14 CFR 417.25 - Post launch report.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Post launch report. 417.25 Section 417.25... TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH SAFETY General and License Terms and Conditions § 417.25 Post launch report. (a) For a launch operator launching from a Federal launch range, a launch operator must file a post launch...

14 CFR 417.25 - Post launch report.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Post launch report. 417.25 Section 417.25... TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH SAFETY General and License Terms and Conditions § 417.25 Post launch report. (a) For a launch operator launching from a Federal launch range, a launch operator must file a post launch...

14 CFR 417.15 - Records.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH SAFETY General and License Terms and Conditions § 417.15 Records. (a) A launch... after completion of all launches conducted under the license. (b) If a launch accident or launch...

14 CFR 417.9 - Launch site responsibility.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Launch site responsibility. 417.9 Section 417.9 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH SAFETY General and License Terms and Conditions § 417.9 Launch...

14 CFR 417.9 - Launch site responsibility.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Launch site responsibility. 417.9 Section 417.9 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH SAFETY General and License Terms and Conditions § 417.9 Launch...

14 CFR 417.13 - Agreement with Federal launch range.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Agreement with Federal launch range. 417.13 Section 417.13 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH SAFETY General and License Terms and Conditions § 417.13...

14 CFR 417.13 - Agreement with Federal launch range.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Agreement with Federal launch range. 417.13 Section 417.13 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH SAFETY General and License Terms and Conditions § 417.13...

Nuclear safety

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Buden, D.

1991-01-01

Topics dealing with nuclear safety are addressed which include the following: general safety requirements; safety design requirements; terrestrial safety; SP-100 Flight System key safety requirements; potential mission accidents and hazards; key safety features; ground operations; launch operations; flight operations; disposal; safety concerns; licensing; the nuclear engine for rocket vehicle application (NERVA) design philosophy; the NERVA flight safety program; and the NERVA safety plan.

Space nuclear safety from a user's viewpoint

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Campbell, R. W.

1985-01-01

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) launched the Jet Propulsion Laboratory's (JPL) two Voyager spacecraft to Jupiter in 1977, each using three radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGs) supplied by the Department of Energy (DOE) for onboard electric power. In 1986 NASA will launch JPL's Galileo spacecraft to Jupiter equipped with two DOE supplied RTGs of an improved design. NASA and JPL are also responsible for obtaining a single RTG of this type from DOE and supplying it to the European Space Agency as part of its participation in the International Solar Polar Mission. As a result of these missions, JPL has been deeply involved in space nuclear safety as a user. This paper will give a brief review of the user contributions by JPL - and NASA in general - to the nuclear safety processes and relate them to the overall nuclear safety program necessary for the launch of an RTG. The two major safety areas requiring user support are the ground operations involving RTGs at the launch site and the failure modes and probabilities associated with launch accidents.

14 CFR 417.15 - Records.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Records. 417.15 Section 417.15 Aeronautics... TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH SAFETY General and License Terms and Conditions § 417.15 Records. (a) A launch operator must maintain all records necessary to verify that it conducts licensed launches according to...

14 CFR 417.15 - Records.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Records. 417.15 Section 417.15 Aeronautics... TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH SAFETY General and License Terms and Conditions § 417.15 Records. (a) A launch operator must maintain all records necessary to verify that it conducts licensed launches according to...

14 CFR 417.15 - Records.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Records. 417.15 Section 417.15 Aeronautics... TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH SAFETY General and License Terms and Conditions § 417.15 Records. (a) A launch operator must maintain all records necessary to verify that it conducts licensed launches according to...

14 CFR 417.221 - Time delay analysis.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH SAFETY Flight Safety Analysis § 417.221 Time delay analysis. (a) General. A flight safety analysis must include a time delay analysis that establishes the mean elapsed time between the violation of a flight termination rule and the time when the flight safety system is...

14 CFR 417.221 - Time delay analysis.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH SAFETY Flight Safety Analysis § 417.221 Time delay analysis. (a) General. A flight safety analysis must include a time delay analysis that establishes the mean elapsed time between the violation of a flight termination rule and the time when the flight safety system is...

A Common Approach for the Certifying of International Space Station (ISS) Basic Hardware for Ground Safety

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Kirkpatrick, Paul D.; Trinchero, Jean-Pierre

2005-01-01

In order to support the International Space Station, as well as any future long term human missions, vast amounts of logistical-type hardware is required to be processed through the various launch sites. This category consists of such hardware as spare parts, replacement items, and upgraded hardware. The category also includes samples for experiments and consumables. One attribute that all these items have is they are generally non-hazardous, at least to ground personnel. Even though the items are non-hazardous, launch site ground safety has a responsibility for the protection of personnel, the flight hardware, and launch site resources. In order to fulfill this responsibility, the safety organization must have knowledge of the hardware and its operations. Conversely, the hardware providers are entitled to a process that is commensurate with the hazard. Additionally, a common system should be in place that is flexible enough to account for the requirements at all launch sites, so that, the hardware provider need only complete one process for ground safety regardless of the launch site.

14 CFR 417.231 - Collision avoidance analysis.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Collision avoidance analysis. 417.231..., DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH SAFETY Flight Safety Analysis § 417.231 Collision avoidance analysis. (a) General. A flight safety analysis must include a collision avoidance analysis that...

Final safety analysis report for the Galileo Mission: Volume 2: Summary

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Not Available

The General Purpose Heat Source Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (GPHS-RTG) will be used as the prime source of electric power for the spacecraft on the Galileo mission. The use of radioactive material in these missions necessitates evaluations of the radiological risks that may be encountered by launch complex personnel and by the Earth's general population resulting from postulated malfunctions or failures occurring in the mission operations. The purpose of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) is to present the analyses and results of the latest evaluation of the nuclear safety potential of the GPHS-RTG as employed in the Galileo mission. Thismore » evaluation is an extension of earlier work that addressed the planned 1986 launch using the Space Shuttle Vehicle with the Centaur as the upper stage. This extended evaluation represents the launch by the Space Shuttle/IUS vehicle. The IUS stage has been selected as the vehicle to be used to boost the Galileo spacecraft into the Earth escape trajectory after the parking orbit is attained.« less

36. GENERAL VIEW OF SLC3W MST STATION 85.5 FROM SOUTHEAST ...

Library of Congress Historic Buildings Survey, Historic Engineering Record, Historic Landscapes Survey

36. GENERAL VIEW OF SLC-3W MST STATION 85.5 FROM SOUTHEAST CORNER SHOWING REMOVABLE SAFETY RAILS AROUND CENTRAL OPENING, STRETCH SLING CYLINDER, AND PULLEY ON WEST SIDE, AIR-CONDITIONING DUCTING IN NORTHWEST CORNER, PLATFORM SEGMENTS AND HINGES - Vandenberg Air Force Base, Space Launch Complex 3, Launch Pad 3 West, Napa & Alden Roads, Lompoc, Santa Barbara County, CA

14 CFR 417.205 - General.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... flight safety analysis must demonstrate that a launch operator will, for each launch, control the risk to... isolation of the hazards, to demonstrate control of the risk to the public. (1) Risk assessment. When demonstrating control of risk through risk assessment, the analysis must demonstrate that any risk to the public...

14 CFR 417.205 - General.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... flight safety analysis must demonstrate that a launch operator will, for each launch, control the risk to... isolation of the hazards, to demonstrate control of the risk to the public. (1) Risk assessment. When demonstrating control of risk through risk assessment, the analysis must demonstrate that any risk to the public...

14 CFR 417.205 - General.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... flight safety analysis must demonstrate that a launch operator will, for each launch, control the risk to... isolation of the hazards, to demonstrate control of the risk to the public. (1) Risk assessment. When demonstrating control of risk through risk assessment, the analysis must demonstrate that any risk to the public...

14 CFR 417.205 - General.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... flight safety analysis must demonstrate that a launch operator will, for each launch, control the risk to... isolation of the hazards, to demonstrate control of the risk to the public. (1) Risk assessment. When demonstrating control of risk through risk assessment, the analysis must demonstrate that any risk to the public...

14 CFR 417.211 - Debris analysis.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Debris analysis. 417.211 Section 417.211 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH SAFETY Flight Safety Analysis § 417.211 Debris analysis. (a) General. A flight...

14 CFR 417.211 - Debris analysis.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Debris analysis. 417.211 Section 417.211 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH SAFETY Flight Safety Analysis § 417.211 Debris analysis. (a) General. A flight...

14 CFR 417.211 - Debris analysis.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Debris analysis. 417.211 Section 417.211 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH SAFETY Flight Safety Analysis § 417.211 Debris analysis. (a) General. A flight...

14 CFR 417.211 - Debris analysis.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Debris analysis. 417.211 Section 417.211 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH SAFETY Flight Safety Analysis § 417.211 Debris analysis. (a) General. A flight...

14 CFR 417.211 - Debris analysis.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Debris analysis. 417.211 Section 417.211 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH SAFETY Flight Safety Analysis § 417.211 Debris analysis. (a) General. A flight...

14 CFR 417.305 - Command control system testing.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Command control system testing. 417.305..., DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH SAFETY Flight Safety System § 417.305 Command control system testing. (a) General. (1) A command control system, including its subsystems and components must undergo...

14 CFR 417.305 - Command control system testing.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Command control system testing. 417.305..., DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH SAFETY Flight Safety System § 417.305 Command control system testing. (a) General. (1) A command control system, including its subsystems and components must undergo...

14 CFR 417.305 - Command control system testing.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Command control system testing. 417.305..., DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH SAFETY Flight Safety System § 417.305 Command control system testing. (a) General. (1) A command control system, including its subsystems and components must undergo...

14 CFR 417.305 - Command control system testing.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Command control system testing. 417.305..., DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH SAFETY Flight Safety System § 417.305 Command control system testing. (a) General. (1) A command control system, including its subsystems and components must undergo...

14 CFR 417.305 - Command control system testing.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Command control system testing. 417.305..., DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH SAFETY Flight Safety System § 417.305 Command control system testing. (a) General. (1) A command control system, including its subsystems and components must undergo...

14 CFR 417.409 - System hazard controls.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

..., or system must account for static and dynamic loads, environmental stresses, and expected wear; (3... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false System hazard controls. 417.409 Section 417... OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH SAFETY Ground Safety § 417.409 System hazard controls. (a) General...

14 CFR 437.21 - General.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... associated with proposed reusable suborbital rocket launches or reentries. The information provided by an... rocket must demonstrate compliance with §§ 460.5, 460.7, 460.11, 460.13, 460.15, 460.17, 460.51 and 460... suborbital rocket, safety system, process, service, or personnel for which the FAA has issued a safety...

14 CFR 437.21 - General.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... associated with proposed reusable suborbital rocket launches or reentries. The information provided by an... rocket must demonstrate compliance with §§ 460.5, 460.7, 460.11, 460.13, 460.15, 460.17, 460.51 and 460... suborbital rocket, safety system, process, service, or personnel for which the FAA has issued a safety...

14 CFR 437.21 - General.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... associated with proposed reusable suborbital rocket launches or reentries. The information provided by an... rocket must demonstrate compliance with §§ 460.5, 460.7, 460.11, 460.13, 460.15, 460.17, 460.51 and 460... suborbital rocket, safety system, process, service, or personnel for which the FAA has issued a safety...

14 CFR 437.21 - General.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... associated with proposed reusable suborbital rocket launches or reentries. The information provided by an... rocket must demonstrate compliance with §§ 460.5, 460.7, 460.11, 460.13, 460.15, 460.17, 460.51 and 460... suborbital rocket, safety system, process, service, or personnel for which the FAA has issued a safety...

14 CFR 437.21 - General.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... associated with proposed reusable suborbital rocket launches or reentries. The information provided by an... rocket must demonstrate compliance with §§ 460.5, 460.7, 460.11, 460.13, 460.15, 460.17, 460.51 and 460... suborbital rocket, safety system, process, service, or personnel for which the FAA has issued a safety...

14 CFR 417.103 - Safety organization.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Safety organization. 417.103 Section 417... OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH SAFETY Launch Safety Responsibilities § 417.103 Safety organization. (a) A launch operator must maintain and document a safety organization. A launch operator must...

Launch Services Safety Overview

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Loftin, Charles E.

2008-01-01

NASA/KSC Launch Services Division Safety (SA-D) services include: (1) Assessing the safety of the launch vehicle (2) Assessing the safety of NASA ELV spacecraft (S/C) / launch vehicle (LV) interfaces (3) Assessing the safety of spacecraft processing to ensure resource protection of: - KSC facilities - KSC VAFB facilities - KSC controlled property - Other NASA assets (4) NASA personnel safety (5) Interfacing with payload organizations to review spacecraft for adequate safety implementation and compliance for integrated activities (6) Assisting in the integration of safety activities between the payload, launch vehicle, and processing facilities

Lessons learned from the Galileo and Ulysses flight safety review experience

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Bennett, Gary L.

In preparation for the launches of the Galileo and Ulysses spacecraft, a very comprehensive aerospace nuclear safety program and flight safety review were conducted. A review of this work has highlighted a number of important lessons which should be considered in the safety analysis and review of future space nuclear systems. These lessons have been grouped into six general categories: (1) establishment of the purpose, objectives and scope of the safety process; (2) establishment of charters defining the roles of the various participants; (3) provision of adequate resources; (4) provision of timely peer-reviewed information to support the safety program; (5)more » establishment of general ground rules for the safety review; and (6) agreement on the kinds of information to be provided from the safety review process.« less

14 CFR 417.109 - Ground safety.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Ground safety. 417.109 Section 417.109... TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH SAFETY Launch Safety Responsibilities § 417.109 Ground safety. (a) Ground safety... 417.115(c), and subpart E of this part provide launch operator ground safety requirements. ...

14 CFR 417.109 - Ground safety.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Ground safety. 417.109 Section 417.109... TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH SAFETY Launch Safety Responsibilities § 417.109 Ground safety. (a) Ground safety... 417.115(c), and subpart E of this part provide launch operator ground safety requirements. ...

14 CFR 417.1 - General information.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... package, (3) Preliminary and final flight data packages, (4) A tailored version of EWR 127-1, (5) Range...) Missile system pre-launch safety package, (3) Preliminary and final flight data packages, (4) A tailored...

14 CFR 417.1 - General information.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... package, (3) Preliminary and final flight data packages, (4) A tailored version of EWR 127-1, (5) Range...) Missile system pre-launch safety package, (3) Preliminary and final flight data packages, (4) A tailored...

14 CFR 417.1 - General information.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... package, (3) Preliminary and final flight data packages, (4) A tailored version of EWR 127-1, (5) Range...) Missile system pre-launch safety package, (3) Preliminary and final flight data packages, (4) A tailored...

14 CFR 417.1 - General information.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... package, (3) Preliminary and final flight data packages, (4) A tailored version of EWR 127-1, (5) Range...) Missile system pre-launch safety package, (3) Preliminary and final flight data packages, (4) A tailored...

14 CFR 431.33 - Safety organization.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Safety organization. 431.33 Section 431.33... TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH AND REENTRY OF A REUSABLE LAUNCH VEHICLE (RLV) Safety Review and Approval for Launch and Reentry of a Reusable Launch Vehicle § 431.33 Safety organization. (a) An applicant shall...

14 CFR 417.103 - Safety organization.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safety organization. 417.103 Section 417... organization. (a) A launch operator must maintain and document a safety organization. A launch operator must... within the launch operator's organization and between the launch operator and any federal launch range or...

14 CFR 415.133 - Safety at end of launch.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Safety at end of launch. 415.133 Section 415.133 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION... Launch Vehicle From a Non-Federal Launch Site § 415.133 Safety at end of launch. An applicant must...

Inadvertent Earth Reentry Breakup Analysis for the New Horizons Mission

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Ling, Lisa M.; Salama, Ahmed; Ivanov, Mark; McRonald, Angus

2007-01-01

The New Horizons (NH) spacecraft was launched in January 2006 aboard an Atlas V launch vehicle, in a mission to explore Pluto, its moons, and other bodies in the Kuiper Belt. The NH spacecraft is powered by a Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (RTG) which encases multiple General Purpose Heat Source (GPHS) modules. Thus, a pre-launch vehicle breakup analysis for an inadvertent atmospheric reentry in the event of a launch failure was required to assess aerospace nuclear safety and for launch contingency planning. This paper addresses potential accidental Earth reentries analyzed at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) which may arise during the ascent to parking orbit, resulting in a suborbital reentry, as well as a departure from parking orbit, resulting in an orbital reentry.

14 CFR 415.33 - Safety organization.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Safety organization. 415.33 Section 415.33... TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH LICENSE Safety Review and Approval for Launch From a Federal Launch Range § 415.33 Safety organization. (a) An applicant shall maintain a safety organization and document it by...

14 CFR 417.117 - Reviews.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... information: (i) Readiness of launch vehicle and payload. (ii) Readiness of any flight safety system and... of a launch safety review must ensure satisfaction of the following criteria: (i) A launch operator... operator must resolve all safety related action items. (ii) A launch operator must assign and certify...

14 CFR 417.405 - Ground safety analysis.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... qualified to perform the ground safety analysis through training, education, and experience. (c) A launch... unfenced boundary of an entire industrial complex or multi-user launch site. A launch location hazard may.... (j) A launch operator must verify all information in a ground safety analysis, including design...

14 CFR 417.405 - Ground safety analysis.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... qualified to perform the ground safety analysis through training, education, and experience. (c) A launch... unfenced boundary of an entire industrial complex or multi-user launch site. A launch location hazard may.... (j) A launch operator must verify all information in a ground safety analysis, including design...

14 CFR 417.405 - Ground safety analysis.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... qualified to perform the ground safety analysis through training, education, and experience. (c) A launch... unfenced boundary of an entire industrial complex or multi-user launch site. A launch location hazard may.... (j) A launch operator must verify all information in a ground safety analysis, including design...

Enhancing the NASA Expendable Launch Vehicle Payload Safety Review Process Through Program Activities

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Palo, Thomas E.

2007-01-01

The safety review process for NASA spacecraft flown on Expendable Launch Vehicles (ELVs) has been guided by NASA-STD 8719.8, Expendable Launch Vehicle Payload Safety Review Process Standard. The standard focused primarily on the safety approval required to begin pre-launch processing at the launch site. Subsequent changes in the contractual, technical, and operational aspects of payload processing, combined with lessons-learned supported a need for the reassessment of the standard. This has resulted in the formation of a NASA ELV Payload Safety Program. This program has been working to address the programmatic issues that will enhance and supplement the existing process, while continuing to ensure the safety of ELV payload activities.

14 CFR 417.23 - Compliance monitoring.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Compliance monitoring. 417.23 Section 417.23 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH SAFETY General and License Terms and Conditions § 417.23...

14 CFR 417.5 - [Reserved

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false [Reserved] 417.5 Section 417.5 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH SAFETY General and License Terms and Conditions § 417.5 [Reserved] ...

14 CFR 417.5 - [Reserved

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false [Reserved] 417.5 Section 417.5 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH SAFETY General and License Terms and Conditions § 417.5 [Reserved] ...

75 FR 8804 - Safety Zone; NASSCO Launching of USNS Charles Drew, San Diego Bay, San Diego, CA.

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-02-26

...-AA00 Safety Zone; NASSCO Launching of USNS Charles Drew, San Diego Bay, San Diego, CA. AGENCY: Coast... United States Naval Ship (USNS) Charles Drew. The safety zone is necessary to provide for the safety of... to the safety of the USNS Charles Drew and surrounding vessels as this ship launches from NASSCO...

Safety aspects of nuclear waste disposal in space

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Rice, E. E.; Edgecombe, D. S.; Compton, P. R.

1981-01-01

Safety issues involved in the disposal of nuclear wastes in space as a complement to mined geologic repositories are examined as part of an assessment of the feasibility of nuclear waste disposal in space. General safety guidelines for space disposal developed in the areas of radiation exposure and shielding, containment, accident environments, criticality, post-accident recovery, monitoring systems and isolation are presented for a nuclear waste disposal in space mission employing conventional space technology such as the Space Shuttle. The current reference concept under consideration by NASA and DOE is then examined in detail, with attention given to the waste source and mix, the waste form, waste processing and payload fabrication, shipping casks and ground transport vehicles, launch site operations and facilities, Shuttle-derived launch vehicle, orbit transfer vehicle, orbital operations and space destination, and the system safety aspects of the concept are discussed for each component. It is pointed out that future work remains in the development of an improved basis for the safety guidelines and the determination of the possible benefits and costs of the space disposal option for nuclear wastes.

14 CFR 417.21 - Financial responsibility requirements.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

....21 Section 417.21 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH SAFETY General and License Terms and Conditions... responsibility requirements as required by part 440 of this chapter and as specified in a license or license...

14 CFR 417.21 - Financial responsibility requirements.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

....21 Section 417.21 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH SAFETY General and License Terms and Conditions... responsibility requirements as required by part 440 of this chapter and as specified in a license or license...

14 CFR 417.233 - Analysis for an unguided suborbital launch vehicle flown with a wind weighting safety system.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... vehicle flown with a wind weighting safety system. 417.233 Section 417.233 Aeronautics and Space... with a wind weighting safety system. For each launch of an unguided suborbital launch vehicle flown with a wind weighting safety system, in addition to the other requirements in this subpart outlined in...

14 CFR 417.233 - Analysis for an unguided suborbital launch vehicle flown with a wind weighting safety system.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... vehicle flown with a wind weighting safety system. 417.233 Section 417.233 Aeronautics and Space... with a wind weighting safety system. For each launch of an unguided suborbital launch vehicle flown with a wind weighting safety system, in addition to the other requirements in this subpart outlined in...

14 CFR 417.233 - Analysis for an unguided suborbital launch vehicle flown with a wind weighting safety system.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... vehicle flown with a wind weighting safety system. 417.233 Section 417.233 Aeronautics and Space... with a wind weighting safety system. For each launch of an unguided suborbital launch vehicle flown with a wind weighting safety system, in addition to the other requirements in this subpart outlined in...

14 CFR 417.233 - Analysis for an unguided suborbital launch vehicle flown with a wind weighting safety system.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... vehicle flown with a wind weighting safety system. 417.233 Section 417.233 Aeronautics and Space... with a wind weighting safety system. For each launch of an unguided suborbital launch vehicle flown with a wind weighting safety system, in addition to the other requirements in this subpart outlined in...

14 CFR 417.233 - Analysis for an unguided suborbital launch vehicle flown with a wind weighting safety system.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... vehicle flown with a wind weighting safety system. 417.233 Section 417.233 Aeronautics and Space... with a wind weighting safety system. For each launch of an unguided suborbital launch vehicle flown with a wind weighting safety system, in addition to the other requirements in this subpart outlined in...

14 CFR 417.405 - Ground safety analysis.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... hazard from affecting the public. A launch operator must incorporate the launch site operator's systems... personnel who are knowledgeable of launch vehicle systems, launch processing, ground systems, operations...) Begin a ground safety analysis by identifying the systems and operations to be analyzed; (2) Define the...

14 CFR 417.405 - Ground safety analysis.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... hazard from affecting the public. A launch operator must incorporate the launch site operator's systems... personnel who are knowledgeable of launch vehicle systems, launch processing, ground systems, operations...) Begin a ground safety analysis by identifying the systems and operations to be analyzed; (2) Define the...

Pad Safety Personnel Launch Support For STS-200

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Guarino, Jennifer

2007-01-01

The launch of a space shuttle is a complex and lengthy procedure. There are many places and components to look at and prepare. The components are the orbiter, solid rocket boosters, external tank, and ground equipment. Some of the places are the launch pad, fuel locations, and surrounding structures. Preparations for a launch include equipment checks, system checks, sniff checks for hazardous commodities, and countless walkdowns. Throughout these preparations, pad safety personnel must always be on call. This requires three shifts of multiple people to be ready when needed. Also, the pad safety personnel must be available for the non-launch tasks that are always present for both launch pads

14 CFR 417.113 - Launch safety rules.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... flight safety analysis of subpart C of this part. These must include criteria for: (i) Surveillance of... criteria for ensuring that: (i) The flight safety system is operating to ensure the launch vehicle will... source at all times from lift-off to orbit insertion for an orbital launch, to the end of powered flight...

14 CFR 417.113 - Launch safety rules.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... flight safety analysis of subpart C of this part. These must include criteria for: (i) Surveillance of... criteria for ensuring that: (i) The flight safety system is operating to ensure the launch vehicle will... source at all times from lift-off to orbit insertion for an orbital launch, to the end of powered flight...

14 CFR 417.113 - Launch safety rules.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... flight safety analysis of subpart C of this part. These must include criteria for: (i) Surveillance of... criteria for ensuring that: (i) The flight safety system is operating to ensure the launch vehicle will... source at all times from lift-off to orbit insertion for an orbital launch, to the end of powered flight...

14 CFR 417.113 - Launch safety rules.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... flight safety analysis of subpart C of this part. These must include criteria for: (i) Surveillance of... criteria for ensuring that: (i) The flight safety system is operating to ensure the launch vehicle will... source at all times from lift-off to orbit insertion for an orbital launch, to the end of powered flight...

14 CFR 417.113 - Launch safety rules.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... flight safety analysis of subpart C of this part. These must include criteria for: (i) Surveillance of... criteria for ensuring that: (i) The flight safety system is operating to ensure the launch vehicle will... source at all times from lift-off to orbit insertion for an orbital launch, to the end of powered flight...

Safety and Suitability for Service Assessment Testing for Surface and Underwater Launched Munitions

DTIC Science & Technology

2014-12-05

test efficiency that tend to associate the Analytical S3 Test Approach with large, complex munition systems and the Empirical S3 Test Approach with...the smaller, less complex munition systems . 8.1 ANALYTICAL S3 TEST APPROACH. The Analytical S3 test approach, as shown in Figure 3, evaluates...assets than the Analytical S3 Test approach to establish the safety margin of the system . This approach is generally applicable to small munitions

14 CFR 417.11 - Continuing accuracy of license application; application for modification of license.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Continuing accuracy of license application; application for modification of license. 417.11 Section 417.11 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH SAFETY General and...

14 CFR 417.26-417.100 - [Reserved

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false [Reserved] 417.26-417.100 Section 417.26-417.100 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH SAFETY General and License Terms and Conditions §§ 417.26—417...

14 CFR 417.11 - Continuing accuracy of license application; application for modification of license.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Continuing accuracy of license application; application for modification of license. 417.11 Section 417.11 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH SAFETY General and...

14 CFR 417.26-417.100 - [Reserved

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false [Reserved] 417.26-417.100 Section 417.26-417.100 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH SAFETY General and License Terms and Conditions §§ 417.26—417...

New Horizons Launch Contingency Effort

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Chang, Yale; Lear, Matthew H.; McGrath, Brian E.; Heyler, Gene A.; Takashima, Naruhisa; Owings, W. Donald

2007-01-01

On 19 January 2006 at 2:00 PM EST, the NASA New Horizons spacecraft (SC) was launched from the Cape Canaveral Air Force Station (CCAFS), FL, onboard an Atlas V 551/Centaur/STAR™ 48B launch vehicle (LV) on a mission to explore the Pluto Charon planetary system and possibly other Kuiper Belt Objects. It carried a single Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (RTG). As part of the joint NASA/US Department of Energy (DOE) safety effort, contingency plans were prepared to address the unlikely events of launch accidents leading to a near-pad impact, a suborbital reentry, an orbital reentry, or a heliocentric orbit. As the implementing organization. The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL) had expanded roles in the New Horizons launch contingency effort over those for the Cassini mission and Mars Exploration Rovers missions. The expanded tasks included participation in the Radiological Control Center (RADCC) at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC), preparation of contingency plans, coordination of space tracking assets, improved aerodynamics characterization of the RTG's 18 General Purpose Heat Source (GPHS) modules, and development of spacecraft and RTG reentry breakup analysis tools. Other JHU/APL tasks were prediction of the Earth impact footprints (ElFs) for the GPHS modules released during the atmospheric reentry (for purposes of notification and recovery), prediction of the time of SC reentry from a potential orbital decay, pre-launch dissemination of ballistic coefficients of various possible reentry configurations, and launch support of an Emergency Operations Center (EOC) on the JHU/APL campus. For the New Horizons launch, JHU/APL personnel at the RADCC and at the EOC were ready to implement any real-time launch contingency activities. A successful New Horizons launch and interplanetary injection precluded any further contingency actions. The New Horizons launch contingency was an interagency effort by several organizations. This paper describes JHU/APL's roles and responsibilities in the launch contingency effort, and the specific tasks to fulfill those responsibilities. The overall effort contributed to mission safety and demonstrated successful cooperation between several agencies.

14 CFR 417.401 - Scope.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH SAFETY Ground Safety § 417.401 Scope. This subpart contains public safety.... Ground safety requirements in this subpart apply to activities performed by, or on behalf of, a launch...

Final safety analysis report for the Galileo Mission: Volume 2: Book 1, Accident model document

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Not Available

The Accident Model Document (AMD) is the second volume of the three volume Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) for the Galileo outer planetary space science mission. This mission employs Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators (RTGs) as the prime electrical power sources for the spacecraft. Galileo will be launched into Earth orbit using the Space Shuttle and will use the Inertial Upper Stage (IUS) booster to place the spacecraft into an Earth escape trajectory. The RTG's employ silicon-germanium thermoelectric couples to produce electricity from the heat energy that results from the decay of the radioisotope fuel, Plutonium-238, used in the RTG heat source.more » The heat source configuration used in the RTG's is termed General Purpose Heat Source (GPHS), and the RTG's are designated GPHS-RTGs. The use of radioactive material in these missions necessitates evaluations of the radiological risks that may be encountered by launch complex personnel as well as by the Earth's general population resulting from postulated malfunctions or failures occurring in the mission operations. The FSAR presents the results of a rigorous safety assessment, including substantial analyses and testing, of the launch and deployment of the RTGs for the Galileo mission. This AMD is a summary of the potential accident and failure sequences which might result in fuel release, the analysis and testing methods employed, and the predicted source terms. Each source term consists of a quantity of fuel released, the location of release and the physical characteristics of the fuel released. Each source term has an associated probability of occurrence. 27 figs., 11 tabs.« less

14 CFR Appendix A to Part 417 - Flight Safety Analysis Methodologies and Products for a Launch Vehicle Flown With a Flight Safety...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... approach provides an equivalent level of safety. If a Federal launch range performs the launch operator's... FAA will measure any proposed alternative analysis approach. This appendix also identifies the... control systems; (ix) Steering misalignment; and (x) Winds. (2) Each three-sigma trajectory must account...

14 CFR Appendix A to Part 417 - Flight Safety Analysis Methodologies and Products for a Launch Vehicle Flown With a Flight Safety...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... approach provides an equivalent level of safety. If a Federal launch range performs the launch operator's... FAA will measure any proposed alternative analysis approach. This appendix also identifies the... control systems; (ix) Steering misalignment; and (x) Winds. (2) Each three-sigma trajectory must account...

14 CFR Appendix A to Part 417 - Flight Safety Analysis Methodologies and Products for a Launch Vehicle Flown With a Flight Safety...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... approach provides an equivalent level of safety. If a Federal launch range performs the launch operator's... FAA will measure any proposed alternative analysis approach. This appendix also identifies the... control systems; (ix) Steering misalignment; and (x) Winds. (2) Each three-sigma trajectory must account...

14 CFR Appendix A to Part 417 - Flight Safety Analysis Methodologies and Products for a Launch Vehicle Flown With a Flight Safety...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... approach provides an equivalent level of safety. If a Federal launch range performs the launch operator's... FAA will measure any proposed alternative analysis approach. This appendix also identifies the... control systems; (ix) Steering misalignment; and (x) Winds. (2) Each three-sigma trajectory must account...

Autonomous system for launch vehicle range safety

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Ferrell, Bob; Haley, Sam

2001-02-01

The Autonomous Flight Safety System (AFSS) is a launch vehicle subsystem whose ultimate goal is an autonomous capability to assure range safety (people and valuable resources), flight personnel safety, flight assets safety (recovery of valuable vehicles and cargo), and global coverage with a dramatic simplification of range infrastructure. The AFSS is capable of determining current vehicle position and predicting the impact point with respect to flight restriction zones. Additionally, it is able to discern whether or not the launch vehicle is an immediate threat to public safety, and initiate the appropriate range safety response. These features provide for a dramatic cost reduction in range operations and improved reliability of mission success. .

Proposal for Ground Safety Review Coordination at ISS Launch Sites

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Kirkpatrick, Paul D.

2010-01-01

As the transportation of ISS payloads and cargo shifts from KSC to other launch sites, close coordination of ground safety review processes would be of benefit to all parties. The benefit would have the launch sites receiving consistent data that would require less effort to review while still meeting their needs. Until recently, ground safety focus for the ISS program has been almost exclusively for prelaunch processing at KSC/post-landing processing at KSC/DFRC Each launch site, used by the ISS Program, has a ground safety review process. Ground safety viewed as local prerogative. Up till now, ground processing has consisted of low risk/low hazard items; but this will not always be the case. Recent coordination issues associated with the ground safety review of ORU's to be processed at Tanegashima for HTV-2, illustrate that IP ground safety review processes are not well understood by the ISS community at large. Confusion for data providers (US only?). Lack of internal review process for data being submitted to launch sites can lead to inconsistent submittals. NCRs/HRs. Majority of IP ground safety requirements are based upon old KHB 1700.7 (now KNPR 8715.3, Chapter 20). Proposals include: Establish a ground safety working group as part of the MS&MAP. Search for efficiencies in requirements and data submittal processes. Document processes in NSTS 13830/SSP 30599. Each launch site report out its payload ground safety status at the F2F (Monthly's as required). Completions/due dates/NCRs/issues/changes. Establish internal processes for review of ground safety submittals.

14 CFR Appendix A to Part 417 - Flight Safety Analysis Methodologies and Products for a Launch Vehicle Flown With a Flight Safety...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... time duration of the turn and must show increments not to exceed one second. The series of tumble turns... FAA will measure any proposed alternative analysis approach. This appendix also identifies the... approach provides an equivalent level of safety. If a Federal launch range performs the launch operator's...

14 CFR 415.131 - Flight safety system crew data.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Flight safety system crew data. 415.131... Launch Vehicle From a Non-Federal Launch Site § 415.131 Flight safety system crew data. (a) An applicant's safety review document must identify each flight safety system crew position and the role of that...

KSC-00pp1580

NASA Image and Video Library

2000-10-18

In the Training Auditorium at KSC, Brig. General Donald P. Pettit, commander of the 45th Space Wing, speaks to attendees at a presentation for Super Safety and Health Day. Safety Day is a full day of NASA-sponsored, KSC and 45th Space Wing events involving a number of health and safety related activities: Displays, vendors, technical paper sessions, panel discussions, a keynote speaker, etc. The entire Center and Wing stand down to participate in the planned events. Safety Day is held annually to proactively increase awareness in safety and health among the government and contractor workforce population. The first guiding principle at KSC is “Safety and Health First.” KSC’s number one goal is to “Assure sound, safe and efficient practices and processes are in place for privatized/commercialized launch site processing.

KSC00pp1580

NASA Image and Video Library

2000-10-18

In the Training Auditorium at KSC, Brig. General Donald P. Pettit, commander of the 45th Space Wing, speaks to attendees at a presentation for Super Safety and Health Day. Safety Day is a full day of NASA-sponsored, KSC and 45th Space Wing events involving a number of health and safety related activities: Displays, vendors, technical paper sessions, panel discussions, a keynote speaker, etc. The entire Center and Wing stand down to participate in the planned events. Safety Day is held annually to proactively increase awareness in safety and health among the government and contractor workforce population. The first guiding principle at KSC is “Safety and Health First.” KSC’s number one goal is to “Assure sound, safe and efficient practices and processes are in place for privatized/commercialized launch site processing.

CloudSat Safety Operations at Vandenberg AFB

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Greenberg, Steve

2006-01-01

CloudSat safety operations at Vendenberg AFB is given. The topics include: 1) CloudSat Project Overview; 2) Vandenberg Ground Operations; 3) Delta II Launch Vehicle; 4) The A-Train; 5) System Safety Management; 6) CALIPSO Hazards Assessment; 7) CALIPSO Supplemental Safeguards; 8) Joint System Safety Operations; 9) Extended Stand-down; 10) Launch Delay Safety Concerns; and 11) Lessons Learned.

14 CFR 431.33 - Safety organization.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safety organization. 431.33 Section 431.33... Launch and Reentry of a Reusable Launch Vehicle § 431.33 Safety organization. (a) An applicant shall maintain a safety organization and document it by identifying lines of communication and approval authority...

Special investigation report: Commercial space launch incident, launch procedure anomaly orbital sciences corporation PEGASUS/SCD-1, 80 nautical miles east of Cape Canaveral, Florida, February 9, 1993

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

This report explains the procedural anomaly that occurred during the launch sequence of an Orbital Sciences Corporation Pegasus expendable launch vehicle, which was subsequently deployed successfully from an NB-52B airplane, on 9 Feb. 1993. The safety issues discussed in the report include command, control and communications responsibility, launch crew fatigue, launch interphone procedures, efficiency of launch constraints, and the lack of common launch documents. Safety recommendations concerning these issues were made to the Department of Transportation, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the Orbital Sciences Corporation.

Special Investigation Report: Commercial Space Launch Incident, Launch Procedure Anomaly Orbital Sciences Corporation PEGASUS/SCD-1, 80 Nautical Miles East of Cape Canaveral, Florida, February 9, 1993

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

1993-01-01

This report explains the procedural anomaly that occurred during the launch sequence of an Orbital Sciences Corporation Pegasus expendable launch vehicle, which was subsequently deployed successfully from an NB-52B airplane, on 9 Feb. 1993. The safety issues discussed in the report include command, control and communications responsibility, launch crew fatigue, launch interphone procedures, efficiency of launch constraints, and the lack of common launch documents. Safety recommendations concerning these issues were made to the Department of Transportation, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the Orbital Sciences Corporation.

Ensuring Payload Safety in Missions with Special Partnerships

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Staubus, Calvert A.; Willenbring, Rachel C.; Blankenship, Michael D.

