DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

McCoy, Michel; Archer, Bill; Hendrickson, Bruce

The Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) is an integrated technical program for maintaining the safety, surety, and reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile. The SSP uses nuclear test data, computational modeling and simulation, and experimental facilities to advance understanding of nuclear weapons. It includes stockpile surveillance, experimental research, development and engineering programs, and an appropriately scaled production capability to support stockpile requirements. This integrated national program requires the continued use of experimental facilities and programs, and the computational capabilities to support these programs. The Advanced Simulation and Computing Program (ASC) is a cornerstone of the SSP, providing simulation capabilities and computationalmore » resources that support annual stockpile assessment and certification, study advanced nuclear weapons design and manufacturing processes, analyze accident scenarios and weapons aging, and provide the tools to enable stockpile Life Extension Programs (LEPs) and the resolution of Significant Finding Investigations (SFIs). This requires a balance of resource, including technical staff, hardware, simulation software, and computer science solutions. ASC is now focused on increasing predictive capabilities in a three-dimensional (3D) simulation environment while maintaining support to the SSP. The program continues to improve its unique tools for solving progressively more difficult stockpile problems (sufficient resolution, dimensionality, and scientific details), and quantifying critical margins and uncertainties. Resolving each issue requires increasingly difficult analyses because the aging process has progressively moved the stockpile further away from the original test base. Where possible, the program also enables the use of high performance computing (HPC) and simulation tools to address broader national security needs, such as foreign nuclear weapon assessments and counter nuclear terrorism.« less

Applying Science and Technology to Combat WMD Terrorism

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Wuest, C R; Werne, R W; Colston, B W

2006-05-04

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) is developing and fielding advanced strategies that dramatically improve the nation's capabilities to prevent, prepare for, detect, and respond to terrorist use of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) weapons. The science, technology, and integrated systems we provide are informed by and developed with key partners and end users. LLNL's long-standing role as one of the two principle U.S. nuclear weapons design laboratories has led to significant resident expertise for health effects of exposure to radiation, radiation detection technologies, characterization of radioisotopes, and assessment and response capabilities for terrorist nuclear weapons use. This papermore » provides brief overviews of a number of technologies developed at LLNL that are being used to address national security needs to confront the growing threats of CBRNE terrorism.« less

Applying science and technology to combat WMD terrorism

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Wuest, Craig R.; Werne, Roger W.; Colston, Billy W.; Hartmann-Siantar, Christine L.

2006-05-01

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) is developing and fielding advanced strategies that dramatically improve the nation's capabilities to prevent, prepare for, detect, and respond to terrorist use of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) weapons. The science, technology, and integrated systems we provide are informed by and developed with key partners and end users. LLNL's long-standing role as one of the two principle U.S. nuclear weapons design laboratories has led to significant resident expertise for health effects of exposure to radiation, radiation detection technologies, characterization of radioisotopes, and assessment and response capabilities for terrorist nuclear weapons use. This paper provides brief overviews of a number of technologies developed at LLNL that are being used to address national security needs to confront the growing threats of CBRNE terrorism.

Earth physicist describes US nuclear test monitoring system

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

1986-01-01

The U. S. capabilities to monitor underground nuclear weapons tests in the USSR was examined. American methods used in monitoring the underground nuclear tests are enumerated. The U. S. technical means of monitoring Solviet nuclear weapons testing, and whether it is possible to conduct tests that could not be detected by these means are examined. The worldwide seismic station network in 55 countries available to the U. S. for seismic detection and measurement of underground nuclear explosions, and also the systems of seismic research observatories in 15 countries and seismic grouping stations in 12 countries are outlined including the advanced computerized data processing capabilities of these facilities. The level of capability of the U. S. seismic system for monitoring nuclear tests, other, nonseismic means of monitoring, such as hydroacoustic and recording of effects in the atmosphere, ionosphere, and the Earth's magnetic field, are discussed.

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Lewis, G.N.; Postol, T.A.

Long-range nuclear-armed cruise missiles are highly accurate and are capable of reaching most targets within the United States and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) from launch points beyond their borders. Neither the United States nor the CIS has air surveillance systems capable of providing reliable warning against cruise missiles. Thus it is possible that a small-scale cruise missile attack could go entirely undetected until the nuclear weapons arrived over their targets. Such an attack could destroy the other country's entire strategic bomber force on the ground and severely damage its strategic command and control system, perhaps to the pointmore » of endangering the ability of its ICBM force to be launched on warning. This capability makes long-range nuclear cruise missiles potentially one of the most destabilizing of all nuclear weapons.« less

Advanced Quantification of Plutonium Ionization Potential to Support Nuclear Forensic Evaluations by Resonance Ionization Mass Spectrometry

DTIC Science & Technology

2015-06-01

Research Committee nm Nanometer Np Neptunium NPT Treaty of Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons ns Nanosecond ps Picosecond Pu Plutonium RIMS...discovery—credited also to Fritz Strassman— scientists realized these reactions also emitted secondary neutrons . These secondary neutrons could in...destructive capabilities of nuclear fission and atomic weapons . Figure 1. Uranium-235 Fission chain reaction, from [1

U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts (2001-2010): Strategy, Policy, Concept, and Vision Documents

DTIC Science & Technology

2011-12-01

Naval Analytical Capabilities: Improving Capabilities-Based Planning (2005)  Milan Vego, “Searching for a Strategy,” Armed Forces Journal (Apr... Schultz , Perry, Kissinger, Nunn, “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,”Wall Street Journal (Jan 2007)  Earlier drafts of this briefing (2005-7) 270 Navy...2007) 316 Context: Other contemporary publications (VII)  Schultz , Perry, Kissinger, Nunn, “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,”WSJ (Jan 2007) CSBA

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Adams, C.; Arsenlis, T.; Bailey, A.

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Campus Capability Plan for 2018-2028. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) is one of three national laboratories that are part of the National Nuclear Security Administration. LLNL provides critical expertise to strengthen U.S. security through development and application of world-class science and technology that: Ensures the safety, reliability, and performance of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile; Promotes international nuclear safety and nonproliferation; Reduces global danger from weapons of mass destruction; Supports U.S. leadership in science and technology. Essential to the execution and continued advancement of these mission areas are responsive infrastructure capabilities. This report showcases each LLNLmore » capability area and describes the mission, science, and technology efforts enabled by LLNL infrastructure, as well as future infrastructure plans.« less

JPRS Report, Nuclear Developments

DTIC Science & Technology

1989-08-29

Korea is developing nuclear weapons Yi and Bartholomew agreed that the two governments capability. should reestablish a bilateral science and...early this year. Taking advantage of such a mood of The government should develop state-of-the-art technol- detente. even our country is now actively...counter to such a mood of detente. and why can they not The report recommended that the government establish abandon nuclear weapons at a time when

Nuclear Forensics: Report of the AAAS/APS Working Group

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Tannenbaum, Benn

2008-04-01

This report was produced by a Working Group of the American Physical Society's Program on Public Affairs in conjunction with the American Association for the Advancement of Science Center for Science, Technology and Security Policy. The primary purpose of this report is to provide the Congress, U.S. government agencies and other institutions involved in nuclear forensics with a clear unclassified statement of the state of the art of nuclear forensics; an assessment of its potential for preventing and identifying unattributed nuclear attacks; and identification of the policies, resources and human talent to fulfill that potential. In the course of its work, the Working Group observed that nuclear forensics was an essential part of the overall nuclear attribution process, which aims at identifying the origin of unidentified nuclear weapon material and, in the event, an unidentified nuclear explosion. A credible nuclear attribution capability and in particular nuclear forensics capability could deter essential participants in the chain of actors needed to smuggle nuclear weapon material or carry out a nuclear terrorist act and could also encourage states to better secure such materials and weapons. The Working Group also noted that nuclear forensics result would take some time to obtain and that neither internal coordination, nor international arrangements, nor the state of qualified personnel and needed equipment were currently enough to minimize the time needed to reach reliable results in an emergency such as would be caused by a nuclear detonation or the intercept of a weapon-size quantity of material. The Working Group assesses international cooperation to be crucial for forensics to work, since the material would likely come from inadequately documented foreign sources. In addition, international participation, if properly managed, could enhance the credibility of the deterrent effect of attribution. Finally the Working Group notes that the U.S. forensics capability involved a number of agencies and other groups that would have to cooperate rapidly in an emergency and that suitable exercises to ensure such cooperation were needed.

Nuclear nonproliferation: India Pakistan. Research report

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Fallon, J.S.

1997-04-01

As most of the world continues to seek ways to reduce or eliminate the spread of nuclear weapons, two countries seem intent on pursuing a path which is contradictory. India and Pakistan, two neighboring and frequently warring nations, condemn the use of nuclear weapons as they continue to develop the capability to deliver a nuclear payload. Additionally, India has stood against the Non-Proliferation Treaty, insisting that all nations must agree to eliminate nuclear weapons. It is against this seemingly hopeless situation that this report is focused. How can nuclear proliferation in South Asia be diffused while answering the security concernsmore » of both India and Pakistan. What I offer here is a review of the history, the current situation for the area, and a proposed solution to this nuclear stalemate.« less

Nonproliferation, arms control and disarmament and extended deterrence in the new security environment

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Pilat, Joseph F

2009-01-01

With the end of the Cold War, in a dramatically changed security environment, the advances in nonnuclear strategic capabilities along with reduced numbers and roles for nuclear forces has altered the calculus of deterrence and defense, at least for the United States. For many, this opened up a realistic possibility of a nuclear-free world. It soon became clear that the initial post-Cold War hopes were exaggerated. The world did change fundamentally, but it did not become more secure and stable. In place of the old Soviet threat, there has been growing concern about proliferation and terrorism involving nuclear and othermore » weapons of mass destruction (WMD), regional conflicts, global instability and increasingly serious new and emerging threats, including cyber attacks and attacks on satellites. For the United States at least, in this emerging environment, the political rationales for nuclear weapons, from deterrence to reassurance to alliance management, are changing and less central than during the Cold War to the security of the United States, its friends and allies. Nuclear weapons remain important for the US, but for a far more limited set of roles and missions. As the Perry-Schlesinger Commission report reveals, there is a domestic US consensus on nuclear policy and posture at the highest level and for the near term, including the continued role of nuclear arms in deterring WMD use and in reassuring allies. Although the value of nuclear weapons has declined for the United States, the value of these weapons for Russia, China and so-called 'rogue' states is seen to be rising. The nuclear logic of NATO during Cold War - the need for nuclear weapons to counter vastly superior conventional capabilities of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact - is today heard from Russians and even some proliferants. Moreover, these weapons present a way for rogues to achieve regional hegemony and possibly to deter interventions by the United States or others. While the vision of a nuclear-free world is powerful, both existing nuclear powers and proliferators are unlikely to forego nuclear weapons entirely in a world that is dangerous and uncertain. And the emerging world would not necessarily be more secure and stable without nuclear weapons. Even if nuclear weapons were given up by the United States and other nuclear-weapon states, there would continue to be concerns about the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, which would not disappear and could worsen. WMD terrorism would remain a concern that was largely unaffected by US and other nuclear-weapon decisions. Conventional capabilities would not disappear and the prospects for warfare could rise. In addition, new problems could arise if rogue states or other non-status-quo powers attempted to take advantage of moves toward disarmament, while friends and allies who are not reassured as in the past could reconsider their options if deterrence declined. To address these challenges, non- and counter-proliferation and counterterrorismincluding defenses and consequence management-are priorities, especially in light of an anticipated 'renaissance' in civil nuclear power. The current agenda of the United States and others includes efforts to: (1) Strengthen International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its safeguards system; (2) Strengthen export controls, especially for sensitive technologies, by limiting the development of reprocessing and enrichment technologies and by requiring the Additional Protocol as a condition of supply; (3) Establish a reliable supply regime, including the possibility of multilateral or multinational ownership of fuel cycle facilities, as a means to promote nuclear energy without increasing the risks of proliferation or terrorism; (4) Implement effectively UN Security Council Resolution 1540; and (5) Strengthen and institutionalize the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. These and other activities are important in themselves, and are essential to maintaining and strengthening the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) bargain by bolstering two of its pillars - nonproliferation and peaceful nuclear energy cooperation. There is no alternative, and little prospect for a better deal.« less

Combating terrorism : opportunities to improve domestic preparedness program focus and efficiency

DOT National Transportation Integrated Search

1998-01-01

Concerned that terrorists might move beyond using conventional weapons to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) - chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear devices - Congress authorized the federal government to improve capabilities to respond to su...

Stockpile Stewardship at Los Alamos(U)

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Webster, Robert B.

2012-06-29

Stockpile stewardship is the retention of nuclear weapons in the stockpile beyond their original design life. These older weapons have potential changes inconsistent with the original design intent and military specifications. The Stockpile Stewardship Program requires us to develop high-fidelity, physics-based capabilities to predict, assess, certify and design nuclear weapons without conducting a nuclear test. Each year, the Lab Directors are required to provide an assessment of the safety, security, and reliability our stockpile to the President of the United States. This includes assessing whether a need to return to testing exists. This is a talk to provide an overviewmore » of Stockpile Stewardship's scientific requirements and how stewardship has changed in the absence of nuclear testing. The talk is adapted from an HQ talk to the War college, and historical unclassified talks on weapon's physics.« less

Defense Threat Reduction Agency Radiochemical Needs

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Walsh, Michael A. R.; Velazquez, Daniel L.

2009-08-01

The United States Government (USG) first developed nuclear forensics-related capabilities to analyze radiological and nuclear materials, including underground nuclear test debris and interdicted materials. Nuclear forensics is not a new mission for Department of Defense (DoD). The department's existing nuclear forensics capability is the result of programs that span six (6) decades and includes activities to assess foreign nuclear weapons testing activities, monitor and verify nuclear arms control treaties, and to support intelligence and law enforcement activities. Today, nuclear forensics must support not only weapons programs and nuclear smuggling incidents, but also the scientific analysis and subsequent attribution of terrorists' use of radiological or nuclear materials/devices. Nuclear forensics can help divulge the source of origin of nuclear materials, the type of design for an interdicted or detonated device, as well as the pathway of the materials or device to the incident. To accomplish this mission, the USG will need trained radiochemists and nuclear scientists to fill new positions and replace the retiring staff.

Vulnerability assessment of a space based weapon platform electronic system exposed to a thermonuclear weapon detonation

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Perez, C. L.; Johnson, J. O.

Rapidly changing world events, the increased number of nations with inter-continental ballistic missile capability, and the proliferation of nuclear weapon technology will increase the number of nuclear threats facing the world today. Monitoring these nation's activities and providing an early warning and/or intercept system via reconnaissance and surveillance satellites and space based weapon platforms is a viable deterrent against a surprise nuclear attack. However, the deployment of satellite and weapon platform assets in space will subject the sensitive electronic equipment to a variety of natural and man-made radiation environments. These include Van Allen Belt protons and electrons; galactic and solar flare protons; and neutrons, gamma rays, and x-rays from intentionally detonated fission and fusion weapons. In this paper, the MASH vl.0 code system is used to estimate the dose to the critical electronics components of an idealized space based weapon platform from neutron and gamma-ray radiation emitted from a thermonuclear weapon detonation in space. Fluence and dose assessments were performed for the platform fully loaded, and in several stages representing limited engagement scenarios. The results indicate vulnerabilities to the Command, Control, and Communication bay instruments from radiation damage for a nuclear weapon detonation for certain source/platform orientations. The distance at which damage occurs will depend on the weapon yield (n,(gamma)/kiloton) and size (kilotons).

Advanced Simulation & Computing FY15 Implementation Plan Volume 2, Rev. 0.5

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

McCoy, Michel; Archer, Bill; Matzen, M. Keith

2014-09-16

The Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) is a single, highly integrated technical program for maintaining the surety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile. The SSP uses nuclear test data, computational modeling and simulation, and experimental facilities to advance understanding of nuclear weapons. It includes stockpile surveillance, experimental research, development and engineering programs, and an appropriately scaled production capability to support stockpile requirements. This integrated national program requires the continued use of experimental facilities and programs, and the computational enhancements to support these programs. The Advanced Simulation and Computing Program (ASC) is a cornerstone of the SSP, providing simulation capabilities andmore » computational resources that support annual stockpile assessment and certification, study advanced nuclear weapons design and manufacturing processes, analyze accident scenarios and weapons aging, and provide the tools to enable stockpile Life Extension Programs (LEPs) and the resolution of Significant Finding Investigations (SFIs). This requires a balance of resource, including technical staff, hardware, simulation software, and computer science solutions. As the program approaches the end of its second decade, ASC is intently focused on increasing predictive capabilities in a three-dimensional (3D) simulation environment while maintaining support to the SSP. The program continues to improve its unique tools for solving progressively more difficult stockpile problems (sufficient resolution, dimensionality, and scientific details), quantify critical margins and uncertainties, and resolve increasingly difficult analyses needed for the SSP. Where possible, the program also enables the use of high-performance simulation and computing tools to address broader national security needs, such as foreign nuclear weapon assessments and counternuclear terrorism.« less

Environmental Detection of Clandestine Nuclear Weapon Programs

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Kemp, R. Scott

2016-06-01

Environmental sensing of nuclear activities has the potential to detect nuclear weapon programs at early stages, deter nuclear proliferation, and help verify nuclear accords. However, no robust system of detection has been deployed to date. This can be variously attributed to high costs, technical limitations in detector technology, simple countermeasures, and uncertainty about the magnitude or behavior of potential signals. In this article, current capabilities and promising opportunities are reviewed. Systematic research in a variety of areas could improve prospects for detecting covert nuclear programs, although the potential for countermeasures suggests long-term verification of nuclear agreements will need to rely on methods other than environmental sensing.

The Iran Nuclear Crisis: An Update

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Sagan, Scott

2007-05-07

Will Iran develop nuclear weapons capabilities and what effects would such capabilities have on international peace and security? Despite two recent U.N. Security Council resolutions sanctioning Iran for its nuclear activities, the government in Tehran continues to press ahead with efforts to expand its uranium enrichment program to industrial scale. But both the Tehran regime and the Iranian people remain divided on the nuclear question, creating opportunities for a negotiated settlement. It is essential for US security that the Iranian program be contained, for nuclear weapons in Iran would increase risks of regional instability, terrorist use, and further proliferation. Themore » U.S. and its negotiating partners have already missed a number of potential opportunities for a diplomatic breakthrough, but the right mix of incentives designed to address the reasons driving Iran’s nuclear program could still succeed in producing an acceptable outcome.« less

New Capabilities for Hostile Environments on Z Grand Challenge LDRD - Final Status

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Cuneo, Michael E.; Griffin, P. J.; Balch, D. K.

2016-10-01

The purpose of this project was to develop new physical simulation capabilities in order to support the science-based qualification of nonnuclear weapon components in hostile radiation environments. The project contributes directly to the goals of maintaining a safe, secure, and effective US nuclear stockpile, maintaining strategic deterrence at lower nuclear force levels, extending the life of the nuclear deterrent capability, and to be ready for technological surprise.

Resource Management in Peace and War

DTIC Science & Technology

1990-04-01

the relatively uncon- strained use of available military forces and weapons, including nuclear, chemical, biological , or other weapons capable of...The Zero-Sum Solution, 1985 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1985), p. 333. 50. John Naisbitt, Megatrends (New York: Warner Books, 1984), pp. 53-60. 51

Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Nuclear Deterrence Skills

DTIC Science & Technology

2008-09-01

entail modeling and simulation capability analogous to that for weapon design. A minimum “national” nuclear weapons effects simulator enterprise...systems programs (design, develop, produce, deploy, and sustain) relies 18 I C HA P TE R 3 upon a variety of management models . For example, the Air...entry vehicle design, modeling and simulation efforts, command and control, launch system infrastructure, intermediate-range missile concepts, advanced

Iran's growing nuclear weapons program: A catalyst for regional instability in the Middle East. Study project

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Deyermond, J.J.

1993-03-10

Following the end of the Cold War, the United States as well as other nations around the world now find themselves in a state of political, economic, and military transition. While the US and other nations such as the Islamic Republic of Iran are undergoing significant increases in military spending. This increase has been primarily in the area of conventional forces, however there is growing evidence that Iran is also attempting to develop a nuclear weapons capability as well. This study examines Iran's nuclear weapons program in detail, and Tehran's increasing ability to emerge as a regional power in themore » Middle East.« less

REDUCTIONS WITHOUT REGRET: DEFINING THE NEEDED CAPABILITIES

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Swegle, J.; Tincher, D.

This is the second of three papers (in addition to an introductory summary) aimed at providing a framework for evaluating future reductions or modifications of the U.S. nuclear force, first by considering previous instances in which nuclear-force capabilities were eliminated; second by looking forward into at least the foreseeable future at the features of global and regional deterrence (recognizing that new weapon systems currently projected will have expected lifetimes stretching beyond our ability to predict the future); and third by providing examples of past or possible undesirable outcomes in the shaping of the future nuclear force, as well as somemore » closing thoughts for the future. This paper begins with a discussion of the current nuclear force and the plans and procurement programs for the modernization of that force. Current weapon systems and warheads were conceived and built decades ago, and procurement programs have begun for the modernization or replacement of major elements of the nuclear force: the heavy bomber, the air-launched cruise missile, the ICBMs, and the ballistic-missile submarines. In addition, the Nuclear Weapons Council has approved a new framework for nuclear-warhead life extension not fully fleshed out yet that aims to reduce the current number of nuclear explosives from seven to five, the so-called 3+2 vision. This vision includes three interoperable warheads for both ICBMs and SLBMs (thus eliminating one backup weapon) and two warheads for aircraft delivery (one gravity bomb and one cruise-missile, eliminating a second backup gravity bomb). This paper also includes a discussion of the current and near-term nuclear-deterrence mission, both global and regional, and offers some observations on future of the strategic deterrence mission and the challenges of regional and extended nuclear deterrence.« less

Leo Szilard Lectureship Award Talk: Nuclear disarmament after the cold war

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Podvig, Pavel

2008-04-01

Now that the cold war is long over, our thinking of nuclear weapons and the role that they play in international security has undergone serious changes. The emphasis has shifted from superpower confrontation to nuclear proliferation, spread of weapon materials, and to the dangers of countries developing nuclear weapon capability under a cover of a civilian program. At the same time, the old cold-war dangers, while receded, have not disappeared completely. The United States and Russia keep maintaining thousands of nuclear weapons in their arsenals, some of them in very high degree of readiness. This situation presents a serious challenge that the international community has to deal with. Although Russia and the United States are taking some steps to reduce their nuclear arsenals, the traditional arms control process has stalled -- the last treaty that was signed in 2002 does not place serious limits on strategic forces of either side. The START Treaty, which provides a framework for verification and transparency in reduction of nuclear arsenals, will expire at the end of 2009. Little effort has been undertaken to extend the treaty or renegotiate it. Moreover, in recent years Russia has stepped up the efforts to modernize its strategic nuclear forces. The United States has resisted joining the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and has been working on controversial new nuclear weapon development programs. The U.S. missile defense program makes the dialogue between Russia and the United States even more difficult. The reluctance of Russia and the United States to engage in a discussion about drastic reductions of their nuclear forces undermines the case of nuclear nonproliferation and seriously complicated their effort to contain the spread of nuclear weapon technologies and expertise. One of the reasons for the current lack of progress in nuclear disarmament is the contradiction between the diminished role that nuclear weapons play in security of nuclear weapon states and the inertia of cold-war institutions that are involved in their development and support. Dealing with this contradiction would require development of new mechanisms of cooperation between nuclear weapons states and their strong commitment to the cause of nuclear nonproliferation. One important area of cooperation is development of a framework that would prevent the spread of nuclear materials and technology at the time when increasing number of countries is turning toward expanded use of nuclear power to cover their energy needs.

Global Operations and Biometrics: Next Generation Capabilities and Policy Implications

DTIC Science & Technology

2013-04-01

could help identify individuals likely to have handled certain chemical, biological or radiological precursor substances associated with weapons of...or biologic weapon production or storage site. See U.S. Department of the Army, Site Exploitation Operations, Army Field Manual FM 3-90.15...and nuclear) forces and shifting increasingly toward the non-nation state actors organized as networked violent extremists, often seeking weapons of

Monitoring and verification R&D

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Pilat, Joseph F; Budlong - Sylvester, Kory W; Fearey, Bryan L

2011-01-01

The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) report outlined the Administration's approach to promoting the agenda put forward by President Obama in Prague on April 5, 2009. The NPR calls for a national monitoring and verification R&D program to meet future challenges arising from the Administration's nonproliferation, arms control and disarmament agenda. Verification of a follow-on to New START could have to address warheads and possibly components along with delivery capabilities. Deeper cuts and disarmament would need to address all of these elements along with nuclear weapon testing, nuclear material and weapon production facilities, virtual capabilities from old weapon and existingmore » energy programs and undeclared capabilities. We only know how to address some elements of these challenges today, and the requirements may be more rigorous in the context of deeper cuts as well as disarmament. Moreover, there is a critical need for multiple options to sensitive problems and to address other challenges. There will be other verification challenges in a world of deeper cuts and disarmament, some of which we are already facing. At some point, if the reductions process is progressing, uncertainties about past nuclear materials and weapons production will have to be addressed. IAEA safeguards will need to continue to evolve to meet current and future challenges, and to take advantage of new technologies and approaches. Transparency/verification of nuclear and dual-use exports will also have to be addressed, and there will be a need to make nonproliferation measures more watertight and transparent. In this context, and recognizing we will face all of these challenges even if disarmament is not achieved, this paper will explore possible agreements and arrangements; verification challenges; gaps in monitoring and verification technologies and approaches; and the R&D required to address these gaps and other monitoring and verification challenges.« less

Nuclear weapons in the 1980s: MAD versus NUTS. Mutual hostage relationship of the superpowers

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Keeny, S.M. Jr.; Panofsky, W.K.H.

Critics of the strategic relationship of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) developed during the 1960s claim it immorally holds entire civilian populations hostage. Some advocate the Nuclear Utilization Target Selection (NUTS) concept, while others argue for a defense-oriented military posture. The interrelationships of these concepts are examined against the background of stockpiled nuclear weapons capable of massive devastation, the technical limits to defense, and the uncertainty that a nuclear war could be controlled. The evidence shows that a MAD world prevails despite NUTS proposals, which may have increased the danger by giving nuclear war the illusion of acceptability. (DCK)

Reviews of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and U.S. security

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Jeanloz, Raymond

2017-11-01

Reviews of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) by the National Academy of Sciences concluded that the United States has the technical expertise and physical means to i) maintain a safe, secure and reliable nuclear-weapons stockpile without nuclear-explosion testing, and ii) effectively monitor global compliance once the Treaty enters into force. Moreover, the CTBT is judged to help constrain proliferation of nuclear-weapons technology, so it is considered favorable to U.S. security. Review of developments since the studies were published, in 2002 and 2012, show that the study conclusions remain valid and that technical capabilities are better than anticipated.

Reductions without Regret: Avoiding Wrong Turns, Roach Motels, and Box Canyons

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Swegle, John A.; Tincher, Douglas J.

This is the third of three papers (in addition to an introductory summary) aimed at providing a framework for evaluating future reductions or modifications of the U.S. nuclear force, first by considering previous instances in which nuclear-force capabilities were eliminated; second by looking forward into at least the foreseeable future at the features of global and regional deterrence (recognizing that new weapon systems currently projected will have expected lifetimes stretching beyond our ability to predict the future); and third by providing examples of past or possible undesirable outcomes in the shaping of the future nuclear force, as well as somemore » closing thoughts for the future. In this paper, we provide one example each of our judgments on what constitutes a box canyon, a roach motel, and a wrong turn: Wrong Turn: The Reliable Replacement Warhead: Roach Motel: SRAM T vs the B61: and A Possible Box Canyon: A Low-Yield Version of the W76 SLBM Warhead. Recognizing that new nuclear missions or weapons are not demanded by current circumstances ₋ a development path that yields future capabilities similar to those of today, which are adequate if not always ideal, and a broader national-security strategy that supports nonproliferation and arms control by reducing the role for, and numbers, of nuclear weapons ₋ we briefly consider alternate, less desirable futures, and their possible effect on the complex problem of regional deterrence. In this regard, we discuss the issues posed by, and possible responses to, three example regional deterrence challenges: in-country defensive use of nuclear weapons by an adversary; reassurance of U.S. allies with limited strategic depth threatened by an emergent nuclear power; and extraterritorial, non-strategic offensive use of nuclear weapons by an adversary in support of limited military objectives against a U.S. ally.« less

Extended Deterrence, Nuclear Proliferation, and START III

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Speed, R.D.

2000-06-20

Early in the Cold War, the United States adopted a policy of ''extended nuclear deterrence'' to protect its allies by threatening a nuclear strike against any state that attacks these allies. This threat can (in principle) be used to try to deter an enemy attack using conventional weapons or one using nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. The credibility of a nuclear threat has long been subject to debate and is dependent on many complex geopolitical factors, not the least of which is the military capabilities of the opposing sides. The ending of the Cold War has led to a significantmore » decrease in the number of strategic nuclear weapons deployed by the United States and Russia. START II, which was recently ratified by the Russian Duma, will (if implemented) reduce the number deployed strategic nuclear weapons on each side to 3500, compared to a level of over 11,000 at the end of the Cold War in 1991. The tentative limit established by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin for START III would reduce the strategic force level to 2000-2500. However, the Russians (along with a number of arms control advocates) now argue that the level should be reduced even further--to 1500 warheads or less. The conventional view is that ''deep cuts'' in nuclear weapons are necessary to discourage nuclear proliferation. Thus, as part of the bargain to get the non-nuclear states to agree to the renewal of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the United States pledged to work towards greater reductions in strategic forces. Without movement in the direction of deep cuts, it is thought by many analysts that some countries may decide to build their own nuclear weapons. Indeed, this was part of the rationale India used to justify its own nuclear weapons program. However, there is also some concern that deep cuts (to 1500 or lower) in the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal could have the opposite effect. The fear is that such cuts might undermine extended deterrence and cause a crisis in confidence among U.S. allies to such an extent that they could seek nuclear weapons of their own to protect themselves.« less

Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Garwin, Richard L.

2003-04-01

The National Academy of Sciences recently published a detailed study of technical factors related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), with emphasis on those issues that arose when the Senate declined to ratify the Treaty in 1999. The study considered (1) the capacity of the United States to maintain confidence in the safety and reliability of its nuclear weapons without nuclear testing; (2) the capabilities of the international nuclear-test monitoring system; and (3) the advances in nuclear weapons capabilities that other countries might make through low-yield testing that might escape detection. Excluding political factors, the committee considered three possible future worlds: (1) a world without a CTBT; (2) a world in which the signatories comply with a CTBT; and (3) a world in the signatories evade its strictures within the limits set by the detection system. The talk and ensuing discussion will elaborate on the study. The principal conclusion of the report, based solely on technical reasons, is that the national security of the United States is better served with a CTBT in force than without it, whether or not other signatories conduct low level but undetected tests in violation of the treaty. Moreover, the study finds that nuclear testing would not add substantially to the US Stockpile Stewardship Program in allowing the United States to maintain confidence in the assessment of its existing nuclear weapons.

Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

2003-03-01

The National Academy of Sciences recently completed a detailed study of the technical factors related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), with emphasis on those issues that arose when the Senate declined to ratify the Treaty in 1999. The study considered (1) the capacity of the United States to maintain confidence in the safety and reliability of its nuclear weapons without nuclear testing; (2) the capabilities of the international nuclear-test monitoring system; and (3) the advances in nuclear weapons capabilities that other countries might make through low-yield testing that might escape detection. While political factors were excluded, the committee considered three possible future worlds: (1) a world without a CTBT; (2) a world in which the signatories comply with a CTBT; and (3) a world in the signatories evade its strictures within the limits set by the detection system. The talk will elaborate on the study. The primary conclusion, based solely on technical reasons, is that the national security of the United States is better served with a CTBT in force than without it, whether or not other signatories conduct low level but undetected tests in violation of the treaty. Moreover, the study finds that nuclear testing would not add substantially to the US Stockpile Stewardship Program in allowing the United States to maintain confidence in the assessment of its existing nuclear weapons."

Soviet short-range nuclear forces: flexible response or flexible aggression. Student essay

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Smith, T.R.

1987-03-23

This essay takes a critical look at Soviet short-range nuclear forces in an effort to identify Soviet capabilities to fight a limited nuclear war with NATO. From an analysis of Soviet military art, weapon-system capabilities and tactics, the author concludes that the Soviets have developed a viable limited-nuclear-attack option. Unless NATO reacts to this option, the limited nuclear attack may become favored Soviet option and result in the rapid defeat of NATO.

The Effects of Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons on Civil-Military Relations in India

DTIC Science & Technology

2009-01-01

just helped sustain a lack of strategic thought.14 Former vice-chief of the Indian army, Vijay Oberoi, observed that the military was always viewed...forces.76 Underscoring concerns about Pakistan’s growing nuclear weapons capability, another senior military official, Gen V. N. Sharma , remarked that... Vijay , was marked by three phases. The initial phase began in early May 1999, during which Indian soldiers suf- fered heavy casualties and most Indian

Impact Upon U.S. Security of a South African Nuclear Weapons Capability.

DTIC Science & Technology

1981-04-01

Simon Brand, dubbed the international companies as the " engine of growth" for the South African economy. The petroleum market, automobile industry , and...thereby halting the flow of metals key to high technology industries which in turn, are critical to U.S. national security. Should Washington’s...to produce nuclear weapons." * More specifically, we found that South Africa has: A sufficient scientific and industrial base on which to conduct

Stockpile stewardship past, present, and future

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Adams, Marvin L., E-mail: mladams@tamu.edu

2014-05-09

The U.S. National Academies released a report in 2012 on technical issues related to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. One important question addressed therein is whether the U.S. could maintain a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear-weapons stockpile in the absence of nuclear-explosion testing. Here we discuss two main conclusions from the 2012 Academies report, which we paraphrase as follows: 1) Provided that sufficient resources and a national commitment to stockpile stewardship are in place, the U.S. has the technical capabilities to maintain a safe, secure, and reliable stockpile of nuclear weapons into the foreseeable future without nuclear-explosion testing. 2) Doingmore » this would require: a) a strong weapons science and engineering program that addresses gaps in understanding; b) an outstanding workforce that applies deep and broad weapons expertise to deliver solutions to stockpile problems; c) a vigorous, stable surveillance program that delivers the requisite data; d) production facilities that meet stewardship needs. We emphasize that these conclusions are independent of CTBT ratification-they apply provided only that the U.S. continues its nuclear-explosion moratorium.« less

The NPR, NPT and the prospects for disarmament

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Pilat, Joseph F

2010-10-04

In Prague's Hradcany Square on April 5, 2009, President Barack Obama offered a bold vision of the nuclear future that encompasses both reducing nuclear dangers and pursuing the goal of a world without nuclear weapons while maintaining, as long as nuclear weapons remain, a safe secure, and effective arsenal, to deter potential adversaries and to assure U.S. allies and other security partners that they can count on America's security commitments. The agenda put forward in Prague involves the full range of issues from deterrence to nonproliferation and disarmament. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) report, reflecting the twin objectives ofmore » the Prague speech, for the first time places the United States effort to lead expanded international efforts to rebuild and strengthen the global nuclear nonproliferation regime at the top the U.S. nuclear agenda. This attention underscores the fact that the top priority of the United States is to discourage additional states from acquiring nuclear weapon capabilities and to stop terrorist groups from acquiring weapon-usable nuclear materials. It also reinforced the view that positively influencing the 2010 Review Conference (RevCon) of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was a key objective of the Obama Administration. The NPR developed both the vision and the policy, but details of implementation will need to be developed and better understood. This paper will address the Nuclear Posture Review and its implementation, as well as it's relation to, and impact on, the NPT RevCon and the long term prospects for nonproliferation and disarmament.« less

User Guide for the Plotting Software for the Los Alamos National Laboratory Nuclear Weapons Analysis Tools Version 2.0

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Cleland, Timothy James

The Los Alamos National Laboratory Plotting Software for the Nuclear Weapons Analysis Tools is a Java™ application based upon the open source library JFreeChart. The software provides a capability for plotting data on graphs with a rich variety of display options while allowing the viewer interaction via graph manipulation and scaling to best view the data. The graph types include XY plots, Date XY plots, Bar plots and Histogram plots.

Advanced Simulation and Computing Fiscal Year 14 Implementation Plan, Rev. 0.5

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Meisner, Robert; McCoy, Michel; Archer, Bill

2013-09-11

The Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) is a single, highly integrated technical program for maintaining the surety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile. The SSP uses nuclear test data, computational modeling and simulation, and experimental facilities to advance understanding of nuclear weapons. It includes stockpile surveillance, experimental research, development and engineering programs, and an appropriately scaled production capability to support stockpile requirements. This integrated national program requires the continued use of experimental facilities and programs, and the computational enhancements to support these programs. The Advanced Simulation and Computing Program (ASC) is a cornerstone of the SSP, providing simulation capabilities andmore » computational resources that support annual stockpile assessment and certification, study advanced nuclear weapons design and manufacturing processes, analyze accident scenarios and weapons aging, and provide the tools to enable stockpile Life Extension Programs (LEPs) and the resolution of Significant Finding Investigations (SFIs). This requires a balanced resource, including technical staff, hardware, simulation software, and computer science solutions. In its first decade, the ASC strategy focused on demonstrating simulation capabilities of unprecedented scale in three spatial dimensions. In its second decade, ASC is now focused on increasing predictive capabilities in a three-dimensional (3D) simulation environment while maintaining support to the SSP. The program continues to improve its unique tools for solving progressively more difficult stockpile problems (sufficient resolution, dimensionality, and scientific details), quantify critical margins and uncertainties, and resolve increasingly difficult analyses needed for the SSP. Moreover, ASC’s business model is integrated and focused on requirements-driven products that address long-standing technical questions related to enhanced predictive capability in the simulation tools.« less

Nuclear capabilities of the Arabs and Israel and their implications for the Arab-Israeli conflict

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Mustajel, S.Y.

The dissertation discusses the implications of such capabilities for the ongoing Arab-Israeli confict within the context of traditional deterrence - especially nuclear deterrence - theory. The major focus is on the resulting balance of terror and how it is likely to determine the outcome of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In part 1, a brief survey of the present and planned nuclear power and nuclear-power-related facilities, installations, research institutions, and possible nuclear delivery means possessed by the Arabs and the Israelis is presented. This survey is based only on readily available information. Part 2 presents an examination of the implications of themore » introduction of nuclear military capabilties by both sides or either side in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Egypt, with whatever nuclear capability it has, or will have, is considered in this study to be part of the Arab camp even though it has recently signed a separate peace treaty with Israel. Then, suggestions, based on conclusions and findings are provided to countries involved on how to avoid the catastrophic consequences of introducing nuclear weapons into the Arab-Israeli confict. In order to avoid catastrophic consequences of introducing nuclear weapons into the Arab-Israeli conflict, it is suggested that there must be a general peace settlement, followed by denuclearization of the Middle East region.« less

Stockpile Stewardship: How We Ensure the Nuclear Deterrent Without Testing

ScienceCinema

None

2018-01-16

In the 1990s, the U.S. nuclear weapons program shifted emphasis from developing new designs to dismantling thousands of existing weapons and maintaining a much smaller enduring stockpile. The United States ceased underground nuclear testing, and the Department of Energy created the Stockpile Stewardship Program to maintain the safety, security, and reliability of the U.S. nuclear deterrent without full-scale testing. This video gives a behind the scenes look at a set of unique capabilities at Lawrence Livermore that are indispensable to the Stockpile Stewardship Program: high performance computing, the Superblock category II nuclear facility, the JASPER a two stage gas gun, the High Explosive Applications Facility (HEAF), the National Ignition Facility (NIF), and the Site 300 contained firing facility.

International Nuclear Security

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Doyle, James E.

2012-08-14

This presentation discusses: (1) Definitions of international nuclear security; (2) What degree of security do we have now; (3) Limitations of a nuclear security strategy focused on national lock-downs of fissile materials and weapons; (4) What do current trends say about the future; and (5) How can nuclear security be strengthened? Nuclear security can be strengthened by: (1) More accurate baseline inventories; (2) Better physical protection, control and accounting; (3) Effective personnel reliability programs; (4) Minimize weapons-usable materials and consolidate to fewer locations; (5) Consider local threat environment when siting facilities; (6) Implement pledges made in the NSS process; andmore » (7) More robust interdiction, emergency response and special operations capabilities. International cooperation is desirable, but not always possible.« less

Structural mechanics simulations

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Biffle, Johnny H.

1992-01-01

Sandia National Laboratory has a very broad structural capability. Work has been performed in support of reentry vehicles, nuclear reactor safety, weapons systems and components, nuclear waste transport, strategic petroleum reserve, nuclear waste storage, wind and solar energy, drilling technology, and submarine programs. The analysis environment contains both commercial and internally developed software. Included are mesh generation capabilities, structural simulation codes, and visual codes for examining simulation results. To effectively simulate a wide variety of physical phenomena, a large number of constitutive models have been developed.

The North Korean nuclear dilemma.

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Hecker, Siegfried S.

