeng, Wu; Cros, Marion; Wright, Katherine D; Shepard, Donald S
2013-09-01
To strengthen Haiti's primary health care (PHC) system, the country first piloted performance-based financing (PBF) in 1999 and subsequently expanded the approach to most internationally funded non-government organizations. PBF complements support (training and technical assistance). This study evaluates (a) the separate impact of PBF and international support on PHC's service delivery; (b) the combined impact of PBF and technical assistance on PHC's service delivery; and (c) the costs of PBF implementation in Haiti. To minimize the risk of facilities neglecting potential non-incentivized services, the incentivized indicators were randomly chosen at the end of each year. We obtained quantities of key services from four departments for 217 health centres (15 with PBF and 202 without) from 2008 through 2010, computed quarterly growth rates and analysed the results using a difference-in-differences approach by comparing the growth of incentivized and non-incentivized services between PBF and non-PBF facilities. To interpret the statistical analyses, we also interviewed staff in four facilities. Whereas international support added 39% to base costs of PHC, incentive payments added only 6%. Support alone increased the quantities of PHC services over 3 years by 35% (2.7%/quarter). However, support plus incentives increased these amounts by 87% over 3 years (5.7%/quarter) compared with facilities with neither input. Incentives alone was associated with a net 39% increase over this period, and more than doubled the growth of services (P < 0.05). Interview findings found no adverse impacts and, in fact, indicated beneficial impacts on quality. Incentives proved to be a relatively inexpensive, well accepted and very effective complement to support, suggesting that a small amount of money, strategically used, can substantially improve PHC. Haiti's experience, after more than a decade of use, indicates that incentives are an effective tool to strengthen PHC.
Moran, Katherine; Priebe, Stefan
2016-08-01
In a randomised controlled trial, patients were offered financial incentives to improve their adherence to anti-psychotic maintenance medication. Compared to a control group without the incentives, they had an improved adherence and also better subjective quality of life (SQOL) after 1 year. This paper explores the question as to whether this improvement in SQOL was associated with the amount of money received or with the improved adherence itself. A secondary analysis was performed using data of the experimental group in the trial. Adherence was assessed as the percentage of all prescribed long-acting anti-psychotic injections that were taken by the patient. In regression models, we tested whether changes in medication adherence and/or the amount of incentives received over the 12-month period was associated with SQOL, as rated on the DIALOG scale. Adherence changed from 68.49 % at baseline to 88.23 % (mean difference in adherence = 19.59 %, SD = 17.52 %). The total amount of incentives received within the 1-year study period varied between £75 and £735, depending on the treatment cycle and the number of long-acting injections taken. Improvement in adherence was found to be a significant predictor of better subjective quality of life (β = 0.014, 95 % CI 0.003-0.025, p = 0.014), whilst the amount of incentives received was not (β = 0.0002, 95 % CI -0.002 to 0.002, p = 0.818). Improved medication adherence is associated with a more favourable SQOL. This underlines the clinical relevance of improved adherence in response to financial incentives in this patient group.
Toward isolating the role of dopamine in the acquisition of incentive salience attribution.
Chow, Jonathan J; Nickell, Justin R; Darna, Mahesh; Beckmann, Joshua S
2016-10-01
Stimulus-reward learning has been heavily linked to the reward-prediction error learning hypothesis and dopaminergic function. However, some evidence suggests dopaminergic function may not strictly underlie reward-prediction error learning, but may be specific to incentive salience attribution. Utilizing a Pavlovian conditioned approach procedure consisting of two stimuli that were equally reward-predictive (both undergoing reward-prediction error learning) but functionally distinct in regard to incentive salience (levers that elicited sign-tracking and tones that elicited goal-tracking), we tested the differential role of D1 and D2 dopamine receptors and nucleus accumbens dopamine in the acquisition of sign- and goal-tracking behavior and their associated conditioned reinforcing value within individuals. Overall, the results revealed that both D1 and D2 inhibition disrupted performance of sign- and goal-tracking. However, D1 inhibition specifically prevented the acquisition of sign-tracking to a lever, instead promoting goal-tracking and decreasing its conditioned reinforcing value, while neither D1 nor D2 signaling was required for goal-tracking in response to a tone. Likewise, nucleus accumbens dopaminergic lesions disrupted acquisition of sign-tracking to a lever, while leaving goal-tracking in response to a tone unaffected. Collectively, these results are the first evidence of an intraindividual dissociation of dopaminergic function in incentive salience attribution from reward-prediction error learning, indicating that incentive salience, reward-prediction error, and their associated dopaminergic signaling exist within individuals and are stimulus-specific. Thus, individual differences in incentive salience attribution may be reflective of a differential balance in dopaminergic function that may bias toward the attribution of incentive salience, relative to reward-prediction error learning only. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Milanowski, Anthony
