Sample records for performance pay programs

  1. Teachers' Perception on Pay-for-Performance Programs in Georgia

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Mighty, Nardiann Kenisha

    2013-01-01

    States are implementing performance programs to help reform compensation systems for teachers; however, little is known on teachers' perception on alternative pay plans. Accordingly, this research study examined the types of pay-for-performance programs Georgia teachers prefer by exploring their perceptions of pay for individual performance, pay…

  2. 28 CFR 345.59 - Inmate performance pay.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 28 Judicial Administration 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Inmate performance pay. 345.59 Section... INDUSTRIES (FPI) INMATE WORK PROGRAMS Inmate Pay and Benefits § 345.59 Inmate performance pay. Inmate workers for FPI may also receive Inmate Performance Pay for participation in programs where this award is made...

  3. Pay for performance in commercial HMOs.

    PubMed

    Rosenthal, Meredith B; Landon, Bruce E; Normand, Sharon-Lise T; Frank, Richard G; Epstein, Arnold M

    2006-11-02

    Pay for performance has increasingly become the subject of intense interest and debate, both of which have been heightened as the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services moves closer to adopting this approach for Medicare. Although many claims have been made for the effectiveness of this approach, the extent of its national penetration remains unknown. We surveyed a sample of 252 health maintenance organizations (HMOs) (response rate, 96%) drawn from 41 metropolitan areas across the nation about use of pay for performance. We determined the prevalence of pay-for-performance programs, detailed the features of such programs, and examined the adoption of pay for performance as a function of the characteristics of both the health plans and markets. More than half the HMOs, representing more than 80% of persons enrolled, use pay for performance in their provider contracts. Of the 126 health plans with pay-for-performance programs, nearly 90% had programs for physicians and 38% had programs for hospitals. Use of pay for performance was statistically associated with geographic region, use of primary care providers (PCPs) as gatekeepers, use of capitation to pay PCPs, and whether the plans themselves received bonuses or penalties according to performance. Pay for performance is now commonly used by HMOs, especially those that are situated to assign responsibility for a particular patient to a PCP or medical group. As the design of Medicare with pay for performance moves forward, it will be important to leverage the early experience of pay for performance in the commercial market. Copyright 2006 Massachusetts Medical Society.

  4. Pay-for-performance in nursing homes.

    PubMed

    Briesacher, Becky A; Field, Terry S; Baril, Joann; Gurwitz, Jerry H

    2009-01-01

    Information on the impact of pay-for-performance programs is lacking in the nursing home setting. This literature review (1980-2007) identified 13 prior examples of pay-for-performance programs in the nursing home setting: 7 programs were active as of 2007, while 6 had been terminated. The programs were mostly short-lived, varied considerably in the choice of performance measures and pay incentives, and evaluations of the impact were rare.

  5. 75 FR 9544 - Inmate Work and Performance Pay Program

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-03-03

    ... inmate may receive performance pay only for that portion of the month that the inmate was working... Inmate Work and Performance Pay Program AGENCY: Bureau of Prisons, Justice. ACTION: Proposed rule... work and performance pay by removing redundant language and provisions that relate solely to staff...

  6. Teacher Performance Pay Programs and Necessary Communication Actions

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Heneman, Herbert G., III; Worth, Robin; Arrigoni, Jessica; Kimball, Steven M.; Milanowski, Anthony

    2013-01-01

    Teacher performance pay programs have proliferated across the country over the past 20 years. To aid in understanding their many variations, the seven major components of these programs are described. Three examples of teacher performance pay programs are provided for illustration: Denver ProComp, TAP, and Houston ASPIRE. Evidence is mixed on the…

  7. Performance pay improves engagement, progress, and satisfaction in computer-based job skills training of low-income adults

    PubMed Central

    Koffarnus, Mikhail N.; DeFulio, Anthony; Sigurdsson, Sigurdur O.; Silverman, Kenneth

    2018-01-01

    Advancing the education of low-income adults could increase employment and income, but adult education programs have not successfully engaged low-income adults. Monetary reinforcement may be effective in promoting progress in adult education. This experiment evaluated the benefits of providing incentives for performance in a job-skills training program for low-income, unemployed adults. Participants worked on Typing and Keypad programs for 7 months. Participants randomly assigned to Group A (n=23) earned hourly and productivity pay on the Typing program (Productivity Pay), but earned only equalized hourly pay on the Keypad program (Hourly Pay). Group B (n=19) participants had the opposite contingencies. Participants worked more on, advanced further on, and preferred their productivity pay program. These results show that monetary incentives can increase performance in a job-skills training program, and indicate that payment in adult education programs should be delivered contingent on performance in the training program instead of simply on attendance. PMID:24114155

  8. Performance pay improves engagement, progress, and satisfaction in computer-based job skills training of low-income adults.

    PubMed

    Koffarnus, Mikhail N; DeFulio, Anthony; Sigurdsson, Sigurdur O; Silverman, Kenneth

    2013-01-01

    Advancing the education of low-income adults could increase employment and income, but adult education programs have not successfully engaged low-income adults. Monetary reinforcement may be effective in promoting progress in adult education. This experiment evaluated the benefits of providing incentives for performance in a job-skills training program for low-income, unemployed adults. Participants worked on typing and keypad programs for 7 months. Participants randomly assigned to Group A (n = 23) earned hourly and productivity pay on the typing program (productivity pay), but earned only equalized hourly pay on the keypad program (hourly pay). Group B (n = 19) participants had the opposite contingencies. Participants worked more on, advanced further on, and preferred their productivity pay program. These results show that monetary incentives can increase performance in a job-skills training program, and indicate that payment in adult education programs should be delivered contingent on performance in the training program instead of simply on attendance. © Society for the Experimental Analysis of Behavior.

  9. 28 CFR 545.31 - Training.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... Work and Performance Pay Program § 545.31 Training. The Warden shall ensure that staff receive training on their roles in, and on the operation of, the work and performance pay program. The Warden shall also ensure that the inmate population is informed of the work and performance pay program, and of the...

  10. In Tanzania, the many costs of pay-for-performance leave open to debate whether the strategy is cost-effective.

    PubMed

    Borghi, Josephine; Little, Richard; Binyaruka, Peter; Patouillard, Edith; Kuwawenaruwa, August

    2015-03-01

    Pay-for-performance programs in health care are widespread in low- and middle-income countries. However, there are no studies of these programs' costs or cost-effectiveness. We conducted a cost-effectiveness analysis of a pay-for-performance pilot program in Tanzania and modeled costs of its national expansion. We reviewed project accounts and reports, interviewed key stakeholders, and derived outcomes from a controlled before-and-after study. In 2012 US dollars, the financial cost of the pay-for-performance pilot was $1.2 million, and the economic cost was $2.3 million. The incremental cost per additional facility-based birth ranged from $540 to $907 in the pilot and from $94 to $261 for a national program. In a low-income setting, the costs of managing the program and generating and verifying performance data were substantial. Pay-for-performance programs can stimulate the generation and use of health information by health workers and managers for strategic planning purposes, but the time involved could divert attention from service delivery. Pay-for-performance programs may become more cost-effective when integrated into routine systems over time. Project HOPE—The People-to-People Health Foundation, Inc.

  11. An official American Thoracic Society policy statement: pay-for-performance in pulmonary, critical care, and sleep medicine.

    PubMed

    Kahn, Jeremy M; Scales, Damon C; Au, David H; Carson, Shannon S; Curtis, J Randall; Dudley, R Adams; Iwashyna, Theodore J; Krishnan, Jerry A; Maurer, Janet R; Mularski, Richard; Popovich, John; Rubenfeld, Gordon D; Sinuff, Tasnim; Heffner, John E

    2010-04-01

    Pay-for-performance is a model for health care financing that seeks to link reimbursement to quality. The American Thoracic Society and its members have a significant stake in the development of pay-for-performance programs. To develop an official ATS policy statement addressing the role of pay-for-performance in pulmonary, critical care and sleep medicine. The statement was developed by the ATS Health Policy Committee using an iterative consensus process including an expert workshop and review by ATS committees and assemblies. Pay-for-performance is increasingly utilized by health care purchasers including the United States government. Published studies generally show that programs result in small but measurable gains in quality, although the data are heterogeneous. Pay-for-performance may result in several negative consequences, including the potential to increase costs, worsen health outcomes, and widen health disparities, among others. Future research should be directed at developing reliable and valid performance measures, increasing the efficacy of pay-for-performance programs, minimizing negative unintended consequences, and examining issues of costs and cost-effectiveness. The ATS and its members can play a key role in the design and evaluation of these programs by advancing the science of performance measurement, regularly developing quality metrics alongside clinical practice guidelines, and working with payors to make performance improvement a routine part of clinical practice. Pay-for-performance programs will expand in the coming years. Pulmonary, critical care and sleep practitioners can use these programs as an opportunity to partner with purchasers to improve health care quality.

  12. Merit pay: viable?

    PubMed

    Farmer, C R

    1978-01-01

    Can an organization really have a meaningful relationship between its merit pay program and motivation of its employees? C. Richard Farmer of Armstrong Cork says yes--if. If the approach to granting merit pay increases is coupled with a salary structure attuned to economic and competitive conditions, and if it is communicated effectively and openly to the employees, then it automatically translates labor market activity, performance, and the cost of living into a meaningful increase. Position descriptions, evaluations, and performance appraisals are some of the tools essential to a viable merit pay program. But besides these definite do's, the author outlines some of the don'ts of merit pay programs, such as centralized administration of the program--policies, programs, and procedures may be centralized, but their administration must be carried out by those close to the individual employees and work units. Above all, the merit pay program must be based on performance, not longevity.

  13. Influence of pay-for-performance programs on information technology use among child health providers: the devil is in the details.

    PubMed

    Menachemi, Nir; Struchen-Shellhorn, Wendy; Brooks, Robert G; Simpson, Lisa

    2009-01-01

    Pay-for-performance programs are used to promote improved health care quality, often through increased use of health information technology. However, little is known about whether pay-for-performance programs influence the adoption of health information technology, especially among child health providers. This study explored how various pay-for-performance compensation methods are related to health information technology use. Survey data from 1014 child health providers practicing in Florida were analyzed by using univariate and multivariate techniques. Questions asked about the adoption of electronic health records and personal digital assistants, as well as types of activities that affected child health provider compensation or income. The most common reported method to affect respondents' compensation was traditional productivity or billing (78%). Of the pay-for-performance-related methods of compensation, child health providers indicated that measures of clinical care (41%), patient surveys and experience (34%), the use of health information technology (29%), and quality bonuses or incentives (27%) were a major or minor factor in their compensation. In multivariate logistic regression analyses, only pay-for-performance programs that compensated directly for health information technology use were associated with an increased likelihood of electronic health record system adoption. Pay-for-performance programs linking measures of clinical quality to compensation were positively associated with personal digital assistant use among child health providers. Pay-for-performance programs that do not directly emphasize health information technology use do not influence the adoption of electronic health records among Florida physicians treating children. Understanding how different pay-for-performance compensation methods incentivize health information technology adoption is important for improving quality.

  14. 28 CFR 545.25 - Eligibility for performance pay.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 28 Judicial Administration 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Eligibility for performance pay. 545.25... WORK AND COMPENSATION Inmate Work and Performance Pay Program § 545.25 Eligibility for performance pay. (a) An inmate may receive performance pay for accomplishments in one or more of the following areas...

  15. 28 CFR 545.26 - Performance pay provisions.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... month that the inmate was working. Performance pay may not be awarded retroactively. (d) An inmate is... 28 Judicial Administration 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Performance pay provisions. 545.26... WORK AND COMPENSATION Inmate Work and Performance Pay Program § 545.26 Performance pay provisions. (a...

  16. 28 CFR 545.22 - Institution work and performance pay committee.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 28 Judicial Administration 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Institution work and performance pay... INSTITUTIONAL MANAGEMENT WORK AND COMPENSATION Inmate Work and Performance Pay Program § 545.22 Institution work... Institution Inmate Work and Performance Pay Committee to administer the institution's work and performance pay...

  17. Use of Provider-Level Dashboards and Pay-for-Performance in Venous Thromboembolism Prophylaxis*

    PubMed Central

    Michtalik, Henry J.; Carolan, Howard T.; Haut, Elliott R.; Lau, Brandyn D.; Streiff, Michael B.; Finkelstein, Joseph; Pronovost, Peter J.; Durkin, Nowella; Brotman, Daniel J.

    2014-01-01

    Background Despite safe and cost-effective venous thromboembolism (VTE) prevention measures, VTE prophylaxis rates are often suboptimal. Healthcare reform efforts emphasize transparency through programs to report performance, and payment incentives through programs to pay-for-performance. Objective To sequentially examine an individualized physician dashboard and pay-for-performance program to improve VTE prophylaxis rates amongst hospitalists. Design Retrospective analysis of 3144 inpatient admissions. After a baseline observation period, VTE prophylaxis compliance was compared during both interventions. Setting 1060-bed tertiary care medical center. Participants 38 part- and full-time academic hospitalists. Interventions A Web-based hospitalist dashboard provided VTE prophylaxis feedback. After 6 months of feedback only, a pay-for-performance program was incorporated, with graduated payouts for compliance rates of 80-100%. Measurements Prescription of American College of Chest Physicians guideline-compliant VTE prophylaxis and subsequent pay-for-performance payments. Results Monthly VTE prophylaxis compliance rates were 86% (95% CI: 85, 88), 90% (95% CI: 88, 93), and 94% (95% CI: 93, 96) during the baseline, dashboard, and combined dashboard/pay-for-performance periods, respectively. Compliance significantly improved with the use of the dashboard (p=0.01) and addition of the pay-for-performance program (p=0.01). The highest rate of improvement occurred with the dashboard (1.58%/month; p=0.01). Annual individual physician performance payments ranged from $53 to $1244 (mean $633; SD ±350). Conclusions Direct feedback using dashboards was associated with significantly improved compliance, with further improvement after incorporating an individual physician pay-for-performance program. Real-time dashboards and physician-level incentives may assist hospitals in achieving higher safety and quality benchmarks. PMID:25545690

  18. Use of provider-level dashboards and pay-for-performance in venous thromboembolism prophylaxis.

    PubMed

    Michtalik, Henry J; Carolan, Howard T; Haut, Elliott R; Lau, Brandyn D; Streiff, Michael B; Finkelstein, Joseph; Pronovost, Peter J; Durkin, Nowella; Brotman, Daniel J

    2015-03-01

    Despite safe and cost-effective venous thromboembolism (VTE) prevention measures, VTE prophylaxis rates are often suboptimal. Healthcare reform efforts emphasize transparency through programs to report performance and payment incentives through pay-for-performance programs. To sequentially examine an individualized physician dashboard and pay-for-performance program to improve VTE prophylaxis rates among hospitalists. Retrospective analysis of 3144 inpatient admissions. After a baseline observation period, VTE prophylaxis compliance was compared during both interventions. A 1060-bed tertiary care medical center. Thirty-eight part-time and full-time academic hospitalists. A Web-based hospitalist dashboard provided VTE prophylaxis feedback. After 6 months of feedback only, a pay-for-performance program was incorporated, with graduated payouts for compliance rates of 80% to 100%. Prescription of American College of Chest Physicians' guideline-compliant VTE prophylaxis and subsequent pay-for-performance payments. Monthly VTE prophylaxis compliance rates were 86% (95% confidence interval [CI]: 85-88), 90% (95% CI: 88-93), and 94% (95% CI: 93-96) during the baseline, dashboard, and combined dashboard/pay-for-performance periods, respectively. Compliance significantly improved with the use of the dashboard (P = 0.01) and addition of the pay-for-performance program (P = 0.01). The highest rate of improvement occurred with the dashboard (1.58%/month; P = 0.01). Annual individual physician performance payments ranged from $53 to $1244 (mean $633; standard deviation ±$350). Direct feedback using dashboards was associated with significantly improved compliance, with further improvement after incorporating an individual physician pay-for-performance program. Real-time dashboards and physician-level incentives may assist hospitals in achieving higher safety and quality benchmarks. © 2014 Society of Hospital Medicine.

  19. Teacher Opinions on Performance Pay: Evidence from India

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Muralidharan, Karthik; Sundararaman, Venkatesh

    2011-01-01

    The practical viability of performance-based pay programs for teachers depends critically on the extent of support the idea will receive from teachers. We present evidence on teacher opinions with regard to performance-based pay from teacher interviews conducted in the context of an experimental evaluation of a program that provided…

  20. Reinforcing Productivity in a Job-Skills Training Program for Unemployed Substance-Abusing Adults.

    PubMed

    Subramaniam, Shrinidhi; Everly, Jeffrey J; Silverman, Kenneth

    2017-05-01

    Chronically unemployed adults may benefit from intensive job-skills training; however, training programs do not always reliably engage participants in mastering skills. This study examined effects of voucher reinforcement for performance on a job-skills training program in the therapeutic workplace. Participants were four unemployed, substance abusing adults who earned monetary vouchers for working on programs targeting typing skills. Participants were exposed to two payment conditions that differed in whether or not pay was dependent on performance in a within-subject reversal design. In the productivity-pay condition, participants earned $8.00 per hour for attending the workplace plus a bonus for performance. In the base-pay condition, participants were paid an hourly wage that was equivalent to the total hourly earnings from the previous productivity-pay condition. Participants completed less work on the typing programs in the base- than the productivity-pay condition, but the amount of time spent in the workroom and the accuracy and rate of typing were not affected by the pay manipulation. All participants reported preferring base pay over productivity pay. Explicit reinforcement of productivity maintains consistent work in training programs, but more aspects of productivity pay need to be refined for effective, efficient, and socially valid implementation with unemployed, substance-abusing adults.

  1. Reinforcing Productivity in a Job-Skills Training Program for Unemployed Substance-Abusing Adults

    PubMed Central

    Subramaniam, Shrinidhi; Everly, Jeffrey J.; Silverman, Kenneth

    2017-01-01

    Chronically unemployed adults may benefit from intensive job-skills training; however, training programs do not always reliably engage participants in mastering skills. This study examined effects of voucher reinforcement for performance on a job-skills training program in the therapeutic workplace. Participants were four unemployed, substance abusing adults who earned monetary vouchers for working on programs targeting typing skills. Participants were exposed to two payment conditions that differed in whether or not pay was dependent on performance in a within-subject reversal design. In the productivity-pay condition, participants earned $8.00 per hour for attending the workplace plus a bonus for performance. In the base-pay condition, participants were paid an hourly wage that was equivalent to the total hourly earnings from the previous productivity-pay condition. Participants completed less work on the typing programs in the base- than the productivity-pay condition, but the amount of time spent in the workroom and the accuracy and rate of typing were not affected by the pay manipulation. All participants reported preferring base pay over productivity pay. Explicit reinforcement of productivity maintains consistent work in training programs, but more aspects of productivity pay need to be refined for effective, efficient, and socially valid implementation with unemployed, substance-abusing adults. PMID:28824954

  2. Chinese Teachers' Attitudes toward Performance Pay: The Cases of Three Schools

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Liu, Shujie; Zhao, Decheng; Xie, Wei

    2016-01-01

    Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to investigate Chinese teachers' attitudes toward performance pay. Specifically, this study examined the extent to which Chinese teachers supported performance-pay programs. The study also examined the effects of these programs on teachers, particularly on their levels of collaboration, work motivation, and…

  3. Optimal Incentives for Public Sector Workers: The Case of Teacher-Designed Incentive Pay in Texas. Working Paper 2009-05

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Taylor, Lori L.; Springer, Matthew G.

    2009-01-01

    Pay for performance is a popular public education reform, and millions of dollars are currently being targeted for pay for performance programs. These reforms are popular because economic and management theories suggest that well-designed incentive pay programs could improve teacher effectiveness. There is little evidence about the characteristics…

  4. Individual pay-for-performance in Canadian healthcare organizations.

    PubMed

    Greengarten, Moshe; Hundert, Mark

    2006-01-01

    Pink et al. discuss some of the issues related to pay-for-performance for individual and organizational healthcare providers. This commentary addresses key success factors for the implementation of individual pay-for-performance in publicly financed Canadian healthcare organizations. Publicly financed healthcare organizations in Canada have been relatively slow to adopt performance-pay programs as compared with private sector organizations; and those that have been developed have been, for the most part, rather crude. In many cases, they have become an additional mechanism for delivering base pay, rather than a true variable-pay program that motivates and differentiates performance. In light of the many issues that need to be addressed, we feel that pay-for-performance should be introduced gradually, beginning at the most senior levels of the organization. Above all, it is critical for publicly financed healthcare organizations to recognize that introducing pay-for-performance involves not only a set of structures and processes, but also likely a profound change in organizational values and behaviours.

  5. WWC Quick Review of the Report "The Effect of Performance-Pay in Little Rock, Arkansas on Student Achievement"

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    What Works Clearinghouse, 2008

    2008-01-01

    This review examined a study designed to evaluate whether the Achievement Challenge Pilot Project, a performance-pay program for teachers, improved the academic achievement of elementary school students. Study authors reported higher student test score gains for students in schools that implemented the performance- pay program than for students in…

  6. 28 CFR 545.26 - Performance pay provisions.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... categories as quality of work, quantity of work, initiative, ability to learn, dependability, response to... inmate may receive special bonus pay based on the inmate's exceptional work in a temporary job assignment... WORK AND COMPENSATION Inmate Work and Performance Pay Program § 545.26 Performance pay provisions. (a...

  7. 28 CFR 545.26 - Performance pay provisions.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... categories as quality of work, quantity of work, initiative, ability to learn, dependability, response to... inmate may receive special bonus pay based on the inmate's exceptional work in a temporary job assignment... WORK AND COMPENSATION Inmate Work and Performance Pay Program § 545.26 Performance pay provisions. (a...

  8. Characteristics and Determinants of Teacher-Designed Pay for Performance Plans: Evidence from Texas' Governor's Educator Excellence Grant (GEEG) Program. Working Paper 2008-26

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Taylor, Lori L.; Springer, Matthew G.; Ehlert, Mark

    2008-01-01

    This study describes the teacher pay for performance plans designed and implemented by the public schools participating in the Governor's Educator Excellence Grant (GEEG) program in Texas. GEEG is a federally funded, incentive pay program that awarded non-competitive grants, ranging from $60,000 to $220,000 each year for three years, to 99 Texas…

  9. The role of disease management in pay-for-performance programs for improving the care of chronically ill patients.

    PubMed

    Beich, Jeff; Scanlon, Dennis P; Ulbrecht, Jan; Ford, Eric W; Ibrahim, Ibrahim A

    2006-02-01

    To date, pay-for-performance programs targeting the care of persons with chronic conditions have primarily been directed at physicians and provide an alternative to health plan-sponsored chronic disease management (DM) programs. Both approaches require similar infrastructure, and each has its own advantages and disadvantages for program implementation. Pay-for-performance programs use incentives based on patient outcomes; however, an alternative system might incorporate measures of structure and process. Using a conceptual framework, the authors explore the variation in 50 diabetes DM programs using data from the 2002 National Business Coalition on Health's eValue8 Request for Information (RFI). The authors raise issues relevant to the assignment of accountability for patient outcomes to either health plans or physicians. They analyze the association between RFI scores measuring structures and processes, and HEDIS diabetes intermediate outcome measures. Finally, the strengths and weaknesses of using the RFI scores as an alternative metric for pay-for-performance programs are discussed.

  10. Long-Term Effects of Teacher Performance Pay: Experimental Evidence from India

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Muralidharan, Karthik

    2012-01-01

    While the idea of teacher performance-pay is increasingly making its way into policy, the evidence on the effectiveness of such programs is both limited and mixed. The central questions in the literature on teacher performance pay to date have been whether teacher performance pay based on test scores can improve student achievement, and whether…

  11. Pay for performance in the natural gas industry

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Geske, L.D.

    1989-08-17

    An effective way for a gas utility to gain flexibility in dealing with the new gas market is through the implementation of an employee compensation program - especially for management-level employees - that ties their pay to the attainment of the company's strategic goals. A survey of several gas utilities with pay-for-performance programs reported several advantages of the programs: they direct management's focus onto key areas that affect bottom-line performance, help build team effort, give the company the ability to change direction rapidly, and aid in keeping talented employees. Most companies agreed that the minimum incentive payout was 12-15% ofmore » base pay levels for adequate motivation.« less

  12. Experiences of general practices with a participatory pay-for-performance program: a qualitative study in primary care.

    PubMed

    Kirschner, Kirsten; Braspenning, Jozé; Jacobs, J E Annelies; Grol, Richard

    2013-01-01

    The involvement of target users in the design choices of a pay-for-performance program may enhance its impact, but little is known about the views of participants in these programs. To explore general practices' experiences with pay-for-performance in primary care we conducted a qualitative study in general practices in the Netherlands. Thirty out of 65 general practices participating in a pay-for-performance program, stratified for bonus, were invited for a semistructured interview on feasibility, feedback and the bonus, spending of the bonus, unintended consequences, and future developments. Content analysis was used to process the resulting transcripts. We included 29 practices. The feasibility of the pay-for-performance program was questioned due to the substantial time investment. The feedback on clinical care, practice management and patient experience was mostly discussed in the team, and used for improvement plans, but was also qualified as annoying for one GP and for another GP it brought feelings of insecurity. Most practices considered the bonus a stimulus to improve quality of care, in addition to compensation for their effort and time invested. Distinctive performance features were not displayed, for instance, on a website. The bonus was mainly spent on new equipment or team building. Practices referred to gaming and focusing on those aspects that were incentivised ('tunnel vision') as unintended consequences. Future developments should be directed to absolute thresholds, new indicators to keep the process going, and an independent audit. Linking a part of the bonus to innovation was also suggested. The participants thought the pay-for-performance program was a labour-intensive positive breakthrough to stimulate quality improvement, but warned of unintended consequences of the program and the sustainability of the indicator set.

  13. A Legal Perspective on Performance-Based Pay for Teachers. Working Paper 2008-10

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Ryan, James E.

    2008-01-01

    Merit pay is now in the midst of a renaissance. Hundreds of school districts are experimenting with some type of performance-based pay system. At least six states have statewide or pilot programs, and the federal government has spent close to $100 million on the Teacher Incentive Fund. Whether such programs will last, encourage the start of…

  14. Pay-for-Performance: New Developments and Issues. Working Paper 2007-05

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Cannon, Mark D.

    2007-01-01

    Intense competitive pressure and the need for continual improvements have led to a burgeoning interest in and use of pay-for-performance programs. This paper explores the increased use of pay-for-performance, drawing examples from healthcare, education, and the government. Suggestions are made as to how best to implement pay-for-performance…

  15. Early experience with pay-for-performance: from concept to practice.

    PubMed

    Rosenthal, Meredith B; Frank, Richard G; Li, Zhonghe; Epstein, Arnold M

    2005-10-12

    The adoption of pay-for-performance mechanisms for quality improvement is growing rapidly. Although there is intense interest in and optimism about pay-for-performance programs, there is little published research on pay-for-performance in health care. To evaluate the impact of a prototypical physician pay-for-performance program on quality of care. We evaluated a natural experiment with pay-for-performance using administrative reports of physician group quality from a large health plan for an intervention group (California physician groups) and a contemporaneous comparison group (Pacific Northwest physician groups). Quality improvement reports were included from October 2001 through April 2004 issued to approximately 300 large physician organizations. Three process measures of clinical quality: cervical cancer screening, mammography, and hemoglobin A1c testing. Improvements in clinical quality scores were as follows: for cervical cancer screening, 5.3% for California vs 1.7% for Pacific Northwest; for mammography, 1.9% vs 0.2%; and for hemoglobin A1c, 2.1% vs 2.1%. Compared with physician groups in the Pacific Northwest, the California network demonstrated greater quality improvement after the pay-for-performance intervention only in cervical cancer screening (a 3.6% difference in improvement [P = .02]). In total, the plan awarded 3.4 million dollars (27% of the amount set aside) in bonus payments between July 2003 and April 2004, the first year of the program. For all 3 measures, physician groups with baseline performance at or above the performance threshold for receipt of a bonus improved the least but garnered the largest share of the bonus payments. Paying clinicians to reach a common, fixed performance target may produce little gain in quality for the money spent and will largely reward those with higher performance at baseline.

  16. Teacher Incentive Pay Programs: Characteristics and Association with Instructional Practices

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Liang, Guodong

    2011-01-01

    This dissertation research examined the characteristics of teacher incentive pay programs in the state of Missouri and across the nation in the United States. The purposes of this study were (a) to examine the characteristics of districts that offered performance-related pay (PRP) programs and teachers who received PRP awards in 2007 using the…

  17. 25 CFR 170.931 - Can tribes use IRR Program funds to pay tribal transportation department operating costs?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-04-01

    ... OF THE INTERIOR LAND AND WATER INDIAN RESERVATION ROADS PROGRAM Miscellaneous Provisions Tribal... performance of approved IRR Program activities (see appendix A, subpart B). Tribes can also use BIA road maintenance funds to pay the cost of planning, administration, and performance of maintenance activities under...

  18. Team Pay for Performance: Experimental Evidence from Round Rock's Project on Incentives in Teaching

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    McCaffrey, Daniel F.; Pane, John F.; Springer, Matthew G.; Burns, Susan F.; Haas, Ann

    2011-01-01

    This paper presents the results of a rigorous experiment examining the impact of pay for performance on student achievement and instructional practice. This study, conducted by the National Center on Performance Incentives, examines a pay-for-performance program in Round Rock (Texas) which distributed performance awards to teachers based on a…

  19. 28 CFR 345.56 - Vacation pay.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 28 Judicial Administration 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Vacation pay. 345.56 Section 345.56... (FPI) INMATE WORK PROGRAMS Inmate Pay and Benefits § 345.56 Vacation pay. Inmate workers are granted FPI vacation pay by the SOI when their continued good work performance justifies such pay, based on...

  20. Pay for performance: will dentistry follow?

    PubMed

    Voinea-Griffin, Andreea; Fellows, Jeffrey L; Rindal, Donald B; Barasch, Andrei; Gilbert, Gregg H; Safford, Monika M

    2010-04-28

    "Pay for performance" is an incentive system that has been gaining acceptance in medicine and is currently being considered for implementation in dentistry. However, it remains unclear whether pay for performance can effect significant and lasting changes in provider behavior and quality of care. Provider acceptance will likely increase if pay for performance programs reward true quality. Therefore, we adopted a quality-oriented approach in reviewing those factors which could influence whether it will be embraced by the dental profession. The factors contributing to the adoption of value-based purchasing were categorized according to the Donabedian quality of care framework. We identified the dental insurance market, the dental profession position, the organization of dental practice, and the dental patient involvement as structural factors influencing the way dental care is practiced and paid for. After considering variations in dental care and the early stage of development for evidence-based dentistry, the scarcity of outcome indicators, lack of clinical markers, inconsistent use of diagnostic codes and scarcity of electronic dental records, we concluded that, for pay for performance programs to be successfully implemented in dentistry, the dental profession and health services researchers should: 1) expand the knowledge base; 2) increase considerably evidence-based clinical guidelines; and 3) create evidence-based performance measures tied to existing clinical practice guidelines. In this paper, we explored factors that would influence the adoption of value-based purchasing programs in dentistry. Although none of these factors were essential deterrents for the implementation of pay for performance programs in medicine, the aggregate seems to indicate that significant changes are needed before this type of program could be considered a realistic option in dentistry.

  1. Characteristics and Determinants of Teacher-Designed Pay for Performance Plans: Evidence from Texas' Governor's Educator Excellence Grant (GEEG) Program. Research Brief

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    National Center on Performance Incentives, 2008

    2008-01-01

    In "Characteristics and Determinants of Teacher-Designed Pay for Performance Plans: Evidence from Texas' Governor's Educator Excellence Grant (GEEG) Program"--a paper presented at the February 2008 National Center on Performance Incentives research to policy conference--Lori Taylor, Matthew Springer, and Mark Ehlert describe the teacher…

  2. Public reporting and pay-for-performance: safety-net hospital executives' concerns and policy suggestions.

    PubMed

    Goldman, L Elizabeth; Henderson, Stuart; Dohan, Daniel P; Talavera, Jason A; Dudley, R Adams

    2007-01-01

    Safety-net hospitals (SNHs) may gain little financial benefit from the rapidly spreading adoption of public reporting and pay-for-performance, but may feel compelled to participate (and bear the costs of data collection) to meet public expectations of transparency and accountability. To better understand the concerns that SNH administrators have regarding public reporting and pay-for-performance, we interviewed 37 executives at randomly selected California SNHs. The main concerns noted by SNH executives were that human and financial resource constraints made it difficult for SNHs to accurately measure their performance. Additionally, some executives felt that market-driven public reporting and pay-for-performance may focus on clinical areas and incentive structures that may not be high-priority clinical areas for SNHs. Executives at SNHs suggested several policy responses to these concerns-such as offering training programs for SNH data collectors-that could be relatively inexpensive and might improve the cost-benefit ratio of public reporting and pay-for-performance programs.