2004-01-01

The current nuclear crisis, the second one in ten years, erupted when North Korea expelled international nuclear inspectors in December 2002, then withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and claimed to be building more nuclear weapons with the plutonium extracted from the spent fuel rods heretofore stored under international inspection. These actions were triggered by a disagreement over U.S. assertions that North Korea had violated the Agreed Framework (which froze the plutonium path to nuclear weapons to end the first crisis in 1994) by clandestinely developing uranium enrichment capabilities providing an alternative path to nuclear weapons. With Stanford Universitymore » Professor John Lewis and three other Americans, I was allowed to visit the Yongbyon Nuclear Center on Jan. 8, 2004. We toured the 5 MWe reactor, the 50 MWe reactor construction site, the spent fuel pool storage building, and the radiochemical laboratory. We concluded that North Korea has restarted its 5 MWe reactor (which produces roughly 6 kg of plutonium annually), it removed the 8000 spent fuel rods that were previously stored under IAEA safeguards from the spent fuel pool, and that it most likely extracted the 25 to 30 kg of plutonium contained in these fuel rods. Although North Korean officials showed us what they claimed was their plutonium metal product from this reprocessing campaign, we were not able to conclude definitively that it was in fact plutonium metal and that it came from the most recent reprocessing campaign. Nevertheless, our North Korean hosts demonstrated that they had the capability, the facility and requisite capacity, and the technical expertise to produce plutonium metal. On the basis of our visit, we were not able to address the issue of whether or not North Korea had a 'deterrent' as claimed - that is, we were not able to conclude that North Korea can build a nuclear device and that it can integrate nuclear devices into suitable delivery systems. However, based on the capabilities we saw, we must assume that North Korea has the capability to produce a crude nuclear device. On the matter of uranium enrichment programs, our host categorically denied that North Korea has a uranium enrichment program - he said, 'we have no program, no equipment, and no technical expertise for uranium enrichment.' The denials were not convincing at the time and since then have proven to be quite hollow by the revelations of A.Q. Khan's nuclear black market activities. There is no easy solution to the nuclear crisis in North Korea. A military strike to eliminate the nuclear facilities was never very attractive and now has been overcome by events. The principal threat is posed by a stockpile of nuclear weapons and weapons-grade plutonium. We have no way of finding where either may be hidden. A diplomatic solution remains the only path forward, but it has proven elusive. All sides have proclaimed a nuclear weapons-free Korean Peninsula as the end goal. The U.S. Government has chosen to negotiate with North Korea by means of the six-party talks. It has very clearly outlined its position of insisting on complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement of all North Korean nuclear programs. North Korea has offered several versions of 're-freezing' its plutonium program while still denying a uranium enrichment program. It has insisted on simultaneous and reciprocal steps to a final solution. Regardless of which diplomatic path is chosen, the scientific challenges of eliminating the North Korean nuclear weapons programs (and its associated infrastructure) in a safe, secure, and verifiable manner are immense. The North Korean program is considerably more complex and developed than the fledgling Iraqi program of 1991 and Libyan program of 2004. It is more along the lines, but more complex than that of South Africa in the early 1990s. Actions taken or not taken by the North Koreans at their nuclear facilities during the course of the ongoing diplomatic discussions are key to whether or not the nuclear program can be eliminated safely and securely, and they will greatly influence the price tag for such operations. Moreover, they will determine whether or not one can verify complete elimination. Hence, cooperation of the North Koreans now and during the dismantlement and elimination stages is crucial. Technical discussions among specialists, perhaps within the framework of the working groups of the six-party talks, could be very productive in setting the stage for an effective, verifiable elimination of North Korea's nuclear weapons program.« less

Institutional plan FY 1999--FY 2004

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

NONE

1998-10-01

Los Alamos has a well-defined and nationally important mission: to reduce the global nuclear danger. This central national security mission consists of four main elements: stockpile stewardship, nuclear materials management, nonproliferation and arms control, and cleanup of the environmental legacy of nuclear weapons activities. The Laboratory provides support for and ensures confidence in the nation`s nuclear stockpile without nuclear testing. This challenge requires the Laboratory to continually hone its scientific acumen and technological capabilities to perform this task reliably using an interdisciplinary approach and advanced experimental and modeling techniques. In the last two National Defense Authorization Acts, Congress identified themore » need to protect the nation from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which includes nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and their potential use by terrorists. Los Alamos is applying multidisciplinary science and engineering skills to address these problems. In addition, the Laboratory`s critical programmatic roles in stockpile stewardship and threat reduction are complemented by its waste management operations and environmental restoration work. Information on specific programs is available in Section 2 of this document.« less

Stockpile Stewardship: How We Ensure the Nuclear Deterrent Without Testing

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

None

2014-09-04

In the 1990s, the U.S. nuclear weapons program shifted emphasis from developing new designs to dismantling thousands of existing weapons and maintaining a much smaller enduring stockpile. The United States ceased underground nuclear testing, and the Department of Energy created the Stockpile Stewardship Program to maintain the safety, security, and reliability of the U.S. nuclear deterrent without full-scale testing. This video gives a behind the scenes look at a set of unique capabilities at Lawrence Livermore that are indispensable to the Stockpile Stewardship Program: high performance computing, the Superblock category II nuclear facility, the JASPER a two stage gas gun,more » the High Explosive Applications Facility (HEAF), the National Ignition Facility (NIF), and the Site 300 contained firing facility.« less

Stabilization and immobilization of military plutonium: A non-proliferation perspective

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Leventhal, P.

1996-05-01

The Nuclear Control Institute welcomes this DOE-sponsored technical workshop on stabilization and immobilization of weapons plutonium (W Pu) because of the significant contribution it can make toward the ultimate non-proliferation objective of eliminating weapons-usable nuclear material, plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU), from world commerce. The risk of theft or diversion of these materials warrants concern, as only a few kilograms in the hands of terrorists or threshold states would give them the capability to build nuclear weapons. Military plutonium disposition questions cannot be addressed in isolation from civilian plutonium issues. The National Academy of Sciences has urged that {open_quotes}furthermore » steps should be taken to reduce the proliferation risks posed by all of the world`s plutonium stocks, military and civilian, separated and unseparated...{close_quotes}. This report discusses vitrification and a mixed oxide fuels option, and the effects of disposition choices on civilian plutonium fuel cycles.« less

The Mesoscale Science of the Matter-Radiation Interactions in Extremes (MaRIE) project

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Kippen, Karen Elizabeth; Montoya, Donald Raymond

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) requires the ability to understand and test how material structures, defects, and interfaces determine performance in extreme environments such as in nuclear weapons. To do this, MaRIE will be an x-ray source that is laser-like and brilliant with very fl exible and fast pulses to see at weapons-relevant time scales, and with high enough energy to study critical materials. The Department of Energy (DOE) has determined there is a mission need for MaRIE to deliver this capability. MaRIE can use some of the existing infrastructure of the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE) andmore » its accelerator capability. MaRIE will be built as a strategic partnership of DOE national laboratories and university collaborators.« less

(236)U and (239,)(240)Pu ratios from soils around an Australian nuclear weapons test site.

PubMed

Tims, S G; Froehlich, M B; Fifield, L K; Wallner, A; De Cesare, M

2016-01-01

The isotopes (236)U, (239)Pu and (240)Pu are present in surface soils as a result of global fallout from nuclear weapons tests carried out in the 1950's and 1960's. These isotopes potentially constitute artificial tracers of recent soil erosion and sediment movement. Only Accelerator Mass Spectrometry has the requisite sensitivity to measure all three isotopes at these environmental levels. Coupled with its relatively high throughput capabilities, this makes it feasible to conduct studies of erosion across the geographical extent of the Australian continent. In the Australian context, however, global fallout is not the only source of these isotopes. As part of its weapons development program the United Kingdom carried out a series of atmospheric and surface nuclear weapons tests at Maralinga, South Australia in 1956 and 1957. The tests have made a significant contribution to the Pu isotopic abundances present in the region around Maralinga and out to distances ∼1000 km, and impact on the assessment techniques used in the soil and sediment tracer studies. Quantification of the relative fallout contribution derived from detonations at Maralinga is complicated owing to significant contamination around the test site from numerous nuclear weapons safety trials that were also carried out around the site. We show that (236)U can provide new information on the component of the fallout that is derived from the local nuclear weapons tests, and highlight the potential of (236)U as a new fallout tracer. Crown Copyright © 2015. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Optical detection of special nuclear materials: an alternative approach for standoff and remote sensing

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Johnson, J. Bruce; Reeve, S. W.; Burns, W. A.; Allen, Susan D.

2010-04-01

Termed Special Nuclear Material (SNM) by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, fissile materials, such as 235U and 239Pu, are the primary components used to construct modern nuclear weapons. Detecting the clandestine presence of SNM represents an important capability for Homeland Security. An ideal SNM sensor must be able to detect fissile materials present at ppb levels, be able to distinguish between the source of the detected fissile material, i.e., 235U, 239Pu, 233U or other fission source, and be able to perform the discrimination in near real time. A sensor with such capabilities would provide not only rapid identification of a threat but, ultimately, information on the potential source of the threat. For example, current detection schemes for monitoring clandestine nuclear testing and nuclear fuel reprocessing to provide weapons grade fissile material rely largely on passive air sampling combined with a subsequent instrumental analysis or some type of wet chemical analysis of the collected material. It would be highly useful to have a noncontact method of measuring isotopes capable of providing forensic information rapidly at ppb levels of detection. Here we compare the use of Kr, Xe and I as "canary" species for distinguishing between 235U and 239Pu fission sources by spectroscopic methods.

Relationship of strategic and theater nuclear forces

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Nitze, P.

Policies governing the development of nuclear forces and the relationship of strategic and theater forces are examined from five different levels: (1) the hierarchy of 10 levels of potential violence, (2) the military implications at each interface between levels, (3) historical aspects of changes in the way nuclear weapons are viewed, (4) strategic rivalry, and (5) a global challenge. The challenge acknowledges that the Soviet perception differs from the American view as is indicated by the extent of the Soviet civil defense effort. These differences are detailed in terms of specific weaponry and their effect on negotiations to limit strategicmore » nuclear arms. There has been a tendency to avoid the facts of the Soviet nuclear capability and, once faced, to avoid deciding what action to take. The author contends that the appropriate step is to deny the Soviets intercontinental nuclear supremacy by maintaining equivalent levels of force. To do this the U.S. must add strategically based cruise missiles and should consider including gray-area systems to its negotiations. The author also advocates deterrence by the unilateral use of nuclear weapons for self-defense and the use of short-range weapons by both sides on the edge of a battlefield. (DCK)« less

Report of the Defense Science Board task force on tritium production technology options. Final technical report

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Welch, L.

1999-05-01

The long-standing national security policy of the US to maintain a robust nuclear deterrent continues to be supported by the Congress and the President. The President has stated that ``...the nuclear deterrent posture is one of the most visible and important examples of how US military capabilities can be used effectively to deter aggression and coercion. Nuclear weapons serve as a hedge against an uncertain future, a guarantee of our security commitments to allies, and a disincentive to those who would contemplate developing or otherwise acquiring their own nuclear weapons.`` US nuclear weapons designs require tritium, an isotope of hydrogen,more » which has not been produced in the US since 1988, when the last tritium production facility (the K-Reactor at the Savannah River Site) was shut down. This long period without tritium production in the US has been possible because arms control agreements reached in the early 1990s reduced the size of the US nuclear weapons stockpile and because the Department of Energy (DOE) met stockpile tritium requirements by recycling the tritium removed from dismantled nuclear weapons. However, since tritium decays at a rate of 5.5% each year, a dependable source of tritium is required to continue to sustain the US nuclear weapons stockpile to underwrite national security policy and to support arms control goals. The US does maintain a five-year reserve supply of tritium, but this reserve is to be used only in an emergency. Current guidance states the reserve must be restored to its original level within five years of being used. To sustain the START I level, tritium production needs to begin around 2005 at a production capacity of about 3.0 kg/ year. START II levels could be sustained with production of about 1.5 kg/year beginning around 2011.« less

A Nuclear Energy Renaissance: Challenges to Nuclear Weapon Nonproliferation

DTIC Science & Technology

2009-03-30

carbon dioxide every second.12 Nuclear energy is currently the only energy source capable of significant expansion to replace the many terawatts of...environmental lobby, which for decades opposed nuclear power, has now to a significant part come to support it as an important answer to reduce carbon ...power produced by burning fossil fuels. The 4 likely addition of carbon emission taxes and tax credits will only make nuclear power more economically

Velocimetry Overview for visitors from the DOD

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Briggs, Matthew E.; Holtkamp, David Bruce

2016-08-19

We are in the midst of a transformative period in which technological advances are making fundamental changes in the measurement techniques that form the backbone of nuclear weapon certification. Optical velocimetry has replaced electrical shorting pins in “Hydrotests,” which measure the dynamic implosion process. This advance has revolutionized nuclear weapons certification during the last 5 years. We can now measure the implosion process that drives a nuclear detonation with many orders of magnitude more resolution in both space and time than was possible just 10 years ago. It has been compared to going from Morse Code to HDTV, resulting inmore » a dozen or more improvements in models of these weapons. These Hydrotests are carried out at LANL, LLNL and the NNSS, with the later holding the important role of allowing us to test with nuclear materials, in sub-critical configurations (i.e., no yield.) Each of these institutions has largely replaced pins with hundreds of channels of optical velocimetry. Velocimetry is non-contact and is used simultaneously with the X-ray capability of these facilities. The U1-a facility at NNSS pioneered this approach in the Gemini series in 2012, and continues to lead, both in channel count and technological advances. Close cooperation among LANL, LLNL and NSTec in these advances serves the complex by leveraging capabilities across sites and accelerating the pace of technical improvements.« less

The Task of Detecting Illicit Nuclear Material: Status and Challenges

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Kouzes, Richard

2006-04-01

In August 1994, police at the Munich airport intercepted a suitcase from Moscow with half a kilogram of nuclear-reactor fuel, of which 363 grams was weapons- grade plutonium. A few months later police seized 2.7 kilograms of highly enriched uranium from a former worker at a Russian nuclear institute and his accomplices in Prague. These are just two of 18 incidents involving the smuggling of weapons grade nuclear materials between 1993 and 2004 reported by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The consequences of a stolen or improvised nuclear device being exploded in a U.S. city would be world changing. The concern over the possibility of a nuclear weapon, or the material for a weapon or a radiological dispersion device, being smuggled across U.S. borders has led to the deployment of radiation detection equipment at the borders. Related efforts are occurring around the world. Radiation portal monitors are used as the main screening tool, supplemented by handheld detectors, personal radiation detectors, and x-ray imaging systems. Passive detection techniques combined with imaging, and possibly active techniques, are the current available tools for screening cargo for items of concern. There are a number of physics limitations to what is possible with each technology given the presence of naturally occurring radioactive materials, commercial sources, and medical radionuclides in the stream of commerce. There have been a number of lessons learned to date from the various efforts in the U.S. and internationally about the capability for interdicting illicit nuclear material.

Sandia National Laboratories: National Security Missions: Nuclear Weapons:

Science.gov Websites

Safety & Security Sandia National Laboratories Exceptional service in the national interest & Figures Programs Nuclear Weapons About Nuclear Weapons Safety & Security Weapons Science & Twitter YouTube Flickr RSS Top Nuclear Weapons About Nuclear Weapons at Sandia Safety & Security

Origins of the Tactical Nuclear Weapons Modernization Program: 1969-1979

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Yaffe, Michael David

On December 12, 1979, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization decided to deploy new long-range theater nuclear forces, Pershing II and Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles. This marked the first major change in NATO's nuclear stockpile since the adoption of the flexible response strategy in 1967. The decision was controversial inasmuch as the Allies disagreed on the fundamental role of nuclear weapons in this strategy and, thereby, the types and number of weapons required for an effective deterrent posture. Europeans generally preferred long-range weapons capable of striking the Soviet Union and small conventional forces while Americans preferred shorter-range nuclear weapons and a stalwart conventional defense. Thus, the December decision is often described as purely politically motivated, in which the Americans reluctantly acquiesced to a European initiative for long-range weapons, prominently expressed by West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in 1977. Recently declassified US government documents reveal, however, that long-range missiles were part of a long-term comprehensive nuclear modernization program conceived in the Pentagon under Defense Secretary James Schlesinger during the period of 1973 through 1975, and presented to skeptical European elites who favored arms control negotiations over costly new deployments. This program was motivated as much by changes in the American national security culture as by an increase in the Soviet military threat to Europe. It was grounded on a clear military rationale: "that a feasible and affordable conventional defense is only possible if NATO has modern nuclear forces" that can effectively hold at risk Warsaw Pact ground and air forces throughout the depth of their employment from the inner-German border to the western military districts of the Soviet Union. When the new US administration in 1977 disagreed with the modernization plan and its rationale, opting instead for more conventional forces, the Allies in a reversal of roles lobbied the US President to deploy the long-range weapons being developed by the Defense Department. In the course of deliberations, political preferences suppressed military considerations of deterrence and only a small portion of the original modernization program was implemented.

Assessing State Nuclear Weapons Proliferation: Using Bayesian Network Analysis of Social Factors

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Coles, Garill A.; Brothers, Alan J.; Olson, Jarrod

A Bayesian network (BN) model of social factors can support proliferation assessments by estimating the likelihood that a state will pursue a nuclear weapon. Social factors including political, economic, nuclear capability, security, and national identity and psychology factors may play as important a role in whether a State pursues nuclear weapons as more physical factors. This paper will show how using Bayesian reasoning on a generic case of a would-be proliferator State can be used to combine evidence that supports proliferation assessment. Theories and analysis by political scientists can be leveraged in a quantitative and transparent way to indicate proliferationmore » risk. BN models facilitate diagnosis and inference in a probabilistic environment by using a network of nodes and acyclic directed arcs between the nodes whose connections, or absence of, indicate probabilistic relevance, or independence. We propose a BN model that would use information from both traditional safeguards and the strengthened safeguards associated with the Additional Protocol to indicate countries with a high risk of proliferating nuclear weapons. This model could be used in a variety of applications such a prioritization tool and as a component of state safeguards evaluations. This paper will discuss the benefits of BN reasoning, the development of Pacific Northwest National Laboratory’s (PNNL) BN state proliferation model and how it could be employed as an analytical tool.« less

Superpower nuclear minimalism in the post-Cold War era

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Graben, E.K.

1992-07-01

With the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union, the strategic environment has fundamentally changed, so it would seem logical to reexamine strategy as well. There are two main schools of nuclear strategic thought: a maximalist school, which emphasizes counterforce superiority and nuclear war-fighting capability, and a MAD-plus school, which emphasizes survivability of an assured destruction capability along with the ability to deliver small, limited nuclear attacks in the event that conflict occurs. The MAD-plus strategy is the more logical of the two strategies, because the maximalist strategy is based on an attempt to conventionalizemore » nuclear weapons which is unrealistic.« less

Superpower nuclear minimalism in the post-Cold War era?. Revised

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Graben, E.K.

1992-07-01

With the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union, the strategic environment has fundamentally changed, so it would seem logical to reexamine strategy as well. There are two main schools of nuclear strategic thought: a maximalist school, which emphasizes counterforce superiority and nuclear war-fighting capability, and a MAD-plus school, which emphasizes survivability of an assured destruction capability along with the ability to deliver small, limited nuclear attacks in the event that conflict occurs. The MAD-plus strategy is the more logical of the two strategies, because the maximalist strategy is based on an attempt to conventionalizemore » nuclear weapons which is unrealistic.« less

Scientific impacts on nuclear strategic policy: Dangers and opportunities

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Keeny S.M. Jr.

1988-12-15

Nuclear weapons have revolutionized warfare, making a mutual capability for assured destruction a fact of life and mutual assured deterrence the underlying nuclear strategy of the superpowers. The program to find a technical solution to the threat of nuclear weapons by creating an impervious defense is fatally flawed by failure to consider responses available to a sophisticated adversary at much lower cost. Responses could involve: exploiting vulnerabilities; increased firepower; technical innovation; and circumvention. Efforts to achieve strategic defense would in fact increase risk of nuclear war by stimulating the nuclear arms race since history demonstrates neither side will allow itsmore » deterrent force to be seriously degraded. Defenses would increase instability in times of a crisis. Science has also reduced the risk of nuclear war by making possible improved control and safety of nuclear forces and predictability of US/Soviet relations, verifiability of arms control agreements, and survivable strategic systems. Science can be a tool for good or evil; mankind must be its masters not its slaves.« less

Scientific impacts on nuclear strategic policy: Dangers and opportunities

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Keeny, Spurgeon M.

1988-12-01

Nuclear weapons have revolutionized warfare, making a mutual capability for assured destruction a fact of life and mutual assured deterrence the underlying nuclear strategy of the superpowers. The program to find a technical solution to the threat of nuclear weapons by creating an impervious defense is fatally flawed by failure to consider responses available to a sophisticated adversary at much lower cost. Responses could involve: exploiting vulnerabilities; increased firepower; technical innovation; and circumvention. Efforts to achieve strategic defense would in fact increase risk of nuclear war by stimulating the nuclear arms race since history demonstrates neither side will allow its deterrent force to be seriously degraded. Defenses would increase instability in times of a crisis. Science has also reduced the risk of nuclear war by making possible improved control and safety of nuclear forces and predictability of US/Soviet relations, verifiability of arms control agreements, and survivable strategic systems. Science can be a tool for good or evil; mankind must be its masters not its slaves.

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

O'Brien, K H

Nuclear weapons play an essential role in United States (U.S.) National Security Policy and a succession of official reviews has concluded that nuclear weapons will continue to have a role for the foreseeable future. Under the evolving U.S. government policy, it is clear that role will be quite different from what it was during the Cold War. The nuclear-weapons stockpile as well as the nuclear-weapons enterprise needs to continue to change to reflect this evolving role. Stockpile reductions in the early 1990s and the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP), established after the cessation of nuclear testing in 1992, began this processmore » of change. Further evolution is needed to address changing security environments, to enable further reductions in the number of stockpiled weapons, and to create a nuclear enterprise that is cost effective and sustainable for the long term. The SSP has successfully maintained the U.S. nuclear stockpile for more than a decade, since the end of nuclear testing. Current plans foresee maintaining warheads produced in the 1980s until about 2040. These warheads continue to age and they are expensive to refurbish. The current Life Extension Program plans for these legacy warheads are straining both the nuclear-weapons production and certification infrastructure making it difficult to respond rapidly to problems or changes in requirements. Furthermore, refurbishing and preserving Cold-War-era nuclear weapons requires refurbishing and preserving an infrastructure geared to support old technology. Stockpile Stewardship could continue this refurbishment approach, but an alternative approach could be considered that is more focused on sustainable technologies, and developing a more responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure. Guided by what we have learned from SSP during the last decade, the stewardship program can be evolved to address this increasing challenge using its computational and experimental tools and capabilities. This approach must start with an improved vision of the future stockpile and enterprise, and find a path that moves us toward that future. The goal of this approach is to achieve a more affordable, sustainable, and responsive enterprise. In order to transform the enterprise in this way, the SSP warhead designs that drive the enterprise must change. Designs that emphasize manufacturability, certifiability, and increased safety and security can enable enterprise transformation. It is anticipated that such warheads can be certified and sustained with high confidence without nuclear testing. The SSP provides the tools to provide such designs, and can develop replacement designs and produce them for the stockpile. The Cold War currency of optimizing warhead yield-to-weight can be replaced by SSP designs optimizing margin-to-uncertainty. The immediate challenge facing the nuclear weapons enterprise is to find a credible path that leads to this vision of the future stockpile and enterprise. Reliable warheads within a sustainable enterprise can best be achieved by shifting from a program of legacy-warhead refurbishment to one of warhead replacement. The nuclear weapons stockpile and the nuclear weapons enterprise must transform together to achieve this vision. The current Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program represents an approach that can begin this process of transformation. If the RRW program succeeds, the designs, manufacturing complex, and certification strategy can evolve together and in so doing come up with a more cost-efficient solution that meets today's and tomorrow's national security requirements.« less

Iran’s Reemergence as a Major Player in Global Security

DTIC Science & Technology

2013-05-21

economic sanctions levied against the Islamic Republic. Iran continues to deny International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors’ access to possible uranium ...build nuclear weapons.”55 Mr. Clapper went on to say that “Iran’s technical advancement, particularly in uranium enrichment, strengthens our assessment...will to do so.”56 During the briefing, he made clear that Iran is technically capable of producing enough highly enriched uranium for a weapon

Nuclear weapons modernizations

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Kristensen, Hans M.

2014-05-01

This article reviews the nuclear weapons modernization programs underway in the world's nine nuclear weapons states. It concludes that despite significant reductions in overall weapons inventories since the end of the Cold War, the pace of reductions is slowing - four of the nuclear weapons states are even increasing their arsenals, and all the nuclear weapons states are busy modernizing their remaining arsenals in what appears to be a dynamic and counterproductive nuclear competition. The author questions whether perpetual modernization combined with no specific plan for the elimination of nuclear weapons is consistent with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and concludes that new limits on nuclear modernizations are needed.

Fiber optic cables for severe environment

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Massarani, M. G.

1982-10-01

The most severe challenges to the fiber optic cable are related to nuclear weapons testing and other military applications. Nuclear experiments are conducted in deep underground holes. Cables connect the experimental device to recording stations positioned at a certain distance from ground zero. Attractive features provided by fiber optic cable technology include large cost advantages in cable purchase price, savings in handling cost due to the lighter weight, immunity to electromagnetic pulses (EMP), and the capability to transmit high data rates. Details of underground nuclear testing are discussed, taking into account the underground nuclear test environment, and questions of fiber optic cable design for the underground experiments. The use of fiber optics for the Ground Launched Cruise Missile Weapons System (GLCM) is also considered. Attention is given to the GLCM environment, and the proposed cable for GLCM application.

The Evolution of India’s Nuclear Program: Implications for the United States

DTIC Science & Technology

2008-05-22

be a part of the global nuclear regime: “On the one hand, nuclear weapons were considered a shameful badge worn by the great powers of the cold war ...Asian region, balancing their policies between the needed Pakistani support for the Global War on Terror (GWOT) with the desire to maintain India as an...1990s: On the Brink of Nuclear War in South Asia .................................................... 25 Section 3: Indian Military Capability

Nuclear weapons modernizations

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Kristensen, Hans M.

This article reviews the nuclear weapons modernization programs underway in the world's nine nuclear weapons states. It concludes that despite significant reductions in overall weapons inventories since the end of the Cold War, the pace of reductions is slowing - four of the nuclear weapons states are even increasing their arsenals, and all the nuclear weapons states are busy modernizing their remaining arsenals in what appears to be a dynamic and counterproductive nuclear competition. The author questions whether perpetual modernization combined with no specific plan for the elimination of nuclear weapons is consistent with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and concludesmore » that new limits on nuclear modernizations are needed.« less

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Volpe, Tristan A.

Why do states wait for prolonged periods of time with the technical capacity to produce nuclear weapons? Only a handful of countries have ever acquired the sensitive nuclear fuel cycle technology needed to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. Yet the enduring trend over the last five decades is for these states to delay or forgo exercising the nuclear weapons option provided by uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing capabilities. I show that states pause at this threshold stage because they use nuclear technology to bargain for concessions from both allies and adversaries. But when does nuclear latency offer bargaining benefits?more » My central argument is that challengers must surmount a dilemma to make coercive diplomacy work: the more they threaten to proliferate, the harder it becomes to reassure others that compliance will be rewarded with nuclear restraint. I identify a range of mechanisms able to solve this credibility problem, from arms control over breakout capacity to third party mediation and confidence building measures. Since each step towards the bomb raises the costs of implementing these policies, a state hits a sweet spot when it first acquires enrichment and/or reprocessing (ENR) technology. Subsequent increases in proliferation capability generate diminishing returns at the bargaining table for two reasons: the state must go to greater lengths to make a credible nonproliferation promise, and nuclear programs exhibit considerable path dependency as they mature over time. Contrary to the conventional wisdom about power in world politics, less nuclear latency thereby yields more coercive threat advantages. I marshal new primary source evidence from archives and interviews to identify episodes in the historical record when states made clear decisions to use ENR technology as a bargaining chip, and employ this theory of proliferation persuasion to explain how Japan, North Korea, and Iran succeeded and failed to barter concessions from the United States. By clarifying when countries are able to leverage steps towards the bomb for international political gain, my work advances our understanding of proliferation and coercive diplomacy.« less

''Whither Deterrence?'' A Brief Synopsis May, 2002

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Poppe, C; Vergino, E; Barker, R

To most audiences, deterrence has been interconnected with nuclear weapons whose purpose had been to deter a Soviet attack. But, the Soviet Union has been gone for almost a decade. President George W. Bush has stated that Russia is not an enemy of the US and the numbers of nuclear weapons can be dramatically reduced. It is important to note that deterrence has always transcended nuclear weapons. The US' first line of deterrence has been its formidable conventional warfare capability, designed to prevent conflict and win wars if necessary. The role of nuclear weapons has been to deter the,use ofmore » nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction against U.S. interests during the conduct of conventional warfare and to ensure our ability to inflict massive destruction on any who would use nuclear weapons, or other weapons of mass destruction, against us. With regard to the Soviet Union, the threat of the use of nuclear weapons was a critical component of our deterrent to prevent massive Soviet conventional attack against our allies in Europe. However, the events of September 11, 2001 make clear that we have not convinced all who seek to harm us that we will be able to respond in a manner to make them wish they had not even tried. The September 11 attacks, as well as other past conflicts, do not mean that deterrence has failed-it remains effective against the threats for which it was designed. We have known there are other threats for which we did not have a credible deterrent. The challenge is to sustain deterrence against the classic threats as they evolve in technical sophistication while remaining alert to the need to evaluate continuously our ability to deter previously unforeseen challenges. How then should we be looking at deterrence as we consider fifteen or so years in the future, say to about 2015? What will be the role of nuclear weapons and other instruments of mass destruction in the future? What should the US be doing to prepare for the future? In this study, we present four futures as a tool for planners who must think ahead fifteen years or more, rather than a prediction of the future. None of the four futures will emerge in just the way we have described. Fifteen years from now, some mix of these futures is more likely, or perhaps we will see a trend towards one of the futures, but with the possibility that any of the other three could appear, perhaps quite swiftly. Any future will undoubtedly contain its own kind of unpleasant surprises and, in contrast to the Cold War; the possession of enormous nuclear-response and conventional-response capability may not be sufficient to deter these from happening. However, there are other tools that the US must include as part of its strategy and security policy in addition to deterrence, specifically dissuasion, defense, destruction, and assurance. Rather than rely on the Cold-War concept of deterrence, future security policy should be built upon the appropriate mix of these elements as a way to steer us toward a more favorable future, while ensuring that we are prepared for the kinds of surprises associated with far less favorable futures. In this study, we have defined three unfavorable futures to be avoided, and one future that represents, we believe, a more desirable global situation than the first three, but still not entirely benign. Our security policy should be defined to avoid or prevent the first three, which we have entitled ''Nuclear Giants, Global Terror'', and ''Regional Nuclear Tension and Use'', and steer us toward a more favorable future, ''Dynamic Cooperation''. We have examined the implications for both policy and military capability that are posed by these different futures. The result often raises more questions than we are able to answer without additional study-however, our primary purpose was to clarify the issues, to identify. what we believe we know, what we don't know, and where more study and effort are needed. Nevertheless, in preparing for unfavorable futures, we must also identify and plan the future we want. This study emphasizes that a desirable future in 2015 would be characterized by peaceful resolution of conflict, growing worldwide economic prosperity, an effective non-proliferation regime, the ability of the United States to control its own destiny without conflict, and expansion of political and economic freedom. Security policies, even in the face of unpleasant futures, should be crafted so as enhance, rather than diminish, these desired goals.« less

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Scribner, R.A.

Sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) present some particularly striking problems for both national security and arms control. These small, dual-purpose, difficult to detect weapons present some formidable challenges for verification in any scheme that attempts to limit rather than eliminate them. Conventionally armed SLCMs offer to the navies of both superpowers important offensive and defensive capabilities. Nuclear armed, long-range, land-attack SLCMs, on the other hand, seem to pose destabilizing threats and otherwise have questionable value, despite strong US support for extensive deployment of them. If these weapons are not constrained, their deployment could circumvent gains which might be made in agreementsmore » directly reducing of strategic nuclear weapons. This paper reviews the technology and planned deployments of SLCMs, the verification schemes which have been discussed and are being investigated to try to deal with the problem, and examines the proposed need for and possible uses of SLCMs. It presents an overview of the problem technically, militarily, and politically.« less

Japan’s Emerging World Role.

DTIC Science & Technology

1974-06-30

refusal of Japanese fishermen to let Japan’s first nuclear ship , the Mutsu , return to port after it suffered reactor problems on its maiden voyage...producing nuclear ships . The f Japanese Navy is highly trained and, with a one-to-four ratio between officers and enlisted men, is capable of very rapid...1946/3-RR 4 broad rearmament program, especially one including the development of nuclear weapons. Current Japanese economic relations with the PRC and

U.S. Strategy for Iran Following its Achievement of Nuclear Weapon Capability

DTIC Science & Technology

2009-04-01

Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2007), 155. 2 Isaiah Wilson III, “Rediscovering Containment: The Sources of American-Iranian...72 Pollack, “The Threat from Iran,” 3. 73 Thomas Donnelly, “Strategy for a Nuclear Iran,” In Getting Ready for a Nuclear-Ready Iran, (Carlisle, PA...Strategic Studies Institute, Oct 2005), 167. 74 Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessments, 111. 75 Stanley, 24. 76 Isaiah Wilson III

Extreme Scale Computing to Secure the Nation

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Brown, D L; McGraw, J R; Johnson, J R

2009-11-10

Since the dawn of modern electronic computing in the mid 1940's, U.S. national security programs have been dominant users of every new generation of high-performance computer. Indeed, the first general-purpose electronic computer, ENIAC (the Electronic Numerical Integrator and Computer), was used to calculate the expected explosive yield of early thermonuclear weapons designs. Even the U. S. numerical weather prediction program, another early application for high-performance computing, was initially funded jointly by sponsors that included the U.S. Air Force and Navy, agencies interested in accurate weather predictions to support U.S. military operations. For the decades of the cold war, national securitymore » requirements continued to drive the development of high performance computing (HPC), including advancement of the computing hardware and development of sophisticated simulation codes to support weapons and military aircraft design, numerical weather prediction as well as data-intensive applications such as cryptography and cybersecurity U.S. national security concerns continue to drive the development of high-performance computers and software in the U.S. and in fact, events following the end of the cold war have driven an increase in the growth rate of computer performance at the high-end of the market. This mainly derives from our nation's observance of a moratorium on underground nuclear testing beginning in 1992, followed by our voluntary adherence to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) beginning in 1995. The CTBT prohibits further underground nuclear tests, which in the past had been a key component of the nation's science-based program for assuring the reliability, performance and safety of U.S. nuclear weapons. In response to this change, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) initiated the Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship (SBSS) program in response to the Fiscal Year 1994 National Defense Authorization Act, which requires, 'in the absence of nuclear testing, a progam to: (1) Support a focused, multifaceted program to increase the understanding of the enduring stockpile; (2) Predict, detect, and evaluate potential problems of the aging of the stockpile; (3) Refurbish and re-manufacture weapons and components, as required; and (4) Maintain the science and engineering institutions needed to support the nation's nuclear deterrent, now and in the future'. This program continues to fulfill its national security mission by adding significant new capabilities for producing scientific results through large-scale computational simulation coupled with careful experimentation, including sub-critical nuclear experiments permitted under the CTBT. To develop the computational science and the computational horsepower needed to support its mission, SBSS initiated the Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative, later renamed the Advanced Simulation & Computing (ASC) program (sidebar: 'History of ASC Computing Program Computing Capability'). The modern 3D computational simulation capability of the ASC program supports the assessment and certification of the current nuclear stockpile through calibration with past underground test (UGT) data. While an impressive accomplishment, continued evolution of national security mission requirements will demand computing resources at a significantly greater scale than we have today. In particular, continued observance and potential Senate confirmation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) together with the U.S administration's promise for a significant reduction in the size of the stockpile and the inexorable aging and consequent refurbishment of the stockpile all demand increasing refinement of our computational simulation capabilities. Assessment of the present and future stockpile with increased confidence of the safety and reliability without reliance upon calibration with past or future test data is a long-term goal of the ASC program. This will be accomplished through significant increases in the scientific bases that underlie the computational tools. Computer codes must be developed that replace phenomenology with increased levels of scientific understanding together with an accompanying quantification of uncertainty. These advanced codes will place significantly higher demands on the computing infrastructure than do the current 3D ASC codes. This article discusses not only the need for a future computing capability at the exascale for the SBSS program, but also considers high performance computing requirements for broader national security questions. For example, the increasing concern over potential nuclear terrorist threats demands a capability to assess threats and potential disablement technologies as well as a rapid forensic capability for determining a nuclear weapons design from post-detonation evidence (nuclear counterterrorism).« less

Flexible response and the INF (Intermediate-range Nuclear Force) Treaty: what next. Study project

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Williams, H.A.

1988-03-14

The prospect of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty led the former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, GEN Bernard Rogers, to claim that NATO would lose weapons vital to the Alliance's defense when Pershing II (PII) and Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM) were withdrawn from Europe. Nuclear weapons and the NATO strategy of flexible response are inseparably dependent upon each other. GEN Rogers' comments focus directly on the capability which PII and GLCM provided NATO to strike Soviet territory in event of conflict and if such an escalatory step was deemed necessary. Various sources were researched to determine if the INF Treatymore » will cripple the flexible response strategy; while it should not, certain changes in NATO's approach to defense are suggested. Specifically, conventional and nuclear improvements, the latter within the terms of the INF Treaty, are suggested, as are conventional force reduction negotiations and the Europeanization of NATO.« less

Vertical nuclear proliferation.

PubMed

Sidel, Victor W

2007-01-01

All the nuclear-weapon states are working to develop new nuclear-weapon systems and upgrade their existing ones. Although the US Congress has recently blocked further development of small nuclear weapons and earth-penetrating nuclear weapons, the United States is planning a range of new warheads under the Reliable Replacement Warhead programme, and renewing its nuclear weapons infrastructure. The United Kingdom is spending 1 billion pounds sterling on updating the Atomic Weapons Establishment at Aldermaston, and about 20 billion pounds sterling on replacing its Vanguard submarines and maintaining its Trident warhead stockpile. The US has withdrawn from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and plans to install missile defence systems in Poland and the Czech Republic; Russia threatens to upgrade its nuclear countermeasures. The nuclear-weapon states should comply with their obligations under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, as summarised in the 13-point plan agreed at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, and they should negotiate a Nuclear Weapons Convention.

Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) Activities on White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico. Volume 1

DTIC Science & Technology

2007-03-01

similar in structure to HMX. HMX is used to implode fissionable material in nuclear devices to achieve critical mass and as a component of plastic...extent of DTRA activities on WSMR and reduce the Department of Defense capability to control and eliminate weapons of mass destruction. The Final...safeguarding the United States and its allies from weapons of mass destruction (WMD). DTRA maintains a number of test beds and target types at White Sands

Analytical Support for the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The WSEG Experience, 1948-1976

DTIC Science & Technology

1979-07-01

high-level officials who participated ŕ’"Directive, Weapons Systems Evaluations Group," En ( Losure to SecDef Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff...and the field was becoming estab- lished as an identifiable discipline in its own right. 1 2 By and large, the World War II mob ization of science and...3trategic nuclear weapons, e,, en at the expense of other capabilities. They were strongly opposed by defenders of combined operations and balanced force

Post-Cold War Science and Technology at Los Alamos

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Browne, John C.

2002-04-01

Los Alamos National Laboratory serves the nation through the development and application of leading-edge science and technology in support of national security. Our mission supports national security by: ensuring the safety, security, and reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile; reducing the threat of weapons of mass destruction in support of counter terrorism and homeland defense; and solving national energy, environment, infrastructure, and health security problems. We require crosscutting fundamental and advanced science and technology research to accomplish our mission. The Stockpile Stewardship Program develops and applies, advanced experimental science, computational simulation, and technology to ensure the safety and reliability of U.S. nuclear weapons in the absence of nuclear testing. This effort in itself is a grand challenge. However, the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, reminded us of the importance of robust and vibrant research and development capabilities to meet new and evolving threats to our national security. Today through rapid prototyping we are applying new, innovative, science and technology for homeland defense, to address the threats of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons globally. Synergistically, with the capabilities that we require for our core mission, we contribute in many other areas of scientific endeavor. For example, our Laboratory has been part of the NASA effort on mapping water on the moon and NSF/DOE projects studying high-energy astrophysical phenomena, understanding fundamental scaling phenomena of life, exploring high-temperature superconductors, investigating quantum information systems, applying neutrons to condensed-matter and nuclear physics research, developing large-scale modeling and simulations to understand complex phenomena, and exploring nanoscience that bridges the atomic to macroscopic scales. In this presentation, I will highlight some of these post-cold war science and technology advances including our national security contributions, and discuss some of challenges for Los Alamos in the future.

Administrator Highlights U.S.-Georgian Nuclear Security Cooperation in Tbilisi

ScienceCinema

Thomas D'Agostino

2017-12-09

NNSA Administrator Thomas D'Agostino highlighted the strong U.S.-Georgian cooperation on nuclear security issues during a day-long visit to the Republic of Georgia in mid-June. He briefed the media at availability at the Tbilisi airport. In April 2009, President Obama outlined an ambitious agenda to secure vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years, calling the danger of a terrorist acquiring nuclear weapons "the most immediate and extreme threat to global security." In this year's State of the Union, he called the threat of nuclear weapons, "the greatest danger to the American people." In order to meet that challenge, the President's FY2011 Budget Request includes close to $2.7 billion for the National Nuclear Security Administration's Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation program -- an increase of 25.7 percent over FY2010. Included in that request is NNSA's Second Line of Defense (SLD) program, which works around the world to strengthen the capability of foreign governments to deter, detect, and interdict illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials across international borders and through the global maritime shipping system.

Administrator Highlights U.S.-Georgian Nuclear Security Cooperation in Tbilisi

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Thomas D'Agostino

2010-07-16

NNSA Administrator Thomas D'Agostino highlighted the strong U.S.-Georgian cooperation on nuclear security issues during a day-long visit to the Republic of Georgia in mid-June. He briefed the media at availability at the Tbilisi airport. In April 2009, President Obama outlined an ambitious agenda to secure vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years, calling the danger of a terrorist acquiring nuclear weapons "the most immediate and extreme threat to global security." In this year's State of the Union, he called the threat of nuclear weapons, "the greatest danger to the American people." In order to meet that challenge, themore » President's FY2011 Budget Request includes close to $2.7 billion for the National Nuclear Security Administration's Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation program -- an increase of 25.7 percent over FY2010. Included in that request is NNSA's Second Line of Defense (SLD) program, which works around the world to strengthen the capability of foreign governments to deter, detect, and interdict illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials across international borders and through the global maritime shipping system.« less

New bomb, no mission

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Mello, G.

1997-05-01

The cold war may be over, but the nuclear arms race has not quite ended. The United States is fielding a new nuclear weapon-a bomb that was used to threaten Libya, a non-nuclear nation, even before it was deployed. The B61 {open_quotes}mod-11{close_quotes} gravity bomb is the first nuclear capability added to the US arsenal since 1989. It was developed and deployed secretly, without public or congressional debate, and in apparent contradiction to official domestic and international assurances that no new nuclear weapons were being developed in the United States. The B61-11`s unique earth-penetrating characteristic and wide range of yields allowmore » it to threaten otherwide indestructible targets from the air-or, in Pentagonese, to hold such targets {open_quotes}at risk.{close_quotes} That makes the B61-11 a uniquely useful warfighting tool. The 1,200-pound B61-11 replaces the B53, a 8,900-pound, nine-megaton bomb that was developed as a {open_quotes}city buster{close_quotes} and was later designated as a substitute for an earth-penetrating weapon. The B53 was deliverable only by vulnerable B-52s; in contrast, the smaller and lighter B61-11 can be delivered the the stealthier B-2A bomber, or even by F16 fighters.« less

Global Security Rule Sets An Analysis of the Current Global Security Environment and Rule Sets Governing Nuclear Weapons Release

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Mollahan, K; Nattrass, L

America is in a unique position in its history. In maintaining its position as the world's only superpower, the US consistently finds itself taking on the role of a global cop, chief exporter of hard and soft power, and primary impetus for globalization. A view of the current global situation shows an America that can benefit greatly from the effects of globalization and soft power. Similarly, America's power can be reduced significantly if globalization and its soft power are not handled properly. At the same time, America has slowly come to realize that its next major adversary is not amore » near peer competitor but terrorism and disconnected nations that seek nuclear capabilities. In dealing with this new threat, America needs to come to terms with its own nuclear arsenal and build a security rule set that will establish for the world explicitly what actions will cause the US to consider nuclear weapons release. This rule set; however, needs to be established with sensitivity to the US's international interests in globalization and soft power. The US must find a way to establish its doctrine governing nuclear weapons release without threatening other peaceful nations in the process.« less

Nuclear Winter Revisited: can it Make a Difference This Time?

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Schneider, S.

