Sustainability of quality improvement following removal of pay-for-performance incentives.
Benzer, Justin K; Young, Gary J; Burgess, James F; Baker, Errol; Mohr, David C; Charns, Martin P; Kaboli, Peter J
2014-01-01
Although pay-for-performance (P4P) has become a central strategy for improving quality in US healthcare, questions persist about the effectiveness of these programs. A key question is whether quality improvement that occurs as a result of P4P programs is sustainable, particularly if incentives are removed. To investigate sustainability of performance levels following removal of performance-based incentives. Observational cohort study that capitalized on a P4P program within the Veterans Health Administration (VA) that included adoption and subsequent removal of performance-based incentives for selected inpatient quality measures. The study sample comprised 128 acute care VA hospitals where performance was assessed between 2004 and 2010. VA system managers set annual performance goals in consultation with clinical leaders, and report performance scores to medical centers on a quarterly basis. These scores inform performance-based incentives for facilities and their managers. Bonuses are distributed based on the attainment of these performance goals. Seven quality of care measures for acute coronary syndrome, heart failure, and pneumonia linked to performance-based incentives. Significant improvements in performance were observed for six of seven quality of care measures following adoption of performance-based incentives and were maintained up to the removal of the incentive; subsequently, the observed performance levels were sustained. This is a quasi-experimental study without a comparison group; causal conclusions are limited. The maintenance of performance levels after removal of a performance-based incentive has implications for the implementation of Medicare's value-based purchasing initiative and other P4P programs. Additional research is needed to better understand human and system-level factors that mediate sustainability of performance-based incentives.
Wang, Ping; Lu, Zhengnan; Sun, Jihong
2018-02-08
Background : New energy has become a key trend for global energy industry development. Talent plays a very critical role in the enhancement of new energy enterprise competitiveness. As a key component of talent, managers have been attracting more and more attention. The increase in job performance relies on, to a certain extent, incentive mechanism. Based on the Two-factor Theory, differences in influences and effects of different incentives on management performance have been checked in this paper from an empirical perspective. Methods : This paper selects the middle and low level managers in new energy enterprises as research samples and classifies the managers' performance into task performance, contextual performance and innovation performance. It uses manager performance questionnaires and intrinsic-extrinsic incentive factor questionnaires to investigate and study the effects and then uses Amos software to analyze the inner link between the intrinsic-extrinsic incentives and job performance. Results : Extrinsic incentives affect task performance and innovation performance positively. Intrinsic incentives impose active significant effects on task performance, contextual performance, and innovation performance. The intrinsic incentive plays a more important role than the extrinsic incentive. Conclusions : Both the intrinsic-extrinsic incentives affect manager performance positively and the intrinsic incentive plays a more important role than the extrinsic incentive. Several suggestions to management should be given based on these results.
Wang, Ping; Lu, Zhengnan; Sun, Jihong
2018-01-01
Background: New energy has become a key trend for global energy industry development. Talent plays a very critical role in the enhancement of new energy enterprise competitiveness. As a key component of talent, managers have been attracting more and more attention. The increase in job performance relies on, to a certain extent, incentive mechanism. Based on the Two-factor Theory, differences in influences and effects of different incentives on management performance have been checked in this paper from an empirical perspective. Methods: This paper selects the middle and low level managers in new energy enterprises as research samples and classifies the managers’ performance into task performance, contextual performance and innovation performance. It uses manager performance questionnaires and intrinsic-extrinsic incentive factor questionnaires to investigate and study the effects and then uses Amos software to analyze the inner link between the intrinsic-extrinsic incentives and job performance. Results: Extrinsic incentives affect task performance and innovation performance positively. Intrinsic incentives impose active significant effects on task performance, contextual performance, and innovation performance. The intrinsic incentive plays a more important role than the extrinsic incentive. Conclusions: Both the intrinsic-extrinsic incentives affect manager performance positively and the intrinsic incentive plays a more important role than the extrinsic incentive. Several suggestions to management should be given based on these results. PMID:29419730
Working under a clinic-level quality incentive: primary care clinicians' perceptions.
Greene, Jessica; Kurtzman, Ellen T; Hibbard, Judith H; Overton, Valerie
2015-01-01
A key consideration in designing pay-for-performance programs is determining what entity the incentive should be awarded to-individual clinicians or to groups of clinicians working in teams. Some argue that team-level incentives, in which clinicians who are part of a team receive the same incentive based on the team's performance, are most effective; others argue for the efficacy of clinician-level incentives. This study examines primary care clinicians' perceptions of a team-based quality incentive awarded at the clinic level. This research was conducted with Fairview Health Services, where 40% of the primary care compensation model was based on clinic-level quality performance. We conducted 48 in-depth interviews to explore clinicians' perceptions of the clinic-level incentive, as well as an online survey of 150 clinicians (response rate 56%) to investigate which entity the clinicians would consider optimal to target for quality incentives. Clinicians reported the strengths of the clinic-based quality incentive were quality improvement for the team and less patient "dumping," or shifting patients with poor outcomes to other clinicians. The weaknesses were clinicians' lack of control and colleagues riding the coattails of higher performers. There were mixed reports on the model's impact on team dynamics. Although clinicians reported greater interaction with colleagues, some described an increase in tension. Most clinicians surveyed (73%) believed that there should be a mix of clinic and individual-level incentives to maintain collaboration and recognize individual performance. The study highlights the important advantages and disadvantages of using incentives based upon clinic-level performance. Future research should test whether hybrid incentives that mix group and individual incentives can maintain some of the best elements of each design while mitigating the negative impacts. © 2015 Annals of Family Medicine, Inc.
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Wickramasinghe, Vathsala; Dabere, Sampath
2012-01-01
The objective of the study is to investigate the effect of performance-based financial incentives on work performance. The study hypothesized that the design features of performance-based financial incentive schemes themselves may influence individuals' work performance. For the study, survey methodology was used and 93 technical-level employees…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Florida State Legislature, Tallahassee. Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability.
This report addresses the Florida Community College System's (FCCS) performance based on measures established by the General Appropriations Act. Discussed are: (1) FCCS' performance on the measures used in the performance-based budgeting (PBB) incentive fund; (2) improvements that can be made to the PBB incentive fund; and (3) changes to community…
Incentive Funding Meets Incentive-Based Budgeting: Can They Coexist?
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Lang, Daniel W.
2016-01-01
Two major developments in the financial management of higher education have occurred more or less contemporaneously: incentive or performance funding on the part of government and incentive-based budgeting on the part of institutions. Both are based on fiscal incentives. Despite their several inherent and interconnected similarities, incentive…
Issues in Perspective. Critical Issues Papers 1-17.
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Duttweiler, Patricia Cloud
The papers in this collection are based on the document "Perspectives on Performance-Based Incentive Plans" and offer brief overviews of the following critical issues in education: (1) performance-based incentive plans; (2) needed organizational changes; (3) successful and unsuccessful teacher incentive plans; (4) compensation strategies and…
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Siregar, K.; Siregar, S. F.
2018-02-01
This research is design employee performance assessment by considering work result of employee based on competency. Relevant competencies are identified according to Spencer’s competence of employees that subsequently processed by Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) method. The results of weighting AHP indicate the highest priority order of criteria, there are; concern of customer satisfaction (0.1325), group work (0.1324) and technical expertise (0.0826). The weight of the criteria is used to design the Work Performance Value (WPV) to be used as the basis for calculating the incentive index. The higher incentive index of an employee, the greater amount of incentives was earned. The calculation of incentives is made to four employees of chopsticks production. From employee incentives A, B, C and D, employee D has the highest incentive index and increment of IDR 2,700,675 compared to previous incentive system. The incentive division system based on the Work Performance Values (WPV) of this proposal reflects a real incentive so that the incapacity of incentive can be reduced.
48 CFR 3416.402-2 - Performance incentives.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 7 2014-10-01 2014-10-01 false Performance incentives. 3416.402-2 Section 3416.402-2 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION...-2 Performance incentives. (b) Award-term contracting may be used for performance-based contracts or...
48 CFR 3416.402-2 - Performance incentives.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 7 2013-10-01 2012-10-01 true Performance incentives. 3416.402-2 Section 3416.402-2 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION...-2 Performance incentives. (b) Award-term contracting may be used for performance-based contracts or...
48 CFR 3416.402-2 - Performance incentives.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 7 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Performance incentives. 3416.402-2 Section 3416.402-2 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION...-2 Performance incentives. (b) Award-term contracting may be used for performance-based contracts or...
48 CFR 3416.402-2 - Performance incentives.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 7 2012-10-01 2012-10-01 false Performance incentives. 3416.402-2 Section 3416.402-2 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION...-2 Performance incentives. (b) Award-term contracting may be used for performance-based contracts or...
45 CFR 305.31 - Amount of incentive payment.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... PROGRAM PERFORMANCE MEASURES, STANDARDS, FINANCIAL INCENTIVES, AND PENALTIES § 305.31 Amount of incentive... establishment, support order, and current collections performance measures and 75 percent of the State's collections base for the fiscal year for the arrearage collections and cost-effectiveness performance measures...
Squitieri, Lee; Chung, Kevin C
2017-07-01
In 2017, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services began requiring all eligible providers to participate in the Quality Payment Program or face financial reimbursement penalty. The Quality Payment Program outlines two paths for provider participation: the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System and Advanced Alternative Payment Models. For the first performance period beginning in January of 2017, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services estimates that approximately 83 to 90 percent of eligible providers will not qualify for participation in an Advanced Alternative Payment Model and therefore must participate in the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System program. The Merit-Based Incentive Payment System path replaces existing quality-reporting programs and adds several new measures to evaluate providers using four categories of data: (1) quality, (2) cost/resource use, (3) improvement activities, and (4) advancing care information. These categories will be combined to calculate a weighted composite score for each provider or provider group. Composite Merit-Based Incentive Payment System scores based on 2017 performance data will be used to adjust reimbursed payment in 2019. In this article, the authors provide relevant background for understanding value-based provider performance measurement. The authors also discuss Merit-Based Incentive Payment System reporting requirements and scoring methodology to provide plastic surgeons with the necessary information to critically evaluate their own practice capabilities in the context of current performance metrics under the Quality Payment Program.
Chib, Vikram S.; De Martino, Benedetto; Shimojo, Shinsuke; O'Doherty, John P.
2012-01-01
Summary Employers often make payment contingent on performance in order to motivate workers. We used fMRI with a novel incentivized skill task to examine the neural processes underlying behavioral responses to performance-based pay. We found that individuals' performance increased with increasing incentives; however, very high incentive levels led to the paradoxical consequence of worse performance. Between initial incentive presentation and task execution, striatal activity rapidly switched between activation and deactivation in response to increasing incentives. Critically, decrements in performance and striatal deactivations were directly predicted by an independent measure of behavioral loss aversion. These results suggest that incentives associated with successful task performance are initially encoded as a potential gain; however, when actually performing a task, individuals encode the potential loss that would arise from failure. PMID:22578508
Financial incentives for quality in breast cancer care.
Tisnado, Diana M; Rose-Ash, Danielle E; Malin, Jennifer L; Adams, John L; Ganz, Patricia A; Kahn, Katherine L
2008-07-01
To examine the use of financial incentives related to performance on quality measures reported by oncologists and surgeons associated with a population-based cohort of patients with breast cancer in Los Angeles County, California, and to explore the physician and practice characteristics associated with the use of these incentives among breast cancer care providers. Cross-sectional observational study. Physician self-reported financial arrangements from a survey of 348 medical oncologists, radiation oncologists, and surgeons caring for patients with breast cancer in Los Angeles County (response rate, 76%). Physicians were asked whether they were subject to financial incentives for quality (ie, patient satisfaction surveys and adherence to practice guidelines). We examined the prevalence and correlates of incentives and performed multivariate logistic regression analyses to assess predictors of incentives, controlling for other covariates. Twenty percent of respondents reported incentives based on patient satisfaction, and 15% reported incentives based on guideline adherence. The use of incentives for quality in this cohort of oncologists and surgeons was modest and was primarily associated with staff- or group-model health maintenance organization (HMO) settings. In other settings, important predictors were partial physician ownership interest, large practice size, and capitation. Most cancer care providers in Los Angeles County outside of staff- or group-model HMOs are not subject to explicit financial incentives based on quality-of-care measures. Those who are, seem more likely to be associated with large practice settings. New approaches are needed to direct financial incentives for quality toward specialists outside of staff- or group-model HMOs if pay-for-performance programs are to succeed in influencing care.
Perspectives on Performance-Based Incentive Plans.
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Duttweiler, Patricia Cloud; Ramos-Cancel, Maria L.
This document is a synthesis of the current literature on performance-based incentive systems for teachers and administrators. Section one provides an introduction to the reform movement and to performance-based pay initiatives; a definition of terms; a brief discussion of funding sources; a discussion of compensation strategies; a description of…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Cooke, Valerie; Arling, Greg; Lewis, Teresa; Abrahamson, Kathleen A.; Mueller, Christine; Edstrom, Lisa
2010-01-01
Purpose: Minnesota's Nursing Facility Performance-Based Incentive Payment Program (PIPP) supports provider-initiated projects aimed at improving care quality and efficiency. PIPP moves beyond conventional pay for performance. It seeks to promote implementation of evidence-based practices, encourage innovation and risk taking, foster collaboration…
Intrinsic motivation and extrinsic incentives jointly predict performance: a 40-year meta-analysis.
Cerasoli, Christopher P; Nicklin, Jessica M; Ford, Michael T
2014-07-01
More than 4 decades of research and 9 meta-analyses have focused on the undermining effect: namely, the debate over whether the provision of extrinsic incentives erodes intrinsic motivation. This review and meta-analysis builds on such previous reviews by focusing on the interrelationship among intrinsic motivation, extrinsic incentives, and performance, with reference to 2 moderators: performance type (quality vs. quantity) and incentive contingency (directly performance-salient vs. indirectly performance-salient), which have not been systematically reviewed to date. Based on random-effects meta-analytic methods, findings from school, work, and physical domains (k = 183, N = 212,468) indicate that intrinsic motivation is a medium to strong predictor of performance (ρ = .21-45). The importance of intrinsic motivation to performance remained in place whether incentives were presented. In addition, incentive salience influenced the predictive validity of intrinsic motivation for performance: In a "crowding out" fashion, intrinsic motivation was less important to performance when incentives were directly tied to performance and was more important when incentives were indirectly tied to performance. Considered simultaneously through meta-analytic regression, intrinsic motivation predicted more unique variance in quality of performance, whereas incentives were a better predictor of quantity of performance. With respect to performance, incentives and intrinsic motivation are not necessarily antagonistic and are best considered simultaneously. Future research should consider using nonperformance criteria (e.g., well-being, job satisfaction) as well as applying the percent-of-maximum-possible (POMP) method in meta-analyses. PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2014 APA, all rights reserved.
Yé, Maurice; Diboulo, Eric; Kagoné, Moubassira; Sié, Ali; Sauerborn, Rainer; Loukanova, Svetla
2016-01-01
One promising way to improve the motivation of healthcare providers and the quality of healthcare services is performance-based incentives (PBIs) also referred as performance-based financing. Our study aims to explore healthcare providers' preferences for an incentive scheme based on local resources, which aimed at improving the quality of maternal and child health care in the Nouna Health District. A qualitative and quantitative survey was carried out in 2010 involving 94 healthcare providers within 34 health facilities. In addition, in-depth interviews involving a total of 33 key informants were conducted at health facility levels. Overall, 85% of health workers were in favour of an incentive scheme based on the health district's own financial resources (95% CI: [71.91; 88.08]). Most health workers (95 and 96%) expressed a preference for financial incentives (95% CI: [66.64; 85.36]) and team-based incentives (95% CI: [67.78; 86.22]), respectively. The suggested performance indicators were those linked to antenatal care services, prevention of mother-to-child human immunodeficiency virus transmission, neonatal care, and immunization. The early involvement of health workers and other stakeholders in designing an incentive scheme proved to be valuable. It ensured their effective participation in the process and overall acceptance of the scheme at the end. This study is an important contribution towards the designing of effective PBI schemes.
Yé, Maurice; Diboulo, Eric; Kagoné, Moubassira; Sié, Ali; Sauerborn, Rainer; Loukanova, Svetla
2016-01-01
Background One promising way to improve the motivation of healthcare providers and the quality of healthcare services is performance-based incentives (PBIs) also referred as performance-based financing. Our study aims to explore healthcare providers’ preferences for an incentive scheme based on local resources, which aimed at improving the quality of maternal and child health care in the Nouna Health District. Design A qualitative and quantitative survey was carried out in 2010 involving 94 healthcare providers within 34 health facilities. In addition, in-depth interviews involving a total of 33 key informants were conducted at health facility levels. Results Overall, 85% of health workers were in favour of an incentive scheme based on the health district's own financial resources (95% CI: [71.91; 88.08]). Most health workers (95 and 96%) expressed a preference for financial incentives (95% CI: [66.64; 85.36]) and team-based incentives (95% CI: [67.78; 86.22]), respectively. The suggested performance indicators were those linked to antenatal care services, prevention of mother-to-child human immunodeficiency virus transmission, neonatal care, and immunization. Conclusions The early involvement of health workers and other stakeholders in designing an incentive scheme proved to be valuable. It ensured their effective participation in the process and overall acceptance of the scheme at the end. This study is an important contribution towards the designing of effective PBI schemes. PMID:26739784
48 CFR 2937.602 - Elements of performance-based contracting.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... objectively measurable incentives (e.g., Firm-Fixed-Price, Fixed-Price-Incentive-Fee, or Cost-Plus-Incentive-Fee) is appropriate. However, when contractor performance (e.g., cost control, schedule, or quality/technical) is best evaluated subjectively using qualitative measures, a Cost-Plus-Award-Fee contract may be...
An Evaluation of Performance Thresholds in Nursing Home Pay-for-Performance.
Werner, Rachel M; Skira, Meghan; Konetzka, R Tamara
2016-12-01
Performance thresholds are commonly used in pay-for-performance (P4P) incentives, where providers receive a bonus payment for achieving a prespecified target threshold but may produce discontinuous incentives, with providers just below the threshold having the strongest incentive to improve and providers either far below or above the threshold having little incentive. We investigate the effect of performance thresholds on provider response in the setting of nursing home P4P. The Minimum Data Set (MDS) and Online Survey, Certification, and Reporting (OSCAR) datasets. Difference-in-differences design to test for changes in nursing home performance in three states that implemented threshold-based P4P (Colorado, Georgia, and Oklahoma) versus three comparator states (Arizona, Tennessee, and Arkansas) between 2006 and 2009. We find that those farthest below the threshold (i.e., the worst-performing nursing homes) had the largest improvements under threshold-based P4P while those farthest above the threshold worsened. This effect did not vary with the percentage of Medicaid residents in a nursing home. Threshold-based P4P may provide perverse incentives for nursing homes above the performance threshold, but we do not find evidence to support concerns about the effects of performance thresholds on low-performing nursing homes. © Health Research and Educational Trust.
Teacher Incentive through Performance Contracting: A Programmatic Approach
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Quarles, Royce W.
1974-01-01
Describes an instructional program which applied the incentive theories of performance contracting--but with individualized, diagnostic-based instruction both designed and conducted by the teachers. (RB)
Financial Incentives and Physician Practice Participation in Medicare's Value-Based Reforms.
Markovitz, Adam A; Ramsay, Patricia P; Shortell, Stephen M; Ryan, Andrew M
2017-07-26
To evaluate whether greater experience and success with performance incentives among physician practices are related to increased participation in Medicare's voluntary value-based payment reforms. Publicly available data from Medicare's Physician Compare (n = 1,278; January 2012 to November 2013) and nationally representative physician practice data from the National Survey of Physician Organizations 3 (NSPO3; n = 907,538; 2013). We used regression analysis to examine practice-level relationships between prior exposure to performance incentives and participation in key Medicare value-based payment reforms: accountable care organization (ACO) programs, the Physician Quality Reporting System ("Physician Compare"), and the Meaningful Use of Health Information Technology program ("Meaningful Use"). Prior experience and success with financial incentives were measured as (1) the percentage of practices' revenue from financial incentives for quality or efficiency; and (2) practices' exposure to public reporting of quality measures. We linked physician participation data from Medicare's Physician Compare to the NSPO3 survey. There was wide variation in practices' exposure to performance incentives, with 64 percent exposed to financial incentives, 45 percent exposed to public reporting, and 2.2 percent of practice revenue coming from financial incentives. For each percentage-point increase in financial incentives, there was a 0.9 percentage-point increase in the probability of participating in ACOs (standard error [SE], 0.1, p < .001) and a 0.8 percentage-point increase in the probability of participating in Meaningful Use (SE, 0.1, p < .001), controlling for practice characteristics. Financial incentives were not associated with participation in Physician Compare. Among ACO participants, a 1 percentage-point increase in incentives was associated with a 0.7 percentage-point increase in the probability of being "very well" prepared to utilize cost and quality data (SE, 0.1, p < .001). Physicians organizations' prior experience and success with performance incentives were related to participation in Medicare ACO arrangements and participation in the meaningful use criteria but not to participation in Physician Compare. We conclude that Medicare must complement financial incentives with additional efforts to address the needs of practices with less experience with such incentives to promote value-based payment on a broader scale. © Health Research and Educational Trust.
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Stecher, Brian M.; Camm, Frank; Damberg, Cheryl L.; Hamilton, Laura S.; Mullen, Kathleen J.; Nelson, Christopher; Sorensen, Paul; Wachs, Martin; Yoh, Allison; Zellman, Gail L.
2010-01-01
Performance-based accountability systems (PBASs), which link incentives to measured performance as a means of improving services to the public, have gained popularity. While PBASs can vary widely across sectors, they share three main components: goals, incentives, and measures. Research suggests that PBASs influence provider behaviors, but little…
Incentives, Selection, and Teacher Performance: Evidence from IMPACT
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Dee, Thomas S.; Wyckoff, James
2015-01-01
Teachers in the United States are compensated largely on the basis of fixed schedules that reward experience and credentials. However, there is a growing interest in whether performance-based incentives based on rigorous teacher evaluations can improve teacher retention and performance. The evidence available to date has been mixed at best. This…
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Gosman, Nathaniel
For energy utilities faced with expanded jurisdictional energy efficiency requirements and pursuing demand-side management (DSM) incentive programs in the large industrial sector, performance incentive programs can be an effective means to maximize the reliability of planned energy savings. Performance incentive programs balance the objectives of high participation rates with persistent energy savings by: (1) providing financial incentives and resources to minimize constraints to investment in energy efficiency, and (2) requiring that incentive payments be dependent on measured energy savings over time. As BC Hydro increases its DSM initiatives to meet the Clean Energy Act objective to reduce at least 66 per cent of new electricity demand with DSM by 2020, the utility is faced with a higher level of DSM risk, or uncertainties that impact the costeffective acquisition of planned energy savings. For industrial DSM incentive programs, DSM risk can be broken down into project development and project performance risks. Development risk represents the project ramp-up phase and is the risk that planned energy savings do not materialize due to low customer response to program incentives. Performance risk represents the operational phase and is the risk that planned energy savings do not persist over the effective measure life. DSM project development and performance risks are, in turn, a result of industrial economic, technological and organizational conditions, or DSM risk factors. In the BC large industrial sector, and characteristic of large industrial sectors in general, these DSM risk factors include: (1) capital constraints to investment in energy efficiency, (2) commodity price volatility, (3) limited internal staffing resources to deploy towards energy efficiency, (4) variable load, process-based energy saving potential, and (5) a lack of organizational awareness of an operation's energy efficiency over time (energy performance). This research assessed the capacity of alternative performance incentive program models to manage DSM risk in BC. Three performance incentive program models were assessed and compared to BC Hydro's current large industrial DSM incentive program, Power Smart Partners -- Transmission Project Incentives, itself a performance incentive-based program. Together, the selected program models represent a continuum of program design and implementation in terms of the schedule and level of incentives provided, the duration and rigour of measurement and verification (M&V), energy efficiency measures targeted and involvement of the private sector. A multi criteria assessment framework was developed to rank the capacity of each program model to manage BC large industrial DSM risk factors. DSM risk management rankings were then compared to program costeffectiveness, targeted energy savings potential in BC and survey results from BC industrial firms on the program models. The findings indicate that the reliability of DSM energy savings in the BC large industrial sector can be maximized through performance incentive program models that: (1) offer incentives jointly for capital and low-cost operations and maintenance (O&M) measures, (2) allow flexible lead times for project development, (3) utilize rigorous M&V methods capable of measuring variable load, process-based energy savings, (4) use moderate contract lengths that align with effective measure life, and (5) integrate energy management software tools capable of providing energy performance feedback to customers to maximize the persistence of energy savings. While this study focuses exclusively on the BC large industrial sector, the findings of this research have applicability to all energy utilities serving large, energy intensive industrial sectors.
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
National Center on Performance Incentives, 2008
2008-01-01
A recent report published by the National Center on Performance Incentives (NCPI) presents findings from the first-year evaluation of the Governor's Educator Excellence Grant (GEEG) program, one of several statewide educator incentive programs in Texas. Findings are based on surveys administered to GEEG teachers during the 2006-07 school year, the…
Incentives, Selection, and Teacher Performance: Evidence from IMPACT. NBER Working Paper No. 19529
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Dee, Thomas; Wyckoff, James
2013-01-01
Teachers in the United States are compensated largely on the basis of fixed schedules that reward experience and credentials. However, there is a growing interest in whether performance-based incentives based on rigorous teacher evaluations can improve teacher retention and performance. The evidence available to date has been mixed at best. This…
42 CFR § 414.1320 - MIPS performance period.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2017-10-01
... (CONTINUED) MEDICARE PROGRAM (CONTINUED) PAYMENT FOR PART B MEDICAL AND OTHER HEALTH SERVICES Merit-Based Incentive Payment System and Alternative Payment Model Incentive § 414.1320 MIPS performance period. (a) For purposes of the 2019 MIPS payment year, the performance period for all performance categories and...
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
National Center on Performance Incentives, 2008
2008-01-01
A recent report published by the National Center on Performance Incentives (NCPI) presents findings from the first-year evaluation of the Texas Educator Excellence Grant (TEEG) program, one of several statewide educator incentive programs in Texas. Findings are based on the responses of full-time instructional personnel at over 1,000 TEEG schools…
Custers, Thomas; Hurley, Jeremiah; Klazinga, Niek S; Brown, Adalsteinn D
2008-01-01
Background The Ontario health care system is devolving planning and funding authority to community based organizations and moving from steering through rules and regulations to steering on performance. As part of this transformation, the Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care (MOHLTC) are interested in using incentives as a strategy to ensure alignment – that is, health service providers' goals are in accord with the goals of the health system. The objective of the study was to develop a decision framework to assist policymakers in choosing and designing effective incentive systems. Methods The first part of the study was an extensive review of the literature to identify incentives models that are used in the various health care systems and their effectiveness. The second part was the development of policy principles to ensure that the used incentive models are congruent with the values of the Ontario health care system. The principles were developed by reviewing the Ontario policy documents and through discussions with policymakers. The validation of the principles and the suggested incentive models for use in Ontario took place at two meetings. The first meeting was with experts from the research and policy community, the second with senior policymakers from the MOHLTC. Based on the outcome of those two meetings, the researchers built a decision framework for incentives. The framework was send to the participants of both meetings and four additional experts for validation. Results We identified several models that have proven, with a varying degree of evidence, to be effective in changing or enabling a health provider's performance. Overall, the literature suggests that there is no single best approach to create incentives yet and the ability of financial and non-financial incentives to achieve results depends on a number of contextual elements. After assessing the initial set of incentive models on their congruence with the four policy principles we defined nine incentive models to be appropriate for use in Ontario and potentially other health care systems that want to introduce incentives to improve performance. Subsequently, the models were incorporated in the resulting decision framework. Conclusion The design of an incentive must reflect the values and goals of the health care system, be well matched to the performance objectives and reflect a range of contextual factors that can influence the effectiveness of even well-designed incentives. As a consequence, a single policy recommendation around incentives is inappropriate. The decision framework provides health care policymakers and purchasers with a tool to support the selection of an incentive model that is the most appropriate to improve the targeted performance. PMID:18371198
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
What Works Clearinghouse, 2014
2014-01-01
The 2013 study, "Incentives, Selection, and Teacher Performance: Evidence from IMPACT" examined the effects of "IMPACT," a teacher evaluation system used in the District of Columbia Public Schools, on teacher retention and performance. "IMPACT" assigns each teacher a single performance score based on classroom…
Team Pay for Performance: Experimental Evidence from Round Rock's Project on Incentives in Teaching
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
McCaffrey, Daniel F.; Pane, John F.; Springer, Matthew G.; Burns, Susan F.; Haas, Ann
2011-01-01
This paper presents the results of a rigorous experiment examining the impact of pay for performance on student achievement and instructional practice. This study, conducted by the National Center on Performance Incentives, examines a pay-for-performance program in Round Rock (Texas) which distributed performance awards to teachers based on a…
Shiels, Keri; Hawk, Larry W; Lysczek, Cynthia L; Tannock, Rosemary; Pelham, William E; Spencer, Sarah V; Gangloff, Brian P; Waschbusch, Daniel A
2008-08-01
Working memory is one of several putative core neurocognitive processes in attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). The present work seeks to determine whether visual-spatial working memory is sensitive to motivational incentives, a laboratory analogue of behavioral treatment. Participants were 21 children (ages 7-10) with a diagnosis of ADHD-combined type. Participants completed a computerized spatial span task designed to assess storage of visual-spatial information (forward span) and manipulation of the stored information (backward span). The spatial span task was completed twice on the same day, once with a performance-based incentive (trial-wise feedback and points redeemable for prizes) and once without incentives. Participants performed significantly better on the backward span when rewarded for correct responses, compared to the no incentive condition. However, incentives had no effect on performance during the forward span. These findings may suggest the use of motivational incentives improved manipulation, but not storage, of visual-spatial information among children with ADHD. Possible explanations for the differential incentive effects are discussed, including the possibility that incentives prevented a vigilance decrement as task difficulty and time on task increased.
Diaz, Adrian; Merath, Katiuscha; Bagante, Fabio; Chen, Qinyu; Akgul, Ozgur; Beal, Eliza; Idrees, Jay; Olsen, Griffin; Gani, Faiz; Pawlik, Timothy M
2018-05-15
The Affordable Care Act established a Center for Medicare/Medicaid Services based 10% reimbursement bonus for general surgeons in Health Professional Shortage Areas. We sought to assess the impact of the Affordable Care Act Surgery Incentive Payment on surgical procedures performed in Health Professional Shortage Areas. Hospital utilization data from the California Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2015, were used to categorize hospitals according to Health Professional Shortage Area location. A difference-in-differences analysis measured the effect of the Surgery Incentive Payment on year-to-year differences for inpatient and outpatient surgical procedures by hospital type pre- (2006-2010) versus post- (2011-2015) Surgery Incentive Payment implementation. Among 409 unique hospitals that performed surgical procedures for at least 1 year of the study period, 2 performed surgery in a designated Health Professional Shortage Area. The two Health Professional Shortage Area -designated hospitals were located in a rural area, were non-teaching hospitals, and had 196 and 202 hospital beds, respectively. After the enactment of the Surgery Incentive Payment, while non- Health Professional Shortage Areas had only a modest relative decrease in total inpatient procedures (Pre-Surgery Incentive Payment: 4,666,938 versus Post-Surgery Incentive Payment: 4,451,612; Δ-4.6%), the proportional decrease in inpatient surgical procedures at Health Professional Shortage Area hospitals was more marked (Pre-Surgery Incentive Payment: 25,830 versus Post-Surgery Incentive Payment: 21,503; Δ-16.7%). In contrast, Health Professional Shortage Area hospitals proportionally had a greater increase in total outpatient procedures (Pre-Surgery Incentive Payment: 17,840 versus Post-Surgery Incentive Payment: 22,375: Δ+25.4%) versus non- Health Professional Shortage Area hospitals (Pre-Surgery Incentive Payment: 5,863,300 versus Post-Surgery Incentive Payment: 6,156,138; Δ+4.9%). Based on the difference-in-differences analysis, the increase in the trend of surgical procedures at Health Professional Shortage Area hospitals was much more notable after Surgery Incentive Payment implementation (Δ+75.2%). The Medicare Surgery Incentive Payment program was associated with an increase in the number of surgical procedures performed at Health Professional Shortage Area hospitals relative to non-Health Professional Shortage Area hospitals during the study period, reversing the trend from negative to positive. Copyright © 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Higher incentives can impair performance: neural evidence on reinforcement and rationality
Achtziger, Anja; Hügelschäfer, Sabine; Steinhauser, Marco
2015-01-01
Standard economic thinking postulates that increased monetary incentives should increase performance. Human decision makers, however, frequently focus on past performance, a form of reinforcement learning occasionally at odds with rational decision making. We used an incentivized belief-updating task from economics to investigate this conflict through measurements of neural correlates of reward processing. We found that higher incentives fail to improve performance when immediate feedback on decision outcomes is provided. Subsequent analysis of the feedback-related negativity, an early event-related potential following feedback, revealed the mechanism behind this paradoxical effect. As incentives increase, the win/lose feedback becomes more prominent, leading to an increased reliance on reinforcement and more errors. This mechanism is relevant for economic decision making and the debate on performance-based payment. PMID:25816816
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Willett, Michael S.
2013-01-01
The purpose of this exploratory longitudinal case study was to examine how the implementation of an Incentive Based Budgeting (IBB) system (i.e., Responsibility-Centered Management [RCM]) affected selected institutional performance indicators at the campus level and two comparable schools at a large Mid-Western public University. The value of…
Incentive-Based Primary Care: Cost and Utilization Analysis.
Hollander, Marcus J; Kadlec, Helena
2015-01-01
In its fee-for-service funding model for primary care, British Columbia, Canada, introduced incentive payments to general practitioners as pay for performance for providing enhanced, guidelines-based care to patients with chronic conditions. Evaluation of the program was conducted at the health care system level. To examine the impact of the incentive payments on annual health care costs and hospital utilization patterns in British Columbia. The study used Ministry of Health administrative data for Fiscal Year 2010-2011 for patients with diabetes, congestive heart failure, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and/or hypertension. In each disease group, cost and utilization were compared across patients who did, and did not, receive incentive-based care. Health care costs (eg, primary care, hospital) and utilization measures (eg, hospital days, readmissions). After controlling for patients' age, sex, service needs level, and continuity of care (defined as attachment to a general practice), the incentives reduced the net annual health care costs, in Canadian dollars, for patients with hypertension (by approximately Can$308 per patient), chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (by Can$496), and congestive heart failure (by Can$96), but not diabetes (incentives cost about Can$148 more per patient). The incentives were also associated with fewer hospital days, fewer admissions and readmissions, and shorter lengths of hospital stays for all 4 groups. Although the available literature on pay for performance shows mixed results, we showed that the funding model used in British Columbia using incentive payments for primary care might reduce health care costs and hospital utilization.
42 CFR § 414.1360 - Data submission criteria for the improvement activities performance category.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2017-10-01
... & MEDICAID SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (CONTINUED) MEDICARE PROGRAM (CONTINUED) PAYMENT FOR PART B MEDICAL AND OTHER HEALTH SERVICES Merit-Based Incentive Payment System and Alternative Payment Model Incentive § 414.1360 Data submission criteria for the improvement activities performance...
42 CFR § 414.1350 - Cost performance category.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2017-10-01
... SERVICES (CONTINUED) MEDICARE PROGRAM (CONTINUED) PAYMENT FOR PART B MEDICAL AND OTHER HEALTH SERVICES Merit-Based Incentive Payment System and Alternative Payment Model Incentive § 414.1350 Cost performance... category comprises: (1) 0 percent of a MIPS eligible clinician's final score for MIPS payment year 2019. (2...
Manchikanti, Laxmaiah; Helm Ii, Standiford; Benyamin, Ramsin M; Hirsch, Joshua A
2016-01-01
The Merit-based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) was created by the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015 (MACRA) to improve the health of all Americans by providing incentives and policies to improve patient health outcomes. MIPS combines 3 existing programs, Meaningful Use (MU), now called Advancing Care Information (ACI), contributing 25% of the composite score; Physician Quality Reporting System (PQRS), changed to Quality, contributing 50% of the composite score; and Value-based Payment (VBP) system to Resource Use or cost, contributing 10% of the composite score. Additionally, Clinical Practice Improvement Activities (CPIA), contributing 15% of the composite score, create multiple strategic goals to design incentives that drive movement toward delivery system reform principles with inclusion of Advanced Alternative Payment Models (APMs). Under the present proposal, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) has estimated approximately 30,000 to 90,000 providers from a total of over 761,000 providers will be exempt from MIPS. About 87% of solo practitioners and 70% of practitioners in groups of less than 10 will be subjected to negative payments or penalties ranging from 4% to 9%. In addition, MIPS also will affect a provider's reputation by making performance measures accessible to consumers and third-party physician rating Web sites.The MIPS composite performance scoring method, at least in theory, utilizes weights for each performance category, exceptional performance factors to earn bonuses, and incorporates the special circumstances of small practices.In conclusion, MIPS has the potential to affect practitioners negatively. Interventional Pain Medicine practitioners must understand the various MIPS measures and how they might participate in order to secure a brighter future. Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015, merit-based incentive payment system, quality performance measures, resource use, clinical practice improvement activities, advancing care information performance category.
Financial incentives and physician commitment to guideline-recommended hypertension management.
Hysong, Sylvia J; Simpson, Kate; Pietz, Kenneth; SoRelle, Richard; Broussard Smitham, Kristen; Petersen, Laura A
2012-10-01
To examine the impact of financial incentives on physician goal commitment to guideline-recommended hypertension care. Clinic-level cluster-randomized trial with 4 arms: individual, group, or combined incentives, and control. A total of 83 full-time primary care physicians at 12 Veterans Affairs medical centers completed web-based surveys measuring their goal commitment to guideline-recommended hypertension care every 4 months and telephone interviews at months 8 and 16. Intervention arm participants received performance-based incentives every 4 months for 5 periods. All participants received guideline education at baseline and audit and feedback every 4 months. Physician goal commitment did not vary over time or across arms. Participants reported patient nonadherence was a perceived barrier and consistent follow-up was a perceived facilitator to successful hypertension care, suggesting that providers may perceive hypertension management as more of a patient responsibility (external locus of control). Financial incentives may constitute an insufficiently strong intervention to influence goal commitment when providers attribute performance to external forces beyond their control.
Hysong, Sylvia J.; Simpson, Kate; Pietz, Kenneth; SoRelle, Richard; Broussard, Kristen; Petersen, Laura A.
2014-01-01
Objective To examine the impact of financial incentives on physician goal commitment to guideline-recommended hypertension care. Study design Clinic-level cluster-randomized controlled trial with four arms: control, individual-, group-, or combined incentives. Intervention arm participants received performance-based incentives every four months for five periods. All participants received guideline education at baseline and audit and feedback every four months. Methods 83 full-time primary care physicians at 12 VA Medical Centers completed web-based survey responses to Hollenbeck’s goal commitment scale every four months and telephone interviews at months 8 and 16. Results Physician goal commitment did not vary over time or across arms. Participants reported patient non-adherence and consistent follow-up as perceived barriers and facilitators to successful hypertension care, suggesting providers may perceive hypertension management as more of a patient responsibility (external locus of control). Conclusions Financial incentives may constitute an insufficiently strong intervention to influence goal commitment when providers attribute performance to external forces beyond their control. PMID:23145846
42 CFR § 414.1365 - Subcategories for the improvement activities performance category.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2017-10-01
..., DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (CONTINUED) MEDICARE PROGRAM (CONTINUED) PAYMENT FOR PART B MEDICAL AND OTHER HEALTH SERVICES Merit-Based Incentive Payment System and Alternative Payment Model Incentive...
Higher incentives can impair performance: neural evidence on reinforcement and rationality.
Achtziger, Anja; Alós-Ferrer, Carlos; Hügelschäfer, Sabine; Steinhauser, Marco
2015-11-01
Standard economic thinking postulates that increased monetary incentives should increase performance. Human decision makers, however, frequently focus on past performance, a form of reinforcement learning occasionally at odds with rational decision making. We used an incentivized belief-updating task from economics to investigate this conflict through measurements of neural correlates of reward processing. We found that higher incentives fail to improve performance when immediate feedback on decision outcomes is provided. Subsequent analysis of the feedback-related negativity, an early event-related potential following feedback, revealed the mechanism behind this paradoxical effect. As incentives increase, the win/lose feedback becomes more prominent, leading to an increased reliance on reinforcement and more errors. This mechanism is relevant for economic decision making and the debate on performance-based payment. © The Author (2015). Published by Oxford University Press. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com.
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Max, Jeffrey; Constantine, Jill; Wellington, Alison; Hallgren, Kristin; Glazerman, Steven; Chiang, Hanley; Speroni, Cecilia
2014-01-01
The Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) provides grants to support performance-based compensation systems for teachers and principals in high-need schools. The study measures the impact of pay-for-performance bonuses as part of a comprehensive compensation system within a large, multisite random assignment study design. The treatment schools were to…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Chiang, Hanley; Wellington, Alison; Hallgren, Kristin; Speroni, Cecilia; Herrmann, Mariesa; Glazerman, Steven; Constantine, Jill
2015-01-01
The Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) provides grants to support performance-based compensation systems for teachers and principals in high-need schools. The study measures the impact of pay-for-performance bonuses as part of a comprehensive compensation system within a large, multisite random assignment study design. The treatment schools were to…
Age-related influence of contingencies on a saccade task
Jazbec, Sandra; Hardin, Michael G.; Schroth, Elizabeth; McClure, Erin; Pine, Daniel S.; Ernst, Monique
2009-01-01
Adolescence is characterized by increased risk-taking and sensation-seeking, presumably brought about by developmental changes within reward-mediating brain circuits. A better understanding of the neural mechanisms underlying reward-seeking during adolescence can have critical implications for the development of strategies to enhance adolescent performance in potentially dangerous situations. Yet little research has investigated the influence of age on the modulation of behavior by incentives with neuroscience-based methods. A monetary reward antisaccade task (the RST) was used with 23 healthy adolescents and 30 healthy adults. Performance accuracy, latency and peak velocity of saccade responses (prosaccades and antisaccades) were analyzed. Performance accuracy across all groups was improved by incentives (obtain reward, avoid punishment) for both, prosaccades and antisaccades. However, modulation of antisaccade errors (direction errors) by incentives differed between groups: adolescents modulated saccade latency and peak velocity depending on contingencies, with incentives aligning their performance to that of adults; adults did not show a modulation by incentives. These findings suggest that incentives modulate a global measure of performance (percent direction errors) in adults and adolescents, and exert a more powerful influence on the control of incorrect motor responses in adolescents than in adults. These findings suggest that this task can be used in neuroimaging studies as a probe of the influence of incentives on cognitive control from a developmental perspective as well as in health and disease. PMID:16733706
Age-related influence of contingencies on a saccade task.
Jazbec, Sandra; Hardin, Michael G; Schroth, Elizabeth; McClure, Erin; Pine, Daniel S; Ernst, Monique
2006-10-01
Adolescence is characterized by increased risk-taking and sensation-seeking, presumably brought about by developmental changes within reward-mediating brain circuits. A better understanding of the neural mechanisms underlying reward-seeking during adolescence can have critical implications for the development of strategies to enhance adolescent performance in potentially dangerous situations. Yet little research has investigated the influence of age on the modulation of behavior by incentives with neuroscience-based methods. A monetary reward antisaccade task (the RST) was used with 23 healthy adolescents and 30 healthy adults. Performance accuracy, latency and peak velocity of saccade responses (prosaccades and antisaccades) were analyzed. Performance accuracy across all groups was improved by incentives (obtain reward, avoid punishment) for both, prosaccades and antisaccades. However, modulation of antisaccade errors (direction errors) by incentives differed between groups: adolescents modulated saccade latency and peak velocity depending on contingencies, with incentives aligning their performance to that of adults; adults did not show a modulation by incentives. These findings suggest that incentives modulate a global measure of performance (percent direction errors) in adults and adolescents, and exert a more powerful influence on the control of incorrect motor responses in adolescents than in adults. These findings suggest that this task can be used in neuroimaging studies as a probe of the influence of incentives on cognitive control from a developmental perspective as well as in health and disease.
Incentive-Based Primary Care: Cost and Utilization Analysis
Hollander, Marcus J; Kadlec, Helena
2015-01-01
Context: In its fee-for-service funding model for primary care, British Columbia, Canada, introduced incentive payments to general practitioners as pay for performance for providing enhanced, guidelines-based care to patients with chronic conditions. Evaluation of the program was conducted at the health care system level. Objective: To examine the impact of the incentive payments on annual health care costs and hospital utilization patterns in British Columbia. Design: The study used Ministry of Health administrative data for Fiscal Year 2010–2011 for patients with diabetes, congestive heart failure, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and/or hypertension. In each disease group, cost and utilization were compared across patients who did, and did not, receive incentive-based care. Main Outcome Measures: Health care costs (eg, primary care, hospital) and utilization measures (eg, hospital days, readmissions). Results: After controlling for patients’ age, sex, service needs level, and continuity of care (defined as attachment to a general practice), the incentives reduced the net annual health care costs, in Canadian dollars, for patients with hypertension (by approximately Can$308 per patient), chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (by Can$496), and congestive heart failure (by Can$96), but not diabetes (incentives cost about Can$148 more per patient). The incentives were also associated with fewer hospital days, fewer admissions and readmissions, and shorter lengths of hospital stays for all 4 groups. Conclusion: Although the available literature on pay for performance shows mixed results, we showed that the funding model used in British Columbia using incentive payments for primary care might reduce health care costs and hospital utilization. PMID:26263389
42 CFR § 414.1335 - Data submission criteria for the quality performance category.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2017-10-01
..., DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (CONTINUED) MEDICARE PROGRAM (CONTINUED) PAYMENT FOR PART B MEDICAL AND OTHER HEALTH SERVICES Merit-Based Incentive Payment System and Alternative Payment Model Incentive...
Using performance-based pay to improve the quality of teachers.
Lavy, Victor
2007-01-01
Tying teachers' pay to their classroom performance should, says Victor Lavy, improve the current educational system both by clarifying teaching goals and by attracting and retaining the most productive teachers. But implementing pay for performance poses many practical challenges, because measuring individual teachers' performance is difficult. Lavy reviews evidence on individual and school-based incentive programs implemented in recent years both in the United States and abroad. Lavy himself evaluated two carefully designed programs in Israel and found significant gains in student and teacher performance. He observes that research evidence suggests, although not conclusively, that pay-for-performance incentives can improve teachers' performance, although they can also lead to unintended and undesired consequences, such as teachers' directing their efforts exclusively to rewarded activities. Lavy also offers general guidelines for designing effective programs. He emphasizes that the system must measure true performance in a way that minimizes random variation as well as undesired and unintended consequences. It must align performance with ultimate outcomes and must be monitored closely to discourage gaming if not outright fraud in measured output. Goals should be attainable. Incentives should balance individual rewards with school incentives, fostering a cooperative culture but not at the expense of free riding. All teachers should be eligible for the incentive offered, but only a subset of teachers should be rewarded in practice. If too many teachers are rewarded, teachers may not need to exert much extra effort to benefit. Many of the practical challenges faced by performance-related pay, Lavy says, can be addressed through careful design of the system. He emphasizes that setting up a performance-related pay system that works is not a one-time task. Even with the best preparation, initial implementation is likely to be problematic. But if the effort is seen as ongoing, it should be possible to make progress gradually in developing incentives that motivate the desired teaching behaviors and that will be perceived by teachers as fair and accurate.
Incentives for Better Performance in Health Care
Abduljawad, Asaad; Al-Assaf, Assaf F.
2011-01-01
Incentives for better performance in health care have several modes and methods. They are designed to motivate and encourage people to perform well and improve their outcomes. They may include monetary or non-monetary incentives and may be applied to consumers, individual providers or institutions. One such model is the Pay-for-Performance system. In this system, beneficiaries are compared with one another based on a set of performance indicators and those that achieve a high level of performance are rewarded financially. This system is meant to recognise and primarily to reward high performers. Its goal is to encourage beneficiaries to strive for better performance. This system has been applied in several countries and for several recipients and settings. Early indications show that this system has had mixed effects on performance. PMID:21969891
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Fryer, Roland G.
2011-01-01
Financial incentives for teachers to increase student performance is an increasingly popular education policy around the world. This paper describes a school-based randomized trial in over two-hundred New York City public schools designed to better understand the impact of teacher incentives on student achievement. I find no evidence that teacher…
Quality Measures for Dialysis: Time for a Balanced Scorecard
2016-01-01
Recent federal legislation establishes a merit-based incentive payment system for physicians, with a scorecard for each professional. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services evaluate quality of care with clinical performance measures and have used these metrics for public reporting and payment to dialysis facilities. Similar metrics may be used for the future merit-based incentive payment system. In nephrology, most clinical performance measures measure processes and intermediate outcomes of care. These metrics were developed from population studies of best practice and do not identify opportunities for individualizing care on the basis of patient characteristics and individual goals of treatment. The In-Center Hemodialysis (ICH) Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems (CAHPS) survey examines patients' perception of care and has entered the arena to evaluate quality of care. A balanced scorecard of quality performance should include three elements: population-based best clinical practice, patient perceptions, and individually crafted patient goals of care. PMID:26316622
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
National Center for Education Evaluation and Regional Assistance, 2015
2015-01-01
The Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) provides grants to support performance-based compensation systems for teachers and principals in high-need schools. The study measures the impact of pay-for-performance bonuses as part of a comprehensive compensation system within a large, multisite random assignment study design. The treatment schools were to…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Chiang, Hanley; Speroni, Cecilia; Herrmann, Mariesa; Hallgren, Kristin; Burkander, Paul; Wellington, Alison
2017-01-01
The Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) provides grants to support performance-based compensation systems for teachers and principals in high-need schools. The study measures the impact of pay-for-performance bonuses as part of a comprehensive compensation system within a large, multisite random assignment study design. The treatment schools were to…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Chiang, Hanley; Speroni, Cecilia; Herrmann, Mariesa; Hallgren, Kristin; Burkander, Paul; Wellington, Alison
2017-01-01
The Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) provides grants to support performance-based compensation systems for teachers and principals in high-need schools. The study measures the impact of pay-for-performance bonuses as part of a comprehensive compensation system within a large, multisite random assignment study design. The treatment schools were to…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Max, Jeffrey; Constantine, Jill; Wellington, Alison; Hallgren, Kristin; Glazerman, Steven; Chiang, Hanley; Speroni, Cecilia
2014-01-01
The Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) provides grants to support performance-based compensation systems for teachers and principals in high-need schools. The study measures the impact of pay-for-performance bonuses as part of a comprehensive compensation system within a large, multisite random assignment study design. The treatment schools were to…
48 CFR 1852.216-88 - Performance incentive.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 6 2013-10-01 2013-10-01 false Performance incentive... 1852.216-88 Performance incentive. As prescribed in 1816.406-70(f), insert the following clause: Performance Incentive (JAN 1997) (a) A performance incentive applies to the following hardware item(s...
48 CFR 1852.216-88 - Performance incentive.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 6 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Performance incentive... 1852.216-88 Performance incentive. As prescribed in 1816.406-70(f), insert the following clause: Performance Incentive (JAN 1997) (a) A performance incentive applies to the following hardware item(s...
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Barbose, Galen; Wiser, Ryan; Bolinger, Mark
In the U.S., the increasing financial support for customer-sited photovoltaic (PV) systems provided through publicly-funded incentive programs has heightened concerns about the long-term performance of these systems. Given the barriers that customers face to ensuring that their PV systems perform well, and the responsibility that PV incentive programs bear to ensure that public funds are prudently spent, these programs should, and often do, play a critical role in addressing PV system performance. To provide a point of reference for assessing the current state of the art, and to inform program design efforts going forward, we examine the approaches to encouragingmore » PV system performance used by 32 prominent PV incentive programs in the U.S. We identify eight general strategies or groups of related strategies that these programs have used to address factors that affect performance, and describe key implementation details. Based on this review, we then offer recommendations for how PV incentive programs can be effectively designed to mitigate potential performance issues.« less
48 CFR 1852.216-88 - Performance incentive.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 6 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 true Performance incentive. 1852... 1852.216-88 Performance incentive. As prescribed in 1816.406-70(f), insert the following clause: Performance Incentive (JAN 1997) (a) A performance incentive applies to the following hardware item(s...
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Chiang, Hanley; Wellington, Alison; Hallgren, Kristin; Speroni, Cecilia; Herrmann, Mariesa; Glazerman, Steven; Constantine, Jill
2016-01-01
Recent efforts to attract and retain effective educators and to improve teaching practices have focused on reforming evaluation and compensation systems for teachers and principals. In 2006, Congress established the Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF), which provides grants to support performance-based compensation systems for teachers and principals in…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
National Center for Education Evaluation and Regional Assistance, 2014
2014-01-01
The Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) provides grants to support performance-based compensation systems for teachers and principals in high-need schools. The study measures the impact of pay-for-performance bonuses as part of a comprehensive compensation system within a large, multisite random assignment study design. The treatment schools were to…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Max, Jeffrey; Constantine, Jill; Wellington, Alison; Hallgren, Kristin; Glazerman, Steven; Chiang, Hanley; Speroni, Cecilia
2015-01-01
Recent efforts to attract and retain effective educators and to improve teaching practices have focused on reforming evaluation and compensation systems for teachers and principals. In 2006, Congress established the Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF), which provides grants to support performance-based compensation systems for teachers and principals in…
Impacts of Performance Pay under the Teacher Incentive Fund: Study Design Report
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Glazerman, Steven; Chiang, Hanley; Wellington, Alison; Constantine, Jill; Player, Dan
2011-01-01
The body of research on the design, implementation, and effects of performance-based compensation systems has influenced the design and evaluation of the 2010 Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) grants. In the sections presented here, the authors describe the key components of 2010 TIF grants and the conceptual framework for the evaluation. The remainder…
Zafeiriou, Athina; Gendolla, Guido H E
2017-09-01
Based on previous research on implicit effects on effort-related cardiovascular response and evidence that aging is associated with cognitive difficulties, we tested whether the mere activation of the aging stereotype can systematically influence young individuals' effort-mobilization during cognitive performance. Young participants performed an objectively difficult short-term memory task during which they processed elderly vs. youth primes and expected low vs. high incentive for success. When participants processed elderly primes during the task, we expected cardiovascular response to be weak in the low-incentive condition and strong in the high-incentive condition. Unaffected by incentive, effort in the youth-prime condition should fall in between the two elderly-prime cells. Effects on cardiac pre-ejection period (PEP) and heart rate (HR) largely supported these predictions. The present findings show for the first time that the mere activation of the aging stereotype can systematically influence effort mobilization during cognitive performance-even in young adults. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Squitieri, Lee; Chung, Kevin C
2017-07-01
In 2015, the U.S. Congress passed the Medicare Access and Children's Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act, which effectively repealed the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services sustainable growth rate formula and established the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Quality Payment Program. The Medicare Access and Children's Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act represents an unparalleled acceleration toward value-based payment models and a departure from traditional volume-driven fee-for-service reimbursement. The Quality Payment Program includes two paths for provider participation: the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System and Advanced Alternative Payment Models. The Merit-Based Incentive Payment System pathway replaces existing quality reporting programs and adds several new measures to create a composite performance score for each provider (or provider group) that will be used to adjust reimbursed payment. The advanced alternative payment model pathway is available to providers who participate in qualifying Advanced Alternative Payment Models and is associated with an initial 5 percent payment incentive. The first performance period for the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System opens January 1, 2017, and closes on December 31, 2017, and is associated with payment adjustments in January of 2019. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services estimates that the majority of providers will begin participation in 2017 through the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System pathway, but aims to have 50 percent of payments tied to quality or value through Advanced Alternative Payment Models by 2018. In this article, the authors describe key components of the Medicare Access and Children's Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act to providers navigating through the Quality Payment Program and discuss how plastic surgeons may optimize their performance in this new value-based payment program.
