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Sample records for international safeguards system

  1. International Nuclear Safeguards at Sandia

    SciTech Connect

    Sternat, Matthew R.

    2015-02-01

    As global nuclear energy expands, assuring peaceful uses of nuclear technology becomes increasingly important. In addition to complying with international nuclear safeguards, a responsible nuclear energy program promotes a corresponding safeguards culture. Establishment of transparent peaceful uses of nuclear technologies starts with cooperative international engagements and safeguards systems. Developing states investing in nuclear energy must assure the international community of their longterm commitment to safeguards, safety, and security (3S) of nuclear materials and technologies. Cultivating a safeguards culture starts in the initial phases of infrastructure planning and must be integrated into the process of developing a responsible nuclear energy program. Sandia National Laboratories supports the implementation of safeguards culture through a variety of activities, including infrastructure development.

  2. International safeguards data authentication

    SciTech Connect

    Melton, R.B.; Smith, C.E.; DeLand, S.M.; Manatt, D.R.

    1996-07-01

    The International Safeguards community is becoming increasingly reliant on information stored in electronic form. In international monitoring and related activities it must be possible to verify and maintain the integrity of this electronic information. This paper discusses the use of data authentication technology to assist in accomplishing this task. The paper provides background information, identifies the relevance to international safeguards, discusses issues related to export controls, algorithm patents, key management and the use of commercial vs. custom software.

  3. Information analysis and international safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Pilat, Joseph F.; Budlong-Sylvester, K. W.; Tape, J. W.

    2004-01-01

    After the first Gulf War, it was recognized that one of the key weaknesses of the international safeguards system was that there was no systematic attempt by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to analyze all available information about States nuclear programs to determine whether these programs were consistent with nonproliferation obligations. The IAEA, as part of its effort to redesign the international safeguards system, is looking closely at the issue of information review and evaluation. The application of information analysis (IA) techniques to the international nuclear safeguards system has the potential to revolutionize the form and practice of safeguards. Assessing the possibilities of IA for the IAEA, and in particular those embodied in concepts of information-driven safeguards, requires an understanding of IA, the limits on its effectiveness and the requirements placed on such analyses in a variety of safeguards contexts. The Australian Safeguards and Nonproliferation Office (ASNO) and the United States Department of Energy (DOE) agreed in July 2002 to undertake a joint study of 'information-driven safeguards' under a long-standing cooperative arrangement. It was decided that a broad range of ideas should be considered, and that the study would not be intended to be and would not be an elaboration of either US or Australian governmental positions. This paper reports some findings of Phase 1 of this collaborative effort and offers some initial thinking on the part of the authors on the outstanding issues to be addressed in Phase 2. An effort to explore through case studies alternative strategies for utilizing IA by the IAEA that provide the same or increased confidence in safeguards conclusions while allowing safeguards resource allocation to be determined not only by the types and quantities of nuclear material and facilities in a State but also by other objective factors.

  4. International safeguards for reprocessing plants. Final report

    SciTech Connect

    Kratzer, M.; Scheinman, L.; Sievering, N.; Wonder, E.; Lipman, D.; Immerman, W.; Elliott, J.M.; Crane, F.

    1981-04-01

    Proliferation risks inherent in reprocessing show the need to employ technically effective safeguards which can detect, with a high degree of assurance and on a timely basis, the diversion of significant quantities of fissionable material. A balance must be struck between what is technically feasible and effective and what is institutionally acceptable. Purpose of this report is to examine the several technical approaches to safeguards in light of their prospective acceptability. This study defines the economic, political and institutional nature of the safeguards problem; surveys generically alternative technical approaches to international safeguards including their effectiveness and relative development; characterizes the institutional implications and uncertainties associated with the acceptance and implementation of each technical alternative; and integrates these assessments into a set of overall judgments on feasible directions for reprocessing plant safeguards systems.

  5. Future issues in international safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Hakkila, E.A.; Markin, J.T.; Mullen, M.F.

    1991-01-01

    The introduction of large bulk-handling facilities into the internationally safeguarded, commercial nuclear fuel cycle, increased concerns for radiation exposure, and the constant level of resources available to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are driving new and innovative approaches to international safeguards. Inspector resources have traditionally been allocated on a facility-type basis. Approaches such as randomization of inspections either within a facility or across facilities in a State or the application of a fuel-cycle approach within a State are being considered as means of conserving resources. Large bulk-handling facilities require frequent material balance closures to meet IAEA timeliness goals. Approaches such as near-real-time accounting, running book inventories, and adjusted running book inventories are considered as means to meet these goals. The automated facilities require that safeguards measures also be automated, leading to more reliance on operator-supplied equipment that must be authenticated by the inspectorate. New Non-Proliferation Treaty signatory States with advanced nuclear programs will further drain IAEA resources. Finally, the role of special inspections in IAEA safeguards may be expanded. This paper discusses these issues in terms of increasing safeguards effectiveness and the possible impact on operators. 14 refs.

  6. Remote monitoring for international safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Dupree, S.A.; Sonnier, C.S.

    1997-09-01

    Remote monitoring is not a new technology, and its application to safeguards relevant activities has been examined for a number of years. On behalf of the US Department of Energy and international partners, remote monitoring systems have been emplaced in nuclear facilities and laboratories in various parts of the world. The experience gained from these field trials of remote monitoring systems has shown the viability of the concept of using integrated monitoring systems. Although a wide variety of sensors has been used in the remote monitoring field trials conducted to date, the possible range of instrumentation that might be used has scarcely been touched. As the technology becomes widespread, large amounts of data will become available to inspectors responsible for safeguards activities at the sites. Effective use of remote monitoring will require processing, archiving, presenting, and assessing of these data. To provide reasonable efficiency in the application of this technology, data processing should be done in a careful and organized manner. The problem will be not an issue of poring over scant records but of surviving under a deluge of information made possible by modern technology. Fortunately, modern technology, which created the problem of the data glut, is available to come to the assistance of those inundated by data. Apart from the technological problems, one of the most important aspects of remote monitoring is the potential constraint related to the transmission of data out of a facility or beyond national borders. Remote monitoring across national borders can be seriously considered only in the context of a comprehensive, transparent, and open implementation regime.

  7. Safeguards Information Management Systems (SIMS)

    SciTech Connect

    Sorenson, R.J.; Sheely, K.B.; Brown, J.B.; Horton, R.D.; Strittmatter, R.; Manatt, D.R.

    1994-04-01

    The requirements for the management of information at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its Department of Safeguards are rapidly changing. Historically, the Department of Safeguards has had the requirement to process large volumes of conventional safeguards information. An information management system is currently in place that adequately handles the IAEA`s conventional safeguards data needs. In the post-Iraq environment, however, there is a growing need to expand the IAEA information management capability to include unconventional forms of information. These data include environmental sampling results, photographs, video film, lists of machine tools, and open-source materials such as unclassified publications. The US Department of Energy (DOE) has responded to this information management need by implementing the Safeguards Information Management Systems (SIMS) initiative. SIMS was created by the DOE to anticipate and respond to IAEA information management needs through a multilaboratory initiative that will utilize an integrated approach to develop and deploy technology in a timely and cost-effective manner. The DOE will use the SIMS initiative to coordinate US information management activities that support the IAEA Department of Safeguards.

  8. Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Pepper,S.; Rosenthal, M.; Fishbone, L.; Occhiogrosso, D.; Carroll, C.; Dreicer, M.; Wallace, R.; Rankhauser, J.

    2008-10-22

    In 2007, the National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24) completed a yearlong review of the challenges facing the international safeguards system today and over the next 25 years. The study found that without new investment in international safeguards, the U.S. safeguards technology base, and our ability to support International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, will continue to erode and soon may be at risk. To reverse this trend, the then U.S. Secretary of Energy, Samuel Bodman, announced at the 2007 IAEA General Conference that the Department of Energy (DOE) would launch the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). He stated 'IAEA safeguards must be robust and capable of addressing proliferation threats. Full confidence in IAEA safeguards is essential for nuclear power to grow safely and securely. To this end, the U.S. Department of Energy will seek to ensure that modern technology, the best scientific expertise, and adequate resources are available to keep pace with expanding IAEA responsibilities.' To meet this goal, the NGSI objectives include the recruitment of international safeguards experts to work at the U.S. national laboratories and to serve at the IAEA's headquarters. Part of the latter effort will involve enhancing our existing efforts to place well-qualified Americans in a sufficient number of key safeguards positions within the IAEA's Department of Safeguards. Accordingly, the International Safeguards Project Office (ISPO) at Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) hosted a Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards (ERIS) on October 22 and 23, 2008. The ISPO used a workshop format developed earlier with Sonalysts, Inc., that was followed at the U.S. Support Program's (USSP's) technology road-mapping sessions. ISPO invited participants from the U.S. DOE, the IAEA, the U.S. national laboratories, private industry, academia, and professional societies who either

  9. Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant Safeguards System Modeling

    SciTech Connect

    Elayat, H A; O'Connell, W J; Boyer, B D

    2006-06-05

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is interested in developing tools and methods for potential U.S. use in designing and evaluating safeguards systems used in enrichment facilities. This research focuses on analyzing the effectiveness of the safeguards in protecting against the range of safeguards concerns for enrichment plants, including diversion of attractive material and unauthorized modes of use. We developed an Extend simulation model for a generic medium-sized centrifuge enrichment plant. We modeled the material flow in normal operation, plant operational upset modes, and selected diversion scenarios, for selected safeguards systems. Simulation modeling is used to analyze both authorized and unauthorized use of a plant and the flow of safeguards information. Simulation tracks the movement of materials and isotopes, identifies the signatures of unauthorized use, tracks the flow and compilation of safeguards data, and evaluates the effectiveness of the safeguards system in detecting misuse signatures. The simulation model developed could be of use to the International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA, enabling the IAEA to observe and draw conclusions that uranium enrichment facilities are being used only within authorized limits for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It will evaluate improved approaches to nonproliferation concerns, facilitating deployment of enhanced and cost-effective safeguards systems for an important part of the nuclear power fuel cycle.

  10. Interim Procedures Safeguarding Mobile Devices during International Travel

    EPA Pesticide Factsheets

    This procedure is for safeguarding EPA information and systems for all employees, contractors, and other users while on international travel or to specifically designated locations within the United States and foreign embassies.

  11. Secret Objective Standoff: International Safeguards Educational Exercise

    SciTech Connect

    Okowita, Samantha L

    2014-01-01

    The International Safeguards Regime, being so multi-faceted, can be overwhelming to those first introduced to its many components. The organizers and lecturers of workshops and courses on nonproliferation often provide a series of independent lectures and must somehow demonstrate the cohesive and effective nature of the system. An exercise titled The Secret Objective Standoff was developed to complement lectures with hands-on learning to assist participants in bringing all the many components (IAEA agreements, export controls, treaty obligations, international diplomacy, etc.) of the International Safeguards Regime together. This exercise divides participants into teams that are assigned the role of either a country or the IAEA and asks that they fully immerse themselves in their roles. The teams are then randomly assigned three unique and secret objectives that are intended to represent realistic and current geopolitical scenarios. Through construction, trading, or hoarding of four resources (experts, technology, money, and uranium), the teams have a finite number of turns to accomplish their objectives. Each turn has three phases random dispersal of resources, a timed discussion where teams can coordinate and strategize with others, and an action phase. During the action phase, teams inform the moderator individually and secretly what they will be doing that turn. The exercise has been tested twice with Oak Ridge National Laboratory personnel, and has been conducted with outside participants twice, in each case the experience was well received by both participants and instructors. This exercise provides instructors the ability to modify the exercise before or during game play to best fit their educational goals. By offering a range of experiences, from an in-depth look at specific components to a generalized overview, this exercise is an effective tool in helping participants achieve a full understanding the International Safeguards Regime.

  12. International Nuclear Safeguards Inspection Support Tool (INSIST)

    SciTech Connect

    St. Pierre, D.E.; Steinmaus, K.L.; Moon, B.D.

    1994-07-01

    DOE is committed to providing technologies to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to meet escalating monitoring and inspection requirements associated with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). One example of technology provided to the IAEA is the information management and remote monitoring capabilities being customized for the IAEA by the International Safeguards Division of the Office of Non-Proliferation and National Security. The ongoing Safeguards Information Management Systems (SIMS) program is an interlaboratory effort providing the IAEA with a range of information management capabilities designed to enhance the effectiveness of their nuclear inspection activities. The initial commitment involved the customization of computer capabilities to provide IAEA with the basic capability to geographically organize, store, and retrieve the large quantity of information involved in their nuclear on site inspection activities in Iraq. This initial system, the International Nuclear Safeguards Inspection Support Tool (INSIST), was developed by DOE`s Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL). To date, two INSIST workstations have been deployed at the IAEA. The first has been used to support the IAEA Action Team in the inspection of Iraqi nuclear facilities since August 1993. A second, and similar, workstation has been deployed to support environmental monitoring under the IAEA 93+2 Programme. Both INSIST workstations geographically integrate analog (video) and digital data to provide an easy to use and effective tool for storing retrieving and displaying multimedia site and facility information including world-wide maps, satellite and aerial imagery, on site photography, live inspection videos, and treaty and inspection textual information. The interactive, UNIX-based workstations have a variety of peripheral devices for information input and output. INSIST software includes commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) modules and application-specific code developed at PNL.

  13. U. S. spent-fuel disposal strategies and International safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Pillay, K.K.; Picard, R.R.; Hafer, J.F. )

    1993-08-01

    Domestic safeguards for fissile nuclear materials are universal, and a variety of international safeguards regimes are applicable, in most member states of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to declared nuclear facilities dedicated to peaceful missions. The U.S. strategy to dispose of all spent nuclear fuels (SNFs) and high-level wastes (HLWs) in engineered geologic repositories has a sometimes-overlooked consequence, namely, the need to maintain domestic and international safeguards in perpetuity. The Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), which has the responsibility to accept and store the spent fuels in the long term either in surface facilities or in engineered geologic repositories, has yet to include safeguards issues in their mission plan.'' There are several stages in the nuclear fuel cycle where materials usable in weapons are available for diversion. This discussion, however, is limited to the potential diversion of spent fuels for clandestine plutonium recovery. The concepts proposed here highlight safeguards elements necessary for a pragmatic safeguards system for SNF from nuclear power generation. The efforts required to initiate and maintain a verifiable international safeguards regime are examined in the context of a typical storage facility in the United States.

  14. STATE-WIDE PERFORMANCE CRITERIA FOR INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS

    SciTech Connect

    K. W. BUDLONG-SYLVESTER; W. D. STANBRO

    2001-06-01

    Traditionally, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has relied upon prescriptive criteria to guide safeguards implementation. The prospect of replacing prescriptive safeguards criteria with more flexible performance criteria would constitute a structural change in safeguards and raises several important questions. Performance criteria imply that while safeguards goals will be fixed, the means of attaining those goals will not be explicitly prescribed. What would the performance objectives be under such a system? How would they be formulated? How would performance be linked to higher level safeguards objectives? How would safeguards performance be measured Statewide? The implementation of safeguards under performance criteria would also signal a dramatic change in the manner the Agency does business. A higher degree of flexibility could, in principle, produce greater effectiveness and efficiency, but would come with a need for increased Agency responsibility in practice. To the extent that reliance on prescriptive criteria decreases, the burden of justifying actions and ensuring their transparency will rise. Would there need to be limits to safeguards implementation? What would be the basis for setting such limits? This paper addresses these and other issues and questions relating to both the formulation and the implementation of performance-based criteria.

  15. International Safeguards and the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory

    SciTech Connect

    Olsen, Khris B.; Smith, Leon E.; Frazar, Sarah L.; Kurzrok, Andrew J.; Orton, Christopher R.; Schanfein, Mark J.; Sayre, Amanda M.; Jones, Rebecca L.

    2016-07-21

    Established in 1965, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory’s (PNNL) strong technical ties and shared heritage with the nearby U.S. Department of Energy Hanford Site were central to the early development of expertise in nuclear fuel cycle signatures, separations chemistry, plutonium chemistry, environmental monitoring, modeling and analysis of reactor systems, and nuclear material safeguards and security. From these Hanford origins, PNNL has grown into a multi-program science and engineering enterprise that utilizes this diversity to strengthen the international safeguards regime. Today, PNNL supports the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in its mission to provide assurances to the international community that nations do not use nuclear materials and equipment outside of peaceful uses. PNNL also serves in the IAEA’s Network of Analytical Laboratories (NWAL) by providing analysis of environmental samples gathered around the world. PNNL is involved in safeguards research and development activities in support of many U.S. Government programs such as the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Office of Research and Development, NNSA Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control, and the U.S. Support Program to IAEA Safeguards. In addition to these programs, PNNL invests internal resources including safeguards-specific training opportunities for staff, and laboratory-directed research and development funding to further ideas that may grow into new capabilities. This paper and accompanying presentation highlight some of PNNL’s contributions in technology development, implementation concepts and approaches, policy, capacity building, and human capital development, in the field of international safeguards.

  16. Technical Training Workshop on International Safeguards: An Introduction to Safeguards for Emerging Nuclear States

    SciTech Connect

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Gastelum, Zoe N.; Olson, Jarrod; Mathews, Caroline E.; Solodov, Alexander; Zhernosek, Alena; Raffo-Caiado, Ana; Baldwin, George; Horak, Karl; McClelland-Kerr, John; VanSickle, Matthew; Mininni, Margot; Kovacic, Donald

    2009-10-06

    The U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) hosted a workshop from May 4-22, 2009, on the fundamental elements of international safeguards. Entitled "A Technical Training Workshop on International Safeguards," the workshop introduced post-graduate students from Malaysia, Vietnam, Indonesia, Thailand, Morocco, Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia to the fundamental issues and best practices associated with international safeguards and encouraged them to explore potential career paths in safeguards. Workshops like these strengthen the international safeguards regime by promoting the development of a "safeguards culture" among young nuclear professionals within nascent nuclear countries. While this concept of safeguards culture is sometimes hard to define and even harder to measure, this paper will demonstrate that the promotion of safeguards cultures through workshops like these justifies the investment of U.S. taxpayer dollars.

  17. International training course on nuclear materials accountability for safeguards purposes

    SciTech Connect

    Not Available

    1980-12-01

    The two volumes of this report incorporate all lectures and presentations at the International Training Course on Nuclear Materials Accountability and Control for Safeguards Purposes, held May 27-June 6, 1980, at the Bishop's Lodge near Santa Fe, New Mexico. The course, authorized by the US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act and sponsored by the US Department of Energy in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, was developed to provide practical training in the design, implementation, and operation of a National system of nuclear materials accountability and control that satisfies both National and IAEA International safeguards objectives. Volume I, covering the first week of the course, presents the background, requirements, and general features of material accounting and control in modern safeguard systems. Volume II, covering the second week of the course, provides more detailed information on measurement methods and instruments, practical experience at power reactor and research reactor facilities, and examples of operating state systems of accountability and control.

  18. International safeguards for spent fuel storage

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Kratzer, M.; Wonder, E.; Immerman, W.; Crane, F.

    1981-08-01

    The nonproliferation effectiveness and political and economic acceptability of prospective improvements in international safeguard techniques for LWR spent fuel storage were analyzed. Although the applicability of item accounting considerably eases the safeguarding of stored spent fuel, the problem of verification is potentially serious. A number of simple gamma and neutron nondestructive assay techniques were found to offer considerable improvements, of a qualitative rather than quantiative nature, in verification-related data and information, and possess the major advantage of intruding very littel on facility operations. A number of improved seals and monitors appear feasible as well, but improvements in the timeliness of detection will not occur unless the frequency of inspection is increased or a remote monitoring capability is established. Limitations on IAEA Safeguards resources and on the integration of results from material accounting and containment and surveillance remain problems.

  19. International safeguards for spent fuel storage

    SciTech Connect

    Kratzer, M.; Wonder, E.; Immerman, W.; Crane, F.

    1981-08-01

    This report analyzes the nonproliferation effectiveness and political and economic acceptability of prospective improvements in international safeguard techniques for LWR spent fuel storage. Although the applicability of item accounting considerably eases the safeguarding of stored spent fuel, the problem of verification is potentially serious. A number of simple gamma and neutron nondestructive assay techniques were found to offer considerable improvements, of a qualitative rather than quantitative nature, in verification-related data and information, and possess the major advantage of intruding very little on facility operations. A number of improved seals and monitors appear feasible as well, but improvements in the timeliness of detection will not occur unless the frequency of inspection is increased or a remote monitoring capability is established. Limitations on IAEA Safeguards resources and on the integration of results from material accounting and containment and surveillance remain problems.

  20. International safeguards: Accounting for nuclear materials

    SciTech Connect

    Fishbone, L.G.

    1988-09-28

    Nuclear safeguards applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are one element of the non-proliferation regime'', the collection of measures whose aim is to forestall the spread of nuclear weapons to countries that do not already possess them. Safeguards verifications provide evidence that nuclear materials in peaceful use for nuclear-power production are properly accounted for. Though carried out in cooperation with nuclear facility operators, the verifications can provide assurance because they are designed with the capability to detect diversion, should it occur. Traditional safeguards verification measures conducted by inspectors of the IAEA include book auditing; counting and identifying containers of nuclear material; measuring nuclear material; photographic and video surveillance; and sealing. Novel approaches to achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness in safeguards verifications are under investigation as the number and complexity of nuclear facilities grow. These include the zone approach, which entails carrying out verifications for groups of facilities collectively, and randomization approach, which entails carrying out entire inspection visits some fraction of the time on a random basis. Both approaches show promise in particular situations, but, like traditional measures, must be tested to ensure their practical utility. These approaches are covered on this report. 15 refs., 16 figs., 3 tabs.

  1. Science and Technology Challenges for International Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Mark Schanfein

    2009-07-01

    The science and technology challenges for international safeguards range from cutting edge physics needs to practical technology solutions for high volume data handling and analysis issues. This paper will take a narrow look at some of the predominant challenges, which include those at high throughput commercial facilities and those in the detection of undeclared facilities. It is hoped that by highlighting these areas it can encourage a concerted effort by scientific institutions and industry to provide robust cost-effective solutions.

  2. Network adaptable information systems for safeguard applications

    SciTech Connect

    Rodriguez, C.; Burczyk, L.; Chare, P.; Wagner, H.

    1996-09-01

    While containment and surveillance systems designed for nuclear safeguards have greatly improved through advances in computer, sensor, and microprocessor technologies, the authors recognize the need to continue the advancement of these systems to provide more standardized solutions for safeguards applications of the future. The benefits to be gained from the use of standardized technologies are becoming evident as safeguard activities are increasing world-wide while funding of these activities is becoming more limited. The EURATOM Safeguards Directorate and Los Alamos National Laboratory are developing and testing advanced monitoring technologies coupled with the most efficient solutions for the safeguards applications of the future.

  3. Swedish experiences in implementing national and international safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Nilsson, A. ); Elborn, M. ); Grahn, P. )

    1991-01-01

    This paper reports that international safeguards have been applied in Sweden since the early 70s. Experiences have been achieved from exclusive bilateral and trilateral control followed by NPT safeguards in 1975. The Swedish State System for accountancy and Control (SSAC) includes all regulations that follows from prevailing obligations regarding the peaceful uses of nuclear material. The system has been developed in cooperation between the national authority, the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate (SKI) and the Swedish nuclear industry. The paper presents experiences from the practical implementation of the SSAC and the IAEA safeguards system, gained by the SKI and the nuclear industry, respectively. Joint approaches and solutions to some significant safeguards issues are presented. The cooperation between the nuclear industry and the authority in R and D activities, in particular with respect to the Swedish Support Program is highlighted, e.g. the use of nuclear facilities in development or training tasks. some of the difficulties encountered with the system are also touched upon.

  4. Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Pepper,S.E.; Rosenthal, M.D.; Fishbone, L.G.; Occhogrosso, D.M.; Lockwood, D.; Carroll, C.J.; Dreicer, M.; Wallace, R.; Fankhauser, J.

    2009-07-12

    Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) hosted a Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards October 22 and 23, 2008. The workshop was sponsored by DOE/NA-243 under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). Placing well-qualified Americans in sufficient number and in key safeguards positions within the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) Department of Safeguards is an important U.S. non-proliferation objective. The goal of the NGSI Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards was to improve U.S. efforts to recruit U.S. citizens for IAEA positions in the Department of Safeguards. The participants considered the specific challenges of recruiting professional staff, safeguards inspectors, and managers. BNL’s International Safeguards Project Office invited participants from the U.S. Department of Energy, the IAEA, U.S. national laboratories, private industry, academia, and professional societies who are either experts in international safeguards or who understand the challenges of recruiting for technical positions. A final report for the workshop will be finalized and distributed in early 2009. The main finding of the workshop was the need for an integrated recruitment plan to take into account pools of potential candidates, various government and private agency stakeholders, the needs of the IAEA, and the NGSI human capital development plan. There were numerous findings related to and recommendations for maximizing the placement of U.S. experts in IAEA Safeguards positions. The workshop participants offered many ideas for increasing the pool of candidates and increasing the placement rate. This paper will provide details on these findings and recommendations

  5. Design Vulnerability Assessments for Safeguards Sealing Systems

    SciTech Connect

    Brockman, Linda; Johnston, Roger; Kravtchenko, Victor; Undem, Halvor A.; Wishard, Bernard

    2010-08-11

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (the "Agency") engages in a rigorous equipment authorization process prior to deploying Safeguards instrumentation, including Safeguards sealing systems, for world-wide use. A positive result from a vulnerability assessment is one of the many requirements that must be met prior to instrumentation deployment. Given the long time period in the Safeguards instrumentation development cycle, the substantial Member State investments made, and the significant Agency staff time required, a negative result for the vulnerability assessment can result in the loss of time, considerable additional expense, or even the failure to deploy an instrument or sealing system at all. First suggested in 1998 by the General Physics Institute in Moscow, an approach that incorporates a design vulnerability assessment minimizes the risk of deployment failure by teaming a public sector vulnerability assessment team with the instrument or sealing system design team in order to identify, at the earliest possible design stage, inherent vulnerabilities. Involving the vulnerability assessors early and often in the design and development process avoids many of the problems inherent in evaluating security vulnerabilities only after the design is finalized. The disadvantages include increased costs and time to deployment. An improved pressure-sensitive adhesive label seal, called the "VOID-3 seal" was developed for the Agency using this design vulnerability assessment process.

  6. 28 CFR 25.8 - System safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 28 Judicial Administration 1 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false System safeguards. 25.8 Section 25.8 Judicial Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE INFORMATION SYSTEMS The National Instant Criminal Background Check System § 25.8 System safeguards. (a) Information maintained in the...

  7. 28 CFR 25.8 - System safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 28 Judicial Administration 1 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false System safeguards. 25.8 Section 25.8 Judicial Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE INFORMATION SYSTEMS The National Instant Criminal Background Check System § 25.8 System safeguards. (a) Information maintained in the...

  8. 28 CFR 25.8 - System safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 28 Judicial Administration 1 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false System safeguards. 25.8 Section 25.8 Judicial Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE INFORMATION SYSTEMS The National Instant Criminal Background Check System § 25.8 System safeguards. (a) Information maintained in the...

  9. 28 CFR 25.8 - System safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 28 Judicial Administration 1 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false System safeguards. 25.8 Section 25.8 Judicial Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE INFORMATION SYSTEMS The National Instant Criminal Background Check System § 25.8 System safeguards. (a) Information maintained in the...

  10. 17 CFR 39.18 - System safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-04-01

    ... 17 Commodity and Securities Exchanges 1 2012-04-01 2012-04-01 false System safeguards. 39.18... ORGANIZATIONS Compliance with Core Principles § 39.18 System safeguards. (a) Definitions. For purposes of this... means the metropolitan or other geographic area within which a derivatives clearing organization has...

  11. Determining information management needs for enhanced international safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Badalamente, R.V.; DeLand, S.M.; Whiteson, R.; Anzelon, G.

    1994-08-01

    The Safeguards Information Management System initiative is a program of the Department of Energy`s (DOE) Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation aimed at supporting the International Atomic Energy Agency`s (IAEA) efforts to strengthen safeguards through the enhancement of information management capabilities. The DOE hopes to provide the IAEA with the ability to correlate and analyze data from existing and new sources of information, including publicly available information, information on imports and exports, design information, environmental monitoring data, and non-safeguards information. The first step in this effort is to identify and define IAEA requirements. In support of this, we have created a users` requirements document based on interviews with IAEA staff that describes the information management needs of the end user projected by the IAEA, including needs for storage, retrieval, analysis, communication, and visualization of data. Also included are characteristics of the end user and attributes of the current environment. This paper describes our efforts to obtain the required information. We discuss how to accurately represent user needs and involve users for an international organization with a multi-cultural user population. We describe our approach, our experience in setting up and conducting the interviews and brainstorming sessions, and a brief discussion of what we learned.

  12. Safeguards Guidance for Designers of Commercial Nuclear Facilities – International Safeguards Requirements for Uranium Enrichment Plants

    SciTech Connect

    Philip Casey Durst; Scott DeMuth; Brent McGinnis; Michael Whitaker; James Morgan

    2010-04-01

    For the past two years, the United States National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of International Regimes and Agreements (NA-243), has sponsored the Safeguards-by-Design Project, through which it is hoped new nuclear facilities will be designed and constructed worldwide more amenable to nuclear safeguards. In the course of this project it was recognized that commercial designer/builders of nuclear facilities are not always aware of, or understand, the relevant domestic and international safeguards requirements, especially the latter as implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). To help commercial designer/builders better understand these requirements, a report was prepared by the Safeguards-by-Design Project Team that articulated and interpreted the international nuclear safeguards requirements for the initial case of uranium enrichment plants. The following paper summarizes the subject report, the specific requirements, where they originate, and the implications for design and construction. It also briefly summarizes the established best design and operating practices that designer/builder/operators have implemented for currently meeting these requirements. In preparing the subject report, it is recognized that the best practices are continually evolving as the designer/builder/operators and IAEA consider even more effective and efficient means for meeting the safeguards requirements and objectives.

  13. Materials management in an internationally safeguarded fuels reprocessing plant

    SciTech Connect

    Hakkila, E.A.; Baker, A.L.; Cobb, D.D.

    1980-04-01

    The following appendices are included: aqueous reprocessing and conversion technology, reference facilities, process design and operating features relevant to materials accounting, operator's safeguards system structure, design principles of dynamic materials accounting systems, modeling and simulation approach, optimization of measurement control, aspects of international verification problem, security and reliability of materials measurement and accounting system, estimation of in-process inventory in solvent-extraction contactors, conventional measurement techniques, near-real-time measurement techniques, isotopic correlation techniques, instrumentation available to IAEA inspectors, and integration of materials accounting and containment and surveillance. (DLC)

  14. International safeguards without material balance areas

    SciTech Connect

    Sanborn, J.B.; Lu Mingshih; Indusi, J.P.

    1992-09-01

    Recently altered perceptions of the role of the non-proliferation regime, as well as continued IAEA funding constraints, suggest a need to re-examine the fundamentals of IAEA verification strategy. This paper suggests that abandoning certain material balance area (MBA) related concepts that nominally form the basic framework of ``full-scope`` safeguards would result in a more flexible inspection regime. The MBA concept applied in the domestic context enables a national authority to localize losses in space and in time and to minimize the need to measure in-process inventory. However, these advantages do not accrue to an international verification regime because it cannot truly verify the ``flows`` between MBAs without extensive containment/surveillance measures. In the verification model studied, the entire nuclear inventory of a state is periodically declared and verified simultaneously in one or two large segments (containing possibly many MBAS). Simultaneous inventory of all MBAs within a segment would occur through advance ``mailbox`` declarations and random selection of MBAs for on-site verification or through enhanced containment/surveillance techniques. Flows are generally speaking not verified. This scheme would free the inspectorate from the obligation to attempt to verify on-site each stratum of the material balance of every facility declaring significant quantities of nuclear material.

  15. International safeguards without material balance areas

    SciTech Connect

    Sanborn, J.B.; Lu Mingshih; Indusi, J.P.

    1992-01-01

    Recently altered perceptions of the role of the non-proliferation regime, as well as continued IAEA funding constraints, suggest a need to re-examine the fundamentals of IAEA verification strategy. This paper suggests that abandoning certain material balance area (MBA) related concepts that nominally form the basic framework of full-scope'' safeguards would result in a more flexible inspection regime. The MBA concept applied in the domestic context enables a national authority to localize losses in space and in time and to minimize the need to measure in-process inventory. However, these advantages do not accrue to an international verification regime because it cannot truly verify the flows'' between MBAs without extensive containment/surveillance measures. In the verification model studied, the entire nuclear inventory of a state is periodically declared and verified simultaneously in one or two large segments (containing possibly many MBAS). Simultaneous inventory of all MBAs within a segment would occur through advance mailbox'' declarations and random selection of MBAs for on-site verification or through enhanced containment/surveillance techniques. Flows are generally speaking not verified. This scheme would free the inspectorate from the obligation to attempt to verify on-site each stratum of the material balance of every facility declaring significant quantities of nuclear material.

  16. 7 CFR 4290.506 - Safeguarding the RBIC's assets/Internal controls.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 15 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safeguarding the RBIC's assets/Internal controls... Safeguarding the RBIC's assets/Internal controls. You must adopt a plan to safeguard your assets and monitor... your control procedures....

  17. Process monitoring in international safeguards for reprocessing plants: A demonstration

    SciTech Connect

    Ehinger, M.H.

    1989-01-01

    In the period 1985--1987, the Oak Ridge National Laboratory investigated the possible role of process monitoring for international safeguards applications in fuel reprocessing plants. This activity was conducted under Task C.59, ''Review of Process Monitoring Safeguards Technology for Reprocessing Facilities'' of the US program of Technical Assistance to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards program. The final phase was a demonstration of process monitoring applied in a prototypical reprocessing plant test facility at ORNL. This report documents the demonstration and test results. 35 figs.

  18. Developing the Next Generation of International Safeguards and Nonproliferation Experts: Highlights of Select Activities at the National Laboratories

    SciTech Connect

    Reed, J; Mathews, C; Kirk, B; Lynch, P; Doyle, J; Meek, E; Pepper, S; Metcalf, R

    2010-03-31

    With many safeguards experts in the United States at or near retirement age, and with the growing and evolving mission of international safeguards, attracting and educating a new generation of safeguards experts is an important element of maintaining a credible and capable international safeguards system. The United States National Laboratories, with their rich experience in addressing the technical and policy challenges of international safeguards, are an important resource for attracting, educating, and training future safeguards experts. This presentation highlights some of the safeguards education and professional development activities underway at the National Laboratories. These include university outreach, summer courses, internships, mid-career transition, knowledge retention, and other projects. The presentation concludes with thoughts on the challenge of interdisciplinary education and the recruitment of individuals with the right balance of skills and backgrounds are recruited to meet tomorrow's needs.

  19. Combining Measurements with Three-Dimensional Laser Scanning System and Coded Aperture Gamma-Ray Imaging Systems for International Safeguards Applications

    SciTech Connect

    Boehnen, Chris Bensing; Bogard, James S; Hayward, Jason P; Raffo-Caiado, Ana Claudia; Smith, Stephen E; Ziock, Klaus-Peter

    2010-01-01

    Being able to verify the operator's declaration in regards to technical design of nuclear facilities is an important aspect of every safeguards approach. In addition to visual observation, it is relevant to know if nuclear material is present or has been present in piping and ducts not declared. The possibility of combining different measurement techniques into one tool should optimize the inspection effort and increase safeguards effectiveness. Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is engaged in a technical collaboration project involving two U.S. Department of Energy foreign partners to investigate combining measurements from a three-dimensional (3D) laser scanning system and gamma-ray imaging systems. ORNL conducted simultaneous measurements with a coded-aperture gamma-ray imager and the 3D laser scanner in an operational facility with complex configuration and different enrichment levels and quantities of uranium. This paper describes these measurements and their results.

  20. Combining Measurements with Three-Dimensional Laser Scanning System and Coded Aperture Gamma-Ray Imaging System for International Safeguards Applications

    SciTech Connect

    Boehnen, Chris Bensing; Bogard, James S; Hayward, Jason P; Raffo-Caiado, Ana Claudia; Smith, Steven E; Ziock, Klaus-Peter

    2010-01-01

    Being able to verify the operator's declaration in regard to the technical design of nuclear facilities is an important aspect of every safeguards approach. In addition to visual observation, it is necessary to know if nuclear material is present or has been present in undeclared piping and ducts. The possibility of combining the results from different measurement techniques into one easily interpreted product should optimize the inspection effort and increase safeguards effectiveness. A collaborative effort to investigate the possibility of combining measurements from a three-dimensional (3D) laser scanning system and gamma-ray imaging systems is under way. The feasibility of the concept has been previously proven with different laboratory prototypes of gamma-ray imaging systems. Recently, simultaneous measurements were conducted with a new highly portable, mechanically cooled, High Purity Germanium (HPGe), coded-aperture gamma-ray imager and a 3D laser scanner in an operational facility with complex configuration and different enrichment levels and quantities of uranium. With specially designed software, data from both instruments were combined and a 3D model of the facility was generated that also identified locations of radioactive sources. This paper provides an overview of the technology, describes the measurements, discusses the various safeguards scenarios addressed, and presents results of experiments.

  1. Feasibility Study of Implementing a Mobile Collaborative Information Platform for International Safeguards Inspections

    SciTech Connect

    Gastelum, Zoe N.; Gitau, Ernest T. N.; Doehle, Joel R.; Toomey, Christopher M.

    2014-09-01

    In response to the growing pervasiveness of mobile technologies such as tablets and smartphones, the International Atomic Energy Agency and the U.S. Department of Energy National Laboratories have been exploring the potential use of these platforms for international safeguards activities. Specifically of interest are information systems (software, and accompanying servers and architecture) deployed on mobile devices to increase the situational awareness and productivity of an IAEA safeguards inspector in the field, while simultaneously reducing paperwork and pack weight of safeguards equipment. Exploratory development in this area has been met with skepticism regarding the ability to overcome technology deployment challenges for IAEA safeguards equipment. This report documents research conducted to identify potential challenges for the deployment of a mobile collaborative information system to the IAEA, and proposes strategies to mitigate those challenges.

  2. Lessons from post-war Iraq for the international full-scope safeguards regime

    SciTech Connect

    Scheinman, L.

    1993-04-01

    The discovery after the Gulf War of the extensive Iraqi nuclear weapon program severely shook public confidence in the nuclear non-proliferation regime in general, and the safeguards program of the IAEA under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, in particular. Iraq provided the justification for evaluating the safeguards regime under new political circumstances, so that appropriate corrective measures could be taken when necessary. It is now up to the individual states within the international system to take advantage of this opportunity.

  3. Third International Meeting on Next Generation Safeguards:Safeguards-by-Design at Enrichment Facilities

    SciTech Connect

    Long, Jon D.; McGinnis, Brent R; Morgan, James B; Whitaker, Michael; Lockwood, Mr. Dunbar; Shipwash, Jacqueline L

    2011-01-01

    The Third International Meeting on Next Generation Safeguards (NGS3) was hosted by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) in Washington, D.C. on 14-15 December 2010; this meeting focused on the Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) concept. There were approximately 100 participants from 13 countries, comprised of safeguards policy and technical experts from government and industry. Representatives also were present from the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), the European Atomic Energy Agency (Euratom), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The primary objective of this meeting was to exchange views and provide recommendations on implementation of the SBD concept for four specific nuclear fuel cycle facility types: gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs), GEN III and GEN IV reactors, aqueous reprocessing plants, and mixed oxide fuel fabrication facilities. The general and facility-specific SBD documents generated from the four working groups, which were circulated for comment among working group participants, are intended to provide a substantive contribution to the IAEA's efforts to publish SBD guidance for these specific types of nuclear facilities in the near future. The IAEA has described the SBD concept as an approach in which 'international safeguards are fully integrated into the design process of a new nuclear facility from the initial planning through design, construction, operation, and decommissioning.' As part of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), the DOE is working to establish SBD as a global norm through DOE laboratory studies, international workshops, engagement with industry and the IAEA, and setting an example through its use in new nuclear facilities in the United States. This paper describes the discussion topics and final recommendations of the Enrichment Facilities Working

  4. 17 CFR 49.24 - System safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-04-01

    ... 17 Commodity and Securities Exchanges 2 2014-04-01 2014-04-01 false System safeguards. 49.24 Section 49.24 Commodity and Securities Exchanges COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION (CONTINUED) SWAP...) Information security; (2) Business continuity—disaster recovery planning and resources; (3) Capacity...

  5. 17 CFR 49.24 - System safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-04-01

    ... 17 Commodity and Securities Exchanges 1 2013-04-01 2013-04-01 false System safeguards. 49.24 Section 49.24 Commodity and Securities Exchanges COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION SWAP DATA... shall address each of the following categories of risk analysis and oversight: (1) Information...

  6. 17 CFR 39.18 - System safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-04-01

    ... ORGANIZATIONS Compliance with Core Principles § 39.18 System safeguards. (a) Definitions. For purposes of this... transportation, telecommunications, power, water, or other critical infrastructure components in a relevant area...) General—(1) Program of risk analysis. Each derivatives clearing organization shall establish and...

  7. Safeguards Guidance Document for Designers of Commercial Nuclear Facilities: International Nuclear Safeguards Requirements and Practices For Uranium Enrichment Plants

    SciTech Connect

    Robert Bean; Casey Durst

    2009-10-01

    This report is the second in a series of guidelines on international safeguards requirements and practices, prepared expressly for the designers of nuclear facilities. The first document in this series is the description of generic international nuclear safeguards requirements pertaining to all types of facilities. These requirements should be understood and considered at the earliest stages of facility design as part of a new process called “Safeguards-by-Design.” This will help eliminate the costly retrofit of facilities that has occurred in the past to accommodate nuclear safeguards verification activities. The following summarizes the requirements for international nuclear safeguards implementation at enrichment plants, prepared under the Safeguards by Design project, and funded by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Office of NA-243. The purpose of this is to provide designers of nuclear facilities around the world with a simplified set of design requirements and the most common practices for meeting them. The foundation for these requirements is the international safeguards agreement between the country and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Relevant safeguards requirements are also cited from the Safeguards Criteria for inspecting enrichment plants, found in the IAEA Safeguards Manual, Part SMC-8. IAEA definitions and terms are based on the IAEA Safeguards Glossary, published in 2002. The most current specification for safeguards measurement accuracy is found in the IAEA document STR-327, “International Target Values 2000 for Measurement Uncertainties in Safeguarding Nuclear Materials,” published in 2001. For this guide to be easier for the designer to use, the requirements have been restated in plainer language per expert interpretation using the source documents noted. The safeguards agreement is fundamentally a

  8. International Safeguards Technology and Policy Education and Training Pilot Programs

    SciTech Connect

    Dreicer, M; Anzelon, G A; Essner, J T; Dougan, A D; Doyle, J; Boyer, B; Hypes, P; Sokava, E; Wehling, F; Martin, J; Charlton, W

    2009-06-16

    A major focus of the National Nuclear Security Administration-led Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) is the development of human capital to meet present and future challenges to the safeguards regime. An effective university-level education in safeguards and related disciplines is an essential element in a layered strategy to rebuild the safeguards human resource capacity. NNSA launched two pilot programs in 2008 to develop university level courses and internships in association with James, Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) at the Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS) and Texas A&M University (TAMU). These pilot efforts involved 44 students in total and were closely linked to hands-on internships at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The Safeguards and Nuclear Material Management pilot program was a collaboration between TAMU, LANL, and LLNL. The LANL-based coursework was shared with the students undertaking internships at LLNL via video teleconferencing. A weeklong hands-on exercise was also conducted at LANL. A second pilot effort, the International Nuclear Safeguards Policy and Information Analysis pilot program was implemented at MIIS in cooperation with LLNL. Speakers from MIIS, LLNL, and other U.S. national laboratories (LANL, BNL) delivered lectures for the audience of 16 students. The majority of students were senior classmen or new master's degree graduates from MIIS specializing in nonproliferation policy studies. The two pilots programs concluded with an NGSI Summer Student Symposium, held at LLNL, where 20 students participated in LLNL facility tours and poster sessions. The value of bringing together the students from the technical and policy pilots was notable and will factor into the planning for the continued refinement of the two programs in the coming years.

  9. TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT ON THE DUPIC SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM

    SciTech Connect

    H. KIM; H. CHA; ET AL

    2001-02-01

    A safeguards system has been developed since 1993 in the course of supporting a fuel cycle process to fabricate CANDU fuel with spent PWR fuel (known as Direct Use of PWR spent fuel In CANDU, DUPIC). The major safeguards technology involved here was to design and fabricate a neutron coincidence counting system for process accountability, and also an unattended continuous monitoring system in association with independent verification by the IAEA. This combined technology was to produce information of nuclear material content and to maintain knowledge of the continuity of nuclear material flow. In addition to hardware development, diagnosis software is being developed to assist data acquisition, data review, and data evaluation based on a neural network system on the IAEA C/S system.

  10. Strenghening Safeguards Authorities and Institutions

    SciTech Connect

    Goodman,M.; Lockwood, d.; Rosenthal, M.D.; Tape, J.W.

    2008-06-06

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system has changed in major ways from the establishment of the IAEA in 1957 until the present. Changes include strengthening the legal framework of safeguards; improvements in concepts and approaches for safeguards implementation; and significant improvements in the technical tools available to inspectors. In this paper, we explore three broad areas related to strengthening safeguards authorities and institutions: integrated safeguards and State-Level Approaches; special inspections; and NPT withdrawal and the continuation of safeguards.

  11. Process monitoring in support of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Ehinger, M.H.; Wachter, J.W.; Hebble, T.L.; Kerr, H.T.

    1987-08-01

    A review of previous efforts in process monitoring for safeguards was conducted. Previous efforts touched on various concepts and a few specific applications, but none was comprehensive in addressing all aspects of a process monitoring application for safeguards. This report develops prototypical process monitoring concepts that can be incorporated into the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) general safeguards approach for fuel reprocessing plants. This effort considers existing approaches, recognizing limitations and needed improvements. Prototypical process monitoring applications are developed and proposed for implementation and demonstration in the Integrated Equipment Test facility, which is located at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. The specific information needed to accomplish the process monitoring objectives are defined, and the mechanics for obtaining that information are described. Effort is given to the identification and assessment of potential impacts and benefits associated with process monitoring concepts, with particular attention to IAEA, state, and plant operator interests. The historical development of process monitoring is described and the implications of using process monitoring in international safeguards are discussed. Specific process process monitoring applications for demonstration in the IET facility are developed in Sects. 6 through 14. 1 fig.

  12. Lessons Learned from the Development of an Example Precision Information Environment for International Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Gastelum, Zoe N.; Henry, Michael J.; Burtner, IV, E. R.; Doehle, J. R.; Hampton, S. D.; La Mothe, R. R.; Nordquist, P. L.; Zarzhitsky, D. V.

    2014-12-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is interested in increasing capabilities of IAEA safeguards inspectors to access information that would improve their situational awareness on the job. A mobile information platform could potentially provide access to information, analytics, and technical and logistical support to inspectors in the field, as well as providing regular updates to analysts at IAEA Headquarters in Vienna or at satellite offices. To demonstrate the potential capability of such a system, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) implemented a number of example capabilities within a PNNL-developed precision information environment (PIE), and using a tablet as a mobile information platform. PNNL’s safeguards proof-of-concept PIE intends to; demonstrate novel applications of mobile information platforms to international safeguards use cases; demonstrate proof-of-principle capability implementation; and provide “vision” for capabilities that could be implemented. This report documents the lessons learned from this two-year development activity for the Precision Information Environment for International Safeguards (PIE-IS), describing the developed capabilities, technical challenges, and considerations for future development, so that developers working to develop a similar system for the IAEA or other safeguards agencies might benefit from our work.

  13. Internal audits can safeguard hospital revenue.

    PubMed

    Allen, Barbara

    2013-09-01

    Hospitals should routinely perform internal audits of all functions affecting billing accuracy to mitigate the effects of payer audits and to protect revenue by improving billing processes. A primary focus for internal audits should be on coding accuracy, because coding errors leading to denials often reflect gaps in coders' knowledge or training. Effective communication between coding and denials management professionals is a critical success factor. Audits should support appeals processes, and audit findings should be used in educational initiatives aimed at improving coding accuracy.

  14. Global partnering related to nuclear materials safeguards and security - A pragmatic approach to international safeguards work

    SciTech Connect

    Stanford, Dennis

    2007-07-01

    This paper documents issues Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. has addressed in the performance of international work to safeguards and security work. It begins with a description of the package we put together for a sample proposal for the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, for which we were ranked number one for technical approach and cost, and concludes with a discussion of approaches that we have taken to performing this work, including issues related to performing the work as part of a team. The primary focus is on communication, workforce, equipment, and coordination issues. Finally, the paper documents the rules that we use to assure the work is performed safely and successfully. (author)

  15. FY 2008 Next Generation Safeguards Initiative International Safeguards Education and Training Pilot Progerams Summary Report

    SciTech Connect

    Dreicer, M; Anzelon, G; Essner, J; Dougan, A; Doyle, J; Boyer, B; Hypes, P; Sokova, E; Wehling, F

    2008-10-17

    Key component of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) launched by the National Nuclear Security Administration is the development of human capital to meet present and future challenges to the safeguards regime. An effective university-level education in safeguards and related disciplines is an essential element in a layered strategy to rebuild the safeguards human resource capacity. Two pilot programs at university level, involving 44 students, were initiated and implemented in spring-summer 2008 and linked to hands-on internships at LANL or LLNL. During the internships, students worked on specific safeguards-related projects with a designated Laboratory Mentor to provide broader exposure to nuclear materials management and information analytical techniques. The Safeguards and Nuclear Material Management pilot program was a collaboration between the Texas A&M University (TAMU), Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). It included a 16-lecture course held during a summer internship program. The instructors for the course were from LANL together with TAMU faculty and LLNL experts. The LANL-based course was shared with the students spending their internship at LLNL via video conference. A week-long table-top (or hands-on) exercise on was also conducted at LANL. The student population was a mix of 28 students from a 12 universities participating in a variety of summer internship programs held at LANL and LLNL. A large portion of the students were TAMU students participating in the NGSI pilot. The International Nuclear Safeguards Policy and Information Analysis pilot program was implemented at the Monterey Institute for International Studies (MIIS) in cooperation with LLNL. It included a two-week intensive course consisting of 20 lectures and two exercises. MIIS, LLNL, and speakers from other U.S. national laboratories (LANL, BNL) delivered lectures for the audience of 16 students. The majority of students were

  16. Lessons Learned in International Safeguards - Implementation of Safeguards at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant

    SciTech Connect

    Ehinger, Michael H; Johnson, Shirley

    2010-02-01

    The focus of this report is lessons learned at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP). However, the subject of lessons learned for application of international safeguards at reprocessing plants includes a cumulative history of inspections starting at the West Valley (New York, U.S.A.) reprocessing plant in 1969 and proceeding through all of the efforts over the years. The RRP is the latest and most challenging application the International Atomic Energy Agency has faced. In many ways the challenges have remained the same, timely inspection and evaluation with limited inspector resources, with the continuing realization that planning and preparations can never start early enough in the life cycle of a facility. Lessons learned over the years have involved the challenges of using ongoing advances in technology and dealing with facilities with increased throughput and continuous operation. This report will begin with a review of historical developments and lessons learned. This will provide a basis for a discussion of the experiences and lessons learned from the implementation of international safeguards at RRP.

  17. Safeguards Culture

    SciTech Connect

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2012-07-01

    The concepts of nuclear safety and security culture are well established; however, a common understanding of safeguards culture is not internationally recognized. Supported by the National Nuclear Security Administration, the authors prepared this report, an analysis of the concept of safeguards culture, and gauged its value to the safeguards community. The authors explored distinctions between safeguards culture, safeguards compliance, and safeguards performance, and evaluated synergies and differences between safeguards culture and safety/security culture. The report concludes with suggested next steps.

  18. Bulk Analysis of International Atomic Energy Agency Environmental Samples in Support of International Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Wogman, Ned A.; Olsen, Khris B.; Farmer, Orville T.

    2008-03-28

    Inspectors for the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Safeguards Program collect environmental samples under traditional safeguards, strengthened safeguards, or additional protocols during facility inspections at declared nuclear facilities throughout the world. Currently, there are 400 facilities under IAEA safeguards in 70 countries. All environmental samples are returned to IAEA’s Clean Laboratory located in Seiberdorf, Austria, where they are screened for gamma-ray emitting isotopes and prepared for distribution to laboratories for additional sampling. After the sample(s) are analyzed, the results are reported to the United States Network of Analytical Laboratories for input into its database. The IAEA reviews the data and incorporates the results into the safeguards evaluation of the state (country).