  3. Teacher Merit Pay. The Progress of Education Reform. Volume 11, Number 3

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Education Commission of the States (NJ1), 2010

    2010-01-01

    Merit pay programs for educators -- sometimes referred to a "pay for performance" -- attempt to tie a teacher's compensation to his/her performance in the classroom. While the idea of merit pay for classroom teachers has been around for several decades, only now is it starting to be implemented in a growing number of districts around the…

  4. The Effect of Performance Pay in Little Rock, Arkansas on Student Achievement. Research Brief

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Winters, Marcus; Greene, Jay; Ritter, Gary; Marsh, Ryan

    2008-01-01

    This paper examines evidence from a performance-pay program implemented in five Little Rock, Arkansas elementary schools between 2004 and 2007. Using a differences-in-differences approach, the evidence shows that students whose teachers were eligible for performance pay made substantially larger test score gains in math, reading, and language than…

  5. Reforming Teacher Pay

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Burns, Susan Freeman; Gardner, Catherine D.

    2010-01-01

    A recent Google search for information regarding performance pay in education produced 6.1 million results. This number should come as no surprise given the current level of interest in incentives as a popular reform option in public education. Supporters believe pay-for-performance programs encourage less effective teachers to improve and will…

  6. 7 CFR 275.23 - Determination of State agency program performance.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... national performance measure for the fiscal year, the State agency shall pay or have its share of... the prescribed timeframe. (8) Interest charges. (i) To the extent that a State agency does not pay a... agency agrees to pay the claim through reduction in Federal financial participation for administrative...

  7. Governor's Educator Excellence Grant (GEEG) Program: Year Three Evaluation Report. Policy Evaluation Report. [Executive Summary

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Springer, Matthew G.; Lewis, Jessica L.; Podgursky, Michael J.; Ehlert, Mark W.; Taylor, Lori L.; Lopez, Omar S.; Peng, Art

    2009-01-01

    The Governor's Educator Excellence Grant (GEEG) program was federally- and state-funded and provided three-year grants to schools to design and implement performance pay plans from the 2005-06 to 2007-08 school years. GEEG was implemented in 99 high poverty, high performing Texas public schools. Performance pay for teachers entered Texas state…

  8. Texas Educator Excellence Grant (TEEG) Program: Year Three Evaluation Report. Policy Evaluation Report. [Executive Summary

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Springer, Matthew G.; Lewis, Jessica L.; Podgursky, Michael J.; Ehlert, Mark W.; Gronberg, Timothy J.; Hamilton, Laura S.; Jansen, Dennis W.; Stecher, Brian M.; Taylor, Lori L.; Lopez, Omar S.; Peng, Art

    2009-01-01

    The Texas Educator Excellence Grant (TEEG) program was state-funded and provided annual grants to schools to design and implement performance pay plans during the 2006-07 to 2009-10 school year. TEEG was implemented each year (i.e., Cycle) in approximately 1,000 high poverty, high performing Texas public schools. Performance pay for teachers…

  9. Modernizing the Federal Government: Paying for Performance

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2007-01-01

    works (Barr, 2007d). Employees are rated on performance measures such as “fair and equitable treatment of taxpayers” and “customer satisfaction ... Performance Act of 2007, Senate bill 1046, Washington, D.C., 2007b. 38 Modernizing the Federal Government: Paying for Performance Vroom , Victor H...AND SUBTITLE Modernizing the federal government paying for performance 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR

  10. Teacher Merit Pay: What Do We Know? The Progress of Education Reform. Volume 11, Number 3

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Education Commission of the States (NJ3), 2010

    2010-01-01

    Merit pay programs for educators--sometimes referred to a "pay for performance"--attempt to tie a teacher's compensation to his/her performance in the classroom. While the idea of merit pay for classroom teachers has been around for several decades, only now is it starting to be implemented in a growing number of districts around the…

  11. The Best Laid Plans: Pay for Performance Incentive Programs for School Leaders

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Goff, Peter; Goldring, Ellen; Canney, Melissa

    2016-01-01

    In an era of heightened accountability and limited fiscal resources, school districts have sought novel ways to increase the effectiveness of their principals in an effort to increase student proficiency. To address these needs, some districts have turned to pay-for-performance programs, aligning leadership goals with financial incentives to…

  12. 28 CFR 545.26 - Performance pay provisions.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... effective management of the overall performance pay program, the percentage of inmates assigned to each... categories as quality of work, quantity of work, initiative, ability to learn, dependability, response to...

  13. 28 CFR 545.26 - Performance pay provisions.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... effective management of the overall performance pay program, the percentage of inmates assigned to each... categories as quality of work, quantity of work, initiative, ability to learn, dependability, response to...

  14. Exploring the Possibility and Potential for Pay for Performance in America's Public Schools

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Ellerson, Noelle M.

    2009-01-01

    In response to a growing dialogue at the local, state and national levels around the idea of restructuring teacher pay to include performance measures, the American Association of School Administrators surveyed a randomly selected sample of its members to gauge their feedback and interest in pay-for-performance programs. AASA launched this survey…

  15. Status of Teacher Performance Pay Programs across the United States. Information Capsule. Volume 1103

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Blazer, Christie

    2011-01-01

    An increasing number of states and school districts across the country are tying teacher pay to student performance. A recent RAND Education study found that nationwide spending on teacher performance pay increased from $99 million in 2006 to $439 million in 2010. However, many states and school districts face significant hurdles when they attempt…

  16. Review of "Cross-Country Evidence on Teacher Performance Pay"

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    von Davier, Matthias

    2011-01-01

    The primary claim of this Harvard Program on Education Policy and Governance report and the abridged Education Next version is that nations "that pay teachers on their performance score higher on PISA tests." After statistically controlling for several variables, the author concludes that nations with some form of merit pay system have,…

  17. New York City's School-Wide Bonus Pay Program: Early Evidence from a Randomized Trial. Working Paper 2009-02

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Springer, Matthew G.; Winters, Marcus A.

    2009-01-01

    In this paper, we examine the impact of New York City's School-Wide Performance Bonus Program (SPBP) on student outcomes and the school learning environment. The SPBP is a pay-for-performance program that was implemented in approximately 200 K-12 public schools midway into the 2007-08 school year. Participating schools can earn bonus awards of up…

  18. The NYC Teacher Pay-For-Performance Program: Early Evidence from a Randomized Trial. Civic Report No. 56

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Springer, Matthew G.; Winters, Marcus A.

    2009-01-01

    Paying teachers varying amounts on the basis of how well their students perform is an idea that has been winning increasing support, both in the United States and abroad, and many school systems have adopted some version of it. Proponents claim that linking teacher pay to student performance is a powerful way to encourage talented and highly…

  19. The NYC Teacher Pay-for-Performance Program: Early Evidence from a Randomized Trial. Civic Report No. 56

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Springer, Matthew G.; Winters, Marcus A.

    2009-01-01

    Paying teachers varying amounts on the basis of how well their students perform is an idea that has been winning increasing support, both in the United States and abroad, and many school systems have adopted some version of it. Proponents claim that linking teacher pay to student performance is a powerful way to encourage talented and highly…

  20. Incentive Pay Programs Do Not Affect Teacher Motivation or Reported Practices: Results from Three Randomized Studies

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Yuan, Kun; Le, Vi-Nhuan; McCaffrey, Daniel F.; Marsh, Julie A.; Hamilton, Laura S.; Stecher, Brian M.; Springer, Matthew G.

    2013-01-01

    This study drew on teacher survey responses from randomized experiments exploring three different pay-for-performance programs to examine the extent to which these programs motivated teachers to improve student achievement and the impact of such programs on teachers' instruction, number of hours worked, job stress, and collegiality. Results showed…

  1. Pay for performance in orthopaedic surgery.

    PubMed

    Pierce, Read G; Bozic, Kevin J; Bradford, David S

    2007-04-01

    In recent decades American medicine has undergone tremendous changes. Numerous reimbursement and systems approaches to controlling medical inflation and improving quality have failed to provide cost-effective, high-quality health care in most circumstances. Public and private payers are currently implementing pay for performance, a new reimbursement method linking physician pay to evidence of adherence to performance measures, to constrain costs, encourage efficiency, and maximize value for health care dollars. High-quality research regarding pay for performance and its impact is scarce, particularly in orthopaedic surgery. Although supporters argue pay for performance will remedy the fragmented, costly delivery of health services in the United States, skeptics raise concerns about disagreement over quality guidelines, financial implications for providers and hospitals, inadequate infrastructure, public reporting, system gaming, and physician support. Our survey of orthopaedic surgeons reveals limited understanding of pay for performance, marked skepticism of nonphysician stakeholders' intentions, and a strong desire for greater clinician involvement in shaping the pay for performance movement. As pay for performance will likely be a long-term change that will have an impact on every orthopaedic surgeon, clinician awareness and participation will be fundamental in creating successful pay for performance programs.

  2. Patient opinions regarding 'pay for performance for patients'.

    PubMed

    Long, Judith A; Helweg-Larsen, Marie; Volpp, Kevin G

    2008-10-01

    Pay for performance (P4P) programs have shown only modest improvements in outcomes and do not target patient behaviors. Many large employers and payers are turning to pay for performance for patients (P4P4P) to reduce health costs and improve the health of their covered populations. How these programs may be perceived by patients is unknown. To assess patients' opinion of the acceptability of P4P4P. Cross-sectional self-administered survey. Patients in waiting rooms in two university-based primary care clinics. Participants were asked their opinions about paying people to quit smoking, lose weight, control their blood pressure, or control their diabetes. Respondents were split on whether P4P4P is desirable. Thirty-six to 42% thought it was a good/excellent idea to pay smokers to quit smoking, obese people to lose weight, people with hypertension to control their blood pressure, or people with diabetes to control their blood sugar, while 41-44% of the sample thought it was a bad/very bad idea. Smokers and patients who were obese endorsed P4P4P more favorably as a means to achieving tobacco cessation and weight loss than their non-smoking and non-obese counterparts. Acceptance of paying patients for performance by the general population is equivocal. Establishing the efficacy of paying patients for performance may help it gain wider acceptance.

  3. Rewarding healthy behaviors--pay patients for performance.

    PubMed

    Wu, Joanne

    2012-01-01

    Despite a considerable investment of resources into pay for performance, preliminary studies have found that it may not be significantly more effective in improving health outcome measures when compared with voluntary quality improvement programs. Because patient behaviors ultimately affect health outcomes, I would propose a novel pay-for-performance program that rewards patients directly for achieving evidence-based health goals. These rewards would be in the form of discounts towards co-payments for doctor's visits, procedures, and medications, thereby potentially reducing cost and compliance issues. A pilot study recruiting patients with diabetes or hypertension, diseases with clear and objective outcome measures, would be useful to examine true costs, savings, and health outcomes of such a reward program. Offering incentives to patients for reaching health goals has the potential to foster a stronger partnership between doctors and patients and improve health outcomes.

  4. Using performance-based pay to improve the quality of teachers.

    PubMed

    Lavy, Victor

    2007-01-01

    Tying teachers' pay to their classroom performance should, says Victor Lavy, improve the current educational system both by clarifying teaching goals and by attracting and retaining the most productive teachers. But implementing pay for performance poses many practical challenges, because measuring individual teachers' performance is difficult. Lavy reviews evidence on individual and school-based incentive programs implemented in recent years both in the United States and abroad. Lavy himself evaluated two carefully designed programs in Israel and found significant gains in student and teacher performance. He observes that research evidence suggests, although not conclusively, that pay-for-performance incentives can improve teachers' performance, although they can also lead to unintended and undesired consequences, such as teachers' directing their efforts exclusively to rewarded activities. Lavy also offers general guidelines for designing effective programs. He emphasizes that the system must measure true performance in a way that minimizes random variation as well as undesired and unintended consequences. It must align performance with ultimate outcomes and must be monitored closely to discourage gaming if not outright fraud in measured output. Goals should be attainable. Incentives should balance individual rewards with school incentives, fostering a cooperative culture but not at the expense of free riding. All teachers should be eligible for the incentive offered, but only a subset of teachers should be rewarded in practice. If too many teachers are rewarded, teachers may not need to exert much extra effort to benefit. Many of the practical challenges faced by performance-related pay, Lavy says, can be addressed through careful design of the system. He emphasizes that setting up a performance-related pay system that works is not a one-time task. Even with the best preparation, initial implementation is likely to be problematic. But if the effort is seen as ongoing, it should be possible to make progress gradually in developing incentives that motivate the desired teaching behaviors and that will be perceived by teachers as fair and accurate.

  5. Impact of 'stretch' targets for cardiovascular disease management within a local pay-for-performance programme.

    PubMed

    Pape, Utz J; Huckvale, Kit; Car, Josip; Majeed, Azeem; Millett, Christopher

    2015-01-01

    Pay-for-performance programs are often aimed to improve the management of chronic diseases. We evaluate the impact of a local pay for performance programme (QOF+), which rewarded financially more ambitious quality targets ('stretch targets') than those used nationally in the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF). We focus on targets for intermediate outcomes in patients with cardiovascular disease and diabetes. A difference-in-difference approach is used to compare practice level achievements before and after the introduction of the local pay for performance program. In addition, we analysed patient-level data on exception reporting and intermediate outcomes utilizing an interrupted time series analysis. The local pay for performance program led to significantly higher target achievements (hypertension: p-value <0.001, coronary heart disease: p-values <0.001, diabetes: p-values <0.061, stroke: p-values <0.003). However, the increase was driven by higher rates of exception reporting (hypertension: p-value <0.001, coronary heart disease: p-values <0.03, diabetes: p-values <0.05) in patients with all conditions except for stroke. Exception reporting allows practitioners to exclude patients from target calculations if certain criteria are met, e.g. informed dissent of the patient for treatment. There were no statistically significant improvements in mean blood pressure, cholesterol or HbA1c levels. Thus, achievement of higher payment thresholds in the local pay for performance scheme was mainly attributed to increased exception reporting by practices with no discernable improvements in overall clinical quality. Hence, active monitoring of exception reporting should be considered when setting more ambitious quality targets. More generally, the study suggests a trade-off between additional incentive for better care and monitoring costs.

  6. Making Teacher Incentives Work: Lessons from North Carolina's Teacher Bonus Program. Education Outlook. No. 5

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Ahn, Thomas; Vigdor, Jacob L.

    2011-01-01

    North Carolina has operated one of the country's largest pay-for-performance teacher-bonus programs since the late 1990s. New research shows that a North Carolina-style incentive-pay program has the potential to improve student learning by encouraging teachers to exert more effort on the job. The North Carolina model avoids three pitfalls…

  7. Credentials versus Performance: Review of the Teacher Performance Pay Research

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Podgursky, Michael; Springer, Matthew G.

    2007-01-01

    In this article we examine the economic case for merit or performance-based pay for K-12 teachers. We review several areas of germane research. The direct evaluation literature on these incentive plans is slender; highly diverse in terms of methodology, targeted populations, and programs evaluated; and primarily focused on short-run motivational…

  8. Do Clinical Standards for Diabetes Care Address Excess Risk for Hypoglycemia in Vulnerable Patients? A Systematic Review

    PubMed Central

    Berkowitz, Seth A; Aragon, Katherine; Hines, Jonas; Seligman, Hilary; Lee, Sei; Sarkar, Urmimala

    2013-01-01

    Objective To determine whether diabetes clinical standards consider increased hypoglycemia risk in vulnerable patients. Data Sources MEDLINE, the National Guidelines Clearinghouse, the National Quality Measures Clearinghouse, and supplemental sources. Study Design Systematic review of clinical standards (guidelines, quality metrics, or pay-for-performance programs) for glycemic control in adult diabetes patients. The primary outcome was discussion of increased risk for hypoglycemia in vulnerable populations. Data Collection/Extraction Methods Manuscripts identified were abstracted by two independent reviewers using prespecified inclusion/exclusion criteria and a standardized abstraction form. Principal Findings We screened 1,166 titles, and reviewed 220 manuscripts in full text. Forty-four guidelines, 17 quality metrics, and 8 pay-for-performance programs were included. Five (11 percent) guidelines and no quality metrics or pay-for-performance programs met the primary outcome. Conclusions Clinical standards do not substantively incorporate evidence about increased risk for hypoglycemia in vulnerable populations. PMID:23445498

  9. Do clinical standards for diabetes care address excess risk for hypoglycemia in vulnerable patients? A systematic review.

    PubMed

    Berkowitz, Seth A; Aragon, Katherine; Hines, Jonas; Seligman, Hilary; Lee, Sei; Sarkar, Urmimala

    2013-08-01

    To determine whether diabetes clinical standards consider increased hypoglycemia risk in vulnerable patients. MEDLINE, the National Guidelines Clearinghouse, the National Quality Measures Clearinghouse, and supplemental sources. Systematic review of clinical standards (guidelines, quality metrics, or pay-for-performance programs) for glycemic control in adult diabetes patients. The primary outcome was discussion of increased risk for hypoglycemia in vulnerable populations. Manuscripts identified were abstracted by two independent reviewers using prespecified inclusion/exclusion criteria and a standardized abstraction form. We screened 1,166 titles, and reviewed 220 manuscripts in full text. Forty-four guidelines, 17 quality metrics, and 8 pay-for-performance programs were included. Five (11 percent) guidelines and no quality metrics or pay-for-performance programs met the primary outcome. Clinical standards do not substantively incorporate evidence about increased risk for hypoglycemia in vulnerable populations. © Health Research and Educational Trust.

  10. What you do not know about disease management: a new ally in the pay-for-performance era.

    PubMed

    Peck, Charles A

    2008-01-01

    Disease management is relatively new, and many medical practices have misconceptions about how it works. Far from being a burden to busy medical practices, disease management programs can reduce hassles for physicians and office managers by coaching patients to be more compliant, better prepared, and less likely to make unnecessary phone calls. Disease management programs cost the medical practices nothing. They can even help practices make money by providing data needed for bonuses from the growing number of pay-for-performance programs.

  11. Patient Opinions Regarding ‘Pay for Performance for Patients’

    PubMed Central

    Helweg-Larsen, Marie; Volpp, Kevin G.

    2008-01-01

    Background Pay for performance (P4P) programs have shown only modest improvements in outcomes and do not target patient behaviors. Many large employers and payers are turning to pay for performance for patients (P4P4P) to reduce health costs and improve the health of their covered populations. How these programs may be perceived by patients is unknown. Objective To assess patients’ opinion of the acceptability of P4P4P. Design Cross-sectional self-administered survey. Participants Patients in waiting rooms in two university-based primary care clinics. Measurements Participants were asked their opinions about paying people to quit smoking, lose weight, control their blood pressure, or control their diabetes. Results Respondents were split on whether P4P4P is desirable. Thrity-six to 42% thought it was a good/excellent idea to pay smokers to quit smoking, obese people to lose weight, people with hypertension to control their blood pressure, or people with diabetes to control their blood sugar, while 41–44% of the sample thought it was a bad/very bad idea. Smokers and patients who were obese endorsed P4P4P more favorably as a means to achieving tobacco cessation and weight loss than their non-smoking and non-obese counterparts. Conclusions Acceptance of paying patients for performance by the general population is equivocal. Establishing the efficacy of paying patients for performance may help it gain wider acceptance. Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (doi:10.1007/s11606-008-0739-1) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users. PMID:18663540

  12. Paying for quality not quantity: a wisconsin health maintenance organization proposes an incentive model for reimbursement of chiropractic services.

    PubMed

    Pursel, Kevin J; Jacobson, Martin; Stephenson, Kathy

    2012-07-01

    The purpose of this study is to describe a reimbursement model that was developed by one Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) to transition from fee-for-service to add a combination of pay for performance and reporting model of reimbursement for chiropractic care. The previous incentive program used by the HMO provided best-practice education and additional reimbursement incentives for achieving the National Committee for Quality Assurance Back Pain Recognition Program (NCQA-BPRP) recognition status. However, this model had not leveled costs between doctors of chiropractic (DCs). Therefore, the HMO management aimed to develop a reimbursement model to incentivize providers to embrace existing best-practice models and report existing quality metrics. The development goals included the following: it should (1) be as financially predictable as the previous system, (2) cost no more on a per-member basis, (3) meet the coverage needs of its members, and (4) be able to be operationalized. The model should also reward DCs who embraced best practices with compensation, not simply tied to providing more procedures, the new program needed to (1) cause little or no disruption in current billing, (2) be grounded achievable and defined expectations for improvement in quality, and (3) be voluntary, without being unduly punitive, should the DC choose not to participate in the program. The generated model was named the Comprehensive Chiropractic Quality Reimbursement Methodology (CCQRM; pronounced "Quorum"). In this hybrid model, additional reimbursement, beyond pay-for-procedures will be based on unique payment interpretations reporting selected, existing Physician Quality Reporting System (PQRS) codes, meaningful use of electronic health records, and achieving NCQA-BPRP recognition. This model aims to compensate providers using pay-for-performance, pay-for-quality reporting, pay-for-procedure methods. The CCQRM reimbursement model was developed to address the current needs of one HMO that aims to transition from fee-for-service to a pay-for-performance and quality reporting for reimbursement for chiropractic care. This model is theoretically based on the combination of a fee-for-service payment, pay for participation (NCQA Back Pain Recognition Program payment), meaningful use of electronic health record payment, and pay for reporting (PQRS-BPMG payment). Evaluation of this model needs to be implemented to determine if it will achieve its intended goals. Copyright © 2012 National University of Health Sciences. Published by Mosby, Inc. All rights reserved.

  13. Medicaid Nursing Home Pay for Performance: Where Do We Stand?

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Arling, Greg; Job, Carol; Cooke, Valerie

    2009-01-01

    Purpose: Nursing home pay-for-performance (P4P) programs are intended to maximize the value obtained from public and private expenditures by measuring and rewarding better nursing home performance. We surveyed the 6 states with operational P4P systems in 2007. We describe key features of six Medicaid nursing home P4P systems and make…

  14. Designing Incentives for Public School Teachers: Evidence from a Texas Incentive Pay Program

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Springer, Matthew G.; Taylor, Lori L.

    2016-01-01

    Pay-for-performance is a popular public education reform, but there is little evidence about the characteristics of a well-designed incentive pay plan for teachers. Some of the literature suggests that effective incentive plans must offer relatively large awards to induce behavioral changes. On the other hand, the experimental economics literature…

  15. Cost savings in a hospital clinical laboratory with a pay-for-performance incentive program for supervisors.

    PubMed

    Winkelman, J W; Aitken, J L; Wybenga, D R

    1991-01-01

    A pay-for-performance incentive program for clinical laboratory supervisors was developed and implemented at Brigham and Women's Hospital (Boston, Mass). It provides monetary rewards to personnel who directly produce cost savings in their area of responsibility. This reward system is new to the hospital laboratory but is commonly used in industry. Substantial true cost savings over and above previously established stringent budgets were achieved, 11% of which was returned to first-line supervisors in the form of a bonus. The program expanded the scope of professionalism for supervisors to include fiscal management.

  16. Making Sense of Performance Pay: Sensemaking and Sensegiving in Teachers' Implementation of Compensation Reform

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Herbert, Karen Shellberg

    2010-01-01

    Teacher compensation reforms have been on the rise in recent years, yet research has yet to fully demonstrate how teachers interpret these policies and how they may influence their instructional practices and professional decisions. This qualitative study of a performance pay program in an urban district in Texas drew on cognitive approaches to…

  17. Race to the Paycheck: Merit Pay and Theories of Teacher Motivation

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Horne, Jason; Foley, Virginia P.; Flora, Bethany H.

    2014-01-01

    Recent reforms in teacher evaluation tie these evaluations to student performance as measured by test scores and merit pay has been offered as a way to reward high test scores and improve teacher performance. Thus, the federal Race to the Top program has led several states toward teacher evaluation instruments that incorporate outcome data in the…

  18. Team Performance Pay and Motivation Theory: A Mixed Methods Study

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Wells, Pamela; Combs, Julie P.; Bustamante, Rebecca M.

    2013-01-01

    This study was conducted to explore teachers' perceptions of a team performance pay program in a large suburban school district through the lens of motivation theories. Mixed data analysis was used to analyze teacher responses from two archival questionnaires (Year 1, n = 368; Year 2, n = 649). Responses from teachers who participated in the team…

  19. Teacher Incentive Pay and Educational Outcomes: Evidence from the NYC Bonus Program. Program on Education Policy and Governance Working Papers Series. PEPG 10-07

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Goodman, Sarena; Turner, Lesley

    2010-01-01

    Teacher compensation schemes are often criticized for lacking a performance-based component. Proponents of merit pay argue that linking teacher salaries to student achievement will incentivize teachers to focus on raising student achievement and stimulate innovation across the school system as a whole. In this paper, we utilize a policy experiment…

  20. Full cost accounting as a tool for the financial assessment of Pay-As-You-Throw schemes: a case study for the Panorama municipality, Greece.

    PubMed

    Karagiannidis, Avraam; Xirogiannopoulou, Anna; Tchobanoglous, George

    2008-12-01

    In the present paper, implementation scenarios of a Pay-As-You-Throw program were developed and analyzed for the first time in Greece. Firstly, the necessary steps for implementing a Pay-As-You-Throw program were determined. A database was developed for the needs of the full cost accounting method, where all financial and waste-production data were inserted, in order to calculate the unit price of charging for four different implementation scenarios of the "polluter-pays" principle. For each scenario, the input in waste management cost was estimated, as well as the total waste charges for households. Finally, a comparative analysis of the results was performed.

  1. What Are Achievement Gains Worth--to Teachers?

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Marsh, Julie A.; McCaffrey, Daniel F.

    2011-01-01

    In 2007, New York City schools commenced a school-level pay-for-performance program for teachers and staff in about 200 schools. The authors found that the program didn't improve schools or student outcomes. Why? Because the program failed to create conditions that theory suggests are necessary for performance-based incentive programs to change…

  2. Using the lessons of behavioral economics to design more effective pay-for-performance programs.

    PubMed

    Mehrotra, Ateev; Sorbero, Melony E S; Damberg, Cheryl L

    2010-07-01

    To describe improvements in the design of pay-for-performance (P4P) programs that reflect the psychology of how people respond to incentives. Investigation of the behavioral economics literature. We describe 7 ways to improve P4P program design in terms of frequency and types of incentive payments. After discussing why P4P incentives can have unintended adverse consequences, we outline potential ways to mitigate these. Although P4P incentives are increasingly popular, the healthcare literature shows that these have had minimal effect. Design improvements in P4P programs can enhance their effectiveness. Lessons from behavioral economics may greatly enhance the design and effectiveness of P4P programs in healthcare, but future work is needed to demonstrate this empirically.

  3. The Strategic Design of Reward Systems.

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1982-10-01

    AuTO1 , 8 CO NTRACT Ok .NANT NUMO lll , Edward E. Lawler III N-00014-81-K-0048 9 PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADORErS 10. PROGRAM ELEMENT...SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES .iL L:~ 19 KEY WORDS (Continue on reveres side It necessary and Identify by block number) A Pay, performance appraisal, motivation...retention, culture development:, and skill development are considered. The relationship between these object iwv and such design options as performance pay

  4. Using Student Test Scores to Award Merit Pay: A Look at the 2012 Pay-for-Performance Program for Idaho Schools

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Storie, Gary; Denner, Peter R.

    2015-01-01

    In the fall of 2012, Idaho implemented a plan to award bonus pay to schools whose students demonstrated academic growth based on the Betebenner (2008) method. This study examined the relationship of the amount of bonus paid to a school, the percentage of students from low income families associated with a school, and the location of the school…

  5. Exclusion of patients from pay-for-performance targets by English physicians.

    PubMed

    Doran, Tim; Fullwood, Catherine; Reeves, David; Gravelle, Hugh; Roland, Martin

    2008-07-17

    In the English pay-for-performance program, physicians use a range of criteria to exclude individual patients from the quality calculations that determine their pay. This process, which is called exception reporting, is intended to safeguard patients against inappropriate treatment by physicians seeking to maximize their income. However, exception reporting may allow physicians to inappropriately exclude patients for whom targets have been missed (a practice known as gaming). We analyzed data extracted automatically from clinical computing systems for 8105 family practices in England (96% of all practices), data from the U.K. Census, and data on practice characteristics from the U.K. Department of Health. We determined the rate of exception reporting for 65 clinical activities and the association between this rate and the characteristics of patients and medical practices. From April 2005 through March 2006, physicians excluded a median of 5.3% of patients (interquartile range, 4.0 to 6.9) from the quality calculations. Physicians were most likely to exclude patients from indicators that were related to providing treatments and achieving target levels of intermediate outcomes; they were least likely to exclude patients from indicators that were related to routine checks and measurements and to offers of treatment. The characteristics of patients and practices explained only 2.7% of the variance in exception reporting. We estimate that exception reporting accounted for approximately 1.5% of the cost of the pay-for-performance program. Exception reporting brings substantial benefits to pay-for-performance programs, providing that the process is used appropriately. In England, rates of exception reporting have generally been low, with little evidence of widespread gaming. 2008 Massachusetts Medical Society

  6. Minnesota's Nursing Facility Performance-Based Incentive Payment Program: An Innovative Model for Promoting Care Quality

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Cooke, Valerie; Arling, Greg; Lewis, Teresa; Abrahamson, Kathleen A.; Mueller, Christine; Edstrom, Lisa

    2010-01-01

    Purpose: Minnesota's Nursing Facility Performance-Based Incentive Payment Program (PIPP) supports provider-initiated projects aimed at improving care quality and efficiency. PIPP moves beyond conventional pay for performance. It seeks to promote implementation of evidence-based practices, encourage innovation and risk taking, foster collaboration…

  7. Merit Pay and Faculty Evaluation.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Hudgins, James L.

    A program linking merit pay and faculty evaluation was initiated at Sumter Area Technical College (SATC) in Sumter, South Carolina, in 1978. The performance-based evaluation system focuses on three elements: the job description, which identifies professional responsibilities and how they relate to the college's mission; the individual action plan;…

  8. Teamwork Key for Pilot Plans on Teacher Pay

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Sawchuk, Stephen

    2008-01-01

    A variety of federally financed grants based on performance pay are providing insights into how districts and teachers can collaborate to implement sustainable programs designed to improve teaching and learning. The question of whether those Teacher Incentive Fund grants will yield measurably higher student achievement, applicant pools with…

  9. The influence of welfare systems on pay-for-performance programs for general practitioners: A critical review.

    PubMed

    Ammi, Mehdi; Fortier, Grant

    2017-04-01

    While pay-for-performance (P4P) programs are increasingly common tools used to foster quality and efficiency in primary care, the evidence concerning their effectiveness is at best mixed. In this article, we explore the influence of welfare systems on four P4P-related dimensions: the level of healthcare funders' commitment to P4Ps (by funding and length of program operation), program design (specifically target-based vs. participation-based program), physicians' acceptance of the program and program effects. Using Esping-Andersen's typology, we examine P4P for general practitioners (GPs) in thirteen European and North American countries and find that welfare systems contribute to explain variations in P4P experiences. Overall, liberal systems exhibited the most enthusiastic adoption of P4P, with significant physician acceptance, generous incentives and positive but modest program effects. Social democratic countries showed minimal interest in P4P for GPs, with the exception of Sweden. Although corporatist systems adopted performance pay, these countries experienced mixed results, with strong physician opposition. In response to this opposition, health care funders tended to favour participation-based over target-based P4P. We demonstrate how the interaction of decommodification and social stratification in each welfare regime influences these countries' experiences with P4P for GPs, directly for funders' commitment, program design and physicians' acceptance, and indirectly for program effects, hence providing a framework for analyzing P4P in other contexts or care settings. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  10. 28 CFR 545.29 - Special awards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... Judicial Administration BUREAU OF PRISONS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE INSTITUTIONAL MANAGEMENT WORK AND COMPENSATION Inmate Work and Performance Pay Program § 545.29 Special awards. (a) Inmates who perform... regardless of the inmate's work or program status. Examples of actions which may result in the inmate being...

  11. Value-Added and Other Methods for Measuring School Performance. Working Paper 2008-17

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Meyer, Robert H.; Christian, Michael S.

    2008-01-01

    One of the central challenges of designing and implementing a performance pay program is developing an approach for determining which schools, teachers, and administrators have performed well enough to have earned a bonus. The U.S. Department of Education's Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) program provides grantees substantial latitude to create…

  12. Principals' Group Seeks Influence on Incentive Pay

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Samuels, Christina A.

    2008-01-01

    School districts that want to start pay-for-performance programs for school leaders should look beyond high-stakes student tests as the primary measure for awarding bonuses, a position paper released last week by the National Association of Secondary School Principals says. Gerald N. Tirozzi, the executive director of the Reston, Virginia-based…

  13. Participating physician preferences regarding a pay-for-performance incentive design: a discrete choice experiment.

    PubMed

    Chen, Tsung-Tai; Lai, Mei-Shu; Chung, Kuo-Piao

    2016-02-01

    To determine whether the magnitude of incentives or other design attributes should be prioritized and the most important attributes, according to physicians, of the diabetes P4P (pay-for-performance) program design. We implemented a discrete choice experiment (DCE) to elicit the P4P incentive design-related preferences of physicians. All of the physicians (n = 248) who participated in the diabetes P4P program located in the supervisory area of the northern regional branch of the Bureau of National Health Insurance in 2009 were included. The response rate was ∼ 60%. Our research found that the bonus type of incentive was the most important attribute, followed by the incentive structure and the investment magnitude. Physicians may feel that good P4P designs are more important than the magnitude of the investment by the insurer. The two most important P4P designs include providing the bonus type of incentive and using pay-for-excellence plus pay-for-improvement. © The Author 2015. Published by Oxford University Press in association with the International Society for Quality in Health Care; all rights reserved.