2016-01-01

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Expendable Launch Vehicle (ELV) payload space flight missions involve cooperative work between NASA and partners including spacecraft (or payload) contractors, universities, nonprofit research centers, Agency payload organization, Range Safety organization, Agency launch service organizations, and launch vehicle contractors. The role of NASA's Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA) Directorate is typically fairly straightforward, but when a mission's partnerships become more complex, to realize cost and science benefits (e.g., multi-agency payload(s) or cooperative international missions), the task of ensuring payload safety becomes much more challenging. This paper discusses lessons learned from NASA safety professionals working multiple-agency missions and offers suggestions to help fellow safety professionals working multiple-agency missions.

The Forest Service Safety Survey: results from an employee-wide safety attitude survey

Treesearch

Vanessa R. Lane; Ken Cordell; Stanley J. Zarnoch; Gary T. Green; Neelam Poudyal; Susan Fox

2014-01-01

The Forest Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture launched a Safety Journey in 2011 aimed at elevating safety consciousness and practice in the Agency. All employees were required to attend an engagement session during the year to introduce them to the Safety Journey. In September, a survey was launched to help Forest Service leadership better understand employee...

Galileo and Ulysses missions safety analysis and launch readiness status

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Cork, M. Joseph; Turi, James A.

1989-01-01

The Galileo spacecraft, which will release probes to explore the Jupiter system, was launched in October, 1989 as the payload on STS-34, and the Ulysses spacecraft, which will fly by Jupiter en route to a polar orbit of the sun, is presently entering system-test activity in preparation for an October, 1990 launch. This paper reviews the Galileo and Ulysses mission objectives and design approaches and presents details of the missions' safety analysis. The processes used to develop the safety analysis are described and the results of safety tests are presented.

78 FR 77594 - Safety Zone; Barge Launches; Gulfport Lake; Gulfport, MS

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-12-24

... 1625-AA00 Safety Zone; Barge Launches; Gulfport Lake; Gulfport, MS AGENCY: Coast Guard, DHS. ACTION... Lake, Gulfport, MS. This action is necessary for the protection of persons and vessels on navigable waters during the launching of barges in Gulfport Lake, Gulfport, MS, particularly small craft in the...

14 CFR 417.417 - Propellants and explosives.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 417.417 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH SAFETY Ground Safety § 417.417 Propellants and explosives. (a) A launch operator must comply with the explosive safety criteria in part 420 of this chapter. (b) A...

Ares I-X Range Safety Flight Envelope Analysis

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Starr, Brett R.; Olds, Aaron D.; Craig, Anthony S.

2011-01-01

Ares I-X was the first test flight of NASA's Constellation Program's Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle designed to provide manned access to low Earth orbit. As a one-time test flight, the Air Force's 45th Space Wing required a series of Range Safety analysis data products to be developed for the specified launch date and mission trajectory prior to granting flight approval on the Eastern Range. The range safety data package is required to ensure that the public, launch area, and launch complex personnel and resources are provided with an acceptable level of safety and that all aspects of prelaunch and launch operations adhere to applicable public laws. The analysis data products, defined in the Air Force Space Command Manual 91-710, Volume 2, consisted of a nominal trajectory, three sigma trajectory envelopes, stage impact footprints, acoustic intensity contours, trajectory turn angles resulting from potential vehicle malfunctions (including flight software failures), characterization of potential debris, and debris impact footprints. These data products were developed under the auspices of the Constellation's Program Launch Constellation Range Safety Panel and its Range Safety Trajectory Working Group with the intent of beginning the framework for the operational vehicle data products and providing programmatic review and oversight. A multi-center NASA team in conjunction with the 45th Space Wing, collaborated within the Trajectory Working Group forum to define the data product development processes, performed the analyses necessary to generate the data products, and performed independent verification and validation of the data products. This paper outlines the Range Safety data requirements and provides an overview of the processes established to develop both the data products and the individual analyses used to develop the data products, and it summarizes the results of the analyses required for the Ares I-X launch.

Ares I-X Range Safety Analyses Overview

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Starr, Brett R.; Gowan, John W., Jr.; Thompson, Brian G.; Tarpley, Ashley W.

2011-01-01

Ares I-X was the first test flight of NASA's Constellation Program's Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle designed to provide manned access to low Earth orbit. As a one-time test flight, the Air Force's 45th Space Wing required a series of Range Safety analysis data products to be developed for the specified launch date and mission trajectory prior to granting flight approval on the Eastern Range. The range safety data package is required to ensure that the public, launch area, and launch complex personnel and resources are provided with an acceptable level of safety and that all aspects of prelaunch and launch operations adhere to applicable public laws. The analysis data products, defined in the Air Force Space Command Manual 91-710, Volume 2, consisted of a nominal trajectory, three sigma trajectory envelopes, stage impact footprints, acoustic intensity contours, trajectory turn angles resulting from potential vehicle malfunctions (including flight software failures), characterization of potential debris, and debris impact footprints. These data products were developed under the auspices of the Constellation's Program Launch Constellation Range Safety Panel and its Range Safety Trajectory Working Group with the intent of beginning the framework for the operational vehicle data products and providing programmatic review and oversight. A multi-center NASA team in conjunction with the 45th Space Wing, collaborated within the Trajectory Working Group forum to define the data product development processes, performed the analyses necessary to generate the data products, and performed independent verification and validation of the data products. This paper outlines the Range Safety data requirements and provides an overview of the processes established to develop both the data products and the individual analyses used to develop the data products, and it summarizes the results of the analyses required for the Ares I-X launch.

76 FR 33139 - Launch Safety: Lightning Criteria for Expendable Launch Vehicles

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-06-08

... availability and implement changes already adopted by the United States Air Force. DATES: Effective July 25... identify the docket and amendment numbers of this rulemaking. I. Background On August 25, 2006, the FAA... lightning during flight. Licensing and Safety Requirements for Launch, 71 FR 50508 (Aug. 25, 2006). An ELV...

14 CFR 415.127 - Flight safety system design and operation data.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... Expendable Launch Vehicle From a Non-Federal Launch Site § 415.127 Flight safety system design and operation...: flight termination system; command control system; tracking; telemetry; communications; flight safety... control system. (7) Flight termination system component storage, operating, and service life. A listing of...

14 CFR 417.217 - Overflight gate analysis.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Overflight gate analysis. 417.217 Section..., DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH SAFETY Flight Safety Analysis § 417.217 Overflight gate analysis. For a launch that involves flight over a populated or other protected area, the flight safety...

14 CFR 417.117 - Reviews.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... hours of flight. A person, identified as required by § 417.103(b)(1), must review all preflight testing... personnel and the results of flight safety system testing. (iii) Readiness of safety-related launch property... conduct a launch safety review no later than 15 days before the planned day of flight, or as agreed to by...

14 CFR 417.117 - Reviews.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... hours of flight. A person, identified as required by § 417.103(b)(1), must review all preflight testing... personnel and the results of flight safety system testing. (iii) Readiness of safety-related launch property... conduct a launch safety review no later than 15 days before the planned day of flight, or as agreed to by...

14 CFR 417.117 - Reviews.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... hours of flight. A person, identified as required by § 417.103(b)(1), must review all preflight testing... personnel and the results of flight safety system testing. (iii) Readiness of safety-related launch property... conduct a launch safety review no later than 15 days before the planned day of flight, or as agreed to by...

Safety Practices Followed in ISRO Launch Complex- An Overview

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Krishnamurty, V.; Srivastava, V. K.; Ramesh, M.

2005-12-01

The spaceport of India, Satish Dhawan Space Centre (SDSC) SHAR of Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), is located at Sriharikota, a spindle shaped island on the east coast of southern India.SDSC SHAR has a unique combination of facilities, such as a solid propellant production plant, a rocket motor static test facility, launch complexes for different types of rockets, telemetry, telecommand, tracking, data acquisition and processing facilities and other support services.The Solid Propellant Space Booster Plant (SPROB) located at SDSC SHAR produces composite solid propellant for rocket motors of ISRO. The main ingredients of the propellant produced here are ammonium perchlorate (oxidizer), fine aluminium powder (fuel) and hydroxyl terminated polybutadiene (binder).SDSC SHAR has facilities for testing solid rocket motors, both at ambient conditions and at simulated high altitude conditions. Other test facilities for the environmental testing of rocket motors and their subsystems include Vibration, Shock, Constant Acceleration and Thermal / Humidity.SDSC SHAR has the necessary infrastructure for launching satellites into low earth orbit, polar orbit and geo-stationary transfer orbit. The launch complexes provide complete support for vehicle assembly, fuelling with both earth storable and cryogenic propellants, checkout and launch operations. Apart from these, it has facilities for launching sounding rockets for studying the Earth's upper atmosphere and for controlled reentry and recovery of ISRO's space capsule reentry missions.Safety plays a major role at SDSC SHAR right from the mission / facility design phase to post launch operations. This paper presents briefly the infrastructure available at SDSC SHAR of ISRO for launching sounding rockets, satellite launch vehicles, controlled reentry missions and the built in safety systems. The range safety methodology followed as a part of the real time mission monitoring is presented. The built in safety systems provided onboard the launch vehicle are automatic shut off the propulsion system based on real time mission performance and a passivation system incorporated in the orbit insertion stage are highlighted.

Safety And Promotion in the Federal Aviation Administration- Enabling Safe and Successful Commercial Space Transportation

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Repcheck, Randall J.

2010-09-01

The United States Federal Aviation Administration’s Office of Commercial Space Transportation(AST) authorizes the launch and reentry of expendable and reusable launch vehicles and the operation of launch and reentry sites by United States citizens or within the United States. It authorizes these activities consistent with public health and safety, the safety of property, and the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States. In addition to its safety role, AST has the role to encourage, facilitate, and promote commercial space launches and reentries by the private sector. AST’s promotional role includes, among other things, the development of information of interest to industry, the sharing of information of interest through a variety of methods, and serving as an advocate for Commercial Space Transportation within the United States government. This dual safety and promotion role is viewed by some as conflicting. AST views these two roles as complementary, and important for the current state of commercial space transportation. This paper discusses how maintaining a sound safety decision-making process, maintaining a strong safety culture, and taking steps to avoid complacency can together enable safe and successful commercial space transportation.

Implementing instructions for KSC systems and safety training

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

1973-01-01

The requirements for the safety training program are reported for KSC including transportation, inspection, checkout operations, maintenance of launch vehicles, spacecraft, ground support equipment, and launch teams. The responsibilities and mechanics for implementing the program are outlined.

2006 NASA Range Safety Annual Report

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

TenHaken, Ron; Daniels, B.; Becker, M.; Barnes, Zack; Donovan, Shawn; Manley, Brenda

2007-01-01

Throughout 2006, Range Safety was involved in a number of exciting and challenging activities and events, from developing, implementing, and supporting Range Safety policies and procedures-such as the Space Shuttle Launch and Landing Plans, the Range Safety Variance Process, and the Expendable Launch Vehicle Safety Program procedures-to evaluating new technologies. Range Safety training development is almost complete with the last course scheduled to go on line in mid-2007. Range Safety representatives took part in a number of panels and councils, including the newly formed Launch Constellation Range Safety Panel, the Range Commanders Council and its subgroups, the Space Shuttle Range Safety Panel, and the unmanned aircraft systems working group. Space based range safety demonstration and certification (formerly STARS) and the autonomous flight safety system were successfully tested. The enhanced flight termination system will be tested in early 2007 and the joint advanced range safety system mission analysis software tool is nearing operational status. New technologies being evaluated included a processor for real-time compensation in long range imaging, automated range surveillance using radio interferometry, and a space based range command and telemetry processor. Next year holds great promise as we continue ensuring safety while pursuing our quest beyond the Moon to Mars.

Public Risk Criteria and Rationale for Commercial Launch and Reentry

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Wilde, P. D.

2012-01-01

This paper summarizes the rationale for risk criteria intended to protect the public during commercial spaceflight, including launch, reentry, and suborbital missions. The recommended approach includes: (1) safety goals to guide periodic updates of the quantitative collective risk limits if warranted based on the quantity of launch and reentry missions; the demonstrated safety record and benefits provided; technological capabilities and maturity of the industry; and contemporary attitudes about the risks from commercial space transportation; (2) separate limits on the risks from each type of mission with explicit definitions of the extent of launch and reentry missions; and (3) quantitative risk limits consistent with the safety goals. For current conditions, the author's recommends (a) maximum of 1E-6 probability of casualty per-mission (b) a maximum of 100E-6 expected casualties per-mission, and (c) equal per-mission risk limits for orbital and suborbital launches, as well as controlled and uncontrolled reentries.

Study of safety implications for shuttle launched spacecraft using fluorinated oxidizers. Volume 2: Executive summary

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

1975-01-01

An abbreviated version of the conclusions dealing with the safety implications of using liquid fluorinated oxidizers on space shuttle launched spacecraft was presented. The complete version was presented in volume 1.

Analysis of pharmaceutical safety-related regulatory actions in Japan: do tradeoffs exist between safer drugs and launch delay?

PubMed

Yamada, Toru; Kusama, Makiko; Hirai, Yuka; Arnold, Frank; Sugiyama, Yuichi; Ono, Shunsuke

2010-12-01

Prediction and management of drug safety is a global regulatory issue. Safety-related regulatory actions (SRRAs) are taken mostly when unexpected adverse drug reactions occur. Currently, Japan is reconciled to delayed access to new drugs (ie, launch delay compared to Western countries), but may have been benefiting by free-riding on safety data accumulated in other countries prior to Japanese launch. To identify factors that are significantly associated with SRRAs, and to discuss the challenges that Japan might have to face with increasing access to new drugs. The SRRAs of 135 new drugs approved from January 2000 to December 2005 were analyzed to investigate association with launch lag, company and drug characteristics, market size, submission data, and regulatory status. SRRAs were measured in terms of the number of emergency safety information notifications and official safety instructions issued by the Japanese regulatory agency within 3 years after approval. A negative binomial distribution model was used for regression analysis. Longer launch lags and presence of drugs with similar modes of action were associated with fewer SRRAs. Bridging strategy showed increased SRRAs. No significant association was observed between SRRAs and the subject number in clinical data packages. Occurrence of SRRAs was varied among development strategy, preceding products, and regional regulations. The occurrence of SRRAs was associated with the accumulation of both foreign and domestic postmarketing evidence rather than with clinical trial data upon launch. Considering the paradigm shift to simultaneous global drug development and filing for regulatory approval, this study indicates the importance of intensive data collection in the early postmarketing phase and use of safety information in early markets. However, even if we would be sufficiently cautious about safety risks of new drugs, a population that enjoys first-in-class drugs probably has to bear the risks.

14 CFR 415.133 - Safety at end of launch.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safety at end of launch. 415.133 Section 415.133 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION... stage or component that will reach Earth orbit. ...

14 CFR 401.5 - Definitions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

.... Expendable launch vehicle means a launch vehicle whose propulsive stages are flown only once. Experimental... during a launch or reentry. Flight safety system means a system designed to limit or restrict the hazards... States. Launch includes the flight of a launch vehicle and includes pre- and post-flight ground...

14 CFR 401.5 - Definitions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

.... Expendable launch vehicle means a launch vehicle whose propulsive stages are flown only once. Experimental... during a launch or reentry. Flight safety system means a system designed to limit or restrict the hazards... States. Launch includes the flight of a launch vehicle and includes pre- and post-flight ground...

14 CFR 401.5 - Definitions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

.... Expendable launch vehicle means a launch vehicle whose propulsive stages are flown only once. Experimental... during a launch or reentry. Flight safety system means a system designed to limit or restrict the hazards... States. Launch includes the flight of a launch vehicle and includes pre- and post-flight ground...

Joint Ordnance Test Procedure (JOTP)-010 Safety and Suitability for Service Assessment Testing for Shoulder Launched Munitions

DTIC Science & Technology

2016-05-09

electromagnetic environment for which they are designed to be used. These tests are performed on a powered weapon during simulated normal operation and are...010B SAFETY AND SUITABILITY FOR SERVICE ASSESSMENT TESTING FOR SHOULDER LAUNCHED MUNITIONS Joint Services Munition Safety Test Working Group JOTP...12 6.8 Test Sample Quantities .......................................................... 13 7. PRE- AND POST - TEST INSPECTIONS

14 CFR 417.111 - Launch plans.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... controls identified by a launch operator's ground safety analysis and implementation of the ground safety.... (ii) For each toxic propellant, any hazard controls and process constraints determined under the... classification and compatibility group as defined by part 420 of this chapter. (3) A graphic depiction of the...

Evolution of area access safety training required for gaining access to Space Shuttle launch and landing facilities

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Willams, M. C.

1985-01-01

Assuring personnel and equipment are fully protected during the Space Shuttle launch and landing operations has been a primary concern of NASA and its associated contractors since the inception of the program. A key factor in support of this policy has been the area access safety training requirements for badging of employees assigned to work on Space Shuttle Launch and Facilities. This requirement was targeted for possible cost savings and the transition of physical on-site walkdowns to the use of television tapes has realized program cost savings while continuing to fully satisfy the area access safety training requirements.

Patient safety in thoracic surgery and European Society of Thoracic Surgeons checklist.

PubMed

Novoa, Nuria M

2015-04-01

Improving patient safety seems to be a new interesting clinical subject but, in fact, it is no new. It has to do with one of the oldest ethical principles of our profession: curing and not harming. The important research that has been done in a short period of time has brought in new insight to this complex area that is fast developing. The creation of safety managing systems will allow coordinating efforts from very different, although complementary, areas to create real safety culture and safety climate in every organization. In the surgical settings, teamwork is basic to provide good quality of care. Safety leaders in every team have an important role in establishing priorities, summarizing proposals, coordinating efforts, launching new initiatives and transmitting that safety efforts are worth taken. Preparedness and anticipation are key points for avoiding most of the diverse types of patient harm that can occur. As has been published, a great number of errors can be avoided simply using crosscheck based on specialized checklist that reviews every important detail of the procedure. This strategy has been demonstrated very useful at other high risk industries such as aviation, nuclear or food management. The Safe Surgery Saves Lives program launched in 2002 by the WHO has taught us that improvement is possible using a simple checklist. More complex and detail checklist can be more adequate for more complex procedures and settings. The proposed ESTS checklist reviews different areas of possible error in deeper detail allowing the finest adjustment of the patient before the skin incision. It has been recently released to the general thoracic community and monitors its use and usefulness has to be warrantied.

14 CFR 417.123 - Computing systems and software.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Computing systems and software. 417.123... systems and software. (a) A launch operator must document a system safety process that identifies the... systems and software. (b) A launch operator must identify all safety-critical functions associated with...

14 CFR 417.123 - Computing systems and software.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Computing systems and software. 417.123... systems and software. (a) A launch operator must document a system safety process that identifies the... systems and software. (b) A launch operator must identify all safety-critical functions associated with...

14 CFR 415.123 - Computing systems and software.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Computing systems and software. 415.123... Launch Vehicle From a Non-Federal Launch Site § 415.123 Computing systems and software. (a) An applicant's safety review document must describe all computing systems and software that perform a safety...

14 CFR 415.123 - Computing systems and software.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Computing systems and software. 415.123... Launch Vehicle From a Non-Federal Launch Site § 415.123 Computing systems and software. (a) An applicant's safety review document must describe all computing systems and software that perform a safety...

14 CFR 417.123 - Computing systems and software.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Computing systems and software. 417.123... systems and software. (a) A launch operator must document a system safety process that identifies the... systems and software. (b) A launch operator must identify all safety-critical functions associated with...

14 CFR 417.123 - Computing systems and software.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Computing systems and software. 417.123... systems and software. (a) A launch operator must document a system safety process that identifies the... systems and software. (b) A launch operator must identify all safety-critical functions associated with...

14 CFR 417.123 - Computing systems and software.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Computing systems and software. 417.123... systems and software. (a) A launch operator must document a system safety process that identifies the... systems and software. (b) A launch operator must identify all safety-critical functions associated with...

14 CFR 415.123 - Computing systems and software.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Computing systems and software. 415.123... Launch Vehicle From a Non-Federal Launch Site § 415.123 Computing systems and software. (a) An applicant's safety review document must describe all computing systems and software that perform a safety...

14 CFR 415.123 - Computing systems and software.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Computing systems and software. 415.123... Launch Vehicle From a Non-Federal Launch Site § 415.123 Computing systems and software. (a) An applicant's safety review document must describe all computing systems and software that perform a safety...

14 CFR 415.123 - Computing systems and software.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Computing systems and software. 415.123... Launch Vehicle From a Non-Federal Launch Site § 415.123 Computing systems and software. (a) An applicant's safety review document must describe all computing systems and software that perform a safety...

14 CFR 415.39 - Safety at end of launch.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safety at end of launch. 415.39 Section 415.39 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT... component that will reach Earth orbit. [Doc. No. FAA-2000-7953, 71 FR 50531, Aug. 25, 2006] ...

14 CFR 401.5 - Definitions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... once. Experimental permit or permit means an authorization by the FAA to a person to launch or reenter... designed to limit or restrict the hazards to public health and safety and the safety of property presented... vehicle and includes pre- and post-flight ground operations as follows: (1) Beginning of launch. (i) Under...

14 CFR 401.5 - Definitions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... once. Experimental permit or permit means an authorization by the FAA to a person to launch or reenter... designed to limit or restrict the hazards to public health and safety and the safety of property presented... vehicle and includes pre- and post-flight ground operations as follows: (1) Beginning of launch. (i) Under...

14 CFR 415.109 - Launch description.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

...) Identification of any facilities at the launch site that will be used for launch processing and flight. (b... dimensions and weight; (iii) Location of all safety critical systems, including any flight termination hardware, tracking aids, or telemetry systems; (iv) Location of all major launch vehicle control systems...

14 CFR 415.109 - Launch description.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

...) Identification of any facilities at the launch site that will be used for launch processing and flight. (b... dimensions and weight; (iii) Location of all safety critical systems, including any flight termination hardware, tracking aids, or telemetry systems; (iv) Location of all major launch vehicle control systems...

14 CFR 415.109 - Launch description.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

...) Identification of any facilities at the launch site that will be used for launch processing and flight. (b... dimensions and weight; (iii) Location of all safety critical systems, including any flight termination hardware, tracking aids, or telemetry systems; (iv) Location of all major launch vehicle control systems...

Debris Dispersion Model Using Java 3D

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Thirumalainambi, Rajkumar; Bardina, Jorge

2004-01-01

This paper describes web based simulation of Shuttle launch operations and debris dispersion. Java 3D graphics provides geometric and visual content with suitable mathematical model and behaviors of Shuttle launch. Because the model is so heterogeneous and interrelated with various factors, 3D graphics combined with physical models provides mechanisms to understand the complexity of launch and range operations. The main focus in the modeling and simulation covers orbital dynamics and range safety. Range safety areas include destruct limit lines, telemetry and tracking and population risk near range. If there is an explosion of Shuttle during launch, debris dispersion is explained. The shuttle launch and range operations in this paper are discussed based on the operations from Kennedy Space Center, Florida, USA.

The safety review and approval process for space nuclear power sources

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Bennett, G.L.

1991-01-01

Over the past 30 yr. the U.S. Government has evolved a process for the safety review and launch approval of nuclear power sources (NPSs) proposed for launch into space. This process, which involves a number of governmental agencies, ensures that the various postulated accident scenarios are considered, that the responses of the NPSs to the accident environments are assessed, and that appropriate elements of the Federal Government are involved in the launch approval. This process has worked very well in the successful launches of 37 radioisotope thermoelectric generators and 1 reactor by the United States since 1961. Particular attention willmore » be focused on the recent launch of the Galileo spacecraft. 19 refs., 12 figs., 4 tabs.« less

Probability of Failure Analysis Standards and Guidelines for Expendable Launch Vehicles

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Wilde, Paul D.; Morse, Elisabeth L.; Rosati, Paul; Cather, Corey

2013-09-01

Recognizing the central importance of probability of failure estimates to ensuring public safety for launches, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Office of Commercial Space Transportation (AST), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and U.S. Air Force (USAF), through the Common Standards Working Group (CSWG), developed a guide for conducting valid probability of failure (POF) analyses for expendable launch vehicles (ELV), with an emphasis on POF analysis for new ELVs. A probability of failure analysis for an ELV produces estimates of the likelihood of occurrence of potentially hazardous events, which are critical inputs to launch risk analysis of debris, toxic, or explosive hazards. This guide is intended to document a framework for POF analyses commonly accepted in the US, and should be useful to anyone who performs or evaluates launch risk analyses for new ELVs. The CSWG guidelines provide performance standards and definitions of key terms, and are being revised to address allocation to flight times and vehicle response modes. The POF performance standard allows a launch operator to employ alternative, potentially innovative methodologies so long as the results satisfy the performance standard. Current POF analysis practice at US ranges includes multiple methodologies described in the guidelines as accepted methods, but not necessarily the only methods available to demonstrate compliance with the performance standard. The guidelines include illustrative examples for each POF analysis method, which are intended to illustrate an acceptable level of fidelity for ELV POF analyses used to ensure public safety. The focus is on providing guiding principles rather than "recipe lists." Independent reviews of these guidelines were performed to assess their logic, completeness, accuracy, self- consistency, consistency with risk analysis practices, use of available information, and ease of applicability. The independent reviews confirmed the general validity of the performance standard approach and suggested potential updates to improve the accuracy each of the example methods, especially to address reliability growth.

76 FR 43825 - Launch Safety: Lightning Criteria for Expendable Launch Vehicles

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-07-22

... Vehicles AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT. ACTION: Direct final rule; Confirmation of... launch vehicle through or near an electrified environment in or near a cloud. These changes also increase...

Loosely Coupled GPS-Aided Inertial Navigation System for Range Safety

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Heatwole, Scott; Lanzi, Raymond J.

2010-01-01

The Autonomous Flight Safety System (AFSS) aims to replace the human element of range safety operations, as well as reduce reliance on expensive, downrange assets for launches of expendable launch vehicles (ELVs). The system consists of multiple navigation sensors and flight computers that provide a highly reliable platform. It is designed to ensure that single-event failures in a flight computer or sensor will not bring down the whole system. The flight computer uses a rules-based structure derived from range safety requirements to make decisions whether or not to destroy the rocket.

KSC-2011-1050

NASA Image and Video Library

2011-01-07

CAPE CANAVERAL, Fla. -- In the Launch Control Center at NASA's Kennedy Space Center in Florida, United Space Alliance Safety Engineer Dwayne Thompson, left, and NASA Safety Engineer Dallas McCarter rehearse procedures for the liftoff of space shuttle Discovery's final mission with other STS-133 launch team members in Firing Room 4. The team at Kennedy also participated in launch simulations with personnel at NASA's Johnson Space Center in Houston. Discovery's next launch opportunity to the International Space Station on the STS-133 mission is planned for no earlier than Feb. 24. For more information on STS-133, visit www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/shuttle/shuttlemissions/sts133/. Photo credit: NASA/Kim Shiflett

Deep Impact Delta II Launch Vehicle Cracked Thick Film Coating on Electronic Packages Technical Consultation Report

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Cameron, Kenneth D.; Kichak, Robert A.; Piascik, Robert S.; Leidecker, Henning W.; Wilson, Timmy R.

2009-01-01

The Deep Impact spacecraft was launched on a Boeing Delta II rocket from Cape Canaveral Air Force Station (CCAFS) on January 12, 2005. Prior to the launch, the Director of the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OS&MA) requested the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) lead a team to render an independent opinion on the rationale for flight and the risk code assignments for the hazard of cracked Thick Film Assemblies (TFAs) in the E-packages of the Delta II launch vehicle for the Deep Impact Mission. The results of the evaluation are contained in this report.

Automating Range Surveillance Through Radio Interferometry and Field Strength Mapping Techniques

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

2008-01-01

Space vehicle launches are often delayed because of the challenge of verifying that the range is clear, and such delays are likely to become more prevalent as more and more new spaceports are built. Range surveillance is one of the primary focuses of Range Safety for launches and often drives costs and schedules. As NASA's primary launch operation center, Kennedy Space Center is very interested in new technologies that increase the responsiveness of radio frequency (RF) surveillance systems. These systems help Range Safety personnel clear the range by identifying, pinpointing, and resolving any unknown sources of RF emissions prior to each launch.

ULA Emergency Egress System (EES) Demonstration

NASA Image and Video Library

2017-03-14

A team of engineers recently tested a newly installed emergency egress system at Space Launch Complex 41 at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station to prepare for crew launches for NASA’s Commercial Crew Program. Boeing’s CST-100 Starliner spacecraft and United Launch Alliance Atlas V rocket that will boost astronauts to the International Space Station, will have many safety elements built into the systems. The Starliner emergency egress system operates a lot like a zip line, with four egress cables connecting at level 12 of the Crew Access Tower to a landing zone about 1,300 feet away from the launch vehicle. Five individual seats on four separate lines can transport up to 20 people off of the tower in the unlikely event there is an emergency on the launch pad. NASA has partnered with private industry to take astronauts to the space station. Boeing and SpaceX are building their own unique systems that meet NASA safety and mission requirements. The systems also will include launch abort systems and additional controls that astronauts can use during flight to enhance crew safety. KSC Contact - Joshua Finch (321)867-2468 Headquarters Contact - Tabatha Thompson (202)358-1100 More Info - www.nasa.gov/commercialcrew

The Role of Probabilistic Design Analysis Methods in Safety and Affordability

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Safie, Fayssal M.

2016-01-01

For the last several years, NASA and its contractors have been working together to build space launch systems to commercialize space. Developing commercial affordable and safe launch systems becomes very important and requires a paradigm shift. This paradigm shift enforces the need for an integrated systems engineering environment where cost, safety, reliability, and performance need to be considered to optimize the launch system design. In such an environment, rule based and deterministic engineering design practices alone may not be sufficient to optimize margins and fault tolerance to reduce cost. As a result, introduction of Probabilistic Design Analysis (PDA) methods to support the current deterministic engineering design practices becomes a necessity to reduce cost without compromising reliability and safety. This paper discusses the importance of PDA methods in NASA's new commercial environment, their applications, and the key role they can play in designing reliable, safe, and affordable launch systems. More specifically, this paper discusses: 1) The involvement of NASA in PDA 2) Why PDA is needed 3) A PDA model structure 4) A PDA example application 5) PDA link to safety and affordability.

Autonomous Flight Safety System - Phase III

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

2008-01-01

The Autonomous Flight Safety System (AFSS) is a joint KSC and Wallops Flight Facility project that uses tracking and attitude data from onboard Global Positioning System (GPS) and inertial measurement unit (IMU) sensors and configurable rule-based algorithms to make flight termination decisions. AFSS objectives are to increase launch capabilities by permitting launches from locations without range safety infrastructure, reduce costs by eliminating some downrange tracking and communication assets, and reduce the reaction time for flight termination decisions.

Safety and Suitability for Service Assessment Testing for Aircraft Launched Munitions

DTIC Science & Technology

2013-07-01

2013 12 benefits in terms of cost and test efficiency that tend to associate the Analytical S3 Test Approach with complex missile systems and the... systems containing expensive, non-safety related components. c. When using the Analytical S3 Test Approach for aircraft launched bombs, full BTCA is...establish safety margin of the system . Details of the Empirical Test Flow with full and reduced BTCA options are provided in Appendix B, Annexes 3 and

Design for Reliability and Safety Approach for the New NASA Launch Vehicle

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Safie, Fayssal M.; Weldon, Danny M.

2007-01-01

The United States National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is in the midst of a space exploration program intended for sending crew and cargo to the international Space Station (ISS), to the moon, and beyond. This program is called Constellation. As part of the Constellation program, NASA is developing new launch vehicles aimed at significantly increase safety and reliability, reduce the cost of accessing space, and provide a growth path for manned space exploration. Achieving these goals requires a rigorous process that addresses reliability, safety, and cost upfront and throughout all the phases of the life cycle of the program. This paper discusses the "Design for Reliability and Safety" approach for the NASA new launch vehicles, the ARES I and ARES V. Specifically, the paper addresses the use of an integrated probabilistic functional analysis to support the design analysis cycle and a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) to support the preliminary design and beyond.

Autonomous Flight Safety System

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Ferrell, Bob; Santuro, Steve; Simpson, James; Zoerner, Roger; Bull, Barton; Lanzi, Jim

2004-01-01

Autonomous Flight Safety System (AFSS) is an independent flight safety system designed for small to medium sized expendable launch vehicles launching from or needing range safety protection while overlying relatively remote locations. AFSS replaces the need for a man-in-the-loop to make decisions for flight termination. AFSS could also serve as the prototype for an autonomous manned flight crew escape advisory system. AFSS utilizes onboard sensors and processors to emulate the human decision-making process using rule-based software logic and can dramatically reduce safety response time during critical launch phases. The Range Safety flight path nominal trajectory, its deviation allowances, limit zones and other flight safety rules are stored in the onboard computers. Position, velocity and attitude data obtained from onboard global positioning system (GPS) and inertial navigation system (INS) sensors are compared with these rules to determine the appropriate action to ensure that people and property are not jeopardized. The final system will be fully redundant and independent with multiple processors, sensors, and dead man switches to prevent inadvertent flight termination. AFSS is currently in Phase III which includes updated algorithms, integrated GPS/INS sensors, large scale simulation testing and initial aircraft flight testing.

Perspectives of The Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Panel (INSRP) on future nuclear powered space missions

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Gray, L.B.; Pyatt, D.W.; Sholtis, J.A.

1993-01-10

The Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Panel (INSRP) has provided reviews of all nuclear powered spacecraft launched by the United States. The two most recent launches were Ulysses in 1990 and Galileo in 1989. One reactor was launched in 1965 (SNAP-10A). All other U.S. space missions have utilized radioisotopic thermoelectric generators (RTGs). There are several missions in the next few years that are to be nuclear powered, including one that would utilize the Topaz II reactor purchased from Russia. INSRP must realign itself to perform parallel safety assessments of a reactor powered space mission, which has not been done in aboutmore » thirty years, and RTG powered missions.« less

Safety Considerations in the Ground Environment

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Kirkpatrick, Paul D.; Palo, Thomas E.

2007-01-01

In the history of humankind, every great space adventure has begun on the ground. While this seems to be stating the obvious, mission and spacecraft designers who have overlooked this fact have paid a high price, either in loss or damage to the spacecraft pre-launch, or in mission failure or reduction. Spacecraft personnel may risk not only their flight hardware, but they may also risk their lives, their co-workers lives and even the general public by not heeding safety on the ground. Their eyes may be on the stars but their feet are on the ground! One additional comment: Although the design requirements are very different for human rated and nonhuman rated flight hardware, while on the ground that flight hardware (and its ground support equipment) doesn't care about what it is flying on. On the ground, additional requirements are often levied to protect the work force and general public. (Authors' Note: The source material for this chapter is primarily taken from the Kennedy Space Center Handbook (KHB) 1700.7/45 SW Handbook S-100 Space Shuttle Payload Ground Safety Handbook and the authors' personal experiences.

Public Safety Standards for the Launch and Entry of Spacecraft

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Wilde, Paul; Van Suetendael, Richard; Hallock, James; Larson, Erik

2005-12-01

This paper describes elements of the US government's response to the Space Shuttle Columbia accident and other actions recently taken, relevant to public safety during launch and entry of spacecraft. The Columbia accident generated numerous debris impacts capable of causing public harm, including major property damage as well as serious injury to members of the public on the ground, in aircraft, and on waterborne vessels. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) commissioned an analysis by ACTA Inc. that found the lack of reported casualties on the ground was a reasonably expected result based on the recovered debris data, census data, and mathematical methods consistent with current standards for launch debris risk analyses. [1, 2] A more detailed aircraft risk analysis, funded by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), used the actual records of aircraft activity at the time of the accident, and found that the probability of an impact by Columbia debris to commercial aircraft in the vicinity was at least one in a thousand, and the chance of an impact to general aviation was at least one in a hundred. [3] After FAA executives were briefed about the potential for aircraft impacts during the Columbia accident, and the challenges presented by integration of innovative vehicles such as SpaceShipOne into the National Airspace System (NAS), the FAA began to investigate a decision support tool to better manage the interface of space and air traffic in the future. In addition, the FAA asked the Common Standards Working Group (CSWG) to investigate risk and air traffic management issues that arise in the event of space vehicle accidents and to develop safety standards to govern the interface between space and air traffic. Most recently, the FAA funded a study of aircraft risk around operating areas for future flights of suborbital rockets that may be authorized by an Experimental Permit (EP). Congress mandated that the FAA develop the EP regime as a streamlined regulatory mechanism relative to a launch license to facilitate research and development tests of reusable suborbital rockets. In response to this Congressional mandate, the FAA has taken a clean sheet look at public risks from launch, including risks to people on the ground, in aircraft, or waterborne vessels of any kind. As a result, several qualitative guiding principles for public safety were formulated that can be used to establish specific quantitative requirements to demonstrate adequate public protection. This paper discusses such efforts made by the US government in response to the Columbia accident, and proposes possible performance standards and safety requirements for public safety based on recent work sponsored by the FAA. For example, this paper presents an analysis of data on aircraft accidents, including serious injuries and fatalities on-board and on the ground, and proposes quantitative safety requirements that would demonstrate compliance with the following performance standard: for any individual not involved in the mission, but participating in a voluntary activity that increases their background risk (such as traveling in an aircraft or waterborne vessel), the chances of casualty resulting from the mission should be no greater than the background risk associated with the voluntary activity.

Hard and Soft Safety Verifications

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Wetherholt, Jon; Anderson, Brenda

2012-01-01

The purpose of this paper is to examine the differences between and the effects of hard and soft safety verifications. Initially, the terminology should be defined and clarified. A hard safety verification is datum which demonstrates how a safety control is enacted. An example of this is relief valve testing. A soft safety verification is something which is usually described as nice to have but it is not necessary to prove safe operation. An example of a soft verification is the loss of the Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) casings from Shuttle flight, STS-4. When the main parachutes failed, the casings impacted the water and sank. In the nose cap of the SRBs, video cameras recorded the release of the parachutes to determine safe operation and to provide information for potential anomaly resolution. Generally, examination of the casings and nozzles contributed to understanding of the newly developed boosters and their operation. Safety verification of SRB operation was demonstrated by examination for erosion or wear of the casings and nozzle. Loss of the SRBs and associated data did not delay the launch of the next Shuttle flight.