2011-01-01
Although many researchers and policy analysts (e.g., Harris, Glazerman et al., 2011; 2010) consider value-added to be the state of the art in school and teacher productivity measurement, only a minority of Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) Round 1 and 2 grantees used value-added as a measure of school or teacher performance. Fourteen of the 34 grantees…
Pavitt, Sue H; Baxter, Paul D; Brunton, Paul A; Douglas, Gail; Edlin, Richard; Gibson, Barry J; Godson, Jenny; Hall, Melanie; Porritt, Jenny; Robinson, Peter G; Vinall, Karen; Hulme, Claire
2014-09-17
In England, in 2006, new dental contracts devolved commissioning of dental services locally to Primary Care Trusts to meet the needs of their local population. The new national General Dental Services contracts (nGDS) were based on payment for Units of Dental Activity (UDAs) awarded in three treatment bands based on complexity of care. Recently, contract currency in UK dentistry is evolving from UDAs based on volume and case complexity towards 'blended contracts' that include incentives linked with key performance indicators such as quality and improved health outcome. Overall, evidence of the effectiveness of incentive-driven contracting of health providers is still emerging. The INCENTIVE Study aims to evaluate a blended contract model (incentive-driven) compared to traditional nGDS contracts on dental service delivery in practices in West Yorkshire, England. The INCENTIVE model uses a mixed methods approach to comprehensively evaluate a new incentive-driven model of NHS dental service delivery. The study includes 6 dental surgeries located across three newly commissioned dental practices (blended contract) and three existing traditional practices (nGDS contracts). The newly commissioned practices have been matched to traditional practices by deprivation index, age profile, ethnicity, size of practice and taking on new patients. The study consists of three interlinked work packages: a qualitative study to explore stakeholder perspectives of the new service delivery model; an effectiveness study to assess the INCENTIVE model in reducing the risk of and amount of dental disease and enhance oral health-related quality of life in patients; and an economic study to assess cost-effectiveness of the INCENTIVE model in relation to clinical status and oral health-related quality of life. The study has been approved by NRES Committee London, Bromley. The results of this study will be disseminated at national and international conferences and in international journals. Published by the BMJ Publishing Group Limited. For permission to use (where not already granted under a licence) please go to http://group.bmj.com/group/rights-licensing/permissions.
Peciña, Susana; Schulkin, Jay; Berridge, Kent C
2006-04-13
Corticotropin-releasing factor (CRF) is typically considered to mediate aversive aspects of stress, fear and anxiety. However, CRF release in the brain is also elicited by natural rewards and incentive cues, raising the possibility that some CRF systems in the brain mediate an independent function of positive incentive motivation, such as amplifying incentive salience. Here we asked whether activation of a limbic CRF subsystem magnifies the increase in positive motivation for reward elicited by incentive cues previously associated with that reward, in a way that might exacerbate cue-triggered binge pursuit of food or other incentives? We assessed the impact of CRF microinjections into the medial shell of nucleus accumbens using a pure incentive version of Pavlovian-Instrumental transfer, a measure specifically sensitive to the incentive salience of reward cues (which it separates from influences of aversive stress, stress reduction, frustration and other traditional explanations for stress-increased behavior). Rats were first trained to press one of two levers to obtain sucrose pellets, and then separately conditioned to associate a Pavlovian cue with free sucrose pellets. On test days, rats received microinjections of vehicle, CRF (250 or 500 ng/0.2 microl) or amphetamine (20 microg/0.2 microl). Lever pressing was assessed in the presence or absence of the Pavlovian cues during a half-hour test. Microinjections of the highest dose of CRF (500 ng) or amphetamine (20 microg) selectively enhanced the ability of Pavlovian reward cues to trigger phasic peaks of increased instrumental performance for a sucrose reward, each peak lasting a minute or so before decaying after the cue. Lever pressing was not enhanced by CRF microinjections in the baseline absence of the Pavlovian cue or during the presentation without a cue, showing that the CRF enhancement could not be explained as a result of generalized motor arousal, frustration or stress, or by persistent attempts to ameliorate aversive states. We conclude that CRF in nucleus accumbens shell amplifies positive motivation for cued rewards, in particular by magnifying incentive salience that is attributed to Pavlovian cues previously associated with those rewards. CRF-induced magnification of incentive salience provides a novel explanation as to why stress may produce cue-triggered bursts of binge eating, drug addiction relapse, or other excessive pursuits of rewards.