  14. Pay for performance programs in Australia: a need for guiding principles.

    PubMed

    Scott, Ian A

    2008-11-01

    Pay-for-performance (P4P) programs which reward clinical providers with incentive payments based on one or more measures of quality of care are now common in the United States and the United Kingdom and it is likely they will attract increasing interest in Australia. However, empirical evidence demonstrating effectiveness of such programs is limited and many existing programs have not had rigorous outcome evaluation. To maximise success, future P4P programs should incorporate the lessons and insights obtained from previous experience. Based on a review of published trials, program evaluations and position statements, the following principles that may guide future program design and implementation were synthesised: 1) formulate a rationale and a business case for P4P; 2) use established evidence-based performance measures; 3) use rigorous and verifiable methods of data collection and analysis; 4) define performance targets using absolute and relative thresholds; 5) use rewards that are sufficient, equitable and transparent; 6) address appropriateness of provider responses and avoid perverse incentives; 7) implement communication and feedback strategies; 8) use existing organisational structures to implement P4P programs; 9) attribute credit for performance to participants in ways that foster population-based perspectives; and 10) invest in outcomes and health service research. Recommendations flowing from these principles relevant to Australian settings are provided.

  15. Do physician organizations located in lower socioeconomic status areas score lower on pay-for-performance measures?

    PubMed

    Chien, Alyna T; Wroblewski, Kristen; Damberg, Cheryl; Williams, Thomas R; Yanagihara, Dolores; Yakunina, Yelena; Casalino, Lawrence P

    2012-05-01

    Physician organizations (POs)--independent practice associations and medical groups--located in lower socioeconomic status (SES) areas may score poorly in pay-for-performance (P4P) programs. To examine the association between PO location and P4P performance. Cross-sectional study; Integrated Healthcare Association's (IHA's) P4P Program, the largest non-governmental, multi-payer program for POs in the U.S. 160 POs participating in 2009. We measured PO SES using established methods that involved geo-coding 11,718 practice sites within 160 POs to their respective census tracts and weighting tract-specific SES according to the number of primary care physicians at each site. P4P performance was defined by IHA's program and was a composite mainly representing clinical quality, but also including measures of patient experience, information technology and registry use. The area-based PO SES measure ranged from -11 to +11 (mean 0, SD 5), and the IHA P4P performance score ranged from 23 to 86 (mean 69, SD 15). In bivariate analysis, there was a significant positive relationship between PO SES and P4P performance (p < 0.001). In multivariate analysis, a one standard deviation increase in PO SES was associated with a 44% increase (relative risk 1.44, 95%CI, 1.22-1.71) in the likelihood of a PO being ranked in the top two quintiles of performance (p < 0.001). Physician organizations' performance scores in a major P4P program vary by the SES of the areas in which their practice sites are located. P4P programs that do not account for this are likely to pay higher bonuses to POs in higher SES areas, thus increasing the resource gap between these POs and POs in lower SES areas, which may increase disparities in the care they provide.

  16. 28 CFR 545.20 - Purpose and scope.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... COMPENSATION Inmate Work and Performance Pay Program § 545.20 Purpose and scope. (a) The Bureau of Prisons...) Reduces inmate idleness, while allowing the inmate to improve and/or develop useful job skills, work... all or part of the work program. (b) The Warden may recognize an inmate's work performance or...

  17. Paying to Learn: The Effect of Financial Incentives on Elementary School Test Scores. NBER Working Paper No. 16333

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Bettinger, Eric P.

    2010-01-01

    Policymakers and academics are increasingly interested in applying financial incentives to individuals in education. This paper presents evidence from a pay for performance program taking place in Coshocton, Ohio. Since 2004, Coshocton has provided cash payments to students in grades three through six for successful completion of their…

  18. The Impact of a Pay-for-Performance Program on Central Line-Associated Blood Stream Infections in Pennsylvania.

    PubMed

    Bastian, Nathaniel D; Kang, Hyojung; Nembhard, Harriet B; Bloschichak, Andrew; Griffin, Paul M

    2016-01-01

    Healthcare associated infections have significantly contributed to the rising cost of hospital care in the United States. The implementation of pay-for-performance (P4P) programs has been one approach to improve quality at a reduced cost. We quantify the impact of Highmark's Quality Blue (QB) hospital P4P program on central line-associated blood stream infections (CLABSI) in Pennsylvania. The impact of years of participation in QB on CLABSI is also evaluated. Data from 149 Pennsylvania hospitals on CLABSI from 2008-2013 are used. Negative binomial regression and fixed effects panel regression are performed. Hospitals participating in QB have 0.727 times the CLABSI as those hospitals that do not participate. Hospitals participating for four or more years have on average 3.13 fewer CLABSI per year compared to those participating for less than four years. Highmark's P4P program has shown improved outcomes with regards to CLABSI, but further research is needed to determine if QB is cost effective.

  19. The Impact of Hospital Pay-for-Performance on Hospital and Medicare Costs

    PubMed Central

    Kruse, Gregory B; Polsky, Daniel; Stuart, Elizabeth A; Werner, Rachel M

    2012-01-01

    Objective To evaluate the effects of Medicare's hospital pay-for-performance demonstration project on hospital revenues, costs, and margins and on Medicare costs. Data Sources/Study Setting All health care utilization for Medicare beneficiaries hospitalized for acute myocardial infarction (AMI; ICD-9-CM code 410.x1) in fiscal years 2002–2005 from Medicare claims, containing 420,211 admissions with AMI. Study Design We test for changes in hospital costs and revenues and Medicare payments among 260 hospitals participating in the Medicare hospital pay-for-performance demonstration project and a group of 780 propensity-score-matched comparison hospitals. Effects were estimated using a difference-in-difference model with hospital fixed effects, testing for changes in costs among pay-for-performance hospitals above and beyond changes in comparison hospitals. Principal Findings We found no significant effect of pay-for-performance on hospital financials (revenues, costs, and margins) or Medicare payments (index hospitalization and 1 year after admission) for AMI patients. Conclusions Pay-for-performance in the CMS hospital demonstration project had minimal impact on hospital financials and Medicare payments to providers. As P4P extends to all hospitals under the Affordable Care Act, these results provide some estimates of the impact of P4P and emphasize our need for a better understanding of the financial implications of P4P on providers and payers if we want to create sustainable and effective programs to improve health care value. PMID:23088391

  20. The impact of hospital pay-for-performance on hospital and Medicare costs.

    PubMed

    Kruse, Gregory B; Polsky, Daniel; Stuart, Elizabeth A; Werner, Rachel M

    2012-12-01

    To evaluate the effects of Medicare's hospital pay-for-performance demonstration project on hospital revenues, costs, and margins and on Medicare costs. All health care utilization for Medicare beneficiaries hospitalized for acute myocardial infarction (AMI; ICD-9-CM code 410.x1) in fiscal years 2002-2005 from Medicare claims, containing 420,211 admissions with AMI. We test for changes in hospital costs and revenues and Medicare payments among 260 hospitals participating in the Medicare hospital pay-for-performance demonstration project and a group of 780 propensity-score-matched comparison hospitals. Effects were estimated using a difference-in-difference model with hospital fixed effects, testing for changes in costs among pay-for-performance hospitals above and beyond changes in comparison hospitals. We found no significant effect of pay-for-performance on hospital financials (revenues, costs, and margins) or Medicare payments (index hospitalization and 1 year after admission) for AMI patients. Pay-for-performance in the CMS hospital demonstration project had minimal impact on hospital financials and Medicare payments to providers. As P4P extends to all hospitals under the Affordable Care Act, these results provide some estimates of the impact of P4P and emphasize our need for a better understanding of the financial implications of P4P on providers and payers if we want to create sustainable and effective programs to improve health care value. © Health Research and Educational Trust.

  1. Bonus Awards for Teachers in Texas' Performance Pay Program: Findings from the First Round of TEEG Schools. Research Brief

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    National Center on Performance Incentives, 2009

    2009-01-01

    A recent report published by the National Center on Performance Incentives (NCPI) presents findings from the second-year of a multi-year evaluation of the Texas Educator Excellence Grant (TEEG) program, a statewide educator incentive program that operated in Texas. As part of this evaluation report, researchers examined how first-year TEEG schools…

  2. 28 CFR 545.30 - Funds due deceased inmates.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... WORK AND COMPENSATION Inmate Work and Performance Pay Program § 545.30 Funds due deceased inmates. Funds due a deceased inmate for work performed and not yet paid shall be made to a legal representative...

  3. Association of patient case-mix adjustment, hospital process performance rankings, and eligibility for financial incentives.

    PubMed

    Mehta, Rajendra H; Liang, Li; Karve, Amrita M; Hernandez, Adrian F; Rumsfeld, John S; Fonarow, Gregg C; Peterson, Eric D

    2008-10-22

    While most comparisons of hospital outcomes adjust for patient characteristics, process performance comparisons typically do not. To evaluate the degree to which hospital process performance ratings and eligibility for financial incentives are altered after accounting for hospitals' patient demographics, clinical characteristics, and mix of treatment opportunities. Using data from the American Heart Association's Get With the Guidelines program between January 2, 2000, and March 28, 2008, we analyzed hospital process performance based on the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services' defined core measures for acute myocardial infarction. Hospitals were initially ranked based on crude composite process performance and then ranked again after accounting for hospitals' patient demographics, clinical characteristics, and eligibility for measures using a hierarchical model. We then compared differences in hospital performance rankings and pay-for-performance financial incentive categories (top 20%, middle 60%, and bottom 20% institutions). Hospital process performance ranking and pay-for-performance financial incentive categories. A total of 148,472 acute myocardial infarction patients met the study criteria from 449 centers. Hospitals for which crude composite acute myocardial infarction performance was in the bottom quintile (n = 89) were smaller nonacademic institutions that treated a higher percentage of patients from racial or ethnic minority groups and also patients with greater comorbidities than hospitals ranked in the top quintile (n = 90). Although there was overall agreement on hospital rankings based on observed vs adjusted composite scores (weighted kappa, 0.74), individual hospital ranking changed with adjustment (median, 22 ranks; range, 0-214; interquartile range, 9-40). Additionally, 16.5% of institutions (n = 74) changed pay-for-performance financial status categories after accounting for patient and treatment opportunity mix. Our findings suggest that accounting for hospital differences in patient characteristics and treatment opportunities is associated with modest changes in hospital performance rankings and eligibility for financial benefits in pay-for-performance programs for treatment of myocardial infarction.

  4. 28 CFR 545.28 - Achievement awards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... Judicial Administration BUREAU OF PRISONS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE INSTITUTIONAL MANAGEMENT WORK AND COMPENSATION Inmate Work and Performance Pay Program § 545.28 Achievement awards. (a) With prior approval of... related trades classroom work that is part of a certified apprenticeship program may be granted an...

  5. Incentive Design and Quality Improvements: Evidence from State Medicaid Nursing Home Pay-for-Performance Programs.

    PubMed

    Konetzka, R Tamara; Skira, Meghan M; Werner, Rachel M

    2018-01-01

    Pay-for-performance (P4P) programs have become a popular policy tool aimed at improving health care quality. We analyze how incentive design affects quality improvements in the nursing home setting, where several state Medicaid agencies have implemented P4P programs that vary in incentive structure. Using the Minimum Data Set and the Online Survey, Certification, and Reporting data from 2001 to 2009, we examine how the weights put on various performance measures that are tied to P4P bonuses, such as clinical outcomes, inspection deficiencies, and staffing levels, affect improvements in those measures. We find larger weights on clinical outcomes often lead to larger improvements, but small weights can lead to no improvement or worsening of some clinical outcomes. We find a qualifier for P4P eligibility based on having few or no severe inspection deficiencies is more effective at decreasing inspection deficiencies than using weights, suggesting simple rules for participation may incent larger improvement.

  6. Incentive Design and Quality Improvements: Evidence from State Medicaid Nursing Home Pay-for-Performance Programs

    PubMed Central

    Konetzka, R. Tamara; Skira, Meghan M.; Werner, Rachel M.

    2017-01-01

    Pay-for-performance (P4P) programs have become a popular policy tool aimed at improving health care quality. We analyze how incentive design affects quality improvements in the nursing home setting, where several state Medicaid agencies have implemented P4P programs that vary in incentive structure. Using the Minimum Data Set and the Online Survey, Certification, and Reporting data from 2001 to 2009, we examine how the weights put on various performance measures that are tied to P4P bonuses, such as clinical outcomes, inspection deficiencies, and staffing levels, affect improvements in those measures. We find larger weights on clinical outcomes often lead to larger improvements, but small weights can lead to no improvement or worsening of some clinical outcomes. We find a qualifier for P4P eligibility based on having few or no severe inspection deficiencies is more effective at decreasing inspection deficiencies than using weights, suggesting simple rules for participation may incent larger improvement. PMID:29594189

  7. 5 CFR 430.402 - Definitions.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ..., evaluating, and rewarding employee performance. This includes appraisal systems and appraisal programs as defined at § 430.203 and performance management systems as defined at § 430.303. GPRA means the Government... Performance Appraisal Certification for Pay Purposes § 430.402 Definitions. In this subpart— Appraisal system...

  8. Review of Related Literature and Research: History of Merit Pay, Differentiated Staffing, and Incentive Pay Programs.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Guernsey, Marsha A.

    This paper reviews selected literature pertaining to merit pay, differentiated staffing, and incentive pay programs. The first section reviews the history of these alternatives to the single salary schedule, beginning with an account of two experimental merit pay plans in the early 20th century. During the 1920s, merit pay plans gave way to the…

  9. [Pay for performance (P4P). Long-term effects and perspectives].

    PubMed

    Schrappe, M; Gültekin, N

    2011-02-01

    After 10 years of experience and research, a wide array of results on evaluation and long-term effects of pay for performance (P4P) programs have been published. These data do not only give insight into most of the problems of implementation, but also into aspects which, in part, may attenuate the high expectations at the beginning of the discussion. P4P programs exhibit a ceiling effect, some improvements are reversed after incentives are cancelled, and improvements show opportunity costs as absent improvements for indicators, which are not object to financial incentives (in some cases for the same disease). These observations can be explained by the hypothesis that P4P programs have characteristics of fee-for-service reimbursement, if symmetric information is available for insurance and provider. P4P programs are local instruments. While integration of healthcare is considered as an important issue, they should be combined with programs and incentives which foster further vertical and horizontal integration. For Germany, further research in the implementation and effects of P4P programs is necessary.

  10. Air Force Integrated Personnel and Pay System (AFIPPS)

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2016-03-01

    2016 Major Automated Information System Annual Report Air Force Integrated Personnel and Pay System (AFIPPS) Defense Acquisition Management...DSN Fax: 665-1207 Date Assigned: February 1, 2016 Program Information Program Name Air Force Integrated Personnel and Pay System (AFIPPS) DoD...therefore, no Original Estimate has been established. AFIPPS 2016 MAR UNCLASSIFIED 4 Program Description Air Force Integrated Personnel and Pay

  11. Governor's Educator Excellence Grant (GEEG) Program: Year Three Evaluation Report. Policy Evaluation Report

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Springer, Matthew G.; Lewis, Jessica L.; Podgursky, Michael J.; Ehlert, Mark W.; Taylor, Lori L.; Lopez, Omar S.; Peng, Art

    2009-01-01

    The Governor's Educator Excellence Grant (GEEG) program was federally- and state-funded and provided three-year grants to schools to design and implement performance pay plans from the 2005-06 to 2007-08 school years. GEEG was implemented in 99 high poverty, high performing Texas public schools. This report builds on the previous GEEG evaluation…

  12. 28 CFR 545.21 - Definitions.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 28 Judicial Administration 2 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Definitions. 545.21 Section 545.21... COMPENSATION Inmate Work and Performance Pay Program § 545.21 Definitions. (a) Physically and mentally able... work assignments are ordinarily made in conjunction with drug treatment programming, education, and/or...

  13. 5 CFR 430.402 - Definitions.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ..., evaluating, and rewarding employee performance. This includes appraisal systems and appraisal programs as..., as determined by the application of a certified appraisal system. Senior employee means a senior... Performance Appraisal Certification for Pay Purposes § 430.402 Definitions. In this subpart— Appraisal system...

  14. 5 CFR 430.402 - Definitions.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ..., evaluating, and rewarding employee performance. This includes appraisal systems and appraisal programs as..., as determined by the application of a certified appraisal system. Senior employee means a senior... Performance Appraisal Certification for Pay Purposes § 430.402 Definitions. In this subpart— Appraisal system...

  15. 5 CFR 430.402 - Definitions.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ..., evaluating, and rewarding employee performance. This includes appraisal systems and appraisal programs as..., as determined by the application of a certified appraisal system. Senior employee means a senior... Performance Appraisal Certification for Pay Purposes § 430.402 Definitions. In this subpart— Appraisal system...

  16. 5 CFR 430.402 - Definitions.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ..., evaluating, and rewarding employee performance. This includes appraisal systems and appraisal programs as..., as determined by the application of a certified appraisal system. Senior employee means a senior... Performance Appraisal Certification for Pay Purposes § 430.402 Definitions. In this subpart— Appraisal system...

  17. Taking stock of pay-for-performance: a candid assessment from the front lines.

    PubMed

    Damberg, Cheryl L; Raube, Kristiana; Teleki, Stephanie S; Dela Cruz, Erin

    2009-01-01

    Pay-for-performance (P4P) has been widely adopted, but it remains unclear how providers are responding and whether results are meeting expectations. Physician organizations involved in the California Integrated Healthcare Association's (IHA) P4P program reported having increased physician-level performance feedback and accountability, speeded up information technology adoption, and sharpened their organizational focus and support for improvement in response to P4P; however, after three years of investment, these changes had not translated into breakthrough quality improvements. Continued monitoring is required to determine whether early investments made by physician organizations provide a basis for greater improvements in the future.

  18. Do we pay our community preceptors? Results from a CERA clerkship directors' survey.

    PubMed

    Anthony, David; Jerpbak, Christine M; Margo, Katherine L; Power, David V; Slatt, Lisa M; Tarn, Derjung M

    2014-03-01

    Family medicine clerkships depend heavily on community-based family physician preceptors to teach medical students. These preceptors have traditionally been unpaid, but in recent years some clerkships have started to pay preceptors. This study determines trends in the number and geographic region of programs that pay their community preceptors, identifies reasons programs pay or do not pay, and investigates perceived advantages and disadvantages of payment. We conducted a cross-sectional, electronic survey of 134 family medicine clerkship directors at allopathic US medical schools. The response rate was 62% (83/132 clerkship directors). Nineteen of these (23%) currently pay community preceptors, 11 of whom are located in either New England or the South Atlantic region. Sixty-three percent of programs who pay report that their community preceptors are also paid for teaching other learners, compared to 32% of those programs who do not pay. Paying respondents displayed more positive attitudes toward paying community preceptors, though a majority of non-paying respondents indicated they would pay if they had the financial resources. The majority of clerkships do not pay their community preceptors to teach medical students, but competition from other learners may drive more medical schools to consider payment to help with preceptor recruitment and retention. Medical schools located in regions where there is competition for community preceptors from other medical and non-medical schools may need to consider paying preceptors as part of recruitment and retention efforts.

  19. A probability metric for identifying high-performing facilities: an application for pay-for-performance programs.

    PubMed

    Shwartz, Michael; Peköz, Erol A; Burgess, James F; Christiansen, Cindy L; Rosen, Amy K; Berlowitz, Dan

    2014-12-01

    Two approaches are commonly used for identifying high-performing facilities on a performance measure: one, that the facility is in a top quantile (eg, quintile or quartile); and two, that a confidence interval is below (or above) the average of the measure for all facilities. This type of yes/no designation often does not do well in distinguishing high-performing from average-performing facilities. To illustrate an alternative continuous-valued metric for profiling facilities--the probability a facility is in a top quantile--and show the implications of using this metric for profiling and pay-for-performance. We created a composite measure of quality from fiscal year 2007 data based on 28 quality indicators from 112 Veterans Health Administration nursing homes. A Bayesian hierarchical multivariate normal-binomial model was used to estimate shrunken rates of the 28 quality indicators, which were combined into a composite measure using opportunity-based weights. Rates were estimated using Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods as implemented in WinBUGS. The probability metric was calculated from the simulation replications. Our probability metric allowed better discrimination of high performers than the point or interval estimate of the composite score. In a pay-for-performance program, a smaller top quantile (eg, a quintile) resulted in more resources being allocated to the highest performers, whereas a larger top quantile (eg, being above the median) distinguished less among high performers and allocated more resources to average performers. The probability metric has potential but needs to be evaluated by stakeholders in different types of delivery systems.

  20. 28 CFR 545.27 - Inmate vacations.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... because of the inmate's poor performance or adverse behavior. [49 FR 38915, Oct. 1, 1984. Redesignated and... COMPENSATION Inmate Work and Performance Pay Program § 545.27 Inmate vacations. (a) An inmate who has worked... shall approve the request if the inmate's work performance qualifies for vacation credit. (b) Staff...

  1. The Effects of Pay-for-Performance Programs on Health, Health Care Use, and Processes of Care: A Systematic Review.

    PubMed

    Mendelson, Aaron; Kondo, Karli; Damberg, Cheryl; Low, Allison; Motúapuaka, Makalapua; Freeman, Michele; O'Neil, Maya; Relevo, Rose; Kansagara, Devan

    2017-03-07

    The benefits of pay-for-performance (P4P) programs are uncertain. To update and expand a prior review examining the effects of P4P programs targeted at the physician, group, managerial, or institutional level on process-of-care and patient outcomes in ambulatory and inpatient settings. PubMed from June 2007 to October 2016; MEDLINE, PsycINFO, CINAHL, Business Economics and Theory, Business Source Elite, Scopus, Faculty of 1000, and Gartner Research from June 2007 to February 2016. Trials and observational studies in ambulatory and inpatient settings reporting process-of-care, health, or utilization outcomes. Two investigators extracted data, assessed study quality, and graded the strength of the evidence. Among 69 studies, 58 were in ambulatory settings, 52 reported process-of-care outcomes, and 38 reported patient outcomes. Low-strength evidence suggested that P4P programs in ambulatory settings may improve process-of-care outcomes over the short term (2 to 3 years), whereas data on longer-term effects were limited. Many of the positive studies were conducted in the United Kingdom, where incentives were larger than in the United States. The largest improvements were seen in areas where baseline performance was poor. There was no consistent effect of P4P on intermediate health outcomes (low-strength evidence) and insufficient evidence to characterize any effect on patient health outcomes. In the hospital setting, there was low-strength evidence that P4P had little or no effect on patient health outcomes and a positive effect on reducing hospital readmissions. Few methodologically rigorous studies; heterogeneous population and program characteristics and incentive targets. Pay-for-performance programs may be associated with improved processes of care in ambulatory settings, but consistently positive associations with improved health outcomes have not been demonstrated in any setting. U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs.

  2. 28 CFR 545.24 - Inmate work conditions.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... AND COMPENSATION Inmate Work and Performance Pay Program § 545.24 Inmate work conditions. (a) The... supervisor so that appropriate action (for example, medical attention, and submission of necessary reports...

  3. 28 CFR 545.24 - Inmate work conditions.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... AND COMPENSATION Inmate Work and Performance Pay Program § 545.24 Inmate work conditions. (a) The... supervisor so that appropriate action (for example, medical attention, and submission of necessary reports...

  4. 28 CFR 545.24 - Inmate work conditions.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... AND COMPENSATION Inmate Work and Performance Pay Program § 545.24 Inmate work conditions. (a) The... supervisor so that appropriate action (for example, medical attention, and submission of necessary reports...

  5. Authorized Course of Instruction for the Quinmester Program. Science: Man and Nature.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    McCarthy, Nancy D.; Silver, Barbara A.

    Performance objectives are stated for this secondary school unit prepared for the Dade County Florida Quinmester Program. The unit examines scientific method, biological classification, evolution, population ecology, and pays attention to problems of the human environment. The booklet lists related state-adopted textbooks, cites descriptions of…

  6. Integrated Personnel and Pay System-Army Increment 2 (IPPS-A Inc 2)

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2016-03-01

    2016 Major Automated Information System Annual Report Integrated Personnel and Pay System-Army Increment 2 (IPPS-A Inc 2) Defense Acquisition...703-325-3747 DSN Phone: 865-2915 DSN Fax: 221-3747 Date Assigned: May 2, 2014 Program Information Program Name Integrated Personnel and Pay System...Program Description The Integrated Personnel and Pay System-Army (IPPS-A) will provide the Army with an integrated, multi-Component (Active, National

  7. Impact of Appointment-Based Medication Synchronization on Proportion of Days Covered for Chronic Medications.

    PubMed

    Dao, Nancy; Lee, Sun; Hata, Micah; Sarino, Lord

    2018-05-22

    Appointment-based medication synchronization (ABMS) programs have been associated with increased adherence and persistence to chronic medications. Adherence to statin therapy, angiotensin-converting enzyme inhibitors (ACEIs), angiotensin receptor blockers (ARBs), and non-insulin antidiabetic medications (NIDM) are used to determine a health plan's Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) Star Rating under a pay-for-performance model. The objective of this study was to evaluate the impact of implementing an ABMS program on overall pharmacy adherence measures for statins, ACEI/ARBs, and NIDM, as presented through the Electronic Quality Improvement Platform for Plans and Pharmacies (EQuIPP©) platform. This retrospective, pre-post ABMS program study evaluated EQuIPP© generated adherence performance measures, represented as proportion of days covered (PDC), 6-months before and 6- and 12-months after the ABMS service for statin therapy, ACEIs/ARBs, and NIDM. All adherence measures showed statistically significant improvement in PDC percentage post ABMS implementation, except for NIDM percentage in 6-months post-ABMS service. This study shows that a comprehensive medication synchronization program can enhance adherence measures that are important to health plans to increase CMS Star Rating under a pay-for-performance model.

  8. Performance-Reward Contingencies: The Role and Relationships of Perceived Equity in the Job Performance-Job Satisfaction Question.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Van Tilburg, Emmalou

    A study examined the relationship between reward contingencies and the levels of job performance and job satisfaction of Cooperative Extension Service county agents. Variables included self-rating of job performance; overall job satisfaction; satisfaction with pay, promotion, co-workers, the work itself, and supervision; agent program area; the…

  9. Texas Educator Excellence Grant (TEEG) Program: Year Three Evaluation Report. Policy Evaluation Report

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Springer, Matthew G.; Lewis, Jessica L.; Podgursky, Michael J.; Ehlert, Mark W.; Gronberg, Timothy J.; Hamilton, Laura S.; Jansen, Dennis W.; Stecher, Brian M.; Taylor, Lori L.; Lopez, Omar S.; Peng, Art

    2009-01-01

    The Texas Educator Excellence Grant (TEEG) program was state-funded and provided annual grants to schools to design and implement performance pay plans during the 2006-07 to 2009-10 school year. This report builds on the previous TEEG evaluation reports, presenting findings from three years of the TEEG program. Overall, the report discusses the…

  10. Marine Corps Pay Incentives

    DTIC Science & Technology

    Marines from 2000 to 2017. The thesis includes a literature review on economic theory related to pay incentives in the Department of Defense, a...The purpose of this thesis to provide the Marine Corps with a comprehensive report on pay incentive programs and special pay that were available to...summarization of pay incentive categories, a data analysis on take-up rates and average annual amounts at the end of each fiscal year, and a program review

  11. Effect of modest pay-for-performance financial incentive on time-to-discharge summary dictation among medical residents.

    PubMed

    Wolk, Adam; Wang, Erwin; Horak, Bernard; Cloonan, Patricia; Adams, Michael; Moore, Eileen; Jaipaul, Chitra Komal; Brown, Gabrielle; Dasgupta, Dabanjan; Deluca, Danielle; Grossman, Mila

    2013-01-01

    Evaluate the effect of a modest financial incentive on time-to-discharge summary dictation among medicine residents. Pay-for-performance incentives are used in a number of health care settings. Studies are lacking on their use with medical residents and other trainees. Timely completion of discharge summaries is necessary for effective follow-up after hospitalization, and residents perform the majority of discharge summary dictations in academic medical centers. Medicine residents with the lowest average discharge-to-dictation time during their 1-month inpatient medicine ward rotation were rewarded with a $50 gift card. Discharge data were captured using an autopopulating electronic database. The average discharge-to-dictation time was reduced from 7.44 to 1.84 days, representing a 75.3% decrease. Almost 90% of discharge summary dictations were performed on the day of discharge. A modest financial incentive resulted in a marked improvement in the time-to-discharge summary dictation by medicine residents. Pay-for-performance programs may be an effective strategy for improving the quality and efficiency of patient care in academic medical centers.

  12. Pay-for-performance as a method to establish the business case for quality.

    PubMed

    Wheeler, John R C; White, Bert; Rauscher, Simone; Nahra, Tammie A; Reiter, Kristin L; Curtin, Kathleen M; Damberg, Cheryl L

    2007-01-01

    One of the major reasons providers give for not implementing promising quality-enhancing interventions (QEI) is that no "business case" for quality has been made. This article clarifies the concepts of the business case for quality and the related economic case for quality and identifies the perspectives of the various actors in health care financing, production, and consumption decisions. A methodology to evaluate the business case for quality from the perspective of payers and providers is presented. The article then uses implemented QEIs to show how a pay-for-performance (P4P) program can alter the business cases for payers and providers. Specifically, the P4P programs described in this article allow a provider to implement a QEI with the financial alignment of the payer in order to achieve financial and non-financial benefits. In some cases, providers and payers may be able to establish P4P programs providing net benefits for both parties.

  13. Medicare’s Payment Strategy For End-Stage Renal Disease Now Embraces Bundled Payment And Pay-For-Performance To Cut Costs

    PubMed Central

    Swaminathan, Shailender; Mor, Vincent; Mehrotra, Rajnish; Trivedi, Amal

    2013-01-01

    Since 1973 Medicare has provided health insurance coverage to all people who have been diagnosed with end-stage renal disease, or kidney failure. In this article we trace the history of payment policies in Medicare’s dialysis program from 1973 to 2011, while also providing some insight into the rationale for changes made over time. Initially, Medicare adopted a fee-for-service payment policy for dialysis care, using the same reimbursement standards employed in the broader Medicare program. However, driven by rapid spending growth in this population, the dialysis program has implemented innovative payment reforms, such as prospective bundled payments and pay-for-performance incentives. It is uncertain whether these strategies can stem the increase in the total cost of dialysis to Medicare, or whether they can do so without adversely affecting the quality of care. Future research on the intended and unintended consequences of payment reform will be critical. PMID:22949455

  14. Performance Pay and Teacher Motivation: Separating Myth from Reality

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Hulleman, Chris S.; Barron, Kenneth E.

    2010-01-01

    This article draws on research from outside of education to evaluate some common myths about performance pay and to consider future directions for designing and evaluating performance pay systems in K-12 education. The five common myths surrounding performance pay include: (1) Performance pay systems improve performance; (2) Performance pay…

  15. Military Compensation: Additional Actions Are Needed to Better Manage Special and Incentive Pay Programs

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2017-02-01

    services largely applied key principles of effective human capital management in the design of their S&I pay programs for nuclear propulsion...aviation, and cybersecurity occupations. However, the application of these key principles varied by service and occupation. Only the Navy’s S&I pay...programs for nuclear propulsion and aviation fully addressed all seven principles ; programs for other occupations and services generally exhibited a

  16. Managing pay for performance: aligning social science research with budget predictability.

    PubMed

    Rosenau, Pauline Vaillancourt; Lal, Lincy S; Lako, Christiaan

    2012-01-01

    Managers and policymakers are seeking practical guidelines for assessing the outcomes of emerging pay-for-performance (P4P) programs. Evaluations of P4P programs published to date are mixed-some are confusing-and methodological problems with them are common. This article first identifies and summarizes obstacles to implementing effective P4P programs. Second, it describes results from social science research going back several decades to support evidence-based P4P best practices. Among the findings from this research, the zero-sum and "earn it back" P4P incentive systems have important drawbacks and may be counterproductive, neither reducing health system costs nor improving quality. The research suggests that punishing participants for low performance may further reduce individuals' performance, especially when involvement is required. We suggest that optimal P4P systems are those that reward all participants for performance improvements. Third, the article links P4P design to budgetary considerations. P4P program designs that provide incentives while improving quality and reducing costs are critical if budget neutrality is a priority for the organization and its resources are limited. In these types of P4P designs, cost calculations are straightforward: The greater the participation, the higher the savings. The article concludes by recommending an evidence-based P4P approach for practitioners that can be implemented without large upfront investment. More research on this topic is also advised.