Hospital responses to pay-for-performance incentives.
Reiter, Kristin L; Nahra, Tammie A; Alexander, Jeffrey A; Wheeler, John R C
2006-05-01
Not-for-profit hospitals are complex organizations and, therefore, may face unique challenges in responding to financial incentives for quality. In this research, we explore the types of behavioural changes made by not-for-profit Michigan hospitals in response to a pay-for-performance system for quality. We also identify factors that motivate or facilitate changes in effort. We apply a conceptual framework based on agency theory to motivate our research questions. Using data derived from structured interviews and surveys administered to 86 hospitals participating in a pay-for-performance system, we compare hospitals reporting and not reporting behavioural changes. Separate analyses are performed for hospitals reporting structure-related changes and hospitals reporting process-related changes. Our findings confirm that hospitals respond to incentive payments; however, our findings also reveal that hospital responses are not universal. Rather, involvement by boards of trustees, willingness to exert leverage with physicians, and financial and competitive motivations are all associated with hospitals' behavioural responses to incentives. Results of this research will help inform payers and hospital managers considering the use of incentives about the nature of hospitals' responses.
48 CFR 16.402-2 - Performance incentives.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2012-10-01 2012-10-01 false Performance incentives. 16... CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES TYPES OF CONTRACTS Incentive Contracts 16.402-2 Performance incentives. (a) Performance incentives may be considered in connection with specific product characteristics (e.g...
48 CFR 16.402-2 - Performance incentives.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2014-10-01 2014-10-01 false Performance incentives. 16... CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES TYPES OF CONTRACTS Incentive Contracts 16.402-2 Performance incentives. (a) Performance incentives may be considered in connection with specific product characteristics (e.g...
48 CFR 16.402-2 - Performance incentives.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Performance incentives. 16... CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES TYPES OF CONTRACTS Incentive Contracts 16.402-2 Performance incentives. (a) Performance incentives may be considered in connection with specific product characteristics (e.g...
Quality-based financial incentives in health care: can we improve quality by paying for it?
Conrad, Douglas A; Perry, Lisa
2009-01-01
This article asks whether financial incentives can improve the quality of health care. A conceptual framework drawn from microeconomics, agency theory, behavioral economics, and cognitive psychology motivates a set of propositions about incentive effects on clinical quality. These propositions are evaluated through a synthesis of extant peer-reviewed empirical evidence. Comprehensive financial incentives--balancing rewards and penalties; blending structure, process, and outcome measures; emphasizing continuous, absolute performance standards; tailoring the size of incremental rewards to increasing marginal costs of quality improvement; and assuring certainty, frequency, and sustainability of incentive payoffs--offer the prospect of significantly enhancing quality beyond the modest impacts of prevailing pay-for-performance (P4P) programs. Such organizational innovations as the primary care medical home and accountable health care organizations are expected to catalyze more powerful quality incentive models: risk- and quality-adjusted capitation, episode of care payments, and enhanced fee-for-service payments for quality dimensions (e.g., prevention) most amenable to piece-rate delivery.
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Wellington, Alison; Chiang, Hanley; Hallgren, Kristin; Speroni, Cecilia; Herrmann, Mariesa; Burkander, Paul
2016-01-01
The Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) provides grants to support performance-based compensation systems for teachers and principals in high-need schools. The goal of the grants is to increase the number of high-performing teachers in high-need schools by rewarding educators for improving students' achievement. The report on which this snapshot is based…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Chiang, Hanley; Wellington, Alison; Hallgren, Kristin; Speroni, Cecilia; Herrmann, Mariesa; Glazerman, Steven; Constantine, Jill
2015-01-01
Recent efforts to attract and retain effective educators and to improve teaching practices have focused on reforming evaluation and compensation systems for teachers and principals. In 2006, Congress established the Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF), which provides grants to support performance-based compensation systems for teachers and principals in…
Chiew, Kimberly S.; Braver, Todd S.
2013-01-01
Motivational manipulations, such as the presence of performance-contingent reward incentives, can have substantial influences on cognitive control. Previous evidence suggests that reward incentives may enhance cognitive performance specifically through increased preparatory, or proactive, control processes. The present study examined reward influences on cognitive control dynamics in the AX-Continuous Performance Task (AX-CPT), using high-resolution pupillometry. In the AX-CPT, contextual cues must be actively maintained over a delay in order to appropriately respond to ambiguous target probes. A key feature of the task is that it permits dissociable characterization of preparatory, proactive control processes (i.e., utilization of context) and reactive control processes (i.e., target-evoked interference resolution). Task performance profiles suggested that reward incentives enhanced proactive control (context utilization). Critically, pupil dilation was also increased on reward incentive trials during context maintenance periods, suggesting trial-specific shifts in proactive control, particularly when context cues indicated the need to overcome the dominant target response bias. Reward incentives had both transient (i.e., trial-by-trial) and sustained (i.e., block-based) effects on pupil dilation, which may reflect distinct underlying processes. The transient pupillary effects were present even when comparing against trials matched in task performance, suggesting a unique motivational influence of reward incentives. These results suggest that pupillometry may be a useful technique for investigating reward motivational signals and their dynamic influence on cognitive control. PMID:23372557
Neural substrates of social facilitation effects on incentive-based performance
Chib, Vikram S; Adachi, Ryo; O’Doherty, John P
2018-01-01
Abstract Throughout our lives we must perform tasks while being observed by others. Previous studies have shown that the presence of an audience can cause increases in an individual’s performance as compared to when they are not being observed—a phenomenon called ‘social facilitation’. However, the neural mechanisms underlying this effect, in the context of skilled-task performance for monetary incentives, are not well understood. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging to monitor brain activity while healthy human participants performed a skilled-task during conditions in which they were paid based on their performance and observed and not observed by an audience. We found that during social facilitation, social signals represented in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) enhanced reward value computations in ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC). We also found that functional connectivity between dmPFC and ventral striatum was enhanced when participants exhibited social facilitation effects, indicative of a means by which social signals serve to modulate brain regions involved in regulating behavioral motivation. These findings illustrate how neural processing of social judgments gives rise to the enhanced motivational state that results in social facilitation of incentive-based performance. PMID:29648653
2011-01-01
Background Despite compelling evidence of the benefits of treatment and well-accepted guidelines for treatment, hypertension is controlled in less than one-half of United States citizens. Methods/design This randomized controlled trial tests whether explicit financial incentives promote the translation of guideline-recommended care for hypertension into clinical practice and improve blood pressure (BP) control in the primary care setting. Using constrained randomization, we assigned 12 Veterans Affairs hospital outpatient clinics to four study arms: physician-level incentive; group-level incentive; combination of physician and group incentives; and no incentives (control). All participants at the hospital (cluster) were assigned to the same study arm. We enrolled 83 full-time primary care physicians and 42 non-physician personnel. The intervention consisted of an educational session about guideline-recommended care for hypertension, five audit and feedback reports, and five disbursements of incentive payments. Incentive payments rewarded participants for chart-documented use of guideline-recommended antihypertensive medications, BP control, and appropriate responses to uncontrolled BP during a prior four-month performance period over the 20-month intervention. To identify potential unintended consequences of the incentives, the study team interviewed study participants, as well as non-participant primary care personnel and leadership at study sites. Chart reviews included data collection on quality measures not related to hypertension. To evaluate the persistence of the effect of the incentives, the study design includes a washout period. Discussion We briefly describe the rationale for the interventions being studied, as well as the major design choices. Rigorous research designs such as the one described here are necessary to determine whether performance-based payment arrangements such as financial incentives result in meaningful quality improvements. Trial Registration http://www.clinicaltrials.gov NCT00302718 PMID:21967830
Petersen, Laura A; Urech, Tracy; Simpson, Kate; Pietz, Kenneth; Hysong, Sylvia J; Profit, Jochen; Conrad, Douglas; Dudley, R Adams; Lutschg, Meghan Z; Petzel, Robert; Woodard, Lechauncy D
2011-10-03
Despite compelling evidence of the benefits of treatment and well-accepted guidelines for treatment, hypertension is controlled in less than one-half of United States citizens. This randomized controlled trial tests whether explicit financial incentives promote the translation of guideline-recommended care for hypertension into clinical practice and improve blood pressure (BP) control in the primary care setting. Using constrained randomization, we assigned 12 Veterans Affairs hospital outpatient clinics to four study arms: physician-level incentive; group-level incentive; combination of physician and group incentives; and no incentives (control). All participants at the hospital (cluster) were assigned to the same study arm. We enrolled 83 full-time primary care physicians and 42 non-physician personnel. The intervention consisted of an educational session about guideline-recommended care for hypertension, five audit and feedback reports, and five disbursements of incentive payments. Incentive payments rewarded participants for chart-documented use of guideline-recommended antihypertensive medications, BP control, and appropriate responses to uncontrolled BP during a prior four-month performance period over the 20-month intervention. To identify potential unintended consequences of the incentives, the study team interviewed study participants, as well as non-participant primary care personnel and leadership at study sites. Chart reviews included data collection on quality measures not related to hypertension. To evaluate the persistence of the effect of the incentives, the study design includes a washout period. We briefly describe the rationale for the interventions being studied, as well as the major design choices. Rigorous research designs such as the one described here are necessary to determine whether performance-based payment arrangements such as financial incentives result in meaningful quality improvements. http://www.clinicaltrials.govNCT00302718.
Quality Measures for Dialysis: Time for a Balanced Scorecard.
Kliger, Alan S
2016-02-05
Recent federal legislation establishes a merit-based incentive payment system for physicians, with a scorecard for each professional. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services evaluate quality of care with clinical performance measures and have used these metrics for public reporting and payment to dialysis facilities. Similar metrics may be used for the future merit-based incentive payment system. In nephrology, most clinical performance measures measure processes and intermediate outcomes of care. These metrics were developed from population studies of best practice and do not identify opportunities for individualizing care on the basis of patient characteristics and individual goals of treatment. The In-Center Hemodialysis (ICH) Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems (CAHPS) survey examines patients' perception of care and has entered the arena to evaluate quality of care. A balanced scorecard of quality performance should include three elements: population-based best clinical practice, patient perceptions, and individually crafted patient goals of care. Copyright © 2016 by the American Society of Nephrology.
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Strand, Michael T.; Hawk, Larry W., Jr.; Bubnik, Michelle; Shiels, Keri; Pelham, William E., Jr.; Waxmonsky, James G.
2012-01-01
Working memory (WM) is considered a core deficit in Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), with numerous studies demonstrating impaired WM among children with ADHD. We tested the degree to which WM in children with ADHD was improved by performance-based incentives, an analog of behavioral intervention. In two studies, WM performance was…
Paying physician group practices for quality: A statewide quasi-experiment.
Conrad, Douglas A; Grembowski, David; Perry, Lisa; Maynard, Charles; Rodriguez, Hector; Martin, Diane
2013-12-01
This article presents the results of a unique quasi-experiment of the effects of a large-scale pay-for-performance (P4P) program implemented by a leading health insurer in Washington state during 2001-2007. The authors received external funding to provide an objective impact evaluation of the program. The program was unique in several respects: (1) It was designed dynamically, with two discrete intervention periods-one in which payment incentives were based on relative performance (the "contest" period) and a second in which payment incentives were based on absolute performance compared to achievable benchmarks. (2) The program was designed in collaboration with large multispecialty group practices, with an explicit run-in period to test the quality metrics. Public reporting of the quality scorecard for all participating medical groups was introduced 1 year before the quality incentive payment program's inception, and continued throughout 2002-2007. (3) The program was implemented in stages with distinct medical groups. A control group of comparable group practices also was assembled, and difference-in-differences methodology was applied to estimate program effects. Case mix measures were included in all multivariate analyses. The regression design permitted a contrast of intervention effects between the "contest" approach in the sub-period of 2003-2004 and the absolute standard, "achievable benchmarks of care" approach in sub-period 2005-2007. Most of the statistically significant quality incentive program coefficients were small and negative (opposite to program intent). A consistent pattern of differential intervention impact in the sub-periods did not emerge. Cumulatively, the probit regression estimates indicate that neither the quality scorecard nor the quality incentive payment program had a significant positive effect on general clinical quality. Based on key informant interviews with medical leaders, practicing physicians, and administrators of the participating groups, the authors conclude that several factors likely combined to dampen program effects: (1) modest size of the incentive; (2) use of rewards only, rather than a balance of rewards and penalties; (3) targeting incentive payments to the group, thus potentially weakening incentive effects at the individual level. Copyright © 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
42 CFR § 414.1330 - Quality performance category.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2017-10-01
... SERVICES (CONTINUED) MEDICARE PROGRAM (CONTINUED) PAYMENT FOR PART B MEDICAL AND OTHER HEALTH SERVICES Merit-Based Incentive Payment System and Alternative Payment Model Incentive § 414.1330 Quality... comprise: (1) 60 percent of a MIPS eligible clinician's final score for MIPS payment year 2019. (2) 50...
Brown, Denver M Y; Bray, Steven R
2017-12-01
Physical performance is impaired following cognitive control exertion. Incentives can ameliorate adverse carryover effects of cognitive control exertion but have not been investigated for physical endurance. This study examined the effect of monetary incentives on physical performance and muscle activation following exposure to a mentally fatiguing, cognitive control task. Participants (N = 82) performed two isometric endurance handgrip trials separated by a 12-min cognitive control manipulation using a 2 (high cognitive control [HCC]/low cognitive control [LCC]) × 2 (incentive/no incentive) design. Mental fatigue was significantly higher in the HCC conditions. Performance decreased in the HCC/no incentive condition but was unaffected in the HCC/incentive condition, which did not differ from the low cognitive control conditions. Electromyography data revealed increased muscle activation in the HCC/no incentive condition, which was also attenuated in the HCC/incentive condition. Findings show that incentives counteract the negative effects of HCC on physical endurance and alter central drive to motor units.
Share, David A; Mason, Margaret H
2012-09-01
Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan partnered with providers across the state to create an innovative, "fee for value" physician incentive program that would deliver high-quality, efficient care. The Physician Group Incentive Program rewards physician organizations-formal groups of physicians and practices that can accept incentive payments on behalf of their members-based on the number of quality and utilization measures they adopt, such as generic drug dispensing rates, and on their performance on these measures across their patient populations. Physicians also receive payments for implementing a range of patient-centered medical home capabilities, such as patient registries, and they receive higher fees for office visits for incorporating these capabilities into routine practice while also improving performance. Taken together, the incentive dollars, fee increases, and care management payments amount to a potential increase in reimbursement of 40 percent or more from Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan for practices designated as high-performing patient-centered medical homes. At the same time, we estimate that implementing the patient-centered medical home capabilities was associated with $155 million in lower medical costs in program year 2011 for Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan members. We intend to devote a higher percentage of reimbursement over time to communities of caregivers that offer high-value, system-based care, and a lower percentage of reimbursement to individual physicians on a service-specific basis.
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Holley, Marc Jacob
2009-01-01
Improving principal quality in Arkansas may be a partial solution to the public policy problem of low performing public schools. Just as policymakers in other states are beginning to explore incentive-based compensation policies to improve principal quality, education policymakers in Arkansas should look to these policies as a way to align goals…
2011-01-24
Performance Metrics Community Based Medical Homes Slide 8 of 10 2011 MHS Conference Increase our primary care market share Net increase in primary... Sharing Knowledge: Achieving Breakthrough Performance 2011 Military Health System Conference Army Incentives for the PCMH 24 January 2011 Mr. Ken...enroll as soon as fully staffed Operate at economic advantage to DoD Improve ER/ UCC usage rates Improve utilization rates Business Rules Army
Incentives Alone Not Enough to Prod Teacher Effectiveness
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Sawchuk, Stephen
2009-01-01
Policy experts are renewing questions about the role of school culture and leadership in the drive to improve teaching effectiveness in the most-challenging school environments. As states and districts increasingly explore tactics like performance-based pay, incentive programs, and bonuses to attract the best teachers to troubled schools, experts…
42 CFR § 414.1445 - Identification of other payer advanced APMs.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2017-10-01
... AND HUMAN SERVICES (CONTINUED) MEDICARE PROGRAM (CONTINUED) PAYMENT FOR PART B MEDICAL AND OTHER HEALTH SERVICES Merit-Based Incentive Payment System and Alternative Payment Model Incentive § 414.1445... determination prior to the QP Performance Period to identify Medicaid Medical Home Models and Medicaid APMs. (b...
42 CFR § 414.1375 - Advancing care information performance category.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2017-10-01
... HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (CONTINUED) MEDICARE PROGRAM (CONTINUED) PAYMENT FOR PART B MEDICAL AND OTHER HEALTH SERVICES Merit-Based Incentive Payment System and Alternative Payment Model Incentive § 414.1375... final score for MIPS payment year 2019 and each MIPS payment year thereafter. (b) Reporting for the...
42 CFR § 414.1355 - Improvement activities performance category.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2017-10-01
... AND HUMAN SERVICES (CONTINUED) MEDICARE PROGRAM (CONTINUED) PAYMENT FOR PART B MEDICAL AND OTHER HEALTH SERVICES Merit-Based Incentive Payment System and Alternative Payment Model Incentive § 414.1355... comprises: (1) 15 percent of a MIPS eligible clinician's final score for MIPS payment year 2019 and for each...
42 CFR § 414.1340 - Data completeness criteria for the quality performance category.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2017-10-01
..., DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (CONTINUED) MEDICARE PROGRAM (CONTINUED) PAYMENT FOR PART B MEDICAL AND OTHER HEALTH SERVICES Merit-Based Incentive Payment System and Alternative Payment Model Incentive... that meet the measure's denominator criteria, regardless of payer for MIPS payment year 2019. (2) At...
Alternative Payment Models in Radiology: The Legislative and Regulatory Roadmap for Reform.
Silva, Ezequiel; McGinty, Geraldine B; Hughes, Danny R; Duszak, Richard
2016-10-01
The Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act (MACRA) replaces the sustainable growth rate with a payment system based on the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System and incentives for alternative payment model participation. It is important that radiologists understand the statutory requirements of MACRA. This includes the nature of the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System composite performance score and its impact on payments. The timeline for MACRA implementation is fairly aggressive and includes a robust effort to define episode groups, which include radiologic services. A number of organizations, including the ACR, are commenting on the structure of MACRA-directed initiatives. Copyright © 2016 American College of Radiology. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Farrell, Anne M.; Goh, Joshua O. S.; White, Brian J.
2018-01-01
Emotional and economic incentives often conflict in decision environments. To make economically desirable decisions then, deliberative neural processes must be engaged to regulate automatic emotional reactions. In this functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study, we evaluated how fixed wage (FW) incentives and performance-based (PB) financial incentives, in which pay is proportional to outcome, differentially regulate positive and negative emotional reactions to hypothetical colleagues that conflicted with the economics of available alternatives. Neural activity from FW to PB incentive contexts decreased for positive emotional stimuli but increased for negative stimuli in middle temporal, insula, and medial prefrontal regions. In addition, PB incentives further induced greater responses to negative than positive emotional decisions in the frontal and anterior cingulate regions involved in emotion regulation. Greater response to positive than negative emotional features in these regions also correlated with lower frequencies of economically desirable choices. Our findings suggest that whereas positive emotion regulation involves a reduction of responses in valence representation regions, negative emotion regulation additionally engages brain regions for deliberative processing and signaling of incongruous events. PMID:29487519
Farrell, Anne M; Goh, Joshua O S; White, Brian J
2018-01-01
Emotional and economic incentives often conflict in decision environments. To make economically desirable decisions then, deliberative neural processes must be engaged to regulate automatic emotional reactions. In this functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study, we evaluated how fixed wage (FW) incentives and performance-based (PB) financial incentives, in which pay is proportional to outcome, differentially regulate positive and negative emotional reactions to hypothetical colleagues that conflicted with the economics of available alternatives. Neural activity from FW to PB incentive contexts decreased for positive emotional stimuli but increased for negative stimuli in middle temporal, insula, and medial prefrontal regions. In addition, PB incentives further induced greater responses to negative than positive emotional decisions in the frontal and anterior cingulate regions involved in emotion regulation. Greater response to positive than negative emotional features in these regions also correlated with lower frequencies of economically desirable choices. Our findings suggest that whereas positive emotion regulation involves a reduction of responses in valence representation regions, negative emotion regulation additionally engages brain regions for deliberative processing and signaling of incongruous events.
Strand, Michael T; Hawk, Larry W; Bubnik, Michelle; Shiels, Keri; Pelham, William E; Waxmonsky, James G
2012-10-01
Working memory (WM) is considered a core deficit in Attention-Deficit/ Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), with numerous studies demonstrating impaired WM among children with ADHD. We tested the degree to which WM in children with ADHD was improved by performance-based incentives, an analog of behavioral intervention. In two studies, WM performance was assessed using a visuo-spatial n-back task. Study 1 compared children (ages 9-12 years) with ADHD-Combined type (n = 24) to a group of typically developing (TD) children (n = 32). Study 1 replicated WM deficits among children with ADHD. Incentives improved WM, particularly among children with ADHD. The provision of incentives reduced the ADHD-control group difference by approximately half but did not normalize WM. Study 2 examined the separate and combined effects of incentives and stimulant medication among 17 children with ADHD-Combined type. Both incentives and a moderate dose of long-acting methylphenidate (MPH; ~0.3 mg/kg t.i.d. equivalent) robustly improved WM relative to the no-incentive, placebo condition. The combination of incentives and medication improved WM significantly more than either incentives or MPH alone. These studies indicate that contingencies markedly improve WM among children with ADHD-Combined type, with effect sizes comparable to a moderate dose of stimulant medication. More broadly, this work calls attention to the role of motivation in studying cognitive deficits in ADHD and in testing multifactorial models of ADHD.
Performance-based financial incentives for diabetes care: an effective strategy?
Latham, Lesley P; Marshall, Emily Gard
2015-02-01
The use of financial incentives provided to primary care physicians who achieve target management or clinical outcomes has been advocated to support the fulfillment of care recommendations for patients with diabetes. This article explores the characteristics of incentive models implemented in the context of universal healthcare systems in the United Kingdom, Australia, Taiwan and Canada; the extent to which these interventions have been successful in improving diabetes outcomes; and the key challenges and concerns around implementing incentive models. Research in the effect of incentives in the United Kingdom demonstrates some improvements in process outcomes and achievement of cholesterol, blood pressure and glycated hemoglobin (A1C) targets. Evidence of the efficacy of programs implemented outside of the United Kingdom is very limited but suggests that physicians participating in these enhanced billing incentive programs were already completing the guideline-recommended care prior to the introduction of the incentive. A shift to pay-for-performance programs may have important implications for professionalism and patient-centred care. In the absence of definitive evidence that financial incentives drive the quality of diabetes management at the level of primary care, policy makers should proceed with caution. It is important to look beyond simply modifying physicians' behaviours and address the factors and systemic barriers that make it challenging for patients and physicians to manage diabetes in partnership. Copyright © 2015 Canadian Diabetes Association. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Konetzka, R Tamara; Skira, Meghan M; Werner, Rachel M
2018-01-01
Pay-for-performance (P4P) programs have become a popular policy tool aimed at improving health care quality. We analyze how incentive design affects quality improvements in the nursing home setting, where several state Medicaid agencies have implemented P4P programs that vary in incentive structure. Using the Minimum Data Set and the Online Survey, Certification, and Reporting data from 2001 to 2009, we examine how the weights put on various performance measures that are tied to P4P bonuses, such as clinical outcomes, inspection deficiencies, and staffing levels, affect improvements in those measures. We find larger weights on clinical outcomes often lead to larger improvements, but small weights can lead to no improvement or worsening of some clinical outcomes. We find a qualifier for P4P eligibility based on having few or no severe inspection deficiencies is more effective at decreasing inspection deficiencies than using weights, suggesting simple rules for participation may incent larger improvement.
Konetzka, R. Tamara; Skira, Meghan M.; Werner, Rachel M.
2017-01-01
Pay-for-performance (P4P) programs have become a popular policy tool aimed at improving health care quality. We analyze how incentive design affects quality improvements in the nursing home setting, where several state Medicaid agencies have implemented P4P programs that vary in incentive structure. Using the Minimum Data Set and the Online Survey, Certification, and Reporting data from 2001 to 2009, we examine how the weights put on various performance measures that are tied to P4P bonuses, such as clinical outcomes, inspection deficiencies, and staffing levels, affect improvements in those measures. We find larger weights on clinical outcomes often lead to larger improvements, but small weights can lead to no improvement or worsening of some clinical outcomes. We find a qualifier for P4P eligibility based on having few or no severe inspection deficiencies is more effective at decreasing inspection deficiencies than using weights, suggesting simple rules for participation may incent larger improvement. PMID:29594189
Chu, Hsuan-Lien; Wang, Chen-Chin; Dai, Yu-Tzu
2009-01-01
The health care industry is under pressure from government and private entities as well as from market conditions to contain costs. In an effort to respond to these pressures, the case hospital in this study implemented a Balanced Scorecard (BSC) in January 2003 and integrated it with the hospital's formal incentive plan for non-physicians in January 2005. The nursing department's performance improved in the 2 years following the introduction of the plan. This study contributes to the literature by demonstrating the performance improvement that results from integrating the BSC with an incentive plan in the nursing field. The results provide insight into the current BSC performance metrics applied by the case nursing department, and could be used as guidelines by other health care organizations that wish to implement BSC-based incentive plans.
Mehta, Rajendra H; Liang, Li; Karve, Amrita M; Hernandez, Adrian F; Rumsfeld, John S; Fonarow, Gregg C; Peterson, Eric D
2008-10-22
While most comparisons of hospital outcomes adjust for patient characteristics, process performance comparisons typically do not. To evaluate the degree to which hospital process performance ratings and eligibility for financial incentives are altered after accounting for hospitals' patient demographics, clinical characteristics, and mix of treatment opportunities. Using data from the American Heart Association's Get With the Guidelines program between January 2, 2000, and March 28, 2008, we analyzed hospital process performance based on the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services' defined core measures for acute myocardial infarction. Hospitals were initially ranked based on crude composite process performance and then ranked again after accounting for hospitals' patient demographics, clinical characteristics, and eligibility for measures using a hierarchical model. We then compared differences in hospital performance rankings and pay-for-performance financial incentive categories (top 20%, middle 60%, and bottom 20% institutions). Hospital process performance ranking and pay-for-performance financial incentive categories. A total of 148,472 acute myocardial infarction patients met the study criteria from 449 centers. Hospitals for which crude composite acute myocardial infarction performance was in the bottom quintile (n = 89) were smaller nonacademic institutions that treated a higher percentage of patients from racial or ethnic minority groups and also patients with greater comorbidities than hospitals ranked in the top quintile (n = 90). Although there was overall agreement on hospital rankings based on observed vs adjusted composite scores (weighted kappa, 0.74), individual hospital ranking changed with adjustment (median, 22 ranks; range, 0-214; interquartile range, 9-40). Additionally, 16.5% of institutions (n = 74) changed pay-for-performance financial status categories after accounting for patient and treatment opportunity mix. Our findings suggest that accounting for hospital differences in patient characteristics and treatment opportunities is associated with modest changes in hospital performance rankings and eligibility for financial benefits in pay-for-performance programs for treatment of myocardial infarction.
Neural basis of the undermining effect of monetary reward on intrinsic motivation
Murayama, Kou; Matsumoto, Madoka; Izuma, Keise; Matsumoto, Kenji
2010-01-01
Contrary to the widespread belief that people are positively motivated by reward incentives, some studies have shown that performance-based extrinsic reward can actually undermine a person's intrinsic motivation to engage in a task. This “undermining effect” has timely practical implications, given the burgeoning of performance-based incentive systems in contemporary society. It also presents a theoretical challenge for economic and reinforcement learning theories, which tend to assume that monetary incentives monotonically increase motivation. Despite the practical and theoretical importance of this provocative phenomenon, however, little is known about its neural basis. Herein we induced the behavioral undermining effect using a newly developed task, and we tracked its neural correlates using functional MRI. Our results show that performance-based monetary reward indeed undermines intrinsic motivation, as assessed by the number of voluntary engagements in the task. We found that activity in the anterior striatum and the prefrontal areas decreased along with this behavioral undermining effect. These findings suggest that the corticobasal ganglia valuation system underlies the undermining effect through the integration of extrinsic reward value and intrinsic task value. PMID:21078974
Neural basis of the undermining effect of monetary reward on intrinsic motivation.
Murayama, Kou; Matsumoto, Madoka; Izuma, Keise; Matsumoto, Kenji
2010-12-07
Contrary to the widespread belief that people are positively motivated by reward incentives, some studies have shown that performance-based extrinsic reward can actually undermine a person's intrinsic motivation to engage in a task. This "undermining effect" has timely practical implications, given the burgeoning of performance-based incentive systems in contemporary society. It also presents a theoretical challenge for economic and reinforcement learning theories, which tend to assume that monetary incentives monotonically increase motivation. Despite the practical and theoretical importance of this provocative phenomenon, however, little is known about its neural basis. Herein we induced the behavioral undermining effect using a newly developed task, and we tracked its neural correlates using functional MRI. Our results show that performance-based monetary reward indeed undermines intrinsic motivation, as assessed by the number of voluntary engagements in the task. We found that activity in the anterior striatum and the prefrontal areas decreased along with this behavioral undermining effect. These findings suggest that the corticobasal ganglia valuation system underlies the undermining effect through the integration of extrinsic reward value and intrinsic task value.
Patel, Mitesh S; Asch, David A; Rosin, Roy; Small, Dylan S; Bellamy, Scarlett L; Eberbach, Kimberly; Walters, Karen J; Haff, Nancy; Lee, Samantha M; Wesby, Lisa; Hoffer, Karen; Shuttleworth, David; Taylor, Devon H; Hilbert, Victoria; Zhu, Jingsan; Yang, Lin; Wang, Xingmei; Volpp, Kevin G
2016-07-01
More than half of adults in the United States do not attain the minimum recommended level of physical activity to achieve health benefits. The optimal design of financial incentives to promote physical activity is unknown. To compare the effectiveness of individual versus team-based financial incentives to increase physical activity. Randomized, controlled trial comparing three interventions to control. Three hundred and four adult employees from an organization in Philadelphia formed 76 four-member teams. All participants received daily feedback on performance towards achieving a daily 7000 step goal during the intervention (weeks 1- 13) and follow-up (weeks 14- 26) periods. The control arm received no other intervention. In the three financial incentive arms, drawings were held in which one team was selected as the winner every other day during the 13-week intervention. A participant on a winning team was eligible as follows: $50 if he or she met the goal (individual incentive), $50 only if all four team members met the goal (team incentive), or $20 if he or she met the goal individually and $10 more for each of three teammates that also met the goal (combined incentive). Mean proportion of participant-days achieving the 7000 step goal during the intervention. Compared to the control group during the intervention period, the mean proportion achieving the 7000 step goal was significantly greater for the combined incentive (0.35 vs. 0.18, difference: 0.17, 95 % confidence interval [CI]: 0.07-0.28, p <0.001) but not for the individual incentive (0.25 vs 0.18, difference: 0.08, 95 % CI: -0.02-0.18, p = 0.13) or the team incentive (0.17 vs 0.18, difference: -0.003, 95 % CI: -0.11-0.10, p = 0.96). The combined incentive arm participants also achieved the goal at significantly greater rates than the team incentive (0.35 vs. 0.17, difference: 0.18, 95 % CI: 0.08-0.28, p < 0.001), but not the individual incentive (0.35 vs. 0.25, difference: 0.10, 95 % CI: -0.001-0.19, p = 0.05). Only the combined incentive had greater mean daily steps than control (difference: 1446, 95 % CI: 448-2444, p ≤ 0.005). There were no significant differences between arms during the follow-up period (weeks 14- 26). Financial incentives rewarded for a combination of individual and team performance were most effective for increasing physical activity. Clinicaltrials.gov identifier: NCT02001194.
Oxman, Andrew D; Fretheim, Atle
2009-05-01
Results-based financing and pay-for-performance refer to the transfer of money or material goods conditional on taking a measurable action or achieving a predetermined performance target. Results-based financing is widely advocated for achieving health goals, including the Millennium Development Goals. We undertook an overview of systematic reviews of the effectiveness of RBF. We searched the Cochrane Library, EMBASE, and MEDLINE (up to August 2007). We also searched for related articles in PubMed, checked the reference lists of retrieved articles, and contacted key informants. We included reviews with a methods section that addressed the effects of any results-based financing in the health sector targeted at patients, providers, organizations, or governments. We summarized the characteristics and findings of each review using a structured format. We found 12 systematic reviews that met our inclusion criteria. Based on the findings of these reviews, financial incentives targeting recipients of health care and individual healthcare professionals are effective in the short run for simple and distinct, well-defined behavioral goals. There is less evidence that financial incentives can sustain long-term changes. Conditional cash transfers to poor and disadvantaged groups in Latin America are effective at increasing the uptake of some preventive services. There is otherwise very limited evidence of the effects of results-based financing in low- or middle-income countries. Results-based financing can have undesirable effects, including motivating unintended behaviors, distortions (ignoring important tasks that are not rewarded with incentives), gaming (improving or cheating on reporting rather than improving performance), widening the resource gap between rich and poor, and dependency on financial incentives. There is limited evidence of the effectiveness of results-based financing and almost no evidence of the cost-effectiveness of results-based financing. Based on the available evidence and likely mechanisms through which financial incentives work, they are more likely to influence discrete individual behaviors in the short run and less likely to create sustained changes. © 2009 Blackwell Publishing Asia Pty Ltd and Chinese Cochrane Center, West China Hospital of Sichuan University.
Effects of Strategy Training and Incentives on Students' Performance, Confidence, and Calibration
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Gutierrez, Antonio P.; Schraw, Gregory
2015-01-01
This study examined the effect of strategy instruction and incentives on performance, confidence, and calibration accuracy. Individuals (N = 107) in randomly assigned treatment groups received a multicomponent strategy instruction intervention, financial incentives for high performance, or both. The authors predicted that incentives would improve…
Judah, Gaby; Darzi, Ara; Vlaev, Ivo; Gunn, Laura; King, Derek; King, Dominic; Valabhji, Jonathan; Bicknell, Colin
2018-05-23
Conflicting evidence exists regarding the impact of financial incentives on encouraging attendance at medical screening appointments. The primary aim was to determine whether financial incentives increase attendance at diabetic eye screening in persistent non-attenders. A three-armed randomised controlled trial was conducted in London in 2015. 1051 participants aged over 16 years, who had not attended eye screening appointments for 2 years or more, were randomised (1.4:1:1 randomisation ratio) to receive the usual invitation letter (control), an offer of £10 cash for attending screening (fixed incentive) or a 1 in 100 chance of winning £1000 (lottery incentive) if they attend. The primary outcome was the proportion of invitees attending screening, and a comparative analysis was performed to assess group differences. Pairwise comparisons of attendance rates were performed, using a conservative Bonferroni correction for independent comparisons. 34/435 (7.8%) of control, 17/312 (5.5%) of fixed incentive and 10/304 (3.3%) of lottery incentive groups attended. Participants who received any incentive were significantly less likely to attend their appointment compared with controls (risk ratio (RR)=0.56; 95% CI 0.34 to 0.92). Those in the probabilistic incentive group (RR=0.42; 95% CI 0.18 to 0.98), but not the fixed incentive group (RR=1.66; 95% CI 0.65 to 4.21), were significantly less likely to attend than those in the control group. Financial incentives, particularly lottery-based incentives, attract fewer patients to diabetic eye screening than standard invites in this population. Financial incentives should not be used to promote screening unless tested in context, as they may negatively affect attendance rates. © Article author(s) (or their employer(s) unless otherwise stated in the text of the article) 2018. All rights reserved. No commercial use is permitted unless otherwise expressly granted.
Performance-Based Funding & Online Learning: Maximizing Resources for Student Success
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Patrick, Susan; Myers, John; Silverstein, Justin; Brown, Amanda; Watson, John
2015-01-01
There is a new conversation taking place in public education on creating systemic incentives through school finance to encourage schools to innovate and be rewarded for positive student outcomes and performance. What if education funding was not based on seat-time, but on rewarding student performance? Performance-based funding is a term that…
Custers, Thomas; Klazinga, Niek S; Brown, Adalsteinn D
2007-01-01
There is increasing evidence that health care systems can create better value for money by improving performance and setting the right incentives. Worldwide this has led to an emergence of financial and non-financial incentive structures as a strategy to improve performance. The role of incentives is not only to motivate high performance through the alignment of results and rewards (financial/non-financial as well as direct/indirect) but also to enable health care providers to perform better by mitigating financial barriers that typically result from funding schemes. Various incentive structures in health care, identified in the scientific literature, are described in this article and available evidence on effectiveness and side effects is summarized. Literature shows that there is no single best approach to create an incentive yet and that the ability of financial and non-financial incentives to achieve desired results depends on a number of circumstantial elements. Several incentive schemes that can be used by health care insurers or local health authorities are discussed and concrete examples are provided. Decision-making on incentive schemes requires a careful design with the involvement of those targeted by incentives.
Road simulation for four-wheel vehicle whole input power spectral density
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Wang, Jiangbo; Qiang, Baomin
2017-05-01
As the vibration of running vehicle mainly comes from road and influence vehicle ride performance. So the road roughness power spectral density simulation has great significance to analyze automobile suspension vibration system parameters and evaluate ride comfort. Firstly, this paper based on the mathematical model of road roughness power spectral density, established the integral white noise road random method. Then in the MATLAB/Simulink environment, according to the research method of automobile suspension frame from simple two degree of freedom single-wheel vehicle model to complex multiple degrees of freedom vehicle model, this paper built the simple single incentive input simulation model. Finally the spectrum matrix was used to build whole vehicle incentive input simulation model. This simulation method based on reliable and accurate mathematical theory and can be applied to the random road simulation of any specified spectral which provides pavement incentive model and foundation to vehicle ride performance research and vibration simulation.
Reading Incentives that Work: No-Cost Strategies to Motivate Kids to Read and Love It!
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Small, Ruth V.
2009-01-01
In education, it is possible to find dozens of examples of "forced" reading incentive programs that categorize student reading levels, provide limited reading lists coordinated with those reading levels, assess student reading through computer-based tests, and award tangible prizes when they pass the test. Those who perform best get the most…
Incentives and provider payment methods.
Barnum, H; Kutzin, J; Saxenian, H
1995-01-01
The mode of payment creates powerful incentives affecting provider behavior and the efficiency, equity and quality outcomes of health finance reforms. This article examines provider incentives as well as administrative costs, and institutional conditions for successful implementation associated with provider payment alternatives. The alternatives considered are budget reforms, capitation, fee-for-service, and case-based reimbursement. We conclude that competition, whether through a regulated private sector or within a public system, has the potential to improve the performance of any payment method. All methods generate both adverse and beneficial incentives. Systems with mixed forms of provider payment can provide tradeoffs to offset the disadvantages of individual modes. Low-income countries should avoid complex payment systems requiring higher levels of institutional development.
45 CFR 305.33 - Determination of applicable percentages based on performance levels.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
..., DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES PROGRAM PERFORMANCE MEASURES, STANDARDS, FINANCIAL INCENTIVES, AND PENALTIES § 305.33 Determination of applicable percentages based on performance levels. (a) A State's... performance levels. 305.33 Section 305.33 Public Welfare Regulations Relating to Public Welfare OFFICE OF...
Review of performance-based incentives in community-based family planning programmes
Bellows, Nicole M; Askew, Ian; Bellows, Benjamin
2015-01-01
Background One strategy for improving family planning (FP) uptake at the community level is the use of performance-based incentives (PBIs), which offer community distributors financial incentives to recruit more users of FP. This article examines the use of PBIs in community-based FP programmes via a literature search of the peer-reviewed and grey literature conducted in April 2013. Results A total of 28 community-based FP programmes in 21 countries were identified as having used PBIs. The most common approach was a sales commission model where distributors received commission for FP products sold, while a referral payment model for long-term methods was also used extensively. Six evaluations were identified that specifically examined the impact of the PBI in community-based FP programmes. Overall, the results of the evaluations are mixed and more research is needed; however, the findings suggest that easy-to-understand PBIs can be successful in increasing the use of FP at the community level. Conclusion For future use of PBIs in community-based FP programmes it is important to consider the ethics of incentivising FP and ensuring that PBIs are non-coercive and choice-enhancing. PMID:25037703
Applied economics: The use of monetary incentives to modulate behavior.
Strang, S; Park, S Q; Strombach, T; Kenning, P
2016-01-01
According to standard economic theory higher monetary incentives will lead to higher performance and higher effort independent of task, context, or individual. In many contexts this standard economic advice is implemented. Monetary incentives are, for example, used to enhance performance at workplace or to increase health-related behavior. However, the fundamental positive impact of monetary incentives has been questioned by psychologists as well as behavioral economists during the last decade, arguing that monetary incentives can sometimes even backfire. In this chapter, studies from proponents as well as opponents of monetary incentives will be presented. Specifically, the impact of monetary incentives on performance, prosocial, and health behavior will be discussed. Furthermore, variables determining whether incentives have a positive or negative impact will be identified. © 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
48 CFR 1816.402-2 - Performance incentives.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 6 2013-10-01 2013-10-01 false Performance incentives. 1816.402-2 Section 1816.402-2 Federal Acquisition Regulations System NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE... Performance incentives. ...
48 CFR 1816.402-2 - Performance incentives.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 6 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Performance incentives. 1816.402-2 Section 1816.402-2 Federal Acquisition Regulations System NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE... Performance incentives. ...
48 CFR 1816.402-2 - Performance incentives.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 6 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 true Performance incentives. 1816.402-2 Section 1816.402-2 Federal Acquisition Regulations System NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE... Performance incentives. ...
Couto, Thomaz Bittencourt; Kerrey, Benjamin T; Taylor, Regina G; FitzGerald, Michael; Geis, Gary L
2015-04-01
Pediatric emergencies require effective teamwork. These skills are developed and demonstrated in actual emergencies and in simulated environments, including simulation centers (in center) and the real care environment (in situ). Our aims were to compare teamwork performance across these settings and to identify perceived educational strengths and weaknesses between simulated settings. We hypothesized that teamwork performance in actual emergencies and in situ simulations would be higher than for in-center simulations. A retrospective, video-based assessment of teamwork was performed in an academic, pediatric level 1 trauma center, using the Team Emergency Assessment Measure (TEAM) tool (range, 0-44) among emergency department providers (physicians, nurses, respiratory therapists, paramedics, patient care assistants, and pharmacists). A survey-based, cross-sectional assessment was conducted to determine provider perceptions regarding simulation training. One hundred thirty-two videos, 44 from each setting, were reviewed. Mean total TEAM scores were similar and high in all settings (31.2 actual, 31.1 in situ, and 32.3 in-center, P = 0.39). Of 236 providers, 154 (65%) responded to the survey. For teamwork training, in situ simulation was considered more realistic (59% vs. 10%) and more effective (45% vs. 15%) than in-center simulation. In a video-based study in an academic pediatric institution, ratings of teamwork were relatively high among actual resuscitations and 2 simulation settings, substantiating the influence of simulation-based training on instilling a culture of communication and teamwork. On the basis of survey results, providers favored the in situ setting for teamwork training and suggested an expansion of our existing in situ program.
Teacher Pay for Performance: Experimental Evidence from the Project on Incentives in Teaching
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Springer, Matthew G.; Hamilton, Laura; McCaffrey, Daniel F.; Ballou, Dale; Le, Vi-Nhuan; Pepper, Matthew; Lockwood, J. R.; Stecher, Brian M.
2010-01-01
In an effort to explore the impact of performance incentives in education, the National Center on Performance Incentives (NCPI) partnered with the Metropolitan Nashville Public Schools (MNPS) to conduct the Project on Incentives in Teaching, or POINT. The study examines the effects on student outcomes of paying eligible teachers bonuses of up to…
Chao, Melody Manchi; Visaria, Sujata; Mukhopadhyay, Anirban; Dehejia, Rajeev
2017-10-01
The current study draws on the motivational model of achievement which has been guiding research on the growth mindset intervention (Dweck & Leggett, 1988) and examines how this intervention interacts with incentive systems to differentially influence performance for high- and low-achieving students in Indian schools that serve low-SES communities. Although, as expected, the growth mindset intervention did interact with incentive systems and prior achievement to influence subsequent academic performance, the existing growth mindset framework cannot fully account for the observed effects. Specifically, we found that the growth mindset intervention did facilitate performance through persistence, but only when the incentive system imparted individuals with a sense of autonomy. Such a facilitation effect was only found among those students who had high prior achievement, but not among those who had underperformed. When the incentive did not impart a sense of autonomy, the growth mindset intervention undermined the performance of those who had high initial achievement. To reconcile these discrepancies and to advance understanding of the impacts of psychological interventions on achievement outcomes, we discuss how the existing theory can be extended and integrated with an identity-based motivation framework (Oyserman & Destin, 2010). We also discuss the implications of our work for future research and practice. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2017 APA, all rights reserved).
Results-Based Financing in Mozambique's Central Medical Store: A Review After 1 Year.
Spisak, Cary; Morgan, Lindsay; Eichler, Rena; Rosen, James; Serumaga, Brian; Wang, Angela
2016-03-01
Public health commodity supply chains are typically weak in low-income countries, partly because they have many disparate yet interdependent functions and components. Approaches to strengthening supply chains in such settings have often fallen short-they address technical weaknesses, but not the incentives that motivate staff to perform better. We reviewed the first year of a results-based financing (RBF) program in Mozambique, which began in January 2013. The program aimed to improve the performance of the central medical store-Central de Medicamentos e Artigos Medicos (CMAM)-by realigning incentives. We completed in-depth interviews and focus group discussions with 33 key informants, including representatives from CMAM and donor agencies, and collected quantitative data on performance measures and use of funds. The RBF agreement linked CMAM performance payments to quarterly results on 5 performance indicators related to supply planning, distribution planning, and warehouse management. RBF is predicated on the theory that a combination of carrot and stick-i.e., shared financial incentives, plus increased accountability for results-will spur changes in behavior. Important design elements: (1) indicators were measured against quarterly targets, and payments were made only for indicators that met those targets; (2) targets were set based on documented performance, at levels that could be reasonably attained, yet pushed for improvement; (3) payment was shared with and dependent on all staff, encouraging teamwork and collaboration; (4) results were validated by verifiable data sources; and (5) CMAM had discretion over how to use the funds. We found that CMAM's performance continually improved over baseline and that CMAM achieved many of its performance targets, for example, timely submission of quarterly supply and distribution planning reports. Warehouse indicators, such as inventory management and order fulfillment, proved more challenging but were nonetheless positive. By linking payments to periodic verified results, and giving CMAM discretion over how to spend the funds, the RBF agreement motivated the workforce; focused attention on results; strengthened data collection; encouraged teamwork and innovation; and ultimately strengthened the central supply chain. Policy makers and program managers can use performance incentives to catalyze and leverage existing investments. To further strengthen the approach, such incentive programs can shift attention from quantity to quality indicators, improve verification processes, and aim to institutionalize the approach. © Mukuria et al.
Results-Based Financing in Mozambique’s Central Medical Store: A Review After 1 Year
Spisak, Cary; Morgan, Lindsay; Eichler, Rena; Rosen, James; Serumaga, Brian; Wang, Angela
2016-01-01
ABSTRACT Background: Public health commodity supply chains are typically weak in low-income countries, partly because they have many disparate yet interdependent functions and components. Approaches to strengthening supply chains in such settings have often fallen short—they address technical weaknesses, but not the incentives that motivate staff to perform better. Methods: We reviewed the first year of a results-based financing (RBF) program in Mozambique, which began in January 2013. The program aimed to improve the performance of the central medical store—Central de Medicamentos e Artigos Medicos (CMAM)—by realigning incentives. We completed in-depth interviews and focus group discussions with 33 key informants, including representatives from CMAM and donor agencies, and collected quantitative data on performance measures and use of funds. Implementation: The RBF agreement linked CMAM performance payments to quarterly results on 5 performance indicators related to supply planning, distribution planning, and warehouse management. RBF is predicated on the theory that a combination of carrot and stick—i.e., shared financial incentives, plus increased accountability for results—will spur changes in behavior. Important design elements: (1) indicators were measured against quarterly targets, and payments were made only for indicators that met those targets; (2) targets were set based on documented performance, at levels that could be reasonably attained, yet pushed for improvement; (3) payment was shared with and dependent on all staff, encouraging teamwork and collaboration; (4) results were validated by verifiable data sources; and (5) CMAM had discretion over how to use the funds. Findings: We found that CMAM’s performance continually improved over baseline and that CMAM achieved many of its performance targets, for example, timely submission of quarterly supply and distribution planning reports. Warehouse indicators, such as inventory management and order fulfillment, proved more challenging but were nonetheless positive. By linking payments to periodic verified results, and giving CMAM discretion over how to spend the funds, the RBF agreement motivated the workforce; focused attention on results; strengthened data collection; encouraged teamwork and innovation; and ultimately strengthened the central supply chain. Conclusion: Policy makers and program managers can use performance incentives to catalyze and leverage existing investments. To further strengthen the approach, such incentive programs can shift attention from quantity to quality indicators, improve verification processes, and aim to institutionalize the approach. PMID:27016552
The Effects of Incentives on Workplace Performance: A Meta-Analytic Review of Research Studies
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Condly, Steven J.; Clark, Richard E.; Stolovitch, Harold D.
2003-01-01
A meta-analytic review of all adequately designed field and laboratory research on the use of incentives to motivate performance is reported. Of approximately 600 studies, 45 qualified. The overall average effect of all incentive programs in all work settings and on all work tasks was a 22% gain in performance. Team-directed incentives had a…
Using financial incentives to improve value in orthopaedics.
Lansky, David; Nwachukwu, Benedict U; Bozic, Kevin J
2012-04-01
A variety of reforms to traditional approaches to provider payment and benefit design are being implemented in the United States. There is increasing interest in applying these financial incentives to orthopaedics, although it is unclear whether and to what extent they have been implemented and whether they increase quality or reduce costs. We reviewed and discussed physician- and patient-oriented financial incentives being implemented in orthopaedics, key challenges, and prerequisites to payment reform and value-driven payment policy in orthopaedics. We searched the MEDLINE database using as search terms various provider payment and consumer incentive models. We retrieved a total of 169 articles; none of these studies met the inclusion criteria. For incentive models known to the authors to be in use in orthopaedics but for which no peer-reviewed literature was found, we searched Google for further information. Provider financial incentives reviewed include payments for reporting, performance, and patient safety and episode payment. Patient incentives include tiered networks, value-based benefit design, reference pricing, and value-based purchasing. Reform of financial incentives for orthopaedic surgery is challenged by (1) lack of a payment/incentive model that has demonstrated reductions in cost trends and (2) the complex interrelation of current pay schemes in today's fragmented environment. Prerequisites to reform include (1) a reliable and complete data infrastructure; (2) new business structures to support cost sharing; and (3) a retooling of patient expectations. There is insufficient literature reporting the effects of various financial incentive models under implementation in orthopaedics to know whether they increase quality or reduce costs. National concerns about cost will continue to drive experimentation, and all anticipated innovations will require improved collaboration and data collection and reporting.
Management of Social Incentives in Air Force Technical Training: A Field Experiment. Final Report.
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Hakel, Milton D.; And Others
The report is a study of the utility of social reinforcement for improving Air Force training. It was conducted through a field evaluation of social incentive instructional systems which would serve to improve student motivation, classroom performance, and attitudes. The participants included a total of 300 trainees from two Air Force bases; 25…
45 CFR 305.42 - Penalty phase-in.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... PROGRAM PERFORMANCE MEASURES, STANDARDS, FINANCIAL INCENTIVES, AND PENALTIES § 305.42 Penalty phase-in. States are subject to the performance penalties described in § 305.40 based on data reported for FY 2001. Data reported for FY 2000 will be used as a base year to determine improvements in performance during...
Performance-Based Pay in the Federal Government. Research Brief
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
National Center on Performance Incentives, 2008
2008-01-01
In "Performance-Based Pay in the Federal Government"--a paper presented at the February 2008 National Center on Performance Incentives research to policy conference--Steve Nelson discusses the evolution of employee pay systems in the federal government, from the inception of the General Schedule to continuing interest in creating more…
Park, Jeongyoung; Werner, Rachel M
2011-07-01
The relationship between financial performance and quality of care in nursing homes is not well defined and prior work has been mixed. The recent focus on improving the quality of nursing homes through market-based incentives such as public reporting may have changed this relationship, as public reporting provides nursing homes with increased incentives to engage in quality-based competition. If quality improvement activities require substantial production costs, nursing home profitability may become a more important predictor of quality under public reporting. This study explores the relationship between financial performance and quality of care and test whether this relationship changes under public reporting. Using a 10-year (fiscal years 1997-2006) panel data set of 9444 skilled nursing facilities in the US, this study employs a facility fixed-effects with and without instrumental variables approach to test the effect of finances on quality improvement and correct for potential endogeneity. The results show that better financial performance, as reflected by the 1-year lagged total profit margin, is modestly associated with higher quality but only after public reporting is initiated. These findings have important policy implications as federal and state governments use market-based incentives to increase demand for high-quality care and induce providers to compete based on quality. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Barbose, Galen; Wiser, Ryan; Bolinger, Mark
Some stakeholders continue to voice concerns about the performance of customer-sited photovoltaic (PV) systems, particularly because these systems typically receive financial support through ratepayer- or publicly-funded programs. Although much remains to be understood about the extent and specific causes of poor PV system performance, several studies of the larger programs and markets have shed some light on the issue. An evaluation of the California Energy Commission (CEC)'s Emerging Renewables Program, for example, found that 7% of systems, in a sample of 95, had lower-than-expected power output due to shading or soiling (KEMA 2005). About 3% of a larger sample ofmore » 140 systems were not operating at all or were operating well below expected output, due to failed equipment, faulty installation workmanship, and/or a lack of basic maintenance. In a recent evaluation of the other statewide PV incentive program in California, the Self-Generation Incentive Program, 9 of 52 projects sampled were found to have annual capacity factors less than 14.5%, although reasons for these low capacity factors generally were not identified (Itron 2005). Studies of PV systems in Germany and Japan, the two largest PV markets worldwide, have also revealed some performance problems associated with issues such as shading, equipment and installation defects, inverter failure, and deviations from module manufacturers' specifications (Otani et al. 2004, Jahn & Nasse 2004). Although owners of PV systems have an inherent incentive to ensure that their systems perform well, many homeowners and building operators may lack the necessary information and expertise to carry out this task effectively. Given this barrier, and the responsibility of PV incentive programs to ensure that public funds are prudently spent, these programs should (and often do) play a critical role in promoting PV system performance. Performance-based incentives (PBIs), which are based on actual energy production rather than the rated capacity of the modules or system, are often suggested as one possible strategy. Somewhat less recognized are the many other program design options also available, each with its particular advantages and disadvantages. To provide a point of reference for assessing the current state of the art, and to inform program design efforts going forward, we examine the approaches to encouraging PV system performance - including, but not limited to, PBIs - used by 32 prominent PV incentive programs in the U.S. (see Table 1).1 We focus specifically on programs that offer an explicit subsidy payment for customer-sited PV installations. PV support programs that offer other forms of financial support or that function primarily as a mechanism for purchasing renewable energy credits (RECs) through energy production-based payments are outside the scope of our review.2 The information presented herein is derived primarily from publicly available sources, including program websites and guidebooks, programs evaluations, and conference papers, as well as from a limited number of personal communications with program staff. The remainder of this report is organized as follows. The next section presents a simple conceptual framework for understanding the issues that affect PV system performance and provides an overview of the eight general strategies to encourage performance used among the programs reviewed in this report. The subsequent eight sections discuss in greater detail each of these program design strategies and describe how they have been implemented among the programs surveyed. Based on this review, we then offer a series of recommendations for how PV incentive programs can effectively promote PV system performance.« less
Financial incentives and maternal health: where do we go from here?