2006-12-01

Some 23 years ago, in the middle of a Cold War and the threat of a strategic nuclear weapons exchange between NATO and the Warsaw Pact nations, atmospheric scientists pointed out that the well-anticipated side effects of a large-scale nuclear war ozone depletion, radioactive contamination and some climatic effects had massively underestimated the more likely implications: massive fires, severe dimming and cooling beneath circulating smoke clouds, disruption to agriculture in non-combatant nations, severe loss of imports of food to already-food-deficient regions and major alterations to atmospheric circulation. While the specific consequences were dependent on both scenarios of weapons use and injections and removals of smoke and dust and other chemicals into the atmosphere, it was clear that this would be despite passionately argued uncertainties a large major additional effect. As further investigations of smoke removal, patchy transport, etc., were pursued, the basic concerns remained, but the magnitude calculated with one-dimensional models diminished creating an unfortunate media debate over nuclear winter vs. nuclear autumn. Of course, one can't grow summer crops in any autumn natural or nuclear but that concern often got lost in the contentious political debate. Of course, it was pointed out that anyone who required knowing the additional environmental consequences of a major nuclear exchange to be finally deterred was already so far from the reality of the direct effects of the blasts that they might never see the concerns. But for non-combatants, it was a major awakening of their inability to escape severe consequences of the troubles of others, even if they were bystanders in the east-west conflicts. Two decades later, things have radically changed: the prospect of a massive strategic nuclear exchange is greatly diminished good news but the possibility of limited regional exchanges or terrorist incidents is widely believed to have greatly increased bad news. Therefore, the re- examination in this AGU session of the entire subject of environmental and social after-effects of any nuclear weapons use is, unfortunately, once again timely. Hopefully it will convince anyone not already convinced based on conventional damages from nuclear weapons use of the urgent need to abate proliferation and monitor and control access to and potential capabilities of those who might contemplate using such weapons for some Strangelove-like strategic or ideological objective. The extent to which a scientific re-examination of the broader horrendous implications of any scale of use of nuclear weapons will deter those contemplating their use is questionable. However, it seems likely such research would increase the resolve of the large number of countries and institutions already pressing to prevent nuclear weapons use.

Combating terrorism : federal response teams provide varied capabilities; opportunities remain to improve coordination

DOT National Transportation Integrated Search

2000-01-01

The General Accounting Office (GAO) was asked to review federal agency teams that can respond to and help manage the consequences of a domestic terrorist incident involving chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear agents or weapons. This report...

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Ball, D Y

The abysmal state of Russia's conventional forces has caused Russia to rely on nuclear weapons to ensure its security. This reliance was formalized in Russia's military doctrine which states that nuclear weapons can be used ''in situations critical to the national security of the RF and its allies.'' In fact, most Russian security analysts believe that this dependence on nuclear weapons will remain for the foreseeable future because the economy will have to improve significantly before a conventional force build up can be contemplated. Yet, despite Russia's need to rely on nuclear weapons, even this may be problematic because itsmore » economic plight may create difficulties in maintaining its current level of nuclear forces. Thus, Russia has a keen interest in negotiating a treaty to reduce Strategic Nuclear Forces below START II levels and would prefer to go even beyond the 2,000-2,500 numbers agreed to by Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton in Helsinki in 1997. Sergei Rogov, an influential defense analyst, believes that Russia's strategic nuclear forces will fall below 1,000 warheads by 2010 irrespective of arms control agreements. Accordingly, Russia is keen to ensure rough parity with the US. To retain a credible deterrent posture at these lower levels, Russia believes that it is important to restrain US sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM)--forces that have heretofore not been captured as strategic weapons in the START treaties. Russian officials reason that once strategic nuclear forces go to very low levels, SLCM capabilities become strategically significant. In fact, according to two well-known Russian security analysts, Anatoli Diakov and Pavel Podvig, Russia's current START III negotiating position calls for the complete elimination of all SLCMs, both nuclear and conventional. Prior to assessing Russia's position regarding cruise missiles and START III, I will examine Russia's overall view of its security position vis-a-vis the US in order to provide background for Russia's negotiating stance. I will also suggest how the US and Russia might approach START III in a manner that is equitable and focuses on creating a more stable environment.« less

X-ray lasers: Strategic problems and potential as an in-orbit exoatmospheric ballistic missile defense system

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Perusich, Karl Anthony

1986-12-01

The problems and potential of a single proposed ballistic missile defense system, the X-ray laser-armed satellite, are examined in this research. Specifically, the X-ray laser satellite system is examined to determine its impact on the issues of cost-effectiveness and crisis stability. To examime the cost-effectiveness and the crisis stability of the X-ray laser satellites, a simulation of a nuclear exchange was constructed. The X-ray laser satellites were assumed to be vulnerable to attack from energy satellites with limited satellite-to-satellite lethal ranges. Symmetric weapons and force postures were used. Five principal weapon classes were used in the model: ICMBs, SLBMs, X-ray laser satellites, bombers, and endo-atmospheric silo defenses. Also, the orbital dynamics of the ballistic missiles and satellites were simulated. The cost-effectiveness of the X-ray laser satellites was determined for two different operational capabilities, damage-limitation and assured destruction. The following conclusions were reached. The effects of deployment of a new weapon system on the Triad as a whole should be examined. The X-ray laser was found to have little effectiveness as a damage-limiting weapon for a defender. For an assured destruction capability, X-ray laser satellites could be part of a minimum-cost force mix with that capability.

Nuclear Weapons: Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

DTIC Science & Technology

2007-07-12

done. Critics raised concerns about the implications of these policies for testing and new weapons. At present, Congress addresses nuclear weapon...future, but there are no plans to do so.’”7 Critics expressed concern about the implications of these policies for testing and new weapons. A statement by...opportunity to design and build new nuclear weapons, and abandon a ten-year-old moratorium on nuclear weapons testing.”8 Another critic felt that

Towards a tactical nuclear weapons treaty? Is There a Role of IAEA Tools of Safeguards?

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Saunders, Emily C.; Rowberry, Ariana N.; Fearey, Bryan L.

2012-07-12

In recent years, there is growing interest in formal negotiations on non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons. With the negotiations of New START, there has been much speculation that a tactical nuclear weapons treaty should be included in the follow on to New START. This paper examines the current policy environment related to tactical weapons and some of the issues surrounding the definition of tactical nuclear weapons. We then map out the steps that would need to be taken in order to begin discussions on a tactical nuclear weapons treaty. These steps will review the potential role of the IAEA inmore » verification of a tactical nuclear weapons treaty. Specifically, does IAEA involvement in various arms control treaties serve as a useful roadmap on how to overcome some of the issues pertaining to a tactical nuclear weapons treaty?« less

West European and East Asian perspectives on defense, deterrence, and strategy. Volume 2. Western European perspectives on defense, deterrence, and strategy. Technical report, 1 December 1982-15 May 1984

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Pfaltzgraff, R.L.; Davis, J.K.; Dougherty, J.E.

1984-05-16

A survey of contemporary West European perspectives on defense, deterrence, and strategy, with special emphasis on the role of nuclear weapons deployed in, or assigned to, the NATO area. Changes have occurred during the past decade in the relative military strength of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, particularly as a result of the substantial growth in Soviet nuclear-capable systems and conventional forces assigned to Europe, and the momentum manifested by the Soviet Union in its deployments of intercontinental ballistic missiles. There has also been a substantial shift in West European thinking and attitudes about security and strategy. Together, these trendsmore » have created a need to reassess the posture of NATO forces generally, and especially nuclear weapons, both in a broader Euro-strategic framework and on the Central Front in the 1980s. The survey is on such issues as the future of the British and French national strategic nuclear forces; the role of the U.S.-strategic nuclear forces in the deterrence of conflict in Europe; the prospects of raising the nuclear threshold by the deployment of new conventional technologies; the impact of strategic defense initiatives on U.S.-NATO security; and the modernization of NATO intermediate-range nuclear capabilities, especially in light of the continuing deployment of the Soviet Union of new generation Euro-strategic forces targeted against Western Europe.« less

Superpower nuclear minimalism

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Graben, E.K.

1992-01-01

During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union competed in building weapons -- now it seems like America and Russia are competing to get rid of them the fastest. The lengthy process of formal arms control has been replaced by exchanges of unilateral force reductions and proposals for reciprocal reductions not necessarily codified by treaty. Should superpower nuclear strategies change along with force postures President Bush has yet to make a formal pronouncement on post-Cold War American nuclear strategy, and it is uncertain if the Soviet/Russian doctrine of reasonable sufficiency formulated in the Gorbachev era actually heraldsmore » a change in strategy. Some of the provisions in the most recent round of unilateral proposals put forth by Presidents Bush and Yeltsin in January 1992 are compatible with a change in strategy. Whether such a change has actually occurred remains to be seen. With the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union, the strategic environment has fundamentally changed, so it would seem logical to reexamine strategy as well. There are two main schools of nuclear strategic thought: a maximalist school, mutual assured destruction (MAD) which emphasizes counterforce superiority and nuclear war- fighting capability, and a MAD-plus school, which emphasizes survivability of an assured destruction capability along with the ability to deliver small, limited nuclear attacks in the event that conflict occurs. The MAD-plus strategy is based on an attempt to conventionalize nuclear weapons which is unrealistic.« less

Teaching Activities on Horizontal Nuclear Proliferation.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Zola, John

1990-01-01

Provides learning activities concerning the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. Includes step-by-step directions for four activities: (1) the life cycle of nuclear weapons; (2) nuclear nonproliferation: pros and cons; (3) the nuclear power/nuclear weapons connection; and (4) managing nuclear proliferation. (NL)

Toward a nuclear weapons free world?

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Maaranen, S.A.

Doubts about the wisdom of relying on nuclear weapons are as old as nuclear weapons themselves. But despite this questioning, nuclear weapons came to be seen as the indispensable element of American (indeed Western) security during the Cold War. By the 1970s and 1980s, however, discontent was growing about the intense US-Soviet nuclear arms competition, as it failed to provide any enduring improvement in security; rather, it was seen as creating ever greater risks and dangers. Arms control negotiations and limitations, adopted as a means to regulate the technical competition, may also have relieved some of the political pressures andmore » dangers. But the balance of terror, and the fears of it, continued. The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) under President Reagan was a very different approach to escaping from the precarious protection of nuclear weapons, in that it sought a way to continue to defend the US and the West, but without the catastrophic risks of mutual deterrence. As such, SDI connoted unhappiness with the precarious nuclear balance and, for many, with nuclear weapons in general. The disappearance of the Warsaw Pact, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the sudden end of the Cold War seemed to offer a unique opportunity to fashion a new, more peaceful world order that might allow for fading away of nuclear weapons. Scholars have foreseen two different paths to a nuclear free world. The first is a fundamental improvement in the relationships between states such that nuclear weapons are no longer needed. The second path is through technological development, e.g., missile defenses which could provide effective protection against nuclear attacks. The paper discusses nuclear weapon policy in the US, views of other nuclear states, the future of nuclear weapons, and issues in a less-nuclear world.« less

Indispensable Nation: U.S. Security Guarantees and Nuclear Proliferation

DTIC Science & Technology

2017-06-01

to achieve this capability. This is encapsulated in Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s famous declaration, “We will make an atomic bomb ...the Bomb " argues that states that receive sensitive nuclear assistance, in the form of aid in weapons design, enrichment facility construction, or...3 Feroz Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb . (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012), 87. 4 Matthew Kroenig, “Importing

The 2015 National Security Strategy: Authorities, Changes, Issues for Congress

DTIC Science & Technology

2016-04-05

Strategy: Authorities, Changes, Issues for Congress Congressional Research Service 3  reverse the spread of nuclear and biological weapons and...secure nuclear materials;  advance peace, security, and opportunity in the greater Middle East;  invest in the capacity of strong and capable...and norms on issues ranging from maritime security to trade and human rights.” 6 On Russia, the document says, “... we will continue to impose

Taking a stand against nuclear proliferation: the pediatrician's role.

PubMed

Newman, Thomas B

2008-05-01

Nuclear weapons pose a grave threat to the health of children. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which for almost 40 years has limited the spread of nuclear weapons, is in danger of unraveling. At the 2000 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference, 180 countries, including the United States, agreed on 13 practical steps to implement Article VI of the treaty, which calls for nuclear disarmament. However, the United States has acted in contravention of several of those disarmament steps, with announced plans to develop new nuclear weapons and to maintain a large nuclear arsenal for decades to come. Pediatricians, working individually and through organizations such as the American Academy of Pediatrics and International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, can educate the public and elected officials regarding the devastating and irremediable effects of nuclear weapons on children and the need for policies that comply with and strengthen the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, rather than undermining it. For the children of the world, our goal must be a nuclear weapons convention (similar to the chemical and biological weapons conventions) that would prohibit these weapons globally.

Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Their Purpose and Placement

DTIC Science & Technology

2015-06-01

War II, nuclear scientists argued against the development of fusion weapons .3 In the 1970s, politicians debated the use of neutron bombs, weapons ...Tactical Nuclear Weapons : Their Purpose and Placement BY EDWARD G. FERGUSON A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE...This study answers the question -- Why does America have tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) in Europe today? – treating America and the North

Guidebook for preparation of aircraft-system survivability requirements for procurement documents. Final report, October 1975-October 1976

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Morrow, J.J.; Burris, R.A.; Watson, D.J.

1977-05-01

This report is intended to provide guidelines for the preparation of procurements specifications for aircraft survivability enhancement equipment, for the survivability/vulnerability (S/V) tasks associated with the procurement of a total aircraft system or its relate subsystems, and also for the modification of current fleet aircraft to their related subsystems. It is intended that these S/V procurement guidelines be applied to the procurement of all military aircraft, aircraft subsystems, and aircraft componenets which can either lose their functional capability of have their performance degraded as a result of interactions with the damage mechanisms of threat weapons. The guidelines should be appliedmore » to preliminary design programs, to production programs, and to programs that will retrofit or modify existing systems. These guidelines include general requirements statements for the establishment of an S/V program, requirements statements for reducing the susceptibility of the system to the threat weapons, and requirements for the reduction of vulnerability to nonnuclear, nuclear, and laser weapon effects. Requirements for S/V assessments and the verification of vulnerability levels and survival enhancement features are also included. Although nuclear and laser weapon effects are included, the major emphasis is on the reduction of susceptibility and vulnerability to conventional weapons and the establishment of the S/V program.« less

Weaponisation of Space - Some Legal Considerations

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Jolly, C.

2002-01-01

This paper will examine a current national initiative from the United States of America to achieve greater national security through the `weaponisation' of extra-atmospheric space. We will propose a synthesis of the current international legal framework pertaining to military activities in space. Based on the analysis of the legal regime and on some current national and regional political initiatives, we will make some practical recommendations to prevent an arms race in space. Civil remote sensing, telecommunications, and launchers launch vehicle technologies have all benefited from a military heritage. They are dual use technologies, in other words, technologies that have both military and civilian applications. In fact, space has always been militarised, ever since the first satellites were put in orbit for reconnaissance missions. But recently, some national policies and technological advances are making the militarisation of space less `discrete'. Military assets from different countries are already stationed in orbit (e.g. reconnaissance and navigation satellites), but they might soon be joined by new `space weapons' with lethal strike capabilities. Currently, in the United States, military and civilian space activities are being closely intertwined. A typical example is the call of the NASA Administrator Sean O'Keefe, a former Secretary of the Navy, for closer cooperation on research and development between NASA and the Department of Defense. Concerning plans to station weapons in space, the American Air Force Space Command issued, in February 2000, its `Strategic Master Plan for FY02 and Beyond'. It states that the United States "...future Air Force Space Command capabilities will enable a fully integrated Aerospace Force to rapidly engage military forces worldwide. [...] Full spectrum dominance in the space medium will be achieved through total space situational awareness, protection of friendly space assets, prevention of unauthorized use of those assets, negation of adversarial use of space and a fully-capable National Missile Defense (NMD). [American] ICBMs will continue to provide a credible strategic deterrence, while advanced, conventional weapons operating in or through space will provide our National Command Authorities (NCA) with formidable and flexible options for prompt, global, conventional strike." As we will see in this paper, the current international legal framework restricting the stationing and use of weapons in space is composed mainly of three treaties. They are: the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (1972), called commonly the `ABM treaty', the `Outer Space Treaty' (1967) and the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (1963). We will also see that - contrary to public opinion - those current legal instruments, even coupled with other international legal texts, do not prohibit the `weaponisation' of space. For instance, The Article Four of the Outer Space Treaty is often cited as the main legal argument against militarisation of space. This article does indeed prohibit the installation or stationing of "any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction", "in orbit around the Earth", "on celestial bodies", "in outer space" and "in any other manner". But, aside from the weapons identified (nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction), nothing prohibits a government signatory to the Outer Space Treaty, to actually station other types of weapons in space, such as laser-based systems. In this paper, the current situation of potential `weaponisation' of space, the international impacts of such a policy and the gaps of the international legal framework concerning the militarisation of space, will prompt some comments and practical recommendations.

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Swift, Alicia L.

There is no better time than now to close the loophole in Article IV of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) that excludes military uses of fissile material from nuclear safeguards. Several countries have declared their intention to pursue and develop naval reactor technology, including Argentina, Brazil, Iran, and Pakistan, while other countries such as China, India, Russia, and the United States are expanding their capabilities. With only a minority of countries using low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel in their naval reactors, it is possible that a state could produce highly enriched uranium (HEU) under the guise of a nuclear navymore » while actually stockpiling the material for a nuclear weapon program. This paper examines the likelihood that non-nuclear weapon states exploit the loophole to break out from the NPT and also the regional ramifications of deterrence and regional stability of expanding naval forces. Possible solutions to close the loophole are discussed, including expanding the scope of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, employing LEU fuel instead of HEU fuel in naval reactors, amending the NPT, creating an export control regime for naval nuclear reactors, and forming individual naval reactor safeguards agreements.« less

Supporting Technology for Chain of Custody of Nuclear Weapons and Materials throughout the Dismantlement and Disposition Processes

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Bunch, Kyle J.; Jones, Anthony M.; Ramuhalli, Pradeep

The ratification and ongoing implementation of the New START Treaty have been widely regarded as noteworthy global security achievements for both the Obama Administration and the Putin (formerly Medvedev) regime. But deeper cuts that move beyond the United States and Russia to engage the P-5 and other nuclear weapons possessor states are envisioned under future arms control regimes, and are indeed required for the P-5 in accordance with their Article VI disarmament obligations in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Future verification needs will include monitoring the cessation of production of new fissile material for weapons, monitoring storage of warhead components andmore » fissile materials and verifying dismantlement of warheads, pits, secondary stages, and other materials. A fundamental challenge to implementing a nuclear disarmament regime is the ability to thwart unauthorized material diversion throughout the dismantlement and disposition process through strong chain of custody implementation. Verifying the declared presence, or absence, of nuclear materials and weapons components throughout the dismantlement and disposition lifecycle is a critical aspect of the disarmament process. From both the diplomatic and technical perspectives, verification under these future arms control regimes will require new solutions. Since any acceptable verification technology must protect sensitive design information and attributes to prevent the release of classified or other proliferation-sensitive information, non-nuclear non-sensitive modalities may provide significant new verification tools which do not require the use of additional information barriers. Alternative verification technologies based upon electromagnetic and acoustics could potentially play an important role in fulfilling the challenging requirements of future verification regimes. For example, researchers at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) have demonstrated that low frequency electromagnetic signatures of sealed metallic containers can be used to rapidly confirm the presence of specific components on a yes/no basis without revealing classified information. PNNL researchers have also used ultrasonic measurements to obtain images of material microstructures which may be used as templates or unique identifiers of treaty-limited items. Such alternative technologies are suitable for application in various stages of weapons dismantlement and often include the advantage of an inherent information barrier due to the inability to extract classified weapon design information from the collected data. As a result, these types of technologies complement radiation-based verification methods for arms control. This article presents an overview of several alternative verification technologies that are suitable for supporting a future, broader and more intrusive arms control regime that spans the nuclear weapons disarmament lifecycle. The general capabilities and limitations of each verification modality are discussed and example technologies are presented. Potential applications are defined in the context of the nuclear material and weapons lifecycle. Example applications range from authentication (e.g., tracking and signatures within the chain of custody from downloading through weapons storage, unclassified templates and unique identification) to verification of absence and final material disposition.« less

National Labs and Nuclear Emergency Response

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Budil, Kimberly

2015-04-01

The DOE national laboratories, and in particular the three NNSA national security laboratories, have long supported a broad suite of national nuclear security missions for the U.S. government. The capabilities, infrastructure and base of expertise developed to support the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile have been applied to such challenges as stemming nuclear proliferation, understanding the nuclear capabilities of adversaries, and assessing and countering nuclear threats including essential support to nuclear emergency response. This talk will discuss the programs that are underway at the laboratories and the essential role that science and technology plays therein. Nuclear scientists provide expertise, fundamental understanding of nuclear materials, processes and signatures, and tools and technologies to aid in the identification and mitigation of nuclear threats as well as consequence management. This talk will also discuss the importance of direct engagement with the response community, which helps to shape research priorities and to enable development of useful tools and techniques for responders working in the field. National Labs and Nuclear Emergency Response.

Proliferation dangers associated with nuclear medicine: getting weapons-grade uranium out of radiopharmaceutical production.

PubMed

Williams, Bill; Ruff, Tilman A

2007-01-01

Abolishing the threat of nuclear war requires the outlawing of nuclear weapons and dismantling current nuclear weapon stockpiles, but also depends on eliminating access to fissile material (nuclear weapon fuel). The near-universal use of weapons-grade, highly enriched uranium (HEU) to produce radiopharmaceuticals is a significant proliferation hazard. Health professionals have a strategic opportunity and obligation to progress the elimination of medically-related commerce in HEU, closing one of the most vulnerable pathways to the much-feared 'terrorist bomb'.

Nuclear Forensics and Attribution: A National Laboratory Perspective

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Hall, Howard L.

2008-04-01

Current capabilities in technical nuclear forensics - the extraction of information from nuclear and/or radiological materials to support the attribution of a nuclear incident to material sources, transit routes, and ultimately perpetrator identity - derive largely from three sources: nuclear weapons testing and surveillance programs of the Cold War, advances in analytical chemistry and materials characterization techniques, and abilities to perform ``conventional'' forensics (e.g., fingerprints) on radiologically contaminated items. Leveraging that scientific infrastructure has provided a baseline capability to the nation, but we are only beginning to explore the scientific challenges that stand between today's capabilities and tomorrow's requirements. These scientific challenges include radically rethinking radioanalytical chemistry approaches, developing rapidly deployable sampling and analysis systems for field applications, and improving analytical instrumentation. Coupled with the ability to measure a signature faster or more exquisitely, we must also develop the ability to interpret those signatures for meaning. This requires understanding of the physics and chemistry of nuclear materials processes well beyond our current level - especially since we are unlikely to ever have direct access to all potential sources of nuclear threat materials.

JPRS Report, China, Handbook of Military Knowledge for Commanders

DTIC Science & Technology

1988-03-07

Chemical and Biological Weapons Chapter I Nuclear Weapons (178) A. Summary Statement on Nuclear Weapons (178) 1. Basic Principles of Nuclear...199) 1. Basic Principles of Protection Against Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Weapons* (199) 2. Maior Actions For Protection Against Nuclear...people’s bodies through the digestive tract. Skin contact. Biological warfare agents may enter the body directly through the skin , mucous membranes or

The nuclear weapons free world . We already live in

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Antonini, R.

We do live in a nuclear weapons free world, already. After a long debate about nuclear weapons the situation today is such that, officially, no governement is in favor of them. The reason is to be found in the strongest moral stigma on nuclear weapons. Moreover the vast majority of the most influencial people share this view.

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Martz, Joseph C; Stevens, Patrice A; Branstetter, Linda

Until very recently, an evaluation of US policy regarding deterrence and the role of its nuclear weapons arsenal as a deterrent has been largely absent in the public debate. With President's Obama embrace of a goal of a future world without nuclear weapons, issues of nuclear policy and deterrence have just recently risen to the forefront of policy discussions. The traditional role of US nuclear weapons-to deter the use of nuclear weapons by other states-endures, but is no longer unique nor even predominant. In an increasingly multi-polar world, the US now faces growing risks of nuclear weapons proliferation; the spreadmore » of weapons of mass destruction generally to non-state, substate and transnational actors; cyber, space, economic, environmental and resource threats along with the application of numerous other forms of 'soft power' in ways that are inimical to national security and to global stability. What concept of deterrence should the US seek to maintain in the 21st Century? That question remains fluid and central to the current debate. Recently there has been a renewed focusing of attention on the role of US nuclear weapons and a national discussion about what the underlying policy should be. In this environment, both the United States and Russia have committed to drastic reductions in their nuclear arsenals, while still maintaining forces sufficient to ensure unacceptable consequence in response to acts of aggression. Further, the declared nuclear powers have maintained that a limited nuclear arsenal continues to provide insurance against uncertain developments in a changing world. In this environment of US and Russian stockpile reductions, all declared nuclear states have reiterated the central role which nuclear weapons continue to provide for their supreme national security interests. Given this new environment and the challenges of the next several decades, how might the United States structure its policy and forces with regard to nuclear weapons? Many competing objectives have been stated across the spectrum of political, social, and military thought. These objectives include goals of ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, recommitment to further downsizing of the nuclear arsenal, embracing a long-term goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons, limitations on both the production complex and upgrades to nuclear weapons and delivery systems, and controls and constraints to limit proliferation of nuclear materials and weapons, particularly to rogue states and terrorist groups.« less

Science and Technology Review July/August 2009

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Bearinger, J P

2009-06-29

This month's issue has the following articles: (1) Game-Changing Science in the National Interest - Commentary by Tomas Diaz de la Rubia; (2) Preventing Close Encounters of the Orbiting Kind - The Testbed Environment for Space Situational Awareness is improving capabilities for monitoring and detecting threats to space operations; (3) A CAT Scanner for Nuclear Weapon Components - A new x-ray system images nuclear weapon components in three dimensions, promising unprecedented resolution and clarity; (4) Mass-Producing Positrons - Scientists reveal a new method for yielding a greater density of positrons at a much faster rate inside a laboratory setting; andmore » (5) The Next Generation of Medical Diagnostic Devices - Portable medical diagnostic devices using ultrawideband technology help first responders evaluate injuries in emergency situations and could improve overall health care.« less

10 CFR 810.3 - Definitions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... of neutrons used to effect SNM production in the “subcritical assembly.” Agreement for cooperation... International Atomic Energy Agency. Non-nuclear-weapon state is a country not recognized as a nuclear-weapon...-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Nuclear reactor means an apparatus, other than a nuclear explosive device...

10 CFR 810.3 - Definitions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... of neutrons used to effect SNM production in the “subcritical assembly.” Agreement for cooperation... International Atomic Energy Agency. Non-nuclear-weapon state is a country not recognized as a nuclear-weapon...-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Nuclear reactor means an apparatus, other than a nuclear explosive device...

Your Career and Nuclear Weapons: A Guide for Young Scientists and Engineers.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Albrecht, Andreas; And Others

This four-part booklet examines various issues related to nuclear weapons and how they will affect an individual working as a scientist or engineer. It provides information about the history of nuclear weapons, about the weapons industry which produces them, and about new weapons programs. Issues are raised so that new or future graduates may make…

DoD Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability Assurance

DTIC Science & Technology

2016-04-27

destructive power, and the potential consequences of an accident or unauthorized act. Assured nuclear weapons safety, security, and control remain of...DOD INSTRUCTION 5210.42 DOD NUCLEAR WEAPONS PERSONNEL RELIABILITY ASSURANCE Originating Component: Office of the Under Secretary of...from the DoD Issuances Website at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives. Reissues and renames: DoD Instruction 5210.42, “ Nuclear Weapons Personnel

What Happens to Deterrence as Nuclear Weapons Decrease Toward Zero?

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Drell, Sidney

2011-04-01

Steps reducing reliance on deployed nuclear weapons en route to zero will be discussed. They include broadly enhancing cooperation and transparency agreements beyond the provisions for verifying limits on deployed strategic nuclear warheads and delivery systems in the New START treaty. Two questions that will be addressed are: What conditions would have to be established in order to maintain strategic stability among nations as nuclear weapons recede in importance? What would nuclear deterrence be like in a world without nuclear weapons?

BACTERIAL AND CHEMICAL WARFARE—The Current Status

PubMed Central

Coggins, Cecil H.

1960-01-01

For fourteen years public attention has been focused so sharply on atomic weapons as to lose sight of other, less spectacular but equally significant advances in the art of warfare. In the shadows cast by brilliant research in nuclear physics are hidden startling advances in the field of chemical and biological weapons. These weapons, as now developed, are not only capable of producing mass casualties quite comparable with those of atomic bombs, but they also possess certain advantages which may make them the weapons of choice for an unscrupulous enemy. If war should come, it is the medical profession which will have the sole responsibility for protecting the citizens of California against these weapons, and we can therefore delay no longer in acquainting ourselves with their potentialities and characteristics. In this task, we are working under two serious handicaps. The first is that our classical medical training affords little appreciation of the real danger, and the second is the cloak of secrecy surrounding the entire subject. PMID:18732324

The nuclear arsenals and nuclear disarmament.

PubMed

Barnaby, F

1998-01-01

Current world stockpiles of nuclear weapons and the status of treaties for nuclear disarmament and the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons are summarised. The need for including stockpiles of civil plutonium in a programme for ending production and disposing of fissile materials is emphasized, and the ultimate difficulty of disposing of the last few nuclear weapons discussed.

Vulnerability of populations and the urban health care systems to nuclear weapon attack – examples from four American cities

PubMed Central

Bell, William C; Dallas, Cham E

2007-01-01

Background The threat posed by the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) within the United States has grown significantly in recent years, focusing attention on the medical and public health disaster capabilities of the nation in a large scale crisis. While the hundreds of thousands or millions of casualties resulting from a nuclear weapon would, in and of itself, overwhelm our current medical response capabilities, the response dilemma is further exacerbated in that these resources themselves would be significantly at risk. There are many limitations on the resources needed for mass casualty management, such as access to sufficient hospital beds including specialized beds for burn victims, respiration and supportive therapy, pharmaceutical intervention, and mass decontamination. Results The effects of 20 kiloton and 550 kiloton nuclear detonations on high priority target cities are presented for New York City, Chicago, Washington D.C. and Atlanta. Thermal, blast and radiation effects are described, and affected populations are calculated using 2000 block level census data. Weapons of 100 Kts and up are primarily incendiary or radiation weapons, able to cause burns and start fires at distances greater than they can significantly damage buildings, and to poison populations through radiation injuries well downwind in the case of surface detonations. With weapons below 100 Kts, blast effects tend to be stronger than primary thermal effects from surface bursts. From the point of view of medical casualty treatment and administrative response, there is an ominous pattern where these fatalities and casualties geographically fall in relation to the location of hospital and administrative facilities. It is demonstrated that a staggering number of the main hospitals, trauma centers, and other medical assets are likely to be in the fatality plume, rendering them essentially inoperable in a crisis. Conclusion Among the consequences of this outcome would be the probable loss of command-and-control, mass casualties that will have to be treated in an unorganized response by hospitals on the periphery, as well as other expected chaotic outcomes from inadequate administration in a crisis. Vigorous, creative, and accelerated training and coordination among the federal agencies tasked for WMD response, military resources, academic institutions, and local responders will be critical for large-scale WMD events involving mass casualties. PMID:17328796

Vulnerability of populations and the urban health care systems to nuclear weapon attack--examples from four American cities.

PubMed

Bell, William C; Dallas, Cham E

2007-02-28

The threat posed by the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) within the United States has grown significantly in recent years, focusing attention on the medical and public health disaster capabilities of the nation in a large scale crisis. While the hundreds of thousands or millions of casualties resulting from a nuclear weapon would, in and of itself, overwhelm our current medical response capabilities, the response dilemma is further exacerbated in that these resources themselves would be significantly at risk. There are many limitations on the resources needed for mass casualty management, such as access to sufficient hospital beds including specialized beds for burn victims, respiration and supportive therapy, pharmaceutical intervention, and mass decontamination. The effects of 20 kiloton and 550 kiloton nuclear detonations on high priority target cities are presented for New York City, Chicago, Washington D.C. and Atlanta. Thermal, blast and radiation effects are described, and affected populations are calculated using 2000 block level census data. Weapons of 100 Kts and up are primarily incendiary or radiation weapons, able to cause burns and start fires at distances greater than they can significantly damage buildings, and to poison populations through radiation injuries well downwind in the case of surface detonations. With weapons below 100 Kts, blast effects tend to be stronger than primary thermal effects from surface bursts. From the point of view of medical casualty treatment and administrative response, there is an ominous pattern where these fatalities and casualties geographically fall in relation to the location of hospital and administrative facilities. It is demonstrated that a staggering number of the main hospitals, trauma centers, and other medical assets are likely to be in the fatality plume, rendering them essentially inoperable in a crisis. Among the consequences of this outcome would be the probable loss of command-and-control, mass casualties that will have to be treated in an unorganized response by hospitals on the periphery, as well as other expected chaotic outcomes from inadequate administration in a crisis. Vigorous, creative, and accelerated training and coordination among the federal agencies tasked for WMD response, military resources, academic institutions, and local responders will be critical for large-scale WMD events involving mass casualties.

Low Yield Nuclear Experiments: Should They Be Permitted Within a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty?

DTIC Science & Technology

1996-10-01

GRAVITY BOMB 83 AF A W87 ICBM REENTRY VEHICLE 86 AF A W88 SLBM REENTRY VEHICLE 89 NAVY C SAFETY FEATURES: A--(ENDS, IHE, FRP) B--(ENDS, IHE) C--(ENDS) o...NUCLEAR WEAPON DELIVERY PLATFORMS (NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW) STRATEGIC DELIVERY VEHICLES 20 B-2 BOMBERS USAF 66 B-52 BOMBERS USAF 500/450 MINUTEMAN III...ICBMs USAF 14 TRIBENT SUBMARINES USN W/ 24 D-5 MISSILES EACH TACTICAL DELIVERY VEHICLES DUAL CAPABLE AIRCRAFT USAF/USN SEA-LAUNCH CRUISE MISSILES USN

One in a Million Given the Accident: Assuring Nuclear Weapon Safety

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Weaver, Jason

2015-08-25

Since the introduction of nuclear weapons, there has not been a single instance of accidental or unauthorized nuclear detonation, but there have been numerous accidents and “close calls.” As the understanding of these environments has increased, the need for a robust nuclear weapon safety philosophy has grown. This paper describes some of the methods used by the Nuclear Weapon Complex today to assure nuclear weapon safety, including testing, modeling, analysis, and design features. Lastly, it also reviews safety’s continued role in the future and examines how nuclear safety’s present maturity can play a role in strengthening security and other areasmore » and how increased coordination can improve safety and reduce long-term cost.« less

Public views on multiple dimensions of security : nuclear waepons, terrorism, energy, and the environment : 2007.

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Herron, Kerry Gale; Jenkins-Smith, Hank C.

2008-01-01

We analyze and compare findings from identical national surveys of the US general public on nuclear security and terrorism administered by telephone and Internet in mid-2007. Key areas of investigation include assessments of threats to US security; valuations of US nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence; perspectives on nuclear proliferation, including the specific cases of North Korea and Iran; and support for investments in nuclear weapons capabilities. Our analysis of public views on terrorism include assessments of the current threat, progress in the struggle against terrorism, preferences for responding to terrorist attacks at different levels of assumed casualties, and support formore » domestic policies intended to reduce the threat of terrorism. Also we report findings from an Internet survey conducted in mid 2007 that investigates public views of US energy security, to include: energy supplies and reliability; energy vulnerabilities and threats, and relationships among security, costs, energy dependence, alternative sources, and research and investment priorities. We analyze public assessments of nuclear energy risks and benefits, nuclear materials management issues, and preferences for the future of nuclear energy in the US. Additionally, we investigate environmental issues as they relate to energy security, to include expected implications of global climate change, and relationships among environmental issues and potential policy options.« less

The Third Temple’s Holy of Holies: Israel’s Nuclear Weapons

DTIC Science & Technology

1999-09-01

explored the Negev Desert for uranium deposits on orders from the Israeli Ministry of Defense. By 1950, they found low-grade deposits near Beersheba and...capable of delivering nuclear bombs.21 French experts secretly built the Israeli reactor underground at Dimona, in the Negev desert of southern Israel...near Beersheba. Hundreds of French engineers and technicians filled Beersheba, the biggest town in the Negev . Many of the same contractors who built

Nuclear Weapons, Psychology, and International Relations

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Dougherty, James E.

1976-01-01

Fear of nuclear energy, nuclear weapons, and nuclear was is widespread among the peoples of the world. However, to what extent do the fears (both rational and irrational) of policy-making elites and political masses produce actual effects upon the behavior of governments (who, after all, control the use of nuclear weapons)? (Author/RK)

Myth-building: The [open quotes]Islamic[close quotes] bomb

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Hoodbhoy, P.

1993-06-01

The [open quotes]Islamic Bomb[close quotes] is roughly understood to be a nuclear weapon aquired for broad ideological reasons--a weapon that supposedly belongs to the Muslim [ital ummah] or community and, as such, is the ultimate expression of Islamic solidarity. Concern about the Islamic bomb is at the heart of the intense effort to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to Muslim countries. The official justification is a general one: proliferation must be curbed globally. But unofficially, the Islamic bomb gets special attention. The reasons behind this special attention are described in this article. The reasons include fear of terrorism, ofmore » a [ital jihad] willing to indiscriminately use nuclear weapons in hope of a reward in the Hereafter, and of the transfer of nuclear arms from nuclear to non-nuclear Muslim countries in times of crisis. Possibilities for controlling the proliferation of nuclear weapons in Muslim countries are addressed. Reasons are cited as to why various Muslim countries wish to acquire nuclear weapons.« less

Challenging Minimum Deterrence: Articulating the Contemporary Relevance of Nuclear Weapons

DTIC Science & Technology

2016-07-13

Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Accident , and the Illusion of Safety (New York: Penguin Press, 2013), 484. 36. Keir A. Lieber and...Remembrance of Things Past,” 78. 53. Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents , and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton, NJ: Princeton...16 | Air & Space Power Journal Challenging Minimum Deterrence Articulating the Contemporary Relevance of Nuclear Weapons Maj Joshua D. Wiitala, USAF

Evolving perceptions of security - US National Security surveys 1993--1995. Progress report, September 30, 1995--November 14, 1995

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Herron, K.G.; Jenkins-Smith, H.C.

This study analyzes findings from a national survey of 2,490 randomly selected members of the US public conducted between September 30 and November 14, 1995. It provides an over time comparison of public perceptions about nuclear weapons risks and benefits and key nuclear policy issues between 1993 and 1995. Other areas of investigation include policy preferences regarding nuclear proliferation, terrorism, US/Russian nuclear cooperation, and personal security. Public perceptions of post-cold war security were found to be evolving in unexpected ways. The perceived threat of nuclear conflict involving the US had not declined, and the threat of nuclear conflict between othermore » countries and fears of nuclear proliferation and terrorism had increased. Perceived risks associated with managing the US nuclear arsenal were also higher. Perceptions of external and domestic benefits from US nuclear weapons were not declining. Support was found for increasing funding for nuclear weapons safety, training, and maintenance, but most respondents favored decreasing funding for developing and testing new nuclear weapons. Strong support was evident for programs and funding to prevent nuclear proliferation and terrorism. Though skeptical that nuclear weapons can be eliminated, most respondents supported reducing the US nuclear arsenal, banning nuclear test explosions, and ending production of fissile materials to make nuclear weapons. Statistically significant relationships were found between perceptions of nuclear weapons risks and benefits and policy and spending preferences. Demographic variables and basic social and political beliefs were systematically related both to risk and benefit perceptions and policy and spending options.« less

Changing soviet doctrine on nuclear war. Final report

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

FitzGerald, M.C.

In January 1977, General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev delivered an address in the city of Tula whose impact on Soviet doctrine and capabilities continues to this day. By rejecting the possibility of a means of defense against nuclear weapons, or a damage-limiting capacity in nuclear war, Brezhnev closed the door on a debate that had lasted for over a decade in Soviet military thought. Since Tula, the Soviet politico-military leadership has presented a consensus on the reality of Mutual Assured Destruction in present-day conditions. The Soviet debate on the viability of nuclear war as an instrument of policy was likewisemore » resolved by a consensus: nuclear war is so unpromising and dangerous that it remains an instrument of policy only in theory, an instrument of policy that cannot be used. While the Soviet consensus on the diminishing military utility of nuclear weapons represents a ground-breaking shift in doctrine since the heyday of Marshal Sokolovskiy, there is scant evidence of any dispute on the new correlation of war and policy in a nuclear age. Marshal N. V. Ogarkov and other hard-minded military figures have themselves emerged as the architects of the Soviet shift away from a nuclear war-fighting and war-winning strategy, while General Secretary Gorbachev has fashioned a corresponding arms control agenda.« less

Nuclear Weapons: Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

DTIC Science & Technology

2007-05-24

remain current. It indicated plans to reduce the time between a decision to conduct a nuclear test and the test itself, which has been done. Critics ...over the Summit,” Manila Bulletin, August 27, 2005. Critics expressed concern about the implications of these policies for testing and new weapons...force, seek the opportunity to design and build new nuclear weapons, and abandon a ten-year-old moratorium on nuclear weapons testing.”8 Another critic

Nuclear obligations: Nuremberg law, nuclear weapons, and protest

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Burroughs, J.R.

1991-01-01

Nuclear weapons use and deployment and nonviolent anti-nuclear protests are evaluated. Use of nuclear weapons would constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity as defined in both the Nuremberg Charter and Allied Control Council Law No. 10 and applied by the International Military Tribunal and other Nuremberg courts. Strategic and atomic bombing during World War 2 did not set a precedent for use of nuclear weapons. The consequentialist argument for World War 2 bombing fails and the bombing has also been repudiated by codification of the law of war in Protocol 1 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The legality ofmore » deploying nuclear weapons as instruments of geopolitical policy is questionable when measured against the Nuremberg proscription of planning and preparation of aggressive war, war crimes, and crimes against humanity and the United Nations Charter's proscription of aggressive threat of force. While states' practice of deploying the weapons and the arms-control treaties that regulate but do not prohibit mere possession provide some support for legality, those treaties recognize the imperative of preventing nuclear war, and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty commits nuclear-armed states to good-faith negotiation of nuclear disarmament.« less

Reagan and the Nuclear Freeze: "Stars Wars" as a Rhetorical Strategy.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Bjork, Rebecca S.

1988-01-01

Analyzes the interaction between nuclear freeze activists and proponents of a Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Argues that SDI strengthens Reagan's rhetorical position concerning nuclear weapons policy because it reduces the argumentative ground of the freeze movement by envisioning a defensive weapons system that would nullify nuclear weapons.…

Advanced Simulation and Computing Fiscal Year 2016 Implementation Plan, Version 0

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

McCoy, M.; Archer, B.; Hendrickson, B.