  17. Getting Value out of Value-Added: Report of a Workshop

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Braun, Henry, Ed.; Chudowsky, Naomi, Ed.; Koenig, Judith, Ed.

    2010-01-01

    Value-added methods refer to efforts to estimate the relative contributions of specific teachers, schools, or programs to student test performance. In recent years, these methods have attracted considerable attention because of their potential applicability for educational accountability, teacher pay-for-performance systems, school and teacher…

  18. What New York City's Experiment with Schoolwide Performance Bonuses Tells Us about Pay for Performance. Research Brief

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Li, Jennifer

    2011-01-01

    In the 2007-2008 school year, the New York City Department of Education (NYCDOE) and the United Federation of Teachers (UFT) implemented the Schoolwide Performance Bonus Program (SPBP). With funding from The Fund for Public Schools and the National Center on Performance Incentives, researchers from the RAND Corporation and Vanderbilt University…

  19. District Awards for Teacher Excellence (D.A.T.E.) Program: Year One Evaluation Report. Policy Evaluation Report. [Executive Summary

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Springer, Matthew G.; Lewis, Jessica L.; Podgursky, Michael J.; Ehlert, Mark W.; Taylor, Lori L.; Lopez, Omar S.; Ghoshdastidar, Bonnie; Peng, Art

    2010-01-01

    The District Awards for Teacher Excellence's (D.A.T.E.'s) first year of implementation in 2008-09 occurred at a time when Texas was operating several state-funded performance pay programs. The three-year Governor's Educator Excellence Grant (G.E.E.G.) program was coming to its expected completion, while the Texas Educator Excellence Grant…

  20. Sustainability of quality improvement following removal of pay-for-performance incentives.

    PubMed

    Benzer, Justin K; Young, Gary J; Burgess, James F; Baker, Errol; Mohr, David C; Charns, Martin P; Kaboli, Peter J

    2014-01-01

    Although pay-for-performance (P4P) has become a central strategy for improving quality in US healthcare, questions persist about the effectiveness of these programs. A key question is whether quality improvement that occurs as a result of P4P programs is sustainable, particularly if incentives are removed. To investigate sustainability of performance levels following removal of performance-based incentives. Observational cohort study that capitalized on a P4P program within the Veterans Health Administration (VA) that included adoption and subsequent removal of performance-based incentives for selected inpatient quality measures. The study sample comprised 128 acute care VA hospitals where performance was assessed between 2004 and 2010. VA system managers set annual performance goals in consultation with clinical leaders, and report performance scores to medical centers on a quarterly basis. These scores inform performance-based incentives for facilities and their managers. Bonuses are distributed based on the attainment of these performance goals. Seven quality of care measures for acute coronary syndrome, heart failure, and pneumonia linked to performance-based incentives. Significant improvements in performance were observed for six of seven quality of care measures following adoption of performance-based incentives and were maintained up to the removal of the incentive; subsequently, the observed performance levels were sustained. This is a quasi-experimental study without a comparison group; causal conclusions are limited. The maintenance of performance levels after removal of a performance-based incentive has implications for the implementation of Medicare's value-based purchasing initiative and other P4P programs. Additional research is needed to better understand human and system-level factors that mediate sustainability of performance-based incentives.

  1. Public Law 100-461, Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1989, 1 October 1988.

    PubMed

    1988-01-01

    This Act does the following among other things: 1) prohibits using funds appropriated under the Act to lobby for abortion and 2) prohibits making development assistance funds available 1) to pay for abortions as a method of family planning (FP) or to motivate or coerce any person to perform abortions; 2) to pay for involuntary sterilization as a method of FP or to coerce or provide any financial incentive to any person to undergo sterilization; 3) to pay for biomedical research that relates to the methods of, or performance of, abortions or involuntary sterilization as a means of FP; or 4) to any country or organization if the use of such funds by such country or organization would violate any of the abortion or involuntary sterilization provisions. It also reaffirms the commitment of the US Congress to population, development assistance, and the need for informed voluntary FP. full text

  2. 41 CFR 105-56.025 - Definitions.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... GSA provides financial support services to the other agency on a reimbursable basis. Financial support... programs, including contributions to the Thrift Savings Plan (TSP); premiums for life (excluding amounts...) Pay means basic pay, special pay, incentive pay, retired pay, retainer pay, or in the case of an...

  3. 28 CFR 345.51 - Inmate pay.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 28 Judicial Administration 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Inmate pay. 345.51 Section 345.51... (FPI) INMATE WORK PROGRAMS Inmate Pay and Benefits § 345.51 Inmate pay. (a) Grade levels. Inmate workers in FPI locations receive pay at five levels ranging from 5th grade pay (lowest) to 1st grade pay...

  4. 5 CFR 9901.342 - Performance payouts.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 5 Administrative Personnel 3 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Performance payouts. 9901.342 Section... PERSONNEL SYSTEM (NSPS) Pay and Pay Administration Performance-Based Pay § 9901.342 Performance payouts. (a) Overview. (1) The NSPS pay system will be a performance-based pay system and will result in a distribution...

  5. 28 CFR 345.52 - Premium pay.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 28 Judicial Administration 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Premium pay. 345.52 Section 345.52... (FPI) INMATE WORK PROGRAMS Inmate Pay and Benefits § 345.52 Premium pay. Payment of premium pay to... inmates at a location. (a) Eligibility. Inmates in first grade pay status may be considered for premium...

  6. 5 CFR 9701.342 - Performance pay increases.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... pools and may adjust those amounts based on overall levels of organizational performance or contribution... 5 Administrative Personnel 3 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Performance pay increases. 9701.342... HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT SYSTEM Pay and Pay Administration Performance-Based Pay § 9701.342...

  7. Self-Assessment of Practice Performance: Development of the ABIM Practice Improvement Module (PIM[superscript SM])

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Duffy, F. Daniel; Lynn, Lorna A.; Didura, Halyna; Hess, Brian; Caverzagie, Kelly; Grosso, Louis; Lipner, Rebecca A.; Holmboe, Eric S.

    2008-01-01

    Background: Quality measurement and improvement in practice are requirements for Maintenance of Certification by the American Board of Medical Specialties boards and a component of many pay for performance programs. Objective: To describe the development of the American Board of Internal Medicine (ABIM) Practice Improvement Module (PIM[superscript…

  8. Student Support and Academic Performance: Experiences at Private Universities in Mexico

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Canton, Erik; Blom, Andreas

    2010-01-01

    Financial aid to students in tertiary education can contribute to human capital accumulation through two channels: increased enrollment and improved student performance. We pay particular attention to the latter channel, and study its quantitative importance in the context of a student support program from the Sociedad de Fomento a la Educacion…

  9. Pay for performance in the inpatient sector: A review of 34 P4P programs in 14 OECD countries.

    PubMed

    Milstein, Ricarda; Schreyoegg, Jonas

    2016-10-01

    Across the member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), pay-for-performance (P4P) programs have been implemented in the inpatient sector to improve the quality of care provided by hospitals. This paper provides an overview of 34 existing P4P programs in the inpatient sector in 14 OECD countries based on a structured literature search in five databases to identify relevant sources in Danish, English, French, German, Hebrew, Italian, Japanese, Korean, Norwegian, Spanish, Swedish and Turkish. It assembles information on the design and effects of these P4P systems and discusses whether evaluations of such programs allow preliminary conclusions to be drawn about the effects of P4P. The programs are very heterogeneous in their aim, the selection of indicators and the design of financial rewards. The impact of P4P is unclear and it may be that the moderately positive effects seen for some programs can be attributed to side effects, such as public reporting and increased awareness of data recording. Policy makers must decide whether the potential benefits of introducing a P4P program outweigh the potential risks within their particular national or regional context, and should be aware that P4P programs have yet not lived up to expectations. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.

  10. The long-term effect of premier pay for performance on patient outcomes.

    PubMed

    Jha, Ashish K; Joynt, Karen E; Orav, E John; Epstein, Arnold M

    2012-04-26

    Pay for performance has become a central strategy in the drive to improve health care. We assessed the long-term effect of the Medicare Premier Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration (HQID) on patient outcomes. We used Medicare data to compare outcomes between the 252 hospitals participating in the Premier HQID and 3363 control hospitals participating in public reporting alone. We examined 30-day mortality among more than 6 million patients who had acute myocardial infarction, congestive heart failure, or pneumonia or who underwent coronary-artery bypass grafting (CABG) between 2003 and 2009. At baseline, the composite 30-day mortality was similar for Premier and non-Premier hospitals (12.33% and 12.40%, respectively; difference, -0.07 percentage points; 95% confidence interval [CI], -0.40 to 0.26). The rates of decline in mortality per quarter at the two types of hospitals were also similar (0.04% and 0.04%, respectively; difference, -0.01 percentage points; 95% CI, -0.02 to 0.01), and mortality remained similar after 6 years under the pay-for-performance system (11.82% for Premier hospitals and 11.74% for non-Premier hospitals; difference, 0.08 percentage points; 95% CI, -0.30 to 0.46). We found that the effects of pay for performance on mortality did not differ significantly among conditions for which outcomes were explicitly linked to incentives (acute myocardial infarction and CABG) and among conditions not linked to incentives (congestive heart failure and pneumonia) (P=0.36 for interaction). Among hospitals that were poor performers at baseline, mortality was similar in the two groups of hospitals at the start of the study (15.12% and 14.73%; difference, 0.39 percentage points; 95% CI, -0.36 to 1.15), with similar rates of improvement per quarter (0.10% and 0.07%; difference, -0.03 percentage points; 95% CI, -0.08 to 0.02) and similar mortality rates at the end of the study (13.37% and 13.21%; difference, 0.15 percentage points; 95% CI, -0.70 to 1.01). We found no evidence that the largest hospital-based pay-for-performance program led to a decrease in 30-day mortality. Expectations of improved outcomes for programs modeled after Premier HQID should therefore remain modest.

  11. 5 CFR 9701.342 - Performance pay increases.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 5 Administrative Personnel 3 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Performance pay increases. 9701.342 Section 9701.342 Administrative Personnel DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT... HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT SYSTEM Pay and Pay Administration Performance-Based Pay § 9701.342...

  12. Comparing 2 methods of assessing 30-day readmissions: what is the impact on hospital profiling in the veterans health administration?

    PubMed

    Mull, Hillary J; Chen, Qi; O'Brien, William J; Shwartz, Michael; Borzecki, Ann M; Hanchate, Amresh; Rosen, Amy K

    2013-07-01

    The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services' (CMS) all-cause readmission measure and the 3M Health Information System Division Potentially Preventable Readmissions (PPR) measure are both used for public reporting. These 2 methods have not been directly compared in terms of how they identify high-performing and low-performing hospitals. To examine how consistently the CMS and PPR methods identify performance outliers, and explore how the PPR preventability component impacts hospital readmission rates, public reporting on CMS' Hospital Compare website, and pay-for-performance under CMS' Hospital Readmission Reduction Program for 3 conditions (acute myocardial infarction, heart failure, and pneumonia). We applied the CMS all-cause model and the PPR software to VA administrative data to calculate 30-day observed FY08-10 VA hospital readmission rates and hospital profiles. We then tested the effect of preventability on hospital readmission rates and outlier identification for reporting and pay-for-performance by replacing the dependent variable in the CMS all-cause model (Yes/No readmission) with the dichotomous PPR outcome (Yes/No preventable readmission). The CMS and PPR methods had moderate correlations in readmission rates for each condition. After controlling for all methodological differences but preventability, correlations increased to >90%. The assessment of preventability yielded different outlier results for public reporting in 7% of hospitals; for 30% of hospitals there would be an impact on Hospital Readmission Reduction Program reimbursement rates. Despite uncertainty over which readmission measure is superior in evaluating hospital performance, we confirmed that there are differences in CMS-generated and PPR-generated hospital profiles for reporting and pay-for-performance, because of methodological differences and the PPR's preventability component.

  13. [Women's willingness to pay for cancer screening].

    PubMed

    Kwak, Min-Son; Sung, Na-Young; Yang, Jeong Hee; Park, Eun-Cheol; Choi, KuiSon

    2006-07-01

    The goal of this study is to measure women's willingness to pay for cancer screening and to identify those factors associated with this willingness to pay A population-based telephone survey was performed on 1,562 women (aged 30 years or over) for 2 weeks (9-23th, July, 2004). Data about sociodemographic characteristics, health behaviors, the intention of the cancer screenings and willingness to pay for cancer screening were collected. 1,400 respondents were included in the analysis. The women's willingness to pay for cancer screening and the factors associated with this willingness to pay were evaluated. The results show that 76% of all respondents have a willingness to pay for cancer screening. Among those who are willing to pay, the average and median amount of money for which the respondents are willing to pay are 126,636 (s.d.: 58,414) and 120,000 won, respectively. As the status of education & the income are higher, the average amount that women are willing to pay becomes much more. The amount of money women are willing to pay is the highest during the 'contemplation' stage. Being willing to pay or not is associated with a change of behavior (transtheoretical model), the income, the concern about the cancer risk, the family cancer history, the marital status, the general health exam, age and the place of residence. Income is associated with a greater willingness to pay. Old age was associated with a lower willingness to pay. According to the two-part model, income and TTM are the most important variables associated with the willingness to pay for cancer screening. The cancer screening participation rate is low compared with the willingness to pay for cancer screening. It is thought that we have to consider the participants' behavior that's associated with cancer screening and their willingness to pay in order to organize and manage cancer screening program.

  14. Developing physician pay arrangements: the cash and care equation.

    PubMed

    Levitch, J H

    1998-11-01

    Developing physician compensation packages that help a healthcare organization meet its business objectives while satisfying physician pay expectations requires new ways of linking pay to physician performance. Such compensation arrangements specifically should include pay tied to defined performance standards, compensation linked to group performance, performance incentives based on realistic, achievable goals, work performance measured by common criteria, and similar pay ensured for similar work. Final pay arrangements also should include items that are sometimes overlooked, such as fully delineated job responsibilities, performance measures aligned correctly with performance areas, and the value of benefits considered in the cash compensation levels.

  15. The Effect of the MassHealth Hospital Pay-for-Performance Program on Quality

    PubMed Central

    Ryan, Andrew M; Blustein, Jan

    2011-01-01

    Objective To test the effect of Massachusetts Medicaid's (MassHealth) hospital-based pay-for-performance (P4P) program, implemented in 2008, on quality of care for pneumonia and surgical infection prevention (SIP). Data Hospital Compare process of care quality data from 2004 to 2009 for acute care hospitals in Massachusetts (N = 62) and other states (N = 3,676) and American Hospital Association data on hospital characteristics from 2005. Study Design Panel data models with hospital fixed effects and hospital-specific trends are estimated to test the effect of P4P on composite quality for pneumonia and SIP. This base model is extended to control for the completeness of measure reporting. Further sensitivity checks include estimation with propensity-score matched control hospitals, excluding hospitals in other P4P programs, varying the time period during which the program was assumed to have an effect, and testing the program effect across hospital characteristics. Principal Findings Estimates from our preferred specification, including hospital fixed effects, trends, and the control for measure completeness, indicate small and nonsignificant program effects for pneumonia (−0.67 percentage points, p>.10) and SIP (−0.12 percentage points, p>.10). Sensitivity checks indicate a similar pattern of findings across specifications. Conclusions Despite offering substantial financial incentives, the MassHealth P4P program did not improve quality in the first years of implementation. PMID:21210796

  16. Performance Pay Improves Engagement, Progress, and Satisfaction in Computer-Based Job Skills Training of Low-Income Adults

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Koffarnus, Mikhail N.; DeFulio, Anthony; Sigurdsson, Sigurdur O.; Silverman, Kenneth

    2013-01-01

    Advancing the education of low-income adults could increase employment and income, but adult education programs have not successfully engaged low-income adults. Monetary reinforcement may be effective in promoting progress in adult education. This experiment evaluated the benefits of providing incentives for performance in a job-skills training…

  17. The Best Laid Plans: Designing Incentive Programs for School Leaders. WCER Working Paper No. 2014-7

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Goff, Peter; Goldring, Ellen; Canney, Melissa

    2014-01-01

    Notable attention and effort has been directed toward improving educator productivity through the use of performance incentives. Little of this work has focused on incentive systems for school leaders (principals) and less yet examines performance pay systems used in practice. This research uses 34 funded grants from the federal Teacher Incentive…

  18. 28 CFR 345.57 - Administrative pay.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 28 Judicial Administration 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Administrative pay. 345.57 Section 345.57... (FPI) INMATE WORK PROGRAMS Inmate Pay and Benefits § 345.57 Administrative pay. An inmate excused from a job assignment may receive administrative pay for such circumstances as a general recall for an...

  19. 28 CFR 345.58 - Holiday pay.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 28 Judicial Administration 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Holiday pay. 345.58 Section 345.58... (FPI) INMATE WORK PROGRAMS Inmate Pay and Benefits § 345.58 Holiday pay. An inmate worker in FPI work status shall receive pay at the standard hourly rate, plus longevity where applicable, for all Federal...

  20. Teacher Incentive Pay Programs in the United States: Union Influence and District Characteristics

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Liang, Guodong; Zhang, Ying; Huang, Haigen; Qiao, Zhaogang

    2015-01-01

    This study examined the characteristics of teacher incentive pay programs in the United States. Using the 2007-08 SASS data set, it found an inverse relationship between union influence and districts' incentive pay offerings. Large and ethnically diverse districts in urban areas that did not meet the requirements for Adequate Yearly Progress as…

  1. Why doesn't performance pay work?

    PubMed

    1993-01-01

    Examines performance pay as a means of motivation in the health sector, and indicates possible reasons for its ineffectiveness. Points out that there are various means of motivating employees, with pay being just one of these. Suggests that this is the reason why performance pay has little impact. Concludes that the NHS is about to implement performance pay within its system. Predicts that this may be problematic.

  2. 28 CFR 551.108 - Performance pay.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 28 Judicial Administration 2 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Performance pay. 551.108 Section 551.108 Judicial Administration BUREAU OF PRISONS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE INSTITUTIONAL MANAGEMENT MISCELLANEOUS Pretrial Inmates § 551.108 Performance pay. The Warden may approve a pretrial inmate for performance pay...

  3. 28 CFR 551.108 - Performance pay.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 28 Judicial Administration 2 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Performance pay. 551.108 Section 551.108 Judicial Administration BUREAU OF PRISONS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE INSTITUTIONAL MANAGEMENT MISCELLANEOUS Pretrial Inmates § 551.108 Performance pay. The Warden may approve a pretrial inmate for performance pay...

  4. 28 CFR 551.108 - Performance pay.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 28 Judicial Administration 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Performance pay. 551.108 Section 551.108 Judicial Administration BUREAU OF PRISONS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE INSTITUTIONAL MANAGEMENT MISCELLANEOUS Pretrial Inmates § 551.108 Performance pay. The Warden may approve a pretrial inmate for performance pay...

  5. 28 CFR 345.60 - Training pay.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 28 Judicial Administration 2 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Training pay. 345.60 Section 345.60... (FPI) INMATE WORK PROGRAMS Inmate Pay and Benefits § 345.60 Training pay. Inmates directed by the SOI to take a particular type of training in connection with a FPI job are to receive FPI pay if the...

  6. 28 CFR 345.60 - Training pay.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 28 Judicial Administration 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Training pay. 345.60 Section 345.60... (FPI) INMATE WORK PROGRAMS Inmate Pay and Benefits § 345.60 Training pay. Inmates directed by the SOI to take a particular type of training in connection with a FPI job are to receive FPI pay if the...

  7. District Awards for Teacher Excellence (D.A.T.E.) Program: Year One Evaluation Report. Policy Evaluation Report

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Springer, Matthew G.; Lewis, Jessica L.; Podgursky, Michael J.; Ehlert, Mark W.; Taylor, Lori L.; Lopez, Omar S.; Ghosh-Dastidar, Bonnie; Peng, Art

    2010-01-01

    District Awards for Teacher Excellence (D.A.T.E.) is a state-funded program in Texas that provides grants to districts for the implementation of locally-designed performance pay plans. All districts in the state are eligible to receive grants, but participation is voluntary. As D.A.T.E. continues in its second year of operation with approximately…

  8. Accounting for Training: An Analysis of the Outcomes of California Employment Training Panel Programs.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Moore, Richard W.; And Others

    The California Employment Training Panel (ETP), which was designed as a performance-driven training program, pays agencies for training provided only if the trainee is placed and retained in a related job for 90 days. The labor market experience of ETP trainees was tracked from 1989-90, 1990-91, and 1991-92 to measure the impact of ETP training on…

  9. Implementing Pay-for-Performance in the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit

    PubMed Central

    Profit, Jochen; Zupancic, John A. F.; Gould, Jeffrey B.; Petersen, Laura A.

    2011-01-01

    Pay-for-performance initiatives in medicine are proliferating rapidly. Neonatal intensive care is a likely target for these efforts because of the high cost, available databases, and relative strength of evidence for at least some measures of quality. Pay-for-performance may improve patient care but requires valid measurements of quality to ensure that financial incentives truly support superior performance. Given the existing uncertainty with respect to both the effectiveness of pay-for-performance and the state of quality measurement science, experimentation with pay-for-performance initiatives should proceed with caution and in controlled settings. In this article, we describe approaches to measuring quality and implementing pay-for-performance in the NICU setting. PMID:17473099

  10. What can the past of pay-for-performance tell us about the future of Value-Based Purchasing in Medicare?

    PubMed

    Ryan, Andrew M; Damberg, Cheryl L

    2013-06-01

    The Medicare program has implemented pay-for-performance (P4P), or Value-Based Purchasing, for inpatient care and for Medicare Advantage plans, and plans to implement a program for physicians in 2015. In this paper, we review evidence on the effectiveness of P4P and identify design criteria deemed to be best practice in P4P. We then assess the extent to which Medicare's existing and planned Value-Based Purchasing programs align with these best practices. Of the seven identified best practices in P4P program design, the Hospital Value-Based Purchasing program is strongly aligned with two of the best practices, moderately aligned with three, weakly aligned with one, and has unclear alignment with one best practice. The Physician Value-Based Purchasing Modifier is strongly aligned with two of the best practices, moderately aligned with one, weakly aligned with three, and has unclear alignment with one of the best practices. The Medicare Advantage Quality Bonus Program is strongly aligned with four of the best practices, moderately aligned with two, and weakly aligned with one of the best practices. We identify enduring gaps in P4P literature as it relates to Medicare's plans for Value-Based Purchasing and discuss important issues in the future of these implementations in Medicare. Copyright © 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

  11. Financial Management. Working for Clean Water: An Information Program for Advisory Groups. Instructor Guide.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Auker, Dennis; And Others

    The implementation of water quality programs in the face of rising costs raises many questions for states and local communities, including: How much can taxpayers afford to pay? Who will pay? How can they pay? Described is an hour-long learning session on financial management that is designed to help citizen advisory groups play an integral role…

  12. 28 CFR 545.31 - Training.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 28 Judicial Administration 2 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Training. 545.31 Section 545.31 Judicial Administration BUREAU OF PRISONS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE INSTITUTIONAL MANAGEMENT WORK AND COMPENSATION Inmate Work and Performance Pay Program § 545.31 Training. The Warden shall ensure that staff receive training...

  13. 29 CFR 70.38 - Definitions.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ....38 Definitions. The following definitions apply to this subpart: (a) Request, in this subpart... costs include, for example, the salary of the Federal employee performing work (the basic rate of pay... research. To qualify under this definition, the program of scholarly research in connection with which the...

  14. 28 CFR 545.24 - Inmate work conditions.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 28 Judicial Administration 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Inmate work conditions. 545.24 Section 545.24 Judicial Administration BUREAU OF PRISONS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE INSTITUTIONAL MANAGEMENT WORK AND COMPENSATION Inmate Work and Performance Pay Program § 545.24 Inmate work conditions. (a) The...

  15. Crisis Reliability Indicators Supporting Emergency Services (CRISES): A Framework for Developing Performance Measures for Behavioral Health Crisis and Psychiatric Emergency Programs.

    PubMed

    Balfour, Margaret E; Tanner, Kathleen; Jurica, Paul J; Rhoads, Richard; Carson, Chris A

    2016-01-01

    Crisis and emergency psychiatric services are an integral part of the healthcare system, yet there are no standardized measures for programs providing these services. We developed the Crisis Reliability Indicators Supporting Emergency Services (CRISES) framework to create measures that inform internal performance improvement initiatives and allow comparison across programs. The framework consists of two components-the CRISES domains (timely, safe, accessible, least-restrictive, effective, consumer/family centered, and partnership) and the measures supporting each domain. The CRISES framework provides a foundation for development of standardized measures for the crisis field. This will become increasingly important as pay-for-performance initiatives expand with healthcare reform.

  16. State adoption of nursing home pay-for-performance.

    PubMed

    Werner, Rachel M; Tamara Konetzka, R; Liang, Kevin

    2010-06-01

    Whereas numerous policies have been adopted to improve quality of care in nursing homes over the past several decades-with varying degrees of success-health care payment has been a largely untapped but potentially powerful policy tool to improve quality of care. Recently, however, payers have invested significant resources in the development and implementation of pay-for-performance (P4P) programs for nursing homes. The authors present results from a survey of state Medicaid agencies documenting the use and structure of P4P in nursing homes. Although the number of states that are implementing nursing home P4P is growing, the structure of these incentives varies across states, and little evidence exists to guide the planning or implementation of these initiatives.

  17. Pay-for-performance: too much of a good thing? A conversation with Martin Roland. Interview by Robert Galvin.

    PubMed

    Roland, Martin

    2006-01-01

    As the United States moves down the road of pay-for-performance (P4P), concerns about unintended consequences are foremost in the minds of policymakers. Initial results from the world's most ambitious P4P program, the United Kingdom's Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF), indicate that while quality improvements exceeded expectations, so too did the amount of funds paid out, straining the National Health Service (NHS) budget. Martin Roland, one of the leading U.K. health services researchers and an adviser to the QOF, gives his views on what went right and what went wrong, and he offers his advice to the United States about using financial incentives to improve quality.

  18. The National Shipbuilding Research Program 1985 Ship Production Symposium Volume 1

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1985-09-01

    though there is some impact on hull construction progress because assembly is performed in shops which provide ideal climate, lighting, and access...with the production of parts is necessary in order to pay employees , report performance to budget and compute productivity. The latter requirement is...progress estimates in addition to the employees normal timecards. Even this can be eliminated by using completion of previously performed tasks as

  19. The Evolution of a Pay-for-Performance Program: A Case Study of a Public School District's Collaboration with an Intermediary Organization

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Shepherd, Julie Kate

    2012-01-01

    Educational intermediary organizations, as defined by Honig (2004a), are characterized by their internal placement within schools as they mediate change among groups during the policymaking process. As intermediary organizations work to bring about internal changes, however, they are still performing their core external functions by operating as…

  20. 5 CFR 591.238 - How do agencies pay COLAs and post differentials?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 5 Administrative Personnel 1 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false How do agencies pay COLAs and post... Program Administration § 591.238 How do agencies pay COLAs and post differentials? (a) Agencies pay COLAs... pay. This includes all periods of paid leave, detail, or travel status outside the COLA or post...

  1. 5 CFR 591.238 - How do agencies pay COLAs and post differentials?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 5 Administrative Personnel 1 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false How do agencies pay COLAs and post... Program Administration § 591.238 How do agencies pay COLAs and post differentials? (a) Agencies pay COLAs... pay. This includes all periods of paid leave, detail, or travel status outside the COLA or post...

  2. 5 CFR 591.238 - How do agencies pay COLAs and post differentials?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 5 Administrative Personnel 1 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false How do agencies pay COLAs and post... Program Administration § 591.238 How do agencies pay COLAs and post differentials? (a) Agencies pay COLAs... pay. This includes all periods of paid leave, detail, or travel status outside the COLA or post...

  3. 5 CFR 591.238 - How do agencies pay COLAs and post differentials?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 5 Administrative Personnel 1 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false How do agencies pay COLAs and post... Program Administration § 591.238 How do agencies pay COLAs and post differentials? (a) Agencies pay COLAs... pay. This includes all periods of paid leave, detail, or travel status outside the COLA or post...

  4. 5 CFR 591.238 - How do agencies pay COLAs and post differentials?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... 5 Administrative Personnel 1 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false How do agencies pay COLAs and post... Program Administration § 591.238 How do agencies pay COLAs and post differentials? (a) Agencies pay COLAs... pay. This includes all periods of paid leave, detail, or travel status outside the COLA or post...

  5. Pay for Performance.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    LaFee, Scott

    1999-01-01

    Top school administrators and school boards across the country are increasingly employing a private-sector incentive: bonus pay for improved (school) performance. Connecticut, Texas, and North Carolina have merit-pay clauses in superintendents' contracts. This article discusses pay-for-performance criteria, increased job expectations, and ethical…

  6. Pay-for-Performance in Education: An Issue Brief for Business Leaders.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    National Alliance of Business, Inc., Washington, DC.

    Implementing pay-for-performance salary structures has been used successfully in business and can result in benefits for educational systems when implemented along with other compensation reforms. Business leaders can help in the implementation of teacher pay-for-performance systems in the following ways: (1) ensure that pay-for-performance plans…

  7. Teacher Compensation: Performance Pay and Other Issues. The Informed Educator Series

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Protheroe, Nancy

    2011-01-01

    This "Informed Educator" examines the issue of performance pay for teachers. Research looking for a possible link between performance pay and student learning is examined, and implementation issues are addressed. Finally, the need to broaden the discussion of performance pay to a more comprehensive review that explicitly connects the structure of…

  8. Testing transferability of willingness to pay for forest fire prevention among three states of California, Florida and Montana

    Treesearch

    John B. Loomis; Hung Trong Le; Armando Gonzalez-Caban

    2005-01-01

    The equivalency of willingness to pay between the states of California, Florida and Montana is tested. Residents in California, Florida and Montana have an average willingness to pay of $417, $305, and $382 for prescribed burning program, and $403, $230, and $208 for mechanical fire fuel reduction program, respectively. Due to wide confidence intervals, household WTP...

  9. Measuring Preferences for a Diabetes Pay-for-Performance for Patient (P4P4P) Program using a Discrete Choice Experiment.

    PubMed

    Chen, Tsung-Tai; Tung, Tao-Hsin; Hsueh, Ya-Seng Arthur; Tsai, Ming-Han; Liang, Hsiu-Mei; Li, Kay-Lun; Chung, Kuo-Piao; Tang, Chao-Hsiun

    2015-07-01

    To elicit a patient's willingness to participate in a diabetes pay-for-performance for patient (P4P4P) program using a discrete choice experiment method. The survey was conducted in March 2013. Our sample was drawn from patients with diabetes at five hospitals in Taiwan (International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision, Clinical Modification code 250). The sample size was 838 patients. The discrete choice experiment questionnaire included the attributes monthly cash rewards, exercise time, diet control, and program duration. We estimated a bivariate probit model to derive willingness-to-accept levels after accounting for the characteristics (e.g., severity and comorbidity) of patients with diabetes. The preferred program was a 3-year program involving 30 minutes of exercise per day and flexible diet control. Offering an incentive of approximately US $67 in cash per month appears to increase the likelihood that patients with diabetes will participate in the preferred P4P4P program by approximately 50%. Patients with more disadvantageous characteristics (e.g., elderly, low income, greater comorbidity, and severity) could have less to gain from participating in the program and thus require a higher monetary incentive to compensate for the disutility caused by participating in the program's activities. Our result demonstrates that a modest financial incentive could increase the likelihood of program participation after accounting for the attributes of the P4P4P program and patients' characteristics. Copyright © 2015 International Society for Pharmacoeconomics and Outcomes Research (ISPOR). Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

  10. Information Disclosure in Postsecondary Vocational Education: Possibilities and Practices. Revised.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Brown, Cynthia L.; Choy, Susan P.

    When students choose postsecondary vocational education programs, they pay, in both money and in income lost during the time they are in the program. The public also pays by tax support for many educational programs. However, students often have little information about the effectiveness of these programs in terms of job placement, wage rates, and…

  11. Pay-for-Performance: Disappointing Results or Masked Heterogeneity?

    PubMed Central

    Markovitz, Adam A.; Ryan, Andrew M.