Peciña, Susana; Schulkin, Jay; Berridge, Kent C
2006-01-01
Background Corticotropin-releasing factor (CRF) is typically considered to mediate aversive aspects of stress, fear and anxiety. However, CRF release in the brain is also elicited by natural rewards and incentive cues, raising the possibility that some CRF systems in the brain mediate an independent function of positive incentive motivation, such as amplifying incentive salience. Here we asked whether activation of a limbic CRF subsystem magnifies the increase in positive motivation for reward elicited by incentive cues previously associated with that reward, in a way that might exacerbate cue-triggered binge pursuit of food or other incentives? We assessed the impact of CRF microinjections into the medial shell of nucleus accumbens using a pure incentive version of Pavlovian-Instrumental transfer, a measure specifically sensitive to the incentive salience of reward cues (which it separates from influences of aversive stress, stress reduction, frustration and other traditional explanations for stress-increased behavior). Rats were first trained to press one of two levers to obtain sucrose pellets, and then separately conditioned to associate a Pavlovian cue with free sucrose pellets. On test days, rats received microinjections of vehicle, CRF (250 or 500 ng/0.2 μl) or amphetamine (20 μg/0.2 μl). Lever pressing was assessed in the presence or absence of the Pavlovian cues during a half-hour test. Results Microinjections of the highest dose of CRF (500 ng) or amphetamine (20 μg) selectively enhanced the ability of Pavlovian reward cues to trigger phasic peaks of increased instrumental performance for a sucrose reward, each peak lasting a minute or so before decaying after the cue. Lever pressing was not enhanced by CRF microinjections in the baseline absence of the Pavlovian cue or during the presentation without a cue, showing that the CRF enhancement could not be explained as a result of generalized motor arousal, frustration or stress, or by persistent attempts to ameliorate aversive states. Conclusion We conclude that CRF in nucleus accumbens shell amplifies positive motivation for cued rewards, in particular by magnifying incentive salience that is attributed to Pavlovian cues previously associated with those rewards. CRF-induced magnification of incentive salience provides a novel explanation as to why stress may produce cue-triggered bursts of binge eating, drug addiction relapse, or other excessive pursuits of rewards. PMID:16613600
Till, Sara R; Everetts, David; Haas, David M
2015-12-15
Prenatal care is recommended during pregnancy as a method to improve neonatal and maternal outcomes. Improving the use of prenatal care is important, particularly for women at moderate to high risk of adverse outcomes. Incentives are sometimes utilized to encourage women to attend prenatal care visits. To determine whether incentives are an effective tool to increase utilization of timely prenatal care among women. We searched the Cochrane Pregnancy and Childbirth Group's Trials Register (31 January 2015) and the reference lists of all retrieved studies. Randomized controlled trials (RCTs), quasi-RCTs, and cluster-RCTs that utilized direct incentives to pregnant women explicitly linked to initiation and frequency of prenatal care were included. Incentives could include cash, vouchers, coupons or products not generally offered to women as a standard of prenatal care. Comparisons were to no incentives and to incentives not linked directly to utilization of care. We also planned to compare different types of interventions, i.e. monetary versus products or services. Two review authors independently assessed studies for inclusion and methodological quality. Two review authors independently extracted data. Data were checked for accuracy. We identified 11 studies (19 reports), six of which we excluded. Five studies, involving 11,935 pregnancies were included, but only 1893 pregnancies contributed data regarding our specified outcomes. Incentives in the studies included cash, gift card, baby carrier, baby blanket or taxicab voucher and were compared with no incentives. Meta-analysis was performed for only one outcome 'Return for postpartum care' and this outcome was not pre-specified in our protocol. Other analyses were restricted to data from single studies.Trials were at a moderate risk of bias overall. Randomization and allocation were adequate and risk of selection bias was low in three studies and unclear in two studies. None of the studies were blinded to the participants. Blinding of outcome assessors was adequate in one study, but was limited or not described in the remaining four studies. Risk of attrition was deemed to be low in all studies that contributed data to the review. Two of the studies reported or analyzed data in a manner that was not consistent with the predetermined protocol and thus were deemed to be at high risk. The other three studies were low risk for reporting bias. The largest two of the five studies comprising the majority of participants took place in rural, low-income, homogenously Hispanic communities in Central America. This setting introduces a number of confounding factors that may affect generalizability of these findings to ethnically and economically diverse urban communities in developed countries.The five included studies of incentive programs did not report any of this review's primary outcomes: preterm birth, small-for-gestational age, or perinatal death.In terms of this review's secondary outcomes, pregnant women receiving incentives were no more likely to initiate prenatal care (risk ratio (RR) 1.04, 95% confidence interval (CI) 0.78 to 1.38, one study, 104 pregnancies). Pregnant women receiving incentives were more likely to attend prenatal visits on a frequent basis (RR 1.18, 95% CI 1.01 to 1.38, one study, 606 pregnancies) and obtain adequate prenatal care defined by number of "procedures" such as testing blood sugar or blood pressure, vaccinations and counseling about breastfeeding and birth control (mean difference (MD) 5.84, 95% CI 1.88 to 9.80, one study, 892 pregnancies). In contrast, women who received incentives were more likely to deliver by cesarean section (RR 1.97, 95% CI 1.18 to 3.30, one study, 979 pregnancies) compared to those women who did not receive