New initiatives for pharmacovigilance in South Korea: introducing the Korea Institute of Drug Safety and Risk Management (KIDS).

PubMed

Shin, Ju-Young; Jung, Sun-Young; Ahn, So-Hyeon; Lee, Shin Haeng; Kim, Su-Jin; Seong, Jong-Mi; Chung, Soo-Youn; Park, Byung-Joo

2014-11-01

Pharmacovigilance plays a vital role in ensuring that patients receive appropriate medical products that are safe and effective. This paper aims to describe the history of pharmacovigilance in Korea and introduce the establishment and goal of the KIDS. In Korea, the adverse drug reactions (ADR) reporting system was launched in 1988 by the Korea Ministry of Food and Drug Safety (MFDS) and spontaneous ADR reports have been collected from health care professionals and the general public. Although the ADR reporting system has begun, the reporting rate was very low in the first 10 years, and safety actions were done passively in response to the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) or European Medicines Agency (EMA)'s safety alert and communications. Therefore, the Korea Institute of Drug Safety and Risk Management (KIDS) was established in April 2012 as a new initiative for pharmacovigilance. The KIDS will continue to contribute to the improvement of Korean pharmacovigilance by collecting, managing, and analyzing consumer-centered drug safety information. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

The Virginia Space Flight Center model for an integrated federal/commercial launch range

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Reed, Billie M.

2000-01-01

Until 1998, the federal government has been the predominant purchaser of space launches in the U.S. through the purchase of hardware and services. Historically, the government provided the necessary infrastructure for launches from the federal DoD and NASA launch ranges. In this historical model, the federal government had complete ownership, responsibility, liability, and expense for launch activities. In 1998, commercial space launches accounted for 60% of U.S. launches. This growth in commercial launches has increased the demand for launch range services. However, the expense, complexity of activities, and issues over certification of flight safety have deterred the establishment of purely commercial launch sites, with purely commercial being defined as without benefit of capabilities provided by the federal government. Provisions of the Commercial Space Launch Act have enabled DoD and NASA to support commercial launches from government launch ranges on a cost-reimbursable, non-interference basis. The government provides services including use of facilities, tracking and data services, and range and flight safety. In the 1990's, commercial space market projections indicated strong potential for large numbers of commercial satellites to be launched well into the first decade of the 21st century. In response to this significant opportunity for economic growth, several states established spaceports to provide the services necessary to meet these forecast commercial needs. In 1997, NASA agreed to the establishment of the Virginia Space Flight Center (VSFC), a commercial spaceport, at its Wallops Flight Facility. Under this arrangement, NASA agreed to allow the Virginia Commercial Space Flight Authority (VCSFA) to construct facilities on NASA property and agreed to provide launch range and other services in accordance with the Space Act and Commercial Space Launch Act in support of VSFC launch customers. A partnership relationship between NASA and VCSFA has emerged which pairs the strengths of the established NASA Test Range and the state-sponsored, commercial launch facility provider in an attempt to satisfy the needs for flexible, low-cost access to space. The continued viability of the VSFC and other commercial spaceports depend upon access to a space launch and re-entry range safety system that assures the public safety and is accepted by the public and government as authoritative and reliable. DoD and NASA budget problems have resulted in deteriorating services and reliability at federal ranges and has caused fear with respect to their ability to service the growing commercial market. Numerous high level studies have been conducted or are in progress that illuminate the deficiencies. No federal agency has been provided the necessary funding or authority to address the nations diminishing space launch capability. It is questionable as to whether the U.S. can continue to compete in the global space launch market unless these domestic space access problems are rapidly corrected. This paper discusses a potential solution to the lack of a coordinated response in the U.S. to the challenge presented by the global market for space launch facilities and services. .

14 CFR 415.119 - Launch plans.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Launch plans. 415.119 Section 415.119... From a Non-Federal Launch Site § 415.119 Launch plans. An applicant's safety review document must contain the plans required by § 417.111 of this chapter, except for the countdown plan of § 417.111(l) of...

14 CFR 414.11 - Application.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... the safety element for which the safety approval is sought. (ii) Engineering design and analyses that... TRANSPORTATION LICENSING SAFETY APPROVALS Application Procedures § 414.11 Application. (a) The application must...) Safety element (i.e., launch vehicle, reentry vehicle, safety system, process, service, or any identified...

14 CFR 414.11 - Application.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... the safety element for which the safety approval is sought. (ii) Engineering design and analyses that... TRANSPORTATION LICENSING SAFETY APPROVALS Application Procedures § 414.11 Application. (a) The application must...) Safety element (i.e., launch vehicle, reentry vehicle, safety system, process, service, or any identified...

14 CFR 414.11 - Application.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... the safety element for which the safety approval is sought. (ii) Engineering design and analyses that... TRANSPORTATION LICENSING SAFETY APPROVALS Application Procedures § 414.11 Application. (a) The application must...) Safety element (i.e., launch vehicle, reentry vehicle, safety system, process, service, or any identified...

14 CFR 415.115 - Flight safety.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Flight safety. 415.115 Section 415.115... From a Non-Federal Launch Site § 415.115 Flight safety. (a) Flight safety analysis. An applicant's safety review document must describe each analysis method employed to meet the flight safety analysis...

14 CFR 415.115 - Flight safety.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Flight safety. 415.115 Section 415.115... From a Non-Federal Launch Site § 415.115 Flight safety. (a) Flight safety analysis. An applicant's safety review document must describe each analysis method employed to meet the flight safety analysis...

14 CFR 415.115 - Flight safety.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Flight safety. 415.115 Section 415.115... From a Non-Federal Launch Site § 415.115 Flight safety. (a) Flight safety analysis. An applicant's safety review document must describe each analysis method employed to meet the flight safety analysis...

14 CFR 415.115 - Flight safety.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Flight safety. 415.115 Section 415.115... From a Non-Federal Launch Site § 415.115 Flight safety. (a) Flight safety analysis. An applicant's safety review document must describe each analysis method employed to meet the flight safety analysis...

14 CFR 415.115 - Flight safety.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Flight safety. 415.115 Section 415.115... From a Non-Federal Launch Site § 415.115 Flight safety. (a) Flight safety analysis. An applicant's safety review document must describe each analysis method employed to meet the flight safety analysis...

Advanced missions safety. Volume 3: Appendices. Part 1: Space shuttle rescue capability

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

1972-01-01

The space shuttle rescue capability is analyzed as a part of the advanced mission safety study. The subjects discussed are: (1) mission evaluation, (2) shuttle configurations and performance, (3) performance of shuttle-launched tug system, (4) multiple pass grazing reentry from lunar orbit, (5) ground launched ascent and rendezvous time, (6) cost estimates, and (7) parallel-burn space shuttle configuration.

14 CFR 414.11 - Application.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

...) Safety element (i.e., launch vehicle, reentry vehicle, safety system, process, service, or any identified... operating limits for which the safety approval is sought. (3) The following as applicable: (i) Information... the safety element for which the safety approval is sought. (ii) Engineering design and analyses that...

14 CFR 414.11 - Application.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

...) Safety element (i.e., launch vehicle, reentry vehicle, safety system, process, service, or any identified... operating limits for which the safety approval is sought. (3) The following as applicable: (i) Information... the safety element for which the safety approval is sought. (ii) Engineering design and analyses that...

Request for Naval Reactors Comment on Proposed Prometheus Space Flight Nuclear Reactor High Tier Reactor Safety Requirements and for Naval Reactors Approval to Transmit These Requirements to JPL

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

D. Kokkinos

2005-04-28

The purpose of this letter is to request Naval Reactors comments on the nuclear reactor high tier requirements for the PROMETHEUS space flight reactor design, pre-launch operations, launch, ascent, operation, and disposal, and to request Naval Reactors approval to transmit these requirements to Jet Propulsion Laboratory to ensure consistency between the reactor safety requirements and the spacecraft safety requirements. The proposed PROMETHEUS nuclear reactor high tier safety requirements are consistent with the long standing safety culture of the Naval Reactors Program and its commitment to protecting the health and safety of the public and the environment. In addition, the philosophymore » on which these requirements are based is consistent with the Nuclear Safety Policy Working Group recommendations on space nuclear propulsion safety (Reference 1), DOE Nuclear Safety Criteria and Specifications for Space Nuclear Reactors (Reference 2), the Nuclear Space Power Safety and Facility Guidelines Study of the Applied Physics Laboratory.« less

Adverse events following immunisation with a meningococcal serogroup B vaccine: report from post-marketing surveillance, Germany, 2013 to 2016.

PubMed

Mentzer, Dirk; Oberle, Doris; Keller-Stanislawski, Brigitte

2018-04-01

Background and aimIn January 2013, a novel vaccine against Neisseria meningitidis serogroup B, the multicomponent meningococcal serogroup B vaccine (4CMenB), was approved by the European Medicines Agency. We aimed to evaluate the safety profile of this vaccine. Methods: All adverse events following immunisation (AEFI) reported from Germany since the vaccine's launch in Germany in November 2013 through December 2016 were reviewed and analysed. Results: Through December 2016, a total of 664 individual case safety reports (ICSR) notifying 1,960 AEFI were received. A majority of vaccinees for whom AEFI were reported were children 2 to 11 years of age (n = 280; 42.2%) followed by infants and toddlers aged 28 days to 23 months (n = 170; 25.6%). General disorders and administration site conditions was the System Organ Class (SOC) with the majority of AEFI (n = 977; 49.8%), followed by nervous system disorders (n = 249; 12.7%), and skin and subcutaneous tissue disorders (n = 191; 9.7%). Screening of patient records for immune-mediated and neurological diseases did not raise any safety signal in terms of an increased proportional reporting ratio (PRR). Conclusions: The safety profile described in the Summary of Product Characteristics, in general, is confirmed by data from spontaneous reporting. No safety concerns were identified.

4. GENERAL VIEW OF LAUNCH PAD B FROM LAUNCH PAD ...

Library of Congress Historic Buildings Survey, Historic Engineering Record, Historic Landscapes Survey

4. GENERAL VIEW OF LAUNCH PAD B FROM LAUNCH PAD A MOBILE SERVICE STRUCTURE; VIEW TO SOUTH. - Cape Canaveral Air Station, Launch Complex 17, Facility 28402, East end of Lighthouse Road, Cape Canaveral, Brevard County, FL

Apollo Spacecraft and Saturn V Launch Vehicle Pyrotechnics/Explosive Devices

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Interbartolo, Michael

2009-01-01

The Apollo Mission employs more than 210 pyrotechnic devices per mission.These devices are either automatic of commanded from the Apollo spacecraft systems. All devices require high reliability and safety and most are classified as either crew safety critical or mission critical. Pyrotechnic devices have a wide variety of applications including: launch escape tower separation, separation rocket ignition, parachute deployment and release and electrical circuit opening and closing. This viewgraph presentation identifies critical performance, design requirements and safety measures used to ensure quality, reliability and performance of Apollo pyrotechnic/explosive devices. The major components and functions of a typical Apollo pyrotechnic/explosive device are listed and described (initiators, cartridge assemblies, detonators, core charges). The presentation also identifies the major locations and uses for the devices on: the Command and Service Module, Lunar Module and all stages of the launch vehicle.

RICK BURT AND ANDY SCHORR WITH LAUNCH VEHICLE STAGE ADAPTER

NASA Image and Video Library

2016-09-23

RICK BURT, RIGHT, DIRECTOR OF SAFETY AND MISSION ASSURANCE TALKS WITH ANDY SCHORR, ASSISTANT MANAGER OF THE SPACE LAUNCH SYSTEM'S SPACECRAFT PAYLOAD INTEGRATION AND EVOLUTION OFFICE. BEHIND THEM IS THE LAUNCH VEHICLE STAGE ADAPTOR, WHICH WAS DESIGNED AND MANUFACTURED AT MARSHALL AND WILL CONNECT TWO MAJOR SLS UPPER SECTIONS

14 CFR 417.411 - Safety clear zones for hazardous operations.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... zone on the following criteria: (i) For a possible explosive event, base a safety clear zone on the... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Safety clear zones for hazardous operations... ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH SAFETY Ground Safety § 417.411 Safety clear zones...

77 FR 42176 - Safety Zones; Annual Fireworks Events in the Captain of the Port Detroit Zone

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2012-07-18

... fireworks launch site located at position 41-34'-18.10'' N, 082-51'-18.70'' W (NAD 83). This zone will be... fireworks launch site located at position 41-39'- 19'' N, 082-48'-57'' W (NAD 83). This zone will be...'' W (NAD 83). This zone will be enforced one evening during the first week in July. The safety zone...

14 CFR 417.411 - Safety clear zones for hazardous operations.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safety clear zones for hazardous operations. 417.411 Section 417.411 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH SAFETY Ground Safety § 417.411 Safety clear zones...

14 CFR Appendix B to Part 415 - Safety Review Document Outline

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

....0Flight Safety (§ 415.115) 4.1Initial Flight Safety Analysis 4.1.1Flight Safety Sub-Analyses, Methods, and... Analysis Data 4.2Radionuclide Data (where applicable) 4.3Flight Safety Plan 4.3.1Flight Safety Personnel 4... Safety (§ 415.117) 5.1Ground Safety Analysis Report 5.2Ground Safety Plan 6.0Launch Plans (§ 415.119 and...

14 CFR Appendix B to Part 415 - Safety Review Document Outline

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

....0Flight Safety (§ 415.115) 4.1Initial Flight Safety Analysis 4.1.1Flight Safety Sub-Analyses, Methods, and... Analysis Data 4.2Radionuclide Data (where applicable) 4.3Flight Safety Plan 4.3.1Flight Safety Personnel 4... Safety (§ 415.117) 5.1Ground Safety Analysis Report 5.2Ground Safety Plan 6.0Launch Plans (§ 415.119 and...

14 CFR 420.53 - Control of public access.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... by a launch operator, through the use of security personnel, surveillance systems, physical barriers... the launch site of safety rules and emergency and evacuation procedures prior to that person's entry...

GPM Timeline Inhibits For IT Processing

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Dion, Shirley K.

2014-01-01

The Safety Inhibit Timeline Tool was created as one approach to capturing and understanding inhibits and controls from IT through launch. Global Precipitation Measurement (GPM) Mission, which launched from Japan in March 2014, was a joint mission under a partnership between the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA). GPM was one of the first NASA Goddard in-house programs that extensively used software controls. Using this tool during the GPM buildup allowed a thorough review of inhibit and safety critical software design for hazardous subsystems such as the high gain antenna boom, solar array, and instrument deployments, transmitter turn-on, propulsion system release, and instrument radar turn-on. The GPM safety team developed a methodology to document software safety as part of the standard hazard report. As a result of this process, a new tool safety inhibit timeline was created for management of inhibits and their controls during spacecraft buildup and testing during IT at GSFC and at the launch range in Japan. The Safety Inhibit Timeline Tool was a pathfinder approach for reviewing software that controls the electrical inhibits. The Safety Inhibit Timeline Tool strengthens the Safety Analysts understanding of the removal of inhibits during the IT process with safety critical software. With this tool, the Safety Analyst can confirm proper safe configuration of a spacecraft during each IT test, track inhibit and software configuration changes, and assess software criticality. In addition to understanding inhibits and controls during IT, the tool allows the Safety Analyst to better communicate to engineers and management the changes in inhibit states with each phase of hardware and software testing and the impact of safety risks. Lessons learned from participating in the GPM campaign at NASA and JAXA will be discussed during this session.

Post Launch Monitoring of food products: what can be learned from pharmacovigilance.

PubMed

van Puijenbroek, E P; Hepburn, P A; Herd, T M; van Grootheest, A C

2007-03-01

Post Launch Monitoring (PLM) is one of the new approaches that are used in assessing the safety of novel foods or ingredients. It shares a close resemblance with procedures applied in the field of medicines, where Post Marketing Surveillance (PMS) has been carried out since the beginning of the 1960s. For this reason, Unilever and the Netherlands Pharmacovigilance Centre Lareb, maintaining the national reporting scheme in the Netherlands for adverse drug reactions, have been working together to optimize the Unilever's Post Launch Monitoring service. As a result of this cooperation a practical model for conducting PLM for food products has been developed. This model is also applicable for consumer products in general. The system allows for coding and assessing reports and the early detection of 'signals' of unintended health reactions. The methodological issues surrounding reporting of possible health reactions and practical issues surrounding coding and assessment of the reports that were encountered in the first period of this partnership are discussed. In addition, similarities and differences concerning PMS and PLM are described.

Integrating Safety and Mission Assurance in Design

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Cianciola, Chris; Crane, Kenneth

2008-01-01

This presentation describes how the Ares Projects are learning from the successes and failures of previous launch systems in order to maximize safety and reliability while maintaining fiscal responsibility. The Ares Projects are integrating Safety and Mission Assurance into design activities and embracing independent assessments by Quality experts in thorough reviews of designs and processes. Incorporating Lean thinking into the design process, Ares is also streamlining existing processes and future manufacturing flows which will yield savings during production. Understanding the value of early involvement of Quality experts, the Ares Projects are leading launch vehicle development into the 21st century.

Shaping NASA's Kennedy Space Center Safety for the Future

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Kirkpatrick, Paul; McDaniel, Laura; Smith, Maynette

2011-01-01

With the completion of the Space Shuttle Program, the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) safety function will be required to evolve beyond the single launch vehicle launch site focus that has held prominence for almost fifty years. This paper will discuss how that evolution is taking place. Specifically, we will discuss the future of safety as it relates to a site that will have multiple, very disparate, functions. These functions will include new business; KSC facilities not under the control of NASA; traditional payload and launch vehicle processing; and, operations conducted by NASA personnel, NASA contractors or a combination of both. A key element in this process is the adaptation of the current KSC set of safety requirements into a multi-faceted set that can address each of the functions above, while maintaining our world class safety environment. One of the biggest challenges that will be addressed is how to protect our personnel and property without dictating how other Non-NASA organizations protect their own employees and property. The past history of KSC Safety will be described and how the lessons learned from previous programs will be applied to the future. The lessons learned from this process will also be discussed as information for other locations that may undergo such a transformation.

Overview of U.S. nuclear launch safety approval process, supporting launch vehicle databook and probabilistic risk assessment methods

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Reinhart, L. E.

2001-01-01

This paper provides an overview of the U.S. space nuclear power system launch approval process as defined by the two separate requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and Presidential Directive/National Security Council Memorandum No. 25 (PD/NSC-25).

14 CFR Appendix B of Part 415 - Safety Review Document Outline

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... Performed by Certified Personnel 4.0Flight Safety (§ 415.115) 4.1Initial Flight Safety Analysis 4.1.1Flight Safety Sub-Analyses, Methods, and Assumptions 4.1.2Sample Calculation and Products 4.1.3 Launch Specific Updates and Final Flight Safety Analysis Data 4.2Radionuclide Data (where applicable) 4.3Flight Safety...

14 CFR Appendix B of Part 415 - Safety Review Document Outline

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... Performed by Certified Personnel 4.0Flight Safety (§ 415.115) 4.1Initial Flight Safety Analysis 4.1.1Flight Safety Sub-Analyses, Methods, and Assumptions 4.1.2Sample Calculation and Products 4.1.3 Launch Specific Updates and Final Flight Safety Analysis Data 4.2Radionuclide Data (where applicable) 4.3Flight Safety...

14 CFR Appendix B of Part 415 - Safety Review Document Outline

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... Performed by Certified Personnel 4.0Flight Safety (§ 415.115) 4.1Initial Flight Safety Analysis 4.1.1Flight Safety Sub-Analyses, Methods, and Assumptions 4.1.2Sample Calculation and Products 4.1.3 Launch Specific Updates and Final Flight Safety Analysis Data 4.2Radionuclide Data (where applicable) 4.3Flight Safety...

A Quantitative Reliability, Maintainability and Supportability Approach for NASA's Second Generation Reusable Launch Vehicle

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Safie, Fayssal M.; Daniel, Charles; Kalia, Prince; Smith, Charles A. (Technical Monitor)

2002-01-01

The United States National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is in the midst of a 10-year Second Generation Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV) program to improve its space transportation capabilities for both cargo and crewed missions. The objectives of the program are to: significantly increase safety and reliability, reduce the cost of accessing low-earth orbit, attempt to leverage commercial launch capabilities, and provide a growth path for manned space exploration. The safety, reliability and life cycle cost of the next generation vehicles are major concerns, and NASA aims to achieve orders of magnitude improvement in these areas. To get these significant improvements, requires a rigorous process that addresses Reliability, Maintainability and Supportability (RMS) and safety through all the phases of the life cycle of the program. This paper discusses the RMS process being implemented for the Second Generation RLV program.

NASA Space Program experience in hydrogen transportation and handling

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Bain, A. L.

1976-01-01

This paper portrays the experience gained in the transportation and handling of hydrogen in support of the Apollo launch site at Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Fla., one of NASA's prime hydrogen users in the Space Program. The objective of the paper is basically to reveal the types of systems involved in handling hydrogen, safety practices, operational techniques, other general experience information, and primarily to convey the routinism by which this potential fuel of the future has already been handled in significant quantities for a number of years.

Artificial intelligent decision support for low-cost launch vehicle integrated mission operations

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Szatkowski, Gerard P.; Schultz, Roger

1988-11-01

The feasibility, benefits, and risks associated with Artificial Intelligence (AI) Expert Systems applied to low cost space expendable launch vehicle systems are reviewed. This study is in support of the joint USAF/NASA effort to define the next generation of a heavy-lift Advanced Launch System (ALS) which will provide economical and routine access to space. The significant technical goals of the ALS program include: a 10 fold reduction in cost per pound to orbit, launch processing in under 3 weeks, and higher reliability and safety standards than current expendables. Knowledge-based system techniques are being explored for the purpose of automating decision support processes in onboard and ground systems for pre-launch checkout and in-flight operations. Issues such as: satisfying real-time requirements, providing safety validation, hardware and Data Base Management System (DBMS) interfacing, system synergistic effects, human interfaces, and ease of maintainability, have an effect on the viability of expert systems as a useful tool.

Artificial intelligent decision support for low-cost launch vehicle integrated mission operations

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Szatkowski, Gerard P.; Schultz, Roger

1988-01-01

The feasibility, benefits, and risks associated with Artificial Intelligence (AI) Expert Systems applied to low cost space expendable launch vehicle systems are reviewed. This study is in support of the joint USAF/NASA effort to define the next generation of a heavy-lift Advanced Launch System (ALS) which will provide economical and routine access to space. The significant technical goals of the ALS program include: a 10 fold reduction in cost per pound to orbit, launch processing in under 3 weeks, and higher reliability and safety standards than current expendables. Knowledge-based system techniques are being explored for the purpose of automating decision support processes in onboard and ground systems for pre-launch checkout and in-flight operations. Issues such as: satisfying real-time requirements, providing safety validation, hardware and Data Base Management System (DBMS) interfacing, system synergistic effects, human interfaces, and ease of maintainability, have an effect on the viability of expert systems as a useful tool.

Evolution of safety-critical requirements post-launch

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Lutz, R. R.; Mikulski, I. C.

2001-01-01

This paper reports the results of a small study of requirements changes to the onboard software of three spacecraft subsequent to launch. Only those requirement changes that resulted from post-launch anoma-lies (i.e., during operations) were of interest here, since the goal was to better understand the relation-ship between critical anomalies during operations and how safety-critical requirements evolve. The results of the study were surprising in that anomaly-driven, post-launch requirements changes were rarely due to previous requirements having been incorrect. Instead, changes involved new requirements (1) for the software to handle rare events or (2) for the software to compensate for hardware failures or limitations. The prevalence of new requirements as a result of post-launch anomalies suggests a need for increased requirements-engineering support of maintenance activities in these systems. The results also confirm both the difficulty and the benefits of pursuing requirements completeness, especially in terms of fault tolerance, during development of critical systems.

14 CFR 415.33 - Safety organization.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safety organization. 415.33 Section 415.33....33 Safety organization. (a) An applicant shall maintain a safety organization and document it by... communication, both within the applicant's organization and between the applicant and any federal launch range...

Evolution of Safety Analysis to Support New Exploration Missions

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Thrasher, Chard W.

2008-01-01

NASA is currently developing the Ares I launch vehicle as a key component of the Constellation program which will provide safe and reliable transportation to the International Space Station, back to the moon, and later to Mars. The risks and costs of the Ares I must be significantly lowered, as compared to other manned launch vehicles, to enable the continuation of space exploration. It is essential that safety be significantly improved, and cost-effectively incorporated into the design process. This paper justifies early and effective safety analysis of complex space systems. Interactions and dependences between design, logistics, modeling, reliability, and safety engineers will be discussed to illustrate methods to lower cost, reduce design cycles and lessen the likelihood of catastrophic events.

An assessment and validation study of nuclear reactors for low power space applications

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Klein, A. C.; Gedeon, S. R.; Morey, D. C.

1987-01-01

The feasibility and safety of six conceptual small, low power nuclear reactor designs was evaluated. Feasibility evaluations included the determination of sufficient reactivity margins for seven years of full power operation and safe shutdown as well as handling during pre-launch assembly phases. Safety evaluations were concerned with the potential for maintaining subcritical conditions in the event of launch or transportation accidents. These included water immersion accident scenarios both with and without water flooding the core. Results show that most of the concepts can potentially meet the feasibility and safety requirements; however, due to the preliminary nature of the designs considered, more detailed designs will be necessary to enable these concepts to fully meet the safety requirements.

Overall Control on Solid Rocket Motor Hazard Zone: Example of VEGA an Innovative Solution at System Level

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Vertueux, M.

2013-09-01

The arrival of additional Space launch vehicles Soyouz and Vega in Guiana Space Center facilities faced a new ground range safety major question: The technical hazards assessment and management related to the preparation of these three launchers simultaneously with the same high level of safety. The objective of this publication is to highlight the new safety solutions that are applied in CSG to reduce the risk of self-propulsion of the stages of VEGA launcher. During all the preparation campaign of VEGA launch vehicle, the explosive risk due to the use of solid propellant is permanent. Uncontrolled propulsion of a solid rocket motor is capable of destruction of other important installations with catastrophic effects. This event could cause loss of human lives and great damages to the CSG launch site structures. Early in the space program development phases of VEGA, the risk of self- propulsion of solid rocket motors and the solutions to avoid the "domino effects" on neighboring facilities have been issued as one of the major concern in term of safety.

Arianespace Launch Service Operator Policy for Space Safety (Regulations and Standards for Safety)

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Jourdainne, Laurent

2013-09-01

Since December 10, 2010, the French Space Act has entered into force. This French Law, referenced as LOS N°2008-518 ("Loi relative aux Opérations Spatiales"), is compliant with international rules. This French Space Act (LOS) is now applicable for any French private company whose business is dealing with rocket launch or in orbit satellites operations. Under CNES leadership, Arianespace contributed to the consolidation of technical regulation applicable to launch service operators.Now for each launch operation, the operator Arianespace has to apply for an authorization to proceed to the French ministry in charge of space activities. In the files issued for this purpose, the operator is able to justify a high level of warranties in the management of risks through robust processes in relation with the qualification maintenance, the configuration management, the treatment of technical facts and relevant conclusions and risks reduction implementation when needed.Thanks to the historic success of Ariane launch systems through its more than 30 years of exploitation experience (54 successes in a row for latest Ariane 5 launches), Arianespace as well as European public and industrial partners developed key experiences and knowledge as well as competences in space security and safety. Soyuz-ST and Vega launch systems are now in operation from Guiana Space Center with identical and proved risks management processes. Already existing processes have been slightly adapted to cope with the new roles and responsibilities of each actor contributing to the launch preparation and additional requirements like potential collision avoidance with inhabited space objects.Up to now, more than 12 Ariane 5 launches and 4 Soyuz-ST launches have been authorized under the French Space Act regulations. Ariane 5 and Soyuz- ST generic demonstration of conformity have been issued, including exhaustive danger and impact studies for each launch system.This article will detail how Arianespace succeeded to contribute to the maturation of the LOS. How Arianespace managed to demonstrate t he full compliance to the technical regulation for the two launch systems under exploitation (Ariane 5 andSoyuz-ST). Up to now, Vega launch system organization is still in an intermediate transition phase between development and exploitation prior to its second flight. Vega launch system will benefit of Arianespace experience capitalized through Ariane and Soyuz."Safet y is not an option". For our company regarding the mid and long term interest of space business of the launch operations and associated customers, it is a must!

Advanced Propulsion for Gun Launched Projectiles and Missiles: Phase 1 - Low Cost Flight Test Platform Development

DTIC Science & Technology

2009-11-30

Son blueberry fields as shown in Figure 113. All FAA and Maine DOT permits were acquired. Richard Willey was the designated LSO (Launch Safety...The launch area is on the Jasper Wyman & Son blueberry fields as shown in Figure 113. FAA and Maine DOT permits are required for flight testing

Orion moved at Kennedy Space Center on This Week @NASA - October 3, 2014

NASA Image and Video Library

2014-10-03

On Sept. 28, NASA’s Orion spacecraft was moved from Kennedy Space Center’s Payload Hazardous Servicing Facility to its Launch Abort System Facility, for installation of its launch abort system, one of the many critical safety systems that will be evaluated during Orion’s un-crewed Exploration Flight Test -1, in December. NASA’s new deep space capsule is being developed to safely transport astronauts to and from Mars and other destinations on future missions. Also, Delta IV Heavy moved to the launch pad, U.S. spacewalks previewed, NASA and India to discuss joint exploration, Helicopter safety crash test, Combined Federal Campaign underway and Stop, Think, Connect!

Aeronautics and Space Report of the President: Fiscal Year 1996 Activities

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

1996-01-01

Topics considered include: (1) Space launch activities: space shuttle missions; expendable launch vehicles. (2) Space science: astronomy and space physics; solar system exploration. (3) Space flight and technology: life and microgravity sciences; space shuttle technology; reuseable launch vehicles; international space station; energy; safety and mission assurance; commercial development and regulation of space; surveillance. (4) Space communications: communications satellites; space network; ground networks; mission control and data systems. (5) Aeronautical activities: technology developments; air traffic control and navigation; weather-related aeronautical activities; flight safety and security; aviation medicine and human factors. (6) Studies of the planet earth: terrestrial studies and applications: atmospheric studies: oceanographic studies; international aeronautical and space activities; and appendices.

Assessment of injection safety in Ha Dong General Hospital, Hanoi, in 2012

PubMed Central

Van Tuong, Phan; Phuong, Tran Thi Minh; Anh, Bui Thi My; Nguyen, Trang Huyen Thi

2017-01-01

Background: Injection is one of the most frequently used medical methods to introduce drugs or other substances into the body for purposes of treatment or prevention. Unsafe injection can cause adverse outcomes, such as abscess and anaphylactic shock, and increases the risk of blood-borne transmission of viruses to patients and health care workers, as well as the community. Recognizing the importance of injection safety, in 2000 the Vietnamese Ministry of Health (MOH) collaborated with the Vietnam Nurses Association to launch the “Safe injection” program throughout the country, including Hanoi. Methods: This cross-sectional study, combining quantitative and qualitative analysis, was conducted from February to August 2012 in Ha Dong General Hospital using a structured questionnaire and observation checklist. The target population of the study was 109 nurses working in clinical departments and 436 injections were observed. Results: The percentage of nurses who are familiar with injection safety standards was found to be 82.6%. The proportion of practical injections that met the 23 standards of injection safety set by the MOH amounted to 22.2%. The factors related to safe injection practice of nurses who were younger age group (OR=3.1; p<0.05) and fewer number of years working as a nurse (OR=2.8; p<0.05). Conclusions: While nurses have high level of knowledge about safe injections but a small proportion actually practiced. Experience may not always guarantee safe practices.  Injection safety training should be regularly imparted upon all categories of nurses. PMID:29188014

Assessment of injection safety in Ha Dong General Hospital, Hanoi, in 2012.

PubMed

Van Tuong, Phan; Phuong, Tran Thi Minh; Anh, Bui Thi My; Nguyen, Trang Huyen Thi

2017-01-01

Background : Injection is one of the most frequently used medical methods to introduce drugs or other substances into the body for purposes of treatment or prevention. Unsafe injection can cause adverse outcomes, such as abscess and anaphylactic shock, and increases the risk of blood-borne transmission of viruses to patients and health care workers, as well as the community. Recognizing the importance of injection safety, in 2000 the Vietnamese Ministry of Health (MOH) collaborated with the Vietnam Nurses Association to launch the "Safe injection" program throughout the country, including Hanoi. Methods : This cross-sectional study, combining quantitative and qualitative analysis, was conducted from February to August 2012 in Ha Dong General Hospital using a structured questionnaire and observation checklist. The target population of the study was 109 nurses working in clinical departments and 436 injections were observed. Results : The percentage of nurses who are familiar with injection safety standards was found to be 82.6%. The proportion of practical injections that met the 23 standards of injection safety set by the MOH amounted to 22.2%. The factors related to safe injection practice of nurses who were younger age group (OR=3.1; p<0.05) and fewer number of years working as a nurse (OR=2.8; p<0.05). Conclusions : While nurses have high level of knowledge about safe injections but a small proportion actually practiced. Experience may not always guarantee safe practices.  Injection safety training should be regularly imparted upon all categories of nurses.

Launch vehicle operations cost reduction through artificial intelligence techniques

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Davis, Tom C., Jr.

1988-01-01

NASA's Kennedy Space Center has attempted to develop AI methods in order to reduce the cost of launch vehicle ground operations as well as to improve the reliability and safety of such operations. Attention is presently given to cost savings estimates for systems involving launch vehicle firing-room software and hardware real-time diagnostics, as well as the nature of configuration control and the real-time autonomous diagnostics of launch-processing systems by these means. Intelligent launch decisions and intelligent weather forecasting are additional applications of AI being considered.

Incidents and Injuries in Foot-Launched Flying Extreme Sports.

PubMed

Feletti, Francesco; Aliverti, Andrea; Henjum, Maggie; Tarabini, Marco; Brymer, Eric

2017-11-01

Participation rates in extreme sports have grown exponentially in the last 40 yr, often surpassing traditional sporting activities. The purpose of this study was to examine injury rates in foot-launched flying sports, i.e., sports in which a pilot foot-launches into flight with a wing already deployed. This paper is based on a retrospective analysis of the reports of incidents that occurred between 2000 and 2014 among the British Hang Gliding and Paragliding Association members. The majority of the 1411 reported injuries were in the lower limb, followed by the upper limb. The most common lower limb injury was to the ankle and included fractures, sprains, and dislocations. The distribution of injures was different in each discipline. The calculated yearly fatality rate (fatalities/100,000 participants) was 40.4 in hang gliding, 47.1 in paragliding, 61.9 in powered hang gliding and 83.4 in powered paragliding; the overall value for foot-launched flight sports was 43.9. Significant differences in injury rates and injury patterns were found among different sport disciplines that can be useful to steer research on safety, and adopt specific safety rules about flying, protective clothing and safety systems in each of these sports.Feletti F, Aliverti A, Henjum M, Tarabini M, Brymer E. Incidents and injuries in foot-launched flying extreme sports. Aerosp Med Hum Perform. 2017; 88(11):1016-1023.

STS-46 MS Chang-Diaz floats in life raft during water egress training at JSC

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

1992-01-01

STS-46 Atlantis, Orbiter Vehicle (OV) 104, Mission Specialist (MS) Franklin R. Chang-Diaz, wearing launch and entry suit (LES) and launch and entry helmet (LEH), relies on a one-person life raft to get him to 'safety' during a launch emergency egress (bailout) simulation conducted in JSC's Weightless Environment Training Facility (WETF) Bldg 29 pool.

14 CFR 431.71 - Public safety responsibility.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Public safety responsibility. 431.71 Section 431.71 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION... Requirements-Reusable Launch Vehicle Mission License Terms and Conditions § 431.71 Public safety responsibility...

14 CFR 431.71 - Public safety responsibility.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Public safety responsibility. 431.71 Section 431.71 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION... Requirements-Reusable Launch Vehicle Mission License Terms and Conditions § 431.71 Public safety responsibility...

14 CFR 431.71 - Public safety responsibility.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Public safety responsibility. 431.71 Section 431.71 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION... Requirements-Reusable Launch Vehicle Mission License Terms and Conditions § 431.71 Public safety responsibility...

14 CFR 417.7 - Public safety responsibility.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Public safety responsibility. 417.7 Section 417.7 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION... safety responsibility. A launch operator is responsible for ensuring the safe conduct of a licensed...

14 CFR 417.7 - Public safety responsibility.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Public safety responsibility. 417.7 Section 417.7 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION... safety responsibility. A launch operator is responsible for ensuring the safe conduct of a licensed...

NASA ELV Payload Safety Program Information Exchange

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Staubus, Cal; Palo, Tom; Dook, Mike; Donovan, Shawn

2007-01-01

This presentation details the Expendable Launch Vehicle (ELV) Payload Safety Program in its development and plan for implementation. It is an overview of the program's policies, process and requirements.

FAA's Implementation of the Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004- The Experimental Permit

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Repcheck, J. Randall

2005-12-01

A number of entrepreneurs are committed to the goal of developing and operating reusable launch vehicles for private human space travel. In order to promote this emerging industry, and to create a clear legal, regulatory, and safety regime, the United States (U.S.) Congress passed the Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004 (CSLAA). Signed on December 23, 2004 by U.S. President George W. Bush, the CSLAA makes the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) responsible for regulating human spaceflight. The CSLAA, among other things, establishes an experimental permit regime for developmental reusable suborbital rockets. This paper describes the FAA's approach in developing guidelines for obtaining and maintaining an experimental permit, and describes the core safety elements of those guidelines.