    2018-01-01

    Research on the effects of pay-for-performance (P4P) in health care indicates largely disappointing results. This central finding, however, may mask important heterogeneity in the effects of P4P. We conducted a literature review to assess whether hospital and physician performance in P4P varied by patient and catchment area factors, organizational and structural capabilities, and P4P program characteristics. Several findings emerged: organizational size, practice type, teaching status, and physician age and gender modify performance in P4P. For physician practices and hospitals, a higher proportion of poor and minority patients is consistently associated with worse performance. Other theoretically influential characteristics – including information technology and staffing levels – yield mixed results. Inconsistent and contradictory effects of bonus likelihood, bonus size, and marginal costs on performance in P4P suggest organizations have not responded strategically to financial incentives. We conclude that extant heterogeneity in the effects of P4P does not fundamentally alter current assessments about its effectiveness. PMID:26743502

  12. WWC Review of the Report "Teacher Incentive Pay and Educational Outcomes: Evidence from the New York City Bonus Program"

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    What Works Clearinghouse, 2012

    2012-01-01

    The study reviewed in this paper examined the effects of offering a school-wide teacher performance bonus program on students' reading and mathematics achievement. The study sample included 309 high-poverty New York City public schools serving students in grades K-8 from 2007-08 to 2008-09. Of these schools, 181 were randomly chosen to be offered…

  13. Federal White-Collar Employee Salary Reform

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1990-03-21

    Richard L. Fogel Assistant Comptroller General for General Government Programs GAO strongly endorses actions to reform federal white-collar employee pay...compensation levels for the employees who manage and operate the programs . -" - CONSIDERATION OP PERFORMANCE LEVELS IN MAKING SALARY ADJUSTMENTS In our...Best Available Copy "AD-A280 667 Uupted S&awe Gener.) AmumgM Ofie eA CNGAO Testimony Pot Release Pederi1 Whit--Collar Employee Salary Reform on

  14. An Accounting Program Merit Pay Survey

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Lindsay, David H.; Campbell, Annhenrie; Tan, Kim B.; Wagner, Andrew

    2010-01-01

    Basing the compensation of accounting professors on merit pay in order to encourage better teaching, research and service is controversial. Before the effectiveness of merit-based salary plans can be examined empirically, it must be determined which accounting programs use such a system. In this study, the 852 accounting programs in the United…

  15. Insights on the effectiveness of reward schemes from 10-year longitudinal case studies in 2 Italian regions.

    PubMed

    Vainieri, Milena; Lungu, Daniel Adrian; Nuti, Sabina

    2018-01-30

    Pay for performance (P4P) programs have been widely analysed in literature, and the results regarding their impact on performance are mixed. Moreover, in the real-life setting, reward schemes are designed combining multiple elements altogether, yet, it is not clear what happens when they are applied using different combinations. To provide insights on how P4P programs are influenced by 5 key elements: whom, what, how, how many targets, and how much to reward. A qualitative longitudinal analysis of 10 years of P4P reward schemes adopted by the regional administrations of Tuscany and Lombardy (Italy) was conducted. The effects of the P4P features on performance are discussed considering both overall and specific indicators. Both regions applied financial reward schemes for General Managers by linking the variable pay to performance. While Tuscany maintained a relatively stable financial incentive design and governance tools, Lombardy changed some elements of the design and introduced, in 2012, a P4P program aimed to reward the providers. The main differences between the 2 cases regard the number of targets (how many), the type (what), and the method applied to set targets (how). Considering the overall performance obtained by the 2 regions, it seems that whom, how, and how much to reward are not relevant in the success of P4P programs; instead, the number (how many) and the type (what) of targets set may influence the performance improvement processes driven by financial reward schemes. © 2018 The Authors. The International Journal of Health Planning and Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

  16. 44 CFR 354.7 - Failure to pay.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-10-01

    ... 44 Emergency Management and Assistance 1 2014-10-01 2014-10-01 false Failure to pay. 354.7 Section 354.7 Emergency Management and Assistance FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND... PROGRAM § 354.7 Failure to pay. Where a licensee fails to pay a prescribed fee required under this part...

  17. 44 CFR 354.7 - Failure to pay.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-10-01

    ... 44 Emergency Management and Assistance 1 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Failure to pay. 354.7 Section 354.7 Emergency Management and Assistance FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND... PROGRAM § 354.7 Failure to pay. Where a licensee fails to pay a prescribed fee required under this part...

  18. 44 CFR 354.7 - Failure to pay.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-10-01

    ... 44 Emergency Management and Assistance 1 2013-10-01 2013-10-01 false Failure to pay. 354.7 Section 354.7 Emergency Management and Assistance FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND... PROGRAM § 354.7 Failure to pay. Where a licensee fails to pay a prescribed fee required under this part...

  19. 44 CFR 354.7 - Failure to pay.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-10-01

    ... 44 Emergency Management and Assistance 1 2012-10-01 2011-10-01 true Failure to pay. 354.7 Section 354.7 Emergency Management and Assistance FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND... PROGRAM § 354.7 Failure to pay. Where a licensee fails to pay a prescribed fee required under this part...

  20. 44 CFR 354.7 - Failure to pay.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... 44 Emergency Management and Assistance 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Failure to pay. 354.7 Section 354.7 Emergency Management and Assistance FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND... PROGRAM § 354.7 Failure to pay. Where a licensee fails to pay a prescribed fee required under this part...

  1. Characteristics and Pay of Federal Civilian Employees

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2007-03-01

    of Federal Civilian Employees 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f...dental assistants , safety technicians, photographers, cartographic tech- nicians, and food inspectors. In December 2005, about 370,000 employees ...promotion program . CHARACTERISTICS AND PAY OF FEDERAL CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES 11pay. Sixty percent of them also switch to a different occu- pation when they

  2. Incentives Alone Not Enough to Prod Teacher Effectiveness

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Sawchuk, Stephen

    2009-01-01

    Policy experts are renewing questions about the role of school culture and leadership in the drive to improve teaching effectiveness in the most-challenging school environments. As states and districts increasingly explore tactics like performance-based pay, incentive programs, and bonuses to attract the best teachers to troubled schools, experts…

  3. Merit Pay International

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Woessmann, Ludger

    2011-01-01

    American 15-year-olds continue to perform no better than at the industrial-world average in reading and science, and below that in mathematics. According to the results of the 2009 Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) tests, released in December 2010 by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the United…

  4. 40 CFR 1027.101 - To whom do these requirements apply?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... POLLUTION CONTROLS FEES FOR ENGINE, VEHICLE, AND EQUIPMENT COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS § 1027.101 To whom do these requirements apply? (a) This part prescribes fees manufacturers must pay for activities related to EPA's engine... certificates of conformity and performing tests and taking other steps to verify compliance with emission...

  5. Assessing Meritorious Teacher Performance: A Differential Validity Study.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Ellett, Chad D; Capie, William

    The Teacher Assessment and Development System (TADS) - Meritorious Teacher Program (MTP) FORM instrument is used in the Dade County Public Schools, Miami, Florida, to evaluate teachers. Its validity for decisions concerning merit pay for master teachers was examined in this study. Specifically, its ability to discriminate between high performing…

  6. Pay-for-virtue: an option to improve pay-for-performance?

    PubMed

    Buetow, Stephen; Entwistle, Vikki

    2011-10-01

    Pay-for-performance schemes reward standardized professional behaviours associated with effective care. However, they neglect the significance of virtue and devalue and erode professional motivation based on virtue. Pay for training to cultivate virtue, and/or pay-for-virtue, may mitigate these dangers. Although virtue is typically considered its own reward, and the assessment of virtue is problematic, pay-for-virtue could involve (1) stringent checks on the appropriateness of the standardized care currently rewarded by pay-for-performance for individual patients or (2) pay for indicators of virtue. These indicators could be based on virtues identified from a framework of universal virtues and through logical inferences from features of practice. It is possible that pay-for-virtue could ultimately strengthen health professionals' intrinsic motivation for good practice, but this and the broader effects of pay-for-virtue would need careful investigation. © 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

  7. The case of the unpopular pay plan.

    PubMed

    Ehrenfeld, T; Coil, M; Berwick, D; Nyberg, T; Beer, M

    1992-01-01

    Three years after launching the team-based Quality For All program, Top Chemical Company CEO Sam Verde was searching for a team-based compensation system that would reflect his company's new philosophy. With a committee gathered to discuss the issue, Verde confronts the fact that changing pay plans is an issue few people can agree on. "Very simply," explains vice president for compensation Gilbert Porterfield, "the plan is designed to give employees working on teams real incentives for constant improvement and overall excellence. The variable aspect of the system pays employees for the performance of their group." This doesn't sit well with the others. "It's going to punish teams like mine for the failings of others instead of rewarding us for the work we do and have already done," says packaging team representative Ruth Gibson. Another committee member feels that team-based anything is a "motivational happy land that doesn't square with how people really work." While Verde likes the proposed pay plan, he has doubts over whether his employees will accept the risk. Upper management has no problem basing 60% of its pay on TopChem's performance. But getting line employees to risk part of their salaries--even as little as 4%--on the ups and downs of the chemical industry may be more trouble than it's worth. Four experts on compensation reveal where Top Chemical went wrong in its plan and how Sam Verde might bring about change successfully.

  8. Agreement Between Michigan State University and Michigan State University Employees Association, July 1, 1974-June 30, 1976.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Michigan State Univ., East Lansing.

    Articles of the agreement cover a definition of terms; fair employment practices; probationary employees; uniforms; working hours; compensation rate schedules; overtime; absences; leaves of absence with and without pay; break in service; insurance benefit programs; educational assistance program; longevity pay; retirement benefit programs; filling…

  9. Characteristics of Teacher Incentive Pay Programs: A Statewide District Survey

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Liang, Guodong; Akiba, Motoko

    2015-01-01

    Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to examine the characteristics of teacher incentive pay programs used by midsize to large school districts in Missouri. Design/methodology/approach: This study primarily used the Teacher Compensation Programs (TCP) survey data. The TCP survey was developed by the authors to understand the nature and…

  10. 48 CFR 532.7002 - Solicitation requirements.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-10-01

    .... Identify the card brand(s) under the GSA SmartPay program that may be used to make payments under the... the card brand(s) under the GSA SmartPay program that may be used to make payments under the contract...

  11. 76 FR 2754 - Agency Information Collection (Pay Now Enter Info Page) Activity Under OMB Review

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-01-14

    ... DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS [OMB Control No. 2900-0663] Agency Information Collection (Pay Now... No. 2900-0663.'' SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Title: Pay Now Enter Info Page. OMB Control Number: 2900... participated in VA's benefit programs and owe debts to VA can voluntary make online payments through VA's Pay...

  12. 77 FR 72960 - William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2012-12-07

    ...'s ``Pay As You Earn'' repayment initiative (the Pay As You Earn repayment plan). DATES: The early... December 21, 2012. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For information about the Pay As You Earn repayment plan or how to apply for Pay As You Earn repayment, the Federal Student Aid Information Center (FSAIC...

  13. Carrots and sticks: impact of an incentive/disincentive employee flexible credit benefit plan on health status and medical costs.

    PubMed

    Stein, A D; Karel, T; Zuidema, R

    1999-01-01

    Employee wellness programs aim to assist in controlling employer costs by improving the health status and fitness of employees, potentially increasing productivity, decreasing absenteeism, and reducing medical claims. Most such programs offer no disincentive for nonparticipation. We evaluated an incentive/disincentive program initiated by a large teaching hospital in western Michigan. The HealthPlus Health Quotient program is an incentive/disincentive approach to health promotion. The employer's contribution to the cafeteria plan benefit package is adjusted based on results of an annual appraisal of serum cholesterol, blood pressure, tobacco use, body fat, physical fitness, motor vehicle safety, nutrition, and alcohol consumption. The adjustment (health quotient [HQ]) can range from -$25 to +$25 per pay period. We examined whether appraised health improved between 1993 and 1996 and whether the HQ predicted medical claims. Mean HQ increased slightly (+$0.47 per pay period in 1993 to +$0.89 per pay period in 1996). Individuals with HQs of less than -$10 per pay period incurred approximately twice the medical claims of the other groups (test for linear trend, p = .003). After adjustment, medical claims of employees in the worst category (HQ < -$10 per pay period) were $1078 (95% confidence interval $429-$1728) greater than those for the neutral (HQ between -$2 and +$2 per pay period) category. A decrease in HQ of at least $6 per pay period from 1993 to 1995 was associated with $956 (95% confidence interval $264-$1647) greater costs in 1996 than was a stable HQ. The HealthPlus Health Quotient program is starting to yield benefits. Most employees are impacted minimally, but savings are accruing to the employer from reductions in medical claims paid and in days lost to illness and disability.

  14. Multiple effects of performance-contingent pay for wait-persons

    PubMed Central

    George, James T.; Hopkins, B. L.

    1989-01-01

    The owners of three restaurants requested help with the pay of waitpersons who were paid by the hour. The waitpersons asked for raises which the owners said they could not afford. This research changed the method of compensating waitpersons by making their pay contingent on dollars of food sold. Increased productivity and increased earnings per hour of work for all of the waitpersons followed the beginning of the performance-contingent pay. Most of the waitpersons also earned increased take-home pay when the performance-contingent pay began. There was little improvement in labor costs per dollar of food sold, a measure of benefit to the owners. The fact that benefits to workers occurred without benefits to owners is contrary to common views about the effects of performance-contingent pay. PMID:16795723

  15. Nursing home administrators' opinions of pay for performance.

    PubMed

    Castle, Nicholas G; Engberg, John; Ferguson-Rome, Jamie C; Sonon, Kristen

    2014-01-01

    The research presented here provides some descriptive information of nursing home pay for performance (P4P) initiatives and an examination of the opinions of nursing home administrators (NHAs) about P4P. Opinions on three common elements of P4P were examined: the incentive format, program format, and quality format. Information came from a mail survey of 2,426 NHAs. Most of the summary scores show that few NHAs gave positive responses to P4P. Very few NHAs believed that P4P would increase their revenues. NHAs were skeptical that P4P systems were for quality improvement and instead believed they were developed for purposes of cost reduction. Relatively few NHAs believed that P4P would improve quality of care. Given that we have limited experience with setting performance goals and incentive formats for NHAs, the findings presented may prove useful in modeling future P4P systems.

  16. Approximate Dynamic Programming Algorithms for United States Air Force Officer Sustainment

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2015-03-26

    level of correction needed. While paying bonuses has an easily calculable cost, RIFs have more subtle costs. Mone (1994) discovered that in a steady...a regression is performed utilizing instrumental variables to minimize Bellman error. This algorithm uses a set of basis functions to approximate the...transitioned to an all-volunteer force. Charnes et al. (1972) utilize a goal programming model for General Schedule civilian manpower management in the

  17. Design choices made by target users for a pay-for-performance program in primary care: an action research approach.

    PubMed

    Kirschner, Kirsten; Braspenning, Jozé; Jacobs, J E Annelies; Grol, Richard

    2012-03-27

    International interest in pay-for-performance (P4P) initiatives to improve quality of health care is growing. Current programs vary in the methods of performance measurement, appraisal and reimbursement. One may assume that involvement of health care professionals in the goal setting and methods of quality measurement and subsequent payment schemes may enhance their commitment to and motivation for P4P programs and therefore the impact of these programs. We developed a P4P program in which the target users were involved in decisions about the P4P methods. For the development of the P4P program a framework was used which distinguished three main components: performance measurement, appraisal and reimbursement. Based on this framework design choices were discussed in two panels of target users using an adapted Delphi procedure. The target users were 65 general practices and two health insurance companies in the South of the Netherlands. Performance measurement was linked to the Dutch accreditation program based on three domains (clinical care, practice management and patient experience). The general practice was chosen as unit of assessment. Relative standards were set at the 25th percentile of group performance. The incentive for clinical care was set twice as high as the one for practice management and patient experience. Quality scores were to be calculated separately for all three domains, and for both the quality level and the improvement of performance. The incentive for quality level was set thrice as high as the one for the improvement of performance. For reimbursement, quality scores were divided into seven levels. A practice with a quality score in the lowest group was not supposed to receive a bonus. The additional payment grew proportionally for each extra group. The bonus aimed at was on average 5% to 10% of the practice income. Designing a P4P program for primary care with involvement of the target users gave us an insight into their motives, which can help others who need to discuss similar programs. The resulting program is in line with target users' views and assessments of relevance and applicability. This may enhance their commitment to the program as was indicated by the growing number of voluntary participants after a successfully performed field test during the procedure. The elements of our framework can be very helpful for others who are developing or evaluating a P4P program.

  18. 5 CFR 9901.344 - Other performance payments.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 5 Administrative Personnel 3 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Other performance payments. 9901.344... SECURITY PERSONNEL SYSTEM (NSPS) Pay and Pay Administration Performance-Based Pay § 9901.344 Other performance payments. (a) The decision to grant other performance payouts, including the amount of such...

  19. Social patterns of pay systems and their associations with psychosocial job characteristics and burnout among paid employees in Taiwan.

    PubMed

    Yeh, Wan-Yu; Cheng, Yawen; Chen, Chiou-Jung

    2009-04-01

    Today, performance-based pay systems, also known as variable pay systems, are commonly implemented in workplaces as a business strategy to improve workers' performance and reduce labor costs. However, their impact on workers' job stress and stress-related health outcomes has rarely been investigated. By utilizing data from a nationally representative sample of paid employees in Taiwan, we examined the distribution of variable pay systems across socio-demographic categories and employment sectors. We also examined the associations of pay systems with psychosocial job characteristics (assessed by Karasek's Demand-Control model) and self-reported burnout status (measured by the Chinese version of the Copenhagen Burnout Inventory). A total of 8906 men and 6382 women aged 25-65 years were studied, and pay systems were classified into three categories, i.e., fixed salary, performance-based pay (with a basic salary), and piece-rated or time-based pay (without a basic salary). Results indicated that in men, 57% of employees were given a fixed salary, 24% were given a performance-based pay, and 19% were remunerated through a piece-rated or time-based pay. In women, the distributions of the 3 pay systems were 64%, 20% and 15%, respectively. Among the three pay systems, employees earning through a performance-based pay were found to have the longest working hours, highest level of job control, and highest percentage of workers who perceived high stress at work. Those remunerated through a piece-rated/time-based pay were found to have the lowest job control, shortest working hours, highest job insecurity, lowest potential for career growth, and lowest job satisfaction. The results of multivariate regression analyses showed that employees earning through performance-based and piece-rated pay systems showed higher scores for personal burnout and work-related burnout, as compared to those who were given fixed salaries, after adjusting for age, education, marital status, employment grade, job characteristics, and family care workloads. As variable pay systems have gained in popularity, findings from this study call for more attention on the tradeoff between the widely discussed management advantages of such pay systems and the health burden they place on employees.

  20. A Comparison of Individual and School Level Approaches to Merit Pay: A Case Study of the Dade County Public Schools.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Provenzo, Eugene F., Jr.; And Others

    This policy study discusses two models of merit pay programs enacted in Florida: the Florida Meritorious Teacher Program and the Quality Instruction Incentives Program (QUIIP). Using the Motivation-Hygiene Theory (Herzberg et al.) as a theoretical framework, each program was analyzed from the perspective of how it worked as a motivator and source…

  1. 5 CFR 9901.344 - Other performance payments.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... RELATIONS SYSTEMS (DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE-OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT) DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE NATIONAL SECURITY PERSONNEL SYSTEM (NSPS) Pay and Pay Administration Performance-Based Pay § 9901.344 Other... officials may make other performance payments to— (1) Reward extraordinary individual performance, as...

  2. The Effects of Objective Feedback on Performance when Individuals Receive Fixed and Individual Incentive Pay

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Johnson, Douglas A.; Dickinson, Alyce M.; Huitema, Bradley E.

    2008-01-01

    We examined whether objective feedback would enhance performance when individuals were paid monetary incentives. A two-by-two factorial design was used, with 123 college students assigned to incentive pay without feedback, incentive pay with feedback, fixed pay without feedback, or fixed pay with feedback. Participants attended six sessions and…

  3. Application of the analytic hierarchy process in the performance measurement of colorectal cancer care for the design of a pay-for-performance program in Taiwan.

    PubMed

    Chung, Kuo-Piao; Chen, Li-Ju; Chang, Yao-Jen; Chang, Yun-Jau; Lai, Mei-Shu

    2013-02-01

    To prioritize performance measures for colorectal cancer care to facilitate the implementation of a pay-for-performance (PFP) system. Questionnaires survey. Medical hospitals in Taiwan. Sixty-six medical doctors from 5 November 2009 to 10 December 2009. Analytic hierarchy process (AHP) technique. Main outcome measure(s) Performance measures (two pre-treatment, six treatment related and three monitoring related) were used. Forty-eight doctors responded and returned questionnaires (response rate 72.7%) with surgeons and physicians contributing equally. The most important measure was the proportion of colorectal patients who had pre-operative examinations that included chest X-ray and abdominal ultrasound, computed tomography or MRI (global priority: 0.144), followed by the proportion of stages I-III colorectal cancer patients who had undergone a wide surgical resection documented as 'negative margin' (global priority: 0.133) and the proportion of colorectal cancer patients who had undergone surgery with a pathology report that included information on tumor size and node differentiation (global priority: 0.116). Most participants considered that the best interval for the renewal indicators was 3-5 years (43.75%) followed by 5-10 years (27.08%). To design a PFP program, the AHP method is a useful technique to prioritize performance measures, especially in a highly specialized domain such as colorectal cancer care.

  4. 5 CFR 930.209 - Senior Administrative Law Judge Program.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... is classified at pay level AL-3, the senior administrative law judge is paid the lowest rate of basic pay in AL-3 that equals or exceeds the highest previous rate of basic pay attained by the individual...

  5. Merit Pay for Teachers. The Best of ERIC on Educational Management, Number 74.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    ERIC Clearinghouse on Educational Management, Eugene, OR.

    Included in this annotated bibliography of 11 publications on merit pay are reports covering various approaches to merit increases and the successes of a merit pay program in California's Round Valley School District, an Educational Research Service review of current research and practice on merit and incentive pay for teachers, an ERIC…

  6. Flexible merit pay for faculty.

    PubMed

    Allcorn, S

    1986-01-01

    Faculty and administrators of medical schools should not depend only upon customary forms of salary administration. Many medical schools and departments set salaries in a manner contrary to the principal mission of the institution. In this approach, the author proposes a versatile, flexible, and cost-effective salary merit pay program. The system not only follows the mission of the institution, it also allows for a stimulating assortment of pay opportunities, and promotes productivity since the faculty members actively design their own programs.

  7. Internet-Based Cervical Cytology Screening Program

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2005-04-01

    and Second Trials of Each Pathologist. * Reference diagnostic category: NEG, ASCUS , LSIL > HSIL Pathologist 1 Interpretation. Negative or LSIL 24 (22...Principal Investigator: David C. Wdlbbur, M.D. Description of Subject Population: Women above the age of l18 years having Pap tests performe PURPOSE We...Subject Population: Women above the age of 18 years having Pay tests performed IRB Protocol Number: 2003P-001658 Sponsor Protocol Number: n/a Consent Form

  8. Willingness to pay to sustain and expand National Health Insurance services in Taiwan.

    PubMed

    Lang, Hui-Chu; Lai, Mei-Shu

    2008-12-17

    The purpose of the present study was to investigate people's willingness to pay to sustain the current National Health Insurance (NHI) program in Taiwan and to extend that program to cover long-term care services. A survey was administered to 1800 inpatients and 1800 outpatients, selected from health care facilities across all accreditation levels that were operating under the supervision of six different regional branches of Taiwan's Bureau of National Health Insurance (BNHI). We used a contingent valuation method with closed-ended questions to elicit participants' willingness to pay for continued national heath insurance and additional institutional long-term care services. We divided participants into six subgroups and asked individuals in these groups referendum-like yes-no questions about whether they were willing to pay one of six price bids: New Taiwan Dollar (NT$) 50, NT$100, NT$200, NT$300, NT$400, or NT$500. Logistic regression was used to analyze willingness to pay. We found maximum willingness to pay for continued coverage by the NHI program and additional institutional long-term care services to be NT$66 and NT$137 dollars per month, respectively. We found that people were willing to pay more for their insurance coverage. With regard to methodology, we also found that using a contingent valuation method to elicit peoples' willingness to pay for health policy issues is valid. The results of the present referendum-like study can serve as a reference for future policy decision making.

  9. Willingness to pay to sustain and expand National Health Insurance services in Taiwan

    PubMed Central

    Lang, Hui-Chu; Lai, Mei-Shu

    2008-01-01

    Background The purpose of the present study was to investigate people's willingness to pay to sustain the current National Health Insurance (NHI) program in Taiwan and to extend that program to cover long-term care services. Methods A survey was administered to 1800 inpatients and 1800 outpatients, selected from health care facilities across all accreditation levels that were operating under the supervision of six different regional branches of Taiwan's Bureau of National Health Insurance (BNHI). We used a contingent valuation method with closed-ended questions to elicit participants' willingness to pay for continued national heath insurance and additional institutional long-term care services. We divided participants into six subgroups and asked individuals in these groups referendum-like yes-no questions about whether they were willing to pay one of six price bids: New Taiwan Dollar (NT$) 50, NT$100, NT$200, NT$300, NT$400, or NT$500. Logistic regression was used to analyze willingness to pay. Results We found maximum willingness to pay for continued coverage by the NHI program and additional institutional long-term care services to be NT$66 and NT$137 dollars per month, respectively. Conclusion We found that people were willing to pay more for their insurance coverage. With regard to methodology, we also found that using a contingent valuation method to elicit peoples' willingness to pay for health policy issues is valid. The results of the present referendum-like study can serve as a reference for future policy decision making. PMID:19091093

  10. 28 CFR 545.27 - Inmate vacations.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 28 Judicial Administration 2 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Inmate vacations. 545.27 Section 545.27... COMPENSATION Inmate Work and Performance Pay Program § 545.27 Inmate vacations. (a) An inmate who has worked full-time for 12 consecutive months on an institution work assignment is eligible to take a five-day...

  11. A Preliminary Qualitative Evaluation of the Virginia Gold Quality Improvement Program

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Craver, Gerald A.; Burkett, Amy K.

    2012-01-01

    Certified nursing assistants (CNAs) perform an important role in the long-term care system because they provide the majority of paid care to nursing facility residents. Unfortunately, annual CNA turnover often exceeds 100 percent nationally. Many factors account for this, including stressful working conditions, low pay, and limited benefits. The…

  12. Estimating residents' willingness to pay for groundwater protection in the Vietnamese Mekong Delta

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Vo, Danh Thanh; Huynh, Khai Viet

    2017-03-01

    Groundwater in the Vietnamese Mekong Delta is facing the pollution and it needs to be protected. Searching literature reviews on economic valuation techniques, the contingent valuation method (CVM) has been popularly applied to estimate the economic value of water protection. This approach is based on a hypothetical scenario in which respondents are requested through questionnaires to reveal their maximum willingness to pay (WTP) for the water protection project. The study used the approach of CVM to analyze the households' motivations and their WTP for the program of groundwater protection in the Mekong Delta. The study performed that the residents in the delta were willing to pay approximately 141,730 VND (US6.74) per household a year. Groundwater could be an inferior good with the negative income effect found in the demanding for clean groundwater. Respondent's gender and groundwater-related health risk consideration were factors sensitively affecting the probability of demanding for groundwater protection.

  13. 5 CFR 534.402 - Definitions.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... Administrative Personnel OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT CIVIL SERVICE REGULATIONS PAY UNDER OTHER SYSTEMS Pay and... contributions to the agency's performance. Performance expectations means the critical and other performance... § 430.303). PRB means Performance Review Board, as described in § 430.310. Rate of basic pay means the...

  14. Experiments of opportunity pay loads revisited

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Shrewsberry, D. J.; Cruddace, R. G.

    1986-01-01

    The design and operation of the Spartan program are discussed. The objective of the Spartan program is to utilize the Space Shuttle for conducting exoatmospheric science research. The Spartan 1 data storage and handling, attitude control, power, and thermal control systems and structure are described. The Spartan 1 was to study the structure of two prominent cosmic X-ray sources, the Perseus cluster of galaxies, and the center of the Milky Way. Spartan 1 was launched on June 17, 1985, deployed on June 20, and retrieved on June 22. The performance of the Spartan's system, and the collected data are analyzed; it was observed that the systems performed as planned. The methods used to minimize the Spartan program costs are considered.

  15. Pay dispersion and performance in teams.

    PubMed

    Bucciol, Alessandro; Foss, Nicolai J; Piovesan, Marco

    2014-01-01

    Extant research offers conflicting predictions about the effect of pay dispersion on team performance. We collected a unique dataset from the Italian soccer league to study the effect of intra-firm pay dispersion on team performance, under different definitions of what constitutes a "team". This peculiarity of our dataset can explain the conflicting evidence. Indeed, we also find positive, null, and negative effects of pay dispersion on team performance, using the same data but different definitions of team. Our results show that when the team is considered to consist of only the members who directly contribute to the outcome, high pay dispersion has a detrimental impact on team performance. Enlarging the definition of the team causes this effect to disappear or even change direction. Finally, we find that the detrimental effect of pay dispersion is due to worse individual performance, rather than a reduction of team cooperation.

  16. Pay Dispersion and Performance in Teams

    PubMed Central

    Bucciol, Alessandro; Foss, Nicolai J.; Piovesan, Marco

    2014-01-01

    Extant research offers conflicting predictions about the effect of pay dispersion on team performance. We collected a unique dataset from the Italian soccer league to study the effect of intra-firm pay dispersion on team performance, under different definitions of what constitutes a “team”. This peculiarity of our dataset can explain the conflicting evidence. Indeed, we also find positive, null, and negative effects of pay dispersion on team performance, using the same data but different definitions of team. Our results show that when the team is considered to consist of only the members who directly contribute to the outcome, high pay dispersion has a detrimental impact on team performance. Enlarging the definition of the team causes this effect to disappear or even change direction. Finally, we find that the detrimental effect of pay dispersion is due to worse individual performance, rather than a reduction of team cooperation. PMID:25397615

  17. Pay Now, Pay Later.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Layzell, Daniel T.

    1988-01-01

    Tuition prepayment is not a panacea for rising college costs. States are treating symptoms and not causes through such programs. Rather than adopting prepayment plans wholesale, state governments need to determine whether the risk to the state and institutions is justifiable by thoroughly analyzing the program's viability. (MSE)

  18. Skin in the game: Does paying for obesity treatment out of pocket lead to better outcomes compared to insurance coverage?

    PubMed

    Ard, Jamy D; Emery, Matt; Cook, Miranda; Hale, Erica; Frain, Annette; Lewis, Kristina H; Song, Eunyoung

    2017-06-01

    To determine whether insurance coverage for medical weight loss treatment was associated with different program engagement and weight loss outcomes compared to those who paid out of pocket. One-year outcomes from an academic medical weight management program were used to compare two groups: employees (n = 480) with insurance coverage ("covered") versus nonemployees (n = 463) who paid out of pocket ("self-pay"). Demographics and weight were abstracted from medical records. Socioeconomic status was estimated using neighborhood demographics. Group differences in weight were analyzed using generalized linear modeling adjusted for age, baseline BMI, sex, program type, and neighborhood socioeconomic status. Covered patients were younger (46.5 ± 10.6 vs. 51.6 ± 12.5) with a lower BMI (38.5 ± 7.5 vs. 41.3 ± 9.9) compared to self-pay (P < 0.001). Self-pay patients resided in higher annual per capita income neighborhoods (+$4,545, P < 0.001). Program dropout was lower for covered patients (12.7% vs. 17.6%, P = 0.03). There was no significant difference in 12-month weight loss between groups in adjusted models; covered patients lost 13.4%, compared to 13.6% for self-pay. Data from an academic medical weight management program suggest that individuals with access to insurance coverage for nonsurgical obesity treatment have lower levels of attrition and similar levels of participation and outcomes as those who pay out of pocket. © 2017 The Obesity Society.

  19. [Preference on screening frequency and willingness-to-pay for multiple-cancer packaging screening programs in urban populations in China].

    PubMed

    Zhu, J; Huang, H Y; Mao, A Y; Sun, Z X; Qiu, W Q; Lei, H K; Dong, P; Huang, J W; Bai, Y N; Sun, X J; Liu, G X; Wang, D B; Liao, X Z; Ren, J S; Guo, L W; Lan, L; Zhou, Q; Song, B B; Liu, Y Q; Du, L B; Zhu, L; Cao, R; Wang, J L; Mai, L; Ren, Y; Zhou, J Y; Sun, X H; Wu, S L; Qi, X; Lou, P A; Cai, B; Li, N; Zhang, K; He, J; Dai, M; Shi, J F

    2018-02-10

    Objective: From an actual cancer screening service demanders' perspective, we tried to understand the preference on screening frequency and willingness-to-pay for the packaging screening program on common cancers and to evaluate its long-term sustainability in urban populations in China. Methods: From 2012 to 2014, a multi-center cross-sectional survey was conducted among the actual screening participants from 13 provinces covered by the Cancer Screening Program in Urban China (CanSPUC). By face-to-face interview, information regarding to preference to screening frequency, willingness-to-pay for packaging screening program, maximum amount on payment and related reasons for unwillingness were investigated. Results: A total of 31 029 participants were included in this survey, with an average age as (55.2±7.5) years and median annual income per family as 25 000 Chinese Yuan. People's preference to screening frequency varied under different assumptions ( " totally free" and "self-paid" ). When the packaging screening was assumed totally free, 93.9% of residents would prefer to take the screening program every 1 to 3 years. However, the corresponding proportion dropped to 67.3% when assuming a self-paid pattern. 76.7% of the participants had the willingness-to-pay for the packaging screening, but only 11.2% of them would like to pay more than 500 Chinese Yuan (the expenditure of the particular packaging screening were about 1 500 Chinese Yuan). The remaining 23.3% of residents showed no willingness-to-pay, and the main reasons were unaffordable expenditure (71.7%) and feeling'no need'(40.4%). Conclusions: People who participated in the CanSPUC program generally tended to choose high-frequency packaging screening program, indicating the high potential acceptance for scale-up packaging screening, while it needs cautious assessments and rational guidance to the public. Although about seven in ten of the residents were willing to pay, the payment amount was limited, revealing the necessity of strengthening individual's awareness of his or her key role in health self-management, and a reasonable payment proportion should be considered when establishing co-compensation mechanism.