2015-08-27

The Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) is an integrated technical program for maintaining the safety, surety, and reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile. The SSP uses nuclear test data, computational modeling and simulation, and experimental facilities to advance understanding of nuclear weapons. It includes stockpile surveillance, experimental research, development and engineering programs, and an appropriately scaled production capability to support stockpile requirements. This integrated national program requires the continued use of experimental facilities and programs, and the computational capabilities to support these programs. The purpose of this IP is to outline key work requirements to be performed and to control individualmore » work activities within the scope of work. Contractors may not deviate from this plan without a revised WA or subsequent IP.« less

Leo Szilard Lectureship Award Talk: Controlling and eliminating nuclear-weapon materials

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

von Hippel, Frank

2010-02-01

Fissile material -- in practice plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) -- is the essential ingredient in nuclear weapons. Controlling and eliminating fissile material and the means of its production is therefore the common denominator for nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and the prevention of nuclear terrorism. From a fundamentalist anti-nuclear-weapon perspective, the less fissile material there is and the fewer locations where it can be found, the safer a world we will have. A comprehensive fissile-material policy therefore would have the following elements: *Consolidation of all nuclear-weapon-usable materials at a minimum number of high-security sites; *A verified ban on the production of HEU and plutonium for weapons; *Minimization of non-weapon uses of HEU and plutonium; and *Elimination of all excess stocks of plutonium and HEU. There is activity on all these fronts but it is not comprehensive and not all aspects are being pursued vigorously or competently. It is therefore worthwhile to review the situation. )

Available means: manifestations of Aristotle's three modes of rhetorical appeal in antinuclear fiction

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Mannix, P.J.

1986-01-01

The abundance of sympathetic scientists, military men and clergymen in antinuclear fiction reflects a public perception that authorities speak most knowledgeably about an issue. Other antinuclear works employ characters with less traditional ethical appeals: nurturing women, vital youths, and even infallible computers. Antinuclear fiction uses enthymeme and example to reflect the history of the nuclear weapons debate. Some works attach the immorality of the weapons by examining the moral dilemmas of nuclear scientists. Others admit the permanence of the nuclear threat. By arousing emotions, fiction is capable of mobilizing its audience's active support for the ideas it presents. The principalmore » emotions that various antinuclear works arouse highlight the close relationship between literature and rhetoric. The most dominant emotions, pity and fear, are the two Aristotle links to tragedy. Scorn, the principal emotion that Dr. Strangelove arouses - is the crucial emotion on which all satire depends. However, the other principal emotion in anti-nuclear fiction - hope - has principally a rhetorical function ensuring that the feelings the works provoke will be channeled constructively.« less

Iran and Iraq - the proliferation challenge. Strategic research report

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Jordan, F.R.

1996-04-15

Worldwide proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles has been on the rise since the end of the Cold War. This escalation has brought a new set of challenges to post-Cold War strategists and policymakers. This study focus on the impact of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. It assesses the possibility of Iran`s and Iraq`s ability to develop a nuclear capability within the next twenty to thirty years. United States` strategy and policy to counter this potential is also considered.

A Comparison in the Accuracy of Mapping Nuclear Fallout Patterns Using HPAC, HYSPLIT, DELFIC FPT and an AFIT FORTRAN95 Fallout Deposition ode

DTIC Science & Technology

2011-03-01

Capability (HPAC), HPAC 4.04 On-Line Help. Alexandria VA , April 2005. 13. Draxler, Roland R. and G.D. Hess. Description of the HYSPLIT_4 Modeling...Effects of Nuclear Weapons. Alexandria, VA : The United States Department of Defense and the United States Department of Energy, 1977. 18...77: 437-431 (3 March 1996). 25. Moroz , Brian E., Harold L. Beck, Andre Bouville, and Steven L. Simon. “Predictions of Dispersion and Deposition

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Peterson, J.F.

The global proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has become one of the most immediate and dangerous threats to U.S. national security. Ballistic missiles were used in four of the last six major wars. Some 190 missiles were fired by Iraqis over a six week period at Iranian cities in 1988, during the 'War of the Cities'. Iraq's firing of Scuds against coalition forces and Israel during the Gulf War provided a vivid reminder of the threat these weapons can present to the world community. During the 1980's, many Third World countries assigned a high prioritymore » to the acquisition of ballistic missiles. By 1991, more than 20 of these nations either possessed ballistic missiles or were attempting to obtain them. Today 43 nations possess ballistic missiles. Seventeen of these probably have a nuclear weapon capability, with 20 of them possessing also a chemical or biological capability. This paper seeks to: define the military challenge ballistic missiles represent; review current U.S. counter-proliferation and nonproliferation initiatives and, finally make recommendations on other potential methods or considerations to reduce ballistic missile proliferation.« less

Civil Defense, U. S. A.: A Programmed Orientation to Civil Defense. Unit 2. Nuclear Weapons Effects and Shelter.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DOD), Battle Creek, MI.

Basic information about nuclear weapons is presented so that their effects can be meaningfully related to the defensive countermeasures which will be most effective against them. Major topics include: (1) Explosive power of nuclear weapons, (2) Major effects of nuclear explosions, (3) Two basic types of nuclear explosions, (4) Contrast between air…

Expanding Fixed-Wing Aircraft Capability in US Army Aviation Operations

DTIC Science & Technology

2009-06-12

48 CHAPTER 5 FINDINGS AND RESULTS ...forces were being neglected by excessive reliance on nuclear weapons as a deterrent to war (Fowler 1990). In 1954, General Gavin wrote an influential...aircraft had deposited them as far forward as possible (Tolson 1989, 23). As a result of the Howze Board recommendations, the Department of Defense

United States Army Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear Corps Capability Combating the Contemporary Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat

DTIC Science & Technology

2012-06-08

doctrine is as up to date as possible given the importance of this mission set. In establishing doctrine, doctrine writers must evaluate the ability...radiation and it also unable to identify the radioisotope present. While just being aware of the presence of radiation can be useful, this equipment is

75 FR 34919 - Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect To the Risk of Nuclear Proliferation Created...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-06-18

... To the Risk of Nuclear Proliferation Created By the Accumulation of Weapons-usable Fissile Material... Risk of Nuclear Proliferation Created By the Accumulation of Weapons-usable Fissile Material In the... Russian Federation Concerning the Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted from Nuclear Weapons...

77 FR 37261 - Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to the Risk of Nuclear Proliferation Created...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2012-06-21

... National Emergency With Respect to the Risk of Nuclear Proliferation Created by the Accumulation of Weapons... Extracted from Nuclear Weapons, dated February 18, 1993, and related contracts and agreements (collectively... derived from nuclear weapons to low enriched uranium for peaceful commercial purposes. The order invoked...

Irans Nuclear Program: Tehrans Compliance with International Obligations

DTIC Science & Technology

2016-04-07

ratified the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970. Article III of the treaty requires non-nuclear- weapon states-parties 1 to accept...concern that Tehran is pursuing nuclear weapons . Tehran’s construction of gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facilities is currently the main source...uranium (HEU), which is one of the two types of fissile material used in nuclear weapons . HEU can also be used as fuel in certain types of nuclear

Irans Nuclear Program: Tehrans Compliance with International Obligations

DTIC Science & Technology

2016-03-03

ratified the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970. Article III of the treaty requires non-nuclear- weapon states-parties 1 to accept...concern that Tehran is pursuing nuclear weapons . Tehran’s construction of gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facilities is currently the main source...uranium (HEU), which is one of the two types of fissile material used in nuclear weapons . HEU can also be used as fuel in certain types of nuclear

The Defense Threat Reduction Agency's Technical Nuclear Forensics Research and Development Program

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Franks, J.

2015-12-01

The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) Technical Nuclear Forensics (TNF) Research and Development (R&D) Program's overarching goal is to design, develop, demonstrate, and transition advanced technologies and methodologies that improve the interagency operational capability to provide forensics conclusions after the detonation of a nuclear device. This goal is attained through the execution of three focus areas covering the span of the TNF process to enable strategic decision-making (attribution): Nuclear Forensic Materials Exploitation - Development of targeted technologies, methodologies and tools enabling the timely collection, analysis and interpretation of detonation materials.Prompt Nuclear Effects Exploitation - Improve ground-based capabilities to collect prompt nuclear device outputs and effects data for rapid, complementary and corroborative information.Nuclear Forensics Device Characterization - Development of a validated and verified capability to reverse model a nuclear device with high confidence from observables (e.g., prompt diagnostics, sample analysis, etc.) seen after an attack. This presentation will outline DTRA's TNF R&D strategy and current investments, with efforts focusing on: (1) introducing new technical data collection capabilities (e.g., ground-based prompt diagnostics sensor systems; innovative debris collection and analysis); (2) developing new TNF process paradigms and concepts of operations to decrease timelines and uncertainties, and increase results confidence; (3) enhanced validation and verification (V&V) of capabilities through technology evaluations and demonstrations; and (4) updated weapon output predictions to account for the modern threat environment. A key challenge to expanding these efforts to a global capability is the need for increased post-detonation TNF international cooperation, collaboration and peer reviews.

Weapons of mass destruction: Overview of the CBRNEs (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives).

PubMed

Prockop, Leon D

2006-11-01

The events of September 11, 2001, made citizens of the world acutely aware of disasters consequent to present-day terrorism. This is a war being waged for reasons obscure to many of its potential victims. The term "NBCs" was coined in reference to terrorist weapons of mass destruction, i.e., nuclear, biological and chemical. The currently accepted acronym is "CBRNE" which includes Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive weapons. Non-nuclear explosives are the most common terrorist weapon now in use. Nuclear and radiological weapons are beyond the scope of this publication, which focuses on the "CBEs", i.e. chemical, biological and explosive weapons. Although neurologists will not be the first responders to CBEs, they must know about the neurological effects in order to provide diagnosis and treatment to survivors. Neurological complications of chemical, biological and explosive weapons which have or may be used by terrorists are reviewed by international experts in this publication. Management and treatment profiles are outlined.

28 CFR 13.6 - Criteria for reward.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-07-01

... Judicial Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ATOMIC WEAPONS AND SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS REWARDS... reward under the Atomic Weapons and Special Nuclear Materials Rewards Act must be original, and must..., acquire or export special nuclear material or atomic weapons, or (5) Loss, diversion or disposal or...

28 CFR 13.6 - Criteria for reward.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-07-01

... Judicial Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ATOMIC WEAPONS AND SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS REWARDS... reward under the Atomic Weapons and Special Nuclear Materials Rewards Act must be original, and must..., acquire or export special nuclear material or atomic weapons, or (5) Loss, diversion or disposal or...

28 CFR 13.6 - Criteria for reward.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... Judicial Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ATOMIC WEAPONS AND SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS REWARDS... reward under the Atomic Weapons and Special Nuclear Materials Rewards Act must be original, and must..., acquire or export special nuclear material or atomic weapons, or (5) Loss, diversion or disposal or...

28 CFR 13.6 - Criteria for reward.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-07-01

... Judicial Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ATOMIC WEAPONS AND SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS REWARDS... reward under the Atomic Weapons and Special Nuclear Materials Rewards Act must be original, and must..., acquire or export special nuclear material or atomic weapons, or (5) Loss, diversion or disposal or...

28 CFR 13.6 - Criteria for reward.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-07-01

... Judicial Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ATOMIC WEAPONS AND SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS REWARDS... reward under the Atomic Weapons and Special Nuclear Materials Rewards Act must be original, and must..., acquire or export special nuclear material or atomic weapons, or (5) Loss, diversion or disposal or...

Multidimensional Analysis of Nuclear Detonations

DTIC Science & Technology

2015-09-17

Features on the nuclear weapons testing films because of the expanding and emissive nature of the nuclear fireball. The use of these techniques to produce...Treaty (New Start Treaty) have reduced the acceptable margins of error. Multidimensional analysis provides the modern approach to nuclear weapon ...scientific community access to the information necessary to expand upon the knowledge of nuclear weapon effects. This data set has the potential to provide

Nuclear Weapons: DOD Assessed the Need for Each Leg of the Strategic Triad and Considered Other Reductions to Nuclear Forces

DTIC Science & Technology

2016-09-01

NUCLEAR WEAPONS DOD Assessed the Need for Each Leg of the Strategic Triad and Considered Other Reductions to... Nuclear Forces Report to Congressional Requesters September 2016 GAO-16-740 United States Government Accountability Office United States...Government Accountability Office Highlights of GAO-16-740, a report to congressional requesters September 2016 NUCLEAR WEAPONS DOD Assessed

Nuclear weapons and medicine: some ethical dilemmas.

PubMed

Haines, A; de B White, C; Gleisner, J

1983-12-01

The enormous destructive power of present stocks of nuclear weapons poses the greatest threat to public health in human history. Technical changes in weapons design are leading to an increased emphasis on the ability to fight a nuclear war, eroding the concept of deterrence based on mutually assured destruction and increasing the risk of nuclear war. Medical planning and civil defence preparations for nuclear war have recently been increased in several countries although there is little evidence that they will be of significant value in the aftermath of a nuclear conflict. These developments have raised new ethical dilemmas for those in health professions. If there is any risk of use of weapons of mass destruction, then support for deterrence with these weapons as a policy for national or global security appears to be incompatible with basic principles of medical ethics and international law. The primary medical responsibility under such circumstances is to participate in attempts to prevent nuclear war.

Y-12 Integrated Materials Management System

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Alspaugh, D. H.; Hickerson, T. W.

2002-06-03

The Integrated Materials Management System, when fully implemented, will provide the Y-12 National Security Complex with advanced inventory information and analysis capabilities and enable effective assessment, forecasting and management of nuclear materials, critical non-nuclear materials, and certified supplies. These capabilities will facilitate future Y-12 stockpile management work, enhance interfaces to existing National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) corporate-level information systems, and enable interfaces to planned NNSA systems. In the current national nuclear defense environment where, for example, weapons testing is not permitted, material managers need better, faster, more complete information about material properties and characteristics. They now must manage non-special nuclearmore » material at the same high-level they have managed SNM, and information capabilities about both must be improved. The full automation and integration of business activities related to nuclear and non-nuclear materials that will be put into effect by the Integrated Materials Management System (IMMS) will significantly improve and streamline the process of providing vital information to Y-12 and NNSA managers. This overview looks at the kinds of information improvements targeted by the IMMS project, related issues, the proposed information architecture, and the progress to date in implementing the system.« less

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Lakamp, M.A.

The United States has adopted a policy of calculated ambiguity regarding the role of nuclear weapons in response to a potential chemical or biological weapons (CBW) attack. Many factors affect decisions about the role nuclear weapons play in US counterproliferation strategy. This thesis describes the policy of calculated ambiguity and offers some observations about its prospects and pitfalls. The thesis presents evidence that suggests nuclear weapons could play a positive role in the US counterproliferation strategy, at least in some circumstances. It also explains how such a role could conflict with the US nonproliferation strategy. Such a role would alsomore » violate the nuclear taboo and be seen by a majority of countries as illegal and immoral. The United States has chosen a policy of calculated ambiguity in an attempt to retain the deterrent value of nuclear weapons without paying the political, legal, and moral costs of explicit reliance on nuclear weapons to deter the use of CBW. This may have short-term benefits, but ultimately may damage the national interest.« less

Going nuclear: The spread of nuclear weapons 1986-1987

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Spector, L.S.

1987-01-01

In the third annual report of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace on the spread of nuclear weapons, Spector provides a critical survey of the status of nuclear proliferation throughout the world and examines the nuclear potential of nations in the Middle East, Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Drawing on both historical documents and up-to-date reports, the author addresses such specific topics as Israel's nuclear arsenal, nuclear terrorism and its global security implications, arms control and nuclear safeguards, international treaties, weapons buildup, and political radicalism and unrest in nuclear-threshold nations.

The doctrine of the nuclear-weapon states and the future of non-proliferation

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Panofsky, W.K.H.; Bunn, G.

Less than a year remains before the critical conference in April 1995 to review and extend the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the main international barrier to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This is a critical moment for the United States. With the end of the Cold War, the likelihood of nuclear war with the states of the former Soviet Union has been radically reduced, but there is greatly increased concern over the potential threats from states or sub-state groups seeking to develop or acquire nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

Wartime nuclear weapons research in Germany and Japan.

PubMed

Grunden, Walter E; Walker, Mark; Yamnazaki, Masakatsu

2005-01-01

This article compares military research projects during the Second World War to develop nuclear weapons in Germany and Japan, two countries who lost the war and failed to create nuclear weapons. The performance and motivations of the scientists, as well as the institutional support given the work, is examined, explaining why, in each case, the project went as far as it did-but no further. The story is carried over into the postwar period, when the two cultures and their scientists had to deal with the buildup of nuclear weapons during the cold war and the new nuclear power industry.

Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues

DTIC Science & Technology

2012-05-10

2009. 143 Abdul Mannan, “Preventing Nuclear Terrorism in Pakistan: Sabotage of a Spent Fuel Cask or a Commercial Irradiation Source in Transport ,” in...Program.” Some analysts argue that spent nuclear fuel is more vulnerable when being transported . 144 Martellini, 2008. Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons...urgency to the program. Pakistan produced fissile material for its nuclear weapons using gas-centrifuge-based uranium enrichment technology, which it

Norms Versus Security: What is More Important to Japan’s View of Nuclear Weapons

DTIC Science & Technology

2017-03-01

objectives: “1) prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, 2) promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy , and 3...http://www.world- nuclear.org/information-library/safety-and-security/safety-of-plants/fukushima-accident.aspx. 40 “Japanese Wary of Nuclear Energy ...PewResearchCenter, accessed February 22, 2017. http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/06/05/japanese-wary-of- nuclear - energy / 41 Malcolm Foster, “Thousands

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the relationship

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Graham, Thomas, Jr.

2014-05-01

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the most important international security arrangement that we have that is protecting the world community and this has been true for many years. But it did not happen by accident, it is a strategic bargain in which 184 states gave up the right forever to acquire the most powerful weapon ever created in exchange for a commitment from the five states allowed to keep nuclear weapons under the NPT (U.S., U.K., Russia, France and China), to share peaceful nuclear technology and to engage in disarmament negotiations aimed at the ultimate elimination of their nuclear stockpiles. The most important part of this is the comprehensive nuclear test ban (CTBT); the thinking by the 184 NPT non-nuclear weapon states was and is that they understand that the elimination of nuclear weapon stockpiles is a long way off, but at least the NPT nuclear weapon states could stop testing the weapons. The CTBT has been ratified by 161 states but by its terms it can only come into force if 44 nuclear potential states ratify; 36 have of the 44 have ratified it, the remaining eight include the United States and seven others, most of whom are in effect waiting for the United States. No state has tested a nuclear weapon-except for complete outlier North Korea-in 15 years. There appears to be no chance that the U.S. Senate will approve the CTBT for ratification in the foreseeable future, but the NPT may not survive without it. Perhaps it is time to consider an interim measure, for the UN Security Council to declare that any future nuclear weapon test any time, anywhere is a "threat to peace and security", in effect a violation of international law, which in today's world it clearly would be.

Nukes in the Post-Cold War Era A View of the World from Inside the US Nuclear Weapons Program

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Wood, Blake Philip

Why do we have nuclear weapons? What is in the US stockpile, how is it deployed and controlled, and how it has changed over the years? What is in the “nuclear weapons complex” and what does each lab and plant do? How do the DOE/NNSA Design Labs interact with the Intelligence Community? How does the US stockpile, NW complex, and NW policy compare with those of other countries? What is easy and hard about designing nuclear weapons?

Confidence in Nuclear Weapons as Numbers Decrease and Time Since Testing Increases

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Adams, Marvin

2011-04-01

As numbers and types of nuclear weapons are reduced, the U.S. objective is to maintain a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent without nuclear-explosive testing. A host of issues combine to make this a challenge. An evolving threat environment may prompt changes to security systems. Aging of weapons has led to ``life extension programs'' that produce weapons that differ in some ways from the originals. Outdated and changing facilities pose difficulties for life-extension, surveillance, and dismantlement efforts. A variety of factors can make it a challenge to recruit, develop, and retain outstanding people with the skills and experience that are needed to form the foundation of a credible deterrent. These and other issues will be discussed in the framework of proposals to reduce and perhaps eliminate nuclear weapons.

High School Students' Attitudes toward Islam and Muslims: Can a Social Studies Course Make a Difference?

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Klepper, Adam

2014-01-01

Despite 9/11, the seemingly endless Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the possibility of Iran developing nuclear weapons capabilities, and the Arab Spring and its aftermath, the social studies curricula of high schools throughout the nation generally put little emphasis on the Middle East and Islam as the foundation for understanding vital issues that…

Red China’s Capitalist Bomb: Inside the Chinese Neutron Bomb Program

DTIC Science & Technology

2015-01-01

developed an enhanced radiation weapon (ERW) but did not deploy it. ERWs, better known as “ neutron bombs,” are specialized nuclear weapons with...contemporary systems of concern. An ERW is a specialized nuclear weapon optimized to produce prompt radiation. Such a device emits neutrons with high...Council stated that China mastered “in succession the neutron bomb design technology and the nuclear weapon miniaturization technology.”10 This statement

Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues

DTIC Science & Technology

2009-12-09

Nuclear Terrorism in Pakistan: Sabotage of a Spent Fuel Cask or a Commercial Irradiation Source in Transport ,” in Pakistan’s Nuclear Future, 2008...gave additional urgency to the program. Pakistan produced fissile material for its nuclear weapons using gas-centrifuge-based uranium enrichment...technology, which it mastered by the mid-1980s. Highly-enriched uranium (HEU) is one of two types of fissile material used in nuclear weapons; the other

The nuclear present. A guide to recent books on nuclear war, weapons, the peace movement, and related issues, with a chronology of nuclear events, 1789-1991

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Burns, G.

The Nuclear Present brings the interested reader up-to-date on significant English-language books about nuclear weapons and related topics, identifying primarily important works of nuclear non-fiction that have come out since 1984. Each reference has a paragraph of comment about its subject and value. General organizational areas include the following: Reference Works; Nuclear weapons and Nuclear war (14 sub-headings including overviews, development, effects, tests, arms race, prospectives, legal considerations etc.); Strategy; proliferation; Stratigic Defense; Arms control and disarmament; ethical, pholosophical and religous perspectives; new paths to peace; periodic guide; the Chernobyl Disaster. An extensive Nuclear Chronology (1789-1991) written by the authormore » allows a fairly detailed sense of the historical record of nuclear weapons, including testing, manufacture, use and movements for arms control and disarmament.« less

The Security of Russia's Nuclear Arsenal: The Human Factor

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Ball, D.Y.

1999-10-12

Assertions by the Russian military that all of their nuclear weapons are secure against theft and that nuclear units within the military are somehow insulated from the problems plaguing the Russian military should not be accepted uncritically. Accordingly, we should not give unwarranted credence to the pronouncements of military figures like Cal.-Gen. Igor Valynkin, Chief of the Defense Ministry's 12th Main Directorate, which oversees the country's nuclear arsenal. He contends that ''Russian nuclear weapons are under reliable supervision'' and that ''talk about the unreliability of our control over nuclear weapons has only one pragmatic goal--to convince international society that themore » country is incapable of maintaining nuclear safety and to introduce international oversight over those weapons, as it is done, for example, in Iraq.'' While the comparison to Iraq is preposterous, many analysts might agree with Valynkin's sanguine appraisal of the security of Russia's nuclear weapons. In contrast, I argue that the numerous difficulties confronting the military as a whole should cause concern in the West over the security of the Russian nuclear arsenal.« less

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the relationship

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Graham, Thomas Jr.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the most important international security arrangement that we have that is protecting the world community and this has been true for many years. But it did not happen by accident, it is a strategic bargain in which 184 states gave up the right forever to acquire the most powerful weapon ever created in exchange for a commitment from the five states allowed to keep nuclear weapons under the NPT (U.S., U.K., Russia, France and China), to share peaceful nuclear technology and to engage in disarmament negotiations aimed at the ultimate elimination of their nuclearmore » stockpiles. The most important part of this is the comprehensive nuclear test ban (CTBT); the thinking by the 184 NPT non-nuclear weapon states was and is that they understand that the elimination of nuclear weapon stockpiles is a long way off, but at least the NPT nuclear weapon states could stop testing the weapons. The CTBT has been ratified by 161 states but by its terms it can only come into force if 44 nuclear potential states ratify; 36 have of the 44 have ratified it, the remaining eight include the United States and seven others, most of whom are in effect waiting for the United States. No state has tested a nuclear weapon-except for complete outlier North Korea-in 15 years. There appears to be no chance that the U.S. Senate will approve the CTBT for ratification in the foreseeable future, but the NPT may not survive without it. Perhaps it is time to consider an interim measure, for the UN Security Council to declare that any future nuclear weapon test any time, anywhere is a 'threat to peace and security', in effect a violation of international law, which in today's world it clearly would be.« less

Strategic defense initiative: critical issues

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Nuckolls, J.H.

The objectives of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) as outlined by President Reagan are discussed. The principal objective for SDI is as a defense against ballistic missiles. Soviet objections and a summary of US-USSR dialogue on the subject are reviewed. Most US studies have been critical of SDI. Four critical issues are addressed in depth: are defense weapons technologically feasible which have high economic leverage relative to offensive ballistic missiles; would the defense feasibility and leverage be degraded or enhanced in the technological race between weapons innovation and countermeasures; could stability be achieved during and after the transition to themore » defense dominated world envisioned by SDI proponents; would the deployment of high leverage defensive weapons increase or decrease the security of NATO Europe, and the probability of major conventional or nuclear wars. The issue of SDI may lead to a paradox that contains the seeds of catastrophe. The author concludes by warning that nuclear disarmament may eliminate the highly successful deterrent mechanism for avoiding another major world war. In a world made safe for major conventional wars by the apparent ''elimination'' of nuclear weapons, the leaders in a conventional World War III - involving unimaginable suffering, hatred, terror, and death - would be strongly motivated to introduce nuclear weapons in the crucial decisive battles. Even if diplomacy could ''eliminate'' nuclear weapons, man's knowledge of nuclear weapons can never be eliminated. The paradox is the attempt to eliminate nuclear weapons may maximize the probability of their use. (DMC)« less

Evaluating Nonproliferation Bona Fides

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Seward, Amy M.; Mathews, Caroline E.; Kessler, Carol E.

2008-07-14

Anticipated growth of global nuclear energy in a difficult international security environment heightens concerns that states could decide to exploit their civilian nuclear fuel cycles as a means of acquiring nuclear weapons. Such concerns partly reflect a fundamental tension in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). On the one hand, Articles II and III of the NPT clearly prohibit each non-nuclear-weapon state party from acquiring nuclear weapons. On the other hand, Article IV of the NPT confers the “inalienable right” of Parties to the treaty to “develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes…,”more » and directs all Parties to “facilitate… the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy…,” and “cooperate in contributing…to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes….” This juxtaposition raises the possibility that a state could exercise its Article IV right to develop a civilian nuclear fuels cycle and then use the equipment, materials and technology to acquire nuclear weapons in violation of its Article II and III obligations.« less

Joseph A. Burton Forum Award: Some Nuclear Weapons Dilemmas

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

May, Michael

2014-03-01

Nuclear weapons pose a combination of political and ethical dilemmas the solution to which has not been found. On one hand, in the view of both US government leaders and US allies, nuclear deterrence continues to play an essential part in the US role as the ultimate source of military strength for the alliances among the major democratic countries. It also continues to be in demand by countries that believe themselves to be isolated and threatened. On the other hand, nuclear weapons, besides being effective deterrents, can cause unprecedented loss of life and risk the demise of civilizations. No ban or technical precaution could prevent the rebuilding of nuclear weapons in a crisis. No diplomatic arrangement to date has erased the threat of invasion and war in the world. Only the abandonment of war and the threat of war as instruments of policy can make nuclear weapons obsolete. The slow, halting, risky road to that end remains the only hope for a world in which lasting solutions to the nuclear dilemmas are possible.

Nuclear weapons and medicine: some ethical dilemmas.

PubMed Central

Haines, A; de B White, C; Gleisner, J

1983-01-01

The enormous destructive power of present stocks of nuclear weapons poses the greatest threat to public health in human history. Technical changes in weapons design are leading to an increased emphasis on the ability to fight a nuclear war, eroding the concept of deterrence based on mutually assured destruction and increasing the risk of nuclear war. Medical planning and civil defence preparations for nuclear war have recently been increased in several countries although there is little evidence that they will be of significant value in the aftermath of a nuclear conflict. These developments have raised new ethical dilemmas for those in health professions. If there is any risk of use of weapons of mass destruction, then support for deterrence with these weapons as a policy for national or global security appears to be incompatible with basic principles of medical ethics and international law. The primary medical responsibility under such circumstances is to participate in attempts to prevent nuclear war. PMID:6668585

76 FR 35953 - Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to the Risk of Nuclear Proliferation Created...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-06-20

... Accumulation of Weapons-Useable Fissile Material in the Territory of the Russian Federation #0; #0; #0... National Emergency With Respect to the Risk of Nuclear Proliferation Created by the Accumulation of Weapons... Extracted from Nuclear Weapons, dated February 18, 1993, and related contracts and agreements (collectively...

3 CFR - Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to the Risk of Nuclear Proliferation Created...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... to the Risk of Nuclear Proliferation Created by the Accumulation of Weapons-Usable Fissile Material... Proliferation Created by the Accumulation of Weapons-Usable Fissile Material in the Territory of the Russian... Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted from Nuclear Weapons, dated February 18, 1993, and related...

3 CFR - Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to the Risk of Nuclear Proliferation Created...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... to the Risk of Nuclear Proliferation Created by the Accumulation of Weapons-usable Fissile Material... Proliferation Created by the Accumulation of Weapons-usable Fissile Material in the Territory of the Russian... Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted from Nuclear Weapons, dated February 18, 1993, and related...

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Background and Current Developments

DTIC Science & Technology

2009-11-23

there are no plans to do so.’”5 Critics expressed concern about the implications of these policies for testing and new weapons. A statement by...opportunity to design and build new nuclear weapons, and abandon a ten-year-old moratorium on nuclear weapons testing.”6 Another critic felt that increased...cannot diagnose or remedy a problem in a warhead critical the U.S. nuclear deterrent without conducting a nuclear test.10 Similarly, a Statement of

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Background and Current Developments

DTIC Science & Technology

2010-01-06

the future, but there are no plans to do so.’”5 Critics expressed concern about the implications of these policies for testing and new weapons. A...seek the opportunity to design and build new nuclear weapons, and abandon a ten-year-old moratorium on nuclear weapons testing.”6 Another critic felt...warhead critical the U.S. nuclear deterrent without conducting a nuclear test.10 Similarly, a Statement of Administration Policy on S. 1547, FY2008

Advanced power sources for space missions

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Gavin, Joseph G., Jr.; Burkes, Tommy R.; English, Robert E.; Grant, Nicholas J.; Kulcinski, Gerald L.; Mullin, Jerome P.; Peddicord, K. Lee; Purvis, Carolyn K.; Sarjeant, W. James; Vandevender, J. Pace

1989-01-01

Approaches to satisfying the power requirements of space-based Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) missions are studied. The power requirements for non-SDI military space missions and for civil space missions of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) are also considered. The more demanding SDI power requirements appear to encompass many, if not all, of the power requirements for those missions. Study results indicate that practical fulfillment of SDI requirements will necessitate substantial advances in the state of the art of power technology. SDI goals include the capability to operate space-based beam weapons, sometimes referred to as directed-energy weapons. Such weapons pose unprecedented power requirements, both during preparation for battle and during battle conditions. The power regimes for these two sets of applications are referred to as alert mode and burst mode, respectively. Alert-mode power requirements are presently stated to range from about 100 kW to a few megawatts for cumulative durations of about a year or more. Burst-mode power requirements are roughly estimated to range from tens to hundreds of megawatts for durations of a few hundred to a few thousand seconds. There are two likely energy sources, chemical and nuclear, for powering SDI directed-energy weapons during the alert and burst modes. The choice between chemical and nuclear space power systems depends in large part on the total duration during which power must be provided. Complete study findings, conclusions, and eight recommendations are reported.

Conventional nuclear strategy and the American doctrine of counterforce

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

David, C.P.

Debate over nuclear weapons still lingers and one cause of this trend, as suggested by this thesis, is the rise of conventional nuclear strategy or, in other words, the attempt by the US government to apply through the counterforce doctrine a conventional weapons strategy in an age of nuclear weapons. That debate is analyzed, as well as the thinking underlining conventional nuclear strategy, and explains why conventionalization has become popular in US nuclear weapons policies. A feature of the American nuclear debate has been the unresolved tension between two approaches to nuclear strategy, namely: the apocalyptic approach and the conventionalmore » approach. The confrontation between these camps has resulted over the years in a gradual but steady erosion of the strategic consensus to the point where, under the Reagan administration, the conventional camp appears to have emerged as a clear winner from the nuclear debate. The attractiveness of conventional nuclear strategy can be attributed to the influence and working of an American style of nuclear strategy, i.e., a specific approach to the phenomena of nuclear weapons. The author concludes that the conventional and official strategic view that nuclear problems can be solved by technological progress may, in fact, contribute to worsen rather than improve the thermonuclear condition of the world.« less

International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards: Challenge and response

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Spector, Leonard S.

2017-11-01

This article provides a critical review of the nuclear accounting and inspection system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), known as "IAEA safeguards." The article focuses on the multiple challenges the Agency confronts in verifying that all nuclear activities in the countries under its safeguards system are being pursued for exclusively peaceful purposes. The principal challenges noted are those posed by: undeclared facilities, the development of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities, illicit procurement activities, denial of inspector access, difficulties in verifying absence of weaponization activities, and difficulties in establishing that all nuclear-relevant activities in a state are peaceful. The article is in the form of annotated PowerPoint briefing slides.

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Reynolds, Adam F.; Steinfeldt, Bradley Alexander; Lafleur, Jarret Marshall

The U.S. nuclear stockpile hedge is an inventory of non-deployed nuclear warheads and a force structure capable of deploying those warheads. Current guidance is to retain this hedge to mitigate the risk associated with the technical failure of any single warhead type or adverse geopolitical developments that could require augmentation of the force. The necessary size of the hedge depends on the composition of the nuclear stockpile and assumed constraints. Knowing the theoretical minimum hedge given certain constraints is useful when considering future weapons policy. HedgeHOGS, an Excel-based tool, was developed to enable rapid calculation of the minimum hedge sizemore » associated with varying active stockpile composition and hedging strategies.« less

Large Bilateral Reductions in Superpower Nuclear Weapons.

DTIC Science & Technology

1985-07-01

missile ( ABM ) systems were deployed, e.g., the current Soviet ABM system around Moscow. Although there have been no further wartime uses of nuclear...have placed more emphasis on strategic defense than the U.S.; however, by agreeing to the ABM Treaty, the 6Soviets implicitly accepted the fundamental...required for the reliability testing of existing nuclear weapons and the development of future nuclear weapons. The ABM Treaty of 1972 was a

Special Issue on University Nonproliferation Education and Training Introduction.

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Leek, K. M.

2006-07-31

Nonproliferation, like many aspects of security, has not played out as many expected following the end of the cold war. The peace dividend has been elusive in many countries. The notion that the world would become a safer and more secure place as nuclear weapons stockpiles were reduced has been trumped by the rise in international terrorism. Hopes that nuclear weapons would lose their salience as markers of elite status among nations along with pressures to acquire them have been dashed. The drive by some countries and terrorist groups to acquire nuclear weapons has not diminished, and the threat ofmore » proliferation has increased. At the level of the nation state, the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) itself is under pressure as more nations acquire nuclear weapons, de facto weapons states fail to join, and nations that want to acquire them leave or threaten to leave. At the sub-state level, the convergence of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has introduced an element of uncertainty into nonproliferation that is unprecedented. Another feature of the post-cold war era that has taken many by surprise is the continued, and growing need for trained specialists in nonproliferation and nuclear materials management. Contained within the notion of disarmament and reduced strategic importance of nuclear weapons was the expectation of a diminishing workforce of trained nonproliferation and nuclear materials specialists. Events have overtaken this assumption.« less

Living with nuclear weapons

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Carnesale, A.; Doty, P.; Hoffmann, S.

1983-01-01

At Harvard President Derek Bok's request, six Harvard professors explain nuclear arms issues to help citizens understand all sides of the national security debates. The goal is to encourage public participation in policy formulation. The book emphasizes that escapism will not improve security; that idealistic plans to eliminate nuclear weapons are a form of escapism. Learning to live with nuclear weapons, they suggest, requires an understanding of the current nuclear predicament and the implications of alternative weapons and policy choices. After reviewing these matters, they emphasize that informed persons will continue to disagree, but that knowledge will improve understanding andmore » appreciation of their differences and improve the quality of policy debates. 54 references, 5 figures, 2 tables. (DCK)« less

Sandia National Laboratories: News

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Sandia National Laboratories: Locations

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Sandia National Laboratories: Careers

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Sandia National Laboratories: Mission

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Sandia National Laboratories: Research

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Sandia National Laboratories:

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Sandia National Laboratories: Feedback

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Multi-Detector Analysis System for Spent Nuclear Fuel Characterization

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Reber, Edward Lawrence; Aryaeinejad, Rahmat; Cole, Jerald Donald

1999-09-01

The Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Non-Destructive Analysis (NDA) program at INEEL is developing a system to characterize SNF for fissile mass, radiation source term, and fissile isotopic content. The system is based on the integration of the Fission Assay Tomography System (FATS) and the Gamma-Neutron Analysis Technique (GNAT) developed under programs supported by the DOE Office of Non-proliferation and National Security. Both FATS and GNAT were developed as separate systems to provide information on the location of special nuclear material in weapons configuration (FATS role), and to measure isotopic ratios of fissile material to determine if the material was frommore » a weapon (GNAT role). FATS is capable of not only determining the presence and location of fissile material but also the quantity of fissile material present to within 50%. GNAT determines the ratios of the fissile and fissionable material by coincidence methods that allow the two prompt (immediately) produced fission fragments to be identified. Therefore, from the combination of FATS and GNAT, MDAS is able to measure the fissile material, radiation source term, and fissile isotopics content.« less

Economic and Non-proliferation Policy Considerations of Uranium Enrichment in Brazil and Argentina

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Short, Steven M.; Phillips, Jon R.; Weimar, Mark R.

2008-09-01

The nuclear development programs of both Argentina and Brazil have, since the 1970s, been premised on the desire for self-sufficiency and assurance of nuclear fuel supply. While military rivalry and mutual distrust led to nuclear weapons related development programs in the 1970s and 1980s, both countries have since terminated these programs. Furthermore, the governments of both countries have pledged their commitment to exclusively non-explosive use of nuclear energy and have signed the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Utilizing rights provided for under the NPT, both Argentina and Brazil have nuclear fuel production facilities, with the notable exception of enrichment plants, thatmore » provide much of the current indigenous fuel requirements for their nuclear power plants. However, both countries are actively developing enrichment capability to fill this gap. The purpose of this report is to assess the economic basis and non-proliferation policy considerations for indigenous enrichment capability within the context of their desired self-sufficiency and to evaluate possible United States Government policy options.« less

Dangers associated with civil nuclear power programmes: weaponization and nuclear waste.

PubMed

Boulton, Frank

2015-07-24

The number of nuclear power plants in the world rose exponentially to 420 by 1990 and peaked at 438 in 2002; but by 2014, as closed plants were not replaced, there were just 388. In spite of using more renewable energy, the world still relies on fossil fuels, but some countries plan to develop new nuclear programmes. Spent nuclear fuel, one of the most dangerous and toxic materials known, can be reprocessed into fresh fuel or into weapons-grade materials, and generates large amounts of highly active waste. This article reviews available literature on government and industry websites and from independent analysts on world energy production, the aspirations of the 'new nuclear build' programmes in China and the UK, and the difficulties in keeping the environment safe over an immense timescale while minimizing adverse health impacts and production of greenhouse gases, and preventing weaponization by non-nuclear-weapons states acquiring civil nuclear technology.

Sandia National Laboratories: Search Results

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Sandia National Laboratories: Visiting Research Scholars

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Sandia National Laboratories: News: Videos

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Sandia National Laboratories: About Sandia

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Sandia National Laboratories: News: Image Gallery

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Sandia National Laboratories: Research: Biodefense

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Sandia National Laboratories: Privacy and Security

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Sandia National Laboratories: Sandia Digital Media

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Sandia National Laboratories: Careers: Special Programs

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Sandia National Laboratories: Cooperative Monitoring Center

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Sandia National Laboratories: Research: Bioscience

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Sandia National Laboratories: Integrated Military Systems

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Sandia National Laboratories: News: Image Gallery

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Environmental Management System Pollution Prevention History 60 impacts Diversity Locations Facts & Figures Programs Nuclear Weapons About Nuclear Weapons Safety & Security Weapons Science & Technology Robotics R&D 100 Awards Laboratory Directed Research & Development Technology Deployment Centers

U.S. Nuclear Weapons: Changes in Policy and Force Structure

DTIC Science & Technology

2006-08-10

the Mound Plant , near Dayton OH; the Pinellas Plant , in Clearwater, FL; and the Pantex Plant near Amarillo, TX. These facilities were also operated...major nuclear weapons production facilities. These included the Rocky Flats Plant , outside Denver, CO; the Kansas City Plant , near Kansas City, MO...response to safety concerns. The Rocky Flats Plant , which produced the nuclear triggers, or “pits,” for nuclear weapons closed in 1989, in response

Zero Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Security Enterprise Modernization

DTIC Science & Technology

2011-01-01

national security strategy. For the first time since the Manhattan Project , the United States was no longer building nuclear weapons and was in fact...50 to 60 years to the Manhattan Project and are on the verge of catastrophic failure. Caustic chemicals and processes have sped up the corrosion and...day, the United States must fund the long-term modernization effort of the entire enter­ prise. Notes 1. Nuclear Weapon Archive, “The Manhattan

Leveraging success: applying Interagency Lessons learned to the Joint Air Delivered Nuclear Weapons Acquisition Process

DTIC Science & Technology

Effective coordination and communication between the Department of Energy (DOE) and the Department of Defense (DoD) is necessary to ensure that the... nuclear weapons stockpile remains safe, secure, and effective without nuclear testing. The science-based Stockpile Sustainment Program (SSP) is the...method used to sustain and maintain the nuclear stockpile throughout the weapons life cycle. A comprehensive review was conducted of the joint

Nuclear Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Counterterrorism: Impacts on Public Health

PubMed Central

Pregenzer, Arian

2014-01-01

Reducing the risks of nuclear war, limiting the spread of nuclear weapons, and reducing global nuclear weapons stockpiles are key national and international security goals. They are pursued through a variety of international arms control, nonproliferation, and counterterrorism treaties and agreements. These legally binding and political commitments, together with the institutional infrastructure that supports them, work to establish global norms of behavior and have limited the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Beyond the primary security objectives, reducing the likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons, preventing environmental releases of radioactive material, increasing the availability of safe and secure nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, and providing scientific data relevant to predicting and managing the consequences of natural or human-caused disasters worldwide provide significant benefits to global public health. PMID:24524501

Sandia National Laboratories: News: Publications: Environmental Reports

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Sandia National Laboratories: Sandia National Laboratories: News: Events

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Sandia National Laboratories: About Sandia: Environmental Responsibility

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Sandia National Laboratories: About Sandia: Community Involvement

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Sandia National Laboratories: News: Publications: HPC Reports

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Sandia National Laboratories: Community Involvement: Volunteer Programs

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Sandia National Laboratories: News: Search Sandia Publications

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Sandia National Laboratories: Working with Sandia: Small Business

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Sandia National Laboratories: Microsystems Science & Technology Center

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Sandia National Laboratories: News: Publications: Strategic Plan

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Sandia National Laboratories: News: Media Resources: Media Contacts

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Sandia National Laboratories: Employee & Retiree Resources: Technical

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Sandia National Laboratories: Z Pulsed Power Facility

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Sandia National Laboratories: Advanced Simulation and Computing

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Sandia National Laboratories: News: Publications: Annual Report

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Sandia National Laboratories: Employee & Retiree Resources: Remote Access

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Sandia National Laboratories: National Security Missions: International

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Prevention History 60 impacts Diversity Locations Facts & Figures Programs Nuclear Weapons About Nuclear Weapons Safety & Security Weapons Science & Technology Defense Systems & Assessments About Directed Research & Development Technology Deployment Centers Working With Sandia Working With Sandia

IMPROVED TECHNNOLOGY TO PREVENT ILLICIT TRAFFICKING IN NUCLEAR MATERIALS

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Richardson, J H

2005-07-20

The proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons (collectively known as weapons of mass destruction, or WMD) and the potential acquisition and use of WMD against the world by terrorists are extremely serious threats to international security. These threats are complex and interrelated. There are myriad routes to weapons of mass destruction--many different starting materials, material sources, and production processes. There are many possible proliferators--threshold countries, rogue states, state-sponsored or transnational terrorists groups, domestic terrorists, and even international crime organizations. Motives for acquiring and using WMD are similarly wide ranging--from a desire to change the regional power balance, deny accessmore » to a strategic area, or alter international policy to extortion, revenge, or hate. Because of the complexity of this threat landscape, no single program, technology, or capability--no silver bullet--can solve the WMD proliferation and terrorism problem. An integrated program is needed that addresses the WMD proliferation and terrorism problem from end to end, from prevention to detection, reversal, and response, while avoiding surprise at all stages, with different activities directed specifically at different types of WMD and proliferators. Radiation detection technologies are an important tool in the prevention of proliferation. A variety of new developments have enabled enhanced performance in terms of energy resolution, spatial resolution, predictive modeling and simulation, active interrogation, and ease of operation and deployment in the field. The radiation properties of nuclear materials, particularly highly enriched uranium (HEU), make the detection of smuggled nuclear materials technically difficult. A number of efforts are under way to devise improved detector materials and instruments and to identify novel signatures that could be detected. Key applications of this work include monitoring for radioactive materials at choke points, searching for nuclear materials, and developing instruments for response personnel.« less

U.S. Nuclear Weapons Modernization - the Stockpile Life Extension Program

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Cook, Donald

2016-03-01

Underground nuclear testing of U.S. nuclear weapons was halted by President George H.W. Bush in 1992 when he announced a moratorium. In 1993, the moratorium was extended by President Bill Clinton and, in 1995, a program of Stockpile Stewardship was put in its place. In 1996, President Clinton signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Twenty years have passed since then. Over the same time, the average age of a nuclear weapon in the stockpile has increased from 6 years (1992) to nearly 29 years (2015). At its inception, achievement of the objectives of the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) appeared possible but very difficult. The cost to design and construct several large facilities for precision experimentation in hydrodynamics and high energy density physics was large. The practical steps needed to move from computational platforms of less than 100 Mflops/sec to 10 Teraflops/sec and beyond were unknown. Today, most of the required facilities for SSP are in place and computational speed has been increased by more than six orders of magnitude. These, and the physicists and engineers in the complex of labs and plants within the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) who put them in place, have been the basis for underpinning an annual decision, made by the weapons lab directors for each of the past 20 years, that resort to underground nuclear testing is not needed for maintaining confidence in the safety and reliability of the U.S stockpile. A key part of that decision has been annual assessment of the physical changes in stockpiled weapons. These weapons, quite simply, are systems that invariably and unstoppably age in the internal weapon environment of radioactive materials and complex interfaces of highly dissimilar organic and inorganic materials. Without an ongoing program to rebuild some components and replace other components to increase safety or security, i.e., life extending these weapons, either underground testing would again be required to assess many changes at once, or confidence in these weapons would be reduced. The strategy and details of the U.S. Stockpile Life Extension Program will be described in this talk. In brief, the strategy is to reduce the number of weapons in the stockpile while increasing confidence in the weapons that remain and, where possible, increase their safety, increase their security, and reduce their nuclear material quantities and yields. A number of ``myths'' pertaining to nuclear weapons, the SSP, and the Stockpile Life Extension Program will be explored.