incentives.Women who received incentives were no more likely to return for postpartum care based on results of meta-analysis (average RR 0.75, 95% CI 0.21 to 2.64, two studies, 833 pregnancies, Tau² = 0.81, I² = 98%). However, there was substantial heterogeneity in this analysis so a subgroup analysis was performed and this identified a clear difference between subgroups based on the type of incentive being offered. In one study, women receiving non-cash incentives were more likely to return for postpartum care (RR 1.26, 95% CI 1.09 to 1.47, 240 pregnancies) than women who did not receive non-cash incentives. In another study, women receiving cash incentives were less likely to return for postpartum care (RR 0.43, 95% CI 0.30 to 0.62, 593 pregnancies) than women who did not receive cash incentives.No data were identified for the following secondary outcomes: frequency of prenatal care; pre-eclampsia; satisfaction with birth experience; maternal mortality; low birthweight (less than 2500 g); infant macrosomia (birthweight greater than 4000 g); or five-minute Apgar less than seven. The included studies did not report on this review's main outcomes: preterm birth, small-for-gestational age, or perinatal death. There is limited evidence that incentives may increase utilization and quality of prenatal care, but may also increase cesarean rate. Overall, there is insufficient evidence to fully evaluate the impact of incentives on prenatal care initiation. There are conflicting data as to the impact of incentives on return for postpartum care. Two of the five studies which accounted for the majority of women in this review were conducted in rural, low-income, overwhelmingly Hispanic communities in Central America, thus limiting the external validity of these results.There is a need for high-quality RCTs to determine whether incentive program increase prenatal care use and improve maternal and neonatal outcomes. Incentive programs, in particular cash-based programs, as suggested in this review and in several observational studies may improve the frequency and ensure adequate quality of prenatal care. No peer-reviewed data have been made publicly available for one of the largest incentive-based prenatal programs - the statewide Medicaid-based programs within the United States. These observational data represent an important starting point for future research with significant implications for policy development and allocation of healthcare resources. The disparate findings related to attending postpartum care should also be further explored as the findings were limited by the number of studies. Future large RCTs are needed to focus on the outcomes of preterm birth, small-for-gestational age and perinatal outcomes.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Brackney, Larry J.
North East utility National Grid (NGrid) is developing a portfolio-scale application of OpenStudio designed to optimize incentive and marketing expenditures for their energy efficiency (EE) programs. NGrid wishes to leverage a combination of geographic information systems (GIS), public records, customer data, and content from the Building Component Library (BCL) to form a JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) input file that is consumed by an OpenStudio-based expert system for automated model generation. A baseline model for each customer building will be automatically tuned using electricity and gas consumption data, and a set of energy conservation measures (ECMs) associated with each NGrid incentivemore » program will be applied to the model. The simulated energy performance and return on investment (ROI) will be compared with customer hurdle rates and available incentives to A) optimize the incentive required to overcome the customer hurdle rate and B) determine if marketing activity associated with the specific ECM is warranted for that particular customer. Repeated across their portfolio, this process will enable NGrid to substantially optimize their marketing and incentive expenditures, targeting those customers that will likely adopt and benefit from specific EE programs.« less
Three proposals to increase Australia's organ supply.
Isdale, William; Savulescu, Julian
2015-01-01
In 2008 the Australian Government introduced a national reform agenda to increase organ and tissue donation. Australia continues to perform poorly by international standards on measures of organ procurement, however. This paper outlines three proposals to improve donation rates and considers the empirical evidence available for each. A number of ethical objections frequently given to resist such proposals are also addressed. Firstly, it is recommended that Australia implement an 'opt-out' system of organ donation. Secondly, the existing veto rules should be changed to better protect the wishes of those who wish to donate. Finally, a numer of incentives should be offered to increase donation rates; these could include incentives of financial value, but also non-financial incentives such as prioritisation for the receipt of organs for previous donors.
45 CFR 305.33 - Determination of applicable percentages based on performance levels.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
..., DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES PROGRAM PERFORMANCE MEASURES, STANDARDS, FINANCIAL INCENTIVES, AND PENALTIES § 305.33 Determination of applicable percentages based on performance levels. (a) A State's... performance levels. 305.33 Section 305.33 Public Welfare Regulations Relating to Public Welfare OFFICE OF...
Study on process evaluation model of students' learning in practical course
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Huang, Jie; Liang, Pei; Shen, Wei-min; Ye, Youxiang
2017-08-01
In practical course teaching based on project object method, the traditional evaluation methods include class attendance, assignments and exams fails to give incentives to undergraduate students to learn innovatively and autonomously. In this paper, the element such as creative innovation, teamwork, document and reporting were put into process evaluation methods, and a process evaluation model was set up. Educational practice shows that the evaluation model makes process evaluation of students' learning more comprehensive, accurate, and fairly.
Results from the first 4 years of pay for performance.