  20. 5 CFR 831.206 - Continuation of coverage for former Federal employees of the Civilian Marksmanship Program.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... individual's retirement records. (d) The Corporation must withhold from the pay of an individual described by paragraph (a) of this section an amount equal to the percentage withheld from the pay of a Federal employee... support the Civilian Marksmanship Program as of the day before the date of the transfer of the Program to...

  1. 76 FR 579 - Privacy Act of 1974; Computer Matching Program Between the Department of Housing and Urban...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-01-05

    ... Payment Accuracy Through a ``Do Not Pay List'' (June 18, 2010); 3. Office of Management and Budget M-10-13... operating Public Housing programs may now offer tenants the option to pay a flat rent, or an income-based... all cases, program administrators will resolve income discrepancies in consultation with tenants...

  2. 28 CFR 545.25 - Eligibility for performance pay.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ..., is expelled, or otherwise fails attendance requirements of the drug abuse education course or the... have committed a level 100 or 200 series drug- or alcohol-related prohibited act will automatically... shall not ordinarily receive performance pay above the maintenance pay level, or bonus pay, or vacation...

  3. Tailoring an educational program on the AHRQ Patient Safety Indicators to meet stakeholder needs: lessons learned in the VA.

    PubMed

    Shin, Marlena H; Rivard, Peter E; Shwartz, Michael; Borzecki, Ann; Yaksic, Enzo; Stolzmann, Kelly; Zubkoff, Lisa; Rosen, Amy K

    2018-02-14

    Given that patient safety measures are increasingly used for public reporting and pay-for performance, it is important for stakeholders to understand how to use these measures for improvement. The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) Patient Safety Indicators (PSIs) are one particularly visible set of measures that are now used primarily for public reporting and pay-for-performance among both private sector and Veterans Health Administration (VA) hospitals. This trend generates a strong need for stakeholders to understand how to interpret and use the PSIs for quality improvement (QI). The goal of this study was to develop an educational program and tailor it to stakeholders' needs. In this paper, we share what we learned from this program development process. Our study population included key VA stakeholders involved in reviewing performance reports and prioritizing and initiating quality/safety initiatives. A pre-program formative evaluation through telephone interviews and web-based surveys assessed stakeholders' educational needs/interests. Findings from the formative evaluation led to development and implementation of a cyberseminar-based program, which we tailored to stakeholders' needs/interests. A post-program survey evaluated program participants' perceptions about the PSI educational program. Interview data confirmed that the concepts we had developed for the interviews could be used for the survey. Survey results informed us on what program delivery mode and content topics were of high interest. Six cyberseminars were developed-three of which focused on two content areas that were noted of greatest interest: learning how to use PSIs for monitoring trends and understanding how to interpret PSIs. We also used snapshots of VA PSI reports so that participants could directly apply learnings. Although initial interest in the program was high, actual attendance was low. However, post-program survey results indicated that perceptions about the program were positive. Conducting a formative evaluation was a highly important process in program development. The useful information that we collected through the interviews and surveys allowed us to tailor the program to stakeholders' needs and interests. Our experiences, particularly with the formative evaluation process, yielded valuable lessons that can guide others when developing and implementing similar educational programs.

  4. Implementation of electronic medical records

    PubMed Central

    Greiver, Michelle; Barnsley, Jan; Glazier, Richard H.; Moineddin, Rahim; Harvey, Bart J.

    2011-01-01

    Abstract Objective To study the effect of electronic medical record (EMR) implementation on preventive services covered by Ontario’s pay-for-performance program. Design Prospective double-cohort study. Participants Twenty-seven community-based family physicians. Setting Toronto, Ont. Intervention Eighteen physicians implemented EMRs, while 9 physicians continued to use paper records. Main outcome measure Provision of 4 preventive services affected by pay-for-performance incentives (Papanicolaou tests, screening mammograms, fecal occult blood testing, and influenza vaccinations) in the first 2 years of EMR implementation. Results After adjustment, combined preventive services for the EMR group increased by 0.7%, a smaller increase than that seen in the non-EMR group (P = .55, 95% confidence interval −2.8 to 3.9). Conclusion When compared with paper records, EMR implementation had no significant effect on the provision of the 4 preventive services studied. PMID:21998246

  5. Using Performance-Based Pay to Improve the Quality of Teachers

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Lavy, Victor

    2007-01-01

    Tying teachers' pay to their classroom performance should, says Victor Lavy, improve the current educational system both by clarifying teaching goals and by attracting and retaining the most productive teachers. But implementing pay for performance poses many practical challenges, because measuring individual teachers' performance is difficult.…

  6. 40 CFR 57.109 - Maintenance of pay.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 40 Protection of Environment 5 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Maintenance of pay. 57.109 Section 57.109 Protection of Environment ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (CONTINUED) AIR PROGRAMS (CONTINUED) PRIMARY NONFERROUS SMELTER ORDERS General § 57.109 Maintenance of pay. The Administrator will not approve...

  7. The Willingness-to-Pay for Work/Family Policies: A Study of Teachers.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Drago, Robert; Costanza, David; Caplan, Robert; Brubaker, Tanya; Cloud, Darnell; Harris, Naomi; Kashian, Russell; Riggs, T. Lynn

    2001-01-01

    A contingent valuation study of 343 elementary teachers identified circumstances in which they would be willing to provide, through payroll deductions, certain work-family policies/programs. Even those with little or no likelihood of using the programs exhibited willingness to pay for some of them. (SK)

  8. 47 CFR 64.1503 - Termination of pay-per-call and other information programs.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... 47 Telecommunication 3 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Termination of pay-per-call and other information programs. 64.1503 Section 64.1503 Telecommunication FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (CONTINUED... interstate information service through any 800 telephone number, or other telephone number advertised or...

  9. Risk Aversion and Support for Merit Pay: Theory and Evidence from Minnesota's Q Comp Program

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Nadler, Carl; Wiswall, Matthew

    2011-01-01

    Recent research attributes the lack of merit pay in teaching to the resistance of teachers. This article examines whether the structure of merit pay affects the types of teachers who support it. We develop a model of the relative utility teachers receive from merit pay versus the current fixed schedule of raises. We show that if teachers are risk…

  10. Merit Pay in Arkansas: An Evaluation of the Cobra Pride Incentive Program in the Fountain Lake School District

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Jensen, Nathan C.

    2012-01-01

    Starting in the 2010-11, administrators at the Fountain Lake School District implemented the Cobra Pride Incentive Program (CPIP), a merit pay program designed to financially reward all school employees with year-end bonuses primarily for significant improvements in student achievement. At the conclusion of the 2010-11 school year, over $800,000…

  11. Willingness to Pay for a Newborn Screening Test for Spinal Muscular Atrophy.

    PubMed

    Lin, Pei-Jung; Yeh, Wei-Shi; Neumann, Peter J

    2017-01-01

    The current US mandatory newborn screening panel does not include spinal muscular atrophy, the most common fatal genetic disease among children. We assessed population preferences for newborn screening for spinal muscular atrophy, and how test preferences varied depending on immediate treatment implications. We conducted an online willingness-to-pay survey of US adults (n = 982). Respondents were asked to imagine being parents of a newborn. Each respondent was presented with two hypothetical scenarios following the spinal muscular atrophy screening test: current standard of care (no treatment available) and one of three randomly assigned scenarios (new treatment available to improve functioning, survival, or both). We used a bidding game to elicit willingness to pay for the spinal muscular atrophy test, and performed a two-part model to estimate median and mean willingness-to-pay values. Most respondents (79% to 87%) would prefer screening their newborns for spinal muscular atrophy. People expressed a willingness to pay for spinal muscular atrophy screening even without an available therapy (median: $142; mean: $253). Willingness to pay increased with treatment availability (median: $161 to $182; mean: $270 to $297) and respondent income. Most respondents considered test accuracy, treatment availability, and treatment effectiveness very important or important factors in deciding willingness to pay. Most people would prefer and would be willing to pay for testing their newborn for spinal muscular atrophy, even in the absence of direct treatment. People perceive the spinal muscular atrophy test more valuable if treatment were available to improve the newborn's functioning and survival. Despite preferences for the test information, adding spinal muscular atrophy to newborn screening programs remains controversial. Future studies are needed to determine how early detection may impact long-term patient outcomes. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

  12. Collective Bargaining in Education and Pay for Performance. Research Brief

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    National Center on Performance Incentives, 2008

    2008-01-01

    In "Collective Bargaining in Education and Pay for Performance"--a paper presented at the National Center on Performance Incentives research to policy conference in February--Jane Hannaway and Andrew J. Rotherham examine the interplay between the emerging policy focus on teacher pay for performance and the response of teacher unions.…

  13. 75 FR 63215 - Federal Salary Council Meeting

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-10-14

    ... Federal employee organizations and experts in the fields of labor relations and pay policy. The Council makes recommendations to the President's Pay Agent (the Secretary of Labor and the Directors of the Office of Management and Budget and the Office of Personnel Management) about the locality pay program...

  14. 78 FR 61404 - Federal Salary Council; Meeting

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2013-10-03

    ... Federal employee organizations and experts in the fields of labor relations and pay policy. The Council makes recommendations to the President's Pay Agent (the Secretary of Labor and the Directors of the Office of Management and Budget and the Office of Personnel Management) about the locality pay program...

  15. 76 FR 59175 - Federal Salary Council; Meeting

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-09-23

    ... Federal employee organizations and experts in the fields of labor relations and pay policy. The Council makes recommendations to the President's Pay Agent (the Secretary of Labor and the Directors of the Office of Management and Budget and the Office of Personnel Management) about the locality pay program...

  16. Teacher Pay-for-Performance in School Turnaround: How Bonuses and Differentiated Pay Scales Can Help Support School Turnaround. Meeting the Turnaround Challenge: Strategies, Resources & Tools to Transform a Framework into Practice

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Mass Insight Education (NJ1), 2009

    2009-01-01

    Given the importance of good teaching and leadership for school success, turnaround schools should think carefully about how to structure professional environments that reward and motivate excellence. A system of "Pay-for-Contribution" that includes tools such as hard-to-staff and skill shortage pay, performance pay, and/or retention…

  17. 5 CFR 894.401 - How do I pay premiums?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 5 Administrative Personnel 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false How do I pay premiums? 894.401 Section 894.401 Administrative Personnel OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT (CONTINUED) CIVIL SERVICE REGULATIONS (CONTINUED) FEDERAL EMPLOYEES DENTAL AND VISION INSURANCE PROGRAM Cost of Coverage § 894.401 How do I pay...

  18. 5 CFR 894.401 - How do I pay premiums?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 5 Administrative Personnel 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false How do I pay premiums? 894.401 Section 894.401 Administrative Personnel OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT (CONTINUED) CIVIL SERVICE REGULATIONS (CONTINUED) FEDERAL EMPLOYEES DENTAL AND VISION INSURANCE PROGRAM Cost of Coverage § 894.401 How do I pay...

  19. 75 FR 68010 - Federal Salary Council

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-11-04

    ... employee organizations and experts in the fields of labor relations and pay policy. The Council makes recommendations to the President's Pay Agent (the Secretary of Labor and the Directors of the Office of Management and Budget and the Office of Personnel Management) about the locality pay program for General Schedule...

  20. 77 FR 59026 - Federal Salary Council

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2012-09-25

    ... employee organizations and experts in the fields of labor relations and pay policy. The Council makes recommendations to the President's Pay Agent (the Secretary of Labor and the Directors of the Office of Management and Budget and the Office of Personnel Management) about the locality pay program for General Schedule...

  1. 78 FR 65717 - Federal Salary Council

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2013-11-01

    ... employee organizations and experts in the fields of labor relations and pay policy. The Council makes recommendations to the President's Pay Agent (the Secretary of Labor and the Directors of the Office of Management and Budget and the Office of Personnel Management) about the locality pay program for General Schedule...

  2. Impact of a Pay-for-Performance Program on Care for Black Patients with Hypertension: Important Answers in the Era of the Affordable Care Act.

    PubMed

    Petersen, Laura A; Ramos, Kate Simpson; Pietz, Kenneth; Woodard, LeChauncy D

    2017-06-01

    Evaluate the effect of a pay-for-performance intervention on the quality of hypertension care provided to black patients and determine whether it produced risk selection. Primary data collected between 2007 and 2009 from Veterans Affairs physicians and their primary care panels. Nested study within a cluster randomized controlled trial of three types of financial incentives and no incentives (control). We compared the proportion of physicians' black patients meeting hypertension performance measures for baseline and final performance periods. We measured risk selection by comparing the proportion of patients who switched providers, patient visit frequency, and panel turnover. Due to limited power, we prespecified in the analysis plan combining the three incentive groups and oversampling black patients. Data collected electronically and by chart review. The proportion of black patients who achieved blood pressure control or received an appropriate response to uncontrolled blood pressure in the final period was 6.3 percent (95 percent confidence interval, 0.8-11.7 percent) greater for physicians who received an incentive than for controls. There was no difference between intervention and controls in the proportion of patients who switched providers, visit frequency, or panel turnover. A pay-for-performance intervention improved blood pressure control or appropriate response to uncontrolled blood pressure in black patients and did not produce risk selection. © Published 2016. This article is a U.S. Government work and is in the public domain in the USA.

  3. Performance Pay System Preferences of Students Preparing to Be Teachers

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Milanowski, Anthony

    2007-01-01

    This study explored the potential acceptability of performance pay to new teachers by investigating attitudes toward performance pay of students preparing to be teachers. Focus groups and a survey of students preparing to be teachers at a large U.S. university were conducted. Most students expressed a preference for some form of performance pay…

  4. Risk Aversion and Support for Merit Pay: Theory and Evidence from Minnesota's Q Comp Program. Working Paper #09-05

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Nadler, Carl; Wiswall, Matthew

    2009-01-01

    Recent research attributes the lack of merit pay in teaching to the resistance of teachers. This paper examines whether the structure of merit pay affects the types of teachers who support it. We develop a model of the relative utility teachers receive from merit pay versus the current fixed schedule of raises. We show that if teachers are risk…

  5. 5 CFR 9701.346 - Pay progression for new supervisors.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 5 Administrative Personnel 3 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Pay progression for new supervisors. 9701.346 Section 9701.346 Administrative Personnel DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY HUMAN RESOURCES... SECURITY HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT SYSTEM Pay and Pay Administration Performance-Based Pay § 9701.346 Pay...

  6. Presidential Compensation in Public Higher Education Institutions: Is There Pay for Performance?

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    He, Lerong; Callahan, Charles, III

    2017-01-01

    This paper discusses the theoretical background of the pay-for-performance incentive as well as its implication for administrators in higher education institutions. Using pay data of a large state university system in the U.S., the paper finds that presidents in public research universities receive significantly higher pay than their counterparts…

  7. Relationship between organizational factors and performance among pay-for-performance hospitals.

    PubMed

    Vina, Ernest R; Rhew, David C; Weingarten, Scott R; Weingarten, Jason B; Chang, John T

    2009-07-01

    The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS)/Premier Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration (HQID) project aims to improve clinical performance through a pay-for-performance program. We conducted this study to identify the key organizational factors associated with higher performance. An investigator-blinded, structured telephone survey of eligible hospitals' (N = 92) quality improvement (QI) leaders was conducted among HQID hospitals in the top 2 or bottom 2 deciles submitting performance measure data from October 2004 to September 2005. The survey covered topics such as QI interventions, data feedback, physician leadership, support for QI efforts, and organizational culture. More top performing hospitals used clinical pathways for the treatment of AMI (49% vs. 15%, p < 0.01), HF (44% vs. 18%, p < 0.01), PN (38% vs. 13%, p < 0.01) and THR/TKR (56% vs. 23%, p < 0.01); organized into multidisciplinary teams to manage patients with AMI (93% vs. 77%, p < 0.05) and HF (93% vs. 69%, p < 0.01); used order sets for the treatment of THR/TKR (91% vs. 64%, p < 0.01); and implemented computerized physician order entry in the hospital (24.4% vs. 7.9%, p < 0.05). Finally, more top performers reported having adequate human resources for QI projects (p < 0.01); support of the nursing staff to increase adherence to quality indicators (p < 0.01); and an organizational culture that supported coordination of care (p < 0.01), pace of change (p < 0.01), willingness to try new projects (p < 0.01), and a focus on identifying system errors rather than blaming individuals (p < 0.05). Organizational structure, support, and culture are associated with high performance among hospitals participating in a pay-for-performance demonstration project. Multiple organizational factors remain important in optimizing clinical care.

  8. So, You Want to Move out?!--An Awareness Program of the Real Costs of Moving Away from Home

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Hines, Steven L.; Hansen, Lyle; Falen, Christi

    2011-01-01

    The So, You Want To Move Out?! program was developed to help teens explore the financial realities of moving away from home. This 3-day camp program allows youth the opportunity to interview for a job, work, earn a paycheck, and pay financial obligations. After paying expenses and trying to put some money away in savings, the participants begin to…

  9. Performance-Based Pay in the Federal Government. Research Brief

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    National Center on Performance Incentives, 2008

    2008-01-01

    In "Performance-Based Pay in the Federal Government"--a paper presented at the February 2008 National Center on Performance Incentives research to policy conference--Steve Nelson discusses the evolution of employee pay systems in the federal government, from the inception of the General Schedule to continuing interest in creating more…

  10. Performance Pay for Teachers: Determinants and Consequences

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Belfield, Clive R.; Heywood, John S.

    2008-01-01

    Theory and evidence on performance-related pay for teaching remain inconclusive. Teachers will respond to rewards, but an appropriate reward structure may not be devised because education is a collaborative endeavor. Here we test three hypotheses: performance-related pay among teachers is more likely to be observed when there are evident…

  11. The effect of personal experience on choice-based preferences for wildfire protection programs

    Treesearch

    Tom Holmes; Armando Gonzalez-Caban; John Loomis; Jose Sanchez

    2013-01-01

    In this paper, we investigate homeowner preferences and willingness to pay for wildfire protection programs using a choice experiment with three attributes: risk, loss and cost. Preference heterogeneity among survey respondents was examined using three econometric models and risk preferences were evaluated by comparing willingness to pay for wildfire protection...

  12. Willingness-to-pay for an area-wide integrated Pest Managment Program to control the Asian Tiger Mosquito in New Jersey.

    USDA-ARS?s Scientific Manuscript database

    Using contingent valuation, the perceived value of an area-wide, integrated pest management program for the Asian tiger mosquito, Aedes albopictus, implemented in Monmouth and Mercer Counties, New Jersey, was estimated. The residents’ maximum willingness-to-pay (WTP) and payment modality was estimat...

  13. Every penny counts: interest-free loan programs could benefit both hospitals and patients.

    PubMed

    Hinderks, Jackie; Wreede, Amanda

    2015-11-01

    Patients' average deductibles have more than quadrupled, and their out-of-pocket costs are much higher now than even a decade ago. The higher a hospital bill, the less likely a patient is to pay. Zero-interest loan programs encourage patients to pay, helping both patient and hospital stay afloat.

  14. Reformist Distractions and Educational Labor: Two Perspectives on Paying for Grades

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Warnick, Bryan R.

    2016-01-01

    In this essay Bryan Warnick examines two recent analyses of the practice of paying students for grades, with a focus on educational justice. Philosopher Derrick Darby argues against cash-for-grades programs on the grounds that such programs leave educational inequality intact. Warnick contends that Darby's arguments are incomplete. Increasing…

  15. 7 CFR 1000.76 - Payments by a handler operating a partially regulated distributing plant.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... and pricing program, shall pay to the market administrator for the producer-settlement fund the amount... pooling of producer returns under a State government's milk classification and pricing program shall pay... disposed of as route disposition in the marketing area; (2) For orders with multiple component pricing...

  16. Cost-effectiveness of diabetes pay-for-performance incentive designs.

    PubMed

    Hsieh, Hui-Min; Tsai, Shu-Ling; Shin, Shyi-Jang; Mau, Lih-Wen; Chiu, Herng-Chia

    2015-02-01

    Taiwan's National Health Insurance (NHI) Program implemented a diabetes pay-for-performance program (P4P) based on process-of-care measures in 2001. In late 2006, that P4P program was revised to also include achievement of intermediate health outcomes. This study examined to what extent these 2 P4P incentive designs have been cost-effective and what the difference in effect may have been. Analyzing data using 3 population-based longitudinal databases (NHI's P4P dataset, NHI's claims database, and Taiwan's death registry), we compared costs and effectiveness between P4P and non-P4P diabetes patient groups in each phase. Propensity score matching was used to match comparable control groups for intervention groups. Outcomes included life-years, quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs), program intervention costs, cost-savings, and incremental cost-effectiveness ratios. QALYs for P4P patients and non-P4P patients were 2.08 and 1.99 in phase 1 and 2.08 and 2.02 in phase 2. The average incremental intervention costs per QALYs was TWD$335,546 in phase 1 and TWD$298,606 in phase 2. The average incremental all-cause medical costs saved by the P4P program per QALYs were TWD$602,167 in phase 1 and TWD$661,163 in phase 2. The findings indicated that both P4P programs were cost-effective and the resulting return on investment was 1.8:1 in phase 1 and 2.0:1 in phase 2. We conclude that the diabetes P4P program in both phases enabled the long-term cost-effective use of resources and cost-savings regardless of whether a bonus for intermediate outcome improvement was added to a process-based P4P incentive design.

  17. Implementation Processes and Pay for Performance in Healthcare: A Systematic Review.

    PubMed

    Kondo, Karli K; Damberg, Cheryl L; Mendelson, Aaron; Motu'apuaka, Makalapua; Freeman, Michele; O'Neil, Maya; Relevo, Rose; Low, Allison; Kansagara, Devan

    2016-04-01

    Over the last decade, various pay-for-performance (P4P) programs have been implemented to improve quality in health systems, including the VHA. P4P programs are complex, and their effects may vary by design, context, and other implementation processes. We conducted a systematic review and key informant (KI) interviews to better understand the implementation factors that modify the effectiveness of P4P. We searched PubMed, PsycINFO, and CINAHL through April 2014, and reviewed reference lists. We included trials and observational studies of P4P implementation. Two investigators abstracted data and assessed study quality. We interviewed P4P researchers to gain further insight. Among 1363 titles and abstracts, we selected 509 for full-text review, and included 41 primary studies. Of these 41 studies, 33 examined P4P programs in ambulatory settings, 7 targeted hospitals, and 1 study applied to nursing homes. Related to implementation, 13 studies examined program design, 8 examined implementation processes, 6 the outer setting, 18 the inner setting, and 5 provider characteristics. Results suggest the importance of considering underlying payment models and using statistically stringent methods of composite measure development, and ensuring that high-quality care will be maintained after incentive removal. We found no conclusive evidence that provider or practice characteristics relate to P4P effectiveness. Interviews with 14 KIs supported limited evidence that effective P4P program measures should be aligned with organizational goals, that incentive structures should be carefully considered, and that factors such as a strong infrastructure and public reporting may have a large influence. There is limited evidence from which to draw firm conclusions related to P4P implementation. Findings from studies and KI interviews suggest that P4P programs should undergo regular evaluation and should target areas of poor performance. Additionally, measures and incentives should align with organizational priorities, and programs should allow for changes over time in response to data and provider input.

  18. Paying physician group practices for quality: A statewide quasi-experiment.

    PubMed

    Conrad, Douglas A; Grembowski, David; Perry, Lisa; Maynard, Charles; Rodriguez, Hector; Martin, Diane

    2013-12-01

    This article presents the results of a unique quasi-experiment of the effects of a large-scale pay-for-performance (P4P) program implemented by a leading health insurer in Washington state during 2001-2007. The authors received external funding to provide an objective impact evaluation of the program. The program was unique in several respects: (1) It was designed dynamically, with two discrete intervention periods-one in which payment incentives were based on relative performance (the "contest" period) and a second in which payment incentives were based on absolute performance compared to achievable benchmarks. (2) The program was designed in collaboration with large multispecialty group practices, with an explicit run-in period to test the quality metrics. Public reporting of the quality scorecard for all participating medical groups was introduced 1 year before the quality incentive payment program's inception, and continued throughout 2002-2007. (3) The program was implemented in stages with distinct medical groups. A control group of comparable group practices also was assembled, and difference-in-differences methodology was applied to estimate program effects. Case mix measures were included in all multivariate analyses. The regression design permitted a contrast of intervention effects between the "contest" approach in the sub-period of 2003-2004 and the absolute standard, "achievable benchmarks of care" approach in sub-period 2005-2007. Most of the statistically significant quality incentive program coefficients were small and negative (opposite to program intent). A consistent pattern of differential intervention impact in the sub-periods did not emerge. Cumulatively, the probit regression estimates indicate that neither the quality scorecard nor the quality incentive payment program had a significant positive effect on general clinical quality. Based on key informant interviews with medical leaders, practicing physicians, and administrators of the participating groups, the authors conclude that several factors likely combined to dampen program effects: (1) modest size of the incentive; (2) use of rewards only, rather than a balance of rewards and penalties; (3) targeting incentive payments to the group, thus potentially weakening incentive effects at the individual level. Copyright © 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

  19. Effects of and Preference for Pay for Performance: An Analogue Analysis

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Long, Robert D., III; Wilder, David A.; Betz, Alison; Dutta, Ami

    2012-01-01

    We examined the effects of 2 payment systems on the rate of check processing and time spent on task by participants in a simulated work setting. Three participants experienced individual pay-for-performance (PFP) without base pay and pay-for-time (PFT) conditions. In the last phase, we asked participants to choose which system they preferred. For…

  20. 5 CFR 9701.345 - Developmental pay adjustments.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 5 Administrative Personnel 3 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Developmental pay adjustments. 9701.345 Section 9701.345 Administrative Personnel DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT... HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT SYSTEM Pay and Pay Administration Performance-Based Pay § 9701.345...

  1. Implementing New Performance Pay-Based Schemes in Higher Educational Institutions

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Minasyan, Eva T.; Midova, Venera O.; Danko, Olga A.; Balakhanova, Dariko K.

    2017-01-01

    The paper presents a review of the study and practice pertaining to the effectiveness of performance-related pay with a particular emphasis on higher educational organizations. The overall research question guiding the review was to establish the extent to which performance pay-based practices have been successful undergoing great changes in…

  2. Techniques of Power: Performance Pay Systems and the Network of School Power Relations

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Drexler Booth, Caleb

    2014-01-01

    As decades pass, new rounds of educational discussion surrounding teacher pay emerge calling for alternative compensation based on performance indicators. While much of the research on this latest iteration of performance pay, inspired by the presidential initiatives "No Child Left Behind" and "Race to the Top," focuses on…

  3. 20 CFR 30.906 - Who will pay for an impairment evaluation?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-04-01

    ... 20 Employees' Benefits 1 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false Who will pay for an impairment evaluation? 30... ENERGY EMPLOYEES OCCUPATIONAL ILLNESS COMPENSATION PROGRAM ACT OF 2000, AS AMENDED Impairment Benefits Under Part E of EEOICPA Medical Evidence of Impairment § 30.906 Who will pay for an impairment...

  4. 42 CFR 130.35 - How and when will the Secretary pay a petition?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... 42 Public Health 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false How and when will the Secretary pay a petition? 130.35 Section 130.35 Public Health PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES COMPASSIONATE PAYMENTS RICKY RAY HEMOPHILIA RELIEF FUND PROGRAM Procedures for Filing and Paying Complete...

  5. Teacher Merit Pay: Is It a Good Idea?

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Clabaugh, Gary K.

    2009-01-01

    President Obama's education agenda, which unhappily seems to be George W. Bush's program squared, contains two major features that will impact teacher pay and working conditions. The first is that charter schools are to be promoted aggressively. The second is an insistence on teacher merit pay. In this article, the author talks about teacher merit…

  6. 34 CFR 692.112 - May a State use the funds it receives from the GAP Program to pay administrative costs?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 34 Education 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false May a State use the funds it receives from the GAP Program to pay administrative costs? 692.112 Section 692.112 Education Regulations of the Offices of the... Assistance and How May It Be Used? § 692.112 May a State use the funds it receives from the GAP Program to...

  7. 5 CFR 534.404 - Setting and adjusting pay for senior executives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 5 Administrative Personnel 1 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Setting and adjusting pay for senior... REGULATIONS PAY UNDER OTHER SYSTEMS Pay and Performance Awards Under the Senior Executive Service § 534.404 Setting and adjusting pay for senior executives. (a) Setting pay upon initial appointment to the SES. An...

  8. WWC Quick Review of the Report "Teacher Pay for Performance: Experimental Evidence from the Project on Incentives in Teaching"

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    What Works Clearinghouse, 2011

    2011-01-01

    The study examined whether offering financial incentives to teachers of fifth- through eighth-grade math students improved their students' achievement on the math section of the Tennessee Comprehensive Assessment Program. The study took place in the Metropolitan Nashville Public School District during the 2006-07 through 2008-09 school years. It…

  9. Maximizing Federal IT Dollars: A Connection Between IT Investments and Organizational Performance

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2011-04-01

    Theory for investments, where diversification of financial assets (stocks, bonds, and cash) is balanced by expected returns and risk (Markowitz, 1952...Stakeholder satisfaction (stakeholder may not pay proportionally for service) Stakeholders Stockholders , owners, market Taxpayers; legislative...Adviser for Off-Campus Programs in the Department of Engineering Manage- ment and Systems Engineering. His current research interests include stochastic

  10. Do Teacher Financial Awards Improve Teacher Retention and Student Achievement in an Urban Disadvantaged School District?

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Shifrer, Dara; Turley, Ruth López; Heard, Holly

    2017-01-01

    Teacher performance pay programs are theorized to improve student achievement by incentivizing teachers, but opponents counter that teachers are not motivated by money. We used regression discontinuity techniques and data on a census of the students, teachers, and schools in a large urban minority-majority school district to show receipt of a…

  11. Using provider performance incentives to increase HIV testing and counseling services in Rwanda.

    PubMed

    de Walque, Damien; Gertler, Paul J; Bautista-Arredondo, Sergio; Kwan, Ada; Vermeersch, Christel; de Dieu Bizimana, Jean; Binagwaho, Agnès; Condo, Jeanine

    2015-03-01

    Paying for performance provides financial rewards to medical care providers for improvements in performance measured by utilization and quality of care indicators. In 2006, Rwanda began a pay for performance scheme to improve health services delivery, including HIV/AIDS services. Using a prospective quasi-experimental design, this study examines the scheme's impact on individual and couples HIV testing. We find a positive impact of pay for performance on HIV testing among married individuals (10.2 percentage points increase). Paying for performance also increased testing by both partners by 14.7 percentage point among discordant couples in which only one of the partners is an AIDS patient. Copyright © 2014. Published by Elsevier B.V.

  12. 5 CFR 842.109 - Continuation of coverage for former Federal employees of the Civilian Marksmanship Program.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... with the individual's retirement records. (d) The Corporation must withhold from the pay of an individual described by paragraph (a) of this section an amount equal to the percentage withheld from the pay... by the Department of Defense to support the Civilian Marksmanship Program as of the day before the...

  13. 5 CFR 890.111 - Continuation of eligibility for former Federal employees of the Civilian Marksmanship Program.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... pay of an individual described by paragraph (a) of this section an amount equal to the premiums withheld from the pay of a Federal employee for FEHB coverage and, in accordance with procedures... Department of Defense to support the Civilian Marksmanship Program as of the day before the date of the...

  14. 45 CFR 1150.8 - Will failure to pay my debt affect my eligibility for Endowment programs?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-10-01

    ... 45 Public Welfare 3 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Will failure to pay my debt affect my eligibility for Endowment programs? 1150.8 Section 1150.8 Public Welfare Regulations Relating to Public Welfare (Continued) NATIONAL FOUNDATION ON THE ARTS AND THE HUMANITIES NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS COLLECTION OF...

  15. Choice Behavior of Nonpathological Women Playing Concurrently Available Slot Machines: Effect of Changes in Payback Percentages

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Weatherly, Jeffrey N.; Thompson, Bradley J.; Hodny, Marisa; Meier, Ellen

    2009-01-01

    In a simulated casino environment, 6 nonpathological women played concurrently available commercial slot machines programmed to pay out at different rates. Participants did not always demonstrate preferences for the higher paying machine. The data suggest that factors other than programmed or obtained rate of reinforcement may control gambling…

  16. 32 CFR 199.20 - Continued Health Care Benefit Program (CHCBP).

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ...) § 199.20 Continued Health Care Benefit Program (CHCBP). (a) Purpose. The CHCBP is a premium based... institution of higher learning; or (2) Is incapable of self-support because of a mental or physical incapacity... retired or retainer pay of a member or former member or an annuity based on the retainer pay of the member...