Radiological Weapons Control: A Soviet and US Perspective. Occasional Paper 29.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Issraelyan, Victor L.; Flowerree, Charles C.

Two international diplomats from the Soviet Union and the United States focus on the need for a treaty to ban the use of radiological weapons. Radiological weapons are those based on the natural decay of nuclear material such as waste from military or civilian nuclear reactors. Such devices include both weapons and equipment, other than a nuclear…

Sandia National Laboratories: What Sandia Looks For In Our Suppliers

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Sandia National Laboratories: Working with Sandia: What Does Sandia Buy?

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Programs Nuclear Weapons About Nuclear Weapons Safety & Security Weapons Science & Technology Robotics R&D 100 Awards Laboratory Directed Research & Development Technology Deployment Centers Audit Sandia's Economic Impact Licensing & Technology Transfer Browse Technology Portfolios

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Harvey, J.R.; Rubin, U.

Missiles themselves are not weapons of mass destruction; they do not give states the ability to wreak unimaginable destruction, or to radically shift the balance of power, as nuclear weapons do. Hence, the primary focus of nonproliferation efforts should remain on weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, rather than on one of the many possible means of delivering them. Moreover, as discussed in more detail below, advanced strike aircraft can also be effective in delivering nuclear weapons, and are generally more effective than ballistic missiles for delivering conventional or chemical ordnance. Ultimately, if the industrialized nations seriously desire tomore » control the spread of delivery means for weapons of mass destruction, they need to consider bringing controls over ballistic missiles and advanced strike aircraft more into balance. At the same time, while efforts to control ballistic missile proliferation - centered on the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) - have had some successes and could be strengthened, US policy will be most effective if it recognizes two key realities: the spread of ballistic missiles cannot be as comprehensively controlled as the spread of nuclear weapons, nor need it be as comprehensively controlled.« less

OPERATIONS TOGGLE, ARBOR and BEDROCK Events: DIAMOND SCULLS, DIDO QUEEN, HUSKY ACE, MING BLADE, HYBLA FAIR and DINING CAR, 20 July 1972 - 5 April 1975

DTIC Science & Technology

1987-11-30

1975 to study weapons effects . All six were tunnel-type nuclear tests. The following table summarizes data on these events: OPERATION TOGGLE ARBOR...194 nuclear device tests conducted, 161 were for weapons related or effects purposes, and 33 were safety ex- periments. An additional 22 nuclear...on 25 April 1962 until the last atmospheric test on 4 November 1962, 40 weapons development and weapons effects tests were conducted as part of

The Future of Nuclear Archaeology: Reducing Legacy Risks of Weapons Fissile Material

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Wood, Thomas W.; Reid, Bruce D.; Toomey, Christopher M.

2014-01-01

This report describes the value proposition for a "nuclear archeological" technical capability and applications program, targeted at resolving uncertainties regarding fissile materials production and use. At its heart, this proposition is that we can never be sure that all fissile material is adequately secure without a clear idea of what "all" means, and that uncertainty in this matter carries risk. We argue that this proposition is as valid today, under emerging state and possible non-state nuclear threats, as it was in an immediate post-Cold-War context, and describe how nuclear archeological methods can be used to verify fissile materials declarations, ormore » estimate and characterize historical fissile materials production independently of declarations.« less

Radiochemical Processing Laboratory (RPL) at PNNL

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Peurrung, Tony; Clark, Sue; Bryan, Sam

2017-03-23

Nuclear research is one of the core components of PNNL's mission. The centerpiece of PNNL's nuclear research is the Radiochemical Processing Laboratory (RPL), a Category 2 nuclear facility with state-of-the-art instrumentation, scientific expertise, and specialized capabilities that enable research with significant quantities of fissionable materials and other radionuclides—from tritium to plutonium. High impact radiological research has been conducted in the RPL since the 1950's, when nuclear weapons and energy production at Hanford were at the forefront of national defense. Since then, significant investments have been made in the RPL to maintain it as a premier nuclear science research facility supportingmore » multiple programs. Most recently, PNNL is developing a world-class analytical electron microscopy facility dedicated to the characterization of radiological materials.« less

Nuclear deterrence in the Arab-Israeli conflict. A case study in Egyptian-Israeli relations

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Shikaki, K.I.

1986-01-01

In order to achieve security and stability, and maximize the chances for resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, should Egypt and Israel adopt declared nuclear deterrence doctrines. Or would such a move be ineffective, dangerous, or even disastrous. The nuclearization of the Middle East is not necessary: military threats to the survival of the states in the region do not justify the introduction of nuclear weapons. Nuclearization is not desirable: deterrence theory's assumptions and implications exhibit intellectual weakness and its explanatory power is unsatisfactory; nuclear deterrence may reduce the frequency of war, but it pays little attention to the consequences of war;more » and in comparison to defense, nuclear deterrence may lack credibility. Presently, Israel has nuclear capability and delivery systems sufficient to provide security to its vital areas through deterrence of or defense against Arab attacks. The Arabs do not, however, believe that such security extends to the Arab territories occupied by Israel during the June 1967 war. To supply security, nuclear deterrence must be effective, stable, and credible. In a multinuclear environment, the Egyptians and Israelis are likely to meet the requirement for an effective deterrence: the possession of a nuclear capability sufficient to inflict an enormous amount of death and destruction. If the Arabs and Israelis sought and adopted strategies of deterrence, they might be able to meet the requirement for a stable deterrence: the acquisition of second strike capabilities.« less

Teaching with the News: North Korea and Nuclear Weapons. Choices for the 21st Century.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Brown Univ., Providence, RI. Thomas J. Watson, Jr. Inst. for International Studies.

In October 2002 North Korea admitted that it had been operating a secret nuclear weapons program in violation of international treaties and the 1994 Agreed Framework with the United States. North Korea also appeared to be taking steps to begin production of nuclear weapons and, according to U.S. officials, may have a missile that can hit…

Effects of Nuclear Weapons.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Sartori, Leo

1983-01-01

Fundamental principles governing nuclear explosions and their effects are discussed, including three components of a nuclear explosion (thermal radiation, shock wave, nuclear radiation). Describes how effects of these components depend on the weapon's yield, its height of burst, and distance of detonation point. Includes effects of three…

The Nuclear Arsenals of the US and USSR.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Levi, Barbara G.

1983-01-01

Compares United States and Soviet nuclear arsenals, surveying strategic and tactical weapons the two countries have (includes chart detailing strategic nuclear arsenals). Also summarizes trends in nuclear weapons, including use of electronics in surveillance and in command, communication, and control structures. (JN)

The Manhattan Project; A very brief introduction to the physics of nuclear weapons

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Reed, B. Cameron

2017-05-01

The development of nuclear weapons by the Manhattan Project during World War II was one of the most dramatic scientific/technological episodes in human history. This book, prepared by a recognized expert on the Manhattan Project, offers a concise survey of the essential physics concepts underlying fission weapons. The text describes the energetics and timescales of fast-neutron chain reactions, why only certain isotopes of uranium and plutonium are suitable for use in fission weapons, how critical mass and bomb yield can be estimated, how the efficiency of nuclear weapons can be enhanced, how the fissile forms of uranium and plutonium were obtained, some of the design details of the 'Little Boy' and 'Fat Man' bombs, and some of the thermal, shock, and radiation effects of nuclear weapons. Calculation exercises are provided, and a Bibliography lists authoritative print and online sources of information for readers who wish to pursue more detailed study of this fascinating topic.

The Artisanal Nuke

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Dixon, M. C.

2014-02-07

There have been many words written about the value and importance of nuclear disarmament. There have been many words written about the value and importance to the U.S. defense posture of nuclear weapons. This thesis will not be about either one of those points of view. The commentary will not purport to tell anyone that there is a need or there is not a need for one nuclear weapon or thousands of nuclear weapons. This study is more about, "well, they are here -- now what?"

[Consequences for military medicine of new nuclear weapons developments].

PubMed

Vogler, H

1985-01-15

The development and production of qualitatively new nuclear weapons (e.g. neutron weapons) has consequences also for the medical protection under conditions of war. In the present paper the peculiarities of these new systems of arms as well as the profile of injured persons which is to be expected after use of neutron weapons are analysed and general conclusions for the medical service are drawn.

11. VIEW OF A SITE RETURN WEAPONS COMPONENT. SITE RETURNS ...

Library of Congress Historic Buildings Survey, Historic Engineering Record, Historic Landscapes Survey

11. VIEW OF A SITE RETURN WEAPONS COMPONENT. SITE RETURNS WERE NUCLEAR WEAPONS SHIPPED TO THE ROCKY FLATS PLANT FROM THE NUCLEAR WEAPON STOCKPILE FOR RETIREMENT, TESTING, OR UPGRADING. FISSILE MATERIALS (PLUTONIUM, URANIUM, ETC.) AND RARE MATERIALS (BERYLLIUM) WERE RECOVERED FOR REUSE, AND THE REMAINDER WAS DISPOSED. (8/7/62) - Rocky Flats Plant, Plutonium Fabrication, Central section of Plant, Golden, Jefferson County, CO

The Role of the DOE Weapons Laboratories in a Changing National Security Environment: CNSS Papers No. 8, April 1988

DOE R&D Accomplishments Database

Hecker, S. S.

1988-04-01

The contributions of the Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear weapons laboratories to the nation's security are reviewed in testimony before the Subcommittee on Procurement and Military Nuclear Systems of the House Armed Services Committee. Also presented are contributions that technology will make in maintaining the strategic balance through deterrence, treaty verification, and a sound nuclear weapons complex as the nation prepares for significant arms control initiatives. The DOE nuclear weapons laboratories can contribute to the broader context of national security, one that recognizes that military strength can be maintained over the long term only if it is built upon the foundations of economic strength and energy security.

Guide to U.S. Atmospheric Nuclear Weapon Effects Data

DTIC Science & Technology

1993-12-01

biological warfare agents, and radiation dosimeters . XRD- 163 identifies the test location of each 4-6 biological sample. Reports containing the results...along with position of the animals at the time of the detonation. Vycor Glass Gamma Ray Dosimeters XRD-176 A rugged new dosimeter capable of measuring...gamma doses on animals exposed to high levels of radiation was employed during Able. Dosimeter readings, locations, and animal condition are reported

REDUCTIONS WITHOUT REGRET: DETAILS - AVOIDING BOX CANYONS, ROACH MOTELS, AND WRONG TURNS

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Swegle, John A.; Tincher, Douglas J.

The United States is concurrently pursuing the goals of reducing the size of its nuclear weapons force – strategic and non-strategic, deployed and non-deployed – and of modernizing the weapons it continues to possess. Many of the existing systems were deployed 30 to 50 years ago, and the modernization process can be expected to extend over the next decade or more. Given the impossibility of predicting the future over the lifetime of systems that could extend to the end of this century, it is essential that dead ends in force development be avoided, and the flexibility and availability of optionsmore » be retained that allow for • Scalability downward in the event that further reductions are agreed upon; • Reposturing to respond to changes in threat levels and to new nuclear actors; and • Breakout response in the event that a competitor significantly increases its force size or force capability, In this paper, we examine the current motivations for reductions and modernization; review a number of historical systems and the attendant capabilities that have been eliminated in recent decades; discuss the current path forward for the U.S. nuclear force; provide a view of the evolving deterrence situation and our assessment of the uncertainties involved; and present examples of possibly problematic directions in force development. We close with our thoughts on how to maintain flexibility and the availability of options for which a need might recur in the future.« less

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Regulating Nuclear Weapons around the World

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Middleton, Tiffany Willey

2010-01-01

In May 2010, scientists, national security experts, and state delegates from nations around the world will convene in New York for the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. They will review current guidelines for nuclear testing and possession of nuclear weapons in accordance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968,…

Sandia National Laboratories: Directed-energy tech receives funding to

Science.gov Websites

Accomplishments Energy Stationary Power Earth Science Transportation Energy Energy Research Global Security WMD & Figures Programs Nuclear Weapons About Nuclear Weapons Safety & Security Weapons Science & Cyber & Infrastructure Security Global Security Remote Sensing & Verification Research Research

2012 Review on the Extension of the AMedP-8(C) Methodology to New Agents, Materials, and Conditions

DTIC Science & Technology

2013-10-01

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to estimate casualties from chemical, biological , radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons . The final draft...chemical, biological , radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons . The final draft documenting this methodology was published by IDA in 2009 and was...from Battlefield Exposure to Chemical, Biological and Radiological Agents and Nuclear Weapon Effects. IDA Document D- 4465. Alexandria, VA: IDA

FY 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan - Biennial Plan Summary

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

None, None

2016-03-01

This year’s summary report updates the Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (FY 2016 SSMP), the 25-year strategic program of record that captures the plans developed across numerous NNSA programs and organizations to maintain and modernize the scientific tools, capabilities, and infrastructure necessary to ensure the success of NNSA’s nuclear weapons mission. The SSMP is a companion to the Prevent, Counter, and Respond: A Strategic Plan to Reduce Global Nuclear Threats (FY 2017-2021) report, the planning document for NNSA’s nuclear threat reduction mission. New versions of both reports are published each year in response to new requirements andmore » challenges. Much was accomplished in FY 2015 as part of the program of record described in this year’s SSMP. The science-based Stockpile Stewardship Program allowed the Secretaries of Energy and Defense to certify for the twentieth time that the stockpile remains safe, secure, and effective without the need for underground nuclear explosive testing. The talented scientists, engineers, and technicians at the three national security laboratories, the four nuclear weapons production plants, and the national security site are primarily responsible for this continued success. Research, development, test, and evaluation programs have advanced NNSA’s understanding of weapons physics, component aging, and material properties through first-of-a-kind shock physics experiments, along with numerous other critical experiments conducted throughout the nuclear security enterprise. The multiple life extension programs (LEPs) that are under way made progress toward their first production unit dates. The W76-1 LEP is past the halfway point in total production, and the B61-12 completed three development flight tests. Critical to this success is the budget. The Administration’s budget request for NNSA’s Weapons Activities has increased for all but one of the past seven years, resulting in a total increase of approximately 45 percent since 2010. If adopted by Congress, the FY 2017 budget request will increase funding by $396 million (about 4.5 percent) from the enacted FY 2016 level. A significant portion of the increase would fund the research for multiple life extension programs, support the programs in Directed Stockpile Work, and modernize the physical infrastructure of the nuclear security enterprise.« less

Nuclear Weapons and Communication Studies: A Review Essay.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Taylor, Bryan C.

1998-01-01

Reviews the body of work inspired by the late Cold War period, where nuclear weapons briefly became a compelling object for communication scholars. Considers the prospects for nuclear communication scholarship in post-Cold War culture. Discusses "nuclear criticism" and issues regarding the bomb in communication. (SC)

The UK Government's global partnership programme - Its achievements over the past five years and challenges ahead

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Heyes, Alan

2007-07-01

Through the Global Partnership the UK continues to make a significant contribution to improve national and global security. Over the past year the UK has continued to implement a wide range of projects across the breadth of its Global Partnership Programme. As well as ensuring the Programme is robust and capable of dealing with new challenges, the UK has cooperated with other donor countries to help them progress projects associated with submarine dismantling, scientist redirection, enhancing nuclear security and Chemical Weapons Destruction. The Global Partnership, although only five years old, has already achieved a great deal. Some 23 states, plusmore » the European Union, are now working closer together under the Global Partnership, and collectively have enhanced global regional and national security by reducing the availability of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) materials and expertise to both states of concern and terrorists. Considerable progress has already been made in, for example: - Improving the security of fissile materials, dangerous biological agents and chemical weapons stocks; - Reducing the number of sites containing radioactive materials; - Working towards closure of reactors still producing weapon-grade plutonium; - Improving nuclear safety to reduce the risks of further, Chernobyl style accidents; - Constructing facilities for destroying Chemical Weapons stocks, and starting actual destruction; - Providing sustainable employment for former WMD scientists to reduce the risk that their expertise will be misused by states or terrorists. By contributing to many of these activities, the UK has helped to make the world safer. This paper reports on the UK's practical and sustainable contribution to the Global Partnership and identifies a number of challenges that remain if it is to have a wider impact on reducing the threats from WMD material. (authors)« less

Integrating nuclear weapons stockpile management and nuclear arms control to enable significant stockpile reductions

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Sanders, Lani Miyoshi; DeLand, Sharon M.; Pregenzer, Arian L.

2010-11-01

In his 2009 Prague speech and the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, President Barack Obama committed the United States to take concrete steps toward nuclear disarmament while maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. There is an inherent tension between these two goals that is best addressed through improved integration of nuclear weapons objectives with nuclear arms control objectives. This article reviews historical examples of the interaction between the two sets of objectives, develops a framework for analyzing opportunities for future integration, and suggests specific ideas that could benefit the nuclear weapons enterprise as it undergoes transformation and that couldmore » make the future enterprise compatible with a variety of arms control futures.« less

Nuclear Forensics: A Capability at Risk (Abbreviated Version)

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

National Research Council of the National Academies

Nuclear forensics is important to our national security. Actions, including provision of appropriate funding, are needed now to sustain and improve the nation's nuclear forensics capabilities. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), working with cooperating agencies and national laboratories, should plan and implement a sustainable, effective nuclear forensics program. Nuclear forensics is the examination and evaluation of discovered or seized nuclear materials and devices or, in cases of nuclear explosions or radiological dispersals, of detonation signals and post-detonation debris. Nuclear forensic evidence helps law enforcement and intelligence agencies work toward preventing, mitigating, and attributing a nuclear or radiological incident. Thismore » report, requested by DHS, the National Nuclear Security Administration, and the Department of Defense, makes recommendations on how to sustain and improve U.S. nuclear forensics capabilities. The United States has developed a nuclear forensics capability that has been demonstrated in real-world incidents of interdicted materials and in exercises of actions required after a nuclear detonation. The committee, however, has concerns about the program and finds that without strong leadership, careful planning, and additional funds, these capabilities will decline. Major areas of concern include: Organization. The responsibility for nuclear forensics is shared by several agencies without central authority and with no consensus on strategic requirements to guide the program. This organizational complexity hampers the program and could prove to be a major hindrance operationally. Sustainability. The nation's current nuclear forensics capabilities are available primarily because the system of laboratories, equipment, and personnel upon which they depend was developed and funded by the nuclear weapons program. However, the weapons program's funds are declining. Workforce and Infrastructure. Personnel skilled in nuclear forensics are too few and are spread too thinly. Some key facilities are in need of replacement because they are old, outdated, and not built to modern environmental, health, and safety standards. Procedures and Tools. Most nuclear forensics techniques were developed to carry out Cold War missions and to satisfy a different, less restrictive set of environmental, health, and safety standards. Some of the equipment also does not reflect today's technical capabilities. The Executive Office of the President established the National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center under the direction of the Secretary of Homeland Security, to coordinate nuclear forensics in the United States. DHS's responsibility can only be carried out with the cooperation and support of the other agencies involved. The committee recommends that DHS and the other cooperating agencies should: 1. Streamline the organizational structure, aligning authority and responsibility; and develop and issue appropriate requirements documents. 2. Issue a coordinated and integrated implementation plan for fulfilling the requirements and sustaining and improving the program's capabilities. This plan would form the basis for the agencies' multi-year program budget requests. 3. Implement a plan to build and maintain an appropriately sized and composed nuclear forensics workforce, ensuring sufficient staffing at the national laboratories and support for university research, training programs, and collaborative relationships among the national laboratories and other organizations. 4. Adapt nuclear forensics to the challenges of real emergency situations, including, for example, conducting more realistic exercises that are unannounced and that challenge regulations and procedures followed in the normal work environment, and implementing lessons learned. The national laboratories should: 5. Optimize procedures and equipment through R&D to meet program requirements. Modeling and simulation should play an increased role in research, development, and planning. The nuclear forensics community should: 6. Develop standards and procedures for nuclear forensics that are rooted in the same underlying principles that have been recommended to guide modern forensic science. DHS and the other cooperating agencies should: 7. Devise and implement a plan that enables access to relevant information in databases including classified and proprietary databases for nuclear forensics missions. The Executive Office of the President and the Department of State, working with the community of nuclear forensics experts, should: 8. Determine the classes of data and methods that are to be shared internationally and explore mechanisms to accomplish that sharing.« less

Nuclear Energy, Nuclear Weapons Proliferation, and the Arms Race.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Hollander, Jack, Ed.

A symposium was organized to reexamine the realities of vertical proliferation between the United States and the Soviet Union and to place into perspective the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons throughout the world, including the possible role of commercial nuclear power in facilitating proliferation. The four invited symposium…

10 CFR 810.3 - Definitions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... pursuant to section 142 of the Atomic Energy Act. Sensitive nuclear technology means any information... nuclear material (SNM) or which a U.S. provider of assistance knows or has reason to know will be used for... International Atomic Energy Agency. Non-nuclear-weapon state is a country not recognized as a nuclear-weapon...

10 CFR 784.6 - National security considerations for waiver of certain sensitive inventions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... or under any Government contract or subcontract of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program or the nuclear weapons programs or other atomic energy defense activities of the Department of Energy, a...) under the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program or the nuclear weapons programs or other atomic energy...

10 CFR 784.6 - National security considerations for waiver of certain sensitive inventions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... or under any Government contract or subcontract of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program or the nuclear weapons programs or other atomic energy defense activities of the Department of Energy, a...) under the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program or the nuclear weapons programs or other atomic energy...

A comparison of the additional protocols of the five nuclear weapon states and the ensuing safeguards benefits to international nonproliferation efforts

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Uribe, Eva C; Sandoval, M Analisa; Sandoval, Marisa N

2009-01-01

With the 6 January 2009 entry into force of the Additional Protocol by the United States of America, all five declared Nuclear Weapon States that are part of the Nonproliferation Treaty have signed, ratified, and put into force the Additional Protocol. This paper makes a comparison of the strengths and weaknesses of the five Additional Protocols in force by the five Nuclear Weapon States with respect to the benefits to international nonproliferation aims. This paper also documents the added safeguards burden to the five declared Nuclear Weapon States that these Additional Protocols put on the states with respect to accessmore » to their civilian nuclear programs and the hosting of complementary access activities as part of the Additional Protocol.« less

What Are Nuclear Weapons For?

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Drell, Sidney

2007-03-01

Through the decades of the Cold War the prospect of a nuclear holocaust was all too real. With the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, that threat to civilization as we know it had receded. But today we face a grave new danger, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by hostile or unstable governments and terrorists. What can and should we be doing to meet this challenge and prevent the world's most dangerous weapons from falling into very dangerous hands? Are there any reasons for us to still retain thousands of nuclear warheads in our arsenals? What are they for? Can we rekindle the bold vision of a world free of nuclear weapons that President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev brought to their remarkable summit meeting at Reykjavik twenty years ago, and define practical steps toward achieving such a goal?

Nuclear Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Counterterrorism: Impacts on Public Health

DOE PAGES

Dreicer, Mona; Pregenzer, Arian

2014-04-01

Reducing the risks of nuclear war, limiting the spread of nuclear weapons and reducing global nuclear weapons stockpiles are key national and international security goals. They are pursued through a variety of international arms control, nonproliferation and counter-terrorism treaties and agreements. These legally binding and political commitments, together with the institutional infrastructure that supports them, work to establish global norms of behavior and have limited the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Beyond the primary security objectives, reducing the likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons, preventing environmental releases of radioactive material, increasing the availability of safe and secure nuclearmore » technology for peaceful purposes, and providing scientific data relevant to predicting and managing the consequences of natural or human-caused disasters world-wide provide significant benefits to global public health.« less

Normative Factors in U.S. Nuclear Policy

DTIC Science & Technology

2016-09-01

policymakers. No weapon since the 1960’s generated such a large ethical debate as the neutron bomb. Domestically and internationally the moral values of...recognized that the neutron bomb was still a kind of nuclear weapon . Paul argues that the Carter administration was constrained by this reality, and...148 While the neutron bomb was a nuclear weapon , it was unique in that it specialized in taking human life through radiation poisoning, without

Planning U.S. General Purpose Forces: The Theater Nuclear Forces

DTIC Science & Technology

1977-01-01

usefulness in combat. All U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in Europe are fitted with Permissive Action Links (PAL), coded devices designed to impede...may be proposed. The Standard Missile 2, the Harpoon missile, the Mk48 tor- pedo , and the SUBROC anti-submarine rocket are all being considered for...Permissive Action Link . A coded device attached to nuclear weapons deployed abroad that impedes the unauthorized arming or firing of the weapon. Pershing

The Future of the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Program

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Brooks, Linton F.

2007-03-01

This paper will examine our plans for the future of the U.S. nuclear weapons program including efforts to ``transform'' the stockpile and supporting infrastructure. We proceed from the premise that the United States will need a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent for the foreseeable future. Moreover, the Stockpile Stewardship Program is working. Today's stockpile---comprised of legacy warheads left over from the Cold War---is safe and reliable. That said, we see increased risk, absent nuclear testing, in assuring the long-term safety and reliability of our current stockpile. Nor is today's nuclear weapons complex sufficiently ``responsive'' to fixing technical problems in the stockpile, or to potential adverse geopolitical change. Our task is to work to ensure that the U.S. nuclear weapons enterprise, including the stockpile and supporting infrastructure, meets long-term national security needs. Our approach is to develop and field replacement warheads for the legacy stockpile---so-called Reliable Replacement Warheads (RRW)---as a means to transform both the nuclear stockpile and supporting infrastructure.

National policy and military doctrine: development of a nuclear concept of land warfare, 1949-1964

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Bockar, D.

In the thirty years that battle field nuclear weapons have been available, no one has originated an idea of how they might be used as an entirely new weapon. New weapons are routinely introduced into existing combat organizations before an appropriate tactical concept has been invented. But never before in history has a new weapon been deployed on so massive a scale without a tactical concept that exploited the radical implications of its novel technology for traditional warfare. This study is an attempt to understand the problem of developing a persuasive tactical concept for nuclear weapons. The process of assimilationmore » by which military organizations integrate new weapons with existing weapons in novel tactical and organizational concepts has an intellectual, and institutional, and a political dimension. The principle of civilian control, however, makes the process by which weapons are assimilated part of the process by which national security policies are made. In peacetime the military's formulation of doctrine is almost entirely consequent upon the world view, the methodological and managerial assumptions, and the domestic policy concerns of political authority.« less

U.S. national response assets for radiological incidents.

PubMed

Remick, Alan L; Crapo, John L; Woodruff, Charles R

2005-11-01

The federal government has had the ability to respond to incidents of national significance for decades. Since 11 September 2001, there have been enhancements to existing federal assets and the creation of new federal assets. This presentation will provide an overview of the more significant federal assets. Pivotal to a response of national significance is the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center, which organizes and coordinates federal agency monitoring activities during an emergency. DOE manages the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center during the emergency phase, and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) manages the response during the recovery phase once the emergency is terminated. EPA monitoring teams provide support during both the emergency and recovery phases of an emergency. Other DOE teams are available to respond to major nuclear power plant events, transportation accidents, or terrorism events involving the use of radiological materials, including the Radiological Assistance Program, the Aerial Measuring System, the National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center, and the Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site. For incidents involving a nuclear weapon, an improvised nuclear device, or a radiological dispersal device, DOE assets such as the Nuclear Emergency Support Team and the Accident Response Group could provide capabilities for weapon or device search, recovery, and removal. The Radiological Triage System harnesses the weapons scientists and engineers at the DOE national laboratories to provide gamma spectroscopy interpretation for agencies responding to an incident. In recent years, National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams have been created to support state and local response to terrorism events. The Civil Support Teams normally come under direct control of the state and can respond without requiring authorization from the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). Changes brought about by the events of September 11 also extend to changing federal response policy and planning. Therefore, the Catastrophic Incident Response Annex to the National Response Plan is discussed. DoD also provides specifically designated radiological response capabilities that can be utilized within the guidelines of the National Response Plan. While optimally designed to support military missions, these resources also help provide for a well-equipped set of national assets to temporarily support and augment the local, state, and federal civil agencies that have primary authority and responsibility for domestic disaster assistance. The military's role in domestic emergencies is well defined in military regulations, as well as the national plan.

Evolution of United States and NATO tactical nuclear doctrine and limited nuclear war options, 1949-1964. Master's thesis

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Maiorano, A.G.

The debate over nuclear weapons in Europe and their utility as part of NATO's forward defense strategy persisted since the mid-1950s. Existing tactical nuclear employment doctrine and strategies are based on obsolete criteria and defense concepts established when the U.S. possessed superiority in nearly all nuclear categories. NATO has allowed its tactical nuclear doctrine and arsenal of battlefield nuclear weapons to deteriorate, choosing instead to rely on the American strategic nuclear umbrella for all but the most localized of conflicts. This thesis examines the development, stagnation and decline of NATO tactical nuclear doctrine and strategy from 1949 to 1984. Itmore » analyzes four tactical nuclear postures, drawing from each to recommend a viable tactical nuclear strategy for NATO today. The presence and potential employment of tactical nuclear weapons make it imperative that NATO devise an effective limited nuclear war strategy.« less

Recognizing the real threat of biological terror.

PubMed

Wenzel, Richard P

2002-01-01

Weapons of mass destruction can be used to harm and terrorize populations. Such weapons include those with chemical, nuclear or biological properties. Obviously computer viruses can add additional barriers to a quick response. The most effective, least costly and greatest threats are biologicals. Biological terror is not new, and biological weapons have been used for centuries. However, as a result of modern technology, the risks are greater now and the outcomes more terrible. Today they include live pathogens, various toxins, and theoretically "bioregulators"--biochemicals affecting cell signaling. Altered cell signaling could be used to induce apoptosis-cell death, or a heightened outpouring of cytokines mimicking overwhelming sepsis, or even an intracellular, biochemical "strike" causing cellular paralysis. Biological weaponeers now have the frightening ability to alter the genetic makeup of pathogens, rendering them resistant not only to available antibiotic therapy but also to currently effective vaccines. In dark corners of some fringe groups, bioweaponeers are searching for the capability of designing pathogens that target specific races, by virtue of discriminating ligands (1). The resulting morbidity and mortality from use of any biological weapons will be accompanied by chaos, governmental and social instability, panic, an extraordinary utilization of available resources, and an ongoing epidemic of sleepless nights (2,3). Herein I will review some of the issues and some of the currently available biological weapons. The major goal is to highlight the clinical presentations of patients with infections that could be used as biological weapons.

Public perspectives on nuclear security. US national security surveys, 1993--1997

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Herron, K.G.; Jenkins-Smith, H.C.

This is the third report in a series of studies to examine how US attitudes about nuclear security are evolving in the post-Cold War era and to identify trends in public perceptions and preferences relevant to the evolution of US nuclear security policy. It presents findings from three surveys: a nationwide telephone survey of randomly selected members of the US general public; a written survey of randomly selected members of American Men and Women of Science; and a written survey of randomly selected state legislators from all fifty US states. Key areas of investigation included nuclear security, cooperation between USmore » and Russian scientists about nuclear issues, vulnerabilities of critical US infrastructures and responsibilities for their protection, and broad areas of US national science policy. While international and US national security were seen to be slowly improving, the primary nuclear threat to the US was perceived to have shifted from Russia to China. Support was found for nuclear arms control measures, including mutual reductions in stockpiles. However, respondents were pessimistic about eliminating nuclear armaments, and nuclear deterrence continued to be highly values. Participants favored decreasing funding f/or developing and testing new nuclear weapons, but supported increased investments in nuclear weapons infrastructure. Strong concerns were expressed about nuclear proliferation and the potential for nuclear terrorism. Support was evident for US scientific cooperation with Russia to strengthen security of Russian nuclear assets. Elite and general public perceptions of external and domestic nuclear weapons risks and external and domestic nuclear weapons benefits were statistically significantly related to nuclear weapons policy options and investment preferences. Demographic variables and individual belief systems were systematically related both to risk and benefit perceptions and to policy and spending preferences.« less

Emerging Environmental Justice Issues in Nuclear Power and Radioactive Contamination.

PubMed

Kyne, Dean; Bolin, Bob

2016-07-12

Nuclear hazards, linked to both U.S. weapons programs and civilian nuclear power, pose substantial environment justice issues. Nuclear power plant (NPP) reactors produce low-level ionizing radiation, high level nuclear waste, and are subject to catastrophic contamination events. Justice concerns include plant locations and the large potentially exposed populations, as well as issues in siting, nuclear safety, and barriers to public participation. Other justice issues relate to extensive contamination in the U.S. nuclear weapons complex, and the mining and processing industries that have supported it. To approach the topic, first we discuss distributional justice issues of NPP sites in the U.S. and related procedural injustices in siting, operation, and emergency preparedness. Then we discuss justice concerns involving the U.S. nuclear weapons complex and the ways that uranium mining, processing, and weapons development have affected those living downwind, including a substantial American Indian population. Next we examine the problem of high-level nuclear waste and the risk implications of the lack of secure long-term storage. The handling and deposition of toxic nuclear wastes pose new transgenerational justice issues of unprecedented duration, in comparison to any other industry. Finally, we discuss the persistent risks of nuclear technologies and renewable energy alternatives.

Nuclear Weapons and the Future: An "Unthinkable" Proposal.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Tyler, Robert L.

1982-01-01

The author looks ahead 30 or 40 years to see what might come of the nuclear weapons predicament. As a minimal first step in the campaign against nuclear warfare, he suggests a unilateral and complete disarmament by the United States. (AM)

Cooperative measures to support the Indo-Pak Agreement Reducing Risk from Accidents Relating to Nuclear Weapons.

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Mishra, Sitakanta; Ahmed, Mansoor

In 2012, India and Pakistan reaffirmed the Agreement on Reducing the Risk from Accidents Relating to Nuclear Weapons. Despite a history of mutual animosity and persistent conflict between the two countries, this agreement derives strength from a few successful nuclear confidence building measures that have stood the test of time. It also rests on the hope that the region would be spared a nuclear holocaust from an accidental nuclear weapon detonation that might be misconstrued as a deliberate use of a weapon by the other side. This study brings together two emerging strategic analysts from South Asia to explore measuresmore » to support the Agreement and further develop cooperation around this critical issue. This study briefly dwells upon the strategic landscape of nuclear South Asia with the respective nuclear force management structures, doctrines, and postures of India and Pakistan. It outlines the measures in place for the physical protection and safety of nuclear warheads, nuclear materials, and command and control mechanisms in the two countries, and it goes on to identify the prominent, emerging challenges posed by the introduction of new weapon technologies and modernization of the respective strategic forces. This is followed by an analysis of the agreement itself leading up to a proposed framework for cooperative measures that might enhance the spirit and implementation of the agreement.« less

3 CFR 13617 - Executive Order 13617 of June 25, 2012. Blocking Property of the Government of the Russian...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... Extracted From Nuclear Weapons 13617 Order 13617 Presidential Documents Executive Orders Executive Order... to the Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted From Nuclear Weapons By the authority vested... accumulation of a large volume of weapons-usable fissile material in the territory of the Russian Federation...

Consequences of Regional Scale Nuclear Conflicts and Acts of Individual Nuclear Terrorism

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Toon, O. B.; Turco, R. P.; Robock, A.; Bardeen, C.; Oman, L.; Stenchikov, G. L.

2006-12-01

The number of nuclear warheads in the world has fallen by about a factor of three since its peak in 1986. However, the potential exists for numerous regional nuclear arms races, and for a significant expansion in the number of nuclear weapons states. Eight countries are known to have nuclear weapons, 2 are constructing them, and an additional 32 nations already have the fissile material needed to build weapons if they so desire. Population and economic activity worldwide are congregated to an increasing extent in "megacities", which are ideal targets for nuclear weapons. We find that low yield weapons, which new nuclear powers are likely to construct, can produce 100 times as many fatalities and 100 times as much smoke from fires per kt yield as high-yield weapons, if they are targeted at city centers. A single low-yield nuclear detonation in an urban center could lead to more fatalities, in some cases by orders of magnitude, than have occurred in major historical conflicts. A regional war between the smallest current nuclear states involving 100 15-kt explosions (less than 0.1% of the explosive yield of the current global nuclear arsenal) could produce direct fatalities comparable to all of those worldwide in World War II (WW-II), or to those once estimated for a "counterforce" nuclear war between the superpowers. Portions of megacities attacked with nuclear devices or exposed to fallout of long-lived isotopes, through armed conflict or terrorism, would likely be abandoned indefinitely, with severe national and international implications. Smoke from urban firestorms in a regional war might induce significant climatic and ozone anomalies on global scales. While there are many uncertainties in the issues we discuss here, the major uncertainties are the type and scale of conflict that might occur. Each of these potential hazards deserves careful analysis by governments worldwide advised by a broad section of the world scientific community, as well as widespread debate.

Serving the Nation for Fifty Years: 1952 - 2002 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory [LLNL], Fifty Years of Accomplishments

DOE R&D Accomplishments Database

2002-01-01

For 50 years, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory has been making history and making a difference. The outstanding efforts by a dedicated work force have led to many remarkable accomplishments. Creative individuals and interdisciplinary teams at the Laboratory have sought breakthrough advances to strengthen national security and to help meet other enduring national needs. The Laboratory's rich history includes many interwoven stories -- from the first nuclear test failure to accomplishments meeting today's challenges. Many stories are tied to Livermore's national security mission, which has evolved to include ensuring the safety, security, and reliability of the nation's nuclear weapons without conducting nuclear tests and preventing the proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction. Throughout its history and in its wide range of research activities, Livermore has achieved breakthroughs in applied and basic science, remarkable feats of engineering, and extraordinary advances in experimental and computational capabilities. From the many stories to tell, one has been selected for each year of the Laboratory's history. Together, these stories give a sense of the Laboratory -- its lasting focus on important missions, dedication to scientific and technical excellence, and drive to made the world more secure and a better place to live.

Conflict in the 21st Century: Counterstrategies for the WMD Terrorist

DTIC Science & Technology

1999-04-01

general categories of bio-agents: bacteria , fungi , rickettsiae, chlamydia, viruses , and toxins.18 Anthrax, plague, and tularemia are some of the better...real threat may be a terrorist organization with the will and capability to use a nuclear, chemical, or biological weapon against America’s territory...nervous system .8 These are some of the most lethal substances known to man. Chemical agents are most hazardous when they attack the body passively

Glossary of Terms--Nuclear Weapon Phenomena and Effects

DTIC Science & Technology

1985-02-15

w".: w~*~ combat ineffective. An individual whose injuries are of such nature that he is no longer capable of carrying out his assigned task...significantly harmful result [39]. That dose of ionizing radiation that is not expected to cause appreciable bodily injury to a person at any time during his...art and science of protecting human beings from injury by radia- tion, and promoting better health through beneficial applications of radiation [39

The nuclear weapons freeze and a cancer metaphor. A physician's view.

PubMed

Bruwer, A

1985-08-02

The nuclear arms race has been described as a cancer spreading through human society and threatening its existence. Bruwer characterizes the current superpower reaction to this nuclear threat, deterrence through a mutual weapons buildup, as a palliative approach that can only postpone death. He compares a bilateral weapons freeze to a hypothetical cancer freeze, a strategy that would not get rid of existing arsenals, but would buy negotiating time to work toward the elimination of these weapons. Answering critics who say that a freeze is unrealistic, or does not go far enough, Bruwer reminds them that it would be a beginning.