Morgan, Lindsay; Stanton, Mary Ellen; Higgs, Elizabeth S; Balster, Robert L; Bellows, Ben W; Brandes, Neal; Comfort, Alison B; Eichler, Rena; Glassman, Amanda; Hatt, Laurel E; Conlon, Claudia M; Koblinsky, Marge
2013-12-01
Health financing strategies that incorporate financial incentives are being applied in many low- and middle-income countries, and improving maternal and neonatal health is often a central goal. As yet, there have been few reviews of such programmes and their impact on maternal health. The US Government Evidence Summit on Enhancing Provision and use of Maternal Health Services through Financial Incentives was convened on 24-25 April 2012 to address this gap. This article, the final in a series assessing the effects of financial incentives--performance-based incentives (PBIs), insurance, user fee exemption programmes, conditional cash transfers, and vouchers--summarizes the evidence and discusses issues of context, programme design and implementation, cost-effectiveness, and sustainability. We suggest key areas to consider when designing and implementing financial incentive programmes for enhancing maternal health and highlight gaps in evidence that could benefit from additional research. Although the methodological rigor of studies varies, the evidence, overall, suggests that financial incentives can enhance demand for and improve the supply of maternal health services. Definitive evidence demonstrating a link between incentives and improved health outcomes is lacking; however, the evidence suggests that financial incentives can increase the quantity and quality of maternal health services and address health systems and financial barriers that prevent women from accessing and providers from delivering quality, lifesaving maternal healthcare.
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Koning, Pierre; Heinrich, Carolyn J.
2013-01-01
As performance-based contracting in social welfare services continues to expand, concerns about potential unintended effects are also growing. We analyze the incentive effects of high-powered, performance-based contracts and their implications for program outcomes using panel data on Dutch cohorts of unemployed and disabled workers that were…
The Massachusetts Community College Performance-Based Funding Formula: A New Model for New England?
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Salomon-Fernandez, Yves
2014-01-01
The Massachusetts community college system is entering a second year with funding for each of its 15 schools determined using a new performance-based formula. Under the new model, 50% of each college's allocation is based on performance on metrics related to enrollment and student success, with added incentives for "at-risk" students…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Mayer, Alexander K.; Patel, Reshma; Rudd, Timothy; Ratledge, Alyssa
2015-01-01
Performance-based scholarships have two main goals: (1) to give students more money for college; and (2) to provide incentives for academic progress. MDRC launched the Performance-Based Scholarship (PBS) Demonstration in 2008 to evaluate the effectiveness of these scholarships in a diverse set of states, institutions, and low-income student…
Urech, Tracy H.; Woodard, LeChauncy D.; Virani, Salim S.; Dudley, R. Adams; Lutschg, Meghan Z.; Petersen, Laura A.
2015-01-01
Background Hospital report cards and financial incentives linked to performance require clinical data that are reliable, appropriate, timely, and cost-effective to process. Pay-for-performance plans are transitioning to automated electronic health record (EHR) data as an efficient method to generate data needed for these programs. Objective To determine how well data from automated processing of structured EHR fields (AP-EHR) reflect data from manual chart review and the impact of these data on performance rewards. Research Design Cross-sectional analysis of performance measures used in a cluster randomized trial assessing the impact of financial incentives on guideline-recommended care for hypertension. Subjects A total of 2,840 patients with hypertension assigned to participating physicians at 12 Veterans Affairs hospital-based outpatient clinics. Fifty-two physicians and 33 primary care personnel received incentive payments. Measures Overall, positive and negative agreement indices and Cohen's kappa were calculated for assessments of guideline-recommended antihypertensive medication use, blood pressure (BP) control, and appropriate response to uncontrolled BP. Pearson's correlation coefficient was used to assess how similar participants’ calculated earnings were between the data sources. Results By manual chart review data, 72.3% of patients were considered to have received guideline-recommended antihypertensive medications compared to 65.0% by AP-EHR review (k=0.51). Manual review indicated 69.5% of patients had controlled BP compared to 66.8% by AP-EHR review (k=0.87). Compared to 52.2% of patients per the manual review, 39.8% received an appropriate response by AP-EHR review (k=0.28). Participants’ incentive payments calculated using the two methods were highly correlated (r≥0.98). Using the AP-EHR data to calculate earnings, participants’ payment changes ranged from a decrease of $91.00 (−30.3%) to an increase of $18.20 (+7.4%) for medication use (IQR, −14.4% to 0%) and a decrease of $100.10 (−31.4%) to an increase of $36.40 (+15.4%) for BP control or appropriate response to uncontrolled BP (IQR, −11.9% to −6.1%). Conclusions Pay-for-performance plans that use only EHR data should carefully consider the measures and the structure of the EHR before data collection and financial incentive disbursement. For this study, we feel that a 10% difference in the total amount of incentive earnings disbursed based on AP-EHR data compared to manual review is acceptable given the time and resources required to abstract data from medical records. PMID:26340661
48 CFR 37.602 - Performance work statement.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... on the use of measurable performance standards and financial incentives in a competitive environment... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Performance work statement... CATEGORIES OF CONTRACTING SERVICE CONTRACTING Performance-Based Acquisition 37.602 Performance work statement...
Performance-Based Funding in Public Schools.
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Foster, Charles A.; Marquart, Deanna J.
This report examines three performance-based funding (PBF) plans: (1) merit pay for teachers and/or administrators; (2) career ladders; and (3) formula-driven incentive payments to schools. The report contends that present-day problems in public schools result largely from the organizational structure of the educational enterprise. Being based on…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
National Center on Performance Incentives, 2008
2008-01-01
In "Value-Added and Other Methods for Measuring School Performance: An Analysis of Performance Measurement Strategies in Teacher Incentive Fund Proposals"--a paper presented at the February 2008 National Center on Performance Incentives research to policy conference--Robert Meyer and Michael Christian examine select performance-pay plans…
Performance-Based Regulation In A High Distributed Energy Resources Future
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Newton Lowry, Mark; Woolf, Tim; Schwartz, Lisa C.
Performance-based regulation (PBR) of utilities has emerged as an important ratemaking option in the last 25 years. It has been implemented in numerous jurisdictions across the United States and is common in many other advanced industrialized countries. PBR’s appeal lies chiefly in its ability to strengthen utility performance incentives relative to traditional cost-of-service regulation (COSR). Some forms of PBR can streamline regulation and provide utilities with greater operating flexibility. Ideally, the benefits of better performance are shared by the utility and its customers. The shortcomings of traditional COSR in providing electric utilities with incentives that are aligned with certain regulatorymore » goals are becoming increasingly clear. In particular, COSR can provide strong incentives to increase electricity sales and utility rate base. Further, some parties express concern that traditional COSR does not provide utilities with appropriate financial incentives to address evolving industry challenges such as changing customer demands for electricity services, increased levels of distributed energy resources (DERs), and growing pressure to mitigate carbon dioxide emissions. In addition, attention to potential new regulatory models to support the “utility of the future” has renewed interest in PBR. This report describes key elements of PBR and explains some of the advantages and disadvantages of various PBR options. We present pertinent issues from the perspectives of utilities and customers. In practice, these different perspectives are not diametrically opposed. Nonetheless, this framework is useful for illustrating how various aspects of PBR may be viewed by those key groups. Regulators have a unique perspective, in that they must balance consumer, utility, and other interests with the goal of achieving a result that is in the overall public interest.« less
Review of performance-based incentives in community-based family planning programmes.
Bellows, Nicole M; Askew, Ian; Bellows, Benjamin
2015-04-01
One strategy for improving family planning (FP) uptake at the community level is the use of performance-based incentives (PBIs), which offer community distributors financial incentives to recruit more users of FP. This article examines the use of PBIs in community-based FP programmes via a literature search of the peer-reviewed and grey literature conducted in April 2013. A total of 28 community-based FP programmes in 21 countries were identified as having used PBIs. The most common approach was a sales commission model where distributors received commission for FP products sold, while a referral payment model for long-term methods was also used extensively. Six evaluations were identified that specifically examined the impact of the PBI in community-based FP programmes. Overall, the results of the evaluations are mixed and more research is needed; however, the findings suggest that easy-to-understand PBIs can be successful in increasing the use of FP at the community level. For future use of PBIs in community-based FP programmes it is important to consider the ethics of incentivising FP and ensuring that PBIs are non-coercive and choice-enhancing. Published by the BMJ Publishing Group Limited. For permission to use (where not already granted under a licence) please go to http://group.bmj.com/group/rights-licensing/permissions.
Pavitt, Sue H; Baxter, Paul D; Brunton, Paul A; Douglas, Gail; Edlin, Richard; Gibson, Barry J; Godson, Jenny; Hall, Melanie; Porritt, Jenny; Robinson, Peter G; Vinall, Karen; Hulme, Claire
2014-01-01
Introduction In England, in 2006, new dental contracts devolved commissioning of dental services locally to Primary Care Trusts to meet the needs of their local population. The new national General Dental Services contracts (nGDS) were based on payment for Units of Dental Activity (UDAs) awarded in three treatment bands based on complexity of care. Recently, contract currency in UK dentistry is evolving from UDAs based on volume and case complexity towards ‘blended contracts’ that include incentives linked with key performance indicators such as quality and improved health outcome. Overall, evidence of the effectiveness of incentive-driven contracting of health providers is still emerging. The INCENTIVE Study aims to evaluate a blended contract model (incentive-driven) compared to traditional nGDS contracts on dental service delivery in practices in West Yorkshire, England. Methods and analysis The INCENTIVE model uses a mixed methods approach to comprehensively evaluate a new incentive-driven model of NHS dental service delivery. The study includes 6 dental surgeries located across three newly commissioned dental practices (blended contract) and three existing traditional practices (nGDS contracts). The newly commissioned practices have been matched to traditional practices by deprivation index, age profile, ethnicity, size of practice and taking on new patients. The study consists of three interlinked work packages: a qualitative study to explore stakeholder perspectives of the new service delivery model; an effectiveness study to assess the INCENTIVE model in reducing the risk of and amount of dental disease and enhance oral health-related quality of life in patients; and an economic study to assess cost-effectiveness of the INCENTIVE model in relation to clinical status and oral health-related quality of life. Ethics and dissemination The study has been approved by NRES Committee London, Bromley. The results of this study will be disseminated at national and international conferences and in international journals. PMID:25231492
Toward a Culture of Consequences: Performance-Based Accountability Systems for Public Services.
Stecher, Brian M; Camm, Frank; Damberg, Cheryl L; Hamilton, Laura S; Mullen, Kathleen J; Nelson, Christopher; Sorensen, Paul; Wachs, Martin; Yoh, Allison; Zellman, Gail L; Leuschner, Kristin J; Camm, Frank; Stecher, Brian M
2012-01-01
Performance-based accountability systems (PBASs), which link incentives to measured performance as a means of improving services to the public, have gained popularity. While PBASs can vary widely across sectors, they share three main components: goals, incentives, and measures. Research suggests that PBASs influence provider behaviors, but little is known about PBAS effectiveness at achieving performance goals or about government and agency experiences. This study examines nine PBASs that are drawn from five sectors: child care, education, health care, public health emergency preparedness, and transportation. In the right circumstances, a PBAS can be an effective strategy for improving service delivery. Optimum circumstances include having a widely shared goal, unambiguous observable measures, meaningful incentives for those with control over the relevant inputs and processes, few competing interests, and adequate resources to design, implement, and operate the PBAS. However, these conditions are rarely fully realized, so it is difficult to design and implement PBASs that are uniformly effective. PBASs represent a promising policy option for improving the quality of service-delivery activities in many contexts. The evidence supports continued experimentation with and adoption of this approach in appropriate circumstances. Even so, PBAS design and its prospects for success depend on the context in which it will operate. Also, ongoing system evaluation and monitoring are integral components of a PBAS; they inform refinements that improve system functioning over time. Empirical evidence of the effects of performance-based public management is scarce. This article also describes a framework used to evaluate a PBAS. Such a system identifies individuals or organizations that must change their behavior for the performance of an activity to improve, chooses an implicit or explicit incentive structure to motivate these organizations or individuals to change, and then chooses performance measures tailored to inform the incentive structure appropriately. The study focused on systems in the child care, education, health care, public health emergency preparedness, and transportation sectors, mainly in the United States. Analysts could use this framework to seek empirical information in other sectors and other parts of the world. Additional empirical information could help refine existing PBASs and, more broadly, improve decisions on where to initiate new PBASs, how to implement them, and then how to design, manage, and refine them over time.
Pedroza, Claudia; Chapman, Sandra B.; Cook, Lori G.; Vásquez, Ana C.; Levin, Harvey S.
2011-01-01
Information regarding the remediation of event-based prospective memory (EB-PM) impairments following pediatric traumatic brain injury (TBI) is scarce. Addressing this, two levels of monetary incentives were used to improve EB-PM in children ages 7 to 16 years with orthopedic injuries (OI, n = 51), or moderate (n = 25), and severe (n = 39) TBI at approximately three months postinjury. The EB-PM task consisted of the child giving a specific verbal response to a verbal cue from the examiner while performing a battery of neuropsychological measures (ongoing task). Significant effects were found for Age-at-Test, Motivation Condition, Period, and Group. Within-group analyses indicated OI and moderate TBI groups performed significantly better under the high-versus low-incentive condition, but the severe TBI group demonstrated no significant improvement. These results indicate EB-PM can be significantly improved at three months postinjury in children with moderate, but not severe, TBI. PMID:21347945
Haff, Nancy; Patel, Mitesh S; Lim, Raymond; Zhu, Jingsan; Troxel, Andrea B; Asch, David A; Volpp, Kevin G
2015-01-01
To evaluate the use of behavioral economics to design financial incentives to promote health behavior change and to explore associations with demographic characteristics. Studies performed by the Center for Health Incentives and Behavioral Economics at the University of Pennsylvania published between January 2006 and March 2014. Randomized, controlled trials with available participant-level data. Studies that did not use financial incentives to promote health behavior change were excluded. Participant-level data from seven studies were pooled. Meta-analysis on the pooled sample using a random-effects model with interaction terms to examine treatment effects and whether they varied by incentive structure or demographic characteristics. The pooled study sample comprised 1403 participants, of whom 35% were female, 70% were white, 24% were black, and the mean age was 48 years (standard deviation 11.2 years). In the fully adjusted model, participants offered financial incentives had higher odds of behavior change (odds ratio [OR]: 3.96; p < .01) when compared to control. There were no significant interactions between financial incentives and gender, age, race, income, or education. When further adjusting for incentive structure, blacks had higher odds than whites of achieving behavior change (OR: 1.67; p < .05) with a conditional payment. Compared to lower-income participants, higher-income participants had lower odds of behavior change (OR: 0.46; p = .01) with a regret lottery. Financial incentives designed using concepts from behavioral economics were effective for promoting health behavior change. There were no large and consistent relationships between the effectiveness of financial incentives and observable demographic characteristics. Second-order examinations of incentive structure suggest potential relationships among the effectiveness of financial incentives, incentive structure, and the demographic characteristics of race and income.
48 CFR 216.402-2 - Technical performance incentives.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 3 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Technical performance incentives. 216.402-2 Section 216.402-2 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEFENSE ACQUISITION... Contracts 216.402-2 Technical performance incentives. See PGI 216.402-2 for guidance on establishing...
Performance-Based Compensation: Linking Performance to Teacher Salaries. Ask the Team
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Behrstock-Sherratt, Ellen; Potemski, Amy
2013-01-01
To achieve the goal of attracting and retaining talented professionals in education, performance-based compensation systems (PBCS) must offer salaries that are both fair and sufficiently competitive at each point across an educator's career continuum. Although many states, especially with the support of the Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) grants,…
Park, Seejeen; Berry, Frances S
2013-09-01
Municipal solid waste (MSW) recycling performance, both nationally and in Florida, USA, has shown little improvement during the past decade. This research examines variations in the MSW recycling program performance in Florida counties in an attempt to identify effective recycling programs. After reviewing trends in the MSW management literature, we conducted an empirical analysis using cross-sectional multiple regression analysis. The findings suggest that the convenience-based hypothesis was supported by showing that curbside recycling had a positive effect on MSW recycling performance. Financial (cost-saving) incentive-based hypotheses were partially supported meaning that individual level incentives can influence recycling performance. Citizen environmental concern was found to positively affect the amount of county recycling, while education and political affiliation yielded no significant results. In conclusion, this article discusses the implications of the findings for both academic research and practice of MSW recycling programs.
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Johnson, Douglas A.; Dickinson, Alyce M.; Huitema, Bradley E.
2008-01-01
We examined whether objective feedback would enhance performance when individuals were paid monetary incentives. A two-by-two factorial design was used, with 123 college students assigned to incentive pay without feedback, incentive pay with feedback, fixed pay without feedback, or fixed pay with feedback. Participants attended six sessions and…
The Role of Incentive Spirometry in Primary Spontaneous Pneumothorax.
Pribadi, Rabbinu R; Singh, Gurmeet; Rumende, Cleopas M
2016-01-01
Pneumothorax is the presence of air in the pleural space. Its management consists of noninvasive and invasive therapies and it is determined based on clinical manifestations, type and size of pneumothorax. We present a case of a patient with diagnosis of primary spontaneous pneumothorax treated with incentive spirometry (noninvasive therapy). A 20 year old man came to respirology clinic with chief complaint of shortness of breath. He was recently diagnosed with left pneumothorax based on previous chest X-ray in another health care facilities and was advised to undergo tube thoracostomy but he refused the procedure. On physical examination, vital signs were normal. Chest X-ray showed 33% of pneumothorax or 1.2 cm. He was asked to perform incentive spirometry therapy at home. During 12 days of therapy, shortness of breath slowly disappeared and on repeated chest X-ray, it showed minimal pneumothorax in the left upper hemithorax. Noninvasive treatment such as incentive spirometry can be considered in patient with minimal symptoms and no signs of life-threatening respiratory distress.
Outcome-based and Participation-based Wellness Incentives
Barleen, Nathan A.; Marzec, Mary L.; Boerger, Nicholas L.; Moloney, Daniel P.; Zimmerman, Eric M.; Dobro, Jeff
2017-01-01
Objective: This study examined whether worksite wellness program participation or achievement of health improvement targets differed according to four incentive types (participation-based, hybrid, outcome-based, and no incentive). Methods: The study included individuals who completed biometric health screenings in both 2013 and 2014 and had elevated metrics in 2013 (baseline year). Multivariate logistic regression modeling tested for differences in odds of participation and achievement of health improvement targets between incentive groups; controlling for demographics, employer characteristics, incentive amounts, and other factors. Results: No statistically significant differences between incentive groups occurred for odds of participation or achievement of health improvement target related to body mass index, blood pressure, or nonhigh-density lipoprotein cholesterol. Conclusions: Given the null findings of this study, employers cannot assume that outcome-based incentives will result in either increased program participation or greater achievement of health improvement targets than participation-based incentives. PMID:28146041
48 CFR 1816.402-270 - NASA technical performance incentives.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 6 2013-10-01 2013-10-01 false NASA technical performance incentives. 1816.402-270 Section 1816.402-270 Federal Acquisition Regulations System NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND....402-270 NASA technical performance incentives. (a) Pursuant to the guidelines in 1816.402, NASA has...
48 CFR 1816.402-270 - NASA technical performance incentives.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 6 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 true NASA technical performance incentives. 1816.402-270 Section 1816.402-270 Federal Acquisition Regulations System NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND....402-270 NASA technical performance incentives. (a) Pursuant to the guidelines in 1816.402, NASA has...
48 CFR 1816.402-270 - NASA technical performance incentives.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 6 2014-10-01 2014-10-01 false NASA technical performance incentives. 1816.402-270 Section 1816.402-270 Federal Acquisition Regulations System NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND....402-270 NASA technical performance incentives. (a) Pursuant to the guidelines in 1816.402, NASA has...
48 CFR 1816.402-270 - NASA technical performance incentives.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 6 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false NASA technical performance incentives. 1816.402-270 Section 1816.402-270 Federal Acquisition Regulations System NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND....402-270 NASA technical performance incentives. (a) Pursuant to the guidelines in 1816.402, NASA has...
48 CFR 1816.402-270 - NASA technical performance incentives.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 6 2012-10-01 2012-10-01 false NASA technical performance incentives. 1816.402-270 Section 1816.402-270 Federal Acquisition Regulations System NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND....402-270 NASA technical performance incentives. (a) Pursuant to the guidelines in 1816.402, NASA has...
48 CFR 970.1100-1 - Performance-based contracting.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-10-01
... methods of accomplishing the work; use measurable (i.e., terms of quality, timeliness, quantity) performance standards and objectives and quality assurance surveillance plans; provide performance incentives... work and other documents used to establish work requirements. (d) Quality assurance surveillance plans...
48 CFR 970.1100-1 - Performance-based contracting.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-10-01
... methods of accomplishing the work; use measurable (i.e., terms of quality, timeliness, quantity) performance standards and objectives and quality assurance surveillance plans; provide performance incentives... work and other documents used to establish work requirements. (d) Quality assurance surveillance plans...
48 CFR 970.1100-1 - Performance-based contracting.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-10-01
... methods of accomplishing the work; use measurable (i.e., terms of quality, timeliness, quantity) performance standards and objectives and quality assurance surveillance plans; provide performance incentives... work and other documents used to establish work requirements. (d) Quality assurance surveillance plans...
Financial Incentives and Maternal Health: Where Do We Go from Here?
Stanton, Mary Ellen; Higgs, Elizabeth S.; Balster, Robert L.; Bellows, Ben W.; Brandes, Neal; Comfort, Alison B.; Eichler, Rena; Glassman, Amanda; Hatt, Laurel E.; Conlon, Claudia M.; Koblinsky, Marge
2013-01-01
Health financing strategies that incorporate financial incentives are being applied in many low- and middle-income countries, and improving maternal and neonatal health is often a central goal. As yet, there have been few reviews of such programmes and their impact on maternal health. The US Government Evidence Summit on Enhancing Provision and use of Maternal Health Services through Financial Incentives was convened on 24-25 April 2012 to address this gap. This article, the final in a series assessing the effects of financial incentives—performance-based incentives (PBIs), insurance, user fee exemption programmes, conditional cash transfers, and vouchers—summarizes the evidence and discusses issues of context, programme design and implementation, cost-effectiveness, and sustainability. We suggest key areas to consider when designing and implementing financial incentive programmes for enhancing maternal health and highlight gaps in evidence that could benefit from additional research. Although the methodological rigor of studies varies, the evidence, overall, suggests that financial incentives can enhance demand for and improve the supply of maternal health services. Definitive evidence demonstrating a link between incentives and improved health outcomes is lacking; however, the evidence suggests that financial incentives can increase the quantity and quality of maternal health services and address health systems and financial barriers that prevent women from accessing and providers from delivering quality, lifesaving maternal healthcare.
Harris, David J; Hilliard, Paul E; Jewell, Elizabeth S; Brummett, Chad M
2015-01-01
Effective use of postoperative incentive spirometry improves patient outcomes but is limited by pain after thoracic and upper abdominal surgery. Thoracic epidurals are frequently used to provide analgesia and attenuate postoperative pulmonary dysfunction. We hypothesized that, in patients with thoracic epidurals for thoracic and abdominal surgery, high pain scores would be associated with poorer incentive spirometry performance, even when accounting for other variables. Retrospective study of 468 patients who underwent upper abdominal or thoracic surgery using postoperative thoracic epidural analgesia between June 1, 2009, and August 31, 2013, at a single tertiary academic center. The association between incentive spirometry performance and pain was assessed as the primary outcome. Other independent predictors of incentive spirometry performance were also identified. Postoperative incentive spirometry performance was found to be inversely proportional to pain score, which correlated significantly stronger with deep breathing pain compared with pain at rest (-0.33 vs -0.14 on postoperative day 1; -0.23 vs -0.12 on postoperative day 2). Pain with deep breathing was independently associated with poorer incentive spirometry performance in the multivariable linear regression model (P < 0.0001), as was increasing age, female sex, thoracic surgery, and higher American Society of Anesthesiologists (ASA) physical status score. The present study suggests that pain with deep breathing is more indicative of thoracic epidural efficacy than is pain at rest. Furthermore, incentive spirometry performance could be used as another indicator of thoracic epidural efficacy. This may be particularly useful in patients reporting high pain scores postoperatively.
Impact of performance-based financing on primary health care services in Haiti.
Zeng, Wu; Cros, Marion; Wright, Katherine D; Shepard, Donald S
2013-09-01
To strengthen Haiti's primary health care (PHC) system, the country first piloted performance-based financing (PBF) in 1999 and subsequently expanded the approach to most internationally funded non-government organizations. PBF complements support (training and technical assistance). This study evaluates (a) the separate impact of PBF and international support on PHC's service delivery; (b) the combined impact of PBF and technical assistance on PHC's service delivery; and (c) the costs of PBF implementation in Haiti. To minimize the risk of facilities neglecting potential non-incentivized services, the incentivized indicators were randomly chosen at the end of each year. We obtained quantities of key services from four departments for 217 health centres (15 with PBF and 202 without) from 2008 through 2010, computed quarterly growth rates and analysed the results using a difference-in-differences approach by comparing the growth of incentivized and non-incentivized services between PBF and non-PBF facilities. To interpret the statistical analyses, we also interviewed staff in four facilities. Whereas international support added 39% to base costs of PHC, incentive payments added only 6%. Support alone increased the quantities of PHC services over 3 years by 35% (2.7%/quarter). However, support plus incentives increased these amounts by 87% over 3 years (5.7%/quarter) compared with facilities with neither input. Incentives alone was associated with a net 39% increase over this period, and more than doubled the growth of services (P < 0.05). Interview findings found no adverse impacts and, in fact, indicated beneficial impacts on quality. Incentives proved to be a relatively inexpensive, well accepted and very effective complement to support, suggesting that a small amount of money, strategically used, can substantially improve PHC. Haiti's experience, after more than a decade of use, indicates that incentives are an effective tool to strengthen PHC.
2012-01-01
Background The General Medical Services primary care contract for the United Kingdom financially rewards performance in 19 clinical areas, through the Quality and Outcomes Framework. Little is known about how best to determine the size of financial incentives in pay for performance schemes. Our aim was to test the hypothesis that performance indicators with larger population health benefits receive larger financial incentives. Methods We performed cross sectional analyses to quantify associations between the size of financial incentives and expected health gain in the 2004 and 2006 versions of the Quality and Outcomes Framework. We used non-parametric two-sided Spearman rank correlation tests. Health gain was measured in expected lives saved in one year and in quality adjusted life years. For each quality indicator in an average sized general practice we tested for associations first, between the marginal increase in payment and the health gain resulting from a one percent point improvement in performance and second, between total payment and the health gain at the performance threshold for maximum payment. Results Evidence for lives saved or quality adjusted life years gained was found for 28 indicators accounting for 41% of the total incentive payments. No statistically significant associations were found between the expected health gain and incentive gained from a marginal 1% increase in performance in either the 2004 or 2006 version of the Quality and Outcomes Framework. In addition no associations were found between the size of financial payment for achievement of an indicator and the expected health gain at the performance threshold for maximum payment measured in lives saved or quality adjusted life years. Conclusions In this subgroup of indicators the financial incentives were not aligned to maximise health gain. This disconnection between incentive and expected health gain risks supporting clinical activities that are only marginally effective, at the expense of more effective activities receiving lower incentives. When designing pay for performance programmes decisions about the size of the financial incentive attached to an indicator should be informed by information on the health gain to be expected from that indicator. PMID:22507660
The response of physician groups to P4P incentives.
Mehrotra, Ateev; Pearson, Steven D; Coltin, Kathryn L; Kleinman, Ken P; Singer, Janice A; Rabson, Barbra; Schneider, Eric C
2007-05-01
Despite substantial enthusiasm among insurers and federal policy makers for pay-for-performance incentives, little is known about the current scope of these incentives or their influence on the delivery of care. To assess the scope and magnitude of pay-for-performance (P4P) incentives among physician groups and to examine whether such incentives are associated with quality improvement initiatives. Structured telephone survey of leaders of physician groups delivering primary care in Massachusetts. ASSESSED METHODS: Prevalence of P4P incentives among physician groups tied to specific measures of quality or utilization and prevalence of physician group quality improvement initiatives. Most group leaders (89%) reported P4P incentives in at least 1 commercial health plan contract. Incentives were tied to performance on Health Employer Data and Information Set (HEDIS) quality measures (89% of all groups), utilization measures (66%), use of information technology (52%), and patient satisfaction (37%). Among the groups with P4P and knowledge of all revenue streams, the incentives accounted for 2.2% (range, 0.3%-8.8%) of revenue. P4P incentives tied to HEDIS quality measures were positively associated with groups' quality improvement initiatives (odds ratio, 1.6; P = .02). Thirty-six percent of group leaders with P4P incentives reported that they were very important or moderately important to the group's financial success. P4P incentives are now common among physician groups in Massachusetts, and these incentives most commonly reward higher clinical quality or lower utilization of care. Although the scope and magnitude of incentives are still modest for many groups, we found an association between P4P incentives and the use of quality improvement initiatives.
Using incentives to achieve A/R goals.
Kivimaki, John
2007-09-01
Offering incentives to patient accounts staff can motivate them to meet--and even exceed--hospital and department goals. Tying incentives to goals and key performance indicators shows staff why the goals are important to the success of A/R performance.
Are Performance-Based Accountability Systems Effective? Evidence from Five Sectors. Research Brief
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Leuschner, Kristin J.
2010-01-01
During the past two decades, performance-based accountability systems (PBASs), which link financial or other incentives to measured performance as a means of improving services, have gained popularity among policymakers. Although PBASs can vary widely across sectors, they share three main components: goals (i.e., one or more long-term outcomes to…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Finnigan, Kara S.; Gross, Betheny
2007-01-01
The federal No Child Left Behind Act and previous performance-based accountability policies are based on a theoretical assumption that sanctions will motivate school staff to perform at higher levels and focus attention on student outcomes. Using data from Chicago, this article draws on expectancy and incentive theories to examine whether…
Effects of incentives on psychosocial performances in simulated space-dwelling groups
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Hienz, Robert D.; Brady, Joseph V.; Hursh, Steven R.; Gasior, Eric D.; Spence, Kevin R.; Emurian, Henry H.
Prior research with individually isolated 3-person crews in a distributed, interactive, planetary exploration simulation examined the effects of communication constraints and crew configuration changes on crew performance and psychosocial self-report measures. The present report extends these findings to a model of performance maintenance that operationalizes conditions under which disruptive affective responses by crew participants might be anticipated to emerge. Experiments evaluated the effects of changes in incentive conditions on crew performance and self-report measures in simulated space-dwelling groups. Crews participated in a simulated planetary exploration mission that required identification, collection, and analysis of geologic samples. Results showed that crew performance effectiveness was unaffected by either positive or negative incentive conditions, while self-report measures were differentially affected—negative incentive conditions produced pronounced increases in negative self-report ratings and decreases in positive self-report ratings, while positive incentive conditions produced increased positive self-report ratings only. Thus, incentive conditions associated with simulated spaceflight missions can significantly affect psychosocial adaptation without compromising task performance effectiveness in trained and experienced crews.
Incentive-compatible demand-side management for smart grids based on review strategies
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Xu, Jie; van der Schaar, Mihaela
2015-12-01
Demand-side load management is able to significantly improve the energy efficiency of smart grids. Since the electricity production cost depends on the aggregate energy usage of multiple consumers, an important incentive problem emerges: self-interested consumers want to increase their own utilities by consuming more than the socially optimal amount of energy during peak hours since the increased cost is shared among the entire set of consumers. To incentivize self-interested consumers to take the socially optimal scheduling actions, we design a new class of protocols based on review strategies. These strategies work as follows: first, a review stage takes place in which a statistical test is performed based on the daily prices of the previous billing cycle to determine whether or not the other consumers schedule their electricity loads in a socially optimal way. If the test fails, the consumers trigger a punishment phase in which, for a certain time, they adjust their energy scheduling in such a way that everybody in the consumer set is punished due to an increased price. Using a carefully designed protocol based on such review strategies, consumers then have incentives to take the socially optimal load scheduling to avoid entering this punishment phase. We rigorously characterize the impact of deploying protocols based on review strategies on the system's as well as the users' performance and determine the optimal design (optimal billing cycle, punishment length, etc.) for various smart grid deployment scenarios. Even though this paper considers a simplified smart grid model, our analysis provides important and useful insights for designing incentive-compatible demand-side management schemes based on aggregate energy usage information in a variety of practical scenarios.
The Impact of Social Pressure and Monetary Incentive on Cognitive Control.
Ličen, Mina; Hartmann, Frank; Repovš, Grega; Slapničar, Sergeja
2016-01-01
We compare the effects of two prominent organizational control mechanisms-social pressure and monetary incentive-on cognitive control. Cognitive control underlies the human ability to regulate thoughts and actions in the pursuit of behavioral goals. Previous studies show that monetary incentives can contribute to goal-oriented behavior by activating proactive control. There is, however, much less evidence of how social pressure affects cognitive control and task performance. In a within-subject experimental design, we tested 47 subjects performing the AX-CPT task to compare the activation of cognitive control modes under social pressure and monetary incentive beyond mere instructions to perform better. Our results indicate that instructing participants to improve their performance on its own leads to a significant shift from a reactive to a proactive control mode and that both social pressure and monetary incentive further enhance performance.
Hasan, Abid; Jha, Kumar Neeraj
2013-01-01
Safety incentive and penalty (I/P) provisions in construction contracts are one of the most common forms of I/P. Contradictory opinions on the effectiveness of these provisions have been expressed in the literature. Statistics on safety provisions were collected from 32 construction projects, which include both types of contracts - those with safety I/P provisions and those without them. Although inclusion of safety I/P provisions in contracts helps in improving the overall safety performance in construction projects, further scope for improvement still exists. Literature review and structured personal interviews, coupled with a survey based on preliminary questionnaire, revealed that successful formulation and implementation of such provisions are dependent on 25 attributes which need the attention of both clients and contractors. A questionnaire-based survey was conducted to evaluate these attributes. The six factors extracted by carrying out factor analysis are: incentive distribution method, proper labour training, special attention to risky situations, role of safety committee and sub-contractors, specialised works and safety equipments, and right form of I/P. If taken care of, these attributes have the potential to improve the safety performance in construction projects. The results would be useful to clients and contractors in implementing the safety I/P provisions and thereby improving safety performance.
Avoiding unintended incentives in ACO payment models.
Douven, Rudy; McGuire, Thomas G; McWilliams, J Michael
2015-01-01
One goal of the Medicare Shared Savings Program for accountable care organizations (ACOs) is to reduce Medicare spending for ACOs' patients relative to the organizations' spending history. However, we found that current rules for setting ACO spending targets (or benchmarks) diminish ACOs' incentives to generate savings and may even encourage higher instead of lower Medicare spending. Spending in the three years before ACOs enter or renew a contract is weighted unequally in the benchmark calculation, with a high weight of 0.6 given to the year just before a new contract starts. Thus, ACOs have incentives to increase spending in that year to inflate their benchmark for future years and thereby make it easier to obtain shared savings from Medicare in the new contract period. We suggest strategies to improve incentives for ACOs, including changes to the weights used to determine benchmarks and new payment models that base an ACO's spending target not only on its own past performance but also on the performance of other ACOs or Medicare providers. Project HOPE—The People-to-People Health Foundation, Inc.
Humans Integrate Monetary and Liquid Incentives to Motivate Cognitive Task Performance
Yee, Debbie M.; Krug, Marie K.; Allen, Ariel Z.; Braver, Todd S.
2016-01-01
It is unequivocal that a wide variety of incentives can motivate behavior. However, few studies have explicitly examined whether and how different incentives are integrated in terms of their motivational influence. The current study examines the combined effects of monetary and liquid incentives on cognitive processing, and whether appetitive and aversive incentives have distinct influences. We introduce a novel task paradigm, in which participants perform cued task-switching for monetary rewards that vary parametrically across trials, with liquid incentives serving as post-trial performance feedback. Critically, the symbolic meaning of the liquid was held constant (indicating successful reward attainment), while liquid valence was blocked. In the first experiment, monetary rewards combined additively with appetitive liquid feedback to improve subject task performance. Aversive liquid feedback counteracted monetary reward effects in low monetary reward trials, particularly in a subset of participants who tended to avoid responding under these conditions. Self-report motivation ratings predicted behavioral performance above and beyond experimental effects. A follow-up experiment replicated the predictive power of motivation ratings even when only appetitive liquids were used, suggesting that ratings reflect idiosyncratic subjective values of, rather than categorical differences between, the liquid incentives. Together, the findings indicate an integrative relationship between primary and secondary incentives and potentially dissociable influences in modulating motivational value, while informing hypotheses regarding candidate neural mechanisms. PMID:26834668
20 CFR 641.750 - Will there be performance-related incentives?
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-04-01
... 20 Employees' Benefits 3 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false Will there be performance-related incentives? 641.750 Section 641.750 Employees' Benefits EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF... incentive awards. The Department will exercise this authority at its discretion. ...
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
National Center on Performance Incentives, 2008
2008-01-01
A recent report published by the National Center on Performance Incentives (NCPI) presents findings from the first-year evaluation of the Governor's Educator Excellence Grant (GEEG) program, one of several statewide performance incentive programs in Texas. The report provides an overview of changes to teacher behavior and instructional practices…
Carrasco, Gonzalo A; Behling, Kathryn C; Lopez, Osvaldo J
2018-04-01
Student participation is important for the success of active learning strategies, but participation is often linked to the level of preparation. At our institution, we use two types of active learning activities, a modified case-based learning exercise called active learning groups (ALG) and team-based learning (TBL). These strategies have different assessment and incentive structures for participation. Non-cognitive skills are assessed in ALG using a subjective five-point Likert scale. In TBL, assessment of individual student preparation is based on a multiple choice quiz conducted at the beginning of each session. We studied first-year medical student participation and performance in ALG and TBL as well as performance on course final examinations. Student performance in TBL, but not in ALG, was strongly correlated with final examination scores. Additionally, in students who performed in the upper 33rd percentile on the final examination, there was a positive correlation between final examination performance and participation in TBL and ALG. This correlation was not seen in students who performed in the lower 33rd percentile on the final examinations. Our results suggest that assessments of medical knowledge during active learning exercises could supplement non-cognitive assessments and could be good predictors of performance on summative examinations.
Rewarding safe behavior: strategies for change.
Fell-Carlson, Deborah
2004-12-01
Effective, sustainable safety incentives are integrated into a performance management system designed to encourage long term behavior change. Effective incentive program design integrates the fundamental considerations of compensation (i.e., valence, instrumentality, expectancy, equity) with behavior change theory in the context of a strong merit based performance management system. Clear expectations are established and communicated from the time applicants apply for the position. Feedback and social recognition are leveraged and used as rewards, in addition to financial incentives built into the compensation system and offered periodically as short term incentives. Rewards are tied to specific objectives intended to influence specific behaviors. Objectives are designed to challenge employees, providing opportunities to grow and enhance their sense of belonging. Safety contests and other awareness activities are most effective when used to focus safety improvement efforts on specific behaviors or processes, for a predetermined period of time, in the context of a comprehensive safety system. Safety incentive programs designed around injury outcomes can result in unintended, and undesirable, consequences. Safety performance can be leveraged by integrating safety into corporate cultural indicators. Symbols of safety remind employees of corporate safety goals and objectives (e.g., posted safety goals and integrating safety into corporate mission and vision). Rites and ceremonies provide opportunities for social recognition and feedback and demonstrate safety is a corporate value. Feedback opportunities, rewards, and social recognition all provide content for corporate legends, those stories embellished over time, that punctuate the overall system of organizational norms, and provide examples of the organizational safety culture in action.
Beyond Widgets -- Systems Incentive Programs for Utilities
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Regnier, Cindy; Mathew, Paul; Robinson, Alastair
Utility incentive programs remain one of the most significant means of deploying commercialized, but underutilized building technologies to scale. However, these programs have been largely limited to component-based products (e.g., lamps, RTUs). While some utilities do provide ‘custom’ incentive programs with whole building and system level technical assistance, these programs require deeper levels of analysis, resulting in higher program costs. This results in custom programs being restricted to utilities with greater resources, and are typically applied mainly to large or energy-intensive facilities, leaving much of the market without cost effective access and incentives for these solutions. In addition, with increasinglymore » stringent energy codes, cost effective component-based solutions that achieve significant savings are dwindling. Building systems (e.g., integrated façade, HVAC and/or lighting solutions) can deliver higher savings that translate into large sector-wide savings if deployed at the scale of these programs. However, systems application poses a number of challenges – baseline energy use must be defined and measured; the metrics for energy and performance must be defined and tested against; in addition, system savings must be validated under well understood conditions. This paper presents a sample of findings of a project to develop validated utility incentive program packages for three specific integrated building systems, in collaboration with Xcel Energy (CO, MN), ComEd, and a consortium of California Public Owned Utilities (CA POUs) (Northern California Power Agency(NCPA) and the Southern California Public Power Authority(SCPPA)). Furthermore, these program packages consist of system specifications, system performance, M&V protocols, streamlined assessment methods, market assessment and implementation guidance.« less
Pavitt, Sue H; Baxter, Paul D; Brunton, Paul A; Douglas, Gail; Edlin, Richard; Gibson, Barry J; Godson, Jenny; Hall, Melanie; Porritt, Jenny; Robinson, Peter G; Vinall, Karen; Hulme, Claire
2014-09-17
In England, in 2006, new dental contracts devolved commissioning of dental services locally to Primary Care Trusts to meet the needs of their local population. The new national General Dental Services contracts (nGDS) were based on payment for Units of Dental Activity (UDAs) awarded in three treatment bands based on complexity of care. Recently, contract currency in UK dentistry is evolving from UDAs based on volume and case complexity towards 'blended contracts' that include incentives linked with key performance indicators such as quality and improved health outcome. Overall, evidence of the effectiveness of incentive-driven contracting of health providers is still emerging. The INCENTIVE Study aims to evaluate a blended contract model (incentive-driven) compared to traditional nGDS contracts on dental service delivery in practices in West Yorkshire, England. The INCENTIVE model uses a mixed methods approach to comprehensively evaluate a new incentive-driven model of NHS dental service delivery. The study includes 6 dental surgeries located across three newly commissioned dental practices (blended contract) and three existing traditional practices (nGDS contracts). The newly commissioned practices have been matched to traditional practices by deprivation index, age profile, ethnicity, size of practice and taking on new patients. The study consists of three interlinked work packages: a qualitative study to explore stakeholder perspectives of the new service delivery model; an effectiveness study to assess the INCENTIVE model in reducing the risk of and amount of dental disease and enhance oral health-related quality of life in patients; and an economic study to assess cost-effectiveness of the INCENTIVE model in relation to clinical status and oral health-related quality of life. The study has been approved by NRES Committee London, Bromley. The results of this study will be disseminated at national and international conferences and in international journals. Published by the BMJ Publishing Group Limited. For permission to use (where not already granted under a licence) please go to http://group.bmj.com/group/rights-licensing/permissions.
Incentive spirometry following thoracic surgery: what should we be doing?
Agostini, Paula; Singh, Sally
2009-06-01
Thoracic surgery may cause reduced respiratory function and pulmonary complications, with associated increased risk of mortality. Postoperative physiotherapy aims to reverse atelectasis and secretion retention, and may include incentive spirometry. To review the evidence for incentive spirometry, examining the physiological basis, equipment and its use following thoracic surgery. MEDLINE was searched from 1950 to January 2008, EMBASE was searched from 1980 to January 2008, and CINAHL was searched from 1982 to January 2008, all using the OVID interface. The search term was: '[incentive spirometry.mp]'. The Cochrane Library was searched using the terms 'incentive spirometry' and 'postoperative physiotherapy'. The Chartered Society of Physiotherapy Resource Centre was also searched, and a hand search was performed to follow-up references from the retrieved studies. Non-scientific papers were excluded, as were papers that did not relate to thoracic surgery or the postoperative treatment of patients with incentive spirometry. Initially, 106 studies were found in MEDLINE, 99 in EMBASE and 42 in CINAHL. Eight references were found in the Cochrane Library and one paper in the Chartered Society of Physiotherapy Resource Centre. Four studies and one systematic review investigating the effects of postoperative physiotherapy and incentive spirometry in thoracic surgery patients were selected and reviewed. Physiological evidence suggests that incentive spirometry may be appropriate for lung re-expansion following major thoracic surgery. Based on sparse literature, postoperative physiotherapy regimes with, or without, the use of incentive spirometry appear to be effective following thoracic surgery compared with no physiotherapy input.
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
What Works Clearinghouse, 2009
2009-01-01
"Rewarding Persistence: Effects of a Performance-Based Scholarship Program for Low-Income Parents" examined whether community college students are more likely to persist in school if they are offered financial incentives tied to school performance. The study included 1,019 low-income parents enrolled at two Louisiana community colleges.…
The Merit-based Incentive Payment System (MIPS): A Primer for Otolaryngologists.
Rathi, Vinay K; Naunheim, Matthew R; Varvares, Mark A; Holmes, Kenneth; Gagliano, Nancy; Hartnick, Christopher J
2018-05-01
Following passage of the 2015 Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act, most clinicians caring for Medicare Part B patients were required to participate in a new value-based reimbursement system known as the Merit-based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) beginning in 2017. The MIPS adjusts payment rates to providers based on a composite score of performance across 4 categories: quality, advancing care information, clinical practice improvement activities, and resource use. However, factors such as practice size, setting, informational capabilities, and patient population may pose challenges as otolaryngologists endeavor to adapt to this broad-reaching payment reform. Given potential barriers to adoption, otolaryngologists should be aware of several important initiatives to help optimize their performance, including advocacy efforts by the American Academy of Otolaryngology-Head and Neck Surgery, the development of otolaryngology-specific MIPS quality measures, and the launch of a Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services-qualified otolaryngology clinical data registry to facilitate reporting.
Performance-Based Funding as an Instrument of Competition in German Higher Education
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Orr, Dominic; Jaeger, Michael; Schwarzenberger, Astrid
2007-01-01
A central theme of approaches to new public management is the emulation of the market through state-induced competition. Basing state funding allocations on comparative performance is one way of setting an incentive for competitive practice amongst universities. Reforms in funding allocation have occurred in Germany at both state and university…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Knight, William; Wessel, Roger D.; Markle, Larry
2018-01-01
The study sought to determine whether students with disabilities are disadvantaged because of state and institutional performance-based policies providing incentives for 4-year graduation. In a longitudinal study of 32,187 students at a Midwestern Research University, the retention and graduation rates, and mean years to graduation, of students…
Coupling Financial Incentives With Direct Mail in Population-Based Practice.
Slater, Jonathan S; Parks, Michael J; Malone, Michael E; Henly, George A; Nelson, Christina L
2017-02-01
Financial incentives are being used increasingly to encourage a wide array of health behaviors because of their well-established efficacy. However, little is known about how to translate incentive-based strategies to public health practice geared toward improving population-level health, and a dearth of research exists on how individuals respond to incentives through public health communication strategies such as direct mail. This study reports results of a population-based randomized controlled trial testing a direct mail, incentive-based intervention for promoting mammography uptake. The study population was composed of a random sample of Minnesota women enrolled in Medicare fee-for-service and overdue for breast cancer screening. Participants ( N = 18,939) were randomized into three groups: (1) Direct Mail only, (2) Direct Mail plus Incentive, and (3) Control. Both direct mail groups received two mailers with a message about the importance of mammography; however, Mail plus Incentive mailers also offered a $25 incentive for getting a mammogram. Logistic regression analyses measured intervention effects. Results showed the odds for receiving mammography were significantly higher for the Direct Mail plus Incentive group compared with both Direct Mail only and Control groups. The use of incentives also proved to be cost-effective. Additionally, the Direct Mail only group was more likely to receive mammography than the Control group. Findings offer experimental evidence on how the population-based strategy of direct mail coupled with a financial incentive can encourage healthy behavior, as well as how incentive-based programs can be translated into health promotion practice aimed at achieving population-level impact.
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
National Center on Performance Incentives, 2008
2008-01-01
A recent report published by the National Center on Performance Incentives (NCPI) presents findings from the first-year evaluation of the Texas Educator Excellence Grant (TEEG) program, one of several statewide educator incentive programs in Texas. This report provides an overview of over 1,000 schools' locally designed TEEG performance incentive…
Leung, Gabriel M.; Yu, Philip L. H.; Wong, Irene O. L.; Johnston, Janice M.; Tin, Keith Y. K.
2003-01-01
Objective: Given the slow adoption of medical informatics in Hong Kong and Asia, we sought to understand the contributory barriers and potential incentives associated with information technology implementation. Design and Measurements: A representative sample of 949 doctors (response rate = 77.0%) was asked through a postal survey to rank a list of nine barriers associated with clinical computerization according to self-perceived importance. They ranked seven incentives or catalysts that may influence computerization. We generated mean rank scores and used multidimensional preference analysis to explore key explanatory dimensions of these variables. A hierarchical cluster analysis was performed to identify homogenous subgroups of respondents. We further determined the relationships between the sets of barriers and incentives/catalysts collectively using canonical correlation. Results: Time costs, lack of technical support and large capital investments were the biggest barriers to computerization, whereas improved office efficiency and better-quality care were ranked highest as potential incentives to computerize. Cost vs. noncost, physician-related vs. patient-related, and monetary vs. nonmonetary factors were the key dimensions explaining the barrier variables. Similarly, within-practice vs external and “push” vs “pull” factors accounted for the incentive variables. Four clusters were identified for barriers and three for incentives/catalysts. Canonical correlation revealed that respondents who were concerned with the costs of computerization also perceived financial incentives and government regulation to be important incentives/catalysts toward computerization. Those who found the potential interference with communication important also believed that the promise of improved care from computerization to be a significant incentive. Conclusion: This study provided evidence regarding common barriers associated with clinical computerization. Our findings also identified possible incentive strategies that may be employed to accelerate uptake of computer systems. PMID:12595409
Dambacher, Michael; Hübner, Ronald; Schlösser, Jan
2011-01-01
The influence of monetary incentives on performance has been widely investigated among various disciplines. While the results reveal positive incentive effects only under specific conditions, the exact nature, and the contribution of mediating factors are largely unexplored. The present study examined influences of payoff schemes as one of these factors. In particular, we manipulated penalties for errors and slow responses in a speeded categorization task. The data show improved performance for monetary over symbolic incentives when (a) penalties are higher for slow responses than for errors, and (b) neither slow responses nor errors are punished. Conversely, payoff schemes with stronger punishment for errors than for slow responses resulted in worse performance under monetary incentives. The findings suggest that an emphasis of speed is favorable for positive influences of monetary incentives, whereas an emphasis of accuracy under time pressure has the opposite effect. PMID:21980316
Investigating Group Contingencies to Promote Brief Abstinence from Cigarette Smoking
Meredith, Steven E.; Dallery, Jesse
2013-01-01
In contingency management (CM), monetary incentives are contingent on evidence of drug abstinence. Typically, incentives (e.g., “vouchers” exchangeable for goods or services) are contingent on individual performance. We programmed vouchers contingent on group performance to investigate whether these contingencies would promote brief abstinence from cigarette smoking. Thirty-two participants were divided into small teams (n = 3 per team). During three 5-day within-subject experimental conditions, participants submitted video recordings of breath carbon monoxide (CO) measures twice daily via Mōtiv8 Systems™, an Internet-based remote monitoring application. During the interdependent contingency condition, participants earned vouchers each time they and their teammates submitted breath CO samples indicative of abstinence (i.e., negative samples). During the independent contingency condition, participants earned vouchers each time they submitted negative samples, regardless of their teammates' performance. During the no vouchers condition, no monetary incentives were contingent on abstinence. In addition, half of the participants (n = 16) could communicate with their teammates through an online peer support forum. Although forum access did not appear to promote smoking abstinence, monetary incentives did promote brief abstinence. Significantly more negative samples were submitted when vouchers were contingent on individual performance (56%) or team performance (53%) relative to when no vouchers were available (35%; F = 6.9, p = 0.002). The results show that interdependent contingencies can promote brief abstinence from cigarette smoking. Moreover, the results suggest that these contingencies may help lower treatment costs and promote social support. PMID:23421358
Yé, M; Aninanya, G A; Sié, A; Kakoko, D C V; Chatio, S; Kagoné, M; Prytherch, H; Loukanova, S; Williams, J E; Sauerborn, R
2014-01-01
Performance-based incentives (PBIs) are currently receiving attention as a strategy for improving the quality of care that health providers deliver. Experiences from several African countries have shown that PBIs can trigger improvements, particularly in the area of maternal and neonatal health. The involvement of health workers in deciding how their performance should be measured is recommended. Only limited information is available about how such schemes can be made sustainable. This study explored the types of PBIs that rural health workers suggested, their ideas regarding the management and sustainability of such schemes, and their views on which indicators best lend themselves to the monitoring of performance. In this article the authors reported the findings from a cross-country survey conducted in Burkina Faso, Ghana and Tanzania. The study was exploratory with qualitative methodology. In-depth interviews were conducted with 29 maternal and neonatal healthcare providers, four district health managers and two policy makers (total 35 respondents) from one district in each of the three countries. The respondents were purposively selected from six peripheral health facilities. Care was taken to include providers who had a management role. By also including respondents from district and policy level a comparison of perspectives from different levels of the health system was facilitated. The data that was collected was coded and analysed with support of NVivo v8 software. The most frequently suggested PBIs amongst the respondents in Burkina Faso were training with per-diems, bonuses and recognition of work done. The respondents in Tanzania favoured training with per-diems, as well as payment of overtime, and timely promotion. The respondents in Ghana also called for training, including paid study leave, payment of overtime and recognition schemes for health workers or facilities. Respondents in the three countries supported the mobilisation of local resources to make incentive schemes more sustainable. There was a general view that it was easier to integrate the cost of non-financial incentives in local budgets. There were concerns about the fairness of such schemes from the provider level in all three countries. District managers were worried about the workload that would be required to manage the schemes. The providers themselves were less clear about which indicators best lent themselves to the purpose of performance monitoring. District managers and policy makers most commonly suggested indicators that were in line with national maternal and neonatal healthcare indicators. The study showed that health workers have considerable interest in performance-based incentive schemes and are concerned about their sustainability. There is a need to further explore the use of non-financial incentives in PBI schemes, as such incentives were considered to stand a greater chance of being integrated into local budgets. Ensuring participation of healthcare providers in the design of such schemes is likely to achieve buy-in and endorsement from the health workers involved. However, input from managers and policy makers is essential to keep expectations realistic and to ensure the indicators selected fit the purpose and are part of routine reporting systems.
48 CFR 48.105 - Relationship to other incentives.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-10-01
... should not be rewarded both as value engineering shares and under performance, design-to-cost, or similar incentives of the contract. To that end, when performance, design-to-cost, or similar targets are set and... CONTRACT MANAGEMENT VALUE ENGINEERING Policies and Procedures 48.105 Relationship to other incentives...
48 CFR 48.105 - Relationship to other incentives.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-10-01
... should not be rewarded both as value engineering shares and under performance, design-to-cost, or similar incentives of the contract. To that end, when performance, design-to-cost, or similar targets are set and... CONTRACT MANAGEMENT VALUE ENGINEERING Policies and Procedures 48.105 Relationship to other incentives...
48 CFR 48.105 - Relationship to other incentives.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-10-01
... should not be rewarded both as value engineering shares and under performance, design-to-cost, or similar incentives of the contract. To that end, when performance, design-to-cost, or similar targets are set and... CONTRACT MANAGEMENT VALUE ENGINEERING Policies and Procedures 48.105 Relationship to other incentives...
18 CFR 35.35 - Transmission infrastructure investment.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-04-01
... infrastructure investment. 35.35 Section 35.35 Conservation of Power and Water Resources FEDERAL ENERGY... AND TARIFFS Transmission Infrastructure Investment Provisions § 35.35 Transmission infrastructure investment. (a) Purpose. This section establishes rules for incentive-based (including performance-based...