Final (Tier 1) environmental impact statement for the Galileo and Ulysses Missions

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

1988-01-01

Presented here is a Final (Tier 1) Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) addressing the potential environmental consequences associated with continuing the modifications of the Galileo and Ulysses spacecraft for launch using a booster/upper stage combination that is different from the one planned for use prior to the Challenger accident, while conducting the detailed safety and environmental analysis in order to preserve the October 1989 launch opportunity for Galileo and an October 1990 launch opportunity for Ulysses. While detailed safety and environmental analyses associated with the missions are underway, they currently are not complete. Nevertheless, sufficient information is available to enable a choice among the reconfiguration alternatives presented. Relevant assessments of the potential for environmental impacts are presented.

Technology Innovations from NASA's Next Generation Launch Technology Program

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Cook, Stephen A.; Morris, Charles E. K., Jr.; Tyson, Richard W.

2004-01-01

NASA's Next Generation Launch Technology Program has been on the cutting edge of technology, improving the safety, affordability, and reliability of future space-launch-transportation systems. The array of projects focused on propulsion, airframe, and other vehicle systems. Achievements range from building miniature fuel/oxygen sensors to hot-firings of major rocket-engine systems as well as extreme thermo-mechanical testing of large-scale structures. Results to date have significantly advanced technology readiness for future space-launch systems using either airbreathing or rocket propulsion.

The evolution of automated launch processing

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Tomayko, James E.

1988-01-01

The NASA Launch Processing System (LPS) to which attention is presently given has arrived at satisfactory solutions for the distributed-computing, good user interface and dissimilar-hardware interface, and automation-related problems that emerge in the specific arena of spacecraft launch preparations. An aggressive effort was made to apply the lessons learned in the 1960s, during the first attempts at automatic launch vehicle checkout, to the LPS. As the Space Shuttle System continues to evolve, the primary contributor to safety and reliability will be the LPS.

Hybrid propulsion technology program: Phase 1, volume 2

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Schuler, A. L.; Wiley, D. R.

1989-01-01

The program objectives of developing hybrid propulsion technology (HPT) to enable its application for manned and unmanned high thrust, high performance space launch vehicles are examined. The studies indicate that the hybrid propulsion (HP) is very attractive, especially when applied to large boosters for programs such as the Advanced Launch System (ALS) and the second generation Space Shuttle. Some of the advantages of HP are identified. Space launch vehicles using HP are less costly than those flying today because their propellant and insulation costs are much less and there are fewer operational restraints due to reduced safety requirements. Boosters using HP have safety features that are highly desirable, particularly for manned flights. HP systems will have a clean exhaust and high performance. Boosters using HP readily integrate with launch vehicles and their launch operations, because they are very compact for the amount of energy contained. Hybrid propulsion will increase the probability of mission success. In order to properly develop the technologies of HP, preliminary HP concepts are evaluated. System analyses and trade studies were performed to identify technologies applicable to HP.

Orion Launch from UCS-3

NASA Image and Video Library

2014-12-05

A Delta IV Heavy rocket lifts off from Space Launch Complex 37 at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station in Florida carrying NASA's Orion spacecraft on an unpiloted flight test to Earth orbit. Liftoff was at 7:05 a.m. EST. During the two-orbit, four-and-a-half hour mission, engineers will evaluate the systems critical to crew safety, the launch abort system, the heat shield and the parachute system.

Orion Launch

NASA Image and Video Library

2014-12-05

A Delta IV Heavy rocket lifts off from Space Launch Complex 37 at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station in Florida carrying NASA's Orion spacecraft on an unpiloted flight test to Earth orbit. Liftoff was at 7:05 a.m. EST. During the two-orbit, four-and-a-half hour mission, engineers will evaluate the systems critical to crew safety, the launch abort system, the heat shield and the parachute system.

KSC-06pd1422

NASA Image and Video Library

2006-07-04

KENNEDY SPACE CENTER, FLA. - In Firing Room 4 of the Launch Control Center, Shuttle Launch Director Mike Leinbach (center) and Center Director Jim Kennedy congratulate the launch team after the successful launch of Space Shuttle Discovery on mission STS-121. The launch was the first ever to take place on Independence Day. During the 12-day mission, the STS-121 crew of seven will test new equipment and procedures to improve shuttle safety, as well as deliver supplies and make repairs to the International Space Station. Landing is scheduled for July 16 or 17 at Kennedy's Shuttle Landing Facility. Photo credit: NASA/Kim Shiflett

KSC-06pd1421

NASA Image and Video Library

2006-07-04

KENNEDY SPACE CENTER, FLA. - In Firing Room 4 of the Launch Control Center, Shuttle Launch Director Mike Leinbach (center) congratulates the launch team after the successful launch of Space Shuttle Discovery on mission STS-121. The launch was the first ever to take place on Independence Day. At far right is Center Director Jim Kennedy. During the 12-day mission, the STS-121 crew of seven will test new equipment and procedures to improve shuttle safety, as well as deliver supplies and make repairs to the International Space Station. Landing is scheduled for July 16 or 17 at Kennedy's Shuttle Landing Facility. Photo credit: NASA/Kim Shiflett

19. Launch Area, general view of Missile Assembly Building and ...

Library of Congress Historic Buildings Survey, Historic Engineering Record, Historic Landscapes Survey

19. Launch Area, general view of Missile Assembly Building and Generator Building VIEW SOUTHWEST - NIKE Missile Battery PR-79, Launch Area, East Windsor Road south of State Route 101, Foster, Providence County, RI

5. GENERAL VIEW OF LAUNCHER BUILDING 28402 SHOWING LAUNCH DECK ...

Library of Congress Historic Buildings Survey, Historic Engineering Record, Historic Landscapes Survey

5. GENERAL VIEW OF LAUNCHER BUILDING 28402 SHOWING LAUNCH DECK AT RIGHT; VIEW TO NORTHEAST. - Cape Canaveral Air Station, Launch Complex 17, Facility 28402, East end of Lighthouse Road, Cape Canaveral, Brevard County, FL

Analysis of Safety-Related Regulatory Actions for New Drugs in Japan by Nature of Identified Risks.

PubMed

Fujikawa, Makoto; Ono, Shunsuke

2017-01-01

Mechanisms underlying safety events may be heterogeneous and depend on conditions of development and marketing, including the populations studied in clinical trials and the amount of data required for approval, especially under pathways for accelerated access. This study was conducted to investigate possible factors affecting the first post-marketing safety-related regulatory actions (SRRAs) after launch of new drugs in Japan. We studied 338 new molecular entities (NMEs) approved in Japan between 2004 and 2014. We focused on three different types of SRRAs: (1) all-SRRAs (i.e. SRRAs from domestic cases and other countries), (2) domestic-SRRAs (i.e. SRRAs from domestic cases) and (3) domestic unknown-SRRAs (i.e. SRRAs of unknown risks from domestic cases). Occurrences of the three types of SRRAs were analyzed using Kaplan-Meier analysis and Cox-regression. SRRAs tended to occur sooner for NMEs launched in recent years versus those launched towards the beginning of the study period. Risk of SRRA was high for antineoplastics. Drugs for cardiovascular diseases, central nervous system, and diabetes had positive associations with all-SRRAs, but the associations were weaker with domestic-SRRAs. Domestic-SRRAs were more likely for drugs with relatively novel modes of action (MOAs). Longer lag to Japanese launch after first global launch significantly lowered SRRA risks. While most of the variables showed similar associations across the three types of SRRAs, adoption of bridging strategies showed higher risks only for domestic-SRRAs, not for all-SRRAs. FDA safety labeling changes and non-orphan priority review drugs presented higher domestic-SRRA risks. The number of adverse drug reactions (ADRs) from spontaneous reports had positive correlations with the three types of SRRAs, whereas the number from company-led surveillance showed no association. Our results indicated that global clinical development pathways and marketing status should be considered more seriously in implementing locally optimized pharmacovigilance activities. Caution may be needed not only for drugs with novel MOAs, but also for drugs for which local dose-finding studies have been skipped, expedited review status has been given, timing of launch is close to those in the USA and the EU, and spontaneous reports rather than company-lead surveillance suggest possible safety risks.

2. GENERAL CONTEXT VIEW SHOWING 36004 AT FAR LEFT, LAUNCH ...

Library of Congress Historic Buildings Survey, Historic Engineering Record, Historic Landscapes Survey

2. GENERAL CONTEXT VIEW SHOWING 36004 AT FAR LEFT, LAUNCH PAD A GANTRY AT CENTER, LAUNCH PAD B GANTRY AT RIGHT; THIS VIEW MATCHES FL-8-5-1 TO FORM PANORAMIC SWEEP OF SITE; VIEW TO NORTHEAST. - Cape Canaveral Air Station, Launch Complex 17, East end of Lighthouse Road, Cape Canaveral, Brevard County, FL

Distributed Web-Based Expert System for Launch Operations

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Bardina, Jorge E.; Thirumalainambi, Rajkumar

2005-01-01

The simulation and modeling of launch operations is based on a representation of the organization of the operations suitable to experiment of the physical, procedural, software, hardware and psychological aspects of space flight operations. The virtual test bed consists of a weather expert system to advice on the effect of weather to the launch operations. It also simulates toxic gas dispersion model, and the risk impact on human health. Since all modeling and simulation is based on the internet, it could reduce the cost of operations of launch and range safety by conducting extensive research before a particular launch. Each model has an independent decision making module to derive the best decision for launch.

NASA Space Technology Draft Roadmap Area 13: Ground and Launch Systems Processing

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Clements, Greg

2011-01-01

This slide presentation reviews the technology development roadmap for the area of ground and launch systems processing. The scope of this technology area includes: (1) Assembly, integration, and processing of the launch vehicle, spacecraft, and payload hardware (2) Supply chain management (3) Transportation of hardware to the launch site (4) Transportation to and operations at the launch pad (5) Launch processing infrastructure and its ability to support future operations (6) Range, personnel, and facility safety capabilities (7) Launch and landing weather (8) Environmental impact mitigations for ground and launch operations (9) Launch control center operations and infrastructure (10) Mission integration and planning (11) Mission training for both ground and flight crew personnel (12) Mission control center operations and infrastructure (13) Telemetry and command processing and archiving (14) Recovery operations for flight crews, flight hardware, and returned samples. This technology roadmap also identifies ground, launch and mission technologies that will: (1) Dramatically transform future space operations, with significant improvement in life-cycle costs (2) Improve the quality of life on earth, while exploring in co-existence with the environment (3) Increase reliability and mission availability using low/zero maintenance materials and systems, comprehensive capabilities to ascertain and forecast system health/configuration, data integration, and the use of advanced/expert software systems (4) Enhance methods to assess safety and mission risk posture, which would allow for timely and better decision making. Several key technologies are identified, with a couple of slides devoted to one of these technologies (i.e., corrosion detection and prevention). Development of these technologies can enhance life on earth and have a major impact on how we can access space, eventually making routine commercial space access and improve building and manufacturing, and weather forecasting for example for the effect of these process improvements on our daily lives.

Draft Environmental Impact Statement for the Ulysses Mission (Tier 2)

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

1990-01-01

This Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) addresses the environmental impacts which may be caused by the preparation and operation of the Ulysses spacecraft, including its planned launch on the Space Transportation System (STS) Shuttle and the alternative of canceling further work on the mission. The launch configuration will use the STS/Inertial Upper Stage (IUS)/Payload Assist Module-Special(PAM-S) combination. The Tier 1 EIS included a delay alternative which considered the Titan 4 launch vehicle as an alternative booster stage for launch in 1991 or later. However, the U.S. Air Force, which procures the Titan 4 for NASA, could not provide a Titan 4 vehicle for the 1991 launch opportunity because of high priority Department of Defense requirements. The only expected environmental effects of the proposed action are associated with normal Shuttle launch operations. These impacts are limited largely to the near-field at the launch pad, except for temporary stratospheric ozone effects during launch and occasional sonic boom effects near the landing site. These effects have been judged insufficient to preclude Shuttle launches. In the event of (1) an accident during launch, or (2) reentry of the spacecraft from earth orbit, there are potential adverse health and environmental effects associated with the possible release of plutonium dioxide from the spacecraft's radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTG). The potential effects considered in this EIS include risks of air and water quality impacts, local land area contamination, adverse health and safety impacts, the disturbance of biotic resources, impacts on wetland areas or areas containing historical sites, and socioeconomic impacts. Intensive analysis of the possible accidents associated with the proposed action are underway and preliminary results indicate small health or environmental risks. The results of a Final Safety Analysis Report will be available for inclusion into the final EIS.

14 CFR 417.221 - Time delay analysis.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... occurs; (2) A flight safety official's decision and reaction time, including variation in human response... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Time delay analysis. 417.221 Section 417... OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH SAFETY Flight Safety Analysis § 417.221 Time delay analysis. (a...

14 CFR 417.221 - Time delay analysis.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... occurs; (2) A flight safety official's decision and reaction time, including variation in human response... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Time delay analysis. 417.221 Section 417... OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH SAFETY Flight Safety Analysis § 417.221 Time delay analysis. (a...

14 CFR 417.221 - Time delay analysis.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... occurs; (2) A flight safety official's decision and reaction time, including variation in human response... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Time delay analysis. 417.221 Section 417... OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH SAFETY Flight Safety Analysis § 417.221 Time delay analysis. (a...

14 CFR 415.204-415.400 - [Reserved

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... Subsystem Design Information 10.4Flight Safety System Analyses 10.5Flight Termination System Environmental... Analysis 4.1.1Flight Safety Sub-Analyses, Methods, and Assumptions 4.1.2Sample Calculation and Products 4.1.3 Launch Specific Updates and Final Flight Safety Analysis Data 4.2Radionuclide Data (where...

14 CFR 415.204-415.400 - [Reserved

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... Subsystem Design Information 10.4Flight Safety System Analyses 10.5Flight Termination System Environmental... Analysis 4.1.1Flight Safety Sub-Analyses, Methods, and Assumptions 4.1.2Sample Calculation and Products 4.1.3 Launch Specific Updates and Final Flight Safety Analysis Data 4.2Radionuclide Data (where...

14 CFR 415.204-415.400 - [Reserved

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... Subsystem Design Information 10.4Flight Safety System Analyses 10.5Flight Termination System Environmental... Analysis 4.1.1Flight Safety Sub-Analyses, Methods, and Assumptions 4.1.2Sample Calculation and Products 4.1.3 Launch Specific Updates and Final Flight Safety Analysis Data 4.2Radionuclide Data (where...

14 CFR 417.227 - Toxic release hazard analysis.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Toxic release hazard analysis. 417.227..., DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH SAFETY Flight Safety Analysis § 417.227 Toxic release hazard analysis. A flight safety analysis must establish flight commit criteria that protect the public from any...

14 CFR Appendix J to Part 417 - Ground Safety Analysis Report

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... information required by this appendix. J417.3Ground safety analysis report chapters (a) Introduction. A ground... analysis report must include a chapter that provides detailed safety information about each launch vehicle... data. A hazard analysis form must contain or reference all information necessary to understand the...

14 CFR Appendix J to Part 417 - Ground Safety Analysis Report

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... information required by this appendix. J417.3Ground safety analysis report chapters (a) Introduction. A ground... analysis report must include a chapter that provides detailed safety information about each launch vehicle... data. A hazard analysis form must contain or reference all information necessary to understand the...

14 CFR Appendix J to Part 417 - Ground Safety Analysis Report

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... information required by this appendix. J417.3Ground safety analysis report chapters (a) Introduction. A ground... analysis report must include a chapter that provides detailed safety information about each launch vehicle... data. A hazard analysis form must contain or reference all information necessary to understand the...

14 CFR Appendix J to Part 417 - Ground Safety Analysis Report

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... information required by this appendix. J417.3Ground safety analysis report chapters (a) Introduction. A ground... analysis report must include a chapter that provides detailed safety information about each launch vehicle... data. A hazard analysis form must contain or reference all information necessary to understand the...

14 CFR Appendix J to Part 417 - Ground Safety Analysis Report

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... information required by this appendix. J417.3Ground safety analysis report chapters (a) Introduction. A ground... analysis report must include a chapter that provides detailed safety information about each launch vehicle... data. A hazard analysis form must contain or reference all information necessary to understand the...

Ares I-X Range Safety Trajectory Analyses Overview and Independent Validation and Verification

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Tarpley, Ashley F.; Starr, Brett R.; Tartabini, Paul V.; Craig, A. Scott; Merry, Carl M.; Brewer, Joan D.; Davis, Jerel G.; Dulski, Matthew B.; Gimenez, Adrian; Barron, M. Kyle

2011-01-01

All Flight Analysis data products were successfully generated and delivered to the 45SW in time to support the launch. The IV&V effort allowed data generators to work through issues early. Data consistency proved through the IV&V process provided confidence that the delivered data was of high quality. Flight plan approval was granted for the launch. The test flight was successful and had no safety related issues. The flight occurred within the predicted flight envelopes. Post flight reconstruction results verified the simulations accurately predicted the FTV trajectory.

Aerodynamic Control-Augmentation Devices For Saturn-Class Launch Vehicles With Aft Centers Of Gravity

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Barret, Chris

1995-01-01

Report describes study of aerodynamic flight-control-augmentation devices proposed for use in increasing payload capabilities of future launch vehicles by allowing more aft centers of gravity. Proposed all-movable devices not only provide increased control authority during ascent trajectory, but also reduce engine gimballing requirements and enhance crew safety. Report proposes various aerodynamic control surfaces mounted fore and aft on Saturn-class launch vehicle.

Orion EFT-1 Launch from NASA Causeway

NASA Image and Video Library

2014-12-05

A Delta IV Heavy rocket lifts off from Space Launch Complex 37 at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station in Florida carrying NASA's Orion spacecraft on an unpiloted flight test to Earth orbit. Liftoff was at 7:05 a.m. EST. During the two-orbit, four-and-a-half hour mission, engineers will evaluate the systems critical to crew safety, the launch abort system, the heat shield and the parachute system.

Orion Launch from UCS-3

NASA Image and Video Library

2014-12-05

A Delta IV Heavy rocket soars after liftoff from Space Launch Complex 37 at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station in Florida carrying NASA's Orion spacecraft on an unpiloted flight test to Earth orbit. Liftoff was at 7:05 a.m. EST. During the two-orbit, four-and-a-half hour mission, engineers will evaluate the systems critical to crew safety, the launch abort system, the heat shield and the parachute system.

Joint NASA/USAF Airborne Field Mill Program - Operation and safety considerations during flights of a Lear 28 airplane in adverse weather

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Fisher, Bruce D.; Phillips, Michael R.; Maier, Launa M.

1992-01-01

A NASA Langley Research Center Learjet 28 research airplane was flown in various adverse weather conditions in the vicinity of the NASA Kennedy Space Center from 1990-1992 to measure airborne electric fields during the Joint NASA/USAF Airborne Field Mill Program. The objective of this program was to characterize the electrical activity in various weather phenomena common to the NASA-Kennedy area in order to refine Launch Commit Criteria for natural and triggered lightning. The purpose of the program was to safely relax the existing launch commit criteria, thereby increasing launch availability and reducing the chance for weather holds and delays. This paper discusses the operational conduct of the flight test, including environmental/safety considerations, aircraft instrumentation and modification, test limitations, flight procedures, and the procedures and responsibilities of the personnel in the ground station. Airborne field mill data were collected for all the Launch Commit Criteria during two summer and two winter deployments. These data are now being analyzed.

14 CFR 420.19 - Launch site location review-general.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... site, at least one type of expendable or reusable launch vehicle can be flown from the launch point... × 10−6). (2) Types of launch vehicles include orbital expendable launch vehicles, guided sub-orbital expendable launch vehicles, unguided sub-orbital expendable launch vehicles, and reusable launch vehicles...

GOES-S Rollout to Pad

NASA Image and Video Library

2018-02-28

A United Launch Alliance Atlas V rocket is rolled to Space Launch Complex 41 at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station. The launch vehicle will send the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's, or NOAA's, Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite, or GOES-S, into orbit. The GOES series is designed to significantly improve the detection and observation of environmental phenomena that directly affect public safety, protection of property and the nation's economic health and prosperity. GOES-S is slated to lift off at 5:02 p.m. EST on March 1, 2018 aboard a United Launch Alliance Atlas V rocket.

GOES-S Rollout to Pad

NASA Image and Video Library

2018-02-28

A United Launch Alliance Atlas V rocket exits the Vertical Integration Facility on its way to the launch pad at Space Launch Complex 41 at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station. The launch vehicle will send the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's, or NOAA's, Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite, or GOES-S, into orbit. The GOES series is designed to significantly improve the detection and observation of environmental phenomena that directly affect public safety, protection of property and the nation's economic health and prosperity. GOES-S is slated to lift off at 5:02 p.m. EST on March 1, 2018 aboard a United Launch Alliance Atlas V rocket.

69. DETAIL OF OPERATIONS AND CHECKOUT (POWER CONTROL AND MONITOR ...

Library of Congress Historic Buildings Survey, Historic Engineering Record, Historic Landscapes Survey

69. DETAIL OF OPERATIONS AND CHECKOUT (POWER CONTROL AND MONITOR PANEL) AND RANGE SAFETY (DESTRUCT SYSTEM CONTROL MONITOR PANEL) PANELS IN SLC-3E CONTROL ROOM - Vandenberg Air Force Base, Space Launch Complex 3, Launch Operations Building, Napa & Alden Roads, Lompoc, Santa Barbara County, CA

Manned space flight nuclear system safety. Volume 3: Reactor system preliminary nuclear safety analysis. Part 1: Reference Design Document (RDD)

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

1972-01-01

The Reference Design Document, of the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) - Reactor System provides the basic design and operations data used in the nuclear safety analysis of the Rector Power Module as applied to a Space Base program. A description of the power module systems, facilities, launch vehicle and mission operations, as defined in NASA Phase A Space Base studies is included. Each of two Zirconium Hydride Reactor Brayton power modules provides 50 kWe for the nominal 50 man Space Base. The INT-21 is the prime launch vehicle. Resupply to the 500 km orbit over the ten year mission is provided by the Space Shuttle. At the end of the power module lifetime (nominally five years), a reactor disposal system is deployed for boost into a 990 km high altitude (long decay time) earth orbit.

Reliability and Crew Safety Assessment for a Solid Rocket Booster/J-2S Launcher

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Fragola, Joseph; Baum, J. D.; Sauvageau, Don; Horowitz, Scott J.

2005-12-01

NASA's Exploration Mission Directorate is currently developing plans to carry out the President's Vision for Space Exploration. This plan includes retiring the Space Shuttle by 2010 and developing the Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) to transport astronauts to/from Low Earth Orbit (LEO). There are several alternatives to launch the CEV, including Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles (EELVs) and launch vehicles derived from new and existing propulsion elements. In May, 2003 the astronaut office made clear its position on the need and feasibility of improving crew safety for future NASA manned missions indicating their "consensus that an order of magnitude reduction in the risk of human life during ascent, compared to the Space Shuttle, is both achievable with current technology and consistent with NASA's focus on steadily improving rocket reliability". The astronaut office set a goal for the Probability of Loss of Crew (PLOC) to be better than 1 in 1,000. This paper documents the evolution of a launch vehicle deign to meet the needs for launching the crew aboard a CEV. The process implemented and the results obtained from, a top-down evaluation performed on the proposed design are presented.

33 CFR 165.721 - Safety Zone: St. Johns River, Jacksonville, FL.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... 33 Navigation and Navigable Waters 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Safety Zone: St. Johns River... Zone: St. Johns River, Jacksonville, FL. (a) Location. The following area is established as a safety... barges during the storage, preparation, and launching of fireworks in the St. Johns River between the...

78 FR 15293 - Safety Zone; St. Patrick's Day Fireworks; Manitowoc River, Manitowoc, WI

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-03-11

...-AA00 Safety Zone; St. Patrick's Day Fireworks; Manitowoc River, Manitowoc, WI AGENCY: Coast Guard, DHS... will hold its annual St. Patrick's Day fireworks display. This fireworks display will be launched from... as follows: Sec. 165.T09-0116 Safety Zone; St. Patrick's Day Fireworks; Manitowoc River, Manitowoc...

75 FR 18056 - Safety Zone; Fireworks Display, Patuxent River, Solomons Island Harbor, MD

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-04-09

..., DHS. ACTION: Temporary final rule. SUMMARY: The Coast Guard is establishing a temporary safety zone... necessary to provide for the safety of life on navigable waters during a fireworks display launched from... protect the maritime public in a portion of Solomons Island Harbor. DATES: This rule is effective from 7...

Analysis of nuclear waste disposal in space, phase 3. Volume 2: Technical report

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Rice, E. E.; Miller, N. E.; Yates, K. R.; Martin, W. E.; Friedlander, A. L.

1980-01-01

The options, reference definitions and/or requirements currently envisioned for the total nuclear waste disposal in space mission are summarized. The waste form evaluation and selection process is documented along with the physical characteristics of the iron nickel-base cermet matrix chosen for disposal of commercial and defense wastes. Safety aspects of radioisotope thermal generators, the general purpose heat source, and the Lewis Research Center concept for space disposal are assessed as well as the on-pad catastrophic accident environments for the uprated space shuttle and the heavy lift launch vehicle. The radionuclides that contribute most to long-term risk of terrestrial disposal were determined and the effects of resuspension of fallout particles from an accidental release of waste material were studied. Health effects are considered. Payload breakup and rescue technology are discussed as well as expected requirements for licensing, supporting research and technology, and safety testing.

Analysis of nuclear waste disposal in space, phase 3. Volume 2: Technical report

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Rice, E. E.; Miller, N. E.; Yates, K. R.; Martin, W. E.; Friedlander, A. L.

1980-03-01

The options, reference definitions and/or requirements currently envisioned for the total nuclear waste disposal in space mission are summarized. The waste form evaluation and selection process is documented along with the physical characteristics of the iron nickel-base cermet matrix chosen for disposal of commercial and defense wastes. Safety aspects of radioisotope thermal generators, the general purpose heat source, and the Lewis Research Center concept for space disposal are assessed as well as the on-pad catastrophic accident environments for the uprated space shuttle and the heavy lift launch vehicle. The radionuclides that contribute most to long-term risk of terrestrial disposal were determined and the effects of resuspension of fallout particles from an accidental release of waste material were studied. Health effects are considered. Payload breakup and rescue technology are discussed as well as expected requirements for licensing, supporting research and technology, and safety testing.

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

1999-01-01

This report covers the activities of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) for calendar year 1998-a year of sharp contrasts and significant successes at NASA. The year opened with the announcement of large workforce cutbacks. The slip in the schedule for launching the International Space Station (ISS) created a 5-month hiatus in Space Shuttle launches. This slack period ended with the successful and highly publicized launch of the STS-95 mission. As the year closed, ISS assembly began with the successful orbiting and joining of the Functional Cargo Block (FGB), Zarya, from Russia and the Unity Node from the United States. Throughout the year, the Panel maintained its scrutiny of NASAs safety processes. Of particular interest were the potential effects on safety of workforce reductions and the continued transition of functions to the Space Flight Operations Contractor. Attention was also given to the risk management plans of the Aero-Space Technology programs, including the X-33, X-34, and X-38. Overall, the Panel concluded that safety is well served for the present. The picture is not as clear for the future. Cutbacks have limited the depth of talent available. In many cases, technical specialties are "one deep." The extended hiring freeze has resulted in an older workforce that will inevitably suffer significant departures from retirements in the near future. The resulting "brain drain" could represent a future safety risk unless appropriate succession planning is started expeditiously. This and other topics are covered in the section addressing workforce. In the case of the Space Shuttle, beneficial and mandatory safety and operational upgrades are being delayed because of a lack of sufficient present funding. Likewise, the ISS has little flexibility to begin long lead-time items for upgrades or contingency planning.

Ares I-X Range Safety Simulation Verification and Analysis Independent Validation and Verification

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Merry, Carl M.; Tarpley, Ashley F.; Craig, A. Scott; Tartabini, Paul V.; Brewer, Joan D.; Davis, Jerel G.; Dulski, Matthew B.; Gimenez, Adrian; Barron, M. Kyle

2011-01-01

NASA s Ares I-X vehicle launched on a suborbital test flight from the Eastern Range in Florida on October 28, 2009. To obtain approval for launch, a range safety final flight data package was generated to meet the data requirements defined in the Air Force Space Command Manual 91-710 Volume 2. The delivery included products such as a nominal trajectory, trajectory envelopes, stage disposal data and footprints, and a malfunction turn analysis. The Air Force s 45th Space Wing uses these products to ensure public and launch area safety. Due to the criticality of these data, an independent validation and verification effort was undertaken to ensure data quality and adherence to requirements. As a result, the product package was delivered with the confidence that independent organizations using separate simulation software generated data to meet the range requirements and yielded consistent results. This document captures Ares I-X final flight data package verification and validation analysis, including the methodology used to validate and verify simulation inputs, execution, and results and presents lessons learned during the process

14 CFR 417.203 - Compliance.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... analysis method is based on accurate data and scientific principles and is statistically valid. The FAA... safety analysis must also meet the requirements for methods of analysis contained in appendices A and B... from an identical or similar launch if the analysis still applies to the later launch. (b) Method of...

14 CFR 417.203 - Compliance.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... analysis method is based on accurate data and scientific principles and is statistically valid. The FAA... safety analysis must also meet the requirements for methods of analysis contained in appendices A and B... from an identical or similar launch if the analysis still applies to the later launch. (b) Method of...

14 CFR 417.203 - Compliance.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... analysis method is based on accurate data and scientific principles and is statistically valid. The FAA... safety analysis must also meet the requirements for methods of analysis contained in appendices A and B... from an identical or similar launch if the analysis still applies to the later launch. (b) Method of...

10 CFR 830.2 - Exclusions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... 10 Energy 4 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Exclusions. 830.2 Section 830.2 Energy DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NUCLEAR SAFETY MANAGEMENT § 830.2 Exclusions. This part does not apply to: (a) Activities that are... 1974, as amended; and (e) Activities related to the launch approval and actual launch of nuclear energy...

10 CFR 830.2 - Exclusions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... 10 Energy 4 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Exclusions. 830.2 Section 830.2 Energy DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NUCLEAR SAFETY MANAGEMENT § 830.2 Exclusions. This part does not apply to: (a) Activities that are... 1974, as amended; and (e) Activities related to the launch approval and actual launch of nuclear energy...

10 CFR 830.2 - Exclusions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... 10 Energy 4 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Exclusions. 830.2 Section 830.2 Energy DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NUCLEAR SAFETY MANAGEMENT § 830.2 Exclusions. This part does not apply to: (a) Activities that are... 1974, as amended; and (e) Activities related to the launch approval and actual launch of nuclear energy...

10 CFR 830.2 - Exclusions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 10 Energy 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Exclusions. 830.2 Section 830.2 Energy DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NUCLEAR SAFETY MANAGEMENT § 830.2 Exclusions. This part does not apply to: (a) Activities that are... 1974, as amended; and (e) Activities related to the launch approval and actual launch of nuclear energy...

10 CFR 830.2 - Exclusions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 10 Energy 4 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Exclusions. 830.2 Section 830.2 Energy DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NUCLEAR SAFETY MANAGEMENT § 830.2 Exclusions. This part does not apply to: (a) Activities that are... 1974, as amended; and (e) Activities related to the launch approval and actual launch of nuclear energy...

Final Programmatic Environment Impact Statement for Commercial Reentry Vehicles

DOT National Transportation Integrated Search

1992-05-28

To ensure that space launch services provided by private enterprises are : consistent with national security and foreign policy interests of the U.S., : and do not jeopardize public safety and safety of property, the Department of : Transportation (D...

Achieving the Proper Balance Between Crew and Public Safety

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Gowan, John; Rosati, Paul; Silvestri, Ray; Stahl, Ben; Wilde, Paul

2011-01-01

A paramount objective of all human-rated launch and reentry vehicle developers is to ensure that the risks to both the crew onboard and the public are minimized within reasonable cost, schedule, and technical constraints. Past experience has shown that proper attention to range safety requirements necessary to ensure public safety must be given early in the design phase to avoid additional operational complexities or threats to the safety of people onboard. This paper will outline the policy considerations, technical issues, and operational impacts regarding launch and reentry vehicle failure scenarios where crew and public safety are intertwined and thus addressed optimally in an integrated manner. Historical examples and lessons learned from both the Space Shuttle and Constellation Programs will be presented. Using these examples as context, the paper will discuss some operational, design, and analysis approaches to mitigate and balance the risks to people onboard and in the public. Manned vehicle perspectives from the FAA and Air Force organizations that oversee public safety will also be summarized. Finally, the paper will emphasize the need to factor policy, operational, and analysis considerations into the early design trades of new vehicles to help ensure that both crew and public safety are maximized to the greatest extent possible.

Proposal of New Triggered Lightning Launch Commit Criteria for Japan's Safety Rocket Launch

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Saito, Yasuhiro; Saito, Toshiya; Okita, Koichi

2013-09-01

Triggered lightning for rocket launch can cause the failure.The current Japanese criteria to postpone the launch opportunity is the thickness of cloud 1.8km with 0 -20 degrees Celsius. Of all H2A launches during these ten years, slipping launches have occurred over half of its flights. So, we have initiated a research on Triggered Lightning Launch Commit Criteria, two years ago.We present the overall activities with the observation campaign (RAIJIN*) in Feb/2012 and Jan-Feb/2013, by means of air-born field mill with airplane, X-band dual polarization radar, ground based field mill and Videosonde. Also, the analytical results and proposal of the new criteria will be shown.*) Raijin is originally a name for Thunder god in Japanese and here it stands for Rocket launch Atmospheric electricity Investigation by Jaxa IN cooperation with academia.

eLaunch Hypersonics: An Advanced Launch System

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Starr, Stanley

2010-01-01

This presentation describes a new space launch system that NASA can and should develop. This approach can significantly reduce ground processing and launch costs, improve reliability, and broaden the scope of what we do in near earth orbit. The concept (not new) is to launch a re-usable air-breathing hypersonic vehicle from a ground based electric track. This vehicle launches a final rocket stage at high altitude/velocity for the final leg to orbit. The proposal here differs from past studies in that we will launch above Mach 1.5 (above transonic pinch point) which further improves the efficiency of air breathing, horizontal take-off launch systems. The approach described here significantly reduces cost per kilogram to orbit, increases safety and reliability of the boost systems, and reduces ground costs due to horizontal-processing. Finally, this approach provides significant technology transfer benefits for our national infrastructure.

22. V2 GANTRY, LAUNCH COMPLEX 33: GENERAL VIEW, LOOKING WEST ...

Library of Congress Historic Buildings Survey, Historic Engineering Record, Historic Landscapes Survey

22. V-2 GANTRY, LAUNCH COMPLEX 33: GENERAL VIEW, LOOKING WEST AND UPWARD FROM APRON OF BLAST PIT, 20,000 POUND MOTOR TEST AND LAUNCH FACILITY - White Sands Missile Range, V-2 Rocket Facilities, Near Headquarters Area, White Sands, Dona Ana County, NM

1. GENERAL VIEW OF LAUNCH PAD A WITH MOBILE SERVICE ...

Library of Congress Historic Buildings Survey, Historic Engineering Record, Historic Landscapes Survey

1. GENERAL VIEW OF LAUNCH PAD A WITH MOBILE SERVICE STRUCTURE IN LOCKED POSITION OVER LAUNCHER BUILDING AND RETENTION POND AT RIGHT; VIEW TO NORTHWEST. - Cape Canaveral Air Station, Launch Complex 17, Facility 28501, East end of Lighthouse Road, Cape Canaveral, Brevard County, FL

Launch Pad Escape System Design (Human Spaceflight)

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Maloney, Kelli

2011-01-01

A launch pad escape system for human spaceflight is one of those things that everyone hopes they will never need but is critical for every manned space program. Since men were first put into space in the early 1960s, the need for such an Emergency Escape System (EES) has become apparent. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has made use of various types of these EESs over the past 50 years. Early programs, like Mercury and Gemini, did not have an official launch pad escape system. Rather, they relied on a Launch Escape System (LES) of a separate solid rocket motor attached to the manned capsule that could pull the astronauts to safety in the event of an emergency. This could only occur after hatch closure at the launch pad or during the first stage of flight. A version of a LES, now called a Launch Abort System (LAS) is still used today for all manned capsule type launch vehicles. However, this system is very limited in that it can only be used after hatch closure and it is for flight crew only. In addition, the forces necessary for the LES/LAS to get the capsule away from a rocket during the first stage of flight are quite high and can cause injury to the crew. These shortcomings led to the development of a ground based EES for the flight crew and ground support personnel as well. This way, a much less dangerous mode of egress is available for any flight or ground personnel up to a few seconds before launch. The early EESs were fairly simple, gravity-powered systems to use when thing's go bad. And things can go bad very quickly and catastrophically when dealing with a flight vehicle fueled with millions of pounds of hazardous propellant. With this in mind, early EES designers saw such a passive/unpowered system as a must for last minute escapes. This and other design requirements had to be derived for an EES, and this section will take a look at the safety design requirements had to be derived for an EES, and this section will take a look at the safety design aspects for a launch pad escape system.

NASA's Integrated Space Transportation Plan — 3 rd generation reusable launch vehicle technology update

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Cook, Stephen; Hueter, Uwe

2003-08-01

NASA's Integrated Space Transportation Plan (ISTP) calls for investments in Space Shuttle safety upgrades, second generation Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV) advanced development and third generation RLV and in-space research and technology. NASA's third generation launch systems are to be fully reusable and operation by 2025. The goals for third generation launch systems are to reduce cost by a factor of 100 and improve safety by a factor of 10,000 over current systems. The Advanced Space Transportation Program Office (ASTP) at NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, AL has the agency lead to develop third generation space transportation technologies. The Hypersonics Investment Area, part of ASTP, is developing the third generation launch vehicle technologies in two main areas, propulsion and airframes. The program's major investment is in hypersonic airbreathing propulsion since it offers the greatest potential for meeting the third generation launch vehicles. The program will mature the technologies in three key propulsion areas, scramjets, rocket-based combined cycle and turbine-based combination cycle. Ground and flight propulsion tests are being planned for the propulsion technologies. Airframe technologies will be matured primarily through ground testing. This paper describes NASA's activities in hypersonics. Current programs, accomplishments, future plans and technologies that are being pursued by the Hypersonics Investment Area under the Advanced Space Transportation Program Office will be discussed.