  17. 45 CFR 1150.8 - Will failure to pay my debt affect my eligibility for Endowment programs?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... 45 Public Welfare 3 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Will failure to pay my debt affect my eligibility for Endowment programs? 1150.8 Section 1150.8 Public Welfare Regulations Relating to Public Welfare (Continued) NATIONAL FOUNDATION ON THE ARTS AND THE HUMANITIES NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS COLLECTION OF...

  18. Integrated controls pay-off. [for flight/propulsion aircraft systems

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Putnam, Terrill W.; Christiansen, Richard S.

    1989-01-01

    It is shown that the integration of the propulsion and flight control systems for high performance aircraft can help reduce pilot workload while simultaneously increasing overall aircraft performance. Results of the Highly Integrated Digital Electronic Control (HiDEC) flight research program are presented to demonstrate the emerging payoffs of controls integration. Ways in which the performance of fighter aircraft can be improved through the use of propulsion for primary aircraft control are discussed. Research being conducted by NASA with the F-18 High Angle-of Attack Research Vehicle is described.

  19. More on Pay-for-Performance: New Developments in the Field Provide Insights for Policymaking. The Progress of Education Reform. Volume 12, Number 5

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Thompson, Barbara; Baumann, Paul

    2011-01-01

    Whether referred to as "pay-for-performance" (PFP) or "merit pay," attempting to tie educators' compensation to their performance in the classroom and students' performance on high-stakes tests has been a key component of many educator compensation reform efforts in the last five years. This issue looks at PFP systems broadly…

  20. Impact of pay-for-performance on mortality in diabetes patients in Taiwan: A population-based study.

    PubMed

    Chen, Yu-Ching; Lee, Charles Tzu-Chi; Lin, Boniface J; Chang, Yong-Yuan; Shi, Hon-Yi

    2016-07-01

    The impact of pay-for-performance (P4P) programs on long-term mortality for chronic illnesses, especially diabetes mellitus, has been rarely reported. Several studies described the favorable impact of P4P for diabetes mellitus on medical utilizations or intermediate outcomes. Therefore, this study aimed to investigate the impact of a P4P program on mortality in patients with type 2 diabetes. The P4P group in this population-based cohort study was 2090 individuals with a primary diagnosis of type 2 diabetes who had been newly enrolled in the P4P program of Taiwan between January 1, 2004 and December 31, 2004. Matched by 1:1 ratio, patients in the non-P4P group were selected by propensity score matching (PSM) for sex, age, the first year of diagnosis as diabetes, and 32 other potential confounding factors. Mean (SD) age was 60.91 (12.04) years when diabetes was first diagnosed and mean (SD) duration of diabetes was 4.3 (1.9) years at baseline. The time-dependent Cox regression model was used to explore the impact of P4P on all-cause mortality. During a mean of 5.13 years (SD = 1.07 years) of follow-up, 206 and 263 subjects died in the P4P group and the non-P4P group, respectively. After adjusting for the potential confounding factors at baseline, survival was significantly longer in the P4P group than in the non-P4P group (hazard ratio, 0.76 [95% confidence interval, 0.64-0.92], P = 0.004, by log-rank test). This decrease in mortality is equivalent to one less death for every 37 patients who were treated in the P4P program for 5.13 years. In this study, the P4P program significantly increased the medical utilization of physician visits and diabetes-related examinations, improved the adherence of oral hypoglycemic drugs during the first 3 years and that of insulin during the second 3 years, and was negatively associated with risk of cancer and chronic kidney disease. In annual health expense, there was no significant difference between P4P and non-P4P groups, P = 0.430. As compared with control, pay-for-performance program significantly improved survival in patients with diabetes without increasing the medical cost. The P4P group had significantly lower risk of cancer and chronic kidney disease.

  1. Does Performance Related Pay for Teachers Improve Student Performance? Some Evidence from India.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Kingdon, Geeta; Teal, Francis

    This study examined whether teacher pay was responsive to measures of student performance, noting whether higher pay actually raised student learning outcomes. Data came from a survey of students and schools in India, where public and private school sectors have developed in parallel. The survey collected data on 902 students, 172 teachers, and…

  2. Florida Public Middle School Principals' Perceptions of Teachers' Performance Pay and Its Relationship to Student Achievement

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Burchfield, Michael G.

    2017-01-01

    This study will examine principals' attitudes concerning the impact of the new performance pay plans on principals' relationships with their teachers and how these plans impact their schools. This study will explore principals' perceptions of performance pay, thus providing information to school policy stakeholders, policymakers, teachers, and…

  3. Pay for Performance Proposals in Race to the Top Round II Applications. Briefing Memo

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Rose, Stephanie

    2010-01-01

    The Education Commission of the States reviewed all 36 Race to the Top (RttT) round II applications. Each of the 36 states that applied for round II funding referenced pay for performance under the heading of "Improving teacher and principal effectiveness based on performance." The majority of states outlined pay for performance…

  4. Using an Equity/Performance Matrix to Address Salary Compression/Inversion and Performance Pay Issues

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Richardson, Peter; Thomas, Steven

    2013-01-01

    Pay compression and inversion are significant problems for many organizations and are often severe in schools of business in particular. At the same time, there is more insistence on showing accountability and paying employees based on performance. The authors explain and show a detailed example of how to use a Compensation Equity/ Performance…

  5. Summary of the 1983 Annual Reports of the Medicare Board of Trustees

    PubMed Central

    1983-01-01

    This summary presents an overview of the information contained in the annual reports of the trustees required under Title XVIII of the Social Security Act, Health Insurance for the Aged and Disabled, commonly known as Medicare. There are two basic programs under Medicare: Hospital insurance (HI), which pays for inpatient hospital care and other related care of those 65 years of age and over and of the long-term disabled.Supplementary medical insurance (SMI), which pays for physicians' services, outpatient hospital services, and other medical expenses of those 65 years of age and over and of the long-term disabled. The HI program is financed primarily by payroll taxes, with the taxes paid by current workers used to pay benefits to current beneficiaries. However, the HI program maintains a trust fund that provides a small reserve against fluctuations. This type of financing is generally known as pay-as-you-go financing. By contrast, the SMI program is financed on an accrual basis with a contingency margin. This means that the SMI trust fund should always be somewhat greater than the claims that have been incurred by enrollees but not yet paid by the program. The trust funds hold all of the income not currently needed to pay benefits and related expenses. The assets of the funds may not be used for any other purpose; however, they may be invested in certain interest-bearing obligations of the U.S. Government. The Secretaries of Treasury, Labor, and Health and Human Services serve as trustees of the HI and SMI trust funds. The Secretary of Treasury is the managing trustee. The Administrator of the Health Care Financing Administration, the agency charged with administering the Medicare program, is the secretary of the Board of Trustees. PMID:10310524

  6. Impact assessment of a pay-for-performance program on breast cancer screening in France using micro data.

    PubMed

    Sicsic, Jonathan; Franc, Carine

    2017-06-01

    A voluntary-based pay-for-performance (P4P) program (the CAPI) aimed at general practitioners (GPs) was implemented in France in 2009. The program targeted prevention practices, including breast cancer screening, by offering a maximal amount of €245 for achieving a target screening rate among eligible women enrolled with the GP. Our objective was to evaluate the impact of the French P4P program (CAPI) on the early detection of breast cancer among women between 50 and 74 years old. Based on an administrative database of 50,752 women aged 50-74 years followed between 2007 and 2011, we estimated a difference-in-difference model of breast cancer screening uptake as a function of visit to a CAPI signatory referral GP, while controlling for both supply-side and demand-side determinants (e.g., sociodemographics, health and healthcare use). Breast cancer screening rates have not changed significantly since the P4P program implementation. Overall, visiting a CAPI signatory referral GP at least once in the pre-CAPI period increased the probability of undergoing breast cancer screening by 1.38 % [95 % CI (0.41-2.35 %)], but the effect was not significantly different following the implementation of the contract. The French P4P program had a nonsignificant impact on breast cancer screening uptake. This result may reflect the fact that the low-powered incentives implemented in France through the CAPI might not provide sufficient leverage to generate better practices, thus inviting regulators to seek additional tools beyond P4P in the field of prevention and screening.

  7. Teledermatology in the United States: An Update in a Dynamic Era.

    PubMed

    Yim, Kaitlyn M; Florek, Aleksandra G; Oh, Dennis H; McKoy, Karen; Armstrong, April W

    2018-01-22

    Teledermatology is rapidly advancing in the United States. The last comprehensive survey of U.S. teledermatology programs was conducted in 2011. This article provides an update regarding the state of teledermatology programs in the United States. Active programs were identified and surveyed from November 2014 to January 2017. Findings regarding practice settings, consult volumes, payment methods, and delivery modalities were compared to those from the 2011 survey. Findings from the Veterans Affairs (VA) were reported as an aggregate. There were 40 active nongovernmental programs, amounting to a 48% increase and 30% discontinuation rate over five years. Academia remained the most common practice setting (50%). Median annual consultation volume was comparable with 263 consultations, but maximum annual consultation volume increased (range: 20-20,000). The most frequent payment method was self-pay (53%). Store-and-forward continued to be the most common delivery modality. In Fiscal Year 2016, the VA System consisted of 62 consultation sites and performed a total of 101,507 consultations. The limitations of this study were that consult volume and payment methods were not available from all programs. U.S. teledermatology programs have increased in number and annual consultation volume. Academia is the most prevalent practice setting, and self-pay is the dominant accepted payment method. Innovative platforms and the provision of direct-to-patient care are changing the practice of teledermatology.

  8. Improving cardiovascular care through outpatient cardiac rehabilitation: an analysis of payment models that would improve quality and promote use.

    PubMed

    Mead, Holly; Grantham, Sarah; Siegel, Bruce

    2014-01-01

    Much attention has been paid to improving the care of patients with cardiovascular disease by focusing attention on delivery system redesign and payment reforms that encompass the healthcare spectrum, from an acute episode to maintenance of care. However, 1 area of cardiovascular disease care that has received little attention in the advancement of quality is cardiac rehabilitation (CR), a comprehensive secondary prevention program that is significantly underused despite evidence-based guidelines that recommending its use. The purpose of this article was to analyze the applicability of 2 payment and reimbursement models-pay-for-performance and bundled payments for episodes of care--that can promote the use of CR. We conclude that a payment model combining elements of both pay-for-performance and episodes of care would increase the use of CR, which would both improve quality and increase efficiency in cardiac care. Specific elements would need to be clearly defined, however, including: (a) how an episode is defined, (b) how to hold providers accountable for the care they provider, (c) how to encourage participation among CR providers, and (d) how to determine an equitable distribution of payment. Demonstrations testing new payment models must be implemented to generate empirical evidence that a melded pay-for-performance and episode-based care payment model will improve quality and efficiency.

  9. 42 CFR 130.34 - How will the Secretary determine whether to pay a petition?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... 42 Public Health 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false How will the Secretary determine whether to pay a petition? 130.34 Section 130.34 Public Health PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES COMPASSIONATE PAYMENTS RICKY RAY HEMOPHILIA RELIEF FUND PROGRAM Procedures for Filing and Paying...

  10. Workforce Downsizing and Restructuring in the Department of Defense: The Voluntary Separation Incentive Payment Program Versus Involuntary Separation

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2016-01-01

    Workforce Downsizing and Restructuring in the Department of Defense The Voluntary Separation Incentive Payment Program Versus Involuntary...Voluntary Separation Incentive Payment (VSIP). The purposes of this research are to place VSIP in context relative to involuntary separation, determine...5 CHAPTER TWO Review of Severance Pay, Voluntary Separation Incentive Pay, and Voluntary

  11. Performance Pay Preferences of College of Education Faculty and Administrators at One Historically Black University: A Case Study

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Jones, Corey Lee

    2012-01-01

    The purpose of this study was to determine the attitudes and perceptions College of Education faculty and administrators have about performance pay at a Historically Black University (HBCU). A secondary purpose of the study was to determine the performance pay plan and specific measures of faculty productivity preferred by College of Education…

  12. 28 CFR 345.55 - Longevity pay.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... factories or shops. An inmate qualifies for longevity pay raises as provided in the table below: Length of.... An inmate who leaves FPI to enter education, vocational training, or drug abuse treatment programs...

  13. 28 CFR 345.55 - Longevity pay.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... factories or shops. An inmate qualifies for longevity pay raises as provided in the table below: Length of.... An inmate who leaves FPI to enter education, vocational training, or drug abuse treatment programs...

  14. 28 CFR 345.55 - Longevity pay.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... factories or shops. An inmate qualifies for longevity pay raises as provided in the table below: Length of.... An inmate who leaves FPI to enter education, vocational training, or drug abuse treatment programs...

  15. 28 CFR 345.55 - Longevity pay.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... factories or shops. An inmate qualifies for longevity pay raises as provided in the table below: Length of.... An inmate who leaves FPI to enter education, vocational training, or drug abuse treatment programs...

  16. 28 CFR 345.55 - Longevity pay.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... factories or shops. An inmate qualifies for longevity pay raises as provided in the table below: Length of.... An inmate who leaves FPI to enter education, vocational training, or drug abuse treatment programs...

  17. Effect of pay for performance on the management and outcomes of hypertension in the United Kingdom: interrupted time series study

    PubMed Central

    Serumaga, Brian; Ross-Degnan, Dennis; Avery, Anthony J; Elliott, Rachel A; Majumdar, Sumit R; Zhang, Fang

    2011-01-01

    Objective To assess the impact of a pay for performance incentive on quality of care and outcomes among UK patients with hypertension in primary care. Design Interrupted time series. Setting The Health Improvement Network (THIN) database, United Kingdom. Participants 470 725 patients with hypertension diagnosed between January 2000 and August 2007. Intervention The UK pay for performance incentive (the Quality and Outcomes Framework), which was implemented in April 2004 and included specific targets for general practitioners to show high quality care for patients with hypertension (and other diseases). Main outcome measures Centiles of systolic and diastolic blood pressures over time, rates of blood pressure monitoring, blood pressure control, and treatment intensity at monthly intervals for baseline (48 months) and 36 months after the implementation of pay for performance. Cumulative incidence of major hypertension related outcomes and all cause mortality for subgroups of newly treated (treatment started six months before pay for performance) and treatment experienced (started treatment in year before January 2001) patients to examine different stages of illness. Results After accounting for secular trends, no changes in blood pressure monitoring (level change 0.85, 95% confidence interval −3.04 to 4.74, P=0.669 and trend change −0.01, −0.24 to 0.21, P=0.615), control (−1.19, −2.06 to 1.09, P=0.109 and −0.01, −0.06 to 0.03, P=0.569), or treatment intensity (0.67, −1.27 to 2.81, P=0.412 and 0.02, −0.23 to 0.19, P=0.706) were attributable to pay for performance. Pay for performance had no effect on the cumulative incidence of stroke, myocardial infarction, renal failure, heart failure, or all cause mortality in both treatment experienced and newly treated subgroups. Conclusions Good quality of care for hypertension was stable or improving before pay for performance was introduced. Pay for performance had no discernible effects on processes of care or on hypertension related clinical outcomes. Generous financial incentives, as designed in the UK pay for performance policy, may not be sufficient to improve quality of care and outcomes for hypertension and other common chronic conditions. PMID:21266440

  18. The economic value of life: linking theory to practice.

    PubMed Central

    Landefeld, J S; Seskin, E P

    1982-01-01

    Human capital estimates of the economic value of life have been routinely used in the past to perform cost-benefit analyses of health programs. Recently, however, serious questions have been raised concerning the conceptual basis for valuing human life by applying these estimates. Most economists writing on these issues tend to agree that a more conceptually correct method to value risks to human life in cost-benefit analyses would be based on individuals.' "willingness to pay" for small changes in their probability of survival. Attempts to implement the willingness-to-pay approach using survey responses or revealed-preference estimates have produced a confusing array of values fraught with statistical problems and measurement difficulties. As a result, economists have searched for a link between willingness to pay and standard human capital estimates and have found that for most individuals a lower bound for valuing risks to life can be based on their willingness to pay to avoid the expected economic losses associated with death. However, while these studies provide support for using individual's private valuation of forgone income in valuing risks to life, it is also clear that standard human capital estimates cannot be used for this purpose without reformulation. After reviewing the major approaches to valuing risks to life, this paper concludes that estimates based on the human capital approach--reformulated using a willingness-to-pay criterion--produce the only clear, consistent, and objective values for use in cost-benefit analyses of policies affecting risks to life. The paper presents the first empirical estimates of such adjusted willingness-to-pay/human capital values. PMID:6803602

  19. Patients' views of pay for performance in primary care: a qualitative study.

    PubMed

    Hannon, Kerin L; Lester, Helen E; Campbell, Stephen M

    2012-05-01

    Many countries use pay-for-performance schemes to reward family practices financially for achieving quality indicators. The views of patients on pay for performance remain largely unexplored. To gain the views of family practice patients on the United Kingdom pay-for-performance Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF). Interviews with 52 patients were conducted in 15 family practices across England. All patients had at least one long-term condition that had been diagnosed before the introduction of the QOF in 2004. Semi-structured interviews analysed using open explorative thematic coding. Few patients had heard of the QOF or had noticed changes to the structure or process of their care. However, where they were noted, changes to consultations such as increased use of computers and health checks initiated by the GP or practice nurse were seen as good practice. The majority of patients were surprised to hear their practice received bonuses for doing 'simple things'. Some patients also raised concerns over potential unintended consequences of pay-for-performance frameworks, such as a reduced focus on non-incentivised areas. This study adds a unique patient perspective to the debate around the impact of pay-for-performance schemes and consequences on patient care. Patients' views, experiences, and concerns about pay for performance mostly chime with previously described opinions of primary care staff. Patient surprise and concern around incentivising basic processes of care shows how patient views are vital when monitoring and evaluating a scheme that is designed to improve patient care.

  20. Focus on Teacher Pay and Incentives: Recent Legislative Actions and Update on Salary Averages. Challenge to Lead

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Gaines; Gale F.

    2007-01-01

    Teacher pay continues to be a hot issue for states, particularly since it is likely the largest expenditure in education budgets. This paper summarizes the latest on average salaries in the Southern Regional Education Board (SREB) states, including an update on recent incentive pay programs, pilot projects, and other legislative actions that…

  1. Payments To Informal vs. Formal Home Care Providers: Policy Divergence Affects the Elderly and Their Families in Michigan and Illinois. Revised.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Keigher, Sharon M.; And Others

    States' policies vary widely on paying friends and family rather than home care agencies to care for the elderly. This analysis explored two state programs which exemplify different payment options: Michigan, which pays clients' informal caregivers, and Illinois, which generally pays agencies to provide services. It asked how different payment…

  2. 13 CFR 123.203 - What interest rate will my business pay on a physical disaster business loan and what are the...

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... business pay on a physical disaster business loan and what are the repayment terms? 123.203 Section 123.203 Business Credit and Assistance SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION DISASTER LOAN PROGRAM Physical Disaster Business Loans § 123.203 What interest rate will my business pay on a physical disaster business loan and...

  3. 13 CFR 123.203 - What interest rate will my business pay on a physical disaster business loan and what are the...

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... business pay on a physical disaster business loan and what are the repayment terms? 123.203 Section 123.203 Business Credit and Assistance SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION DISASTER LOAN PROGRAM Physical Disaster Business Loans § 123.203 What interest rate will my business pay on a physical disaster business loan and...

  4. 13 CFR 123.203 - What interest rate will my business pay on a physical disaster business loan and what are the...

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... business pay on a physical disaster business loan and what are the repayment terms? 123.203 Section 123.203 Business Credit and Assistance SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION DISASTER LOAN PROGRAM Physical Disaster Business Loans § 123.203 What interest rate will my business pay on a physical disaster business loan and...

  5. 13 CFR 123.203 - What interest rate will my business pay on a physical disaster business loan and what are the...

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... business pay on a physical disaster business loan and what are the repayment terms? 123.203 Section 123.203 Business Credit and Assistance SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION DISASTER LOAN PROGRAM Physical Disaster Business Loans § 123.203 What interest rate will my business pay on a physical disaster business loan and...

  6. 5 CFR 534.406 - Conversion to the SES pay system.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 5 Administrative Personnel 1 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Conversion to the SES pay system. 534.406... UNDER OTHER SYSTEMS Pay and Performance Awards Under the Senior Executive Service § 534.406 Conversion... senior executive's converted rate of basic pay. Conversion to a new SES rate of basic pay is not...

  7. Compensation Reform in the Schools

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Laine, Sabrina; Potemski, Amy; Rowland, Cortney

    2010-01-01

    One of the most frequently discussed topics in education reform circles is teacher pay--how much money teachers make, for what work and who decides teachers' salaries. Over time, educator pay reform has included many different reward structures and goes by as many different names, such as merit pay, performance pay and differentiated pay. The…

  8. 76 FR 52537 - Pay for Sunday Work

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-08-23

    ... OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT 5 CFR Parts 532 and 550 RIN 3206-AM08 Pay for Sunday Work AGENCY... the payment of Sunday premium pay for work performed on Sundays. The revised Sunday premium pay... Sunday premium pay, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 5544(a). Intermittent employees continue to be excluded from...

  9. 5 CFR 9701.345 - Developmental pay adjustments.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... Section 9701.345 Administrative Personnel DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY-OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT) DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT SYSTEM Pay and Pay Administration Performance-Based Pay § 9701.345...

  10. 5 CFR 9701.345 - Developmental pay adjustments.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... Section 9701.345 Administrative Personnel DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY-OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT) DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT SYSTEM Pay and Pay Administration Performance-Based Pay § 9701.345...

  11. 5 CFR 9701.345 - Developmental pay adjustments.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... Section 9701.345 Administrative Personnel DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY-OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT) DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT SYSTEM Pay and Pay Administration Performance-Based Pay § 9701.345...

  12. 5 CFR 9701.345 - Developmental pay adjustments.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... Section 9701.345 Administrative Personnel DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY-OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT) DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT SYSTEM Pay and Pay Administration Performance-Based Pay § 9701.345...

  13. 45 CFR 2528.70 - What steps are necessary to use an education award to pay expenses incurred in enrolling in a G.I...

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... to pay expenses incurred in enrolling in a G.I. Bill approved program? 2528.70 Section 2528.70 Public... incurred in enrolling in a G.I. Bill approved program? (a) Required Information. Before disbursing an amount from an education award for this purpose, the Corporation must receive— (1) An individual's...

  14. 45 CFR 2528.70 - What steps are necessary to use an education award to pay expenses incurred in enrolling in a G.I...

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-10-01

    ... to pay expenses incurred in enrolling in a G.I. Bill approved program? 2528.70 Section 2528.70 Public... incurred in enrolling in a G.I. Bill approved program? (a) Required Information. Before disbursing an amount from an education award for this purpose, the Corporation must receive— (1) An individual's...

  15. 45 CFR 2528.70 - What steps are necessary to use an education award to pay expenses incurred in enrolling in a G.I...

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-10-01

    ... to pay expenses incurred in enrolling in a G.I. Bill approved program? 2528.70 Section 2528.70 Public... incurred in enrolling in a G.I. Bill approved program? (a) Required Information. Before disbursing an amount from an education award for this purpose, the Corporation must receive— (1) An individual's...

  16. 45 CFR 2528.70 - What steps are necessary to use an education award to pay expenses incurred in enrolling in a G.I...

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-10-01

    ... to pay expenses incurred in enrolling in a G.I. Bill approved program? 2528.70 Section 2528.70 Public... incurred in enrolling in a G.I. Bill approved program? (a) Required Information. Before disbursing an amount from an education award for this purpose, the Corporation must receive— (1) An individual's...

  17. District Awards for Teacher Excellence (D.A.T.E.) Program: Final Evaluation Report. [Executive Summary

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Springer, Matthew G.; Lewis, Jessica L.; Ehlert, Mark W.; Podgursky, Michael J.; Crader, Gary D.; Taylor, Lori L.; Gronberg, Timothy J.; Jansen, Dennis W.; Lopez, Omar S.; Stuit, David A.

    2010-01-01

    District Awards for Teacher Excellence (D.A.T.E.) is a state-funded program in Texas that provides grants to districts for the implementation of locally-designed incentive pay plans. All districts in the state are eligible to receive grants, but participation is voluntary. D.A.T.E. incentive pay plans were first implemented in Texas districts…

  18. District Awards for Teacher Excellence (D.A.T.E.) Program: Final Evaluation Report. Policy Evaluation Report

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Springer, Matthew G.; Lewis, Jessica L.; Ehlert, Mark W.; Podgursky, Michael J.; Crader, Gary D.; Taylor, Lori L.; Gronberg, Timothy J.; Jansen, Dennis W.; Lopez, Omar S.; Stuit, David A.

    2010-01-01

    District Awards for Teacher Excellence (D.A.T.E.) is a state-funded program in Texas that provides grants to districts for the implementation of locally-designed incentive pay plans. All districts in the state are eligible to receive grants, but participation is voluntary. D.A.T.E. incentive pay plans were first implemented in Texas districts…

  19. Patient assessment of diabetes care in a pay-for-performance program.

    PubMed

    Chiu, Herng-Chia; Hsieh, Hui-Min; Lin, Yi-Chieh; Kuo, Shou-Jen; Kao, Hao-Yun; Yeh, Shu-Chuan Jennifer; Chang, Wen-Hsin; Hsiao, Pi-Jung; Chen, Yao-Shen; Lin, Shoei-Loong; Lo, Gin-Ho; Ker, Chen-Guo; Hung, Yu-Han; Cheng, Hsien-An; Chou, Tiang-Hong; Chou, Sze-Yuan; Wang, Jao-Hsien; Wang, Chien-Fu

    2016-04-01

    Few studies address quality of care in pay-for-performance (P4P) programs from the perspective of patients' perceptions. This study aimed to examine and compare the patient assessment of diabetes chronic care as perceived by diabetic patients enrolled and not enrolled in a P4P program from the patients' self-reported perspectives. A cross-sectional study with case and comparison group design. A large-scale survey was conducted from February to November 2013 in 18 healthcare institutions in Taiwan. A total of 1458 P4P (n = 1037) and non-P4P (n = 421) diabetic patients participated in this large survey. The Chinese version of the Patient Assessment of Chronic Illness Care (PACIC) instrument was used and patients' clinical outcome data (e.g. HbA1c, LDL) were collected. None. Five subscales from the PACIC were measured, including patient activation, delivery system design/system support, goal setting/tailoring, problem solving/contextual and follow-up/coordination. Patient clinical outcomes were also measured. Multiple linear regression and logistic regression models were used and controlled for patient demographic and health institution characteristics statistically. After adjusting for covariates, P4P patients had higher overall scores on the PACIC and five subscales than non-P4P patients. P4P patients also had better clinical processes of care (e.g. HbA1c test) and intermediate outcomes. Patients who participated in the program likely received better patient-centered care given the original Chronic Care Model. Better perceptions of diabetic care assessment also better clinical outcomes. The PACIC instrument can be used for the patient assessment of chronic care in a P4P program. © The Author 2016. Published by Oxford University Press in association with the International Society for Quality in Health Care; all rights reserved.

  20. 5 CFR 532.507 - Pay for holiday work.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 5 Administrative Personnel 1 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Pay for holiday work. 532.507 Section 532... SYSTEMS Premium Pay and Differentials § 532.507 Pay for holiday work. (a) An employee who is entitled to holiday premium pay and who performs work on a holiday which is not overtime work shall be paid the...

  1. The Pay-for-Performance Dilemma.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Meyer, Herbert H.

    1975-01-01

    The basis for most problems with merit pay plans is that the great majority of employees believe their own job performance is above average. Even a well-administered merit pay plan cannot give positive feedback to this majority. The likely consequence is that the employee's self-esteem is threatened. Often one copes with such a threat by demeaning…

  2. Expecting Too Much of Performance Pay?

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Johnson, Susan Moore; Papay, John P.

    2010-01-01

    Pay for performance is not a new idea, and reformers should not ignore the dismal record of merit pay over the past century. Initially adopted with a flourish of expectations during several waves of popularity in the past, every plan eventually fell into disuse. These plans proved to be unexpectedly costly and cumbersome to run. They often…

  3. Teachers' Perceptions of Individual Performance-Related Pay in Practice: A Picture of a Counterproductive Pay System

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Lundstrom, Ulf

    2012-01-01

    This article describes and discusses Swedish upper-secondary teachers' perceptions of the effects of individual performance-related pay (PRP) in the context of educational restructuring and governance. The empirical data were generated through semi-structured interviews of 23 teachers. Power's distinction between programmatic and technological…

  4. Does Performance-Based Pay Improve Teaching? PISA in Focus. No. 16

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    OECD Publishing (NJ1), 2012

    2012-01-01

    The Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) has long established that high-performing education systems tend to pay their teachers more. They also often prioritise the quality of teaching over other choices, including class size. But in the current budgetary climate, paying everybody more may not be a viable alternative. So many…

  5. Performance Related Pay in Australian Universities: The Case of Swinburne University

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Harkness, Peter; Schier, Mark

    2011-01-01

    Performance related pay is not common in Australian universities. A number of Australian universities have begun to show interest in implementing more individualised pay arrangements. Swinburne University of Technology, in Melbourne, has chosen, contrary to the wishes of many of its staff, to be a path-breaker and has introduced a performance…

  6. Teaching to the Tails: Teacher Performance Pay and the Distribution of Student Achievement

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Loyalka, Prashant; Sylvia, Sean; Liu, Chengfang; Chu, James; Rozelle, Scott

    2015-01-01

    Growing evidence suggests that teachers in developing countries often have weak or misaligned incentives for improving student outcomes. In response, policymakers and researchers have proposed performance pay as a way to improve student outcomes by tying concrete measures like achievement scores to teacher pay. While evidence from randomized…

  7. Measuring Success in Health Care Value-Based Purchasing Programs

    PubMed Central

    Damberg, Cheryl L.; Sorbero, Melony E.; Lovejoy, Susan L.; Martsolf, Grant R.; Raaen, Laura; Mandel, Daniel

    2014-01-01

    Abstract Value-based purchasing (VBP) refers to a broad set of performance-based payment strategies that link financial incentives to health care providers' performance on a set of defined measures in an effort to achieve better value. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services is advancing the implementation of VBP across an array of health care settings in the Medicare program in response to requirements in the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, and policymakers are grappling with many decisions about how best to design and implement VBP programs so that they are successful in achieving stated goals. This article summarizes the current state of knowledge about VBP based on a review of the published literature, a review of publicly available documentation from VBP programs, and discussions with an expert panel composed of VBP program sponsors, health care providers and health systems, and academic researchers with VBP evaluation expertise. Three types of VBP models were the focus of the review: (1) pay-for-performance programs, (2) accountable care organizations, and (3) bundled payment programs. The authors report on VBP program goals and what constitutes success; the evidence on the impact of these programs; factors that characterize high– and low–performing providers in VBP programs; the measures, incentive structures, and benchmarks used by VBP programs; evidence on spillover effects and unintended consequences; and gaps in the knowledge base. PMID:28083347

  8. 13 CFR 123.104 - What interest rate will I pay on my home disaster loan?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 13 Business Credit and Assistance 1 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false What interest rate will I pay on... ADMINISTRATION DISASTER LOAN PROGRAM Home Disaster Loans § 123.104 What interest rate will I pay on my home disaster loan? If you can obtain credit elsewhere, your interest rate is set by a statutory formula, but...

  9. 41 CFR 302-12.113 - Under a homesale program, may we direct the relocation services company to pay an employee more...

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... or an amended value sale. (b) Once you have a RSC contract, you must monitor costs and tax..., may we direct the relocation services company to pay an employee more than the fair market value of... we direct the relocation services company to pay an employee more than the fair market value of his...

  10. Increasing the Effectiveness of Navy Retention Compensation by Evaluating Different Auction Compensation Formats

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2015-06-01

    ABBREVIATIONS ACCP aviation career continuation pay BCA Budget Control Act CO commanding officer DOD Department of Defense MILPERS Military Personnel...healthcare costs, overhaul retirement benefits, set a limit on pay increases, and eliminate acquisition programs. Ensuring an optimum level of...Congressional Budget Office, 2014). This appropriation houses the basic pay , allowances and retention bonuses that are offered to service members

  11. Medicaid nursing home pay for performance: where do we stand?

    PubMed

    Arling, Greg; Job, Carol; Cooke, Valerie

    2009-10-01

    Nursing home pay-for-performance (P4P) programs are intended to maximize the value obtained from public and private expenditures by measuring and rewarding better nursing home performance. We surveyed the 6 states with operational P4P systems in 2007. We describe key features of six Medicaid nursing home P4P systems and make recommendations for further development of nursing home P4P. We surveyed the six states with operational P4P systems in 2007. The range of performance measures employed by the states is quite broad: staffing level and satisfaction, findings from the regulatory system, clinical quality indicators, resident quality of life or satisfaction with care, family satisfaction, access to care for special populations, and efficiency. The main data sources for the measures are the Minimum Data Set (MDS), nursing home inspections, special surveys of nursing home residents, consumers or employees, and facility cost reports or other administrative systems. The most common financial incentive for better performance is a percentage bonus or an add-on to a facility's per diem rate. The bonus is generally proportional to a facility performance score, which consists of simple or weighted sums of scores on individual measures. States undertaking nursing home P4P programs should involve key stakeholders at all stages of P4P system design and implementation. Performance measures should be comprehensive, valid and reliable, risk adjusted where appropriate, and communicated clearly to providers and consumers. The P4P system should encourage provider investment in better care yet recognize state fiscal restraints. Consumer report cards, quality improvement initiatives, and the regulatory process should complement and reinforce P4P. Finally, the P4P system should be transparent and continuously evaluated.