Joseph A. Burton Forum Award Lecture: Managing Nuclear and Biological Risks: Building Resilience through International Cooperation

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Pregenzer, Arian

2012-03-01

International technical cooperation has long been an important nonproliferation strategy, especially since the 1990s when cooperative threat reduction (CTR) to prevent theft or illicit transfer of nuclear weapons, material and expertise in the former Soviet Union became a keystone of U.S. policy. The CTR approach expanded to include engagement with scientists and engineers with expertise relevant to biological and chemical weapons, and continued in the 2000s with efforts in Iraq and Libya, and cooperation with a wide range of countries on export control and nuclear and biological security. In general, the goal of such efforts has been to prevent proliferation or WMD terrorism. In most cases, the United States (or the West) defines the threat, and then funds partner countries to implement solutions. This presentation will argue that the future requires a new approach. Nuclear capabilities are more widely available than ever before, repercussions of the A.Q. Khan network continue to unfurl, and countries such as the DPRK engage in illicit cooperation. In addition, there has been a global boom in biotechnology with many nations, particularly across South and East Asia, investing in the biotech industry as a source of fuels, food, and materials for their rapidly expanding populations. Compared to the 1990s, today's threat is more diffuse, and the line between legitimate and illegitimate technical capability is no longer so clear. In addition, the West has many fewer resources to invest due to the global economic downturn. In this environment, full commitment of all countries that benefit from nuclear and biological advances will be required to assure the safety and security of all. Technical cooperation can continue to play an important role, but with some significant changes: First, challenges should be defined from a local perspective to ensure full commitment and participation. Second, the goal of cooperation should shift from preventing specific threats to building general capabilities to respond to a broad range of challenges as they arise. Finally, the funding model for technical cooperation should move from contractual arrangements to mutual investment and partnership, with regional approaches encouraged to add credibility, increase available resources, and help to ensure broad support.

Belief Structures of Students For and Against the Nuclear Freeze.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Tankard, James W., Jr.

An investigation of college students' belief structures underlying their support or non-support of a nuclear freeze revealed a three-dimensional structure for beliefs in the areas of nuclear weapons and national defense. A questionnaire containing 25 belief statements concerning national defense and nuclear weapons and 4 media use questions was…

Nuclear Weapons: NNSA Needs to Establish a Cost and Schedule Baseline for Manufacturing a Critical Nuclear Weapon Component

DTIC Science & Technology

2008-05-01

building up to and beyond the 2013 time frame. However, in October 2007, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, which monitors safety...manufacturing. They said that NNSA is still working through this process with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board. Processing of waste

Cognitive Consistency in Beliefs about Nuclear Weapons.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Nelson, Linden

The paper details a study supporting the hypothesis that people's opinions about nuclear arms control are influenced by their logically relevant beliefs about nuclear weapons, nuclear war, and the Soviet Union. The hypothesis should not be construed to imply that these beliefs are the only influences or the most powerful influences on arms control…

The Midlife Crisis of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Pella, Peter

2016-03-01

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) has been the principal legal barrier to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons for the past forty-five years. It promotes the peaceful uses of nuclear technology and insures, through the application of safeguards inspections conducted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), that those technologies are not being diverted toward the production of nuclear weapons. It is also the only multinational treaty that obligates the five nuclear weapons states that are party to the treaty (China, France, Great Britain, Russia, and the United States) to pursue nuclear disarmament measures. Though there have been many challenges over the years, most would agree that the treaty has largely been successful. However, many are concerned about the continued viability of the NPT. The perceived slow pace of nuclear disarmament, the interest by some countries to consider a weapons program while party to the treaty, and the funding and staffing issues at the IAEA, are all putting considerable strain on the treaty. This manuscript explores those issues and offers some possible solutions to ensure that the NPT will survive effectively for many years to come.

22 CFR 129.7 - Prior approval (license).

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-04-01

...; (ii) Nuclear weapons strategic delivery systems and all components, parts, accessories, attachments specifically designed for such systems and associated equipment; (iii) Nuclear weapons design and test equipment of a nature described by Category XVI of Part 121; (iv) Naval nuclear propulsion equipment of a...

22 CFR 129.7 - Prior approval (license).

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-04-01

...; (ii) Nuclear weapons strategic delivery systems and all components, parts, accessories, attachments specifically designed for such systems and associated equipment; (iii) Nuclear weapons design and test equipment of a nature described by Category XVI of part 121; (iv) Naval nuclear propulsion equipment of a...

Changing Our Ways of Thinking: Health Professionals and Nuclear Weapons.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Neal, Mary

1984-01-01

Outlines the issues raised by health professionals concerned about the threat of nuclear weapons and nuclear war, including epidemics, civil defense, arms costs, psychosocial aspects, and ethical responsibility. Appendixes include lists of antinuclear organizations, medical professional associations, and 160 references. (SK)

The ``Nuclear Renaissance'' and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Lyman, Edwin S.

2007-05-01

As interest grows around the world in nuclear power as an energy source that could help control greenhouse gas emissions, some have proclaimed the arrival of a ``nuclear renaissance.'' But can the increased risks of more nuclear power be managed? The political crisis surrounding Iran's pursuit of uranium enrichment has exposed weaknesses in the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Also, al Qaeda's declared interest in weapons of mass destruction raises the concern that terrorists could acquire nuclear weapons by stealing materials from poorly secured facilities. Growth of nuclear energy would require the construction of many additional uranium enrichment plants. And the generation of more spent nuclear fuel without a credible waste disposal strategy would increase political support for reprocessing, which separates large quantities of weapon-usable plutonium from spent fuel. There is little evidence that the various institutional arrangements and technical schemes proposed to mitigate the security risks of a major nuclear expansion would be effective. This talk will focus on the measures necessary to allow large-scale global growth of nuclear power without resulting in an unacceptably high risk of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism, and will discuss the feasibility of such measures. To cite this abstract, use the following reference: http://meetings.aps.org/link/BAPS.2007.OSS07.E1.2

A Sandia weapon review bulletin : defense programs, Autumn 1992.

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Not Available

1992-09-01

Topics in this issue: (1) Focal Point and STEP. Sandia National Laboratories has always focused its advanced weapon development not only on future weapon needs, but also on the engineering and manufacturing sciences needed to meet them. Both areas are changing dramatically. As the nation dismantles many of its warheads, it becomes essential that those that remain are increasingly reliable, secure, capable, and safe. And as development resources diminish, it becomes vital that they are applied to the most critical technologies in a disciplined manner. The mission of the Focal Point program and the Stockpile Transition Enabling Program (STEP) ismore » to develop processes for meeting these challenges. Focal Point offers a decision-making process for allocating Sandia's resources to meets its defense programs strategic goals. (2) Defense Programs news in brief. (3) Dismantling the nuclear stockpile. (4) W88/MK5: Arming, Fuzing, and Firing system meets all requirements and goals. (5) The Common Radar Fuze. (6) Insertable-explosive arming of firing sets. (7) Preparing for fewer underground tests.« less

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Weiss, K G

The end of the Cold War seemed to create a more peaceful international environment. September 11 reminded us of the dangers of complacency. Indeed, even before September 11 US forces had intervened in a number of wars and crises, including Panama, the Persian Gulf War, Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo, several Taiwan Straits crises, the North Korea nuclear weapons crisis, and most recently Afghanistan. US ability to intervene in remote areas of the world is often dependent on the Navy's ability to project power ashore. As a result, US ability to influence events in crisis situations, especially between or among nuclearmore » powers, may become more difficult along with our ability to conduct littoral warfare. Although the numbers of potentially hostile submarines have declined with the end of the Cold War, US anti-submarine warfare capabilities have also declined. Moreover, foreign submarines and related technologies are likely to diffuse globally. New technologies like Air Independent Propulsion (AIP), improved weapons and sensors will make conventional submarines more dangerous, and the spread of nuclear submarines even to a few more countries raise political, military, environmental, and safety concerns. Submarines are one of the key weapon systems used alone or in combination with other weapon systems such as coastal defense missiles, aircraft, and other sea-based missile platforms to deny US ability to project power ashore, Thus, other countries who wish to deny the US the ability to interfere with their regional or even global ambitions may emphasize the acquisition and/or development of submarines. As the world become more multipolar over the longer term, as the Chinese believe it will, countries such as Russia, China. etc., may be able to acquire the submarine capabilities to challenge us not just regionally, but in blue waters. To the extent that our alliance relationships require US naval access or superiority to sustain them, then our erstwhile friendly allies such as Japan, South Korea, ASEAN states, Taiwan, etc., may seek their own arrangements with other powers for their protection or seek WMD capabilities to offset the former reliance on the US. In addition to a loss of unchallenged regional access, the US may have to devote greater resources for protecting its homeland, and perhaps its sea-based deterrent, from hostile submarine forces.« less

Los Alamos Explosives Performance Key to Stockpile Stewardship

ScienceCinema

Dattelbaum, Dana

2018-02-14

As the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent ages, one essential factor in making sure that the weapons will continue to perform as designed is understanding the fundamental properties of the high explosives that are part of a nuclear weapons system. As nuclear weapons go through life extension programs, some changes may be advantageous, particularly through the addition of what are known as "insensitive" high explosives that are much less likely to accidentally detonate than the already very safe "conventional" high explosives that are used in most weapons. At Los Alamos National Laboratory explosives research includes a wide variety of both large- and small-scale experiments that include small contained detonations, gas and powder gun firings, larger outdoor detonations, large-scale hydrodynamic tests, and at the Nevada Nuclear Security Site, underground sub-critical experiments.

Nuclear Security, Disarmament and Development

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Salam, Abdus

The world's stock of nuclear weapons, which was three in 1945, has been growing ever since and is 50,OOOa in 1985. Nearly two trillion dollars of the public funds have been spent over the years to improve their destructive power, and the means of delivering them. One indicator of the awful power of these weapons is that the explosive yield of the nuclear weapons stockpiled today by the US, USSR, UK, France, and China is equivalent to one million Hiroshima bombs. Less than 1,000 of these 50,000 weapons could destroy USA and USSR. A thousand more in an all-out nuclear exchange could destroy the world as a habitable planet, ending life for the living and the prospects of life for those not yet born, sparing no nation, no region of the world…

Use of limited data to construct Bayesian networks for probabilistic risk assessment.

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Groth, Katrina M.; Swiler, Laura Painton

2013-03-01

Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) is a fundamental part of safety/quality assurance for nuclear power and nuclear weapons. Traditional PRA very effectively models complex hardware system risks using binary probabilistic models. However, traditional PRA models are not flexible enough to accommodate non-binary soft-causal factors, such as digital instrumentation&control, passive components, aging, common cause failure, and human errors. Bayesian Networks offer the opportunity to incorporate these risks into the PRA framework. This report describes the results of an early career LDRD project titled %E2%80%9CUse of Limited Data to Construct Bayesian Networks for Probabilistic Risk Assessment%E2%80%9D. The goal of the work was tomore » establish the capability to develop Bayesian Networks from sparse data, and to demonstrate this capability by producing a data-informed Bayesian Network for use in Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) as part of nuclear power plant Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA). This report summarizes the research goal and major products of the research.« less

High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) Testing

DTIC Science & Technology

2015-07-09

Electromagnetic Pulse Horizontal Electromagnetic Pulse Advanced Fast Electromagnetic Pulse Nuclear Weapons Effect Testing and Environments 16. SECURITY... Weapons of Mass Destruction Agency (USANCA). In order to effectively determine criteria compliance, the TO/PE must thoroughly understand the...ELECTROMAGNETIC ENVIRONMENT AND EFFECTS. A.1 The electromagnetic environment produced by a nuclear weapon consists of the ionization of the atmosphere and

77 FR 38457 - Blocking Property of the Government of the Russian Federation Relating to the Disposition of...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2012-06-27

... Extracted From Nuclear Weapons #0; #0; #0; Presidential Documents #0; #0; #0;#0;Federal Register / Vol. 77... Federation Relating to the Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted From Nuclear Weapons By the... the accumulation of a large volume of weapons-usable fissile material in the territory of the Russian...

28 CFR 13.3 - Definitions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-07-01

... Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ATOMIC WEAPONS AND SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS REWARDS REGULATIONS § 13.3 Definitions. Atomic energy means all forms of energy released in the course of nuclear fission or nuclear transformation. Atomic weapon means any device utilizing atomic energy, exclusive of the means for transporting...

28 CFR 13.3 - Definitions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-07-01

... Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ATOMIC WEAPONS AND SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS REWARDS REGULATIONS § 13.3 Definitions. Atomic energy means all forms of energy released in the course of nuclear fission or nuclear transformation. Atomic weapon means any device utilizing atomic energy, exclusive of the means for transporting...

28 CFR 13.3 - Definitions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ATOMIC WEAPONS AND SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS REWARDS REGULATIONS § 13.3 Definitions. Atomic energy means all forms of energy released in the course of nuclear fission or nuclear transformation. Atomic weapon means any device utilizing atomic energy, exclusive of the means for transporting...

28 CFR 13.3 - Definitions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-07-01

... Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ATOMIC WEAPONS AND SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS REWARDS REGULATIONS § 13.3 Definitions. Atomic energy means all forms of energy released in the course of nuclear fission or nuclear transformation. Atomic weapon means any device utilizing atomic energy, exclusive of the means for transporting...

28 CFR 13.3 - Definitions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-07-01

... Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ATOMIC WEAPONS AND SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS REWARDS REGULATIONS § 13.3 Definitions. Atomic energy means all forms of energy released in the course of nuclear fission or nuclear transformation. Atomic weapon means any device utilizing atomic energy, exclusive of the means for transporting...

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Winstanley, J. L.

In August 1945, U.S. Navy Captain William Parsons served as the weaponeer aboard the Enola Gay for the mission to Hiroshima (Shelton 1988). In view of the fact that four B-29s had crashed and burned on takeoff from Tinian the night before, Captain Parsons made the decision to arm the gun-type weapon after takeoff for safety reasons (15 kilotons of TNT equivalent). Although he had no control over the success of the takeoff, he could prevent the possibility of a nuclear detonation on Tinian by controlling what we now call the nuclear explosive. As head of the Ordnance Division atmore » Los Alamos and a former gunnery officer, Captain Parsons clearly understood the role of safety in his work. The advent of the pre-assembled implosion weapon where the high explosive and nuclear materials are always in an intimate configuration meant that nuclear explosive safety became a reality at a certain point in development and production not just at the time of delivery by the military. This is the only industry where nuclear materials are intentionally put in contact with high explosives. The agency of the U.S. Government responsible for development and production of U.S. nuclear weapons is the Department of Energy (DOE) (and its predecessor agencies). This paper will be limited to nuclear explosive safety as it is currently practiced within the DOE nuclear weapons« less

Physical Security Modeling for the Shipboard Nuclear Weapons Security Program,

DTIC Science & Technology

1982-04-01

I AOA1IR 396 NAVAL SURFACE WEAPONS CENTER SILVER SPRING MO F/G 15/3 PHYSICAL SECURITY MODELING FOR THE SHIPROARD NUCLEAR WEAPONS SE--ETEEU) APR A2 E ...WEAPONS SECURITY )PROGRAM 0% BY E . G. JACOUES D. L BARTUSEK R. W. MONROE M. S. SCHWARTZ WEAPONS SYSTEMS DEPARTMENT 1 APRIL 1982 A4pm lvW for p uic r...ASSIPICATIO N O F Tb IS PAGE t’W "mu Dat e E DLeT R)....... t READ W~STRUCTIoNs’ REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE BEFORE COMPLETNG FORM4 . REPiQRT NUM1e[i ja. VT

HOW OLD IS IT? - 241PU/241AM NUCLEAR FORENSIC CHRONOLOGY REFERENCE MATERIALS

PubMed Central

Fitzgerald, Ryan; Inn, Kenneth G.W.; Horgan, Christopher

2018-01-01

One material attribute for nuclear forensics is material age. 241Pu is almost always present in uranium- and plutonium-based nuclear weapons, which pose the greatest threat to our security. The in-growth of 241Am due to the decay of 241Pu provides an excellent chronometer of the material. A well-characterized 241Pu/241Am standard is needed to validate measurement capability, as a basis for between-laboratory comparability, and as material for verifying laboratory performance. This effort verifies the certification of a 38 year old 241Pu Standard Reference Material (SRM4340) through alpha-gamma anticoincidence counting, and also establishes the separation date to two weeks of the documented date. PMID:29720779

Plutonium Bioassay Testing of U.S. Atmospheric Nuclear Test Participants and U.S. Occupation Forces of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan

DTIC Science & Technology

2015-10-30

with nuclear weapons testing or plutonium work. The results for the 100 atomic veterans were compared to those of the unexposed population, and...as a marker for significant internal intakes of other associated radionuclides in nuclear weapons debris due to its low natural background. However...isotope in weapons grade plutonium, is important from a health perspective, its presence within a given urine sample being analyzed by FTA can only

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Background and Current Developments

DTIC Science & Technology

2010-12-07

there are no plans to do so.’”4 Critics expressed concern about the implications of these policies for testing and new weapons. Physicians for...design and build new nuclear weapons, and abandon a ten-year-old moratorium on nuclear weapons testing.”5 Another critic felt that increased funding for...guarantees regarding the voluntary moratorium. We may find at some future time that we cannot diagnose or remedy a problem in a warhead critical the U.S

A Medical Center Network for Optimized Lung Cancer Biospecimen Banking

DTIC Science & Technology

2013-10-01

Carcinoma Stage IIB N N .149 1 8 .132 1 8 .092 1 No - Quit Smoking 50 AR Agent Orange , Nuclear weapons, Second-hand smoke Agent Orange , Nuclear weapons...Smoking 30 None Agent Orange , Asbestos, Second-hand smoke Agent Orange , Asbestos, Second-hand smoke S0159 Squamous Cell Carcinoma Stage IIB Y N...2.560 100 80 25 6 7 0.670 4 4 0.370 1 No - Quit Smoking 30 NV Agent Orange , Asbestos, Nuclear weapons, Second- hand smoke Agent Orange , Asbestos

Virtual enterprise model for the electronic components business in the Nuclear Weapons Complex

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Ferguson, T.J.; Long, K.S.; Sayre, J.A.

1994-08-01

The electronic components business within the Nuclear Weapons Complex spans organizational and Department of Energy contractor boundaries. An assessment of the current processes indicates a need for fundamentally changing the way electronic components are developed, procured, and manufactured. A model is provided based on a virtual enterprise that recognizes distinctive competencies within the Nuclear Weapons Complex and at the vendors. The model incorporates changes that reduce component delivery cycle time and improve cost effectiveness while delivering components of the appropriate quality.

Uncrackable code for nuclear weapons

ScienceCinema

Hart, Mark

2018-05-11

Mark Hart, a scientist and engineer in Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's (LLNL) Defense Technologies Division, has developed a new approach for ensuring nuclear weapons and their components can't fall prey to unauthorized use. The beauty of his approach: Let the weapon protect itself. "Using the random process of nuclear radioactive decay is the gold standard of random number generators," said Mark Hart. "You’d have a better chance of winning both Mega Millions and Powerball on the same day than getting control of IUC-protected components."

Uncrackable code for nuclear weapons

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Hart, Mark

Mark Hart, a scientist and engineer in Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's (LLNL) Defense Technologies Division, has developed a new approach for ensuring nuclear weapons and their components can't fall prey to unauthorized use. The beauty of his approach: Let the weapon protect itself. "Using the random process of nuclear radioactive decay is the gold standard of random number generators," said Mark Hart. "You’d have a better chance of winning both Mega Millions and Powerball on the same day than getting control of IUC-protected components."

An Iranium bomb?

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Albright, D.

1995-07-01

This year, the nuclear proliferation spotlight has swung away from Iraq and North Korea, only to focus on Iran. Western intelligence agencies have assembled a substantial body of evidence suggesting that, although Iran signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), it is secretly pursuing a broad, organized effort to develop nuclear weapons. US officials say that Iran is attempting to acquire nuclear technologies that are not consistent with a strictly peaceful program. Intelligence agencies have detected procurement patterns that point to a weapons program. Iran has a multifaceted strategy to develop options to make nuclear weapons: Iran has sought, with limitedmore » success, to buy nuclear power and research facilities from many countries, particularly China and Russia; Iran has shopped quietly in many countries, particularly in Western and Eastern Europe, for a wide range of nuclear-related or dual-use nuclear items that might enable it to put together facilities to enrich uranium, separate plutonium, and make nuclear weapons. There is little public information about how effective this clandestine shopping has been or which countries have been contacted; There is no evidence that Iran has bought any fissile material - but not for wont of trying, and the matter continues to be scrutinized very closely.« less

Nuclear Weapons and Science Education.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Wellington, J. J.

1984-01-01

Provides suggestions on how science teachers can, and should, deal with the nuclear weapons debate in a balanced and critical way. Includes a table outlining points for and against deterrence and disarmament. (JN)

Nuclear Technology in War and Peace: A Study of Issues and Choices.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Shanebrook, J. Richard

This is the syllabus of a course that explores the technology of nuclear weapons and nuclear energy for electric power generation, and considers some problems of nuclear weapons proliferation and technical alternatives. It provides a course description, a course outline, a list of required readings, and information on the films shown in the…

Prevent, Counter, and Respond - A Strategic Plan to Reduce Global Nuclear Threats (FY 2016-FY2020)

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

None

2015-03-01

NNSA’s second core mission is reducing global nuclear dangers by preventing the acquisition of nuclear weapons or weapons-usable materials, countering efforts to acquire such weapons or materials, and responding to nuclear or radiological incidents. In 2015, NNSA reorganized its nonproliferation activities based on core competencies and realigned its counterterrorism and counterproliferation functions to more efficiently address both current and emerging threats and challenges. The reorganization accompanied the March 2015 release of the first ever Prevent, Counter, and Respond – A Strategic Plan to Reduce Global Nuclear Threats. This report, which NNSA will update annually, highlights key nuclear threat trends andmore » describes NNSA’s integrated threat reduction strategy.« less

Efforts of Uzbekistan to prevent nuclear terrorism and smuggling of radioactive and nuclear materials.

PubMed

Petrenko, V D; Karimov, Yu N; Podkovirin, A I; Shipilov, N N; Yuldashev, B S; Fazylov, M I

2005-01-01

Uzbekistan is located on the cross-roads from the north--Russia, Western Europe--to the south--Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq and others. The appearance of terrorist organizations urged some Asian countries to make the nuclear weapons, the making the task of stopping the transportation of nuclear materials and technologies from the north (from countries possessing nuclear weapon) to the south (to countries desiring to have weapons and its components) a reality. To resolve this problem, on the main transportation routes, "Yantar" stationary radiation monitors of Russian production were installed, and development and production of monitors of our own make was started. This paper covers these works as well as those on preventing possible terrorist attacks on nuclear objects of Uzbekistan.

SIOP for Perestroika. Research report

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Szafranski, R.

1990-04-01

The pursuit of greater stability through arms reductions is an important component of perestroika. Assuming strategic weapons reductions, the general nuclear war plan, the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), will change to employ fewer nuclear arms. If stability and threat reduction are authentic goals, the composition of nuclear offensive forces and the SIOP alert force will evolve accordingly. Greater reliance will likely be placed on bombers. The United States and the Soviet Union can use the opportunity provided by perestroika to agree that the only legitimate role of nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear weapons by threatening nuclear reprisal ormore » punishment. Both sides can then share a strategic catechism that would allow them to move toward small reprisal forces.« less

Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues

DTIC Science & Technology

2012-06-26

145 Abdul Mannan, “Preventing Nuclear Terrorism in Pakistan: Sabotage of a Spent Fuel Cask or a Commercial ...Pakistan’s Civil Nuclear Program.” Some analysts argue that spent nuclear fuel is more vulnerable when being transported . 146 Martellini, 2008. 147...produced fissile material for its nuclear weapons using gas-centrifuge-based uranium enrichment technology, which it mastered by the mid-1980s

Can Nuclear Terrorists be Deterred?

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Ferguson, Charles

2005-04-01

Conventional thinking since September 11, 2001, posits that nuclear-armed terrorists cannot be deterred. However, not all terrorist groups are alike. For instance, those that are strongly affiliated with a national territory or a constituency that can be held hostage are more likely to be self-deterred against using or even acquiring nuclear weapons. In contrast, international terrorist organizations, such as al Qaeda, or apocalyptic groups, such as Aum Shinrikyo, may welcome retaliatory nuclear strikes because they embrace martyrdom. Such groups may be immune to traditional deterrence, which threatens direct punishment against the group in question or against territory or people the terrorists' value. Although deterring these groups may appear hopeless, nuclear forensic techniques could provide the means to establish deterrence through other means. In particular, as long as the source of the nuclear weapon or fissile material could be identified, the United States could threaten a retaliatory response against a nation that did not provide adequate security for its nuclear weapons or weapons-usable fissile material. This type of deterrent threat could be used to compel the nation with lax security to improve its security to meet rigorous standards.

Emerging Environmental Justice Issues in Nuclear Power and Radioactive Contamination

PubMed Central

Kyne, Dean; Bolin, Bob

2016-01-01

Nuclear hazards, linked to both U.S. weapons programs and civilian nuclear power, pose substantial environment justice issues. Nuclear power plant (NPP) reactors produce low-level ionizing radiation, high level nuclear waste, and are subject to catastrophic contamination events. Justice concerns include plant locations and the large potentially exposed populations, as well as issues in siting, nuclear safety, and barriers to public participation. Other justice issues relate to extensive contamination in the U.S. nuclear weapons complex, and the mining and processing industries that have supported it. To approach the topic, first we discuss distributional justice issues of NPP sites in the U.S. and related procedural injustices in siting, operation, and emergency preparedness. Then we discuss justice concerns involving the U.S. nuclear weapons complex and the ways that uranium mining, processing, and weapons development have affected those living downwind, including a substantial American Indian population. Next we examine the problem of high-level nuclear waste and the risk implications of the lack of secure long-term storage. The handling and deposition of toxic nuclear wastes pose new transgenerational justice issues of unprecedented duration, in comparison to any other industry. Finally, we discuss the persistent risks of nuclear technologies and renewable energy alternatives. PMID:27420080

Screening study for evaluation of the potential for system 80+ to consume excess plutonium - Volume 1. Final report

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Not Available

1994-04-30

As part of the U.S. effort to evaluate technologies offering solutions for the safe disposal or utilization of surplus nuclear materials, the fiscal year 1993 Energy and Water Appropriations legislation provided the Department of Energy (DOE) the necessary funds to conduct multi-phased studies to determine the technical feasibility of using reactor technologies for the triple mission of burning weapons grade plutonium, producing tritium for the existing smaller weapons stockpile, and generating commercial electricity. DOE limited the studies to five advanced reactor designs. Among the technologies selected is the ABB-Combustion Engineering (ABB-CE) System 80+. The DOE study, currently in Phase ID,more » is proceeding with a more detailed evaluation of the design`s capability for plutonium disposition.« less

Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 1999.

DTIC Science & Technology

1998-01-01

chemical and biological weapons technology in Africa. However, there remains much to be done: - • Terrorism: The economic and political weakness of many...OPERATIONAL GOAL: Counter the proliferation of missile technology and nuclear, chemical, and biological Weapons . Levels of cooperation with our...34 terrorism; chemical, biological , nuclear, or radiological weapons . 6. Enhance CT cooperation through the establishment of legal instruments like mutual

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Mark, H.

A development history and development status evaluation is presented for weapons technologies capable of serving as defenses against nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles. The decisive turning-point in this history was the March 23, 1983 announcement by President Reagan of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Due to President Reagan's emphasis on population protection, 'global' defense systems have tended to dominate SDI design efforts. The most important SDI technical achievements to date encompass (1) miniature homig devices, (2) the upgrade of the Patriot SAM for missile-interception capabilities, (3) light exoatmospheric projectiles, such as 'Brilliant Pebbles', (4) successful laser-communications experiments, and (5) the warhead/decoy-discriminating Firepondmore » lidar system. 7 refs.« less

Business as Usual: An Assessment of Donald Rumsfeld’s Transformation Vision and Transformation’s Prospects for the Future

DTIC Science & Technology

2008-06-01

capabilities: • Goal 1: Protecting critical bases and defeating chemical, biological, rad and nuclear weapons. • Goal 2: Projecting and sustaining ...bases is the supply side of the equation, whereas projecting and sustaining forces is the equation’s consumption side. The product of this equation...dominance through comprehensive knowledge, focused execution, and coordinated sustainment shared cross fully netted maritime, joint, and combined forces.123

Intelligence Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region: Establishing a Framework for Multilateralism

DTIC Science & Technology

2003-03-01

responding in a manner consistent with an absence of diplomacy. The North is developing nuclear weapons out of self -defense. The participant remarked...capabilities, the support for terrorism. We see these things and feel self defense needs to be defined more broadly and needs to be more proactive. The...occur, which affected the tourism industry in the area. The Malaysian government is serious about stop- ping this problem and has recently devoted an

Making weapons, talking peace

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

York, H.F.

The memoirs of the author traces his life from his first-year graduate studies in physics at the University of Rochester in 1942 to his present position as Director of the University of California's Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation. The part of his life involved in making weapons extends from 1942 to 1961. During this period, he worked with E.O. Lawrence on the Manhattan Project and served as director of Livermore after it became the Atomic Energy Commission's second nuclear weapons laboratory. He also served on many government advisory boards and commissions dealing with nuclear and other weapons. In 1961,more » the combination of a heart attack and changes in administration in Washington led York too return to the University of California for the talking peace portion of his life. He has since become a public exponent of arms control and disarmament and the futility of seeking increased security through more and better nuclear weapons. York's explanation of his move from making weapons to talking peace leaves the reader with a puzzle.« less

Nuclear Weapons Effects (Self-Teaching Materials).

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DOD), Battle Creek, MI.

Developed by the Civil Defense Preparedness Agency, this autoinstructional text deals with nuclear weapons effects. The destructive effects of an atomic blast are first introduced, and then long-term radioactive consequences are stressed. (CP)

Los Alamos Explosives Performance Key to Stockpile Stewardship

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Dattelbaum, Dana

2014-11-03

As the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent ages, one essential factor in making sure that the weapons will continue to perform as designed is understanding the fundamental properties of the high explosives that are part of a nuclear weapons system. As nuclear weapons go through life extension programs, some changes may be advantageous, particularly through the addition of what are known as "insensitive" high explosives that are much less likely to accidentally detonate than the already very safe "conventional" high explosives that are used in most weapons. At Los Alamos National Laboratory explosives research includes a wide variety of both large- andmore » small-scale experiments that include small contained detonations, gas and powder gun firings, larger outdoor detonations, large-scale hydrodynamic tests, and at the Nevada Nuclear Security Site, underground sub-critical experiments.« less

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Hoffman, B.

This report examines recent trends and future prospects of terrorism in the United States and assesses their implications for the possibility of a terrorist group attempting an act of nuclear terrorism involving either the theft of a weapons system or strategic nuclear material or an attack on a weapons facility. An emerging trend of ideologically motivated terrorism by groups espousing white supremacist and anti-federalist beliefs or opposing specific issues such as abortion has largely supplanted the ethnic centered violence that dominated earlier domestic terrorist activity. The threat to U.S. nuclear weapons facilities from unknown terrorist groups in this country cannotmore » be considered high at this time. There is no evidence to suggest that any of the organizations reviewed in this study have seriously contemplated a nuclear-related act, nor is there any indication that any group is poised to undertake such an attack in the future. Nevertheless, trends in the terrorist activities of certain groups must be considered in the context of possible operations directed against nuclear weapons sites. Members of these groups are considerably more skilled with weapons than are other terrorist in this country, they possess large stockpiles of sophisticated weapons, they are well trained guerrilla warfare and survival techniques, and they possess an apocalyptic vision of the future-factors that make them the most likely domestic terrorists to attempt an act of nuclear terrorism. In sum, while the volume of annual terrorist incidents in the United States is relatively small, the emerging trends merit intensive and continuing attention.« less

A Random Variable Approach to Nuclear Targeting and Survivability

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Undem, Halvor A.

We demonstrate a common mathematical formalism for analyzing problems in nuclear survivability and targeting. This formalism, beginning with a random variable approach, can be used to interpret past efforts in nuclear-effects analysis, including targeting analysis. It can also be used to analyze new problems brought about by the post Cold War Era, such as the potential effects of yield degradation in a permanently untested nuclear stockpile. In particular, we illustrate the formalism through four natural case studies or illustrative problems, linking these to actual past data, modeling, and simulation, and suggesting future uses. In the first problem, we illustrate themore » case of a deterministically modeled weapon used against a deterministically responding target. Classic "Cookie Cutter" damage functions result. In the second problem, we illustrate, with actual target test data, the case of a deterministically modeled weapon used against a statistically responding target. This case matches many of the results of current nuclear targeting modeling and simulation tools, including the result of distance damage functions as complementary cumulative lognormal functions in the range variable. In the third problem, we illustrate the case of a statistically behaving weapon used against a deterministically responding target. In particular, we show the dependence of target damage on weapon yield for an untested nuclear stockpile experiencing yield degradation. Finally, and using actual unclassified weapon test data, we illustrate in the fourth problem the case of a statistically behaving weapon used against a statistically responding target.« less

Materials for Children about Nuclear War.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Eiss, Harry

President Reagan's Fiscal Year 1987 budget was an attempt to increase dramatically spending on national defense, on nuclear weapons, while cutting back on social programs. The increases for almost all nuclear weapons indicate the Administration of the United States saw its major responsibility as one of providing a strong military, one centered on…

CALCM: The untold story of the weapon used to start the Gulf war

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Nielson, John T.

1994-07-01

The Conventional Air Launched Cruise Missile (CALCM) was developed from the strategic ALCM, AGM-86, by integrating GPS navigation into the missile in place of terrain correlation (TERCOM). In addition, the nuclear warhead was replaced by conventional explosives. The CALCM was developed, tested, and fielded in a single year (mid-1986 - mid-1987) by the Boeing Company where the author was then employed. Although the GPS technology used, a Rockwell single channel aided receiver, has been eclipsed by newer receivers with additional capabilities and newer technology, many innovative things were done in completing the CALCM integration: the external loading of almanac data along with other mission data, three satellite navigation capability, and the use of a single channel receiver in a dynamic flight environment. This effort demonstrated that GPS outputs can be integrated quickly into an existing weapon system using the traditional loosely coupled 'cascaded filter' approach. Although this approach is not as ideal as a tightly coupled integration using raw GPS data, the use of cascaded filters resulted in a weapon that was able to be rapidly fielded. The Air Force had sufficient confidence in the missile, that after four years of operational testing, 35 of these missiles were targeted at key sites at the start of the Gulf War in 1991. This effort, which was declassified in 1992, resulted in the first weapon in the DoD inventory to be operational using GPS navigation. The effort deserves consideration as a model as to how GPS integration can be performed.

Report of a Workshop in Nuclear Forces and Nonproliferation held at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Pilat, Joseph F

2009-01-01

The workshop addressed evolving nuclear forces and their impacts on nonproliferation in the context of the new strategic environment, the Obama Administration's Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) Review and the 2010 Conference (RevCon) of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The issues discussed are at the heart of the debate on nuclear policy issues such asfuture nuclear weapons requirements and nonproliferation, but also the stockpile stewardship program and infrastructure modernization. The workshop discussions reflected the importance of the NPRfor defining the role of US nuclear forces in dealing with 21s1 century threats and providing guidancemore » that will shape NNSA and DoD programs. They also highlighted its importancefor NPT diplomacy. The discussion noted the report of the bipartisan Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, and the expectation that the NPR would likely reflect its consensus to a large degree (although the Administration was not bound by the report). There was widespread support for developing thefoundationsfor a sustainable nuclear-weapon program that addresses nuclear weapons, infrastructure and expertise in the broader nonproliferation, disarmament and international security contexts. The discussion also revealed a convergence of views, but no consensus, on a number of important issues, including the diminished role but continued importance of nuclear weapons; the need to take action to ensure the sustainability of the stockpile, and the recapitalization of the infrastructure and expertise; and the need to take action to promote nonproliferation, arms control and disarmament objectives.« less

The abolition of war as a goal of environmental policy.

PubMed

Snyder, Brian F; Ruyle, Leslie E

2017-12-15

Since the 1950s, select military and political leaders have had the capacity to kill all or nearly all human life on Earth. The number of people entrusted with this power grows each year through proliferation and the rise of new political leaders. If humans continue to maintain and develop nuclear weapons, it is highly probable that a nuclear exchange will occur again at some point in the future. This nuclear exchange may or may not annihilate the human species, but it will cause catastrophic effects on the biosphere. The international community has attempted to resolve this existential problem via treaties that control and potentially eliminate nuclear weapons, however, these treaties target only nuclear weapons, leaving the use of war as a normalized means for settling conflict. As long as war exists as a probable future, nations will be under pressure to develop more powerful weapons. Thus, we argue that the elimination of nuclear weapons alone is not a stable, long-term strategy. A far more secure strategy would be the elimination of war as a means of settling international disputes. Therefore, those concerned about environmental sustainability or the survival of the biosphere should work to abolish war. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Opaque Nuclear Strategy

DTIC Science & Technology

2017-12-01

enrichment facility); 3. The acquisition of the technology and know-how to design, assemble, and manufacture the bomb ; 4. A full-scale nuclear test...14 Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb ,” International...15 Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb ,” 57–59. 16 Lewis A. Dunn and Herman Kahn, Trends in Nuclear

Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues

DTIC Science & Technology

2009-10-15

and technical measures to prevent unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons, as well as contribute to physical security of storage ...Talks On Nuclear Security,” The Boston Globe, May 5, 2009. 79 Abdul Mannan, “Preventing Nuclear Terrorism in Pakistan: Sabotage of a Spent Fuel Cask or...a Commercial Irradiation Source in Transport ,” in Pakistan’s Nuclear Future, 2008; Martellini, 2008. 80 Martellini, 2008. 81 For more information

Understanding Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control: A Guide to the Issues. New Edition.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Mayers, Teena

Intended for secondary and college level students and teachers, this guide discusses the nuclear arms control issue. There are four sections. Section I discusses U.S. nuclear strategy from 1945 to the present, strategic nuclear weapons competition between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.), U.S.…

A U.S. Minimum Nuclear Deterrence Strategy: By Design or Default It’s about the Policy Options

DTIC Science & Technology

2012-06-01

then who are we to suggest actions that may upset the apple cart. Continued Retention of a Nuclear Deterrence Force. The ideas of M. K. Ghandi ...shaped India’s thinking about nuclear weapons. Ghandi espoused non-violence as a political strategy and his moral rejection of nuclear weapons laid the

3 CFR - Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... to Weapons of Mass Destruction Presidential Documents Other Presidential Documents Notice of November 9, 2011 Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction On... United States posed by the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (weapons of mass...

3 CFR - Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... to Weapons of Mass Destruction Presidential Documents Other Presidential Documents Notice of November 1, 2012 Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction On... United States posed by the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (weapons of mass...

Nuclear threat on the Korean peninsula: The present and the future. Final report

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Kang, S.

1994-04-01

Forty years after they were divided by the Cold War, South and North Korea are closer to reunification than ever before. However, North Korea's nuclear weapons program might cause South Koreans to be much less sure about reunification. Today the Cold War is over, but the Korean peninsula is still divided into two Koreas despite the new era of reconciliation. Since December 1991 when a non-aggression pact was signed barring nuclear weapons, North Korea has pursued its nuclear weapon development. In March 1993, North Korea declared its intention to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and has been refusing amore » full inspection of its nuclear program. North Korea's nuclear issue is an international issue today. This paper discusses 'what threat we have today' and 'what should be done in the future.'.« less

75 FR 68671 - Continuation of Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-11-08

... the United States posed by the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (weapons of... Weapons of Mass Destruction #0; #0; #0; Presidential Documents #0; #0; #0;#0;Federal Register / Vol. 75... [[Page 68673

US changes course on nuclear-weapons strategy

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Gwynne, Peter

2010-05-01

US President Barack Obama has signalled a new approach to nuclear-weapons policy that limits their use against other states and documents how the country will ensure the viability of existing stockpiles. The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which sets out the US's nuclear strategy over a 10-year period, also calls for a highly skilled workforce to ensure "the long-term safety, security and effectiveness of the nuclear arsenal and to support the full range of nuclear-security work".

Identification of nuclear weapons

DOEpatents

Mihalczo, J.T.; King, W.T.

1987-04-10

A method and apparatus for non-invasively indentifying different types of nuclear weapons is disclosed. A neutron generator is placed against the weapon to generate a stream of neutrons causing fissioning within the weapon. A first detects the generation of the neutrons and produces a signal indicative thereof. A second particle detector located on the opposite side of the weapon detects the fission particles and produces signals indicative thereof. The signals are converted into a detected pattern and a computer compares the detected pattern with known patterns of weapons and indicates which known weapon has a substantially similar pattern. Either a time distribution pattern or noise analysis pattern, or both, is used. Gamma-neutron discrimination and a third particle detector for fission particles adjacent the second particle detector are preferably used. The neutrons are generated by either a decay neutron source or a pulled neutron particle accelerator.