Applications of Advanced Nondestructive Measurement Techniques to Address Safety of Flight Issues on NASA Spacecraft

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Prosser, Bill

2016-01-01

Advanced nondestructive measurement techniques are critical for ensuring the reliability and safety of NASA spacecraft. Techniques such as infrared thermography, THz imaging, X-ray computed tomography and backscatter X-ray are used to detect indications of damage in spacecraft components and structures. Additionally, sensor and measurement systems are integrated into spacecraft to provide structural health monitoring to detect damaging events that occur during flight such as debris impacts during launch and assent or from micrometeoroid and orbital debris, or excessive loading due to anomalous flight conditions. A number of examples will be provided of how these nondestructive measurement techniques have been applied to resolve safety critical inspection concerns for the Space Shuttle, International Space Station (ISS), and a variety of launch vehicles and unmanned spacecraft.

Launch Commit Criteria Monitoring Agent

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Semmel, Glenn S.; Davis, Steven R.; Leucht, Kurt W.; Rowe, Dan A.; Kelly, Andrew O.; Boeloeni, Ladislau

2005-01-01

The Spaceport Processing Systems Branch at NASA Kennedy Space Center has developed and deployed a software agent to monitor the Space Shuttle's ground processing telemetry stream. The application, the Launch Commit Criteria Monitoring Agent, increases situational awareness for system and hardware engineers during Shuttle launch countdown. The agent provides autonomous monitoring of the telemetry stream, automatically alerts system engineers when predefined criteria have been met, identifies limit warnings and violations of launch commit criteria, aids Shuttle engineers through troubleshooting procedures, and provides additional insight to verify appropriate troubleshooting of problems by contractors. The agent has successfully detected launch commit criteria warnings and violations on a simulated playback data stream. Efficiency and safety are improved through increased automation.

KSC-06pd1398

NASA Image and Video Library

2006-07-04

KENNEDY SPACE CENTER, FLA. - STS-121 Mission Specialist Lisa Nowak is happy to be making a third launch attempt on the mission. She is suiting up before heading to Launch Pad 39B. The July 2 launch attempt was scrubbed due to the presence of showers and thunderstorms within the surrounding area of the launch site. The launch of Space Shuttle Discovery on mission STS-121 is the 115th shuttle flight and the 18th U.S. flight to the International Space Station. During the 12-day mission, the STS-121 crew will test new equipment and procedures to improve shuttle safety, as well as deliver supplies and make repairs to the International Space Station. Photo credit: NASA/Kim Shiflett

KSC-06pd1394

NASA Image and Video Library

2006-07-04

KENNEDY SPACE CENTER, FLA. - Mission Specialist Thomas Reiter, happy to be making a third launch attempt on mission STS-121, is suited up before heading to Launch Pad 39B. The July 2 launch attempt was scrubbed due to the presence of showers and thunderstorms within the surrounding area of the launch site. The launch of Space Shuttle Discovery on mission STS-121 is the 115th shuttle flight and the 18th U.S. flight to the International Space Station. During the 12-day mission, the STS-121 crew will test new equipment and procedures to improve shuttle safety, as well as deliver supplies and make repairs to the International Space Station. Photo credit: NASA/Kim Shiflett

Modeling and Simulation of Shuttle Launch and Range Operations

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Bardina, Jorge; Thirumalainambi, Rajkumar

2004-01-01

The simulation and modeling test bed is based on a mockup of a space flight operations control suitable to experiment physical, procedural, software, hardware and psychological aspects of space flight operations. The test bed consists of a weather expert system to advise on the effect of weather to the launch operations. It also simulates toxic gas dispersion model, impact of human health risk, debris dispersion model in 3D visualization. Since all modeling and simulation is based on the internet, it could reduce the cost of operations of launch and range safety by conducting extensive research before a particular launch. Each model has an independent decision making module to derive the best decision for launch.

GOES-S Atlas V Centaur Stage Transport to VIF

NASA Image and Video Library

2018-02-08

The Centaur upper stage that will help launch NOAA's Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite-S, or GOES-S, arrives at the Vertical Integration Facility at Space Launch Complex 41 at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station in Florida. The Centaur will be mated to a United Launch Alliance Atlas V booster. GOES-S is the second in a series of four advanced geostationary weather satellites that will significantly improve the detection and observation of environmental phenomena that directly affect public safety, protection of property and the nation's economic health and prosperity. GOES-S is slated to launch March 1, 2018.

Comments on the commercialization of expendable launch vehicles

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Trilling, D. R.

1984-01-01

The President's national space policy encourages private sector investment and involvement in civil space activities. Last November, the President designated the Department of Transportation as lead agency for the commercialization of expendable launch vehicles. This presents a substantial challenge to the United States Government, since the guidelines and requirements that are set now will have great influence on whether American firms can become a viable competitive industry in the world launch market. There is a dual need to protect public safety and free the private sector launch industry from needless regulatory barriers so that it can grow and prosper.

Autonomous Flight Safety System

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Simpson, James

2010-01-01

The Autonomous Flight Safety System (AFSS) is an independent self-contained subsystem mounted onboard a launch vehicle. AFSS has been developed by and is owned by the US Government. Autonomously makes flight termination/destruct decisions using configurable software-based rules implemented on redundant flight processors using data from redundant GPS/IMU navigation sensors. AFSS implements rules determined by the appropriate Range Safety officials.

78 FR 38830 - Safety Zone; Execpro Services Fireworks Display, Lake Tahoe, Incline Village, NV

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-06-28

... spectators from the dangers associated with the pyrotechnics. Unauthorized persons or vessels are prohibited... pyrotechnics used in this fireworks display, the safety zone is necessary to provide for the safety of event... loading, transit and arrival of the pyrotechnics from the loading site to the launch site and until the...

76 FR 78820 - Safety Zone; City of Beaufort's Tricentennial New Year's Eve Fireworks Display, Beaufort River...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-12-20

...-AA00 Safety Zone; City of Beaufort's Tricentennial New Year's Eve Fireworks Display, Beaufort River... establishing a temporary safety zone on the Beaufort River, in Beaufort, South Carolina, during the City of... Carolina. The fireworks will be launched from a barge, which will be located on the Beaufort River. The...

Space-Based Range Safety and Future Space Range Applications

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Whiteman, Donald E.; Valencia, Lisa M.; Simpson, James C.

2005-01-01

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Space-Based Telemetry and Range Safety (STARS) study is a multiphase project to demonstrate the performance, flexibility and cost savings that can be realized by using space-based assets for the Range Safety [global positioning system (GPS) metric tracking data, flight termination command and range safety data relay] and Range User (telemetry) functions during vehicle launches and landings. Phase 1 included flight testing S-band Range Safety and Range User hardware in 2003 onboard a high-dynamic aircraft platform at Dryden Flight Research Center (Edwards, California, USA) using the NASA Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS) as the communications link. The current effort, Phase 2, includes hardware and packaging upgrades to the S-band Range Safety system and development of a high data rate Ku-band Range User system. The enhanced Phase 2 Range Safety Unit (RSU) provided real-time video for three days during the historic Global Flyer (Scaled Composites, Mojave, California, USA) flight in March, 2005. Additional Phase 2 testing will include a sounding rocket test of the Range Safety system and aircraft flight testing of both systems. Future testing will include a flight test on a launch vehicle platform. This paper discusses both Range Safety and Range User developments and testing with emphasis on the Range Safety system. The operational concept of a future space-based range is also discussed.

Space-Based Range Safety and Future Space Range Applications

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Whiteman, Donald E.; Valencia, Lisa M.; Simpson, James C.

2005-01-01

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration Space-Based Telemetry and Range Safety study is a multiphase project to demonstrate the performance, flexibility and cost savings that can be realized by using space-based assets for the Range Safety (global positioning system metric tracking data, flight termination command and range safety data relay) and Range User (telemetry) functions during vehicle launches and landings. Phase 1 included flight testing S-band Range Safety and Range User hardware in 2003 onboard a high-dynamic aircraft platform at Dryden Flight Research Center (Edwards, California) using the NASA Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System as the communications link. The current effort, Phase 2, includes hardware and packaging upgrades to the S-band Range Safety system and development of a high data rate Ku-band Range User system. The enhanced Phase 2 Range Safety Unit provided real-time video for three days during the historic GlobalFlyer (Scaled Composites, Mojave, California) flight in March, 2005. Additional Phase 2 testing will include a sounding rocket test of the Range Safety system and aircraft flight testing of both systems. Future testing will include a flight test on a launch vehicle platform. This report discusses both Range Safety and Range User developments and testing with emphasis on the Range Safety system. The operational concept of a future space-based range is also discussed.

NASA's Next Generation Launch Technology Program - Strategy and Plans

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Hueter, Uwe

2003-01-01

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration established a new program office, Next Generation Launch Technology (NGLT) Program Office, last year to pursue technologies for future space launch systems. NGLT will fund research in key technology areas such as propulsion, launch vehicles, operations and system analyses. NGLT is part of NASA s Integrated Space Technology Plan. The NGLT Program is sponsored by NASA s Office of Aerospace Technology and is part of the Space Launch Initiative theme that includes both NGLT and Orbital Space Plane. NGLT will focus on technology development to increase safety and reliability and reduce overall costs associated with building, flying and maintaining the nation s next-generations of space launch vehicles. These investments will be guided by systems engineering and analysis with a focus on the needs of National customers.

Adapting PC104Plus for Space

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Abbott, Larry; Cox, Gary; Nguyen, Hai

2000-01-01

This article addresses the issues associated with adapting the commercial PC104Plus standard and its associated architecture to the requirements of space applications. In general, space applications exhibit extreme constraints on power, weight, and volume. EMI and EMC are also issues of significant concern. Additionally, space applications have to survive high radiation environment. Finally, NASA is always concerned about achieving cost effective solutions that are compatible with safety and launch constraints. Weight and volume constraints are directly related to high launch cost. Power on the other hand is not only related to the high launch costs, but are related to the problem of dissipating the resulting heat once in space. The article addresses why PC104Plus is an appropriate solution for the weight and volume issues. The article also addresses what NASA did electrically to reduce power consumption and mechanically dissipate the associated heat in a microgravity and vacuum environment, and how these solutions allow NASA to integrate various sizes of ruggedized custom PC104 boards with COTS, PC104 complaint boards for space applications. In addition to the mechanical changes to deal with thermal dissipation NASA also made changes to minimize EMI. Finally, radiation issues are addressed as well as the architectural and testing solutions and the implications for use of COTS PC104Plus boards.

Canadian Space Launch: Exploiting Northern Latitudes For Efficient Space Launch

DTIC Science & Technology

2015-04-01

9  Peoples’ Republic of China .........................................................................................11  USA Launch... taxation and legislation that make Canada an attractive destination for commercial space companies.3 General Definitions Highly Inclined Orbit...launches from sites north of the 35th parallel.33 USA Launch Facilities There are 3 US based launch facilities that conduct launch operations north

14. DETAIL OF EAST END OF CENTRAL CONTROL CONSOLE IN ...

Library of Congress Historic Buildings Survey, Historic Engineering Record, Historic Landscapes Survey

14. DETAIL OF EAST END OF CENTRAL CONTROL CONSOLE IN SLC-3W CONTROL ROOM SHOWING BLANK PANEL AND COMPLEX SAFETY OFFICER PANEL. CONSOLES AND CHAIRS NEAR NORTH WALL IN BACKGROUND. - Vandenberg Air Force Base, Space Launch Complex 3, Launch Operations Building, Napa & Alden Roads, Lompoc, Santa Barbara County, CA

14 CFR 417.415 - Post-launch and post-flight-attempt hazard controls.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Post-launch and post-flight-attempt hazard controls. 417.415 Section 417.415 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION... evidence; and (4) Ensuring public safety from hazardous debris, such as plans for recovery and salvage of...

Preliminary risk assessment for nuclear waste disposal in space, volume 2

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Rice, E. E.; Denning, R. S.; Friedlander, A. L.

1982-01-01

Safety guidelines are presented. Waste form, waste processing and payload fabrication facilities, shipping casks and ground transport vehicles, payload primary container/core, radiation shield, reentry systems, launch site facilities, uprooted space shuttle launch vehicle, Earth packing orbits, orbit transfer systems, and space destination are discussed. Disposed concepts and risks are then discussed.

14 CFR 417.415 - Post-launch and post-flight-attempt hazard controls.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Post-launch and post-flight-attempt hazard controls. 417.415 Section 417.415 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION... evidence; and (4) Ensuring public safety from hazardous debris, such as plans for recovery and salvage of...

14 CFR 417.415 - Post-launch and post-flight-attempt hazard controls.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Post-launch and post-flight-attempt hazard controls. 417.415 Section 417.415 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION... evidence; and (4) Ensuring public safety from hazardous debris, such as plans for recovery and salvage of...

Systems Engineering Approach to Technology Integration for NASA's 2nd Generation Reusable Launch Vehicle

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Thomas, Dale; Smith, Charles; Thomas, Leann; Kittredge, Sheryl

2002-01-01

The overall goal of the 2nd Generation RLV Program is to substantially reduce technical and business risks associated with developing a new class of reusable launch vehicles. NASA's specific goals are to improve the safety of a 2nd-generation system by 2 orders of magnitude - equivalent to a crew risk of 1-in-10,000 missions - and decrease the cost tenfold, to approximately $1,000 per pound of payload launched. Architecture definition is being conducted in parallel with the maturating of key technologies specifically identified to improve safety and reliability, while reducing operational costs. An architecture broadly includes an Earth-to-orbit reusable launch vehicle, on-orbit transfer vehicles and upper stages, mission planning, ground and flight operations, and support infrastructure, both on the ground and in orbit. The systems engineering approach ensures that the technologies developed - such as lightweight structures, long-life rocket engines, reliable crew escape, and robust thermal protection systems - will synergistically integrate into the optimum vehicle. To best direct technology development decisions, analytical models are employed to accurately predict the benefits of each technology toward potential space transportation architectures as well as the risks associated with each technology. Rigorous systems analysis provides the foundation for assessing progress toward safety and cost goals. The systems engineering review process factors in comprehensive budget estimates, detailed project schedules, and business and performance plans, against the goals of safety, reliability, and cost, in addition to overall technical feasibility. This approach forms the basis for investment decisions in the 2nd Generation RLV Program's risk-reduction activities. Through this process, NASA will continually refine its specialized needs and identify where Defense and commercial requirements overlap those of civil missions.

Systems Engineering Approach to Technology Integration for NASA's 2nd Generation Reusable Launch Vehicle

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Thomas, Dale; Smith, Charles; Thomas, Leann; Kittredge, Sheryl

2002-01-01

The overall goal of the 2nd Generation RLV Program is to substantially reduce technical and business risks associated with developing a new class of reusable launch vehicles. NASA's specific goals are to improve the safety of a 2nd generation system by 2 orders of magnitude - equivalent to a crew risk of 1-in-10,000 missions - and decrease the cost tenfold, to approximately $1,000 per pound of payload launched. Architecture definition is being conducted in parallel with the maturating of key technologies specifically identified to improve safety and reliability, while reducing operational costs. An architecture broadly includes an Earth-to-orbit reusable launch vehicle, on-orbit transfer vehicles and upper stages, mission planning, ground and flight operations, and support infrastructure, both on the ground and in orbit. The systems engineering approach ensures that the technologies developed - such as lightweight structures, long-life rocket engines, reliable crew escape, and robust thermal protection systems - will synergistically integrate into the optimum vehicle. To best direct technology development decisions, analytical models are employed to accurately predict the benefits of each technology toward potential space transportation architectures as well as the risks associated with each technology. Rigorous systems analysis provides the foundation for assessing progress toward safety and cost goals. The systems engineering review process factors in comprehensive budget estimates, detailed project schedules, and business and performance plans, against the goals of safety, reliability, and cost, in addition to overall technical feasibility. This approach forms the basis for investment decisions in the 2nd Generation RLV Program's risk-reduction activities. Through this process, NASA will continually refine its specialized needs and identify where Defense and commercial requirements overlap those of civil missions.

FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT--SNAP 1A RADIOISOTOPE FUELED THERMOELECTRIC GENERATOR

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Dix, G.P.

1960-06-30

The safety aspects involved in utilizing the Task 2 radioisotope-powered thermoelectric generator in a terrestrial satellite are described. It is based upon a generalized satellite mission having a 600-day orbital lifetime. A description of the basic design of the generator is presented in order to establish the analytical model. This includes the generator design, radiocerium fuel properties, and the fuel core. The transport of the generator to the launch site is examined, including the shipping cask, shipping procedures, and shipping hazards. A description of ground handling and vehicle integration is presented including preparation for fuel transfer, transfer, mating of generatorsmore » to final stage, mating final stage to booster, and auxiliary support equipment. The flight vehicle is presented to complete the analytical model. Contained in this chapter are descriptions of the booster-sustainer, final stage, propellants, and built-in safety systems. The typical missile range is examined with respect to the launch complex and range safety characteristics. The shielding of the fuel is discussed and includes both dose rates and shield thicknesses required. The bare core, shielded generator, fuel transfer operation and dose rates for accidental conditions are treated. mechanism of re-entry from the successful mission is covered. Radiocerium inventories with respect to time and the chronology of re-entry are specifically treated. The multiplicity of conditions for aborted missions is set forth. The definition of aborted missions is treated first in order to present the initial conditions. Following this, a definition of the forces imposed upon the generator is presented. The aborted missions is presented. A large number of initial vehicle failure cases is narrowed down into categories of consequences. Since stratospheric injection of fuel results in cases where the fuel is not contained after re-entry, an extensive discussion of the fall-out mechanism is presented. (auth)« less

Using PHM to measure equipment usable life on the Air Force's next generation reusable space booster

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Blasdel, A.

The U.S. Air Force procures many launch vehicles and launch vehicle services to place their satellites at their desired location in space. The equipment on-board these satellite and launch vehicle often suffer from premature failures that result in the total loss of the satellite or a shortened mission life sometimes requiring the purchase of a replacement satellite and launch vehicle. The Air Force uses its EELV to launch its high priority satellites. Due to a rise in the cost of purchasing a launch using the Air Force's EELV from 72M in 1997 to as high as 475M per launch today, the Air Force is working to replace the EELV with a reusable space booster (RSB). The RSB will be similar in design and operations to the recently cancelled NASA reusable space booster known as the Space Shuttle. If the Air Force uses the same process that procures the EELV and other launch vehicles and satellites, the RSB will also suffer from premature equipment failures thus putting the payloads at a similar high risk of mission failure. The RSB is expected to lower each launch cost by 50% compared to the EELV. The development of the RSB offers the Air Force an opportunity to use a new reliability paradigm that includes a prognostic and health management program and a condition-based maintenance program. These both require using intelligent, decision making self-prognostic equipment The prognostic and health management program and its condition-based maintenance program allows increases in RSB equipment usable life, lower logistics and maintenance costs, while increasing safety and mission assurance. The PHM removes many decisions from personnel that, in the past resulted in catastrophic failures and loss of life. Adding intelligent, decision-making self-prognostic equipment to the RSB will further decrease launch costs while decreasing risk and increasing safety and mission assurance.

NASA Range Safety Annual Report 2007

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Dumont, Alan G.

2007-01-01

As always, Range Safety has been involved in a number of exciting and challenging activities and events. Throughout the year, we have strived to meet our goal of protecting the public, the workforce, and property during range operations. During the past year, Range Safety was involved in the development, implementation, and support of range safety policy. Range Safety training curriculum development was completed this year and several courses were presented. Tailoring exercises concerning the Constellation Program were undertaken with representatives from the Constellation Program, the 45th Space Wing, and the Launch Constellation Range Safety Panel. Range Safety actively supported the Range Commanders Council and it subgroups and remained involved in updating policy related to flight safety systems and flight safety analysis. In addition, Range Safety supported the Space Shuttle Range Safety Panel and addressed policy concerning unmanned aircraft systems. Launch operations at Kennedy Space Center, the Eastern and Western ranges, Dryden Flight Research Center, and Wallops Flight Facility were addressed. Range Safety was also involved in the evaluation of a number of research and development efforts, including the space-based range (formerly STARS), the autonomous flight safety system, the enhanced flight termination system, and the joint advanced range safety system. Flight safety system challenges were evaluated. Range Safety's role in the Space Florida Customer Assistance Service Program for the Eastern Range was covered along with our support for the Space Florida Educational Balloon Release Program. We hope you have found the web-based format both accessible and easy to use. Anyone having questions or wishing to have an article included in the 2008 Range Safety Annual Report should contact Alan Dumont, the NASA Range Safety Program Manager located at the Kennedy Space Center, or Michael Dook at NASA Headquarters.

Refractory Materials for Flame Deflector Protection System Corrosion Control: Refractory Ceramics Literature Survey

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Calle, Luz Marina; Hintze, Paul E.; Parlier, Christopher R.; Curran, Jerome P.; Kolody, Mark; Perusich, Stephen; Whitten, Mary C.; Trejo, David; Zidek, Jason; Sampson, Jeffrey W.;

Safety Characteristics in System Application of Software for Human Rated Exploration Missions for the 8th IAASS Conference

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Mango, Edward J.

2016-01-01

NASA and its industry and international partners are embarking on a bold and inspiring development effort to design and build an exploration class space system. The space system is made up of the Orion system, the Space Launch System (SLS) and the Ground Systems Development and Operations (GSDO) system. All are highly coupled together and dependent on each other for the combined safety of the space system. A key area of system safety focus needs to be in the ground and flight application software system (GFAS). In the development, certification and operations of GFAS, there are a series of safety characteristics that define the approach to ensure mission success. This paper will explore and examine the safety characteristics of the GFAS development. The GFAS system integrates the flight software packages of the Orion and SLS with the ground systems and launch countdown sequencers through the 'agile' software development process. A unique approach is needed to develop the GFAS project capabilities within this agile process. NASA has defined the software development process through a set of standards. The standards were written during the infancy of the so-called industry 'agile development' movement and must be tailored to adapt to the highly integrated environment of human exploration systems. Safety of the space systems and the eventual crew on board is paramount during the preparation of the exploration flight systems. A series of software safety characteristics have been incorporated into the development and certification efforts to ensure readiness for use and compatibility with the space systems. Three underlining factors in the exploration architecture require the GFAS system to be unique in its approach to ensure safety for the space systems, both the flight as well as the ground systems. The first are the missions themselves, which are exploration in nature, and go far beyond the comfort of low Earth orbit operations. The second is the current exploration system will launch only one mission per year even less during its developmental phases. Finally, the third is the partnered approach through the use of many different prime contractors, including commercial and international partners, to design and build the exploration systems. These three factors make the challenges to meet the mission preparations and the safety expectations extremely difficult to implement. As NASA leads a team of partners in the exploration beyond earth's influence, it is a safety imperative that the application software used to test, checkout, prepare and launch the exploration systems put safety of the hardware and mission first. Software safety characteristics are built into the design and development process to enable the human rated systems to begin their missions safely and successfully. Exploration missions beyond Earth are inherently risky, however, with solid safety approaches in both hardware and software, the boldness of these missions can be realized for all on the home planet.

STS-107 Mission Specialist Kalpana Chawla during TCDT at LC-39A

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

2002-01-01

KENNEDY SPACE CENTER, FLA. - STS-107 Mission Specialist Kalpana Chawla is shown during the crew's Terminal Countdown Demonstration Test activities on Launch Pad 39A. The TCDT also includes a simulated launch countdown. STS-107 is a mission devoted to research and will include more than 80 experiments that will study Earth and space science, advanced technology development, and astronaut health and safety. Launch is planned for Jan. 16, 2003, between 10 a.m. and 2 p.m. EST aboard Space Shuttle Columbia. .

General-Purpose Heat Source Safety Verification Test Program: Edge-on flyer plate tests

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

George, T. G.

1987-03-01

The radioisotope thermoelectric generator (RTG) that will supply power for the Galileo and Ulysses space missions contains 18 General-Purpose Heat Source (GPHS) modules. The GPHS modules provide power by transmitting the heat of Pu-238 alpha-decay to an array of thermoelectric elements. Each module contains four Pu-238O2-fueled clads and generates 250 W(t). Because the possibility of a launch vehicle explosion always exists, and because such an explosion could generate a field of high-energy fragments, the fueled clads within each GPHS module must survive fragment impact. The edge-on flyer plate tests were included in the Safety Verification Test series to provide information on the module/clad response to the impact of high-energy plate fragments. The test results indicate that the edge-on impact of a 3.2-mm-thick, aluminum-alloy (2219-T87) plate traveling at 915 m/s causes the complete release of fuel from capsules contained within a bare GPHS module, and that the threshold velocity sufficient to cause the breach of a bare, simulant-fueled clad impacted by a 3.5-mm-thick, aluminum-alloy (5052-TO) plate is approximately 140 m/s.

Application of the Life Safety Code to a Historic Test Stand

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Askins, Bruce; Lemke, Paul R.; Lewis, William L.; Covell, Carol C.

2011-01-01

NASA has conducted a study to assess alternatives to refurbishing existing launch vehicle modal test facilities as opposed to developing new test facilities to meet the demands of a very fiscally constrained test and evaluation environment. The results of this study showed that Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) Test Stand (TS) 4550 could be made compliant, within reasonable cost and schedule impacts, if safety processes and operational limitations were put in place to meet the safety codes and concerns of the Fire Marshall. Trades were performed with key selection criteria to ensure that appropriate levels of occupant safety are incorporated into test facility design modifications. In preparation for the ground vibration tests that were to be performed on the Ares I launch vehicle, the Ares Flight and Integrated Test Office (FITO) organization evaluated the available test facility options, which included the existing mothballed structural dynamic TS4550 used by Apollo and Shuttle, alternative ground vibration test facilities at other locations, and construction of a new dynamic test stand. After an exhaustive assessment of the alternatives, the results favored modifying the TS4550 because it was the lowest cost option and presented the least schedule risk to the NASA Constellation Program for Ares Integrated Vehicle Ground Vibration Test (IVGVT). As the renovation design plans and drawings were being developed for TS4550, a safety concern was discovered the original design for the construction of the test stand, originally built for the Apollo Program and renovated for the Shuttle Program, was completed before NASA s adoption of the currently imposed safety and building codes per National Fire Protection Association Life Safety Code [NFPA 101] and International Building Codes. The initial FITO assessment of the design changes, required to make TS4550 compliant with current safety and building standards, identified a significant cost increase and schedule impact. An effort was launched to thoroughly evaluate the applicable life safety requirements, examine the context in which they were derived, and determine a means by which the TS4550 modifications could be made within budget and on schedule, while still providing the occupants with appropriate levels of safety.

78 FR 20454 - Safety Zones; Annual Events Requiring Safety Zones in the Captain of the Port Lake Michigan Zone

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-04-05

... written--Celebrate Americafest/Fire over the Fox. This event has historically involved both a fireworks... day of the event. To ensure the safety of the Celebrate Americafest/Fire over the Fox event in its... 7 p.m. (2) Michigan Aerospace Challenge Sport Rocket Launch; Muskegon, MI--(i) Location. All waters...

The FAA's Approach to Quality Assurance in the Flight Safety Analysis of Launch and Reentry Vehicles

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Murray, Daniel P.; Weil, Andre

2010-09-01

The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration(FAA) Office of Commercial Space Transportation’s safety mission is to ensure protection of the public, property, and the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States during commercial launch and reentry activities. As part of this mission, the FAA issues licenses to the operators of launch and reentry vehicles who successfully demonstrate compliance with FAA regulations. To meet these regulations, vehicle operators submit an application that contains, among other things, flight safety analyses of their proposed missions. In the process of evaluating these submitted analyses, the FAA often conducts its own independent analyses, using input data from the submitted license application. These analyses are conducted according to approved procedures using industry developed tools. To assist in achieving the highest levels of quality in these independent analyses, the FAA has developed a quality assurance program that consists of multiple levels of review. These reviews rely on the work of multiple teams, as well as additional, independently performed work of support contractors. This paper describes the FAA’s quality assurance process for flight safety analyses. Members of the commercial space industry may find that elements of this process can be easily applied to their own analyses, improving the quality of the material they submit to the FAA in their license applications.

KSC-06pd1393

NASA Image and Video Library

2006-07-04

KENNEDY SPACE CENTER, FLA. - Mission Specialist Piers Sellers is happy to be making a third launch attempt on mission STS-121. Here, he fixes one of his gloves during suitup before heading to Launch Pad 39B. The July 2 launch attempt was scrubbed due to the presence of showers and thunderstorms within the surrounding area of the launch site. The launch of Space Shuttle Discovery on mission STS-121 is the 115th shuttle flight and the 18th U.S. flight to the International Space Station. During the 12-day mission, the STS-121 crew will test new equipment and procedures to improve shuttle safety, as well as deliver supplies and make repairs to the International Space Station. Photo credit: NASA/Kim Shiflett

14 CFR 417.213 - Flight safety limits analysis.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Flight safety limits analysis. 417.213 Section 417.213 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION... launch vehicle's flight to prevent the hazardous effects of the resulting debris impacts from reaching...

14 CFR 417.225 - Debris risk analysis.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Debris risk analysis. 417.225 Section 417.225 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH SAFETY Flight Safety Analysis § 417.225 Debris risk analysis. A...

14 CFR 417.225 - Debris risk analysis.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Debris risk analysis. 417.225 Section 417.225 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH SAFETY Flight Safety Analysis § 417.225 Debris risk analysis. A...

14 CFR 417.225 - Debris risk analysis.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Debris risk analysis. 417.225 Section 417.225 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH SAFETY Flight Safety Analysis § 417.225 Debris risk analysis. A...

14 CFR 417.213 - Flight safety limits analysis.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Flight safety limits analysis. 417.213 Section 417.213 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION... launch vehicle's flight to prevent the hazardous effects of the resulting debris impacts from reaching...

14 CFR 417.225 - Debris risk analysis.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Debris risk analysis. 417.225 Section 417.225 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH SAFETY Flight Safety Analysis § 417.225 Debris risk analysis. A...

14 CFR 417.213 - Flight safety limits analysis.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Flight safety limits analysis. 417.213 Section 417.213 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION... launch vehicle's flight to prevent the hazardous effects of the resulting debris impacts from reaching...

14 CFR 417.225 - Debris risk analysis.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Debris risk analysis. 417.225 Section 417.225 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH SAFETY Flight Safety Analysis § 417.225 Debris risk analysis. A...

14 CFR 417.213 - Flight safety limits analysis.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Flight safety limits analysis. 417.213 Section 417.213 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION... launch vehicle's flight to prevent the hazardous effects of the resulting debris impacts from reaching...

14 CFR 417.213 - Flight safety limits analysis.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Flight safety limits analysis. 417.213 Section 417.213 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION... launch vehicle's flight to prevent the hazardous effects of the resulting debris impacts from reaching...

Nuclear Safety for Space Systems

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Offiong, Etim

2010-09-01

It is trite, albeit a truism, to say that nuclear power can provide propulsion thrust needed to launch space vehicles and also, to provide electricity for powering on-board systems, especially for missions to the Moon, Mars and other deep space missions. Nuclear Power Sources(NPSs) are known to provide more capabilities than solar power, fuel cells and conventional chemical means. The worry has always been that of safety. The earliest superpowers(US and former Soviet Union) have designed and launched several nuclear-powered systems, with some failures. Nuclear failures and accidents, however little the number, could be far-reaching geographically, and are catastrophic to humans and the environment. Building on the numerous research works on nuclear power on Earth and in space, this paper seeks to bring to bear, issues relating to safety of space systems - spacecrafts, astronauts, Earth environment and extra terrestrial habitats - in the use and application of nuclear power sources. It also introduces a new formal training course in Space Systems Safety.

14 CFR 415.3 - Types of launch licenses.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Types of launch licenses. 415.3 Section 415.3 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH LICENSE General § 415.3 Types of launch licenses. (a) Launch...

14 CFR 415.3 - Types of launch licenses.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Types of launch licenses. 415.3 Section 415.3 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH LICENSE General § 415.3 Types of launch licenses. (a) Launch...

KSC-06pd1490

NASA Image and Video Library

2006-07-04

KENNEDY SPACE CENTER, FLA. - In Firing Room 4 of the Launch Control Center, NASA launch team members cheer and wave American flags at the successful launch of Space Shuttle Discovery on mission STS-121. The launch made history as the first to occur on Independence Day. Liftoff was on-time at 2:38 p.m. EDT. During the 12-day mission, the STS-121 crew of seven will test new equipment and procedures to improve shuttle safety, as well as deliver supplies and make repairs to the International Space Station. Landing is scheduled for July 16 or 17 at Kennedy's Shuttle Landing Facility. Photo credit: NASA/Bill Ingalls

Weather impacts on space operations

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Madura, J.; Boyd, B.; Bauman, W.; Wyse, N.; Adams, M.

The efforts of the 45th Weather Squadron of the USAF to provide weather support to Patrick Air Force Base, Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, Eastern Range, and the Kennedy Space Center are discussed. Its weather support to space vehicles, particularly the Space Shuttle, includes resource protection, ground processing, launch, and Ferry Flight, as well as consultations to the Spaceflight Meteorology Group for landing forecasts. Attention is given to prelaunch processing weather, launch support weather, Shuttle launch commit criteria, and range safety weather restrictions. Upper level wind requirements are examined. The frequency of hourly surface observations with thunderstorms at the Shuttle landing facility, and lightning downtime at the Titan launch complexes are illustrated.

KSC All Hands

NASA Image and Video Library

2018-01-11

Russ DeLoach, director of Safety and Mission Assurance, speaks to Kennedy Space Center employees about plans for the coming year. The event took place in the Lunar Theater at the Kennedy Space Center Visitor Complex’s Apollo Saturn V Center. The year will be highlighted with NASA's partners preparing test flights for crewed missions to the International Space Station as part of the agency's Commercial Crew Program and six launches by the Launch Services Program. Exploration Ground Systems will be completing facilities to support the Space Launch System rocket and Orion spacecraft. Exploration Research and Technology Programs will continue to provide supplies to the space station launched as part of the Commercial Resupply Services effort.

GOES-S Atlas V Centaur Stage Transport to VIF

NASA Image and Video Library

2018-02-08

The Centaur upper stage that will help launch NOAA's Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite-S, or GOES-S, departs the Delta Operations Center for the Vertical Integration Facility at Space Launch Complex 41 at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station in Florida. The Centaur then will be mated to a United Launch Alliance Atlas V booster. GOES-S is the second in a series of four advanced geostationary weather satellites that will significantly improve the detection and observation of environmental phenomena that directly affect public safety, protection of property and the nation's economic health and prosperity. GOES-S is slated to launch March 1, 2018.

KSC-06pd0903

NASA Image and Video Library

2006-05-19

KENNEDY SPACE CENTER, FLA. -- Near Launch Pad 39B, wild pigs (at right) root for food near a stand of trees while Space Shuttle Discovery rolls out to the pad. The 4.2-mile journey from the Vehicle Assembly Building began at 12:45 p.m. EDT. The rollout is an important step before launch of Discovery on mission STS-121 to the International Space Station. Discovery's launch is targeted for July 1 in a launch window that extends to July 19. During the 12-day mission, Discovery's crew will test new hardware and techniques to improve shuttle safety, as well as deliver supplies and make repairs to the station. Photo credit: NASA/Ken Thornsley

29. DETAIL OF OUTLET DUCTS FOR MST AIRCONDITIONING SYSTEM IN ...

Library of Congress Historic Buildings Survey, Historic Engineering Record, Historic Landscapes Survey

29. DETAIL OF OUTLET DUCTS FOR MST AIR-CONDITIONING SYSTEM IN NORTHWEST CORNER OF SLC-3W MST STATION 70.5 (LOWEST PAYLOAD SERVICE STATION). NOTE RING ATTACHMENT FOR PERSONNEL SAFETY HARNESS IN LEFT FOREGROUND. - Vandenberg Air Force Base, Space Launch Complex 3, Launch Pad 3 West, Napa & Alden Roads, Lompoc, Santa Barbara County, CA

14 CFR 420.23 - Launch site location review-flight corridor.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... this part, to contain debris with a ballistic coefficient of ≥ 3 pounds per square foot, from any non... that its proposed method provides an equivalent level of safety to that required by appendix A or B of... of ≥ 3 pounds per square foot, from any non-nominal flight of a guided sub-orbital expendable launch...

NPSAT1: Assessment Of Risk For Human Casualty From Atmospheric Reentry

DTIC Science & Technology

2016-03-01

document is SpaceX . The design of the company’s Falcon Heavy rocket, the same launch vehicle chosen for the NPSAT1 satellite, chooses to return the...first stage of the rocket back to its originating launch pad for reuse. Among the numerous safety requirements that are levied upon SpaceX by the CFR

78 FR 76751 - Safety Zone; Vessel Launch; Menominee River; Marinette, WI

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-12-19

... Agriculture Regulatory Enforcement Ombudsman and the Regional Small Business Regulatory Fairness Boards. The... consensus standards. 14. Environment We have analyzed this rule under Department of Homeland Security... significant effect on the human environment. This rule involves the establishment of a safety zone and...

14 CFR 417.209 - Malfunction turn analysis.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... turn behavior for each cause of a malfunction turn. For each malfunction turn envelope, the analysis... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Malfunction turn analysis. 417.209 Section..., DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH SAFETY Flight Safety Analysis § 417.209 Malfunction turn...

14 CFR 417.209 - Malfunction turn analysis.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... turn behavior for each cause of a malfunction turn. For each malfunction turn envelope, the analysis... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Malfunction turn analysis. 417.209 Section..., DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH SAFETY Flight Safety Analysis § 417.209 Malfunction turn...

14 CFR 417.209 - Malfunction turn analysis.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... turn behavior for each cause of a malfunction turn. For each malfunction turn envelope, the analysis... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Malfunction turn analysis. 417.209 Section..., DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH SAFETY Flight Safety Analysis § 417.209 Malfunction turn...