  19. International Internships in Nuclear Safeguards and Security: Challenges and Successes

    SciTech Connect

    Duncan, Cristen L.; Heinberg, Cynthia L.; Killinger, Mark H.; Goodey, Kent O.; Kryuchkov, Eduard F.; Geraskin, Nikolai I.; Silaev, Maxim E.; Sokova, Elena K.; Ford, David G.

    2010-04-20

    All students in the Russian safeguards and security degree programs at the National Research Nuclear University MEPhI and Tomsk Polytechnic University, sponsored by the Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A) Education Project, take part in a domestic internship at a Russian enterprise or facility. In addition, a select few students are placed in an international internship. These internships provide students with a better view of how MPC&A and nonproliferation in general are addressed outside of Russia. The possibility of an international internship is a significant incentive for students to enroll in the safeguards and security degree programs. The U.S. members of the MPC&A Education Project team interview students who have been nominated by their professors. These students must have initiative and reasonable English skills. The project team and professors then select students to be tentatively placed in various international internships during the summer or fall of their final year of study. Final arrangements are then made with the host organizations. This paper describes the benefits of the joint United States/Russia cooperation for next-generation workforce development, some of the international internships that have been carried out, the benefits of these international internships, and lessons learned in implementing them.

  20. Oak Ridge National Laboratory Office of International Nuclear Safeguards: Human Capital Development Activity in FY16

    SciTech Connect

    Gilligan, Kimberly V.; Gaudet, Rachel N.

    2016-09-30

    In 2007, the U.S. Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control (NPAC) completed a comprehensive review of the current and potential future challenges facing the international safeguards system. One of the report’s key recommendations was for DOE NNSA to launch a major new program to revitalize the international safeguards technology and human resource base. In 2007, at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) General Conference, then Secretary of Energy Samuel W. Bodman announced the newly created Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). NGSI consists of five program elements: policy development and outreach, concepts and approaches, technology and analytical methodologies, human capital development (HCD), and infrastructure development. This report addresses the HCD component of NGSI. The goal of the HCD component as defined in the NNSA Program Plan is “to revitalize and expand the international safeguards human capital base by attracting and training a new generation of talent.” The major objectives listed in the HCD goal include education and training, outreach to universities and professional societies, postdoctoral appointments, and summer internships at national laboratories.

  1. Implementation of remove monitoring in facilities under safeguards with unattended systems

    SciTech Connect

    Beddingfield, David H; Nordquist, Heather A; Umebayaashi, Eiji

    2009-01-01

    Remote monitoring is being applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at nuclear facilities around the world. At the Monju Reactor in Japan we have designed, developed and implemented a remote monitoring approach that can serve as a model for applying remote monitoring to facilities that are already under full-scope safeguards using unattended instrumentation. Remote monitoring implementations have historically relied upon the use of specialized data collection hardware and system design features that integrate remote monitoring into the safeguards data collection system. The integration of remote monitoring and unattended data collection increases the complexity of safeguards data collection systems. This increase in complexity necessarily produces a corresponding reduction of system reliability compared to less-complex unattended monitoring systems. At the Monju facility we have implemented a remote monitoring system that is decoupled from the activity of safeguards data collection. In the completed system the function of remote data transfer is separated from the function of safeguards data collection. As such, a failure of the remote monitoring function cannot produce an associated loss of safeguards data, as is possible with integrated remote-monitoring implementations. Currently, all safeguards data from this facility is available to the IAEA on a 24/7 basis. This facility employs five radiation-based unattended systems, video surveillance and numerous optical seal systems. The implementation of remote monitoring at this facility, while increasing the complexity of the safeguards system, is designed to avoid any corresponding reduction in reliability of the safeguards data collection systems by having decoupled these functions. This design and implementation can serve as a model for implementation of remote monitoring at nuclear facilities that currently employ unattended safeguards systems.

  2. International Atomic Energy agency use of facility calorimeters for safeguards purposes

    SciTech Connect

    Mcrae, L.P.

    1996-06-28

    The IAEA is performing nuclear materials safeguards on an inventory of pure and scrap plutonium oxide powder materials held in Vault 3 of the Plutonium Finishing Plant at the Hanford Site,Washington State. The IAEA uses qualitative and quantitative techniques (weighing, sampling, and destructive analyses) to verify the presence and quantity of the nuclear materials under safeguards. In contrast, the plant operator generally uses non-destructive plutonium assay based on gamma spectrometry and calorimetry for its most accurate plutonium powder container measurements. Recent results have shown that the operator`s calorimeter system achieves measurement variabilities comparable with, or better than, the destructive analyses, particularly for scrap. The results are achieved more quickly and economically,with less waste and lower radiation exposure and contamination hazard, by calorimetry than by classical destructive analyses.Techniques, including authentication methods, are being jointly developed to permit use of the operator`s calorimeter system for international safeguards purposes. The authentication is to ensure the independence of, and to substantiate the validity of,calorimeter measurements for international safeguards. The authentication methods considered and being developed are discussed.

  3. U.S. Department of Energy`s International Safeguards Program

    SciTech Connect

    Sheely, K.B.

    1993-12-31

    Since 1978 the United States Department of Energy`s (DOE) International Safeguards Program has conducted policy analysis, strategies and technology development, international cooperation and training to support the formulation and implementation of international safeguards. The end of the Gulf War (1991), the end of the Cold War (1992), and the trend towards regionalization of safeguards has led to increased US and international attention to the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation and the need for significantly greater support to nonproliferation policy making and implementation activities. As a result, DOE`s International Safeguards Program has undergone substantial growth and has continued to focus its resources on the priority issues which are part of today`s and tomorrow`s world. In order to effectively and efficiently conduct and manage these activities the International Safeguards Program has developed and continues to refine and implement a strategic plan. This plan provides guidance for the activities conducted by support organizations and makes the program objectives and activities more transparent to other interested parties. The Strategic Plan centralizes into one document the mission, priorities, resources, activities, and operating procedures of DOE`s International Safeguards Program. The International Safeguards Program provides technical leadership in the formulation and implementation of the US nonproliferation policy concerning the IAEA, international safeguards, physical protection, and nuclear safeguards inspection activities.

  4. Safeguards equipment of the future integrated monitoring systems and remote monitoring

    SciTech Connect

    Sonnier, C.S.; Johnson, C.S.

    1994-08-01

    Becoming aware of the significant events of the past four years and their effect on the expectations to international safeguards, it is necessary to reflect on which direction the development of nuclear safeguards in a new era needs to take and the implications. The lime proven monitoring techniques, based on quantitative factor`s and demonstrated universal application, have shown their merit. However, the new expectations suggest a possibility that a future IAEA safeguards system could rely more heavily on the value of a comprehensive, transparent and open implementation regime. Within such a regime, the associated measures need to be determined and technological support identified. This paper will identify the proven techniques which, with appropriate implementation support, could most quickly make available additional measures for a comprehensive, transparent and open implementation regime. In particular, it will examine the future of Integrated Monitoring Systems and Remote Monitoring in international safeguards, including technical and other related factors.

  5. Systems Analysis of Safeguards Effectiveness in a Uranium Conversion Facility

    SciTech Connect

    Elayat, H A; Lambert, H; O'Connell, W J

    2004-06-16

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is interested in developing tools and methods for potential U.S. use in designing and evaluating safeguards systems. For this goal several DOE National Laboratories are defining the characteristics of typical facilities of several size scales, and the safeguards measures and instrumentation that could be applied. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory is providing systems modeling and analysis of facility and safeguards operations, diversion path generation, and safeguards system effectiveness. The constituent elements of diversion scenarios are structured using directed graphs (digraphs) and fault trees. Safeguards indicator probabilities are based on sampling statistics and/or measurement accuracies. Scenarios are ranked based on value and quantity of material removed and the estimated probability of non-detection. Significant scenarios, especially those involving timeliness or randomly varying order of events, are transferred to simulation analysis. Simulations show the range of conditions encountered by the safeguards measurements and inspections, e.g., the quantities of intermediate materials in temporary storage and the time sequencing of material flow. Given a diversion campaign, simulations show how much the range of the same parameters observed by the safeguards system can differ from the base-case range. The combination of digraphs, fault trees, statistics and simulation constitute a method for evaluation of the estimated benefit of alternate or additional safeguards equipment or features. A generic example illustrates the method.

  6. Secure Video Surveillance System (SVSS) for unannounced safeguards inspections.

    SciTech Connect

    Galdoz, Erwin G. , Rio de Janeiro, Brazil); Pinkalla, Mark

    2010-09-01

    The Secure Video Surveillance System (SVSS) is a collaborative effort between the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC). The joint project addresses specific requirements of redundant surveillance systems installed in two South American nuclear facilities as a tool to support unannounced inspections conducted by ABACC and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The surveillance covers the critical time (as much as a few hours) between the notification of an inspection and the access of inspectors to the location in facility where surveillance equipment is installed. ABACC and the IAEA currently use the EURATOM Multiple Optical Surveillance System (EMOSS). This outdated system is no longer available or supported by the manufacturer. The current EMOSS system has met the project objective; however, the lack of available replacement parts and system support has made this system unsustainable and has increased the risk of an inoperable system. A new system that utilizes current technology and is maintainable is required to replace the aging EMOSS system. ABACC intends to replace one of the existing ABACC EMOSS systems by the Secure Video Surveillance System. SVSS utilizes commercial off-the shelf (COTS) technologies for all individual components. Sandia National Laboratories supported the system design for SVSS to meet Safeguards requirements, i.e. tamper indication, data authentication, etc. The SVSS consists of two video surveillance cameras linked securely to a data collection unit. The collection unit is capable of retaining historical surveillance data for at least three hours with picture intervals as short as 1sec. Images in .jpg format are available to inspectors using various software review tools. SNL has delivered two SVSS systems for test and evaluation at the ABACC Safeguards Laboratory. An additional 'proto-type' system remains

  7. Us-Japan cooperation on safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Beddingfield, David H; Menlove, Howard O; Hori, Masato; Kawakubo, Yoko; Mcclelland - Kerr, J

    2009-01-01

    There is a long history of collaborative safeguards development between the United States and Japan. Japan has built, and continues to expand, the largest civil nuclear fuel cycle under full-scope IAEA safeguards in world. This development has posed unique challenges to the international safeguards system. Safeguards developments made through the US-Japan cooperation to address these unique challenges have significantly impacted the technologies deployed for international safeguards applications around the world.

  8. Enabling International Safeguards Research and Development in the United States

    SciTech Connect

    John E. Dwight; Mark J. Schanfein; Trond A. Bjornard

    2009-07-01

    Idaho National Laboratory (INL) is the lead laboratory in nuclear energy research and development within the U.S. Department of Energy national laboratory complex. INL is tasked with the advancement of nuclear energy research and development, and leadership in the renaissance of nuclear power globally. INL scientists have been central to the assessment of needs and the integration of technical programs aimed at the world-wide growth of nuclear power. One of the grand challenges of the nuclear energy resurgence is nuclear nonproliferation. Nonproliferation technology development is key to meeting this challenge. The needed advances in nonproliferation technologies are being made more difficult by the growing gap between increasing demands for nuclear materials to support technology development, and reduced availability of these materials. The gap is caused by the reduction, consolidation and more stringent lockdown of nuclear materials, made necessary by heightened and evolving security concerns, in the face of increased demand for materials to support technology development. Ironically, the increased demand for materials for technology development is made necessary by these same security concerns. The situation will continue to worsen if safeguards and security budgets remain limited for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and many member states, while growth in global nuclear energy becomes a reality. Effective U.S. leadership in the closing of this gap is vital to homeland security and global stability. INL has taken positive steps, described in this paper, to close this gap by reestablishing a viable base for the development, testing and demonstration of safeguards and security technologies. Key attributes of this technology development base are (1) the availability of a wide variety of special nuclear materials in forms that allow for enhanced accessibility; (2) ease of access by U.S. government, national laboratory, industry and academic institution

  9. Review of selected dynamic material control functions for international safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Lowry, L.L.

    1980-09-01

    With the development of Dynamic Special Nuclear Material Accounting and Control systems used in nuclear manufacturing and reprocessing plants, there arises the question as to how these systems affect the IAEA inspection capabilities. The systems in being and under development provide information and control for a variety of purposes important to the plant operator, the safeguards purpose being one of them. This report attempts to judge the usefulness of these dynamic systems to the IAEA and have defined 12 functions that provide essential information to it. If the information acquired by these dynamic systems is to be useful to the IAEA, the inspectors must be able to independently verify it. Some suggestions are made as to how this might be done. But, even if it should not be possible to verify all the data, the availability to the IAEA of detailed, simultaneous, and plant-wide information would tend to inhibit a plant operator from attempting to generate a floating or fictitious inventory. Suggestions are made that might be helpful in the design of future software systems, an area which has proved to be fatally deficient in some systems and difficult in all.

  10. Zone approaches to international safeguards of a nuclear fuel cycle

    SciTech Connect

    Fishbone, L.G.; Higinbotham, W.A.

    1986-01-01

    At present the IAEA designs its safeguards approach with regard to each type of nuclear facility so that the safeguards activities and effort are essentially the same for a given type and size of nuclear facility wherever it may be located. Conclusions regarding a state are derived by combining the results of safeguards verifications for the individual facilities within it. We have examined safeguards approaches for a state nuclear fuel cycle that take into account the existence of all of the nuclear facilities in the state. We have focussed on the fresh-fuel zone of an advanced nuclear fuel cycle, the several facilities of which use or process low-enriched uranium. At one extreme, flows and inventories would be verified at each material balance area. At the other extreme, the flows into and out of the zone and the inventory of the whole zone would be verified. The intention is to develop an approach which will make it possible to compare the technical effectiveness and the inspection effort for the facility-oriented approach, for the zone approach and for some reasonable intermediate safeguards approaches. Technical effectiveness, in these cases, means an estimate of the assurance that all nuclear material has been accounted for.

  11. Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1995-01-01

    process inventory: as above, for solutions - Wastes: leached hulls (short lengths of fuel-rod cladding after the fuel itself has been dissolved away...common tion probability is defined as 90 per- type is the liquid-metal fast breeder cent. reactor, or LMFBR ) 1137 138 1 Nuclear Safeguards and the

  12. The Prospective Durability of the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) Safeguards System and Financing of the System. Volume 3. Main Report

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1987-02-24

    bilateral supply arrangements, the Treaty of Tlatelolco , several so-called IAEA project agreements, as well as some voluntary safe- guards agreements...regional inspectorate for Latin America or the Western Hemisphere structured around the Treaty of Tlatelolco (b) possibly seeking to broaden the scope of...West European regional system through joint efforts between EURATOM and the OECD. At P least conceptually the Treaty of TlateloLco might serve as the

  13. Treaty on Open Skies sensor technologies with potential international safeguards applications

    SciTech Connect

    Sandoval, M.B.

    1996-12-01

    The Treaty on Open Skies is a precedent-setting agreement that allows signatory states to fly aircraft over each other`s territory with sensor systems. The purpose of the Treaty is to improve confidence and security with respect to military activities of the signatories. This paper reviews the sensor technology that is currently allowed by the Treaty on Open Skies and potential future sensor technology. The Treaty on Open Skies does have provisions to allow for the improvement of the technology of the current sensor systems and for the proposal of new sensors after a period of time. This can occur only after the Treaty has been ratified and has entered into force. If this regime was to be used for other than Treaty on Open Skies applications some modifications to the allowed sensor technology should be examined. This paper presents some ideas on potential improvements to existing allowed sensor technology as well as some suggested new advanced sensor systems that would be useful for future potential monitoring of safeguard`s related activities. This paper addresses advanced imaging sensors and non-imaging sensors for potential use in aerial remote sensing roles that involve international data sharing.

  14. Integrating Nuclear Information to Enhance Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Suski, N; Dubrin, J; Scarbrough, J

    2001-10-01

    Implementation of the Strengthened Safeguards System provides many new opportunities and challenges for collecting; analyzing and archiving nuclear materials safeguards information. For the first time in the history of safeguards, the International Atomic Energy Agency will be required not only to verify the accuracy of declarations, but also the completeness. To successfully implement the new safeguards regime, new and innovative ways of collecting, analyzing and archiving large amounts of safeguards information will be required. A conceptual system design that utilizes a geographical information system for the integration and analysis of this safeguards information will be described and demonstrated.

  15. Application of laser induced breakdown spectroscopy (LIBS) instrumentation for international safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Barefield Ii, James E; Clegg, Samuel M; Lopez, Leon N; Le, Loan A; Veirs, D Kirk; Browne, Mike

    2010-01-01

    Advanced methodologies and improvements to current measurements techniques are needed to strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of international safeguards. This need was recognized and discussed at a Technical Meeting on 'The Application of Laser Spectrometry Techniques in IAEA Safeguards' held at IAEA headquarters (September 2006). One of the principal recommendations from that meeting was the need to pursue the development of novel complementary access instrumentation based on Laser Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy (UBS) for the detection of gaseous and solid signatures and indicators of nuclear fuel cycle processes and associated materials'. Pursuant to this recommendation the Department of Safeguards (SG) under the Division of Technical Support (SGTS) convened the 'Experts and Users Advisory Meeting on Laser Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy (LIBS) for Safeguards Applications' also held at IAEA headquarters (July 2008). This meeting was attended by 12 LlBS experts from the Czech Republic, the European Commission, France, the Republic of South Korea, the United States of America, Germany, the United Kingdom of Great Britain, Canada, and Northern Ireland. Following a presentation of the needs of the IAEA inspectors, the LIBS experts agreed that needs as presented could be partially or fully fulfilled using LIBS instrumentation. Inspectors needs were grouped into the following broad categories: (1) Improvements to in-field measurements/environmental sampling; (2) Monitoring status of activities in Hot Cells; (3) Verify status of activity at a declared facility via process monitoring; and (4) Need for pre-screening of environmental samples before analysis. The primary tool employed by the IAEA to detect undeclared processes and activities at special nuclear material facilities and sites is environmental sampling. One of the objectives of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) Program Plan calls for the development of advanced tools and methodologies to

  16. 13 CFR 108.506 - Safeguarding the NMVC Company's assets/Internal controls.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... assets/Internal controls. 108.506 Section 108.506 Business Credit and Assistance SMALL BUSINESS... Requirements § 108.506 Safeguarding the NMVC Company's assets/Internal controls. You must adopt a plan to... document describing your control procedures....

  17. 14 CFR 1212.605 - Safeguarding information in systems of records.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 14 Aeronautics and Space 5 2011-01-01 2010-01-01 true Safeguarding information in systems of... PRIVACY ACT-NASA REGULATIONS Instructions for NASA Employees § 1212.605 Safeguarding information in systems of records. (a) Safeguards appropriate for a NASA system of records shall be developed by...

  18. 14 CFR 1212.605 - Safeguarding information in systems of records.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 14 Aeronautics and Space 5 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Safeguarding information in systems of... PRIVACY ACT-NASA REGULATIONS Instructions for NASA Employees § 1212.605 Safeguarding information in systems of records. (a) Safeguards appropriate for a NASA system of records shall be developed by...

  19. Conceptual baseline document for the nuclear materials safeguards system

    SciTech Connect

    Nelson, R.A.

    1995-08-01

    This document defines the baseline scope, schedule, and cost requirements of the Nuclear Materials Safeguards System (NMSS) replacement for the Plutonium Finishing Plant. The Nuclear Material Safeguards System (NMSS), operating in PFP, comprises data from several site safeguards systems that have been merged since 1987. NMSS was designed and implemented to the state of computer technology for the mid 1970`s. Since implementation, the hardware vendor has stopped producing computer systems and the availability of personnel trained and willing to work with the technology has diminished. Maintenance has become expensive and `reliability is a serious concern. -This effort provides a replacement in kind of the NMSS, using modern, scalable, upgradable hardware and software to the same standards used for the Hanford Local Area Network (HLAN) system. The NMSS Replacement is a Client/Server architecture designed on a Personal Computer based local area network (LAN) platform. The LAN is provided through an ethernet interface running the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP). This architecture conforms to the HLAN standard, including the End System Operating Environment (ESOE). The Server runs the Microsoft Windows NT` Server operating system, Microsoft SQL Server2 database management system, and application tools. Clients run Microsoft Windows` and application software provided as part of the system. The interface between the clients and the database is through Microsoft ODBC4.

  20. Safeguards equipment of the future: Integrated monitoring systems and remote monitoring

    SciTech Connect

    Sonnier, C.S.; Johnson, C.S.

    1994-02-01

    From the beginning, equipment to support IAEA Safeguards could be characterized as that which is used to measure nuclear material, Destructive Assay (DA) and Non Destructive Assay (NDA), and that which is used to provide continuity of knowledge between inspection intervals, Containment & Surveillance (C/S). C/S equipment has often been thought of as Cameras and Seals, with a limited number of monitors being employed as they became available. In recent years, technology has advanced at an extremely rapid rate, and continues to do so. The traditional film cameras are being replaced by video equipment, and fiber optic and electronic seals have come into rather widespread use. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of this evolution, and that which indicates the wave of the future without much question, is the integration of video surveillance and electronic seals with a variety of monitors. This is demonstrated by safeguards systems which are installed in several nuclear facilities in France, Germany, Japan, the UK, the USA, and elsewhere. The terminology of Integrated Monitoring Systems (IMS) has emerged, with the employment of network technology capable of interconnecting all desired elements in a very flexible manner. Also, the technology for transmission of a wide variety of information to off-site locations, termed Remote Monitoring, is in widespread industrial use, requiring very little adaptation for safeguards use. This paper examines the future of the Integrated Monitoring Systems and Remote Monitoring in International Safeguards, including technical and other related factors.

  1. Facility Safeguardability Analysis In Support of Safeguards-by-Design

    SciTech Connect

    Philip Casey Durst; Roald Wigeland; Robert Bari; Trond Bjornard; John Hockert; Michael Zentner

    2010-07-01

    The following report proposes the use of Facility Safeguardability Analysis (FSA) to: i) compare and evaluate nuclear safeguards measures, ii) optimize the prospective facility safeguards approach, iii) objectively and analytically evaluate nuclear facility safeguardability, and iv) evaluate and optimize barriers within the facility and process design to minimize the risk of diversion and theft of nuclear material. As proposed by the authors, Facility Safeguardability Analysis would be used by the Facility Designer and/or Project Design Team during the design and construction of the nuclear facility to evaluate and optimize the facility safeguards approach and design of the safeguards system. Through a process of “Safeguards-by-Design” (SBD), this would be done at the earliest stages of project conceptual design and would involve domestic and international nuclear regulators and authorities, including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The benefits of the Safeguards-by-Design approach is that it would clarify at a very early stage the international and domestic safeguards requirements for the Construction Project Team, and the best design and operating practices for meeting these requirements. It would also minimize the risk to the construction project, in terms of cost overruns or delays, which might otherwise occur if the nuclear safeguards measures are not incorporated into the facility design at an early stage. Incorporating nuclear safeguards measures is straight forward for nuclear facilities of existing design, but becomes more challenging with new designs and more complex nuclear facilities. For this reason, the facility designer and Project Design Team require an analytical tool for comparing safeguards measures, options, and approaches, and for evaluating the “safeguardability” of the facility. The report explains how preliminary diversion path analysis and the Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection (PRPP) evaluation

  2. Overview of the Facility Safeguardability Analysis (FSA) Process

    SciTech Connect

    Bari, Robert A.; Hockert, John; Wonder, Edward F.; Johnson, Scott J.; Wigeland, Roald; Zentner, Michael D.

    2012-08-01

    Executive Summary The safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is intended to provide the international community with credible assurance that a State is fulfilling its safeguards obligations. Effective and cost-efficient IAEA safeguards at the facility level are, and will remain, an important element of IAEA safeguards as those safeguards evolve towards a “State-Level approach.” The Safeguards by Design (SBD) concept can facilitate the implementation of these effective and cost-efficient facility-level safeguards (Bjornard, et al. 2009a, 2009b; IAEA, 1998; Wonder & Hockert, 2011). This report, sponsored by the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Nuclear Safeguards and Security, introduces a methodology intended to ensure that the diverse approaches to Safeguards by Design can be effectively integrated and consistently used to cost effectively enhance the application of international safeguards.

  3. Role of IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards in confidence building

    SciTech Connect

    Augustson, R.H.

    1989-01-01

    In this paper, I will examine some attributes of confidence building and connect them with how the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) interacts with its member states in carrying out its safeguards function. These interactions and the structure set up to define them help maintain and strengthen confidence between the IAEA and the member states and among these states. 3 refs.

  4. The U.S./IAEA Workshop on Software Sustainability for Safeguards Instrumentation: Report to the NNSA DOE Office of International Nuclear Safeguards (NA-241)

    SciTech Connect

    Pepper, Susan E.; Pickett, Chris A.; Queirolo, Al; Bachner, Katherine M.; Worrall, Louise G.

    2015-04-07

    The U.S Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) convened a workshop on Software Sustainability for Safeguards Instrumentation in Vienna, Austria, May 6-8, 2014. Safeguards instrumentation software must be sustained in a changing environment to ensure existing instruments can continue to perform as designed, with improved security. The approaches to the development and maintenance of instrument software used in the past may not be the best model for the future and, therefore, the organizers’ goal was to investigate these past approaches and to determine an optimal path forward. The purpose of this report is to provide input for the DOE NNSA Office of International Nuclear Safeguards (NA-241) and other stakeholders that can be utilized when making decisions related to the development and maintenance of software used in the implementation of international nuclear safeguards. For example, this guidance can be used when determining whether to fund the development, upgrade, or replacement of a particular software product. The report identifies the challenges related to sustaining software, and makes recommendations for addressing these challenges, supported by summaries and detailed notes from the workshop discussions. In addition the authors provide a set of recommendations for institutionalizing software sustainability practices in the safeguards community. The term “software sustainability” was defined for this workshop as ensuring that safeguards instrument software and algorithm functionality can be maintained efficiently throughout the instrument lifecycle, without interruption and providing the ability to continue to improve that software as needs arise.

  5. NNSA's next generation safeguards initiative to define an effective state system of accounting and control

    SciTech Connect

    Stevens, Rebecca S; Sunshine, Alexander; Matthews, Caroline; Frazer, Sarah; Matthews, Carrie

    2010-01-01

    The International Nuclear Safeguards and Engagement Program (INSEP), the international outreach component of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), is a collaborative program that endeavors to strengthen international safeguards at all stages of nuclear development. One of the critical ways the program achieves this objective is through working with partners to increase the effectiveness of the State System of Accountancy for and Control of Nuclear Materials (SSAC) - the essential elements of national, regulatory and facility safeguards competencies that work as a system to provide the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the world the full assurance of the state's adherence to its safeguards agreements. INSEP provides assistance in developing a state's SSAC in a number of areas, from developing national legislation governing the possession and use of nuclear material to working with nuclear facility operators to developing good practices in waste management. INSEP has collaborated with foreign partners in peaceful nuclear applications for over two decades, but recently, it has focused its efforts on strengthening SSACs due to the growth of nuclear power worldwide, particularly in countries with limited nuclear infrastructures. This new area of focus has prompted INSEP to develop a model of SSAC competencies that will serve not only as a structure for its engagement with partner states, but also as a means to facilitate coordination with other states that provide training and assistance, and as a mechanism for evaluating the effectiveness of its work in reaching its intended objectives. While this model uses as its starting point the requirements on a State that are presented in the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol, it is not, in itself, a requirements document or guidance for implementing requirements. It is rather an analysis of what capabilities will be needed in a State to be able to meet requirements and to

  6. 17 CFR 49.24 - System safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-04-01

    ... swap data in its custody: (1) Establish and maintain a program of risk analysis and oversight to... repository's program of risk analysis and oversight with respect to its operations and automated systems shall address each of the following categories of risk analysis and oversight: (1) Information...

  7. Nuclear materials safeguards for the future

    SciTech Connect

    Tape, J.W.

    1995-12-31

    Basic concepts of domestic and international safeguards are described, with an emphasis on safeguards systems for the fuel cycles of commercial power reactors. Future trends in institutional and technical measures for nuclear materials safeguards are outlined. The conclusion is that continued developments in safeguards approaches and technology, coupled with institutional measures that facilitate the global management and protection of nuclear materials, are up to the challenge of safeguarding the growing inventories of nuclear materials in commercial fuel cycles in technologically advanced States with stable governments that have signed the nonproliferation treaty. These same approaches also show promise for facilitating international inspection of excess weapons materials and verifying a fissile materials cutoff convention.

  8. Possible Contributions of International Organizations to Safeguarding Human Rights.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Bennett, A. LeRoy

    This paper discusses ways in which international organizations have in the past and can continue in the future to foster social, economic, and cultural rights on a global scale. Involvement of international organizations such as the United Nations in the realm of human rights expanded after the second world war. Examples of contributions to the…

  9. Extended Evaluations of the Commercial Spectrometer Systems for Safeguards Applications

    SciTech Connect

    Duc T. Vo

    1999-08-01

    Safeguards applications require the best of the spectrometer system with excellent resolution, stability, and throughput. Instruments must perform well in all situations and environments. Data communication to the computer should be convenient, fast, and reliable. The software should have all the necessary tools and be easy to use. Portable systems should be small in size, lightweight, and have a long battery life. Nine commercially available spectrometer systems are tested with five different germanium detectors. Considering the performance of the Digital Signal Processors (DSP), digital-based spectroscope y may become the way of future gamma-ray spectroscopy.

  10. International safeguards for a modern MOX (mixed-oxide) fuel fabrication facility

    SciTech Connect

    Pillay, K.K.S.; Stirpe, D.; Picard, R.R.

    1987-03-01

    Bulk-handling facilities that process plutonium for commercial fuel cycles offer considerable challenges to nuclear materials safeguards. Modern fuel fabrication facilities that handle mixed oxides of plutonium and uranium (MOX) often have large inventories of special nuclear materials in their process lines and in storage areas for feed and product materials. In addition, the remote automated processing prevalent at new MOX facilities, which is necessary to minimize radiation exposures to personnel, tends to limit access for measurements and inspections. The facility design considered in this study incorporates all these features as well as state-of-the-art measurement technologies for materials accounting. Key elements of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards for such a fuel-cycle facility have been identified in this report, and several issues of primary importance to materials accountancy and IAEA verifications have been examined. We have calculated detection sensitivities for abrupt and protracted diversions of plutonium assuming a single materials balance area for all processing areas. To help achieve optimal use of limited IAEA inspection resources, we have calculated sampling plans for attributes/variables verification. In addition, we have demonstrated the usefulness of calculating sigma/sub (MUF-D)/ and detection probabilities corresponding to specified material-loss scenarios and resource allocations. The data developed and the analyses performed during this study can assist both the facility operator and the IAEA in formulating necessary safeguards approaches and verification procedures to implement international safeguards for special nuclear materials.

  11. Operational facility-integrated computer system for safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Armento, W.J.; Brooksbank, R.E.; Krichinsky, A.M.

    1980-01-01

    A computer system for safeguards in an active, remotely operated, nuclear fuel processing pilot plant has been developed. This sytem maintains (1) comprehensive records of special nuclear materials, (2) automatically updated book inventory files, (3) material transfer catalogs, (4) timely inventory estimations, (5) sample transactions, (6) automatic, on-line volume balances and alarmings, and (7) terminal access and applications software monitoring and logging. Future development will include near-real-time SNM mass balancing as both a static, in-tank summation and a dynamic, in-line determination. It is planned to incorporate aspects of site security and physical protection into the computer monitoring.

  12. Safeguards Culture: Lessons Learned

    SciTech Connect

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2010-06-01

    Today, safeguards culture can be a useful tool for measuring nonproliferation postures, but so far its impact on the international safeguards regime has been underappreciated. There is no agreed upon definition for safeguards culture nor agreement on how it should be measured. This paper argues that safeguards culture as an indicator of a country’s nonproliferation posture can be a useful tool.

  13. INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEM CYBER SECURITY: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS RELEVANT TO NUCLEAR FACILITIES, SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY

    SciTech Connect

    Robert S. Anderson; Mark Schanfein; Trond Bjornard; Paul Moskowitz

    2011-07-01

    Typical questions surrounding industrial control system (ICS) cyber security always lead back to: What could a cyber attack do to my system(s) and; how much should I worry about it? These two leading questions represent only a fraction of questions asked when discussing cyber security as it applies to any program, company, business, or organization. The intent of this paper is to open a dialog of important pertinent questions and answers that managers of nuclear facilities engaged in nuclear facility security and safeguards should examine, i.e., what questions should be asked; and how do the answers affect an organization's ability to effectively safeguard and secure nuclear material. When a cyber intrusion is reported, what does that mean? Can an intrusion be detected or go un-noticed? Are nuclear security or safeguards systems potentially vulnerable? What about the digital systems employed in process monitoring, and international safeguards? Organizations expend considerable efforts to ensure that their facilities can maintain continuity of operations against physical threats. However, cyber threats particularly on ICSs may not be well known or understood, and often do not receive adequate attention. With the disclosure of the Stuxnet virus that has recently attacked nuclear infrastructure, many organizations have recognized the need for an urgent interest in cyber attacks and defenses against them. Several questions arise including discussions about the insider threat, adequate cyber protections, program readiness, encryption, and many more. These questions, among others, are discussed so as to raise the awareness and shed light on ways to protect nuclear facilities and materials against such attacks.

  14. FEMO, A FLOW AND ENRICHMENT MONITOR FOR VERIFYING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS REQUIREMENTS AT A GAS CENTRIFUGE ENRICHMENT FACILITY

    SciTech Connect

    Gunning, John E; Laughter, Mark D; March-Leuba, Jose A

    2008-01-01

    A number of countries have received construction licenses or are contemplating the construction of large-capacity gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs). The capability to independently verify nuclear material flows is a key component of international safeguards approaches, and the IAEA does not currently have an approved method to continuously monitor the mass flow of 235U in uranium hexafluoride (UF6) gas streams. Oak Ridge National Laboratory is investigating the development of a flow and enrichment monitor, or FEMO, based on an existing blend-down monitoring system (BDMS). The BDMS was designed to continuously monitor both 235U mass flow and enrichment of UF6 streams at the low pressures similar to those which exists at GCEPs. BDMSs have been installed at three sites-the first unit has operated successfully in an unattended environment for approximately 10 years. To be acceptable to GCEP operators, it is essential that the instrument be installed and maintained without interrupting operations. A means to continuously verify flow as is proposed by FEMO will likely be needed to monitor safeguards at large-capacity plants. This will enable the safeguards effectiveness that currently exists at smaller plants to be maintained at the larger facilities and also has the potential to reduce labor costs associated with inspections at current and future plants. This paper describes the FEMO design requirements, operating capabilities, and development work required before field demonstration.

  15. Safeguards and security considerations for automated and robotic systems

    SciTech Connect

    Jordan, S.E.; Jaeger, C.D.

    1994-09-01

    Within the reconfigured Nuclear Weapons Complex there will be a large number of automated and robotic (A&R) systems because of the many benefits derived from their use. To meet the overall security requirements of a facility, consideration must be given to those systems that handle and process nuclear material. Since automation and robotics is a relatively new technology, not widely applied to the Nuclear Weapons Complex, safeguards and security (S&S) issues related to these systems have not been extensively explored, and no guidance presently exists. The goal of this effort is to help integrate S&S into the design of future A&R systems. Towards this, the authors first examined existing A and R systems from a security perspective to identify areas of concern and possible solutions of these problems. They then were able to develop generalized S&S guidance and design considerations for automation and robotics.

  16. Analysis of the vibration response of a safeguard piping system

    SciTech Connect

    Trollat, C.; Tephany, F.; Payan, F. )

    1993-01-01

    Following the discovery of a longitudinal through-wall crack at the base of a pressure instrumentation tap on the system, Electricite de France started a huge campaign to check the safeguard pipes in its 1300-MW nuclear power plants. The analysis of several hundreds of taps of this type on-site revealed several tens of cases of cracking. These safeguard systems practically only operate during periodic test phases that generally correspond to partial now regimes for the pump and to hydraulic configurations that do not correspond to the main system function. These hydraulic configurations were clearly identified as [open quotes]worst cases[close quotes] for the system through vibration measurements during the startup tests, allowing the system to be tested under rated conditions. Experience feedback raises several difficulties in interpreting the damage; in particular, considerable differences were found in the vibration levels of the same tap on the same piping system from one plant unit to another. Also, the vibration measurements taken on the main pipe are not always correlated with the tap vibration level. To explain these phenomena, it was decided to model the discharge line of the 1300-MW low head safety injection system. To obtain the system response to pump excitation, a fluid-structure-coupled finite element model was built for which the boundary conditions are well controlled. Modal analysis revealed acoustic-mechanical coupling of the system in the environment of the discontinuous zone that cracked. Further analysis of this mechanical discontinuity showed that its first natural frequency is close to that of the coupled mode. Knowing the system transfer function, the force and displacement response are obtained.

  17. Consultation and remediation in the north: meeting international commitments to safeguard health and well-being

    PubMed Central

    Banfield, Laura; Jardine, Cynthia G.

    2013-01-01

    Background International commitments exist for the safeguarding of health and the prevention of ill health. One of the earliest commitments is the Declaration of Alma-Ata (1978), which provides 5 principles guiding primary health care: equity, community participation, health promotion, intersectoral collaboration and appropriate technology. These broadly applicable international commitments are premised on the World Health Organization's multifaceted definition of health. The environment is one sector in which these commitments to safeguarding health can be applied. Giant Mine, a contaminated former gold mine in the Northwest Territories, Canada, represents potential threats to all aspects of health. Strategies for managing such threats usually involve an obligation to engage the affected communities through consultation. Objective To examine the remediation and consultation process associated with Giant Mine within the context of commitments to safeguard health and well-being through adapting and applying the principles of primary health care. Methods Semi-structured interviews with purposively selected key informants representing government proponents and community members were conducted. Results In reviewing themes which emerged from a series of interviews exploring the community consultation process for the remediation of Giant Mine, the principles guiding primary health were mapped to consultation in the North: (a) “equity” is the capacity to fairly and meaningfully participate in the consultation; (b) “community participation” is the right to engage in the process through reciprocal dialogue; (c) “health promotion” represents the need for continued information sharing towards awareness; (d) “intersectoral collaboration” signifies the importance of including all stakeholders; and (e) “appropriate technology” is the need to employ the best remediation actions relevant to the site and the community. Conclusions Within the context of mining

  18. Safeguards instrumentation: a computer-based catalog

    SciTech Connect

    Fishbone, L.G.; Keisch, B.

    1981-08-01

    The information contained in this catalog is needed to provide a data base for safeguards studies and to help establish criteria and procedures for international safeguards for nuclear materials and facilities. The catalog primarily presents information on new safeguards equipment. It also describes entire safeguards systems for certain facilities, but it does not describe the inspection procedures. Because IAEA safeguards do not include physical security, devices for physical protection (as opposed to containment and surveillance) are not included. An attempt has been made to list capital costs, annual maintenance costs, replacement costs, and useful lifetime for the equipment. For equipment which is commercially available, representative sources have been listed whenever available.

  19. Model of a Generic Natural Uranium Conversion Plant ? Suggested Measures to Strengthen International Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Raffo-Caiado, Ana Claudia; Begovich, John M; Ferrada, Juan J

    2009-11-01

    This is the final report that closed a joint collaboration effort between DOE and the National Nuclear Energy Commission of Brazil (CNEN). In 2005, DOE and CNEN started a collaborative effort to evaluate measures that can strengthen the effectiveness of international safeguards at a natural uranium conversion plant (NUCP). The work was performed by DOE s Oak Ridge National Laboratory and CNEN. A generic model of a NUCP was developed and typical processing steps were defined. Advanced instrumentation and techniques for verification purposes were identified and investigated. The scope of the work was triggered by the International Atomic Energy Agency s 2003 revised policy concerning the starting point of safeguards at uranium conversion facilities. Prior to this policy only the final products of the uranium conversion plant were considered to be of composition and purity suitable for use in the nuclear fuel cycle and therefore, subject to the IAEA safeguards control. DOE and CNEN have explored options for implementing the IAEA policy, although Brazil understands that the new policy established by the IAEA is beyond the framework of the Quadripartite Agreement of which it is one of the parties, together with Argentina, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) and the IAEA. Two technical papers on this subject were published at the 2005 and 2008 INMM Annual Meetings.

  20. 30 CFR 75.1101-20 - Safeguards for dry powder chemical systems.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 30 Mineral Resources 1 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Safeguards for dry powder chemical systems. 75...-20 Safeguards for dry powder chemical systems. Adequate guards shall be provided along all belt conveyors in the vicinity of each dry powder chemical system to protect persons whose vision is...

  1. 30 CFR 75.1101-20 - Safeguards for dry powder chemical systems.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 30 Mineral Resources 1 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Safeguards for dry powder chemical systems. 75...-20 Safeguards for dry powder chemical systems. Adequate guards shall be provided along all belt conveyors in the vicinity of each dry powder chemical system to protect persons whose vision is...

  2. 30 CFR 75.1101-20 - Safeguards for dry powder chemical systems.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 30 Mineral Resources 1 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Safeguards for dry powder chemical systems. 75...-20 Safeguards for dry powder chemical systems. Adequate guards shall be provided along all belt conveyors in the vicinity of each dry powder chemical system to protect persons whose vision is...

  3. 30 CFR 75.1101-20 - Safeguards for dry powder chemical systems.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 30 Mineral Resources 1 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Safeguards for dry powder chemical systems. 75...-20 Safeguards for dry powder chemical systems. Adequate guards shall be provided along all belt conveyors in the vicinity of each dry powder chemical system to protect persons whose vision is...

  4. 14 CFR 1212.605 - Safeguarding information in systems of records.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 14 Aeronautics and Space 5 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safeguarding information in systems of... requirements applicable to the system of records. (c) When records or copies of records are distributed to... PRIVACY ACT-NASA REGULATIONS Instructions for NASA Employees § 1212.605 Safeguarding information...

  5. 14 CFR § 1212.605 - Safeguarding information in systems of records.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 14 Aeronautics and Space 5 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Safeguarding information in systems of... the system manager in a written plan approved by the Center Security Officer or Center Information... ADMINISTRATION PRIVACY ACT-NASA REGULATIONS Instructions for NASA Employees § 1212.605 Safeguarding...

  6. 14 CFR 1212.605 - Safeguarding information in systems of records.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... 14 Aeronautics and Space 5 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Safeguarding information in systems of... system manager in a written plan approved by the Center Security Officer or Center Information Technology... PRIVACY ACT-NASA REGULATIONS Instructions for NASA Employees § 1212.605 Safeguarding information...

  7. 41 CFR 51-9.101-5 - Safeguarding systems of records.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 41 Public Contracts and Property Management 1 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 true Safeguarding systems of records. 51-9.101-5 Section 51-9.101-5 Public Contracts and Property Management Other Provisions Relating... ACT RULES 9.1-General Policy § 51-9.101-5 Safeguarding systems of records. The Executive...

  8. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA) SAFEGUARDS DURING STABILIZATION AT HANFORD PLUTONIUM FINISHING PLANT (PFP)

    SciTech Connect

    MCRAE, L.P.

    2004-06-30

    The Vault at the Plutonium Finishing Plan (PFP) became subject to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards beginning in 1994 as part of the US excess fissile material program. The inventory needed to be stabilized and repackaged for long-term storage to comply with Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board Recommendation 94-1. In 1998, the United States began negotiations with IAEA to develop methods to maintain safeguards during stabilization and repackaging of this material. The Design Information Questionnaire was revised and submitted to the IAEA in 2002 describing modification to the facility to accommodate the stabilization process line. The operation plan for 2003 was submitted describing the proposed schedules for removing materials for stabilization. Stabilization and repackaging activities for the safeguarded plutonium began in January 2003 and were completed in December 2003. The stabilization was completed in five phases. IAEA containment and surveillance measures were maintained until the material was removed by phase for stabilization and repackaging. Following placement of the repackaged material into the storage vault, the IAEA conducted inventory change verification measurements, and re-established containment and surveillance. Plant activities and the impacts on operations are described.

  9. The uranium cylinder assay system for enrichment plant safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Miller, Karen A; Swinhoe, Martyn T; Marlow, Johnna B; Menlove, Howard O; Rael, Carlos D; Iwamoto, Tomonori; Tamura, Takayuki; Aiuchi, Syun

    2010-01-01

    Safeguarding sensitive fuel cycle technology such as uranium enrichment is a critical component in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. A useful tool for the nuclear materials accountancy of such a plant would be an instrument that measured the uranium content of UF{sub 6} cylinders. The Uranium Cylinder Assay System (UCAS) was designed for Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited (JNFL) for use in the Rokkasho Enrichment Plant in Japan for this purpose. It uses total neutron counting to determine uranium mass in UF{sub 6} cylinders given a known enrichment. This paper describes the design of UCAS, which includes features to allow for unattended operation. It can be used on 30B and 48Y cylinders to measure depleted, natural, and enriched uranium. It can also be used to assess the amount of uranium in decommissioned equipment and waste containers. Experimental measurements have been carried out in the laboratory and these are in good agreement with the Monte Carlo modeling results.

  10. Recover: A Potentially Useful Technology for Nuclear Safeguards, but Greater International Commitment is Needed.

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1983-01-25

    dated November 29, 1982 from the Department of State 50 ABEREVIATIONS ACDA Arms Control and Disarmament Agency CANDU Canadian Deuterium Reactor C/S...oxide fuel fabrication. Although IAEA’s safeguards system depends primarily on mate- rial accountancy and on-site inspections , IAIA now complements these...percent--18 CANDUs and as many as four fast critical assemblies--were of types at which Brookhaven found RECOVER to be 8 cost--effective. 1/ According

  11. Measuring Safeguards Culture

    SciTech Connect

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2011-07-19

    As the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements a State Level Approach to its safeguards verification responsibilities, a number of countries are beginning new nuclear power programs and building new nuclear fuel cycle faculties. The State Level approach is holistic and investigatory in nature, creating a need for transparent, non-discriminatory judgments about a state's nonproliferation posture. In support of this need, the authors previously explored the value of defining and measuring a state's safeguards culture. We argued that a clear definition of safeguards culture and an accompanying set of metrics could be applied to provide an objective evaluation and demonstration of a country's nonproliferation posture. As part of this research, we outlined four high-level metrics that could be used to evaluate a state's nuclear posture. We identified general data points. This paper elaborates on those metrics, further refining the data points to generate a measurable scale of safeguards cultures. We believe that this work could advance the IAEA's goals of implementing a safeguards system that is fully information driven, while strengthening confidence in its safeguards conclusions.

  12. Preliminary considerations on developing IAEA technical safeguards for LMFBR power systems

    SciTech Connect

    Persiani, P. J.

    1980-09-01

    Nuclear fuel cycles safeguards should be considered in the dynamic context of a world deployment of various reactor types and varying availability of fuel-cycle services. There will be a close interaction between thermal-reactor cycles and the future deployment of fast breeders. The quantitites of plutonium and the reprocessing, conversion, fabrication, and storage methods of the fuel for the fast breeders will have a significant impact on safeguards techniques. The approach to the fast breeder fuel cycle safeguards follows the general safeguards system approach proposed by the IAEA. Objective of IAEA safeguards is the detection of diversion of nuclear material and deterrence of such diversion. To achieve independent verification of material balance accountancy requires the capability to monitor inventory status and verify material flows and quantities of all nuclear materials subject to safeguards. Containment and surveillance measures are applied to monitor key measurement points, maintain integrity of material balance, and complement material accountancy. The safeguards study attempts to develop a generic reference IAEA Safeguards System and explores various system options using containment/surveillance and material accountancy instrumentation and integrated systems designs.

  13. Panel on protection and management of plutonium: Subpanel on safeguards and security

    SciTech Connect

    Tape, J.W.

    1995-07-01

    Nuclear materials safeguards and security systems are described in the context of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Materials of interest to safeguards, threats, proposals to strengthen International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, evolving safeguards issues and requirements, system effectiveness, and elements of a global nuclear materials management regime are discussed. Safeguards are seen as an essential element of nuclear materials management, but not a driver for decisions regarding nuclear power or the disposal of excess weapon nuclear materials.

  14. Precision Information Environment (PIE) for International Safeguards: Pre-Demonstration Development Use Cases

    SciTech Connect

    Gastelum, Zoe N.; Henry, Michael J.

    2013-11-13

    In FY2013, the PIE International Safeguards team demonstrated our development progress to U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) staff from the Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24, our client) and the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development (NA-22). Following the demonstration, the team was asked by our client to complete additional development prior to a planned demonstration at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), scheduled tentatively for January or spring of 2014. The team discussed four potential areas for development (in priority order), and will develop them as time and funding permit prior to an IAEA demonstration. The four capability areas are: 1. Addition of equipment manuals to PIE-accessible files 2. Optical character recognition (OCR) of photographed text 3. Barcode reader with information look-up from a database 4. Add Facilities to Data Model 5. Geospatial capabilities with information integration Each area will be described below in a use case.

  15. International Atomic Energy Agency's advisory group meeting on safeguards related to the final disposal of waste and spent fuel, Vienna, Austria, September 12-16, 1988: Foreign trip report

    SciTech Connect

    Moran, B.W.

    1988-10-01

    B.W. Moran traveled to Vienna, Austria, during the period of September 12--16, 1988, to serve as the technical advisor to the US Department of Energy's (DOE's) Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) representatives to the International Atomic Energy Agency's Advisory Group Meeting on ''Safeguards Related to the Final Disposal of Nuclear Material in Waste and Spent Fuel.'' The goal of the US representatives to this meeting was to ensure that the advisory group's recommendations established (1) an effective IAEA safeguards approach for all radioactive waste and spent fuel management facilities and (2) a safeguards approach that is appropriate for the US Federal Waste Management System. The principal concerns of the United States on entering the advisory group meeting were: criteria for the termination of safeguards on waste should not be established, but should be referred for further study, safeguards on spent fuel should not be terminated, and safeguards studies are required before IAEA safeguards approaches for spent fuel are established. The US representatives generally recommended that consultant meetings be convened to address the technical issues after the requisite safeguards related research and development tasks have been performed. These objectives of the US representatives were achieved, and the recommendations of the advisory group generally coincided with and extended the recommendations presented in the US position paper.

  16. Safeguards by Design Challenge

    SciTech Connect

    Alwin, Jennifer Louise

    2016-09-13

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines Safeguards as a system of inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials as part of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. IAEA oversees safeguards worldwide. Safeguards by Design (SBD) involves incorporation of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation during the design phase of a facility, rather that after the fact. Design challenge goals are the following: Design a system of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation for inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials. Cost should be minimized to work with the IAEA’s limited budget. Dose to workers should always be as low are reasonably achievable (ALARA). Time is of the essence in operating facilities and flow of material should not be interrupted significantly. Proprietary process information in facilities may need to be protected, thus the amount of information obtained by inspectors should be the minimum required to achieve the measurement goal. Then three different design challenges are detailed: Plutonium Waste Item Measurement System, Marine-based Modular Reactor, and Floating Nuclear Power Plant (FNPP).

  17. Safeguards issues in spent fuel consolidation facilities

    SciTech Connect

    Belew, W.L.; Moran, B.W.

    1991-01-01

    In the nuclear power industry, the fuel assembly is the basic unit for nuclear material accountancy. The safeguards procedures for the spent fuel assemblies, therefore, are based on an item accountancy approach. When fuel consolidation occurs in at-reactor'' or away-from-reactor'' facilities, the fuel assemblies are disassembled and cease to be the basic unit containing nuclear material. Safeguards can no longer be based on item accountancy of fuel assemblies. The spent fuel pins containing plutonium are accessible, and the possibilities for diversion of spent fuel for clandestine reprocessing to recover the plutonium are increased. Thus, identifying the potential safeguards concerns created by operation of these facilities is necessary. Potential safeguards techniques to address these concerns also must be identified so facility designs may include the equipment and systems required to provide an acceptable level of assurance that the international safeguards objectives can be met when these facilities come on-line. The objectives of this report are (1) to identify the safeguards issues associated with operation of spent fuel consolidation facilities, (2) to provide a preliminary assessment of the assessment of the safeguards vulnerabilities introduced, and (3) to identify potential safeguards approaches that could meet international safeguards requirements. The safeguards aspects of spent fuel consolidation are addressed in several recent reports and papers. 11 refs., 3 figs., 3 tabs.

  18. National and International Security Applications of Cryogenic Detectors—Mostly Nuclear Safeguards

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Rabin, Michael W.