DeVore, Susan D
2010-01-01
Some of the lessons hospitals that have participated in the Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration project have learned include: the need to tie in quality-of-care initiatives to the organization's strategic plan and to incentive plans for all employees, from executives on down; the value in allowing hospital physicians to "own" quality improvement initiatives; the importance of making results of the initiative available to all staff; the benefit of creating best-practice teams to address improvements in specific clinical areas.
Park, Jeongyoung; Werner, Rachel M
2011-07-01
The relationship between financial performance and quality of care in nursing homes is not well defined and prior work has been mixed. The recent focus on improving the quality of nursing homes through market-based incentives such as public reporting may have changed this relationship, as public reporting provides nursing homes with increased incentives to engage in quality-based competition. If quality improvement activities require substantial production costs, nursing home profitability may become a more important predictor of quality under public reporting. This study explores the relationship between financial performance and quality of care and test whether this relationship changes under public reporting. Using a 10-year (fiscal years 1997-2006) panel data set of 9444 skilled nursing facilities in the US, this study employs a facility fixed-effects with and without instrumental variables approach to test the effect of finances on quality improvement and correct for potential endogeneity. The results show that better financial performance, as reflected by the 1-year lagged total profit margin, is modestly associated with higher quality but only after public reporting is initiated. These findings have important policy implications as federal and state governments use market-based incentives to increase demand for high-quality care and induce providers to compete based on quality. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Incentive Control Strategies for Decision Problems with Parametric Uncertainties
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Cansever, Derya H.
The central theme of this thesis is the design of incentive control policies in large scale systems with hierarchical decision structures, under the stipulation that the objective functionals of the agents at the lower level of the hierarchy are uncertain to the top-level controller (the leader). These uncertainties are modeled as a finite -dimensional parameter vector whose exact value constitutes private information to the relevant agent at the lower level. The approach we have adopted is to design incentive policies for the leader such that the dependence of the decision of the agents on the uncertain parameter is minimized. We have identified several classes of problems for which this approach is feasible. In particular, we have constructed policies whose performance is arbitrarily close to the solution of a version of the same problem that does not involve uncertainties. We have also shown that for a certain class of problem wherein the leader observes a linear combination of the agents' decisions, the leader can achieve the performance he would obtain if he had observed each decision separately.
[Pay for performance (P4P). Long-term effects and perspectives].
Schrappe, M; Gültekin, N
2011-02-01
After 10 years of experience and research, a wide array of results on evaluation and long-term effects of pay for performance (P4P) programs have been published. These data do not only give insight into most of the problems of implementation, but also into aspects which, in part, may attenuate the high expectations at the beginning of the discussion. P4P programs exhibit a ceiling effect, some improvements are reversed after incentives are cancelled, and improvements show opportunity costs as absent improvements for indicators, which are not object to financial incentives (in some cases for the same disease). These observations can be explained by the hypothesis that P4P programs have characteristics of fee-for-service reimbursement, if symmetric information is available for insurance and provider. P4P programs are local instruments. While integration of healthcare is considered as an important issue, they should be combined with programs and incentives which foster further vertical and horizontal integration. For Germany, further research in the implementation and effects of P4P programs is necessary.
Marsden, Karen E; Ma, Wei Ji; Deci, Edward L; Ryan, Richard M; Chiu, Pearl H
2015-06-01
The duration and quality of human performance depend on both intrinsic motivation and external incentives. However, little is known about the neuroscientific basis of this interplay between internal and external motivators. Here, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging to examine the neural substrates of intrinsic motivation, operationalized as the free-choice time spent on a task when this was not required, and tested the neural and behavioral effects of external reward on intrinsic motivation. We found that increased duration of free-choice time was predicted by generally diminished neural responses in regions associated with cognitive and affective regulation. By comparison, the possibility of additional reward improved task accuracy, and specifically increased neural and behavioral responses following errors. Those individuals with the smallest neural responses associated with intrinsic motivation exhibited the greatest error-related neural enhancement under the external contingency of possible reward. Together, these data suggest that human performance is guided by a "tonic" and "phasic" relationship between the neural substrates of intrinsic motivation (tonic) and the impact of external incentives (phasic).
48 CFR 3452.224-70 - Release of information under the Freedom of Information Act.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-10-01
...: (1) Unit prices, including labor rates; (2) Statements of Work/Performance Work Statements generated by the contractor; (3) Performance requirements, including incentives, performance standards, quality levels, and service level agreements; (4) Reports, deliverables, and work products delivered in...
48 CFR 3452.224-70 - Release of information under the Freedom of Information Act.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-10-01
...: (1) Unit prices, including labor rates; (2) Statements of Work/Performance Work Statements generated by the contractor; (3) Performance requirements, including incentives, performance standards, quality levels, and service level agreements; (4) Reports, deliverables, and work products delivered in...
48 CFR 3452.224-70 - Release of information under the Freedom of Information Act.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-10-01
...: (1) Unit prices, including labor rates; (2) Statements of Work/Performance Work Statements generated by the contractor; (3) Performance requirements, including incentives, performance standards, quality levels, and service level agreements; (4) Reports, deliverables, and work products delivered in...