Evaluating the Impact of Performance Funding in Ohio and Tennessee
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Hillman, Nicholas W.; Hicklin Fryar, Alisa; Crespín-Trujillo, Valerie
2018-01-01
Today, 35 states use performance-based funding models tying appropriations directly to educational outcomes. Financial incentives should induce colleges to improve performance, but there are several well-documented reasons why this is unlikely to occur. We examine how two of the most robust performance funding states--Tennessee and Ohio--responded…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Elqadri, Zaenal Mustafa; Priyono; Suci, Rahayu Puji; Chandra, Teddy
2015-01-01
This study aims to identify and examine the importance of leadership style, motivation, and incentives to improve employee performance. Variables examined as factors that affect performance of employees were style of leadership (X1), motivation (X2), and the provision of incentives (X3). The population of this study was all employees in the Sales…
48 CFR 1552.216-77 - Award term incentive.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... performance measures for the corresponding evaluation period; or (iii) The Government notifies the contractor....216-77 Section 1552.216-77 Federal Acquisition Regulations System ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY...) based on overall contractor performance as evaluated in accordance with the Clause entitled “Award Term...
Investigating financial incentives for maternal health: an introduction.
Stanton, Mary Ellen; Higgs, Elizabeth S; Koblinsky, Marge
2013-12-01
Projection of current trends in maternal and neonatal mortality reduction shows that many countries will fall short of the UN Millennium Development Goal 4 and 5. Underutilization of maternal health services contributes to this poor progress toward reducing maternal and neonatal morbidity and mortality. Moreover, the quality of services continues to lag in many countries, with a negative effect on the health of women and their babies, including deterring women from seeking care. To enhance the use and provision of quality maternal care, countries and donors are increasingly using financial incentives. This paper introduces the JHPN Supplement, in which each paper reviews the evidence of the effectiveness of a specific financial incentive instrument with the aim of improving the use and quality of maternal healthcare and impact. The US Agency for International Development and the US National Institutes of Health convened a US Government Evidence Summit on Enhancing Provision and Use of Maternal Health Services through Financial Incentives on 24-25 April 2012 in Washington, DC. The Summit brought together leading global experts in finance, maternal health, and health systems from governments, academia, development organizations, and foundations to assess the evidence on whether financial incentives significantly and substantially increase provision, use and quality of maternal health services, and the contextual factors that impact the effectiveness of these incentives. Evidence review teams evaluated the multidisciplinary evidence of various financial mechanisms, including supply-side incentives (e.g. performance-based financing, user fees, and various insurance mechanisms) and demand-side incentives (e.g. conditional cash transfers, vouchers, user fee exemptions, and subsidies for care-seeking). At the Summit, the teams presented a synthesis of evidence and initial recommendations on practice, policy, and research for discussion. The Summit enabled structured feedback on recommendations which the teams included in their final papers appearing in this Supplement. Papers in this Supplement review the evidence for a specific financial incentive mechanism (e.g. pay for performance, conditional cash transfer) to improve the use and quality of maternal healthcare and makes recommendations for programmes and future research. While data on programmes using financial incentives for improved use and indications of the quality of maternal health services support specific conclusions and recommendations, including those for future research, data linking the use of financial incentives with improved health outcomes are minimal.
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Kaikkonen, Darby
2016-01-01
Performance-based funding (PBF) in higher education has grown in recent years as a means of institutional accountability and incentive for improving student success. Although most states have successfully implemented their respective systems, research on early funding models suggests a difficult fiscal environment can introduce tension between…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Mabogoane, Thabo; Patel, Firoz
2006-01-01
This article argues that incentives can help increase teacher performance and retention. Incentives send out a clear signal of what an education system expects from its teachers; at the same time teachers do respond to incentives inherent in the education system. Many education systems have weak incentives and therefore fail to signal to teachers…
Kraus, Michael; Burkart, John; Hegeman, Rebecca; Solomon, Richard; Coplon, Norman; Moran, John
2007-10-01
Home hemodialysis has been a therapeutic option for almost 4 decades. The complexity of dialysis equipment has been a factor-limiting adoption of this modality. We performed a feasibility study to demonstrate the safety of center-based vs. home-based daily hemodialysis with the NxStage System One portable hemodialysis device. We also performed a retrospective analysis to determine if clinical effects previously associated with short-daily dialysis were also seen using this novel device. We conducted a prospective, 2-treatment, 2-period, open-label, crossover study of in-center hemodialysis vs. home hemodialysis in 32 patients treated at 6 U.S. centers. The 8-week In-Center Phase (6 days/week) was followed by a 2-week transition period and then followed by the 8-week Home Phase (6 days/week). We retrospectively collected data on hemodialysis treatment parameters immediately preceding the study in a subset of patients. Twenty-six out of 32 patients (81%) successfully completed the study. Successful delivery of at least 90% of prescribed fluid volume (primary endpoint) was achieved in 98.5% of treatments in-center and 97.3% at home. Total effluent volume as a percentage of prescribed volume was between 94% and 100% for all study weeks. The composite rate of intradialytic and interdialytic adverse events per 100 treatments was significantly higher for the In-Center Phase (5.30) compared with the Home Phase (2.10; p=0.007). Compared with the period immediately preceding the study, there were reductions in blood pressure, antihypertensive medications, and interdialytic weight gain. Daily home hemodialysis with a small, easy-to-use hemodialysis device is a viable dialysis option for end-stage renal disease patients capable of self/partner-administered dialysis.
Physician Payment after the SGR--The New Meritocracy.
Rosenthal, Meredith B
2015-09-24
With the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System, Medicare shifts from payment based on macroeconomic indicators to relying on physician- or group-level indicators of cost and quality--and could create a large fee differential between high- and low-performing physicians.
Khim, Keovathanak
2016-01-01
Financial incentives are widely used in performance-based financing (PBF) schemes, but their contribution to health workers' incomes and job motivation is poorly understood. Cambodia undertook health sector reform from the middle of 2009 and PBF was employed as a part of the reform process. This study examines job motivation for primary health workers (PHWs) under PBF reform in Cambodia and assesses the relationship between job motivation and income. A cross-sectional self-administered survey was conducted on 266 PHWs, from 54 health centers in the 15 districts involved in the reform. The health workers were asked to report all sources of income from public sector jobs and provide answers to 20 items related to job motivation. Factor analysis was conducted to identify the latent variables of job motivation. Factors associated with motivation were identified through multivariable regression. PHWs reported multiple sources of income and an average total income of US$190 per month. Financial incentives under the PBF scheme account for 42% of the average total income. PHWs had an index motivation score of 4.9 (on a scale from one to six), suggesting they had generally high job motivation that was related to a sense of community service, respect, and job benefits. Regression analysis indicated that income and the perception of a fair distribution of incentives were both statistically significant in association with higher job motivation scores. Financial incentives used in the reform formed a significant part of health workers' income and influenced their job motivation. Improving job motivation requires fixing payment mechanisms and increasing the size of incentives. PBF is more likely to succeed when income, training needs, and the desire for a sense of community service are addressed and institutionalized within the health system.
Hsieh, Shulan; Li, Tzu-Hsien; Tsai, Ling-Ling
2010-04-01
To examine whether monetary incentives attenuate the negative effects of sleep deprivation on cognitive performance in a flanker task that requires higher-level cognitive-control processes, including error monitoring. Twenty-four healthy adults aged 18 to 23 years were randomly divided into 2 subject groups: one received and the other did not receive monetary incentives for performance accuracy. Both subject groups performed a flanker task and underwent electroencephalographic recordings for event-related brain potentials after normal sleep and after 1 night of total sleep deprivation in a within-subject, counterbalanced, repeated-measures study design. Monetary incentives significantly enhanced the response accuracy and reaction time variability under both normal sleep and sleep-deprived conditions, and they reduced the effects of sleep deprivation on the subjective effort level, the amplitude of the error-related negativity (an error-related event-related potential component), and the latency of the P300 (an event-related potential variable related to attention processes). However, monetary incentives could not attenuate the effects of sleep deprivation on any measures of behavior performance, such as the response accuracy, reaction time variability, or posterror accuracy adjustments; nor could they reduce the effects of sleep deprivation on the amplitude of the Pe, another error-related event-related potential component. This study shows that motivation incentives selectively reduce the effects of total sleep deprivation on some brain activities, but they cannot attenuate the effects of sleep deprivation on performance decrements in tasks that require high-level cognitive-control processes. Thus, monetary incentives and sleep deprivation may act through both common and different mechanisms to affect cognitive performance.
[Pay for performance explained by transaction costs theory].
Gorbaneff, Yuri; Cortes, Ariel; Torres, Sergio; Yepes, Francisco
2011-01-01
To evaluate the ability of transaction costs theory to explain incentives in the health care chain. We performed a case study of CPS, a health insurance company in Bogota (Colombia), which preferred not to publish its name. CPS moves in the environment of high transaction costs and uses the hybrid form of governance at the outpatient level. Incentive intensity, administrative control and the contract all agree with the theory. At the hospital level, the market is used, despite greater uncertainty. Because of the discrete form (1.0) of the incentives and the absence of administrative control, it is difficult for CPS to relate payment to hospital performance. Transaction costs theory explains the configuration of incentives. Another contribution made by this theory to the literature is the criterion to differentiate between the market and the hybrid. We propose that the market uses discrete-type (1.0) incentives, while the hybrid uses continuous, commission-like incentives. Copyright © 2011 SESPAS. Published by Elsevier Espana. All rights reserved.
Characterization and effectiveness of pay-for-performance in ophthalmology: a systematic review.
Herbst, Tim; Emmert, Martin
2017-06-05
To identify, characterize and compare existing pay-for-performance approaches and their impact on the quality of care and efficiency in ophthalmology. A systematic evidence-based review was conducted. English, French and German written literature published between 2000 and 2015 were searched in the following databases: Medline (via PubMed), NCBI web site, Scopus, Web of Knowledge, Econlit and the Cochrane Library. Empirical as well as descriptive articles were included. Controlled clinical trials, meta-analyses, randomized controlled studies as well as observational studies were included as empirical articles. Systematic characterization of identified pay-for-performance approaches (P4P approaches) was conducted according to the "Model for Implementing and Monitoring Incentives for Quality" (MIMIQ). Methodological quality of empirical articles was assessed according to the Critical Appraisal Skills Programme (CASP) checklists. Overall, 13 relevant articles were included. Eleven articles were descriptive and two articles included empirical analyses. Based on these articles, four different pay-for-performance approaches implemented in the United States were identified. With regard to quality and incentive elements, systematic comparison showed numerous differences between P4P approaches. Empirical studies showed isolated cost or quality effects, while a simultaneous examination of these effects was missing. Research results show that experiences with pay-for-performance approaches in ophthalmology are limited. Identified approaches differ with regard to quality and incentive elements restricting comparability. Two empirical studies are insufficient to draw strong conclusions about the effectiveness and efficiency of these approaches.
The Best Laid Plans: Designing Incentive Programs for School Leaders. WCER Working Paper No. 2014-7
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Goff, Peter; Goldring, Ellen; Canney, Melissa
2014-01-01
Notable attention and effort has been directed toward improving educator productivity through the use of performance incentives. Little of this work has focused on incentive systems for school leaders (principals) and less yet examines performance pay systems used in practice. This research uses 34 funded grants from the federal Teacher Incentive…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Glazerman, Steven; Protik, Ali; Teh, Bing-ru; Bruch, Julie; Max, Jeffrey
2013-01-01
One way to improve struggling schools' access to effective teachers is to use selective transfer incentives. Such incentives offer bonuses for the highest-performing teachers to move into schools serving the most disadvantaged students. In this report, we provide evidence from a randomized experiment that tested whether such a policy intervention…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
National Center on Performance Incentives, 2008
2008-01-01
A recent report published by the National Center on Performance Incentives (NCPI) presents findings from the first-year evaluation of the Governor's Educator Excellence Grant (GEEG) program, one of several statewide educator incentive programs in Texas. In this report, the authors provide an overview of 99 schools' locally designed educator…
Agarwal, Koki; Askew, Ian; Iriarte, Emma; Morgan, Lindsay; Watson, Julia
2013-01-01
Performance-based incentives (PBIs) aim to counteract weak providers’ performance in health systems of many developing countries by providing rewards that are directly linked to better health outcomes for mothers and their newborns. Translating funding into better health requires many actions by a large number of people. The actions span from community to the national level. While different forms of PBIs are being implemented in a number of countries to improve health outcomes, there has not been a systematic review of the evidence of their impact on the health of mothers and newborns. This paper analyzes and synthesizes the available evidence from published studies on the impact of supply-side PBIs on the quantity and quality of health services for mothers and newborns. This paper reviews evidence from published and grey literature that spans PBI for public-sector facilities, PBI in social insurance reforms, and PBI in NGO contracting. Some initiatives focus on safe deliveries, and others reward a broader package of results that include deliveries. The Evidence Review Team that focused on supply-side incentives for the US Government Evidence Summit on Enhancing Provision and Use of Maternal Health Services through Financial Incentives, reviewed published research reports and papers and added studies from additional grey literature that were deemed relevant. After collecting and reviewing 17 documents, nine studies were included in this review, three of which used before-after designs; four included comparison or control groups; one applied econometric methods to a five-year time series; and one reported results from a large-scale impact evaluation with randomly-assigned intervention and control facilities. The available evidence suggests that incentives that reward providers for institutional deliveries result in an increase in the number of institutional deliveries. There is some evidence that the content of antenatal care can improve with PBI. We found no direct evidence on the impact of PBI on neonatal health services or on mortality of mothers and newborns, although intention of the study was not to document impact on mortality. A number of studies describe approaches to rewarding quality as well as increases in the quantities of services provided, although how quality is defined and monitored is not always clear. Because incentives exist in all health systems, considering how to align the incentives of the many health workers and their supervisors so that they focus efforts on achieving health goals for mothers and newborns is critical if the health system is to perform more effectively and efficiently. A wide range of PBI models is being developed and tested, and there is still much to learn about what works best. Future studies should include a larger focus on rewarding quality and measuring its impact. Finally, more qualitative research to better understand PBI implementation and how various incentive models function in different settings is needed to help practitioners refine and improve their programmes.
Eichler, Rena; Agarwal, Koki; Askew, Ian; Iriarte, Emma; Morgan, Lindsay; Watson, Julia
2013-12-01
Performance-based incentives (PBIs) aim to counteract weak providers' performance in health systems of many developing countries by providing rewards that are directly linked to better health outcomes for mothers and their newborns. Translating funding into better health requires many actions by a large number of people. The actions span from community to the national level. While different forms of PBIs are being implemented in a number of countries to improve health outcomes, there has not been a systematic review of the evidence of their impact on the health of mothers and newborns. This paper analyzes and synthesizes the available evidence from published studies on the impact of supply-side PBIs on the quantity and quality of health services for mothers and newborns. This paper reviews evidence from published and grey literature that spans PBI for public-sector facilities, PBI in social insurance reforms, and PBI in NGO contracting. Some initiatives focus on safe deliveries, and others reward a broader package of results that include deliveries. The Evidence Review Team that focused on supply-side incentives for the US Government Evidence Summit on Enhancing Provision and Use of Maternal Health Services through Financial Incentives, reviewed published research reports and papers and added studies from additional grey literature that were deemed relevant. After collecting and reviewing 17 documents, nine studies were included in this review, three of which used before-after designs; four included comparison or control groups; one applied econometric methods to a five-year time series; and one reported results from a large-scale impact evaluation with randomly-assigned intervention and control facilities. The available evidence suggests that incentives that reward providers for institutional deliveries result in an increase in the number of institutional deliveries. There is some evidence that the content of antenatal care can improve with PBI. We found no direct evidence on the impact of PBI on neonatal health services or on mortality of mothers and newborns, although intention of the study was not to document impact on mortality. A number of studies describe approaches to rewarding quality as well as increases in the quantities of services provided, although how quality is defined and monitored is not always clear. Because incentives exist in all health systems, considering how to align the incentives of the many health workers and their supervisors so that they focus efforts on achieving health goals for mothers and newborns is critical if the health system is to perform more effectively and efficiently. A wide range of PBI models is being developed and tested, and there is still much to learn about what works best. Future studies should include a larger focus on rewarding quality and measuring its impact. Finally, more qualitative research to better understand PBI implementation and how various incentive models function in different settings is needed to help practitioners refine and improve their programmes.
Credentials versus Performance: Review of the Teacher Performance Pay Research
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Podgursky, Michael; Springer, Matthew G.
2007-01-01
In this article we examine the economic case for merit or performance-based pay for K-12 teachers. We review several areas of germane research. The direct evaluation literature on these incentive plans is slender; highly diverse in terms of methodology, targeted populations, and programs evaluated; and primarily focused on short-run motivational…
Millett, Christopher; Gray, Jeremy; Saxena, Sonia; Netuveli, Gopalakrishnan; Majeed, Azeem
2007-06-05
Many people with diabetes continue to smoke despite being at high risk of cardiovascular disease. We examined the impact of a pay-for-performance incentive in the United Kingdom introduced in 2004 as part of the new general practitioner contract to improve support for smoking cessation and to reduce the prevalence of smoking among people with chronic diseases such as diabetes. We performed a population-based longitudinal study of the recorded delivery of cessation advice and the prevalence of smoking using electronic records of patients with diabetes obtained from participating general practices. The survey was carried out in an ethnically diverse part of southwest London before (June-October 2003) and after (November 2005-January 2006) the introduction of a pay-for-performance incentive. Significantly more patients with diabetes had their smoking status ever recorded in 2005 than in 2003 (98.8% v. 90.0%, p <0.001). The proportion of patients with documented smoking cessation advice also increased significantly over this period, from 48.0% to 83.5% (p < 0.001). The prevalence of smoking decreased significantly from 20.0% to 16.2% (p < 0.001). The reduction over the study period was lower among women (adjusted odds ratio 0.71, 95% confidence interval 0.53-0.95) but was not significantly different in the most and least affluent groups. In 2005, smoking rates continued to differ significantly with age (10.6%-25.1%), sex (women, 11.5%; men, 20.6%) and ethnic background (4.9%-24.9%). The introduction of a pay-for-performance incentive in the United Kingdom increased the provision of support for smoking cessation and was associated with a reduction in smoking prevalence among patients with diabetes in primary health care settings. Health care planners in other countries may wish to consider introducing similar incentive schemes for primary care physicians.
Pay-for-performance in disease management: a systematic review of the literature.
de Bruin, Simone R; Baan, Caroline A; Struijs, Jeroen N
2011-10-14
Pay-for-performance (P4P) is increasingly implemented in the healthcare system to encourage improvements in healthcare quality. P4P is a payment model that rewards healthcare providers for meeting pre-established targets for delivery of healthcare services by financial incentives. Based on their performance, healthcare providers receive either additional or reduced payment. Currently, little is known about P4P schemes intending to improve delivery of chronic care through disease management. The objectives of this paper are therefore to provide an overview of P4P schemes used to stimulate delivery of chronic care through disease management and to provide insight into their effects on healthcare quality and costs. A systematic PubMed search was performed for English language papers published between 2000 and 2010 describing P4P schemes related to the implementation of disease management. Wagner's chronic care model was used to make disease management operational. Eight P4P schemes were identified, introduced in the USA (n = 6), Germany (n = 1), and Australia (n = 1). Five P4P schemes were part of a larger scheme of interventions to improve quality of care, whereas three P4P schemes were solely implemented. Most financial incentives were rewards, selective, and granted on the basis of absolute performance. More variation was found in incented entities and the basis for providing incentives. Information about motivation, certainty, size, frequency, and duration of the financial incentives was generally limited. Five studies were identified that evaluated the effects of P4P on healthcare quality. Most studies showed positive effects of P4P on healthcare quality. No studies were found that evaluated the effects of P4P on healthcare costs. The number of P4P schemes to encourage disease management is limited. Hardly any information is available about the effects of such schemes on healthcare quality and costs. © 2011 de Bruin et al; licensee BioMed Central Ltd.
Pay-for-performance in disease management: a systematic review of the literature
2011-01-01
Background Pay-for-performance (P4P) is increasingly implemented in the healthcare system to encourage improvements in healthcare quality. P4P is a payment model that rewards healthcare providers for meeting pre-established targets for delivery of healthcare services by financial incentives. Based on their performance, healthcare providers receive either additional or reduced payment. Currently, little is known about P4P schemes intending to improve delivery of chronic care through disease management. The objectives of this paper are therefore to provide an overview of P4P schemes used to stimulate delivery of chronic care through disease management and to provide insight into their effects on healthcare quality and costs. Methods A systematic PubMed search was performed for English language papers published between 2000 and 2010 describing P4P schemes related to the implementation of disease management. Wagner's chronic care model was used to make disease management operational. Results Eight P4P schemes were identified, introduced in the USA (n = 6), Germany (n = 1), and Australia (n = 1). Five P4P schemes were part of a larger scheme of interventions to improve quality of care, whereas three P4P schemes were solely implemented. Most financial incentives were rewards, selective, and granted on the basis of absolute performance. More variation was found in incented entities and the basis for providing incentives. Information about motivation, certainty, size, frequency, and duration of the financial incentives was generally limited. Five studies were identified that evaluated the effects of P4P on healthcare quality. Most studies showed positive effects of P4P on healthcare quality. No studies were found that evaluated the effects of P4P on healthcare costs. Conclusion The number of P4P schemes to encourage disease management is limited. Hardly any information is available about the effects of such schemes on healthcare quality and costs. PMID:21999234
A Legal Perspective on Performance-Based Pay for Teachers. Working Paper 2008-10
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Ryan, James E.
2008-01-01
Merit pay is now in the midst of a renaissance. Hundreds of school districts are experimenting with some type of performance-based pay system. At least six states have statewide or pilot programs, and the federal government has spent close to $100 million on the Teacher Incentive Fund. Whether such programs will last, encourage the start of…
The Long and Winding Path (from Instructional Design to Performance Technology).
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Carr, Clay; Totzke, Larry
1995-01-01
Presents a case study based on experiences at Amway Corporation that explains how the Human Resources Development Department progressed from providing training to providing a broader range of human performance technology interventions. Strategic planning is described, including identifying incentives and required competencies, providing for…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Mintrop, Rick; Ordenes, Miguel; Coghlan, Erin; Pryor, Laura; Madero, Cristobal
2018-01-01
Purpose: The study examines why the logic of a performance management system, supported by the federal Teacher Incentive Fund, might be faulty. It does this by exploring the nuances of the interplay between teaching evaluations as formative and summative, the use of procedures, tools, and artifacts obligated by the local Teacher Incentive Fund…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Glazerman, Steven; Protik, Ali; Teh, Bing-ru; Bruch, Julie; Max, Jeffrey
2013-01-01
One way to improve struggling schools' access to effective teachers is to use selective transfer incentives. Such incentives offer bonuses for the highest-performing teachers to move into schools serving the most disadvantaged students. In this report, we provide evidence from a randomized experiment that tested whether such a policy intervention…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Mintrop, Rick; Ordenes, Miguel
2017-01-01
Mindful of the withering of high-stakes accountability and disappointing data from pay for performance evaluations in the US, we ask why management by extrinsic incentives and organizational goal setting may have been far less powerful than designers of accountability and extrinsic incentive systems had expected. We explore how…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Taylor, Lori L.; Springer, Matthew G.
2009-01-01
Pay for performance is a popular public education reform, and millions of dollars are currently being targeted for pay for performance programs. These reforms are popular because economic and management theories suggest that well-designed incentive pay programs could improve teacher effectiveness. There is little evidence about the characteristics…
The Motivation-Cognition Interface in Learning and Decision-Making.
Maddox, W Todd; Markman, Arthur B
2010-04-01
In this article we discuss how incentive motivations and task demands affect performance. We present a three-factor framework that suggests that performance is determined from the interaction of global incentives, local incentives, and the psychological processes needed to achieve optimal task performance. We review work that examines the implications of the motivation-cognition interface in classification, choice and on phenomena such as stereotype threat and performance pressure. We show that under some conditions stereotype threat and pressure accentuate performance. We discuss the implications of this work for neuropsychological assessment, and outline a number of challenges for future research.
Value affect of construction incentive payments on pavement performance.
DOT National Transportation Integrated Search
2009-08-01
The Michigan Department of Transportation (MDOT) has been using monetary incentive payments : for many years to improve contractors conformance with specifications and their overall : workmanship. It was envisioned that incentive/disincentive (I/D...
Countervailing incentives in value-based payment.
Arnold, Daniel R
2017-09-01
Payment reform has been at the forefront of the movement toward higher-value care in the U.S. health care system. A common belief is that volume-based incentives embedded in fee-for-service need to be replaced with value-based payments. While this belief is well-intended, value-based payment also contains perverse incentives. In particular, behavioral economists have identified several features of individual decision making that reverse some of the typical recommendations for inducing desirable behavior through financial incentives. This paper discusses the countervailing incentives associated with four behavioral economic concepts: loss aversion, relative social ranking, inertia or status quo bias, and extrinsic vs. intrinsic motivation. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
48 CFR 12.102 - Applicability.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... item in FAR 2.101, if the contract or task order— (i) Is entered into on or before November 24, 2013; (ii) Has a value of $29.5 million or less; (iii) Meets the definition of performance-based acquisition at FAR 2.101; (iv) Uses a quality assurance surveillance plan; (v) Includes performance incentives...
Performance Funding in Higher Education: Do Financial Incentives Impact College Completions?
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Hillman, Nicholas W.; Tandberg, David A.; Gross, Jacob P. K.
2014-01-01
In 2000, the Pennsylvania State System of Higher Education introduced a performance-based funding model aimed at increasing degree productivity among the state's public colleges. This study examines how the new policy affected undergraduate degree completions. Using a difference-in-differences estimation strategy, results suggest the policy has…
Performance Standards in Need-Based Student Aid
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Scott-Clayton, Judith; Schudde, Lauren
2016-01-01
College attendance is a risky investment. But students may not recognize when they are at risk for failure, and financial aid introduces the possibility for moral hazard. Academic performance standards can serve three roles in this context: signaling expectations for success, providing incentives for increased student effort, and limiting…
Corepal, Rekesh; Tully, Mark A; Kee, Frank; Miller, Sarah J; Hunter, Ruth F
2018-05-01
Physical inactivity, an unhealthy diet, smoking, and alcohol consumption are key determinants of morbidity and mortality. These health behaviours often begin at a young age and track into adulthood, emphasising a need for interventions in children and young people. Previous research has demonstrated the potential effectiveness of behavioural incentive (BI) interventions in adults. However, little is known about their effectiveness in children and adolescents. Eight bibliographic databases were searched. Eligibility criteria included controlled trials using behavioural incentives (rewards provided contingent on successful performance of the target behaviour) as an intervention component for health behaviour change in children and adolescents. Intervention effects (standardised mean differences or odds ratios) were calculated and pooled by health behaviour, using a random effects model. Twenty-two studies were included (of n = 8392 identified), 19 of which were eligible for meta-analysis: physical activity (n = 8); healthier eating (n = 3); and smoking (n = 8). There was strong evidence that behavioural incentives may encourage healthier eating behaviours, some evidence that behavioural incentives were effective for encouraging physical activity behaviour, and limited evidence to support the use of behavioural incentives for smoking cessation and prevention in adolescents. Findings suggest that behavioural incentives may encourage uptake and initiation of healthy eating and physical activity in young people. However, this is a limited evidence base and a wide range of incentive designs have yet to be explored. Future research should further investigate the acceptability of these intervention approaches for young people. Copyright © 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
What to do? The effects of discrepancies, incentives, and time on dynamic goal prioritization.
Schmidt, Aaron M; DeShon, Richard P
2007-07-01
This study examined factors that influence the dynamic pursuit of multiple goals over time. As hypothesized, goal-performance discrepancies were significantly related to subsequent time allocation. Greater distance from a given goal resulted in greater time subsequently allocated to that goal. In addition, the incentives offered for goal attainment determined the relative influence of discrepancies for each goal. When the incentives for each goal were equivalent, progress toward each goal exhibited equal influence, with greater time allocated to whichever goal was furthest from completion at the time. However, with an incentive available for only 1 of the 2 goals, time allocation was largely determined by progress toward the rewarded goal. Likewise, when incentives for each task differed in their approach-avoidance framing, progress toward the avoidance-framed goal was a stronger predictor of subsequent allocation than was progress toward the approach-framed goal. Finally, the influence of goal-performance discrepancies differed as a function of the time remaining for goal pursuit. The implications for future work on dynamic goal prioritization and the provision of performance incentives are discussed.
Pay for performance programs in Australia: a need for guiding principles.
Scott, Ian A
2008-11-01
Pay-for-performance (P4P) programs which reward clinical providers with incentive payments based on one or more measures of quality of care are now common in the United States and the United Kingdom and it is likely they will attract increasing interest in Australia. However, empirical evidence demonstrating effectiveness of such programs is limited and many existing programs have not had rigorous outcome evaluation. To maximise success, future P4P programs should incorporate the lessons and insights obtained from previous experience. Based on a review of published trials, program evaluations and position statements, the following principles that may guide future program design and implementation were synthesised: 1) formulate a rationale and a business case for P4P; 2) use established evidence-based performance measures; 3) use rigorous and verifiable methods of data collection and analysis; 4) define performance targets using absolute and relative thresholds; 5) use rewards that are sufficient, equitable and transparent; 6) address appropriateness of provider responses and avoid perverse incentives; 7) implement communication and feedback strategies; 8) use existing organisational structures to implement P4P programs; 9) attribute credit for performance to participants in ways that foster population-based perspectives; and 10) invest in outcomes and health service research. Recommendations flowing from these principles relevant to Australian settings are provided.
Anand, R.
2016-01-01
Objective. To evaluate the effects of diaphragmatic breathing exercises and flow and volume-oriented incentive spirometry on pulmonary function and diaphragm excursion in patients undergoing laparoscopic abdominal surgery. Methodology. We selected 260 patients posted for laparoscopic abdominal surgery and they were block randomization as follows: 65 patients performed diaphragmatic breathing exercises, 65 patients performed flow incentive spirometry, 65 patients performed volume incentive spirometry, and 65 patients participated as a control group. All of them underwent evaluation of pulmonary function with measurement of Forced Vital Capacity (FVC), Forced Expiratory Volume in the first second (FEV1), Peak Expiratory Flow Rate (PEFR), and diaphragm excursion measurement by ultrasonography before the operation and on the first and second postoperative days. With the level of significance set at p < 0.05. Results. Pulmonary function and diaphragm excursion showed a significant decrease on the first postoperative day in all four groups (p < 0.001) but was evident more in the control group than in the experimental groups. On the second postoperative day pulmonary function (Forced Vital Capacity) and diaphragm excursion were found to be better preserved in volume incentive spirometry and diaphragmatic breathing exercise group than in the flow incentive spirometry group and the control group. Pulmonary function (Forced Vital Capacity) and diaphragm excursion showed statistically significant differences between volume incentive spirometry and diaphragmatic breathing exercise group (p < 0.05) as compared to that flow incentive spirometry group and the control group. Conclusion. Volume incentive spirometry and diaphragmatic breathing exercise can be recommended as an intervention for all patients pre- and postoperatively, over flow-oriented incentive spirometry for the generation and sustenance of pulmonary function and diaphragm excursion in the management of laparoscopic abdominal surgery. PMID:27525116
Alaparthi, Gopala Krishna; Augustine, Alfred Joseph; Anand, R; Mahale, Ajith
2016-01-01
Objective. To evaluate the effects of diaphragmatic breathing exercises and flow and volume-oriented incentive spirometry on pulmonary function and diaphragm excursion in patients undergoing laparoscopic abdominal surgery. Methodology. We selected 260 patients posted for laparoscopic abdominal surgery and they were block randomization as follows: 65 patients performed diaphragmatic breathing exercises, 65 patients performed flow incentive spirometry, 65 patients performed volume incentive spirometry, and 65 patients participated as a control group. All of them underwent evaluation of pulmonary function with measurement of Forced Vital Capacity (FVC), Forced Expiratory Volume in the first second (FEV1), Peak Expiratory Flow Rate (PEFR), and diaphragm excursion measurement by ultrasonography before the operation and on the first and second postoperative days. With the level of significance set at p < 0.05. Results. Pulmonary function and diaphragm excursion showed a significant decrease on the first postoperative day in all four groups (p < 0.001) but was evident more in the control group than in the experimental groups. On the second postoperative day pulmonary function (Forced Vital Capacity) and diaphragm excursion were found to be better preserved in volume incentive spirometry and diaphragmatic breathing exercise group than in the flow incentive spirometry group and the control group. Pulmonary function (Forced Vital Capacity) and diaphragm excursion showed statistically significant differences between volume incentive spirometry and diaphragmatic breathing exercise group (p < 0.05) as compared to that flow incentive spirometry group and the control group. Conclusion. Volume incentive spirometry and diaphragmatic breathing exercise can be recommended as an intervention for all patients pre- and postoperatively, over flow-oriented incentive spirometry for the generation and sustenance of pulmonary function and diaphragm excursion in the management of laparoscopic abdominal surgery.
Designing Incentives for Public School Teachers: Evidence from a Texas Incentive Pay Program
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Springer, Matthew G.; Taylor, Lori L.
2016-01-01
Pay-for-performance is a popular public education reform, but there is little evidence about the characteristics of a well-designed incentive pay plan for teachers. Some of the literature suggests that effective incentive plans must offer relatively large awards to induce behavioral changes. On the other hand, the experimental economics literature…
48 CFR 48.105 - Relationship to other incentives.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-10-01
... incentives of the contract. To that end, when performance, design-to-cost, or similar targets are set and incentivized, the targets of such incentives affected by the VECP are not to be adjusted because of the...
Koffarnus, Mikhail N; Wong, Conrad J; Fingerhood, Michael; Svikis, Dace S; Bigelow, George E; Silverman, Kenneth
2013-01-01
The current study examined whether monetary incentives could increase engagement and achievement in a job-skills training program for unemployed, homeless, alcohol-dependent adults. Participants (n=124) were randomized to a no-reinforcement group (n=39), during which access to the training program was provided but no incentives were given; a training reinforcement group (n=42), during which incentives were contingent on attendance and performance; or an abstinence and training reinforcement group (n=43), during which incentives were contingent on attendance and performance, but access was granted only if participants demonstrated abstinence from alcohol. abstinence and training reinforcement and training reinforcement participants advanced further in training and attended more hours than no-reinforcement participants. Monetary incentives were effective in promoting engagement and achievement in a job-skills training program for individuals who often do not take advantage of training programs. © Society for the Experimental Analysis of Behavior.
Till, Sara R; Everetts, David; Haas, David M
2015-12-15
Prenatal care is recommended during pregnancy as a method to improve neonatal and maternal outcomes. Improving the use of prenatal care is important, particularly for women at moderate to high risk of adverse outcomes. Incentives are sometimes utilized to encourage women to attend prenatal care visits. To determine whether incentives are an effective tool to increase utilization of timely prenatal care among women. We searched the Cochrane Pregnancy and Childbirth Group's Trials Register (31 January 2015) and the reference lists of all retrieved studies. Randomized controlled trials (RCTs), quasi-RCTs, and cluster-RCTs that utilized direct incentives to pregnant women explicitly linked to initiation and frequency of prenatal care were included. Incentives could include cash, vouchers, coupons or products not generally offered to women as a standard of prenatal care. Comparisons were to no incentives and to incentives not linked directly to utilization of care. We also planned to compare different types of interventions, i.e. monetary versus products or services. Two review authors independently assessed studies for inclusion and methodological quality. Two review authors independently extracted data. Data were checked for accuracy. We identified 11 studies (19 reports), six of which we excluded. Five studies, involving 11,935 pregnancies were included, but only 1893 pregnancies contributed data regarding our specified outcomes. Incentives in the studies included cash, gift card, baby carrier, baby blanket or taxicab voucher and were compared with no incentives. Meta-analysis was performed for only one outcome 'Return for postpartum care' and this outcome was not pre-specified in our protocol. Other analyses were restricted to data from single studies.Trials were at a moderate risk of bias overall. Randomization and allocation were adequate and risk of selection bias was low in three studies and unclear in two studies. None of the studies were blinded to the participants. Blinding of outcome assessors was adequate in one study, but was limited or not described in the remaining four studies. Risk of attrition was deemed to be low in all studies that contributed data to the review. Two of the studies reported or analyzed data in a manner that was not consistent with the predetermined protocol and thus were deemed to be at high risk. The other three studies were low risk for reporting bias. The largest two of the five studies comprising the majority of participants took place in rural, low-income, homogenously Hispanic communities in Central America. This setting introduces a number of confounding factors that may affect generalizability of these findings to ethnically and economically diverse urban communities in developed countries.The five included studies of incentive programs did not report any of this review's primary outcomes: preterm birth, small-for-gestational age, or perinatal death.In terms of this review's secondary outcomes, pregnant women receiving incentives were no more likely to initiate prenatal care (risk ratio (RR) 1.04, 95% confidence interval (CI) 0.78 to 1.38, one study, 104 pregnancies). Pregnant women receiving incentives were more likely to attend prenatal visits on a frequent basis (RR 1.18, 95% CI 1.01 to 1.38, one study, 606 pregnancies) and obtain adequate prenatal care defined by number of "procedures" such as testing blood sugar or blood pressure, vaccinations and counseling about breastfeeding and birth control (mean difference (MD) 5.84, 95% CI 1.88 to 9.80, one study, 892 pregnancies). In contrast, women who received incentives were more likely to deliver by cesarean section (RR 1.97, 95% CI 1.18 to 3.30, one study, 979 pregnancies) compared to those women who did not receive incentives.Women who received incentives were no more likely to return for postpartum care based on results of meta-analysis (average RR 0.75, 95% CI 0.21 to 2.64, two studies, 833 pregnancies, Tau² = 0.81, I² = 98%). However, there was substantial heterogeneity in this analysis so a subgroup analysis was performed and this identified a clear difference between subgroups based on the type of incentive being offered. In one study, women receiving non-cash incentives were more likely to return for postpartum care (RR 1.26, 95% CI 1.09 to 1.47, 240 pregnancies) than women who did not receive non-cash incentives. In another study, women receiving cash incentives were less likely to return for postpartum care (RR 0.43, 95% CI 0.30 to 0.62, 593 pregnancies) than women who did not receive cash incentives.No data were identified for the following secondary outcomes: frequency of prenatal care; pre-eclampsia; satisfaction with birth experience; maternal mortality; low birthweight (less than 2500 g); infant macrosomia (birthweight greater than 4000 g); or five-minute Apgar less than seven. The included studies did not report on this review's main outcomes: preterm birth, small-for-gestational age, or perinatal death. There is limited evidence that incentives may increase utilization and quality of prenatal care, but may also increase cesarean rate. Overall, there is insufficient evidence to fully evaluate the impact of incentives on prenatal care initiation. There are conflicting data as to the impact of incentives on return for postpartum care. Two of the five studies which accounted for the majority of women in this review were conducted in rural, low-income, overwhelmingly Hispanic communities in Central America, thus limiting the external validity of these results.There is a need for high-quality RCTs to determine whether incentive program increase prenatal care use and improve maternal and neonatal outcomes. Incentive programs, in particular cash-based programs, as suggested in this review and in several observational studies may improve the frequency and ensure adequate quality of prenatal care. No peer-reviewed data have been made publicly available for one of the largest incentive-based prenatal programs - the statewide Medicaid-based programs within the United States. These observational data represent an important starting point for future research with significant implications for policy development and allocation of healthcare resources. The disparate findings related to attending postpartum care should also be further explored as the findings were limited by the number of studies. Future large RCTs are needed to focus on the outcomes of preterm birth, small-for-gestational age and perinatal outcomes.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Barbose, Galen; Wiser, Ryan; Bolinger, Mark
Increasing levels of financial support for customer-sited photovoltaic (PV) systems, provided through publicly-funded incentive programs, has heightened concerns about the long-term performance of these systems. Given the barriers that customers face to ensuring that their PV systems perform well, and the responsibility that PV incentive programs bear to ensure that public funds are prudently spent, these programs should, and often do, play a critical role in ensuring that PV systems receiving incentives perform well. To provide a point of reference for assessing the current state of the art, and to inform program design efforts going forward, we examine the approachesmore » to encouraging PV system performance used by 32 prominent PV incentive programs in the U.S. We identify eight general strategies or groups of related strategies that these programs have used to address performance issues, and highlight important differences in the implementation of these strategies among programs.« less
The Impact of Social Pressure and Monetary Incentive on Cognitive Control
Ličen, Mina; Hartmann, Frank; Repovš, Grega; Slapničar, Sergeja
2016-01-01
We compare the effects of two prominent organizational control mechanisms—social pressure and monetary incentive—on cognitive control. Cognitive control underlies the human ability to regulate thoughts and actions in the pursuit of behavioral goals. Previous studies show that monetary incentives can contribute to goal-oriented behavior by activating proactive control. There is, however, much less evidence of how social pressure affects cognitive control and task performance. In a within-subject experimental design, we tested 47 subjects performing the AX-CPT task to compare the activation of cognitive control modes under social pressure and monetary incentive beyond mere instructions to perform better. Our results indicate that instructing participants to improve their performance on its own leads to a significant shift from a reactive to a proactive control mode and that both social pressure and monetary incentive further enhance performance. PMID:26903901
A Study on the Self-Adaption Incentive Performance Salary
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Zhang, Chuanming; Wang, Yang
In project managing, the performance salary management mode is often used to motivate project managers and other similar staff to improve performance or reduce the cost. But the engineering activities who own a lot of internal and external uncertain factors can not be known by the principle. It is difficult for to develop a suitable incentive target to project managers etch. This paper thinks that the manager self master the maximum of information on engineering activities. So this paper sets up an incentive model: the project managers themselves report performance objectives; owner gives the managers reward or punishment combined with their reported performance and actual performance. The model to ensure that the project manager is only accurate self reported its results to get the maximum profit. At the same time, it cans incentive managers to improve performance or reduce the cost. This paper focuses on setting up the model, analyzing the model parameters. And cite an example analyze them.
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Struhl, Ben
2013-01-01
Far too few students who enter college succeed in earning a certificate or degree. States are developing a range of strategies to increase college completion rates. Performance-based funding is an increasingly popular way for states to fund public colleges and universities: Produce more graduates; get more funding. The author suggests that in…
Cash Incentives and Turnover in Center-Based Child Care Staff
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Gable, Sara; Rothrauff, Tanja C.; Thornburg, Kathy R.; Mauzy, Denise
2007-01-01
The current study evaluates the Workforce INcentive Project (WIN), a programmatic effort to increase child care workforce stability in center- and home-based child care providers via the provision of bi-annual cash incentives based on educational attainment. Five hundred and thirteen center-based teaching staff (304 WIN and 209 comparison) and 167…
48 CFR 16.402-2 - Performance incentives.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Performance incentives. 16.402-2 Section 16.402-2 Federal Acquisition Regulations System FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION... appropriate in major systems contracts, both in development (when performance objectives are known and the...
45 CFR 305.34 - Payment of incentives.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... PROGRAM PERFORMANCE MEASURES, STANDARDS, FINANCIAL INCENTIVES, AND PENALTIES § 305.34 Payment of... performance data submitted by December 31st by the State and other States for that fiscal year. A positive or...
Clayton, Byron C.
2015-01-01
Successful corporate acquisitions require its managers to achieve substantial performance improvements in order to sufficiently cover acquisition premiums, the expected return of debt and equity investors, and the additional resources needed to capture synergies and accelerate growth. Acquirers understand that achieving the performance improvements necessary to cover these costs and create value for investors will most likely require a significant effort from mergers and acquisitions (M&A) management teams. This understanding drives the common and longstanding practice of offering hefty performance incentive packages to key managers, assuming that financial incentives will induce in-role and extra-role behaviors that drive organizational change and growth. The present study debunks the assumptions of this common M&A practice, providing quantitative evidence that shared vision and autonomous motivation are far more effective drivers of managerial performance than financial incentives. PMID:25610406
Clayton, Byron C
2014-01-01
Successful corporate acquisitions require its managers to achieve substantial performance improvements in order to sufficiently cover acquisition premiums, the expected return of debt and equity investors, and the additional resources needed to capture synergies and accelerate growth. Acquirers understand that achieving the performance improvements necessary to cover these costs and create value for investors will most likely require a significant effort from mergers and acquisitions (M&A) management teams. This understanding drives the common and longstanding practice of offering hefty performance incentive packages to key managers, assuming that financial incentives will induce in-role and extra-role behaviors that drive organizational change and growth. The present study debunks the assumptions of this common M&A practice, providing quantitative evidence that shared vision and autonomous motivation are far more effective drivers of managerial performance than financial incentives.
Incentives for college student participation in web-based substance use surveys.
Patrick, Megan E; Singer, Eleanor; Boyd, Carol J; Cranford, James A; McCabe, Sean Esteban
2013-03-01
The purpose of this study was to examine the effects of two incentive conditions (a $10 pre-incentive only vs. a $2 pre-incentive and a $10 promised incentive) on response rates, sample composition, substantive data, and cost-efficiency in a survey of college student substance use and related behaviors. Participants were 3000 randomly-selected college students invited to participate in a survey on substance use. Registrar data on all invitees was used to compare response rates and respondents, and web-based data collection on participants was used to compare substantive findings. Participants randomized to the pre-incentive plus promised incentive condition were more likely to complete the survey and less likely to give partial responses. Subgroup differences by sex, class year, and race were evaluated among complete responders, although only sex differences were significant. Men were more likely to respond in the pre-incentive plus promised incentive condition than the pre-incentive only condition. Substantive data did not differ across incentive structure, although the pre-incentive plus promised incentive condition was more cost-efficient. Survey research on college student populations is warranted to support the most scientifically sound and cost-efficient studies possible. Although substantive data did not differ, altering the incentive structure could yield cost savings with better response rates and more representative samples. Copyright © 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Finkelstein, Martin
The incentive grant approach in higher Education is a resource allocation strategy that may have significant positive impact on educational performance. This document covers: (1) the incentive grant approach to resource allocation; (2) the evolution during the past 15 years of types of incentive grant programs and the contrasting roles played by…
Greenberg, J; Pyszczynski, T; Paisley, C
1984-11-01
We conducted an experiment to assess the effect of extrinsic incentives on the use of test anxiety as a self-handicapping strategy. We hypothesized that although reports of anxiety may be greater when such symptoms can serve a defensive function, this effect occurs only when extrinsic incentives are low and not under conditions of high extrinsic incentive. Eighty-four male undergraduates anticipated taking a test of intellectual abilities and either were led to believe that test anxiety has no effect on test performance or were given no particular information about the relation between test anxiety and performance. Subjects were offered either +5 or +25 for obtaining the highest score on the test. Consistent with predictions, no-information subjects reported greater test anxiety before the test than did those who believed that test anxiety was unrelated to performance, but only when the extrinsic incentive for performance was low. However, these subjects did not report greater cognitive interference or exhibit lower test scores than did subjects in other conditions. It is tentatively suggested that the defensive strategy used by these subjects consisted of altering perceptions of anxiety, rather than anxiety itself. The implications of the absence of self-handicapping under high incentive conditions are discussed.
Causey, Kayla B; Bjorklund, David F
2014-11-01
Prospective memory (PM) is remembering to perform an action in the future and is crucial to achieving goal-directed activities in everyday life. Doing so requires that an intention is encoded, retained during a delay interval, and retrieved at the appropriate time of execution. We examined PM ability in preschool children by manipulating factors related to agency and incentive. We further explored how metacognition, executive functioning, and theory of mind-factors known to account for individual differences in PM-influenced performance on these PM tasks. A sample of 31 preschool children were asked to carry out a delayed intention or to remind an adult to carry out an intention that was of high or low incentive to the children. Findings indicated that individual differences in theory of mind were related to individual differences in preschoolers' performance on low-incentive PM tasks, independent of executive functioning contributions, whereas individual differences in executive functioning were related to performance on the high-incentive tasks. These findings suggest that changes in theory of mind and executive functioning are important to consider in models of PM and that different PM tasks (e.g., high vs. low incentive) may involve different cognitive requirements for young children. Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Perlman, David C; Friedmann, Patricia; Horn, Leslie; Nugent, Anne; Schoeb, Veronika; Carey, Jeanne; Salomon, Nadim; Des Jarlais, Don C
2003-09-01
Syringe-exchange programs (SEPs) have proven to be valuable sites to conduct tuberculin skin testing among active injection drug users. Chest x-rays (CXRs) are needed to exclude active tuberculosis prior to initiating treatment for latent tuberculosis infection. Adherence of drug users to referral for off-site chest x-rays has been incomplete. Previous cost modeling demonstrated that a monetary incentive to promote adherence could be justified on the cost basis if it had even a modest effect on adherence. We compared adherence to referral for chest x-rays among injection drug users undergoing syringe exchange-based tuberculosis screening in New York City before and after the implementation of monetary incentives. From 1995 to 1998, there were 119 IDUs referred for CXRs based on tuberculin skin testing at the SEP. From 1999 to 2001, there were 58 IDUs referred for CXRs with a $25 incentive based on adherence. Adherence to CXR referral within 7 days was 46/58 (79%) among individuals who received the monetary incentive versus 17/119 (14%) prior to the implementation of the monetary incentive (P<.0001; odds ratio [OR]=23; 95% confidence interval [CI]=9.5-57). The median time to obtaining a CXR was significantly shorter among those given the incentive than among those referred without the incentive (2 vs. 11 days, P<.0001). In multivariate logistic regression analysis, use of the incentive was highly independently associated with increased adherence (OR=22.9; 95% CI=10-52). Monetary incentives are highly effective in increasing adherence to referral for screening CXRs to exclude active tuberculosis after syringe exchange-based tuberculin skin testing. Prior cost modeling demonstrated that monetary incentives could be justified on the cost basis if they had even a modest effect on adherence. The current data demonstrated that monetary incentives are highly effective at increasing adherence in this setting and therefore are justifiable on a cost basis. When health care interventions for drug users require referral off site, monetary incentives may be particularly valuable in promoting adherence.
42 CFR § 414.1450 - APM incentive payment.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2017-10-01
... (CONTINUED) MEDICARE PROGRAM (CONTINUED) PAYMENT FOR PART B MEDICAL AND OTHER HEALTH SERVICES Merit-Based Incentive Payment System and Alternative Payment Model Incentive § 414.1450 APM incentive payment. (a) In... 42 Public Health 3 2017-10-01 2017-10-01 false APM incentive payment. § 414.1450 Section § 414...
Paying for performance: Performance incentives increase desire for the reward object.
Hur, Julia D; Nordgren, Loran F
2016-09-01
The current research examines how exposure to performance incentives affects one's desire for the reward object. We hypothesized that the flexible nature of performance incentives creates an attentional fixation on the reward object (e.g., money), which leads people to become more desirous of the rewards. Results from 5 laboratory experiments and 1 large-scale field study provide support for this prediction. When performance was incentivized with monetary rewards, participants reported being more desirous of money (Study 1), put in more effort to earn additional money in an ensuing task (Study 2), and were less willing to donate money to charity (Study 4). We replicated the result with nonmonetary rewards (Study 5). We also found that performance incentives increased attention to the reward object during the task, which in part explains the observed effects (Study 6). A large-scale field study replicated these findings in a real-world setting (Study 7). One laboratory experiment failed to replicate (Study 3). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved).
Rewards and Performance Incentives.
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Zigon, Jack
1994-01-01
Discusses rewards and performance incentives for employees, including types of rewards; how rewards help in managing; dysfunctional awards; selecting the right reward; how to find rewards that fit; and delivering rewards effectively. Examples are included. (three references) (LRW)
Influence of paper color and a monetary incentive on response rate.
King, Keith A; Vaughan, Jennifer L
2004-10-01
This study examined whether survey response rate differed based on the color of the paper the survey was printed on (blue vs green) and presence of a monetary incentive. A 4-page survey on eating disorders was mailed to Division 1A and 1AA college head athletic trainers (N=223) with half of the surveys on blue paper and half on green paper. Half of the athletic trainers (n = 111) received a $1.00 monetary incentive, and half (n = 112) received no monetary incentive. A total of 166 (71%) athletic trainers returned completed surveys. Response rates did not differ based on survey color but did differ based on presence of a monetary incentive. Athletic trainers who received a monetary incentive were significantly more likely than those who did not to return completed surveys (86% vs 63%, respectively).
What Makes for a Good Teacher and Who Can Tell? Working Paper 30
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Harris, Douglas N.; Sass, Tim R.
2009-01-01
Mounting pressure in the policy arena to improve teacher productivity either by improving signals that predict teacher performance or through creating incentive contracts based on performance--has spurred two related questions: Are there important determinants of teacher productivity that are not captured by teacher credentials but that can be…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Sommo, Colleen; Boynton, Melissa; Collado, Herbert; Diamond, John; Gardenhire, Alissa; Ratledge, Alyssa; Rudd, Timothy; Weiss, Michael J.
2014-01-01
In 2010, Hillsborough Community College (HCC), a large multicampus institution in Tampa, Florida, worked with MDRC to create the Mathematics Access Performance Scholarship (MAPS) program to help academically underprepared community college students succeed in developmental math. MAPS provides an incentive for low-income students referred to…
Performance Standards in Need-Based Student Aid. A CAPSEE Working Paper
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Scott-Clayton, Judith; Schudde, Lauren
2016-01-01
College attendance is a risky investment. But students may not recognize when they are at risk for failure, and financial aid introduces the possibility for moral hazard. Academic performance standards can serve three roles in this context: signaling expectations for success, providing incentives for increased student effort, and limiting…
What Are Achievement Gains Worth--to Teachers?
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Marsh, Julie A.; McCaffrey, Daniel F.
2011-01-01
In 2007, New York City schools commenced a school-level pay-for-performance program for teachers and staff in about 200 schools. The authors found that the program didn't improve schools or student outcomes. Why? Because the program failed to create conditions that theory suggests are necessary for performance-based incentive programs to change…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
What Works Clearinghouse, 2013
2013-01-01
This study examined the effect of IMPACT on teacher retention and performance. IMPACT is a high-stakes teacher evaluation system used in the District of Columbia public schools that gives teachers scores reflecting their performance in the classroom and the achievement of their students. Based on these scores, teachers were assigned to one of four…
Weindler, J; Kiefer, R T
2001-06-01
The study evaluated the impact of the additional imposed work of breathing (WBimp) generated by two different spirometers on postoperative incentive spirometry performance in patients at high risk and moderate risk for postoperative pulmonary complications (PPCs). Additionally, we investigated whether maximal inspiratory pressure (PImax) is an easy estimate of the WBimp imposed by incentive spirometers. Prospective, randomized, single-blind clinical trial. ICU of a university hospital. Thirty male patients were assigned to a group at high risk for PPCs (group A; inspiratory capacity [IC], < 1.6 L) or to a group at moderate risk for PPCs (group B; IC, 1.6 to 2.5 L) after upper-abdominal, thoracic, or two-cavity surgery. On the first or second postoperative day WBimp, IC, and PImax were recorded without spirometers (baseline) and during incentive spirometry with the Mediflo spirometer (Medimex; Hamburg, Germany) (high WBimp) and the Coach spirometer (Kendall; Neustadt, Germany) (low WBimp) using a pneumotachograph. In group A, the baseline and the ICs for both spirometers only differed slightly. In group B, the IC was significantly reduced for the Mediflo (p < 0.05), which imposed a WBimp twice as high as the Coach (p < 0.01). PImax was significantly increased for both the Mediflo and the Coach (p < 0.01). PImax was positively correlated with WBimp (r = 0.8). Incentive spirometers differ considerably in their additional Wbimp with a potential impact on the efficacy of postoperative incentive spirometry performance. PImax might be an easy clinical estimate for the WBimp during incentive spirometry. Incentive spirometers with low WBimp permit increased maximal sustained inspiration and, thus, enhanced incentive spirometry performance, and, therefore, it might be more suitable for use in postoperative respiratory care.