The Application of Software Safety to the Constellation Program Launch Control System

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Kania, James; Hill, Janice

2011-01-01

The application of software safety practices on the LCS project resulted in the successful implementation of the NASA Software Safety Standard NASA-STD-8719.138 and CxP software safety requirements. The GOP-GEN-GSW-011 Hazard Report was the first report developed at KSC to identify software hazard causes and their controls. This approach can be applied to similar large software - intensive systems where loss of control can lead to a hazard.

Prospective drug safety monitoring using the UK primary-care General Practice Research Database: theoretical framework, feasibility analysis and extrapolation to future scenarios.

PubMed

Johansson, Saga; Wallander, Mari-Ann; de Abajo, Francisco J; García Rodríguez, Luis Alberto

2010-03-01

Post-launch drug safety monitoring is essential for the detection of adverse drug signals that may be missed during preclinical trials. Traditional methods of postmarketing surveillance such as spontaneous reporting have intrinsic limitations, many of which can be overcome by the additional application of structured pharmacoepidemiological approaches. However, further improvement in drug safety monitoring requires a shift towards more proactive pharmacoepidemiological methods that can detect adverse drug signals as they occur in the population. To assess the feasibility of using proactive monitoring of an electronic medical record system, in combination with an independent endpoint adjudication committee, to detect adverse events among users of selected drugs. UK General Practice Research Database (GPRD) information was used to detect acute liver disorder associated with the use of amoxicillin/clavulanic acid (hepatotoxic) or low-dose aspirin (acetylsalicylic acid [non-hepatotoxic]). Individuals newly prescribed these drugs between 1 October 2005 and 31 March 2006 were identified. Acute liver disorder cases were assessed using GPRD computer records in combination with case validation by an independent endpoint adjudication committee. Signal generation thresholds were based on the background rate of acute liver disorder in the general population. Over a 6-month period, 8148 patients newly prescribed amoxicillin/clavulanic acid and 5577 patients newly prescribed low-dose aspirin were identified. Within this cohort, searches identified 11 potential liver disorder cases from computerized records: six for amoxicillin/clavulanic acid and five for low-dose aspirin. The independent endpoint adjudication committee refined this to four potential acute liver disorder cases for whom paper-based information was requested for final case assessment. Final case assessments confirmed no cases of acute liver disorder. The time taken for this study was 18 months (6 months for recruitment and 12 months for data management and case validation). To reach the estimated target exposure necessary to raise or rule out a signal of concern to public health, we determined that a recruitment period 2-3 times longer than that used in this study would be required. Based on the real market uptake of six commonly used medicinal products launched between 2001 and 2006 in the UK (budesonide/eformoterol [fixed-dose combination], duloxetine, ezetimibe, metformin/rosiglitazone [fixed-dose combination], tiotropium bromide and tadalafil) the target exposure would not have been reached until the fifth year of marketing using a single database. It is feasible to set up a system that actively monitors drug safety using a healthcare database and an independent endpoint adjudication committee. However, future successful implementation will require multiple databases to be queried so that larger study populations are included. This requires further development and harmonization of international healthcare databases.

Measurements in atmospheric electricity designed to improve launch safety during the Apollo series

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Nanevicz, J. E.; Pierce, E. T.; Whitson, A. L.

1972-01-01

Ground test measurements were made during the launches of Apollo 13 and 14 in an effort to better define the electrical characteristics of a large launch vehicle. Of particular concern was the effective electrical length of the vehicle and plume since this parameter markedly affects the likelihood of a lightning stroke being triggered by a launch during disturbed weather conditions. Since no instrumentation could be carried aboard the launch vehicle, the experiments were confined to LF radio noise and electrostatic-field measurements on the ground in the vicinity of the launch pad. The philosophy of the experiment and the instrumentation and layout are described. From the results of the experiment it is concluded that the rocket and exhaust do not produce large-scale shorting of the earth's field out to distances of thousands of feet from the launch pad. There is evidence, however, that the plume does add substantially to the electrical length of the rocket. On this basis, it was recommended that there be no relaxation of launch rules for launches during disturbed weather.

76 FR 37643 - Safety Zone; Delta Independence Day Foundation Celebration, Mandeville Island, CA

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-06-28

... with the pyrotechnics. Unauthorized persons or vessels are prohibited from entering into, transiting... the dangers posed by the pyrotechnics used in this fireworks display, the safety zone is necessary to... fireworks launch site during loading of the pyrotechnics, and during the fireworks display. This restricted...

75 FR 34376 - Safety Zone; City of Pittsburg Independence Day Celebration, Pittsburg, CA

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-06-17

... associated with the pyrotechnics. Unauthorized persons or vessels are prohibited from entering into... of the dangers posed by the pyrotechnics used in this fireworks display, the safety zone is necessary... restricted area on the waters surrounding the fireworks launch site during loading of the pyrotechnics, and...

78 FR 29020 - Safety Zone; Tennessee River, Mile 463.5 to 464.5; Chattanooga, TN

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-05-17

... hazards associated with the Riverbend Festival fireworks. Entry into this zone is prohibited unless... protect persons and vessels from potential safety hazards associated with the Riverbend Festival fireworks. The Riverbend Festival fireworks display takes place on the Tennessee River and is launched from the...

Where's the Fire?

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Needham, Dorothy

1977-01-01

National Fire Protection Week is a perfect time for launching a fire safety learning center. The activities described here are intended to help children recognize fire hazards in their homes, play areas and public buildings; learn how to act intelligently in fire emergencies; be able to share their knowledge of fire safety with others and…

Food Safety, Farm to Fork.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Jones, Rebecca

1998-01-01

In response to growing threat of food-borne illness, the federal government launched the Food Safety Initiative. A key element is the Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points system (HACCP), designed to make everyone in the food-delivery chain responsible for ensuring a safe food supply. The Food and Drug Administration also announced a beef…

Managing External Relations: The Lifeblood of Mission Success

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Dumbacher, Daniel L.

2007-01-01

The slide presentation examines the role of customer and stakeholder relations in the success of space missions. Topics include agency transformation; an overview of project and program experience with a discussion of positions, technical accomplishments, and management lessons learned; and approaches to project success with emphasis on communication. Projects and programs discussed include the Space Shuttle Main Engine System, DC-XA Flight Demonstrator, X-33 Flight Demonstrator, Space Launch Initiative/2nd Generation Reusable Launch Vehicle, X-37 Flight Demonstrator, Constellation (pre Dr. Griffin), Safety and Mission Assurance, and Exploration Launch Projects.

Hydrodynamic Interactions during Launch and Recovery of a Small Boat from a Ship in a Seaway

DTIC Science & Technology

2014-11-28

during launch and recovery. The RHIB is based on a Zodiac H935, with properties given in Table 1 when loaded with 12 person- nel. Figure 1 shows the hull...and recovery of a small craft from a larger ship, wave-induced motions of the larger ship will influence dy- namic loads on the crane. The motions of... the small craft will be a major determinant of the safety of onboard personnel. This paper exam- ines wave-induced motions during launch and recovery

KSC-06pd1327

NASA Image and Video Library

2006-07-01

KENNEDY SPACE CENTER, FLA. - STS-121 Mission Specialist Lisa Nowak shows she is happy and excited to be preparing for launch with the fitting of her launch and entry suit. Nowak is making her first space flight. The launch is the 115th shuttle flight and the 18th U.S. flight to the International Space Station. During the 12-day mission, the STS-121 crew will test new equipment and procedures to improve shuttle safety, as well as deliver supplies and make repairs to the International Space Station. Photo credit: NASA/Kim Shiflett

Ground Handling of Batteries at Test and Launch-site Facilities

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Jeevarajan, Judith A.; Hohl, Alan R.

2008-01-01

Ground handling of flight as well as engineering batteries at test facilities and launch-site facilities is a safety critical process. Test equipment interfacing with the batteries should have the required controls to prevent a hazardous failure of the batteries. Test equipment failures should not induce catastrophic failures on the batteries. Transportation requirements for batteries should also be taken into consideration for safe transportation. This viewgraph presentation includes information on the safe handling of batteries for ground processing at test facilities as well as launch-site facilities.

GOES-S Atlas V Centaur Stage OVI

NASA Image and Video Library

2018-02-08

At the Vertical Integration Facility at Space Launch Complex 41 at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station in Florida, a Centaur upper stage is mated to a United Launch Alliance Atlas V rocket that will boost NOAA's Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite-S, or GOES-S, to orbit. GOES-S is the second in a series of four advanced geostationary weather satellites that will significantly improve the detection and observation of environmental phenomena that directly affect public safety, protection of property and the nation's economic health and prosperity. GOES-S is slated to launch March 1, 2018.

GOES-S Atlas V First Stage Booster Lift to Vertical On Stand (LV

NASA Image and Video Library

2018-01-31

A crane lifts a United Launch Alliance Atlas V first stage into the Vertical Integration Facility at Space Launch Complex 41 at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station in Florida. The rocket will be positioned on its launcher to boost the Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite, or GOES-S. It will be the second in a series of four advanced geostationary weather satellites and will significantly improve the detection and observation of environmental phenomena that directly affect public safety. GOES-S is slated to launch March 1, 2018.

GOES-S Atlas V First Stage Booster Lift to Vertical On Stand (LV

NASA Image and Video Library

2018-01-31

A crane lifts a United Launch Alliance Atlas V first stage at the Vertical Integration Facility at Space Launch Complex 41 at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station in Florida. The rocket will be positioned on its launcher to boost the Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite, or GOES-S. It will be the second in a series of four advanced geostationary weather satellites and will significantly improve the detection and observation of environmental phenomena that directly affect public safety. GOES-S is slated to launch March 1, 2018.

Mission Success of U.S. Launch Vehicle Flights from a Propulsion Stage-Based Perspective: 1980-2015

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Go, Susie; Lawrence, Scott L.; Mathias, Donovan L.; Powell, Ryann

2017-01-01

This report documents a study of the historical safety and reliability trends of U.S. space launch vehicles from 1980 to 2015. The launch data history is examined to determine whether propulsion technology choices drove launch system risk and is used to understand how different propulsion system failures manifested into different failure scenarios. The historical data is processed by launch vehicle stage, where a stage is limited by definition to a single propulsion technology, either liquid or solid. Results are aggregated in terms of failure trends and manifestations as a functions of different propulsion stages. Failure manifestations are analyzed in order to understand the types and frequencies of accident environments in which an abort system for a crewed vehicle would be required to operate.

Performance and safety testing of lithium batteries for the Expendable, Mobile, ASW Training Target (EMATT)

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Hallal, P. B.; Bis, R. F.

1986-08-01

The developmental EMATT (expendable, mobile, ASW training target) may use a high-energy (lithium/sulfuryl chloride) battery system. Safety problems with the original battery cell design were experienced during early performance and safety testing. After redesign of the battery cell, performance and safety tests were made under specified abuse conditions, as well as under simulated launch conditions. The test results showed that the power system now meets all safety requirements, and that the EMATT vehicle is safe to deploy for its engineering development phase.

CubeSat Material Limits For Design for Demise

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Kelley, R. L.; Jarkey, D. R.

2014-01-01

The CubeSat form factor of nano-satellite (a satellite with a mass between one and ten kilograms) has grown in popularity due to their ease of construction and low development and launch costs. In particular, their use as student led payload design projects has increased due to the growing number of launch opportunities. CubeSats are often deployed as secondary or tertiary payloads on most US launch vehicles or they may be deployed from the ISS. The focus of this study will be on CubeSats launched from the ISS. From a space safety standpoint, the development and deployment processes for CubeSats differ significantly from that of most satellites. For large satellites, extensive design reviews and documentation are completed, including assessing requirements associated with reentry survivability. Typical CubeSat missions selected for ISS deployment have a less rigorous review process that may not evaluate aspects beyond overall design feasibility. CubeSat design teams often do not have the resources to ensure their design is compliant with reentry risk requirements. A study was conducted to examine methods to easily identify the maximum amount of a given material that can be used in the construction of a CubeSats without posing harm to persons on the ground. The results demonstrate that there is not a general equation or relationship that can be used for all materials; instead a limiting value must be defined for each unique material. In addition, the specific limits found for a number of generic materials that have been previously used as benchmarking materials for reentry survivability analysis tool comparison will be discussed.

CubeSat Material Limits for Design for Demise

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Kelley, R. L.; Jarkey, D. R.

2014-01-01

The CubeSat form factor of nano-satellite (a satellite with a mass between one and ten kilograms) has grown in popularity due to their ease of construction and low development and launch costs. In particular, their use as student led payload design projects has increased due to the growing number of launch opportunities. CubeSats are often deployed as secondary or tertiary payloads on most US launch vehicles or they may be deployed from the ISS. The focus of this study will be on CubeSats launched from the ISS. From a space safety standpoint, the development and deployment processes for CubeSats differ significantly from that of most satellites. For large satellites, extensive design reviews and documentation are completed, including assessing requirements associated with re-entry survivability. Typical CubeSat missions selected for ISS deployment have a less rigorous review process that may not evaluate aspects beyond overall design feasibility. CubeSat design teams often do not have the resources to ensure their design is compliant with re-entry risk requirements. A study was conducted to examine methods to easily identify the maximum amount of a given material that can be used in the construction of a CubeSats without posing harm to persons on the ground. The results demonstrate that there is not a general equation or relationship that can be used for all materials; instead a limiting value must be defined for each unique material. In addition, the specific limits found for a number of generic materials that have been previously used as benchmarking materials for re-entry survivability analysis tool comparison will be discussed.

GLM Post Launch Testing and Airborne Science Field Campaign

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Goodman, S. J.; Padula, F.; Koshak, W. J.; Blakeslee, R. J.

2017-12-01

The Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite (GOES-R) series provides the continuity for the existing GOES system currently operating over the Western Hemisphere. The Geostationary Lightning Mapper (GLM) is a wholly new instrument that provides a capability for total lightning detection (cloud and cloud-to-ground flashes). The first satellite in the GOES-R series, now GOES-16, was launched in November 2016 followed by in-orbit post launch testing for approximately 12 months before being placed into operations replacing the GOES-E satellite in December. The GLM will map total lightning continuously throughout day and night with near-uniform spatial resolution of 8 km with a product latency of less than 20 sec over the Americas and adjacent oceanic regions. The total lightning is very useful for identifying hazardous and severe thunderstorms, monitoring storm intensification and tracking evolution. Used in tandem with radar, satellite imagery, and surface observations, total lightning data has great potential to increase lead time for severe storm warnings, improve aviation safety and efficiency, and increase public safety. In this paper we present initial results from the post-launch in-orbit performance testing, airborne science field campaign conducted March-May, 2017 and assessments of the GLM instrument and science products.

Dabigatran - a continuing exemplar case history demonstrating the need for comprehensive models to optimize the utilization of new drugs.

PubMed

Godman, Brian; Malmström, Rickard E; Diogene, Eduardo; Jayathissa, Sisira; McTaggart, Stuart; Cars, Thomas; Alvarez-Madrazo, Samantha; Baumgärtel, Christoph; Brzezinska, Anna; Bucsics, Anna; Campbell, Stephen; Eriksson, Irene; Finlayson, Alexander; Fürst, Jurij; Garuoliene, Kristina; Gutiérrez-Ibarluzea, Iñaki; Hviding, Krystyna; Herholz, Harald; Joppi, Roberta; Kalaba, Marija; Laius, Ott; Malinowska, Kamila; Pedersen, Hanne B; Markovic-Pekovic, Vanda; Piessnegger, Jutta; Selke, Gisbert; Sermet, Catherine; Spillane, Susan; Tomek, Dominik; Vončina, Luka; Vlahović-Palčevski, Vera; Wale, Janet; Wladysiuk, Magdalena; van Woerkom, Menno; Zara, Corinne; Gustafsson, Lars L

2014-01-01

There are potential conflicts between authorities and companies to fund new premium priced drugs especially where there are effectiveness, safety and/or budget concerns. Dabigatran, a new oral anticoagulant for the prevention of stroke in patients with non-valvular atrial fibrillation (AF), exemplifies this issue. Whilst new effective treatments are needed, there are issues in the elderly with dabigatran due to variable drug concentrations, no known antidote and dependence on renal elimination. Published studies showed dabigatran to be cost-effective but there are budget concerns given the prevalence of AF. These concerns resulted in extensive activities pre- to post-launch to manage its introduction. To (i) review authority activities across countries, (ii) use the findings to develop new models to better manage the entry of new drugs, and (iii) review the implications based on post-launch activities. (i) Descriptive review and appraisal of activities regarding dabigatran, (ii) development of guidance for key stakeholder groups through an iterative process, (iii) refining guidance following post launch studies. Plethora of activities to manage dabigatran including extensive pre-launch activities, risk sharing arrangements, prescribing restrictions and monitoring of prescribing post launch. Reimbursement has been denied in some countries due to concerns with its budget impact and/or excessive bleeding. Development of a new model and future guidance is proposed to better manage the entry of new drugs, centering on three pillars of pre-, peri-, and post-launch activities. Post-launch activities include increasing use of patient registries to monitor the safety and effectiveness of new drugs in clinical practice. Models for introducing new drugs are essential to optimize their prescribing especially where concerns. Without such models, new drugs may be withdrawn prematurely and/or struggle for funding.

Dabigatran - a continuing exemplar case history demonstrating the need for comprehensive models to optimize the utilization of new drugs

PubMed Central

Godman, Brian; Malmström, Rickard E.; Diogene, Eduardo; Jayathissa, Sisira; McTaggart, Stuart; Cars, Thomas; Alvarez-Madrazo, Samantha; Baumgärtel, Christoph; Brzezinska, Anna; Bucsics, Anna; Campbell, Stephen; Eriksson, Irene; Finlayson, Alexander; Fürst, Jurij; Garuoliene, Kristina; Gutiérrez-Ibarluzea, Iñaki; Hviding, Krystyna; Herholz, Harald; Joppi, Roberta; Kalaba, Marija; Laius, Ott; Malinowska, Kamila; Pedersen, Hanne B.; Markovic-Pekovic, Vanda; Piessnegger, Jutta; Selke, Gisbert; Sermet, Catherine; Spillane, Susan; Tomek, Dominik; Vončina, Luka; Vlahović-Palčevski, Vera; Wale, Janet; Wladysiuk, Magdalena; van Woerkom, Menno; Zara, Corinne; Gustafsson, Lars L.

2014-01-01

Background: There are potential conflicts between authorities and companies to fund new premium priced drugs especially where there are effectiveness, safety and/or budget concerns. Dabigatran, a new oral anticoagulant for the prevention of stroke in patients with non-valvular atrial fibrillation (AF), exemplifies this issue. Whilst new effective treatments are needed, there are issues in the elderly with dabigatran due to variable drug concentrations, no known antidote and dependence on renal elimination. Published studies showed dabigatran to be cost-effective but there are budget concerns given the prevalence of AF. These concerns resulted in extensive activities pre- to post-launch to manage its introduction. Objective: To (i) review authority activities across countries, (ii) use the findings to develop new models to better manage the entry of new drugs, and (iii) review the implications based on post-launch activities. Methodology: (i) Descriptive review and appraisal of activities regarding dabigatran, (ii) development of guidance for key stakeholder groups through an iterative process, (iii) refining guidance following post launch studies. Results: Plethora of activities to manage dabigatran including extensive pre-launch activities, risk sharing arrangements, prescribing restrictions and monitoring of prescribing post launch. Reimbursement has been denied in some countries due to concerns with its budget impact and/or excessive bleeding. Development of a new model and future guidance is proposed to better manage the entry of new drugs, centering on three pillars of pre-, peri-, and post-launch activities. Post-launch activities include increasing use of patient registries to monitor the safety and effectiveness of new drugs in clinical practice. Conclusion: Models for introducing new drugs are essential to optimize their prescribing especially where concerns. Without such models, new drugs may be withdrawn prematurely and/or struggle for funding. PMID:24959145

Autonomous Flight Safety System Road Test

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Simpson, James C.; Zoemer, Roger D.; Forney, Chris S.

2005-01-01

On February 3, 2005, Kennedy Space Center (KSC) conducted the first Autonomous Flight Safety System (AFSS) test on a moving vehicle -- a van driven around the KSC industrial area. A subset of the Phase III design was used consisting of a single computer, GPS receiver, and UPS antenna. The description and results of this road test are described in this report.AFSS is a joint KSC and Wallops Flight Facility project that is in its third phase of development. AFSS is an independent subsystem intended for use with Expendable Launch Vehicles that uses tracking data from redundant onboard sensors to autonomously make flight termination decisions using software-based rules implemented on redundant flight processors. The goals of this project are to increase capabilities by allowing launches from locations that do not have or cannot afford extensive ground-based range safety assets, to decrease range costs, and to decrease reaction time for special situations.

Risk Perception and Communication in Commercial Reusable Launch Vehicle Operations

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Hardy, Terry L.

2005-12-01

A number of inventors and entrepreneurs are currently attempting to develop and commercially operate reusable launch vehicles to carry voluntary participants into space. The operation of these launch vehicles, however, produces safety risks to the crew, to the space flight participants, and to the uninvolved public. Risk communication therefore becomes increasingly important to assure that those involved in the flight understand the risk and that those who are not directly involved understand the personal impact of RLV operations on their lives. Those involved in the launch vehicle flight may perceive risk differently from those non-participants, and these differences in perception must be understood to effectively communicate this risk. This paper summarizes existing research in risk perception and communication and applies that research to commercial reusable launch vehicle operations. Risk communication is discussed in the context of requirements of United States law for informed consent from any space flight participants on reusable suborbital launch vehicles.

Performance Assessment of Refractory Concrete Used on the Space Shuttle's Launch Pad

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Trejo, David; Calle, Luz Marina; Halman, Ceki

2005-01-01

The John F. Kennedy Space Center (KSC) maintains several facilities for launching space vehicles. During recent launches it has been observed that the refractory concrete materials that protect the steel-framed flame duct are breaking away from this base structure and are being projected at high velocities. There is significant concern that these projected pieces can strike the launch complex or space vehicle during the launch, jeopardizing the safety of the mission. A qualification program is in place to evaluate the performance of different refractory concretes and data from these tests have been used to assess the performance of the refractory concretes. However, there is significant variation in the test results, possibly making the existing qualification test program unreliable. This paper will evaluate data from past qualification tests, identify potential key performance indicators for the launch complex, and will recommend a new qualification test program that can be used to better qualify refractory concrete.

Shuttle/Agena study. Volume 2, part 3: Preliminary test plans

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

1972-01-01

Proposed testing for the Agena tug program is based upon best estimates of shuttle and Agena tug requirements and upon the Agena configuration currently envisioned to meet these requirements. The proposed tests are presented in development, qualification, system, and launch base test plans. These plans are based upon generalized requirements and assumed situations. The limitations of this study precluded all but minimal consideration of related shuttle orbiter and shuttle ground systems. The test plans include provisions for all testing from major component to systems level, identified as necessary to aid in confirmation of the modified Agena configuration for the space tug; considerations that crew safety requirements and new environmental conditions from shuttle interface effects do impose some new Agena testing requirements; considerations that many existing Agena flight-qualified components will be utilized and qualification testing will be minimal; testing not only for the Agena tug but also for new or modified items of handling or servicing equipment for supporting the Agena factory-to-launch sequence; and the assembly of required testing into a sequence-ordered series of events.

Design for Reliability and Safety Approach for the NASA New Launch Vehicle

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Safie, Fayssal, M.; Weldon, Danny M.

2007-01-01

The United States National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is in the midst of a space exploration program intended for sending crew and cargo to the international Space Station (ISS), to the moon, and beyond. This program is called Constellation. As part of the Constellation program, NASA is developing new launch vehicles aimed at significantly increase safety and reliability, reduce the cost of accessing space, and provide a growth path for manned space exploration. Achieving these goals requires a rigorous process that addresses reliability, safety, and cost upfront and throughout all the phases of the life cycle of the program. This paper discusses the "Design for Reliability and Safety" approach for the NASA new crew launch vehicle called ARES I. The ARES I is being developed by NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) in support of the Constellation program. The ARES I consists of three major Elements: A solid First Stage (FS), an Upper Stage (US), and liquid Upper Stage Engine (USE). Stacked on top of the ARES I is the Crew exploration vehicle (CEV). The CEV consists of a Launch Abort System (LAS), Crew Module (CM), Service Module (SM), and a Spacecraft Adapter (SA). The CEV development is being led by NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC). Designing for high reliability and safety require a good integrated working environment and a sound technical design approach. The "Design for Reliability and Safety" approach addressed in this paper discusses both the environment and the technical process put in place to support the ARES I design. To address the integrated working environment, the ARES I project office has established a risk based design group called "Operability Design and Analysis" (OD&A) group. This group is an integrated group intended to bring together the engineering, design, and safety organizations together to optimize the system design for safety, reliability, and cost. On the technical side, the ARES I project has, through the OD&A environment, implemented a probabilistic approach to analyze and evaluate design uncertainties and understand their impact on safety, reliability, and cost. This paper focuses on the use of the various probabilistic approaches that have been pursued by the ARES I project. Specifically, the paper discusses an integrated functional probabilistic analysis approach that addresses upffont some key areas to support the ARES I Design Analysis Cycle (DAC) pre Preliminary Design (PD) Phase. This functional approach is a probabilistic physics based approach that combines failure probabilities with system dynamics and engineering failure impact models to identify key system risk drivers and potential system design requirements. The paper also discusses other probabilistic risk assessment approaches planned by the ARES I project to support the PD phase and beyond.

NASA Expendable Launch Vehicle (ELV) Payload Safety Review Process

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Starbus, Calvert S.; Donovan, Shawn; Dook, Mike; Palo, Tom

2007-01-01

Issues addressed by this program: (1) Complicated roles and responsibilities associated with multi-partner projects (2) Working relationships and communications between all organizations involved in the payload safety process (3) Consistent interpretation and implementation of safety requirements from one project to the rest (4) Consistent implementation of the Tailoring Process (5) Clearly defined NASA decision-making-authority (6) Bring Agency-wide perspective to each ElV payload project. Current process requires a Payload Safety Working Group (PSWG) for eac payload with representatives from all involved organizations.

Assessment of Microphone Phased Array for Measuring Launch Vehicle Lift-off Acoustics

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Garcia, Roberto

2012-01-01

The specific purpose of the present work was to demonstrate the suitability of a microphone phased array for launch acoustics applications via participation in selected firings of the Ares I Scale Model Acoustics Test. The Ares I Scale Model Acoustics Test is a part of the discontinued Constellation Program Ares I Project, but the basic understanding gained from this test is expected to help development of the Space Launch System vehicles. Correct identification of sources not only improves the predictive ability, but provides guidance for a quieter design of the launch pad and optimization of the water suppression system. This document contains the results of the NASA Engineering and Safety Center assessment.

Integrated Vehicle Ground Vibration Testing in Support of Launch Vehicle Loads and Controls Analysis

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Tuma, Margaret L.; Chenevert, Donald J.

2009-01-01

NASA has conducted dynamic tests on each major launch vehicle during the past 45 years. Each test provided invaluable data to correlate and correct analytical models. GVTs result in hardware changes to Saturn and Space Shuttle, ensuring crew and vehicle safety. Ares I IVGT will provide test data such as natural frequencies, mode shapes, and damping to support successful Ares I flights. Testing will support controls analysis by providing data to reduce model uncertainty. Value of testing proven by past launch vehicle successes and failures. Performing dynamic testing on Ares vehicles will provide confidence that the launch vehicles will be safe and successful in their missions.

Analysis of Proposed 2007-2008 Revisions to the Lightning Launch Commit Criteria for United States Space Launches

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Dye, J. E.; Krider, E. P.; Merceret, F. J.; Willett, J. C.; Bateman, M. G.; Mach, D. M.; Rust, W. D.; Walterscheid, R.; O'Brien, T. P.; Christian, H. J.

2008-01-01

Ascending space vehicles are vulnerable to both natural and triggered lightning. Launches under the jurisdiction of the United States are generally subject to a set of rules called the Lightning Launch Commit Criteria (LLCC). The LLCC protect both the vehicle and the public by assuring that the launch does not take place in conditions posing a significant risk of a lightning strike to the ascending vehicle. Such a strike could destroy the vehicle and its payload, thus causing failure of the mission while releasing both toxic materials and debris. To assure safety, the LLCC are conservative and sometimes they may seriously limit the ability of the launch operator to fly as scheduled even when conditions are benign. In order to safely reduce the number of launch scrubs and delays attributable to the LLCC, the Airborne Field Mill (ABFM) program was undertaken in 2000 - 2001. The effort was directed to collecting detailed high-quality data on the electrical, microphysical, radar and meteorological properties of thunderstorm-associated clouds. The expectation was that this additional knowledge would provide a better physical basis for the LLCC and allow them to be revised to be both safer and less restrictive. That expectation was fulfilled, leading to significant revisions to the LLCC in 2003 and 2005. The 2005 revisions included the application of a new radar-derived quantity called the Volume Averaged Height Integrated Radar Reflectivity (VAHIRR) in the rules governing flight through anvil clouds. Analysis of the ABFM data has continued, and two additional revisions to the LLCC were proposed in late 2006 for adoption in 2007 or 2008. One proposal was to apply the VAHIRR concept to debris clouds, and the other was to reduce the "stand-off distances" in the rules for anvil and/or debris clouds. The stand-off distance is the clearance (out side of the cloud) required between the flight path of the vehicle and the edge of a cloud that it is not permissible to fly through. This paper will discuss these proposed changes in the LLCC and the scientific rationale for adopting or rejecting them based on ABFM data.

A Battery Certification Testbed for Small Satellite Missions

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Cameron, Zachary; Kulkarni, Chetan S.; Luna, Ali Guarneros; Goebel, Kai; Poll, Scott

2015-01-01

A battery pack consisting of standard cylindrical 18650 lithium-ion cells has been chosen for small satellite missions based on previous flight heritage and compliance with NASA battery safety requirements. However, for batteries that transit through the International Space Station (ISS), additional certification tests are required for individual cells as well as the battery packs. In this manuscript, we discuss the development of generalized testbeds for testing and certifying different types of batteries critical to small satellite missions. Test procedures developed and executed for this certification effort include: a detailed physical inspection before and after experiments; electrical cycling characterization at the cell and pack levels; battery-pack overcharge, over-discharge, external short testing; battery-pack vacuum leak and vibration testing. The overall goals of these certification procedures are to conform to requirements set forth by the agency and identify unique safety hazards. The testbeds, procedures, and experimental results are discussed for batteries chosen for small satellite missions to be launched from the ISS.

EcoCAR Challenge: Finish Line

ScienceCinema

None

2017-12-09

The EcoCAR Challenege is a competition that challenges participating students from across North America to re-engineer a vehicle donated by General Motors. With the goal of minimizing the vehicle's fuel consumption and emissions, while maintaining its utility, safety and performance, teams had to find the best combination of cutting-edge technologies to meet these objectives. In the final year, the vehicles ran through a series of safety and technical tests at GM's Proving Ground in Milford, Michigan very similar to those GM's own production vehicles undergo. As EcoCAR wraps up, it is only the beginning for the next chapter in the DOE's 23-year history of advanced vehicle technology competitions. In April, Assistant Secretary for Policy and International Affairs David Sandalow announced the launch of EcoCAR 2: Plugging into the Future http://www.ecocar2.org/index.html . We look forward to seeing the new and innovative designs that students bring to this challenge and know they will find a way to exceed even our highest expectations.

The Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Panel's Galileo safety evaluation report

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Nelson, R.C.; Gray, L.B.; Huff, D.A.

The safety evaluation report (SER) for Galileo was prepared by the Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Panel (INSRP) coordinators in accordance with Presidential directive/National Security Council memorandum 25. The INSRP consists of three coordinators appointed by their respective agencies, the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy (DOE), and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). These individuals are independent of the program being evaluated and depend on independent experts drawn from the national technical community to serve on the five INSRP subpanels. The Galileo SER is based on input provided by the NASA Galileo Program Office, review and assessment ofmore » the final safety analysis report prepared by the Office of Special Applications of the DOE under a memorandum of understanding between NASA and the DOE, as well as other related data and analyses. The SER was prepared for use by the agencies and the Office of Science and Technology Policy, Executive Office of the Present for use in their launch decision-making process. Although more than 20 nuclear-powered space missions have been previously reviewed via the INSRP process, the Galileo review constituted the first review of a nuclear power source associated with launch aboard the Space Transportation System.« less

Final safety analysis report for the Galileo Mission: Volume 1, Reference design document

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Not Available

The Galileo mission uses nuclear power sources called Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators (RTGs) to provide the spacecraft's primary electrical power. Because these generators contain nuclear material, a Safety Analysis Report (SAR) is required. A preliminary SAR and an updated SAR were previously issued that provided an evolving status report on the safety analysis. As a result of the Challenger accident, the launch dates for both Galileo and Ulysses missions were later rescheduled for November 1989 and October 1990, respectively. The decision was made by agreement between the DOE and the NASA to have a revised safety evaluation and report (FSAR) preparedmore » on the basis of these revised vehicle accidents and environments. The results of this latest revised safety evaluation are presented in this document (Galileo FSAR). Volume I, this document, provides the background design information required to understand the analyses presented in Volumes II and III. It contains descriptions of the RTGs, the Galileo spacecraft, the Space Shuttle, the Inertial Upper Stage (IUS), the trajectory and flight characteristics including flight contingency modes, and the launch site. There are two appendices in Volume I which provide detailed material properties for the RTG.« less

Collaborative Approaches in Developing Environmental and Safety Management Systems for Commercial Space Transportation

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Zee, Stacey; Murray, D.

2009-01-01

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Office of Commercial Space Transportation (AST) licenses and permits U.S. commercial space launch and reentry activities, and licenses the operation of non-federal launch and reentry sites. ASTs mission is to ensure the protection of the public, property, and the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States during commercial space transportation activities and to encourage, facilitate, and promote U.S. commercial space transportation. AST faces unique challenges of ensuring the protection of public health and safety while facilitating and promoting U.S. commercial space transportation. AST has developed an Environmental Management System (EMS) and a Safety Management System (SMS) to help meet its mission. Although the EMS and SMS were developed independently, the systems share similar elements. Both systems follow a Plan-Do-Act-Check model in identifying potential environmental aspects or public safety hazards, assessing significance in terms of severity and likelihood of occurrence, developing approaches to reduce risk, and verifying that the risk is reduced. This paper will describe the similarities between ASTs EMS and SMS elements and how AST is building a collaborative approach in environmental and safety management to reduce impacts to the environment and risks to the public.

Apollo experience report: Launch escape propulsion subsystem

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Townsend, N. A.

1973-01-01

The Apollo launch escape propulsion subsystem contained three solid rocket motors. The general design, development, and qualification of the solid-propellant pitch-control, tower-jettison, and launch-escape motors of the Apollo launch escape propulsion subsystem were completed during years 1961 to 1966. The launch escape system components are described in general terms, and the sequence of events through the ground-based test programs and flight-test programs is discussed. The initial ground rules established for this system were that it should use existing technology and designs as much as possible. The practicality of this decision is proved by the minimum number of problems that were encountered during the development and qualification program.

143. GENERAL DYNAMICS SPACE SYSTEMS DIVISION SCHEDULE BOARD IN LUNCH ...

Library of Congress Historic Buildings Survey, Historic Engineering Record, Historic Landscapes Survey

143. GENERAL DYNAMICS SPACE SYSTEMS DIVISION SCHEDULE BOARD IN LUNCH ROOM (120), LSB (BLDG. 770) - Vandenberg Air Force Base, Space Launch Complex 3, Launch Pad 3 West, Napa & Alden Roads, Lompoc, Santa Barbara County, CA

Ares I-X Range Safety Simulation Verification and Analysis IV and V

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Tarpley, Ashley; Beaty, James; Starr, Brett

2010-01-01

NASA s ARES I-X vehicle launched on a suborbital test flight from the Eastern Range in Florida on October 28, 2009. NASA generated a Range Safety (RS) flight data package to meet the RS trajectory data requirements defined in the Air Force Space Command Manual 91-710. Some products included in the flight data package were a nominal ascent trajectory, ascent flight envelope trajectories, and malfunction turn trajectories. These data are used by the Air Force s 45th Space Wing (45SW) to ensure Eastern Range public safety and to make flight termination decisions on launch day. Due to the criticality of the RS data in regards to public safety and mission success, an independent validation and verification (IV&V) effort was undertaken to accompany the data generation analyses to ensure utmost data quality and correct adherence to requirements. Multiple NASA centers and contractor organizations were assigned specific products to IV&V. The data generation and IV&V work was coordinated through the Launch Constellation Range Safety Panel s Trajectory Working Group, which included members from the prime and IV&V organizations as well as the 45SW. As a result of the IV&V efforts, the RS product package was delivered with confidence that two independent organizations using separate simulation software generated data to meet the range requirements and yielded similar results. This document captures ARES I-X RS product IV&V analysis, including the methodology used to verify inputs, simulation, and output data for an RS product. Additionally a discussion of lessons learned is presented to capture advantages and disadvantages to the IV&V processes used.

Achieving the Proper Balance Between Crew and Public Safety

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Gowan, John; Silvestri, Ray; Stahl, Ben; Rosati, Paul; Wilde, Paul

2011-01-01

A paramount objective of all human-rated launch and reentry vehicle developers is to ensure that the risks to both the crew onboard and the public are minimized within reasonable cost, schedule, and technical constraints. Past experience has shown that proper attention to range safety requirements necessary to ensure public safety must be given early in the design phase to avoid additional operational complexities or threats to the safety of people onboard, and the design engineers must give these requirements the same consideration as crew safety requirements. For human spaceflight, the primary purpose and operational concept for any flight safety system is to protect the public while maximizing the likelihood of crew survival. This paper will outline the policy considerations, technical issues, and operational impacts regarding launch and reentry vehicle failure scenarios where crew and public safety are intertwined and thus addressed optimally in an integrated manner. An overview of existing range and crew safety policy requirements will be presented. Application of these requirements and lessons learned from both the Space Shuttle and Constellation Programs will also be discussed. Using these past programs as examples, the paper will detail operational, design, and analysis approaches to mitigate and balance the risks to people onboard and in the public. Manned vehicle perspectives from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and Air Force organizations that oversee public safety will be summarized as well. Finally, the paper will emphasize the need to factor policy, operational, and analysis considerations into the early design trades of new vehicles to help ensure that both crew and public safety are maximized to the greatest extent possible.