Financing & Incentives | Efficient Windows Collaborative
Foundry Foundry New Construction Windows Window Selection Tool Selection Process Design Guidance Installation Replacement Windows Window Selection Tool Assessing Options Selection Process Design Guidance Installation Understanding Windows Benefits Design Considerations Measuring Performance Performance Standards
Gallucci, Armen; Deutsch, Thomas; Youngquist, Jaymie
2013-01-01
The authors attempt to simplify the key elements to the process of negotiating successfully with private physicians. From their experience, the business elements that have resulted in the most discussion center on the compensation including the incentive plan. Secondarily, how the issue of malpractice is handled will also consume a fair amount of time. What the authors have also learned is that the intangible issues can often be the reason for an unexpectedly large amount of discussion and therefore add time to the negotiation process. To assist with this process, they have derived a negotiation checklist, which seeks to help hospital leaders and administrators set the proper framework to ensure successful negotiation conversations. More importantly, being organized and recognizing these broad issues upfront and remaining transparent throughout the process will help to ensure a successful negotiation.
Dovis, Sebastiaan; Van der Oord, Saskia; Wiers, Reinout W; Prins, Pier J M
2012-07-01
Visual-spatial Working Memory (WM) is the most impaired executive function in children with Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). Some suggest that deficits in executive functioning are caused by motivational deficits. However, there are no studies that investigate the effects of motivation on the visual-spatial WM of children with- and without ADHD. Studies examining this in executive functions other than WM, show inconsistent results. These inconsistencies may be related to differences in the reinforcement used. The effects of different reinforcers on WM performance were investigated in 30 children with ADHD and 31 non-ADHD controls. A visual-spatial WM task was administered in four reinforcement conditions: Feedback-only, 1 euro, 10 euros, and a computer-game version of the task. In the Feedback-only condition, children with ADHD performed worse on the WM measure than controls. Although incentives significantly improved the WM performance of children with ADHD, even the strongest incentives (10 euros and Gaming) were unable to normalize their performance. Feedback-only provided sufficient reinforcement for controls to reach optimal performance, while children with ADHD required extra reinforcement. Only children with ADHD showed a decrease in performance over time. Importantly, the strongest incentives (10 euros and Gaming) normalized persistence of performance in these children, whereas 1 euro had no such effect. Both executive and motivational deficits give rise to visual-spatial WM deficits in ADHD. Problems with task-persistence in ADHD result from motivational deficits. In ADHD-reinforcement studies and clinical practice (e.g., assessment), reinforcement intensity can be a confounding factor and should be taken into account. Gaming can be a cost-effective way to maximize performance in ADHD.
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Tkaczyk, A. H.; Bartl, A.; Amato, A.; Lapkovskis, V.; Petranikova, M.
2018-05-01
The criticality of raw materials has become an important issue in recent years. As the supply of certain raw materials is essential for technologically-advanced economies, the European Commission and other international counterparts have started several initiatives to secure reliable and unhindered access to raw materials. Such efforts include the EU Raw Materials Initiative, European Innovation Partnership on Raw Materials, US Critical Materials Institute, and others. In this paper, the authors present a multi-faceted and multi-national review of the essentials for the critical raw materials (CRMs) Co, Nb, W, and rare earth elements (REEs). The selected CRMs are of specific interest as they are considered relevant for emerging technologies and will thus continue to be of increasing major economic importance. This paper presents a ‘sustainability evaluation’ for each element, including essential data about markets, applications and recycling, and possibilities for substitution have been summarized and analysed. All the presented elements are vital for the advanced materials and processes upon which modern societies rely. These elements exhibit superior importance in ‘green’ applications and products subject to severe conditions. The annual production quantities are quite low compared to common industrial metals. Of the considered CRMs, only Co and REE gross production exceed 100 000 t. At the same time, the prices are quite high, with W and Nb being in the range of 60 USD kg‑1 and some rare earth compounds costing almost 4000 USD kg‑1. Despite valiant effort, in practice some of the considered elements are de facto irreplaceable for many specialized applications, at today’s technological level. Often, substitution causes a significant loss of quality and performance. Furthermore, possible candidates for substitution may be critical themselves or available in considerably low quantities. It can be concluded that one preferred approach for the investigated elements could be the use of secondary resources derived from recycling. W exhibits the highest recycling rate (37%), whereas Co (16%), Nb (11%) and rare earths (~0%) lag behind. In order to promote recycling of these essential elements, financial incentives as well as an improvement of recycling technologies would be required.
The Effect of Incentives and Meta-incentives on the Evolution of Cooperation.