Hardin, Michael G; Schroth, Elizabeth; Pine, Daniel S; Ernst, Monique
2007-05-01
Developmental changes in cognitive and affective processes contribute to adolescent risk-taking behavior, emotional intensification, and psychopathology. The current study examined adolescent development of cognitive control processes and their modulation by incentive, in health and psychopathology. Predictions include 1) better cognitive control in adults than adolescents, and in healthy adolescents than anxious and depressed adolescents, and 2) a stronger influence of incentives in adolescents than adults, and in healthy adolescents than their depressed and anxious counterparts. Antisaccadic eye movement parameters, which provide a measure of cognitive control, were collected during a reward antisaccade task that included parameterized incentive levels. Participants were 20 healthy adults, 30 healthy adolescents, 16 adolescents with an anxiety disorder, and 11 adolescents with major depression. Performance accuracy and saccade latency were analyzed to test both developmental and psychopathology hypotheses. Development and psychopathology group differences in cognitive control were found. Specifically, adults performed better than healthy adolescents, and healthy adolescents than anxious and depressed adolescents. Incentive improved accuracy for all groups; however, incremental increases were not sufficiently large to further modulate performance. Incentives also affected saccade latencies, pushing healthy adolescent latencies to adult levels, while being less effective in adolescents with depression or anxiety. This latter effect was partially mediated by anxiety symptom severity. Current findings evidence the modulation of cognitive control processes by incentives. While seen in both healthy adults and healthy adolescents, this modulatory effect was stronger in youth. While anxious and depressed adolescents exhibited improved cognitive control under incentives, this effect was smaller than that in healthy adolescents. These findings suggest differential incentive and/or cognitive control processing in anxiety and depression, and across development. Differences could result from disorder specific, or combined developmental and pathological mechanisms.
Incentive-related modulation of cognitive control in healthy, anxious, and depressed adolescents
Hardin, Michael G.; Schroth, Elizabeth; Pine, Daniel S.; Ernst, Monique
2009-01-01
Background Developmental changes in cognitive and affective processes contribute to adolescent risk-taking behavior, emotional intensification, and psychopathology. The current study examined adolescent development of cognitive control processes and their modulation by incentive, in health and psychopathology. Predictions include 1) better cognitive control in adults than adolescents, and in healthy adolescents than anxious and depressed adolescents, and 2) a stronger influence of incentives in adolescents than adults, and in healthy adolescents than their depressed and anxious counterparts. Methods Antisaccadic eye movement parameters, which provide a measure of cognitive control, were collected during a reward antisaccade task that included parameterized incentive levels. Participants were 20 healthy adults, 30 healthy adolescents, 16 adolescents with an anxiety disorder, and 11 adolescents with major depression. Performance accuracy and saccade latency were analyzed to test both developmental and psychopathology hypotheses. Results Development and psychopathology group differences in cognitive control were found. Specifically, adults performed better than healthy adolescents, and healthy adolescents than anxious and depressed adolescents. Incentive improved accuracy for all groups; however, incremental increases were not sufficiently large to further modulate performance. Incentives also affected saccade latencies, pushing healthy adolescent latencies to adult levels, while being less effective in adolescents with depression or anxiety. This latter effect was partially mediated by anxiety symptom severity. Conclusions Current findings evidence the modulation of cognitive control processes by incentives. While seen in both healthy adults and healthy adolescents, this modulatory effect was stronger in youth. While anxious and depressed adolescents exhibited improved cognitive control under incentives, this effect was smaller than that in healthy adolescents. These findings suggest differential incentive and/or cognitive control processing in anxiety and depression, and across development. Differences could result from disorder specific, or combined developmental and pathological mechanisms. PMID:17501725
Khim, Keovathanak
2016-01-01
Background Financial incentives are widely used in performance-based financing (PBF) schemes, but their contribution to health workers’ incomes and job motivation is poorly understood. Cambodia undertook health sector reform from the middle of 2009 and PBF was employed as a part of the reform process. Objective This study examines job motivation for primary health workers (PHWs) under PBF reform in Cambodia and assesses the relationship between job motivation and income. Design A cross-sectional self-administered survey was conducted on 266 PHWs, from 54 health centers in the 15 districts involved in the reform. The health workers were asked to report all sources of income from public sector jobs and provide answers to 20 items related to job motivation. Factor analysis was conducted to identify the latent variables of job motivation. Factors associated with motivation were identified through multivariable regression. Results PHWs reported multiple sources of income and an average total income of US$190 per month. Financial incentives under the PBF scheme account for 42% of the average total income. PHWs had an index motivation score of 4.9 (on a scale from one to six), suggesting they had generally high job motivation that was related to a sense of community service, respect, and job benefits. Regression analysis indicated that income and the perception of a fair distribution of incentives were both statistically significant in association with higher job motivation scores. Conclusions Financial incentives used in the reform formed a significant part of health workers’ income and influenced their job motivation. Improving job motivation requires fixing payment mechanisms and increasing the size of incentives. PBF is more likely to succeed when income, training needs, and the desire for a sense of community service are addressed and institutionalized within the health system. PMID:27319575
45 CFR 305.32 - Requirements applicable to calculations.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... HUMAN SERVICES PROGRAM PERFORMANCE MEASURES, STANDARDS, FINANCIAL INCENTIVES, AND PENALTIES § 305.32... necessary to calculate performance for incentives and penalties for a fiscal year must be submitted to the... fiscal year. Only data submitted as of December 31st will be used to determine the State's performance...
48 CFR 1609.7101-1 - Community-rated carrier incentive performance elements.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-10-01
... incentive performance elements. 1609.7101-1 Section 1609.7101-1 Federal Acquisition Regulations System... performance elements. (a) Customer Service. This element is intended to assist OPM in achieving the goal of... and other measures as required contractually between OPM and the carrier. (This element will be...
48 CFR 1609.7101-1 - Community-rated carrier incentive performance elements.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-10-01
... incentive performance elements. 1609.7101-1 Section 1609.7101-1 Federal Acquisition Regulations System... performance elements. (a) Customer Service. This element is intended to assist OPM in achieving the goal of... and other measures as required contractually between OPM and the carrier. (This element will be...
48 CFR 1609.7101-1 - Community-rated carrier incentive performance elements.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-10-01
... incentive performance elements. 1609.7101-1 Section 1609.7101-1 Federal Acquisition Regulations System... performance elements. (a) Customer Service. This element is intended to assist OPM in achieving the goal of... and other measures as required contractually between OPM and the carrier. (This element will be...
Effect of motivation on academic fluency performance in survivors of pediatric medulloblastoma.
Holland, Alice Ann; Hughes, Carroll W; Harder, Lana; Silver, Cheryl; Bowers, Daniel C; Stavinoha, Peter L
2016-01-01
It has been proposed previously that extrinsic motivation may enable survivors of childhood medulloblastoma to significantly improve aspects of neurocognitive performance. In healthy populations, enhanced motivation has been shown to promote academic fluency, a domain likely more relevant to the educational outcomes of pediatric medulloblastoma survivors than academic skill development. The present study investigates the effect of enhanced extrinsic motivation on fluent (i.e., accurate and efficient) academic performance in pediatric medulloblastoma survivors. Participants were 36 children, ages 7-18, who had completed treatment for medulloblastoma. Participants completed a neuropsychological battery that included administration of equivalent tasks on Forms A and B of the Woodcock-Johnson III Tests of Achievement. Half were randomly assigned to an incentive condition prior to the administration of Form B. Provision of a performance-based incentive resulted in statistically significant improvement, but not normalization of function, in performance on measures of academic fluency. No demographic, treatment-related, academic, neuropsychological, or self-perception variables predicted response to incentive. Findings suggest that academic performance of survivors may significantly improve under highly motivating conditions. In addition to implications for educational services, this finding raises the novel possibility that decreased motivation represents an inherent neuropsychological deficit in this population and provides a rationale for further investigation of factors affecting individual differences in motivational processes. Further, by examining effort in a context where effort is not inherently suspect, present findings also significantly contribute to the debate regarding the effects of effort and motivation on neuropsychological performance.
Bärnighausen, Till; Bloom, David E
2009-06-26
In many countries worldwide, health worker shortages are one of the main constraints in achieving population health goals. Financial-incentive programmes for return of service, whereby participants receive payments in return for a commitment to practise for a period of time in a medically underserved area, can alleviate local and regional health worker shortages through a number of mechanisms. First, they can redirect the flow of those health workers who would have been educated without financial incentives from well-served to underserved areas. Second, they can add health workers to the pool of workers who would have been educated without financial incentives and place them in underserved areas. Third, financial-incentive programmes may improve the retention in underserved areas of those health workers who participate in a programme, but who would have worked in an underserved area without any financial incentives. Fourth, the programmes may increase the retention of all health workers in underserved areas by reducing the strength of some of the reasons why health workers leave such areas, including social isolation, lack of contact with colleagues, lack of support from medical specialists and heavy workload. We draw on studies of financial-incentive programmes and other initiatives with similar objectives to discuss seven management functions that are essential for the long-term success of financial-incentive programmes: financing (programmes may benefit from innovative donor financing schemes, such as endowment funds, international financing facilities or compensation payments); promotion (programmes should use tested communication channels in order to reach secondary school graduates and health workers); selection (programmes may use selection criteria to ensure programme success and to achieve supplementary policy goals); placement (programmes should match participants to areas in order to maximize participant satisfaction and retention); support (programmes should prepare participants for the time in an underserved area, stay in close contact with participants throughout the different phases of enrolment and help participants by assigning them mentors, establishing peer support systems or financing education courses relevant to work in underserved areas); enforcement (programmes may use community-based monitoring or outsource enforcement to existing institutions); and evaluation (in order to broaden the evidence on the effectiveness of financial incentives in increasing the health workforce in underserved areas, programmes in developing countries should evaluate their performance; in order to improve the strength of the evidence on the effectiveness of financial incentives, controlled experiments should be conducted where feasible). In comparison to other interventions to increase the supply of health workers to medically underserved areas, financial-incentive programmes have advantages--unlike initiatives using non-financial incentives, they establish legally enforceable commitments to work in underserved areas and, unlike compulsory service policies, they will not be opposed by health workers--as well as disadvantages--unlike initiatives using non-financial incentives, they may not improve the working and living conditions in underserved areas (which are important determinants of health workers' long-term retention) and, unlike compulsory service policies, they cannot guarantee that they will supply health workers to underserved areas who would not have worked in such areas without financial incentives. Financial incentives, non-financial incentives, and compulsory service are not mutually exclusive and may positively affect each other's performance.
Bärnighausen, Till; Bloom, David E
2009-01-01
In many countries worldwide, health worker shortages are one of the main constraints in achieving population health goals. Financial-incentive programmes for return of service, whereby participants receive payments in return for a commitment to practise for a period of time in a medically underserved area, can alleviate local and regional health worker shortages through a number of mechanisms. First, they can redirect the flow of those health workers who would have been educated without financial incentives from well-served to underserved areas. Second, they can add health workers to the pool of workers who would have been educated without financial incentives and place them in underserved areas. Third, financial-incentive programmes may improve the retention in underserved areas of those health workers who participate in a programme, but who would have worked in an underserved area without any financial incentives. Fourth, the programmes may increase the retention of all health workers in underserved areas by reducing the strength of some of the reasons why health workers leave such areas, including social isolation, lack of contact with colleagues, lack of support from medical specialists and heavy workload. We draw on studies of financial-incentive programmes and other initiatives with similar objectives to discuss seven management functions that are essential for the long-term success of financial-incentive programmes: financing (programmes may benefit from innovative donor financing schemes, such as endowment funds, international financing facilities or compensation payments); promotion (programmes should use tested communication channels in order to reach secondary school graduates and health workers); selection (programmes may use selection criteria to ensure programme success and to achieve supplementary policy goals); placement (programmes should match participants to areas in order to maximize participant satisfaction and retention); support (programmes should prepare participants for the time in an underserved area, stay in close contact with participants throughout the different phases of enrolment and help participants by assigning them mentors, establishing peer support systems or financing education courses relevant to work in underserved areas); enforcement (programmes may use community-based monitoring or outsource enforcement to existing institutions); and evaluation (in order to broaden the evidence on the effectiveness of financial incentives in increasing the health workforce in underserved areas, programmes in developing countries should evaluate their performance; in order to improve the strength of the evidence on the effectiveness of financial incentives, controlled experiments should be conducted where feasible). In comparison to other interventions to increase the supply of health workers to medically underserved areas, financial-incentive programmes have advantages – unlike initiatives using non-financial incentives, they establish legally enforceable commitments to work in underserved areas and, unlike compulsory service policies, they will not be opposed by health workers – as well as disadvantages – unlike initiatives using non-financial incentives, they may not improve the working and living conditions in underserved areas (which are important determinants of health workers' long-term retention) and, unlike compulsory service policies, they cannot guarantee that they will supply health workers to underserved areas who would not have worked in such areas without financial incentives. Financial incentives, non-financial incentives, and compulsory service are not mutually exclusive and may positively affect each other's performance. PMID:19558682
The impact of productivity-based incentives on faculty salary-based compensation.
Miller, Ronald D; Cohen, Neal H
2005-07-01
In industry and academic anesthesia departments, incentives and bonus payments based on productivity are accounting for an increasing proportion of a total compensation. When incentives are primarily based on clinical productivity, the impact on the distribution of total compensation to the faculty is not known. We compared a pure salary-based compensation methodology based entirely on academic rank to salary plus incentives and/or clinical productivity compensation (i.e., billable hours). The change in compensation methodology resulted in two major findings. First, the productivity-based compensation resulted in a large increase in the variability of total compensation among faculty, especially at the Assistant Professor rank. Second, the mean difference in total compensation between Assistant and Full Professors decreased. The authors conclude that this particular incentive plan, primarily directed toward clinical productivity, dramatically changed the distribution of total compensation in favor of junior faculty. Although not analytically investigated, the potential impact of these changes on faculty morale and distribution of faculty activities is discussed.
Luo, Renfu; Zhang, Linxiu; Sylvia, Sean; Shi, Yaojiang; Foo, Patricia; Zhao, Qiran; Martorell, Reynaldo; Medina, Alexis; Rozelle, Scott
2012-01-01
Objectives To test the impact of provider performance pay for anaemia reduction in rural China. Design A cluster randomised trial of information, subsidies, and incentives for school principals to reduce anaemia among their students. Enumerators and study participants were not informed of study arm assignment. Setting 72 randomly selected rural primary schools across northwest China. Participants 3553 fourth and fifth grade students aged 9-11 years. All fourth and fifth grade students in sample schools participated in the study. Interventions Sample schools were randomly assigned to a control group, with no intervention, or one of three treatment arms: (a) an information arm, in which principals received information about anaemia; (b) a subsidy arm, in which principals received information and unconditional subsidies; and (c) an incentive arm, in which principals received information, subsidies, and financial incentives for reducing anaemia among students. Twenty seven schools were assigned to the control arm (1816 students at baseline, 1623 at end point), 15 were assigned to the information arm (659 students at baseline, 596 at end point), 15 to the subsidy arm (726 students at baseline, 667 at end point), and 15 to the incentive arm (743 students at baseline, 667 at end point). Main outcome measures Student haemoglobin concentrations. Results Mean student haemoglobin concentration rose by 1.5 g/L (95% CI –1.1 to 4.1) in information schools, 0.8 g/L (–1.8 to 3.3) in subsidy schools, and 2.4 g/L (0 to 4.9) in incentive schools compared with the control group. This increase in haemoglobin corresponded to a reduction in prevalence of anaemia (Hb <115 g/L) of 24% in incentive schools. Interactions with pre-existing incentives for principals to achieve good academic performance led to substantially larger gains in the information and incentive arms: when combined with incentives for good academic performance, associated effects on student haemoglobin concentration were 9.8 g/L (4.1 to 15.5) larger in information schools and 8.6 g/L (2.1 to 15.1) larger in incentive schools. Conclusions Financial incentives for health improvement were modestly effective. Understanding interactions with other motives and pre-existing incentives is critical. Trial registration number ISRCTN76158086. PMID:22842354
Modulation of working memory function by motivation through loss-aversion
Krawczyk, Daniel C.; D’Esposito, Mark
2012-01-01
Cognitive performance is affected by motivation. Few studies, however, have investigated the neural mechanisms of the influence of motivation through potential monetary punishment on working memory. We employed functional MRI during a delayed recognition task that manipulated top-down control demands with added monetary incentives to some trials in the form of potential losses of bonus money. Behavioral performance on the task was influenced by loss-threatening incentives in the form of faster and more accurate performance. As shown previously, we found enhancement of activity for relevant stimuli occurs throughout all task periods (e.g. stimulus encoding, maintenance, and response) in both prefrontal and visual association cortex. Further, these activation patterns were enhanced for trials with possible monetary loss relative to non-incentive trials. During the incentive cue, the amygdala and striatum showed significantly greater activation when money was at a possible loss on the trial. We also evaluated patterns of functional connectivity between regions responsive to monetary consequences and prefrontal areas responsive to the task. This analysis revealed greater delay period connectivity between and the left insula and prefrontal cortex with possible monetary loss relative to non-incentive trials. Overall, these results reveal that incentive motivation can modulate performance on working memory tasks through top-down signals via amplification of activity within prefrontal and visual association regions selective to processing the perceptual inputs of the stimuli to be remembered. PMID:22113962
Marti, Joachim; Bachhuber, Marcus; Feingold, Jordyn; Meads, David; Richards, Michael; Hennessy, Sean
2017-01-01
Objectives Investigate the acceptability of financial incentives for initiating a medically supervised benzodiazepine discontinuation programme among people with long-term benzodiazepine use and to identify programme features that influence willingness to participate. Methods We conducted a discrete choice experiment in which we presented a variety of incentive-based programs to a sample of older adults with long-term benzodiazepine use identified using the outpatient electronic health record of a university-owned health system. We studied four programme variables: incentive amount for initiating the programme, incentive amount for successful benzodiazepine discontinuation, lottery versus certain payment and whether partial payment was given for dose reduction. Respondents reported their willingness to participate in the programmes and additional information was collected on demographics, history of use and anxiety symptoms. Results The overall response rate was 28.4%. Among the 126 respondents, all four programme variables influenced stated preferences. Respondents strongly preferred guaranteed cash-based incentives as opposed to a lottery, and the dollar amount of both the starting and conditional incentives had a substantial impact on choice. Willingness to participate increased with the amount of conditional incentive. Programme participation also varied by gender, duration of use and income. Conclusions Participation in an incentive-based benzodiazepine discontinuation programme might be relatively low, but is modifiable by programme variables including incentive amounts. These results will be helpful to inform the design of future trials of benzodiazepine discontinuation programmes. Further research is needed to assess the financial viability and potential cost-effectiveness of such economic incentives. PMID:28988167
Teacher Incentives in Developing Countries: Experimental Evidence from India. Research Brief
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
National Center on Performance Incentives, 2008
2008-01-01
In "Teacher Incentives in Developing Countries: Experimental Evidence from India"--a paper presented at the National Center on Performance Incentives research to policy conference in February--Karthik Muralidharan (Harvard University) and Venkatesh Sundararaman (The World Bank) present findings from a randomized experiment conducted in…
An incentive plan for professional fee collections at an indigent-care teaching hospital.
Stewart, M G; Jones, D B; Garson, A T
2001-11-01
The authors describe the implementation and development of an incentive plan to improve professional fee collections at an indigent-care teaching hospital. They theorized that an incentive plan based on relative value unit (RVU) productivity would increase billings and collections of professional fees. Unique RVU targets were set for individual services based on the number of faculty full-time equivalents and average reported productivity for academic physicians by specialty. The incentive plan was based on the level of expected faculty billings, measured in RVUs, for each department. A "base + incentive" model was used, with the base budget being distributed monthly throughout the year, and the incentive held as a "withhold" to be paid at the year's end only if the billing target in RVUs was met. Additionally, a task force worked with physician billing office and the hospital to improve collections. In the first year after implementation of the system was in place, important increases were noted in total RVU productivity (30.5% over the previous year) and in collections (49.5% over the previous year). Sixteen of 23 departments exceeded their incentive targets, and it was possible to make distributions of professional fees to those departments, to be used within the hospital system to enhance clinical services. Moreover, the plan created an overall positive attitude toward billings and documentation of faculty activities. The authors believe that this kind of incentive plan will be increasingly important for academic faculty working in public hospital systems.
Petersen, Laura A.; Simpson, Kate; Pietz, Kenneth; Urech, Tracy H.; Hysong, Sylvia J.; Profit, Jochen; Conrad, Douglas A.; Dudley, R. Adams; Woodard, LeChauncy D.
2014-01-01
Importance Pay for performance is intended to align incentives to promote high quality care, but results have been contradictory. Objective To test the effect of explicit financial incentives to reward guideline-recommended hypertension care. Design, Setting, and Participants Cluster randomized controlled trial of 12 Veterans Affairs hospital-based outpatient clinics with five performance periods and a 12-month washout. We enrolled 83 primary care physicians and 42 non-physician personnel (e.g., nurses, pharmacists) working with physicians to deliver hypertension care. Interventions Clinics randomized to one of four groups: physician-level (individual) incentives; practice-level incentives; individual- plus practice-level incentives (combined); or none. Intervention participants received up to five payments every four months; all participants could access feedback reports. Main outcome measures For each four-month period, the number of hypertensive patients among a random sample who achieved guideline-recommended blood pressure thresholds or received an appropriate response to uncontrolled blood pressure; and/or been prescribed guideline-recommended medications and the number who developed hypotension. Results Mean (standard deviation) total payments over the study were $4,270 ($459), $2,672 ($153), and $1,648 ($248) for the combined, individual, and practice-level interventions, respectively. The adjusted change over the study in patients meeting the combined blood pressure/appropriate response measure was 8.84 percentage points (95% confidence interval [CI], 4.20–11.80) for the individual-level, 3.70 (95% CI, 0.24–7.68) for the practice-level, 5.54 (95% CI, 1.92–9.52) for the combined, and 0.47 (95% CI, −3.12–4.04) for the control groups. For medications, the change was 9.07 (95% CI, 4.52–13.44), 4.98 (95% CI, 0.64–10.08), 7.26 (95% CI, 2.92–12.48), and 4.35 (95% CI, −0.28–9.28) percentage points, respectively. The adjusted estimated difference in the change between the proportion of patients with blood pressure control/appropriate response for individual incentive and control groups was 8.36 percentage points (95% CI, 2.40–13.00; P=.005). Use of guideline-recommended medications did not significantly change compared to controls, nor did the incidence of hypotension. The effect of the incentive was not sustained after a washout. Conclusions and Relevance Individual financial incentives, but not practice-level or combined incentives, resulted in greater blood pressure control or appropriate response to uncontrolled blood pressure; none of the incentives resulted in greater use of guideline-recommended medications or increased incidence of hypotension compared to controls. Further research is needed to understand the factors that contributed to our findings. Trial registration NCT00302718; www.clinicaltrials.gov PMID:24026599
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Kaimal, Girija; Jordan, Will J.
2016-01-01
Context: Policymakers have increasingly advocated for incentive-based approaches for improving urban schools. Purpose of the study: Few studies have examined the implementation of incentive based approaches in the urban charter school context. This paper presents research findings from a 4-year longitudinal study of the implementation of a…
Bertone, Maria Paola; Witter, Sophie
2015-07-28
Human resources for health represent an essential component of health systems and play a key role to accelerate progress towards universal health coverage. Many countries in sub-Saharan Africa face challenges regarding the availability, distribution and performance of health workers, which could be in part addressed by providing effective financial incentives. Based on an overview of the existing literature, the paper highlights the gaps in the existing research in low-income countries exploring the different components of health workers' incomes. It then proposes a novel approach to the analysis of financial incentives and delineates a research agenda, which could contribute to shed light on this topic. The article finds that, while there is ample research that investigates separately each of the incomes health workers may earn (for example, salary, fee-for-service payments, informal incomes, "top-ups" and per diems, dual practice and non-health activities), there is a dearth of studies which look at the health workers' "complex remuneration", that is, the whole of the financial incentives available. Little research exists which analyses simultaneously all revenues of health workers, quantifies the overall remuneration and explores its complexity, its multiple components and their features, as well as the possible interaction between income components. However, such a comprehensive approach is essential to fully comprehend health workers' incentives, by investigating the causes (at individual and system level) of the fragmentation in the income structure and the variability in income levels, as well as the consequences of the "complex remuneration" on motivation and performance. This proposition has important policy implications in terms of devising effective incentive packages as it calls for an active consideration of the role that "complex remuneration" plays in determining recruitment, retention and motivation patterns, as well as, more broadly, the performance of health systems. This paper argues that research focusing on the health workers' "complex remuneration" is critical to address some of the most challenging issues affecting human resources for health. An empirical research agenda is proposed to fill the gap in our understanding.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-01-01
... Definitions. Award means something bestowed or an action taken to recognize and reward individual or team... to, employee incentives which are based on predetermined criteria such as productivity standards, performance goals, measurement systems, award formulas, or payout schedules. Award program means the specific...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-01-01
... Definitions. Award means something bestowed or an action taken to recognize and reward individual or team... to, employee incentives which are based on predetermined criteria such as productivity standards, performance goals, measurement systems, award formulas, or payout schedules. Award program means the specific...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-01-01
... Definitions. Award means something bestowed or an action taken to recognize and reward individual or team... to, employee incentives which are based on predetermined criteria such as productivity standards, performance goals, measurement systems, award formulas, or payout schedules. Award program means the specific...
Kamb, M L; Rhodes, F; Hoxworth, T; Rogers, J; Lentz, A; Kent, C; MacGowen, R; Peterman, T A
1998-08-01
We studied the effect of small monetary incentives and non-monetary incentives of similar value on enrollment and participation in clinic based HIV/STD prevention counselling. We examined incident STDs to try to assess whether participants offered money may be less motivated to change risky behaviours than those offered other incentives. Patients from five US STD clinics were invited to enroll in a multisession risk reduction counselling intervention and, based on their enrollment date, were offered either $15 for each additional session or non-monetary incentives worth $15. The two incentive groups were compared on participants' enrollment, completion of intervention sessions, and new STDs over the 24 months after enrollment. Of 648 patients offered money, 198 (31%) enrolled compared with 160 (23%) of 696 patients offered other incentives (p = 0.002). Enrollees in the two incentive groups had similar baseline characteristics, including condom use. Of the 198 participants offered money, 109 (55%) completed all sessions compared with 59 (37%) of the participants offered other incentives (p < 0.0001). Comparing those offered money with those offered other incentives STD rates were similar after 6, 12, and 24 months. Small monetary incentives enhanced enrollment and participation compared with other incentives of similar value. Regardless of incentive offered, participants had similar post-enrollment STD rates, suggesting that the type of incentive does not adversely affect motivation to change behaviour. Money may be useful in encouraging high risk individuals to participate in and complete counselling or other public health interventions.
Measuring Success in Health Care Value-Based Purchasing Programs
Damberg, Cheryl L.; Sorbero, Melony E.; Lovejoy, Susan L.; Martsolf, Grant R.; Raaen, Laura; Mandel, Daniel
2014-01-01
Abstract Value-based purchasing (VBP) refers to a broad set of performance-based payment strategies that link financial incentives to health care providers' performance on a set of defined measures in an effort to achieve better value. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services is advancing the implementation of VBP across an array of health care settings in the Medicare program in response to requirements in the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, and policymakers are grappling with many decisions about how best to design and implement VBP programs so that they are successful in achieving stated goals. This article summarizes the current state of knowledge about VBP based on a review of the published literature, a review of publicly available documentation from VBP programs, and discussions with an expert panel composed of VBP program sponsors, health care providers and health systems, and academic researchers with VBP evaluation expertise. Three types of VBP models were the focus of the review: (1) pay-for-performance programs, (2) accountable care organizations, and (3) bundled payment programs. The authors report on VBP program goals and what constitutes success; the evidence on the impact of these programs; factors that characterize high– and low–performing providers in VBP programs; the measures, incentive structures, and benchmarks used by VBP programs; evidence on spillover effects and unintended consequences; and gaps in the knowledge base. PMID:28083347
Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014
2011-05-09
[email protected] and [email protected] . Information may also be found at the ETA Performance Web site: http://www.doleta.gov/performance . SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Four states (see Appendix) qualify to... and Family Literacy Act (AEFLA), are available for the eligible states to use through June 30, 2013...
Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014
2012-05-25
[email protected] and [email protected] . Information may also be found at the ETA Performance Web site: http://www.doleta.gov/performance . SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Eight states (see Appendix) qualify to... and Family Literacy Act (AEFLA), are available for the eligible states to use through June 30, 2014...
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Koffarnus, Mikhail N.; DeFulio, Anthony; Sigurdsson, Sigurdur O.; Silverman, Kenneth
2013-01-01
Advancing the education of low-income adults could increase employment and income, but adult education programs have not successfully engaged low-income adults. Monetary reinforcement may be effective in promoting progress in adult education. This experiment evaluated the benefits of providing incentives for performance in a job-skills training…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Lauen, Douglas Lee
2011-01-01
This study examines the incentive effects of North Carolina's practice of awarding performance bonuses on test score achievement on the state tests. Bonuses were awarded based solely on whether a school exceeds a threshold on a continuous performance metric. The study uses a sharp regression discontinuity design, an approach with strong internal…
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Brackney, Larry J.
North East utility National Grid (NGrid) is developing a portfolio-scale application of OpenStudio designed to optimize incentive and marketing expenditures for their energy efficiency (EE) programs. NGrid wishes to leverage a combination of geographic information systems (GIS), public records, customer data, and content from the Building Component Library (BCL) to form a JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) input file that is consumed by an OpenStudio-based expert system for automated model generation. A baseline model for each customer building will be automatically tuned using electricity and gas consumption data, and a set of energy conservation measures (ECMs) associated with each NGrid incentivemore » program will be applied to the model. The simulated energy performance and return on investment (ROI) will be compared with customer hurdle rates and available incentives to A) optimize the incentive required to overcome the customer hurdle rate and B) determine if marketing activity associated with the specific ECM is warranted for that particular customer. Repeated across their portfolio, this process will enable NGrid to substantially optimize their marketing and incentive expenditures, targeting those customers that will likely adopt and benefit from specific EE programs.« less
Should we pay the student? A randomised trial of financial incentives in medical education.
Raupach, Tobias; Brown, Jamie; Wieland, Anna; Anders, Sven; Harendza, Sigrid
2013-09-01
Financial incentives are effective in moderating physician and patient behaviour, but they have not been studied in the context of medical education. This study assessed whether financial incentives can motivate students to acquire electrocardiogram (ECG) interpretation skills. Students enrolled for a cardio-respiratory teaching module (n = 121) were randomised to an intervention (financial incentive) or a control (book voucher raffle) condition. All students took three validated exams of ECG interpretation skills (at module entry, module exit and seven weeks later). Only the exit exam was financially incentivised in the intervention group. The primary outcome was the proportion of students who correctly identified ≥60% of clinically important diagnoses in the exit exam. Financial incentives more than doubled the odds of correctly identifying ≥60% of diagnoses in the exit exam (adjusted odds ratio 2.44, 95% confidence interval 1.05-5.67) and significantly increased student learning time. However, there was no significant effect on performance levels in the retention exam. Financial incentives increase reported learning time and examination results in the short-term. The lack of a sustained effect on performance suggests that financial incentives may foster a superficial or strategic rather than a deep approach to learning.
Changes in Incentives, Rewards and Sanctions.
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Lonsdale, Alan
1993-01-01
A review of the literature over the past decade reflects substantial changes in rewards, incentives, and sanctions used with college faculty. These changes parallel changes in the public sector generally. Increasing emphasis on formal evaluation and on use of money as an incentive and reward for performance is noted. (MSE)
Financial incentives for exercise adherence in adults: systematic review and meta-analysis.
Mitchell, Marc S; Goodman, Jack M; Alter, David A; John, Leslie K; Oh, Paul I; Pakosh, Maureen T; Faulkner, Guy E
2013-11-01
Less than 5% of U.S. adults accumulate the required dose of exercise to maintain health. Behavioral economics has stimulated renewed interest in economic-based, population-level health interventions to address this issue. Despite widespread implementation of financial incentive-based public health and workplace wellness policies, the effects of financial incentives on exercise initiation and maintenance in adults remain unclear. A systematic search of 15 electronic databases for RCTs reporting the impact of financial incentives on exercise-related behaviors and outcomes was conducted in June 2012. A meta-analysis of exercise session attendance among included studies was conducted in April 2013. A qualitative analysis was conducted in February 2013 and structured along eight features of financial incentive design. Eleven studies were included (N=1453; ages 18-85 years and 50% female). Pooled results favored the incentive condition (z=3.81, p<0.0001). Incentives also exhibited significant, positive effects on exercise in eight of the 11 included studies. One study determined that incentives can sustain exercise for longer periods (>1 year), and two studies found exercise adherence persisted after the incentive was withdrawn. Promising incentive design feature attributes were noted. Assured, or "sure thing," incentives and objective behavioral assessment in particular appear to moderate incentive effectiveness. Previously sedentary adults responded favorably to incentives 100% of the time (n=4). The effect estimate from the meta-analysis suggests that financial incentives increase exercise session attendance for interventions up to 6 months in duration. Similarly, a simple count of positive (n=8) and null (n=3) effect studies suggests that financial incentives can increase exercise adherence in adults in the short term (<6 months). © 2013 American Journal of Preventive Medicine.
Performance Incentives: Their Growing Impact on American K-12 Education
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Springer, Matthew G., Ed.
2009-01-01
The concept of "pay for performance" for public school teachers is once again growing in popularity and use. U.S. education is now at a critical juncture that requires thoughtful and informed consideration of this policy innovation. "Performance Incentives" offers the most up-to-date and complete analysis yet of the…
Incentives and Their Dynamics in Public Sector Performance Management Systems
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Heinrich, Carolyn J.; Marschke, Gerald
2010-01-01
We use the principal-agent model as a focal theoretical frame for synthesizing what we know, both theoretically and empirically, about the design and dynamics of the implementation of performance management systems in the public sector. In this context, we review the growing body of evidence about how performance measurement and incentive systems…
48 CFR 215.404-71-2 - Performance risk.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-10-01
... incentive range when contract performance includes the introduction of new, significant technological innovation. Use the technology incentive range only for the most innovative contract efforts. Innovation may... reliability, or reduced costs; or (B) New products or systems that contain significant technological advances...
Optimisation of Healthcare Contracts: Tensions Between Standardisation and Innovation
Mikkers, Misja; Ryan, Padhraig
2016-01-01
An important determinant of health system performance is contracting. Providers often respond to financial incentives, despite the ethical underpinnings of medicine, and payers can craft contracts to influence performance. Yet contracting is highly imperfect in both single-payer and multi-payer health systems. Arguably, in a competitive, multi-payer environment, contractual innovation may occur more rapidly than in a single-payer system. This innovation in contract design could enhance performance. However, contractual innovation often fails to improve performance as payer incentives are misaligned with public policy objectives. Numerous countries seek to improve healthcare contracts, but thus far no health system has demonstrably crafted the necessary blend of incentives to stimulate optimal contracting. PMID:26927400
Marti, Joachim; Bachhuber, Marcus; Feingold, Jordyn; Meads, David; Richards, Michael; Hennessy, Sean
2017-10-06
Investigate the acceptability of financial incentives for initiating a medically supervised benzodiazepine discontinuation programme among people with long-term benzodiazepine use and to identify programme features that influence willingness to participate. We conducted a discrete choice experiment in which we presented a variety of incentive-based programs to a sample of older adults with long-term benzodiazepine use identified using the outpatient electronic health record of a university-owned health system. We studied four programme variables: incentive amount for initiating the programme, incentive amount for successful benzodiazepine discontinuation, lottery versus certain payment and whether partial payment was given for dose reduction. Respondents reported their willingness to participate in the programmes and additional information was collected on demographics, history of use and anxiety symptoms. The overall response rate was 28.4%. Among the 126 respondents, all four programme variables influenced stated preferences. Respondents strongly preferred guaranteed cash-based incentives as opposed to a lottery, and the dollar amount of both the starting and conditional incentives had a substantial impact on choice. Willingness to participate increased with the amount of conditional incentive. Programme participation also varied by gender, duration of use and income. Participation in an incentive-based benzodiazepine discontinuation programme might be relatively low, but is modifiable by programme variables including incentive amounts. These results will be helpful to inform the design of future trials of benzodiazepine discontinuation programmes. Further research is needed to assess the financial viability and potential cost-effectiveness of such economic incentives. © Article author(s) (or their employer(s) unless otherwise stated in the text of the article) 2017. All rights reserved. No commercial use is permitted unless otherwise expressly granted.
Han, Yafeng; Shen, Bo; Hu, Huajin; ...
2015-01-12
Ice-storage air-conditioning is a technique that uses ice for thermal energy storage. Replacing existing air conditioning systems with ice storage has the advantage of shifting the load from on-peak times to off-peak times that often have excess generation. However, increasing the use of ice-storage faces significant challenges in China. One major barrier is the inefficiency in the current electricity tariff structure. There is a lack of effective incentive mechanism that induces ice-storage systems from achieving optimal load-shifting results. This study presents an analysis that compares the potential impacts of ice-storage systems on load-shifting under a new credit-based incentive scheme andmore » the existing incentive arrangement in Jiangsu, China. The study indicates that by changing how ice-storage systems are incentivized in Jiangsu, load-shifting results can be improved.« less
2013-01-01
Background Recently both the UK and US governments have advocated the use of financial incentives to encourage healthier lifestyle choices but evidence for the cost-effectiveness of such interventions is lacking. Our aim was to perform a cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) of a quasi-experimental trial, exploring the use of financial incentives to increase employee physical activity levels, from a healthcare and employer’s perspective. Methods Employees used a 'loyalty card’ to objectively monitor their physical activity at work over 12 weeks. The Incentive Group (n=199) collected points and received rewards for minutes of physical activity completed. The No Incentive Group (n=207) self-monitored their physical activity only. Quality of life (QOL) and absenteeism were assessed at baseline and 6 months follow-up. QOL scores were also converted into productivity estimates using a validated algorithm. The additional costs of the Incentive Group were divided by the additional quality adjusted life years (QALYs) or productivity gained to calculate incremental cost effectiveness ratios (ICERs). Cost-effectiveness acceptability curves (CEACs) and population expected value of perfect information (EVPI) was used to characterize and value the uncertainty in our estimates. Results The Incentive Group performed more physical activity over 12 weeks and by 6 months had achieved greater gains in QOL and productivity, although these mean differences were not statistically significant. The ICERs were £2,900/QALY and £2,700 per percentage increase in overall employee productivity. Whilst the confidence intervals surrounding these ICERs were wide, CEACs showed a high chance of the intervention being cost-effective at low willingness-to-pay (WTP) thresholds. Conclusions The Physical Activity Loyalty card (PAL) scheme is potentially cost-effective from both a healthcare and employer’s perspective but further research is warranted to reduce uncertainty in our results. It is based on a sustainable “business model” which should become more cost-effective as it is delivered to more participants and can be adapted to suit other health behaviors and settings. This comes at a time when both UK and US governments are encouraging business involvement in tackling public health challenges. PMID:24112295
Dallat, Mary Anne T; Hunter, Ruth F; Tully, Mark A; Cairns, Karen J; Kee, Frank
2013-10-10
Recently both the UK and US governments have advocated the use of financial incentives to encourage healthier lifestyle choices but evidence for the cost-effectiveness of such interventions is lacking. Our aim was to perform a cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) of a quasi-experimental trial, exploring the use of financial incentives to increase employee physical activity levels, from a healthcare and employer's perspective. Employees used a 'loyalty card' to objectively monitor their physical activity at work over 12 weeks. The Incentive Group (n=199) collected points and received rewards for minutes of physical activity completed. The No Incentive Group (n=207) self-monitored their physical activity only. Quality of life (QOL) and absenteeism were assessed at baseline and 6 months follow-up. QOL scores were also converted into productivity estimates using a validated algorithm. The additional costs of the Incentive Group were divided by the additional quality adjusted life years (QALYs) or productivity gained to calculate incremental cost effectiveness ratios (ICERs). Cost-effectiveness acceptability curves (CEACs) and population expected value of perfect information (EVPI) was used to characterize and value the uncertainty in our estimates. The Incentive Group performed more physical activity over 12 weeks and by 6 months had achieved greater gains in QOL and productivity, although these mean differences were not statistically significant. The ICERs were £2,900/QALY and £2,700 per percentage increase in overall employee productivity. Whilst the confidence intervals surrounding these ICERs were wide, CEACs showed a high chance of the intervention being cost-effective at low willingness-to-pay (WTP) thresholds. The Physical Activity Loyalty card (PAL) scheme is potentially cost-effective from both a healthcare and employer's perspective but further research is warranted to reduce uncertainty in our results. It is based on a sustainable "business model" which should become more cost-effective as it is delivered to more participants and can be adapted to suit other health behaviors and settings. This comes at a time when both UK and US governments are encouraging business involvement in tackling public health challenges.
Profit incentives and the hospital industry: are we expecting too much?
Register, C A; Sharp, A M; Bivin, D G
1985-01-01
In the recent past, a great deal of faith has been placed in the idea that the performance of the hospital industry could be improved significantly by relying more heavily on profit incentives. This article considers the effect of profit incentives on hospital behavior and finds that the existence of profit incentives has not led the for-profit hospitals in the sample to behave in significantly different economic fashions than the nonprofits. PMID:3924860
Motivation and Organizational Incentives for High Vitality Teachers: A Qualitative Perspective.
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Sederberg, Charles H.; Clark, Shirley M.
1990-01-01
Minnesota teachers of the year (N=18) were interviewed to identify motivation and organizational incentives for exemplary classroom performance. Values and role behaviors of high-vitality teachers differ from those assumed by rational management models calling for incentives such as increased academic preparation, career ladders, and merit pay.…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Mertler, Craig A.
This study attempted to (1) expand the dichotomous classification scheme typically used by educators and researchers to describe teaching incentives and (2) offer administrators and teachers an alternative framework within which to develop incentive systems. Elementary, middle, and high school teachers in Ohio rated 10 commonly instituted teaching…
Chen, Tsung-Tai; Lai, Mei-Shu; Chung, Kuo-Piao
2016-02-01
To determine whether the magnitude of incentives or other design attributes should be prioritized and the most important attributes, according to physicians, of the diabetes P4P (pay-for-performance) program design. We implemented a discrete choice experiment (DCE) to elicit the P4P incentive design-related preferences of physicians. All of the physicians (n = 248) who participated in the diabetes P4P program located in the supervisory area of the northern regional branch of the Bureau of National Health Insurance in 2009 were included. The response rate was ∼ 60%. Our research found that the bonus type of incentive was the most important attribute, followed by the incentive structure and the investment magnitude. Physicians may feel that good P4P designs are more important than the magnitude of the investment by the insurer. The two most important P4P designs include providing the bonus type of incentive and using pay-for-excellence plus pay-for-improvement. © The Author 2015. Published by Oxford University Press in association with the International Society for Quality in Health Care; all rights reserved.
Rollins, K E; Aggarwal, S; Fletcher, A; Knight, A; Rigg, K; Williams, A R; Bhattacharjya, S
2013-05-01
This study aimed to assess the impact of early incentive spirometry on the incidence of chest infection in patients undergoing laparoscopic donor nephrectomy. A retrospective review on all consecutive laparoscopic donor nephrectomies (LDN) performed at a single institution from January 2008 to August 2012 was performed. We performed 84 LDN. Seventy patients had epidural analgesia continued for 48 hours postoperatively and 14 had a combination of spinal followed by oral analgesia. Incentive spirometry was introduced from July 2010 and 45 of the 84 donors used the spirometer as taught, both pre- and postoperatively. We performed 84 LDN; 39 patients did not receive incentive spirometers and had postoperative chest physiotherapy started on postoperative day 1. Of the 45 patients given incentive spirometers, 44 started using their spirometers as taught, after recovery once they were settled in the ward, 1 patient started the exercises the following day. In the group who received no spirometer, 5 patients had a chest infection. In the group of patients who started using their spirometers in the early perioperative period (44/45), no patient developed a chest infection. One patient in this group was excluded from the analysis because he started spirometer exercises on postoperative day 1. This patient did develop a chest infection. Our results suggest that early introduction of incentive spirometry after LDN significantly reduces the incidence of chest infection (P < .05); however, this benefit may be lost if the introduction of spirometry is delayed. Copyright © 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Rudasingwa, Martin; Uwizeye, Marie Rose
2017-01-01
Performance-based financing (PBF) was first implemented in Burundi in 2006 as a pilot programme in three provinces and was rolled out nationwide in 2010. PBF is a reform approach to improve the quality, quantity, and equity of health services and aims at achieving universal health coverage. It focuses on how to best motivate health practitioners. To elicit physicians' and nurses' experiences and views on how PBF influenced and helped them in healthcare delivery. A qualitative cross-sectional study was carried out among frontline health workers such as physicians and nurses. The data was gathered through individual face-to-face, in-depth, semi-structured interviews with 6 physicians and 30 nurses from February to March 2011 in three hospitals in Gitega Province. A simple framework approach and thematic analysis using a combination of manual technique and MAXQDA software guided the analysis of the interview data. Overall, the interviewees felt that the PBF scheme had provided positive motivation to improve the quality of care, mainly in the structures and process of care. The utilization of health services and the relationship between health practitioners and patients also improved. The salary top-ups were recognized as the most significant impetus to increase effort in improving the quality of care. The small and sometimes delayed financial incentives paid to physicians and nurses were criticized. The findings of this study also indicate that the positive interaction between performance-based incentive schemes and other health policies is crucial in achieving comprehensive improvement in healthcare delivery. PBF has the potential to motivate medical staff to improve healthcare provision. The views of medical staff and the context of the area of implementation have to be taken into consideration when designing and implementing PBF schemes.
20 CFR 666.230 - How does the Department determine the amounts for Incentive Grant awards?
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-04-01
... under WIA section 136(g)(2) resulting from funds withheld for poor performance by States; and (4) The... ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR PERFORMANCE ACCOUNTABILITY UNDER TITLE I OF THE WORKFORCE INVESTMENT ACT Incentives and Sanctions for State Performance § 666.230 How does the Department determine the amounts for...
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
What Works Clearinghouse, 2014
2014-01-01
"Transfer Incentives for High-Performing Teachers: Final Results from a Multisite Experiment," examined the impact of the Talent Transfer Initiative (TTI) on both student achievement and teacher retention in 10 school districts across seven states. The initiative gave bonuses to high-performing teachers for them to transfer to and stay…
Staffing a Low-Performing School: Behavioral Responses to Selective Teacher Transfer Incentives
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Protik, Ali; Glazerman, Steven; Bruch, Julie; Teh, Bing-ru
2015-01-01
We examine behavioral responses to an incentive program that offers high-performing teachers in ten school districts across the country $20,000 to transfer into the district's hardest-to-staff schools. We discuss behavioral responses to the program on high-performing teachers' willingness to transfer (supply) and the effect of the transfer offer…
On Supplementing “Foot in the Door” Incentives for eHealth Program Engagement
2014-01-01
Financial health incentives, such as paying people to lose weight, are being widely implemented by Western nations and large corporations. A growing number of studies have tested the impact of incentives on health behaviors, though few have evaluated the approach on a population-scale. In this issue of the Journal of Medical Internet Research, Liu et al add to the evidence-base by examining whether a single incentive can motivate enrollment and engagement in a preventive eHealth program in a sample of 142,726 Canadian adults. While the incentives increased enrollment significantly (by a factor of about 28), a very high level of program attrition was noted (90%). The “foot in the door” incentive technique employed was insufficient; enrollees received incentives for signing-up for, but not for engaging with, the eHealth program. To supplement this technique and drive sustained behavior change, several theoretically- and empirically-based strategies are proposed. Specifically, incentives indexed to behavioral achievements over time are highlighted as one approach to boost engagement in this population in the future. PMID:25092221
Zhang, Jingwen; Brackbill, Devon; Yang, Sijia; Becker, Joshua; Herbert, Natalie; Centola, Damon
2016-12-01
To identify what features of online social networks can increase physical activity, we conducted a 4-arm randomized controlled trial in 2014 in Philadelphia, PA. Students (n = 790, mean age = 25.2) at an university were randomly assigned to one of four conditions composed of either supportive or competitive relationships and either with individual or team incentives for attending exercise classes. The social comparison condition placed participants into 6-person competitive networks with individual incentives. The social support condition placed participants into 6-person teams with team incentives. The combined condition with both supportive and competitive relationships placed participants into 6-person teams, where participants could compare their team's performance to 5 other teams' performances. The control condition only allowed participants to attend classes with individual incentives. Rewards were based on the total number of classes attended by an individual, or the average number of classes attended by the members of a team. The outcome was the number of classes that participants attended. Data were analyzed using multilevel models in 2014. The mean attendance numbers per week were 35.7, 38.5, 20.3, and 16.8 in the social comparison, the combined, the control, and the social support conditions. Attendance numbers were 90% higher in the social comparison and the combined conditions (mean = 1.9, SE = 0.2) in contrast to the two conditions without comparison (mean = 1.0, SE = 0.2) (p = 0.003). Social comparison was more effective for increasing physical activity than social support and its effects did not depend on individual or team incentives.
Schofield, Heather; Loewenstein, George; Kopsic, Jessica; Volpp, Kevin G
2015-12-01
This study examines the impact of individually oriented, purely altruistic, and a hybrid of competitive and cooperative monetary reward incentives on older adults' completion of cognitive exercises and cognitive function. We find that all three incentive structures approximately double the number of exercises completed during the six-week active experimental period relative to a no incentive control condition. However, the altruistic and cooperative/competitive incentives led to different patterns of participation, with significantly higher inter-partner correlations in utilization of the software, as well as greater persistence once incentives were removed. Provision of all incentives significantly improved performance on the incentivized exercises. However, results of an independent cognitive testing battery suggest no generalizable gains in cognitive function resulted from the training. Copyright © 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Wolk, Adam; Wang, Erwin; Horak, Bernard; Cloonan, Patricia; Adams, Michael; Moore, Eileen; Jaipaul, Chitra Komal; Brown, Gabrielle; Dasgupta, Dabanjan; Deluca, Danielle; Grossman, Mila
2013-01-01
Evaluate the effect of a modest financial incentive on time-to-discharge summary dictation among medicine residents. Pay-for-performance incentives are used in a number of health care settings. Studies are lacking on their use with medical residents and other trainees. Timely completion of discharge summaries is necessary for effective follow-up after hospitalization, and residents perform the majority of discharge summary dictations in academic medical centers. Medicine residents with the lowest average discharge-to-dictation time during their 1-month inpatient medicine ward rotation were rewarded with a $50 gift card. Discharge data were captured using an autopopulating electronic database. The average discharge-to-dictation time was reduced from 7.44 to 1.84 days, representing a 75.3% decrease. Almost 90% of discharge summary dictations were performed on the day of discharge. A modest financial incentive resulted in a marked improvement in the time-to-discharge summary dictation by medicine residents. Pay-for-performance programs may be an effective strategy for improving the quality and efficiency of patient care in academic medical centers.
Levinson, W; Gorawara-Bhat, R; Dueck, R; Egener, B; Kao, A; Kerr, C; Lo, B; Perry, D; Pollitz, K; Reifsteck, S; Stein, T; Santa, J; Kemp-White, M
1999-10-20
Managed care uses financial incentives and restrictions on tests and procedures to attempt to influence physician decision making and limit costs. Increasingly, the public is questioning whether physicians are truly making decisions based on the patient's best interest or are unduly influenced by economic incentives. These circumstances lead to the potential for disagreements and conflict in the patient-physician relationship. We convened a group of individuals in October 1998, including patient representatives, leaders from health care organizations, practicing physicians, communication experts, and medical ethicists, to articulate the types of disagreements emerging in the patient-physician relationship as a result of managed care. We addressed 3 specific scenarios physicians may encounter, including allocation, illustrated by a patient who is referred to a different ophthalmologist based on a new arrangement in the physician's group; access, illustrated by a patient who wishes to see his own physician for a same-day visit rather than a nurse specialist; and financial incentives, illustrated by a patient who expects to have a test performed and a physician who does not believe the test is necessary but is afraid the patient will think the physician is not ordering the test because of financial incentives. Using these scenarios, we suggest communication strategies that physicians can use to decrease the potential for disagreements. In addition, we propose strategies that health plans or physician groups can use to alleviate or resolve these disagreements.
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Slater, Jonathan S.; Parks, Michael J.; Malone, Michael E.; Henly, George A.; Nelson, Christina L.
2017-01-01
Financial incentives are being used increasingly to encourage a wide array of health behaviors because of their well-established efficacy. However, little is known about how to translate incentive-based strategies to public health practice geared toward improving population-level health, and a dearth of research exists on how individuals respond…
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Yin, Honglian; Sun, Aihua; Liu, Quanru; Chen, Zhiyi
2018-03-01
It is the key of motivating sub-contractors working hard and mutual cooperation, ensuring implementation overall goal of the project that to design rational incentive mechanism for general contractor. Based on the principal-agency theory, the subcontractor efforts is divided into two parts, one for individual efforts, another helping other subcontractors, team Cooperation incentive models of multiple subcontractors are set up, incentive schemes and intensities are also given. The results show that the general contractor may provide individual and team motivation incentives when subcontractors working independently, not affecting each other in time and space; otherwise, the general contractor may only provide individual incentive to entice teams collaboration between subcontractors and helping each other. The conclusions can provide a reference for the subcontract design of general and sub-contractor dynamic alliances.
Effects of Social Incentives on Task Performance in the Elderly
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Levendusky, Philip G.
1978-01-01
The performance of 60 elderly volunteers on two cancellation tasks was examined under one of three experimental conditions: social praise, social reproof, or no comment. The clear implications from these data are that social incentives may well facilitate behavioral change in the aged. (Author)
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Walker, Richard M.; Boyne, George A.
2006-01-01
We present the first empirical assessment of the U.K. Labour government's program of public management reform. This reform program is based on rational planning, devolution and delegation, flexibility and incentives, and enhanced choice. Measures of these variables are tested against external and internal indicators of organizational performance.…
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Bird, L.; Reger, A.; Heeter, J.
Based on lessons from recent program experience, this report explores best practices for designing and implementing incentives for small and mid-sized residential and commercial distributed solar energy projects. The findings of this paper are relevant to both new incentive programs as well as those undergoing modifications. The report covers factors to consider in setting and modifying incentive levels over time, differentiating incentives to encourage various market segments, administrative issues such as providing equitable access to incentives and customer protection. It also explores how incentive programs can be designed to respond to changing market conditions while attempting to provide a longer-termmore » and stable environment for the solar industry. The findings are based on interviews with program administrators, regulators, and industry representatives as well as data from numerous incentive programs nationally, particularly the largest and longest-running programs. These best practices consider the perspectives of various stakeholders and the broad objectives of reducing solar costs, encouraging long-term market viability, minimizing ratepayer costs, and protecting consumers.« less
Koffarnus, Mikhail N.; DeFulio, Anthony; Sigurdsson, Sigurdur O.; Silverman, Kenneth
2018-01-01
Advancing the education of low-income adults could increase employment and income, but adult education programs have not successfully engaged low-income adults. Monetary reinforcement may be effective in promoting progress in adult education. This experiment evaluated the benefits of providing incentives for performance in a job-skills training program for low-income, unemployed adults. Participants worked on Typing and Keypad programs for 7 months. Participants randomly assigned to Group A (n=23) earned hourly and productivity pay on the Typing program (Productivity Pay), but earned only equalized hourly pay on the Keypad program (Hourly Pay). Group B (n=19) participants had the opposite contingencies. Participants worked more on, advanced further on, and preferred their productivity pay program. These results show that monetary incentives can increase performance in a job-skills training program, and indicate that payment in adult education programs should be delivered contingent on performance in the training program instead of simply on attendance. PMID:24114155
Koffarnus, Mikhail N; DeFulio, Anthony; Sigurdsson, Sigurdur O; Silverman, Kenneth
2013-01-01
Advancing the education of low-income adults could increase employment and income, but adult education programs have not successfully engaged low-income adults. Monetary reinforcement may be effective in promoting progress in adult education. This experiment evaluated the benefits of providing incentives for performance in a job-skills training program for low-income, unemployed adults. Participants worked on typing and keypad programs for 7 months. Participants randomly assigned to Group A (n = 23) earned hourly and productivity pay on the typing program (productivity pay), but earned only equalized hourly pay on the keypad program (hourly pay). Group B (n = 19) participants had the opposite contingencies. Participants worked more on, advanced further on, and preferred their productivity pay program. These results show that monetary incentives can increase performance in a job-skills training program, and indicate that payment in adult education programs should be delivered contingent on performance in the training program instead of simply on attendance. © Society for the Experimental Analysis of Behavior.