Achieving the Proper Balance between Crew & Public Safety

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Wilde, P.; Gowan, J.; Silvestri, R.; Stahl, B.; Rosati, P.

2012-01-01

A paramount objective of all human-rated launch and reentry vehicle developers is to ensure that the risks to both the crew onboard and the public are minimized within reasonable cost, schedule, and technical constraints. Past experience has shown that proper attention to range safety requirements necessary to ensure public safety must be given early in the design phase to avoid additional operational complexities or threats to the safety of people onboard, and the design engineers must give these requirements the same consideration as crew safety requirements. For human spaceflight, the primary purpose and operational concept for any flight safety system is to protect the public while maximizing the likelihood of crew survival. This paper will outline the policy considerations, technical issues, and operational impacts regarding launch and reentry vehicle failure scenarios where crew and public safety are intertwined and thus addressed optimally in an integrated manner. An overview of existing range and crew safety policy requirements will be presented. Application of these requirements and lessons learned from both the Space Shuttle and Constellation Programs will also be discussed. Using these past programs as examples, the paper will detail operational, design, and analysis approaches to mitigate and balance the risks to people onboard and in the public. Crewed vehicle perspectives from the Federal Aviation Administration and Air Force organizations that oversee public safety will be summarized as well. Finally, the paper will emphasize the need to factor policy, operational, and analysis considerations into the early design trades of new vehicles to help ensure that both crew and public safety are maximized to the greatest extent possible.

69. GENERAL VIEW OF SOUTH SIDE OF SLC3W LIQUID OXYGEN ...

Library of Congress Historic Buildings Survey, Historic Engineering Record, Historic Landscapes Survey

69. GENERAL VIEW OF SOUTH SIDE OF SLC-3W LIQUID OXYGEN APRON. EQUIPMENT SKIDS IN FOREGROUND. LARGE LIQUID OXYGEN TANKS FLANKING NITROGEN GAS STORAGE TANKS VISIBLE BEHIND SKIDS. LAUNCH DECK VISIBLE IMMEDIATELY WEST. MST IN PARKED POSITION AT NORTHERN TERMINUS OF RAILS IN BACKGROUND. - Vandenberg Air Force Base, Space Launch Complex 3, Launch Pad 3 West, Napa & Alden Roads, Lompoc, Santa Barbara County, CA

Use of Smoothed Measured Winds to Predict and Assess Launch Environments

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Cordova, Henry S.; Leahy, Frank; Adelfang, Stanley; Roberts, Barry; Starr, Brett; Duffin, Paul; Pueri, Daniel

2011-01-01

Since many of the larger launch vehicles are operated near their design limits during the ascent phase of flight to optimize payload to orbit, it often becomes necessary to verify that the vehicle will remain within certification limits during the ascent phase as part of the go/no-go review made prior to launch. This paper describes the approach used to predict Ares I-X launch vehicle structural air loads and controllability prior to launch which represents a distinct departure from the methodology of the Space Shuttle and Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) programs. Protection for uncertainty of key environment and trajectory parameters is added to the nominal assessment of launch capability to ensure that critical launch trajectory variables would be within the integrated vehicle certification envelopes. This process was applied by the launch team as a key element of the launch day go/no-go recommendation. Pre-launch assessments of vehicle launch capability for NASA's Space Shuttle and the EELV heavy lift versions require the use of a high-resolution wind profile measurements, which have relatively small sample size compared with low-resolution profile databases (which include low-resolution balloons and radar wind profilers). The approach described in this paper has the potential to allow the pre-launch assessment team to use larger samples of wind measurements from low-resolution wind profile databases that will improve the accuracy of pre-launch assessments of launch availability with no degradation of mission assurance or launch safety.

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel Annual Report for 1999

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Blomberg, Richard D.

2000-01-01

This report covers the activities of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) for the calendar year 1999.This was a year of notable achievements and significant frustrations. Both the Space Shuttle and International Space Station (ISS) programs were delayed.The Space Shuttle prudently postponed launches after the occurrence of a wiring short during ascent of the STS-93 mission. The ISS construction schedule slipped as a result of the Space Shuttle delays and problems the Russians experienced in readying the Service Module and its launch vehicle. Each of these setbacks was dealt with in a constructive way. The STS-93 short circuit led to detailed wiring inspections and repairs on all four orbiters as well as analysis of other key subsystems for similar types of hidden damage. The ISS launch delays afforded time for further testing, training, development, and contingency planning. The safety consciousness of the NASA and contractor workforces, from hands-on labor to top management, continues high. Nevertheless, workforce issues remain among the most serious safety concerns of the Panel. Cutbacks and reorganizations over the past several years have resulted in problems related to workforce size, critical skills, and the extent of on-the-job experience. These problems have the potential to impact safety as the Space Shuttle launch rate increases to meet the demands of the ISS and its other customers. As with last year's report, these work- force-related issues were considered of sufficient import to place them first in the material that follows. Some of the same issues of concern for the Space Shuttle and ISS arose in a review of the launch vehicle for the Terra mission that the Panel was asked by NASA to undertake. Other areas the Panel was requested to assess included the readiness of the Inertial Upper Stage for the deployment of the Chandra X-ray Observatory and the possible safety impact of electromagnetic effects on the Space Shuttle. The findings and recommendations in this report do not highlight any major, immediate issues that might compromise the safe pursuit of the various NASA programs. They do, however, cover concerns that the Panel believes should be addressed in the interest of maintaining NASA's excellent safety record.The Panel is pleased to note that remedial efforts for some of the findings raised are underway. Given appropriate funding and cooperative efforts among the Administration, the Congress and the various contractors, the Panel is convinced that safety problems can be avoided or solved resulting in lower risk for NASA's human space and aeronautics programs. Section II of this report contains specific findings and recommendations generated by Panel activities during the calendar year 1999. Section III presents more detailed information in support of these findings and recommendations. A current roster of Panel members, consultants, and staff is included as Appendix A. Appendix B contains NASA's response to the findings and recommendations from the 1998 annual report. It has been augmented this year to include brief explanations of why the Panel classified the NASA response as " open,""continuing," or "closed." Appendix C lists the fact-finding activities of the Panel in 1999.

Value of Responsive Launch Safety Toolsets

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Devoid, Wayne E.

2013-09-01

This paper will discuss the advantages and disadvantages of all-in-one risk assessment toolsets as they are applied to a wide variety of orbital, suborbital, lander, and unmanned vehicles. Toolsets like APT's SafeLab and Horizon, that are designed from the ground up specifically to address ever- changing vehicle and mission parameters, reduce the need for additional software development costs for launch ranges and vehicle manufacturers.

78 FR 45057 - Safety Zone; Alpena Area HOG Rally Fireworks, Alpena, Michigan

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-07-26

...-AA00 Safety Zone; Alpena Area HOG Rally Fireworks, Alpena, Michigan AGENCY: Coast Guard, DHS. ACTION... rally in Alpena, Michigan with a fireworks display. Fireworks will be launched near the end of Mason Street, South of State Avenue, approximately 50 yards west of Thunder Bay in Alpena, Michigan. The...

78 FR 39995 - Safety Zone; Margate Mother's Association Fireworks Display, Atlantic Ocean; Margate, NJ

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-07-03

...-AA00 Safety Zone; Margate Mother's Association Fireworks Display, Atlantic Ocean; Margate, NJ AGENCY... launched from a barge with a fall out zone that covers part of the Atlantic Ocean. Margate Mother's..., Sector Delaware Bay, has determined that the Margate Mother's Association Fireworks Display will pose...

33 CFR 165.1712 - Safety Zones; Annual Independence Day Firework Displays, Skagway, Haines, and Wrangell, AK.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-07-01

... Day Firework Displays, Skagway, Haines, and Wrangell, AK. 165.1712 Section 165.1712 Navigation and... Displays, Skagway, Haines, and Wrangell, AK. (a) Regulated areas. The following areas are permanent safety..., Haines, AK within a 300-yard radius around the fireworks launch area, centered at approximate position 59...

33 CFR 165.1712 - Safety Zones; Annual Independence Day Firework Displays, Skagway, Haines, and Wrangell, AK.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-07-01

... Day Firework Displays, Skagway, Haines, and Wrangell, AK. 165.1712 Section 165.1712 Navigation and... Displays, Skagway, Haines, and Wrangell, AK. (a) Regulated areas. The following areas are permanent safety..., Haines, AK within a 300-yard radius around the fireworks launch area, centered at approximate position 59...

75 FR 33995 - Safety Zone; Michigan Orthopaedic Society 50th Anniversary Fireworks, Lake Huron, Mackinac Island...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-06-16

...-AA00 Safety Zone; Michigan Orthopaedic Society 50th Anniversary Fireworks, Lake Huron, Mackinac Island... from a portion of Lake Huron during the Michigan Orthopaedic Society 50th Anniversary Fireworks display... launching of fireworks in conjunction with the Michigan Orthopaedic Society 50th Anniversary Fireworks...

Life Cycle Systems Engineering Approach to NASA's 2nd Generation Reusable Launch Vehicle

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Thomas, Dale; Smith, Charles; Safie, Fayssal; Kittredge, Sheryl

2002-01-01

The overall goal of the 2nd Generation RLV Program is to substantially reduce technical and business risks associated with developing a new class of reusable launch vehicles. NASA's specific goals are to improve the safety of a 2nd- generation system by 2 orders of magnitude - equivalent to a crew risk of 1 -in- 10,000 missions - and decrease the cost tenfold, to approximately $1,000 per pound of payload launched. Architecture definition is being conducted in parallel with the maturating of key technologies specifically identified to improve safety and reliability, while reducing operational costs. An architecture broadly includes an Earth-to-orbit reusable launch vehicle, on-orbit transfer vehicles and upper stages, mission planning, ground and flight operations, and support infrastructure, both on the ground and in orbit. The systems engineering approach ensures that the technologies developed - such as lightweight structures, long-life rocket engines, reliable crew escape, and robust thermal protection systems - will synergistically integrate into the optimum vehicle. Given a candidate architecture that possesses credible physical processes and realistic technology assumptions, the next set of analyses address the system's functionality across the spread of operational scenarios characterized by the design reference missions. The safety/reliability and cost/economics associated with operating the system will also be modeled and analyzed to answer the questions "How safe is it?" and "How much will it cost to acquire and operate?" The systems engineering review process factors in comprehensive budget estimates, detailed project schedules, and business and performance plans, against the goals of safety, reliability, and cost, in addition to overall technical feasibility. This approach forms the basis for investment decisions in the 2nd Generation RLV Program's risk-reduction activities. Through this process, NASA will continually refine its specialized needs and identify where Defense and commercial requirements overlap those of civil missions.

14 CFR 415.51 - General.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH LICENSE Payload Review and Determination § 415.51 General. The FAA reviews a payload proposed for launch to determine whether a license applicant or payload owner or operator has...

14 CFR 415.51 - General.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH LICENSE Payload Review and Determination § 415.51 General. The FAA reviews a payload proposed for launch to determine whether a license applicant or payload owner or operator has...

KSC-97PC1288

NASA Image and Video Library

1997-08-25

The Boeing Delta II expendable launch vehicle carrying the Advanced Composition Explorer (ACE) undergoes final preparations for liftoff in the predawn hours of Aug. 25, 1997, at Launch Complex 17A, Cape Canaveral Air Station. This is the second Delta launch under the Boeing name and the first from Cape Canaveral. The first launch attempt on Aug. 24 was scrubbed by Air Force range safety personnel because two commercial fishing vessels were within the Delta’s launch danger area. ACE with its combination of nine sensors and instruments will investigate the origin and evolution of solar phenomenon, the formation of solar corona, solar flares and acceleration of the solar wind. ACE was built for NASA by the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory and is managed by the Explorer Project Office at NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center. The lead scientific institution is the California Institute of Technology

KSC-97PC1289

NASA Image and Video Library

1997-08-25

The Boeing Delta II expendable launch vehicle carrying the Advanced Composition Explorer (ACE) undergoes final preparations for liftoff in the predawn hours of Aug. 25, 1997, at Launch Complex 17A, Cape Canaveral Air Station. This is the second Delta launch under the Boeing name and the first from Cape Canaveral. The first launch attempt on Aug. 24 was scrubbed by Air Force range safety personnel because two commercial fishing vessels were within the Delta’s launch danger area. ACE with its combination of nine sensors and instruments will investigate the origin and evolution of solar phenomenon, the formation of solar corona, solar flares and acceleration of the solar wind. ACE was built for NASA by the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory and is managed by the Explorer Project Office at NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center. The lead scientific institution is the California Institute of Technology

Crew Launch Vehicle Mobile Launcher Solid Rocket Motor Plume Induced Environment

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Vu, Bruce T.; Sulyma, Peter

2008-01-01

The plume-induced environment created by the Ares 1 first stage, five-segment reusable solid rocket motor (RSRMV) will impose high heating rates and impact pressures on Launch Complex 39. The extremes of these environments pose a potential threat to weaken or even cause structural components to fail if insufficiently designed. Therefore the ability to accurately predict these environments is critical to assist in specifying structural design requirements to insure overall structural integrity and flight safety. This paper presents the predicted thermal and pressure environments induced by the launch of the Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) from Launch Complex (LC) 39. Once the environments are predicted, a follow-on thermal analysis is required to determine the surface temperature response and the degradation rate of the materials. An example of structures responding to the plume-induced environment will be provided.

Air Data Boom System Development for the Max Launch Abort System (MLAS) Flight Experiment

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Woods-Vedeler, Jessica A.; Cox, Jeff; Bondurant, Robert; Dupont, Ron; ODonnell, Louise; Vellines, Wesley, IV; Johnston, William M.; Cagle, Christopher M.; Schuster, David M.; Elliott, Kenny B.;

14 CFR 415.13 - Transfer of a launch license.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Transfer of a launch license. 415.13 Section 415.13 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH LICENSE General § 415.13 Transfer of a launch license. (a) Only...

14 CFR 415.9 - Issuance of a launch license.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Issuance of a launch license. 415.9 Section 415.9 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH LICENSE General § 415.9 Issuance of a launch license. (a) The...

14 CFR 415.9 - Issuance of a launch license.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Issuance of a launch license. 415.9 Section 415.9 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH LICENSE General § 415.9 Issuance of a launch license. (a) The...

14 CFR 415.13 - Transfer of a launch license.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Transfer of a launch license. 415.13 Section 415.13 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH LICENSE General § 415.13 Transfer of a launch license. (a) Only...

14 CFR 420.19 - Launch site location review-general.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... nm orbit Weight class Small Medium Medium large Large 28 degrees inclination * ≤4400 >4400 to ≤11100.... Orbital expendable launch vehicles are further classified by weight class, based on the weight of payload... class of orbital expendable launch vehicles flown from a launch point, the applicant shall demonstrate...

14 CFR 420.59 - Launch site accident investigation plan.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Launch site accident investigation plan... Licensee § 420.59 Launch site accident investigation plan. (a) General. A licensee shall develop and implement a launch site accident investigation plan that contains the licensee's procedures for reporting...

14 CFR 420.59 - Launch site accident investigation plan.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Launch site accident investigation plan... Licensee § 420.59 Launch site accident investigation plan. (a) General. A licensee shall develop and implement a launch site accident investigation plan that contains the licensee's procedures for reporting...

Range Safety for an Autonomous Flight Safety System

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Lanzi, Raymond J.; Simpson, James C.

2010-01-01

The Range Safety Algorithm software encapsulates the various constructs and algorithms required to accomplish Time Space Position Information (TSPI) data management from multiple tracking sources, autonomous mission mode detection and management, and flight-termination mission rule evaluation. The software evaluates various user-configurable rule sets that govern the qualification of TSPI data sources, provides a prelaunch autonomous hold-launch function, performs the flight-monitoring-and-termination functions, and performs end-of-mission safing

Orion Launch Abort System Jettison Motor Performance During Exploration Flight Test 1

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

McCauley, Rachel J.; Davidson, John B.; Winski, Richard G.

2015-01-01

This paper presents an overview of the flight test objectives and performance of the Orion Launch Abort System during Exploration Flight Test-1. Exploration Flight Test-1, the first flight test of the Orion spacecraft, was managed and led by the Orion prime contractor, Lockheed Martin, and launched atop a United Launch Alliance Delta IV Heavy rocket. This flight test was a two-orbit, high-apogee, high-energy entry, low-inclination test mission used to validate and test systems critical to crew safety. This test included the first flight test of the Launch Abort System performing Orion nominal flight mission critical objectives. Although the Orion Program has tested a number of the critical systems of the Orion spacecraft on the ground, the launch environment cannot be replicated completely on Earth. Data from this flight will be used to verify the function of the jettison motor to separate the Launch Abort System from the crew module so it can continue on with the mission. Selected Launch Abort System flight test data is presented and discussed in the paper. Through flight test data, Launch Abort System performance trends have been derived that will prove valuable to future flights as well as the manned space program.

Test plan and report for Space Shuttle launch environment testing of Bergen cable technology safety cable

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Ralph, John

1992-01-01

Bergen Cable Technology (BCT) has introduced a new product they refer to as 'safety cable'. This product is intended as a replacement for lockwire when installed per Aerospace Standard (AS) 4536 (included in Appendix D of this document). Installation of safety cable is reportedly faster and more uniform than lockwire. NASA/GSFC proposes to use this safety cable in Shuttle Small Payloads Project (SSPP) applications on upcoming Shuttle missions. To assure that BCT safety cable will provide positive locking of fasteners equivalent to lockwire, the SSPP will conduct vibration and pull tests of the safety cable.

KSC-06pd1416

NASA Image and Video Library

2006-07-04

KENNEDY SPACE CENTER, FLA. - In Firing Room 4 of the Launch Control Center, the launch team stands to view the liftoff of Space Shuttle Discovery on mission STS-121 -- the first ever Independence Day launch of a space shuttle. Liftoff was on-time at 2:38 p.m. EDT. During the 12-day mission, the STS-121 crew of seven will test new equipment and procedures to improve shuttle safety, as well as deliver supplies and make repairs to the International Space Station. Landing is scheduled for July 16 or 17 at Kennedy's Shuttle Landing Facility. Photo credit: NASA/Kim Shiflett

REUSABLE PROPULSION ARCHITECTURE FOR SUSTAINABLE LOW-COST ACCESS TO SPACE

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Bonometti, Joseph; Frame, Kyle L.; Dankanich, John W.

2005-01-01

Two transportation architecture changes are presented at either end of a conventional two-stage rocket flight: 1) Air launch using a large, conventional, pod hauler design (i.e., Crossbow)ans 2) Momentum exchange tether (i.e., an in-space asset like MXER). Air launch has ana analytically justified cost reduction of approx. 10%, but its intangible benefits suggest real-world operations cost reductions much higher: 1) Inherent launch safety; 2) Mission Risk Reduction; 3) Favorable payload/rocket limitations; and 4) Leveraging the aircraft for other uses (military transport, commercial cargo, public outreach activities, etc.)

GOES-S Atlas V Centaur Stage OVI

NASA Image and Video Library

2018-02-08

At the Vertical Integration Facility at Space Launch Complex 41 at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station in Florida, a crane lifts a Centaur upper stage for mating to a United Launch Alliance Atlas V rocket that will boost NOAA's Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite-S, or GOES-S, to orbit. GOES-S is the second in a series of four advanced geostationary weather satellites that will significantly improve the detection and observation of environmental phenomena that directly affect public safety, protection of property and the nation's economic health and prosperity. GOES-S is slated to launch March 1, 2018.

GOES-S Atlas V Last SRB Lift to Booster

NASA Image and Video Library

2018-02-07

At the Vertical Integration Facility at Space Launch Complex 41 at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station in Florida, solid rocket boosters (SRBs) have been mated to a United Launch Alliance Atlas V first stage. The SRBs will be help boost NOAA's Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite, or GOES-S, to orbit. GOES-S is the second in a series of four advanced geostationary weather satellites that will significantly improve the detection and observation of environmental phenomena that directly affect public safety, protection of property and the nation's economic health and prosperity. GOES-S is slated to launch March 1, 2018.

GOES-S Atlas V First Stage Booster Lift to Vertical On Stand (LV

NASA Image and Video Library

2018-01-31

A technician adjusts a crane that will lift a United Launch Alliance Atlas V first stage at the Vertical Integration Facility at Space Launch Complex 41 at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station in Florida. The rocket will be positioned on its launcher to boost the Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite, or GOES-S. It will be the second in a series of four advanced geostationary weather satellites and will significantly improve the detection and observation of environmental phenomena that directly affect public safety. GOES-S is slated to launch March 1, 2018.

Texture Modification of the Shuttle Landing Facility Runway at the NASA Kennedy Space Center

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Daugherty, Robert H.; Yager, Thomas J.

1996-01-01

This paper describes the test procedures and the selection criteria used in selecting the best runway surface texture modification at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Shuttle Landing Facility (SLF) to reduce Orbiter tire wear. The new runway surface may ultimately result in an increase of allowable crosswinds for launch and landing operations. The modification allows launch and landing operations in 20-kt crosswinds if desired. This 5-kt increase over the previous 15-kt limit drastically increases landing safety and the ability to make on-time launches to support missions where space station rendezvous is planned.

GOES-S Atlas V Centaur Stage OVI

NASA Image and Video Library

2018-02-08

At the Vertical Integration Facility at Space Launch Complex 41 at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station in Florida, technicians and engineers monitor progress as a Centaur upper stage is mated to a United Launch Alliance Atlas V rocket that will boost NOAA's Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite-S, or GOES-S, to orbit. GOES-S is the second in a series of four advanced geostationary weather satellites that will significantly improve the detection and observation of environmental phenomena that directly affect public safety, protection of property and the nation's economic health and prosperity. GOES-S is slated to launch March 1, 2018.

GOES-S Atlas V Last SRB Lift to Booster

NASA Image and Video Library

2018-02-07

At the Vertical Integration Facility at Space Launch Complex 41 at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station in Florida, a solid rocket booster (SRB) is mated to a United Launch Alliance Atlas V first stage. The SRB will help boost NOAA's Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite, or GOES-S, to orbit. GOES-S is the second in a series of four advanced geostationary weather satellites that will significantly improve the detection and observation of environmental phenomena that directly affect public safety, protection of property and the nation's economic health and prosperity. GOES-S is slated to launch March 1, 2018.

GOES-S Atlas V First SRB Mate to Booster

NASA Image and Video Library

2018-02-01

A solid rocket booster (SRB) is lifted for mating to a United Launch Alliance Atlas V first stage in the Vertical Integration Facility at Space Launch Complex 41 at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station in Florida. The SRB will be help boost NOAA's Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite, or GOES-S, to orbit. GOES-S is the second in a series of four advanced geostationary weather satellites that will significantly improve the detection and observation of environmental phenomena that directly affect public safety, protection of property and the nation's economic health and prosperity. GOES-S is slated to launch March 1, 2018.

GOES-S Atlas V First SRB Mate to Booster

NASA Image and Video Library

2018-02-01

A solid rocket booster (SRB) is prepared for mating to a United Launch Alliance Atlas V first stage in the Vertical Integration Facility at Space Launch Complex 41 at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station in Florida. The SRB will be help boost NOAA's Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite, or GOES-S, to orbit. GOES-S is the second in a series of four advanced geostationary weather satellites that will significantly improve the detection and observation of environmental phenomena that directly affect public safety, protection of property and the nation's economic health and prosperity. GOES-S is slated to launch March 1, 2018.

GOES-S Atlas V First SRB Mate to Booster

NASA Image and Video Library

2018-02-01

A crane lifts a solid rocket booster (SRB) for mating to a United Launch Alliance Atlas V first stage in the Vertical Integration Facility at Space Launch Complex 41 at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station in Florida. The SRB will be help boost NOAA's Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite, or GOES-S, to orbit. GOES-S is the second in a series of four advanced geostationary weather satellites that will significantly improve the detection and observation of environmental phenomena that directly affect public safety, protection of property and the nation's economic health and prosperity. GOES-S is slated to launch March 1, 2018.

GOES-S Atlas V First SRB Mate to Booster

NASA Image and Video Library

2018-02-01

A solid rocket booster (SRB) is mated to a United Launch Alliance Atlas V first stage in the Vertical Integration Facility at Space Launch Complex 41 at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station in Florida. The SRB will be help boost NOAA's Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite, or GOES-S, to orbit. GOES-S is the second in a series of four advanced geostationary weather satellites that will significantly improve the detection and observation of environmental phenomena that directly affect public safety, protection of property and the nation's economic health and prosperity. GOES-S is slated to launch March 1, 2018.

GOES-S Atlas V Last SRB Lift to Booster

NASA Image and Video Library

2018-02-07

Technicians and engineers prepare to mate a solid rocket booster (SRB) to a United Launch Alliance Atlas V first stage in the Vertical Integration Facility at Space Launch Complex 41 at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station in Florida. The SRB will help boost NOAA's Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite, or GOES-S, to orbit. GOES-S is the second in a series of four advanced geostationary weather satellites that will significantly improve the detection and observation of environmental phenomena that directly affect public safety, protection of property and the nation's economic health and prosperity. GOES-S is slated to launch March 1, 2018.

GOES-S Atlas V Last SRB Lift to Booster

NASA Image and Video Library

2018-02-07

At the Vertical Integration Facility at Space Launch Complex 41 at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station in Florida, a solid rocket booster (SRB) is prepared for mating to a United Launch Alliance Atlas V first stage. The SRB will help boost NOAA's Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite, or GOES-S, to orbit. GOES-S is the second in a series of four advanced geostationary weather satellites that will significantly improve the detection and observation of environmental phenomena that directly affect public safety, protection of property and the nation's economic health and prosperity. GOES-S is slated to launch March 1, 2018.

GOES-S Atlas V Last SRB Lift to Booster

NASA Image and Video Library

2018-02-07

At the Vertical Integration Facility at Space Launch Complex 41 at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station in Florida, a solid rocket booster (SRB) is lifted for mating to a United Launch Alliance Atlas V first stage. The SRB will help boost NOAA's Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite, or GOES-S, to orbit. GOES-S is the second in a series of four advanced geostationary weather satellites that will significantly improve the detection and observation of environmental phenomena that directly affect public safety, protection of property and the nation's economic health and prosperity. GOES-S is slated to launch March 1, 2018.

GOES-S Atlas V Last SRB Lift to Booster

NASA Image and Video Library

2018-02-07

At the Vertical Integration Facility at Space Launch Complex 41 at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station in Florida, a solid rocket booster (SRB) is mated to a United Launch Alliance Atlas V first stage. The SRB will be help boost NOAA's Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite, or GOES-S, to orbit. GOES-S is the second in a series of four advanced geostationary weather satellites that will significantly improve the detection and observation of environmental phenomena that directly affect public safety, protection of property and the nation's economic health and prosperity. GOES-S is slated to launch March 1, 2018.

GOES-S Atlas V Last SRB Lift to Booster

NASA Image and Video Library

2018-02-07

At the Vertical Integration Facility at Space Launch Complex 41 at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station in Florida, technicians support operations to mate a solid rocket booster (SRB) to a United Launch Alliance Atlas V first stage. The SRB will be help boost NOAA's Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite, or GOES-S, to orbit. GOES-S is the second in a series of four advanced geostationary weather satellites that will significantly improve the detection and observation of environmental phenomena that directly affect public safety, protection of property and the nation's economic health and prosperity. GOES-S is slated to launch March 1, 2018.

GOES-S Atlas V Last SRB Lift to Booster

NASA Image and Video Library

2018-02-07

At the Vertical Integration Facility at Space Launch Complex 41 at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station in Florida, technicians support operations to mate a solid rocket booster (SRB) to a United Launch Alliance Atlas V first stage. The SRB will help boost NOAA's Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite, or GOES-S, to orbit. GOES-S is the second in a series of four advanced geostationary weather satellites that will significantly improve the detection and observation of environmental phenomena that directly affect public safety, protection of property and the nation's economic health and prosperity. GOES-S is slated to launch March 1, 2018.

Hybrids - Best of both worlds. [liquid and solid propellants mated for safe reliable and low cost launch vehicles

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Goldberg, Ben E.; Wiley, Dan R.

1991-01-01

An overview is presented of hybrid rocket propulsion systems whereby combining solids and liquids for launch vehicles could produce a safe, reliable, and low-cost product. The primary subsystems of a hybrid system consist of the oxidizer tank and feed system, an injector system, a solid fuel grain enclosed in a pressure vessel case, a mixing chamber, and a nozzle. The hybrid rocket has an inert grain, which reduces costs of development, transportation, manufacturing, and launch by avoiding many safety measures that must be taken when operating with solids. Other than their use in launch vehicles, hybrids are excellent for simulating the exhaust of solid rocket motors for material development.

Safety and regulation of yeasts used for biocontrol or biopreservation in the food or feed chain.

PubMed

Sundh, Ingvar; Melin, Petter

2011-01-01

Yeasts have been important components of spontaneous fermentations in food and beverage processing for millennia. More recently, the potential of utilising antagonistic yeasts, e.g. Pichia anomala and Candida spp., for post-harvest biological control of spoilage fungi during storage of plant-derived produce ('biopreservation') has been clearly demonstrated. Although some yeast species are among the safest microorganisms known, several have been reported in opportunistic infections in humans, including P. anomala and bakers' yeast, Saccharomyces cerevisiae. More research is needed about the dominant pathogenicity and virulence factors in opportunistic yeasts, and whether increased utilisation of biopreservative yeasts in general could contribute to an increased prevalence of yeast infections. The regulatory situation for yeasts used in post-harvest biocontrol is complex and the few products that have reached the market are mainly registered as biological pesticides. The qualified presumption of safety (QPS) approach to safety assessments of microorganisms intentionally added to food or feed, recently launched by the European Food Safety Authority, can lead to more efficient evaluations of new products containing microbial species with a sufficient body of knowledge or long-term experience on their safety. P. anomala is one of several yeast species that have been given QPS status, although the status is restricted to use of this yeast for enzyme and metabolite production purposes. With regard to authorisation of new biopreservative yeasts, we recommend that the possibility to regulate microorganisms for food biopreservation as food additives be considered.

Safety of immunization injections in Africa: not simply a problem of logistics.

PubMed Central

Dicko, M.; Oni, A. Q.; Ganivet, S.; Kone, S.; Pierre, L.; Jacquet, B.

2000-01-01

In 1995, the WHO Regional Office for Africa launched a logistics project to address the four main areas of immunization logistics: the cold chain, transport, vaccine supply and quality, and the safety of injections in the countries of the region. The impact of this logistic approach on immunization injection safety was evaluated through surveys of injection procedures and an analysis of the injection materials (e.g. sterilizable or disposable syringes) chosen by the Expanded Programme on Immunization (EPI) and those actually seen to be used. Re-use of injection materials without sterilization, accidental needle-stick injuries among health care workers, and injection-related abscesses in patients were common in countries in the WHO African Region. Few health centres used time-steam saturation-temperature (TST) indicators to check the quality of sterilization and, in many centres, the injection equipment was boiled instead of being steam sterilized. Facilities for the proper disposal of used materials were rarely present. Although the official EPI choice was to use sterilizable equipment, use of a combination of sterilizable and disposable equipment was observed in the field. Unsafe injection practices in these countries were generally due to a failure to integrate nursing practices and public awareness with injection safety issues, and an absence of the influence of EPI managers on health care service delivery. Holistic rather than logistic approaches should be adopted to achieve safe injections in immunization, in the broader context of promoting safe vaccines and safety of all injections. PMID:10743280

Application of the French Space Operation Act and the Development of Space Activities in the Field of Launchers

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Cahuzac, F.; Biard, A.

2012-01-01

The development of space activities has led France to define a new legal framework: French Space Operation Act (FSOA). The aim of this act, is to define the conditions according to which the French government authorizes and checks the spatial operations under its jurisdiction or its international responsibility as State of launch, according to the international treaties of the UN on space, in particular the Treaty (1967) on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, the Convention ( 1972 ) on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, and the Convention (1975) on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space. The main European space centre is the Guiana Space Centre (CSG), settled in France. A clarification of the French legal framework was compulsory to allow the arrival of new launchers (Soyuz and Vega). This act defines the competent authority, the procedure of authorization and licenses, the regime for operations led from foreign countries, the control of spatial objects, the enabling of inspectors, the delegation of monitoring to CNES, the procedure for urgent measures necessary for the safety, the registration of spatial objects. In this framework, the operator is fully responsible of the operation that he leads. He is subjected to a regime of authorization and to governmental technical monitoring delegated to CNES. In case of litigation, the operator gets the State guarantee above a certain level of damage to third party. The introduction of FSOA has led to issue a Technical Regulation set forth, in particular for the safety of persons and property, the protection of public health and the environment. This general regulation is completed by a specific regulation applicable to CSG that covers the preparation phase of the launch, and all specificities of the launch range, as regards the beginning of the launch. The Technical Regulation is based on 30 years of Ariane's activities and on the application of international standards. Thus, its introduction has been made easy. The Technical Regulation is mainly written in term of objectives of safety, leaving great possibilities of technical innovations or improvements to the developer and operators. In the Technical Regulation, the approach of risk management is based on two orientations: prevention of risk on one side, treatment of risks on the other side. The prevention of risks is based on the reliability of the launch system, and the treatment of risk is based either on a neutralization function, or the control of trajectory according to the phase of the mission. The monitoring of activity is fitted to this approach of control of risks. Thus, the operator and its final customer, practically benefit from the system of monitoring associated to the act. One of the contributions of FSOA is a clarification of roles, between on one side an operator that controls the activities, and on the other side an independent entity that monitors activities according to the Technical Regulation. This act introduce a secured legal framework, on one side clear and suitable for protecting anyone against dangers linked necessarily to space activities, on the other side offering to all actors a favourable environment for the development of their activities. A first appraisal of the application of the authorization regime applied since 2010, December 10th, is presented.

154. Photocopy of drawing (1963 structural drawing by General Dynamics/Astronautics) ...

Library of Congress Historic Buildings Survey, Historic Engineering Record, Historic Landscapes Survey

154. Photocopy of drawing (1963 structural drawing by General Dynamics/Astronautics) STRUCTURAL PLANS FOR MST STATION 30, SHEET S84 - Vandenberg Air Force Base, Space Launch Complex 3, Launch Pad 3 East, Napa & Alden Roads, Lompoc, Santa Barbara County, CA

225. Photocopy of drawing (1967 structural drawing by General Dynamics/Astronautics) ...

Library of Congress Historic Buildings Survey, Historic Engineering Record, Historic Landscapes Survey

225. Photocopy of drawing (1967 structural drawing by General Dynamics/Astronautics) WIND DEFLECTOR FOR THE UMBILICAL MAST, SHEET S122 - Vandenberg Air Force Base, Space Launch Complex 3, Launch Pad 3 East, Napa & Alden Roads, Lompoc, Santa Barbara County, CA

158. Photocopy of drawing (1963 structural drawing by General Dynamics/Astronautics) ...

Library of Congress Historic Buildings Survey, Historic Engineering Record, Historic Landscapes Survey

158. Photocopy of drawing (1963 structural drawing by General Dynamics/Astronautics) FRAMING PLANS FOR MST STATION 124, SHEET S94 - Vandenberg Air Force Base, Space Launch Complex 3, Launch Pad 3 East, Napa & Alden Roads, Lompoc, Santa Barbara County, CA

68. GENERAL VIEW OF SOUTH AND EAST SIDES OF SLC3W ...

Library of Congress Historic Buildings Survey, Historic Engineering Record, Historic Landscapes Survey

68. GENERAL VIEW OF SOUTH AND EAST SIDES OF SLC-3W LIQUID OXYGEN APRON. CABLE TRAYS IN FOREGROUND - Vandenberg Air Force Base, Space Launch Complex 3, Launch Pad 3 West, Napa & Alden Roads, Lompoc, Santa Barbara County, CA

75. GENERAL VIEW OF PORTABLE PAYLOAD AIRCONDITIONING SYSTEM LOCATED ON ...

Library of Congress Historic Buildings Survey, Historic Engineering Record, Historic Landscapes Survey

75. GENERAL VIEW OF PORTABLE PAYLOAD AIR-CONDITIONING SYSTEM LOCATED ON NORTH SIDE OF SLC-3W LIQUID OXYGEN APRON - Vandenberg Air Force Base, Space Launch Complex 3, Launch Pad 3 West, Napa & Alden Roads, Lompoc, Santa Barbara County, CA

102. VIEW OF GRANETZ 'EVENTRECORDER' COMPUTER AND GENERAL ELECTRIC PRINTERS ...

Library of Congress Historic Buildings Survey, Historic Engineering Record, Historic Landscapes Survey

102. VIEW OF GRANETZ 'EVENT-RECORDER' COMPUTER AND GENERAL ELECTRIC PRINTERS FOR GRANETZ OUTPUT LOCATED NEAR EAST WALL OF LANDLINE INSTRUMENTATION ROOM - Vandenberg Air Force Base, Space Launch Complex 3, Launch Operations Building, Napa & Alden Roads, Lompoc, Santa Barbara County, CA

SureTrak Probability of Impact Display

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Elliott, John

2012-01-01

The SureTrak Probability of Impact Display software was developed for use during rocket launch operations. The software displays probability of impact information for each ship near the hazardous area during the time immediately preceding the launch of an unguided vehicle. Wallops range safety officers need to be sure that the risk to humans is below a certain threshold during each use of the Wallops Flight Facility Launch Range. Under the variable conditions that can exist at launch time, the decision to launch must be made in a timely manner to ensure a successful mission while not exceeding those risk criteria. Range safety officers need a tool that can give them the needed probability of impact information quickly, and in a format that is clearly understandable. This application is meant to fill that need. The software is a reuse of part of software developed for an earlier project: Ship Surveillance Software System (S4). The S4 project was written in C++ using Microsoft Visual Studio 6. The data structures and dialog templates from it were copied into a new application that calls the implementation of the algorithms from S4 and displays the results as needed. In the S4 software, the list of ships in the area was received from one local radar interface and from operators who entered the ship information manually. The SureTrak Probability of Impact Display application receives ship data from two local radars as well as the SureTrak system, eliminating the need for manual data entry.