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Chrzanowski, P; Walter, K

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's many outstanding accomplishments in 2007 are a tribute to a dedicated staff, which is shaping the Laboratory's future as we go through a period of transition and transformation. The achievements highlighted in this annual report illustrate our focus on the important problems that affect our nation's security and global stability, our application of breakthrough science and technology to tackle those problems, and our commitment to safe, secure, and efficient operations. In May 2007, the Department of Energy (DOE) awarded Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC (LLNS), a new public-private partnership, the contract to manage and operate themore » Laboratory starting in October. Since its inception in 1952, the Laboratory had been managed by the University of California (UC) for the DOE's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and predecessor organizations. UC is one of the parent organizations that make up LLNS, and UC's presence in the new management entity will help us carry forward our strong tradition of multidisciplinary science and technology. 'Team science' applied to big problems was pioneered by the Laboratory's co-founder and namesake, Ernest O. Lawrence, and has been our hallmark ever since. Transition began fully a year before DOE's announcement. More than 1,600 activities had to be carried out to transition the Laboratory from management by a not-for-profit to a private entity. People, property, and procedures as well as contracts, formal agreements, and liabilities had to be transferred to LLNS. The pre-transition and transition teams did a superb job, and I thank them for their hard work. Transformation is an ongoing process at Livermore. We continually reinvent ourselves as we seek breakthroughs that impact emerging national needs. An example is our development in the late 1990s of a portable instrument that could rapidly detect DNA signatures, research that started with a view toward the potential threat of terrorist use of biological weapons. As featured in our annual report, activities in this area have grown to many important projects contributing to homeland security and disease prevention and control. At times transformation happens in large steps. Such was the case when nuclear testing stopped in the early 1990s. As one of the nation's nuclear weapon design laboratories, Livermore embarked on the Stockpile Stewardship Program. The objectives are to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile and to develop a science-based, thorough understanding of the performance of nuclear weapons. The ultimate goal is to sustain confidence in an aging stockpile without nuclear testing. Now is another time of major change for the Laboratory as the nation is resizing its nuclear deterrent and NNSA begins taking steps to transform the nuclear weapons complex to meet 21st-century national security needs. As you will notice in the opening commentary to each section of this report, the Laboratory's senior management team is a mixture of new and familiar faces. LLNS drew the best talent from its parent organizations--Bechtel National, UC, Babcock & Wilcox, the Washington Group Division of URS, and Battelle--to lead the Laboratory. We are honored to take on the responsibility and see a future with great opportunities for Livermore to apply its exceptional science and technology to important national problems. We will work with NNSA to build on the successful Stockpile Stewardship Program and transform the nation's nuclear weapons complex to become smaller, safer, more secure, and more cost effective. Our annual report highlights progress in many relevant areas. Laboratory scientists are using astonishing computational capabilities--including BlueGene/L, the world's fastest supercomputer with a revolutionary architecture and over 200,000 processors--to gain key insights about performance of aging nuclear weapons. What we learn will help us sustain the stockpile without nuclear testing. Preparations are underway to start experiments at the National Ignition Facility (NIF), the world's largest laser. They will help us resolve the most important questions we still have about nuclear weapons performance. Future NIF experiments will also explore the promise of an essentially inexhaustible source of clean energy from nuclear fusion. In addition, we have begun the process of eliminating significant quantities of special nuclear materials from the Livermore site. We will carry forward Livermore's tradition of exceptional science and technology. This is the S&T that led to the design and construction of NIF and leadership in an international consortium that is developing the Gemini Planet Imager. When the Imager comes on line in 2010 at an observatory in Chile, the Imager will bring into sharp focus planets that are 30 to 150 light years from our solar system.« less

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Walter, Andrew

National policymakers are currently considering a dilemma of critical importance to the continued security of the United States: how can U.S. nuclear weapons policies be leveraged to benefit U.S. nuclear nonproliferation goals in the near-term, without sacrificing U.S. national security? In its role supporting U.S. nuclear weapons policy, Sandia National Laboratories has a responsibility to provide objective technical advice to support policy deliberations on this question. However, to best fulfill this duty Sandia must have a broader understanding of the context of the problem. To help develop this understanding, this paper analyzes the two predominant analytical perspectives of international relationsmore » theory to explore their prescriptions for how nuclear weapons and nonproliferation policies interact. As lenses with which to view and make sense of the world, theories of international relations must play a crucial role in framing the trade-offs at the intersection of the nuclear weapons and nonproliferation policy domains. An analysis of what these theories suggest as courses of action to leverage nuclear weapons policies to benefit nonproliferation goals is then offered, with particular emphasis on where the policy prescriptions resulting from the respective theories align to offer near-term policy changes with broad theoretical support. These policy prescriptions are then compared to the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review to understand what the theories indicate policymakers may have gotten right in their dealing with the nuclear dilemma, and where they may have gone wrong. Finally, a brief international relations research agenda is proposed to help address the dilemma between nuclear deterrence and nuclear nonproliferation policies, with particular emphasis on how such an agenda can best support the needs of the policy community and a potential 'all things nuclear' policy deliberation and decision-support framework.« less

Educating the Army of 2010: A Strategic Plan

DTIC Science & Technology

1992-02-20

States have been identified by futurist John Naisbitt, in his books Megatrends : Ten New Directions Transforming Our Lives and Megatrends 2000. Several...information and equipment. - The proliferation of weapons will continue, including chemical, biological , and nuclear weapons. Despite the reduction of...conventional systems as well as biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction. Nuclear technology will be more common, both as a source of

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Graham, T.W.

There has been a growing debate over the future of US nonproliferation policy. Some, including this author, believe that many current trends, especially the increasing delegitimization of nuclear weapons for all forms of extended deterrence, provide an opportunity to think about winning the nonproliferation battle - freezing or reversing the nuclear programs of the four current de facto nuclear-weapon states (India, Israel, Pakistan, and South Africa), and ensuring that no additional states are added to this list for at least the next 20 years. Others, including some senior Pentagon officials, believe that additional proliferation is inevitable, and that a realisticmore » reading of international politics requires the US to focus much of its nonproliferation effort on managing the proliferation that does occur - attempting to reduce the risks to international security posed by those states that gain access to nuclear weapons. The outcome of this debate could have a major impact on the spread of nuclear weapons over the next two decades, and thereby on the dangers the world will face in the post-Cold War era.« less

Operations MANDREL and GROMMET Events MINUTE STEAK, DIESEL TRAIN, DIANA MIST, MINT LEAF, HUDSON MOON, DIAGONAL LINE, and MISTY NORTH, 12 September 1969 to 2 May 1972

DTIC Science & Technology

1987-01-30

conducted from 12 September 1969 to 2 May 1972 to study weapons effects . Two were shaft-type and five were tunnel- type nuclear tests. The following table...1958. Of the 194 nuclear device tests conducted, 161 were for weapons related or effects purposes, and 33 were safety ex- periments. An additional 22...States atmospheric testing on 25 April 1962 until the last atmospheric test on 4 November 1962, 40 weapons related and weapons effects tests were

A long view of global plutonium management

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Wagner, R.L. Jr.

1995-10-01

Dealing with the large and growing world inventories of fissile materials from all sources is a major part of the long term challenge of limiting the danger from nuclear weapons. Providing clean, safe nuclear power may also be needed to prevent conditions from arising which could lead to large scale nuclear weapon (re)armament. ADTT technologies might reconcile the seeming dilemma of providing nuclear power while maintaining a very low world inventory of nuclear materials which can be used in weapons. This vision for ADTT should be tested in a variety of ways, including comparisons with competing approaches and with othermore » objectives. Such testing is one part of constructing a path for a decades-long, worldwide implementation campaign for ADTT.« less

Design and implementation of a nuclear weapons management system submodule: Shipboard security force system. Master's thesis

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Settlemyer, S.R.

1991-09-01

The Nuclear Weapons Management System combines the strengths of an expert system with the flexibility of a database management system to assist the Weapons Officer, Security Officer, and the Personnel Reliability Program Officer in the performance of administrative duties associated with the nuclear weapons programs in the United States Navy. This thesis examines the need for, and ultimately the design of, a system that will assist the Security Officer in administrative duties associated with the Shipboard Self Defense Force. This system, designed and coded utilizing dBASE IV, can be implemented as a stand alone system. Furthermore, it interfaces with themore » expert system submodule that handles the PRP screening process.« less

Proliferation: Threat and response

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

NONE

1996-04-01

During the height of the Cold War, the Russian physicist Andre Sakharov said, `Reducing the risk of annihilating humanity in a nuclear war carries an absolute priority over all other considerations.` The end of the Cold War has reduced the threat of global nuclear war, but today a new threat is rising from the global spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Hostile groups and nations have tried - or have been able - to obtain these weapons, the technology, and homegrown ability to make them or ballistic missiles that can deliver the massive annihilation, poison, and death of thesemore » weapons hundreds of miles away. For rogue nations, these weapons are a ticket to power, stature, and confidence in regional war.« less

Principles of Guided Missiles and Nuclear Weapons.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Naval Personnel Program Support Activity, Washington, DC.

Fundamentals of missile and nuclear weapons systems are presented in this book which is primarily prepared as the second text of a three-volume series for students of the Navy Reserve Officers' Training Corps and the Officer Candidate School. Following an introduction to guided missiles and nuclear physics, basic principles and theories are…

8 CFR 204.10 - Petitions by, or for, certain scientists of the Commonwealth of Independent States or the Baltic...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... ballistic missiles, nuclear, biological, chemical, or other high-technology weapons of mass destruction, or who are working on nuclear, chemical, biological, or other high-technology defense projects, as... production of ballistic missiles, nuclear, biological, chemical, or other high-technology weapons of mass...

8 CFR 204.10 - Petitions by, or for, certain scientists of the Commonwealth of Independent States or the Baltic...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... ballistic missiles, nuclear, biological, chemical, or other high-technology weapons of mass destruction, or who are working on nuclear, chemical, biological, or other high-technology defense projects, as... production of ballistic missiles, nuclear, biological, chemical, or other high-technology weapons of mass...

Psychology and Nuclear Weapon Issues: Topics, Concepts, and Bibliography.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Nelson, Linden, Comp.

The document outlines 15 topics, each with concepts and selected references, to illustrate the relevance of psychology for understanding and coping with the threat of nuclear war. Awareness of the literature is intended to encourage psychologists to become more active in applying psychological concepts to nuclear weapons issues. The articles and…

Nuclear Weapon Tests and their Consequences,

DTIC Science & Technology

Nuclear weapon research, specifically nuclear bomb tests, and the deleterious effects of heightened radioactivity levels on the world’s biology, are...Soviet Union is discussed. The effects of the U.S.A. bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as well as the U.S.A. bomb test of March 1, 1954, and listed as

Coping With Nuclear Weapons Policy: How Expert Do You Have To Be?

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Ruina, Jack

1983-01-01

Points out that policy decisions about nuclear weapons evolve from politics, bureaucracy, and technology, indicating that intelligent people can learn enough about technology to make judgments about policy issues. Suggests, however, that much more thinking is necessary to arrive at a coherent perspective about what constitutes nuclear weapons…

US defense policy, US Air Force doctrine and strategic nuclear weapon systems, 1958-1964: the case of the Minuteman ICBM

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Reed, G.A.

This study examines the efforts of the US Air Force during 1958-1964 to develop doctrine for strategic nuclear weapon systems. These years were characterized by rapid, extensive change in the technology of nuclear weapons delivery systems, centering in ICBMs replacing bombers as the chief vehicles. Simultaneously, national military strategy changed with the transfer of power from the Eisenhower to the Kennedy Administrations, shifting from reliance on overwhelming nuclear retaliation to emphasis on balanced conventional and nuclear forces. Against this background, the study poses the question: did the Air Force, when confronted with major changes in technology and national policy, developmore » doctrine for strategic nuclear weapon systems that was politically acceptable, technically feasible, and strategically sound. Using the development of the Minuteman ICBM as a case study, the study examines the evolution of Air Force doctrine and concludes that the Air Force did not, because of conceptual problems and bureaucratic exigencies, develop a doctrine adequate to the requirements of deterrence in the dawning era of solid-fuel ICBMs.« less

Perfection and the Bomb: Nuclear Weapons, Teleology, and Motives.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Brummett, Barry

1989-01-01

Uses Kenneth Burke's theory of perfection to explore the vocabularies of nuclear weapons in United States public discourse and how "the Bomb" as a God term has gained imbalanced ascendancy in centers of power. (MS)

The Feed Materials Program of the Manhattan Project: A Foundational Component of the Nuclear Weapons Complex

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Reed, B. Cameron

2014-12-01

The feed materials program of the Manhattan Project was responsible for procuring uranium-bearing ores and materials and processing them into forms suitable for use as source materials for the Project's uranium-enrichment factories and plutonium-producing reactors. This aspect of the Manhattan Project has tended to be overlooked in comparison with the Project's more dramatic accomplishments, but was absolutely vital to the success of those endeavors: without appropriate raw materials and the means to process them, nuclear weapons and much of the subsequent cold war would never have come to pass. Drawing from information available in Manhattan Engineer District Documents, this paper examines the sources and processing of uranium-bearing materials used in making the first nuclear weapons and how the feed materials program became a central foundational component of the postwar nuclear weapons complex.

Worldwide Report, Arms Control

DTIC Science & Technology

1985-12-28

NUCLEAR FORCES NATO Reviews Nuclear Weapons in Europe (Paris AFP, 28 Nov 85) 37 RELATED ISSUES ’.,. European Defense Ministers Congratulate Reagan...militarization of space and its statement of not being the first one to use nuclear weapons." [Excerpts] [Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service in Chinese 1522...threat of nuclear war, the prevention of military advantages for the Soviet Union and the United States over each other, the prevention

Japan’s Rearmament Dilemma: Obstacles to Rearmament.

DTIC Science & Technology

1980-01-01

aircraft carrier Enterprise, and the problems with the first Japanese nuclear -powered ship , the Mutsu , have continued to keep the issue of nuclear weapons...4 Formation of the Psychology. .. ............... 4 Nuclear Allergy .. .................... 7 Self-Defense Force .. ................... 10 ARTICLE 9... nuclear weapons, would elicit a strong reaction from the U.S. This specter of the U.S. reaction is another obstacle to rearmament. While most scholars

ASSESSING THE UNCERTAINTY OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

DTIC Science & Technology

2017-04-22

empirical attempts. From both qualitative and quantitative perspectives, this paper finds cause to question the certainty that nuclear deterrence will...suggests nuclear weapons do indeed possess a higher deterrence effect than conventional forces alone. Data from the “ Correlates of War” data set was...certainly do not provide an absolute deterrent against aggression. 16 While nuclear weapons appear to be correlated with a reduction in the occurrences

3 CFR - Continuation of Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 3 The President 1 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Continuation of Emergency With Respect to Weapons of... Continuation of Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction On November 14, 1994, by Executive Order... of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (weapons of mass destruction) and the means of...

3 CFR - Continuation of Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 3 The President 1 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Continuation of Emergency With Respect to Weapons of... Continuation of Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction On November 14, 1994, by Executive Order... of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (weapons of mass destruction) and the means of...

76 FR 70317 - Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-11-10

... proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (weapons of mass destruction) and the means of...--Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction #0; #0; #0; Presidential... the National Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction On November 14, 1994, by Executive...

77 FR 66513 - Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2012-11-05

... proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (weapons of mass destruction) and the means of delivering such weapons. On July 28, 1998, the President issued Executive Order 13094 amending Executive... the National Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction On November 14, 1994, by Executive...

Department of Energy Efforts to Promote Universal Adherence to the IAEA Additional Protocol

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Killinger, Mark H.; Hansen, Linda H.; Kovacic, Don N.

2009-10-06

Entry-into-force of the U.S. Additional Protocol (AP) in January 2009 continues to demonstrate the ongoing commitment by the United States to promote universal adherence to the AP. The AP is a critical tool for improving the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) capabilities to detect undeclared activities that indicate a clandestine nuclear weapons program. This is because States Parties are required to provide information about, and access to, nuclear fuel cycle activities beyond their traditional safeguards reporting requirements. As part of the U.S. AP Implementation Act and Senate Resolution of Ratification, the Administration is required to report annually to Congress onmore » measures taken to achieve the adoption of the AP in non-nuclear weapon states, as well as assistance to the IAEA to promote the effective implementation of APs in those states. A key U.S. effort in this area is being managed by the International Nuclear Safeguards and Engagement Program (INSEP) of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). Through new and existing bilateral cooperation agreements, INSEP has initiated technical assistance projects for AP implementation with selected non-weapon states. States with which INSEP is currently cooperating include Vietnam and Thailand, with Indonesia, Algeria, Morocco, and other countries as possible future collaborators in the area of AP implementation. The INSEP collaborative model begins with a joint assessment with our partners to identify specific needs they may have regarding entering the AP into force and any impediments to successful implementation. An action plan is then developed detailing and prioritizing the necessary joint activities. Such assistance may include: advice on developing legal frameworks and regulatory documents; workshops to promote understanding of AP requirements; training to determine possible declarable activities; assistance in developing a system to collect and submit declarations; performing industry outreach to raise awareness; guidance for reporting export and manufacturing of “especially designed or prepared” equipment listed in AP Annex I/Annex II; and lastly, developing indigenous capabilities to sustain AP implementation. INSEP also coordinates with the IAEA to ensure the harmonization of the assistance provided by DOE and the IAEA. This paper describes current efforts and future plans for AP international implementation support.« less

Igniting the Light Elements: The Los Alamos Thermonuclear Weapon Project, 1942-1952

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Fitzpatrick, Anne C.

1999-07-01

The American system of nuclear weapons research and development was conceived and developed not as a result of technological determinism, but by a number of individual architects who promoted the growth of this large technologically-based complex. While some of the technological artifacts of this system, such as the fission weapons used in World War II, have been the subject of many historical studies, their technical successors--fusion (or hydrogen) devices--are representative of the largely unstudied highly secret realms of nuclear weapons science and engineering. In the postwar period a small number of Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory's staff and affiliates were responsiblemore » for theoretical work on fusion weapons, yet the program was subject to both the provisions and constraints of the US Atomic Energy Commission, of which Los Alamos was a part. The Commission leadership's struggle to establish a mission for its network of laboratories, least of all to keep them operating, affected Los Alamos's leaders' decisions as to the course of weapons design and development projects. Adapting Thomas P. Hughes's ''large technological systems'' thesis, I focus on the technical, social, political, and human problems that nuclear weapons scientists faced while pursuing the thermonuclear project, demonstrating why the early American thermonuclear bomb project was an immensely complicated scientific and technological undertaking. I concentrate mainly on Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory's Theoretical, or T, Division, and its members' attempts to complete an accurate mathematical treatment of the ''Super''--the most difficult problem in physics in the postwar period--and other fusion weapon theories. Although tackling a theoretical problem, theoreticians had to address technical and engineering issues as well. I demonstrate the relative value and importance of H-bomb research over time in the postwar era to scientific, politician, and military participants in this project. I analyze how and when participants in the H-bomb project recognized both blatant and subtle problems facing the project, how scientists solved them, and the relationship this process had to official nuclear weapons policies. Consequently, I show how the practice of nuclear weapons science in the postwar period became an extremely complex, technologically-based endeavor.« less

MSTD 2007 Publications and Patents

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

King, W E

2008-04-01

The Materials Science and Technology Division (MSTD) supports the central scientific and technological missions of the Laboratory, and at the same time, executes world-class, fundamental research and novel technological development over a wide range of disciplines. Our organization is driven by the institutional needs in nuclear weapons stockpile science, high-energy-density science, nuclear reactor science, and energy and environment science and technology. We maintain expertise and capabilities in many diverse areas, including actinide science, electron microscopy, laser-materials interactions, materials theory, simulation and modeling, materials synthesis and processing, materials science under extreme conditions, ultrafast materials science, metallurgy, nanoscience and technology, nuclear fuelsmore » and energy security, optical materials science, and surface science. MSTD scientists play leadership roles in the scientific community in these key and emerging areas.« less

Taking Off the Wedding Ring: The Consequences of the Netherlands’ Choice to Forgo a Nuclear Capable F-35

DTIC Science & Technology

2015-02-17

F-16. After his commission, flying assignments included duties as Weapons Instructor Pilot, Flight Commander and Operations Officer at Volkel AB ...the Netherlands. He also served a tour at the Tactical Leadership Program (TLP) at Florennes AB , Belgium as a Seminar Leader. He is a command pilot...the glue that keeps NATO together.40 The deepening crisis between Russia, NATO, EU and the United States over Ukraine that has emerged over the last

Integration of National Guard Medical Capabilities During Domestic Disasters: Developing the Synergies

DTIC Science & Technology

2009-03-20

A major earthquake along the New Madrid fault3 or the urban detonation of a Nuclear weapon would be devastating not only in its injuries and loss...injuries and deaths, and destroy the very infrastructure needed to respond. For example, a major earthquake on the New Madrid fault in the Mississippi... Earthquake Potential of the New Madrid Seismic Zone. Bulletin of the Seismological Society of America. 2002;92(6):2080-2089. 27 38. Bonnett CJ, Schock

The monitoring and verification of nuclear weapons

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Garwin, Richard L., E-mail: RLG2@us.ibm.com

2014-05-09

This paper partially reviews and updates the potential for monitoring and verification of nuclear weapons, including verification of their destruction. Cooperative monitoring with templates of the gamma-ray spectrum are an important tool, dependent on the use of information barriers.

Tacit Knowledge Involvement in the Production of Nuclear Weapons: A Critical Component of a Credible US Nuclear Deterrent in the 21st Century

DTIC Science & Technology

2013-02-14

important in sustaining a credible nuclear deterrent without testing. Thinking in the early days of the Manhattan Project was that designing a nuclear...weapon would occur quickly. Renowned physicist Edward Teller recalled being discouraged from joining the Manhattan Project at Los Alamos National...difficulties with their nuclear program in the early years despite involvement with portions of the Manhattan Project . With permission, the British

"Fat Man and Little Boy": The Cinematic Representation of Interests in the Nuclear Weapons Organization.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Taylor, Bryan C.

1993-01-01

Examines the ironic "problems" of the 1989 Hollywood film "Fat Man and Little Boy" (portraying the construction of the atomic bomb at the Los Alamos Laboratory during World War II) to demonstrate the ideological operations of nuclear texts, and the role of the nuclear weapons organization as a symbolic form in cultural…

The Demands of Nuclear Safety: Mishaps and USSTRATCOM

DTIC Science & Technology

2011-06-01

maintenance operation—the unexpected will occur. Scott D. Sagan On 30 August 2007 the unexpected occurred. Ironically, the safety problem did... Sagan , The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 14, 48. 39 Sagan , Limits...1 Scott D. Sagan , The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton, NJ: Princeton

Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear War. Papers Based on a Symposium of the Forum on Physics and Society of the American Physical Society, (Washington, D.C., April 1982).

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Morrison, Philip; And Others

Three papers on nuclear weapons and nuclear war, based on talks given by distinguished physicists during an American Physical Society-sponsored symposium, are provided in this booklet. They include "Caught Between Asymptotes" (Philip Morrison), "We are not Inferior to the Soviets" (Hans A. Bethe), and "MAD vs. NUTS"…

American-Ukrainian Nuclear Relations

DTIC Science & Technology

1996-10-01

Ukrainian nuclear question. Foreign Minister Kozyrev was blunt in his view that the Ukrainians were seeking to gain control of the nuclear weapons and...the nuclear material in the weapons on its territory. Kiev was very pleased with the U.S. position, claiming that it mirrored the Ukrainian stance...had pcrsonally directed Kozyrev to come up with language that would please Ukraine and that Russia would be willing to provide the assurances

Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues

DTIC Science & Technology

2009-07-30

Pakistan: Sabotage of a Spent Fuel Cask or a Commercial Irradiation Source in Transport ,” in Pakistan’s Nuclear Future, 2008; Martellini, 2008. 79...that Pakistan’s strategic nuclear assets could be obtained by terrorists, or used by elements in the Pakistani government. Chair of the Joint Chiefs...that gave additional urgency to the program. Pakistan produced fissile material for its nuclear weapons using gas-centrifuge-based uranium

Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues

DTIC Science & Technology

2010-10-07

Pakistan: Sabotage of a Spent Fuel Cask or a Commercial Irradiation Source in Transport ,” in Pakistan’s Nuclear Future, 2008; Martellini, 2008. 99...prevent unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons, as well as contribute to physical security of storage facilities and personnel reliability... nuclear assets could be obtained by terrorists, or used by elements in the Pakistani government. Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael

Nuclear programs in India and Pakistan

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Mian, Zia

India and Pakistan launched their respective nuclear programs in the 1940s and 1950s with considerable foreign technical support, especially from the United States Atoms for Peace Program. The technology and training that was acquired served as the platform for later nuclear weapon development efforts that included nuclear weapon testing in 1974 and in 1998 by India, and also in 1998 by Pakistan - which had illicitly acquired uranium enrichment technology especially from Europe and received assistance from China. As of 2013, both India and Pakistan were continuing to produce fissile material for weapons, in the case of India also formore » nuclear naval fuel, and were developing a diverse array of ballistic and cruise missiles. International efforts to restrain the South Asian nuclear build-up have been largely set aside over the past decade as Pakistani support became central for the U.S. war in Afghanistan and as U.S. geopolitical and economic interests in supporting the rise of India, in part as a counter to China, led to India being exempted both from U.S non-proliferation laws and international nuclear trade guidelines. In the absence of determined international action and with Pakistan blocking the start of talks on a fissile material cutoff treaty, nuclear weapon programs in South Asia are likely to keep growing for the foreseeable future.« less

Nuclear programs in India and Pakistan

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Mian, Zia

2014-05-01

India and Pakistan launched their respective nuclear programs in the 1940s and 1950s with considerable foreign technical support, especially from the United States Atoms for Peace Program. The technology and training that was acquired served as the platform for later nuclear weapon development efforts that included nuclear weapon testing in 1974 and in 1998 by India, and also in 1998 by Pakistan - which had illicitly acquired uranium enrichment technology especially from Europe and received assistance from China. As of 2013, both India and Pakistan were continuing to produce fissile material for weapons, in the case of India also for nuclear naval fuel, and were developing a diverse array of ballistic and cruise missiles. International efforts to restrain the South Asian nuclear build-up have been largely set aside over the past decade as Pakistani support became central for the U.S. war in Afghanistan and as U.S. geopolitical and economic interests in supporting the rise of India, in part as a counter to China, led to India being exempted both from U.S non-proliferation laws and international nuclear trade guidelines. In the absence of determined international action and with Pakistan blocking the start of talks on a fissile material cutoff treaty, nuclear weapon programs in South Asia are likely to keep growing for the foreseeable future.

Combating the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Jenkins, Bonnie

1997-01-01

Reveals the growing threat posed to all countries by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Discusses the international effort combating this proliferation including the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties, Biological Weapons Convention, and Chemical Weapons Convention. Also considers regional arms…

Total Quality Management and nuclear weapons: A historian`s perspective

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Meade, R.A.

1993-11-01

Total Quality Management (TQM) has become a significant management theme at Los Alamos National Laboratory. This paper discusses the historical roots of TQM at Los Alamos and how TQM has been used in the development of nuclear weapons.

The nuclear weapons inheritance project: student-to-student dialogues and interactive peer education in disarmament activism.

PubMed

Buhmann, Caecilie Böck

2007-01-01

The Nuclear Weapons Inheritance Project is a student run and student initiated project founded in 2001 with the purpose of increasing awareness of health effects of nuclear policies and empowering university students to take action in a local and international context. The project uses dialogues to discuss nuclear disarmament with university students and a method of interactive peer education to train new trainers. The project has met more than 1500 students in nuclear weapon states in dialogue and trained about 400 students from all over the world. This article describes the methods and results of the project and discuss how the experience of the project can be used in other projects seeking to increase awareness of a topic and to initiate action on social injustice.

78 FR 67289 - Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-11-12

... economy of the United States posed by the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (weapons of mass destruction) and the means of delivering such weapons. On July 28, 1998, the President... November 7, 2013 Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to the Proliferation of Weapons of...

The ROK Army’s Role When North Korea Collapses Without a War with the ROK

DTIC Science & Technology

2001-02-01

produced large amounts of biological and chemical weapons. In addition, North Korea continues to develop nuclear weapons and missile technology and export...process. 6. Security and safe disposal of WMD. This includes research, production and storage facilities for nuclear, biological and chemical weapons...Publishers, 1989. Naisbitt, John . Megatrends Asia: Eight Asian Megatrends That Are Reshaping Our World, New York: Simon and Schuster. 1996. The New

Mechanical Analysis of W78/88-1 Life Extension Program Warhead Design Options

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Spencer, Nathan

2014-09-01

Life Extension Program (LEP) is a program to repair/replace components of nuclear weapons to ensure the ability to meet military requirements. The W78/88-1 LEP encompasses the modernization of two major nuclear weapon reentry systems into an interoperable warhead. Several design concepts exist to provide different options for robust safety and security themes, maximum non-nuclear commonality, and cost. Simulation is one capability used to evaluate the mechanical performance of the designs in various operational environments, plan for system and component qualification efforts, and provide insight into the survivability of the warhead in environments that are not currently testable. The simulation effortsmore » use several Sandia-developed tools through the Advanced Simulation and Computing program, including Cubit for mesh generation, the DART Model Manager, SIERRA codes running on the HPC TLCC2 platforms, DAKOTA, and ParaView. Several programmatic objectives were met using the simulation capability including: (1) providing early environmental specification estimates that may be used by component designers to understand the severity of the loads their components will need to survive, (2) providing guidance for load levels and configurations for subassembly tests intended to represent operational environments, and (3) recommending design options including modified geometry and material properties. These objectives were accomplished through regular interactions with component, system, and test engineers while using the laboratory's computational infrastructure to effectively perform ensembles of simulations. Because NNSA has decided to defer the LEP program, simulation results are being documented and models are being archived for future reference. However, some advanced and exploratory efforts will continue to mature key technologies, using the results from these and ongoing simulations for design insights, test planning, and model validation.« less

75 FR 54689 - Additional Designation of an Entity Pursuant to Executive Order 13382

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-09-08

... proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or their means of delivery (including missiles capable of... means of delivery (including missiles capable of delivering such weapons), including any efforts to...

78 FR 13140 - Additional Designation of Amr Armanazi Pursuant to Executive Order 13382

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-02-26

... means of delivery (including missiles capable of delivering such weapons), including any efforts to... proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or their means of delivery (including missiles capable of...

Effects of 30 Mev Electron Irradiation on InGaAsP LEDs (Light Emitting Diodes) and InGaAs Photodiodes.

DTIC Science & Technology

1986-06-01

devices in satellites and military combat systems, the reliability of LEDs and photodiodes when exposed to the typical radiation of a space or nuclear ...could be exposed to: nuclear power plants, space environments or a nuclear weapon detonation. When located on the 15 surface of the earth, nuclear power...35,000 miles above the earth’s surface. Additionally, electrons, neutrons and other products from a high altitude detonation of a nuclear weapon can

10 CFR 1045.15 - Classification and declassification presumptions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... experimental physics, engineering, materials science, biology and medicine; (2) Magnetic confinement fusion... the application of the criteria in § 1045.16 indicates otherwise: (1) Detailed designs, specifications... design and analysis of nuclear weapons; (3) Vulnerabilities of U.S. nuclear weapons to sabotage...

10 CFR 1045.15 - Classification and declassification presumptions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... experimental physics, engineering, materials science, biology and medicine; (2) Magnetic confinement fusion... the application of the criteria in § 1045.16 indicates otherwise: (1) Detailed designs, specifications... design and analysis of nuclear weapons; (3) Vulnerabilities of U.S. nuclear weapons to sabotage...

Race horses vs work horses: Competition between the nuclear weapons labs in the 1950s

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Francis, S.

1992-01-01

This document provides a discussion of the missions and research programs of Los Alamos National Laboratory and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and details the competition between the two nuclear weapons laboratories in the 1950's. (FI)

Race horses vs work horses: Competition between the nuclear weapons labs in the 1950s

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Francis, S.

1992-06-01

This document provides a discussion of the missions and research programs of Los Alamos National Laboratory and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and details the competition between the two nuclear weapons laboratories in the 1950`s. (FI)

Proceedings: 17th Asilomar conference on fire and blast effects of nuclear weapons

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Hickman, R.G.; Meier, C.A.

1983-01-01

The objective of the 1983 conference was to provide for the technical exchange of ideas relating to the science and technology of the immediate effects of nuclear weapon explosions. Separate abstracts were prepared for 39 of the papers.

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Vanderwiel, Scott A; Wilson, Alyson G; Graves, Todd L

Both the U. S. Department of Defense (DoD) and Department of Energy (DOE) maintain weapons stockpiles: items like bullets, missiles and bombs that have already been produced and are being stored until needed. Ideally, these stockpiles maintain high reliability over time. To assess reliability, a surveillance program is implemented, where units are periodically removed from the stockpile and tested. The most definitive tests typically destroy the weapons so a given unit is tested only once. Surveillance managers need to decide how many units should be tested, how often they should be tested, what tests should be done, and how themore » resulting data are used to estimate the stockpile's current and future reliability. These issues are particularly critical from a planning perspective: given what has already been observed and our understanding of the mechanisms of stockpile aging, what is an appropriate and cost-effective surveillance program? Surveillance programs are costly, broad, and deep, especially in the DOE, where the US nuclear weapons surveillance program must 'ensure, through various tests, that the reliability of nuclear weapons is maintained' in the absence of full-system testing (General Accounting Office, 1996). The DOE program consists primarily of three types of tests: nonnuclear flight tests, that involve the actual dropping or launching of a weapon from which the nuclear components have been removed; and nonnuclear and nuclear systems laboratory tests, which detect defects due to aging, manufacturing, and design of the nonnuclear and nuclear portions of the weapons. Fully integrated analysis of the suite of nuclear weapons surveillance data is an ongoing area of research (Wilson et al., 2007). This paper introduces a simple model that captures high-level features of stockpile reliability over time and can be used to answer broad policy questions about surveillance programs. Our intention is to provide a framework that generates tractable answers that integrate expert knowledge and high-level summaries of surveillance data to allow decision-making about appropriate trade-offs between the cost of data and the precision of stockpile reliability estimates.« less

Abramovo Counterterrorism Training Center

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Hayes, Christopher M; Ross, Larry; Lingenfelter, Forrest E

2011-01-01

The U.S. government has been assisting the Russian Federation (RF) Ministry of Defense (MOD) for many years with nuclear weapons transportation security (NWTS) through the provision of specialized guard escort railcars and cargo railcars with integrated physical security and communication systems, armored transport vehicles, and armored escort vehicles. As a natural continuation of the NWTS program, a partnership has been formed to construct a training center that will provide counterterrorism training to personnel in all branches of the RF MOD. The Abramovo Counterterrorism Training Center (ACTC) is a multinational, multiagency project with funding from Canada, RF and the U.S. Departmentsmore » of Defense and Energy. ACTC will be a facility where MOD personnel can conduct basic through advanced training in various security measures to protect Category IA material against the threat of terrorist attack. The training will enhance defense-in-depth principles by integrating MOD guard force personnel into the overall physical protection systems and improving their overall response time and neutralization capabilities. The ACTC project includes infrastructure improvements, renovation of existing buildings, construction of new buildings, construction of new training facilities, and provision of training and other equipment. Classroom training will be conducted in a renovated training building. Basic and intermediate training will be conducted on three different security training areas where various obstacles and static training devices will be constructed. The central element of ACTC, where advanced training will be held, is the 'autodrome,' a 3 km road along which various terrorist events can be staged to challenge MOD personnel in realistic and dynamic nuclear weapons transportation scenarios. This paper will address the ACTC project elements and the vision for training development and integrating this training into actual nuclear weapons transportation operations.« less

Supplying the nuclear arsenal: Production reactor technology, management, and policy, 1942--1992

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Carlisle, R.P.; Zenzen, J.M.

1994-01-01

This book focuses on the lineage of America`s production reactors, those three at Hanford and their descendants, the reactors behind America`s nuclear weapons. The work will take only occasional sideways glances at the collateral lines of descent, the reactor cousins designed for experimental purposes, ship propulsion, and electric power generation. Over the decades from 1942 through 1992, fourteen American production reactors made enough plutonium to fuel a formidable arsenal of more than twenty thousand weapons. In the last years of that period, planners, nuclear engineers, and managers struggled over designs for the next generation of production reactors. The story ofmore » fourteen individual machines and of the planning effort to replace them might appear relatively narrow. Yet these machines lay at the heart of the nation`s nuclear weapons complex. The story of these machines is the story of arming the winning weapon, supplying the nuclear arms race. This book is intended to capture the history of the first fourteen production reactors, and associated design work, in the face of the end of the Cold War.« less

The Unauthorized Movement of Nuclear Weapons and Mistaken Shipment of Classified Missile Components: An Assessment

DTIC Science & Technology

2012-01-01

options to defeat any aggressor .44 The 2002 National Security Strategy further articulated the Administration‘s focus on WMD. It is this change...Review that reduced the role of U.S. nuclear weapons to largely, but not completely, a retaliatory role against any nuclear aggressor , reversing the...the Air Force‘s nuclear cognitive -dissonance that interviewees relayed to the Study Team. In addition to addressing joint operations, Goldwater

On Nuclear Deterrence and Assurance

DTIC Science & Technology

2009-01-01

Strategic  Studies  Quarterly ♦  Spring  2009 [ 43 ] On Nuclear Deterrence  and Assurance Keith B. Payne Weakness is provocative. —Donald Rumsfeld...Strategic  Studies  Quarterly ♦  Spring  2009 Keith B. Payne [ 44 ] No Deterrence Value for Nuclear Weapons...Payne.indd 44 2/2/09 2:31:00 PM On Nuclear Deterrence and Assurance Strategic  Studies  Quarterly ♦  Spring  2009 [ 45 ] of nuclear weapons were to be

Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues

DTIC Science & Technology

2010-02-04

Terrorism in Pakistan: Sabotage of a Spent Fuel Cask or a Commercial Irradiation Source in Transport ,” in Pakistan’s Nuclear Future, 2008; Martellini, 2008...measures to prevent unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons, as well as contribute to physical security of storage facilities and personnel...strategic nuclear assets could be obtained by terrorists, or used by elements in the Pakistani government. Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral

JPRS Report, East Europe

DTIC Science & Technology

1988-12-14

situation in the world healthier, particularly for the program to liquidate nuclear arms and other types of weapons of mass destruction. During the...make preparations for extensive discussions with the aim of radically reducing tactical nuclear weapons, armed forces, and conventional weap- ons...liquidat- ing two classes of nuclear arms as a historic step which will create preconditions for limiting the feverish arms race and for better

The Complete Burning of Weapons Grade Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium with (Laser Inertial Fusion-Fission Energy) LIFE Engine

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Farmer, J C; Diaz de la Rubia, T; Moses, E

2008-12-23

The National Ignition Facility (NIF) project, a laser-based Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) experiment designed to achieve thermonuclear fusion ignition and burn in the laboratory, is under construction at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and will be completed in April of 2009. Experiments designed to accomplish the NIF's goal will commence in late FY2010 utilizing laser energies of 1 to 1.3 MJ. Fusion yields of the order of 10 to 20 MJ are expected soon thereafter. Laser initiated fusion-fission (LIFE) engines have now been designed to produce nuclear power from natural or depleted uranium without isotopic enrichment, and from spentmore » nuclear fuel from light water reactors without chemical separation into weapons-attractive actinide streams. A point-source of high-energy neutrons produced by laser-generated, thermonuclear fusion within a target is used to achieve ultra-deep burn-up of the fertile or fissile fuel in a sub-critical fission blanket. Fertile fuels including depleted uranium (DU), natural uranium (NatU), spent nuclear fuel (SNF), and thorium (Th) can be used. Fissile fuels such as low-enrichment uranium (LEU), excess weapons plutonium (WG-Pu), and excess highly-enriched uranium (HEU) may be used as well. Based upon preliminary analyses, it is believed that LIFE could help meet worldwide electricity needs in a safe and sustainable manner, while drastically shrinking the nation's and world's stockpile of spent nuclear fuel and excess weapons materials. LIFE takes advantage of the significant advances in laser-based inertial confinement fusion that are taking place at the NIF at LLNL where it is expected that thermonuclear ignition will be achieved in the 2010-2011 timeframe. Starting from as little as 300 to 500 MW of fusion power, a single LIFE engine will be able to generate 2000 to 3000 MWt in steady state for periods of years to decades, depending on the nuclear fuel and engine configuration. Because the fission blanket in a fusion-fission hybrid system is subcritical, a LIFE engine can burn any fertile or fissile nuclear material, including unenriched natural or depleted U and SNF, and can extract a very high percentage of the energy content of its fuel resulting in greatly enhanced energy generation per metric ton of nuclear fuel, as well as nuclear waste forms with vastly reduced concentrations of long-lived actinides. LIFE engines could thus provide the ability to generate vast amounts of electricity while greatly reducing the actinide content of any existing or future nuclear waste and extending the availability of low cost nuclear fuels for several thousand years. LIFE also provides an attractive pathway for burning excess weapons Pu to over 99% FIMA (fission of initial metal atoms) without the need for fabricating or reprocessing mixed oxide fuels (MOX). Because of all of these advantages, LIFE engines offer a pathway toward sustainable and safe nuclear power that significantly mitigates nuclear proliferation concerns and minimizes nuclear waste. An important aspect of a LIFE engine is the fact that there is no need to extract the fission fuel from the fission blanket before it is burned to the desired final level. Except for fuel inspection and maintenance process times, the nuclear fuel is always within the core of the reactor and no weapons-attractive materials are available outside at any point in time. However, an important consideration when discussing proliferation concerns associated with any nuclear fuel cycle is the ease with which reactor fuel can be converted to weapons usable materials, not just when it is extracted as waste, but at any point in the fuel cycle. Although the nuclear fuel remains in the core of the engine until ultra deep actinide burn up is achieved, soon after start up of the engine, once the system breeds up to full power, several tons of fissile material is present in the fission blanket. However, this fissile material is widely dispersed in millions of fuel pebbles, which can be tagged as individual accountable items, and thus made difficult to divert in large quantities. This report discusses the application of the LIFE concept to nonproliferation issues, initially looking at the LIFE (Laser Inertial Fusion-Fission Energy) engine as a means of completely burning WG Pu and HEU. By combining a neutron-rich inertial fusion point source with energy-rich fission, the once-through closed fuel-cycle LIFE concept has the following characteristics: it is capable of efficiently burning excess weapons or separated civilian plutonium and highly enriched uranium; the fission blanket is sub-critical at all times (keff < 0.95); because LIFE can operate well beyond the point at which light water reactors (LWRs) need to be refueled due to burn-up of fissile material and the resulting drop in system reactivity, fuel burn-up of 99% or more appears feasible. The objective of this work is to develop LIFE technology for burning of WG-Pu and HEU.« less

Is crisis stability still achievable?

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Pollack, Joshua

During the Cold War, the idea of crisis stability concerned whether the United States and the Soviet Union would be faced with powerful incentives to strike each other first with their nuclear weapons during periods of tension. This idea influenced the design of nuclear forces and guided aspects of nuclear arms control. The United States and Russia continue to operate large, alert nuclear forces, but at least three new factors have emerged that add significantly greater complexity to this picture. The first new factor consists of the development and deployment of new strategic military technologies that are entangled with nuclear weapons. These include strategic ballistic missile defenses, counter-space weapons, and strategic conventional weapons. The second new factor consists of new dyads of interacting strategic forces beyond US-Russia. These include US-China, US-North Korea, India-Pakistan, and India-China. The third new factor consists of the emergence of three-actor crisis stability dynamics, where the third actor is not necessarily nuclear-armed. This paper illustrates the concept with the US-North Korea-South Korea triangle. It briefly discusses the implications of these developments and reflects on the broad policy options that may be available.

Scope and verification of a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty

DOE PAGES

von Hippel, Frank N.

2014-01-01

A Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) would ban the production of fissile material – in practice highly-enriched uranium and separated plutonium – for weapons. It has been supported by strong majorities in the United Nations. After it comes into force, newly produced fissile materials could only be produced under international – most likely International Atomic Energy Agency – monitoring. There are many non-weapon states that argue the treaty should also place under safeguards pre-existing stocks of fissile material in civilian use or declared excess for weapons so as to make nuclear-weapons reductions irreversible. Our paper discusses the scope of themore » FMCT, the ability to detect clandestine production and verification challenges in the nuclear-weapons states.« less

Facing reality: The future of the US nuclear weapons complex

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Not Available

1992-01-01

Facing Reality is a collaboration by 15 authors from environmental and grass-roots groups. The authors bluntly conclude that whether the inertia, habit, or material interest, the nuclear weapons establishment has proven itself incapable of genuine reform.' They therefore call for government agencies other than the Department of Energy to manage the tasks of decontamination and decommissioning. Just a partial list of what needs to be done to clean up the DOE's mess is daunting: closing, decommissioning, and decontaminating production facilities, dismantling thousands of nuclear warheads, safely storing dangerous radioactive materials, identifying alternative employment for weapons specialists, conducting meaningful health studiesmore » of workers and citizens exposed to radiation, and providng compensation for the victims of the nuclear buildup.« less

Nuclear Targeting Terms for Engineers and Scientists

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

St Ledger, John W.

The Department of Defense has a methodology for targeting nuclear weapons, and a jargon that is used to communicate between the analysts, planners, aircrews, and missile crews. The typical engineer or scientist in the Department of Energy may not have been exposed to the nuclear weapons targeting terms and methods. This report provides an introduction to the terms and methodologies used for nuclear targeting. Its purpose is to prepare engineers and scientists to participate in wargames, exercises, and discussions with the Department of Defense. Terms such as Circular Error Probable, probability of hit and damage, damage expectancy, and the physicalmore » vulnerability system are discussed. Methods for compounding damage from multiple weapons applied to one target are presented.« less

78 FR 13139 - Additional Designation of A North Korean Entity and Two North Korean Individuals Pursuant to...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-02-26

... delivery (including missiles capable of delivering such weapons), including any efforts to manufacture... destruction or their means of delivery (including missiles capable of delivering such weapons), including any...