Bringing Managed Care Incentives to Medicare's Fee-for-Service Sector
Tompkins, Christopher P.; Wallack, Stanley S.; Bhalotra, Sarita; Chilingerian, Jon A.; Glavin, Mitchell P.V.; Ritter, Grant A.; Hodgkin, Dominic
1996-01-01
The Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) could work with eligible physician organizations to generate savings in total reimbursements for their Medicare patients. Medicare would continue to reimburse all providers according to standard payment policies and mechanisms, and beneficiaries would retain the freedom to choose providers. However, implementation of new financial incentives, based on meeting targets called Group-Specific Volume Performance Standards (GVPS), would encourage cost-effective service delivery patterns. HCFA could use new and existing data systems to monitor access, utilization patterns, cost outcomes and quality of care. In short, HCFA could manage providers, who, in turn, would manage their patients' care. PMID:10165712
Duckett, Stephen J
2008-01-01
Background Hospital policy involves multiple objectives: efficiency of service delivery, pursuit of high quality care, promoting access. Funding policy based on hospital casemix has traditionally been considered to be only about promoting efficiency. Discussion Formula-based funding policy can be (and has been) used to pursue a range of policy objectives, not only efficiency. These are termed 'adjunct' goals. Strategies to incorporate adjunct goals into funding design must, implicitly or explicitly, address key decision choices outlined in this paper. Summary Policy must be clear and explicit about the behaviour to be rewarded; incentives must be designed so that all facilities with an opportunity to improve have an opportunity to benefit; the reward structure is stable and meaningful; and the funder monitors performance and gaming. PMID:18384694
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
...), ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES PROGRAM PERFORMANCE MEASURES, STANDARDS, FINANCIAL INCENTIVES, AND PENALTIES § 305.0 Scope. This part implements the incentive system...
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Jeong, Dong Wook
2009-01-01
Many states provide incentives to students, teachers, and schools for the participation and success of students on Advanced Placement (AP) examinations administered by the College Board. The purpose of this article is to examine whether these incentives help students enroll and succeed in AP exams. An analysis of nationally representative AP exam…
Scott, Anthony; Sivey, Peter; Ait Ouakrim, Driss; Willenberg, Lisa; Naccarella, Lucio; Furler, John; Young, Doris
2011-09-07
The use of blended payment schemes in primary care, including the use of financial incentives to directly reward 'performance' and 'quality' is increasing in a number of countries. There are many examples in the US, and the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QoF) for general practitioners (GPs) in the UK is an example of a major system-wide reform. Despite the popularity of these schemes, there is currently little rigorous evidence of their success in improving the quality of primary health care, or of whether such an approach is cost-effective relative to other ways to improve the quality of care. The aim of this review is to examine the effect of changes in the method and level of payment on the quality of care provided by primary care physicians (PCPs) and to identify:i) the different types of financial incentives that have improved quality;ii) the characteristics of patient populations for whom quality of care has been improved by financial incentives; andiii) the characteristics of PCPs who have responded to financial incentives. We searched the Cochrane Effective Practice and Organisation of Care (EPOC) Trials Register, Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials (CENTRAL) and Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews (CDSR) (The Cochrane Library), MEDLINE, HealthSTAR, EMBASE, CINAHL, PsychLIT, and ECONLIT. Searches of Internet-based economics and health economics working paper collections were also conducted. Finally, studies were identified through the reference lists of retrieved articles, websites of key organisations, and from direct contact with key authors in the field. Articles were included if they were published from 2000 to August 2009. Randomised controlled trials (RCT), controlled before and after studies (CBA), and interrupted time series analyses (ITS) evaluating the impact of different financial interventions on the quality of care delivered by primary healthcare physicians (PCPs). Quality of care was defined as patient reported outcome measures, clinical behaviours, and intermediate clinical and physiological measures. Two review authors independently extracted data and assessed study quality, in consultation with two other review authors where there was disagreement. For each included study, we reported the estimated effect sizes and confidence intervals. Seven studies were included in this review. Three of the studies evaluated single-threshold target payments, one examined a fixed fee per patient achieving a specified outcome, one study evaluated payments based on the relative ranking of medical groups' performance (tournament-based pay), one study examined a mix of tournament-based pay and threshold payments, and one study evaluated changing from a blended payments scheme to salaried payment. Three cluster RCTs examined smoking cessation; one CBA examined patients' assessment of the quality of care; one CBA examined cervical screening, mammography screening, and HbA1c; one ITS focused on four outcomes in diabetes; and one controlled ITS (a difference-in-difference design) examined cervical screening, mammography screening, HbA1c, childhood immunisation, chlamydia screening, and appropriate asthma medication. Six of the seven studies showed positive but modest effects on quality of care for some primary outcome measures, but not all. One study found no effect on quality of care. Poor study design led to substantial risk of bias in most studies. In particular, none of the studies addressed issues of selection bias as a result of the ability of primary care physicians to select into or out of the incentive scheme or health plan. The use of financial incentives to reward PCPs for improving the quality of primary healthcare services is growing. However, there is insufficient evidence to support or not support the use of financial incentives to improve the quality of primary health care. Implementation should proceed with caution and incentive schemes should be more carefully designed before implementation. In addition to basing incentive design more on theory, there is a large literature discussing experiences with these schemes that can be used to draw out a number of lessons that can be learned and that could be used to influence or modify the design of incentive schemes. More rigorous study designs need to be used to account for the selection of physicians into incentive schemes. The use of instrumental variable techniques should be considered to assist with the identification of treatment effects in the presence of selection bias and other sources of unobserved heterogeneity. In randomised trials, care must be taken in using the correct unit of analysis and more attention should be paid to blinding. Studies should also examine the potential unintended consequences of incentive schemes by having a stronger theoretical basis, including a broader range of outcomes, and conducting more extensive subgroup analysis. Studies should more consistently describe i) the type of payment scheme at baseline or in the control group, ii) how payments to medical groups were used and distributed within the groups, and iii) the size of the new payments as a percentage of total revenue. Further research comparing the relative costs and effects of financial incentives with other behaviour change interventions is also required.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2017-10-01
...) HEALTH CARE INFRASTRUCTURE AND MODEL PROGRAMS EPISODE PAYMENT MODEL General Provisions § 512.2... model means the model testing CR incentive payments for CR/ICR service use made in accordance with... performance year means one of the years in which the CR incentive payment model is being tested. Performance...
20 CFR 628.325 - Incentive grants, capacity building, and technical assistance.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-04-01
..., exceeding title II performance standards (section 106(b)(7)). (2) Incentive grant funds under this section... give consideration to recognizing the performance of service providers within the State. (5) SDA's... capacity building and technical assistance efforts aimed at improving the competencies of the personnel who...
When and Why Do University Managers Use Publication Incentive Payments?
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Opstrup, Niels
2017-01-01
Pay-for-performance schemes have become a widespread management strategy in the public sector. However, not much is known about the rationales that trigger the adoption of performance-related pay provisions. This article examines managerial and organisational features of university departments in Denmark that use publication incentive payments.…
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-04-01
... 20 Employees' Benefits 3 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false What are the time frames under which States submit performance progress reports and apply for incentive grants? 666.205 Section 666.205 Employees... the time frames under which States submit performance progress reports and apply for incentive grants...
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
What Works Clearinghouse, 2015
2015-01-01
For the 2013 study, "Transfer Incentives for High-Performing Teachers: Final Results from a Multisite Randomized Experiment," researchers examined the impact of the Talent Transfer Initiative (TTI) on students' reading and mathematics achievement in 10 school districts. The TTI enabled principals of low-performing schools to provide…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Gutierrez de Blume, Antonio P.
2017-01-01
This study investigated the influence of strategy training instruction and an extrinsic incentive on American fourth- and fifth-grade students' (N = 35) performance, confidence in performance, and calibration accuracy. Using an experimental design, children were randomized to either an experimental group (strategy training and an extrinsic…
Turner, Jason S; Broom, Kevin D; Counte, Michael A
2015-01-01
Recent US legislation is attempting to transition inpatient Medicare payments to a value-based purchasing (VBP) program. The VBP program is a pay-for-performance (P4P) system that incentivizes hospitals to improve patient satisfaction, health outcomes, and adherence to clinical protocols while simultaneously holding down costs. Our study evaluates (1) the impact of financial performance on the VBP adjustments and (2) whether there is a correlation between the VBP adjustment and the financial performance of Missouri hospitals that opted into the program. While upward and downward adjustments to the inpatient base rate may be related to hospital financial performance, prior financial performance may also be related to the adjustments. Financial health may allow facilities to invest and position the hospital for favorable future P4P adjustments. The results of our analysis indicate the VBP adjustment to the inpatient base rate is very small (±0.18%), clustered around zero, and is not correlated with financial performance. We also find that financial performance and improvement in the years prior to the adjustment are not related to the VBP adjustment or its respective components. This suggests that CMS is avoiding penalizing less profitable facilities, but the adjustment is also so small and tightly clustered around zero that it is failing to provide an adequate incentive to hospitals. The costs of improving patient satisfaction, clinical process adherence, health care outcomes, and efficiency above that of peers coupled with the growing number of metrics being used to calculate the VBP adjustments call into question the financial incentives of the hospital VBP program.
Gajic, Aleksandra; Cameron, David; Hurley, Jeremiah
2012-12-01
We present the results of a randomized experiment to test the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of response incentives for a stated-preference survey of a general community population. The survey was administered using a mixed-mode approach, in which community members were invited to participate using a traditional mailed letter using contact information for a representative sample of the community; but individuals completed the survey via the web, which exploited the advantages of electronic capture. Individuals were randomized to four incentive groups: (a) no incentive, (b) prepaid cash incentive ($2), (c) a low lottery (10 prizes of $25) and (d) a high lottery (2 prizes of $250). Letters of invitation were mailed to 3,000 individuals. In total, 405 individuals (14.4%) contacted the website and 277 (9.8%) provided complete responses. The prepaid cash incentive generated the highest contact and response rates (23.3 and 17.3%, respectively), and no incentive generated the lowest (9.1 and 5.7%, respectively). The high lottery, however, was the most cost-effective incentive for obtaining completed surveys: compared with no incentive, the incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) per completed survey for high lottery was $13.89; for prepaid cash, the ICER was $18.29. This finding suggests that the preferred response incentive for community-based, stated-preference surveys is a lottery with a small number of large prizes.
Using Behavioral Economics to Design Physician Incentives That Deliver High-Value Care.
Emanuel, Ezekiel J; Ubel, Peter A; Kessler, Judd B; Meyer, Gregg; Muller, Ralph W; Navathe, Amol S; Patel, Pankaj; Pearl, Robert; Rosenthal, Meredith B; Sacks, Lee; Sen, Aditi P; Sherman, Paul; Volpp, Kevin G
2016-01-19
Behavioral economics provides insights about the development of effective incentives for physicians to deliver high-value care. It suggests that the structure and delivery of incentives can shape behavior, as can thoughtful design of the decision-making environment. This article discusses several principles of behavioral economics, including inertia, loss aversion, choice overload, and relative social ranking. Whereas these principles have been applied to motivate personal health decisions, retirement planning, and savings behavior, they have been largely ignored in the design of physician incentive programs. Applying these principles to physician incentives can improve their effectiveness through better alignment with performance goals. Anecdotal examples of successful incentive programs that apply behavioral economics principles are provided, even as the authors recognize that its application to the design of physician incentives is largely untested, and many outstanding questions exist. Application and rigorous evaluation of infrastructure changes and incentives are needed to design payment systems that incentivize high-quality, cost-conscious care.
Lynagh, Marita C; Sanson-Fisher, Rob W; Bonevski, Billie
2013-03-01
The use of financial incentives or pay-for-performance programs for health care providers has triggered emerging interest in the use of financial incentives for encouraging health behaviour change. This paper aims to identify key conditions under which the use of financial incentives for improvements in public health outcomes is most likely to be effective and appropriate. We review recent systematic reviews on their effectiveness in changing health behaviour and identify existing moral concerns concerning personal financial incentives. Current evidence indicates that incentives can be effective in driving health behaviour change under certain provisos, while a number of misgivings continue to be deliberated on. We outline a number of key principles for consideration in decisions about the potential use of incentives in leading to public health improvements. These key principles can assist policy makers in making decisions on the use of financial incentives directed at achieving improvements in public health.
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Spiteri, Arian; Nepalz, Sanjay K.
2006-01-01
Biodiversity conservation in developing countries has been a challenge because of the combination of rising human populations, rapid technological advances, severe social hardships, and extreme poverty. To address the social, economic, and ecological limitations of people-free parks and reserves, incentives have been incorporated into conservation programs in the hopes of making conservation meaningful to local people. However, such incentive-based programs have been implemented with little consideration for their ability to fulfill promises of greater protection of biodiversity. Evaluations of incentive-based conservation programs indicate that the approach continually falls short of the rhetoric. This article provides an overview of the problems associated with incentive-based conservation approaches in developing countries. It argues that existing incentive-based programs (IBPs) have yet to realize that benefits vary greatly at different “community” scales and that a holistic conceptualization of a community is essential to incorporate the complexities of a heterogeneous community when designing and implementing the IBPs. The spatial complexities involved in correctly identifying the beneficiaries in a community and the short-term focus of IBPs are two major challenges for sustaining conservation efforts. The article suggests improvements in three key areas: accurate identification of “target” beneficiaries, greater inclusion of marginal communities, and efforts to enhance community aptitudes.
Incentives to create and sustain healthy behaviors: technology solutions and research needs.
Teyhen, Deydre S; Aldag, Matt; Centola, Damon; Edinborough, Elton; Ghannadian, Jason D; Haught, Andrea; Jackson, Theresa; Kinn, Julie; Kunkler, Kevin J; Levine, Betty; Martindale, Valerie E; Neal, David; Snyder, Leslie B; Styn, Mindi A; Thorndike, Frances; Trabosh, Valerie; Parramore, David J
2014-12-01
Health-related technology, its relevance, and its availability are rapidly evolving. Technology offers great potential to minimize and/or mitigate barriers associated with achieving optimal health, performance, and readiness. In support of the U.S. Army Surgeon General's vision for a "System for Health" and its Performance Triad initiative, the U.S. Army Telemedicine and Advanced Technology Research Center hosted a workshop in April 2013 titled "Incentives to Create and Sustain Change for Health." Members of government and academia participated to identify and define the opportunities, gain clarity in leading practices and research gaps, and articulate the characteristics of future technology solutions to create and sustain real change in the health of individuals, the Army, and the nation. The key factors discussed included (1) public health messaging, (2) changing health habits and the environmental influence on health, (3) goal setting and tracking, (4) the role of incentives in behavior change intervention, and (5) the role of peer and social networks in change. This report summarizes the recommendations on how technology solutions could be employed to leverage evidence-based best practices and identifies gaps in research where further investigation is needed. Reprint & Copyright © 2014 Association of Military Surgeons of the U.S.
Ashcroft, Rachelle; Menear, Matthew; Silveira, Jose; Dahrouge, Simone; McKenzie, Kwame
2016-11-14
There is strong consensus that prevention and management of common mental disorders (CMDs) should occur in primary care and evidence suggests that treatment of CMDs in these settings can be effective. New interprofessional team-based models of primary care have emerged that are intended to address problems of quality and access to mental health services, yet many people continue to struggle to access care for CMDs in these settings. Insufficient attention directed towards the incentives and disincentives that influence care for CMDs in primary care, and especially in interprofessional team-based settings, may have resulted in missed opportunities to improve care quality and control healthcare costs. Our research is driven by the hypothesis that a stronger understanding of the full range of incentives and disincentives at play and their relationships with performance and other contextual factors will help stakeholders identify the critical levers of change needed to enhance prevention and management of CMDs in interprofessional primary care contexts. Participant recruitment began in May 2016. An explanatory qualitative design, based on a constructivist grounded theory methodology, will be used. Our study will be conducted in the Canadian province of Ontario, a province that features a widely implemented interprofessional team-based model of primary care. Semistructured interviews will be conducted with a diverse range of healthcare professionals and stakeholders that can help us understand how various incentives and disincentives influence the provision of evidence-based collaborative care for CMDs. A final sample size of 100 is anticipated. The protocol was peer reviewed by experts who were nominated by the funding organisation. The model we generate will shed light on the incentives and disincentives that are and should be in place to support high-quality CMD care and help stimulate more targeted, coordinated stakeholder responses to improving primary mental healthcare quality. Published by the BMJ Publishing Group Limited. For permission to use (where not already granted under a licence) please go to http://www.bmj.com/company/products-services/rights-and-licensing/.
48 CFR 1609.7101-1 - Community-rated carrier incentive performance elements.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-10-01
... “Enrollment Instructions” in the FEHB Supplemental Literature Guidelines in the FEHB contract. The contracting officer will evaluate this item based on the carrier's ability to accept electronic data transmission from the OPM designated electronic enrollment system and issue ID cards timely. (ii) Enrollment...
Using the lessons of behavioral economics to design more effective pay-for-performance programs.
Mehrotra, Ateev; Sorbero, Melony E S; Damberg, Cheryl L
2010-07-01
To describe improvements in the design of pay-for-performance (P4P) programs that reflect the psychology of how people respond to incentives. Investigation of the behavioral economics literature. We describe 7 ways to improve P4P program design in terms of frequency and types of incentive payments. After discussing why P4P incentives can have unintended adverse consequences, we outline potential ways to mitigate these. Although P4P incentives are increasingly popular, the healthcare literature shows that these have had minimal effect. Design improvements in P4P programs can enhance their effectiveness. Lessons from behavioral economics may greatly enhance the design and effectiveness of P4P programs in healthcare, but future work is needed to demonstrate this empirically.
Vaquero, Lucía; Cámara, Estela; Sampedro, Frederic; Pérez de Los Cobos, José; Batlle, Francesca; Fabregas, Josep Maria; Sales, Joan Artur; Cervantes, Mercè; Ferrer, Xavier; Lazcano, Gerardo; Rodríguez-Fornells, Antoni; Riba, Jordi
2017-05-01
Cocaine addiction has been associated with increased sensitivity of the human reward circuit to drug-related stimuli. However, the capacity of non-drug incentives to engage this network is poorly understood. Here, we characterized the functional sensitivity to monetary incentives and the structural integrity of the human reward circuit in abstinent cocaine-dependent (CD) patients and their matched controls. We assessed the BOLD response to monetary gains and losses in 30 CD patients and 30 healthy controls performing a lottery task in a magnetic resonance imaging scanner. We measured brain gray matter volume (GMV) using voxel-based morphometry and white matter microstructure using voxel-based fractional anisotropy (FA). Functional data showed that, after monetary incentives, CD patients exhibited higher activation in the ventral striatum than controls. Furthermore, we observed an inverted BOLD response pattern in the prefrontal cortex, with activity being highest after unexpected high gains and lowest after losses. Patients showed increased GMV in the caudate and the orbitofrontal cortex, increased white matter FA in the orbito-striatal pathway but decreased FA in antero-posterior association bundles. Abnormal activation in the prefrontal cortex correlated with GMV and FA increases in the orbitofrontal cortex. While functional abnormalities in the ventral striatum were inversely correlated with abstinence duration, structural alterations were not. In conclusion, results suggest abnormal incentive processing in CD patients with high salience for rewards and punishments in subcortical structures but diminished prefrontal control after adverse outcomes. They further suggest that hypertrophy and hyper-connectivity within the reward circuit, to the expense of connectivity outside this network, characterize cocaine addiction. © 2016 Society for the Study of Addiction.
Bhatnagar, Aarushi; George, Asha S
2016-09-01
In 2012, the Nigerian government launched performance-based financing (PBF) in three districts providing financial incentives to health workers based on the quantity and quality of service provision. They were given autonomy to use funds for operational costs and performance bonuses. This study aims to understand changes in perceived motivation among health workers with the introduction of PBF in Wamba district, Nigeria. The study used a qualitative research design to compare perceptions of health workers in facilities receiving PBF payments in the pilot district of Wamba to those that were not. In-depth semi-structured interviews (n = 39) were conducted with health workers from PBF and non-PBF facilities along with managers of the PBF project. Framework analysis was used to identify patterns and variations in responses. Facility records were collated and triangulated with qualitative data. Health workers receiving PBF payments reported to be 'awakened' by performance bonuses and improved working environments including routine supportive supervision and availability of essential drugs. They recounted being more punctual, hard working and proud of providing better services to their communities. In comparison, health workers in non-PBF facilities complained about the dearth of basic equipment and lack of motivating strategies. However, health workers from both sets of facilities considered there to be a severe shortage of manpower resulting in excessive workload, fatigue and general dissatisfaction. PBF strategies can succeed in motivating health workers by bringing about a change in incentives and working conditions. However, such programmes need to be aligned with human resource reforms including timely recruitment and appropriate distribution of health workers to prevent burn out and attrition. As people working on the frontline of constrained health systems, health workers are responsive to improved incentives and working conditions, but need more comprehensive support. © The Author 2016. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com.
When Payment Undermines the Pitch.
Barasch, Alixandra; Berman, Jonathan Z; Small, Deborah A
2016-10-01
Studies on crowding out document that incentives sometimes backfire-decreasing motivation in prosocial tasks. In the present research, we demonstrated an additional channel through which incentives can be harmful. Incentivized advocates for a cause are perceived as less sincere than nonincentivized advocates and are ultimately less effective in persuading other people to donate. Further, the negative effects of incentives hold only when the incentives imply a selfish motive; advocates who are offered a matching incentive (i.e., who are told that the donations they successfully solicit will be matched), which is not incompatible with altruism, perform just as well as those who are not incentivized. Thus, incentives may affect prosocial outcomes in ways not previously investigated: by crowding out individuals' sincerity of expression and thus their ability to gain support for a cause.
Pourat, Nadereh; Rice, Thomas; Tai-Seale, Ming; Bolan, Gail; Nihalani, Jas
2005-07-01
To examine the association between primary care physician (PCP) reimbursement and delivery of sexually transmitted disease (STD) services. Cross-sectional sample of PCPs contracted with Medicaid managed care organizations in 2002 in 8 California counties with the highest rates of Medicaid enrollment and chlamydia cases. The association between physician reimbursement methods and physician practices in delivery of STD services was examined in multiple logistic regression models, controlling for a number of potential confounders. Evidence of an association between reimbursement based on management of utilization and the PCP practice of providing chlamydia drugs for the partner's treatment was most apparent. In adjusted analyses, physicians reimbursed with capitation and a financial incentive for management of utilization (odds ratio [OR] = 1.63) or salary and a financial incentive for management of utilization (OR = 2.63) were more likely than those reimbursed under other methods to prescribe chlamydia drugs for the partner. However, PCPs least often reported they annually screened females aged 15-19 years for chlamydia (OR = 0.63) if reimbursed under salary and a financial incentive for productivity, or screened females aged 20-25 years (OR = 0.43) if reimbursed under salary and a financial incentive for financial performance. Some physician reimbursement methods may influence care delivery, but reimbursement is not consistently associated with how physicians deliver STD care. Interventions to encourage physicians to consistently provide guideline-concordant care despite conflicting financial incentives can maintain quality of care. In addition, incentives that may improve guideline-concordant care should be strengthened.
Pay-for-Performance Incentives: Holy Grail or Sippy Cup?
Caveney, Brian J
2016-01-01
The health care system is slowly evolving from fee-for-service care to other forms of payment. Pay-for-performance contracts based on quality, patient satisfaction, and utilization are an important development along the continuum. The metrics are not perfect and do not always nudge clinicians to improve their performance, but many outcomes are likely to improve. ©2016 by the North Carolina Institute of Medicine and The Duke Endowment. All rights reserved.
Acceptability of Financial Incentives for Health Behaviours: A Discrete Choice Experiment.
Giles, Emma L; Becker, Frauke; Ternent, Laura; Sniehotta, Falko F; McColl, Elaine; Adams, Jean
2016-01-01
Healthy behaviours are important determinants of health and disease, but many people find it difficult to perform these behaviours. Systematic reviews support the use of personal financial incentives to encourage healthy behaviours. There is concern that financial incentives may be unacceptable to the public, those delivering services and policymakers, but this has been poorly studied. Without widespread acceptability, financial incentives are unlikely to be widely implemented. We sought to answer two questions: what are the relative preferences of UK adults for attributes of financial incentives for healthy behaviours? Do preferences vary according to the respondents' socio-demographic characteristics? We conducted an online discrete choice experiment. Participants were adult members of a market research panel living in the UK selected using quota sampling. Preferences were examined for financial incentives for: smoking cessation, regular physical activity, attendance for vaccination, and attendance for screening. Attributes of interest (and their levels) were: type of incentive (none, cash, shopping vouchers or lottery tickets); value of incentive (a continuous variable); schedule of incentive (same value each week, or value increases as behaviour change is sustained); other information provided (none, written information, face-to-face discussion, or both); and recipients (all eligible individuals, people living in low-income households, or pregnant women). Cash or shopping voucher incentives were preferred as much as, or more than, no incentive in all cases. Lower value incentives and those offered to all eligible individuals were preferred. Preferences for additional information provided alongside incentives varied between behaviours. Younger participants and men were more likely to prefer incentives. There were no clear differences in preference according to educational attainment. Cash or shopping voucher-type financial incentives for healthy behaviours are not necessarily less acceptable than no incentives to UK adults.
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Frengki; Hubeis, Aida Vitayala; Affandi, M. Joko
2017-01-01
There are several ways that can be done to improve employee performance, among others, by motivating employees and improving work discipline. Increased motivation and discipline can be pursued by the provision of incentive. This study aims to analyze the influence of incentive on Andalas University's employee motivation and discipline and analyze…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Strunk, Katharine O.; McEachin, Andrew; Westover, Theresa N.
2014-01-01
The theory of action upon which high-stakes accountability policies are based calls for systemic reforms in educational systems that will emerge by pairing incentives for improvement with extensive and targeted technical assistance (TA) to build the capacity of low-performing schools and districts. To this end, a little discussed and often…
The Effect of Pharmacy Benefit Design on Patient-Physician Communication About Costs
Shrank, William H; Fox, Sarah A; Kirk, Adele; Ettner, Susan L; Cantrell, Clairessa H; Glassman, Peter; Asch, Steven M
2006-01-01
BACKGROUND Incentive-based formularies have been widely instituted to control the rising costs of prescription drugs. To work properly, such formularies depend on patients to be aware of financial incentives and communicate their cost preferences with prescribing physicians. The impact of financial incentives on patient awareness of and communication about those costs is unknown. OBJECTIVE To evaluate the relationship between enrollment in incentive-based pharmacy benefit plans and awareness of out-of-pocket costs and rates of communication about out-of-pocket costs. DESIGN A matched telephone survey of patients and their primary care physicians. SETTING Los Angeles County. PARTICIPANTS One thousand nine hundred and seventeen patients aged 53 to 82 (73% response rate). MEASUREMENTS Patient-reported pharmacy benefit design, knowledge of out-of-pocket costs, and discussion of out-of-pocket costs with physicians. RESULTS Sixty-two percent of patients who had prescription drug coverage and were aware of their pharmacy benefit design reported being enrolled in incentive-based plans. The majority of these (54%) were “never” or only “sometimes” aware of their out-of-pocket cost requirements at the time of the physician visit. After controlling for numerous physician and patient level variables, we found that patients enrolled in pharmacy benefit designs requiring no copayments were more likely to report they “never” discuss out-of-pocket costs with physicians compared with patients enrolled in incentive-based pharmacy benefit designs (81% vs 67%, P =.001) and patients with no prescription druginsurance (57%, P <.001). CONCLUSIONS Incentive-based pharmacy benefit plans and lack of insurance are associated with increased rates of discussions about out-of-pocket costs. Nonetheless, most incentive-based enrollees are unaware of out-of-pocket costswhen prescriptions are written and never discuss out-of-pocket costs with their physicians, likely mitigating the effectiveness of financial incentives to guide decision making. Considering that out-of-pocket costs are associated with adherence to medical therapy, interventions to improve patient access to out-of-pocket cost information and the frequency of patient-physician discussions about costs are needed. PMID:16686808
The National Shipbuilding Research Program Executive Summary Robotics in Shipbuilding Workshop
1981-01-01
based on technoeconomic analysis and consideration environment. of working c-c-2 (3) The conceptual designs were based on application of commercial...results of our study. We identified shipbuilding tasks that should be performed by industrial robots based on technoeconomic and working-life incentives...is the TV image of the illuminated workplaces. The image is analyzed by the computer. The analysis includes noise rejection and fitting of straight
Giving University Students Incentives to Do Homework Improves Their Performance
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Radhakrishnan, Phanikiran; Lam, Dianne; Ho, Geoffrey
2009-01-01
Past research has focused on either the positive influence of incentives on homework completion (Cullen, Cullen, Hayhow, & Plouffe, 1975) or the positive influence of homework completion on academic performance (Cooper, Robinson, & Patall, 2006). Our study is one of the first to integrate these two streams of research to examine whether higher…
The Best Laid Plans: Pay for Performance Incentive Programs for School Leaders
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Goff, Peter; Goldring, Ellen; Canney, Melissa
2016-01-01
In an era of heightened accountability and limited fiscal resources, school districts have sought novel ways to increase the effectiveness of their principals in an effort to increase student proficiency. To address these needs, some districts have turned to pay-for-performance programs, aligning leadership goals with financial incentives to…
Individual- versus group-based financial incentives for weight loss: a randomized, controlled trial.
Kullgren, Jeffrey T; Troxel, Andrea B; Loewenstein, George; Asch, David A; Norton, Laurie A; Wesby, Lisa; Tao, Yuanyuan; Zhu, Jingsan; Volpp, Kevin G
2013-04-02
Data on the effectiveness of employer-sponsored financial incentives for employee weight loss are limited. To test the effectiveness of 2 financial incentive designs for promoting weight loss among obese employees. Randomized, controlled trial. (ClinicalTrials.gov: NCT01208350) Children's Hospital of Philadelphia. 105 employees with a body mass index between 30 and 40 kg/m2. 24 weeks of monthly weigh-ins (control group; n = 35); individual incentive, designed as $100 per person per month for meeting or exceeding weight-loss goals (n = 35); and group incentive, designed as $500 per month split among participants within groups of 5 who met or exceeded weight-loss goals (n = 35). Weight loss after 24 weeks (primary outcome) and 36 weeks and changes in behavioral mediators of weight loss (secondary outcomes). Group-incentive participants lost more weight than control participants (mean between-group difference, 4.4 kg [95% CI, 2.0 to 6.7 kg]; P < 0.001) and individual-incentive participants (mean between-group difference, 3.2 kg [CI, 0.9 to 5.5 kg]; P = 0.008). Twelve weeks after incentives ended and after adjustment for 3-group comparisons, group-incentive participants maintained greater weight loss than control group participants (mean between-group difference, 2.9 kg [CI, 0.5 to 5.3 kg]; P = 0.016) but not greater than individual-incentive participants (mean between-group difference, 2.7 kg [CI, 0.4 to 5.0 kg]; P = 0.024). Single employer and short follow-up. A group-based financial incentive was more effective than an individual incentive and monthly weigh-ins at promoting weight loss among obese employees at 24 weeks. National Institute on Aging.
Sarin, Enisha; Lunsford, Sarah Smith; Sooden, Ankur; Rai, Sanjay; Livesley, Nigel
2016-01-01
Incentives play an important role in motivating community health workers (CHWs). In India, accredited social health activists (ASHAs) are female CHWs who provide a range of services, including those specific to reproductive, maternal, neonatal, child, and adolescent health. Qualitative interviews were conducted with 49 ASHAs and one of their family members (husband, mother-in-law, sister-in-law, or son) from Gurdaspur and Mewat districts to explore the role of family, community, and health system in supporting ASHAs in their work. Thematic analysis revealed that incentives were both empowering and a source of distress for ASHAs and their families. Earning income and contributing to the household's financial wellbeing inspired a sense of financial independence and self-confidence for ASHAs, especially with respect to relations with their husbands and parents-in-law. In spite of the empowering effects of the incentives, they were a cause of distress. Low incentive rates relative to the level of effort required to complete ASHA responsibilities, compounded by irregular and incomplete payment, put pressure on families. ASHAs dedicated much of their time and own resources to perform their duties, drawing them away from their household responsibilities. Communication around incentives from supervisors may have led ASHAs to prioritize and promote those services that yielded higher incentives, as opposed to focusing on the most appropriate services for the client. ASHAs and their families maintained hope that their positions would eventually bring in a regular salary, which contributed to retention of ASHAs. Incentives, therefore, are both motivating and inspiring as well as a cause dissatisfaction among ASHAs and their families. Recommendations include revising the incentive scheme to be responsive to the time and effort required to complete tasks and the out-of-pocket costs incurred while working as an ASHA; improve communication to ASHAs on incentives and responsibilities; and ensure timely and complete payment of incentives to ASHAs. The findings from this study contribute to the existing literature on incentivized CHW programs and help throw added light on the role incentives play in family dynamics which affects performance of CHW.
Districts Abandon Grants Targeting Teacher Quality
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Zubrzycki, Jaclyn
2012-01-01
Three big-city districts--Chicago, Milwaukee, and New York--have terminated federal grants aimed at promoting performance-based compensation plans and professional development for teachers and principals. Overall, the 2010 Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) grants to the three districts would have provided an $88 million payout over five years--nearly 7…
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Ferriere, D.; Rucinski, A.; Jankowski, T.
2007-04-01
Establishing a Virtual Sea Border by performing a real-time, satellite-accessible Internet-based bio-metric supported threat assessment of arriving foreign-flagged cargo ships, their management and ownership, their arrival terminal operator and owner, and rewarding proven legitimate operators with an economic incentive for their transparency will simultaneously improve port security and maritime transportation efficiencies.
Teamwork Key for Pilot Plans on Teacher Pay
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Sawchuk, Stephen
2008-01-01
A variety of federally financed grants based on performance pay are providing insights into how districts and teachers can collaborate to implement sustainable programs designed to improve teaching and learning. The question of whether those Teacher Incentive Fund grants will yield measurably higher student achievement, applicant pools with…
Contractor Incentives for Success in Implementing Performance-Based Logistics: A Progress Report
2010-04-30
amount of risk; this, however, gives the contractor more latitude in determining and applying its methods ( KMC /OPI, 2010). The general consensus...Klevan, P. (2008, October 27). Navy success with PBL. Presentation at the DoD Maintenance Symposium. KMC /OPI. (2010, January 19). Acquisition
The effect of task demand and incentive on neurophysiological and cardiovascular markers of effort.
Fairclough, Stephen H; Ewing, Kate
2017-09-01
According to motivational intensity theory, effort is proportional to the level of task demand provided that success is possible and successful performance is deemed worthwhile. The current study represents a simultaneous manipulation of demand (working memory load) and success importance (financial incentive) to investigate neurophysiological (EEG) and cardiovascular measures of effort. A 2×2 repeated-measures study was conducted where 18 participants performed a n-back task under three conditions of demand: easy (1-back), hard (4-back) and very hard (7-back). In addition, participants performed these tasks in the presence of performance-contingent financial incentive or in a no-incentive (pilot trial) condition. Three bands of EEG activity were quantified: theta (4-7Hz), lower-alpha (7.5-10Hz) and upper-alpha (10.5-13Hz). Fronto-medial activity in the theta band and activity in the upper-alpha band at frontal, central and parietal sites were sensitive to demand and indicated greatest effort when the task was challenging and success was possible. Mean systolic blood pressure and activity in the lower-alpha band at parietal sites were also sensitive to demand but also increased in the incentive condition across all levels of task demand. The results of the study largely support the predictions of motivational intensity using neurophysiological markers of effort. Copyright © 2017. Published by Elsevier B.V.
Predicting incentives to change among adolescents with substance abuse disorder.
Breda, Carolyn; Heflinger, Craig Anne
2004-05-01
While interest in understanding the incentives to change among individuals with substance abuse disorders is growing, little is known about incentives among adolescents with substance abuse disorders who are participating in formal services. The present research assesses the degree and nature of motivation and treatment readiness among adolescents admitted to substance abuse services, and whether such factors vary across significant subgroups of youth based on their social, legal, or clinical profiles. Data are based on interviews with 249 youth between 12 and 18 years of age who have been admitted to either inpatient, residential, or outpatient substance abuse treatment. Measures are adapted from an instrument developed to assess multiple domains of motivation to change (e.g., intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, treatment readiness). Results suggest that the incentive to change among adolescents with substance-abusing behavior is modest at best, regardless of dimension. Nonetheless, ethnicity, type of substance use, and psychopathology significantly predict incentives to change, though the predictors depend on which dimension is considered. The most robust predictor of incentives is the severity of negative consequences associated with youth's substance use--the greater the severity, the greater the incentives. Findings underscore the need to examine the utility and dimensionality of incentive for treatment planning, while at the same time, they identify factors that treatment planners can consider as they seek ways to enhance incentives and help adolescents with substance use disorders attain positive outcomes.
State Adoption of Incentives to Promote Evidence-Based Practices in Behavioral Health Systems.
Stewart, Rebecca E; Marcus, Steven C; Hadley, Trevor R; Hepburn, Brian M; Mandell, David S
2018-06-01
Despite the critical role behavioral health care payers can play in creating an incentive to use evidence-based practices (EBPs), little research has examined which incentives are used in public mental health systems, the largest providers of mental health care in the United States. The authors surveyed state mental health directors from 44 states about whether they used any of seven strategies to increase the use of EBPs. Participants also ranked attributes of each incentive on the basis of key characteristics of diffusion of innovation theory (perceived advantage, simplicity, compatibility, observability, and gradually implementable) and perceived effectiveness. Almost three-quarters of state directors endorsed using at least one financial incentive; most paid for training and technical assistance. Few used other incentives. Strategies perceived as simple and compatible were more readily adopted. Enhanced rates and paying for better outcomes were perceived as the most effective but were the least deployed, suggesting that simplicity and organizational compatibility may be the most decisive factors when choosing incentives. Payers are not using the incentives they perceive as most effective, and they are mostly using only one strategy for reasons of simplicity and compatibility. Future work should focus on barriers to measurement that likely hinder the adoption and implementation of paying for better outcomes and enhanced reimbursement rates, with the ultimate goal of measuring the effectiveness of incentives on EBP implementation efforts.
Kelly Bricker; Stuart Cottrell; Peter Verhoven
1998-01-01
The purpose of this empirical study was to examine benefits sought from an incentive travel experience prior to departure and individuals' subsequent involvement in various activities during the experience. During September-November, 1996, a California-based adventure travel company organized two incentive travel experiences to Fiji and Kenya for radio stations in...
Analysis of alternative strategies for energy conservation in new buildings
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Fang, J. M.; Tawil, J.
1980-12-01
The policy instruments considered include: greater reliance on market forces; research and development; information, education and demonstration programs; tax incentives and sanctions; mortgage and finance programs; and regulations and standards. The analysis starts with an explanation of the barriers to energy conservation in the residential and commercial sectors. Individual policy instruments are described and evaluated with respect to energy conservation, economic efficiency, equity, political impacts, and implementation and other transitional impacts. Five possible strategies are identified: (1) increased reliance on the market place; (2) energy consumption tax and supply subsidies; (3) Building Energy Performance Standards (BEPS) with no sanctions and no incentives; (4) BEPS with sanctions and incentives (price control); and (5) BEPS with sanctions and incentives (no price controls). A comparative analysis is performed. Elements are proposed for inclusion in a comprehensive strategy for conservation in new buildings.
Morean, Meghan E.; Camenga, Deepa R.; Kong, Grace; Cavallo, Dana A.; Schepis, Ty S.
2014-01-01
Behavioral incentives have been used to encourage smoking cessation in older adolescents, but the acceptability of incentives to promote a smoke-free lifestyle in younger adolescents is unknown. To inform the development of novel, effective, school-based interventions for youth, we assessed middle school students' interest in participating in an incentive-based tobacco abstinence program. We surveyed 988 students (grades 6–8) attending three Connecticut middle schools to determine whether interest in program participation varied as a function of (1) intrapersonal factors (i.e., demographic characteristics (sex, age, race), smoking history, and trait impulsivity) and/or (2) aspects of program design (i.e., prize type, value, and reward frequency). Primary analyses were conducted using multiple regression. A majority of students (61.8%) reported interest in program participation. Interest did not vary by gender, smoking risk status, or offering cash prizes. However, younger students, non-Caucasian students, behaviorally impulsive students, and students with higher levels of self-regulation were more likely to report interest. Inexpensive awards (e.g., video games) offered monthly motivated program interest. In sum, middle school students reported high levels of interest in an incentive-based program to encourage a tobacco-free lifestyle. These formative data can inform the design of effective, incentive-based smoking cessation and prevention programs in middle schools. PMID:25147747
The Theory of Value-Based Payment Incentives and Their Application to Health Care.
Conrad, Douglas A
2015-12-01
To present the implications of agency theory in microeconomics, augmented by behavioral economics, for different methods of value-based payment in health care; and to derive a set of future research questions and policy recommendations based on that conceptual analysis. Original literature of agency theory, and secondarily behavioral economics, combined with applied research and empirical evidence on the application of those principles to value-based payment. Conceptual analysis and targeted review of theoretical research and empirical literature relevant to value-based payment in health care. Agency theory and secondarily behavioral economics have powerful implications for design of value-based payment in health care. To achieve improved value-better patient experience, clinical quality, health outcomes, and lower costs of care-high-powered incentives should directly target improved care processes, enhanced patient experience, and create achievable benchmarks for improved outcomes. Differing forms of value-based payment (e.g., shared savings and risk, reference pricing, capitation, and bundled payment), coupled with adjunct incentives for quality and efficiency, can be tailored to different market conditions and organizational settings. Payment contracts that are "incentive compatible"-which directly encourage better care and reduced cost, mitigate gaming, and selectively induce clinically efficient providers to participate-will focus differentially on evidence-based care processes, will right-size and structure incentives to avoid crowd-out of providers' intrinsic motivation, and will align patient incentives with value. Future research should address the details of putting these and related principles into practice; further, by deploying these insights in payment design, policy makers will improve health care value for patients and purchasers. © Health Research and Educational Trust.
Re-insurance in the Swiss health insurance market: Fit, power, and balance.
Schmid, Christian P R; Beck, Konstantin
2016-07-01
Risk equalization mechanisms mitigate insurers' incentives to practice risk selection. On the other hand, incentives to limit healthcare spending can be distorted by risk equalization, particularly when risk equalization payments depend on realized costs instead of expected costs. In addition, cost based risk equalization mechanisms may incentivize health insurers to distort the allocation of resources among different services. The incentives to practice risk selection, to limit healthcare spending, and to distort the allocation of resources can be measured by fit, power, and balance, respectively. We apply these three measures to evaluate the risk adjustment mechanism in Switzerland. Our results suggest that it performs very well in terms of power but rather poorly in terms of fit. The latter indicates that risk selection might be a severe problem. We show that re-insurance can reduce this problem while power remains on a high level. In addition, we provide evidence that the Swiss risk equalization mechanism does not lead to imbalances across different services. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.
Theory and Practice in the Design of Physician Payment Incentives
Robinson, James C.
2001-01-01
Combining the economic literature on principal-agent relationships with examples of marketplace innovations allows analysis of the evolution of methods for paying physicians. Agency theory and the economic principles of performance-based compensation are applied in the context of imperfect information, risk aversion, multiple interrelated tasks, and team production efficiencies. Fee-for-service and capitation are flawed methods of motivating physicians to achieve specific goals. Payment innovations that blend elements of fee-for-service, capitation, and case rates can preserve the advantages and attenuate the disadvantages of each. These innovations include capitation with fee-for-service carve-outs, department budgets with individual fee-for-service or “contact” capitation, and case rates for defined episodes of illness. The context within which payment incentives are embedded, includes such nonprice mechanisms as screening and monitoring and such organizational relationships as employment and ownership. The analysis has implications for health services research and public policy with respect to physician payment incentives. PMID:11439463
Singh, Prakarsh; Masters, William A
2017-09-01
This paper tests the effectiveness of performance pay and bonuses among government childcare workers in India. In a controlled study of 160 ICDS centers serving over 4000 children, we randomly assign workers to either fixed bonuses or payments based on the nutritional status of children in their care, and also collect data from a control group receiving only standard salaries. In all three study arms mothers receive nutrition information. We find that performance pay reduces underweight prevalence by about 5 percentage points over 3 months, and height improves by about one centimeter. Impacts on weight continue when incentives are renewed and return to parallel trends thereafter. Fixed bonuses are less expensive but lead to smaller and less precisely estimated effects than performance pay, especially for children near malnutrition thresholds. Both treatments improve worker effort and communication with mothers, who in turn feed a more calorific diet to children at home. Copyright © 2017 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Andriole, Katherine P; Prevedello, Luciano M; Dufault, Allen; Pezeshk, Parham; Bransfield, Robert; Hanson, Richard; Doubilet, Peter M; Seltzer, Steven E; Khorasani, Ramin
2010-03-01
Radiology report signature time (ST) can be a substantial component of total report turnaround time. Poor turnaround time resulting from lengthy ST can adversely affect patient care. The combination of technology adoption with financial incentive was evaluated to determine if ST improvement can be augmented and sustained. This prospective study was performed at a 751-bed, urban, tertiary care adult teaching hospital. Test-site imaging volume approximated 48,000 examinations per month. The radiology department has 100 trainees and 124 attending radiologists serving multiple institutions. Over a study period of 4 years and 4 months, three interventions focused on radiologist signature performance were implemented: 1) a notification paging application that alerted radiologists when reports were ready for signature, 2) a picture archiving and communications systems (PACS)-integrated speech recognition report generation system, and 3) a departmental financial incentive to reward radiologists semiannually for ST performance. Signature time was compared before and after the interventions. Wilcoxon and linear regression statistical analyses were used to assess the significance of trends. Technology adoption (paging plus speech recognition) reduced median ST from >5 to <1 hour (P < .001) and 80th-percentile ST from >24 to 15 to 18 hours (P < .001). Subsequent addition of a financial incentive further improved 80th-percentile ST to 4 to 8 hours (P < .001). The gains in median and 80th-percentile ST were sustained over the final 31 months of the study period. Technology interventions coupled with financial incentive can result in synergistic and sustainable improvement in radiologist report-signing behavior. The addition of a financial incentive leads to better performance than that achievable through technology alone.
Broom, Kevin D.; Counte, Michael A.
2015-01-01
Recent US legislation is attempting to transition inpatient Medicare payments to a value-based purchasing (VBP) program. The VBP program is a pay-for-performance (P4P) system that incentivizes hospitals to improve patient satisfaction, health outcomes, and adherence to clinical protocols while simultaneously holding down costs. Our study evaluates (1) the impact of financial performance on the VBP adjustments and (2) whether there is a correlation between the VBP adjustment and the financial performance of Missouri hospitals that opted into the program. While upward and downward adjustments to the inpatient base rate may be related to hospital financial performance, prior financial performance may also be related to the adjustments. Financial health may allow facilities to invest and position the hospital for favorable future P4P adjustments. The results of our analysis indicate the VBP adjustment to the inpatient base rate is very small (±0.18%), clustered around zero, and is not correlated with financial performance. We also find that financial performance and improvement in the years prior to the adjustment are not related to the VBP adjustment or its respective components. This suggests that CMS is avoiding penalizing less profitable facilities, but the adjustment is also so small and tightly clustered around zero that it is failing to provide an adequate incentive to hospitals. The costs of improving patient satisfaction, clinical process adherence, health care outcomes, and efficiency above that of peers coupled with the growing number of metrics being used to calculate the VBP adjustments call into question the financial incentives of the hospital VBP program. PMID:28462265
A resource-sharing model based on a repeated game in fog computing.
Sun, Yan; Zhang, Nan
2017-03-01
With the rapid development of cloud computing techniques, the number of users is undergoing exponential growth. It is difficult for traditional data centers to perform many tasks in real time because of the limited bandwidth of resources. The concept of fog computing is proposed to support traditional cloud computing and to provide cloud services. In fog computing, the resource pool is composed of sporadic distributed resources that are more flexible and movable than a traditional data center. In this paper, we propose a fog computing structure and present a crowd-funding algorithm to integrate spare resources in the network. Furthermore, to encourage more resource owners to share their resources with the resource pool and to supervise the resource supporters as they actively perform their tasks, we propose an incentive mechanism in our algorithm. Simulation results show that our proposed incentive mechanism can effectively reduce the SLA violation rate and accelerate the completion of tasks.
Kim, Annice; Kamyab, Kian; Zhu, Jingsan; Volpp, Kevin
2011-01-01
Process evaluation of a worksite intervention in which employees were offered $750 to complete a cessation program and to quit smoking. Awareness and attitudes about financial incentives were assessed following a randomized controlled trial of 878 smokers at a US-based company. Cessation program attendance was higher in incentive group versus control (20.2% vs 7.1%, P < 0.01). Most quitters (69.8%) in the incentive group who were already motivated to quit and reported that they would have quit for less money, said incentives were "not at all" or only "somewhat" important. Most nonquitters in the incentive group reported that even $1500 would not have motivated them to quit. Financial incentives are ineffective at motivating some smokers to quit. Internal motivation and readiness to quit need to be sufficiently high for relatively modest incentives to be effective.
Selfish play increases during high-stakes NBA games and is rewarded with more lucrative contracts.
Uhlmann, Eric Luis; Barnes, Christopher M
2014-01-01
High-stakes team competitions can present a social dilemma in which participants must choose between concentrating on their personal performance and assisting teammates as a means of achieving group objectives. We find that despite the seemingly strong group incentive to win the NBA title, cooperative play actually diminishes during playoff games, negatively affecting team performance. Thus team cooperation decreases in the very high stakes contexts in which it is most important to perform well together. Highlighting the mixed incentives that underlie selfish play, personal scoring is rewarded with more lucrative future contracts, whereas assisting teammates to score is associated with reduced pay due to lost opportunities for personal scoring. A combination of misaligned incentives and psychological biases in performance evaluation bring out the "I" in "team" when cooperation is most critical.
Selfish Play Increases during High-Stakes NBA Games and Is Rewarded with More Lucrative Contracts
Uhlmann, Eric Luis; Barnes, Christopher M.
2014-01-01
High-stakes team competitions can present a social dilemma in which participants must choose between concentrating on their personal performance and assisting teammates as a means of achieving group objectives. We find that despite the seemingly strong group incentive to win the NBA title, cooperative play actually diminishes during playoff games, negatively affecting team performance. Thus team cooperation decreases in the very high stakes contexts in which it is most important to perform well together. Highlighting the mixed incentives that underlie selfish play, personal scoring is rewarded with more lucrative future contracts, whereas assisting teammates to score is associated with reduced pay due to lost opportunities for personal scoring. A combination of misaligned incentives and psychological biases in performance evaluation bring out the “I” in “team” when cooperation is most critical. PMID:24763384
Kok, Maryse C; Dieleman, Marjolein; Taegtmeyer, Miriam; Broerse, Jacqueline EW; Kane, Sumit S; Ormel, Hermen; Tijm, Mandy M; de Koning, Korrie AM
2015-01-01
Community health workers (CHWs) are increasingly recognized as an integral component of the health workforce needed to achieve public health goals in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). Many factors influence CHW performance. A systematic review was conducted to identify intervention design related factors influencing performance of CHWs. We systematically searched six databases for quantitative and qualitative studies that included CHWs working in promotional, preventive or curative primary health services in LMICs. One hundred and forty studies met the inclusion criteria, were quality assessed and double read to extract data relevant to the design of CHW programmes. A preliminary framework containing factors influencing CHW performance and characteristics of CHW performance (such as motivation and competencies) guided the literature search and review. A mix of financial and non-financial incentives, predictable for the CHWs, was found to be an effective strategy to enhance performance, especially of those CHWs with multiple tasks. Performance-based financial incentives sometimes resulted in neglect of unpaid tasks. Intervention designs which involved frequent supervision and continuous training led to better CHW performance in certain settings. Supervision and training were often mentioned as facilitating factors, but few studies tested which approach worked best or how these were best implemented. Embedment of CHWs in community and health systems was found to diminish workload and increase CHW credibility. Clearly defined CHW roles and introduction of clear processes for communication among different levels of the health system could strengthen CHW performance. When designing community-based health programmes, factors that increased CHW performance in comparable settings should be taken into account. Additional intervention research to develop a better evidence base for the most effective training and supervision mechanisms and qualitative research to inform policymakers in development of CHW interventions are needed. PMID:25500559
Incentives for Organ Donation: Proposed Standards for an Internationally Acceptable System
2012-01-01
Incentives for organ donation, currently prohibited in most countries, may increase donation and save lives. Discussion of incentives has focused on two areas: (1) whether or not there are ethical principles that justify the current prohibition and (2) whether incentives would do more good than harm. We herein address the second concern and propose for discussion standards and guidelines for an acceptable system of incentives for donation. We believe that if systems based on these guidelines were developed, harms would be no greater than those to today’s conventional donors. Ultimately, until there are trials of incentives, the question of benefits and harms cannot be satisfactorily answered. PMID:22176925
42 CFR § 414.1460 - Monitoring and program integrity.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2017-10-01
... SERVICES (CONTINUED) MEDICARE PROGRAM (CONTINUED) PAYMENT FOR PART B MEDICAL AND OTHER HEALTH SERVICES Merit-Based Incentive Payment System and Alternative Payment Model Incentive § 414.1460 Monitoring and program integrity. (a) Vetting eligible clinicians prior to payment of the APM Incentive Payment. Prior to...
Impacts of pay for performance on the quality of primary care
Allen, T; Mason, T; Whittaker, W
2014-01-01
Increasingly, financial incentives are being used in health care as a result of increasing demand for health care coupled with fiscal pressures. Financial incentive schemes are one approach by which the system may incentivize providers of health care to improve productivity and/or adapt to better quality provision. Pay for performance (P4P) is an example of a financial incentive which seeks to link providers’ payments to some measure of performance. This paper provides a discussion of the theoretical underpinnings of P4P, gives an overview of the health P4P evidence base, and provide a detailed case study of a particularly large scheme from the English National Health Service. Lessons are then drawn from the evidence base. Overall, we find that the evidence for the effectiveness of P4P for improving quality of care in primary care is mixed. This is to some extent due to the fact that the P4P schemes used in primary care are also mixed. There are many different schemes that incentivize different aspects of care in different ways and in different settings, making evaluation problematic. The Quality and Outcomes Framework in the United Kingdom is the largest example of P4P in primary care. Evidence suggests incentivized quality initially improved following the introduction of the Quality and Outcomes Framework, but this was short-lived. If P4P in primary care is to have a long-term future, the question about scheme effectiveness (perhaps incorporating the identification and assessment of potential risk factors) needs to be answered robustly. This would require that new schemes be designed from the onset to support their evaluation: control and treatment groups, coupled with before and after data. PMID:25061341
Payment models to support population health management.
Huerta, Timothy R; Hefner, Jennifer L; McAlearney, Ann Scheck
2014-01-01
To survey the policy-driven financial controls currently being used to drive physician change in the care of populations. This paper offers a review of current health care payment models and discusses the impact of each on the potential success of PHM initiatives. We present the benefits of a multi-part model, combining visit-based fee-for-service reimbursement with a monthly "care coordination payment" and a performance-based payment system. A multi-part model removes volume-based incentives and promotes efficiency. However, it is predicated on a pay-for-performance framework that requires standardized measurement. Application of this model is limited due to the current lack of standardized measurement of quality goals that are linked to payment incentives. Financial models dictated by health system payers are inextricably linked to the organization and management of health care. There is a need for better measurements and realistic targets as part of a comprehensive system of measurement assessment that focuses on practice redesign, with the goal of standardizing measurement of the structure and process of redesign. Payment reform is a necessary component of an accurate measure of the associations between practice transformation and outcomes important to both patients and society.