Okada, Isamu; Yamamoto, Hitoshi; Toriumi, Fujio; Sasaki, Tatsuya
2015-05-01
Although positive incentives for cooperators and/or negative incentives for free-riders in social dilemmas play an important role in maintaining cooperation, there is still the outstanding issue of who should pay the cost of incentives. The second-order free-rider problem, in which players who do not provide the incentives dominate in a game, is a well-known academic challenge. In order to meet this challenge, we devise and analyze a meta-incentive game that integrates positive incentives (rewards) and negative incentives (punishments) with second-order incentives, which are incentives for other players' incentives. The critical assumption of our model is that players who tend to provide incentives to other players for their cooperative or non-cooperative behavior also tend to provide incentives to their incentive behaviors. In this paper, we solve the replicator dynamics for a simple version of the game and analytically categorize the game types into four groups. We find that the second-order free-rider problem is completely resolved without any third-order or higher (meta) incentive under the assumption. To do so, a second-order costly incentive, which is given individually (peer-to-peer) after playing donation games, is needed. The paper concludes that (1) second-order incentives for first-order reward are necessary for cooperative regimes, (2) a system without first-order rewards cannot maintain a cooperative regime, (3) a system with first-order rewards and no incentives for rewards is the worst because it never reaches cooperation, and (4) a system with rewards for incentives is more likely to be a cooperative regime than a system with punishments for incentives when the cost-effect ratio of incentives is sufficiently large. This solution is general and strong in the sense that the game does not need any centralized institution or proactive system for incentives.
The Effect of Incentives and Meta-incentives on the Evolution of Cooperation
Okada, Isamu; Yamamoto, Hitoshi; Toriumi, Fujio; Sasaki, Tatsuya
2015-01-01
Although positive incentives for cooperators and/or negative incentives for free-riders in social dilemmas play an important role in maintaining cooperation, there is still the outstanding issue of who should pay the cost of incentives. The second-order free-rider problem, in which players who do not provide the incentives dominate in a game, is a well-known academic challenge. In order to meet this challenge, we devise and analyze a meta-incentive game that integrates positive incentives (rewards) and negative incentives (punishments) with second-order incentives, which are incentives for other players’ incentives. The critical assumption of our model is that players who tend to provide incentives to other players for their cooperative or non-cooperative behavior also tend to provide incentives to their incentive behaviors. In this paper, we solve the replicator dynamics for a simple version of the game and analytically categorize the game types into four groups. We find that the second-order free-rider problem is completely resolved without any third-order or higher (meta) incentive under the assumption. To do so, a second-order costly incentive, which is given individually (peer-to-peer) after playing donation games, is needed. The paper concludes that (1) second-order incentives for first-order reward are necessary for cooperative regimes, (2) a system without first-order rewards cannot maintain a cooperative regime, (3) a system with first-order rewards and no incentives for rewards is the worst because it never reaches cooperation, and (4) a system with rewards for incentives is more likely to be a cooperative regime than a system with punishments for incentives when the cost-effect ratio of incentives is sufficiently large. This solution is general and strong in the sense that the game does not need any centralized institution or proactive system for incentives. PMID:25974684
Bolton, Carolyn; Lyabola, Lane-Lee; Phiri, Gabriel; Samona, Alick; Kaonga, Albert; Thirumurthy, Harsha
2016-01-01
Background: Medical male circumcision is a promising HIV prevention tool in countries with generalized HIV epidemics, but demand creation interventions are needed to support scale-up. We piloted a peer referral intervention in which circumcision clients were offered incentives for referring their peers for circumcision. Methods: The intervention was implemented between June 2014 and February 2015 in 6 randomly selected health facilities in Southern Province, Zambia. For the first 5 months, circumcision clients ≥18 years of age were given referral vouchers that allowed them to refer up to 5 peers for circumcision within a 3-month period. An incentive of US$2 was offered for each referral. The primary outcome was the number of circumcisions performed per month in each facility. To assess the effect of the intervention, a difference-in-difference analysis was performed using longitudinal data from the intervention facilities and 22 nonintervention facilities. A questionnaire was also implemented to understand men's perceptions of the intervention. Results: During the 8-month intervention period, 1222 men over 18 years of age were circumcised in intervention facilities. In the first 5 months, 699 circumcision clients were enrolled and 385 clients brought a referral voucher given to them by an enrolled client. Difference-in-difference analyses did not show a significant increase in circumcisions performed in intervention facilities. However, circumcision clients reported that the referral incentive motivated them to encourage their friends to seek male circumcision. Peer referrals were also reported to be an important factor in men's decisions because 78% of clients who were referred reported that talking with a circumcised friend was important for their decision to get circumcised. Conclusions: The peer referral incentive intervention for male circumcision was feasible and acceptable. However, the intervention did not have a significant effect on demand for male circumcision. Barriers to circumcision and features of the intervention may have limited the effect of the intervention. Further efforts regarding encouraging male-to-male communication and evaluations with larger sample sizes are needed. PMID:27404006