    2009-12-01

    As with science, so with security—in both arenas, the extraordinary sensitivity of cryogenic sensors enables high-confidence detection and high-precision measurement even of the faintest signals. Science applications are more mature, but several national and international security applications have been identified where cryogenic detectors have high potential payoff. International safeguards and nuclear forensics are areas needing new technology and methods to boost speed, sensitivity, precision and accuracy. Successfully applied, improved nuclear materials analysis will help constrain nuclear materials diversion pathways and contribute to treaty verification. Cryogenic microcalorimeter detectors for X-ray, gamma-ray, neutron, and alpha-particle spectrometry are under development with these aims in mind. In each case the unsurpassed energy resolution of microcalorimeters reveals previously invisible spectral features of nuclear materials. Preliminary results of quantitative analysis indicate substantial improvements are still possible, but significant work will be required to fully understand the ultimate performance limits.

  19. International and national security applications of cryogenic detectors - mostly nuclear safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Rabin, Michael W

    2009-01-01

    As with science, so with security - in both arenas, the extraordinary sensitivity of cryogenic sensors enables high-confidence detection and high-precision measurement even of the faintest signals. Science applications are more mature, but several national and international security applications have been identified where cryogenic detectors have high potential payoff. International safeguards and nuclear forensics are areas needing new technology and methods to boost speed, sensitivity, precision and accuracy. Successfully applied, improved nuclear materials analysis will help constrain nuclear materials diversion pathways and contribute to treaty verification. Cryogenic microcalorimeter detectors for X-ray, gamma ray, neutron, and alpha particle spectrometry are under development with these aims in mind. In each case the unsurpassed energy resolution of microcalorimeters reveals previously invi sible spectral features of nuclear materials. Preliminary results of quantitative analysis indicate substantial improvements are still possible, but significant work will be required to fully understand the ultimate performance limits.

  20. Safeguards Considerations for Thorium Fuel Cycles

    DOE PAGES

    Worrall, Louise G.; Worrall, Andrew; Flanagan, George F.; ...

    2016-04-21

    We report that by around 2025, thorium-based fuel cycles are likely to be deployed internationally. States such as China and India are pursuing research, development, and deployment pathways toward a number of commercial-scale thorium fuel cycles, and they are already building test reactors and the associated fuel cycle infrastructure. In the future, the potential exists for these emerging programs to sell, export, and deploy thorium fuel cycle technology in other states. Without technically adequate international safeguards protocols and measures in place, any future potential clandestine misuse of these fuel cycles could go undetected, compromising the deterrent value of these protocolsmore » and measures. The development of safeguards approaches for thorium-based fuel cycles is therefore a matter of some urgency. Yet, the focus of the international safeguards community remains mainly on safeguarding conventional 235U- and 239Pu-based fuel cycles while the safeguards challenges of thorium-uranium fuel cycles remain largely uninvestigated. This raises the following question: Is the International Atomic Energy Agency and international safeguards system ready for thorium fuel cycles? Furthermore, is the safeguards technology of today sufficiently mature to meet the verification challenges posed by thorium-based fuel cycles? In defining these and other related research questions, the objectives of this paper are to identify key safeguards considerations for thorium-based fuel cycles and to call for an early dialogue between the international safeguards and the nuclear fuel cycle communities to prepare for the potential safeguards challenges associated with these fuel cycles. In this paper, it is concluded that directed research and development programs are required to meet the identified safeguards challenges and to take timely action in preparation for the international deployment of thorium fuel cycles.« less

  1. Safeguards Considerations for Thorium Fuel Cycles

    SciTech Connect

    Worrall, Louise G.; Worrall, Andrew; Flanagan, George F.; Croft, Steven

    2016-04-21

    We report that by around 2025, thorium-based fuel cycles are likely to be deployed internationally. States such as China and India are pursuing research, development, and deployment pathways toward a number of commercial-scale thorium fuel cycles, and they are already building test reactors and the associated fuel cycle infrastructure. In the future, the potential exists for these emerging programs to sell, export, and deploy thorium fuel cycle technology in other states. Without technically adequate international safeguards protocols and measures in place, any future potential clandestine misuse of these fuel cycles could go undetected, compromising the deterrent value of these protocols and measures. The development of safeguards approaches for thorium-based fuel cycles is therefore a matter of some urgency. Yet, the focus of the international safeguards community remains mainly on safeguarding conventional 235U- and 239Pu-based fuel cycles while the safeguards challenges of thorium-uranium fuel cycles remain largely uninvestigated. This raises the following question: Is the International Atomic Energy Agency and international safeguards system ready for thorium fuel cycles? Furthermore, is the safeguards technology of today sufficiently mature to meet the verification challenges posed by thorium-based fuel cycles? In defining these and other related research questions, the objectives of this paper are to identify key safeguards considerations for thorium-based fuel cycles and to call for an early dialogue between the international safeguards and the nuclear fuel cycle communities to prepare for the potential safeguards challenges associated with these fuel cycles. In this paper, it is concluded that directed research and development programs are required to meet the identified safeguards challenges and to take timely action in preparation for the international deployment of thorium fuel cycles.

  2. Safeguards Considerations for Thorium Fuel Cycles

    SciTech Connect

    Worrall, Louise G.; Worrall, Andrew; Flanagan, George F.; Croft, Steven

    2016-04-21

    We report that by around 2025, thorium-based fuel cycles are likely to be deployed internationally. States such as China and India are pursuing research, development, and deployment pathways toward a number of commercial-scale thorium fuel cycles, and they are already building test reactors and the associated fuel cycle infrastructure. In the future, the potential exists for these emerging programs to sell, export, and deploy thorium fuel cycle technology in other states. Without technically adequate international safeguards protocols and measures in place, any future potential clandestine misuse of these fuel cycles could go undetected, compromising the deterrent value of these protocols and measures. The development of safeguards approaches for thorium-based fuel cycles is therefore a matter of some urgency. Yet, the focus of the international safeguards community remains mainly on safeguarding conventional 235U- and 239Pu-based fuel cycles while the safeguards challenges of thorium-uranium fuel cycles remain largely uninvestigated. This raises the following question: Is the International Atomic Energy Agency and international safeguards system ready for thorium fuel cycles? Furthermore, is the safeguards technology of today sufficiently mature to meet the verification challenges posed by thorium-based fuel cycles? In defining these and other related research questions, the objectives of this paper are to identify key safeguards considerations for thorium-based fuel cycles and to call for an early dialogue between the international safeguards and the nuclear fuel cycle communities to prepare for the potential safeguards challenges associated with these fuel cycles. In this paper, it is concluded that directed research and development programs are required to meet the identified safeguards challenges and to take timely action in preparation for the international deployment of thorium fuel cycles.

  3. International safeguards relevant to geologic disposal of high-level wastes and spent fuels

    SciTech Connect

    Pillay, K.K.S.; Picard, R.R.

    1989-01-01

    Spent fuels from once-through fuel cycles placed in underground repositories have the potential to become attractive targets for diversion and/or theft because of their valuable material content and decreasing radioactivity. The first geologic repository in the US, as currently designed, will contain approximately 500 Mt of plutonium, 60,000 Mt of uranium and a host of other fissile and strategically important elements. This paper identifies some of the international safeguards issues relevant to the various proposed scenarios for disposing of the spent fuel. In the context of the US program for geologic disposal of spent fuels, this paper highlights several issues that should be addressed in the near term by US industries, the Department of Energy, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission before the geologic repositories for spent fuels become a reality. Based on US spent fuel discharges, an example is presented to illustrate the enormity of the problem of verifying spent fuel inventories. The geologic disposal scenario for high-level wastes originating from defense facilities produced a practicably irrecoverable'' waste form. Therefore, safeguards issues for geologic disposal of high-level waste now in the US are less pressing. 56 refs. , 2 figs.

  4. DOE/ABACC safeguards cooperation

    SciTech Connect

    Whitaker, J.M.; Alvim, C.F.; Toth, P.; Rubio, J.

    1995-12-31

    In 1994, the US Department of Energy (DOE) and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) signed a safeguards cooperation agreement. The agreement provides for cooperation in the areas of nuclear material control, accountancy, verification, and advanced containment and surveillance technologies for international safeguards applications. ABACC is an international safeguards organization responsible for verifying the commitments of a 1991 bilateral agreement between Argentina and Brazil in which both countries agreed to submit all nuclear material in all nuclear activities to a Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC). DOE provides critical assistance (including equipment and training) through the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security to countries and international organizations to enhance their capabilities to control and verify nuclear material inventories. Specific activities initiated under the safeguards agreement include: (1) active US participation in ABACC`s safeguards training courses, (2) joint development of specialized measurement training workshops, (3) characterization of laboratory standards, and (4) development and application of an extensive analytical laboratory comparison program. The results realized from these initial activities have been mutually beneficial in regard to strengthening the application of international safeguards in Argentina and Brazil.

  5. Cooperation between JRC and SNL in the field of surveillance and monitoring for international safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Johnson, C.S.; Sorel, F.

    1993-08-01

    Under a Cooperative Agreement between the Commission of European Communities (CEC) and the U. S. Department of Energy (DOE), the Joint Research Centre, (JRC) ISPRA, and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) have been cooperating in the development of Containment and Surveillance equipment for a number of years. With recent technology advancements, this cooperation is expanding into the areas of Data Authentication, Safeguards Data Networks, Integrated Systems, and Image Processing. This paper will describe recently expanded efforts in connecting the Integrated Monitoring System designed by SNL to the Computer Aided Video Surveillance System designed by JRC. An SNL Modular Video Authentication System was furnished to test in the video circuitry of the Computer Aided Video Surveillance System. The two systems will remain at JRC for demonstrations, training, and future development activities.

  6. Processing large sensor data sets for safeguards : the knowledge generation system.

    SciTech Connect

    Thomas, Maikel A.; Smartt, Heidi Anne; Matthews, Robert F.

    2012-04-01

    Modern nuclear facilities, such as reprocessing plants, present inspectors with significant challenges due in part to the sheer amount of equipment that must be safeguarded. The Sandia-developed and patented Knowledge Generation system was designed to automatically analyze large amounts of safeguards data to identify anomalous events of interest by comparing sensor readings with those expected from a process of interest and operator declarations. This paper describes a demonstration of the Knowledge Generation system using simulated accountability tank sensor data to represent part of a reprocessing plant. The demonstration indicated that Knowledge Generation has the potential to address several problems critical to the future of safeguards. It could be extended to facilitate remote inspections and trigger random inspections. Knowledge Generation could analyze data to establish trust hierarchies, to facilitate safeguards use of operator-owned sensors.

  7. 12 CFR 917.6 - Internal control system.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... Finance Board; and (iv) Compliance with applicable laws, regulations, policies, supervisory determinations... appropriate periodic basis; (iii) Physical and procedural controls to safeguard, and prevent the unauthorized... periodic discussions with senior management regarding the effectiveness of the internal control system; (2...

  8. International Systems.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Saba, Farhad, Ed.

    1999-01-01

    Completes a discussion of a systems model of distance education (in articles since May 1999) focusing on the most complex level, international. Discussion includes transfer of technology from United States universities to developing nations, the free market, and the age of the global economy. Presents a list of "early indicators" of changes in…

  9. BN-350 unattended safeguards system current status and initial fuel movement data

    SciTech Connect

    Williams, Richard Brady; Browne, Michael C; Parker, Robert F; Ingegneri, Maurizio

    2009-01-01

    The Unattended and Remote Monitoring (UNARM) system at the BN-350 fast breeder reactor facility in Aktau, Kazakhstan continues to provide safeguards monitoring data as the spent fuel disposition project transitions from wet fuel storage to dry storage casks. Qualitative data from the initial cask loading procedures has been released by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and is presented here for the first time. The BN-350 fast breeder reactor in Aktau, Kazakhstan, operated as a plutonium-producing facility from 1973 W1til 1999. Kazakhstan signed the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in February 1994, and shortly afterwards the IAEA began safeguarding the reactor facility and its nuclear material. Slnce the cessation of reactor operations ten years ago, the chief proliferation concern has been the spent fuel assemblies stored in the pond on-site. By 2002, all fuel assemblies in wet storage had been repackaged into proliferation-resistant canisters. From the beginning, the IAEA's safeguards campaign at the BN-350 included a constant unattended sensor presence in the form of UNARM which monitors nuclear material activities at the facility in the absence of inspector presence. The UNARM equipment at the BN-350 was designed to be modular and extensible, allowing the system to adapt as the safeguards requirements change. This has been particularly important at the BN-350 due to the prolonged wet storage phase of the project. The primary function of the BN-350 UNARM system is to provide the IAEA with an independent, radiation-centric Containment and Surveillance (C&S) layer in addition to the standard seals and video systems. The UNARM system has provided continuous Continuity of Knowledge (COK) data for the BN-350's nuclear material storage areas in order to ensure the validity of the attended measurements during the lifetime of the project. The first of these attended measurements was characterization of the spent fuel assemblies. This characterization utilized

  10. Report on the US Program of Technical Assistance to Safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (POTAS)

    SciTech Connect

    Not Available

    1981-05-01

    This document summarizes the work done under the US Program of Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards (POTAS), providing the US Government, IAEA, and others with a short review of the progress made in the program since its inception. Becaue of the size and complexity of the program, only major accomplishments are presented. These are grouped under the following categories: (1) equipment and standard which cover assay of irradiated and unirradiated nuclear materials, automatic data processing, and physical standards; (2) experts who are involved in technology transfer, training, system design, and safeguard information processing and analysis; (3) system studies which cover diversion hazard analysis, safeguards approaches and application, and inspection effort planning and forecasting; (4) techniques, procedures, and equipment evaluation; (5) training of IAEA inspectors and safeguards specialists from member states. The major achievement has been the provisions of safeguards equipment designed to be reliable, and tamper resistant, some of which have already been in use in the field by inspector or by IAEA staff members in Vienna. These are listed in a table. (AT)

  11. Development of a Safeguard System Using an Episomal Mammalian Artificial Chromosome for Gene and Cell Therapy

    PubMed Central

    Uno, Narumi; Uno, Katsuhiro; Komoto, Shinya; Suzuki, Teruhiko; Hiratsuka, Masaharu; Osaki, Mitsuhiko; Kazuki, Yasuhiro; Oshimura, Mitsuo

    2015-01-01

    The development of a safeguard system to remove tumorigenic cells would allow safer clinical applications of stem cells for the treatment of patients with an intractable disease including genetic disorders. Such safeguard systems should not disrupt the host genome and should have long-term stability. Here, we attempted to develop a tumor-suppressing mammalian artificial chromosome containing a safeguard system that uses the immune rejection system against allogeneic tissue from the host. For proof-of-concept of the safeguard system, B16F10 mouse melanoma cells expressing the introduced H2-K(d) major histocompatibility complex (MHC class I)-allogenic haplotype were transplanted into recipient C57BL/6J mice expressing MHC H2-K(b). Subcutaneous implantation of B16F10 cells into C57BL/6J mice resulted in high tumorigenicity. The volume of tumors derived from B16F10 cells expressing allogenic MHC H2-K(d) was decreased significantly (P < 0.01). Suppression of MHC H2-K(d)-expressing tumors in C57BL/6J mice was enhanced by immunization with MHC H2-K(d)-expressing splenocytes (P < 0.01). These results suggest that the safeguard system is capable of suppressing tumor formation by the transplanted cells. PMID:26670279

  12. Safeguards and Security progress report, January--December 1989

    SciTech Connect

    Smith, D.B.; Jaramillo, G.R.

    1990-11-01

    From January to December 1989, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Research and Development (R D) program carried out the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Science and Technology Base Development, Basic Systems Design, Onsite Test and Evaluation and Facility Support, and International Safeguards. For the most part, these activities were sponsored by the Department of Energy's Office of Safeguards and Security. Part 1 covers development of the basic technology essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards and security. It includes our computer security R D and the activities of the DOE Center for Computer Security, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this important technology. Part 2 treats activities aimed at developing methods for designing and evaluating safeguards systems, with special emphasis on the integration of the several subsystems into a real safeguards system. Part 3 describes efforts of direct assistance to the DOE and its contractors and includes consultation on materials control and accounting problems, development and demonstration of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and demonstration of advanced safeguards systems. Part 3 also reports a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards that makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Part 5 reports several safeguards-related activities that have sponsors other than the DOE/OSS. 87 refs., 52 figs.

  13. Achieving the Benefits of Safeguards by Design

    SciTech Connect

    Trond Bjornard; Robert Bean; David Hebditch; Jim Morgan; Bruce Meppen; Scott DeMuth; Michael Ehinger; John Hockert

    2008-07-01

    The overarching driver for developing a formalized process to achieve safeguards by design is to support the global growth of nuclear power while reducing ‘nuclear security’ risks. This paper discusses an institutional approach to the design process for a nuclear facility, for designing proliferation resistance, international safeguards and U.S. national safeguards and security into new nuclear facilities. In the United States, the need exists to develop a simple, concise, formalized, and integrated approach for incorporating international safeguards and other non-proliferation considerations into the facility design process. An effective and efficient design process is one which clearly defines the functional requirements at the beginning of the project and provides for the execution of the project to achieve a reasonable balance among competing objectives in a cost effective manner. Safeguards by Design is defined as “the integration of international and national safeguards, physical security and non-proliferation features as full and equal partners in the design process of a nuclear energy system or facility,” with the objective to achieve facilities that are intrinsically more robust while being less expensive to safeguard and protect. This Safeguards by Design process has been developed such that it: • Provides improved safeguards, security, and stronger proliferation barriers, while reducing the life cycle costs to the operator and regulatory agencies, • Can be translated to any international context as a model for nuclear facility design, • Fosters a culture change to ensure the treatment of ‘nuclear security’ considerations as “full and equal” partners in the design process, • Provides a useful tool for the project manager responsible for the design, construction, and start-up of nuclear facilities, and • Addresses the key integration activities necessary to efficiently incorporate International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards into

  14. Behavior of 241Am in fast reactor systems - a safeguards perspective

    SciTech Connect

    Beddingfield, David H; Lafleur, Adrienne M

    2009-01-01

    Advanced fuel-cycle developments around the world currently under development are exploring the possibility of disposing of {sup 241}Am from spent fuel recycle processes by burning this material in fast reactors. For safeguards practitioners, this approach could potentially complicate both fresh- and spent-fuel safeguards measurements. The increased ({alpha},n) production in oxide fuels from the {sup 241}Am increases the uncertainty in coincidence assay of Pu in MOX assemblies and will require additional information to make use of totals-based neutron assay of these assemblies. We have studied the behavior of {sup 241}Am-bearing MOX fuel in the fast reactor system and the effect on neutron and gamma-ray source-terms for safeguards measurements. In this paper, we will present the results of simulations of the behavior of {sup 241}Am in a fast breeder reactor system. Because of the increased use of MOX fuel in thermal reactors and advances in fuel-cycle designs aimed at americium disposal in fast reactors, we have undertaken a brief study of the behavior of americium in these systems to better understand the safeguards impacts of these new approaches. In this paper we will examine the behavior of {sup 241}Am in a variety of nuclear systems to provide insight into the safeguards implications of proposed Am disposition schemes.

  15. 18 CFR 3b.204 - Safeguarding information in manual and computer-based record systems.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-04-01

    ... information in manual and computer-based record systems. 3b.204 Section 3b.204 Conservation of Power and Water... Collection of Records § 3b.204 Safeguarding information in manual and computer-based record systems. (a) The administrative and physical controls to protect the information in the manual and computer-based record systems...

  16. 18 CFR 3b.204 - Safeguarding information in manual and computer-based record systems.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-04-01

    ... information in manual and computer-based record systems. 3b.204 Section 3b.204 Conservation of Power and Water... Collection of Records § 3b.204 Safeguarding information in manual and computer-based record systems. (a) The administrative and physical controls to protect the information in the manual and computer-based record systems...

  17. 18 CFR 3b.204 - Safeguarding information in manual and computer-based record systems.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-04-01

    ... information in manual and computer-based record systems. 3b.204 Section 3b.204 Conservation of Power and Water... Collection of Records § 3b.204 Safeguarding information in manual and computer-based record systems. (a) The administrative and physical controls to protect the information in the manual and computer-based record systems...

  18. 18 CFR 3b.204 - Safeguarding information in manual and computer-based record systems.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-04-01

    ... information in manual and computer-based record systems. 3b.204 Section 3b.204 Conservation of Power and Water... Collection of Records § 3b.204 Safeguarding information in manual and computer-based record systems. (a) The administrative and physical controls to protect the information in the manual and computer-based record systems...

  19. 18 CFR 3b.204 - Safeguarding information in manual and computer-based record systems.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-04-01

    ... information in manual and computer-based record systems. 3b.204 Section 3b.204 Conservation of Power and Water... Collection of Records § 3b.204 Safeguarding information in manual and computer-based record systems. (a) The administrative and physical controls to protect the information in the manual and computer-based record systems...

  20. 30 CFR 75.1101-20 - Safeguards for dry powder chemical systems.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ...-20 Safeguards for dry powder chemical systems. Adequate guards shall be provided along all belt conveyors in the vicinity of each dry powder chemical system to protect persons whose vision is restricted... provide assistance to those passing along the conveyor after a powder discharge. ...

  1. Active Time-Domain Reflectometry for Unattended Safeguards Systems FY15 Report

    SciTech Connect

    Tedeschi, Jonathan R.; Smith, Leon E.; Moore, David E.; Sheen, David M.; Conrad, Ryan C.; Gavric, Gordan

    2015-09-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) continues to expand its use of unattended measurement systems. An increasing number of systems and an expanding family of instruments create challenges in terms of deployment efficiency and the implementation of data authentication measures. In collaboration with the IAEA, tamper-indicating measures to address data-transmission authentication challenges with unattended safeguards systems are under investigation. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is studying the viability of active time-domain reflectometry (TDR) along two parallel but interconnected paths: (1) swept-frequency TDR as the highly flexible, laboratory gold standard to which field-deployable options can be compared, and (2) a low-cost commercially available spread-spectrum TDR technology as one option for field implementation. This report describes PNNL’s FY15 progress in the viability study including: an overview of the TDR methods under investigation; description of the testing configurations and mock tampering scenarios; results from a preliminary sensitivity comparison of the two TDR methods; demonstration of a quantitative metric for estimating field performance that acknowledges the need for high detection probability while minimizing false alarms. FY15 progress reported here sets the stage for a rigorous comparison of the candidate TDR methods, over a range of deployment scenarios and perturbing effects typical of IAEA unattended monitoring systems.

  2. Assessment of the requirements for placing and maintaining Savannah River Site spent fuel storage basins under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Amacker, O.P. Jr.; Curtis, M.M.; Delegard, C.H.; Hsue, S.T.; Whitesel, R.N.

    1997-03-01

    The United States is considering the offer of irradiated research reactor spent fuel (RRSF) for international safeguards applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The offer would be to add one or more spent fuel storage basins to the list of facilities eligible for IAEA safeguards. The fuel to be safeguarded would be stored in basins on the Savannah River Site (SRS). This RRSF potentially can include returns of Material Test Reactor (MTR) VAX fuel from Argentina, Brazil, and Chile (ABC); returns from other foreign research reactors; and fuel from domestic research reactors. Basins on the SRS being considered for this fuel storage are the Receiving Basin for Offsite Fuel (RBOF) and the L-Area Disassembly Basin (L-Basin). A working group of SRS, U.S. Department of Energy International Safeguards Division (NN-44), and National Laboratory personnel with experience in IAEA safeguards was convened to consider the requirements for applying the safeguards to this material. The working group projected the safeguards requirements and described alternatives.

  3. 36 CFR 1202.30 - How does NARA safeguard its systems of records?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 3 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false How does NARA safeguard its systems of records? 1202.30 Section 1202.30 Parks, Forests, and Public Property NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND... confidentiality of records. In order to protect against any threats or hazards to their security or loss...

  4. 78 FR 56541 - Concept Release on Risk Controls and System Safeguards for Automated Trading Environments

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2013-09-12

    ... September 12, 2013 Part IV Commodity Futures Trading Commission 17 CFR Chapter I Concept Release on Risk Controls and System Safeguards for Automated Trading Environments; Proposed Rule #0;#0;Federal Register / Vol. 78 , No. 177 / Thursday, September 12, 2013 / Proposed Rules#0;#0; ] COMMODITY FUTURES...

  5. Nuclear safeguards research and development. Program status report, October 1980-January 1981

    SciTech Connect

    Henry, C.N.

    1981-11-01

    This report presents the status of the Nuclear Safeguards Research and Development Program pursued by the Energy, Chemistry-Materials Science, and Operational Security/Safeguards Divisions of the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Topics include nondestructive assay technology development and applications, international safeguards systems. Also discussed are training courses, technology transfer, analytical chemistry methods for fissionable materials safeguards, the Department of Energy Computer Security Technical Center, and operational security.

  6. FRONT-END ELECTRONICS FOR UNATTENDED SAFEGUARDS SYSTEMS: TESTING OF A CANDIDATE DEVICE

    SciTech Connect

    Smith, Leon E.; Conrad, Ryan C.; Keller, Daniel T.; Morris, Scott J.

    2015-07-14

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) deploys unattended monitoring systems to provide continuous monitoring of nuclear material within safeguarded facilities around the world. As the number of unattended monitoring instruments increases, the IAEA is challenged to become more efficient in the implementation of those systems. In 2010, the IAEA initiated the Front-End Electronics for Unattended Measurement (FEUM) project with the goals of greater flexibility in the interfaces to various sensors and data acquisition systems, and improved capabilities for remotely located sensors (e.g., where sensor and front-end electronics might be separated by tens of meters). In consultation with the IAEA, a technical evaluation of a candidate FEUM device produced by a commercial vendor is being performed. This evaluation is assessing the device against the IAEA’s original technical specifications and a broad range of important parameters that included sensor types, cable types, and industrial electromagnetic noise that can degrade signals from remotely located detectors. Testing has been performed in a laboratory and also in environments representative of IAEA deployments. The results are expected to inform the IAEA about where and how FEUM devices might be implemented in the field. Data and preliminary findings from the testing performed to date are presented.

  7. The safeguards options study

    SciTech Connect

    Hakkila, E.A.; Mullen, M.F.; Olinger, C.T.; Stanbro, W.D.; Olsen, A.P.; Roche, C.T.; Rudolph, R.R.; Bieber, A.M.; Lemley, J.; Filby, E.

    1995-04-01

    The Safeguards Options Study was initiated to aid the International Safeguards Division (ISD) of the DOE Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation in developing its programs in enhanced international safeguards. The goal was to provide a technical basis for the ISD program in this area. The Safeguards Options Study has been a cooperative effort among ten organizations. These are Argonne National Laboratory, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Mound Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest Laboratories, Sandia National Laboratories, and Special Technologies Laboratory. Much of the Motivation for the Safeguards Options Study is the recognition after the Iraq experience that there are deficiencies in the present approach to international safeguards. While under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards at their declared facilities, Iraq was able to develop a significant weapons program without being noticed. This is because negotiated safeguards only applied at declared sites. Even so, their nuclear weapons program clearly conflicted with Iraq`s obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as a nonnuclear weapon state.

  8. Safeguarding the provision of ecosystem services in catchment systems.

    PubMed

    Everard, Mark

    2013-04-01

    A narrow technocentric focus on a few favored ecosystem services (generally provisioning services) has led to ecosystem degradation globally, including catchment systems and their capacities to support human well-being. Increasing recognition of the multiple benefits provided by ecosystems is slowly being translated into policy and some areas of practice, although there remains a significant shortfall in the incorporation of a systemic perspective into operation management and decision-making tools. Nevertheless, a range of ecosystem-based solutions to issues as diverse as flooding and green space provision in the urban environment offers hope for improving habitat and optimization of beneficial services. The value of catchment ecosystem processes and their associated services is also being increasingly recognized and internalized by the water industry, improving water quality and quantity through catchment land management rather than at greater expense in the treatment costs of contaminated water abstracted lower in catchments. Parallel recognition of the value of working with natural processes, rather than "defending" built assets when catchment hydrology is adversely affected by unsympathetic upstream development, is being progressively incorporated into flood risk management policy. This focus on wider catchment processes also yields a range of cobenefits for fishery, wildlife, amenity, flood risk, and other interests, which may be optimized if multiple stakeholders and their diverse value systems are included in decision-making processes. Ecosystem services, particularly implemented as a central element of the ecosystem approach, provide an integrated framework for building in these different perspectives and values, many of them formerly excluded, into commercial and resource management decision-making processes, thereby making tractable the integrative aspirations of sustainable development. This can help redress deeply entrenched inherited assumptions

  9. The International Safeguards Technology Base: How is the Patient Doing? An Exploration of Effective Metrics

    SciTech Connect

    Schanfein, Mark J; Gouveia, Fernando S

    2010-07-01

    The term “Technology Base” is commonly used but what does it mean? Is there a common understanding of the components that comprise a technology base? Does a formal process exist to assess the health of a given technology base? These are important questions the relevance of which is even more pressing given the USDOE/NNSA initiatives to strengthen the safeguards technology base through investments in research & development and human capital development. Accordingly, the authors will establish a high-level framework to define and understand what comprises a technology base. Potential goal-driven metrics to assess the health of a technology base will also be explored, such as linear demographics and resource availability, in the hope that they can be used to better understand and improve the health of the U.S. safeguards technology base. Finally, through the identification of such metrics, the authors will offer suggestions and highlight choices for addressing potential shortfalls.

  10. Overview of the Facility Safeguardability Analysis (FSA) Process

    SciTech Connect

    Bari, Robert A.; Hockert, John; Wonder, Edward F.; Johnson, Shirley J.; Wigeland, Roald; Zentner, Michael D.

    2011-10-10

    The safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) provides the international community with credible assurance that a State is fulfilling its nonproliferation obligations. The IAEA draws such conclusions from the evaluation of all available information. Effective and cost-efficient IAEA safeguards at the facility level are, and will remain, an important element of this “State-level” approach. Efficiently used, the Safeguards by Design (SBD) methodologies , , , now being developed can contribute to effective and cost-efficient facility-level safeguards. The Facility Safeguardability Assessment (FSA) introduced here supports SBD in three areas. 1. It describes necessary interactions between the IAEA, the State regulator, and the owner / designer of a new or modified facility to determine where SBD efforts can be productively applied, 2. It presents a screening approach intended to identify potential safeguard issues for; a) design changes to existing facilities; b) new facilities similar to existing facilities with approved safeguards approaches, and c) new designs, 3. It identifies resources (the FSA toolkit), such as good practice guides, design guidance, and safeguardability evaluation methods that can be used by the owner/designer to develop solutions for potential safeguards issues during the interactions with the State regulator and IAEA. FSA presents a structured framework for the application of the SBD tools developed in other efforts. The more a design evolves, the greater the probability that new safeguards issues could be introduced. Likewise, for first-of-a-kind facilities or research facilities that involve previously unused processes or technologies, it is reasonable to expect that a number of possible safeguards issues might exist. Accordingly, FSA is intended to help the designer and its safeguards experts identify early in the design process: • Areas where elements of previous accepted safeguards approach(es) may be applied

  11. 44 CFR 6.6 - Safeguarding systems of records.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... systems of records. (a) Systems managers shall ensure that appropriate administrative, technical, and..., training, special qualification, and skills, performance appraisals, and conduct, shall be stored in a...

  12. Safeguard Application Options for the Laser-Based Item Monitoring System (LBIMS)

    SciTech Connect

    Laughter, Mark D

    2008-10-01

    Researchers at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) are developing a Laser-Based Item Monitoring System (LBIMS) for advanced safeguards at nuclear facilities. LBIMS uses a low-power laser transceiver to monitor the presence and position of items with retroreflective tags. The primary advantages of LBIMS are its scalability to continuously monitor a wide range of items, its ability to operate unattended, its low cost of implementation, and its inherent information security due to its line-of-sight and non-broadcasting operation. The primary proposed safeguard application of LBIMS is described in its name: item monitoring. LBIMS could be implemented in a storage area to continuously monitor containers of nuclear material and the area in which they are stored. The system could be configured to provide off-site notification if any of the containers are moved or removed or if the area is accessed. Individual tags would be used to monitor storage containers, and additional tags could be used to record information regarding secondary storage units and room access. The capability to register small changes in tag position opens up the possibility of several other uses. These include continuously monitoring piping arrangements for design information verification or recording equipment positions for other safeguards systems, such as tracking the opening and closing of autoclaves as part of a cylinder tracking system or opening and closing valves on a sample or product take-off line. Combined with attribute tags, which transmit information from any kind of sensor by modulating the laser signal, LBIMS provides the capability to wirelessly and securely collect safeguards data, even in areas where radio-frequency or other wireless communication methods are not practicable. Four application types are described in this report: static item monitoring, in-process item monitoring with trigger tags, multi-layered integration with trigger tags, and line-of-sight data transfer with

  13. Wearable system-on-a-chip radiometer for remote temperature sensing and its application to the safeguard of emergency operators.

    PubMed

    Fonte, A; Alimenti, F; Zito, D; Neri, B; De Rossi, D; Lanatà, A; Tognetti, A

    2007-01-01

    The remote sensing and the detection of events that may represent a danger for human beings have become more and more important thanks to the latest advances of the technology. A microwave radiometer is a sensor capable to detect a fire or an abnormal increase of the internal temperature of the human body (hyperthermia), or an onset of a cancer, or even meteorological phenomena (forest fires, pollution release, ice formation on road pavement). In this paper, the overview of a wearable low-cost low-power system-on-a-chip (SoaC) 13 GHz passive microwave radiometer in CMOS 90 nm technology is presented. In particular, we focused on its application to the fire detection for civil safeguard. In detail, this sensor has been thought to be inserted into the fireman jacket in order to help the fireman in the detection of a hidden fire behind a door or a wall. The simulation results obtained by Ptolemy system simulation have confirmed the feasibility of such a SoaC microwave radiometer in a low-cost standard silicon technology for temperature remote sensing and, in particular, for its application to the safeguard of emergency operators.

  14. ASSESS (Analytic System and Software for Evaluating Safeguards and Security) update: Current status and future developments

    SciTech Connect

    Al-Ayat, R.A. ); Cousins, T.D. ); Hoover, E.R. )

    1990-07-15

    The Analytic System and Software for Evaluating Safeguards and Security (ASSESS) has been released for use by DOE field offices and their contractors. In October, 1989, we offered a prototype workshop to selected representatives of the DOE community. Based on the prototype results, we held the first training workshop at the Central Training Academy in January, 1990. Four additional workshops are scheduled for FY 1990. ASSESS is a state-of-the-art analytical tool for management to conduct integrated evaluation of safeguards systems at facilities handling facilities. Currently, ASSESS focuses on the threat of theft/diversion of special nuclear material by insiders, outsiders, and a special form of insider/outsider collusion. ASSESS also includes a neutralization module. Development of the tool is continuing. Plans are underway to expand the capabilities of ASSESS to evaluate against violent insiders, to validate the databases, to expand the neutralization module, and to assist in demonstrating compliance with DOE Material Control and Accountability (MC A) Order 5633.3. These new capabilities include the ability to: compute a weighted average for performance capability against a spectrum of insider adversaries; conduct defense-in-depth analyses; and analyze against protracted theft scenarios. As they become available, these capabilities will be incorporated in our training program. ASSESS is being developed jointly by Lawrence Livermore and Sandia National Laboratories under the sponsorship of the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Safeguards and Security.

  15. Development of a safeguards data acquisition system for the process monitoring of a simulated reprocessing facility

    SciTech Connect

    Wachter, J.W.

    1986-01-01

    As part of the Consolidated Fuel Reprocessing Program of the Fuel Recycle Division at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), an Integrated Process Demonstration (IPD) facility has been constructed for development of reprocessing plant technology. Through the use of cold materials, the IPD facility provides for the integrated operation of the major equipment items of the chemical-processing portion of a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant. The equipment, processes, and the extensive use of computers in data acquisition and control are prototypical of future reprocessing facilities and provide a unique test-bed for nuclear safeguards demonstrations. The data acquisition and control system consists of several microprocessors that communicate with one another and with a host minicomputer over a common data highway. At intervals of a few minutes, a ''snapshot'' is taken of the process variables, and the data are transmitted to a safeguards computer and minicomputer work station for analysis. This paper describes this data acquisition system and the data-handling procedures leading to microscopic process monitoring for safeguards purposes.

  16. 17 CFR 37.1400 - Core Principle 14-System safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-04-01

    ... and minimize sources of operational risk, through the development of appropriate controls and procedures, and automated systems, that: (1) Are reliable and secure; and (2) Have adequate scalable capacity...

  17. Safeguards and security status report, August 1981-January 1982

    SciTech Connect

    Shipley, J.P.

    1982-09-01

    From August 1981 through January 1982, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in many activities that are described in the four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Safeguards Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Support. Part 1 covers those efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensee facilities. This assistance varies from consultation on materials accounting problems, through development of specialized techniques and devices, to comprehensive participation in the design and implementation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards helps make the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 concerns a relatively new set of activities at Los Alamos aimed at the security of information and computer systems. The focus this period has been on furthering the development of the Computer Security Center, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating the emerging technology. Part 3 describes the development efforts that are essential to continued improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, in every case they are directed ultimately at recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. In addition, enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gaseous Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer.

  18. Oak Ridge National Laboratory Next Generation Safeguards Initiative

    SciTech Connect

    Kirk, Bernadette Lugue; Eipeldauer, Mary D; Whitaker, J Michael

    2011-12-01

    In 2007, the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24) completed a comprehensive review of the current and potential future challenges facing the international safeguards system. The review examined trends and events impacting the mission of international safeguards and the implications of expanding and evolving mission requirements on the legal authorities and institutions that serve as the foundation of the international safeguards system, as well as the technological, financial, and human resources required for effective safeguards implementation. The review's findings and recommendations were summarized in the report, 'International Safeguards: Challenges and Opportunities for the 21st Century (October 2007)'. One of the report's key recommendations was for DOE/NNSA to launch a major new program to revitalize the international safeguards technology and human resource base. In 2007, at the International Atomic Energy Agency's General Conference, then Secretary of Energy Samuel W. Bodman announced the newly created Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). NGSI consists of five program elements: (1) Policy development and outreach; (2) Concepts and approaches; (3) Technology and analytical methodologies; (4) Human resource development; and (5) Infrastructure development. The ensuing report addresses the 'Human Resource Development (HRD)' component of NGSI. The goal of the HRD as defined in the NNSA Program Plan (November 2008) is 'to revitalize and expand the international safeguards human capital base by attracting and training a new generation of talent.' One of the major objectives listed in the HRD goal includes education and training, outreach to universities, professional societies, postdoctoral appointments, and summer internships at national laboratories. ORNL is a participant in the NGSI program, together with several DOE laboratories such as Pacific

  19. Cobra sealing system; From field evaluation to practical safeguards application

    SciTech Connect

    Vodrazka, P.; Cermak, L. )

    1991-01-01

    After a successful conclusion of the Cobra seal IAEA field trials, the Cobra Seal System was installed in two Canadian facilities. The seals permit on-site verification without needing to replace them in extreme weather conditions, thus allowing a substantial time reduction for inspectors as well as minimizing intrusiveness of these activities. The paper describes experiences with practical installations of almost sixty Cobra seals including the selection of environmental conduits and housing. Examples of the results of the first several inspections utilizing a new version of the Cobra seal verifier are also included. Possible future outdoor applications of Cobra seals are described and some suggested improvements are outlined.

  20. Evaluations of the commercial spectrometer systems for safeguards applications using the germanium detectors

    SciTech Connect

    Vo, D.T.

    1998-12-31

    Safeguards applications require the best spectrometer systems with excellent resolution, stability, and throughput. Instruments must perform well in all the situations and environments. Data communication to the computer should be convenient, fast, and reliable. The software should have all the necessary tools and be ease to use. Portable systems should be small in size, lightweight, and have a long battery life. Nine commercially available spectrometer systems are tested with both the planar and coaxial germanium detectors. Considering the performance of the Digital Signal Processors (DSP), digital-based spectroscopy may be the future of gamma-ray spectroscopy.

  1. Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1985

    SciTech Connect

    Not Available

    1987-03-01

    From January to December 1985, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Safeguards Operations, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Support. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development and demonstration of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and evaluation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this period was on continuing the activities of the Center for Computer Security, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards and international safeguards for reprocessing plants required a significant portion of our resources. All of these efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in our benefiting from field experiences in operating environments.

  2. Strengthening the International Safeguards System, Institutional and Financial Issues,

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1978-02-26

    only rather typicl of"I nternat ional~organIzat:ions, I t I s about twice the increase In" US federal goVernrent expenditures in real terms over. the...the Agency provides assistance only to those projects it finds technically *23sound. Since there is probably some "padding" in the requests and since...promotional programs. The latter include peaceful explos.ions, agricultural applications, theoretical research projects , Information distribution, and others

  3. Remote monitoring: A global partnership for safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Bardsley, J.

    1996-08-01

    With increased awareness of the significant changes of the past several years and their effect on the expectations to international safeguards, it is necessary to reflect on the direction for development of nuclear safeguards in a new era and the resulting implications. The time proven monitoring techniques, based on quantitative factors and demonstrated universal application, have shown their merit. However, the new expectations suggest a possibility that a future IAEA safeguards system could rely more heavily on the value of a comprehensive, transparent, and open implementation regime. With the establishment of such a regime, it is highly likely that remote monitoring will play a significant role. Several states have seen value in cooperating with each other to address the many problems associated with the remote interrogation of integrated monitoring systems. As a consequence the International Remote Monitoring Project was organized to examine the future of remote monitoring in International Safeguards. This paper provides an update on the technical issues, the future plans, and the safeguards implications of cooperative programs relating to remote monitoring. Without providing answers to the policy questions involved, it suggests that it is timely to begin addressing these issues.

  4. Simulation Enabled Safeguards Assessment Methodology

    SciTech Connect

    Robert Bean; Trond Bjornard; Thomas Larson

    2007-09-01

    It is expected that nuclear energy will be a significant component of future supplies. New facilities, operating under a strengthened international nonproliferation regime will be needed. There is good reason to believe virtual engineering applied to the facility design, as well as to the safeguards system design will reduce total project cost and improve efficiency in the design cycle. Simulation Enabled Safeguards Assessment MEthodology (SESAME) has been developed as a software package to provide this capability for nuclear reprocessing facilities. The software architecture is specifically designed for distributed computing, collaborative design efforts, and modular construction to allow step improvements in functionality. Drag and drop wireframe construction allows the user to select the desired components from a component warehouse, render the system for 3D visualization, and, linked to a set of physics libraries and/or computational codes, conduct process evaluations of the system they have designed.

  5. Oak Ridge National Laboratory Next-Generation Safeguards Initiative: Human Capital Development

    SciTech Connect

    Gilligan, Kimberly

    2014-01-01

    In 2007, the US Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24) completed a comprehensive review of the current and potential future challenges facing the international safeguards system. The review examined: trends and events that have an effect on the mission of international safeguards; the implications of expanding and evolving mission requirements of the legal authorities and institutions that serve as the foundation of the international safeguards system; and, the technological, financial, and human resources required for effective safeguards implementation. The review’s findings and recommendations were summarized in the report International Safeguards: Challenges and Opportunities for the 21st Century (October 2007). The executive summary is available at the following link: http://nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/nnsa/inlinefiles/NGSI_Report.pdf.

  6. Integrated safeguards and facility design and operations

    SciTech Connect

    Tape, J.W.; Coulter, C.A.; Markin, J.T.; Thomas, K.E.

    1987-01-01

    The integration of safeguards functions to deter or detect unauthorized actions by insiders requires careful communication and management of safeguards-relevant information on a timely basis. The separation of safeguards functions into physical protection, materials control, and materials accounting often inhibits important information flows. Redefining the major safeguards functions as authorization, enforcement, and verification and careful attention to management of information can result in effective safeguards integration. Whether designing new systems or analyzing existing ones, understanding the interface between facility operations and safeguards is critical to cost-effective integrated safeguards systems that meet modern standards of performance.

  7. Applications of Virtual Reality to Nuclear Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Stansfield, S.

    1998-11-03

    This paper explores two potential applications of Virtual Reality (VR) to international nuclear safeguards: training and information organization and navigation. The applications are represented by two existing prototype systems, one for training nuclear weapons dismantlement and one utilizing a VR model to facilitate intuitive access to related sets of information.

  8. The future of IAEA safeguards: challenges and responses

    SciTech Connect

    Pilat, Joseph F; Budlong - Sylvester, Kory W

    2011-01-01

    For nearly two decades, the International Atomic Energy Agency (lAEA) has been transforming its safeguards system to address the challenges posed by undeclared nuclear programs, the associated revelation of an extensive non-State nuclear procurement network and other issues, including past limits to its verification mandate and the burden of noncompliance issues. Implementing the new measures, including those in the Additional Protocol, and integrating new and old safeguards measures, remains a work in progress. Implementation is complicated by factors including the limited teclmological tools that are available to address such issues as safeguarding bulk handling facilities, detection of undeclared facilities/activities, especially related to enrichment, etc. As this process continues, new challenges are arising, including the demands of expanding nuclear power production worldwide, so-called safeguards by design for a new generation of facilities, the possible IAEA role in a fissile material cutoff treaty and other elements of the arms control and disarmament agenda, the possible role in 'rollback' cases, etc. There is no doubt safeguards will need to evolve in the future, as they have over the last decades. In order for the evolutionary path to proceed, there will inter alia be a need to identify technological gaps, especially with respect to undeclared facilities, and ensure they are filled by adapting old safeguards technologies, by developing and introducing new and novel safeguards teclmologies and/or by developing new procedures and protocols. Safeguards will also need to respond to anticipated emerging threats and to future, unanticipated threats. This will require strategic planning and cooperation among Member States and with the Agency. This paper will address challenges to IAEA safeguards and the technological possibilities and R&D strategies needed to meet those challenges in the context of the forty-year evolution of safeguards, including the ongoing

  9. Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1984

    SciTech Connect

    Smith, D.B.

    1986-01-01

    From January to December 1984, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Safeguards. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensee facilities. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. was Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in benefiting from field experiences in operating environments.

  10. Safeguards Culture: Lessons Learned

    SciTech Connect

    Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2009-05-27

    Abstract: At the 2005 INMM/ESARDA Workshop in Santa Fe, New Mexico, I presented a paper entitled “Changing the Safeguards Culture: Broader Perspectives and Challenges.” That paper described a set of theoretical models that can be used as a basis for evaluating changes to safeguards culture. This paper builds on that theoretical discussion to address practical methods for influencing culture. It takes lessons from methods used to influence change in safety culture and security culture, and examines the applicability of these lessons to changing safeguards culture. Paper: At the 2005 INMM/ESARDA Workshop on “Changing the Safeguards Culture: Broader Perspectives and Challenges,” in Santa Fe, New Mexico, I presented a paper entitled “Changing the Safeguards Culture: Broader Perspectives and Challenges.” That paper, coauthored by Karyn R. Durbin and Andrew Van Duzer, described a set of theoretical models that can be used as a basis for evaluating changes to safeguards culture. This paper updates that theoretical discussion, and seeks to address practical methods for influencing culture. It takes lessons from methods used to influence change in safety culture and security culture, and examines the applicability of these lessons to changing safeguards culture. Implicit in this discussion is an understanding that improving a culture is not an end in itself, but is one method of improving the underlying discipline, that is safety, security, or safeguards. Culture can be defined as a way of life, or general customs and beliefs of a particular group of people at a particular time. There are internationally accepted definitions of safety culture and nuclear security culture. As yet, there is no official agreed upon definition of safeguards culture. At the end of the paper I will propose my definition. At the Santa Fe Workshop the summary by the Co-Chairs of Working Group 1, “The Further Evolution of Safeguards,” noted: “It is clear that ‘safeguards culture

  11. Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1983

    SciTech Connect

    Smith, D.B.

    1984-09-01

    From January to December 1983, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Safeguards. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and implementation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this peiod was on continuing the activities of the Computer Security Center, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in our benefiting from field experiences in operating environments.

  12. An improved characterization method for international accountancy measurements of fresh and irradiated mixed oxide (MOX) fuel: helping achieve continual monitoring and safeguards through the fuel cycle

    SciTech Connect

    Evans, Louise G; Croft, Stephen; Swinhoe, Martyn T; Tobin, S. J.; Menlove, H. O.; Schear, M. A.; Worrall, Andrew

    2011-01-13

    Nuclear fuel accountancy measurements are conducted at several points through the nuclear fuel cycle to ensure continuity of knowledge (CofK) of special nuclear material (SNM). Non-destructive assay (NDA) measurements are performed on fresh fuel (prior to irradiation in a reactor) and spent nuclear fuel (SNF) post-irradiation. We have developed a fuel assembly characterization system, based on the novel concept of 'neutron fingerprinting' with multiplicity signatures to ensure detailed CofK of nuclear fuel through the entire fuel cycle. The neutron fingerprint in this case is determined by the measurement of the various correlated neutron signatures, specific to fuel isotopic composition, and therefore offers greater sensitivity to variations in fissile content among fuel assemblies than other techniques such as gross neutron counting. This neutron fingerprint could be measured at the point of fuel dispatch (e.g. from a fuel fabrication plant prior to irradiation, or from a reactor site post-irradiation), monitored during transportation of the fuel assembly, and measured at a subsequent receiving site (e.g. at the reactor site prior to irradiation, or reprocessing facility post-irradiation); this would confirm that no unexpected changes to the fuel composition or amount have taken place during transportation and/ or reactor operations. Changes may indicate an attempt to divert material for example. Here, we present the current state of the practice of fuel measurements for both fresh mixed oxide (MOX) fuel and SNF (both MOX and uranium dioxide). This is presented in the framework of international safeguards perspectives from the US and UK. We also postulate as to how the neutron fingerprinting concept could lead to improved fuel characterization (both fresh MOX and SNF) resulting in: (a) assured CofK of fuel across the nuclear fuel cycle, (b) improved detection of SNM diversion, and (c) greater confidence in safeguards of SNF transportation.

  13. An improved characterization method for international accountancy measurements of fresh and irradiated mixed oxide (MOX) fuel: helping achieve continual monitoring and safeguards through the fuel cycle

    SciTech Connect

    Evans, Louise G; Croft, Stephen; Swinhoe, Martyn T; Tobin, S. J.; Boyer, B. D.; Menlove, H. O.; Schear, M. A.; Worrall, Andrew

    2010-11-24

    Nuclear fuel accountancy measurements are conducted at several points through the nuclear fuel cycle to ensure continuity of knowledge (CofK) of special nuclear material (SNM). Non-destructive assay (NDA) measurements are performed on fresh fuel (prior to irradiation in a reactor) and spent nuclear fuel (SNF) post-irradiation. We have developed a fuel assembly characterization system, based on the novel concept of 'neutron fingerprinting' with multiplicity signatures to ensure detailed CofK of nuclear fuel through the entire fuel cycle. The neutron fingerprint in this case is determined by the measurement of the various correlated neutron signatures, specific to fuel isotopic composition, and therefore offers greater sensitivity to variations in fissile content among fuel assemblies than other techniques such as gross neutron counting. This neutron fingerprint could be measured at the point of fuel dispatch (e.g. from a fuel fabrication plant prior to irradiation, or from a reactor site post-irradiation), monitored during transportation of the fuel assembly, and measured at a subsequent receiving site (e.g. at the reactor site prior to irradiation, or reprocessing facility post-irradiation); this would confirm that no unexpected changes to the fuel composition or amount have taken place during transportation and/or reactor operations. Changes may indicate an attempt to divert material for example. Here, we present the current state of the practice of fuel measurements for both fresh mixed oxide (MOX) fuel and SNF (both MOX and uranium dioxide). This is presented in the framework of international safeguards perspectives from the US and UK. We also postulate as to how the neutron fingerprinting concept could lead to improved fuel characterization (both fresh MOX and SNF) resulting in: (a) assured CofK of fuel across the nuclear fuel cycle, (b) improved detection of SNM diversion, and (c) greater confidence in safeguards of SNF transportation.

  14. Safeguards and security research and development: Program status report, February-July 1981

    SciTech Connect

    Henry, C.N.; Walton, R.B.

    1982-04-01

    This report, one of a series of biannual progress reports, describes the status of research and development in the Safeguards and Security Program at Los Alamos from February-July 1981. Most work covered here is sponsored by the Office of Safeguards and Security of the Department of Energy; however, project activities that are technically closely related to nuclear safeguards and security also are included where appropriate for conveying information useful to the nuclear community. The report comprises four major subject areas: Security Development and Support; Nuclear Materials Measurement and Engineering; Nuclear Facility Safeguards Support; and International Safeguards, Technology Transfer, and Training. Some technical topics included in the subject areas are computer and informational security, chemical and nondestructive analysis of nuclear materials, process modeling and analysis, nuclear materials accounting systems, evaluation of prototype measurement instrumentation and procedures in nuclear facilities, design and consultation for facilities, technical exchange, training courses, and international safeguards.