Jack, B. Kelsey; Kousky, Carolyn; Sims, Katharine R. E.
2008-01-01
Payments for ecosystem services (PES) policies compensate individuals or communities for undertaking actions that increase the provision of ecosystem services such as water purification, flood mitigation, or carbon sequestration. PES schemes rely on incentives to induce behavioral change and can thus be considered part of the broader class of incentive- or market-based mechanisms for environmental policy. By recognizing that PES programs are incentive-based, policymakers can draw on insights from the substantial body of accumulated knowledge about this class of instruments. In particular, this article offers a set of lessons about how the environmental, socioeconomic, political, and dynamic context of a PES policy is likely to interact with policy design to produce policy outcomes, including environmental effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, and poverty alleviation. PMID:18621696
Jack, B Kelsey; Kousky, Carolyn; Sims, Katharine R E
2008-07-15
Payments for ecosystem services (PES) policies compensate individuals or communities for undertaking actions that increase the provision of ecosystem services such as water purification, flood mitigation, or carbon sequestration. PES schemes rely on incentives to induce behavioral change and can thus be considered part of the broader class of incentive- or market-based mechanisms for environmental policy. By recognizing that PES programs are incentive-based, policymakers can draw on insights from the substantial body of accumulated knowledge about this class of instruments. In particular, this article offers a set of lessons about how the environmental, socioeconomic, political, and dynamic context of a PES policy is likely to interact with policy design to produce policy outcomes, including environmental effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, and poverty alleviation.
48 CFR 16.405-2 - Cost-plus-award-fee contracts.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES TYPES OF CONTRACTS Incentive Contracts 16.405-2 Cost-plus-award-fee... during performance and that is sufficient to provide motivation for excellence in the areas of cost... consisting of (1) a base amount fixed at inception of the contract, if applicable and at the discretion of...
48 CFR 1609.7101-1 - Community-rated carrier incentive performance elements.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
.... In order for information to be available to our customers in time for the annual Open Season... Open Season choices in selecting a health plan. In evaluating this item, the contracting officer will... officer will evaluate this item based on the carrier's ability to accept electronic data transmission from...
Study Casts Cold Water on Bonus Pay
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Sawchuk, Stephen
2010-01-01
The most rigorous experimental study of performance-based teacher compensation ever conducted in the United States shows that a nationally watched bonus-pay system had no overall impact on student achievement--results that are certain to set off a firestorm of debate. The study, known as POINT for the Project on Incentives in Teaching, was a…
Teacher Leader Programs: Structure and Staffing in Four TIF Districts
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Pyatigorsky, Mikhail; Heneman, Herb; Steele, Clarissa; Finster, Matthew; Milanowski, Tony
2015-01-01
Some Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) grantees are experimenting with the design and operation of teacher leader (TL) programs as part of their performance-based compensation systems (PBCS). Much of the impetus for this is the U.S Department of Education TIF 4 requirement that grantees' PBCS should provide for "additional responsibilities and…
Rewarding Teachers: Issues and Incentives.
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Newcombe, Ellen
This paper discusses some of the issues behind the current debate on merit pay for teachers. A brief history is presented of performance-based compensation systems. The difficulties in arriving at a consensus on a valid definition of merit pay are pointed out, and examples are presented of various merit plans, such as master teaching plans, career…
Reward Motivation Enhances Task Coding in Frontoparietal Cortex
Etzel, Joset A.; Cole, Michael W.; Zacks, Jeffrey M.; Kay, Kendrick N.; Braver, Todd S.
2016-01-01
Reward motivation often enhances task performance, but the neural mechanisms underlying such cognitive enhancement remain unclear. Here, we used a multivariate pattern analysis (MVPA) approach to test the hypothesis that motivation-related enhancement of cognitive control results from improved encoding and representation of task set information. Participants underwent two fMRI sessions of cued task switching, the first under baseline conditions, and the second with randomly intermixed reward incentive and no-incentive trials. Information about the upcoming task could be successfully decoded from cue-related activation patterns in a set of frontoparietal regions typically associated with task control. More critically, MVPA classifiers trained on the baseline session had significantly higher decoding accuracy on incentive than non-incentive trials, with decoding improvement mediating reward-related enhancement of behavioral performance. These results strongly support the hypothesis that reward motivation enhances cognitive control, by improving the discriminability of task-relevant information coded and maintained in frontoparietal brain regions. PMID:25601237
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Rothstein, Richard
2008-01-01
Accountability and performance incentive plans in education are compromised by goal distortion, gaming, and corruption. Education policy makers who design such plans have paid insufficient attention to similar experiences in other fields. This paper describes institutions in health care, job training and welfare administration, and in the private…
Practice and Incentive Effects on Learner Performance: Aircraft Instrument Comprehension Task.
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Tenpas, Barbara G.; Higgins, Norman C.
To study the effects of practice and incentive on learner performance on the aircraft instrument comprehension task, 48 third-year Air Force cadets were chosen as subjects. The subjects were expected to be able to identify which one of four pictures of aircraft in flight most nearly corresponded to the position indicated on a panel of attitude and…
Incentives from Curriculum Tracking
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Koerselman, Kristian
2013-01-01
Curriculum tracking creates incentives in the years before its start, and we should therefore expect test scores to be higher during those years. I find robust evidence for incentive effects of tracking in the UK based on the UK comprehensive school reform. Results from the Swedish comprehensive school reform are inconclusive. Internationally, I…
42 CFR § 414.1455 - Limitation on review.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2017-10-01
... (CONTINUED) MEDICARE PROGRAM (CONTINUED) PAYMENT FOR PART B MEDICAL AND OTHER HEALTH SERVICES Merit-Based Incentive Payment System and Alternative Payment Model Incentive § 414.1455 Limitation on review. There is... of the APM Incentive Payment under § 414.1450, including any estimation as part of such determination. ...
Deriving fair incentives for management of hardwood timber stands
David A. Gansner; W. Herrick Owen; David N. Larsen; David N. Larsen
1973-01-01
The authors present a practical method for deriving timber-management incentive payments and demonstrate its application in forest stands of upland hardwoods. The suggested incentive payment is based on the differences between discounted costs and returns of deliberate forest management and the "harvest and let grow" option.
Dykema, Jennifer; Stevenson, John; Kniss, Chad; Kvale, Katherine; González, Kim; Cautley, Eleanor
2012-05-01
From 2009 to 2010, an experiment was conducted to increase response rates among African American mothers in the Wisconsin Pregnancy Risk Assessment Monitoring System (PRAMS). Sample members were randomly assigned to groups that received a prepaid, cash incentive of $5 (n = 219); a coupon for diapers valued at $6 (n = 210); or no incentive (n = 209). Incentives were included with the questionnaire, which was mailed to respondents. We examined the effects of the incentives on several outcomes, including response rates, cost effectiveness, survey response distributions, and item nonresponse. Response rates were significantly higher for the cash group than for the coupon (42.5 vs. 32.4%, P < .05) or no incentive group (42.5 vs. 30.1%, P < .01); the coupon and no incentive groups performed similarly. While absolute costs were the highest for the cash group, the cost per completed survey was the lowest. The incentives had limited effects on response distributions for specific survey questions. Although respondents completing the survey by mail in the cash and coupon groups exhibited a trend toward being less likely to have missing data, the effect was not significant. Compared to a coupon or no incentive, a small cash incentive significantly improved response rates and was cost effective among African American respondents in Wisconsin PRAMS. Incentives had only limited effects, however, on survey response distributions, and no significant effects on item nonresponse.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Logan, Jeffrey S
Performance-based regulations (PBRs) provide a regulatory framework to connect goals, targets, and measures to utility performance or executive compensation. Well-designed PBRs provide incentives for utility performance, benefiting consumers and utility owners alike. This report considers the role of both PBRs and more discrete performance incentive mechanisms (PIMs) in 21st century power sector transformation. Innovative technologies are transforming the way electricity is generated, delivered, and consumed. PBRs have the potential to realign utility, investor, and consumer incentives and mitigate emerging challenges to the utility business model, renewable integration, and even cyber security.The goals of PBRs in the form of multi-year ratemore » plans are in many respects the same in terms of providing reasonably priced and reliable service to customers. However, today's technologies have changed, and there is more emphasis on clean energy. Thus, the pathways and the potential outcomes are different than they were in the 20th century when centralized generator stations and large infrastructure additions dominated the utility landscape. Given unprecedented changes underway in the electricity sector, PBRs - by specifying expectations of utility performance and outcomes for consumers, while staying agnostic to the exact means of delivery - constitute a form of prescient regulation that harnesses disruption. PBRs are one tool in a broader toolbox in the transition toward flexible regulatory and market structures that rewards utilities that adapt or evolve in reaction to market and technology change. PBRs and PIMs have great value for the electric industry when designed well and can be applied to many different situations. How exactly PBR mechanisms are most effectively enacted will vary based on the utility ownership model, institutional arrangements, and a variety of other local factors. PBRs should be tailored to the needs and goals of each jurisdiction, and perhaps each utility, to most effectively achieve the needs of a 21st century power grid in that jurisdiction. Presented in three volumes, this report highlights the lessons learned from their evolving history, explores essential elements of their design and implementation as well as considerations for how they may be best applied, and examines leading examples of PBRs from the United Kingdom, New York, Denmark, Mexico, and South Africa. The full report, 'Next-Generation Performance Based Regulation - Emphasizing Utility Performance to Unleash Power Sector Innovation,' published in September 2017, can be accessed at https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy17osti/68512.pdf.« less
Role of contingency in striatal response to incentive in adolescents with anxiety.
Benson, Brenda E; Guyer, Amanda E; Nelson, Eric E; Pine, Daniel S; Ernst, Monique
2015-03-01
This study examines the effect of contingency on reward function in anxiety. We define contingency as the aspect of a situation in which the outcome is determined by one's action-that is, when there is a direct link between one's action and the outcome of the action. Past findings in adolescents with anxiety or at risk for anxiety have revealed hypersensitive behavioral and neural responses to higher value rewards with correct performance. This hypersensitivity to highly valued (salient) actions suggests that the value of actions is determined not only by outcome magnitude, but also by the degree to which the outcome is contingent on correct performance. Thus, contingency and incentive value might each modulate reward responses in unique ways in anxiety. Using fMRI with a monetary reward task, striatal response to cue anticipation is compared in 18 clinically anxious and 20 healthy adolescents. This task manipulates orthogonally reward contingency and incentive value. Findings suggest that contingency modulates the neural response to incentive magnitude differently in the two groups. Specifically, during the contingent condition, right-striatal response tracks incentive value in anxious, but not healthy, adolescents. During the noncontingent condition, striatal response is bilaterally stronger to low than to high incentive in anxious adolescents, while healthy adolescents exhibit the expected opposite pattern. Both contingency and reward magnitude differentiate striatal activation in anxious versus healthy adolescents. These findings may reflect exaggerated concern about performance and/or alterations of striatal coding of reward value in anxious adolescents. Abnormalities in reward function in anxiety may have treatment implications.
Managing pay for performance: aligning social science research with budget predictability.
Rosenau, Pauline Vaillancourt; Lal, Lincy S; Lako, Christiaan
2012-01-01
Managers and policymakers are seeking practical guidelines for assessing the outcomes of emerging pay-for-performance (P4P) programs. Evaluations of P4P programs published to date are mixed-some are confusing-and methodological problems with them are common. This article first identifies and summarizes obstacles to implementing effective P4P programs. Second, it describes results from social science research going back several decades to support evidence-based P4P best practices. Among the findings from this research, the zero-sum and "earn it back" P4P incentive systems have important drawbacks and may be counterproductive, neither reducing health system costs nor improving quality. The research suggests that punishing participants for low performance may further reduce individuals' performance, especially when involvement is required. We suggest that optimal P4P systems are those that reward all participants for performance improvements. Third, the article links P4P design to budgetary considerations. P4P program designs that provide incentives while improving quality and reducing costs are critical if budget neutrality is a priority for the organization and its resources are limited. In these types of P4P designs, cost calculations are straightforward: The greater the participation, the higher the savings. The article concludes by recommending an evidence-based P4P approach for practitioners that can be implemented without large upfront investment. More research on this topic is also advised.
Yamaguti, Wellington Pereira dos Santos; Sakamoto, Eliana Takahama; Panazzolo, Danilo; Peixoto, Corina da Cunha; Cerri, Giovanni Guido; Albuquerque, André Luis Pereira
2010-01-01
To compare the diaphragmatic mobility of healthy subjects during incentive spirometry with a volume-oriented device, during incentive spirometry with a flow-oriented device, and during diaphragmatic breathing. To compare men and women in terms of diaphragmatic mobility during these three types of breathing exercises. We evaluated the pulmonary function and diaphragmatic mobility of 17 adult healthy volunteers (9 women and 8 men). Diaphragmatic mobility was measured via ultrasound during diaphragmatic breathing and during the use of the two types of incentive spirometers. Diaphragmatic mobility was significantly greater during the use of the volume-oriented incentive spirometer than during the use of the flow-oriented incentive spirometer (70.16 ± 12.83 mm vs. 63.66 ± 10.82 mm; p = 0.02). Diaphragmatic breathing led to a greater diaphragmatic mobility than did the use of the flow-oriented incentive spirometer (69.62 ± 11.83 mm vs. 63.66 ± 10.82 mm; p = 0.02). During all three types of breathing exercises, the women showed a higher mobility/FVC ratio than did the men. Incentive spirometry with a volume-oriented device and diaphragmatic breathing promoted greater diaphragmatic mobility than did incentive spirometry with a flow-oriented device. Women performed better on the three types of breathing exercises than did men.
Developing physician pay arrangements: the cash and care equation.
Levitch, J H
1998-11-01
Developing physician compensation packages that help a healthcare organization meet its business objectives while satisfying physician pay expectations requires new ways of linking pay to physician performance. Such compensation arrangements specifically should include pay tied to defined performance standards, compensation linked to group performance, performance incentives based on realistic, achievable goals, work performance measured by common criteria, and similar pay ensured for similar work. Final pay arrangements also should include items that are sometimes overlooked, such as fully delineated job responsibilities, performance measures aligned correctly with performance areas, and the value of benefits considered in the cash compensation levels.
Cost-effectiveness of diabetes pay-for-performance incentive designs.
Hsieh, Hui-Min; Tsai, Shu-Ling; Shin, Shyi-Jang; Mau, Lih-Wen; Chiu, Herng-Chia
2015-02-01
Taiwan's National Health Insurance (NHI) Program implemented a diabetes pay-for-performance program (P4P) based on process-of-care measures in 2001. In late 2006, that P4P program was revised to also include achievement of intermediate health outcomes. This study examined to what extent these 2 P4P incentive designs have been cost-effective and what the difference in effect may have been. Analyzing data using 3 population-based longitudinal databases (NHI's P4P dataset, NHI's claims database, and Taiwan's death registry), we compared costs and effectiveness between P4P and non-P4P diabetes patient groups in each phase. Propensity score matching was used to match comparable control groups for intervention groups. Outcomes included life-years, quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs), program intervention costs, cost-savings, and incremental cost-effectiveness ratios. QALYs for P4P patients and non-P4P patients were 2.08 and 1.99 in phase 1 and 2.08 and 2.02 in phase 2. The average incremental intervention costs per QALYs was TWD$335,546 in phase 1 and TWD$298,606 in phase 2. The average incremental all-cause medical costs saved by the P4P program per QALYs were TWD$602,167 in phase 1 and TWD$661,163 in phase 2. The findings indicated that both P4P programs were cost-effective and the resulting return on investment was 1.8:1 in phase 1 and 2.0:1 in phase 2. We conclude that the diabetes P4P program in both phases enabled the long-term cost-effective use of resources and cost-savings regardless of whether a bonus for intermediate outcome improvement was added to a process-based P4P incentive design.
Rudasingwa, Martin; Uwizeye, Marie Rose
2017-01-01
ABSTRACT Background: Performance-based financing (PBF) was first implemented in Burundi in 2006 as a pilot programme in three provinces and was rolled out nationwide in 2010. PBF is a reform approach to improve the quality, quantity, and equity of health services and aims at achieving universal health coverage. It focuses on how to best motivate health practitioners. Objective: To elicit physicians’ and nurses’ experiences and views on how PBF influenced and helped them in healthcare delivery. Methods: A qualitative cross-sectional study was carried out among frontline health workers such as physicians and nurses. The data was gathered through individual face-to-face, in-depth, semi-structured interviews with 6 physicians and 30 nurses from February to March 2011 in three hospitals in Gitega Province. A simple framework approach and thematic analysis using a combination of manual technique and MAXQDA software guided the analysis of the interview data. Results: Overall, the interviewees felt that the PBF scheme had provided positive motivation to improve the quality of care, mainly in the structures and process of care. The utilization of health services and the relationship between health practitioners and patients also improved. The salary top-ups were recognized as the most significant impetus to increase effort in improving the quality of care. The small and sometimes delayed financial incentives paid to physicians and nurses were criticized. The findings of this study also indicate that the positive interaction between performance-based incentive schemes and other health policies is crucial in achieving comprehensive improvement in healthcare delivery. Conclusions: PBF has the potential to motivate medical staff to improve healthcare provision. The views of medical staff and the context of the area of implementation have to be taken into consideration when designing and implementing PBF schemes. PMID:28452651
Paperless Transaction for Publication Incentive System
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Ibrahim, Rosziati; Madon, Hamiza Diana; Nazri, Nurul Hashida Amira Mohd; Saarani, Norhafizah; Mustapha, Aida
2017-08-01
Within the Malaysian context, incentive system in scientific publishing rewards authors for publishing journal articles or conference papers that are indexed by Scopus. At Universiti Tun Hussein Onn Malaysia, the incentive system is going into its third year in operational. The main challenge lies in preparing the evidences as required by the application guideline. This paper presents an online module for publication incentive within the University Publication Information System (SMPU). The module was developed using the Scrum methodology based on the existing workflow of paper-based application. The module is hoped to increase the quality of the system deliverables of SMPU as well as having the ability to cope with change of university requirements in the future.
49 CFR 350.317 - What are Incentive Funds and how may they be used?
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-10-01
... States that achieve reduction in CMV-involved fatal accidents, CMV fatal accident rate, or that meet specified CMV safety performance criteria. Incentive Funds may be used for any eligible activity or item...
49 CFR 350.317 - What are Incentive Funds and how may they be used?
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-10-01
... States that achieve reduction in CMV-involved fatal accidents, CMV fatal accident rate, or that meet specified CMV safety performance criteria. Incentive Funds may be used for any eligible activity or item...
49 CFR 350.317 - What are Incentive Funds and how may they be used?
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-10-01
... States that achieve reduction in CMV-involved fatal accidents, CMV fatal accident rate, or that meet specified CMV safety performance criteria. Incentive Funds may be used for any eligible activity or item...
49 CFR 350.317 - What are Incentive Funds and how may they be used?
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... States that achieve reduction in CMV-involved fatal accidents, CMV fatal accident rate, or that meet specified CMV safety performance criteria. Incentive Funds may be used for any eligible activity or item...
49 CFR 350.317 - What are Incentive Funds and how may they be used?
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-10-01
... States that achieve reduction in CMV-involved fatal accidents, CMV fatal accident rate, or that meet specified CMV safety performance criteria. Incentive Funds may be used for any eligible activity or item...
Fulmer, Ingrid Smithey; Shaw, Jason D
2018-06-07
Compensation research has focused traditionally on how pay design characteristics (e.g., pay level, individual or group incentives) relate to average employee outcomes and, in toto, on how these outcomes affect organizational performance. Recently, scholars have begun to pay more attention to how individuals vary in the strength of their reactions to pay. Empirical research in several disciplines examines how the interplay of pay systems and person-based characteristics (psychological individual differences, demographics, and relative performance or position in a group) relate to important work-related outcomes. We develop a compensation-activation theory that frames compensation design characteristics as workplace "situations" providing cues that activate individuals' corresponding fundamental social motives made salient due to chronic or transient person-based characteristics. Where activation occurs, stronger-than-average responses to the compensation "situation" are expected. Using the theory as a lens, we synthesize and reinterpret existing research on person-based reactions to pay characteristics, including sorting, incentive/motivational effects, and effects on collective pay system reactions and unit/organizational outcomes. We conclude with a research agenda aimed at refining compensation-activation theory and advancing the study of compensation as it affects individual and organizational outcomes. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved).
Development of industry-based strategies for motivating seat-belt usage
DOT National Transportation Integrated Search
1983-03-01
A variety of incentive-based programs to motivate safety belt use were tested during the 18-month grant period in order to define optimal incentive strategies for particular corporate settings. Initial programs provoked important research questions w...
Medicare and Medicaid: Conflicting Incentives for Long-Term Care
Grabowski, David C
2007-01-01
The structure of Medicare and Medicaid creates conflicting incentives regarding dually eligible beneficiaries without coordinating their care. Both Medicare and Medicaid have an interest in limiting their costs, and neither has an incentive to take responsibility for the management or quality of care. Examples of misaligned incentives are Medicare's cost-sharing rules, cost shifting within home health care and nursing homes, and cost shifting across chronic and acute care settings. Several policy initiatives—capitation, pay-for-performance, and the shift of the dually eligible population's Medicaid costs to the federal government—may address these conflicting incentives, but all have strengths and weaknesses. With the aging baby boom generation and projected federal and state budget shortfalls, this issue will be a continuing focus of policymakers in the coming decades. PMID:18070331
Williams, David M; Lee, Harold H; Connell, Lauren; Boyle, Holly; Emerson, Jessica; Strohacker, Kelley; Galárraga, Omar
2018-03-01
Regular physical activity (PA) enhances weight-loss and reduces risk of chronic disease. However, as few as 10% of U.S. adults engage in regular PA. Incentive programs to promote PA have shown some promise, but have typically used incentives that are too large to sustain over time and have not demonstrated habit formation or been tested in community settings. This report presents the rationale and design of a randomized pilot study testing the feasibility and preliminary efficacy of small monetary incentives for PA (n=25) versus charitable donations in the same amount (n=25) versus control (n=25) over 12months among 75 low-active but otherwise healthy adults at a local YMCA. Incentives are based on YMCA attendance, which is verified by electronic swipe card data and is the primary study outcome, with self-reported minutes/week of PA assessed as a secondary outcome. Incentives are intentionally small enough-$1/session, maximum of $5/week-such that they could be indefinitely sustained by community organizations, privately-owned health clubs, healthcare organizations, or employers (e.g., employer fitness facilities). Costs of the incentive program for the sponsoring organization may be partially offset by increases in membership resulting from the appeal of the program. Moreover, if efficacious, the charitable donation incentive program may have the added benefit of building social capital for the sponsoring organization and potentially serving as a tax write-off, thus further offsetting the cost of the incentives. Findings will also have implications for the use of financially sustainable community-based incentive programs for other health-related behaviors (e.g., weight loss, smoking). Copyright © 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Schuster, Roseanne C; de Sousa, Octávio; Rivera, Jacqueline; Olson, Rebecca; Pinault, Delphine; Young, Sera L
2016-10-07
Performance-based incentives (PBIs) have garnered global attention as a promising strategy to improve healthcare delivery to vulnerable populations. However, literature gaps in the context in which an intervention is implemented and how the PBIs were developed exist. Therefore, we (1) characterized the barriers and promoters to prevention of vertical transmission of HIV (PVT) service delivery in rural Mozambique, where the vertical transmission rate is 12 %, and (2) assessed the appropriateness for a PBI's intervention and application to PVT. We conducted 24 semi-structured interviews with nurses, volunteers, community health workers, and traditional birth attendants about the barriers and promoters they experienced delivering PVT services. We then explored emergent themes in subsequent focus group discussions (n = 7, total participants N = 92) and elicited participant perspectives on PBIs. The ecological motivation-opportunity-ability framework guided our iterative data collection and thematic analysis processes. The interviews revealed that while all health worker cadres were motivated intrinsically and by social recognition, they were dissatisfied with low and late remuneration. Facility-based staff were challenged by factors across the rest of the ecological levels, primarily in the opportunity domain, including the following: poor referral and record systems (work mandate), high workload, stock-outs, poor infrastructure (facility environment), and delays in obtaining patient results and donor payment discrepancies (administrative). Community-based cadres' opportunity challenges included lack of supplies, distance (work environment), lack of incorporation into the health system (administration), and ability challenges of incorrect knowledge (health worker). PBIs based on social recognition and that enable action on intrinsic motivation through training, supervision, and collaboration were thought to have the most potential for targeting improvements in record and referral systems and better integrating community-based health workers into the health system. Concerns about the implementation of incentives included neglect of non-incentivized tasks and distorted motivation among colleagues. We found that highly motivated health workers encountered severe opportunity challenges in their PVT mandate. PBIs have the potential to address key barriers that facility- and community-based health workers encounter when delivering PVT services, specifically by building upon existing intrinsic motivation and leveraging highly valued social recognition. We recommend a controlled intervention to monitor incentives' effects on worker motivation and non-incentivized tasks to generate insights about the feasibility of PBIs to improve the delivery of PVT services.
Randomized Trial of Four Financial-Incentive Programs for Smoking Cessation
Halpern, Scott D.; French, Benjamin; Small, Dylan S.; Saulsgiver, Kathryn; Harhay, Michael O.; Audrain-McGovern, Janet; Loewenstein, George; Brennan, Troyen A.; Asch, David A.; Volpp, Kevin G.
2015-01-01
BACKGROUND Financial incentives promote many health behaviors, but effective ways to deliver health incentives remain uncertain. METHODS We randomly assigned CVS Caremark employees and their relatives and friends to one of four incentive programs or to usual care for smoking cessation. Two of the incentive programs targeted individuals, and two targeted groups of six participants. One of the individual-oriented programs and one of the group-oriented programs entailed rewards of approximately $800 for smoking cessation; the others entailed refundable deposits of $150 plus $650 in reward payments for successful participants. Usual care included informational resources and free smoking-cessation aids. RESULTS Overall, 2538 participants were enrolled. Of those assigned to reward-based programs, 90.0% accepted the assignment, as compared with 13.7% of those assigned to deposit-based programs (P<0.001). In intention-to-treat analyses, rates of sustained abstinence from smoking through 6 months were higher with each of the four incentive programs (range, 9.4 to 16.0%) than with usual care (6.0%) (P<0.05 for all comparisons); the superiority of reward-based programs was sustained through 12 months. Group-oriented and individual-oriented programs were associated with similar 6-month abstinence rates (13.7% and 12.1%, respectively; P = 0.29). Reward-based programs were associated with higher abstinence rates than deposit-based programs (15.7% vs. 10.2%, P<0.001). However, in instrumental-variable analyses that accounted for differential acceptance, the rate of abstinence at 6 months was 13.2 percentage points (95% confidence interval, 3.1 to 22.8) higher in the deposit-based programs than in the reward-based programs among the estimated 13.7% of the participants who would accept participation in either type of program. CONCLUSIONS Reward-based programs were much more commonly accepted than deposit-based programs, leading to higher rates of sustained abstinence from smoking. Group-oriented incentive programs were no more effective than individual-oriented programs. (Funded by the National Institutes of Health and CVS Caremark; ClinicalTrials.gov number, NCT01526265.) PMID:25970009
Tidey, Jennifer W
2012-11-01
Serious mental illness (SMI) is associated with high rates of tobacco and other drug dependence, poor treatment compliance, obesity and low levels of physical activity, which have severe medical and psychosocial consequences. Interventions that effectively reduce these health risk behaviors among people with SMI are urgently needed. Published reports from studies evaluating incentive-based treatments for promoting tobacco and other drug abstinence, treatment attendance, medication use and increased physical activity are reviewed. Results of this review indicate the efficacy of incentive-based treatments for reducing tobacco and other drug use among people with SMI. Few studies have examined whether incentive-based treatments improve treatment attendance, medication use and physical activity levels in people with SMI; however, initial evidence is positive and indicates that further research in these areas is warranted. Given the medical and psychosocial costs of tobacco and other drug use, treatment non-compliance and physical inactivity, and the efficacy of incentive-based treatments for improving these behaviors, such interventions should be further developed and integrated into behavioral health treatment programs for people with SMI. Copyright © 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Comparing Types of Financial Incentives to Promote Walking: An Experimental Test.
Burns, Rachel J; Rothman, Alexander J
2018-04-19
Offering people financial incentives to increase their physical activity is an increasingly prevalent intervention strategy. However, little is known about the relative effectiveness of different types of incentives. This study tested whether incentives based on specified reinforcement types and schedules differentially affected the likelihood of meeting a walking goal and explored if observed behavioural changes may have been attributable to the perceived value of the incentive. A 2 (reinforcement type: cash reward, deposit contract) × 2 (schedule: fixed, variable) between-subjects experiment with a hanging control condition was conducted over 8 weeks (n = 153). Although walking was greater in the incentive conditions relative to the control condition, walking did not differ across incentive conditions. Exploratory analyses indicated that the perceived value of the incentive was associated with the likelihood of meeting the walking goal, but was not affected by reinforcement type or schedule. The reinforcement type and schedule manipulations tested in this study did not differentially affect walking. Given that walking behaviour was associated with perceived value, designing incentive strategies that optimise the perceived value of the incentive may be a promising avenue for future research. © 2018 The International Association of Applied Psychology.
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
National Center on Performance Incentives, 2009
2009-01-01
A recent report published by the National Center on Performance Incentives (NCPI) presents findings from the second-year of a multi-year evaluation of the Texas Educator Excellence Grant (TEEG) program, a statewide educator incentive program that operated in Texas. As part of this evaluation report, researchers examined how first-year TEEG schools…
Batorsky, Benjamin; Taylor, Erin; Huang, Crystal; Liu, Hangsheng; Mattke, Soeren
2016-01-01
We aimed to understand how employer characteristics relate to the use of incentives to promote participation in wellness programs and to explore the relationship between incentive type and participation rates. A cross-sectional analysis of nationally representative survey data combined with an administrative business database was employed. Random sampling of U.S. companies within strata based on industry and number of employees was used to determine a final sample of 3000 companies. Of these, 19% returned completed surveys. The survey asked about employee participation rate, incentive type, and gender composition of employees. Incentive types included any incentives, high-value rewards, and rewards plus penalties. Logistic regressions of incentive type on employer characteristics were used to determine what types of employers are more likely to offer which type of incentives. A generalized linear model of participation rate was used to determine the relationship between incentive type and participation. Employers located in the Northeast were 5 to 10 times more likely to offer incentives. Employers with a large number of employees, particularly female employees, were up to 1.25 times more likely to use penalties. Penalty and high-value incentives were associated with participation rates of 68% and 52%, respectively. Industry or regional characteristics are likely determinants of incentive use for wellness programs. Penalties appear to be effective, but attention should be paid to what types of employees they affect.
Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014
2013-02-12
... announced below concerns Cost-Benefit of Incentive- based Smoking Cessation for Pregnant Women, FOA DP 13... Incentive-based Smoking Cessation for Pregnant Women, FOA DP 13-003, initial review.'' Contact Person for...
The Use of Enhanced Appointment Access Strategies by Medical Practices.
Rodriguez, Hector P; Knox, Margae; Hurley, Vanessa; Rittenhouse, Diane R; Shortell, Stephen M
2016-06-01
Strategies to enhance appointment access are being adopted by medical practices as part of patient-centered medical home (PCMH) implementation, but little is known about the use of these strategies nationally. We examine practice use of open access scheduling and after-hours care. Data were analyzed from the Third National Study of Physician Organizations (NSPO3) to examine which enhanced appointment access strategies are more likely to be used by practices with more robust PCMH capabilities and with greater external incentives. Logistic regression estimated the effect of PCMH capabilities and external incentives on practice use of open access scheduling and after-hours care. Physician organizations with >20% primary care physicians (n=1106). PCMH capabilities included team-based care, health information technology capabilities, quality improvement orientation, and patient experience orientation. External incentives included public reporting, pay-for-performance (P4P), and accountable care organization participation. A low percentage of practices (19.8%) used same-day open access scheduling, while after-hours care (56.1%) was more common. In adjusted analyses, system-owned practices and practices with greater use of team-based care, health information technology capabilities, and public reporting were more likely to use open access scheduling. Accountable care organization-affiliated practices and practices with greater use of public reporting and P4P were more likely to provide after-hours care. Open access scheduling may be most effectively implemented by practices with robust PCMH capabilities. External incentives appear to influence practice adoption of after-hours care. Expanding open access scheduling and after-hours care will require distinct policies and supports.
Incentive schemes in development of socio-economic systems
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Grachev, V. V.; Ivushkin, K. A.; Myshlyaev, L. P.
2018-05-01
The paper is devoted to the study of incentive schemes when developing socio-economic systems. The article analyzes the existing incentive schemes. It is established that the traditional incentive mechanisms do not fully take into account the specifics of the creation of each socio-economic system and, as a rule, are difficult to implement. The incentive schemes based on the full-scale simulation approach, which allow the most complete information from the existing projects of creation of socio-economic systems to be extracted, are proposed. The statement of the problem is given, the method and algorithm of the full-scale simulation study of the efficiency of incentive functions is developed. The results of the study are presented. It is shown that the use of quadratic and piecewise linear functions of incentive allows the time and costs for creating social and economic systems to be reduced by 10%-15%.
Pittig, Andre; Hengen, Kristina; Bublatzky, Florian; Alpers, Georg W
2018-04-22
The reduction of avoidance behavior is a central target in the treatment of anxiety disorders, but it has rarely been studied how approach of fear-relevant stimuli may be initiated. In two studies, the impact of hypothetical monetary and symbolic social incentives on approach-avoidance behavior was examined. In Study 1, individuals high or low on fear of spiders (N = 84) could choose to approach a fear-relevant versus a neutral stimulus, which were equally rewarded. In a subsequent micro-intervention, approaching the fear-relevant stimulus was differentially rewarded either by monetary or social incentives. In Study 2 (N = 76), initial incentives for approach were discontinued to investigate the stability of approach. Hypothetical monetary and symbolic social incentives reduced or eliminated initial avoidance, even in highly fearful individuals. Approach resulted in a decrease of self-reported aversiveness towards the fear-relevant stimulus. However, even after successful approach, fearful individuals showed significant avoidance behavior when incentives for approach were discontinued. Future research should investigate the long-term effects of prolonged approach incentives on multiple levels of fear (e.g., self-report, behavioral, physiological). It should also be tested if such an intervention actually improves compliance with exposure based interventions. The present findings highlight that incentives are useful to initiate initial approach towards a feared stimulus. Although incentive-based approach may neither fully eliminate avoidance nor negative feelings towards the feared stimulus, such operant interventions may set the stage for more extensive extinction training. Copyright © 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Kurti, Allison N; Davis, Danielle R; Redner, Ryan; Jarvis, Brantley P; Zvorsky, Ivori; Keith, Diana R; Bolivar, Hypatia A; White, Thomas J; Rippberger, Peter; Markesich, Catherine; Atwood, Gary; Higgins, Stephen T
2016-06-01
Use of technology (e.g., Internet, cell phones) to allow remote implementation of incentives interventions for health-related behavior change is growing. To our knowledge, there has yet to be a systematic review of this literature reported. The present report provides a systematic review of the controlled studies where technology was used to remotely implement financial incentive interventions targeting substance use and other health behaviors published between 2004 and 2015. For inclusion in the review, studies had to use technology to remotely accomplish one of the following two aims alone or in combination: (a) monitor the target behavior, or (b) deliver incentives for achieving the target goal. Studies also had to examine financial incentives (e.g., cash, vouchers) for health-related behavior change, be published in peer-reviewed journals, and include a research design that allowed evaluation of the efficacy of the incentive intervention relative to another condition (e.g., non-contingent incentives, treatment as usual). Of the 39 reports that met inclusion criteria, 18 targeted substance use, 10 targeted medication adherence or home-based health monitoring, and 11 targeted diet, exercise, or weight loss. All 39 (100%) studies used technology to facilitate remote monitoring of the target behavior, and 26 (66.7%) studies also incorporated technology in the remote delivery of incentives. Statistically significant intervention effects were reported in 71% of studies reviewed. Overall, the results offer substantial support for the efficacy of remotely implemented incentive interventions for health-related behavior change, which have the potential to increase the cost-effectiveness and reach of this treatment approach.
Alhassan, Robert Kaba; Nketiah-Amponsah, Edward; Spieker, Nicole; Arhinful, Daniel Kojo; Rinke de Wit, Tobias F.
2016-01-01
Background Health worker density per 1000 population in Ghana is one of the lowest in the world estimated to be 2.3, below the global average of 9.3. Low health worker motivation induced by poor working conditions partly explain this challenge. Albeit the wage bill for public sector health workers is about 90% of domestic government expenditure on health in countries such as Ghana, staff motivation and performance output remain a challenge, suggesting the need to complement financial incentives with non-financial incentives through a community-based approach. In this study, a systematic community engagement (SCE) intervention was implemented to engage community groups in healthcare quality assessment to promote mutual collaboration between clients and healthcare providers, and enhance health worker motivation levels. SCE involves structured use of existing community groups and associations to assess healthcare quality in health facilities. Identified quality gaps are discussed with healthcare providers, improvements made and rewards given to best performing facilities for closing quality care gaps. Purpose To evaluate the effect of SCE interventions on health worker motivation and experiences with clients. Methods The study is a cluster randomized trial involving health workers in private (n = 38) and public (n = 26) primary healthcare facilities in two administrative regions in Ghana. Out of 324 clinical and non-clinical staff randomly interviewed at baseline, 234 (72%) were successfully followed at end-line and interviewed on workplace motivation factors and personal experiences with clients. Propensity score matching and difference-in-difference estimations were used to estimate treatment effect of the interventions on staff motivation. Results Intrinsic (non-financial) work incentives including cordiality with clients and perceived career prospects appeared to be prime sources of motivation for health staff interviewed in intervention health facilities while financial incentives were ranked lowest. Intervention health facilities that were assessed by female community groups (Coef. = 0.2720, p = 0.0118) and informal groups with organized leadership structures like Artisans (Coef. = 0.2268, p = 0.0368) associated positively with higher intrinsic motivation levels of staff. Conclusion Community-based approach to health worker motivation is a potential complementary strategy that needs policy deliberation to explore its prospects. Albeit financial incentives remain critical sources of staff motivation, innovative non-financial approaches like SCE should complement the latter. PMID:27439012
Alhassan, Robert Kaba; Nketiah-Amponsah, Edward; Spieker, Nicole; Arhinful, Daniel Kojo; Rinke de Wit, Tobias F
2016-01-01
Health worker density per 1000 population in Ghana is one of the lowest in the world estimated to be 2.3, below the global average of 9.3. Low health worker motivation induced by poor working conditions partly explain this challenge. Albeit the wage bill for public sector health workers is about 90% of domestic government expenditure on health in countries such as Ghana, staff motivation and performance output remain a challenge, suggesting the need to complement financial incentives with non-financial incentives through a community-based approach. In this study, a systematic community engagement (SCE) intervention was implemented to engage community groups in healthcare quality assessment to promote mutual collaboration between clients and healthcare providers, and enhance health worker motivation levels. SCE involves structured use of existing community groups and associations to assess healthcare quality in health facilities. Identified quality gaps are discussed with healthcare providers, improvements made and rewards given to best performing facilities for closing quality care gaps. To evaluate the effect of SCE interventions on health worker motivation and experiences with clients. The study is a cluster randomized trial involving health workers in private (n = 38) and public (n = 26) primary healthcare facilities in two administrative regions in Ghana. Out of 324 clinical and non-clinical staff randomly interviewed at baseline, 234 (72%) were successfully followed at end-line and interviewed on workplace motivation factors and personal experiences with clients. Propensity score matching and difference-in-difference estimations were used to estimate treatment effect of the interventions on staff motivation. Intrinsic (non-financial) work incentives including cordiality with clients and perceived career prospects appeared to be prime sources of motivation for health staff interviewed in intervention health facilities while financial incentives were ranked lowest. Intervention health facilities that were assessed by female community groups (Coef. = 0.2720, p = 0.0118) and informal groups with organized leadership structures like Artisans (Coef. = 0.2268, p = 0.0368) associated positively with higher intrinsic motivation levels of staff. Community-based approach to health worker motivation is a potential complementary strategy that needs policy deliberation to explore its prospects. Albeit financial incentives remain critical sources of staff motivation, innovative non-financial approaches like SCE should complement the latter.
Aligning incentives in supply chains.
Narayanan, V G; Raman, Ananth
2004-11-01
Most companies don't worry about the behavior of their supply chain partners. Instead, they expect the supply chain to work efficiently without interference, as if guided by Adam Smith's famed invisible hand. In their study of more than 50 supply networks, V.G. Narayanan and Ananth Raman found that companies often looked out for their own interests and ignored those of their network partners. Consequently, supply chains performed poorly. Those results aren't shocking when you consider that supply chains extend across several functions and many companies, each with its own priorities and goals. Yet all those functions and firms must pull in the same direction for a chain to deliver goods and services to consumers quickly and cost-effectively. According to the authors, a supply chain works well only if the risks, costs, and rewards of doing business are distributed fairly across the network. In fact, misaligned incentives are often the cause of excess inventory, stock-outs, incorrect forecasts, inadequate sales efforts, and even poor customer service. The fates of all supply chain partners are interlinked: If the firms work together to serve consumers, they will all win. However, they can do that only if incentives are aligned. Companies must acknowledge that the problem of incentive misalignment exists and then determine its root cause and align or redesign incentives. They can improve alignment by, for instance, adopting revenue-sharing contracts, using technology to track previously hidden information, or working with intermediaries to build trust among network partners. It's also important to periodically reassess incentives, because even top-performing networks find that changes in technology or business conditions alter the alignment of incentives.
Green Pays Its Way--Performance-Based Fees.
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Burns, Cameron M.; Eubank, Huston
2002-01-01
Reports that giving building and design professionals a financial incentive to create high-efficiency schools has proven to be a winning strategy for both the firms that design and build schools and the students who learn in them. Discusses a group of educators who had heard about the effects of natural lighting and ventilation on student and…
Olmstead, Todd A; Sindelar, Jody L; Petry, Nancy M
2007-03-16
To evaluate the cost-effectiveness of a prize-based intervention as an addition to usual care for stimulant abusers. This cost-effectiveness analysis is based on a randomized clinical trial implemented within the National Drug Abuse Treatment Clinical Trials Network. The trial was conducted at eight community-based outpatient psychosocial drug abuse treatment clinics. Four hundred and fifteen stimulant abusers were assigned to usual care (N=206) or usual care plus abstinence-based incentives (N=209) for 12 weeks. Participants randomized to the incentive condition earned the chance to draw for prizes for submitting substance negative samples; the number of draws earned increased with continuous abstinence time. Incremental cost-effectiveness ratios were estimated to compare prize-based incentives relative to usual care. The primary patient outcome was longest duration of confirmed stimulant abstinence (LDA). Unit costs were obtained via surveys administered at the eight participating clinics. Resource utilizations and patient outcomes were obtained from the clinical trial. Acceptability curves are presented to illustrate the uncertainty due to the sample and to provide policy relevant information. The incremental cost to lengthen the LDA by 1 week was 258 US dollars (95% confidence interval, 191-401 US dollars). Sensitivity analyses on several key parameters show that this value ranges from 163 to 269 US dollars. Compared with the usual care group, the incentive group had significantly longer LDAs and significantly higher costs.
Xu, Wanying; Zhou, Chuanbin; Lan, Yajun; Jin, Jiasheng; Cao, Aixin
2015-05-01
Municipal solid waste (MSW) management (MSWM) is most important and challenging in large urban communities. Sound community-based waste management systems normally include waste reduction and material recycling elements, often entailing the separation of recyclable materials by the residents. To increase the efficiency of source separation and recycling, an incentive-based source separation model was designed and this model was tested in 76 households in Guiyang, a city of almost three million people in southwest China. This model embraced the concepts of rewarding households for sorting organic waste, government funds for waste reduction, and introducing small recycling enterprises for promoting source separation. Results show that after one year of operation, the waste reduction rate was 87.3%, and the comprehensive net benefit under the incentive-based source separation model increased by 18.3 CNY tonne(-1) (2.4 Euros tonne(-1)), compared to that under the normal model. The stakeholder analysis (SA) shows that the centralized MSW disposal enterprises had minimum interest and may oppose the start-up of a new recycling system, while small recycling enterprises had a primary interest in promoting the incentive-based source separation model, but they had the least ability to make any change to the current recycling system. The strategies for promoting this incentive-based source separation model are also discussed in this study. © The Author(s) 2015.
DOT National Transportation Integrated Search
2014-02-01
The Michigan Department of Transportation (MDOT) has been using monetary incentive payments for many : years to accelerate highway construction work, resulting in reduced delays to the traveling public. It was : envisioned that incentive/disincentive...
Kaczorowski, Janusz; Hearps, Stephen J C; Lohfeld, Lynne; Goeree, Ron; Donald, Faith; Burgess, Ken; Sebaldt, Rolf J
2013-06-01
To evaluate the effect of the Provider and Patient Reminders in Ontario: Multi-Strategy Prevention Tools (P-PROMPT) reminder and recall system and pay-for-performance incentives on the delivery rates of cervical and breast cancer screening in primary care practices in Ontario, with or without deployment of nurse practitioners (NPs). Before-and-after comparisons of the time-appropriate delivery rates of cervical and breast cancer screening using the automated and NP-augmented strategies of the P-PROMPT reminder and recall system. Southwestern Ontario. A total of 232 physicians from 24 primary care network or family health network groups across 110 different sites eligible for pay-for-performance incentives. The P-PROMPT project combined pay-for-performance incentives with provider and patient reminders and deployment of NPs to enhance the delivery of preventive care services. The mean delivery rates at the practice level of time-appropriate mammograms and Papanicolaou tests completed within the previous 30 months. Before-and-after comparisons of time-appropriate delivery rates (< 30 months) of cancer screening showed the rates of Pap tests and mammograms for eligible women significantly increased over a 1-year period by 6.3% (P < .001) and 5.3% (P < .001), respectively. The NP-augmented strategy achieved comparable rate increases to the automated strategy alone in the delivery rates of both services. The use of provider and patient reminders and pay-for-performance incentives resulted in increases in the uptake of Pap tests and mammograms among eligible primary care patients over a 1-year period in family practices in Ontario.
Harrison, Mark; Milbers, Katherine; Mihic, Tamara; Anis, Aslam H
2016-07-01
Concerns about the sustainability of current health care expenditure are focusing attention on the cost, quality and value of health care provision. Financial incentives, for example pay-for-performance (P4P), seek to reward quality and value in health care provision. There has long been an expectation that P4P schemes are coming to rheumatology. We review the available evidence about the use of incentives in this setting and provide two emerging examples of P4P schemes which may shape the future of service provision in rheumatology. Currently, there is limited and equivocal evidence in rheumatology about the impact of incentive schemes. However, reporting variation in the quality and provision of rheumatology services has highlighted examples of inefficiencies in the delivery of care. If financial incentives can improve the delivery of timely and appropriate care for rheumatology patients, then they may have an important role to play in the sustainability of health care provision.
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Fryer, Roland G., Jr.
2010-01-01
This paper describes a series of school-based randomized trials in over 250 urban schools designed to test the impact of financial incentives on student achievement. In stark contrast to simple economic models, our results suggest that student incentives increase achievement when the rewards are given for inputs to the educational production…
TIPP. Training Incentive Payments Program. Five Year's Operations. Final Report.
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Institute of Public Administration, New York, NY.
A report is made of the first operating phase from March 1970 through May 1971 of a test of the feasibility of using financial incentives to stimulate more effective upgrading of the skills and earnings of low income workers in the private sector. TIPP provides incentive payments to employers based on results achieved. Program administration…
Horter, H; Zapp, W; Driessen, M
2016-07-01
The German fixed rate remuneration system in psychiatry and psychosomatics (PEPP) has been criticized by many specialty associations because negative effects on mental healthcare are expected through economic incentives. Through analysis of performance data in the treatment of alcohol dependency at the Evangelical Hospital Bielefeld (Evangelisches Krankenhaus Bielefeld, EvKB) from 2014 and various simulations, the incentives of the PEPP (version 2015) were analyzed and its potential impact on patient care was evaluated. Groups of cases were created based on the clinical data. Various parameters were evaluated, such as duration of treatment, PEPP coding, loss of income by merging cases and case remuneration. Additionally, changes in the duration of treatment, the intensity of treatment and the intensity of care were simulated. In the simulations a reduction in the duration of treatment by 16.1 % led to additional revenues of 1.9 % per treatment day. The calculated additional costs of 1:1 care and intensive nursing care were not completely covered by the additional revenues, whereas psychotherapeutic inpatient treatment programs showed positive profit contributions. Complicated cases with increased merging of cases showed lower revenues but with above average expenditure of efforts. The current version of the PEPP leads to misdirected incentives in patient care. This is caused, for example, by the fact that higher profit contributions can be realized in some patient groups and intensive nursing care of patients is insufficiently represented. It is not clear whether these incentives will persist or can be compensated in subsequent versions of the system.
Merit-Based Incentive Payment System: Meaningful Changes in the Final Rule Brings Cautious Optimism.
Manchikanti, Laxmaiah; Helm Ii, Standiford; Calodney, Aaron K; Hirsch, Joshua A
2017-01-01
The Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015 (MACRA) eliminated the flawed Sustainable Growth Rate (SGR) act formula - a longstanding crucial issue of concern for health care providers and Medicare beneficiaries. MACRA also included a quality improvement program entitled, "The Merit-Based Incentive Payment System, or MIPS." The proposed rule of MIPS sought to streamline existing federal quality efforts and therefore linked 4 distinct programs into one. Three existing programs, meaningful use (MU), Physician Quality Reporting System (PQRS), value-based payment (VBP) system were merged with the addition of Clinical Improvement Activity category. The proposed rule also changed the name of MU to Advancing Care Information, or ACI. ACI contributes to 25% of composite score of the four programs, PQRS contributes 50% of the composite score, while VBP system, which deals with resource use or cost, contributes to 10% of the composite score. The newest category, Improvement Activities or IA, contributes 15% to the composite score. The proposed rule also created what it called a design incentive that drives movement to delivery system reform principles with the inclusion of Advanced Alternative Payment Models (APMs).Following the release of the proposed rule, the medical community, as well as Congress, provided substantial input to Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS),expressing their concern. American Society of Interventional Pain Physicians (ASIPP) focused on 3 important aspects: delay the implementation, provide a 3-month performance period, and provide ability to submit meaningful quality measures in a timely and economic manner. The final rule accepted many of the comments from various organizations, including several of those specifically emphasized by ASIPP, with acceptance of 3-month reporting period, as well as the ability to submit non-MIPS measures to improve real quality and make the system meaningful. CMS also provided a mechanism for physicians to avoid penalties for non-reporting with reporting of just a single patient. In summary, CMS has provided substantial flexibility with mechanisms to avoid penalties, reporting for 90 continuous days, increasing the low volume threshold, changing the reporting burden and data thresholds and, finally, coordination between performance categories. The final rule has made MIPS more meaningful with bonuses for exceptional performance, the ability to report for 90 days, and to report on 50% of the patients in 2017 and 60% of the patients in 2018. The final rule also reduced the quality measures to 6, including only one outcome or high priority measure with elimination of cross cutting measure requirement. In addition, the final rule reduced the burden of ACI, improved the coordination of performance, reduced improvement activities burden from 60 points to 40 points, and finally improved coordination between performance categories. Multiple concerns remain regarding the reduction in scoring for quality improvement in future years, increase in proportion of MIPS scoring for resource use utilizing flawed, claims based methodology and the continuation of the disproportionate importance of ACI, an expensive program that can be onerous for providers which in many ways has not lived up to its promise. Key words: Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015, merit-based incentive payment system, quality performance measures, resource use, improvement activities, advancing care information performance category.
75 FR 8854 - Teacher Incentive Fund Program
Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014
2010-02-26
...The Secretary of Education (Secretary) proposes priorities, requirements, definitions, and selection criteria under the Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) program. These proposed priorities, requirements, definitions, and selection criteria are designed to be used in two separate and distinct TIF grant competitions: The Main TIF competition, which will provide TIF funding to eligible entities to support their implementation of performance-based compensation systems (PBCSs) in accordance with the priorities, the Main TIF requirements, the definitions, and the selection criteria proposed in this document, and the TIF Evaluation competition, which will provide, in accordance with the priorities, the Main TIF requirements, the definitions, and the selection criteria as well as the Evaluation requirements proposed in this document, TIF funding to help pay for the costs of implementing these eligible entities' PBCS in exchange for an agreement to participate in the national evaluation. The Secretary may use these proposed TIF priorities, requirements, definitions, and selection criteria in fiscal year (FY) 2010 and subsequent years. We intend the proposed priorities, requirements, definitions, and selection criteria to improve student achievement in high-need schools by creating incentives for effective teachers and principals in these schools.
Tomich, Georgia Miranda; França, Danielle Corrêa; Diniz, Marco Túlio Costa; Britto, Raquel Rodrigues; Sampaio, Rosana Ferreira; Parreira, Verônica Franco
2010-01-01
To evaluate breathing pattern and thoracoabdominal motion during breathing exercises. Twenty-four patients with class II or III obesity (18 women; 6 men) were studied on the second postoperative day after gastroplasty. The mean age was 37 +/- 11 years, and the mean BMI was 44 +/- 3 kg/m(2). Diaphragmatic breathing, incentive spirometry with a flow-oriented device and incentive spirometry with a volume-oriented device were performed in random order. Respiratory inductive plethysmography was used in order to measure respiratory variables and thoracoabdominal motion. Comparisons among the three exercises showed significant differences: tidal volume was higher during incentive spirometry (with the flow-oriented device or with the volume-oriented device) than during diaphragmatic breathing; the respiratory rate was lower during incentive spirometry with the volume-oriented device than during incentive spirometry with the flow-oriented device; and minute ventilation was higher during incentive spirometry (with the flow-oriented device or with the volume-oriented device) than during diaphragmatic breathing. Rib cage motion did not vary during breathing exercises, although there was an increase in thoracoabdominal asynchrony, especially during incentive spirometry with the flow-oriented device. Among the breathing exercises evaluated, incentive spirometry with the volume-oriented device provided the best results, because it allowed slower, deeper inhalation.
Premium-Based Financial Incentives Did Not Promote Workplace Weight Loss In A 2013-15 Study.
Patel, Mitesh S; Asch, David A; Troxel, Andrea B; Fletcher, Michele; Osman-Koss, Rosemary; Brady, Jennifer; Wesby, Lisa; Hilbert, Victoria; Zhu, Jingsan; Wang, Wenli; Volpp, Kevin G
2016-01-01
Employers commonly use adjustments to health insurance premiums as incentives to encourage healthy behavior, but the effectiveness of those adjustments is controversial. We gave 197 obese participants in a workplace wellness program a weight loss goal equivalent to 5 percent of their baseline weight. They were randomly assigned to a control arm, with no financial incentive for achieving the goal, or to one of three intervention arms offering an incentive valued at $550. Two intervention arms used health insurance premium adjustments, beginning the following year (delayed) or in the first pay period after achieving the goal (immediate). A third arm used a daily lottery incentive separate from premiums. At twelve months there were no statistically significant differences in mean weight change either between the control group (whose members had a mean gain of 0.1 pound) and any of the incentive groups (delayed premium adjustment, -1.2 pound; immediate premium adjustment, -1.4 pound; daily lottery incentive, -1.0 pound) or among the intervention groups. The apparent failure of the incentives to promote weight loss suggests that employers that encourage weight reduction through workplace wellness programs should test alternatives to the conventional premium adjustment approach by using alternative incentive designs, larger incentives, or both. Project HOPE—The People-to-People Health Foundation, Inc.
77 FR 35795 - Applications for New Awards; Teacher Incentive Fund
Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014
2012-06-14
... personnel may include, for example, school counselors, media specialists, or para-educators. Performance... by the State as a priority school pursuant to the State's approved request for Elementary and... Incentive Fund AGENCY: Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Department of Education. ACTION: Notice...