Oxman, Andrew D; Fretheim, Atle
2009-05-01
Results-based financing and pay-for-performance refer to the transfer of money or material goods conditional on taking a measurable action or achieving a predetermined performance target. Results-based financing is widely advocated for achieving health goals, including the Millennium Development Goals. We undertook an overview of systematic reviews of the effectiveness of RBF. We searched the Cochrane Library, EMBASE, and MEDLINE (up to August 2007). We also searched for related articles in PubMed, checked the reference lists of retrieved articles, and contacted key informants. We included reviews with a methods section that addressed the effects of any results-based financing in the health sector targeted at patients, providers, organizations, or governments. We summarized the characteristics and findings of each review using a structured format. We found 12 systematic reviews that met our inclusion criteria. Based on the findings of these reviews, financial incentives targeting recipients of health care and individual healthcare professionals are effective in the short run for simple and distinct, well-defined behavioral goals. There is less evidence that financial incentives can sustain long-term changes. Conditional cash transfers to poor and disadvantaged groups in Latin America are effective at increasing the uptake of some preventive services. There is otherwise very limited evidence of the effects of results-based financing in low- or middle-income countries. Results-based financing can have undesirable effects, including motivating unintended behaviors, distortions (ignoring important tasks that are not rewarded with incentives), gaming (improving or cheating on reporting rather than improving performance), widening the resource gap between rich and poor, and dependency on financial incentives. There is limited evidence of the effectiveness of results-based financing and almost no evidence of the cost-effectiveness of results-based financing. Based on the available evidence and likely mechanisms through which financial incentives work, they are more likely to influence discrete individual behaviors in the short run and less likely to create sustained changes. © 2009 Blackwell Publishing Asia Pty Ltd and Chinese Cochrane Center, West China Hospital of Sichuan University.
Ahrens, Allison M; Ferguson, Lindsay M; Robinson, Terry E; Aldridge, J Wayne
2018-01-01
Some rats are especially prone to attribute incentive salience to a cue (conditioned stimulus, CS) paired with food reward (sign-trackers, STs), but the extent they do so varies as a function of the form of the CS. Other rats respond primarily to the predictive value of a cue (goal-trackers, GTs), regardless of its form. Sign-tracking is associated with greater cue-induced activation of mesolimbic structures than goal-tracking; however, it is unclear how the form of the CS itself influences activity in neural systems involved in incentive salience attribution. Thus, our goal was to determine how different cue modalities affect neural activity in the ventral pallidum (VP), which is known to encode incentive salience attribution, as rats performed a two-CS Pavlovian conditioned approach task in which both a lever-CS and a tone-CS predicted identical food reward. The lever-CS elicited sign-tracking in some rats (STs) and goal-tracking in others (GTs), whereas the tone-CS elicited only goal-tracking in all rats. The lever-CS elicited robust changes in neural activity (sustained tonic increases or decreases in firing) throughout the VP in STs, relative to GTs. These changes were not seen when STs were exposed to the tone-CS, and in GTs there were no differences in firing between the lever-CS and tone-CS. We conclude that neural activity throughout the VP encodes incentive signals and is especially responsive when a cue is of a form that promotes the attribution of incentive salience to it, especially in predisposed individuals.
Pourat, Nadereh; Rice, Thomas; Tai-Seale, Ming; Bolan, Gail; Nihalani, Jas
2005-07-01
To examine the association between primary care physician (PCP) reimbursement and delivery of sexually transmitted disease (STD) services. Cross-sectional sample of PCPs contracted with Medicaid managed care organizations in 2002 in 8 California counties with the highest rates of Medicaid enrollment and chlamydia cases. The association between physician reimbursement methods and physician practices in delivery of STD services was examined in multiple logistic regression models, controlling for a number of potential confounders. Evidence of an association between reimbursement based on management of utilization and the PCP practice of providing chlamydia drugs for the partner's treatment was most apparent. In adjusted analyses, physicians reimbursed with capitation and a financial incentive for management of utilization (odds ratio [OR] = 1.63) or salary and a financial incentive for management of utilization (OR = 2.63) were more likely than those reimbursed under other methods to prescribe chlamydia drugs for the partner. However, PCPs least often reported they annually screened females aged 15-19 years for chlamydia (OR = 0.63) if reimbursed under salary and a financial incentive for productivity, or screened females aged 20-25 years (OR = 0.43) if reimbursed under salary and a financial incentive for financial performance. Some physician reimbursement methods may influence care delivery, but reimbursement is not consistently associated with how physicians deliver STD care. Interventions to encourage physicians to consistently provide guideline-concordant care despite conflicting financial incentives can maintain quality of care. In addition, incentives that may improve guideline-concordant care should be strengthened.
45 CFR 305.60 - Types and scope of Federal audits.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... HUMAN SERVICES PROGRAM PERFORMANCE MEASURES, STANDARDS, FINANCIAL INCENTIVES, AND PENALTIES § 305.60... more frequently if the State fails to meet performance standards and reliability of data requirements... used to process the data in calculating performance indicators under this part; (b) Also, OCSE will...