  15. Strengthening regional safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Palhares, L.; Almeida, G.; Mafra, O.

    1996-08-01

    Nuclear cooperation between Argentina and Brazil has been growing since the early 1980`s and as it grew, so did cooperation with the US Department of Energy (DOE). The Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) was formed in December 1991 to operate the Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC). In April 1994, ABACC and the DOE signed an Agreement of Cooperation in nuclear material safeguards. This cooperation has included training safeguards inspectors, exchanging nuclear material measurement and containment and surveillance technology, characterizing reference materials, and studying enrichment plant safeguards. The goal of the collaboration is to exchange technology, evaluate new technology in Latin American nuclear facilities, and strengthen regional safeguards. This paper describes the history of the cooperation, its recent activities, and future projects. The cooperation is strongly supported by all three governments: the Republics of Argentina and Brazil and the United States.

  16. Study of safeguards system on dry reprocessing for fast breeder reactor

    SciTech Connect

    Li, T. K.; Burr, Tom; Menlove, Howard O.; Thomas, K. E.; Fukushima, M.; Hori, M.

    2002-01-01

    A 'Feasibility Study on the Commercialized Fast Breeder Reactor (FBR) Cycle System' is underway at Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute (JNC). Concepts to commercialize the FBR fuel cycle are being created together with their necessary research and development (R&D) tasks. 'Dry,' non-aqueous, processes are candidates for FBR fuel reprocessing. Dry reprocessing technology takes advantage of proliferation barriers, due to the lower decontamination factors achievable by the simple pyrochemical processes proposed. The concentration o f highly radioactive impurities and non-fissile materials in products from a dry reprocess is generally significantly larger than the normal aqueous (Purex) process. However, the safeguards of dry reprocesses have not been widely analyzed. In 2000, JNC and Los Alamos National Laboratoiy (LANL) initiated a joint research program to study the safeguards aspects of dry reprocessing. In this study, the safeguardability of the three options: metal electrorefining, oxide electrowinning, and fluoride volatility processes, are assessed. FBR spent fuels are decladded and powdered into mixed oxides (MOX) at the Head-End process either by oxidation-reduction reactions (metal electrorefining and fluoride volatility) or mechanically (oxide electrowinning). At the oxide electrowinning process, the spent MOX he1 powder is transferred to chloride in molten salt and nuclear materials are extracted onto cathode as oxides. For metal electrorefining process, on the other hand, the MOX fuel is converted to chloride in molten salt, and nuclear materials are extracted onto cathode as a metal fomi. At lhe fluoride volatility process, the MOX fuel powder is converted to U&/PuF6 (gaseous form) in a fluidized bed; plutonium and uranium fluorides are separated by volatilization properties and then are converted to oxides. Since the conceptual design of a dry reprocessing plant is incomplete, the operational mode, vessel capacities, residence times, and campaigns

  17. Integrated Process Monitoring based on Systems of Sensors for Enhanced Nuclear Safeguards Sensitivity and Robustness

    SciTech Connect

    Humberto E. Garcia

    2014-07-01

    This paper illustrates safeguards benefits that process monitoring (PM) can have as a diversion deterrent and as a complementary safeguards measure to nuclear material accountancy (NMA). In order to infer the possible existence of proliferation-driven activities, the objective of NMA-based methods is often to statistically evaluate materials unaccounted for (MUF) computed by solving a given mass balance equation related to a material balance area (MBA) at every material balance period (MBP), a particular objective for a PM-based approach may be to statistically infer and evaluate anomalies unaccounted for (AUF) that may have occurred within a MBP. Although possibly being indicative of proliferation-driven activities, the detection and tracking of anomaly patterns is not trivial because some executed events may be unobservable or unreliably observed as others. The proposed similarity between NMA- and PM-based approaches is important as performance metrics utilized for evaluating NMA-based methods, such as detection probability (DP) and false alarm probability (FAP), can also be applied for assessing PM-based safeguards solutions. To this end, AUF count estimates can be translated into significant quantity (SQ) equivalents that may have been diverted within a given MBP. A diversion alarm is reported if this mass estimate is greater than or equal to the selected value for alarm level (AL), appropriately chosen to optimize DP and FAP based on the particular characteristics of the monitored MBA, the sensors utilized, and the data processing method employed for integrating and analyzing collected measurements. To illustrate the application of the proposed PM approach, a protracted diversion of Pu in a waste stream was selected based on incomplete fuel dissolution in a dissolver unit operation, as this diversion scenario is considered to be problematic for detection using NMA-based methods alone. Results demonstrate benefits of conducting PM under a system

  18. Nuclear Materials Safeguards - Manpower Needs.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Kanter, Manuel A.

    Nuclear safeguard systems, their operation and implications for future manpower needs, and the need for these topics to be integrated into the engineering education curriculum, are focused on in this paper. The elements of a safeguard system and factors influencing the selection of a particular system are presented. Projections concerning the use…

  19. Nuclear Materials Safeguards - Manpower Needs.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Kanter, Manuel A.

    Nuclear safeguard systems, their operation and implications for future manpower needs, and the need for these topics to be integrated into the engineering education curriculum, are focused on in this paper. The elements of a safeguard system and factors influencing the selection of a particular system are presented. Projections concerning the use…

  20. SAFEGUARDS ENVELOPE

    SciTech Connect

    Duc Cao; Richard Metcalf

    2010-07-01

    The Safeguards Envelope is a strategy to determine a set of specific operating parameters within which nuclear facilities may operate to maximize safeguards effectiveness without sacrificing safety or plant efficiency. This paper details advanced statistical techniques that will be applied to real plant process monitoring (PM) data from the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP). In a simulation based on this data, multi-tank and multi-attribute correlations were tested against synthetic diversion scenarios. Kernel regression smoothing was used to fit a curve to the historical data, and multivariable, residual analysis and cumulative sum techniques set parameters for operating conditions. Diversion scenarios were created and tested, showing improved results when compared with a previous study utilizing only one-variable Z-testing. A brief analysis of the impact of the safeguards optimization on the rest of plant efficiency, criticality concerns, and overall requirements is presented.

  1. Project plan international atomic energy agency (IAEA) safeguards project plutonium finishing plant

    SciTech Connect

    BARTLETT, W.D.

    1999-05-13

    This plan presents the overall objectives, description, justification and planning for the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) project. The intent of this plan is to describe how this project will be managed and integrated with other facility stabilization and deactivation activities. This plan supplements the overall integrated plan presented in the PFP Integrated Project Management Plan (PMP), HNF-3617, Rev. 0. This project plan is the top-level definitive project management document for the PFP IAEA project. It specifies the technical, schedule, requirements and the cost baselines to manage the execution of the IAEA project. Any deviations to the document must be authorized through the appropriate change control process.

  2. Safeguard Vulnerability Analysis Program (SVAP)

    SciTech Connect

    Gilman, F.M.; Dittmore, M.H.; Orvis, W.J.; Wahler, P.S.

    1980-06-23

    This report gives an overview of the Safeguard Vulnerability Analysis Program (SVAP) developed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. SVAP was designed as an automated method of analyzing the safeguard systems at nuclear facilities for vulnerabilities relating to the theft or diversion of nuclear materials. SVAP addresses one class of safeguard threat: theft or diversion of nuclear materials by nonviolent insiders, acting individually or in collusion. SVAP is a user-oriented tool which uses an interactive input medium for preprocessing the large amounts of safeguards data. Its output includes concise summary data as well as detailed vulnerability information.

  3. Measurement and simulation of a Compton suppression system for safeguards application

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Lee, Seung Kyu; Seo, Hee; Won, Byung-Hee; Lee, Chaehun; Shin, Hee-Sung; Na, Sang-Ho; Song, Dae-Yong; Kim, Ho-Dong; Park, Geun-Il; Park, Se-Hwan

    2015-11-01

    Plutonium (Pu) contents in spent nuclear fuels, recovered uranium (U) or uranium/transuranium (U/TRU) products must be measured in order to secure the safeguardability of a pyroprocessing facility. Self-induced X-Ray fluorescence (XRF) and gamma-ray spectroscopy are useful techniques for determining Pu-to-U ratios and Pu isotope ratios of spent fuel. Photon measurements of spent nuclear fuel by using high-resolution spectrometers such as high-purity germanium (HPGe) detectors show a large continuum background in the low-energy region, which is due in large part to Compton scattering of energetic gamma rays. This paper proposes a Compton suppression system for reducing of the Compton continuum background. In the present study, the system was configured by using an HPGe main detector and a BGO (bismuth germanate: Bi4Ge3O12) guard detector. The system performances for gamma-ray measurement and XRF were evaluated by means of Monte Carlo simulations and measurements of the radiation source. The Monte Carlo N-Particle eXtended (MCNPX) simulations were performed using the same geometry as for the experiments, and considered, for exact results, the production of secondary electrons and photons. As a performance test of the Compton suppression system, the peak-to-Compton ratio, which is a figure of merit to evaluate the gamma-ray detection, was enhanced by a factor of three or more when the Compton suppression system was used.

  4. REVIEW OF THE NEGOTIATION OF THE MODEL PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE AGREEMENT(S) BETWEEN STATE(S) AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY FOR THE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS,INFCIRC/540 (Corrected) VOLUME I/III SETTING THE STAGE: 1991-1996.

    SciTech Connect

    Rosenthal, M.D.; Saum-Manning, L.; Houck, F.; Anzelon, G.

    2010-01-01

    Events in Iraq at the beginning of the 1990s demonstrated that the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) needed to be improved. It had failed, after all, to detect Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapon program even though some of Iraq's's activities had been pursued at inspected facilities in buildings adjacent to ones being inspected by the IAEA. Although there were aspects of the implementation of safeguards where the IAEA needed to improve, the primary limitations were considered to be part of the safeguards system itself. That system was based on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1970, to which Iraq was a party, and implemented on the basis of a model NPT safeguards agreement, published by the IAEA 1972 as INFCIRC/153 (corrected). The agreement calls for states to accept and for the IAEA to apply safeguards to all nuclear material in the state. Iraq was a party to such an agreement, but it violated the agreement by concealing nuclear material and other nuclear activities from the IAEA. Although the IAEA was inspecting in Iraq, it was hindered by aspects of the agreement that essentially limited its access to points in declared facilities and provided the IAEA with little information about nuclear activities anywhere else in Iraq. As a result, a major review of the NPT safeguards system was initiated by its Director General and Member States with the objective of finding the best means to enable the IAEA to detect both diversions from declared stocks and any undeclared nuclear material or activities in the state. Significant improvements that could be made within existing legal authority were taken quickly, most importantly a change in 1992 in how and when and what design information would be reported to the IAEA. During 1991-1996, the IAEA pursued intensive study, legal and technical analysis, and field trials and held numerous consultations with Member States. The Board of Governors discussed the issue of strengthening safeguards

  5. Integration of the advanced transparency framework to advanced nuclear systems : enhancing Safety, Operations, Security and Safeguards (SOSS).

    SciTech Connect

    Mendez, Carmen Margarita; Rochau, Gary Eugene; Cleary, Virginia D.

    2008-08-01

    The advent of the nuclear renaissance gives rise to a concern for the effective design of nuclear fuel cycle systems that are safe, secure, nonproliferating and cost-effective. We propose to integrate the monitoring of the four major factors of nuclear facilities by focusing on the interactions between Safeguards, Operations, Security, and Safety (SOSS). We proposed to develop a framework that monitors process information continuously and can demonstrate the ability to enhance safety, operations, security, and safeguards by measuring and reducing relevant SOSS risks, thus ensuring the safe and legitimate use of the nuclear fuel cycle facility. A real-time comparison between expected and observed operations provides the foundation for the calculation of SOSS risk. The automation of new nuclear facilities requiring minimal manual operation provides an opportunity to utilize the abundance of process information for monitoring SOSS risk. A framework that monitors process information continuously can lead to greater transparency of nuclear fuel cycle activities and can demonstrate the ability to enhance the safety, operations, security and safeguards associated with the functioning of the nuclear fuel cycle facility. Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) has developed a risk algorithm for safeguards and is in the process of demonstrating the ability to monitor operational signals in real-time though a cooperative research project with the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA). The risk algorithms for safety, operations and security are under development. The next stage of this work will be to integrate the four algorithms into a single framework.

  6. 36 CFR 1202.30 - How does NARA safeguard its systems of records?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... records are protected in accordance with the Computer Security Act, OMB Circular A-11 requiring privacy... RECORDS ADMINISTRATION GENERAL RULES REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974 Collecting... appropriate administrative, technical, and physical safeguards are established to ensure the security...

  7. 36 CFR 1202.30 - How does NARA safeguard its systems of records?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... records are protected in accordance with the Computer Security Act, OMB Circular A-11 requiring privacy... RECORDS ADMINISTRATION GENERAL RULES REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974 Collecting... appropriate administrative, technical, and physical safeguards are established to ensure the security...

  8. 36 CFR 1202.30 - How does NARA safeguard its systems of records?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... records are protected in accordance with the Computer Security Act, OMB Circular A-11 requiring privacy... RECORDS ADMINISTRATION GENERAL RULES REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974 Collecting... appropriate administrative, technical, and physical safeguards are established to ensure the security...

  9. Development of an all-in-one gamma camera/CCD system for safeguard verification

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Kim, Hyun-Il; An, Su Jung; Chung, Yong Hyun; Kwak, Sung-Woo

    2014-12-01

    For the purpose of monitoring and verifying efforts at safeguarding radioactive materials in various fields, a new all-in-one gamma camera/charged coupled device (CCD) system was developed. This combined system consists of a gamma camera, which gathers energy and position information on gamma-ray sources, and a CCD camera, which identifies the specific location in a monitored area. Therefore, 2-D image information and quantitative information regarding gamma-ray sources can be obtained using fused images. A gamma camera consists of a diverging collimator, a 22 × 22 array CsI(Na) pixelated scintillation crystal with a pixel size of 2 × 2 × 6 mm3 and Hamamatsu H8500 position-sensitive photomultiplier tube (PSPMT). The Basler scA640-70gc CCD camera, which delivers 70 frames per second at video graphics array (VGA) resolution, was employed. Performance testing was performed using a Co-57 point source 30 cm from the detector. The measured spatial resolution and sensitivity were 4.77 mm full width at half maximum (FWHM) and 7.78 cps/MBq, respectively. The energy resolution was 18% at 122 keV. These results demonstrate that the combined system has considerable potential for radiation monitoring.

  10. SAFEGUARDS CULTURE: WHAT IS IT AND DOES IT MATTER?

    SciTech Connect

    Mladineo, Stephen V.; Frazar, Sarah L.

    2012-11-01

    The concepts of safety and security culture are well established; however, a common understanding of safeguards culture is not internationally recognized. With the support of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) the authors have attempted a rigorous analysis of the concept of safeguards culture, with the goal of determining its value to the international safeguards community, and to provide recommendations as to whether the concept deserves further development. As part of this analysis, the authors explore the distinctions between safeguards culture, safeguards compliance, and safeguards performance. The authors also discuss synergies and differences between safeguards culture and safety/security culture.

  11. THE NEXT GENERATION SAFEGUARDS PROFESSIONAL NETWORK: PROGRESS AND NEXT STEPS

    SciTech Connect

    Zhernosek, Alena V; Lynch, Patrick D; Scholz, Melissa A

    2011-01-01

    President Obama has repeatedly stated that the United States must ensure that the international safeguards regime, as embodied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has 'the authority, information, people, and technology it needs to do its job.' The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) works to implement the President's vision through the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), a program to revitalize the U.S. DOE national laboratories safeguards technology and human capital base so that the United States can more effectively support the IAEA and ensure that it meets current and emerging challenges to the international safeguards system. In 2009, in response to the human capital development goals of NGSI, young safeguards professionals within the Global Nuclear Security Technology Division at Oak Ridge National Laboratory launched the Next Generation Safeguards Professional Network (NGSPN). The purpose of this initiative is to establish working relationships and to foster collaboration and communication among the next generation of safeguards leaders. The NGSPN is an organization for, and of, young professionals pursuing careers in nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation - as well as mid-career professionals new to the field - whether working within the U.S. DOE national laboratory complex, U.S. government agencies, academia, or industry or at the IAEA. The NGSPN is actively supported by the NNSA, boasts more than 70 members, maintains a website and newsletter, and has held two national meetings as well as an NGSPN session and panel at the July 2010 Institute of Nuclear Material Management Annual Meeting. This paper discusses the network; its significance, goals and objectives; developments and progress to date; and future plans.

  12. Safeguards operations in the integral fast reactor fuel cycle

    SciTech Connect

    Goff, K.M.; Benedict, R.W.; Brumbach, S.B.; Dickerman, C.E.; Tompot, R.W.

    1994-08-01

    Argonne National Laboratory is currently demonstrating the fuel cycle for the Integral Fast Reactor (IFR), an advanced reactor concept that takes advantage of the properties of metallic fuel and liquid metal cooling to offer significant improvements in reactor safety, operation, fuel-cycle economics, environmental protection, and safeguards. The IFR fuel cycle employs a pyrometallurgical process using molten salts and liquid metals to recover actinides from spent fuel. The safeguards aspects of the fuel cycle demonstration must be approved by the United States Department of Energy, but a further goal of the program is to develop a safeguards system that could gain acceptance from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and International Atomic Energy Agency. This fuel cycle is described with emphasis on aspects that differ from aqueous reprocessing and on its improved safeguardability due to decreased attractiveness and diversion potential of all process streams, including the fuel product.

  13. Waste management safeguards project: History of and recommendations for development activities in support of safeguards of final disposal of spent fuel

    SciTech Connect

    Moran, B.W.

    1994-02-16

    Coordinated safeguards assessment and development activities in support of the U.S. Civilian Radioactive Waste Management System (CRWMS) and international safeguards objectives were initiated in Fiscal Year 1987. Initial technical support activities were performed at the direction of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM); however, as the priority of support activities changed, direction for the support tasks was transferred to the U.S. Department of State (State), the DOE Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation (DOE/IS-40), and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The direction for technical support activities was established at the International Atomic Energy Agency`s (IAEA`s) advisory group meeting and subsequent consultants` meetings on safeguards related to the final disposal of nuclear material contained in waste and spent fuel. Task directions for the development of international safeguards in support of the final disposal of spent fuel are currently being provided by DOE/IS-40. A summary of safeguards activities performed by the Waste Management Safeguards Project is provided. Systems for design information verification for spent fuel consolidation and conditioning operations are needed immediately. Safeguards approaches for maintaining continuity of knowledge of spent fuel processed at the conditioning facility and for verification of the final disposal package will be needed within three years. Systems for design information verification of the repository facilities will be needed by the end of the decade.

  14. The evolution of information-driven safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Budlong-sylvester, Kory W; Pilat, Joseph F

    2010-10-14

    From the adoption of the Model Additional Protocol and integrated safeguards in the 1990s, to current International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) efforts to deal with cases of noncompliance, the question of how the Agency can best utilize all the information available to it remains of great interest and increasing importance. How might the concept of 'information-driven' safeguards (IDS) evolve in the future? The ability of the Agency to identify and resolve anomalies has always been important and has emerged as a core Agency function in recent years as the IAEA has had to deal with noncompliance in Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). Future IAEA safeguards implementation should be designed with the goal of facilitating and enhancing this vital capability. In addition, the Agency should utilize all the information it possesses, including its in-house assessments and expertise, to direct its safeguards activities. At the State level, knowledge of proliferation possibilities is currently being used to guide the analytical activities of the Agency and to develop inspection plans. How far can this approach be extended? Does it apply across State boundaries? Should it dictate a larger fraction of safeguards activities? Future developments in IDS should utilize the knowledge resident within the Agency to ensure that safeguards resources flow to where they are most needed in order to address anomalies first and foremost, but also to provide greater confidence in conclusions regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear activities. The elements of such a system and related implementation issues are assessed in this paper.

  15. Safeguards management inspection procedures

    SciTech Connect

    Barth, M.J.; Dunn, D.R.

    1984-08-01

    The objective of this inspection module is to independently assess the contributions of licensee management to overall safeguards systems performance. The inspector accomplishes this objective by comparing the licensee's safeguards management to both the 10 CFR, parts 70 and 73, requirements and to generally accepted management practices. The vehicle by which this comparison is to be made consists of assessment questions and key issues which point the inspector to areas of primary concern to the NRC and which raise additional issues for the purpose of exposing management ineffectiveness. Further insight into management effectiveness is obtained through those assessment questions specifically directed toward the licensee's safeguards system performance. If the quality of the safeguards is poor, then the inspector should strongly suspect that management's role is ineffective and should attempt to determine management's influence (or lack thereof) on the underlying safeguards deficiencies. (The converse is not necessarily true, however.) The assessment questions in essence provide an opportunity for the inspector to identify, to single out, and to probe further, questionable management practices. Specific issues, circumstances, and concerns which point to questionable or inappropriate practices should be explicitly identified and referenced against the CFR and the assessment questions. The inspection report should also explain why the inspector feels certain management practices are poor, counter to the CFR, and/or point to ineffecive management. Concurrent with documenting the inspection results, the inspector should provide recommendations for alleviating observed management practices that are detrimental to effective safeguards. The recommendations could include: specific changes in the practices of the licensee, followup procedures on the part of NRC, and proposed license changes.

  16. Safeguards and security research and development: Progress report, October 1994--September 1995

    SciTech Connect

    Rutherford, D.R.; Henriksen, P.W.

    1997-03-01

    The primary goal of the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Technology Development Program, International Safeguards, and other Safeguards and Security Programs is to continue to be the center of excellence in the field of Safeguards and Security. This annual report for 1995 describes those scientific and engineering projects that contribute to all of the aforementioned programs. The authors have presented the information in a different format from previous annual reports. Part I is devoted to Nuclear Material Measurement Systems. Part II contains projects that are specific to Integrated Safeguards Systems. Part III highlights Safeguards Systems Effectiveness Evaluations and Part IV is a compilation of highlights from Information Assurance projects. Finally Part V highlights work on the projects at Los Alamos for International Safeguards. The final part of this annual report lists titles and abstracts of Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Technology Development reports, technical journal articles, and conference papers that were presented and published in 1995. This is the last annual report in this format. The authors wish to thank all of the individuals who have contributed to this annual report and made it so successful over the years.

  17. Safeguards and security by design (SSBD) for the domestic threat - theft and sabotage

    SciTech Connect

    Demuth, Scott F; Mullen, Mark

    2011-10-05

    Safeguards by Design (SBD) is receiving significant interest with respect to international safeguards objectives. However, less attention has been focused on the equally important topic of domestic Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD), which addresses requirements such as those of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in the United States. While international safeguards are concerned with detecting State diversion of nuclear material from peaceful to nuclear explosives purposes, domestic Material Protection, Control and Accounting measures (MPC&A) are focused on non-State theft and sabotage. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has described the Safeguards by Design (SBD) concept as an approach in which 'international safeguards are fully integrated into the design process of a new nuclear facility from the initial planning through design, construction, operation, and decommissioning.' This same concept is equally applicable to SSBD for domestic requirements. The United States Department of Energy (DOE) has initiated a project through its Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) and more specifically its Fuel Cycle Research and Development (FCRD) program, to develop a domestic SSBD discipline and methodology in parallel with similar efforts sponsored by the DOE Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) and the IAEA for international safeguards. This activity includes the participation of industry (through DOE-sponsored contracts) and DOE National Laboratories. This paper will identify the key domestic safeguards and security requirements (i.e. MC&A and physical protection) and explain how and why Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) is important and beneficial for the design of future US nuclear energy systems.

  18. Review of effectiveness-evaluation methodologies for safeguards and security systems

    SciTech Connect

    Dowdy, E.J.; Mangan, D.L.

    1982-06-01

    We discuss the factors that influence the effectiveness of safeguards and security measures and the characteristics required of effectiveness evaluation methodologies. Within this context and from a utility standpoint, we review those effectiveness evaluation methodologies that have been developed. Our principal recommendation concerns the application and concomitant validation of existing methodologies. This recommendation derives from our conclusion that there has been a gross imbalance between the effort spent on methodology development and the application of those methodologies. Only for those safeguards measures that do not seem to be covered by existing methodologies or that seem to be inadequately covered do we suggest development. 44 references.

  19. Documentation and Analysis of IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) Safeguards Implementation at the Exxon Nuclear Fuel Fabrication Plant.

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1984-10-01

    Those efforts also resulted in the development of innovative approaches for improving effectiveness and minimizing the cost burden. The experience showed...approaches for improving effectiveness and minimizing the cost burden. The experience showed that IAEA safeguards could be technically effective...services such as the cost of shipping the IAEA equipment to other locations in the U.S. and for providing the IAEA with working standards for use at the U.S

  20. Deterring Nuclear Proliferation: The Importance of IAEA Safeguards: A TEXTBOOK

    SciTech Connect

    Rosenthal, M.D.; Fishbone, L.G.; Gallini, L.; Krass, A.; Kratzer, M.; Sanborn, J.; Ward, B.; Wulf, N. A.

    2012-03-13

    Nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation are among the most pressing challenges to international peace and security that we face today. Iran and Syria remain in non-compliance with the safeguards requirements of the NPT, and the nuclear ambitions of North Korea remain unchecked. Despite these challenges, the NPT remains a cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and the safeguards implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) under the NPT play a critical role in deterring nuclear proliferation.How do they work? Where did they come from? And what is their future? This book answers these questions. Anyone studying the field of nuclear non-proliferation will benefit from reading this book, and for anyone entering the field, the book will enable them to get a running start. Part I describes the foundations of the international safeguards system: its origins in the 1930s - when new discoveries in physics made it clear immediately that nuclear energy held both peril and promise - through the entry into force in 1970 of the NPT, which codified the role of IAEA safeguards as a means to verify states NPT commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons. Part II describes the NPT safeguards system, which is based on a model safeguards agreement developed specifically for the NPT, The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States required in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which has been published by the IAEA as INFCIRC/153. Part III describes events, especially in South Africa, the DPRK, and Iraq in the early 1990s, that triggered a transformation in the way in which safeguards were conceptualized and implemented.

  1. IAEA safeguards and classified materials

    SciTech Connect

    Pilat, J.F.; Eccleston, G.W.; Fearey, B.L.; Nicholas, N.J.; Tape, J.W.; Kratzer, M.

    1997-11-01

    The international community in the post-Cold War period has suggested that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) utilize its expertise in support of the arms control and disarmament process in unprecedented ways. The pledges of the US and Russian presidents to place excess defense materials, some of which are classified, under some type of international inspections raises the prospect of using IAEA safeguards approaches for monitoring classified materials. A traditional safeguards approach, based on nuclear material accountancy, would seem unavoidably to reveal classified information. However, further analysis of the IAEA`s safeguards approaches is warranted in order to understand fully the scope and nature of any problems. The issues are complex and difficult, and it is expected that common technical understandings will be essential for their resolution. Accordingly, this paper examines and compares traditional safeguards item accounting of fuel at a nuclear power station (especially spent fuel) with the challenges presented by inspections of classified materials. This analysis is intended to delineate more clearly the problems as well as reveal possible approaches, techniques, and technologies that could allow the adaptation of safeguards to the unprecedented task of inspecting classified materials. It is also hoped that a discussion of these issues can advance ongoing political-technical debates on international inspections of excess classified materials.

  2. Safeguarding Porpoises

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    1997-01-01

    The NetMark 1000 by the Dukane Corporation, used to safeguard porpoises from net entanglement, employs technology developed in the late 1960s by NASA engineers at the Langley Research Center. It is based on an underwater location aid, able to withstand high impact, then emit multidirectional signals for hours on end, originally used in the retrieval of NASA payloads following watery touch-downs on Earth. Dukane and Burnett Electronics later obtained a license from NASA, further improving on the beacon design. In a large scale experiment off the coast of New Hampshire in autumn of 1994, it was found that the use of acoustic alarms appears to hold considerable promise in reducing the number of harbor porpoises killed in the sink gill nets in the Gulf of Maine. Dukane has sold well over 100,000 units. Applications of the pinger are also expanding to other animal species.

  3. Implications of Export/Import Reporting Requirements in the United States - International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards Additional Protocol

    SciTech Connect

    Killinger, Mark H.; Benjamin, Eugene L.; McNair, Gary W.

    2001-02-20

    The United States has signed but not ratified the US/IAEA Safeguards Additional Protocol. If ratified, the Additional Protocol will require the US to report to the IAEA certain nuclear-related exports and imports to the IAEA. This document identifies and assesses the issues associated with the US making those reports. For example, some regulatory changes appear to be necessary. The document also attempts to predict the impact on the DOE Complex by assessing the historical flow of exports and imports that would be reportable if the Additional Protocol were in force.

  4. Reactor safeguards against insider sabotage

    SciTech Connect

    Bennett, H.A.

    1982-03-01

    A conceptual safeguards system is structured to show how both reactor operations and physical protection resources could be integrated to prevent release of radioactive material caused by insider sabotage. Operational recovery capabilities are addressed from the viewpoint of both detection of and response to disabled components. Physical protection capabilities for preventing insider sabotage through the application of work rules are analyzed. Recommendations for further development of safeguards system structures, operational recovery, and sabotage prevention are suggested.

  5. The International System.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    East, Maurice A.

    Designed as a unit for an international relations course, this systems approach paper outlines a learning method which contributes to the student's awareness that the United States is only one of many actors in the world. It also makes the student aware that there are limitations on the U. S. individual actions because of this interdependence and…

  6. Reversing the Trend: Creating a Growing and Sustainable Cadre of Safeguards Experts in the United States

    SciTech Connect

    Lockwood, Dunbar; Mathews, Caroline E.; Seward, Amy M.

    2008-07-17

    In October 2007, the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Office of Non-Proliferation and International Security (NA-24) completed a wide-ranging study on international safeguards issues that found, inter alia, that the human capital base in the United States must be revitalized and expanded to ensure a seamless succession from the current generation of safeguards experts. Many current safeguards experts will soon retire and a new generation of talent with capabilities that cover the full spectrum of safeguards-relevant disciplines is needed. The success of this effort will have direct bearing on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). An effective international safeguards system that responds to current and future nonproliferation challenges requires a cadre of skilled safeguards specialists. However, a number of factors have converged in recent years that have challenged the IAEA’s ability to effectively carry out its safeguards mission, e.g. flat funding, expanding responsibilities, and several ad hoc high profile investigations. In the near future, the Agency will require increased numbers of qualified staff to address the expansion and evolution of its mission and anticipated worldwide growth in nuclear energy production. Without a large-scale effort to address this requirement in the near future, the international community will have far less confidence that nuclear material in civil programs is not being diverted for nuclear weapons and the risks of nuclear proliferation will increase around the world. This paper will describe in detail NNSA’s efforts, in coordination with other federal agencies, to address the safeguards human resources challenge, focusing on the recommendations of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI).

  7. a state department perspective on IAEA safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Kessler, J.C. )

    1989-07-01

    The maintenance of effective international safeguards is a fundamental tenet of U.S. non-proliferation policy. The U.S. Department of State plays a substantial role not only in articulating U.S. non-proliferation policy, but in the implementation of that policy, including a substantial role in all aspects of U.S. support of IAEA safeguards. The State Department's role in supporting IAEA safeguards ranges from considerations related to bilateral agreements for cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy and export control to many rather technical aspects of safeguards such as the U.S. Program of Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards (POTAS) and negotiation of Facility Attachments for U.S. nuclear facilities subject to IAEA safeguards. TSO plays an important role in support of these efforts by providing technical advice on a broad range of matters where technical and policy issues are closely intertwined.

  8. REVIEW OF THE NEGOTIATION OF THE MODEL PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE AGREEMENT(S) BETWEEN STATE(S) AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY FOR THE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS, INFCIRC/540 (Corrected) VOLUME II/III IAEA COMMITTEE 24, Major Issues Underlying the Model Additional Protocol (1996-1997).

    SciTech Connect

    Rosenthal, M.D.; Saum-Manning, L.; Houck, F.

    2010-01-01

    Volume I of this Review traces the origins of the Model Additional Protocol. It covers the period from 1991, when events in Iraq triggered an intensive review of the safeguards system, until 1996, when the IAEA Board of Governors established Committee 24 to negotiate a new protocol to safeguards agreement. The period from 1991-1996 set the stage for this negotiation and shaped its outcome in important ways. During this 5-year period, many proposals for strengthening safeguards were suggested and reviewed. Some proposals were dropped, for example, the suggestion by the IAEA Secretariat to verify certain imports, and others were refined. A rough consensus was established about the directions in which the international community wanted to go, and this was reflected in the draft of an additional protocol that was submitted to the IAEA Board of Governors on May 6, 1996 in document GOV/2863, Strengthening the Effectiveness and Improving the Efficiency of the Safeguards System - Proposals For Implementation Under Complementary Legal Authority, A Report by the Director General. This document ended with a recommendation that, 'the Board, through an appropriate mechanism, finalize the required legal instrument taking as a basis the draft protocol proposed by the Secretariat and the explanation of the measures contained in this document.'

  9. DOE/DHS INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEM CYBER SECURITY PROGRAMS: A MODEL FOR USE IN NUCLEAR FACILITY SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY

    SciTech Connect

    Robert S. Anderson; Mark Schanfein; Trond Bjornard; Paul Moskowitz

    2011-07-01

    Many critical infrastructure sectors have been investigating cyber security issues for several years especially with the help of two primary government programs. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National SCADA Test Bed and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Control Systems Security Program have both implemented activities aimed at securing the industrial control systems that operate the North American electric grid along with several other critical infrastructure sectors (ICS). These programs have spent the last seven years working with industry including asset owners, educational institutions, standards and regulating bodies, and control system vendors. The programs common mission is to provide outreach, identification of cyber vulnerabilities to ICS and mitigation strategies to enhance security postures. The success of these programs indicates that a similar approach can be successfully translated into other sectors including nuclear operations, safeguards, and security. The industry regulating bodies have included cyber security requirements and in some cases, have incorporated sets of standards with penalties for non-compliance such as the North American Electric Reliability Corporation Critical Infrastructure Protection standards. These DOE and DHS programs that address security improvements by both suppliers and end users provide an excellent model for nuclear facility personnel concerned with safeguards and security cyber vulnerabilities and countermeasures. It is not a stretch to imagine complete surreptitious collapse of protection against the removal of nuclear material or even initiation of a criticality event as witnessed at Three Mile Island or Chernobyl in a nuclear ICS inadequately protected against the cyber threat.

  10. 21 CFR 26.21 - Safeguard clause.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-04-01

    ... OF PHARMACEUTICAL GOOD MANUFACTURING PRACTICE REPORTS, MEDICAL DEVICE QUALITY SYSTEM AUDIT REPORTS... Specific Sector Provisions for Pharmaceutical Good Manufacturing Practices § 26.21 Safeguard clause....

  11. 21 CFR 26.21 - Safeguard clause.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-04-01

    ... OF PHARMACEUTICAL GOOD MANUFACTURING PRACTICE REPORTS, MEDICAL DEVICE QUALITY SYSTEM AUDIT REPORTS... Specific Sector Provisions for Pharmaceutical Good Manufacturing Practices § 26.21 Safeguard clause. Each...

  12. 21 CFR 26.21 - Safeguard clause.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-04-01

    ... OF PHARMACEUTICAL GOOD MANUFACTURING PRACTICE REPORTS, MEDICAL DEVICE QUALITY SYSTEM AUDIT REPORTS... Specific Sector Provisions for Pharmaceutical Good Manufacturing Practices § 26.21 Safeguard clause. Each...

  13. 21 CFR 26.21 - Safeguard clause.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-04-01

    ... OF PHARMACEUTICAL GOOD MANUFACTURING PRACTICE REPORTS, MEDICAL DEVICE QUALITY SYSTEM AUDIT REPORTS... Specific Sector Provisions for Pharmaceutical Good Manufacturing Practices § 26.21 Safeguard clause. Each...

  14. 21 CFR 26.21 - Safeguard clause.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-04-01

    ... OF PHARMACEUTICAL GOOD MANUFACTURING PRACTICE REPORTS, MEDICAL DEVICE QUALITY SYSTEM AUDIT REPORTS... Specific Sector Provisions for Pharmaceutical Good Manufacturing Practices § 26.21 Safeguard clause. Each...

  15. Internal insulation system development

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Gille, J. P.

    1973-01-01

    The development of an internal insulation system for cryogenic liquids is described. The insulation system is based on a gas layer concept in which capillary or surface tension effects are used to maintain a stable gas layer within a cellular core structure between the tank wall and the contained cryogen. In this work, a 1.8 meter diameter tank was insulated and tested with liquid hydrogen. Ability to withstand cycling of the aluminum tank wall to 450 K was a design and test condition.

  16. The state-level approach: moving beyond integrated safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Tape, James W

    2008-01-01

    The concept of a State-Level Approach (SLA) for international safeguards planning, implementation, and evaluation was contained in the Conceptual Framework for Integrated Safeguards (IS) agreed in 2002. This paper describes briefly the key elements of the SLA, including State-level factors and high-level safeguards objectives, and considers different cases in which application of the SLA methodology could address safeguards for 'suspect' States, 'good' States, and Nuclear Weapons States hosting fuel cycle centers. The continued use and further development of the SLA to customize safeguards for each State, including for States already under IS, is seen as central to effective and efficient safeguards for an expanding nuclear world.

  17. Key aspects of a Flemish system to safeguard public health interests in case of chemical release incidents.

    PubMed

    Smolders, Roel; Colles, Ann; Cornelis, Christa; Van Holderbeke, Mirja; Chovanova, Hana; Wildemeersch, Dirk; Mampaey, Maja; Van Campenhout, Karen

    2014-12-15

    Although well-established protocols are available for emergency services and first-responders in case of chemical release incidents, a well-developed system to monitor and safeguard public health was, until recently, lacking in Flanders. We therefore developed a decision support system (DSS) to aid public health officials in identifying the appropriate actions in case of incidents. Although the DSS includes human biomonitoring as one of its key instruments, it also goes well beyond this instrument alone. Also other, complementary, approaches that focus more on effect assessment using in vitro toxicity testing, indirect exposures through the food chain, and parallel means of data collection (e.g. through ecosurveillance or public consultation), are integrated in the Flemish approach. Even though the DSS is set up to provide a flexible and structured decision tree, the value of expert opinion is deemed essential to account for the many uncertainties associated with the early phases of technological incidents. When the DSS and the associated instruments will be fully operational, it will provide a valuable addition to the already available protocols, and will specifically safeguard public health interests.

  18. A comparison of the additional protocols of the five nuclear weapon states and the ensuing safeguards benefits to international nonproliferation efforts

    SciTech Connect

    Uribe, Eva C; Sandoval, M Analisa; Sandoval, Marisa N; Boyer, Brian D; Leitch, Rosalyn M

    2009-01-01

    With the 6 January 2009 entry into force of the Additional Protocol by the United States of America, all five declared Nuclear Weapon States that are part of the Nonproliferation Treaty have signed, ratified, and put into force the Additional Protocol. This paper makes a comparison of the strengths and weaknesses of the five Additional Protocols in force by the five Nuclear Weapon States with respect to the benefits to international nonproliferation aims. This paper also documents the added safeguards burden to the five declared Nuclear Weapon States that these Additional Protocols put on the states with respect to access to their civilian nuclear programs and the hosting of complementary access activities as part of the Additional Protocol.

  19. Containment and surveillance -- A principal IAEA safeguards measure

    SciTech Connect

    Drayer, D.D.; Dupree, S.A.; Sonnier, C.S.

    1997-12-31

    The growth of the safeguards inspectorate of the Agency, spanning more than 40 years, has produced a variety of interesting subjects (legal, technical, political, etc.) for recollection, discussion, and study. Although the Agency was established in 1957, the first practical inspections did not occur until the early 1960s. In the early inspections, thee was little C/S equipment available, and no optical surveillance was used. However, by the third decade of the IAEA, the 1980s, many technology advances were made, and the level of C/S equipment activities increased. By the late 1980s, some 200 Twin Minolta film camera systems were deployed by the Agency for safeguards use. At the present time, the Agency is evaluating and beginning to implement remote monitoring as part of the Strengthened Safeguards System. However, adoption of remote monitoring by international agencies cannot occur rapidly because of the many technical and policy issues associated with this activity. A glimpse into the future indicates that an important element of safeguards instrumentation will be the merging of C/S and NDA equipment into integrated systems. The use of modern interior area monitors in International Safeguards also offers a great potential for advancing C/S measures. The research in microsensors is in its infancy, and the opportunities for their reducing the cost, increasing the life time, and increasing the reliability of sensors for safeguards applications are manifold. A period may be approaching in which the terminology of C/S will no longer have its original meaning, as integrated systems combining NDA instruments and C/S instruments are already in use and are expected to be the norm in the near future.

  20. 17 CFR 39.34 - System safeguards for systemically important derivatives clearing organizations and subpart C...

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-04-01

    ... systemically important derivatives clearing organizations and subpart C derivatives clearing organizations. 39.34 Section 39.34 Commodity and Securities Exchanges COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION DERIVATIVES CLEARING ORGANIZATIONS Provisions Applicable to Systemically Important Derivatives Clearing...

  1. Potential application of LIBS to NNSA next generation safeguards initiative (NGSI)

    SciTech Connect

    Barefield Ii, James E; Clegg, Samuel M; Veirs, Douglas K; Browne, Mike; Lopez, Leon; Martinez, Ron; Le, Loan; Lamontagne, Stephen A

    2009-01-01

    In a climate in which states and nations have been and perhaps currently are involved in the prol iferation of nuclear materials and technologies, advanced methodologies and improvements in current measurement techniques are needed to combat new threats and increased levels of sophistication. The Department of Energy through the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has undertaken a broad review of International Safeguards. The conclusion from that review was that a comprehensive initiative to revitalize international safeguards technology and the human resource base was urgently needed to keep pace with demands and increasingly sophisticated emerging safeguards challenges. To address these challenges, NNSA launched the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) to develop policies, concepts, technologies, expertise, and infrastructure necessary to sustain the international safeguards system as its mission evolves for the next 25 years. NGSI is designed to revitalize and strengthen the U.S. safeguards technical base, recognizing that without a robust program the United States of America will not be in a position to exercise leadership or provide the necessary support to the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency). International safeguards as administrated by the IAEA are the primary vehicle for verifying compliance with the peaceful use and nonproliferation of nuclear materials and technologies. Laser Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy or LIBS has the potential to support the goals of NGSI as follows: by providing (1) automated analysis in complex nuclear processing or reprocessing facilities in real-time or near real-time without sample preparation or removal, (2) isotopic and important elemental ratio (Cm/Pu, Cm/U, ... etc) analysis, and (3) centralized remote control, process monitoring, and analysis of nuclear materials in nuclear facilities at multiple locations within the facility. Potential application of LIBS to international safeguards as

  2. REPORT OF THE WORKSHOP ON NUCLEAR FACILITY DESIGN INFORMATION EXAMINATION AND VERIFICATION FOR SAFEGUARDS

    SciTech Connect

    Richard Metcalf; Robert Bean

    2009-10-01

    Executive Summary The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements nuclear safeguards and verifies countries are compliant with their international nuclear safeguards agreements. One of the key provisions in the safeguards agreement is the requirement that the country provide nuclear facility design and operating information to the IAEA relevant to safeguarding the facility, and at a very early stage. , This provides the opportunity for the IAEA to verify the safeguards-relevant features of the facility and to periodically ensure that those features have not changed. The national authorities (State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material - SSAC) provide the design information for all facilities within a country to the IAEA. The design information is conveyed using the IAEA’s Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ) and specifies: (1) Identification of the facility’s general character, purpose, capacity, and location; (2) Description of the facility’s layout and nuclear material form, location, and flow; (3) Description of the features relating to nuclear material accounting, containment, and surveillance; and (4) Description of existing and proposed procedures for nuclear material accounting and control, with identification of nuclear material balance areas. The DIQ is updated as required by written addendum. IAEA safeguards inspectors examine and verify this information in design information examination (DIE) and design information verification (DIV) activities to confirm that the facility has been constructed or is being operated as declared by the facility operator and national authorities, and to develop a suitable safeguards approach. Under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), the National Nuclear Security Administrations (NNSA) Office of Non-Proliferation and International Security identified the need for more effective and efficient verification of design information by the IAEA for improving international safeguards

  3. Internal Control Systems in the Library Environment.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Begg, Robert T.

    1985-01-01

    Examines system for safeguarding assets and guaranteeing reliability of library's financial records within context of management functions that comprise accounting controls: planning by budget or other standard of comparison; operation of effective accounting and record-keeping system; personnel management practices. Cash controls as example of…

  4. Irans Nuclear Program: Tehrans Compliance with International Obligations

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2016-03-03

    Research Service Summary Several U.N. Security Council resolutions required Iran to cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s...comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards; Tehran concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA in 1974. 2 In 2002...in the State (i.e. completeness).” 17 The Safeguards System of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Available at http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SG

  5. The Internal Audit.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Kuhn, Robert H.

    1981-01-01

    Internal control comprises the plan of organization and all the coordinate methods and measures adopted within a school system to safeguard its assets, check the reliability of its accounting data, promote operational efficiency, and encourage adherence to prescribed policies. (Author)

  6. The Internal Audit.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Kuhn, Robert H.

    1981-01-01

    Internal control comprises the plan of organization and all the coordinate methods and measures adopted within a school system to safeguard its assets, check the reliability of its accounting data, promote operational efficiency, and encourage adherence to prescribed policies. (Author)

  7. Strategic analysis for safeguards systems: a feasibility study. Volume 2. Appendix

    SciTech Connect

    Goldman, A J

    1984-12-01

    This appendix provides detailed information regarding game theory (strategic analysis) and its potential role in safeguards to supplement the main body of this report. In particualr, it includes an extensive, though not comprehensive review of literature on game theory and on other topics that relate to the formulation of a game-theoretic model (e.g. the payoff functions). The appendix describes the basic form and components of game theory models, and the solvability of various models. It then discusses three basic issues related to the use of strategic analysis in material accounting: (1) its understandability; (2) its viability in regulatory settings; and (3) difficulties in the use of mixed strategies. Each of the components of a game theoretic model are then discussed and related to the present context.

  8. Time-Domain Reflectometry for Tamper Indication in Unattended Monitoring Systems for Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Tedeschi, Jonathan R.; Smith, Leon E.; Moore, David E.; Sheen, David M.; Conrad, Ryan C.

    2014-12-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) continues to expand its use of unattended, remotely monitored measurement systems. An increasing number of systems and an expanding family of instruments create challenges in terms of deployment efficiency and the implementation of data authentication measures. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) leads a collaboration that is exploring various tamper-indicating (TI) measures that could help to address some of the long-standing detector and data-transmission authentication challenges with IAEA’s unattended systems. PNNL is investigating the viability of active time-domain reflectometry (TDR) along two parallel but interconnected paths: (1) swept-frequency TDR as the highly flexible, laboratory gold standard to which field-deployable options can be compared, and (2) a low-cost commercially available spread-spectrum TDR technology as one option for field implementation. This report describes PNNL’s progress and preliminary findings from the first year of the study, and describes the path forward.

  9. International Space Station Power Systems

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Propp, Timothy William

    2001-01-01

    This viewgraph presentation gives a general overview of the International Space Station Power Systems. The topics include: 1) The Basics of Power; 2) Space Power Systems Design Constraints; 3) Solar Photovoltaic Power Systems; 4) Energy Storage for Space Power Systems; 5) Challenges of Operating Power Systems in Earth Orbit; 6) and International Space Station Electrical Power System.

  10. Safeguard Requirements for Fusion Power Plants

    SciTech Connect

    Robert J. Goldston and Alexander Glaser

    2012-08-10

    Nuclear proliferation risks from magnetic fusion energy associated with access to fissile materials can be divided into three main categories: 1) clandestine production of fissile material in an undeclared facility, 2) covert production and diversion of such material in a declared and safeguarded facility, and 3) use of a declared facility in a breakout scenario, in which a state openly produces fissile material in violation of international agreements. The degree of risk in each of these categories is assessed, taking into account both state and non-state actors, and it is found that safeguards are required for fusion energy to be highly attractive from a non-proliferation standpoint. Specific safeguard requirements and R&D needs are outlined for each category of risk, and the technical capability of the ITER experiment, under construction, to contribute to this R&D is noted. A preliminary analysis indicates a potential legal pathway for fusion power systems to be brought under the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. "Vertical" proliferation risks associated with tritium and with the knowledge that can be gained from inertial fusion energy R&D are outlined.

  11. Safeguards-by-Design: Guidance for High Temperature Gas Reactors (HTGRs) With Pebble Fuel

    SciTech Connect

    Philip Casey Durst; Mark Schanfein

    2012-08-01

    The following is a guidance document from a series prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), to assist facility designers and operators in implementing international Safeguards-by-Design (SBD). SBD has two main objectives: (1) to avoid costly and time consuming redesign work or retrofits of new nuclear fuel cycle facilities and (2) to make the implementation of international safeguards more effective and efficient at such facilities. In the long term, the attainment of these goals would save industry and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) time, money, and resources and be mutually beneficial. This particular safeguards guidance document focuses on pebble fuel high temperature gas reactors (HTGR). The purpose of the IAEA safeguards system is to provide credible assurance to the international community that nuclear material and other specified items are not diverted from peaceful nuclear uses. The safeguards system consists of the IAEA’s statutory authority to establish safeguards; safeguards rights and obligations in safeguards agreements and additional protocols; and technical measures implemented pursuant to those agreements. Of foremost importance is the international safeguards agreement between the country and the IAEA, concluded pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). According to a 1992 IAEA Board of Governors decision, countries must: notify the IAEA of a decision to construct a new nuclear facility as soon as such decision is taken; provide design information on such facilities as the designs develop; and provide detailed design information based on construction plans at least 180 days prior to the start of construction, and on "as-built" designs at least 180 days before the first receipt of nuclear material. Ultimately, the design information will be captured in an IAEA Design Information

  12. IAEA Safeguards: Past, Present, and Future

    SciTech Connect

    Santi, Peter A.; Hypes, Philip A.

    2012-06-14

    This talk will present an overview of the International Atomic Energy Agency with a specific focus on its international safeguards mission and activities. The talk will first present a brief history of the IAEA and discuss its current governing structure. It will then focus on the Safeguards Department and its role in providing assurance that nuclear materials are being used for peaceful purposes. It will then look at how the IAEA is currently evolving the way in which it executes its safeguards mission with a focus on the idea of a state-level approach.

  13. 38 CFR 18.436 - Procedural safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... or are believed to need special instruction or related services. The system shall include: (1) Notice... Adult Education § 18.436 Procedural safeguards. (a) A recipient that operates a public elementary or secondary education program shall implement a system of procedural safeguards with respect to...

  14. Fiscal Year 2014 Annual Report on BNLs Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Human Capital Development Activities

    SciTech Connect

    Pepper, Susan E.

    2014-10-10

    Brookhaven National Laboratory’s (BNL’s) Nonproliferation and National Security Department contributes to the National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Nonproliferation and International Security Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) through university engagement, safeguards internships, safeguards courses, professional development, recruitment, and other activities aimed at ensuring the next generation of international safeguards professionals is adequately prepared to support the U.S. safeguards mission. This report is a summary of BNL s work under the NGSI program in Fiscal Year 2014.

  15. Full spectrum optical safeguard

    DOEpatents

    Ackerman, Mark R.

    2008-12-02

    An optical safeguard device with two linear variable Fabry-Perot filters aligned relative to a light source with at least one of the filters having a nonlinear dielectric constant material such that, when a light source produces a sufficiently high intensity light, the light alters the characteristics of the nonlinear dielectric constant material to reduce the intensity of light impacting a connected optical sensor. The device can be incorporated into an imaging system on a moving platform, such as an aircraft or satellite.