NASA Social

NASA Image and Video Library

2012-05-18

NASA Social participants are reflected in the sunglasses of former NASA astronaut Garrett Reisman, now a senior engineer working on astronaut safety and mission assurance for Space Exploration Technologies, or SpaceX, as he speaks with them, Friday, May 18, 2012, at the launch complex where the company's Falcon 9 rocket is set to launch early Friday morning at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station in Cape Canaveral, Fla. Photo Credit: (NASA/Paul E. Alers)

Integrated System Safety Program for the MX Weapon System.

DTIC Science & Technology

1979-09-25

Quantitative AnalIsis Of Specified Undesired Events Nuclr Safey Anisis Reports ISARI Contractor Inpu To AFWL Technical Nucler Sa An. Is FIGURE 1...Launch Includes all functions from initiation of launch se- quence to missile first motion, such as transfer from ground power to airborne power ...all credible contingency or emergency condi- tions, such as Toxic gases/fluid release, inadvertently armed ordnance, electric power loss, and destruct

75 FR 35649 - Safety Zone; Fourth of July Fireworks, Lake Tahoe, CA

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-06-23

... Zone; Fourth of July Fireworks, Lake Tahoe, CA AGENCY: Coast Guard, DHS. ACTION: Notice of enforcement of regulation. SUMMARY: The Coast Guard will enforce the Fourth of July Fireworks safety zone from 9... Fourth of July Fireworks Display in 33 CFR 165.1191 on July 3, 2010. The fireworks launch site is...

78 FR 49121 - Safety Zone; Luna Pier Fireworks, Luna Pier, MI

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-08-13

... Zone; Luna Pier Fireworks, Luna Pier, MI AGENCY: Coast Guard, DHS. ACTION: Notice of enforcement of regulation. SUMMARY: The Coast Guard will enforce the safety zone for the Luna Pier Fireworks Show, Luna Pier... the fireworks launch site at the Clyde E. Evens Municipal Pier, located at position 41[deg]48'32'' N...

33 CFR 165.104 - Safety Zone: Vessel Launches, Bath Iron Works, Kennebec River, Bath, Maine.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... COAST GUARD, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (CONTINUED) PORTS AND WATERWAYS SAFETY REGULATED NAVIGATION... Bath Iron Works dry dock while it is being moved to and from its moored position at the Bath Iron Works... into or movement within this zone is prohibited unless authorized by the Captain of the Port, Portland...

77 FR 28769 - Safety Zone; Fourth of July Fireworks, City of Antioch, CA

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2012-05-16

... Zone; Fourth of July Fireworks, City of Antioch, CA AGENCY: Coast Guard, DHS. ACTION: Notice of enforcement of regulation. SUMMARY: The Coast Guard will enforce the safety zone for the City of Antioch... 4, 2012 the loaded barge will transit from Fulton Shipyard Pier to the launch site off the City of...

77 FR 29932 - Safety Zone; Nautical City Festival Air Show, Rogers City, MI

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2012-05-21

...-AA00 Safety Zone; Nautical City Festival Air Show, Rogers City, MI AGENCY: Coast Guard, DHS. ACTION... City Festival will be celebrating Calcite's 100th Anniversary. As part of that celebration, an air show will be launched to the east of the Rogers City marina. The Captain of the Port Sault Sainte Marie has...

75 FR 35294 - Safety Zone; Marquette 4th of July Fireworks, Marquette Harbor, Lake Superior, Marquette, MI

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-06-22

...-AA00 Safety Zone; Marquette 4th of July Fireworks, Marquette Harbor, Lake Superior, Marquette, MI... vessels from a portion of Marquette Harbor during the Marquette 4th of July Fireworks display. This... vessels during the setup and launching of fireworks in conjunction with the Marquette 4th of July...

Rationales for the Lightning Launch Commit Criteria

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Willett, John C. (Editor); Merceret, Francis J. (Editor); Krider, E. Philip; O'Brien, T. Paul; Dye, James E.; Walterscheid, Richard L.; Stolzenburg, Maribeth; Cummins, Kenneth; Christian, Hugh J.; Madura, John T.

2016-01-01

Since natural and triggered lightning are demonstrated hazards to launch vehicles, payloads, and spacecraft, NASA and the Department of Defense (DoD) follow the Lightning Launch Commit Criteria (LLCC) for launches from Federal Ranges. The LLCC were developed to prevent future instances of a rocket intercepting natural lightning or triggering a lightning flash during launch from a Federal Range. NASA and DoD utilize the Lightning Advisory Panel (LAP) to establish and develop robust rationale from which the criteria originate. The rationale document also contains appendices that provide additional scientific background, including detailed descriptions of the theory and observations behind the rationales. The LLCC in whole or part are used across the globe due to the rigor of the documented criteria and associated rationale. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) adopted the LLCC in 2006 for commercial space transportation and the criteria were codified in the FAA's Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) for Safety of an Expendable Launch Vehicle (Appendix G to 14 CFR Part 417, (G417)) and renamed Lightning Flight Commit Criteria in G417.

KSC-04pd1336

NASA Image and Video Library

2004-06-24

KENNEDY SPACE CENTER, FLA. - Reporters (left) take notes during an informal briefing concerning NASA’s Cassini spacecraft, launched aboard an Air Force Titan IV rocket from Cape Canaveral Air Force Station Oct. 15, 1997. Cassini launch team members at right discussed the challenge and experience of preparing Cassini for launch, integrating it with the Titan IV rocket and the countdown events of launch day. From left are Ron Gillett, NASA Safety and Lead Federal Agency official; Omar Baez, mechanical and propulsion systems engineer; Ray Lugo, NASA launch manager; Chuck Dovale, chief, Avionics Branch; George Haddad, Integration and Ground Systems mechanical engineer; and Ken Carr, Cassini assistant launch site support manager. Approximately 10:36 p.m. EDT, June 30, the Cassini-Huygens spacecraft will arrive at Saturn. After nearly a seven-year journey, it will be the first mission to orbit Saturn. The international cooperative mission plans a four-year tour of Saturn, its rings, icy moons, magnetosphere, and Titan, the planet’s largest moon.

KSC-04pd1335

NASA Image and Video Library

2004-06-24

KENNEDY SPACE CENTER, FLA. - Reporters (bottom) take notes during an informal briefing concerning NASA’s Cassini spacecraft, launched aboard an Air Force Titan IV rocket from Cape Canaveral Air Force Station Oct. 15, 1997. Cassini launch team members seen here discussed the challenge and experience of preparing Cassini for launch, integrating it with the Titan IV rocket and the countdown events of launch day. Facing the camera (from left) are Ron Gillett, NASA Safety and Lead Federal Agency official; Omar Baez, mechanical and propulsion systems engineer; Ray Lugo, NASA launch manager; Chuck Dovale, chief, Avionics Branch; George Haddad, Integration and Ground Systems mechanical engineer; and Ken Carr, Cassini assistant launch site support manager. Approximately 10:36 p.m. EDT, June 30, the Cassini-Huygens spacecraft will arrive at Saturn. After nearly a seven-year journey, it will be the first mission to orbit Saturn. The international cooperative mission plans a four-year tour of Saturn, its rings, icy moons, magnetosphere, and Titan, the planet’s largest moon.

Review of Our National Heritage of Launch Vehicles Using Aerodynamic Surfaces and Current Use of These by Other Nations. Part II; Center Director's Discretionary Fund Project Numbe

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Barret, C.

1996-01-01

Marshall Space Flight Center has a rich heritage of launch vehicles that have used aerodynamic surfaces for flight stability and for flight control. Recently, due to the aft center-of-gravity (cg) locations on launch vehicles currently being studied, the need has arisen for the vehicle control augmentation that can be provided by these flight controls. Aerodynamic flight control can also reduce engine gimbaling requirements, provide actuator failure protection, enhance crew safety, and increase vehicle reliability and payload capability. As a starting point for the novel design of aerodynamic flight control augmentors for a Saturn class, aft cg launch vehicle, this report undertakes a review of our national heritage of launch vehicles using aerodynamic surfaces, along with a survey of current use of aerodynamic surfaces on large launch vehicles of other nations. This report presents one facet of Center Director's Discretionary Fund Project 93-05 and has a previous and subsequent companion publication.

STS-107 Crew Interviews: Laurel Clark, Mission Specialist

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

2002-01-01

STS-107 Mission Specialist 4 Laurel Clark is seen during this preflight interview, where she gives a quick overview of the mission before answering questions about her inspiration to become an astronaut and her career path. Clark outlines her role in the mission in general, and specifically in conducting onboard science experiments. She discusses the following suite of experiments and instruments in detail: ARMS (Advanced Respiratory Monitoring System) and the European Space Agency's Biopack. Clark also mentions on-board activities and responsibilities during launch and reentry, mission training, and microgravity research. In addition, she touches on the use of crew members as research subjects including pre and postflight monitoring activities, the emphasis on crew safety and the value of international cooperation.

33 CFR 165.160 - Safety Zones; fireworks displays and swim events in Coast Guard Captain of the Port New York Zone.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-07-01

..., Hempstead Harbor Safety Zone • Launch site: A barge located in approximate position 40°51′58″ N 073°39′34″ W... 33 Navigation and Navigable Waters 2 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Safety Zones; fireworks displays and swim events in Coast Guard Captain of the Port New York Zone. 165.160 Section 165.160 Navigation...

33 CFR 165.160 - Safety Zones; fireworks displays and swim events in Coast Guard Captain of the Port New York Zone.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-07-01

..., Hempstead Harbor Safety Zone • Launch site: A barge located in approximate position 40°51′58″ N 073°39′34″ W... 33 Navigation and Navigable Waters 2 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Safety Zones; fireworks displays and swim events in Coast Guard Captain of the Port New York Zone. 165.160 Section 165.160 Navigation...

33 CFR 165.160 - Safety Zones; fireworks displays and swim events in Coast Guard Captain of the Port New York Zone.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-07-01

..., Hempstead Harbor Safety Zone • Launch site: A barge located in approximate position 40°51′58″ N 073°39′34″ W... 33 Navigation and Navigable Waters 2 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Safety Zones; fireworks displays and swim events in Coast Guard Captain of the Port New York Zone. 165.160 Section 165.160 Navigation...

An investigation of pre-launch and in-flight STS range safety radio signal degradation and dropout

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Mcdonald, Malcolm W.

1991-01-01

The range safety system (RSS) transmitters operate at a frequency of 416.500 MHz. The transmitting antennas transmit left circularly polarized waves, and the shuttle range safety system (SRSS) receiving antennas onboard the shuttle vehicle receive left circular polarization. Preliminary explanations are proposed for many of the observed fluctuations in signal levels. It is recommended that experiments and further investigation be performed to test the validity of certain of these explanations.

The Delta II with ACE aboard is prepared for liftoff from Pad 17A, CCAS

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

1997-01-01

The Boeing Delta II expendable launch vehicle carrying the Advanced Composition Explorer (ACE) undergoes final preparations for liftoff in the predawn hours of Aug. 25, 1997, at Launch Complex 17A, Cape Canaveral Air Station. This is the second Delta launch under the Boeing name and the first from Cape Canaveral. The first launch attempt on Aug. 24 was scrubbed by Air Force range safety personnel because two commercial fishing vessels were within the Delta's launch danger area. ACE with its combination of nine sensors and instruments will investigate the origin and evolution of solar phenomenon, the formation of solar corona, solar flares and acceleration of the solar wind. ACE was built for NASA by the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory and is managed by the Explorer Project Office at NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center. The lead scientific institution is the California Institute of Technology.

KSC-07pd3344

NASA Image and Video Library

2007-11-18

KENNEDY SPACE CENTER, FLA. -- STS-122 Mission Specialist Rex Walheim, at right, practices driving an M-113 armored personnel carrier as the instructor beside him monitors his performance. The practice near Launch Pad 39B is part of training on emergency egress procedures. An M-113 will be available to transport the crew to safety in the event of a contingency on the pad before their launch. The crew is participating in Terminal Countdown Demonstration Test activities, a standard part of launch preparations. The TCDT provides astronauts and ground crews with equipment familiarization, emergency egress training and a simulated launch countdown. On mission STS-122, Atlantis will deliver the European Space Agency's Columbus module to the International Space Station. Columbus is a multifunctional, pressurized laboratory that will be permanently attached to U.S. Node 2, called Harmony, and will expand the research facilities aboard the station. Launch is targeted for Dec. 6. Photo credit: NASA/Kim Shiflett

KSC-07pd3336

NASA Image and Video Library

2007-11-18

KENNEDY SPACE CENTER, FLA. -- STS-122 Commander Stephen Frick takes time out from driving practice of the M-113 armored personnel carrier to pose for a photo. The practice near Launch Pad 39B is part of training on emergency egress procedures. An M-113 will be available to transport the crew to safety in the event of a contingency on the pad before their launch. The crew is participating in Terminal Countdown Demonstration Test activities, a standard part of launch preparations. The TCDT provides astronauts and ground crews with equipment familiarization, emergency egress training and a simulated launch countdown. On mission STS-122, Atlantis will deliver the European Space Agency's Columbus module to the International Space Station. Columbus is a multifunctional, pressurized laboratory that will be permanently attached to U.S. Node 2, called Harmony, and will expand the research facilities aboard the station. Launch is targeted for Dec. 6. Photo credit: NASA/Kim Shiflett

KSC-07pd3338

NASA Image and Video Library

2007-11-18

KENNEDY SPACE CENTER, FLA. -- STS-122 Pilot Alan Poindexter takes time out from driving practice of the M-113 armored personnel carrier to pose for a photo. The practice near Launch Pad 39B is part of training on emergency egress procedures. An M-113 will be available to transport the crew to safety in the event of a contingency on the pad before their launch. The crew is participating in Terminal Countdown Demonstration Test activities, a standard part of launch preparations. The TCDT provides astronauts and ground crews with equipment familiarization, emergency egress training and a simulated launch countdown. On mission STS-122, Atlantis will deliver the European Space Agency's Columbus module to the International Space Station. Columbus is a multifunctional, pressurized laboratory that will be permanently attached to U.S. Node 2, called Harmony, and will expand the research facilities aboard the station. Launch is targeted for Dec. 6. Photo credit: NASA/Kim Shiflett

KSC-07pd3340

NASA Image and Video Library

2007-11-18

KENNEDY SPACE CENTER, FLA. -- STS-122 Mission Specialist Leland Melvin takes time out from driving practice of the M-113 armored personnel carrier to pose for a photo. The practice near Launch Pad 39B is part of training on emergency egress procedures. An M-113 will be available to transport the crew to safety in the event of a contingency on the pad before their launch. The crew is participating in Terminal Countdown Demonstration Test activities, a standard part of launch preparations. The TCDT provides astronauts and ground crews with equipment familiarization, emergency egress training and a simulated launch countdown. On mission STS-122, Atlantis will deliver the European Space Agency's Columbus module to the International Space Station. Columbus is a multifunctional, pressurized laboratory that will be permanently attached to U.S. Node 2, called Harmony, and will expand the research facilities aboard the station. Launch is targeted for Dec. 6. Photo credit: NASA/Kim Shiflett

KSC-07pd3345

NASA Image and Video Library

2007-11-18

KENNEDY SPACE CENTER, FLA. -- STS-122 Mission Specialist Hans Schlegel, of the European Space Agency, takes time out from driving practice of the M-113 armored personnel carrier to pose for a photo. The practice near Launch Pad 39B is part of training on emergency egress procedures. An M-113 will be available to transport the crew to safety in the event of a contingency on the pad before their launch. The crew is participating in Terminal Countdown Demonstration Test activities, a standard part of launch preparations. The TCDT provides astronauts and ground crews with equipment familiarization, emergency egress training and a simulated launch countdown. On mission STS-122, Atlantis will deliver the European Space Agency's Columbus module to the International Space Station. Columbus is a multifunctional, pressurized laboratory that will be permanently attached to U.S. Node 2, called Harmony, and will expand the research facilities aboard the station. Launch is targeted for Dec. 6. Photo credit: NASA/Kim Shiflett

Rationales for the Lightning Flight-Commit Criteria

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Willett, John C. (Editor); Merceret, Francis J.; Krider, E. Philip; Dye, James E.; OBrien, T. Paul; Rust, W. David; Walterscheid, Richard L.; Madura, John T.; Christian, Hugh J.

2010-01-01

Since natural and artificially-initiated (or "triggered") lightning are demonstrated hazards to the launch of space vehicles, the American space program has responded by establishing a set of Lightning Flight Commit Criteria (LFCC), also known as Lightning Launch Commit Criteria (LLCC), and associated Definitions to mitigate the risk. The LLCC apply to all Federal Government ranges and similar LFCC have been adopted by the Federal Aviation Administration for application at state-operated and private spaceports. The LLCC and Definitions have been developed, reviewed, and approved over the years of the American space program, progressing from relatively simple rules in the mid-twentieth century (that were inadequate) to a complex suite for launch operations in the early 21st century. During this evolutionary process, a "Lightning Advisory Panel (LAP)" of top American scientists in the field of atmospheric electricity was established to guide it. Details of this process are provided in a companion document entitled "A History of the Lightning Launch Commit Criteria and the Lightning Advisory Panel for America s Space program" which is available as NASA Special Publication 2010-216283. As new knowledge and additional operational experience have been gained, the LFCC/LLCC have been updated to preserve or increase their safety and to increase launch availability. All launches of both manned and unmanned vehicles at all Federal Government ranges now use the same rules. This simplifies their application and minimizes the cost of the weather infrastructure to support them. Vehicle operators and Range safety personnel have requested that the LAP provide a detailed written rationale for each of the LFCC so that they may better understand and appreciate the scientific and operational justifications for them. This document provides the requested rationales

DUKSUP: A Computer Program for High Thrust Launch Vehicle Trajectory Design and Optimization

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Williams, C. H.; Spurlock, O. F.

2014-01-01

From the late 1960's through 1997, the leadership of NASA's Intermediate and Large class unmanned expendable launch vehicle projects resided at the NASA Lewis (now Glenn) Research Center (LeRC). One of LeRC's primary responsibilities --- trajectory design and performance analysis --- was accomplished by an internally-developed analytic three dimensional computer program called DUKSUP. Because of its Calculus of Variations-based optimization routine, this code was generally more capable of finding optimal solutions than its contemporaries. A derivation of optimal control using the Calculus of Variations is summarized including transversality, intermediate, and final conditions. The two point boundary value problem is explained. A brief summary of the code's operation is provided, including iteration via the Newton-Raphson scheme and integration of variational and motion equations via a 4th order Runge-Kutta scheme. Main subroutines are discussed. The history of the LeRC trajectory design efforts in the early 1960's is explained within the context of supporting the Centaur upper stage program. How the code was constructed based on the operation of the Atlas/Centaur launch vehicle, the limits of the computers of that era, the limits of the computer programming languages, and the missions it supported are discussed. The vehicles DUKSUP supported (Atlas/Centaur, Titan/Centaur, and Shuttle/Centaur) are briefly described. The types of missions, including Earth orbital and interplanetary, are described. The roles of flight constraints and their impact on launch operations are detailed (such as jettisoning hardware on heating, Range Safety, ground station tracking, and elliptical parking orbits). The computer main frames on which the code was hosted are described. The applications of the code are detailed, including independent check of contractor analysis, benchmarking, leading edge analysis, and vehicle performance improvement assessments. Several of DUKSUP's many major impacts on launches are discussed including Intelsat, Voyager, Pioneer Venus, HEAO, Galileo, and Cassini.

DUKSUP: A Computer Program for High Thrust Launch Vehicle Trajectory Design and Optimization

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Spurlock, O. Frank; Williams, Craig H.

2015-01-01

From the late 1960s through 1997, the leadership of NASAs Intermediate and Large class unmanned expendable launch vehicle projects resided at the NASA Lewis (now Glenn) Research Center (LeRC). One of LeRCs primary responsibilities --- trajectory design and performance analysis --- was accomplished by an internally-developed analytic three dimensional computer program called DUKSUP. Because of its Calculus of Variations-based optimization routine, this code was generally more capable of finding optimal solutions than its contemporaries. A derivation of optimal control using the Calculus of Variations is summarized including transversality, intermediate, and final conditions. The two point boundary value problem is explained. A brief summary of the codes operation is provided, including iteration via the Newton-Raphson scheme and integration of variational and motion equations via a 4th order Runge-Kutta scheme. Main subroutines are discussed. The history of the LeRC trajectory design efforts in the early 1960s is explained within the context of supporting the Centaur upper stage program. How the code was constructed based on the operation of the AtlasCentaur launch vehicle, the limits of the computers of that era, the limits of the computer programming languages, and the missions it supported are discussed. The vehicles DUKSUP supported (AtlasCentaur, TitanCentaur, and ShuttleCentaur) are briefly described. The types of missions, including Earth orbital and interplanetary, are described. The roles of flight constraints and their impact on launch operations are detailed (such as jettisoning hardware on heating, Range Safety, ground station tracking, and elliptical parking orbits). The computer main frames on which the code was hosted are described. The applications of the code are detailed, including independent check of contractor analysis, benchmarking, leading edge analysis, and vehicle performance improvement assessments. Several of DUKSUPs many major impacts on launches are discussed including Intelsat, Voyager, Pioneer Venus, HEAO, Galileo, and Cassini.

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

2002-01-01

This report presents the results of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) activities during 2002. The format of the report has been modified to capture a long-term perspective. Section II is new and highlights the Panel's view of NASA's safety progress during the year. Section III contains the pivotal safety issues facing NASA in the coming year. Section IV includes the program area findings and recommendations. The Panel has been asked by the Administrator to perform several special studies this year, and the resulting white papers appear in Appendix C. The year has been filled with significant achievements for NASA in both successful Space Shuttle operations and International Space Station (ISS) construction. Throughout the year, safety has been first and foremost in spite of many changes throughout the Agency. The relocation of the Orbiter Major Modifications (OMMs) from California to Kennedy Space Center (KSC) appears very successful. The transition of responsibilities for program management of the Space Shuttle and ISS programs from Johnson Space Center (JSC) to NASA Headquarters went smoothly. The decision to extend the life of the Space Shuttle as the primary NASA vehicle for access to space is viewed by the Panel as a prudent one. With the appropriate investments in safety improvements, in maintenance, in preserving appropriate inventories of spare parts, and in infrastructure, the Space Shuttle can provide safe and reliable support for the ISS for the foreseeable future. Indications of an aging Space Shuttle fleet occurred on more than one occasion this year. Several flaws went undetected in the early prelaunch tests and inspections. In all but one case, the problems were found prior to launch. These incidents were all handled properly and with safety as the guiding principle. Indeed, launches were postponed until the problems were fully understood and mitigating action could be taken. These incidents do, however, indicate the need to analyze the Space Shuttle certification criteria closely. Based on this analysis, NASA can determine the need to receritfy the vehicles and to incorporate more stringent inspections throughout the process to minimize launch schedule impact. A highly skilled and experience workforce will be increasingly important for safe and reliable operations as the Space Shuttle vehicles and infrastructure continue to age.

Human Performance Modeling and Simulation for Launch Team Applications

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Peaden, Cary J.; Payne, Stephen J.; Hoblitzell, Richard M., Jr.; Chandler, Faith T.; LaVine, Nils D.; Bagnall, Timothy M.

2006-01-01

This paper describes ongoing research into modeling and simulation of humans for launch team analysis, training, and evaluation. The initial research is sponsored by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA)'s Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA) and NASA's Exploration Program and is focused on current and future launch team operations at Kennedy Space Center (KSC). The paper begins with a description of existing KSC launch team environments and procedures. It then describes the goals of new Simulation and Analysis of Launch Teams (SALT) research. The majority of this paper describes products from the SALT team's initial proof-of-concept effort. These products include a nominal case task analysis and a discrete event model and simulation of launch team performance during the final phase of a shuttle countdown; and a first proof-of-concept training demonstration of launch team communications in which the computer plays most roles, and the trainee plays a role of the trainee's choice. This paper then describes possible next steps for the research team and provides conclusions. This research is expected to have significant value to NASA's Exploration Program.

2nd Generation RLV: Program Goals and Acquisition Strategy

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Graham, J. Bart; Dumbacher, D. L. (Technical Monitor)

2001-01-01

The risk to loss of life for Space Shuttle crewmembers is approximately one in 245 missions. U.S. launch service providers captured nearly 100%, of the commercial launch market revenues in the mid 1980s. Today, the U.S. captures less than 50% of that market. A launch system architecture is needed that will dramatically increase the safety of space flight while significantly reducing the cost. NASA's Space Launch Initiative, which is implemented by the 2nd Generation RLV Program Office at Marshall Space Flight Center, seeks to develop technology and reusable launch vehicle concepts which satisfy the commercial launch market needs and the unique needs of NASA. Presented in this paper are the five primary elements of NASA's Integrated Space Transportation Plan along with the highest level goals and the acquisition strategy of the 2nd Generation RLV Program. Approval of the Space Launch Initiative FY01 budget of $290M is seen as a major commitment by the Agency and the Nation to realize the commercial potential that space offers and to move forward in the exploration of space.

A Geometric Analysis to Protect Manned Assets from Newly Launched Objects - Cola Gap Analysis

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Hametz, Mark E.; Beaver, Brian A.

2013-01-01

A safety risk was identified for the International Space Station (ISS) by The Aerospace Corporation, where the ISS would be unable to react to a conjunction with a newly launched object following the end of the launch Collision Avoidance (COLA) process. Once an object is launched, there is a finite period of time required to track, catalog, and evaluate that new object as part of standard onorbit COLA screening processes. Additionally, should a conjunction be identified, there is an additional period of time required to plan and execute a collision avoidance maneuver. While the computed prelaunch probability of collision with any object is extremely low, NASA/JSC has requested that all US launches take additional steps to protect the ISS during this "COLA gap" period. This paper details a geometric-based COLA gap analysis method developed by the NASA Launch Services Program to determine if launch window cutouts are required to mitigate this risk. Additionally, this paper presents the results of several missions where this process has been used operationally.

153. Photocopy of drawing (1963 structural drawing by General Dynamics/Astronautics) ...

Library of Congress Historic Buildings Survey, Historic Engineering Record, Historic Landscapes Survey

153. Photocopy of drawing (1963 structural drawing by General Dynamics/Astronautics) PLANS, ELEVATIONS, AND DETAILS FOR MST STATION 3, SHEET A20 - Vandenberg Air Force Base, Space Launch Complex 3, Launch Pad 3 East, Napa & Alden Roads, Lompoc, Santa Barbara County, CA

156. Photocopy of drawing (1963 architectural drawing by General Dynamics/Astronautics) ...

Library of Congress Historic Buildings Survey, Historic Engineering Record, Historic Landscapes Survey

156. Photocopy of drawing (1963 architectural drawing by General Dynamics/Astronautics) PLAN AND DETAILS FOR MST STATION 85.5, SHEET A29 - Vandenberg Air Force Base, Space Launch Complex 3, Launch Pad 3 East, Napa & Alden Roads, Lompoc, Santa Barbara County, CA

82. GENERAL VIEW FROM NORTH OF FUEL STORAGE AND TRANSFER ...

Library of Congress Historic Buildings Survey, Historic Engineering Record, Historic Landscapes Survey

82. GENERAL VIEW FROM NORTH OF FUEL STORAGE AND TRANSFER CONTROL SKID (SKID 2) ON SOUTH END OF SLC-3W FUEL APRON - Vandenberg Air Force Base, Space Launch Complex 3, Launch Pad 3 West, Napa & Alden Roads, Lompoc, Santa Barbara County, CA

Comparison of the KSC-ER Cloud-to-Ground Lightning Surveillance System (CGLSS) and the U.S. National Lightning Detection Network (NLDN)

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Ward, Jennifer G.; Cummins, Kenneth L.; Krider, E. Philip

2008-01-01

The NASA Kennedy Space Center (KSC) and Air Force Eastern Range (ER) are located in a region of Florida that experiences the highest area density of lightning strikes to ground in the United States, with values approaching 16 fl/km 2/yr when accumulated in 10x10 km (100 sq km) grids (see Figure 1). Consequently, the KSC-ER use data derived from two cloud-to-ground (CG) lightning detection networks to detect hazardous weather, the "Cloud-to-Ground Lightning Surveillance System" (CGLSS) that is owned and operated by the Air Force and the U.S. National Lightning Detection Network (NLDN) that is owned and operated by Vaisala, Inc. These systems are used to provide lightning warnings for ground operations and to insure mission safety during space launches at the KSC-ER. In order to protect the rocket and shuttle fleets, NASA and the Air Force follow a set of lightning safety guidelines that are called the Lightning Launch Commit Criteria (LLCC). These rules are designed to insure that vehicles are not exposed to the hazards of natural or triggered lightning that would in any way jeopardize a mission or cause harm to the shuttle astronauts. Also, if any CG lightning strikes too close to a vehicle on a launch pad, it can cause time-consuming mission delays due to the extensive retests that are often required for vehicles and/or payloads when this occurs. If any CG lightning strike is missed or mis-located by even a small amount, the result could have significant safety implications, require expensive retests, or create unnecessary delays or scrubs in launches. Therefore, it is important to understand the performance of each lightning detection system in considerable detail.

Use of Shuttle Heritage Hardware in Space Launch System (SLS) Application-Structural Assessment

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Aggarwal, Pravin; Booker, James N.

2018-01-01

NASA is moving forward with the development of the next generation system of human spaceflight to meet the Nation's goals of human space exploration. To meet these goals, NASA is aggressively pursuing the development of an integrated architecture and capabilities for safe crewed and cargo missions beyond low-Earth orbit. Two important tenets critical to the achievement of NASA's strategic objectives are Affordability and Safety. The Space Launch System (SLS) is a heavy-lift launch vehicle being designed/developed to meet these goals. The SLS Block 1 configuration (Figure 1) will be used for the first Exploration Mission (EM-1). It utilizes existing hardware from the Space Shuttle inventory, as much as possible, to save cost and expedite the schedule. SLS Block 1 Elements include the Core Stage, "Heritage" Boosters, Heritage Engines, and the Integrated Spacecraft and Payload Element (ISPE) consisting of the Launch Vehicle Stage Adapter (LVSA), the Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) Stage Adapter (MSA), and an Interim Cryogenic Propulsion Stage (ICPS) for Earth orbit escape and beyond-Earth orbit in-space propulsive maneuvers. When heritage hardware is used in a new application, it requires a systematic evaluation of its qualification. In addition, there are previously-documented Lessons Learned (Table -1) in this area cautioning the need of a rigorous evaluation in any new application. This paper will exemplify the systematic qualification/assessment efforts made to qualify the application of Heritage Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) hardware in SLS. This paper describes the testing and structural assessment performed to ensure the application is acceptable for intended use without having any adverse impact to Safety. It will further address elements such as Loads, Material Properties and Manufacturing, Testing, Analysis, Failure Criterion and Factor of Safety (FS) considerations made to reach the conclusion and recommendation.

Autonomous Flight Safety System September 27, 2005, Aircraft Test

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Simpson, James C.

2005-01-01

This report describes the first aircraft test of the Autonomous Flight Safety System (AFSS). The test was conducted on September 27, 2005, near Kennedy Space Center (KSC) using a privately-owned single-engine plane and evaluated the performance of several basic flight safety rules using real-time data onboard a moving aerial vehicle. This test follows the first road test of AFSS conducted in February 2005 at KSC. AFSS is a joint KSC and Wallops Flight Facility (WEF) project that is in its third phase of development. AFSS is an independent subsystem intended for use with Expendable Launch Vehicles that uses tracking data from redundant onboard sensors to autonomously make flight termination decisions using software-based rules implemented on redundant flight processors. The goals of this project are to increase capabilities by allowing launches from locations that do not have or cannot afford extensive ground-based range safety assets, to decrease range costs, and to decrease reaction time for special situations. The mission rules are configured for each operation by the responsible Range Safety authorities and can be loosely categorized in four major categories: Parameter Threshold Violations, Physical Boundary Violations present position and instantaneous impact point (TIP), Gate Rules static and dynamic, and a Green-Time Rule. Examples of each of these rules were evaluated during this aircraft test.

Space Shuttle Day-of-Launch Trajectory Design and Verification

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Harrington, Brian E.

2010-01-01

A top priority of any launch vehicle is to insert as much mass into the desired orbit as possible. This requirement must be traded against vehicle capability in terms of dynamic control, thermal constraints, and structural margins. The vehicle is certified to a specific structural envelope which will yield certain performance characteristics of mass to orbit. Some envelopes cannot be certified generically and must be checked with each mission design. The most sensitive envelopes require an assessment on the day-of-launch. To further minimize vehicle loads while maximizing vehicle performance, a day-of-launch trajectory can be designed. This design is optimized according to that day s wind and atmospheric conditions, which will increase the probability of launch. The day-of-launch trajectory verification is critical to the vehicle's safety. The Day-Of-Launch I-Load Uplink (DOLILU) is the process by which the Space Shuttle Program redesigns the vehicle steering commands to fit that day's environmental conditions and then rigorously verifies the integrated vehicle trajectory's loads, controls, and performance. The Shuttle methodology is very similar to other United States unmanned launch vehicles. By extension, this method would be similar to the methods employed for any future NASA launch vehicles. This presentation will provide an overview of the Shuttle's day-of-launch trajectory optimization and verification as an example of a more generic application of dayof- launch design and validation.

14 CFR 431.15 - Rights not conferred by a reusable launch vehicle mission license.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Rights not conferred by a reusable launch vehicle mission license. 431.15 Section 431.15 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION... LAUNCH VEHICLE (RLV) General § 431.15 Rights not conferred by a reusable launch vehicle mission license...

14 CFR 431.15 - Rights not conferred by a reusable launch vehicle mission license.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Rights not conferred by a reusable launch vehicle mission license. 431.15 Section 431.15 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION... LAUNCH VEHICLE (RLV) General § 431.15 Rights not conferred by a reusable launch vehicle mission license...

14 CFR 431.15 - Rights not conferred by a reusable launch vehicle mission license.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Rights not conferred by a reusable launch vehicle mission license. 431.15 Section 431.15 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION... LAUNCH VEHICLE (RLV) General § 431.15 Rights not conferred by a reusable launch vehicle mission license...

14 CFR 431.15 - Rights not conferred by a reusable launch vehicle mission license.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Rights not conferred by a reusable launch vehicle mission license. 431.15 Section 431.15 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION... LAUNCH VEHICLE (RLV) General § 431.15 Rights not conferred by a reusable launch vehicle mission license...

14 CFR 431.15 - Rights not conferred by a reusable launch vehicle mission license.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Rights not conferred by a reusable launch vehicle mission license. 431.15 Section 431.15 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION... LAUNCH VEHICLE (RLV) General § 431.15 Rights not conferred by a reusable launch vehicle mission license...

Photocopy of drawing. LAUNCH COMPLEX 39, CRAWLER TRANSPORTER. NASA, John ...

Library of Congress Historic Buildings Survey, Historic Engineering Record, Historic Landscapes Survey

Photocopy of drawing. LAUNCH COMPLEX 39, CRAWLER TRANSPORTER. NASA, John F. Kennedy Space Center, Florida. Drawing 75M05760, KSC-Launch Support Equipment Engineering Division, January 1967. GENERAL ARRANGEMENT. Sheet 1 of 4 - Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, Launch Complex 39, Crawler Transporters, Launcher Road, East of Kennedy Parkway North, Cape Canaveral, Brevard County, FL

Ares-I-X Vehicle Preliminary Range Safety Malfunction Turn Analysis

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Beaty, James R.; Starr, Brett R.; Gowan, John W., Jr.

2008-01-01

Ares-I-X is the designation given to the flight test version of the Ares-I rocket (also known as the Crew Launch Vehicle - CLV) being developed by NASA. As part of the preliminary flight plan approval process for the test vehicle, a range safety malfunction turn analysis was performed to support the launch area risk assessment and vehicle destruct criteria development processes. Several vehicle failure scenarios were identified which could cause the vehicle trajectory to deviate from its normal flight path, and the effects of these failures were evaluated with an Ares-I-X 6 degrees-of-freedom (6-DOF) digital simulation, using the Program to Optimize Simulated Trajectories Version 2 (POST2) simulation framework. The Ares-I-X simulation analysis provides output files containing vehicle state information, which are used by other risk assessment and vehicle debris trajectory simulation tools to determine the risk to personnel and facilities in the vicinity of the launch area at Kennedy Space Center (KSC), and to develop the vehicle destruct criteria used by the flight test range safety officer. The simulation analysis approach used for this study is described, including descriptions of the failure modes which were considered and the underlying assumptions and ground rules of the study, and preliminary results are presented, determined by analysis of the trajectory deviation of the failure cases, compared with the expected vehicle trajectory.

157. Photocopy of drawing (1963 structural drawing by General Dynamics/Astronautics) ...

Library of Congress Historic Buildings Survey, Historic Engineering Record, Historic Landscapes Survey

157. Photocopy of drawing (1963 structural drawing by General Dynamics/Astronautics) PLANS, SECTIONS, AND DETAILS FOR MST STATION 85.5, SHEET S90 - Vandenberg Air Force Base, Space Launch Complex 3, Launch Pad 3 East, Napa & Alden Roads, Lompoc, Santa Barbara County, CA

173. Photocopy of drawing (1963 piping drawing by General Dynamics/Astronautics) ...

Library of Congress Historic Buildings Survey, Historic Engineering Record, Historic Landscapes Survey

173. Photocopy of drawing (1963 piping drawing by General Dynamics/Astronautics) COMPRESSED AIR AND WATER SYSTEM SCHEMATIC FOR THE MST, SHEET P38 - Vandenberg Air Force Base, Space Launch Complex 3, Launch Pad 3 East, Napa & Alden Roads, Lompoc, Santa Barbara County, CA