Cost-effectiveness of hospital pay-for-performance incentives.
Nahra, Tammie A; Reiter, Kristin L; Hirth, Richard A; Shermer, Janet E; Wheeler, John R C
2006-02-01
One increasingly popular mechanism for stimulating quality improvements is pay-for-performance, or incentive, programs. This article examines the cost-effectiveness of a hospital incentive system for heart-related care, using a principal-agent model, where the insurer is the principal and hospitals are the agents. Four-year incentive system costsfor the payer were dollar 22,059,383, composed primarily of payments to the participating hospitals, with approximately 5 percent in administrative costs. Effectiveness is measured in stages, beginning with improvements in the processes of heart care. Care process improvements are converted into quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) gained, with reference to literatures on clinical effectiveness and survival. An estimated 24,418 patients received improved care, resulting in a range of QALYs from 733 to 1,701, depending on assumptions about clinical effectiveness. Cost per QALY was found to be between dollar 12,967 and dollar 30,081, a level well under consensus measures of the value of a QALY.
Financial versus Non-Financial Incentives for Improving Patient Experience.
Lee, Thomas H
2015-05-01
Delivering compassionate and coordinated care is a goal for all health care providers. Humans are not always consistent, though, both individually and collectively, and this is why everyone needs incentives to be at their best and to try to always be improving. The endlessly interesting question in patient experience is, what should those incentives look like? Should they be financial or nonfinancial? Dr. Thomas H. Lee explores what is most effective in regard to engaging and motivating physicians. While different approaches will work in different organizational cultures, financial incentives have their role in performance improvement. Compassionate coordinated care should be a social norm and be pursued by all health care organizations.
Prosocial Motivation and Blood Donations: A Survey of the Empirical Literature
Goette, Lorenz; Stutzer, Alois; Frey, Beat M.
2010-01-01
Summary Recent shortages in the supply of blood donations have renewed the interest in how blood donations can be increased temporarily. We survey the evidence on the role of financial and other incentives in eliciting blood donations among donors who are normally willing to donate pro bono. We present the predictions from different empirical/psychological-based theories, with some predicting that incentives are effective while others predict that incentives may undermine prosocial motivation. The evidence suggests that incentives work relatively well in settings in which donors are relatively anonymous, but evidence indicates also that when image concerns become important, incentives may be counterproductive as donors do not want to be seen as greedy. PMID:20737018
Beyond Measurement and Reward: Methods of Motivating Quality Improvement and Accountability.
Berenson, Robert A; Rice, Thomas
2015-12-01
The article examines public policies designed to improve quality and accountability that do not rely on financial incentives and public reporting of provider performance. Payment policy should help temper the current "more is better" attitude of physicians and provider organizations. Incentive neutrality would better support health professionals' intrinsic motivation to act in their patients' best interests to improve overall quality than would pay-for-performance plans targeted to specific areas of clinical care. Public policy can support clinicians' intrinsic motivation through approaches that support systematic feedback to clinicians and provide concrete opportunities to collaborate to improve care. Some programs administered by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, including Partnership for Patients and Conditions of Participation, deserve more attention; they represent available, but largely ignored, approaches to support providers to improve quality and protect beneficiaries against substandard care. Public policies related to quality improvement should focus more on methods of enhancing professional intrinsic motivation, while recognizing the potential role of organizations to actively promote and facilitate that motivation. Actually achieving improvement, however, will require a reexamination of the role played by financial incentives embedded in payments and the unrealistic expectations placed on marginal incentives in pay-for-performance schemes. © Health Research and Educational Trust.
Participatory development of incentives to coexist with jaguars and pumas.
Amit, Ronit; Jacobson, Susan K
2018-01-22
Reducing costs and increasing benefits for rural communities coexisting with large carnivores is necessary for conservation of jaguar (Panthera onca) and puma (Puma concolor). To design acceptable incentives, stakeholders must be involved in the process. We conducted an innovative, structured, group communication process based on a Delphi technique as a template for identifying potential incentives. Community workshops with 133 members of 7 communities and surveys with 25 multidisciplinary experts from government, nongovernmental organizations, and academia provided iterative data to design a plan of incentives through 4 rounds of discussion. The final product integrated 862 ideas into 6 types of incentives: organization of communities, mechanisms for improved dialogue, citizen technical assistance, green labeling for community products, payment for the ecosystem service of biodiversity, and an assessment of financial alternatives. We used quantitative and qualitative techniques to indicate support for decisions about the design of incentives, which reduced researcher subjectivity. The diverse incentives developed and the cooperation from multiple stakeholders resulted in an incentive plan that integrated issues of governance, equity, and social norms. © 2018 Society for Conservation Biology.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Spencer, D.F.
This analysis evaluates the incentives necessary to introduce commercial scale Advanced Clean Coal Technologies, specifically Integrated Coal Gasification Combined Cycle (ICGCC) and Pressurized Fluidized Bed Combustion (PFBC) powerplants. The incentives required to support the initial introduction of these systems are based on competitive busbar electricity costs with natural gas fired combined cycle powerplants, in baseload service. A federal government price guarantee program for up to 10 Advanced Clean Coal Technology powerplants, 5 each ICGCC and PFBC systems is recommended in order to establish the commercial viability of these systems by 2010. By utilizing a decreasing incentives approach as the technologiesmore » mature (plants 1--5 of each type), and considering the additional federal government benefits of these plants versus natural gas fired combined cycle powerplants, federal government net financial exposure is minimized. Annual net incentive outlays of approximately 150 million annually over a 20 year period could be necessary. Based on increased demand for Advanced Clean Coal Technologies beyond 2010, the federal government would be revenue neutral within 10 years of the incentives program completion.« less
Gagnon, Marc-André
2013-01-01
This paper explains how the current architecture of the pharmaceutical markets has created a misalignment of financial incentives and public health that is a central cause of harmful practices. It explores three possible solutions to address that misalignment: taxes, increased financial penalties, and drug pricing based on value. Each proposal could help to partly realign financial incentives and public health. However, because of the limits of each proposal, there is no easy solution to fixing the problem of financial incentives. © 2013 American Society of Law, Medicine & Ethics, Inc.
Impact of Provider Incentives on Quality and Value of Health Care.
Doran, Tim; Maurer, Kristin A; Ryan, Andrew M
2017-03-20
The use of financial incentives to improve quality in health care has become widespread. Yet evidence on the effectiveness of incentives suggests that they have generally had limited impact on the value of care and have not led to better patient outcomes. Lessons from social psychology and behavioral economics indicate that incentive programs in health care have not been effectively designed to achieve their intended impact. In the United States, Medicare's Hospital Readmission Reduction Program and Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Program, created under the Affordable Care Act (ACA), provide evidence on how variations in the design of incentive programs correspond with differences in effect. As financial incentives continue to be used as a tool to increase the value and quality of health care, improving the design of programs will be crucial to ensure their success.
Incentives and intrinsic motivation in healthcare.
Berdud, Mikel; Cabasés, Juan M; Nieto, Jorge
It has been established in the literature that workers within public organisations are intrinsically motivated. This paper is an empirical study of the healthcare sector using methods of qualitative analysis research, which aims to answer the following hypotheses: 1) doctors are intrinsically motivated; 2) economic incentives and control policies may undermine doctors' intrinsic motivation; and 3) well-designed incentives may encourage doctors' intrinsic motivation. We conducted semi-structured interviews à-la-Bewley with 16 doctors from Navarre's Healthcare Service (Servicio Navarro de Salud-Osasunbidea), Spain. The questions were based on current theories of intrinsic motivation and incentives to test the hypotheses. Interviewees were allowed to respond openly without time constraints. Relevant information was selected, quantified and analysed by using the qualitative concepts of saturation and codification. The results seem to confirm the hypotheses. Evidence supporting hypotheses 1 and 2 was gathered from all interviewees, as well as indications of the validity of hypothesis 3 based on interviewees' proposals of incentives. The conclusions could act as a guide to support the optimal design of incentive policies and schemes within health organisations when healthcare professionals are intrinsically motivated. Copyright © 2016 SESPAS. Publicado por Elsevier España, S.L.U. All rights reserved.
Rapid core measure improvement through a "business case for quality".
Perlin, Jonathan B; Horner, Stephen J; Englebright, Jane D; Bracken, Richard M
2014-01-01
Incentives to improve performance are emerging as revenue or financial penalties are linked to the measured quality of service provided. The HCA "Getting to Green" program was designed to rapidly increase core measure performance scores. Program components included (1) the "business case for quality"-increased awareness of how quality drives financial performance; (2) continuous communication of clinical and financial performance data; and (3) evidence-based clinical protocols, incentives, and tools for process improvement. Improvement was measured by comparing systemwide rates of adherence to national quality measures for heart failure (HF), acute myocardial infarction (AMI), pneumonia (PN), and surgical care (SCIP) to rates from all facilities reporting to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). As of the second quarter of 2011, 70% of HCA total measure set composite scores were at or above the 90th percentile of CMS scores. A test of differences in regression coefficients between the CMS national average and the HCA average revealed significant differences for AMI (p = .001), HF (p = .012), PN (p < .001), and SCIP (p = .015). This program demonstrated that presentation of the financial implications of quality, transparency in performance data, and clearly defined goals could cultivate the desire to use improvement tools and resources to raise performance. © 2012 National Association for Healthcare Quality.
Pueyo, Maria-Jesus; Escuriet, Ramon; Pérez-Botella, M; de Molina, I; Ruíz-Berdun, D; Albert, S; Díaz, S; Torres-Capcha, P; Ortún, V
2018-04-01
To explore the effect of hospital's characteristics in the proportion of obstetric interventions (OI) performed in singleton fullterm births (SFTB) in Catalonia (2010-2014), while incentives were employed to reduce C-sections. Data about SFTB assisted at 42 public hospitals were extracted from the dataset of hospital discharges. Hospitals were classified according to the level of complexity, the volume of births attended, and the adoption of a non-medicalized delivery (NMD) strategy. The annual average change in the percentage for OI was calculated based on Poisson regression models. The rate of OI (35% of all SFTB) including C-sections (20.6%) remained stable through the period. Hospitals attending less complex cases had a lower average of OI, while hospitals attending lower volumes had the highest average. Higher levels of complexity increased the use of C-sections (+4% yearly) and forceps (+16%). The adoption of the NMD strategy decreased the rate of C-sections. The proportion of OI, including C-sections, remained stable in spite of public incentives to reduce them. The adoption of the NMD strategy could help in decreasing the rate of OI. To reduce the OI rate, new strategies should be launched as the development of low-risk pregnancies units, alignment of incentives and hospital payment, increased value of incentives and encouragement of a cultural shift towards non-medicalized births. Copyright © 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Mehta, Shivan J; Feingold, Jordyn; Vandertuyn, Matthew; Niewood, Tess; Cox, Catherine; Doubeni, Chyke A; Volpp, Kevin G; Asch, David A
2017-11-01
Behavioral economic approaches could increase uptake for colorectal cancer screening. We performed a randomized controlled trial of 2245 employees to determine whether an email containing a phone number for scheduling (control), an email with the active choice to opt in or opt out (active choice), or the active choice email plus a $100 incentive (financial incentive) increased colonoscopy completion within 3 months. Higher proportions of participants in the financial incentive group underwent screening (3.7%) than in the control (1.6%) or active choice groups (1.5%) (P = .01 and P < .01). We found no difference in uptake of screening between the active choice and control groups (P = .88). The $100 conditional incentive modestly but significantly increased colonoscopy use. ClinicalTrials.gov no: NCT02660671. Copyright © 2017 AGA Institute. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
42 CFR § 414.1370 - APM scoring standard under MIPS.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2017-10-01
... SERVICES (CONTINUED) MEDICARE PROGRAM (CONTINUED) PAYMENT FOR PART B MEDICAL AND OTHER HEALTH SERVICES Merit-Based Incentive Payment System and Alternative Payment Model Incentive § 414.1370 APM scoring... Participation List; (3) The APM bases payment on cost/utilization and quality measures; and (4) The APM is not...
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
McMahon, Kelly A.
2017-01-01
Federal school accountability policies like No Child Left Behind were based on a logic that measuring school performance and making the results public through tools like school report cards would incentivize educators to create strategies for improving school quality. Yet, most schools needed more than incentives to be able to design improvement…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Elstad, Eyvind; Turmo, Are
2011-01-01
As education systems around the world move towards increased accountability based on performance measures, it is important to investigate the unintended effects of accountability systems. This article seeks to explore the extent to which head teachers in a large Norwegian municipality may resort to gaming the incentive system to boost their…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Wellington, Alison; Chiang, Hanley; Hallgren, Kristin; Speroni, Cecilia; Herrmann, Mariesa; Burkander, Paul
2016-01-01
Research indicates that effective teachers are critical to raising student achievement. However, there is little evidence about the best ways to improve teacher effectiveness, or how schools that serve the students most in need can attract and retain effective teachers. Traditional salary schedules, which pay teachers based on their years of…
Wassum, Kate M.; Ostlund, Sean B.; Balleine, Bernard W.; Maidment, Nigel T.
2011-01-01
Here we attempted to clarify the role of dopamine signaling in reward seeking. In Experiment 1, we assessed the effects of the dopamine D1/D2 receptor antagonist flupenthixol (0.5 mg/kg i.p.) on Pavlovian incentive motivation and found that flupenthixol blocked the ability of a conditioned stimulus to enhance both goal approach and instrumental performance (Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer). In Experiment 2 we assessed the effects of flupenthixol on reward palatability during post-training noncontingent re-exposure to the sucrose reward in either a control 3-h or novel 23-h food-deprived state. Flupenthixol, although effective in blocking the Pavlovian goal approach, was without effect on palatability or the increase in reward palatability induced by the upshift in motivational state. This noncontingent re-exposure provided an opportunity for instrumental incentive learning, the process by which rats encode the value of a reward for use in updating reward-seeking actions. Flupenthixol administered prior to the instrumental incentive learning opportunity did not affect the increase in subsequent off-drug reward-seeking actions induced by that experience. These data suggest that although dopamine signaling is necessary for Pavlovian incentive motivation, it is not necessary for changes in reward experience, or for the instrumental incentive learning process that translates this experience into the incentive value used to drive reward-seeking actions, and provide further evidence that Pavlovian and instrumental incentive learning processes are dissociable. PMID:21693635
Kramer, Jan-Niklas; Kehr, Flavius; Wahle, Fabian; Elser, Niklas; Fleisch, Elgar
2016-01-01
Background Research has so far benefited from the use of pedometers in physical activity interventions. However, when public health institutions (eg, insurance companies) implement pedometer-based interventions in practice, people may refrain from participating due to privacy concerns. This might greatly limit the applicability of such interventions. Financial incentives have been successfully used to influence both health behavior and privacy concerns, and may thus have a beneficial effect on the acceptance of pedometer-based interventions. Objective This paper presents the design and baseline characteristics of a cluster-randomized controlled trial that seeks to examine the effect of financial incentives on the acceptance of and adherence to a pedometer-based physical activity intervention offered by a health insurance company. Methods More than 18,000 customers of a large Swiss health insurance company were allocated to a financial incentive, a charitable incentive, or a control group and invited to participate in a health prevention program. Participants used a pedometer to track their daily physical activity over the course of 6 months. A Web-based questionnaire was administered at the beginning and at the end of the intervention and additional data was provided by the insurance company. The primary outcome of the study will be the participation rate, secondary outcomes will be adherence to the prevention program, physical activity, and health status of the participants among others. Results Baseline characteristics indicate that residence of participants, baseline physical activity, and subjective health should be used as covariates in the statistical analysis of the secondary outcomes of the study. Conclusions This is the first study in western cultures testing the effectiveness of financial incentives with regard to a pedometer-based health intervention offered by a large health insurer to their customers. Given that the incentives prove to be effective, this study provides the basis for powerful health prevention programs of public health institutions that are easy to implement and can reach large numbers of people in need. PMID:27624645
Judah, Gaby; Vlaev, Ivo; Gunn, Laura; King, Dominic; King, Derek; Valabhji, Jonathan; Darzi, Ara; Bicknell, Colin
2016-03-18
Diabetes is an increasing public health problem in the UK and globally. Diabetic retinopathy is a microvascular complication of diabetes, and is one of the leading causes of blindness in the UK working age population. The diabetic eye screening programme in England aims to invite all people with diabetes aged 12 or over for retinal photography to screen for the presence of diabetic retinopathy. However, attendance rates are only 81 %, leaving many people at risk of preventable sight loss. This is a three arm randomized controlled trial to investigate the impact of different types of financial incentives (based on principles from behavioral economics) on increasing attendance at diabetic eye screening appointments in London. Eligible participants will be aged 16 or over, and are those who have been invited to screening appointments annually, but who have not attended, or telephoned to rearrange an appointment, within the last 24 months. Eligible participants will be randomized to one of three conditions: 1. Control condition (usual invitation letter) 2. Fixed incentive condition (usual invitation letter, including a voucher for £10 if they attend their appointment) 3. Probabilistic incentive condition (invitation letter, including a voucher for a 1 in 100 chance of winning £1000 if they attend their appointment). Participants will be sent invitation letters, and the primary outcome will be whether or not they attend their appointment. One thousand participants will be included in total, randomized with a ratio of 1.4:1:1. In order to test whether the incentive scheme has a differential impact on patients from different demographic or socio-economic groups, information will be recorded on age, gender, distance from screening center, socio-economic status and length of time since they were last screened. A cost-effectiveness analysis will also be performed. This study will be the first trial of financial incentives for improving uptake of diabetic eye screening. If effective, the intervention may suggest a cost-effective way to increase screening rates, thus reducing unnecessary blindness. ISRCTN14896403, 25 February 2016.
48 CFR 1552.216-78 - Award term incentive plan.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... evaluation of performance, and, together with Agency need and availability of funding, serves as the basis... the acceptable quality levels (AQL) for the evaluated tasks, both individual and aggregate, for that... incentive period. [identify the most significant tasks. Describe the AQL for each task as well as an overall...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... Acquisition Regulations System DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AGENCY SUPPLEMENTARY REGULATIONS DOE MANAGEMENT AND.... Financial incentives for timely mission accomplishment or cost effectiveness shall never compromise or..., undue risk to the common defense and security. In addition, this category includes performance failures...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-10-01
... Acquisition Regulations System DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AGENCY SUPPLEMENTARY REGULATIONS DOE MANAGEMENT AND.... Financial incentives for timely mission accomplishment or cost effectiveness shall never compromise or..., undue risk to the common defense and security. In addition, this category includes performance failures...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-10-01
... Acquisition Regulations System DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AGENCY SUPPLEMENTARY REGULATIONS DOE MANAGEMENT AND.... Financial incentives for timely mission accomplishment or cost effectiveness shall never compromise or..., undue risk to the common defense and security. In addition, this category includes performance failures...
Home-based radiology transcription and a productivity pay plan.
Kerr, K
1997-01-01
Shands Hospital in Gainesville, Fla., decided to evaluate the way it provided transcription services in its radiology department. It identified four goals: increased productivity, decreased operating expense, finding much needed space in the radiology department and increasing employee morale. The department performs 165,000 procedures annually, with 66 radiologists, 29 faculty, and 37 residents and fellows on staff. Six FTEs comprised the transcription pool in the radiology department, with transcription their only duty. Transcriptionists were paid an hourly rate based on their years of service, not their productivity. Evaluation and measurement studies were undertaken by the hospital's management systems engineering department. The transcriptionists' hours were then changed to provide coverage during the periods of heaviest dictation. The productivity level of the transcription staff was also measured and various methods of measurement reviewed. The goal was a pure incentive pay plan that would reward employees for every increase in productivity. The incentive pay plan was phased in over a three-month period. Transcriptionists were paid for work performed, with no base pay beyond minimum wage. The move to home-based transcription was planned. The necessary equipment was identified and various issues specific to working at home were addressed. Approximately six months later, the transcriptionists were set up to work at home. The astounding results achieved are presented: 28% increase in productivity, operational cost savings exceeding $25,000 and a space savings of 238 square feet.
The impact of primary care reform on health system performance in Canada: a systematic review.
Carter, Renee; Riverin, Bruno; Levesque, Jean-Frédéric; Gariepy, Geneviève; Quesnel-Vallée, Amélie
2016-07-30
We aimed to synthesize the evidence of a causal effect and draw inferences about whether Canadian primary care reforms improved health system performance based on measures of health service utilization, processes of care, and physician productivity. We searched the Embase, PubMed and Web of Science databases for records from 2000 to September 2015. We based our risk of bias assessment on the Grading of Recommendations Assessment, Development and Evaluation guidelines. Full-text studies were synthesized and organized according to the three outcome categories: health service utilization, processes of care, and physician costs and productivity. We found moderate quality evidence that team-based models of care led to reductions in emergency department use, but the evidence was mixed for hospital admissions. We also found low quality evidence that team-based models, blended capitation models and pay-for-performance incentives led to small and sometimes non-significant improvements in processes of care. Studies examining new payment models on physician costs and productivity were of high methodological quality and provided a coherent body of evidence assessing enhanced fee-for-service and blended capitation payment models. A small number of studies suggested that team-based models contributed to reductions in emergency department use in Quebec and Alberta. Regarding processes of diabetes care, studies found higher rates of testing for blood glucose levels, retinopathy and cholesterol in Alberta's team-based primary care model and in practices eligible for pay-for-performance incentives in Ontario. However pay-for-performance in Ontario was found to have null to moderate effects on other prevention and screening activities. Although blended capitation payment in Ontario contributed to decreases in the number of services delivered and patients seen per day, the number of enrolled patients and number of days worked in a year was similar to that of enhanced fee-for-service practices.
Effect of Incentives and Mailing Features on Online Health Program Enrollment
Alexander, Gwen L.; Divine, George W.; Couper, Mick P.; McClure, Jennifer B.; Stopponi, Melanie A.; Fortman, Kristine K.; Tolsma, Dennis D.; Strecher, Victor J.; Johnson, Christine Cole
2008-01-01
Background With the growing use of Internet-based interventions, strategies are needed to encourage broader participation. This study examined the effects of combinations of monetary incentives and mailing characteristics on enrollment, retention, and cost effectiveness for an online health program. Methods In 2004, a recruitment letter was mailed to randomly selected Midwestern integrated health system members aged 21–65 and stratified by gender and race/ethnicity; recipients were randomly pre-assigned to one of 24 combinations of incentives and various mailing characteristics. Enrollment and 3-month retention rates were measured by completion of online surveys. Analysis, completed in 2005, compared enrollment and retention factors using t tests and chi-square tests. Multivariate logistic regression modeling assessed the probability of enrollment and retention. Results Of 12,289 subjects, 531 (4.3%) enrolled online, ranging from 1% to 11% by incentive combination. Highest enrollment occurred with unconditional incentives, and responses varied by gender. Retention rates ranged from 0% to 100%, with highest retention linked to higher-value incentives. The combination of a $2 bill prepaid incentive and the promise of $20 for retention (10% enrollment and 71% retention) was optimal, considering per-subject recruitment costs ($32 enrollment, $70 retention) and equivalent enrollment by gender and race/ethnicity. Conclusions Cash incentives improved enrollment in an online health program. Men and women responded differently to mailing characteristics and incentives. Including a small prepaid monetary incentive ($2 or $5) and revealing the higher promised-retention incentive was cost effective and boosted enrollment. PMID:18407004
42 CFR § 414.1325 - Data submission requirements.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2017-10-01
... SERVICES (CONTINUED) MEDICARE PROGRAM (CONTINUED) PAYMENT FOR PART B MEDICAL AND OTHER HEALTH SERVICES Merit-Based Incentive Payment System and Alternative Payment Model Incentive § 414.1325 Data submission...
42 CFR § 414.1395 - Public reporting.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2017-10-01
... (CONTINUED) MEDICARE PROGRAM (CONTINUED) PAYMENT FOR PART B MEDICAL AND OTHER HEALTH SERVICES Merit-Based Incentive Payment System and Alternative Payment Model Incentive § 414.1395 Public reporting. (a) Public...
Jackson, Tracy; Shields, Michael D; Heaney, Liam G; Kendall, Marilyn; Pearce, Christina J; Hui, Chi Yan; Pinnock, Hilary
2017-01-01
Financial incentives are utilised in healthcare systems in a number of countries to improve quality of care delivered to patients by rewarding practices or practitioners for achieving set targets. To systematically review the evidence investigating the impact of financial incentives for implementation of supported self-management on quality of care including: organisational process outcomes, individual behavioural outcomes, and health outcomes for individuals with asthma or diabetes; both conditions with an extensive evidence base for self-management. We followed Cochrane methodology, using a PICOS search strategy to search eight databases in November 2015 (updated May 2017) including a broad range of implementation methodologies. Studies were weighted by robustness of methodology, number of participants and the quality score. We used narrative synthesis due to heterogeneity of studies. We identified 2,541 articles; 12 met our inclusion criteria. The articles were from the US (n = 7), UK (n = 4) and Canada (n = 1). Measured outcomes were HbA1c tests undertaken and/or the level achieved (n = 10), written action plans for asthma (n = 1) and hospital/emergency department visits (n = 1). Three of the studies were part of a larger incentive scheme including many conditions; one focused on asthma; eight focussed on diabetes. In asthma, the proportion receiving 'perfect care' (including providing a written action plan) increased from 4% to 88% in one study, and there were fewer hospitalisations/emergency department visits in another study. Across the diabetes studies, quality-of-care/GP performance scores improved in three, were unchanged in six and deteriorated in one. Results for the impact of financial incentives for the implementation of self-management were mixed. The evidence in diabetes suggests no consistent impact on diabetic control. There was evidence from a single study of improved process and health outcomes in asthma. Further research is needed to confirm these findings and understand the process by which financial incentives may impact (or not) on care. Protocol registration number: CRD42016027411.
Patel, Mitesh S; Asch, David A; Rosin, Roy; Small, Dylan S; Bellamy, Scarlett L; Heuer, Jack; Sproat, Susan; Hyson, Chris; Haff, Nancy; Lee, Samantha M; Wesby, Lisa; Hoffer, Karen; Shuttleworth, David; Taylor, Devon H; Hilbert, Victoria; Zhu, Jingsan; Yang, Lin; Wang, Xingmei; Volpp, Kevin G
2016-03-15
Financial incentive designs to increase physical activity have not been well-examined. To test the effectiveness of 3 methods to frame financial incentives to increase physical activity among overweight and obese adults. Randomized, controlled trial. (ClinicalTrials.gov: NCT 02030119). University of Pennsylvania. 281 adult employees (body mass index ≥27 kg/m2). 13-week intervention. Participants had a goal of 7000 steps per day and were randomly assigned to a control group with daily feedback or 1 of 3 financial incentive programs with daily feedback: a gain incentive ($1.40 given each day the goal was achieved), lottery incentive (daily eligibility [expected value approximately $1.40] if goal was achieved), or loss incentive ($42 allocated monthly upfront and $1.40 removed each day the goal was not achieved). Participants were followed for another 13 weeks with daily performance feedback but no incentives. Primary outcome was the mean proportion of participant-days that the 7000-step goal was achieved during the intervention. Secondary outcomes included the mean proportion of participant-days achieving the goal during follow-up and the mean daily steps during intervention and follow-up. The mean proportion of participant-days achieving the goal was 0.30 (95% CI, 0.22 to 0.37) in the control group, 0.35 (CI, 0.28 to 0.42) in the gain-incentive group, 0.36 (CI, 0.29 to 0.43) in the lottery-incentive group, and 0.45 (CI, 0.38 to 0.52) in the loss-incentive group. In adjusted analyses, only the loss-incentive group had a significantly greater mean proportion of participant-days achieving the goal than control (adjusted difference, 0.16 [CI, 0.06 to 0.26]; P = 0.001), but the adjusted difference in mean daily steps was not significant (861 [CI, 24 to 1746]; P = 0.056). During follow-up, daily steps decreased for all incentive groups and were not different from control. Single employer. Financial incentives framed as a loss were most effective for achieving physical activity goals. National Institute on Aging.
Kotani, Toshiaki; Akazawa, Tsutomu; Sakuma, Tsuyoshi; Nagaya, Shigeyuki; Sonoda, Masaru; Tanaka, Yuji; Katogi, Takehide; Nemoto, Tetsuharu; Minami, Shohei
2015-06-01
To investigate the effectiveness of incentive spirometry on respiratory motion in healthy subjects using cine breathing magnetic resonance imaging (MRI). Ten non-smoking healthy subjects without any history of respiratory disease were studied. Subjects were asked to perform pulmonary training using incentive spirometry every day for two weeks. To assess the effectiveness of this training, pulmonary function tests and cine breathing MRI were performed before starting pulmonary training and two weeks after its completion. After training, there were significant improvements in vital capacity (VC) from 3.58±0.8 L to 3.74±0.8 L and in %VC from 107.4±10.8 to 112.1±8.2. Significant changes were observed in the right diaphragm motion, right chest wall motion, and left chest wall motion, which were increased from 55.7±9.6 mm to 63.4±10.2 mm, from 15.6±6.1 mm to 23.4±10.4 mm, and from 16.3±7.6 mm to 22.0±9.8 mm, respectively. Two weeks of training using incentive spirometry provided improvements in pulmonary function and respiratory motion, which suggested that incentive spirometry may be a useful preoperative modality for improving pulmonary function during the perioperative period.
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Pourhosseini, Parissa
2009-01-01
In this study the problem examined was a lack of research based information on the degree to which incentives can be used to encourage consumers to volunteer private information. The purpose of this study was to determine if monetary incentives would be a beneficial means to increase consumers' involvement in eCommerce and thereby boost the growth…
Mannion, Russell; Goddard, Maria; Kuhn, Michael; Bate, Angela
2005-01-01
This article examines the incentive effects of delegating operational and financial decision making from central government to local healthcare providers. It addresses the economic consequences of a contemporary policy initiative in the English National Health Service (NHS)-earned autonomy. This policy entails awarding operational autonomy to 'front-line' organisations that are assessed to be meeting national performance targets. In doing so, it introduces new types of incentives into the healthcare system, changes the nature of established agency relationships and represents a novel approach to performance management. Theoretical elements of a principal-agent model are used to examine the impact of decentralization in the context of the results of an empirical study that elicited the perceptions of senior hospital managers regarding the incentive effects of earned autonomy. A multi-method approach was adopted. In order to capture the breadth of policy impact, we conducted a national postal questionnaire survey of all Chief Executives in acute-care hospital Trusts in England (n = 173). To provide added depth and richness to our understanding of the impact and incentive effects of earned autonomy at an organisational level, we interviewed senior managers in a purposeful sample of eight acute-care hospital Trusts. This theoretical framework and our empirical work suggest that some aspects of the earned autonomy as currently implemented in the NHS serve to weaken the potential incentive effect of decentralization. In particular, the nature of the freedoms is such that many senior managers do not view autonomy as a particularly valuable prize. This suggests that incentives associated with the policy will be insufficiently powerful to motivate providers to deliver better performance. We also found that principal commitment may be a problem in the NHS. Some hospital managers reported that they already enjoyed a large degree of autonomy, regardless of their current performance ratings. We also found evidence that the objectives of providers may differ from those of both the central government and local purchasers. There is, therefore, a risk that granting greater autonomy will allow providers to pursue their own objectives which, whilst not self-serving, may still jeopardize the achievement of strategic goals. It is apparent that the design and implementation features of decentralizing policies such as earned autonomy require careful attention if an optimal balance is to be struck between central oversight and local autonomy in the delivery of healthcare.
Incentives for Research Participation: Policy and Practice From Canadian Corrections
Forrester, Pamela; Brazil, Amanda; Doherty, Sherri; Affleck, Lindy
2012-01-01
We explored current policies and practices on the use of incentives in research involving adult offenders under correctional supervision in prison and in the community (probation and parole) in Canada. We contacted the correctional departments of each of the Canadian provinces and territories, as well as the federal government department responsible for offenders serving sentences of two years or more. Findings indicated that two departments had formal policy whereas others had unwritten practices, some prohibiting their use and others allowing incentives on a case-by-case basis. Given the differences across jurisdictions, it would be valuable to examine how current incentive policies and practices are implemented to inform national best practices on incentives for offender-based research. PMID:22698018
Elsler, Dietmar; Eeckelaert, Lieven
2010-06-01
This article looks at the factors that influence the transferability of different types of occupational safety and health (OSH) economic incentives from one country to another. To review the legal, political, and cultural framework conditions for economic incentive schemes in the European Union (EU), the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work (EU-OSHA) surveyed EU member states about the state of such schemes in their countries. In addition to the survey responses, relevant information on existing schemes and their national context within the 27 EU member states was gathered through reports, articles, and databases. Following this, countries were clustered according to cross-cultural differences. Despite the apparent variations in Europe's social security systems, there is a high degree of similarity between the countries regarding the basic criteria of design of the system. In addition, different kinds of incentives are used in different member states regardless of the social insurance system. When it comes to insurance incentive schemes, the fundamental difference between countries is whether the workers' compensation scheme is based on a competitive market between private insurance companies or a kind of monopoly structure, where the employers do not have the choice between several insurance companies. A clear majority of 19 of the 27 EU member states have a monopoly system. Subsidy systems, tax incentives, and insurance-based "experience rating" are theoretically -possible in all EU countries. In competitive insurance markets, effort-based incentives are more difficult to achieve. A possible solution could be the introduction of long-term contracts or the creation of a common prevention fund, financed equally by all insurers.
42 CFR § 414.1390 - Data validation and auditing.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2017-10-01
... SERVICES (CONTINUED) MEDICARE PROGRAM (CONTINUED) PAYMENT FOR PART B MEDICAL AND OTHER HEALTH SERVICES Merit-Based Incentive Payment System and Alternative Payment Model Incentive § 414.1390 Data validation...
Kok, Maryse C; Dieleman, Marjolein; Taegtmeyer, Miriam; Broerse, Jacqueline E W; Kane, Sumit S; Ormel, Hermen; Tijm, Mandy M; de Koning, Korrie A M
2015-11-01
Community health workers (CHWs) are increasingly recognized as an integral component of the health workforce needed to achieve public health goals in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). Many factors influence CHW performance. A systematic review was conducted to identify intervention design related factors influencing performance of CHWs. We systematically searched six databases for quantitative and qualitative studies that included CHWs working in promotional, preventive or curative primary health services in LMICs. One hundred and forty studies met the inclusion criteria, were quality assessed and double read to extract data relevant to the design of CHW programmes. A preliminary framework containing factors influencing CHW performance and characteristics of CHW performance (such as motivation and competencies) guided the literature search and review.A mix of financial and non-financial incentives, predictable for the CHWs, was found to be an effective strategy to enhance performance, especially of those CHWs with multiple tasks. Performance-based financial incentives sometimes resulted in neglect of unpaid tasks. Intervention designs which involved frequent supervision and continuous training led to better CHW performance in certain settings. Supervision and training were often mentioned as facilitating factors, but few studies tested which approach worked best or how these were best implemented. Embedment of CHWs in community and health systems was found to diminish workload and increase CHW credibility. Clearly defined CHW roles and introduction of clear processes for communication among different levels of the health system could strengthen CHW performance.When designing community-based health programmes, factors that increased CHW performance in comparable settings should be taken into account. Additional intervention research to develop a better evidence base for the most effective training and supervision mechanisms and qualitative research to inform policymakers in development of CHW interventions are needed. Published by Oxford University Press in association with The London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine © The Author 2014.
Dellve, Lotta; Hadzibajramovic, Emina; Ahlborg, Gunnar
2011-09-01
This paper is a report of a cohort study of healthcare workers' work attendance, and its long-term consequences' on health, burnout, work ability and performance. Concepts and measures of work attendance have varied in the scientific literature. Attending work in spite of being sick can have serious consequences on health. There is little knowledge on which individual and work-related conditions that increase work attendance and the long-term impact on health and performance. Prospective analyses of three measures of work attendance i.e. sickness attendance, uninterrupted long-term attendance and balanced attendance (≤7 days of sick leave per year and no sickness attendance) were done using questionnaire data from a 2-year cohort study (2004-2006) of randomly selected healthcare workers (n = 2624). Incentives (e.g. effort-reward balance, social support, meaningfulness) and requirements (e.g. time-pressure, dutifulness, high responsibility) to attend work as well as general health, burnout, sick leave, work ability and performance were assessed. There was a positive relation between balanced work attendance and incentives, whereas high sickness attendance was associated with requirements. Follow up after 2 years showed that balanced attendance was associated with sustained health and performance while sickness attendance was associated with poor health, burnout, sick-leave and decreased performance. It is important to distinguish between measures of work attendance as they differ in relation to incentives, and health- and performance-related consequences. Sickness attendance seems to be an important risk indicator. A balanced work attendance should be promoted for sustained health and performance in healthcare organisations. © 2011 The Authors. Journal of Advanced Nursing © 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Reece, E Albert; Nugent, Olan; Wheeler, Richard P; Smith, Charles W; Hough, Aubrey J; Winter, Charles
2008-01-01
Performance-Based Incentive Compensation (PBIC) plans currently prevail throughout industry and have repeatedly demonstrated effectiveness as powerful motivational tools for attracting and retaining top talent, enhancing key indicators, increasing employee productivity, and, ultimately, enhancing mission-based parameters. The University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences (UAMS) College of Medicine introduced its PBIC plan to further the transition of the college to a high-performing academic and clinical enterprise. A forward-thinking compensation plan was progressively implemented during a three-year period. After the introduction of an aggressive five-year vision plan in 2002, the college introduced a PBIC plan designed to ensure the retention and recruitment of high-quality faculty through the use of uncapped salaries that reflect each faculty member's clinical, research, and education duties. The PBIC plan was introduced with broad, schoolwide principles adaptable to each department and purposely flexible to allow for tailor-made algorithms to fit the specific approaches required by individual departments. As of July 2006, the college had begun to reap a variety of short-term benefits from Phase I of its PBIC program, including increases in revenue and faculty salaries, and increased faculty morale and satisfaction.Successful implementation of a PBIC plan depends on a host of factors, including the development of a process for evaluating performance that is considered fair and reliable to the entire faculty. The college has become more efficient and effective by adopting such a program, which has helped it to increase overall productivity. The PBIC program continues to challenge our faculty members to attain their highest potential while rewarding them accordingly.
Petersen, Laura A; Ramos, Kate Simpson; Pietz, Kenneth; Woodard, LeChauncy D
2017-06-01
Evaluate the effect of a pay-for-performance intervention on the quality of hypertension care provided to black patients and determine whether it produced risk selection. Primary data collected between 2007 and 2009 from Veterans Affairs physicians and their primary care panels. Nested study within a cluster randomized controlled trial of three types of financial incentives and no incentives (control). We compared the proportion of physicians' black patients meeting hypertension performance measures for baseline and final performance periods. We measured risk selection by comparing the proportion of patients who switched providers, patient visit frequency, and panel turnover. Due to limited power, we prespecified in the analysis plan combining the three incentive groups and oversampling black patients. Data collected electronically and by chart review. The proportion of black patients who achieved blood pressure control or received an appropriate response to uncontrolled blood pressure in the final period was 6.3 percent (95 percent confidence interval, 0.8-11.7 percent) greater for physicians who received an incentive than for controls. There was no difference between intervention and controls in the proportion of patients who switched providers, visit frequency, or panel turnover. A pay-for-performance intervention improved blood pressure control or appropriate response to uncontrolled blood pressure in black patients and did not produce risk selection. © Published 2016. This article is a U.S. Government work and is in the public domain in the USA.
Modulation of working memory function by motivation through loss-aversion.
Krawczyk, Daniel C; D'Esposito, Mark
2013-04-01
Cognitive performance is affected by motivation. Few studies, however, have investigated the neural mechanisms of the influence of motivation through potential monetary punishment on working memory. We employed functional MRI during a delayed recognition task that manipulated top-down control demands with added monetary incentives to some trials in the form of potential losses of bonus money. Behavioral performance on the task was influenced by loss-threatening incentives in the form of faster and more accurate performance. As shown previously, we found enhancement of activity for relevant stimuli occurs throughout all task periods (e.g., stimulus encoding, maintenance, and response) in both prefrontal and visual association cortex. Further, these activation patterns were enhanced for trials with possible monetary loss relative to nonincentive trials. During the incentive cue, the amygdala and striatum showed significantly greater activation when money was at a possible loss on the trial. We also evaluated patterns of functional connectivity between regions responsive to monetary consequences and prefrontal areas responsive to the task. This analysis revealed greater delay period connectivity between and the left insula and prefrontal cortex with possible monetary loss relative to nonincentive trials. Overall, these results reveal that incentive motivation can modulate performance on working memory tasks through top-down signals via amplification of activity within prefrontal and visual association regions selective to processing the perceptual inputs of the stimuli to be remembered. Copyright © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Hammac, W. A.; Pan, W.; Koenig, R. T.; McCracken, V.
2012-12-01
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has mandated through the second renewable fuel standard (RFS2) that biodiesel meet a minimum threshold requirement (50% reduction) for greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction compared to fossil diesel. This designation is determined by life cycle assessment (LCA) and carries with it potential for monetary incentives for biodiesel feedstock growers (Biomass Crop Assistance Program) and biodiesel processors (Renewable Identification Numbers). A national LCA was carried out for canola (Brassica napus) biodiesel feedstock by the EPA and it did meet the minimum threshold requirement. However, EPA's national LCA does not provide insight into regional variation in GHG mitigation. The authors propose for full GHG reduction potential of biofuels to be realized, LCA results must have regional specificity and should inform incentives for growers and processors on a regional basis. The objectives of this work were to determine (1) variation in biofuel feedstock production related GHG emissions between three agroecological zones (AEZs) in eastern Washington State (2) the impact of nitrogen use efficiency (NUE) on GHG mitigation potential for each AEZ and (3) the impact of incentives on adoption of oilseed production. Results from objective (1) revealed there is wide variability in range for GHG estimates both across and within AEZs based on variation in farming practices and environment. It is expected that results for objective (2) will show further GHG mitigation potential due to minimizing N use and therefore fertilizer transport and soil related GHG emission while potentially increasing biodiesel production per hectare. Regional based incentives may allow more timely achievement of goals for bio-based fuels production. Additionally, incentives may further increase GHG offsetting by promoting nitrogen conserving best management practices implementation. This research highlights the need for regional assessment/incentive based strategies for maximizing GHG mitigation potential of biofuel feedstocks.
42 CFR § 414.1400 - Third party data submission.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2017-10-01
... SERVICES (CONTINUED) MEDICARE PROGRAM (CONTINUED) PAYMENT FOR PART B MEDICAL AND OTHER HEALTH SERVICES Merit-Based Incentive Payment System and Alternative Payment Model Incentive § 414.1400 Third party data...
Aligning incentives in health care: physician practice and health system partnership.
Levin, L Scott; Gustave, Lori
2013-06-01
The key to successfully aligning hospitals and physicians is financial integration and joint incentives for academic, quality, and clinical productivity. Many physician practices and health systems are moving toward closer integration, but mainly through consolidation and employment strategies. We describe a fully integrated physician and hospital relationship including an overview of an aligned funds flow process that affords the department support for clinical services and teaching, research, and administrative activity. We also describe a physician compensation model that provides incentive not only for increased clinical performance, but also quality and academic objectives. The content of this article was acquired through our own experience in managing the Department of Orthopaedic Surgery at the University of Pennsylvania Health System including the health system's funds flow process. Based on input from both health system leaders and the faculty, the department's compensation plan was totally redesigned to create a line-of-sight plan that credits clinical performance and academic productivity. Our model is multifactorial and provides sustainable support for the department and a compensation plan that is competitive within the local market and nationally. The health system's funds flow process has enhanced alignment of the faculty and hospitals by providing compensation for nonclinical time and assists the department's growth strategies by providing funding for new faculty and gain-sharing of improved hospital margin. The implementation of the compensation plan increased productivity by 8% in its first year with no additional resources. Academic productivity in that same year was arguably at or above any other year in the department's history in terms of accepted publications, national presentations, and research grants awarded. A model of complete integration between an academic department and a health system is achievable through a systematic process of mission-based support.
Dolan, Robert W; Nesto, Richard; Ellender, Stacey; Luccessi, Christopher
Hospitals and healthcare systems are introducing incentive metrics into compensation plans that align with value-based payment methodologies. These incentive measures should be considered a practical application of the transition from volume to value and will likely replace traditional productivity-based compensation in the future. During the transition, there will be provider resistance and implementation challenges. This article examines a large multispecialty group's experience with a newly implemented incentive compensation plan including the structure of the plan, formulas for calculation of the payments, the mix of quality and productivity metrics, and metric threshold achievement. Three rounds of surveys with comments were collected to measure knowledge and attitudes regarding the plan. Lessons learned and specific recommendations for success are described. The participant's knowledge and attitudes regarding the plan are important considerations and affect morale and engagement. Significant provider dissatisfaction with the plan was found. Careful metric selection, design, and management are critical activities that will facilitate provider acceptance and support. Improvements in data collection and reporting will be needed to produce reliable metrics that can supplant traditional volume-based productivity measures.
The effect of explicit financial incentives on physician behavior.
Armour, B S; Pitts, M M; Maclean, R; Cangialose, C; Kishel, M; Imai, H; Etchason, J
2001-05-28
Managed care organizations use explicit financial incentives to influence physicians' use of resources. This has contributed to concerns regarding conflicts of interest for physicians and adverse effects on the quality of patient care. In light of recent publicized legislative and legal battles about this issue, we reviewed the literature and analyzed studies that examine the effect of these explicit financial incentives on the behavior of physicians. The method used to undertake the literature review followed the approach set forth in the Cochrane Collaboration handbook. Our literature review revealed a paucity of data on the effect of explicit financial incentives. Based on this limited evidence, explicit incentives that place individual physicians at financial risk appear to be effective in reducing physician resource use. However, the empirical evidence regarding the effectiveness of bonus payments on physician resource use is mixed. Similarly, our review revealed mixed effects of the influence of explicit financial incentives on the quality of patient care. The effect of explicit financial incentives on physician behavior is complicated by a lack of understanding of the incentive structure by the managed care organization and the physician. The lack of a universally acceptable definition of quality renders it important that future researchers identify the term explicitly.
Focus on Teacher Pay and Incentives: Recent Legislative Actions and Update on Salary Averages
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Gaines, Gale F.
2004-01-01
One indicator of progress in the Challenge to Lead goals refers to teacher compensation: Salaries, benefits and incentives are competitive in the marketplace. They are aimed at recognized expertise, student performance, state needs and taking on additional or different roles to improve curriculum and instruction." Most Southern Regional Education…
Self-Solicited Feedback: Effects of Hourly Pay and Individual Monetary Incentive Pay
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Slowiak, Julie M.; Dickinson, Alyce M.; Huitema, Bradley E.
2011-01-01
The frequency of feedback solicitation under hourly pay and individual monetary incentive pay conditions was examined. A between-subjects design was used with 30 college students in the two groups. Participants attended three experimental sessions and entered the cash value of simulated bank checks presented on a computer screen. Performance was…
Clark's Triangle and Fiscal Incentives: Implications for Colleges'
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Lang, Dan
2015-01-01
For nearly 35 year's Burton Clark's triangle has been used as a paradigm for describing, assessing, and comparing systems of postsecondary education (Clark, 1998, 2004). Two major developments in the fiscal management of post-secondary education occurred more or less contemporaneously: incentive or performance funding on the part of the state and…
Time-bound promotions in Indian medical institutes: a mirage?
Sukhlecha, Anupama
2016-01-01
Incentives, pay hikes and timely promotions enhance the job performance of an employee. In medical institutes, too, satisfied teachers would train students in a better way leading to better equipped doctors and ultimately, greater patient satisfaction. A study in Malaysia links high levels of satisfaction of employees with good salary, promotions, and incentives.
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Groom, Madeleine J.; Liddle, Elizabeth B.; Scerif, Gaia; Liddle, Peter F.; Batty, Martin J.; Liotti, Mario; Hollis, Chris P.
2013-01-01
Background: Children with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) are characterised by developmentally inappropriate levels of hyperactivity, impulsivity and/or inattention and are particularly impaired when performing tasks that require a high level of cognitive control. Methylphenidate (MPH) and motivational incentives may help improve…
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Watson, Jeffery; Witham, Peter; St. Louis, Timothy
2010-01-01
The U.S. Department of Education Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) seeks to transform education compensation systems so that principal and teacher performance (measured through classroom productivity measures) connects to compensation. Classroom-level productivity measures require robust student-teacher linkage data. Organizations such as the…
Increasing Educator Effectiveness: Lessons Learned from Teacher Incentive Fund Sites
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Eckert, Jonathan
2013-01-01
Created by the U.S. Congress in 2006, the Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) represents the first federal initiative targeted directly at state and district efforts to introduce performance measures into educator compensation. TIF responds to a growing body of evidence that existing pay structures do not respond to labor force realities or adequately…
Reward Motivation Enhances Task Coding in Frontoparietal Cortex.
Etzel, Joset A; Cole, Michael W; Zacks, Jeffrey M; Kay, Kendrick N; Braver, Todd S
2016-04-01
Reward motivation often enhances task performance, but the neural mechanisms underlying such cognitive enhancement remain unclear. Here, we used a multivariate pattern analysis (MVPA) approach to test the hypothesis that motivation-related enhancement of cognitive control results from improved encoding and representation of task set information. Participants underwent two fMRI sessions of cued task switching, the first under baseline conditions, and the second with randomly intermixed reward incentive and no-incentive trials. Information about the upcoming task could be successfully decoded from cue-related activation patterns in a set of frontoparietal regions typically associated with task control. More critically, MVPA classifiers trained on the baseline session had significantly higher decoding accuracy on incentive than non-incentive trials, with decoding improvement mediating reward-related enhancement of behavioral performance. These results strongly support the hypothesis that reward motivation enhances cognitive control, by improving the discriminability of task-relevant information coded and maintained in frontoparietal brain regions. © The Author 2015. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com.
Ball, Kylie; Hunter, Ruth F; Maple, Jaimie-Lee; Moodie, Marj; Salmon, Jo; Ong, Kok-Leong; Stephens, Lena D; Jackson, Michelle; Crawford, David
2017-03-21
Despite recent interest in the potential of incentivisation as a strategy for motivating healthier behaviors, little remains known about the effectiveness of incentives in promoting physical activity and reducing sedentary behavior, and improving associated health outcomes. This pre-post-test design study investigated the feasibility, appeal and effects of providing non-financial incentives for promoting increased physical activity, reduced sedentary time, and reduced body mass index (BMI) and blood pressure among inactive middle-aged adults. Inactive men (n = 36) and women (n = 46) aged 40-65 years were recruited via a not-for-profit insurance fund and participated in a 4 month pre-post design intervention. Baseline and post-intervention data were collected on self-reported physical activity and sitting time (IPAQ-Long), BMI and blood pressure. Participants were encouraged to increase physical activity to 150 mins/week and reduce sedentary behavior by 150 mins/week in progressive increments. Incentives included clothing, recipe books, store gift vouchers, and a chance to win one of four Apple iPad Mini devices. The incentive component of the intervention was supported by an initial motivational interview and text messaging to encourage participants and provide strategies to increase physical activity and reduce sedentary behaviors. Only two participants withdrew during the program, demonstrating the feasibility of recruiting and retaining inactive middle-aged participants. While two-thirds of the sample qualified for the easiest physical activity incentive (by demonstrating 100 mins physical activity/week or 100 mins reduced sitting time/week), only one third qualified for the most challenging incentive. Goals to reduce sitting appeared more challenging, with 43% of participants qualifying for the first incentive, but only 20% for the last incentive. More men than women qualified for most incentives. Mean leisure-time physical activity increased by 252 mins/week (leisure-time), with 65% of the sample achieving at least 150 mins/week; and sitting time decreased by 3.1 h/day (both p < 0.001) between baseline and follow-up. BMI, systolic and diastolic (men only) blood pressure all significantly decreased. Most participants (50-85%) reported finding the incentives and other program components helpful/motivating. Acknowledging the uncontrolled design, the large pre-post changes in behavioral and health-related outcomes suggest that the ACHIEVE incentives-based behavior change program represents a promising approach for promoting physical activity and reducing sitting, and should be tested in a randomized controlled trial. Australian New Zealand Clinical Trials Registry IDACTRN12616000158460 , registered 10/2/16.
Peirce, Jessica M; Petry, Nancy M; Stitzer, Maxine L; Blaine, Jack; Kellogg, Scott; Satterfield, Frank; Schwartz, Marion; Krasnansky, Joe; Pencer, Eileen; Silva-Vazquez, Lolita; Kirby, Kimberly C; Royer-Malvestuto, Charlotte; Roll, John M; Cohen, Allan; Copersino, Marc L; Kolodner, Ken; Li, Rui
2006-02-01
Contingency management interventions that provide tangible incentives based on objective indicators of drug abstinence have improved treatment outcomes of substance abusers, but have not been widely implemented in community drug abuse treatment settings. To compare outcomes achieved when a lower-cost prize-based contingency management treatment is added to usual care in community methadone hydrochloride maintenance treatment settings. Random assignment to usual care with (n = 198) or without (n = 190) abstinence incentives during a 12-week trial. Six community-based methadone maintenance drug abuse treatment clinics in locations across the United States. Three hundred eighty-eight stimulant-abusing patients enrolled in methadone maintenance programs for at least 1 month and no more than 3 years. Participants submitting stimulant- and alcohol-negative samples earned draws for a chance to win prizes; the number of draws earned increased with continuous abstinence time. Total number of stimulant- and alcohol-negative samples provided, percentage of stimulant- and alcohol-negative samples provided, longest duration of abstinence, retention, and counseling attendance. Submission of stimulant- and alcohol-negative samples was twice as likely for incentive as for usual care group participants (odds ratio, 1.98; 95% confidence interval, 1.42-2.77). Achieving 4 or more, 8 or more, and 12 weeks of continuous abstinence was approximately 3, 9, and 11 times more likely, respectively, for incentive vs usual care participants. Groups did not differ on study retention or counseling attendance. The average cost of prizes was 120 dollars per participant. An abstinence incentive approach that paid 120 dollars in prizes per participant effectively increased stimulant abstinence in community-based methadone maintenance treatment clinics.
2016-11-04
The Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015 (MACRA) repeals the Medicare sustainable growth rate (SGR) methodology for updates to the physician fee schedule (PFS) and replaces it with a new approach to payment called the Quality Payment Program that rewards the delivery of high-quality patient care through two avenues: Advanced Alternative Payment Models (Advanced APMs) and the Merit-based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) for eligible clinicians or groups under the PFS. This final rule with comment period establishes incentives for participation in certain alternative payment models (APMs) and includes the criteria for use by the Physician-Focused Payment Model Technical Advisory Committee (PTAC) in making comments and recommendations on physician-focused payment models (PFPMs). Alternative Payment Models are payment approaches, developed in partnership with the clinician community, that provide added incentives to deliver high-quality and cost-efficient care. APMs can apply to a specific clinical condition, a care episode, or a population. This final rule with comment period also establishes the MIPS, a new program for certain Medicare-enrolled practitioners. MIPS will consolidate components of three existing programs, the Physician Quality Reporting System (PQRS), the Physician Value-based Payment Modifier (VM), and the Medicare Electronic Health Record (EHR) Incentive Program for Eligible Professionals (EPs), and will continue the focus on quality, cost, and use of certified EHR technology (CEHRT) in a cohesive program that avoids redundancies. In this final rule with comment period we have rebranded key terminology based on feedback from stakeholders, with the goal of selecting terms that will be more easily identified and understood by our stakeholders.
Performance-Based Incentives and the Behavior of Accounting Academics: Responding to Changes
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Moya, Soledad; Prior, Diego; Rodríguez-Pérez, Gonzalo
2015-01-01
When laws change the rules of the game, it is important to observe the effects on the players' behavior. Some effects can be anticipated while others are difficult to enunciate before the law comes into force. In this paper we have analyzed articles authored by Spanish accounting academics between 1996 and 2005 to assess the impact of a change in…