  16. IMPLEMENTING THE SAFEGUARDS-BY-DESIGN PROCESS

    SciTech Connect

    Whitaker, J Michael; McGinnis, Brent; Laughter, Mark D; Morgan, Jim; Bjornard, Trond; Bean, Robert; Durst, Phillip; Hockert, John; DeMuth, Scott; Lockwood, Dunbar

    2010-01-01

    The Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) approach incorporates safeguards into the design and construction of nuclear facilities at the very beginning of the design process. It is a systematic and structured approach for fully integrating international and national safeguards for material control and accountability (MC&A), physical protection, and other proliferation barriers into the design and construction process for nuclear facilities. Implementing SBD is primarily a project management or project coordination challenge. This paper focuses specifically on the design process; the planning, definition, organization, coordination, scheduling and interaction of the safeguards experts and stakeholders as they participate in the design and construction of a nuclear facility. It delineates the steps in a nuclear facility design and construction project in order to provide the project context within which the safeguards design activities take place, describes the involvement of the safeguards experts in the design process, the nature of their analyses, interactions and decisions, and describes the documents created and how they are used. This report highlights the project context of safeguards activities, and identifies the safeguards community (nuclear facility operator, designer/builder, state regulator, SSAC and IAEA) must accomplish in order to implement SBD within the project.

  17. 26 CFR 301.6803-1 - Accounting and safeguarding.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-04-01

    ... 26 Internal Revenue 18 2013-04-01 2013-04-01 false Accounting and safeguarding. 301.6803-1 Section 301.6803-1 Internal Revenue INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY (CONTINUED) PROCEDURE... Accounting and safeguarding. In cases coming within the provisions of section 6802 (2) and (3) and...

  18. 26 CFR 301.6803-1 - Accounting and safeguarding.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-04-01

    ... 26 Internal Revenue 18 2011-04-01 2011-04-01 false Accounting and safeguarding. 301.6803-1 Section 301.6803-1 Internal Revenue INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY (CONTINUED) PROCEDURE... Accounting and safeguarding. In cases coming within the provisions of section 6802 (2) and (3) and...

  19. 26 CFR 301.6803-1 - Accounting and safeguarding.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-04-01

    ... 26 Internal Revenue 18 2014-04-01 2014-04-01 false Accounting and safeguarding. 301.6803-1 Section 301.6803-1 Internal Revenue INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY (CONTINUED) PROCEDURE... Accounting and safeguarding. In cases coming within the provisions of section 6802 (2) and (3) and...

  20. A preliminary study on the safeguardability of a Korean advanced pyro-processing facility (KAPF)

    SciTech Connect

    Lee, S.Y.; Thomas, K.E.; Marlow, J.B.; Menlove, H.O.; Ko, W.I.; Yang, M.S.; Park, S.W.

    2007-07-01

    A preliminary study on the safeguardability of the Korean Advanced Pyro-processing Facility (KAPF) was performed. The main processes of the facility include voloxidation, electrolytic reduction, electrorefining, electrowinning, and salt recycling with a transuranic (TRU) recovery process. The subprocesses and material flow of the conceptually designed KAPF with a unit capacity of 100 tHM/year were analysed, and subsequently, the relevant material balance area (MBA) and key measurement point (KMP) were designed for material accounting. Uncertainty in material accounting was evaluated with designed MBA and KMP, together with measurement uncertainties of analytic methods identified for the KAPF. It was found that the major safeguards challenges were Pu input accountability and U/Pu inventory measurement at each subprocess. The continuous association of Pu with Cm presents measurement options in both cases. It was concluded that a safeguards system for the KAPF could be designed to meet the International Atomic Energy Agency's comprehensive safeguards objective. (authors)

  1. A Mock UF6 Feed and Withdrawal System for Testing Safeguards Monitoring Systems and Strategies Intended for Nuclear Fuel Enrichment and Processing Plants

    SciTech Connect

    Krichinsky, Alan M; Bates, Bruce E; Chesser, Joel B; Koo, Sinsze; Whitaker, J Michael

    2009-12-01

    This report describes an engineering-scale, mock UF6 feed and withdrawal (F&W) system, its operation, and its intended uses. This system has been assembled to provide a test bed for evaluating and demonstrating new methodologies that can be used in remote, unattended, continuous monitoring of nuclear material process operations. These measures are being investigated to provide independent inspectors improved assurance that operations are being conducted within declared parameters, and to increase the overall effectiveness of safeguarding nuclear material. Testing applicable technologies on a mock F&W system, which uses water as a surrogate for UF6, enables thorough and cost-effective investigation of hardware, software, and operational strategies before their direct installation in an industrial nuclear material processing environment. Electronic scales used for continuous load-cell monitoring also are described as part of the basic mock F&W system description. Continuous monitoring components on the mock F&W system are linked to a data aggregation computer by a local network, which also is depicted. Data collection and storage systems are described only briefly in this report. The mock UF{sub 6} F&W system is economical to operate. It uses a simple process involving only a surge tank between feed tanks and product and withdrawal (or waste) tanks. The system uses water as the transfer fluid, thereby avoiding the use of hazardous UF{sub 6}. The system is not tethered to an operating industrial process involving nuclear materials, thereby allowing scenarios (e.g., material diversion) that cannot be conducted otherwise. These features facilitate conducting experiments that yield meaningful results with a minimum of expenditure and quick turnaround time. Technologies demonstrated on the engineering-scale system lead to field trials (described briefly in this report) for determining implementation issues and performance of the monitoring technologies under plant

  2. Implementing Safeguards-by-Design

    SciTech Connect

    Trond Bjornard; Robert Bean; Phillip Casey Durst; John Hockert; James Morgan

    2010-02-01

    Executive Summary Excerpt Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) is an approach to the design and construction of nuclear facilities whereby safeguards are designed-in from the very beginning. It is a systematic and structured approach for fully integrating international and national safeguards (MC&A), physical security, and other proliferation barriers into the design and construction process for nuclear facilities. SBD is primarily a project management or project coordination challenge, and this report focuses on that aspect of SBD. The present report continues the work begun in 2008 and focuses specifically on the design process, or project management and coordination - the planning, definition, organization, coordination, scheduling and interaction of activities of the safeguards experts and stakeholders as they participate in the design and construction of a nuclear facility. It delineates the steps in a nuclear facility design and construction project, in order to provide the project context within which the safeguards design activities take place, describes the involvement of safeguards experts in the design process, the nature of their analyses, interactions and decisions, as well as describing the documents created and how they are used. Designing and constructing a nuclear facility is an extremely complex undertaking. The stakeholders in an actual project are many – owner, operator, State regulators, nuclear facility primary contractor, subcontractors (e.g. instrument suppliers), architect engineers, project management team, safeguards, safety and security experts, in addition to the IAEA and its team. The purpose of the present report is to provide a common basis for discussions amongst stakeholders to collaboratively develop a SBD approach that will be both practically useful and mutually beneficial. The principal conclusions from the present study are: • In the short term, the successful implementation of SBD is principally a project management problem.

  3. Safeguards for spent fuels: Verification problems

    SciTech Connect

    Pillay, K.K.S.; Picard, R.R.

    1991-01-01

    The accumulation of large quantities of spent nuclear fuels world-wide is a serious problem for international safeguards. A number of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) member states, including the US, consider spent fuel to be a material form for which safeguards cannot be terminated, even after permanent disposal in a geologic repository. Because safeguards requirements for spent fuels are different from those of conventional bulk-handling and item-accounting facilities, there is room for innovation to design a unique safeguards regime for spent fuels that satisfies the goals of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty at a reasonable cost to both the facility and the IAEA. Various strategies being pursued for long-term management of spent fuels are examined with a realistic example to illustrate the problems of verifying safeguards under the present regime. Verification of a safeguards regime for spent fuels requires a mix of standard safeguards approaches, such as quantitative verification and use of seals, with other measures that are unique to spent fuels. 17 refs.

  4. Training course on nuclear material safeguards for enrichment plants, Vienna, Austria, November 14--18, 1988: Report of foreign travel

    SciTech Connect

    Cooley, J.N.; Swindle, D.W. Jr.; Von Halle, E.

    1989-02-01

    J. N. Cooley, manager, Safeguards Studies Department; E. Von Halle, head, Technical Resources Section; and D. W. Swindle, Jr., director, International Technology Programs Division, Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., traveled to Vienna, Austria, November 9--20, 1988, to conduct a 5-day uranium enrichment safeguards training course for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The course was developed and conducted by Energy Systems for the IAEA through the US. Program for Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards (POTAS) under Task B.48. Titled ''Nuclear Material Safeguards for Enrichment Plants,'' this second session of the course was held on November 14--18, 1988, for 15 IAEA inspectorate and support division personnel. The course was developed and initially taught in 1987 to train IAEA professionals whose responsibilities require knowledge of safeguarding nuclear material at enrichment plants on the safeguards-relevant principles of enrichment technology, particularly as related to centrifuge enrichment facilities. Based on comments received during initial training session, the course and reference materials were revised, updated, and expanded. The main objective of the course is to provide participants with the necessary skills to perform their inspection activities at enrichment plants. Overall, the course was very well received; the four-part course manual was especially appreciated because of the text accompanying the view graphs. The general consensus was that the course should be repeated so that inspectors who could not be accommodated in this session will have a chance to be trained in this important area of safeguards.

  5. Comparing International Curriculum Systems: The International Instructional Systems Study

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Creese, Brian; Gonzalez, Alvaro; Isaacs, Tina

    2016-01-01

    This paper sets out the main findings of the International Instructional Systems Study (IISS), conducted by the UCL Institute of Education and funded by the Center on International Education Benchmarking (CIEB). The study examined the instructional systems and intended curricula of six "high performing" countries and two US states. The…

  6. Comparing International Curriculum Systems: The International Instructional Systems Study

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Creese, Brian; Gonzalez, Alvaro; Isaacs, Tina

    2016-01-01

    This paper sets out the main findings of the International Instructional Systems Study (IISS), conducted by the UCL Institute of Education and funded by the Center on International Education Benchmarking (CIEB). The study examined the instructional systems and intended curricula of six "high performing" countries and two US states. The…

  7. RADIO FREQUENCY IDENTIFICATION DEVICES: EFFECTIVENESS IN IMPROVING SAFEGUARDS AT GAS-CENTRIFUGE URANIUM-ENRICHMENT PLANTS.

    SciTech Connect

    JOE,J.

    2007-07-08

    Recent advances in radio frequency identification devices (RFIDs) have engendered a growing interest among international safeguards experts. Potentially, RFIDs could reduce inspection work, viz. the number of inspections, number of samples, and duration of the visits, and thus improve the efficiency and effectiveness of international safeguards. This study systematically examined the applications of RFIDs for IAEA safeguards at large gas-centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs). These analyses are expected to help identify the requirements and desirable properties for RFIDs, to provide insights into which vulnerabilities matter most, and help formulate the required assurance tests. This work, specifically assesses the application of RFIDs for the ''Option 4'' safeguards approach, proposed by Bruce Moran, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), for large gas-centrifuge uranium-enrichment plants. The features of ''Option 4'' safeguards include placing RFIDs on all feed, product and tails (F/P/T) cylinders, along with WID readers in all FP/T stations and accountability scales. Other features of Moran's ''Option 4'' are Mailbox declarations, monitoring of load-cell-based weighing systems at the F/P/T stations and accountability scales, and continuous enrichment monitors. Relevant diversion paths were explored to evaluate how RFIDs improve the efficiency and effectiveness of safeguards. Additionally, the analysis addresses the use of RFIDs in conjunction with video monitoring and neutron detectors in a perimeter-monitoring approach to show that RFIDs can help to detect unidentified cylinders.

  8. Safeguards Envelope Progress FY08

    SciTech Connect

    Robert Bean; Richard Metcalf; Aaron Bevill

    2008-09-01

    The Safeguards Envelope Project met its milestones by creating a rudimentary safeguards envelope, proving the value of the approach on a small scale, and determining the most appropriate path forward. The Idaho Chemical Processing Plant’s large cache of reprocessing process monitoring data, dubbed UBER Data, was recovered and used in the analysis. A probabilistic Z test was used on a Markov Monte Carlo simulation of expected diversion data when compared with normal operating data. The data regarding a fully transient event in a tank was used to create a simple requirement, representative of a safeguards envelope, whose impact was a decrease in operating efficiency by 1.3% but an increase in material balance period of 26%. This approach is operator, state, and international safeguards friendly and should be applied to future reprocessing plants. Future requirements include tank-to-tank correlations in reprocessing facilities, detailed operations impact studies, simulation inclusion, automated optimization, advanced statistics analysis, and multi-attribute utility analysis.

  9. Advanced safeguards for the nuclear renaissance

    SciTech Connect

    Miller, Michael C; Menlove, Howard O

    2008-01-01

    The global expansion of nuclear energy provides not only the benefit of carbon-neutral electricity, but also the potential for proliferation concern as well. Nuclear safeguards implemented at the state level (domestic) and at the international level by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are essential for ensuring that nuclear materials are not misused and are thereby a critical component of the increased usage of nuclear energy. In the same way that the 1950's Atoms for Peace initiative provided the foundation for a robust research and development program in nuclear safeguards, the expansion of nuclear energy that is underway today provides the impetus to enter a new era of technical development in the safeguards community. In this paper, we will review the history of nuclear safeguards research and development as well future directions.

  10. A study of a zone approach to IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards: The low-enriched-uranium zone of a light-water-reactor fuel cycle

    SciTech Connect

    Fishbone, L.G.; Higinbotham, W.A.

    1986-06-01

    At present the IAEA designs its safeguards approach with regard to each type of nuclear facility so that the safeguards activities and effort are essentially the same for a given type and size of nuclear facility wherever it may be located. Conclusions regarding a state are derived by combining the conclusions regarding the effectiveness of safeguards for the individual facilities within a state. In this study it was convenient to define three zones in a state with a closed light-water-reactor nuclear fuel cycle. Each zone contains those facilities or parts thereof which use or process nuclear materials of the same safeguards significance: low-enriched uranium, radioactive spent fuel, or recovered plutonium. The possibility that each zone might be treated as an extended material balance area for safeguards purposes is under investigation. The approach includes defining the relevant features of the facilities in the three zones and listing the safeguards activities which are now practiced. This study has focussed on the fresh-fuel zone, the several facilities of which use or process low-enriched uranium. At one extreme, flows and inventories would be verified at each material balance area. At the other extreme, the flows into and out of the zone and the inventory of the whole zone would be verified. There are a number of possible safeguards approaches which fall between the two extremes. The intention is to develop a rational approach which will make it possible to compare the technical effectiveness and the inspection effort for the facility-oriented approach, for the approach involving the zone as a material balance area, and for some reasonable intermediate safeguards approaches.

  11. Violence: Safeguarding Our Children.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Our Children, 1995

    1995-01-01

    This adaptation of the National Parent Teacher Association (PTA) booklet "Safeguarding Your Children" discusses cooperative efforts of communities, schools, and homes to protect children from violence. (SM)

  12. Building safeguards infrastructure

    SciTech Connect

    Stevens, Rebecca S; Mcclelland - Kerr, John

    2009-01-01

    Much has been written in recent years about the nuclear renaissance - the rebirth of nuclear power as a clean and safe source of electricity around the world. Those who question the nuclear renaissance often cite the risk of proliferation, accidents or an attack on a facility as concerns, all of which merit serious consideration. The integration of these three areas - sometimes referred to as 3S, for safety, security and safeguards - is essential to supporting the growth of nuclear power, and the infrastructure that supports them should be strengthened. The focus of this paper will be on the role safeguards plays in the 3S concept and how to support the development of the infrastructure necessary to support safeguards. The objective of this paper has been to provide a working definition of safeguards infrastructure, and to discuss xamples of how building safeguards infrastructure is presented in several models. The guidelines outlined in the milestones document provide a clear path for establishing both the safeguards and the related infrastructures needed to support the development of nuclear power. The model employed by the INSEP program of engaging with partner states on safeguards-related topics that are of current interest to the level of nuclear development in that state provides another way of approaching the concept of building safeguards infrastructure. The Next Generation Safeguards Initiative is yet another approach that underscored five principal areas for growth, and the United States commitment to working with partners to promote this growth both at home and abroad.

  13. Advanced Safeguards Approaches for New Reprocessing Facilities

    SciTech Connect

    Durst, Philip C.; Therios, Ike; Bean, Robert; Dougan, A.; Boyer, Brian; Wallace, Richard; Ehinger, Michael H.; Kovacic, Don N.; Tolk, K.

    2007-06-24

    U.S. efforts to promote the international expansion of nuclear energy through the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) will result in a dramatic expansion of nuclear fuel cycle facilities in the United States. New demonstration facilities, such as the Advanced Fuel Cycle Facility (AFCF), the Advanced Burner Reactor (ABR), and the Consolidated Fuel Treatment Center (CFTC) will use advanced nuclear and chemical process technologies that must incorporate increased proliferation resistance to enhance nuclear safeguards. The ASA-100 Project, “Advanced Safeguards Approaches for New Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities,” commissioned by the NA-243 Office of NNSA, has been tasked with reviewing and developing advanced safeguards approaches for these demonstration facilities. Because one goal of GNEP is developing and sharing proliferation-resistant nuclear technology and services with partner nations, the safeguards approaches considered are consistent with international safeguards as currently implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This first report reviews possible safeguards approaches for the new fuel reprocessing processes to be deployed at the AFCF and CFTC facilities. Similar analyses addressing the ABR and transuranic (TRU) fuel fabrication lines at AFCF and CFTC will be presented in subsequent reports.

  14. DESIGN INFORMATION VERIFICATION FOR NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS

    SciTech Connect

    Robert S. Bean; Richard R. M. Metcalf; Phillip C. Durst

    2009-07-01

    A critical aspect of international safeguards activities performed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the verification that facility design and construction (including upgrades and modifications) do not create opportunities for nuclear proliferation. These Design Information Verification activities require that IAEA inspectors compare current and past information about the facility to verify the operator’s declaration of proper use. The actual practice of DIV presents challenges to the inspectors due to the large amount of data generated, concerns about sensitive or proprietary data, the overall complexity of the facility, and the effort required to extract just the safeguards relevant information. Planned and anticipated facilities will (especially in the case of reprocessing plants) be ever larger and increasingly complex, thus exacerbating the challenges. This paper reports the results of a workshop held at the Idaho National Laboratory in March 2009, which considered technologies and methods to address these challenges. The use of 3D Laser Range Finding, Outdoor Visualization System, Gamma-LIDAR, and virtual facility modeling, as well as methods to handle the facility data issues (quantity, sensitivity, and accessibility and portability for the inspector) were presented. The workshop attendees drew conclusions about the use of these techniques with respect to successfully employing them in an operating environment, using a Fuel Conditioning Facility walk-through as a baseline for discussion.

  15. POSSIBLE ROLES FOR THE INTEGRATED SAFEGUARDS EVALUATION METHODOLOGY (ISEM)

    SciTech Connect

    J. F. PILAT

    2001-06-01

    The Integrated Safeguards Evaluation Methodology (ISEM) is designed to be a flexible tool capable of meeting as yet undefined requirements for the evaluation of a range of integrated safeguards proposals (ISPs), irrespective of the precise scope, the author of the proposal or the level of analysis desired. Its objective as a tool is to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to make informed decisions on integrated safeguards that strengthen the international safeguards system and maximize its efficiency. The ISEM can be used to evaluate generic facility or State-wide ISPs in support of integrated safeguards criteria development and to evaluate ISPs for implementation in specific states. Reflecting the interests and needs of the Agency, ISEM has been used to evaluate generic, single-facility ISPs. This role, with a hypothetical State assumed, was the basis for the March-April and September 2000 exercises undertaken to evaluate an Agency proposal for LWRs without MOX and Agency ISPs for research reactors and critical assemblies, respectively. It was also the basis for Agency evaluation of its ISP for spent-fuel storage. In a similar fashion, the methodology could be used to evaluate multiple-facility ISPs. However, the primary use of ISEM envisioned during its creation was for the evaluation of State-wide ISPs, both generic and State-specific. A simple State-level ISP was evaluated as the first illustrative application of the ISEM. A generic State-wide approach can reflect any number of real-world fuel cycles, or it might usefully be limited to considerations of a small number of representative groupings of facilities. It allows an evaluation of tradeoffs as well as optimization of cost and effectiveness in general terms. For any of these uses, and perhaps others, ISEM can help the Agency to filter and to optimize proposals, and to focus information analysis and complementary access.

  16. Project Report on Development of a Safeguards Approach for Pyroprocessing

    SciTech Connect

    Robert Bean

    2010-09-01

    The Idaho National Laboratory has undertaken an effort to develop a standard safeguards approach for international commercial pyroprocessing facilities. This report details progress for the fiscal year 2010 effort. A component by component diversion pathway analysis has been performed, and has led to insight on the mitigation needs and equipment development needed for a valid safeguards approach. The effort to develop an in-hot cell detection capability led to the digital cloud chamber, and more importantly, the significant potential scientific breakthrough of the inverse spectroscopy algorithm, including the ability to identify energy and spatial location of gamma ray emitting sources with a single, non-complex, stationary radiation detector system. Curium measurements were performed on historical and current samples at the FCF to attempt to determine the utility of using gross neutron counting for accountancy measurements. A solid cost estimate of equipment installation at FCF has been developed to guide proposals and cost allocations to use FCF as a test bed for safeguards measurement demonstrations. A combined MATLAB and MCNPX model has been developed to perform detector placement calculations around the electrorefiner. Early harvesting has occurred wherein the project team has been requested to provide pyroprocessing technology and safeguards short courses.

  17. Long-term proliferation and safeguards issues in future technologies

    SciTech Connect

    Keisch, B.; Auerbach, C.; Fainberg, A.; Fiarman, S.; Fishbone, L.G.; Higinbotham, W.A.; Lemley, J.R.; O'Brien, J.

    1986-02-01

    The purpose of the task was to assess the effect of potential new technologies, nuclear and non-nuclear, on safeguards needs and non-proliferation policies, and to explore possible solutions to some of the problems envisaged. Eight subdivisions were considered: New Enrichment Technologies; Non-Aqueous Reprocessing Technologies; Fusion; Accelerator-Driven Reactor Systems; New Reactor Types; Heavy Water and Deuterium; Long-Term Storage of Spent Fuel; and Other Future Technologies (Non-Nuclear). For each of these subdivisions, a careful review of the current world-wide effort in the field provided a means of subjectively estimating the viability and qualitative probability of fruition of promising technologies. Technologies for which safeguards and non-proliferation requirements have been thoroughly considered by others were not restudied here (e.g., the Fast Breeder Reactor). The time scale considered was 5 to 40 years for possible initial demonstration although, in some cases, a somewhat optimistic viewpoint was embraced. Conventional nuclear-material safeguards are only part of the overall non-proliferation regime. Other aspects are international agreements, export controls on sensitive technologies, classification of information, intelligence gathering, and diplomatic initiatives. The focus here is on safeguards, export controls, and classification.

  18. Safeguards effectiveness evaluations in safeguards planning

    SciTech Connect

    Al-Ayat, R.A.

    1987-12-03

    This paper describes analytic tools we developed to quantify the effectiveness of safeguards against theft of special nuclear material by insiders. These tools help identify vulnerabilities in existing safeguards, suggest potential improvements, and help assess the benefits of these upgrades prior to implementation. Alone, these tools are not sufficient for safeguards planning, since the cost of implementing all suggested upgrades almost always exceeds the available resources. This paper describes another tool we developed to allow comparsion of benefits of various upgrades to identify those upgrade packages that achieve the greatest improvement in protection for a given cost and to provide a priority ranking among cost-effective packages, thereby helping decision-makers select the upgrades to implement and highlight the mount of residual risk. 5 refs., 3 figs.

  19. Evaluation of information technology impact on effective internal control in the University system

    SciTech Connect

    Sanusi Fasilat, A. Hassan, Haslinda

    2015-12-11

    Information Technology (IT) plays a key role in internal control system in various organizations in terms of maintaining records and other internal services. Internal control system is defined as an efficient control procedures set up by firm to safeguard resources and to assure the reliability and accuracy of both financial and non-financial records in line with applicable governance and procedure to acquire the established goal and objectives. This paper focuses on the impact of IT on internal control system in the Nigerian universities. Data are collected from three different universities via questionnaire. Descriptive statistics is used to analyze the data; Chi-square is performed to test the hypothesis. The results of the hypothesis showed that IT has a positive relationship with the effective internal control activities in the University system. It is concluded that the adoption of IT will significantly improve the effectiveness of the internal control system operations in the University in terms of quality service delivery.

  20. Evaluation of information technology impact on effective internal control in the University system

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Sanusi Fasilat, A.; Hassan, Haslinda

    2015-12-01

    Information Technology (IT) plays a key role in internal control system in various organizations in terms of maintaining records and other internal services. Internal control system is defined as an efficient control procedures set up by firm to safeguard resources and to assure the reliability and accuracy of both financial and non-financial records in line with applicable governance and procedure to acquire the established goal and objectives. This paper focuses on the impact of IT on internal control system in the Nigerian universities. Data are collected from three different universities via questionnaire. Descriptive statistics is used to analyze the data; Chi-square is performed to test the hypothesis. The results of the hypothesis showed that IT has a positive relationship with the effective internal control activities in the University system. It is concluded that the adoption of IT will significantly improve the effectiveness of the internal control system operations in the University in terms of quality service delivery.

  1. Materials management in an internationally safeguarded fuels reprocessing plant. [1500 and 210 metric tons heavy metal per year

    SciTech Connect

    Hakkila, E.A.; Cobb, D.D.; Dayem, H.A.; Dietz, R.J.; Kern, E.A.; Markin, J.T.; Shipley, J.P.; Barnes, J.W.; Scheinman, L.

    1980-04-01

    The second volume describes the requirements and functions of materials measurement and accounting systems (MMAS) and conceptual designs for an MMAS incorporating both conventional and near-real-time (dynamic) measurement and accounting techniques. Effectiveness evaluations, based on recently developed modeling, simulation, and analysis procedures, show that conventional accountability can meet IAEA goal quantities and detection times in these reference facilities only for low-enriched uranium. Dynamic materials accounting may meet IAEA goals for detecting the abrupt (1-3 weeks) diversion of 8 kg of plutonium. Current materials accounting techniques probably cannot meet the 1-y protracted-diversion goal of 8 kg for plutonium.

  2. Analysis of IAEA Environmental Samples for Plutonium and Uranium by ICP/MS in Support Of International Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Farmer, Orville T.; Olsen, Khris B.; Thomas, May-Lin P.; Garofoli, Stephanie J.

    2008-05-01

    A method for the separation and determination of total and isotopic uranium and plutonium by ICP-MS was developed for IAEA samples on cellulose-based media. Preparation of the IAEA samples involved a series of redox chemistries and separations using TRU® resin (Eichrom). The sample introduction system, an APEX nebulizer (Elemental Scientific, Inc), provided enhanced nebulization for a several-fold increase in sensitivity and reduction in background. Application of mass bias (ALPHA) correction factors greatly improved the precision of the data. By combining the enhancements of chemical separation, instrumentation and data processing, detection levels for uranium and plutonium approached high attogram levels.

  3. Long-Term Information Management (LTIM) of Safeguards Data at Repositories: Phase II

    SciTech Connect

    Haddal, Risa N.

    2016-10-01

    One of the challenges of implementing safeguards for geological repositories will be the long-term preservation of safeguards-related data for 100 years or more. While most countries considering the construction and operation of such facilities agree that safeguards information should be preserved, there are gaps with respect to standardized requirements, guidelines, timescales, and approaches. This study analyzes those gaps and explores research to clarify stakeholder needs, identify current policies, approaches, best practices and international standards, and explores existing safeguards information management infrastructure. The study also attempts to clarify what a safeguards data classification system might look like, how long data should be retained, and how information should be exchanged between stakeholders at different phases of a repository’s life cycle. The analysis produced a variety of recommendations on what information to preserve, how to preserve it, where to store it, retention options and how to exchange information in the long term. Key findings include the use of the globally recognized international records management standard, ISO15489, for guidance on the development of information management systems, and the development of a Key Information File (KIF). The KIF could be used to identify only the most relevant, high-level safeguards information and the history of decision making about the repository. The study also suggests implementing on-site and off-site records storage in digital and physical form; developing a safeguards data classification system; long-term records retention with periodic reviews every 5 to 10 years during each phase of the repository life cycle; and establishing transition procedures well in advance so that data shepherds and records officers can transfer information with incoming facility managers effectively and efficiently. These and other recommendations are further analyzed in this study.

  4. Safeguards: The past present, and future

    SciTech Connect

    Seaton, M.B.

    1987-07-01

    The non-destructive assay techniques developed at Los Alamos have become a primary means for verification by the IAEA and most important for domestic safeguards. We must challenge our assumptions, e.g., that inventory differences are a valid measure of safeguards performance, that more money is the solution, and the threats are much exaggerated. A human reliability program will be initiated. Material control, accounting, and physical protection need further integration. A serious effort involving scholarships, internships, etc. is needed to attract and motivate young people. Increased emphasis will be placed on designing safeguards into new systems such as laser isotope separation. Finally, continuing generous support for the IAEA is most important.

  5. Capabilities for Planetary Protection: Safeguarding the Crew and Engineering Systems for Human Missions to Mars

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Venkateswaran, K.

    2015-03-01

    Validated microbial monitoring systems are required to preserve acceptable microbial burden levels, ensure interference of false-positives with life-detection experiments, and prevent the inadvertent exposure of humans to extraterrestrial materials.

  6. An American Academy for Training Safeguards Inspectors - An Idea Revisited

    SciTech Connect

    Philip Casey Durst; Robert Bean

    2010-07-01

    In 2009, we presented the idea of an American academy for training safeguards inspectors for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), due to the declining percentage of Americans in that international organization. In this paper we assert that there is still a compelling need for this academy. While the American Safeguards Academy would be useful in preparing and pre-training American inspectors for the IAEA, it would also be useful for preparing Americans for domestic safeguards duties in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), U.S. DOE National Laboratories, and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). It is envisioned that such an academy would train graduate and post-graduate university students, DOE National Laboratory interns, and nuclear safeguards professionals in the modern equipment, safeguards measures, and approaches currently used by the IAEA. It is also envisioned that the Academy would involve the domestic nuclear industry, which could provide use of commercial nuclear facilities for tours and demonstrations of the safeguards tools and methods in actual nuclear facilities. This would be in support of the U.S. DOE National Nuclear Security Administration’s Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). This training would also help American nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation professionals better understand the potential limitations of the current tools used by the IAEA and give them a foundation from which to consider even more effective and efficient safeguards measures and approaches.

  7. Structured Assessment Approach: a procedure for the assessment of fuel cycle safeguard systems

    SciTech Connect

    Parziale, A.A.; Patenaude, C.J.; Renard, P.A.; Sacks, I.J.

    1980-03-06

    Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory has developed and tested for the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission a procedure for the evaluation of Material Control and Accounting (MC and A) Systems at Nuclear Fuel Facilities. This procedure, called the Structured Assessment Approach, SAA, subjects the MC and A system at a facility to a series of increasingly sophisticated adversaries and strategies. A fully integrated version of the computer codes which assist the analyst in this assessment was made available in October, 1979. The concepts of the SAA and the results of the assessment of a hypothetical but typical facility are presented.

  8. 36 CFR 1202.30 - How does NARA safeguard its systems of records?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... integrity, paper records are maintained in areas accessible only to authorized NARA personnel. Electronic... systems of records? 1202.30 Section 1202.30 Parks, Forests, and Public Property NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION GENERAL RULES REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974 Collecting...

  9. SARP-II: Safeguards Accounting and Reports Program, Revised

    SciTech Connect

    Kempf, C.R.

    1994-03-01

    A computer code, SARP (Safeguards Accounting and Reports Program) which will generate and maintain at-facility safeguards accounting records, and generate IAEA safeguards reports based on accounting data input by the user, was completed in 1990 by the Safeguards, Safety, and Nonproliferation Division (formerly the Technical Support Organization) at Brookhaven National Laboratory as a task under the US Program of Technical Support to IAEA safeguards. The code was based on a State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC) for off-load refueled power reactor facilities, with model facility and safeguards accounting regime as described in IAEA Safeguards Publication STR-165. Since 1990, improvements in computing capabilities and comments and suggestions from users engendered revision of the original code. The result is an updated, revised version called SARP-II which is discussed in this report.

  10. Scripting Quality of Security Service (QoSS) Safeguard Measures for the Suggested INFOCON System

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2004-03-01

    primary perimeter defense mechanism that will mitigate the threat of most amateur attackers, known as Script Kiddies . The managed switch is a second...layer perimeter defense mechanism that mitigates the better Script Kiddies , the insider threat, and allows isolation of critical systems. Syslog... hot IP addresses, etc. See reference a for format and explanation. m. Technical impact assessment. This information may be included in an

  11. FUTURE SAFEGUARDS EFFECTIVENESS: CONCEPTS AND ISSUES

    SciTech Connect

    K. W. BUDLONG-SYLVESTER; J. F. PILAT

    2000-09-01

    With new safeguards measures (under old and new authority) now available to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), there will be fundamental changes in the manner IAEA safeguards are implemented, raising questions about their effectiveness in meeting expanded Agency safeguards objectives. In order to characterize the capability of various safeguards approaches in meeting their objectives, it will be necessary to fully understand what is involved in the new safeguards equation. Both old and new measures will be required to construct a comprehensive picture of a State's nuclear activities and capabilities, and they both have strengths and weaknesses. There are (for political and cost reasons) likely to be tradeoffs between the two types of measures. Significant differences among measures with respect to the probability of their detecting an anomaly, along with other characteristics, need be considered in this context. Given the important role of both types of measures in future approaches, their inherent differences with regard to their capabilities and limitations, and their potential impact on the credibility of safeguards, it will be essential to consider these measures systematically, independently, and in combination in any effectiveness evaluation. This paper will consider concepts and issues in addressing this need.

  12. AFCI Safeguards Enhancement Study: Technology Development Roadmap

    SciTech Connect

    Smith, Leon E.; Dougan, A.; Tobin, Stephen; Cipiti, B.; Ehinger, Michael H.; Bakel, A. J.; Bean, Robert; Grate, Jay W.; Santi, P.; Bryan, Steven; Kinlaw, M. T.; Schwantes, Jon M.; Burr, Tom; Lehn, Scott A.; Tolk, K.; Chichester, David; Menlove, H.; Vo, D.; Duckworth, Douglas C.; Merkle, P.; Wang, T. F.; Duran, F.; Nakae, L.; Warren, Glen A.; Friedrich, S.; Rabin, M.

    2008-12-31

    The Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI) Safeguards Campaign aims to develop safeguards technologies and processes that will significantly reduce the risk of proliferation in the U.S. nuclear fuel cycle of tomorrow. The Safeguards Enhancement Study was chartered with identifying promising research and development (R&D) directions over timescales both near-term and long-term, and under safeguards oversight both domestic and international. This technology development roadmap documents recognized gaps and needs in the safeguarding of nuclear fuel cycles, and outlines corresponding performance targets for each of those needs. Drawing on the collective expertise of technologists and user-representatives, a list of over 30 technologies that have the potential to meet those needs was developed, along with brief summaries of each candidate technology. Each summary describes the potential impact of that technology, key research questions to be addressed, and prospective development milestones that could lead to a definitive viability or performance assessment. Important programmatic linkages between U.S. agencies and offices are also described, reflecting the emergence of several safeguards R&D programs in the U.S. and the reinvigoration of nuclear fuel cycles across the globe.

  13. Computerized international geothermal information systems

    SciTech Connect

    Phillips, S.L.; Lawrence, J.D.; Lepman, S.R.

    1980-03-01

    The computerized international geothermal energy information system is reviewed. The review covers establishment of the Italy - United States linked data centers by the NATO Committee on Challenges of Modern Society, through a bilateral agreement, and up to the present time. The result of the information exchange project is given as the bibliographic and numerical data available from the data centers. Recommendations for the exchange of computerized geothermal information at the international level are discussed.

  14. Development of laser induced breakdown spectroscopy instrumentatin for safeguards applications

    SciTech Connect

    Barefield Il, James E; Clegg, Samuel M; Le, Loan A; Lopez, Leon N

    2010-01-01

    In September 2006, a Technical Meeting on Application of Laser Spectrometry Techniques in IAEA Safeguards was held at IAEA headquarters (HQ). One of the principal recommendations from this meeting was the need to 'pursue the development of novel complementary access instrumentation based on laser induced breakdown spectroscopy (LIBS) for the detection of gaseous and solid signatures and indicators of nuclear fuel cycle processes and associated materials.' Pursuant to this recommendation the Department of Safeguards (SG) under the Division of Technical Support (SGTS) convened the Experts and Users Advisory Meeting on Laser Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy (LIBS) for Safeguards Applications. This meeting was held at IAEA HQ from July 7-11,2008 and hosted by the Novel Technologies Unit (NTU). The meeting was attended by 12 LIBS experts from the Czech Republic, the European Commission, France, the Republic of Korea, the United States of America, Germany, the United Kingdom of Great Britain, Canada, and Northern Ireland. After a presentation of the needs of the IAEA inspectors, the LIBS experts were in agreement that needs as presented could be partially or fully fulfilled using LIBS instrumentation. The needs of the IAEA inspectors were grouped in the following broad categories: (1) Improvements to in-field measurements/environmental sampling; (2) Monitoring status of activity in a Hot Cell; (3) Verifying status of activity at a declared facility via process monitoring; and (4) Need for pre-screening of environmental samples before analysis. Under the Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) Los Alamos National Laboratory is exploring three potential applications of LIBS for international safeguards. As part of this work, we are developing: (1) a user-friendly man-portable LIBS system to characterize samples across a wide range of elements in the periodic table from hydrogen up to heavy elements

  15. Advanced integrated safeguards at Barnwell

    SciTech Connect

    Bambas, K.J.; Barnes, L.D.

    1980-06-01

    The development and initial performance testing of an advanced integrated safeguards system at the Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant (BNFP) is described. The program concentrates on the integration and coordination of physical security and nuclear materials control and accounting at a single location. Hardware and software for this phase have been installed and are currently being evaluated. The AGNS/DOE program is now in its third year of development at the BNFP.

  16. Marketing and reputation aspects of neonatal safeguards and hospital-security systems.

    PubMed

    Smith, Alan D

    2009-01-01

    Technological advancements have migrated from personal-use electronics into the healthcare setting for security enhancements. Within maternity wards and nurseries, technology was seen as one of best way to protect newborns from abduction. The present study is a focus on what systems and methods are used in neonatal security, the security arrangements, staff training, and impacts outside the control of the hospital, customer satisfaction and customer relations management. Through hypothesis-testing and exploratory analysis, gender biases and extremely high levels of security were found within a web-enabled and professional sample of 200 respondents. The factor-based constructs were found to be, in order of the greatest explained variance: security concerns, personal technology usage, work technology applications, and demographic maturity concerns, resulting in four factor-based scores with significant combined variance of 61.5%. It was found that through a better understanding on the importance and vital need for hospitals to continue to improve on their technology-based security policies significantly enhanced their reputation in the highly competitive local healthcare industry.

  17. Countering the livestock-targeted bioterrorism threat and responding with an animal health safeguarding system.

    PubMed

    Yeh, J-Y; Lee, J-H; Park, J-Y; Cho, Y S; Cho, I-S

    2013-08-01

    Attacks against livestock and poultry using biological agents constitute a subtype of agroterrorism. These attacks are defined as the intentional introduction of an animal infectious disease to strike fear in people, damage a nation's economy and/or threaten social stability. Livestock bioterrorism is considered attractive to terrorists because biological agents for use against livestock or poultry are more readily available and difficult to monitor than biological agents for use against humans. In addition, an attack on animal husbandry can have enormous economic consequences, even without human casualties. Animal husbandry is vulnerable to livestock-targeted bioterrorism because it is nearly impossible to secure all livestock animals, and compared with humans, livestock are less well-guarded targets. Furthermore, anti-livestock biological weapons are relatively easy to employ, and a significant effect can be produced with only a small amount of infectious material. The livestock sector is presently very vulnerable to bioterrorism as a result of large-scale husbandry methods and weaknesses in the systems used to detect disease outbreaks, which could aggravate the consequences of livestock-targeted bioterrorism. Thus, terrorism against livestock and poultry cannot be thought of as either a 'low-probability' or 'low-consequence' incident. This review provides an overview of methods to prevent livestock-targeted bioterrorism and respond to terrorism involving the deliberate introduction of a pathogen-targeting livestock and poultry.

  18. Beyond Human Capital Development: Balanced Safeguards Workforce Metrics and the Next Generation Safeguards Workforce

    SciTech Connect

    Burbank, Roberta L.; Frazar, Sarah L.; Gitau, Ernest TN; Shergur, Jason M.; Scholz, Melissa A.; Undem, Halvor A.

    2014-03-28

    Since its establishment in 2008, the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) has achieved a number of objectives under its five pillars: concepts and approaches, policy development and outreach, international nuclear safeguards engagement, technology development, and human capital development (HCD). As a result of these efforts, safeguards has become much more visible as a critical U.S. national security interest across the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) complex. However, limited budgets have since created challenges in a number of areas. Arguably, one of the more serious challenges involves NGSI’s ability to integrate entry-level staff into safeguards projects. Laissez fair management of this issue across the complex can lead to wasteful project implementation and endanger NGSI’s long-term sustainability. The authors provide a quantitative analysis of this problem, focusing on the demographics of the current safeguards workforce and compounding pressures to operate cost-effectively, transfer knowledge to the next generation of safeguards professionals, and sustain NGSI safeguards investments.

  19. Modeling and Simulation for Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Swinhoe, Martyn T.

    2012-07-26

    The purpose of this talk is to give an overview of the role of modeling and simulation in Safeguards R&D and introduce you to (some of) the tools used. Some definitions are: (1) Modeling - the representation, often mathematical, of a process, concept, or operation of a system, often implemented by a computer program; (2) Simulation - the representation of the behavior or characteristics of one system through the use of another system, especially a computer program designed for the purpose; and (3) Safeguards - the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material. The role of modeling and simulation are: (1) Calculate amounts of material (plant modeling); (2) Calculate signatures of nuclear material etc. (source terms); and (3) Detector performance (radiation transport and detection). Plant modeling software (e.g. FACSIM) gives the flows and amount of material stored at all parts of the process. In safeguards this allow us to calculate the expected uncertainty of the mass and evaluate the expected MUF. We can determine the measurement accuracy required to achieve a certain performance.

  20. Changing Landscapes in Safeguarding Babies and Young Children in England

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Lumsden, Eunice

    2014-01-01

    The importance of safeguarding children from violence is internationally recognised. However, detecting, intervening and protecting children from abuse both within the family and in institutions is complex. This paper specifically focuses on safeguarding in England and how workforce reform in the early years offers the opportunity to forge new…

  1. The Role of School Psychologists in Child Protection and Safeguarding

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Woods, Kevin; Bond, Caroline; Tyldesley, Kath; Farrell, Peter; Humphrey, Neil

    2011-01-01

    Child protection and safeguarding are important aspects of work for all professionals working with children. The current article outlines the international context of school psychologists' work in relation to child protection and safeguarding and describes the United Kingdom context in more detail. Given the relatively recent broadening of the UK…

  2. The Role of School Psychologists in Child Protection and Safeguarding

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Woods, Kevin; Bond, Caroline; Tyldesley, Kath; Farrell, Peter; Humphrey, Neil

    2011-01-01

    Child protection and safeguarding are important aspects of work for all professionals working with children. The current article outlines the international context of school psychologists' work in relation to child protection and safeguarding and describes the United Kingdom context in more detail. Given the relatively recent broadening of the UK…

  3. Comprehensive safeguards evaluation methods and societal risk analysis

    SciTech Connect

    Richardson, J.M.

    1982-03-01

    Essential capabilities of an integrated evaluation methodology for analyzing safeguards systems are discussed. Such a methodology must be conceptually meaningful, technically defensible, discriminating and consistent. A decompostion of safeguards systems by function is mentioned as a possible starting point for methodology development. The application of a societal risk equation to safeguards systems analysis is addressed. Conceptual problems with this approach are discussed. Technical difficulties in applying this equation to safeguards systems are illustrated through the use of confidence intervals, information content, hypothesis testing and ranking and selection procedures.

  4. Training in Environmental Analyses for Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Williams, R W; Gaffney, A M; Hutcheon, N A; Kersting, A B

    2009-05-28

    Responding to recommendations of the DOE/NNSA's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative, a new course, Training in Environmental Sample Analysis for IAEA Safeguards, is being offered as a summer internship opportunity at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. The first students completed the 8 week program during the summer of 2008. Interns are given training in the analysis of bulk environmental samples for safeguards through hands-on experience working in a clean laboratory, purifying U and Pu from bulk environmental samples, and measuring U and Pu isotope ratios by multi-collector ICP mass spectrometry. A series of lectures by invited safeguards and non-proliferation experts gives the students a broad picture of the safeguards work of the IAEA. At the end of the course, the students prepare a poster of their work to showcase at LLNL's summer student poster symposium. Both undergraduate and graduate students are recruited and hired as paid interns under the aegis of the Glenn T. Seaborg Institute in the Physical and Life Sciences Directorate at LLNL. This training course seeks to introduce students to analytical and interpretive skill-sets that are not generally taught at universities, and to encourage them to pursue careers with the IAEA.

  5. International Instructional Systems: Social Studies

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Brant, Jacek; Chapman, Arthur; Isaacs, Tina

    2016-01-01

    This paper reports on research conducted as part of the International Instructional System Study that explored five subject areas across nine jurisdictions in six high-performing countries. The Study's overall aim was to understand what, if anything, there is in common in the curricula and assessment arrangements among the high-performing…

  6. International Instructional Systems: Social Studies

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Brant, Jacek; Chapman, Arthur; Isaacs, Tina

    2016-01-01

    This paper reports on research conducted as part of the International Instructional System Study that explored five subject areas across nine jurisdictions in six high-performing countries. The Study's overall aim was to understand what, if anything, there is in common in the curricula and assessment arrangements among the high-performing…

  7. Value Systems in International Business.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Heiba, Farouk I.

    Every society has a system of values and seeks to achieve goals which it defines as desirable. To gain insight and a measure of understanding of another culture, international marketers can approach a country as a whole, seek out behavioral premises, obtain a theoretical knowledge of the culture, and learn the country's social heritage.…

  8. International Guide to Education Systems.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Holmes, Brian

    This book presents brief educational profiles of 85 countries based on reports presented at the International Conference of Education in 1977. Educational systems in Africa, the Arab states, Asia and Oceania, Europe, and the Americas are outlined according to general aims, administration, finance, structure and organization, curricula, and teacher…

  9. The new DMT SAFEGUARD low-cost GNSS measuring system and its application in the field of geotechnical deformation and movement monitoring

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Schröder, Daniel

    2017-04-01

    epoch. Based on these requirements DMT has developed the new DMT SAFEGUARD GNSS. In this article the latest developments in the field of low-cost GNSS are shown by different examples from industry and authorities. By means of a detailed accuracy study the DMT SAFEGUARD GNSS system applicability will be demonstrated. The study shows possibilities to detect coordinate shifts on sub centimeter level by using suitable data processing approaches and permanent network solutions. In addition to the DMT SAFEGUARD GNSS system this article illustrates the combination with further relevant sensors to integrated multisensorial networks. Such networks include geodetic data, geophysical data, geotechnical data, video, audio etc. For the central integration of all sensor types DMT has developed a web-based monitoring system - DMT SAFEGUARD which offers individual customizing, sophisticated analysis tools as well as comprehensive reporting options.

  10. International system of units (SI)

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Goldman, D. T.; Bell, R. J.

    1986-07-01

    The booklet is the United States edition of the English translation of the fifth edition of Le Systeme International d'Unites (SI), the definitive publication in the French language issued in 1985 by the International Bureau of Weights and Measures (BIPM). This U.S. edition, which conforms in substance with the British edition that follows the French text in the BIPM document is the result of a joint effort by the National Bureau of Standards (NBS) of the United States and the National Physical Laboratory (NPL) in the United Kingdom.

  11. 1996 initiatives under the CNEN/DOE safeguards cooperation agreement

    SciTech Connect

    Vinhas, L.; Iskin, M.C.L.; Almeida, S.G. de; Dupree, S.; Reilly, D.; Smith, C.; Whitaker, J.M.

    1996-12-31

    In September 1995, the US Department of Energy (DOE) and the Brazilian Comissao Nacional de Energia Nuclear (CNEN) signed an agreement on methods and technologies for safeguards applications. This agreement provides for cooperation in the areas of nuclear material control, accountancy, verification, physical protection, and advanced containment and surveillance technologies for international safeguards applications. CNEN is responsible for managing nuclear facilities and institutions in Brazil and is responsible for coordinating international safeguards as applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC). Following the ratification of the Quadripartite Agreement among Argentina, Brazil, ABACC, and IAEA in March 1994, all nuclear materials in all nuclear activities in Brazil became subject to comprehensive safeguards. Collaboration between CNEN and DOE in 1996 is focusing on: (1) the use of a GRAND FORK detector at the Angra Nuclear Power Station, (2) a remote monitoring field trial, (3) workshops on environmental monitoring and analysis as a safeguards application, (4) developing and studying methods and techniques for applying safeguards at enrichment plants, and (5) support of CNEN`s safeguards analytical laboratory. This paper will describe each of the aforementioned safeguards cooperation activities.

  12. Safeguards and security research and development progress report, October 1993--September 1994

    SciTech Connect

    Smith, D.B.; Jaramillo, G.R.

    1995-08-01

    This report describes the activities carried out by the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Research and Development (R&D) program from October 1993 through September 1994. The activities presented in the first part of the report were directed primarily to domestic US safeguards applications and were, for the most part, sponsored by the Department of Energy`s Office of Safeguards and Security (DOE/OSS, NN-50). The activities described in Part 2, International Safeguards, were supported by the International Safeguards Division of the Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation (DOE/OACN, NN-40). Part 3 describes several safeguards or safeguards-related activities that have other sponsors. The final part of the report lists titles and abstracts of Los Alamos safeguards R&D reports, technical journal articles, and conference papers that were published or presented in 1994.

  13. Are xenotransplantation safeguards legally viable?

    PubMed

    Florencio, P S; Ramanathan, E D

    2001-01-01

    Scientists agree on the need for robust public health safeguards to accompany the imminent introduction of xenotransplantation--clinical transplantation of animal tissue into humans. To protect society in the event of emerging infectious diseases, governments must devise a legally effective means of ensuring compliance with such safeguards. Neither consent law, the law of contracts, nor existing public health legislation can adequately enforce such compliance. Consent law serves as a mechanism of communicating the momentary waiver of legal rights, not as a durable enforcement doctrine. Because it would be essential for recipients personally to comply with public safety measures, the law of contracts would also be unable to compel compliance. Existing public health legislation would also likely be ineffective because it would need to be substantially amended to incorporate the heightened powers necessary for the periodic examination of asymptomatic xenotransplant recipients. Xenotransplantation-specific legislation would be a legally effective means of enforcing public health safeguards since it could require conforming behaviors and could impose monetary fines on those recipients who, having benefited from life-saving intervention, fail to comply. This Article argues that legislation implementing a post-xenotransplantation surveillance system should withstand constitutional scrutiny because it would not be discriminatory and because, although it would violate fundamental rights of recipients, such violations would be justified under existing constitutional doctrines.

  14. Safeguardability of the vitrification option for disposal of plutonium

    SciTech Connect

    Pillay, K.K.S.

    1996-05-01

    Safeguardability of the vitrification option for plutonium disposition is rather complex and there is no experience base in either domestic or international safeguards for this approach. In the present treaty regime between the US and the states of the former Soviet Union, bilaterial verifications are considered more likely with potential for a third-party verification of safeguards. There are serious technological limitations to applying conventional bulk handling facility safeguards techniques to achieve independent verification of plutonium in borosilicate glass. If vitrification is the final disposition option chosen, maintaining continuity of knowledge of plutonium in glass matrices, especially those containing boron and those spike with high-level wastes or {sup 137}Cs, is beyond the capability of present-day safeguards technologies and nondestructive assay techniques. The alternative to quantitative measurement of fissile content is to maintain continuity of knowledge through a combination of containment and surveillance, which is not the international norm for bulk handling facilities.

  15. Nuclear proliferation-resistance and safeguards for future nuclear fuel cycle

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Kuno, Y.; Inoue, N.; Senzaki, M.

    2009-03-01

    Corresponding to the world nuclear security concerns, future nuclear fuel cycle (NFC) should have high proliferation-resistance (PR) and physical protection (PP), while promotion of the peaceful use of the nuclear energy must not be inhibited. In order to accomplish nuclear non-proliferation from NFC, a few models of the well-PR systems should be developed so that international community can recognize them as worldwide norms. To find a good balance of 'safeguard-ability (so-called extrinsic measure or institutional barrier)' and 'impede-ability (intrinsic feature or technical barrier)' will come to be essential for NFC designers to optimize civilian nuclear technology with nuclear non-proliferation, although the advanced safeguards with high detectability can still play a dominant role for PR in the states complying with full institutional controls. Accomplishment of such goal in a good economic efficiency is a future key challenge.