Waging modern war: An analysis of the moral literature on the nuclear arms debate

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Palmer-Fernandez, G.F.

1992-01-01

The primary aim was to examine the dominant views on the subject of deterrence and the use of nuclear weapons, to compare them with each other, and to consider objections that have or might be made against them. A second, more controversial and substantive, aim was to show that nuclear weapons and war-fighting plans engender some disturbing moral dilemmas that call into question fundamental ways of thinking about morality and some of the common intuitions on the relation of intentions and actions. The author examines the moral literature, both religious and secular, on nuclear arms policy written between the earlymore » 1960s and the late 1980s. Three different schools of thought, or parties,' are identified. To establish the differences among these parties, the author shows the various ways in which judgments on the use of nuclear weapons and on deterrence are linked either by a prohibitive moral principle which draws a moral equivalence going from action to intention or by a factual assumption about the nature of nuclear weapons. He concludes with the suggestion that the dilemmas that arise in the moral evaluation of nuclear deterrence represent a profound and much wider problem in moral theory between the ideals of character and the moral claims of politics.« less

Promote health, not nuclear weapons: ethical duty of medical professionals.

PubMed

Mitra, Arun

2018-03-07

Despite ongoing tensions in various parts of the world, the year 2017 ended on a positive note. The Treaty Prohibiting Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) was passed by the UN General Assembly on July 7, 2017, which will always be a red-letter day in history. It has raised many hopes for a future world without nuclear weapons and staved off the impending humanitarian catastrophe. Good health is a basic need of every individual. Therefore, each person yearns for a life free of violence and free of man-made catastrophes like the ones at Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, which killed over two hundred thousand people and resulted in genetic mutations affecting generations thereafter. Unfortunately, instead of working for nuclear disarmament, the world moved towards an unending nuclear arms race, costing billions which could have been used for healing millions of people living in despair and sickness. This is why on December 10, 2017, Oslo, the capital of Norway, was filled with excitement when the Nobel Peace Prize for this year was bestowed upon the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN). Large numbers of medical professionals from around the globe had gathered there to affirm their commitment to a healthy future through diversion of wasteful expenditure from the nuclear arms race towards universal health.

Nuclear pumped lasers: Advantages of O2 (1 delta)

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Taylor, J. J.

1979-01-01

Nuclear pumped laser technology was evaluated as a possible future weapons contender. It was determined that in order to become a primary weapon the following engineering problems must be solved: shielding, heat dissipation, high efficiency fixed focus pumping, good beam quality, and thermal blooming.

Patenting the bomb: nuclear weapons, intellectual property, and technological control.

PubMed

Wellerstein, Alex

2008-03-01

During the course of the Manhattan Project, the U.S. government secretly attempted to acquire a monopoly on the patent rights for inventions used in the production of nuclear weapons and nuclear energy. The use of patents as a system of control, while common for more mundane technologies, would seem at first glance to conflict with the regimes of secrecy that have traditionally been associated with nuclear weapons. In explaining the origins and operations of the Manhattan Project patent system, though, this essay argues that the utilization of patents was an ad hoc attempt at legal control of the atomic bomb by Manhattan Project administrators, focused on the monopolistic aspects of the patent system and preexisting patent secrecy legislation. From the present perspective, using patents as a method of control for such weapons seems inadequate, if not unnecessary; but at the time, when the bomb was a new and essentially unregulated technology, patents played an important role in the thinking of project administrators concerned with meaningful postwar control of the bomb.

Nuclear, biological and chemical warfare. Part I: Medical aspects of nuclear warfare.

PubMed

Kasthuri, A S; Pradhan, A B; Dham, S K; Bhalla, I P; Paul, J S

1990-04-01

Casualties in earlier wars were due much more to diseases than to weapons. Mention has been made in history of the use of biological agents in warfare, to deny the enemy food and water and to cause disease. In the first world war chemical agents were used to cause mass casualties. Nuclear weapons were introduced in the second world war. Several countries are now involved in developing nuclear, biological and chemical weapon systems, for the mass annihilation of human beings, animals and plants, and to destroy the economy of their enemies. Recently, natural calamities and accidents in nuclear, chemical and biological laboratories and industries have caused mass instantaneous deaths in civilian population. The effects of future wars will not be restricted to uniformed persons. It is time that physicians become aware of the destructive potential of these weapons. Awareness, immediate protective measures and first aid will save a large number of persons. This series of articles will outline the medical aspects of nuclear, biological and chemical weapon systems in three parts. Part I will deal with the biological effects of a nuclear explosion. The short and long term effects due to blast, heat and associated radiation are highlighted. In Part II, the role of biological agents which cause commoner or new disease patterns is mentioned. Some of the accidents from biological warfare laboratories are a testimony to its potential deleterious effects. Part III deals with medical aspects of chemical warfare agents, which in view of their mass effects can overwhelm the existing medical resources, both civilian and military.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 250 WORDS)

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in Context

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Davenport, Kelsey

2017-01-01

The 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) is the cornerstone of multilateral efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and promote efforts toward complete disarmament. In the grand bargain of the NPT, states foreswore pursuit of nuclear weapons in exchange for access to nuclear technology and limited nuclear arsenals to the five states (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) that tested such weapons before the NPT's conception. Now in its seventh decade, the NPT regime is embraced by the vast majority of the world's nations and is viewed as a critical element of international security. However, despite past successes in halting efforts in several states to pursue nuclear weapons, near universal adherence, and only one withdrawal (North Korea), the NPT regime is at a critical crossroads. The treaty has proven unable to adapt to new challenges, such as emerging technologies that threaten operational strategic realities, the devolution of state authority to non-state actors and institutions, and growing dissatisfaction with slow pace of nuclear disarmament. Additionally, the treaty leaves open critical questions, including whether or not state parties have the `right' to pursue technologies that allow for domestic production of fuels for nuclear reactors and if modernization programs for nuclear warheads are inconsistent with the treaty. If these questions remain unresolved, the international community will find itself ill prepared to confront emerging proliferation challenges and the NPT, the linchpin of international nonproliferation and disarmament efforts, may begin to erode.

One perspective on stakeholder involvement at Hanford.

PubMed

Martin, Todd

2011-11-01

The Hanford nuclear site in Washington State had a major role in the production of nuclear weapons materials during the Manhattan Project in World War II and during the Cold War that followed. The production of weapons-grade radionuclides produced a large amount of radioactive byproducts that have been stored since the mid-1900s at the Hanford Site. These by-product radionuclides have leaked from containment facilities into the groundwater, contaminated buildings used for radionuclide processing, and also contaminated the nuclear reactors used to produce weapons-grade uranium and plutonium. This issue has been a major concern to Hanford stakeholders for several decades, and the U.S. Department of Energy, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and the Washington State Department of Ecology established a Tri-Party Agreement in 1989, at which time Hanford ceased production of nuclear weapons materials and began a major effort to clean up and remediate the Hanford Site's contaminated groundwater, soil, and facilities. This paper describes the concerns of stakeholders in the production of nuclear weapons, the secrecy of Hanford operations, and the potential impacts to public health and the environment from the unintended releases of weapons-grade materials and by-products associated with their production at the Hanford Site. It also describes the involvement of public stakeholders in the development and oversight by the Hanford Advisory Board of the steps that have been taken in cleanup activities at the Hanford Site that began as a major effort about two decades ago. The importance of involvement of the general public and public interest organizations in developing and implementing the Hanford cleanup strategy are described in detail.

The Dilemmas of Developing an Indigenous Advanced Arms Industry for Developing Countries: The Case of India and China

DTIC Science & Technology

2006-12-01

of providing nuclear power. Once you have the nuclear weapons, they require a delivery system resulting in a missile program. It is afforded higher...out that some domestic advancements may be made in certain sectors, such as nuclear bombs and missiles, because resources may be spent on narrowly...capital, fighter, aviation, nuclear weapons, missiles 16. PRICE CODE 17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified 18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

No weapons in the weapons lab

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Trebino, Rick

2010-03-01

I spent 12 years working at a top-secret nuclear-weapons lab that had its own dedicated force of heavily armed security guards. Of course, security-related incidents were rare, so the guards' main challenge was simply staying awake.

Post Cold War Nuclear Weapons Policy

DTIC Science & Technology

2012-03-20

are unknown.”14 This instability threatens the success and future of the NPT. According to scholar Joseph F. Pilat , While the vision of a nuclear...for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, April 2007. 15 Joseph F. Pilat , “Nonproliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament, and ExtendedDeterrence

Ballistic Missile Defense Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement

DTIC Science & Technology

1994-10-01

included: the need for BMD; budget allocations; procedural problems related to NEPA; nuclear weapon dangers; arms reductions; and potential contravention...2-26 2.6.2 TECHNOLOGY ALTERNATIVES ........................... 2-26 2.6.2.1 Directed Energy Weapons ..................... 2-26 2.6.2.2 Nuclear ...national defense strategy of mutually assured destruction to keep conflicts from escalating beyond conventional warfare to nuclear war. In 1955, the

Joint Force Quarterly. Issue 58, 3rd Quarter

DTIC Science & Technology

2010-06-01

rise to concerns over the future security of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. Anticipating the possibility of loosely controlled nuclear weapons inside...broader Cooperative Threat Reduction program—an unprecedented effort to reduce nuclear dangers by secur- ing or eliminating Russian weapons systems and...volume is about applications of the biological sciences, here called “biologi- cally inspired innovations,” to the military. Rather than treating

Extended Nuclear Deterrence for Europe Without Forward-based Weapons

DTIC Science & Technology

2012-02-15

financial costs of nuclear burden sharing, bolsters safety and security and further reduces proliferation risks. 22 Bibliography Bildt, Carl and... Sagan , Scott D. and Waltz, Kenneth N. The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed. W. W. Norton and Company New York, NY and London...Point. Center for International Relations, Reports and Analyses. Konrad-Adenauer Foundation, Warsaw, 2011, 2. 30 Bildt, Carl and Sikorski, Radek

JPRS Report, Proliferation Issues

DTIC Science & Technology

1991-08-08

from its processing plant at Valindaba, and fuel-fabrication plants at Valindaba and Pelindaba. where fuel rods for use at the Koeberg nuclear-power...construction of the fourth one. The pulsed reactor uses special elements of nuclear fuel The site of the proposed fourth nuclear power plant can enabling...chemical, and biological weapons, including delivery systems and the transfer of weapons-relevant technologies.] AFRICA SOUTH AFRICA Civilian Uses for

What Are the Legal and Policy Implications of Conducting Preemption and Interdiction Against a Weapons of Mass Destruction?

DTIC Science & Technology

2002-01-01

Manhattan project , gaseous diffusion plant, or even a weapons program. It will be used heavily in chapters 4 and 5. Both The Making of the Atomic Bomb...requirement for secrecy surrounding the Manhattan project and the lingering requirement for secrecy regarding nuclear weapons design. The application to the...another MANHATTAN Project ” to produce a nuclear device (McPhee 1973, 123-4, 136). Scientists who worked on the Manhattan Project maintain that

Russia`s Great Game in a nuclear South Asia

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Pilat, J.F.; Taylor, T.T.

1998-12-31

Lost in the noise of Pakistan`s nuclear weapon tests in the western Baluchistan desert on 28 and 30 May was a surprising diplomatic move by Russia. On 23 May, Russia became the first state to express its willingness to recognize India as a nuclear-weapon state, provided that India commits itself to the international nonproliferation regime. Russia`s Ambassador to India, Albert Chernyshev, stated in the days after the Indian but before the Pakistani nuclear tests that ``India proclaimed itself a nuclear weapons power. One now hopes that India will behave as a nuclear weapons power by acting responsibly. Every nuclear weaponsmore » state has some rights. But for getting recognition it must have some obligations. Once it is ready to show these obligations by joining the nonproliferation regime, its recognition as a nuclear weapons power will follow.`` Russia`s Great Game in South Asia in pursuit of short-term economic and other interests appears to be a serious obstacle on the path to dealing effectively with the South Asian nuclear crisis. Grave damage to security, stability and nonproliferation has already resulted from India`s and Pakistan`s actions, but the situation does not have to spiral out of control. It is imperative that the international community respond appropriately to this challenge. The international community is at a crossroads and Russia`s actions will be critical. Will it be willing to go beyond the narrow economic and political calculations reflected in its diplomatic posturing, and take actions that will serve its long-term interests by bridging differences with other great powers in order to demonstrate to India that it has not chosen the right path. If Russia decides it can gain from India`s current, perilous path and blocks or otherwise frustrates appropriate responses, the nuclear danger on the subcontinent will escalate and the global regimes to promote nonproliferation and to ban testing will be seriously, perhaps fatally, weakened with unpredictable regional and global effects.« less

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Nation, J.E.

Whether and by what means nations can successfully de-escalate nuclear crises - and avoid the disastrous effects of nuclear war - will remain two of the most critical challenges facing humankind. Whatever the future of superpower relations, the United States, the Soviet Union, and other nations will undoubtedly continue to possess and to threaten the use of nuclear weapons. Moreover, the number of nations with nuclear weapons seems likely to increase. This examines how nations in crises might successfully move back from the brink of nuclear war - and how confidence-building measures might help and hinder the de-escalatory process.

Teaching Nuclear Physics in a General Education Curriculum

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Lesher, Shelly R.

2017-01-01

The general public is unaware how physics shapes the world. This is especially true for nuclear physics, where many people are scared of the words ``nuclear'' and ``radiation''. To combat these perceptions, the Physics Department at the University of Wisconsin - La Crosse teaches a general education class on nuclear weapons, energy, and policy in society. This includes the social, economic, cultural, and political aspects surrounding the development of nuclear weapons and their place in the world, especially in current events. This talk will discuss the course, how it has grown, and sample student responses.

Classifying threats with a 14-MeV neutron interrogation system.

PubMed

Strellis, Dan; Gozani, Tsahi

2005-01-01

SeaPODDS (Sea Portable Drug Detection System) is a non-intrusive tool for detecting concealed threats in hidden compartments of maritime vessels. This system consists of an electronic neutron generator, a gamma-ray detector, a data acquisition computer, and a laptop computer user-interface. Although initially developed to detect narcotics, recent algorithm developments have shown that the system is capable of correctly classifying a threat into one of four distinct categories: narcotic, explosive, chemical weapon, or radiological dispersion device (RDD). Detection of narcotics, explosives, and chemical weapons is based on gamma-ray signatures unique to the chemical elements. Elements are identified by their characteristic prompt gamma-rays induced by fast and thermal neutrons. Detection of RDD is accomplished by detecting gamma-rays emitted by common radioisotopes and nuclear reactor fission products. The algorithm phenomenology for classifying threats into the proper categories is presented here.

[Organization and delivery of therapeutic care in modern local wars and armed conflicts].

PubMed

Khalimov, Iu Sh; Tkachuk, N A; Zhekalov, A N

2014-08-01

The system of providing therapeutic care within a united system of staged treatment of wounded and sick and evacuation was established during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 and helped to return 90,6% of casualties to duty. In terms of local wars and armed conflicts the most important task of military field therapy is to improve the provision of therapeutic support through regional and territorial principles, echeloning of forces and facilities, optimization of allocation of medical institutions in accordance with their capabilities, evacuation routes, etc. The organization of therapeutic assistance should be guided primarily by the size and structure of sanitary losses. In modern local wars cannot exclude the occurrence of massive sanitary losses with limited use of weapons of mass destruction, as a result of failure (with a conventional weapon or as a result of sabotage) of nuclear power plants, chemical plants, and transport containers containing toxic chemicals.

Atmospheric effects and societal consequences of regional scale nuclear conflicts and acts of individual nuclear terrorism

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Toon, O. B.; Turco, R. P.; Robock, A.; Bardeen, C.; Oman, L.; Stenchikov, G. L.

2007-04-01

We assess the potential damage and smoke production associated with the detonation of small nuclear weapons in modern megacities. While the number of nuclear warheads in the world has fallen by about a factor of three since its peak in 1986, the number of nuclear weapons states is increasing and the potential exists for numerous regional nuclear arms races. Eight countries are known to have nuclear weapons, 2 are constructing them, and an additional 32 nations already have the fissile material needed to build substantial arsenals of low-yield (Hiroshima-sized) explosives. Population and economic activity worldwide are congregated to an increasing extent in megacities, which might be targeted in a nuclear conflict. We find that low yield weapons, which new nuclear powers are likely to construct, can produce 100 times as many fatalities and 100 times as much smoke from fires per kt yield as previously estimated in analyses for full scale nuclear wars using high-yield weapons, if the small weapons are targeted at city centers. A single "small" nuclear detonation in an urban center could lead to more fatalities, in some cases by orders of magnitude, than have occurred in the major historical conflicts of many countries. We analyze the likely outcome of a regional nuclear exchange involving 100 15-kt explosions (less than 0.1% of the explosive yield of the current global nuclear arsenal). We find that such an exchange could produce direct fatalities comparable to all of those worldwide in World War II, or to those once estimated for a "counterforce" nuclear war between the superpowers. Megacities exposed to atmospheric fallout of long-lived radionuclides would likely be abandoned indefinitely, with severe national and international implications. Our analysis shows that smoke from urban firestorms in a regional war would rise into the upper troposphere due to pyro-convection. Robock et al. (2007) show that the smoke would subsequently rise deep into the stratosphere due to atmospheric heating, and then might induce significant climatic anomalies on global scales. We also anticipate substantial perturbations of global ozone. While there are many uncertainties in the predictions we make here, the principal unknowns are the type and scale of conflict that might occur. The scope and severity of the hazards identified pose a significant threat to the global community. They deserve careful analysis by governments worldwide advised by a broad section of the world scientific community, as well as widespread public debate.

Verifying the INF and START treaties

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Ifft, Edward

2014-05-01

The INF and START Treaties form the basis for constraints on nuclear weapons. Their verification provisions are one of the great success stories of modern arms control and will be an important part of the foundation upon which the verification regime for further constraints on nuclear weapons will be constructed.

The Superpowers: Nuclear Weapons and National Security. National Issues Forums.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Mitchell, Greg; Melville, Keith

Designed to stimulate thinking about United States-Soviet relationships in terms of nuclear weapons and national security, this document presents ideas and issues that represent differing viewpoints and positions. Chapter 1, "Rethinking the U.S.-Soviet Relationship," considers attempts to achieve true national security, and chapter 2,…

Verifying the INF and START treaties

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Ifft, Edward

The INF and START Treaties form the basis for constraints on nuclear weapons. Their verification provisions are one of the great success stories of modern arms control and will be an important part of the foundation upon which the verification regime for further constraints on nuclear weapons will be constructed.

Operations Nougat and Whetstone events: Hard Hat, Danny Boy, Marshmallow, Mudpack, Wishbone, Gumdrop, Diluted Waters, and Tiny Tot, 15 February 1962-17 June 1965. Final report 15 Feb 62-19 Jun 68

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Brady, W.J.; Horton, K.K.; Eubank, B.F.

1984-01-31

This report is a personnel oriented history of DOD participation in underground nuclear weapons testing during Operations NOUGAT and WHETSTONE, test events HARD HAT, DANNY BOY, MARSHMALLOW, MUDPACK, WISHBONE, GUMDROP, DILUTED WATERS, and TINY TOT. It is the first in a series of historical reports which will include all DOD underground nuclear weapons tests and DOE underground nuclear weapons tests with significant DOD participation from 1962 forward. In addition to these volumes presenting a history of the underground nuclear test program, a later restricted volume will identify all DOD participants, (military, civilian, and their contractors) and will list their dosimetrymore » data.« less

Leveling the Playing Field: China’s Development of Advanced Energy Weapons

DTIC Science & Technology

2012-05-02

02-05-2012 2. REPORT TYPE Master of Military Studies Research Paper 3. DATES COVERED (From - To) September 2011 - April 2012 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER...weapons in a surprise attack scenario to counter superior U.S. capabilities and technology. This paper will update and review current and developing...utilizing these weapons in a surprise attack scenario to counter superior U.S. capabilities and technology. This paper will update and review current

Development of a fourth generation predictive capability maturity model.

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Hills, Richard Guy; Witkowski, Walter R.; Urbina, Angel

2013-09-01

The Predictive Capability Maturity Model (PCMM) is an expert elicitation tool designed to characterize and communicate completeness of the approaches used for computational model definition, verification, validation, and uncertainty quantification associated for an intended application. The primary application of this tool at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) has been for physics-based computational simulations in support of nuclear weapons applications. The two main goals of a PCMM evaluation are 1) the communication of computational simulation capability, accurately and transparently, and 2) the development of input for effective planning. As a result of the increasing importance of computational simulation to SNLs mission, themore » PCMM has evolved through multiple generations with the goal to provide more clarity, rigor, and completeness in its application. This report describes the approach used to develop the fourth generation of the PCMM.« less

Hidden dangers: Environmental consequences of preparing for war

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Birks, J.W.; Ehrlich, A.H.

1990-01-01

This compilation of chapters by some of the world's foremost non-governmental experts, focuses on the military's nuclear mess. Hidden Dangers suggests that in the end, events, not politics, changed operations' in the nuclear complex. After Chernobyl, safety became the pressing issue. Although the continuing stream of revelations of safety and environmental violations within the US nuclear weapons complex may make the 1990 book seem out of date, it remains an indispensable primer for those concerned with the social and environmental consequences of nuclear weapons production.

Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (PASCC)

DTIC Science & Technology

2015-09-01

Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD, defined as nuclear, chemical , and biological) and weapons of mass effect (WME, defined as other high... Chemical Weapons • Scoping Study for a U.S.-Israel Strategic Dialogued 5 • U.S.-India Strategic Dialogue • Implications of Indian Tactical...of Chemical Weapons : Strategic Dialogue, Research, and Report Performer: Arizona State University (ASU) Principal Investigator: Orde Kittrie Cost

Underestimated: Our Not So Peaceful Nuclear Future

DTIC Science & Technology

2016-01-01

strategic appraisals; • The nature of land warfare; • Matters affecting the Army’s future; • The concepts, philosophy, and theory of strategy; and...has long complained about Israeli nuclear weapons and previously attempted to get nuclear weapons, just announced its intention to tender bids for...cooperation with India, Russia, and the Chinese. As a part of this review, it also would be helpful to game alternative war and military crisis scenarios

Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and Agreements

DTIC Science & Technology

2009-02-10

agreements to address U.S. security concerns. The United States and Soviet Union began to sign agreements limiting their strategic offensive nuclear ...era nuclear , chemical, and biological weapons. Through these cooperative efforts, the United States now allocates more than $1 billion each year to...spread of nuclear weapons. This regime, although suffering from some setbacks in recent years in Iran and North Korea, includes formal treaties

Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and Agreements

DTIC Science & Technology

2007-08-09

security and control over nuclear weapons and fissile materials. These projects provided Russia with bullet-proof Kevlar blankets, secure canisters ...U.S. security concerns. The United States and Soviet Union began to sign agreements limiting their strategic offensive nuclear weapons in the early...U.S.-Russian relationship. At the same time, however, the two sides began to cooperate on securing and eliminating Soviet-era nuclear , chemical, and

Shaping Strategic Defense: The Air Force Nuclear Mission

DTIC Science & Technology

2009-01-01

Strike Command. Washington DC: Department of the Air Force. Kall , Rob. June 20, 2008. “Pentagon: Over 1000 Nuclear Weapons Parts Missing?” http...www.huffingtonpost.com/rob- kall /pentagon-over-1000-nuclea_b_108225.html (accessed December 16, 2008). Rolfsen, B. November 6, 2007. http...16, 2008). 6 Schlesinger. 7 Kall , Rob. June 20, 2008. “Pentagon: Over 1000 Nuclear Weapons Parts Missing?” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rob- kall

Difficulties in Determining If Nuclear Training of Foreigners Contributes to Weapons Proliferation. Report by the Comptroller General of the United States.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Congress of the U.S., Washington, DC. House Committee on Appropriations.

The General Accounting Office (GAO) conclusion that it is impossible to determine the contribution of U.S. nuclear training of foreigners to the spread of nuclear weapons is presented. The GAO position is that there is no way to ascertain the true intentions of foreign nationals being trained or the motivations of their countries. Issues…

Director`s series on proliferation

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Bailey, K.C.; Price, M.E.

1994-10-17

This series is an occasional publication of essays on the topics of nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile proliferation. Essays contained in this document include: Key issues on NPT renewal and extension, Africa and nuclear nonproliferation, Kenya`s views on the NPT, Prospects for establishing a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the middle east, effects of a special nuclear weapon materials cut-off convention, and The UK view of NPT renewal.

The Inadvertent Effect of Assurance on Nuclear Proliferation

DTIC Science & Technology

2013-02-14

those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US government, the Department of Defense, or Air University. In...umbrella and a state’s normative desire to be viewed and treated favorably by the international community dissuades nuclear weapons development.2...desire to be viewed and treated favorably by the international community dissuades nuclear weapons development.24 Tatsumi and Schoff suggest the best

How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love 3D Printing

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Pete, Cassandra; Morrell, Sean; Maloney, Jillian

The nuclear nonproliferation regime has many robust measures in place to prevent the acquisition of a nuclear weapon, a key pillar of which is denying or preventing the transfer of technology to specific actors. Additive manufacturing (AM) is a rapidly advancing, not fully understood technology that could dramatically alter the landscape of the safeguarded fuel cycle. However, many of the benefits of AM could also be used to circumvent or defeat current safeguard practices and controls. Because the AM capability is not fully understood, research and integration is necessary early in the technology development stages in order for nonproliferation tomore » remain on the leading edge of discovery and not the tail end of technology deployment.« less

Determining the Capability Requirements for a Space-Based Optical Sensor to Determine the Trajectory of an Incoming Antisatellite Weapon

DTIC Science & Technology

2008-03-01

Figure a, b, shows Thor and Nike-Zeus missiles respectively . [3], [19] a series of high altitude nuclear tests in 1962 and later. The Thor system was...satellites simultaneously and scan large areas of space in a very short time. 16 For instance, the AN/FPS-85 phased-array radar at Eglin AFB in Florida is...sensors, located at different SSN sites such as Maui, Eglin , Thule, and Diego Garcia collect up to 80,000 satellite observations each day. 18 Each

Development of a helmet-mounted PLZT thermal/flash protection system. [Protective goggles

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Harris, J.O. Jr.; Cutchen, J.T.; Pfoff, B.J.

1976-01-01

Sandia Laboratories is developing PLZT thermal/flash protective devices (TFPD's) goggles to prevent exposure and resultant eye damage from nuclear weapon detonations. The primary emphasis of the present program is to transfer technology and establish production capability for helmet-mounted PLZT/TFPD goggles for USAF flight crews, with a non-helmet-mounted configuration to follow. The first production units are anticipated in the fall of 1977. The operating principles of the PLZT/TFPD goggle device are briefly outlined, and the device configuration and operational characteristics are described.

Nuclear choices

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Wolfson, R.

This book contains part of the series New Liberal Arts, which is intended to make science and technology more accessible to students of the liberal arts. Volume in hand provides a comprehensive, multifaceted examination of nuclear energy, in nontechnical terms. Wolfson explains the basics of nuclear energy and radiation, nuclear power..., and nuclear weapons..., and he invites readers to make their own judgments on controversial nuclear issues. Illustrated with photos and diagrams. Each chapter contains suggestions for additional reading and a glossary. For policy, science, and general collections in all libraries. (ES) Topics contained include Atoms and nuclei. Effects andmore » uses of radiation. Energy and People. Reactor safety. Nuclear strategy. Defense in the nuclear age. Nuclear power, nuclear weapons, and nuclear futures.« less

Trinity to Trinity 1945-2015

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Moniz, Ernest; Carr, Alan; Bethe, Hans

The Trinity Test of July 16, 1945 was the first full-scale, real-world test of a nuclear weapon; with the new Trinity supercomputer Los Alamos National Laboratory's goal is to do this virtually, in 3D. Trinity was the culmination of a fantastic effort of groundbreaking science and engineering by hundreds of men and women at Los Alamos and other Manhattan Project sites. It took them less than two years to change the world. The Laboratory is marking the 70th anniversary of the Trinity Test because it not only ushered in the Nuclear Age, but with it the origin of today’s advancedmore » supercomputing. We live in the Age of Supercomputers due in large part to nuclear weapons science here at Los Alamos. National security science, and nuclear weapons science in particular, at Los Alamos National Laboratory have provided a key motivation for the evolution of large-scale scientific computing. Beginning with the Manhattan Project there has been a constant stream of increasingly significant, complex problems in nuclear weapons science whose timely solutions demand larger and faster computers. The relationship between national security science at Los Alamos and the evolution of computing is one of interdependence.« less

Trinity to Trinity 1945-2015

ScienceCinema

Moniz, Ernest; Carr, Alan; Bethe, Hans; Morrison, Phillip; Ramsay, Norman; Teller, Edward; Brixner, Berlyn; Archer, Bill; Agnew, Harold; Morrison, John

2018-01-16

The Trinity Test of July 16, 1945 was the first full-scale, real-world test of a nuclear weapon; with the new Trinity supercomputer Los Alamos National Laboratory's goal is to do this virtually, in 3D. Trinity was the culmination of a fantastic effort of groundbreaking science and engineering by hundreds of men and women at Los Alamos and other Manhattan Project sites. It took them less than two years to change the world. The Laboratory is marking the 70th anniversary of the Trinity Test because it not only ushered in the Nuclear Age, but with it the origin of today’s advanced supercomputing. We live in the Age of Supercomputers due in large part to nuclear weapons science here at Los Alamos. National security science, and nuclear weapons science in particular, at Los Alamos National Laboratory have provided a key motivation for the evolution of large-scale scientific computing. Beginning with the Manhattan Project there has been a constant stream of increasingly significant, complex problems in nuclear weapons science whose timely solutions demand larger and faster computers. The relationship between national security science at Los Alamos and the evolution of computing is one of interdependence.

Personnel Attrition Rates in Historical Land Combat Operations: Susceptibility and Vulnerability of Major Anatomical Regions

DTIC Science & Technology

1993-08-01

effectiveness , estimate personnel attr;i"on, perform studies and analyses. or assess protective equipment for personnel. i II CAA-RP-93-3 DEPARTMENT OF THE...weapons or weapons effects that are difficult to localize are excluded from the 1-1 CAA-RP-93-3 scope of this paper Some examples of the types of weapons...or weapon effects excluded atr" .;i,nical weapons (encompassing war gases and other toxic substances, flame weapons. and biological agents), nuclear

Proliferation: Threat and Response

DTIC Science & Technology

1997-11-01

primary agent, the Defense Technology capabilities also contribute to ongoing efforts to Security Administration ( DTSA ). These efforts are focus and...Special Weapons Agency Organization DTSA Defense Technology Security BW Biological Weapons Administration BWC Biological and Toxin Weapons EPCI Enhanced

Integrating international responses to complex emergencies, unconventional war, and terrorism.

PubMed

Burkle, Frederick M

2005-01-01

The world is experiencing unprecedented violence and threats of violence, taking the form of complex internal nation-state conflicts, unconventional or guerrilla warfare against established governments, and stateless threats of terrorism by potential biologic, chemical, and nuclear weapons. What happens locally has immediate ramifications internationally. Real and potential health consequences of these events have evoked global concerns and realization that capacities and capabilities to respond to such events require unparalleled integration, coordination, and cooperation of the international community. However, politics and the institutions singular governments form are inherently limited in their objectives and capability to effectively respond. Public health, broadly defined, must be recognized as a security and strategic requirement, one that serves to build a foundation for an international integrated response capacity.

27 CFR 478.132 - Dispositions of semiautomatic assault weapons and large capacity ammunition feeding devices to...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-04-01

... official use and to employees or contractors of nuclear facilities. 478.132 Section 478.132 Alcohol... and to employees or contractors of nuclear facilities. Licensed manufacturers, licensed importers, and licensed dealers in semiautomatic assault weapons, as well as persons who manufacture, import, or deal in...

Using Elementary Mechanics to Estimate the Maximum Range of ICBMs

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Amato, Joseph

2018-01-01

North Korea's development of nuclear weapons and, more recently, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) has added a grave threat to world order. The threat presented by these weapons depends critically on missile range, i.e., the ability to reach North America or Europe while carrying a nuclear warhead. Using the limited information available…

Tonopah Test Range Flight Test

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

None

From a distance, the drop of a mock nuclear weapon — containing only non-nuclear components — was a mere puff of dust rising from a dry lake bed at Nevada’s Tonopah Test Range. However, it marked the start of a new series of test flights vital to the nation’s B61-12 weapon refurbishment program.

Alternative World Scenarios for a New Order of Nations.

DTIC Science & Technology

1993-01-01

chemical, biological and nuclear weapons continues. Despite the reduction of world tensions, almost every industrial nation will be armed with a range...of conventional, chemical, and biological weapons. Most of these weapons will have been supplied to them by the EC, the United States, and China before...weapons and delivery systems as well as chemical and biological weapons to build or increase their arsenals. The combined effect of new found economic

Iran’s Nuclear Program: Status

DTIC Science & Technology

2009-11-25

wave software, and neutron sources, which could be useful for developing nuclear weapons.44 In addition, ElBaradei’s May 2008 report notes that...Intelligence stated that the Bureau continues to stand by this estimate. 77 The time frame described in the 2007 NIE is the same as one described in a... standing with the IAEA has ever used this tactic. North Korea restarted its nuclear weapons program after announcing its withdrawal from the NPT in

Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and Agreements

DTIC Science & Technology

2007-01-29

U.S. security concerns. The United States and Soviet Union began to sign agreements limiting their strategic offensive nuclear weapons in the early...Russian relationship. At the same time, however, the two sides began to cooperate on securing and eliminating Soviet-era nuclear , chemical, and...the former Soviet Union. The United States is also a leader of an international regime that attempts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. This

Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and Agreements

DTIC Science & Technology

2007-06-01

security concerns. The United States and Soviet Union began to sign agreements limiting their strategic offensive nuclear weapons in the early 1970s...Russian relationship. At the same time, however, the two sides began to cooperate on securing and eliminating Soviet-era nuclear , chemical, and biological...former Soviet Union. The United States is also a leader of an international regime that attempts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. This regime

The Third Nuclear Age: How I Learned to Start Worrying about the Clean Bomb

DTIC Science & Technology

2013-02-14

Fourth generation fusion nuclear weapons (FGNW) represent a significant improvement in nuclear weapons technology and suggest the potential for...future challenges that the United States and its Air Force may face twenty-five years from now. This paper does not answer whether the fusion technology...is possible and assumes it as an inevitable technological advancement. Instead, this study predicts a world in which low yield, clean fusion

The Drivers of Indias Nuclear Weapons Program

DTIC Science & Technology

2014-06-01

Pokhran and Beyond, 235. 304 Sunil Dasgupta, “The Reluctant Nuclear Power,” in Arming without Aiming, ed. Stephen Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta...Development,” Economic and Political Weekly 35, no. 31 (July 29–August 4, 2000): 2769. 332 Sunil Dasgupta, “Struggling with Reform,” in Arming without Aiming...ed. Stephen Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2010), 33. 333 Clary, “The Future of Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons

Counterproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

DTIC Science & Technology

2010-04-01

nuclear weapons program in 1941 and renamed the program the Manhattan Project in 1942.6 The mammoth efforts of the Manhattan Project resulted in the...killing or mortally wounding up to 130,000 Japanese.11 While the scientists of the Manhattan Project were awestruck at the first nuclear blast in New...remove great danger for us.”12 Klaus Fuchs and Theodore Hall, two scientists on the Manhattan Project , had been previously recruited to spy for the

A Guide to Nuclear Weapons Phenomena and Effects Literature

DTIC Science & Technology

1984-10-31

and Disarmament Agency. An article entitled "Limited Nuclear War" in Scientific American (Reference ECE-14) is also of interest because of its rela... Sistems and the Aemosphere’-BCj=9. 43 Personne l; .-EP)- / 47 Civilian .S’ector and the .Environment, (ECE) 50 5 SPECIAL REFERENCE MATERIALS (R) ’<ൾ...approximations. DNA has sponsored the development of software for scientific and military applications of nuclear weapon phenomena and effects information

The myth of the ``proliferation-resistant'' closed nuclear fuel cycle

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Lyman, Edwin S.

2000-07-01

National nuclear energy programs that engage in reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and the development of "closed" nuclear fuel cycles based on the utilization of plutonium process and store large quantities of weapons-usable nuclear materials in forms vulnerable to diversion or theft by national or subnational groups. Proliferation resistance, an idea dating back at least as far as the International Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) of the late 1970s, is a loosely defined term referring to processes for chemical separation of SNF that do not extract weapons-usable materials in a purified form.

Nuclear Weapons: NNSA Has a New Approach to Managing the B61-12 Life Extension, but a Constrained Schedule and Other Risks Remain

DTIC Science & Technology

2016-02-01

components. In 2010, they began an LEP to consolidate four versions of a legacy nuclear weapon, the B61 bomb , into a bomb called the B61-12 (see...Force Integrated Master Schedule BIMS Boeing Integrated Master Schedule B61 bomb B61 legacy bomb CD critical decision Cost Guide GAO Cost...are versions of the B61 bomb , an aircraft-delivered weapon that is a key component of the United States’ commitments to the North Atlantic Treaty

The Indefinite Extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: A Hinderence or Help to Future Arms Control

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Pella, Peter J.

1996-05-01

The indefinite and "unconditional" extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was achieved almost one year ago today. This outcome was a major foreign policy goal of the Clinton Administration. Some critics of the NPT's indefinite extension claim that nuclear weapons states parties to the NPT have now legitimized their possession of nuclear weapons for all time and that there is no incentive for future nuclear arms control and disarmament measures. A discussion of how the indefinite extension of the NPT has affected the nuclear arms control landscape and the prospects for future disarmament measures will be discussed.

How to think about nuclear war

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Luttwak, E.N.

1982-08-01

Mr. Luttwak, a professional defense consultant, observes the arguments of nuclear freeze proponents can be refuted on both strategic and moral grounds. The freeze concept is illogical, he notes, because it is political systems - not state boundaries - that separate sides and because the Warsaw Pact countries are more heavily armed than the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries. An important factor keeping NATO forces at a disadvantage is their defensive orientation, which keeps forces militarily diffuse and dependent on nuclear weapons and preemptive action as a deterrent. Mr. Luttwak feels the shock effect of any use of nuclearmore » weapons would probably shorten a war rather than expand it because of the instinct for survival on both sides; further only nuclear weapons have this awesome power to deter. The proposal for universal disarmament under world government control is not a serious one, he thinks, and reflects an indifference to the possibility of a long non-nuclear war. The effect would be to trade the risk of nuclear death for the inevitability of many non-nuclear casualties. (DCK)« less

Improving US theater nuclear doctrine. a critical analysis

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Sollinger, J.M.

This monograph argues that the doctrine, equipment, and training of US forces do not meet the demands of fighting a theater nuclear war. Current doctrine rests upon questionable assumptions, lacks the flexibility required to fight a tactical nuclear battle, and limits itself by concentrating on defense. Recommended improvements include increased flexibility and decentralized execution, emphasizing maneuver and dispersion. Service doctrinal writings should focus on enemy forces rather than terrain. Because the nuclear battlefield promises chaos and confusion, US forces need redundant command and control. The equipment of US forces also needs improving, The services must field equipment capable of withstandingmore » the effects of nuclear weapons. In most cases this requirement means making existing procedures work and the hardening of equipment. Some new items of equipment, such as monitoring devices, are needed. Training requires improvement at both the individual and unit levels. Individual enlisted training tends to concentrate specialized knowledge at too high a level. With substantial casualties expected in a nuclear battle, US forces cannot afford to confine specialized knowledge to a few individuals.« less

The long-term problems of contaminated land: Sources, impacts and countermeasures

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Baes, C.F. III

1986-11-01

This report examines the various sources of radiological land contamination; its extent; its impacts on man, agriculture, and the environment; countermeasures for mitigating exposures; radiological standards; alternatives for achieving land decontamination and cleanup; and possible alternatives for utilizing the land. The major potential sources of extensive long-term land contamination with radionuclides, in order of decreasing extent, are nuclear war, detonation of a single nuclear weapon (e.g., a terrorist act), serious reactor accidents, and nonfission nuclear weapons accidents that disperse the nuclear fuels (termed ''broken arrows'').

U.S. Army Medical Department Journal, October-December 2007

DTIC Science & Technology

2007-12-01

Warrior Task Training requirements (such as weapons assembly/disassembly and functions check; individual chemical, biological , radiological, nuclear...training program focused on hands-on training in the 40 Army Warrior Tasks and 11 Battle Drills, to include advanced land navigation training; weapons ...familiarization and qualification; convoy operations; chemical, biological , radiological, nuclear and high- explosive defense; and squad and platoon

75 FR 55577 - Office of the Secretary: Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on the Survivability of DoD...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-09-13

... DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE Office of the Secretary: Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on the Survivability of DoD Systems and Assets to Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) and Other Nuclear Weapons Effects AGENCY... Systems and Assets to Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) and other Nuclear Weapons Effects (hereafter referred to...

48 CFR 952.204-76 - Conditional payment of fee or profit-safeguarding restricted data and other classified information.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-10-01

... compartmented information (SCI), or high risk nuclear weapons-related data. (ii) Contractor actions that result... as SCI, or high risk nuclear weapons-related data. (iii) Failure to promptly report the loss... Secret, any classification level of information in a SAP, information identified as SCI, or high risk...

The Gravest Danger:. Nuclear Weapons and Their Proliferation

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Drell, S.

2005-02-01

Nuclear weapons are unique in their terrifying potential. With an energy release a million times larger than that of previous explosives, mass destruction is inevitable. The prospect of the spread of nuclear weapons and other dangerous technologies into the hands of suicidal terrorists and rogue nations unrestrained by the norms of civilized behavior has led President Bush to remark that "the gravest danger our nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology." This talk will address what can and should be done, in the face of new challenges in times punctuated by terrorist threats, to sustain and strengthen the non-proliferation regime, taking into consideration technical realities, and the roles and limits of diplomatic initiatives and of military force.

10 CFR 160.4 - Unauthorized introduction of weapons or dangerous materials.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 10 Energy 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Unauthorized introduction of weapons or dangerous materials. 160.4 Section 160.4 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) TRESPASSING ON COMMISSION PROPERTY § 160.4 Unauthorized introduction of weapons or dangerous materials. Unauthorized carrying...

10 CFR 160.4 - Unauthorized introduction of weapons or dangerous materials.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... 10 Energy 2 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Unauthorized introduction of weapons or dangerous materials. 160.4 Section 160.4 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) TRESPASSING ON COMMISSION PROPERTY § 160.4 Unauthorized introduction of weapons or dangerous materials. Unauthorized carrying...

10 CFR 160.4 - Unauthorized introduction of weapons or dangerous materials.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... 10 Energy 2 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Unauthorized introduction of weapons or dangerous materials. 160.4 Section 160.4 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) TRESPASSING ON COMMISSION PROPERTY § 160.4 Unauthorized introduction of weapons or dangerous materials. Unauthorized carrying...