  16. Improving the Safeguardability of Nuclear Facilities

    SciTech Connect

    T. Bjornard; R. Bari; D. Hebditch; P. Peterson; M. Schanfein

    2009-07-01

    The application of a Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process for new nuclear facilities has the potential to reduce security risks and proliferation hazards while improving the synergy of major design features and raising operational efficiency, in a world where significant expansion of nuclear energy use may occur. Correspondingly, the U.S. DOE’s Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) includes objectives to contribute to international efforts to develop SBD, and to apply SBD in the development of new U.S. nuclear infrastructure. Here, SBD is defined as a structured approach to ensure the timely, efficient and cost effective integration of international safeguards and other nonproliferation barriers with national material control and accountability, physical protection, and safety objectives into the overall design process for a nuclear facility, from initial planning through design, construction and operation. The SBD process, in its simplest form, may be applied usefully today within most national regulatory environments. Development of a mature approach to implementing SBD requires work in the areas of requirements definition, design processes, technology and methodology, and institutionalization. The U.S. efforts described in this paper are supportive of SBD work for international safeguards that has recently been initiated by the IAEA with the participation of many stakeholders including member States, the IAEA, nuclear technology suppliers, nuclear utilities, and the broader international nonproliferation community.

  17. Safeguards-by-Design:Guidance for High Temperature Gas Reactors (HTGRs) With Prismatic Fuel

    SciTech Connect

    Mark Schanfein; Casey Durst

    2012-11-01

    Introduction and Purpose The following is a guidance document from a series prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), to assist facility designers and operators in implementing international Safeguards-by-Design (SBD). SBD has two main objectives: (1) to avoid costly and time consuming redesign work or retrofits of new nuclear fuel cycle facilities and (2) to make the implementation of international safeguards more effective and efficient at such facilities. In the long term, the attainment of these goals would save industry and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) time, money, and resources and be mutually beneficial. This particular safeguards guidance document focuses on prismatic fuel high temperature gas reactors (HTGR). The purpose of the IAEA safeguards system is to provide credible assurance to the international community that nuclear material and other specified items are not diverted from peaceful nuclear uses. The safeguards system consists of the IAEA’s statutory authority to establish safeguards; safeguards rights and obligations in safeguards agreements and additional protocols; and technical measures implemented pursuant to those agreements. Of foremost importance is the international safeguards agreement between the country and the IAEA, concluded pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). According to a 1992 IAEA Board of Governors decision, countries must: notify the IAEA of a decision to construct a new nuclear facility as soon as such decision is taken; provide design information on such facilities as the designs develop; and provide detailed design information based on construction plans at least 180 days prior to the start of construction, and on "as-built" designs at least 180 days before the first receipt of nuclear material. Ultimately, the design information will be captured in an IAEA

  18. Reactor monitoring and safeguards using antineutrino detectors

    SciTech Connect

    Bowden, N S

    2008-09-07

    Nuclear reactors have served as the antineutrino source for many fundamental physics experiments. The techniques developed by these experiments make it possible to use these very weakly interacting particles for a practical purpose. The large flux of antineutrinos that leaves a reactor carries information about two quantities of interest for safeguards: the reactor power and fissile inventory. Measurements made with antineutrino detectors could therefore offer an alternative means for verifying the power history and fissile inventory of a reactors, as part of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other reactor safeguards regimes. Several efforts to develop this monitoring technique are underway across the globe.

  19. Fuzzy resource optimization for safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Zardecki, A.; Markin, J.T.

    1991-01-01

    Authorization, enforcement, and verification -- three key functions of safeguards systems -- form the basis of a hierarchical description of the system risk. When formulated in terms of linguistic rather than numeric attributes, the risk can be computed through an algorithm based on the notion of fuzzy sets. Similarly, this formulation allows one to analyze the optimal resource allocation by maximizing the overall detection probability, regarded as a linguistic variable. After summarizing the necessary elements of the fuzzy sets theory, we outline the basic algorithm. This is followed by a sample computation of the fuzzy optimization. 10 refs., 1 tab.

  20. Designing and Operating for Safeguards: Lessons Learned From the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP)

    SciTech Connect

    Johnson, Shirley J.; Ehinger, Michael

    2010-08-07

    This paper will address the lessons learned during the implementation of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP) which are relevant to the issue of ‘safeguards by design’. However, those lessons are a result of a cumulative history of international safeguards experiences starting with the West Valley reprocessing plant in 1969, continuing with the Barnwell plant, and then with the implementation of international safeguards at WAK in Germany and TRP in Japan. The design and implementation of safeguards at RRP in Japan is the latest and most challenging that the IAEA has faced. This paper will discuss the work leading up to the development of a safeguards approach, the design and operating features that were introduced to improve or aid in implementing the safeguards approach, and the resulting recommendations for future facilities. It will provide an overview of how ‘safeguardability’ was introduced into RRP.

  1. 32 CFR 310.13 - Safeguarding personal information.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... Standards and Technology. For paper records, disposal methods, such as tearing, burning, melting, chemical... (CONTINUED) PRIVACY PROGRAM DOD PRIVACY PROGRAM Systems of Records § 310.13 Safeguarding personal information... and physical safeguards to ensure that the records in each system of records are protected from...

  2. 48 CFR 814.401 - Receipt and safeguarding of bids.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 5 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Receipt and safeguarding of bids. 814.401 Section 814.401 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS....401 Receipt and safeguarding of bids. The contracting officer is designated as the official to open...

  3. 48 CFR 814.401 - Receipt and safeguarding of bids.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 5 2013-10-01 2013-10-01 false Receipt and safeguarding of bids. 814.401 Section 814.401 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS....401 Receipt and safeguarding of bids. The contracting officer is designated as the official to open...

  4. 48 CFR 814.401 - Receipt and safeguarding of bids.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 5 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Receipt and safeguarding of bids. 814.401 Section 814.401 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS....401 Receipt and safeguarding of bids. The contracting officer is designated as the official to open...

  5. 48 CFR 970.0404 - Safeguarding classified information.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 5 2013-10-01 2013-10-01 false Safeguarding classified information. 970.0404 Section 970.0404 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AGENCY SUPPLEMENTARY REGULATIONS DOE MANAGEMENT AND OPERATING CONTRACTS Administrative Matters 970.0404 Safeguarding...

  6. 48 CFR 970.0404 - Safeguarding classified information.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 5 2014-10-01 2014-10-01 false Safeguarding classified information. 970.0404 Section 970.0404 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AGENCY SUPPLEMENTARY REGULATIONS DOE MANAGEMENT AND OPERATING CONTRACTS Administrative Matters 970.0404 Safeguarding...

  7. 48 CFR 970.0404 - Safeguarding classified information.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 5 2012-10-01 2012-10-01 false Safeguarding classified information. 970.0404 Section 970.0404 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AGENCY SUPPLEMENTARY REGULATIONS DOE MANAGEMENT AND OPERATING CONTRACTS Administrative Matters 970.0404 Safeguarding...

  8. 48 CFR 970.0404 - Safeguarding classified information.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 5 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Safeguarding classified information. 970.0404 Section 970.0404 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AGENCY SUPPLEMENTARY REGULATIONS DOE MANAGEMENT AND OPERATING CONTRACTS Administrative Matters 970.0404 Safeguarding...

  9. 48 CFR 970.0404 - Safeguarding classified information.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 5 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Safeguarding classified information. 970.0404 Section 970.0404 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AGENCY SUPPLEMENTARY REGULATIONS DOE MANAGEMENT AND OPERATING CONTRACTS Administrative Matters 970.0404 Safeguarding...

  10. NEAMS safeguards and separations

    SciTech Connect

    Sadasivan, Pratap; De Paoli, David W

    2011-01-25

    This presentation provides a program management update on the Safeguards and Separations Integrated Performance and Safety Code (IPSC) program in the DOE Nuclear Energy Advanced Modeling and Simulation (NEAMS). It provides an overview of FY11 work packages at multiple DOE Labs and includes material on challenge problem definitions for the IPSC effort.

  11. Fundamentals of materials accounting for nuclear safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Pillay, K.K.S.

    1989-04-01

    Materials accounting is essential to providing the necessary assurance for verifying the effectiveness of a safeguards system. The use of measurements, analyses, records, and reports to maintain knowledge of the quantities of nuclear material present in a defined area of a facility and the use of physical inventories and materials balances to verify the presence of special nuclear materials are collectively known as materials accounting for nuclear safeguards. This manual, prepared as part of the resource materials for the Safeguards Technology Training Program of the US Department of Energy, addresses fundamental aspects of materials accounting, enriching and complementing them with the first-hand experiences of authors from varied disciplines. The topics range from highly technical subjects to site-specific system designs and policy discussions. This collection of papers is prepared by more than 25 professionals from the nuclear safeguards field. Representing research institutions, industries, and regulatory agencies, the authors create a unique resource for the annual course titled ''Materials Accounting for Nuclear Safeguards,'' which is offered at the Los Alamos National Laboratory.

  12. Analysis of the effectiveness of gas centrifuge enrichment plants advanced safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Boyer, Brian David; Erpenbeck, Heather H; Miller, Karen A; Swinjoe, Martyn T; Ianakiev, Kiril D; Marlow, Johnna B

    2010-01-01

    Current safeguards approaches used by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs) need enhancement in order to verify declared low-enriched uranium (LEU) production, detect undeclared LEU production and detect highly enriched uranium (HEU) production with adequate detection probability using non destructive assay (NDA) techniques. At present inspectors use attended systems, systems needing the presence of an inspector for operation, during inspections to verify the mass and 235U enrichment of declared UF6 containers used in the process of enrichment at GCEPs. This paper contains an analysis of possible improvements in unattended and attended NDA systems including process monitoring and possible on-site destructive assay (DA) of samples that could reduce the uncertainty of the inspector's measurements. These improvements could reduce the difference between the operator's and inspector's measurements providing more effective and efficient IAEA GCEPs safeguards. We also explore how a few advanced safeguards systems could be assembled for unattended operation. The analysis will focus on how unannounced inspections (UIs), and the concept of information-driven inspections (IDS) can affect probability of detection of the diversion of nuclear materials when coupled to new GCEPs safeguards regimes augmented with unattended systems.

  13. Safeguards-By-Design: Guidance and Tools for Stakeholders

    SciTech Connect

    Mark Schanfein; Shirley Johnson

    2012-02-01

    Effective implementation of the Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) approach can help meet the challenges of global nuclear energy growth, by designing facilities that have improved safeguardability and reduced safeguards-related life cycle costs. The ultimate goal of SBD is to implement effective and efficient safeguards that reduce the burden to both the facility operator and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Since 2008, the National Nuclear Security Administration's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative's Safeguards By Design Project has initiated multiple studies and workshops with industry and regulatory stakeholders, including the IAEA, to develop relevant documents to support the implementation of SBD. These 'Good Practices Guides' describe facility and process design features that will facilitate implementation of effective nuclear material safeguards starting in the earliest phases of design through to final design. These guides, which are in their final editorial stages, start at a high level and then narrow down to specific nuclear fuel cycle facilities such as Light Water Reactors, Generation III/IV Reactors, High Temperature Gas Cooled Reactors, and Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants. Most recently, NGSI has begun development of a facility safeguardability assessment toolkit to assist the designer. This paper will review the current status of these efforts, provide some examples of these documents, and show some standard IAEA Unattended Instrumentation that is permanently installed in nuclear facilities for monitoring.

  14. Sustaining International CBRN Centers of Excellence with a Focus on Nuclear Security and Safeguards: Initial Scoping Session London, 23-24 September 2013 SUMMARY REPORT

    SciTech Connect

    Anderson, Roger G.; Frazar, Sarah L.

    2013-12-12

    This report provides a summary-level description of the key information, observations, ideas, and recommendations expressed during the subject meeting. The report is organized to correspond to the meeting agenda provided in Appendix 1 and includes references to several of the participants listed in Appendix 2 .The meeting venue was Lloyd’s Register in the City of London. Lloyd’s Register graciously accommodated the request of The Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNNL) with whom it works on various safeguards activities commissioned by NNSA. PNNL and NNSA also shared the goal of the meeting/study with the United Kingdom (UK) Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Department of Energy and Climate Change with whom they coordinated the participant list.

  15. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Safeguards and Security quarterly progress report ending March 31, 1996

    SciTech Connect

    Davis, B.; Davis, G.; Johnson, D.; Mansur, D.L.; Ruhter, W.D.; Strait, R.S.

    1996-04-01

    LLNL carries out safeguards and security activities for DOE Office of Safeguards and Security (OSS) and other organizations within and outside DOE. LLNL is supporting OSS in 6 areas: safeguards technology, safeguards and materials accountability, computer security--distributed systems, complex-wide access control, standardization of security systems, and information technology and security center. This report describes the activities in each of these areas.

  16. Eight years of groundwater monitoring at the building site of the MOSE system for the safeguard of Venice

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Casasso, Alessandro; Sethi, Rajandrea; Di Molfetta, Antonio

    2015-04-01

    The survival of Venice is threatened by the continuous increase of frequency and intensity of tidal floods. To prevent these events, a safeguarding system known as MOSE is under construction at the inlets of the Lagoon of Venice. Four arrays of mobile barriers will be lifted in the case of exceptionally high tides (>1.10 m) to insulate the Lagoon. The prefabrication of the mobile barriers required a large construction area close to the final installation sites. Given the lack of space in the inlets of Lido and Chioggia, two basins of the future navigation locks were used for this purpose, and a system of water pumps and wells was therefore installed in each site to ensure the accessibility and safety of the construction areas. The impact of dewatering on the aquifers on the mainland in Punta Sabbioni (inlet of Lido) was monitored by means of continuous hydraulic head measurements in a network 25 piezometers, 11 screened in the phreatic aquifer and 14 in the shallowest confined aquifer. These aquifers are separated by a 5 m thick clayey aquiclude, and a 30 m thick impervious layer isolates them from the underlying confined aquifers, which were therefore not monitored. Each monitoring well was equipped with an automatic water pressure transducer and the hourly recorded hydraulic heads were compensated with the barometric pressure. The time series were compared with the natural driving forces (tides, rainfall, evapotranspiration) and the anthropogenic impact sources (dewatering pumping, slurry walls, land reclamation channels). The dynamics of seawater intrusion were also studied through monthly measurements of the vertical profiles of the electrical conductivity (EC) of groundwater. The monitoring activity was successful in assessing the impacts of the construction works. A drawdown was observed in the confined aquifer due to the dewatering pumping, with a maximum displacement of some 5 m on the mainland and an extension of some 1000 m from the dewatered basin. By

  17. 48 CFR 52.239-1 - Privacy or Security Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 2 2013-10-01 2013-10-01 false Privacy or Security....239-1 Privacy or Security Safeguards. As prescribed in 39.107, insert a clause substantially the same as the following: Privacy or Security Safeguards (AUG 1996) (a) The Contractor shall not publish...

  18. 48 CFR 52.239-1 - Privacy or Security Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 2 2014-10-01 2014-10-01 false Privacy or Security....239-1 Privacy or Security Safeguards. As prescribed in 39.107, insert a clause substantially the same as the following: Privacy or Security Safeguards (AUG 1996) (a) The Contractor shall not publish...

  19. 48 CFR 52.239-1 - Privacy or Security Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 2 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Privacy or Security....239-1 Privacy or Security Safeguards. As prescribed in 39.107, insert a clause substantially the same as the following: Privacy or Security Safeguards (AUG 1996) (a) The Contractor shall not publish...

  20. 48 CFR 52.239-1 - Privacy or Security Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 2 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Privacy or Security....239-1 Privacy or Security Safeguards. As prescribed in 39.107, insert a clause substantially the same as the following: Privacy or Security Safeguards (AUG 1996) (a) The Contractor shall not publish...

  1. 48 CFR 52.239-1 - Privacy or Security Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 2 2012-10-01 2012-10-01 false Privacy or Security....239-1 Privacy or Security Safeguards. As prescribed in 39.107, insert a clause substantially the same as the following: Privacy or Security Safeguards (AUG 1996) (a) The Contractor shall not publish...

  2. DOE integrated safeguards and security (DISS) system a nation-wide distributed information system for personnel security

    SciTech Connect

    Block, B.

    1997-06-05

    DISS uses secure client-server and relational database technology across open networks to address the problems of security clearance request processing and tracking of security clearances for the Department of energy. The system supports the entire process from data entry by the prospective clearance holders through tracking of all DOE clearances, and use of standard DOE badges in automated access control systems throughout the DOE complex.

  3. International training course on implementation of state systems of accounting for and control of nuclear materials: proceedings

    SciTech Connect

    Not Available

    1986-06-01

    This report incorporates all lectures and presentations at the International Training Course on Implementation of State Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials held June 3 through June 21, 1985, at Santa Fe and Los Alamos, New Mexico, and San Clemente, California. Authorized by the US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act and sponsored by the US Department of Energy in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Course was developed to provide practical training in the design, implementation, and operation of a state system of nuclear materials accountability and control that satisfies both national and international safeguards requirements. Major emphasis for the 1985 course was placed on safeguards methods used at item-control facilities, particularly nuclear power generating stations and test reactors. An introduction to safeguards methods used at bulk handling facilities, particularly low-enriched uranium conversion and fuel fabrication plants, was also included. The course was conducted by the University of California's Los Alamos National Laboratory and the Southern California Edison Company. Tours and demonstrations were arranged at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico, and the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, San Clemente, California.

  4. The U.S. Support Program to IAEA Safeguards - How It Works

    SciTech Connect

    Nock,C.; Hoffheins,B.

    2008-07-13

    The U.S. Support Program to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards (USSP) was established in 1977 to transfer US technology and expertise to assist the IAEA Department of Safeguards because its limited budget and scope would not allow for R&D activities and the procurement of specialized or customized equipment. Over the years, the USSP and the Department of Safeguards have worked together continuously to develop and improve processes for requesting, selecting, and managing projects that support the Safeguards verification mission. This paper will discuss the main USSP processes for accepting and processing Safeguards requests, and managing and reporting task progress.

  5. Application of Framework for Integrating Safety, Security and Safeguards (3Ss) into the Design Of Used Nuclear Fuel Storage Facility

    SciTech Connect

    Badwan, Faris M.; Demuth, Scott F

    2015-01-06

    Department of Energy’s Office of Nuclear Energy, Fuel Cycle Research and Development develops options to the current commercial fuel cycle management strategy to enable the safe, secure, economic, and sustainable expansion of nuclear energy while minimizing proliferation risks by conducting research and development focused on used nuclear fuel recycling and waste management to meet U.S. needs. Used nuclear fuel is currently stored onsite in either wet pools or in dry storage systems, with disposal envisioned in interim storage facility and, ultimately, in a deep-mined geologic repository. The safe management and disposition of used nuclear fuel and/or nuclear waste is a fundamental aspect of any nuclear fuel cycle. Integrating safety, security, and safeguards (3Ss) fully in the early stages of the design process for a new nuclear facility has the potential to effectively minimize safety, proliferation, and security risks. The 3Ss integration framework could become the new national and international norm and the standard process for designing future nuclear facilities. The purpose of this report is to develop a framework for integrating the safety, security and safeguards concept into the design of Used Nuclear Fuel Storage Facility (UNFSF). The primary focus is on integration of safeguards and security into the UNFSF based on the existing Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approach to addressing the safety/security interface (10 CFR 73.58 and Regulatory Guide 5.73) for nuclear power plants. The methodology used for adaptation of the NRC safety/security interface will be used as the basis for development of the safeguards /security interface and later will be used as the basis for development of safety and safeguards interface. Then this will complete the integration cycle of safety, security, and safeguards. The overall methodology for integration of 3Ss will be proposed, but only the integration of safeguards and security will be applied to the design of the

  6. The International Remote Monitoring Project and implications

    SciTech Connect

    Sonnier, C.S.; Johnson, C.S.

    1994-10-01

    Becoming aware of the significant changes of the past several years and their effect on the expectations to international safeguards, it is necessary to reflect on which direction the development of nuclear safeguards in a new era needs to take. The time-proven monitoring techniques, based on quantitative factors and demonstrated universal application, have shown their merit. However, the new expectations suggest a possibility that a future IAEA safeguards, system could rely more heavily on the value of a comprehensive, transparent, and open implementation regime. Within such a regime, the associated measures need to be determined and technological support identified. This paper will identify proven techniques which, with appropriate implementation support, could most quickly make available additional measures for a comprehensive, transparent and open implementation regime. In particular, it will examine the future of remote monitoring in International Safeguards, and provide an update on the International Remote Monitoring Project and related implications.

  7. Advanced international training course on state systems of accounting for and control of nuclear materials

    SciTech Connect

    Not Available

    1981-10-01

    This report incorporates all lectures and presentations at the Advanced International Training Course on State Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material held April 27 through May 12, 1981 at Santa Fe and Los Alamos, New Mexico, and Richland, Washington, USA. Authorized by the US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act and sponsored by the US Department of Energy in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, the course was developed to provide practical training in the design, implementation, and operation of a state system of nuclear materials accountability and control that satisfies both national and international safeguards. Major emphasis for the 1981 course was placed on safeguards methods used at bulk-handling facilities, particularly low-enriched uranium conversion and fuel fabrication plants. The course was conducted by the University of California's Los Alamos National Laboratory, the Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratory, and Exxon Nuclear Company, Inc. Tours and demonstrations were arranged at both the Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico, and the Exxon Nuclear fuel fabrication plant, Richland, Washington.

  8. Safeguards-by-Design: Early Integration of Physical Protection and Safeguardability into Design of Nuclear Facilities

    SciTech Connect

    T. Bjornard; R. Bean; S. DeMuth; P. Durst; M. Ehinger; M. Golay; D. Hebditch; J. Hockert; J. Morgan

    2009-09-01

    The application of a Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process for new nuclear facilities has the potential to minimize proliferation and security risks as the use of nuclear energy expands worldwide. This paper defines a generic SBD process and its incorporation from early design phases into existing design / construction processes and develops a framework that can guide its institutionalization. SBD could be a basis for a new international norm and standard process for nuclear facility design. This work is part of the U.S. DOE’s Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), and is jointly sponsored by the Offices of Non-proliferation and Nuclear Energy.

  9. New Prototype Safeguards Technology Offers Improved Confidence and Automation for Uranium Enrichment Facilities

    SciTech Connect

    Brim, Cornelia P.

    2013-04-01

    An important requirement for the international safeguards community is the ability to determine the enrichment level of uranium in gas centrifuge enrichment plants and nuclear fuel fabrication facilities. This is essential to ensure that countries with nuclear nonproliferation commitments, such as States Party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, are adhering to their obligations. However, current technologies to verify the uranium enrichment level in gas centrifuge enrichment plants or nuclear fuel fabrication facilities are technically challenging and resource-intensive. NNSA’s Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) supports the development, testing, and evaluation of future systems that will strengthen and sustain U.S. safeguards and security capabilities—in this case, by automating the monitoring of uranium enrichment in the entire inventory of a fuel fabrication facility. One such system is HEVA—hybrid enrichment verification array. This prototype was developed to provide an automated, nondestructive assay verification technology for uranium hexafluoride (UF6) cylinders at enrichment plants.

  10. International Remote Monitoring Project Embalse Nuclear Power Station, Argentina Embalse Remote Monitoring System

    SciTech Connect

    Schneider, Sigfried L.; Glidewell, Donnie D.; Bonino, Anibal; Bosler, Gene; Mercer, David; Maxey, Curt; Vones, Jaromir; Martelle, Guy; Busse, James; Kadner, Steve; White, Mike; Rovere, Luis

    1999-07-21

    The Autoridad Regulatoria Nuclear of Argentina (ARN), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), ABACC, the US Department of Energy, and the US Support Program POTAS, cooperated in the development of a Remote Monitoring System for nuclear nonproliferation efforts. This system was installed at the Embalse Nuclear Power Station last year to evaluate the feasibility of using radiation sensors in monitoring the transfer of spent fuel from the spent fuel pond to dry storage. The key element in this process is to maintain continuity of knowledge throughout the entire transfer process. This project evaluated the fundamental design and implementation of the Remote Monitoring System in its application to regional and international safeguard efficiency. New technology has been developed to enhance the design of the system to include storage capability on board sensor platforms. This evaluation has led to design enhancements that will assure that no data loss will occur during loss of RF transmission of the sensors.

  11. Next generation safeguards initiative (NGSI) program plan for safeguards by design

    SciTech Connect

    Demuth, Scott F; Budlong - Sylvester, Kory; Lockwood, Dunbar

    2010-01-01

    Safeguards by Design (SBD) is defined as the incorporation of safeguards features early in the design phase of a new nuclear facility in order to avoid the need to redesign the facility at a later date, or retrofit the completed facility. Not only can SBD avoid the need for redesign or retrofit, but consideration of safeguards features early in the facility design effort can provide for a more efficient and effective safeguards design. A program has been initiated by the United States Department of Energy during the past several years to develop, demonstrate and institutionalization SBD. This plan has been developed in parallel with a similar effort at the IAEA while taking into account their achievements and future plans. The United States SBD program is focused on (1) identification of best practices that satisfy existing safeguards requirements, (2) identification of advanced concepts where best practices can be improved, and (3) institutionalizing SBD by gaining its acceptance as a global norm for the design of new nuclear facilities. SBD guidance documents are being prepared as an aid to industry for their design activities, to describe the relationship between requirements, best practices, and advanced concepts. SBD 'lessons learned' studies have been conducted to help identify the existing best practices and potential areas for improvement. Finally, acceptance as a global norm is being pursued by way of international workshops, engagement with industry and the IAEA, and setting an example by way of its use in new nuclear facilities in the United States.

  12. 45 CFR 164.310 - Physical safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... storage (Addressable). Create a retrievable, exact copy of electronic protected health information, when... Information § 164.310 Physical safeguards. A covered entity must, in accordance with § 164.306: (a)(1... electronic information systems and the facility or facilities in which they are housed, while ensuring...

  13. 45 CFR 164.312 - Technical safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... Information § 164.312 Technical safeguards. A covered entity must, in accordance with § 164.306: (a)(1) Standard: Access control. Implement technical policies and procedures for electronic information systems that maintain electronic protected health information to allow access only to those persons or...

  14. 45 CFR 84.36 - Procedural safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... Welfare DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES GENERAL ADMINISTRATION NONDISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF... identification, evaluation, or educational placement of persons who, because of handicap, need or are believed to need special instruction or related services, a system of procedural safeguards that includes notice...

  15. Readability of Special Education Procedural Safeguards

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Mandic, Carmen Gomez; Rudd, Rima; Hehir, Thomas; Acevedo-Garcia, Dolores

    2012-01-01

    This study focused on literacy-related barriers to understanding the rights of students with disabilities and their parents within the special education system. SMOG readability scores were determined for procedural safeguards documents issued by all state departments of education. The average reading grade level was 16; 6% scored in the high…

  16. Readability of Special Education Procedural Safeguards

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Mandic, Carmen Gomez; Rudd, Rima; Hehir, Thomas; Acevedo-Garcia, Dolores

    2012-01-01

    This study focused on literacy-related barriers to understanding the rights of students with disabilities and their parents within the special education system. SMOG readability scores were determined for procedural safeguards documents issued by all state departments of education. The average reading grade level was 16; 6% scored in the high…

  17. Defining the needs for gas centrifuge enrichment plants advanced safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Boyer, Brian David; Erpenbeck, Heather H; Miller, Karen A; Swinhoe, Martyn T; Ianakiev, Kiril; Marlow, Johnna B

    2010-04-05

    Current safeguards approaches used by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs) need enhancement in order to verify declared low-enriched (LEU) production, detect undeclared LEU production and detect highly enriched uranium (HEU) production with adequate detection probability using nondestructive assay (NDA) techniques. At present inspectors use attended systems, systems needing the presence of an inspector for operation, during inspections to verify the mass and {sup 235}U enrichment of declared UF{sub 6} containers used in the process of enrichment at GCEPs. In verifying declared LEU production, the inspectors also take samples for off-site destructive assay (DA) which provide accurate data, with 0.1% to 0.5% measurement uncertainty, on the enrichment of the UF{sub 6} feed, tails, and product. However, taking samples of UF{sub 6} for off-site analysis is a much more labor and resource intensive exercise for the operator and inspector. Furthermore, the operator must ship the samples off-site to the IAEA laboratory which delays the timeliness of results and interruptions to the continuity of knowledge (CofK) of the samples during their storage and transit. This paper contains an analysis of possible improvements in unattended and attended NDA systems such as process monitoring and possible on-site analysis of DA samples that could reduce the uncertainty of the inspector's measurements and provide more effective and efficient IAEA GCEPs safeguards. We also introduce examples advanced safeguards systems that could be assembled for unattended operation.

  18. 26 CFR 301.6803-1 - Accounting and safeguarding.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-04-01

    ... 26 Internal Revenue 18 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false Accounting and safeguarding. 301.6803-1 Section 301.6803-1 Internal Revenue INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY (CONTINUED) PROCEDURE AND ADMINISTRATION PROCEDURE AND ADMINISTRATION General Provisions Relating to Stamps § 301.6803-1...

  19. Smarter radiation monitors for safeguards and security

    SciTech Connect

    Fehlau, P.E.; Pratt, J.C.; Markin, J.T.; Scurry, T. Jr.

    1983-01-01

    Radiation monitors for nuclear safeguards and security depend on internal control circuits to determine when diversion of special nuclear materials is taking place. Early monitors depended on analog circuits for this purpose, subsequently, digital logic controllers made better monitoring methods possible. Now, versatile microprocessor systems permit new, more efficient, and more useful monitoring methods. One such method is simple stepwise monitoring, which has variable alarm levels to expedite monitoring where extended monitoring periods are required. Another method, sequential probability ratio logic, tests data as it accumulates against two hypothesis - background, or background plus a transient diversion signal - and terminates monitoring as soon as a decision can be made that meets false-alarm and detection confidence requirements. A third method, quantitative monitoring for personnel, calculates count ratios of high- to low-energy gamma-ray regions to predict whether the material detected is a small quantity of bare material or a larger quantity of shielded material. In addition, microprocessor system subprograms can assist in detector calibration and trouble-shooting. Examples of subprograms are a variance analysis technique to set bias levels in plastic scintillators and a state-of-health routine for detecting malfunctions in digital circuit components.

  20. The integration of process monitoring for safeguards.

    SciTech Connect

    Cipiti, Benjamin B.; Zinaman, Owen R.

    2010-09-01

    The Separations and Safeguards Performance Model is a reprocessing plant model that has been developed for safeguards analyses of future plant designs. The model has been modified to integrate bulk process monitoring data with traditional plutonium inventory balances to evaluate potential advanced safeguards systems. Taking advantage of the wealth of operator data such as flow rates and mass balances of bulk material, the timeliness of detection of material loss was shown to improve considerably. Four diversion cases were tested including both abrupt and protracted diversions at early and late times in the run. The first three cases indicated alarms before half of a significant quantity of material was removed. The buildup of error over time prevented detection in the case of a protracted diversion late in the run. Some issues related to the alarm conditions and bias correction will need to be addressed in future work. This work both demonstrates the use of the model for performing diversion scenario analyses and for testing advanced safeguards system designs.

  1. Exploring Operational Safeguards, Safety, and Security by Design to Address Real Time Threats in Nuclear Facilities

    SciTech Connect

    Schanfein, Mark J.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2015-07-07

    Over the last few years, significant attention has been paid to both encourage application and provide domestic and international guidance for designing in safeguards and security in new facilities.1,2,3 However, once a facility is operational, safeguards, security, and safety often operate as separate entities that support facility operations. This separation is potentially a serious weakness should insider or outsider threats become a reality.Situations may arise where safeguards detects a possible loss of material in a facility. Will they notify security so they can, for example, check perimeter doors for tampering? Not doing so might give the advantage to an insider who has already, or is about to, move nuclear material outside the facility building. If outsiders break into a facility, the availability of any information to coordinate the facility’s response through segregated alarm stations or a failure to include all available radiation sensors, such as safety’s criticality monitors can give the advantage to the adversary who might know to disable camera systems, but would most likely be unaware of other highly relevant sensors in a nuclear facility.This paper will briefly explore operational safeguards, safety, and security by design (3S) at a high level for domestic and State facilities, identify possible weaknesses, and propose future administrative and technical methods, to strengthen the facility system’s response to threats.

  2. Field trial of the enhanced data authentication system (EDAS)

    SciTech Connect

    Thomas, Maikael A.; Hymel, Ross W.; Baldwin, George; Smejkal, Andreas; Linnebach, Ralf

    2016-11-01

    The Enhanced Data Authentication System (EDAS) is means to securely branch information from an existing measurement system or data stream to a secondary observer. In an international nuclear safeguards context, the EDAS connects to operator instrumentation, and provides a cryptographically secure copy of the information for a safeguards inspectorate. However, this novel capability could be a valuable complement to inspector-owned safeguards instrumentation, offering context that is valuable for anomaly resolution and contingency.

  3. Field trial of the enhanced data authentication system (EDAS)

    DOE PAGES

    Thomas, Maikael A.; Hymel, Ross W.; Baldwin, George; ...

    2016-11-01

    The Enhanced Data Authentication System (EDAS) is means to securely branch information from an existing measurement system or data stream to a secondary observer. In an international nuclear safeguards context, the EDAS connects to operator instrumentation, and provides a cryptographically secure copy of the information for a safeguards inspectorate. However, this novel capability could be a valuable complement to inspector-owned safeguards instrumentation, offering context that is valuable for anomaly resolution and contingency.

  4. New Measures to Safeguard Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants

    SciTech Connect

    Whitaker, Jr., James; Garner, James R; Whitaker, Michael; Lockwood, Dunbar; Gilligan, Kimberly V; Younkin, James R; Hooper, David A; Henkel, James J; Krichinsky, Alan M

    2011-01-01

    As Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants (GCEPs) increase in separative work unit (SWU) capacity, the current International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) model safeguards approach needs to be strengthened. New measures to increase the effectiveness of the safeguards approach are being investigated that will be mutually beneficial to the facility operators and the IAEA. One of the key concepts being studied for application at future GCEPs is embracing joint use equipment for process monitoring of load cells at feed and withdrawal (F/W) stations. A mock F/W system was built at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to generate and collect F/W data from an analogous system. The ORNL system has been used to collect data representing several realistic normal process and off-normal (including diversion) scenarios. Emphasis is placed on the novelty of the analysis of data from the sensors as well as the ability to build information out of raw data, which facilitates a more effective and efficient verification process. This paper will provide a progress report on recent accomplishments and next steps.

  5. Research and Development for Safeguards.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Inman, Guy M.

    This report summarizes the results of unclassified research and development contracts in the field of peaceful use safeguards regarding the use of nuclear material. These summaries indicate there is really no sharp line of demarcation between research for safeguards and research for many other purposes. It includes areas of research effort and…

  6. The Importance of Safeguards Culture

    SciTech Connect

    Mladineo, Stephen V.; Frazar, Sarah L.

    2013-11-01

    This is a paper we plan to submit to the Nonproliferation Review for publication. The paper provides an analysis of the concept of safeguards culture and gauges its value to the safeguards community. Accompanying the paper are three additional documents that contain the figures and tables cited in the paper. NPR guidelines state these figures and tables are to be submitted in separate documents.

  7. Criteria for internal auditing.

    PubMed

    Holder, W W; Clay, R J

    1979-01-01

    An effective, inclusive internal auditing endeavor should help assure hospital managements that (1) an adequate system of internal control exists to assure the safeguarding of assets and the reliability of data produced by the financial information system, (2) uneconomic operating practices are detected promptly so they can be remedied, and (3) program results and effectiveness levels are of sufficiently high quality to demonstrate managerial competence.

  8. Nuclear safeguards and security: we can do better.

    SciTech Connect

    Johnston, R. G.; Warner, Jon S.; Garcia, A. R. E.; Martinez, R. K.; Lopez, L. N.; Pacheco, A. N.; Trujillo, S. J.; Herrera, A. M.; Bitzer, E. G. , III

    2005-01-01

    There are a number of practical ways to significantly improve nuclear safeguards and security. These include recognizing and minimizing the insider threat; using adversarial vulnerability assessments to find vulnerabilities and countermeasures; fully appreciating the disparate nature of domestic and international nuclear safeguards; improving tamper detection and tamper-indicating seals; not confusing the inventory and security functions; and recognizing the limitations of GPS tracking, contact memory buttons, and RFID tags. The efficacy of nuclear safeguards depends critically on employing sophisticated security strategies and effective monitoring hardware. The Vulnerability Assessment Team (VAT) at Los Alamos National Laboratory has extensively researched issues associated with nuclear safeguards, especially in the areas of tamper/intrusion detection, transport security, and vulnerability assessments. This paper discusses some of our findings, recommendations, and warnings.

  9. Safeguards aspects of spent-fuel management

    SciTech Connect

    Richter, B.; Stein, G.; Remagen, H.H.; Weh, R.

    1989-11-01

    In the Federal Republic of Germany, the concept of spent-fuel management is based on a closed fuel cycle that has the following principal features: (1) intermediate dry storage of spent fuel; (2) reprocessing; (3) thermal recycling of unconsumed nuclear material; and (4) conditioning and final disposal of radioactive waste. Complementary to this concept, methods and techniques for the direct final disposal of spent fuel are under development, including investigations of licensing issues. Furthermore, a licensing procedure is under way for the construction of a pilot conditioning plant close to the Gorleben dry storage facility. Apart from operational safety and environmental protection, the issue of international safeguards is of paramount interest. This paper discusses safeguards aspects of spent-fuel management related to direct final disposal.

  10. 75 FR 78777 - Advisory Committee On Reactor Safeguards; Renewal

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-12-16

    ...: The Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards was established by Section 29 of the Atomic Energy Act... accident phenomena; design of nuclear power plant structures, systems and components; materials science...

  11. Development of Pattern Recognition Options for Combining Safeguards Subsystems

    SciTech Connect

    Burr, Thomas L.; Hamada, Michael S.

    2012-08-24

    This talk reviews project progress in combining process monitoring data and nuclear material accounting data to improve the over nuclear safeguards system. Focus on 2 subsystems: (1) nuclear materials accounting (NMA); and (2) process monitoring (PM).

  12. Advanced integrated safeguards using front-end-triggering devices

    SciTech Connect

    Howell, J.A.; Whitty, W.J.

    1995-12-01

    This report addresses potential uses of front-end-triggering devices for enhanced safeguards. Such systems incorporate video surveillance as well as radiation and other sensors. Also covered in the report are integration issues and analysis techniques.

  13. Safeguards Accountability Network accountability and materials management

    SciTech Connect

    Carnival, G.J.; Meredith, E.M.

    1985-01-01

    The Safeguards Accountability Network (SAN) is an on-line accountability system used by Rocky Flats Plant to provide accountability control of its nuclear material inventory. The system is also used to monitor and evaluate the use of the nuclear material inventory against programmatic objectives for materials management. The SAN system utilizes two Harris 800 Computers as central processing units. Enhancement plans are currently being formulated to provide automated data collection from process operations on the shop floor and from non-destructive analysis safeguards instrumentation. SAN, discussed in this paper, is an excellent system for basic accountability control of nuclear materials inventories and is a quite useful tool in evaluating the efficient use of nuclear materials inventories at Rocky Flats Plant.

  14. The International System of Units (SI).

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Page, Chester H., Ed.; Vigoureux, Paul, Ed.

    This document gives definitions and symbols for the basic units of measure, for derived units, and for supplementary units. Decimal multiples and sub-multiples of units and units outside the International System also are discussed. Appendix I reproduces the decisions made on units and on the International System by two committees (the General…

  15. Assessing the effectiveness of safeguards at a medium-sized spent-fuel reprocessing facility

    SciTech Connect

    Higinbotham, W.; Fishbone, L.G.; Suda, S.

    1983-01-01

    In order to evaluate carefully and systematically the effectiveness of safeguards at nuclear-fuel-cycle facilities, the International Atomic Energy Agency has adopted a safeguards effectiveness assessment methodology. The methodology has been applied to a well-characterized, medium-sized, spent-fuel reprocessing plant to understand how explicit safeguards inspection procedures would serve to expose conceivable nuclear materials diversion schemes, should such diversion occur.

  16. Los Alamos safeguards program overview and NDA in safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Keepin, G.R.

    1988-01-01

    Over the years the Los Alamos safeguards program has developed, tested, and implemented a broad range of passive and active nondestructive analysis (NDA) instruments (based on gamma and x-ray detection and neutron counting) that are now widely employed in safeguarding nuclear materials of all forms. Here very briefly, the major categories of gamma ray and neutron based NDA techniques, give some representative examples of NDA instruments currently in use, and cite a few notable instances of state-of-the-art NDA technique development. Historical aspects and a broad overview of the safeguards program are also presented.

  17. Implementation of IT-based applications in the safeguards field

    SciTech Connect

    Ekenstam, G.C. af; Sallstrom, M.

    1995-12-31

    For many years the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate, SKI, has used computers as a tool within nuclear material control and accountancy. Over the last five years a lot of effort has been put into projects related to the increasing possibilities of fast and reliable data transfer over large distances. The paper discusses related administrative and technical issues and presents experience gained in tasks of the Swedish Support Program to IAEA Safeguards and during the alternative Safeguards trials carried out by SKI. The following topics will be presented: (1) Main Safeguards purposes and data transfer; (2) Administrative systems and requirements; (3) Technical possibilities and experiences; and (4) The cost aspect.

  18. Integrating Safeguards and Security with Safety into Design

    SciTech Connect

    Robert S. Bean; John W. Hockert; David J. Hebditch

    2009-05-01

    There is a need to minimize security risks, proliferation hazards, and safety risks in the design of new nuclear facilities in a global environment of nuclear power expansion, while improving the synergy of major design features and raising operational efficiency. In 2008, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) launched the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) covering many safeguards areas. One of these, launched by NNSA with support of the DOE Office of Nuclear Energy, was a multi-laboratory project, led by the Idaho National Laboratory (INL), to develop safeguards by design. The proposed Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process has been developed as a structured approach to ensure the timely, efficient, and cost effective integration of international safeguards and other nonproliferation barriers with national material control and accountability, physical security, and safety objectives into the overall design process for the nuclear facility lifecycle. A graded, iterative process was developed to integrate these areas throughout the project phases. It identified activities, deliverables, interfaces, and hold points covering both domestic regulatory requirements and international safeguards using the DOE regulatory environment as exemplar to provide a framework and guidance for project management and integration of safety with security during design. Further work, reported in this paper, created a generalized SBD process which could also be employed within the licensed nuclear industry and internationally for design of new facilities. Several tools for integrating safeguards, safety, and security into design are discussed here. SBD appears complementary to the EFCOG TROSSI process for security and safety integration created in 2006, which focuses on standardized upgrades to enable existing DOE facilities to meet a more severe design basis threat. A collaborative approach is suggested.

  19. Next Generation Safeguards Initiative: Analysis of Probability of Detection of Plausible Diversion Scenarios at Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants Using Advanced Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Hase, Kevin R.; Hawkins Erpenbeck, Heather; Boyer, Brian D.

    2012-07-10

    Over the last decade, efforts by the safeguards community, including inspectorates, governments, operators and owners of centrifuge facilities, have given rise to new possibilities for safeguards approaches in enrichment plants. Many of these efforts have involved development of new instrumentation to measure uranium mass and uranium-235 enrichment and inspection schemes using unannounced and random site inspections. We have chosen select diversion scenarios and put together a reasonable system of safeguards equipment and safeguards approaches and analyzed the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed safeguards approach by predicting the probability of detection of diversion in the chosen safeguards approaches. We analyzed the effect of redundancy in instrumentation, cross verification of operator instrumentation by inspector instrumentation, and the effects of failures or anomalous readings on verification data. Armed with these esults we were able to quantify the technical cost benefit of the addition of certain instrument suites and show the promise of these new systems.

  20. Gamma-ray spectrometric determination of UF/sub 6/ assay with 1 percent precision for international safeguards. Part 1: product and feed in 1S and 2S sample cylinders

    SciTech Connect

    Ricci, E.

    1981-06-15

    The method is based on counting the 186-keV gamma rays emitted by /sup 235/U using a Pb-collimated Ge(Li) detector. Measurements of fifty UF/sub 6/ product and feed cylinders reveal the following precisions and counting times: Product - 2S, 0.98% (600 s); Feed - 2S, 0.48% (2500 s); Product - 1S, 0.62% (1000 s); Feed - 1S, 0.73% (3000 s). A 1% precision is desired for variables - attributes verification measurements of /sup 235/U assay in UF/sub 6/ sample cylinders for safeguards inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Statistically, these measurements stand between fine, high-precision (or variables) measurements and gross, low-precision (or attributes) ones. Because of their intermediate precisions, the variables-attributes measurements may not require analysis of all samples, and this could result in significant savings of IAEA inspector time. Although the precision of the above results is satisfactory, the average relative differences between gamma-ray and mass-spectrometric determinations for the last two sets of measurements (1S cylinders) have positive biases.

  1. Advanced Safeguards Technology Demonstration at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory

    SciTech Connect

    Orton, Christopher R.; Schwantes, Jon M.; Bryan, Samuel A.; Levitskaia, Tatiana G.; Duckworth, Douglas C.; Douglas, Matthew; Farmer, O. T.; Fraga, Carlos G.; Lehn, Scott A.; Liezers, Martin; Peper, Shane M.; Christensen, Richard

    2008-10-01

    The IAEA has established international safeguards standards for fissionable materials at spent fuel reprocessing plants to ensure that significant quantities of weapons-grade nuclear material are not diverted over a specified time frame. It is, therefore, necessary to confirm proper operational performance to verify facilities operate under adequate safeguard-declared conditions. This verification can be achieved by employing monitoring equipment. Online real time monitoring of the flowsheet radiochemical streams provides a unique capability to rapidly identify deviations from normal operating conditions. Flowsheet monitoring technologies being developed at PNNL include three integrated systems: Multi-Isotope Process (MIP) Monitor, spectroscopy-based monitor (UV-vis-NIR and Raman spectrometers), and Electrochemically Modulated Separations (EMS). The MIP Monitor is designed to identify off-normal conditions in process streams using gamma spectroscopy and pattern recognition software. The spectroscopic monitoring continuously measures chemical compositions of the process streams including actinide metal ions (U, Pu, Np), selected fission products, and major cold flowsheet chemicals. EMS provides an on-line means for pre-separating and pre-concentrating elements of interest out of complex matrices prior to detection. PNNL is preparing to test these multi-parametric technologies using different samples of dissolved spent fuel and aqueous and organic phases of the PUREX and UREX flowsheets. We will report our on-going efforts with specific focus given to quantifying sensitivity of the MIP Monitor and UV-Vis and Raman spectrometers to detect minor changes in major process variables.

  2. LANL Safeguards and Security Assurance Program. Revision 6

    SciTech Connect

    1995-04-03

    The Safeguards and Security (S and S) Assurance Program provides a continuous quality improvement approach to ensure effective, compliant S and S program implementation throughout the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Any issues identified through the various internal and external assessments are documented, tracked and closed using the Safeguards and Security Issue Management Program. The Laboratory utilizes an integrated S and S systems approach to protect US Department of Energy (DOE) interests from theft or diversion of special nuclear material (SNM), sabotage, espionage, loss or theft of classified/controlled matter or government property, and other hostile acts that may cause unacceptable impacts on national security, health and safety of employees and the public, and the environment. This document explains the basis, scope, and conduct of the S and S process to include: self-assessments, issue management, risk assessment, and root cause analysis. It also provides a discussion of S and S topical areas, roles and responsibilities, process flow charts, minimum requirements, methodology, terms, and forms.

  3. Market Research Survey of Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) Portable MS Systems for IAEA Safeguards Applications

    SciTech Connect

    Hart, Garret L.; Hager, George J.; Barinaga, Charles J.; Duckworth, Douglas C.

    2013-02-01

    This report summarizes the results for the market research survey of mass spectrometers that are deemed pertinent to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) needs and strategic objectives. The focus of the report is on MS instruments that represent currently available (or soon to be) commercial off-the shelf (COTS) technology and weigh less than 400 pounds. A compilation of all available MS instruments (36 COTS and 2 R&D) is presented, along with pertinent information regarding each instrument.

  4. Using Process Load Cell Information for IAEA Safeguards at Enrichment Plants

    SciTech Connect

    Laughter, Mark D; Whitaker, J Michael; Howell, John

    2010-01-01

    Uranium enrichment service providers are expanding existing enrichment plants and constructing new facilities to meet demands resulting from the shutdown of gaseous diffusion plants, the completion of the U.S.-Russia highly enriched uranium downblending program, and the projected global renaissance in nuclear power. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conducts verification inspections at safeguarded facilities to provide assurance that signatory States comply with their treaty obligations to use nuclear materials only for peaceful purposes. Continuous, unattended monitoring of load cells in UF{sub 6} feed/withdrawal stations can provide safeguards-relevant process information to make existing safeguards approaches more efficient and effective and enable novel safeguards concepts such as information-driven inspections. The IAEA has indicated that process load cell monitoring will play a central role in future safeguards approaches for large-scale gas centrifuge enrichment plants. This presentation will discuss previous work and future plans related to continuous load cell monitoring, including: (1) algorithms for automated analysis of load cell data, including filtering methods to determine significant weights and eliminate irrelevant impulses; (2) development of metrics for declaration verification and off-normal operation detection ('cylinder counting,' near-real-time mass balancing, F/P/T ratios, etc.); (3) requirements to specify what potentially sensitive data is safeguards relevant, at what point the IAEA gains on-site custody of the data, and what portion of that data can be transmitted off-site; (4) authentication, secure on-site storage, and secure transmission of load cell data; (5) data processing and remote monitoring schemes to control access to sensitive and proprietary information; (6) integration of process load cell data in a layered safeguards approach with cross-check verification; (7) process mock-ups constructed to provide simulated

  5. Creating an Internal Content Management System

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Sennema, Greg

    2004-01-01

    In this article, the author talks about an internal content management system that they have created at Calvin College. It is a hybrid of CMS and intranet that organizes Web site content and a variety of internal tools to help librarians complete their daily tasks. Hobbes is a Web-based tool that uses Common Gateway Interface (CGI) scripts written…

  6. Creating an Internal Content Management System

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Sennema, Greg

    2004-01-01

    In this article, the author talks about an internal content management system that they have created at Calvin College. It is a hybrid of CMS and intranet that organizes Web site content and a variety of internal tools to help librarians complete their daily tasks. Hobbes is a Web-based tool that uses Common Gateway Interface (CGI) scripts written…

  7. Emerging National Space Launch Programs. Economics and Safeguards

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1993-01-01

    safeguard system (3ee Table 3.2). Now let us elaborate why SLV flight testi might not provide timely warniing. There are three reasons. First, some countries...ballistic missiles hereafter means surface-to-surface guided ballistic missiles only, Space launch vehicles ( SLVs ) are surface-to-space ballistic missiles...support missile nonproliferation. This dream is, however, hard to fulfill. xii A likely scheme for safeguarding SLVs , including sounding rockets, would

  8. The US Support Program Assistance to the IAEA Safeguards Information Technology, Collection, and Analysis 2008

    SciTech Connect

    Tackentien,J.

    2008-06-12

    One of the United States Support Program's (USSP) priorities for 2008 is to support the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) development of an integrated and efficient safeguards information infrastructure, including reliable and maintainable information systems, and effective tools and resources to collect and analyze safeguards-relevant information. The USSP has provided funding in support of this priority for the ISIS Re-engineering Project (IRP), and for human resources support to the design and definition of the enhanced information analysis architecture project (nVision). Assistance for several other information technology efforts is provided. This paper will report on the various ongoing support measures undertaken by the USSP to support the IAEA's information technology enhancements and will provide some insights into activities that the USSP may support in the future.

  9. The Use of Performance Metrics for the Assessment of Safeguards Effectiveness at the State Level

    SciTech Connect

    Bachner K. M.; George Anzelon, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA Yana Feldman, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA Mark Goodman,Department of State, Washington, DC Dunbar Lockwood, National Nuclear Security Administration, Washington, DC Jonathan B. Sanborn, JBS Consulting, LLC, Arlington, VA.

    2016-07-24

    In the ongoing evolution of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards at the state level, many safeguards implementation principles have been emphasized: effectiveness, efficiency, non-discrimination, transparency, focus on sensitive materials, centrality of material accountancy for detecting diversion, independence, objectivity, and grounding in technical considerations, among others. These principles are subject to differing interpretations and prioritizations and sometimes conflict. This paper is an attempt to develop metrics and address some of the potential tradeoffs inherent in choices about how various safeguards policy principles are implemented. The paper carefully defines effective safeguards, including in the context of safeguards approaches that take account of the range of state-specific factors described by the IAEA Secretariat and taken note of by the Board in September 2014, and (2) makes use of performance metrics to help document, and to make transparent, how safeguards implementation would meet such effectiveness requirements.

  10. The International Space Station: Systems and Science

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Giblin, Timothy W.

    2010-01-01

    ISS Program Mission: Safely build, operate, and utilize a permanent human outpost in space through an international partnership of government, industry, and academia to advance exploration of the solar system, conduct scientific research, and enable commerce in space.

  11. THIEF: An interactive simulation of nuclear materials safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Stanbro, W. D.

    1990-01-01

    The safeguards community is facing an era in which it will be called upon to tighten protection of nuclear material. At the same time, it is probable that safeguards will face more competition for available resources from other activities such as environmental cleanup. To exist in this era, it will be necessary to understand and coordinate all aspects of the safeguards system. Because of the complexity of the interactions involved, this process puts a severe burden on designers and operators of safeguards systems. This paper presents a simulation tool developed at the Los Alamos National Laboratory to allow users to examine the interactions among safeguards elements as they apply to combating the insider threat. The tool consists of a microcomputer-based simulation in which the user takes the role of the insider trying to remove nuclear material from a facility. The safeguards system is run by the computer and consists of both physical protection and MC A computer elements. All data elements describing a scenario can be altered by the user. The program can aid in training, as well as in developing threat scenarios. 4 refs.

  12. Internal coaxial cable seal system

    DOEpatents

    Hall, David R.; Sneddon, Cameron; Dahlgren, Scott Steven; Briscoe, Michael A.

    2006-07-25

    The invention is a seal system for a coaxial cable and is placed within the coaxial cable and its constituent components. A series of seal stacks including load ring components and elastomeric rings are placed on load bearing members within the coaxial cable sealing the annular space between the coaxial cable and an electrical contact passing there through. The coaxial cable is disposed within drilling components to transmit electrical signals between drilling components within a drill string. The seal system can be used in a variety of downhole components, such as sections of pipe in a drill string, drill collars, heavy weight drill pipe, and jars.

  13. Safeguards for spent fuel in an irretrievable storage facility

    SciTech Connect

    Richter, B.; Stein, G. )

    1992-01-01

    Ultimately, high-level waste from the reprocessing of German spent fuel, spent light water reactor (LWR) fuel assemblies that will not be reprocessed, and spent THTR-300 fuel will be disposed of in a geologic repository in the Gorleben salt dome, provided it will be licensed; the exploration of the salt dome is under way. Because of its fissile material content, particularly plutonium, the International Atomic Energy Agency will not release spent fuel from safeguards, although the irradiated material will be packaged in huge containers and irretrievably buried in the salt. International safeguards in an irretrievable storage facility will have to be designed accordingly. This paper discusses various safeguards aspects, investigations, and results. Technical aspects were presented in a previous paper.

  14. Passive Measurement of Organic-Scintillator Neutron Signatures for Nuclear Safeguards Applications

    SciTech Connect

    Jennfier L. Dolan; Eric C. Miller; Alexis C. Kaplan; Andreas Enqvist; Marek Flaska; Alice Tomanin; Paolo Peerani; David L. Chichester; Sara A. Pozzi

    2012-10-01

    At nuclear facilities, domestically and internationally, most measurement systems used for nuclear materials’ control and accountability rely on He-3 detectors. Due to resource shortages, alternatives to He-3 systems are needed. This paper presents preliminary simulation and experimental efforts to develop a fast-neutron-multiplicity counter based on liquid organic scintillators. This mission also provides the opportunity to broaden the capabilities of such safeguards measurement systems to improve current neutron-multiplicity techniques and expand the scope to encompass advanced nuclear fuels.

  15. International training course on implementation of state systems of accounting for and control of nuclear materials: proceedings

    SciTech Connect

    Not Available

    1984-06-01

    This report incorporates all lectures and presentations at the International Training Course on Implementation of State Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials held October 17 through November 4, 1983, at Santa Fe and Los Alamos, New Mexico and Richland, Washington, USA. Authorized by the US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act and sponsored by the US Department of Energy in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, the course was developed to provide practical training in the design, implementation, and operation of a State system of nuclear materials accountability and control that satisfies both national and international safeguards requirements. Major emphasis for the 1983 course was placed on safeguards methods used at bulk-handling facilities, particularly low-enriched uranium conversion and fuel fabrication plants. The course was conducted by the University of California's Los Alamos National Laboratory and Exxon Nuclear Company, Inc. Tours and demonstrations were arranged at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico, and the Exxon Nuclear fuel fabrication plant, the Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Westinghouse Fast Flux Test Facility Visitor Center, and Washington Public Power System nuclear reactor facilities in Richland, Washington. Individual presentations were indexed for inclusion in the Energy Data Base.

  16. Safeguards First Principle Initiative (SFPI) Cost Model

    SciTech Connect

    Mary Alice Price

    2010-07-11

    The Nevada Test Site (NTS) began operating Material Control and Accountability (MC&A) under the Safeguards First Principle Initiative (SFPI), a risk-based and cost-effective program, in December 2006. The NTS SFPI Comprehensive Assessment of Safeguards Systems (COMPASS) Model is made up of specific elements (MC&A plan, graded safeguards, accounting systems, measurements, containment, surveillance, physical inventories, shipper/receiver differences, assessments/performance tests) and various sub-elements, which are each assigned effectiveness and contribution factors that when weighted and rated reflect the health of the MC&A program. The MC&A Cost Model, using an Excel workbook, calculates budget and/or actual costs using these same elements/sub-elements resulting in total costs and effectiveness costs per element/sub-element. These calculations allow management to identify how costs are distributed for each element/sub-element. The Cost Model, as part of the SFPI program review process, enables management to determine if spending is appropriate for each element/sub-element.

  17. Health Information Security in Hospitals: the Application of Security Safeguards

    PubMed Central

    Mehraeen, Esmaeil; Ayatollahi, Haleh; Ahmadi, Maryam

    2016-01-01

    Introduction: A hospital information system has potentials to improve the accessibility of clinical information and the quality of health care. However, the use of this system has resulted in new challenges, such as concerns over health information security. This paper aims to assess the status of information security in terms of administrative, technical and physical safeguards in the university hospitals. Methods: This was a survey study in which the participants were information technology (IT) managers (n=36) who worked in the hospitals affiliated to the top ranked medical universities (university A and university B). Data were collected using a questionnaire. The content validity of the questionnaire was examined by the experts and the reliability of the questionnaire was determined using Cronbach’s coefficient alpha (α=0.75). Results: The results showed that the administrative safeguards were arranged at a medium level. In terms of the technical safeguards and the physical safeguards, the IT managers rated them at a strong level. Conclusion: According to the results, among three types of security safeguards, the administrative safeguards were assessed at the medium level. To improve it, developing security policies, implementing access control models and training users are recommended. PMID:27046944

  18. Health Information Security in Hospitals: the Application of Security Safeguards.

    PubMed

    Mehraeen, Esmaeil; Ayatollahi, Haleh; Ahmadi, Maryam

    2016-02-01

    A hospital information system has potentials to improve the accessibility of clinical information and the quality of health care. However, the use of this system has resulted in new challenges, such as concerns over health information security. This paper aims to assess the status of information security in terms of administrative, technical and physical safeguards in the university hospitals. This was a survey study in which the participants were information technology (IT) managers (n=36) who worked in the hospitals affiliated to the top ranked medical universities (university A and university B). Data were collected using a questionnaire. The content validity of the questionnaire was examined by the experts and the reliability of the questionnaire was determined using Cronbach's coefficient alpha (α=0.75). The results showed that the administrative safeguards were arranged at a medium level. In terms of the technical safeguards and the physical safeguards, the IT managers rated them at a strong level. According to the results, among three types of security safeguards, the administrative safeguards were assessed at the medium level. To improve it, developing security policies, implementing access control models and training users are recommended.

  19. USSP-IAEA WORKSHOP ON ADVANCED SENSORS FOR SAFEGUARDS.

    SciTech Connect

    PEPPER,S.; QUEIROLO, A.; ZENDEL, M.; WHICHELLO, J.; ANNESE, C.; GRIEBE, J.; GRIEBE, R.

    2007-11-13

    The IAEA Medium Term Strategy (2006-2011) defines a number of specific goals in respect to the IAEA's ability to provide assurances to the international community regarding the peaceful use of nuclear energy through States adherences to their respective non-proliferation treaty commitments. The IAEA has long used and still needs the best possible sensors to detect and measure nuclear material. The Department of Safeguards, recognizing the importance of safeguards-oriented R&D, especially targeting improved detection capabilities for undeclared facilities, materials and activities, initiated a number of activities in early 2005. The initiatives included letters to Member State Support Programs (MSSPs), personal contacts with known technology holders, topical meetings, consultant reviews of safeguards technology, and special workshops to identify new and novel technologies and methodologies. In support of this objective, the United States Support Program to IAEA Safeguards hosted a workshop on ''Advanced Sensors for Safeguards'' in Santa Fe, New Mexico, from April 23-27, 2007. The Organizational Analysis Corporation, a U.S.-based management consulting firm, organized and facilitated the workshop. The workshop's goal was to help the IAEA identify and plan for new sensors for safeguards implementation. The workshop, which was attended by representatives of seven member states and international organizations, included presentations by technology holders and developers on new technologies thought to have relevance to international safeguards, but not yet in use by the IAEA. The presentations were followed by facilitated breakout sessions where the participants considered two scenarios typical of what IAEA inspectors might face in the field. One scenario focused on an enrichment plant; the other scenario focused on a research reactor. The participants brainstormed using the technologies presented by the participants and other technologies known to them to propose

  20. An automated airplane detection system for the safeguard against airplane illumination from the laser guide star beacons at the MMT

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Snyder, Miguel; Lloyd-Hart, Michael

    2007-09-01

    Laser beams for guide star generation are a potential hazard for aircraft. At the MMT telescope located on Mt. Hopkins in Southern Arizona, a constellation of five Rayleigh guide stars is created with a total of 25 W of projected power at 532 nm wavelength. We report operational results from an automatic system deployed at the MMT that is designed to detect aircraft and shut down the lasers if a collision with the beams appears likely. The system, building on a previous prototype, uses a wide-angle CCD camera mounted with a minimally unobstructed view to the optical support structure at the top of the telescope. A computer program reads the camera once every two seconds and calculates the difference between adjacent image pairs. The anti-collision beacons required on all aircraft by the Federal Aviation Administration appear as streaks in the field. If an airplane is detected, it is located in the field relative to the laser beam and its path is projected. If aircraft are detected near or appear that they will approach the beam, the laser's safety shutter is closed and warning messages are sent to the laser operator. Failsafe operation is assured by a "heart beat" signal continuously sent from the detection system to the laser controller, and by the fact that the safety shutter must be energized to open. In the event of a power failure, the system must be manually reset by the Laser Safety Officer before the laser beam can again be propagated.

  1. Maintaining continuity of knowledge on safeguards samples

    SciTech Connect

    Franssen, F; Islam, A B.M.N.; Sonnier, C; Schoeneman, J L; Baumann, M

    1992-01-01

    The conclusions of the vulnerability test on VOPAN (verification of Operator's Analysis) as conducted at Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (ASA) at Seibersdorf, Austria in October 1990 and documented in STR-266, indicate that whenever samples are taken for safeguards purposes extreme care must be taken to ensure that they have not been interfered with during the sample taking, transportation, storage or sample preparation process.'' Indeed there exist a number of possibilities to alter the content of a safeguards sample vial from the moment of sampling up to the arrival of the treated (or untreated) sample at SAL. The time lapse between these two events can range from a few days up to months. The sample history over this period can be subdivided into three main sub-periods: (1) the period from when the sampling activities are commenced up to the treatment in the operator's laboratory, (2) during treatment of samples in the operator's laboratory, and finally, (3) the period between that treatment and the arrival of the sample at SAL. A combined effort between the Agency and the United States Support Program to the Agency (POTAS) has resulted in two active tasks and one proposed task to investigate improving the maintenance of continuity of knowledge on safeguards samples during the entire period of their existence. This paper describes the use of the Sample Vial Secure Container (SVSC), of the Authenticated Secure Container System (ASCS), and of the Secure Container for Storage and Transportation of samples (SCST) to guarantee that a representative portion of the solution sample will be received at SAL.

  2. Advanced techniques in safeguarding a conditioning facility for spent fuel

    SciTech Connect

    Rudolf, K.; Weh, R. )

    1992-01-01

    Although reprocessing continues to be the main factor in the waste management of nuclear reactors, the alternative of direct final disposal is currently being developed to the level of industrial applications, based on an agreement between the heads of the federal government and the federal states of Germany. Thus, the Konrad and Gorleben sites are being studied as potential final repositories as is the pilot conditioning facility (PKA) under construction. Discussions on the application of safeguards measures have led to the drafting of an approach that will cover the entire back end of the fuel cycle. The conditioning of fuel prior to direct final disposal represents one element in the overall approach. A modern facility equipped with advanced technology, PKA is a pilot plant with regard to conditioning techniques as well as to safeguards. Therefore, the PKA safeguards approach is expected to facilitate future industrial applications of the conditioning procedure. This cannot be satisfactorily implemented without advanced safeguards techniques. The level of development of the safeguards techniques varies. While advanced camera and seal systems are basically available, the other techniques and methods still require research and development. Feasibility studies and equipment development are geared to providing applicable safeguards techniques in time for commissioning of the PKA.

  3. International Instructional Systems: How England Measures Up

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Creese, Brian; Isaacs, Tina

    2016-01-01

    Although England was not included in the International Instructional Systems Study because it was not a high-performing jurisdiction by the Study's definition, contributors largely were England-based. Analysing the Study's nine overall aspects of instructional systems, this paper finds that England is out of step with many of the high-performing…

  4. International Instructional Systems: How England Measures Up

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Creese, Brian; Isaacs, Tina

    2016-01-01

    Although England was not included in the International Instructional Systems Study because it was not a high-performing jurisdiction by the Study's definition, contributors largely were England-based. Analysing the Study's nine overall aspects of instructional systems, this paper finds that England is out of step with many of the high-performing…

  5. A perspective on safeguarding and monitoring of excess military plutonium

    SciTech Connect

    Sutcliffe, W.G.

    1994-10-02

    The purpose of this paper is to provide a perspective and framework for the development of safeguarding and monitoring procedures for the various stages of disposition of excess military plutonium. The paper briefly outlines and comments on some of the issues involved in safeguarding and monitoring excess military plutonium as it progresses from weapons through dismantlement, to fabrication as reactor fuel, to use in a reactor, and finally to storage and disposal as spent fuel. {open_quotes}Military{close_quotes} refers to ownership, and includes both reactor-grade and weapon-grade plutonium. {open_quotes}Excess{close_quotes} refers to plutonium (in any form) that a government decides is no longer needed for military use and can be irrevocably removed from military stockpiles. Many of the issues and proposals presented in this paper are based on, or are similar to, those mentioned in the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) report on excess military plutonium. Safeguards for plutonium disposition are discussed elsewhere in terms of requirements established by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Here, the discussion is less specific. The term {open_quotes}safeguarding{close_quotes} is used broadly to refer to materials control and accountancy (MC&A), containment and surveillance (C&S), and physical protection of nuclear materials by the state that possesses those materials. This is also referred to as material protection, control, and accountancy (MPCA). The term {open_quotes}safeguarding{close_quotes} was chosen for brevity and to distinguish MPCA considered in this paper from international or IAEA safeguards. {open_quotes}Monitoring{close_quotes} is used to refer to activities designed to assure another party (state or international organization) that the nuclear materials of the host state (the United States or Russia) are secure and not subject to unauthorized use.

  6. Safeguarding health care workers.

    PubMed

    Benton, David; Williamson, Lindsey

    2014-12-01

    Editor's note: The International Council of Nurses (ICN) is a federation of more than 130 international nursing organizations. We invited the ICN to contribute a periodic column highlighting some of its initiatives to address global nursing issues. For more information, see the ICN Web site at www.icn.ch.

  7. International Systems Integration on the International Space Station

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Gerstenmaier, William H.; Ticker, Ronald L.

    2007-01-01

    Over the next few months, the International Space Station (ISS), and human spaceflight in general, will undergo momentous change. The European Columbus and Japanese Kibo Laboratories will be added to the station joining U.S. and Russian elements already on orbit. Columbus, Jules Vernes Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV) and Kibo Control Centers will soon be joining control centers in the US and Russia in coordinating ISS operations and research. The Canadian Special Purpose Dexterous Manipulator (SPDM) will be performing extra vehicular activities that previously only astronauts on EVA could do, but remotely and with increased safety. This paper will address the integration of these international elements and operations into the ISS, both from hardware and human perspectives. Interoperability of on-orbit systems and ground control centers and their human operators from Europe, Japan, Canada, Russia and the U.S. pose significant and unique challenges. Coordination of logistical support and transportation of crews and cargo is also a major challenge. As we venture out into the cosmos and inhabit the Moon and other planets, it's the systems and operational experience and partnership development on ISS, humanity's orbiting outpost that is making these journeys possible.

  8. The Los Alamos nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation technology development program

    SciTech Connect

    Smith, H.A. Jr.; Menlove, H.O.; Reilly, T.D.; Bosler, G.E.; Hakkila, E.A.; Eccleston, G.W.

    1994-04-01

    For nearly three decades, Los Alamos National Laboratory has developed and implemented nuclear measurement technology and training in support of national and international nuclear safeguards. This paper outlines the major elements of those technologies and highlights some of the latest developments.

  9. 41 CFR 101-28.306-5 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ...-Customer Supply Centers § 101-28.306-5 Safeguards. Agencies shall establish internal controls to ensure that the customer access codes assigned for their accounts are properly protected. It is by use of... all orders filled by the CSC with the exception of orders picked up at the CSC by the customer....

  10. 45 CFR 1182.15 - Institute responsibility for maintaining adequate technical, physical, and security safeguards to...

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... record systems. These security safeguards shall apply to all systems in which identifiable personal data... data and automated systems shall be adequately trained in the security and privacy of personal data. (4... technical, physical, and security safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure or destruction of manual...

  11. The European Safeguards Research and Development Association Addresses Safeguards and Nonproliferation

    SciTech Connect

    Janssens-Maenhout, Greet; Kusumi, R.; Daures, Pascal A.; Janssens, Willem; Dickman, Deborah A.

    2010-06-16

    The renaissance of efforts to expand the use of nuclear energy requires the parallel development of a renewed and more sophisticated work force. Growth in the nuclear sector with high standard of safety, safeguards and security requires skilled staff for design, operations, inspections etc. High-quality nuclear technology educational programs are diminished from past years, and the ability of universities to attract students and to meet future staffing requirements of the nuclear industry is becoming seriously compromised. Thus, education and training in nuclear engineering and sciences is one of the cornerstones for the nuclear sector. Teaching in the nuclear field still seems strongly influenced by national history but it is time to strengthen resources and collaborate. Moreover with the current nuclear security threats it becomes critical that nuclear technology experts master the basic principles not only of safety, but also of nuclear safeguards, nonproliferation and nuclear security. In Europe the European Nuclear Education Network (ENEN) Association has established the certificate 'European Master of Science in Nuclear Engineering (EMSNE)' as the classic nuclear engineering program covering reactor operation and nuclear safety. However, it does not include courses on nonproliferation, safeguards, or dual-use technologies. The lack of education in nuclear safeguards was tackled by the European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA), through development and implementation of safeguards course modules. Since 2005 the ESARDA Working Group, called the Training and Knowledge Management Working Group, (TKMWG) has worked with the Joint Research Centre (JRC) in Ispra, Italy to organize a Nuclear Safeguards and Nonproliferation course. This five-day course is held each spring at the JRC, and continues to show increasing interest as evidenced by the positive responses of international lecturers and students. The standard set of lectures covers a broad

  12. Advanced Safeguards Technology Demonstration at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory

    SciTech Connect

    Arrigo, Leah M.; Bryan, Samuel A.; Christensen, Richard; Douglas, Matthew; Duckworth, Douglas C.; Fraga, Carlos G.; Levitskaia, Tatiana G.; Liezers, Martin; Orton, Christopher R.; Peper, Shane M.; Schwantes, Jon M.

    2010-05-21

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has established international safeguards standards for fissionable material at spent fuel reprocessing plants to ensure that significant quantities of weapons-grade nuclear material are not diverted over a specified time frame. Currently, methods to verify that the facilities are operating under adequate safeguard-declared conditions require time consuming sampling and expensive, destructive analysis. The time delay between sampling and subsequent analysis provides a potential opportunity to divert the material out of the appropriate chemical stream. One way to avoid this problem is to use process monitoring equipment that is capable of on-line and in near-real time monitoring of the flowsheet radiochemical streams to rapidly identify deviations from normal operating conditions. Three integrated systems for flowsheet monitoring are currently being developed at PNNL including: 1) Multi-Isotope Process Monitor (MIP), 2) a spectroscopy-based monitor utilizing UV-Vis-NIR (Ultra Violet-Visible-Near Infrared) and Raman spectrometers, and 3) Electrochemically Modulated Separations (EMS). MIP uses gamma spectroscopy and pattern recognition software to identify off-normal conditions in process streams. The UV-Vis-NIR and Raman spectroscopic monitoring continuously measures chemical compositions of the process streams including actinide metal ions (U, Pu, Np), selected fission products, and major cold flowsheet chemicals. EMS provides an on-line means for pre-separating and preconcentrating elements of interest out of complex matrices prior to detection via non-destructive assay by gamma spectroscopy or destructive analysis with mass spectrometry. PNNL previously reported some of its initial modeling work as proof of principle. Here we will provide a general overview of the technologies and the ongoing demonstrations that utilize actual spent fuel.

  13. International collaboration in SAR ground data systems

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Curlander, John C.

    1993-01-01

    A set of considerations that are pertinent to future international cooperation in the area of synthetic aperture radar (SAR) ground data systems are presented. The considerations are as follows: (1) success of future spaceborne SAR missions will require multi-agency and/or multi-national collaboration; (2) ground processing is typically performed by each agency for their user base; (3) international standards are required to achieve a uniform data product independent of the processing center; (4) to reduce the aggregate cost of the ground data systems, collaboration is required in design and development; (5) effective utilization of the data by an international user community; (6) commercialization of data products; and (7) security of data systems.

  14. Regional Cooperation to Strengthen Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Minnini, Margot; Elkhamri, Oksana O.

    2016-06-06

    President Obama’s decision over four years ago to ”pivot” toward Asia represented an important strategic shift in American foreign policy and a rebalancing of U.S. economic and security engagement in the Asia-Pacific countries. The United States has since supported a variety of regional initiatives aimed at promoting nuclear security and safeguards. When a new regional organization, the Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network (APSN) was established in 2010, DOE/NNSA became an early member and enthusiastic advocate. Launched on the initiative of Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, and Indonesia, the APSN aims to strengthen the quality and effectiveness of safeguards implementation in the Asia-Pacific region.

  15. Advanced Safeguards Approaches for New TRU Fuel Fabrication Facilities

    SciTech Connect

    Durst, Philip C.; Ehinger, Michael H.; Boyer, Brian; Therios, Ike; Bean, Robert; Dougan, A.; Tolk, K.

    2007-12-15

    This second report in a series of three reviews possible safeguards approaches for the new transuranic (TRU) fuel fabrication processes to be deployed at AFCF – specifically, the ceramic TRU (MOX) fuel fabrication line and the metallic (pyroprocessing) line. The most common TRU fuel has been fuel composed of mixed plutonium and uranium dioxide, referred to as “MOX”. However, under the Advanced Fuel Cycle projects custom-made fuels with higher contents of neptunium, americium, and curium may also be produced to evaluate if these “minor actinides” can be effectively burned and transmuted through irradiation in the ABR. A third and final report in this series will evaluate and review the advanced safeguards approach options for the ABR. In reviewing and developing the advanced safeguards approach for the new TRU fuel fabrication processes envisioned for AFCF, the existing international (IAEA) safeguards approach at the Plutonium Fuel Production Facility (PFPF) and the conceptual approach planned for the new J-MOX facility in Japan have been considered as a starting point of reference. The pyro-metallurgical reprocessing and fuel fabrication process at EBR-II near Idaho Falls also provided insight for safeguarding the additional metallic pyroprocessing fuel fabrication line planned for AFCF.

  16. End user needs for enhanced IAEA Safeguards Information Management Capabilities

    SciTech Connect

    Badalamente, R.; Anzelon, G.; Deland, S.; Whiteson, R.

    1994-07-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency is undertaking a program for strengthening its safeguards on the recognition that safeguards must give assurance not only of the non-diversion of declared material or that declared facilities are not being misused, but also of the absence of any undeclared nuclear activities in States which have signed comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency. The IAEA has determined that the detection of undeclared nuclear activities and the creation of confidence in the continuing peaceful use of declared material and facilities is largely dependent on more information being made available to the Agency and on the capability of the Agency to make more effective use of this additional information, as well as existing information.

  17. Safeguards techniques in a pilot conditioning plant for spent fuel

    SciTech Connect

    Leitner, E.; Rudolf, K.; Weh, R. )

    1991-01-01

    The pilot conditioning plant at Gorleben, Germany, is designed as a multi-purpose plant. Its primary task is the conditioning of spent fuel assemblies into a form suitable for final disposal. As a pilot plant, it allows furthermore for the development and testing of various conditioning techniques. In terms of international safeguards, the pilot conditioning plant is basically considered an item facility. Entire fuel assemblies enter the plant in transport casks, whereas bins filled with fuel rods or canisters containing cut fuel rods leave the facility in final disposal packages (e.g. POLLUX). Each POLLUX final disposal package content is uniquely correlated to a definite number of fuel assemblies which have entered the conditioning process. For this type of facility, containment/surveillance (C/S) should take over the major role in nuclear material safeguards. This paper discusses the safeguards at the Gorleben plant.

  18. United States Program for Technical assistance to IAEA Standards. Concept Paper: Knowledge Acquisition, Skills training for enhanced IAEA safeguards inspections

    SciTech Connect

    Morris, F.A.; Toquam, J.L.

    1993-11-01

    This concept paper explores the potential contribution of ``Knowledge Acquisition Skills`` in enhancing the effectiveness of international safeguards inspections by the International Atomic energy Agency (IAEA, or Agency) and identifies types of training that could be provided to develop or improve such skills. For purposes of this concept paper, Knowledge Acquisition Skills are defined broadly to include all appropriate techniques that IAEA safeguards inspectors can use to acquire and analyze information relevant to the performance of successful safeguards inspections. These techniques include a range of cognitive, analytic, judgmental, interpersonal, and communications skills that have the potential to help IAEA safeguards inspectors function more effectively.

  19. Internally insulated thermal storage system development program

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Scott, O. L.

    1980-01-01

    A cost effective thermal storage system for a solar central receiver power system using molten salt stored in internally insulated carbon steel tanks is described. Factors discussed include: testing of internal insulation materials in molten salt; preliminary design of storage tanks, including insulation and liner installation; optimization of the storage configuration; and definition of a subsystem research experiment to demonstrate the system. A thermal analytical model and analysis of a thermocline tank was performed. Data from a present thermocline test tank was compared to gain confidence in the analytical approach. A computer analysis of the various storage system parameters (insulation thickness, number of tanks, tank geometry, etc.,) showed that (1) the most cost-effective configuration was a small number of large cylindrical tanks, and (2) the optimum is set by the mechanical constraints of the system, such as soil bearing strength and tank hoop stress, not by the economics.

  20. New challenges in adolescent safeguarding.

    PubMed

    James, David R; Sargant, Nwanneka N; Bostock, Nancy; Khadr, Sophie

    2017-02-01

    The environment in which young people are growing up has changed significantly with the growth in social communication, changes in migration patterns and the proliferation of gangs. These changes pose a real and present danger to the health and well-being of young people in the UK and around the world. However, recognition of the safeguarding needs for this group continues to lag behind those of younger children and services often remain patchy and incomplete. We present a review of current safeguarding concerns as well as practical suggestions on their recognition and response for professionals working with young people in all branches of healthcare as well as education and wider society.

  1. Fuzzy risk analysis for nuclear safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Zardecki, A.

    1993-01-01

    Analysis of a safeguards system, based on the notion of fuzzy sets and linguistic variables, concerns such as complexity and inherent imprecision in estimating the possibility of loss or compromise. The automated risk analysis allows the risk to be determined for an entire system based on estimates for lowest level components and the component proportion. In addition, for each component (asset) the most effective combination of protection mechanisms against a given set of threats is determined. A distinction between bar and featured risk is made.

  2. Remote instrumentation and safeguards monitoring for the star project

    SciTech Connect

    Buettner, H M; Labiak, W; Spiridon, A

    2000-06-15

    A part of the Nuclear Energy Research Initiative (NERI) is the development of the Small Transportable Autonomous Reactor (STAR) for deployment in countries that do not have a nuclear industry. STARs would have an output of from 100 to 150 MW electric, would be fueled in the country of manufacture, and after 15 to 20 years of operation the reactor core would be returned to the country of manufacture for refueling. A candidate STAR design can be found in (Greenspan, 2000). This paper describes the design of the control and monitoring system that might be used. There are two unique features to this system. One is that the monitored information will be transmitted to a remote site for two purposes, safeguards, and allowing experts a great distance away direct access to view the reactor's operating parameters. The second feature is safeguards sensors will be designed into the system and there will monitoring of the safeguards aspects of the system for tampering. Any safeguards anomalies will be sent to the remote site as alarms. Encrypted satellite communications will be used to transmit the data. These features allow the STAR to be operated by a small staff and will reduce the costs of safeguards monitoring by reducing the number of plant visits by inspectors.

  3. EURATOM safeguards efforts in the development of spent fuel verification methods by non-destructive assay

    SciTech Connect

    Matloch, L.; Vaccaro, S.; Couland, M.; De Baere, P.; Schwalbach, P.

    2015-07-01

    The back end of the nuclear fuel cycle continues to develop. The European Commission, particularly the Nuclear Safeguards Directorate of the Directorate General for Energy, implements Euratom safeguards and needs to adapt to this situation. The verification methods for spent nuclear fuel, which EURATOM inspectors can use, require continuous improvement. Whereas the Euratom on-site laboratories provide accurate verification results for fuel undergoing reprocessing, the situation is different for spent fuel which is destined for final storage. In particular, new needs arise from the increasing number of cask loadings for interim dry storage and the advanced plans for the construction of encapsulation plants and geological repositories. Various scenarios present verification challenges. In this context, EURATOM Safeguards, often in cooperation with other stakeholders, is committed to further improvement of NDA methods for spent fuel verification. In this effort EURATOM plays various roles, ranging from definition of inspection needs to direct participation in development of measurement systems, including support of research in the framework of international agreements and via the EC Support Program to the IAEA. This paper presents recent progress in selected NDA methods. These methods have been conceived to satisfy different spent fuel verification needs, ranging from attribute testing to pin-level partial defect verification. (authors)

  4. 77 FR 37804 - Rules for Investigations Relating to Global and Bilateral Safeguard Actions, Market Disruption...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2012-06-25

    ..., Market Disruption, Trade Diversion, and Review of Relief Actions AGENCY: United States International...) governing investigations relating to global and bilateral safeguard actions, market disruption, trade...--INVESTIGATIONS RELATING TO GLOBAL AND BILATERAL SAFEGUARG ACTIONS, MARKET DISRUPTION, TRADE DIVERSION, AND...

  5. 78 FR 2295 - Consideration of Approval of Application Containing Sensitive Unclassified Non-Safeguards...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2013-01-10

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office ] NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Consideration of Approval of Application Containing Sensitive Unclassified Non-Safeguards Information Regarding Proposed Energy Future Holdings Corporation Internal Restructuring AGENCY:...

  6. NFC Internal: An Indoor Navigation System

    PubMed Central

    Ozdenizci, Busra; Coskun, Vedat; Ok, Kerem

    2015-01-01

    Indoor navigation systems have recently become a popular research field due to the lack of GPS signals indoors. Several indoors navigation systems have already been proposed in order to eliminate deficiencies; however each of them has several technical and usability limitations. In this study, we propose NFC Internal, a Near Field Communication (NFC)-based indoor navigation system, which enables users to navigate through a building or a complex by enabling a simple location update, simply by touching NFC tags those are spread around and orient users to the destination. In this paper, we initially present the system requirements, give the design details and study the viability of NFC Internal with a prototype application and a case study. Moreover, we evaluate the performance of the system and compare it with existing indoor navigation systems. It is seen that NFC Internal has considerable advantages and significant contributions to existing indoor navigation systems in terms of security and privacy, cost, performance, robustness, complexity, user preference and commercial availability. PMID:25825976

  7. NFC internal: an indoor navigation system.

    PubMed

    Ozdenizci, Busra; Coskun, Vedat; Ok, Kerem

    2015-03-27

    Indoor navigation systems have recently become a popular research field due to the lack of GPS signals indoors. Several indoors navigation systems have already been proposed in order to eliminate deficiencies; however each of them has several technical and usability limitations. In this study, we propose NFC Internal, a Near Field Communication (NFC)-based indoor navigation system, which enables users to navigate through a building or a complex by enabling a simple location update, simply by touching NFC tags those are spread around and orient users to the destination. In this paper, we initially present the system requirements, give the design details and study the viability of NFC Internal with a prototype application and a case study. Moreover, we evaluate the performance of the system and compare it with existing indoor navigation systems. It is seen that NFC Internal has considerable advantages and significant contributions to existing indoor navigation systems in terms of security and privacy, cost, performance, robustness, complexity, user preference and commercial availability.

  8. Veggie System on International Space Station

    NASA Image and Video Library

    2017-04-03

    Charles Spern, project manager on the Engineering Services Contract, communicates instructions for the Veggie system to astronaut Peggy Whitson aboard the International Space Station during the initiation of the second Chinese cabbage to be grown aboard the orbiting laboratory on April 3, 2017.

  9. Synchronization of extended systems from internal coherence

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Duane, Gregory S.

    2009-07-01

    A condition for the synchronizability of a pair of extended systems governed by partial differential equations (PDEs), coupled through a finite set of variables, is commonly the existence of internal synchronization or internal coherence in each system separately. The condition was previously illustrated in a forced-dissipative system and is here extended to Hamiltonian systems using an example from particle physics. Full synchronization is precluded by Liouville’s theorem. A form of synchronization weaker than “measure synchronization” is manifest as the positional coincidence of coherent oscillations (“breathers” or “oscillons”) in a pair of coupled scalar field models in an expanding universe with a nonlinear potential, and does not occur with a variant of the model that does not exhibit oscillons.

  10. [Safeguarding herds from the animal hygiene point of view].

    PubMed

    Hartung, J

    2005-08-01

    One of the most important concepts for the protection of herd health is the implementation of structural and organisational measures to prevent infective agents and other adverse compounds from entering the farm. Safeguarding health, well-being and production efficiency is part of the overall management concept of hygiene in animal production systems. This paper presents an overview of the most important rules and recommendations to protect livestock production facilities from the intrusion of infectious pathogens, beginning with the right choice of the site for the farm and the animal housing ("safe distances" to neighbouring farm animal houses), solid fencing and control and disinfecting places at the entrance gate. The traffic of vehicles and people transporting animals, feedstuff, equipment and slurry or manure to and from the facility should be reduced to a minimum. Fallen animals should be stored in separate and safe containers until removed by specialised companies. Regular control of rodents, insects and wild birds is crucial to avoid the transfer of infectious agents from farm to farm and between herds within a farm. Equally important factors are the health status of personnel to avoid transmission of zoonotic diseases, the application of the all-in-all-out system and a strict cleaning and disinfecting regime. The internal and external organisational measures for preventing the spread of infections in animal production will gain increasing importance in the future because the farm animal producer bears the responsibility for the production of safe and healthy food at the primary segment of the food chain. Increasing restrictions on the use of veterinary drugs for food delivering animals will increase the importance of prophylaxis, prevention and protection of production units as the keys for safeguarding health, well-being and efficiency of farm animals. Only the application of strict hygiene principles in animal production will make it possible to meet

  11. Sensitivity of complex, internally coupled systems

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Sobieszczanski-Sobieski, Jaroslaw

    1990-01-01

    A method is presented for computing sensitivity derivatives with respect to independent (input) variables for complex, internally coupled systems, while avoiding the cost and inaccuracy of finite differencing performed on the entire system analysis. The method entails two alternative algorithms: the first is based on the classical implicit function theorem formulated on residuals of governing equations, and the second develops the system sensitivity equations in a new form using the partial (local) sensitivity derivatives of the output with respect to the input of each part of the system. A few application examples are presented to illustrate the discussion.

  12. Assessment of Critical Mass Laboratory safeguards and security upgrades

    SciTech Connect

    Merrill, B.J.; DeMyer, J.J.

    1985-05-31

    Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) conducted an evaluation of the safeguards and security systems at the Critical Mass Laboratory (CML) in February 1985, to identify appropriate upgrading actions necessary to ensure that effective and efficient systems consistent with DOE-RL policies, procedures, and site priorities are in place. Since that evaluation, there have been changes in Patrol contingency philosophy, response tactics, and distribution of manpower. Because of these changes, and at the request of DOE-RL, PNL has re-evaluated the safeguards and security systems in place at CML.

  13. A colalborative environment for information driven safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Scott, Mark R; Michel, Kelly D

    2010-09-15

    For two decades, the IAEA has recognized the need for a comprehensive and strongly integrated Knowledge Management system to support its Information Driven Safeguards activities. In the past, plans for the development of such a system have progressed slowly due to concerns over costs and feasibility. In recent years, Los Alamos National Laboratory has developed a knowledge management system that could serve as the basis for an IAEA Collaborative Environment (ICE). The ICE derivative knowledge management system described in this paper addresses the challenge of living in an era of information overload coupled with certain knowledge shortfalls. The paper describes and defines a system that is flexible, yet ensures coordinated and focused collaboration, broad data evaluation capabilities, architected and organized work flows, and improved communications. The paper and demonstration of ICE will utilize a hypothetical scenario to highlight the functional features that facilitate collaboration amongst and between information analysts and inspectors. The scenario will place these two groups into a simulated planning exercise for a safeguards inspection drawing upon past data acquisitions, inspection reports, analyst conclusions, and a coordinated walk-through of a 3-D model of the facility. Subsequent to the conduct of the simulated facility inspection, the detection of an anomaly and pursuit of follow up activities will illustrate the event notification, information sharing, and collaborative capabilities of the system. The use of a collaborative environment such as ICE to fulfill the complicated knowledge management demands of the Agency and facilitate the completion of annual State Evaluation Reports will also be addressed.

  14. Integrated safeguards & security for material protection, accounting, and control.

    SciTech Connect

    Duran, Felicia Angelica; Cipiti, Benjamin B.

    2009-10-01

    Traditional safeguards and security design for fuel cycle facilities is done separately and after the facility design is near completion. This can result in higher costs due to retrofits and redundant use of data. Future facilities will incorporate safeguards and security early in the design process and integrate the systems to make better use of plant data and strengthen both systems. The purpose of this project was to evaluate the integration of materials control and accounting (MC&A) measurements with physical security design for a nuclear reprocessing plant. Locations throughout the plant where data overlap occurs or where MC&A data could be a benefit were identified. This mapping is presented along with the methodology for including the additional data in existing probabilistic assessments to evaluate safeguards and security systems designs.

  15. Application of Telepresence Technologies to Nuclear Material Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Wright, M.C.; Rome, J.A.

    1999-09-20

    Implementation of remote monitoring systems has become a priority area for the International Atomic Energy Agency and other international inspection regimes. For the past three years, DOE2000 has been the US Department of Energy's (DOE's) initiative to develop innovative applications to exploit the capabilities of broadband networks and media integration. The aim is to enhance scientific collaboration by merging computing and communications technologies. These Internet-based telepresence technologies could be easily extended to provide remote monitoring and control for confidence building and transparency systems at nuclear facilities around the world. One of the original DOE2000 projects, the Materials Microcharacterization Collaboratory is an interactive virtual laboratory, linking seven DOE user facilities located across the US. At these facilities, external collaborators have access to scientists, data, and instrumentation, all of which are available to varying degrees using the Internet. Remote operation of the instruments varies between passive (observational) to active (direct control), in many cases requiring no software at the remote site beyond a Web browser. Live video streams are continuously available on the Web so that participants can see what is happening at a particular location. An X.509 certificate system provides strong authentication, The hardware and software are commercially available and are easily adaptable to safeguards applications.

  16. International remote monitoring project Argentina Nuclear Power Station Spent Fuel Transfer Remote Monitoring System

    SciTech Connect

    Schneider, S.; Lucero, R.; Glidewell, D.

    1997-08-01

    The Autoridad Regulataria Nuclear (ARN) and the United States Department of Energy (DOE) are cooperating on the development of a Remote Monitoring System for nuclear nonproliferation efforts. A Remote Monitoring System for spent fuel transfer will be installed at the Argentina Nuclear Power Station in Embalse, Argentina. The system has been designed by Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), with Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) providing gamma and neutron sensors. This project will test and evaluate the fundamental design and implementation of the Remote Monitoring System in its application to regional and international safeguards efficiency. This paper provides a description of the monitoring system and its functions. The Remote Monitoring System consists of gamma and neutron radiation sensors, RF systems, and video systems integrated into a coherent functioning whole. All sensor data communicate over an Echelon LonWorks Network to a single data logger. The Neumann DCM 14 video module is integrated into the Remote Monitoring System. All sensor and image data are stored on a Data Acquisition System (DAS) and archived and reviewed on a Data and Image Review Station (DIRS). Conventional phone lines are used as the telecommunications link to transmit on-site collected data and images to remote locations. The data and images are authenticated before transmission. Data review stations will be installed at ARN in Buenos Aires, Argentina, ABACC in Rio De Janeiro, IAEA Headquarters in Vienna, and Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, New Mexico. 2 refs., 2 figs.

  17. Integrating Diverse Data Systems for International Collaboration

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Fox, Peter

    2014-05-01

    International collaborations, especially ones that arise with little or no financial resources, still face challenges in opening up data collections via a wide variety of differing and often non-interoperable means. In turn, this hampers the collaborative process, slows or even prevents scientific exchange. Early efforts that proposed a centralized, and project specific data archive encountered many difficulties, ranging from little or no adoption, to the inability to provide required documentation and metadata to make the datasets findable or usable. In time, virtualized approaches appeared to gain traction, for e.g. virtual observatories. In this contribution, we report on several international collaboration case studies with distributed data systems; their needs, successes, challenges and failures and synthesize a set of suggested practices to inform future international collaboration efforts.

  18. Improving the Internal Accounting Controls of Educational Institutions.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Apostolou, Nicholas G.; And Others

    1986-01-01

    Accounting controls are primarily concerned with methods and procedures that safeguard an entity's assets and ensure the reliability of its financial records. This article discusses internal control objectives as applied to educational institutions, outlines specific steps necessary to develop an effective internal control system, and mentions…

  19. Valve control system for internal combustion engines

    SciTech Connect

    Kaptur, S.J.

    1989-10-24

    This patent describes a valve control system for an internal combustion engine. The system comprising a primary control and a secondary control for modifying the operation of the primary control. The primary control comprising: a camshaft journaled for rotation in camshaft brackets, intake and exhaust cylindrical cams including cam channels; valve pin means; and timing belt means. The secondary system comprising: control plate means adjustably mounted between the cylindrical cams, rocker arm means; and at least one driver positioned between the driver leg and one of cylindrical cams.

  20. The US Support program to IAEA Safeguards - 2008

    SciTech Connect

    Pepper,S.

    2008-06-09

    The U.S. Support Program to IAEA Safeguards (USSP) was established in 1977 to provide technical assistance to the IAEA Department of Safeguards. Since that time the U.S. Department of State has provided funding of over $200 million and over 900 tasks have been completed by USSP contractors on behalf of the KEA. The USSP is directed by a U.S. interagency subcommittee known as the Subgroup on Safeguards Technical Support (SSTS) and is managed by the International Safeguards Project Office (ISPO) at Brookhaven National Laboratory. In recent years, the SSTS and ISPO have identified priorities to guide the process of determining which IAEA requests are aligned with US. policy and will be funded. The USSP priorities are reviewed and updated prior to the USSP Annual Review Meeting which is hosted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) each spring in Vienna, Austria. This paper will report on the 2008 USSP priorities and be an introduction for a session which will consist of four papers on USSP priorities and four other papers related to USSP activities.

  1. Improving Transparency in the Reporting of Safeguards Implementation: FY11 Update

    SciTech Connect

    Toomey, Christopher; Odlaug, Christopher S.; Wyse, Evan T.

    2011-09-30

    In 2008, the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI) indicated that the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR) has not kept pace with the evolution of safeguards and provided the IAEA with a set of recommendations for improvement. The SIR is the primary mechanism for providing an overview of safeguards implementation in a given year and reporting on the annual safeguards findings and conclusions drawn by the Secretariat. As the IAEA transitions to State-level safeguards approaches, SIR reporting must adapt to reflect these evolutionary changes. This evolved report will better reflect the IAEA's transition to a more qualitative and information-driven approach, based upon State-as-a-whole considerations. This paper applies SAGSI's recommendations to the development of multiple models for an evolved SIR and finds that an SIR repurposed as a 'safeguards portal' could significantly enhance information delivery, clarity, and transparency. In addition, this paper finds that the 'portal concept' also appears to have value as a standardized information presentation and analysis platform for use by Country Officers, for continuity of knowledge purposes, and the IAEA Secretariat in the safeguards conclusion process. Accompanying this paper is a fully functional prototype of the 'portal' concept, built using commercial software and IAEA Annual Report data and available for viewing at http://safeguardsportal.pnnl.gov.

  2. Global Survey of the Concepts and Understanding of the Interfaces Between Nuclear Safety, Security, and Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Kovacic, Don N.; Stewart, Scott; Erickson, Alexa R.; Ford, Kerrie D.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2015-07-15

    There is increasing global discourse on how the elements of nuclear safety, security, and safeguards can be most effectively implemented in nuclear power programs. While each element is separate and unique, they must nevertheless all be addressed in a country’s laws and implemented via regulations and in facility operations. This topic is of particular interest to countries that are currently developing the infrastructure to support nuclear power programs. These countries want to better understand what is required by these elements and how they can manage the interfaces between them and take advantages of any synergies that may exist. They need practical examples and guidance in this area in order to develop better organizational strategies and technical capacities. This could simplify their legal, regulatory, and management structures and avoid inefficient approaches and costly mistakes that may not be apparent to them at this early stage of development. From the perspective of IAEA International Safeguards, supporting Member States in exploring such interfaces and synergies provides a benefit to them because it acknowledges that domestic safeguards in a country do not exist in a vacuum. Instead, it relies on a strong State System of Accounting and Control that is in turn dependent on a capable and independent regulatory body as well as a competent operator and technical staff. These organizations must account for and control nuclear material, communicate effectively, and manage and transmit complete and correct information to the IAEA in a timely manner. This, while in most cases also being responsible for the safety and security of their facilities. Seeking efficiencies in this process benefits international safeguards and nonproliferation. This paper will present the results of a global survey of current and anticipated approaches and practices by countries and organizations with current or future nuclear power programs on how they are implementing, or

  3. INSTITUTIONALIZING SAFEGUARDS-BY-DESIGN: HIGH-LEVEL FRAMEWORK

    SciTech Connect

    Trond Bjornard PhD; Joseph Alexander; Robert Bean; Brian Castle; Scott DeMuth, Ph.D.; Phillip Durst; Michael Ehinger; Prof. Michael Golay, Ph.D.; Kevin Hase, Ph.D.; David J. Hebditch, DPhil; John Hockert, Ph.D.; Bruce Meppen; James Morgan; Jerry Phillips, Ph.D., PE

    2009-02-01

    The application of a Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process for new nuclear facilities can reduce proliferation risks. A multi-laboratory team was sponsored in Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 to define a SBD process and determine how it could be incorporated into existing facility design and construction processes. The possibility to significantly influence major design features, such as process selection and plant layout, largely ends with the conceptual design step. Therefore SBD’s principal focus must be on the early inclusion of safeguards requirements and the early identification of beneficial design features. The result could help form the basis for a new international norm for integrating safeguards into facility design. This is an interim report describing progress and project status as of the end of FY08. In this effort, SBD is defined as a structured approach to ensure the timely, efficient, and cost-effective integration of international and national safeguards, physical security, and other nonproliferation objectives into the overall design process for a nuclear facility. A key objective is to ensure that security and nonproliferation issues are considered when weighing facility design alternatives. Central to the work completed in FY08 was a study in which a SBD process was developed in the context of the current DOE facility acquisition process. The DOE study enabled the development of a “SBD design loop” that is suitable for use in any facility design process. It is a graded, iterative process that incorporates safeguards concerns throughout the conceptual, preliminary and final design processes. Additionally, a set of proposed design principles for SBD was developed. A “Generic SBD Process” was then developed. Key features of the process include the initiation of safeguards design activities in the pre-conceptual planning phase, early incorporation of safeguards requirements into the project requirements, early appointment of an SBD team, and

  4. Liverpool's healthcare future safeguarded.

    PubMed

    Lewis, David

    2014-03-01

    David Lewis, Principal and design lead for the London studio of international design and architecture firm, NBBJ, and part of the Carillion consortium designing the new Royal Liverpool University Hospital with HKS for The Royal Liverpool and Broadgreen University Hospitals NHS Trust, describes how the masterplan will seek to more clearly define the urban space of the street, restore public access to the centre of the site, and 'knit' the hospital more fully into fabric of Liverpool than is the case with the current, 1970s-built, Royal Liverpool University Hospital.

  5. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory safeguards and security quarterly progress report to the US Department of Energy. Quarter ending June 30, 1996

    SciTech Connect

    Davis, B.; Davis, G.; Johnson, D; Mansur, D.L.; Ruhter, W.D.; Strait, R.S.

    1996-07-01

    LLNL carries out safeguards and security activities for DOE Office of Safeguards and Security (OSS) and other organizations, both within and outside DOE. This document summarizes activities conducted for OSS during this quarter. LLNL is supporting OSS in six areas: safeguards technology, safeguards and materials accountability, computer security/distributed system, complex-wide access control, standardization of security systems, and information technology & security center. This document describes the activities in each of these six areas.

  6. A Physical Protection Systems Test Bed for International Counter-Trafficking System Development

    SciTech Connect

    Stinson, Brad J; Kuhn, Michael J; Donaldson, Terrence L; Richardson, Dave; Rowe, Nathan C; Younkin, James R; Pickett, Chris A

    2011-01-01

    Physical protection systems have a widespread impact on the nuclear industry in areas such as nuclear safeguards, arms control, and trafficking of illicit goods (e.g., nuclear materials) across international borders around the world. Many challenges must be overcome in design and deployment of foreign border security systems such as lack of infrastructure, extreme environmental conditions, limited knowledge of terrain, insider threats, and occasional cultural resistance. Successful security systems, whether it be a system designed to secure a single facility or a whole border security system, rely on the entire integrated system composed of multiple subsystems. This test bed is composed of many unique sensors and subsystems, including wireless unattended ground sensors, a buried fiber-optic acoustic sensor, a lossy coaxial distributed sensor, wireless links, pan-tilt-zoom cameras, mobile power generation systems, unmanned aerial vehicles, and fiber-optic-fence intrusion detection systems. A Common Operating Picture software architecture is utilized to integrate a number of these subsystems. We are currently performance testing each system for border security and perimeter security applications by examining metrics such as probability of sense and a qualitative understanding of the sensor s vulnerability of defeat. The testing process includes different soil conditions for buried sensors (e.g., dry, wet, and frozen) and an array of different tests including walking, running, stealth detection, and vehicle detection. Also, long term sustainability of systems is tested including performance differences due to seasonal variations (e.g. summer versus winter, while raining, in foggy conditions). The capabilities of the test bed are discussed. Performance testing results, both at the individual component level and integrated into a larger system for a specific deployment (in situ), help illustrate the usefulness and need for integrated testing facilities to carry out this

  7. Promoting global safeguards cooperation: Argentine-U.S. technical achievements

    SciTech Connect

    Owens, L.; Smith, C.

    1996-04-01

    The bilateral ENREN (Argentina National Nuclear Regulatory Board)-DOE Safeguards Agreement was signed by Dr. Dan Beninson, ENREN, and Dr. Kenneth Baker, DOE, at the Peaceful Uses Conference in Bariloche in 1994. Two major activities identified for immediate cooperation were: nondestructive assay (NDA) techniques for Pilcaniyeu, and advanced containment and surveillance at Embalse. Both of these are discussed here. While the activities of the past year and a half are significant, many more opportunities remain for valuable cooperative partnering to discover more effective and efficient ways to apply safeguards. Several that have been identified by ENREN and DOE for 1996 are: (1) environmental monitoring as a safeguards technique; (2) Pilcaniyeu measurement studies and joint IAEA support program activities; (3) information management and analysis tools; (4) safeguards analytical laboratory support; (5) study of the safeguards approach for Embalse; (6) expansion of the remote monitoring system at Embalse; (7) use of ground-penetrating radar technology at Embalse; and (8) computerized material control and accounting tools for Pilcaniyeu.

  8. Visualizing Safeguards: Software for Conceptualizing and Communicating Safeguards Data

    SciTech Connect

    Gallucci, N.

    2015-07-12

    The nuclear programs of states are complex and varied, comprising a wide range of fuel cycles and facilities. Also varied are the types and terms of states’ safeguards agreements with the IAEA, each placing different limits on the inspectorate’s access to these facilities. Such nuances make it difficult to draw policy significance from the ground-level nuclear activities of states, or to attribute ground-level outcomes to the implementation of specific policies or initiatives. While acquiring a firm understanding of these relationships is critical to evaluating and formulating effective policy, doing so requires collecting and synthesizing large bodies of information. Maintaining a comprehensive working knowledge of the facilities comprising even a single state’s nuclear program poses a challenge, yet marrying this information with relevant safeguards and verification information is more challenging still. To facilitate this task, Brookhaven National Laboratory has developed a means of capturing the development, operation, and safeguards history of all the facilities comprising a state’s nuclear program in a single graphic. The resulting visualization offers a useful reference tool to policymakers and analysts alike, providing a chronology of states’ nuclear development and an easily digestible history of verification activities across their fuel cycles.

  9. 48 CFR 14.401 - Receipt and safeguarding of bids.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2012-10-01 2012-10-01 false Receipt and safeguarding of bids. 14.401 Section 14.401 Federal Acquisition Regulations System FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES SEALED BIDDING Opening of Bids and Award of Contract 14.401 Receipt and...

  10. 48 CFR 14.401 - Receipt and safeguarding of bids.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Receipt and safeguarding of bids. 14.401 Section 14.401 Federal Acquisition Regulations System FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES SEALED BIDDING Opening of Bids and Award of Contract 14.401 Receipt and...

  11. 48 CFR 14.401 - Receipt and safeguarding of bids.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2014-10-01 2014-10-01 false Receipt and safeguarding of bids. 14.401 Section 14.401 Federal Acquisition Regulations System FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES SEALED BIDDING Opening of Bids and Award of Contract 14.401 Receipt and...

  12. 48 CFR 14.401 - Receipt and safeguarding of bids.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2013-10-01 2013-10-01 false Receipt and safeguarding of bids. 14.401 Section 14.401 Federal Acquisition Regulations System FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES SEALED BIDDING Opening of Bids and Award of Contract 14.401 Receipt and...

  13. 48 CFR 14.401 - Receipt and safeguarding of bids.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Receipt and safeguarding of bids. 14.401 Section 14.401 Federal Acquisition Regulations System FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES SEALED BIDDING Opening of Bids and Award of Contract 14.401 Receipt and...

  14. A Simple Candle Filter Safeguard Device

    SciTech Connect

    Hurley, J.P.; Henderson, A.K.; Swanson, M.L.

    2002-09-18

    In order to reach the highest possible efficiencies in a coal-fired turbine-based power system, the turbine should be directly fired with the products of coal utilization. Two main designs employ these turbines: those based on pressurized fluidized-bed combustors (PFBCs) and those based on integrated gasification combined cycles (IGCCs). In both designs, the suspended particulates, or dust, must be cleaned from the gas before it enters the turbine to prevent fouling and erosion of the blades. To produce the cleanest gas, barrier filters are being developed and are in commercial use. Barrier filters are composed of porous, high-temperature materials that allow the hot gas to pass but collect the dust on the surface. The three main configurations are candle, cross-flow, and tube. Both candle and tube filters have been tested extensively. They are primarily composed of coarsely porous ceramic that serves as a structural support, overlain with a thin, microporous ceramic layer o n the dirty gas side that serves as the primary filter surface. They are highly efficient at removing particulate matter from the gas stream and, because of their ceramic construction, are resistant to gas and ash corrosion. However, ceramics are brittle, and individual elements can fail, allowing the particulates to pass through the hole left by the filter element and erode the turbine. Because of the possibility of occasional filter breakage, safeguard devices (SGDs) must be employed to prevent the dust streaming through broken filters from reaching the turbine. The Energy & Environmental Research Center (EERC) safeguard device is composed of three main parts: the ceramic substrate, the adhesive coating, and the safeguard device housing. This report describes the development and laboratory testing of each of those parts as well as the bench-scale performance of both types of complete SGDs.

  15. Safeguards and security modeling for electrochemical plants

    SciTech Connect

    Cipiti, B.B.; Duran, F.A.; Mendoza, L.A.; Parks, M.J.; Dominguez, D.; Le, T.D.

    2013-07-01

    Safeguards and security design for reprocessing plants can lead to excessive costs if not incorporated early in the design process. The design for electrochemical plants is somewhat uncertain since these plants have not been built at a commercial scale in the past. The Separation and Safeguards Performance Model (SSPM), developed at Sandia National Laboratories, has been used for safeguards design and evaluation for multiple reprocessing plant types. The SSPM includes the following capabilities: -) spent fuel source term library, -) mass tracking of elements 1-99 and bulk solid/liquids, -) tracking of heat load and activity, -) customisable measurement points, -) automated calculation of ID and error propagation, -) alarm conditions and statistical tests, and -) user-defined diversion scenarios. Materials accountancy and process monitoring data can provide more timely detection of material loss specifically to protect against the insider threat. While the SSPM is capable of determining detection probabilities and examining detection times for material loss scenarios, it does not model the operations or spatial effects for a plant design. The STAGE software was chosen to model the physical protection system. STAGE provides a framework to create end-to-end scalable force-on-force combat simulations. It allows for a complete 3D model of a facility to be designed along with the design of physical protection elements. This software, then, can be used to model operations and response for various material loss scenarios. The future integration of the SSPM model data with the STAGE software will provide a more complete analysis of diversion scenarios to assist plant designers.

  16. The evolution of the international refugee system.

    PubMed

    Gallagher, D

    1989-01-01

    This article examines the evolution of the current international system for responding to refugee problems and the climate within which the legal and institutional framework has developed. It reviews the background and handling of some of the key refugee movements since World War II and traces the legal and institutional adjustments that have been made to deal with new refugee movements that have occurred predominantly, but not exclusively, in the developing world. Finally, it assesses the adequacy of the present system to meet the challenges ahead.

  17. GRIN-Global: An International Project to Develop a Global Plant Genebank and Information Management System

    USDA-ARS?s Scientific Manuscript database

    The mission of the GRIN-Global Project is to create a new, scalable version of the Germplasm Resource Information System (GRIN) to provide the world’s crop genebanks with a powerful, flexible, easy-to-use plant genetic resource (PGR) information management system. The system will help safeguard PGR ...

  18. GRIN-Global: An International Project to Develop a Global Plant Genebank and Information Management System

    USDA-ARS?s Scientific Manuscript database

    The mission of the GRIN-Global Project is to create a new, scalable version of the Germplasm Resource Information System (GRIN) to provide the world's crop genebanks with a powerful, flexible, easy-to-use plant genetic resource (PGR) information management system. The system will help safeguard PGR ...

  19. GRIN-Global: An International Project to Develop a Global Plant Genebank Information Management System

    USDA-ARS?s Scientific Manuscript database

    The mission of the GRIN-Global Project is to create a new, scalable version of the Germplasm Resource Information System (GRIN) to provide the world’s crop genebanks with a powerful, flexible, easy-to-use plant genetic resource (PGR) information management system. The system will help safeguard PGR ...

  20. GRIN-Global: An International Project to Develop a Global Plant Genebank and Information Management System

    USDA-ARS?s Scientific Manuscript database

    The mission of the GRIN-Global Project is to create a new, scalable version of the Germplasm Resource Information System (GRIN) to provide the world's crop genebanks with a powerful, flexible, easy-to-use plant genetic resource (PGR) information management system. The system will help safeguard PGR ...

  1. GRIN-Global: An International Project to Develop a Global Plant Genebank and Information Management System

    USDA-ARS?s Scientific Manuscript database

    The mission of the GRIN-Global Project is to create a new, scalable version of the Germplasm Resource Information System (GRIN) to provide the world’s crop genebanks with a powerful, flexible, easy-to-use plant genetic resource (PGR) information management system. The system will help safeguard PGR...

  2. Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence for Safeguards Applications

    SciTech Connect

    Ludewigt, Bernhard A; Quiter, Brian J; Ambers, Scott D

    2011-02-04

    In nuclear resonance fluorescence (NRF) measurements, resonances are excited by an external photon beam leading to the emission of {gamma} rays with specific energies that are characteristic of the emitting isotope. The promise of NRF as a non-destructive analysis technique (NDA) in safeguards applications lies in its potential to directly quantify a specific isotope in an assay target without the need for unfolding the combined responses of several fissile isotopes as often required by other NDA methods. The use of NRF for detection of sensitive nuclear materials and other contraband has been researched in the past. In the safeguards applications considered here one has to go beyond mere detection and precisely quantify the isotopic content, a challenge that is discussed throughout this report. Basic NRF measurement methods, instrumentation, and the analytical calculation of NRF signal strengths are described in Section 2. Well understood modeling and simulation tools are needed for assessing the potential of NRF for safeguards and for designing measurement systems. All our simulations were performed with the radiation transport code MCNPX, a code that is widely used in the safeguards community. Our initial studies showed that MCNPX grossly underestimated the elastically scattered background at backwards angles due to an incorrect treatment of Rayleigh scattering. While new, corrected calculations based on ENDF form factors showed much better agreement with experimental data for the elastic scattering of photons on an uranium target, the elastic backscatter is still not rigorously treated. Photonuclear scattering processes (nuclear Thomson, Delbruck and Giant Dipole Resonance scattering), which are expected to play an important role at higher energies, are not yet included. These missing elastic scattering contributions were studied and their importance evaluated evaluated against data found in the literature as discussed in Section 3. A transmission experiment

  3. Future challenges and DOE/NNSA-JAEA cooperation for the development of advanced safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Stevens, Rebecca S; Mc Clelland - Kerr, John; Senzaki, Masao; Hori, Masato

    2009-01-01

    The United States Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) has been cooperating with Japan on nuclear safeguards for over thirty years. DOE/NNSA has collaborated with the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) and its predecessors in addressing the need for innovative solutions to nuclear transparency and verification issues in one of the world's most advanced nuclear fuel cycle states. This collaboration includes over ninety activities that have involved nearly every facility in the JAEA complex and many national laboratories in the U.S. complex. The partnership has yielded new technologies and approaches that have benefited international safeguards not only in Japan, but around the world. The International Atomic Energy Agency uses a number of safeguards solutions developed under this collaboration to improve its inspection efforts in Japan and elsewhere. Japanese facilities serve as test beds for emerging safeguards technologies and are setting the trend for new nuclear energy and fuel cycle development worldwide. The collaboration continues to be an essential component of U.S. safeguards outreach and is integral to the DOE/NNSA's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative. In addition to fostering international safeguards development, the cooperation is an opportunity for U.S. scientists to work in facilities that have no analog in the United States, thus providing crucial real-life experience for and aiding development of the next generation of U.S. safeguards specialists. It is also an important element of promoting regional transparency thereby building confidence in the peaceful nature of nuclear programs in the region. The successes engendered by this partnership provide a strong basis for addressing future safeguards challenges, in Japan and elsewhere. This paper summarizes these challenges and the associated cooperative efforts that are either underway or anticipated.

  4. Multilayered genetic safeguards limit growth of microorganisms to defined environments

    PubMed Central

    Gallagher, Ryan R.; Patel, Jaymin R.; Interiano, Alexander L.; Rovner, Alexis J.; Isaacs, Farren J.

    2015-01-01

    Genetically modified organisms (GMOs) are commonly used to produce valuable compounds in closed industrial systems. However, their emerging applications in open clinical or environmental settings require enhanced safety and security measures. Intrinsic biocontainment, the creation of bacterial hosts unable to survive in natural environments, remains a major unsolved biosafety problem. We developed a new biocontainment strategy containing overlapping ‘safeguards’—engineered riboregulators that tightly control expression of essential genes, and an engineered addiction module based on nucleases that cleaves the host genome—to restrict viability of Escherichia coli cells to media containing exogenously supplied synthetic small molecules. These multilayered safeguards maintain robust growth in permissive conditions, eliminate persistence and limit escape frequencies to <1.3 × 10−12. The staged approach to safeguard implementation revealed mechanisms of escape and enabled strategies to overcome them. Our safeguarding strategy is modular and employs conserved mechanisms that could be extended to clinically or industrially relevant organisms and undomesticated species. PMID:25567985

  5. Intrusion detection capabilities of smart video: Collaborative efforts to improve remote monitoring for safeguards surveillance

    SciTech Connect

    Kadner, S.P.; Ondrik, M.; Reisman, A.

    1996-12-31

    Collaborative efforts between the International Projects Division (IPD) of the Department of Advanced Technology at Brookhaven National Laboratory, Aquila Technologies Group, Inc. (Aquila), and the General Physics Institute (GPI) in Moscow have developed object recognition technologies to provide real-time intrusion detection capabilities for Aquila`s GEMINI Digital Surveillance System. The research, development and testing for integrating enhanced surveillance capabilities into Aquila`s GEMINI system will receive support from the US Industry Coalition (USIC), an initiative funded by the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP), in the coming year. Oversight of the research and development effort is being provided by the IPD staff to ensure that the technical standards of safeguards systems for use by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are met. The scientific expertise at GPI is providing breakthroughs in the realm of motion detection for surveillance. Aquila`s contribution to the project focuses on the integration of authenticated digital camera technology for front-end detection. This project illustrates how the application of technology can increase efficiency and reliability of remote monitoring, as well as the timely detection of Safeguards-significant events.

  6. Environmental monitoring for nuclear safeguards. Background paper

    SciTech Connect

    1995-09-01

    To assure that states are not violating their Non-Proliferation Treaty commitments, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) must verify that states do not possess convert nuclear facilities-a mission that prior to the 1991 Gulf War, it had neither the political backing nor the resources to conduct. The IAEA recognizes the importance of this new mission and is in the process of assuming it. One of the tools it is exploring to provide some indication of the presence of secret, or undeclared, nuclear activities and facilities is environmental monitoring. Modern sampling and analysis technologies provide powerful tools to detect the presence of characteristic substances that are likely to be emitted by such illicit activities. This background paper examines the prospects for such technologies to improve nuclear safeguards. It concludes that environmental monitoring can greatly increase the ability to detect undeclared activity at declared, or known, sites, and it can significantly increase the chances of detecting and locating undeclared sites.

  7. Acoustic techniques in nuclear safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Olinger, C.T.; Sinha, D.N.

    1995-07-01

    Acoustic techniques can be employed to address many questions relevant to current nuclear technology needs. These include establishing and monitoring intrinsic tags and seals, locating holdup in areas where conventional radiation-based measurements have limited capability, process monitoring, monitoring containers for corrosion or changes in pressure, and facility design verification. These acoustics applications are in their infancy with respect to safeguards and nuclear material management, but proof-of-principle has been demonstrated in many of the areas listed.

  8. Working Toward Robust Process Monitoring for Safeguards Applications

    SciTech Connect

    Krichinsky, Alan M; Bell, Lisa S; Gilligan, Kimberly V; Laughter, Mark D; Miller, Paul; Pickett, Chris A; Richardson, Dave; Rowe, Nathan C; Younkin, James R

    2010-01-01

    New safeguards technologies allow continuous monitoring of plant processes. Efforts to deploy these technologies, as described in a preponderance of literature, typically have consisted of case studies attempting to prove their efficacy in proof-of-principle installations. While the enhanced safeguards capabilities of continuous monitoring have been established, studies thus far have not addressed such challenges as manipulation of a system by a host nation. To prevent this and other such vulnerabilities, one technology, continuous load cell monitoring, was reviewed. This paper will present vulnerabilities as well as mitigation strategies that were identified.

  9. Nuclear material control and accounting safeguards in the United States

    SciTech Connect

    Woltermann, H.A.; Rudy, C.R.; Rakel, D.A.; DeVer, E.A.

    1982-07-01

    Material control and accounting (MC and A) of special nuclear material (SNM) must supplement physical security to protect SNM from unlawful use such as terrorist activities. This article reviews MC and A safeguards of SNM in the United States. The following topics are covered: a brief perspective and history of MC and A safeguards, current MC and A practices, measurement methods for SNM, historical MC and A performance, a description of near-real-time MC and A systems, and conclusions on the status of MC and A in the United States.

  10. Safeguards Envelope Progress FY10

    SciTech Connect

    Richard Metcalf

    2010-10-01

    The Safeguards Envelope is a strategy to determine a set of specific operating parameters within which nuclear facilities may operate to maximize safeguards effectiveness without sacrificing safety or plant efficiency. This paper details the additions to the advanced operating techniques that will be applied to real plant process monitoring (PM) data from the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP). Research this year focused on combining disparate pieces of data together to maximize operating time with minimal downtime due to safeguards. A Chi-Square and Croiser's cumulative sum were both included as part of the new analysis. Because of a major issue with the original data, the implementation of the two new tests did not add to the existing set of tests, though limited one-variable optimization made a small increase in detection probability. Additional analysis was performed to determine if prior analysis would have caused a major security or safety operating envelope issue. It was determined that a safety issue would have resulted from the prior research, but that the security may have been increased under certain conditions.

  11. The International System of Units (SI)

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Taylor, Barry N.

    1991-08-01

    The booklet is the U.S. edition of the English language translation of the 6th edition of Le Systeme International d'Unites (SI), the definitive reference on the SI published in 1991 by the International Bureau of Weights and Measures (BIPM) in the French language. The U.S. edition conforms in substance with the English language translation that follows the French language text in the BIPM publication. To make the booklet helpful to the broadest community of users in the U.S., it was necessary to follow current Federal policy, to recognize present U.S. practices as they are found in the literature of the authors domestic voluntary standards organizations such as ASTM and IEEE, and to use American spelling of certain words.

  12. Nuclear material safeguards for enrichments plants: Part 4, Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant: Diversion scenarios and IAEA safeguards activities: Safeguards training course

    SciTech Connect

    Not Available

    1988-10-01

    This publication is Part 4 of a safeguards training course in Nuclear Material Safeguards for enrichment plants. This part of the course deals with diversion scenarios and safeguards activities at gas centrifuge enrichment plants.

  13. Preliminary Safeguards Assessment for the Pebble-Bed Fluoride High-Temperature Reactor (PB-FHR) Concept

    SciTech Connect

    Disser, Jay; Arthur, Edward; Lambert, Janine

    2016-09-01

    This report examines a preliminary design for a pebble bed fluoride salt-cooled high temperature reactor (PB-FHR) concept, assessing it from an international safeguards perspective. Safeguards features are defined, in a preliminary fashion, and suggestions are made for addressing further nuclear materials accountancy needs.

  14. Safeguards-by-Design: Guidance for Independent Spent Fuel Dry Storage Installations (ISFSI)

    SciTech Connect

    Trond Bjornard; Philip C. Durst

    2012-05-01

    This document summarizes the requirements and best practices for implementing international nuclear safeguards at independent spent fuel storage installations (ISFSIs), also known as Away-from- Reactor (AFR) storage facilities. These installations may provide wet or dry storage of spent fuel, although the safeguards guidance herein focuses on dry storage facilities. In principle, the safeguards guidance applies to both wet and dry storage. The reason for focusing on dry independent spent fuel storage installations is that this is one of the fastest growing nuclear installations worldwide. Independent spent fuel storage installations are typically outside of the safeguards nuclear material balance area (MBA) of the reactor. They may be located on the reactor site, but are generally considered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the State Regulator/SSAC to be a separate facility. The need for this guidance is becoming increasingly urgent as more and more nuclear power plants move their spent fuel from resident spent fuel ponds to independent spent fuel storage installations. The safeguards requirements and best practices described herein are also relevant to the design and construction of regional independent spent fuel storage installations that nuclear power plant operators are starting to consider in the absence of a national long-term geological spent fuel repository. The following document has been prepared in support of two of the three foundational pillars for implementing Safeguards-by-Design (SBD). These are: i) defining the relevant safeguards requirements, and ii) defining the best practices for meeting the requirements. This document was prepared with the design of the latest independent dry spent fuel storage installations in mind and was prepared specifically as an aid for designers of commercial nuclear facilities to help them understand the relevant international requirements that follow from a country’s safeguards agreement with

  15. Robot speeds assays and enhances safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Phelan, P.F.; Powell, W.D.; Blankenship, R.W.

    1990-01-01

    At the Los Alamos National Laboratory Plutonium Facility, a robotics system utilizing a gantry robot and an automated inventory system operates five calorimeters and two gamma isotopic assay instruments. This system has significantly improved safeguards, because the opportunity for diversion has been greatly reduced. Not only is the accountability much more timely because throughput has doubled but the special nuclear material has been made physically more secure in several ways. First, items awaiting assay are kept in the inventory system, whose doors remain locked whenever the robot is unattended. An alarm sounds if the doors are unlocked without authorization. Second, light curtains surround the robot's work envelope and pressure-sensitive pads cover the floor to detect entry into the assay area. Third, the robot weighs each item whenever it is moved, and the result is compared with the weight that was measured when the item was first put into inventory. 2 refs., 3 figs.

  16. Internal convective cooling systems for hypersonic aircraft

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Anthony, F. M.; Dukes, W. H.; Helenbrook, R. G.

    1975-01-01

    Parametric studies were conducted to investigate the relative merits of construction materials, coolants, and cooled panel concepts for internal convective cooling systems applied to airframe structures of hydrogen-fueled hypersonic aircraft. These parametric studies were then used as a means of comparing various cooled structural arrangements for a hypersonic transport and a hypersonic research airplane. The cooled airplane studies emphasized weight aspects as related to the choice of materials, structural arrangements, structural temperatures, and matching of the cooling system heat load to the available hydrogen fuel-flow heat sink. Consideration was given to reliability and to fatigue and fracture aspects, as well. Even when auxiliary thermal protection system items such as heat shielding, insulation, and excess hydrogen for cooling are considered the more attractive actively cooled airframe concepts indicated potential payload increases of from 40 percent to over 100 percent for the hypersonic transport as compared to the results of previous studies of the same vehicle configuration with an uncooled airframe.

  17. An Internal Coaxil Cable Seal System

    DOEpatents

    Hall, David R.; Hall, Jr., H. Tracy; Pixton, David; Dahlgren, Scott; Sneddon, Cameron; Briscoe, Michael; Fox, Joe

    2004-12-23

    The invention is a seal system for a coaxial cable more specifically an internal seal system placed within the coaxial cable and its constituent components. A series of seal stacks including flexible rigid rings and elastomeric rings are placed on load bearing members within the coaxial cable. The current invention is adapted to seal the annular space between the coaxial cable and an electrical contact passing there through. The coaxial cable is disposed within drilling components to transmit electrical signals between drilling components within a drill string. During oil and gas exploration, a drill string can see a range of pressures and temperatures thus resulting in multiple combinations of temperature and pressure and increasing the difficulty of creating a robust seal for all combinations. The seal system can be used in a plurality of downhole components, such as sections of pipe in a drill string, drill collars, heavy weight drill pipe, and jars.

  18. Safeguards-by-Design: An Element of 3S Integration

    SciTech Connect

    R. S. Bean; T. A. Bjornard; D. J. Hebdich

    2009-04-01

    In 2008, the “20/20 Vision for the Future” background report by the IAEA Director General identified the possibility of integrating certain activities related to safeguards, safety, and security. Later in the year, the independent Commission report prepared at the request of the IAEA Director General noted that the Agency’s roles in nuclear safeguards, safety, and security (3S) complement and can mutually reinforce each other. Safeguards-by-design (SBD) is a practical measure that strengthens 3S integration, especially for the stage of nuclear facility design and construction, but also with ramifications for other stages of the facility life-cycle. This paper describes the SBD concept, with examples for diverse regulatory environments, being developed in the U.S under the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Next Generation Safeguards Initiative and the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative. This is compared with related international SBD work performed in the recent IAEA workshop on “Facility Design and Plant Operation Features that Facilitate the Implementation of IAEA Safeguards”. Potential future directions for further development of SBD and its integration within 3S are identified.

  19. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory safeguards and security quarterly progress report to the US Department of Energy quarter ending September 30, 1994

    SciTech Connect

    Davis, G.; Mansur, D.L.; Ruhter, W.D.; Steele, E.; Strait, R.S.

    1994-10-01

    This report presents the details of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory safeguards and securities program. This program is focused on developing new technology, such as x- and gamma-ray spectrometry, for measurement of special nuclear materials. This program supports the Office of Safeguards and Securities in the following five areas; safeguards technology, safeguards and decision support, computer security, automated physical security, and automated visitor access control systems.

  20. Recommended observational skills training for IAEA safeguards inspections. Final report: Recommended observational skills training for IAEA safeguards inspections

    SciTech Connect

    Toquam, J.L.; Morris, F.A.

    1994-09-01

    This is the second of two reports prepared to assist the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA or Agency) in enhancing the effectiveness of its international safeguards inspections through inspector training in {open_quotes}Observational Skills{close_quotes}. The first (Phase 1) report was essentially exploratory. It defined Observational Skills broadly to include all appropriate cognitive, communications, and interpersonal techniques that have the potential to help IAEA safeguards inspectors function more effectively. It identified 10 specific Observational Skills components, analyzed their relevance to IAEA safeguards inspections, and reviewed a variety of inspection programs in the public and private sectors that provide training in one or more of these components. The report concluded that while it should be possible to draw upon these other programs in developing Observational Skills training for IAEA inspectors, the approaches utilized in these programs will likely require significant adaption to support the specific job requirements, policies, and practices that define the IAEA inspector`s job. The overall objective of this second (Phase 2) report is to provide a basis for the actual design and delivery of Observational Skills training to IAEA inspectors. The more specific purposes of this report are to convey a fuller understanding of the potential application of Observational Skills to the inspector`s job, describe inspector perspectives on the relevance and importance of particular Observational Skills, identify the specific Observational Skill components that are most important and relevant to enhancing safeguards inspections, and make recommendations as to Observational Skills training for the IAEA`s consideration in further developing its Safeguards training program.

  1. DOE enrichment plants-safeguards means business

    SciTech Connect

    Donnelly, R.

    1987-01-01

    The Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant, owned by the US Department of Energy (DOE) and operated by Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., is a full service enrichment plant. Its long enriching cascade can process uranium hexafluoride (UF{sub 6}) feeds at almost any {sup 235}U level and can produce UF{sub 6} over the complete spectrum from depleted to very highly enriched uranium. The DOE uranium enrichment program is a government-owned enterprise operating as a business. The operating concerns of the DOE uranium enrichment plants and their safeguards programs have evolved together over the past three decades, and that evolution will likely continue. As the risk associated with possession, processing, and shipment of strategic nuclear material increased, the protection and control of it increased; as the value of the product grew with time, better ways were found to measure and conserve it. In each of these areas, safeguards objectives and the business requirements of the plant are complementary, and the progress made in one area has been reflected by progress in the other. The plant's material control and accountability program has become crucial to such business requirements as quantifying the enriched uranium (separative work units) produced in each monthly period and convincing financial auditors that the multibillion dollar enriched uranium assets located at the Portsmouth plant are properly stated.

  2. 46 CFR 121.602 - Internal communications systems.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-10-01

    ... MISCELLANEOUS SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT Control and Internal Communications Systems § 121.602 Internal communications systems. (a) A vessel equipped with pilothouse control must have a fixed means of two-way... 46 Shipping 4 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Internal communications systems. 121.602 Section...

  3. 46 CFR 184.602 - Internal communications systems.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-10-01

    ... TONS) VESSEL CONTROL AND MISCELLANEOUS SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT Control and Internal Communications Systems § 184.602 Internal communications systems. (a) A vessel equipped with pilothouse control must have... 46 Shipping 7 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Internal communications systems. 184.602 Section...

  4. 12 CFR 609.940 - Internal systems and controls.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 12 Banks and Banking 6 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Internal systems and controls. 609.940 Section... for Boards and Management § 609.940 Internal systems and controls. When applicable, internal systems and controls must provide reasonable assurances that System institutions will: (a) Follow and...

  5. 46 CFR 184.602 - Internal communications systems.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... TONS) VESSEL CONTROL AND MISCELLANEOUS SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT Control and Internal Communications Systems § 184.602 Internal communications systems. (a) A vessel equipped with pilothouse control must have... 46 Shipping 7 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Internal communications systems. 184.602 Section...

  6. 46 CFR 121.602 - Internal communications systems.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... MISCELLANEOUS SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT Control and Internal Communications Systems § 121.602 Internal communications systems. (a) A vessel equipped with pilothouse control must have a fixed means of two-way... 46 Shipping 4 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Internal communications systems. 121.602 Section...

  7. 46 CFR 184.602 - Internal communications systems.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-10-01

    ... 46 Shipping 7 2013-10-01 2013-10-01 false Internal communications systems. 184.602 Section 184.602... TONS) VESSEL CONTROL AND MISCELLANEOUS SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT Control and Internal Communications Systems § 184.602 Internal communications systems. (a) A vessel equipped with pilothouse control must...

  8. 46 CFR 184.602 - Internal communications systems.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-10-01

    ... 46 Shipping 7 2012-10-01 2012-10-01 false Internal communications systems. 184.602 Section 184.602... TONS) VESSEL CONTROL AND MISCELLANEOUS SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT Control and Internal Communications Systems § 184.602 Internal communications systems. (a) A vessel equipped with pilothouse control must...

  9. 46 CFR 121.602 - Internal communications systems.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-10-01

    ... 46 Shipping 4 2013-10-01 2013-10-01 false Internal communications systems. 121.602 Section 121.602... MISCELLANEOUS SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT Control and Internal Communications Systems § 121.602 Internal communications systems. (a) A vessel equipped with pilothouse control must have a fixed means of...

  10. 46 CFR 184.602 - Internal communications systems.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-10-01

    ... 46 Shipping 7 2014-10-01 2014-10-01 false Internal communications systems. 184.602 Section 184.602... TONS) VESSEL CONTROL AND MISCELLANEOUS SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT Control and Internal Communications Systems § 184.602 Internal communications systems. (a) A vessel equipped with pilothouse control must...

  11. 46 CFR 121.602 - Internal communications systems.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-10-01

    ... 46 Shipping 4 2012-10-01 2012-10-01 false Internal communications systems. 121.602 Section 121.602... MISCELLANEOUS SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT Control and Internal Communications Systems § 121.602 Internal communications systems. (a) A vessel equipped with pilothouse control must have a fixed means of...

  12. 46 CFR 121.602 - Internal communications systems.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-10-01

    ... 46 Shipping 4 2014-10-01 2014-10-01 false Internal communications systems. 121.602 Section 121.602... MISCELLANEOUS SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT Control and Internal Communications Systems § 121.602 Internal communications systems. (a) A vessel equipped with pilothouse control must have a fixed means of...

  13. IMPACT OF THE U.S. SUPPORT PROGRAM SAFEGUARDS INTERNSHIP PROGRAM.

    SciTech Connect

    PEPPER, S.; OSIECKI, C.

    2006-07-16

    The U.S. Support Program began funding an internship program in the IAEA Department of Safeguards in 2002. Since that time, 39 U.S. citizens and permanent residents have been placed in one-year, paid internships with the IAEA. The management of the internship program was originally the responsibility of the International Safeguards Project Office but was transferred to the Office of Educational Programs at Brookhaven National Laboratory in 2004. Feedback on the internship program from the U.S. government and the IAEA has been positive. The interns have completed basic yet essential work for the Department of Safeguards and freed IAEA staff members to perform more complex tasks. The cost of an intern is low relative to other forms of human resources support. After the conclusion of their assignments, many of the interns go on to work for the U.S. government, the national laboratories, or companies in international safeguards and nonproliferation. This paper will discuss the work done by the interns for the IAEA, factors influencing the success of the internship program, and the effects the program has had on the careers of interns, in preparing the next generation to work in the nuclear industry, participation in INMM activities, and recruitment for U.S. citizens for safeguards positions.

  14. Implementation of safeguards to improve patient safety in chemotherapy.

    PubMed

    Huertas-Fernández, M J; Martínez-Bautista, Mª J; Rodríguez-Mateos, M E; Zarzuela-Ramírez, M; Muñoz-Lucero, T; Baena-Cañada, J M

    2017-09-01

    To evaluate the effectiveness of safeguards introduced in the process of using cytostatic agents for increasing the safety of oncology patients. Prospective hospital study conducted in two stages, before and after the implementation of safeguards: staff training, standardized procedures, computerized prescription, pharmaceutical validation, implementation of bar codes, and a new manual on drug interactions. Medication errors (MEs) were actively recorded during the process of administering chemotherapy in the Medical Oncology Department. The study classified MEs by the stage of the medication process in which they occurred and assessed their severity. 500 patients, 250 before implementing safeguards and 250 afterward, were included in this study . Out of all patients included before, 43.1% had at least 1 error, compared to 27% of those included later. The number of MEs detected before and after was 144 vs. 95: 125 vs. 55 prescription errors, 2 vs. 5 validation errors, 14 vs. 4 preparation errors, 3 vs. 1 dispensation errors and 0 vs. 30 administration errors. The number of MEs that reached the patient before and after safeguard implementation was 16.7% vs. 6.3%. After the safeguards were introduced, all MEs that could have caused harm or required monitoring of some kind were prevented. Implementing safeguards in the hospital's cytostatic treatment cycle is useful for preventing MEs. Computerized prescription, pharmaceutical validation, and the creation/dissemination of proper work procedures are effective barriers that keep MEs from reaching the patient. Administering chemotherapy with a bar-code system facilitates detection error detection at this stage of the cycle and prevents them from reaching the patient.

  15. Safeguarding nuclear materials in the Former Soviet Union

    SciTech Connect

    Erkkila, B.

    1995-12-31

    This article is a discussion of the safeguarding of nuclear materials in the states of the former Soviet Union. Several issues have been identified and improvements are being pursued at many facilities. These issues include: (1) improvements to existing computerized accounting systems, (2) access control, and (3) control of material movement.

  16. Getting the Facts Straight about Education Data. Safeguarding Data

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Data Quality Campaign, 2014

    2014-01-01

    Education data can empower educators, students, parents, and policymakers with the information they need to make the best decisions to improve student achievement, information that can move the nation toward an education system in which every student graduates prepared for college and career. Safeguarding the privacy of student data is a critical…

  17. Organizational Culture for Safety, Security, and Safeguards in New Nuclear Power Countries

    SciTech Connect

    Kovacic, Donald N

    2015-01-01

    This chapter will contain the following sections: Existing international norms and standards for developing the infrastructure to support new nuclear power programs The role of organizational culture and how it supports the safe, secure, and peaceful application of nuclear power Identifying effective and efficient strategies for implementing safety, security and safeguards in nuclear operations Challenges identified in the implementation of safety, security and safeguards Potential areas for future collaboration between countries in order to support nonproliferation culture

  18. Current Status of Helium-3 Alternative Technologies for Nuclear Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Henzlova, Daniela; Kouzes, R.; McElroy, R.; Peerani, P.; Aspinall, M.; Baird, K.; Bakel, A.; Borella, M.; Bourne, M.; Bourva, L.; Cave, F.; Chandra, R.; Chernikova, D.; Croft, S.; Dermody, G.; Dougan, A.; Ely, J.; Fanchini, E.; Finocchiaro, P.; Gavron, Victor; Kureta, M.; Ianakiev, Kiril Dimitrov; Ishiyama, K.; Lee, T.; Martin, Ch.; McKinny, K.; Menlove, Howard Olsen; Orton, Ch.; Pappalardo, A.; Pedersen, B.; Peranteau, D.; Plenteda, R.; Pozzi, S.; Schear, M.; Seya, M.; Siciliano, E.; Stave, S.; Sun, L.; Swinhoe, Martyn Thomas; Tagziria, H.; Vaccaro, S.; Takamine, J.; Weber, A. -L.; Yamaguchi, T.; Zhu, H.

    2015-12-01

    International safeguards inspectorates (e.g., International Atomic Energy Agency {IAEA}, or Euratom) rely heavily on neutron assay techniques, and in particular, on coincidence counters for the verification of declared nuclear materials under safeguards and for monitoring purposes. While 3He was readily available, the reliability, safety, ease of use, gamma-ray insensitivity, and high intrinsic thermal neutron detection efficiency of 3He-based detectors obviated the need for alternative detector technologies. However, the recent decline of the 3He gas supply has triggered international efforts to develop and field neutron detectors that make use of alternative materials. In response to this global effort, the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and Euratom launched a joint effort aimed at bringing together international experts, technology users and developers in the field of nuclear safeguards to discuss and evaluate the proposed 3He alternative materials and technologies. The effort involved a series of two workshops focused on detailed overviews and viability assessments of various 3He alternative technologies for use in nuclear safeguards applications. The key objective was to provide a platform for collaborative discussions and technical presentations organized in a compact, workshop-like format to stimulate interactions among the participants. The meetings culminated in a benchmark exercise providing a unique opportunity for the first inter-comparison of several available alternative technologies. This report provides an overview of the alternative technology efforts presented during the two workshops along with a summary of the benchmarking activities and results. The workshop recommendations and key consensus observations are discussed in the report, and used to outline a proposed path forward and future needs foreseeable in the area of 3

  19. Evolution of Safeguards over Time: Past, Present, and Projected Facilities, Material, and Budget

    SciTech Connect

    Kollar, Lenka; Mathews, Caroline E.

    2009-07-01

    This study examines the past trends and evolution of safeguards over time and projects growth through 2030. The report documents the amount of nuclear material and facilities under safeguards from 1970 until present, along with the corresponding budget. Estimates for the future amount of facilities and material under safeguards are made according to non-nuclear-weapons states’ (NNWS) plans to build more nuclear capacity and sustain current nuclear infrastructure. Since nuclear energy is seen as a clean and economic option for base load electric power, many countries are seeking to either expand their current nuclear infrastructure, or introduce nuclear power. In order to feed new nuclear power plants and sustain existing ones, more nuclear facilities will need to be built, and thus more nuclear material will be introduced into the safeguards system. The projections in this study conclude that a zero real growth scenario for the IAEA safeguards budget will result in large resource gaps in the near future.

  20. The 'INMARSAT' international maritime satellite communication system

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Atserov, Iu. S.

    1982-12-01

    The history, design, operating characteristics, achievements, and prospects of INMARSAT are discussed. More than 1300 ships are presently equipped to operate within the system, and this number is expected to rise to about 5000 by 1986. The principle of operation involves single coordinating earth stations allocating telephone channels in their zones between other earth stations. The messages reach a common signalling channel with which all ship stations keep in touch. The ship stations are connected to the international telex network. The INMARSAT system enables ships in the automated mode of operation to establish telephone and telegraph comunication with any subscriber on the shore of any country. The quality of the communication is practically independent of the distance between ship and shore at any time of year and under any meteorological conditions. Estimates indicate that the use of satellite communication with ships reduces losses from accidents by 10 percent per year.

  1. 45 CFR 164.308 - Administrative safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-10-01

    ... reporting discrepancies. (D) Password management (Addressable). Procedures for creating, changing, and safeguarding passwords. (6)(i) Standard: Security incident procedures. Implement policies and procedures...

  2. 34 CFR 300.623 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... § 300.623 Safeguards. (a) Each participating agency must protect the confidentiality of personally... participating agency must assume responsibility for ensuring the confidentiality of any personally...

  3. 34 CFR 300.623 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... § 300.623 Safeguards. (a) Each participating agency must protect the confidentiality of personally... participating agency must assume responsibility for ensuring the confidentiality of any personally...

  4. Internal density functional theory of molecular systems

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Nalewajski, Roman F.

    1984-08-01

    A thermodynamiclike theory of internal equilibrium and constrained equilibrium states of individual molecular systems is formulated, based on the Legendre transformed density functional theory (LT DFT). The molecular system (nonrelativistic, field free, Born-Oppenheimer or non-Born-Oppenheimer) is treated as the closed composite thermodynamic system, consisting of very small, rigid (open) subsystems (simple systems) containing a multi-(m)-component charged fluid in the presence of an external field. The generalized Levy constrained search construction of various ``thermodynamic'' potentials of LT DFT is given and the local Maxwell relations are derived. The reduction of various second-order partial functional derivatives (system sensitivities) in terms of few independent, basic kernels is described, using the Jacobian determinants technique. The qualitative implications for the basic kernels of the theory, from the Maxwell relations and stability criteria (generalized Le Châtelier and Le Châtelier-Braun principles) are systematically examined. Finally, possible applications of the general formalism in the thermodynamic analysis of the chemical bond, molecular stability, and chemical reactivity are identified.

  5. Strengthening IAEA Safeguards: Challenges Ahead (437th Brookhaven Lecture)

    SciTech Connect

    Rosenthal, Michael

    2008-06-25

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), headquartered in Vienna, Austria, was established in 1957 to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to discourage its military use. The agency's success in halting nuclear proliferation and in enhancing nuclear safeguards and security have been recognized internationally, including with the 2005 Nobel Peace Prize awarded to the IAEA and its Director General. BNL has long had a role in the IAEA, by providing technical advice and assistance to its safeguards department. In fact, the IAEA's International Safeguards Project Office (ISPO) is headquartered at the Lab and is responsible for the management of U.S. programs supporting ISPO. In the 437th Brookhaven Lecture on Wednesday, June 25th, at 4 p.m. in Berkner Hall, physicist Michael Rosenthal of the Energy, Environment & National Security Directorate will discuss the challenges facing the IAEA and ISPO in light of the world political situation and today's tight budgets, and BNL's role in finding and implementing solutions.

  6. 39 CFR 3055.4 - Internal measurement systems.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 39 Postal Service 1 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Internal measurement systems. 3055.4 Section 3055... SATISFACTION REPORTING Annual Reporting of Service Performance Achievements § 3055.4 Internal measurement systems. Service performance measurements obtained from internal measurement systems or hybrid measurement...

  7. 39 CFR 3055.4 - Internal measurement systems.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 39 Postal Service 1 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Internal measurement systems. 3055.4 Section 3055... SATISFACTION REPORTING Annual Reporting of Service Performance Achievements § 3055.4 Internal measurement systems. Service performance measurements obtained from internal measurement systems or hybrid measurement...

  8. 45 CFR 2508.10 - Who has the responsibility for maintaining adequate technical, physical, and security safeguards...

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... record systems. These security safeguards shall apply to all systems in which identifiable personal data... the security and privacy of such records. (7) The disposal and destruction of records within a system... adequate technical, physical, and security safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure or destruction...

  9. Safeguards.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Taylor, Steve, Ed.; And Others

    1993-01-01

    This policy bulletin addresses the issue of protecting the safety of people with developmental disabilities from their increased risk of neglect, abuse, and mistreatment. An article by Steven J. Taylor considers "The Paradox of Regulations," noting both the protective effects of regulations and their effect in stifling innovation and…

  10. Exhaust system for an internal combustion engine

    SciTech Connect

    Cruichshank, R.W.

    1993-06-15

    An exhaust system for a two-cycle internal combustion engine is described comprising: an exhaust port; exhaust pipe having an upstream end connected to said exhaust port; a baffle chamber connected to a downstream portion of said exhaust pipe; displaceable baffle member means, swingably mounted on pivot means having a fixed axis of rotation and projecting from said pivot means across said baffle chamber toward a wall defining said baffle chamber, for varying the effective volume of said baffle chamber; rotating mechanism means, and means connecting said rotating mechanism means with said displaceable baffle member means, for swingably displacing said displaceable baffle member means in said baffle chamber about said axis of rotation; control means, connected to said rotating mechanism means, for driving said rotating mechanism means and thereby rotating said baffle member means throughout a predetermined range of movement; and tail pipe means for receiving exhaust from said exhaust pipe and said baffle chamber.

  11. Internal combustion engine camshaft phaseshift control system

    SciTech Connect

    Schechter, M.

    1992-06-02

    This patent describes an internal combustion engine, a hydraulic system for varying the timing of an intake valve camshaft and an exhaust valve camshaft relative to a crankshaft. It comprises a drive flange adapted to be rotatably coupled to a crank shaft for rotation about one the camshaft axis; a driven flange coupled to the camshaft for rotation above the one camshaft axis; a hydraulic coupling including a housing means connected to one of the flanges and a piston means cooperating with the housing means and connected to the other of the flanges; valve means for regulating the flow of fluid in the conduit means in response to a control signal to cause the drive and driven flanges to rotate relative to one another in a direction selected without any external power utilizing the cyclically varying fluid pressure within the fluid chambers.

  12. GRIN-Global: An International Project to Develop a Global Plant Genebank and Information Management System

    USDA-ARS?s Scientific Manuscript database

    Many of the world's national genebanks, responsible for the safeguarding and availability of their country's Plant Genetic Resource (PGR) collections, have lacked access to high quality IT needed to document and manage their collections electronically. The Germplasm Resource Information System (GRI...

  13. Separations and safeguards model integration.

    SciTech Connect

    Cipiti, Benjamin B.; Zinaman, Owen

    2010-09-01

    Research and development of advanced reprocessing plant designs can greatly benefit from the development of a reprocessing plant model capable of transient solvent extraction chemistry. This type of model can be used to optimize the operations of a plant as well as the designs for safeguards, security, and safety. Previous work has integrated a transient solvent extraction simulation module, based on the Solvent Extraction Process Having Interaction Solutes (SEPHIS) code developed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, with the Separations and Safeguards Performance Model (SSPM) developed at Sandia National Laboratory, as a first step toward creating a more versatile design and evaluation tool. The goal of this work was to strengthen the integration by linking more variables between the two codes. The results from this integrated model show expected operational performance through plant transients. Additionally, ORIGEN source term files were integrated into the SSPM to provide concentrations, radioactivity, neutron emission rate, and thermal power data for various spent fuels. This data was used to generate measurement blocks that can determine the radioactivity, neutron emission rate, or thermal power of any stream or vessel in the plant model. This work examined how the code could be expanded to integrate other separation steps and benchmark the results to other data. Recommendations for future work will be presented.

  14. Safeguards Envelope Progress FY09

    SciTech Connect

    Richard Metcalf; Robert Bean

    2009-09-01

    The Safeguards Envelope is a strategy to determine a set of specific operating parameters which nuclear facilities may operate within to maximize safeguards effectiveness without sacrificing safety or plant efficiency. This paper details advanced statistical techniques will be applied to real plant process monitoring (PM) data from the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP). As a result of the U.S. having no operating nuclear chemical reprocessing plants, there has been a strong interest in obtaining process monitoring data from the ICPP. The ICPP was shut down in 1996 and a recent effort has been made to retrieve the PM data from storage in a data mining effort. In a simulation based on this data, multi-tank and multi-attribute correlations were tested against synthetic diversion scenarios. Kernel regression smoothing was used to fit a curve to the historical data, and multivariable, residual analysis and cumulative sum techniques set parameters for operating conditions. Diversion scenarios were created and tested, showing improved results when compared with a previous study utilizing only one-variable Z- testing7.

  15. Proposed clinical internal carotid artery classification system

    PubMed Central

    Abdulrauf, Saleem I; Ashour, Ahmed M; Marvin, Eric; Coppens, Jeroen; Kang, Brian; Hsieh, Tze Yu Yeh; Nery, Breno; Penanes, Juan R; Alsahlawi, Aysha K; Moore, Shawn; Al-Shaar, Hussam Abou; Kemp, Joanna; Chawla, Kanika; Sujijantarat, Nanthiya; Najeeb, Alaa; Parkar, Nadeem; Shetty, Vilaas; Vafaie, Tina; Antisdel, Jastin; Mikulec, Tony A; Edgell, Randall; Lebovitz, Jonathan; Pierson, Matt; Pires de Aguiar, Paulo Henrique; Buchanan, Paula; Di Cosola, Angela; Stevens, George

    2016-01-01

    Introduction: Numerical classification systems for the internal carotid artery (ICA) are available, but modifications have added confusion to the numerical systems. Furthermore, previous classifications may not be applicable uniformly to microsurgical and endoscopic procedures. The purpose of this study was to develop a clinically useful classification system. Materials and Methods: We performed cadaver dissections of the ICA in 5 heads (10 sides) and evaluated 648 internal carotid arteries with computed tomography angiography. We identified specific anatomic landmarks to define the beginning and end of each ICA segment. Results: The ICA was classified into eight segments based on the cadaver and imaging findings: (1) Cervical segment; (2) cochlear segment (ascending segment of the ICA in the temporal bone) (relation of the start of this segment to the base of the styloid process: Above, 425 sides [80%]; below, 2 sides [0.4%]; at same level, 107 sides [20%]; P < 0.0001) (relation of cochlea to ICA: Posterior, 501 sides [85%]; posteromedial, 84 sides [14%]; P < 0.0001); (3) petrous segment (horizontal segment of ICA in the temporal bone) starting at the crossing of the eustachian tube superolateral to the ICA turn in all 10 samples; (4) Gasserian-Clival segment (ascending segment of ICA in the cavernous sinus) starting at the petrolingual ligament (PLL) (relation to vidian canal on imaging: At same level, 360 sides [63%]; below, 154 sides [27%]; above, 53 sides [9%]; P < 0.0001); in this segment, the ICA projected medially toward the clivus in 275 sides (52%) or parallel to the clivus with no deviation in 256 sides (48%; P < 0.0001); (5) sellar segment (medial loop of ICA in the cavernous sinus) starting at the takeoff of the meningeal hypophyseal trunk (ICA was medial into the sella in 271 cases [46%], lateral without touching the sella in 127 cases [23%], and abutting the sella in 182 cases [31%]; P < 0.0001); (6) sphenoid segment (lateral loop of ICA within the

  16. 34 CFR 104.36 - Procedural safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 34 Education 1 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Procedural safeguards. 104.36 Section 104.36 Education Regulations of the Offices of the Department of Education OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION... Preschool, Elementary, and Secondary Education § 104.36 Procedural safeguards. A recipient that operates...

  17. 5 CFR 2500.9 - Safeguarding.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 5 Administrative Personnel 3 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safeguarding. 2500.9 Section 2500.9 Administrative Personnel OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT INFORMATION SECURITY REGULATION § 2500.9 Safeguarding. The Office of Administration shall protect information in its...

  18. 32 CFR 154.68 - Safeguarding procedures.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 1 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Safeguarding procedures. 154.68 Section 154.68 National Defense Department of Defense OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE SECURITY DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PERSONNEL SECURITY PROGRAM REGULATION Safeguarding Personnel Security Investigative Records §...

  19. 5 CFR 2500.9 - Safeguarding.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 5 Administrative Personnel 3 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Safeguarding. 2500.9 Section 2500.9 Administrative Personnel OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT INFORMATION SECURITY REGULATION § 2500.9 Safeguarding. The Office of Administration shall protect information in its custody...

  20. Safeguards and security issues for the disposition of fissile materials

    SciTech Connect

    Jaeger, C.D.; Moya, R.W.; Duggan, R.A.; Mangan, D.L.; Tolk, K.M.; Rutherford, D.; Fearey, B.; Moore, L.

    1995-07-01

    The Department of Energy`s Office of Fissile Material Disposition (FMD) is analyzing long-term storage and disposition options for surplus weapons-usable fissile materials, preparing a programmatic environmental impact statement (PEIS), preparing for a record of decision (ROD) regarding this material and conducting other activities. The primary security objectives of this program are to reduce major security risks and strengthen arms reduction and nonproliferation (NP). To help achieve these objectives, a safeguards and security (S&S) team consisting of participants from Sandia, Los Alamos, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories was established. The S&S activity for this program is a cross-cutting task which addresses all of the FMD program options. It includes both domestic and international safeguards and includes areas such as physical protection, nuclear materials accountability and material containment and surveillance. This paper will discuss the activities of the Fissile Materials Disposition Program (FMDP) S&S team as well as some specific S&S issues associated with various FMDP options/facilities. Some of the items to be discussed include the threat, S&S requirements, S&S criteria for assessing risk, S&S issues concerning fissile material processing/facilities, and international and domestic safeguards.