  12. [Public reporting of the Californian "pay for performance" conducted by the Integrated Healthcare Association (IHA)].

    PubMed

    Emmert, M; Schöffski, O

    2007-01-01

    In Germany, there is little transparency when it comes to quality of care of national health care providers. The population has hardly any opportunity to identify well-performing health-care providers. Therefore, the emerging quality improvement initiative "Pay for Performance (P4P)" developed in California, USA is examined with regard to an implementation into the German health care sector. This program wants to achieve higher levels of health care by setting both goal-oriented financial and non-financial incentives. Therefore, performance-based payment is combined with Public Reporting of the measured quality of care. As people can be influenced by the information provided, Public Reporting is supposed to have a positive effect on the quality of treatment. Published data to the American population will be highlighted as well as indications and examinations included in the P4P program. Also, it will be shown how the performance of health care providers is determined. Since published performance results can be considered not only for a specific indication but also as a whole, patients have the opportunity to choose a well-performing health-care provider, according to their specific requirements. Thus, Public Reporting might be regarded as an effective method in order to improve the quality of care provided by health-care providers. Public Reporting in P4P is already conducted in a differentiated but also in a broad context. In the development of this key success element, many stakeholders have been involved, including health-care providers. So, the presented way of Public Reporting can be regarded as a business case to learn from with regard to more transparency in the German health-care sector.

  13. Review of HIV Pre exposure prophylaxis (PrEP) and example of HIV PrEP Toolkit

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2017-08-28

    Research Division may pay for your basic journal publishing charges (to include costs for tables and black and white photos). We cannot pay for...USAF, BSC Director, Clinical Investigations & Research Support Warrior Medics - Mission Ready Patient Focused PROCESSING OF PROFESSIONAL MEDICAL...SGS O&M); SGS R&D: Tri-Service Nursing Research Program (TSNRP); Defense Medical Research & Development Program (DMRDP); NIH; Congressionally

  14. A focus on the asthma HEDIS measure and its implications for clinical practice.

    PubMed

    Davies, Thomas J; Bunn, William B; Fromer, Leonard; Gelfand, Erwin W; Colice, Gene L

    2006-02-01

    With more than $16.1 billion in annual costs, the asthma management system is inadequate and needs revision to improve health and financial outcomes. Solutions may be found in the National Committee for Quality Assurance's guidelines and in such programs as Pay for Performance that financially reward providers for adherence to standards of practice based on Health Plan Employer Data and Information Set measures.

  15. DoD Actions Were Not Adequate to Reduce Improper Travel Payments

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2016-03-10

    this audit in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. We considered management comments on a draft of this report when...DoD Travel Pay program were effective. See Appendix A for the scope and methodology and prior audit coverage. Background Public Law 111-204, the...conducted this performance audit from May 2015 through January 2016 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those

  16. Outcomes of a Seven Practice Pilot in a Pay For Performance (P4P)-Based Program in Pennsylvania

    PubMed Central

    Johnson, Rhonda M.; Johnson, Twyla; Zimmerman, Sarah D.; Marsh, Gary M.; Garcia-Dominic, Oralia

    2014-01-01

    Objectives To examine how a targeted six-month interventions impacted Best Practice/Patient Outcomes for minority patients receiving primary care in physician practices participating in a pay-for-performance (P4P) program. Methods P4P Practices were invited to participate in a pilot intervention study designed to improve care for minority patients with hypertension, diabetes or pediatric asthma. Patient medical records were reviewed to assess how the interventions impacted (n=7 practices): Body mass index, diet and exercise, smoking, compliance with visits as recommended, blood pressure, sodium intake and weight management counseling, medication reconciliation, HbA1c testing, annual lipid profile, and anti-inflammatory medications. Results Significant improvements in various clinical quality measures were observed in all seven practices. Of the 19 specified interventions, 13 were statistically significant at α=0.05 level and 14 met the target proportion. This suggests that the best practice intervention had a significant impact on some of the health care processes in the physician practices. Conclusions The most impactful interventions were those related to face-to-face educational discussions, patient medical chart documentations rather than those pertaining to medication adherence. Improvements in measuring reporting and recording of data at post-intervention were also observed. PMID:25893158

  17. Pay-for-performance in a community substance abuse clinic

    PubMed Central

    Vandrey, Ryan; Stitzer, Maxine L.; Acquavita, Shauna P.; Quinn-Stabile, Patricia

    2011-01-01

    Pay-for-performance (P4P) strategies improve employee productivity and morale in business settings and are increasingly being implemented in medical care settings. This study investigated whether P4P could improve treatment utilization and retention at a community drug treatment clinic. Counselors had the opportunity to earn cash bonuses based on therapy attendance rates of individual clients as well as the quarterly retention rates of their caseload. Using a pre-post study design, average therapy sessions attended during the first month of treatment increased from 4.6 sessions prior to the intervention to 5.5 sessions per client during the intervention. The 90-day client retention rate increased from 40% to 53%. Additional analyses suggest that the improvement in 90-day retention was mediated by the increase in attendance during the first month of treatment. This project demonstrates that implementing a P4P incentive program in community drug abuse treatment clinics is feasible and effective at improving utilization and retention. PMID:21489739

  18. Quality-based financial incentives in health care: can we improve quality by paying for it?

    PubMed

    Conrad, Douglas A; Perry, Lisa

    2009-01-01

    This article asks whether financial incentives can improve the quality of health care. A conceptual framework drawn from microeconomics, agency theory, behavioral economics, and cognitive psychology motivates a set of propositions about incentive effects on clinical quality. These propositions are evaluated through a synthesis of extant peer-reviewed empirical evidence. Comprehensive financial incentives--balancing rewards and penalties; blending structure, process, and outcome measures; emphasizing continuous, absolute performance standards; tailoring the size of incremental rewards to increasing marginal costs of quality improvement; and assuring certainty, frequency, and sustainability of incentive payoffs--offer the prospect of significantly enhancing quality beyond the modest impacts of prevailing pay-for-performance (P4P) programs. Such organizational innovations as the primary care medical home and accountable health care organizations are expected to catalyze more powerful quality incentive models: risk- and quality-adjusted capitation, episode of care payments, and enhanced fee-for-service payments for quality dimensions (e.g., prevention) most amenable to piece-rate delivery.

  19. The business end of health information technology. Can a fully integrated electronic health record increase provider productivity in a large community practice?

    PubMed

    De Leon, Samantha; Connelly-Flores, Alison; Mostashari, Farzad; Shih, Sarah C

    2010-01-01

    Electronic health records (EHRs) are expected to transform and improve the way medicine is practiced. However, providers perceive many barriers toward implementing new health information technology. Specifically, they are most concerned about the potentially negative impact on their practice finances and productivity. This study compares the productivity of 75 providers at a large urban primary care practice from January 2005 to February 2009, before and after implementing an EHR system, using longitudinal mixed model analyses. While decreases in productivity were observed at the time the EHR system was implemented, most providers quickly recovered, showing increases in productivity per month shortly after EHR implementation. Overall, providers had significant productivity increases of 1.7% per month per provider from pre- to post-EHR adoption. The majority of the productivity gains occurred after the practice instituted a pay-for-performance program, enabled by the data capture of the EHRs. Coupled with pay-for-performance, EHRs can spur rapid gains in provider productivity.

  20. Cost-effectiveness of hospital pay-for-performance incentives.

    PubMed

    Nahra, Tammie A; Reiter, Kristin L; Hirth, Richard A; Shermer, Janet E; Wheeler, John R C

    2006-02-01

    One increasingly popular mechanism for stimulating quality improvements is pay-for-performance, or incentive, programs. This article examines the cost-effectiveness of a hospital incentive system for heart-related care, using a principal-agent model, where the insurer is the principal and hospitals are the agents. Four-year incentive system costsfor the payer were dollar 22,059,383, composed primarily of payments to the participating hospitals, with approximately 5 percent in administrative costs. Effectiveness is measured in stages, beginning with improvements in the processes of heart care. Care process improvements are converted into quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) gained, with reference to literatures on clinical effectiveness and survival. An estimated 24,418 patients received improved care, resulting in a range of QALYs from 733 to 1,701, depending on assumptions about clinical effectiveness. Cost per QALY was found to be between dollar 12,967 and dollar 30,081, a level well under consensus measures of the value of a QALY.

  1. Type 2 diabetes patients’ preferences and willingness to pay for lifestyle programs: a discrete choice experiment

    PubMed Central

    2013-01-01

    Background Participation rates of lifestyle programs among type 2 diabetes mellitus (T2DM) patients are less than optimal around the globe. Whereas research shows notable delays in the development of the disease among lifestyle program participants. Very little is known about the relative importance of barriers for participation as well as the willingness of T2DM patients to pay for participation in such programs. The aim of this study was to identify the preferences of T2DM patients with regard to lifestyle programs and to calculate participants’ willingness to pay (WTP) as well as to estimate the potential participation rates of lifestyle programs. Methods A Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE) questionnaire assessing five different lifestyle program attributes was distributed among 1250 Dutch adults aged 35–65 years with T2DM, 391 questionnaires (31%) were returned and included in the analysis. The relative importance of the program attributes (i.e., meal plan, physical activity (PA) schedule, consultation structure, expected program outcome and out-of-pocket costs) was determined using panel-mixed logit models. Based on the retrieved attribute estimates, patients’ WTP and potential participation rates were determined. Results The out-of-pocket costs (β = −0.75, P < .001), consultation structure (β = −0.46, P < .001) and expected outcome (β = 0.72, P < .001) were the most important factors for respondents when deciding whether to participate in a lifestyle program. Respondents were willing to pay €128 per year for individual instead of group consultation and €97 per year for 10 kilograms anticipated weight loss. Potential participation rates for different lifestyle-program scenarios ranged between 48.5% and 62.4%. Conclusions When deciding whether to participate in a lifestyle program, T2DM patients are mostly driven by low levels of out-of-pocket costs. Thereafter, they prefer individual consultation and high levels of anticipated outcomes with respect to weight loss. PMID:24289831

  2. Evaluating a Pay-for-Performance Program for Medicaid Children in an Accountable Care Organization.

    PubMed

    Gleeson, Sean; Kelleher, Kelly; Gardner, William

    2016-03-01

    Pay for performance (P4P) is a mechanism by which purchasers of health care offer greater financial rewards to physicians for improving processes or outcomes of care. To our knowledge, P4P has not been studied within the context of a pediatric accountable care organization (ACO). To determine whether P4P promotes pediatric performance improvement in primary care physicians. This retrospective cohort study was conducted from January 1, 2010, to December 31, 2013. A differences-in-differences design was used to test whether P4P improved physician performance in an ACO serving Medicaid children. Data were obtained from 2966 physicians and 323,812 patients. Three groups of physicians were identified: (1) community physicians who received the P4P incentives, (2) nonincentivized community physicians, and (3) nonincentivized physicians employed at a hospital. Pay for performance. Healthcare Effectiveness Data Information Set measure rates for preventive care, chronic care, and acute care primary care services. We examined 21 quality measures, 14 of which were subject to P4P incentives. There were 203 incentivized physicians, 2590 nonincentivized physicians, and 173 nonincentivized hospital physicians. Among them, the incentivized community physicians had greater improvements in performance than the nonincentivized community physicians on 2 of 2 well visits (largest difference was for adolescent well care: odds ratio, 1.05; 99.88% CI, 1.02-1.08), 3 of 10 immunization-incentivized measures (largest difference was for inactivated polio vaccine: odds ratio, 1.14; 99.88% CI, 1.07-1.21), and 2 nonincentivized measures (largest difference was for rotavirus: odds ratio, 1.11; 99.88% CI, 1.04-1.18). The employed physician group at the hospital had greater improvements in performance than the incentivized community physicians on 8 of 14 incentivized measures and 1 of 7 nonincentivized measures (largest difference was for hepatitis A vaccine: odds ratio, 0.34; 99.88% CI, 0.31-0.37). Pay for performance resulted in modest changes in physician performance in a pediatric ACO, but other interventions at the disposal of the ACO may have been even more effective. Further research is required to find methods to enhance quality improvements across large distributed pediatric health systems.

  3. Teacher Professionalism under the Recent Reform of Performance Pay in Mainland China

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Wang, Lijia; Lai, Manhong; Lo, Leslie Nai-Kwai

    2014-01-01

    In 2009, a reform in teachers' pay, linking remuneration to performance, was implemented in China. The intention was to improve the quality of education by making teachers more diligent and creative and removing the inequality in pay between teachers in different schools. A review of this reform reveals that it has resolved the problem of…

  4. The Perceived Association of Merit Pay and Teacher Qualities in Two Middle Schools in a Southeastern State

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Balls, John Daniel

    2013-01-01

    This dissertation determined the perceived association of merit pay and teacher qualities in the sample schools. The research focused on the association of merit pay and levels of teacher qualities and if a relationship exists between teacher performance-based compensation and teacher qualities/performance. The indications and suggestions of this…

  5. 49 CFR 40.173 - Who is responsible for paying for the test of a split specimen?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-10-01

    ... 49 Transportation 1 2013-10-01 2013-10-01 false Who is responsible for paying for the test of a split specimen? 40.173 Section 40.173 Transportation Office of the Secretary of Transportation PROCEDURES FOR TRANSPORTATION WORKPLACE DRUG AND ALCOHOL TESTING PROGRAMS Split Specimen Tests § 40.173 Who is responsible for paying for the test of a spli...

  6. Cost-Effectiveness of a Diabetes Pay-For-Performance Program in Diabetes Patients with Multiple Chronic Conditions.

    PubMed

    Hsieh, Hui-Min; Gu, Song-Mao; Shin, Shyi-Jang; Kao, Hao-Yun; Lin, Yi-Chieh; Chiu, Herng-Chia

    2015-01-01

    Pay for performance (P4P) has been used as a strategy to improve quality for patients with chronic illness. Little was known whether care provided to individuals with multiple chronic conditions in a P4P program were cost-effective. This study investigated cost effectiveness of a diabetes P4P program for caring patients with diabetes alone (DM alone) and diabetes with comorbid hypertension and hyperlipidemia (DMHH) from a single payer perspective in Taiwan. Analyzing data using population-based longitudinal databases, we compared costs and effectiveness between P4P and non-P4P diabetes patient groups in two cohorts. Propensity score matching (PSM) was used to match comparable control groups for intervention groups. Outcomes included life-years, quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs), program intervention costs, cost-savings and incremental cost-effectiveness ratios (ICERs). QALYs for P4P patients and non-P4P patients were 2.80 and 2.71 for the DM alone cohort and 2.74 and 2.66 for the DMHH patient cohort. The average incremental intervention costs per QALYs was TWD$167,251 in the DM alone cohort and TWD$145,474 in the DMHH cohort. The average incremental all-cause medical costs saved by the P4P program per QALYs were TWD$434,815 in DM alone cohort and TWD$506,199 in the DMHH cohort. The findings indicated that the P4P program for both cohorts were cost-effective and the resulting return on investment (ROI) was 2.60:1 in the DM alone cohort and 3.48:1 in the DMHH cohort. We conclude that the diabetes P4P program in both cohorts enabled the long-term cost-effective use of resources and cost-savings, especially for patients with multiple comorbid conditions.

  7. Cost-Effectiveness of a Diabetes Pay-For-Performance Program in Diabetes Patients with Multiple Chronic Conditions

    PubMed Central

    Hsieh, Hui-Min; Gu, Song-Mao; Shin, Shyi-Jang; Kao, Hao-Yun; Lin, Yi-Chieh; Chiu, Herng-Chia

    2015-01-01

    Pay for performance (P4P) has been used as a strategy to improve quality for patients with chronic illness. Little was known whether care provided to individuals with multiple chronic conditions in a P4P program were cost-effective. This study investigated cost effectiveness of a diabetes P4P program for caring patients with diabetes alone (DM alone) and diabetes with comorbid hypertension and hyperlipidemia (DMHH) from a single payer perspective in Taiwan. Analyzing data using population-based longitudinal databases, we compared costs and effectiveness between P4P and non-P4P diabetes patient groups in two cohorts. Propensity score matching (PSM) was used to match comparable control groups for intervention groups. Outcomes included life-years, quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs), program intervention costs, cost-savings and incremental cost-effectiveness ratios (ICERs). QALYs for P4P patients and non-P4P patients were 2.80 and 2.71 for the DM alone cohort and 2.74 and 2.66 for the DMHH patient cohort. The average incremental intervention costs per QALYs was TWD$167,251 in the DM alone cohort and TWD$145,474 in the DMHH cohort. The average incremental all-cause medical costs saved by the P4P program per QALYs were TWD$434,815 in DM alone cohort and TWD$506,199 in the DMHH cohort. The findings indicated that the P4P program for both cohorts were cost-effective and the resulting return on investment (ROI) was 2.60:1 in the DM alone cohort and 3.48:1 in the DMHH cohort. We conclude that the diabetes P4P program in both cohorts enabled the long-term cost-effective use of resources and cost-savings, especially for patients with multiple comorbid conditions. PMID:26173086

  8. Publish or perish, and pay--the new paradigm of open-access journals.

    PubMed

    Tzarnas, Stephanie; Tzarnas, Chris D

    2015-01-01

    The new open-access journal business model is changing the publication landscape and residents and junior faculty should be aware of these changes. A national survey of surgery program directors and residents was performed. Open-access journals have been growing over the past decade, and many traditional printed journals are also sponsoring open-access options (the hybrid model) for accepted articles. Authors need to be aware of the new publishing paradigm and potential costs involved in publishing their work. Copyright © 2014 Association of Program Directors in Surgery. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

  9. Value-Added Merit Pay.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Twomey, Daniel F.

    The purpose of merit pay is to reward employees for their accomplishments and motivate them to continue improving. Critics of merit pay say the increased extrinsic motivation that it prompts is more than offset by the decrease in intrinsic motivation. Supporters of performance-based pay claim several benefits of the practice. This study addressed…

  10. 75 FR 18133 - Pay for Sunday Work

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-04-09

    ...-AM08 Pay for Sunday Work AGENCY: Office of Personnel Management. ACTION: Proposed rule. SUMMARY: The U... provisions of 5 U.S.C. 5546(a), the statute governing the payment of Sunday premium pay for work performed on Sundays. The revised Sunday premium pay regulations would eliminate references to ``full-time'' employees...

  11. 5 CFR 610.407 - Premium pay for holiday work for employees on compressed work schedules.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... schedule who performs work on a holiday is entitled to basic pay, plus premium pay at a rate equal to basic pay, for the work that is not in excess of the employee's compressed work schedule for that day. For... 5 Administrative Personnel 1 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Premium pay for holiday work for...

  12. 34 CFR 692.72 - May a State use the funds it receives under the SLEAP Program to pay administrative costs?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 34 Education 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false May a State use the funds it receives under the SLEAP... Is the Amount of Assistance and How May It Be Used? § 692.72 May a State use the funds it receives under the SLEAP Program to pay administrative costs? A State may not use any of the funds it receives...

  13. A Look at Poor Dads Who Don't Pay Child Support. Discussion Papers. Assessing the New Federalism: An Urban Institute Program To Assess Changing Social Policies.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Sorensen, Elaine; Zibman, Chava

    The barriers that poor fathers face in paying child support and how existing programs assist them were studied and contrasted to the barriers faced by poor custodial mothers using data from the National Survey of America's Families (NSAF). Efforts to serve these fathers through Temporary Assistance for Needy Families welfare-to-work grants, and…

  14. Willingness to Pay for Drug Rehabilitation: Implications for Cost Recovery October 14, 2007

    PubMed Central

    Bishai, D.; Sindelar, J.; Ricketts, E. P.; Huettner, S.; Cornelius, L.; Lloyd, J. J.; Havens, J. R.; Latkin, C. A.; Strathdee, S. A.

    2008-01-01

    Objectives This study estimates the value that clients place on methadone maintenance and how this value varies with the effectiveness of treatment and availability of case management. We provide the first estimate of the price elasticity of the demand for drug treatment. Methods We interviewed 241 heroin users who had been referred to, but had not yet entered, methadone maintenance treatment in Baltimore, Maryland. We asked each subject to state a preference among three hypothetical treatment programs that varied across 3 domains: weekly fee paid by the client out-of-pocket ($5 to $100), presence/absence of case management, and time spent heroin-free (3 to 24 months). Each subject was asked to complete 18 orthogonal comparisons. Subsequently each subject was asked if they likely would enroll in their preferred choice among the set of three. We computed the expected willingness to pay (WTP) as the probability of enrollment times the fee considered in each choice considered from a multivariate logistic model that controlled for product attributes. We also estimated the price elasticity of demand. Results The median expected fee subjects were willing to pay for a program that offered 3 months of heroin-free time was $7.30 per week, rising to $17.11 per week for programs that offered 24 months of heroin-free time. The availability of case management increased median WTP by $5.64 per week. The price elasticity was −0.39 (SE 0.042). Conclusions Clients will pay more for higher rates of treatment success and for the presence of case management. Clients are willing to pay for drug treatment but the median willingness to pay falls short of the estimated program costs of $82 per week. Thus a combined approach of user fees and subsidization may be the optimal financing strategy for the drug treatment system. PMID:18207264

  15. Physician Quality Reporting System Program Updates and the Impact on Emergency Medicine Practice.

    PubMed

    Wiler, Jennifer L; Granovsky, Michael; Cantrill, Stephen V; Newell, Richard; Venkatesh, Arjun K; Schuur, Jeremiah D

    2016-03-01

    In 2007, the Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services (CMS) created a novel payment program to create incentives for physician's to focus on quality of care measures and report quality performance for the first time. Initially termed "The Physician Voluntary Reporting Program," various Congressional actions, including the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 (TRHCA) and Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008 (MIPPA) further strengthened and ensconced this program, eventually leading to the quality program termed today as the Physician Quality Reporting System (PQRS). As a result of passage of the Affordable Care Act of 2010, the PQRS program has expanded to include both the "traditional PQRS" reporting program and the newer "Value Modifier" program (VM). For the first time, these programs were designed to include pay-for-performance incentives for all physicians providing care to Medicare beneficiaries and to measure the cost of care. The recent passage of the Medicare Access and Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) Reauthorization Act in March of 2015 includes changes to these payment programs that will have an even more profound impact on emergency care providers. We describe the implications of these important federal policy changes for emergency physicians.

  16. Effects of and preference for pay for performance: an analogue analysis.

    PubMed

    Long, Robert D; Wilder, David A; Betz, Alison; Dutta, Ami

    2012-01-01

    We examined the effects of 2 payment systems on the rate of check processing and time spent on task by participants in a simulated work setting. Three participants experienced individual pay-for-performance (PFP) without base pay and pay-for-time (PFT) conditions. In the last phase, we asked participants to choose which system they preferred. For all participants, the PFP condition produced higher rates of check processing and more time spent on task than did the PFT condition, but choice of payment system varied both within and across participants.

  17. Impacts of Pay on Employee Behaviors and Attitudes: An Update

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Dyer, Lee; And Others

    1978-01-01

    Examines the potential impacts of pay on decisions to join organizations; behaviors such as performance and absenteeism levels; and pay satisfaction, dissatisfaction, and decisions to leave organizations. (Author/IRT)

  18. Ensemble machine learning and forecasting can achieve 99% uptime for rural handpumps

    PubMed Central

    Thomas, Evan A.

    2017-01-01

    Broken water pumps continue to impede efforts to deliver clean and economically-viable water to the global poor. The literature has demonstrated that customers’ health benefits and willingness to pay for clean water are best realized when clean water infrastructure performs extremely well (>99% uptime). In this paper, we used sensor data from 42 Afridev-brand handpumps observed for 14 months in western Kenya to demonstrate how sensors and supervised ensemble machine learning could be used to increase total fleet uptime from a best-practices baseline of about 70% to >99%. We accomplish this increase in uptime by forecasting pump failures and identifying existing failures very quickly. Comparing the costs of operating the pump per functional year over a lifetime of 10 years, we estimate that implementing this algorithm would save 7% on the levelized cost of water relative to a sensor-less scheduled maintenance program. Combined with a rigorous system for dispatching maintenance personnel, implementing this algorithm in a real-world program could significantly improve health outcomes and customers’ willingness to pay for water services. PMID:29182673

  19. Faculty performance evaluation in accredited U.S. public health graduate schools and programs: a national study.

    PubMed

    Gimbel, Ronald W; Cruess, David F; Schor, Kenneth; Hooper, Tomoko I; Barbour, Galen L

    2008-10-01

    To provide baseline data on evaluation of faculty performance in U.S. schools and programs of public health. The authors administered an anonymous Internet-based questionnaire using PHP Surveyor. The invited sample consisted of individuals listed in the Council on Education for Public Health (CEPH) Directory of Accredited Schools and Programs of Public Health. The authors explored performance measures in teaching, research, and service, and assessed how faculty performance measures are used. A total of 64 individuals (60.4%) responded to the survey, with 26 (40.6%) reporting accreditation/reaccreditation by CEPH within the preceding 24 months. Although all schools and programs employ faculty performance evaluations, a significant difference exists between schools and programs in the use of results for merit pay increases and mentoring purposes. Thirty-one (48.4%) of the organizations published minimum performance expectations. Fifty-nine (92.2%) of the respondents counted number of publications, but only 22 (34.4%) formally evaluated their quality. Sixty-two (96.9%) evaluated teaching through student course evaluations, and only 29 (45.3%) engaged in peer assessment. Although aggregate results of teaching evaluation are available to faculty and administrators, this information is often unavailable to students and the public. Most schools and programs documented faculty service activities qualitatively but neither assessed it quantitatively nor evaluated its impact. This study provides insight into how schools and programs of public health evaluate faculty performance. Results suggest that although schools and programs do evaluate faculty performance on a basic level, many do not devote substantial attention to this process.

  20. Getting Real Performance Out of Pay-for-Performance

    PubMed Central

    Nicholson, Sean; Pauly, Mark V; Wu, Anita Ya Jung; Murray, James F; Teutsch, Steven M; Berger, Marc L

    2008-01-01

    Context Most private and public health insurers are implementing pay-for-performance (P4P) programs in an effort to improve the quality of medical care. This article offers a paradigm for evaluating how P4P programs should be structured and how effective they are likely to be. Methods This article assesses the current comprehensiveness of evidence-based medicine by estimating the percentage of outpatient medical spending for eighteen medical processes recommended by the Institute of Medicine. Findings Three conditions must be in place for outcomes-based P4P programs to improve the quality of care: (1) health insurers must not fully understand what medical processes improve health (i.e., the health production function); (2) providers must know more about the health production function than insurers do; and (3) health insurers must be able to measure a patient's risk-adjusted health. Only two of these conditions currently exist. Payers appear to have incomplete knowledge of the health production function, and providers appear to know more about the health production function than payers do, but accurate methods of adjusting the risk of a patient's health status are still being developed. Conclusions This article concludes that in three general situations, P4P will have a different impact on quality and costs and so should be structured differently. When information about patients’ health and the health production function is incomplete, as is currently the case, P4P payments should be kept small, should be based on outcomes rather than processes, and should target physicians’ practices and health systems. As information improves, P4P incentive payments could be increased, and P4P may become more powerful. Ironically, once information becomes complete, P4P can be replaced entirely by “optimal fee-for-service.” PMID:18798885

  1. 5 CFR 930.205 - Administrative law judge pay system.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 5 Administrative Personnel 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Administrative law judge pay system. 930.205 Section 930.205 Administrative Personnel OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT (CONTINUED) CIVIL SERVICE REGULATIONS (CONTINUED) PROGRAMS FOR SPECIFIC POSITIONS AND EXAMINATIONS (MISCELLANEOUS) Administrative Law...

  2. 5 CFR 930.205 - Administrative law judge pay system.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 5 Administrative Personnel 2 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Administrative law judge pay system. 930.205 Section 930.205 Administrative Personnel OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT (CONTINUED) CIVIL SERVICE REGULATIONS (CONTINUED) PROGRAMS FOR SPECIFIC POSITIONS AND EXAMINATIONS (MISCELLANEOUS) Administrative Law...

  3. 5 CFR 930.205 - Administrative law judge pay system.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 5 Administrative Personnel 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Administrative law judge pay system. 930.205 Section 930.205 Administrative Personnel OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT (CONTINUED) CIVIL SERVICE REGULATIONS (CONTINUED) PROGRAMS FOR SPECIFIC POSITIONS AND EXAMINATIONS (MISCELLANEOUS) Administrative Law...

  4. 5 CFR 930.205 - Administrative law judge pay system.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... 5 Administrative Personnel 2 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Administrative law judge pay system. 930.205 Section 930.205 Administrative Personnel OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT (CONTINUED) CIVIL SERVICE REGULATIONS (CONTINUED) PROGRAMS FOR SPECIFIC POSITIONS AND EXAMINATIONS (MISCELLANEOUS) Administrative Law...

  5. 5 CFR 930.205 - Administrative law judge pay system.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 5 Administrative Personnel 2 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Administrative law judge pay system. 930.205 Section 930.205 Administrative Personnel OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT (CONTINUED) CIVIL SERVICE REGULATIONS (CONTINUED) PROGRAMS FOR SPECIFIC POSITIONS AND EXAMINATIONS (MISCELLANEOUS) Administrative Law...

  6. 7 CFR 1703.123 - Nonapproved purposes for grants.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ..., DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE RURAL DEVELOPMENT Distance Learning and Telemedicine Grant Program § 1703.123...) To pay for medical equipment not having telemedicine as its essential function; (3) To pay salaries... the applicant. (6) To duplicate facilities providing distance learning or telemedicine services in...

  7. 7 CFR 1703.123 - Nonapproved purposes for grants.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ..., DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE RURAL DEVELOPMENT Distance Learning and Telemedicine Grant Program § 1703.123...) To pay for medical equipment not having telemedicine as its essential function; (3) To pay salaries... the applicant. (6) To duplicate facilities providing distance learning or telemedicine services in...

  8. 7 CFR 1703.123 - Nonapproved purposes for grants.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ..., DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE RURAL DEVELOPMENT Distance Learning and Telemedicine Grant Program § 1703.123...) To pay for medical equipment not having telemedicine as its essential function; (3) To pay salaries... the applicant. (6) To duplicate facilities providing distance learning or telemedicine services in...

  9. 7 CFR 1703.123 - Nonapproved purposes for grants.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ..., DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE RURAL DEVELOPMENT Distance Learning and Telemedicine Grant Program § 1703.123...) To pay for medical equipment not having telemedicine as its essential function; (3) To pay salaries... the applicant. (6) To duplicate facilities providing distance learning or telemedicine services in...

  10. Self-Solicited Feedback: Effects of Hourly Pay and Individual Monetary Incentive Pay

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Slowiak, Julie M.; Dickinson, Alyce M.; Huitema, Bradley E.

    2011-01-01

    The frequency of feedback solicitation under hourly pay and individual monetary incentive pay conditions was examined. A between-subjects design was used with 30 college students in the two groups. Participants attended three experimental sessions and entered the cash value of simulated bank checks presented on a computer screen. Performance was…

  11. 76 FR 80268 - Pay for Senior-Level and Scientific or Professional Positions

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-12-23

    ... 3206-AL88 Pay for Senior-Level and Scientific or Professional Positions AGENCY: U.S. Office of... to amend rules for setting and adjusting pay of senior-level (SL) and scientific or professional (ST) employees. The Senior Professional Performance Act of 2008 changes pay for these employees by providing for...

  12. Using Outperformance Pay to Motivate Academics: Insiders' Accounts of Promises and Problems

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Field, Laurie

    2015-01-01

    Many researchers have investigated the appropriateness of pay for outperformance, (also called "merit-based pay" and "performance-based pay") for academics, but a review of this body of work shows that the voice of academics themselves is largely absent. This article is a contribution to addressing this gap, summarising the…

  13. Comparing the cost-effectiveness of simulation modalities: a case study of peripheral intravenous catheterization training.

    PubMed

    Isaranuwatchai, Wanrudee; Brydges, Ryan; Carnahan, Heather; Backstein, David; Dubrowski, Adam

    2014-05-01

    While the ultimate goal of simulation training is to enhance learning, cost-effectiveness is a critical factor. Research that compares simulation training in terms of educational- and cost-effectiveness will lead to better-informed curricular decisions. Using previously published data we conducted a cost-effectiveness analysis of three simulation-based programs. Medical students (n = 15 per group) practiced in one of three 2-h intravenous catheterization skills training programs: low-fidelity (virtual reality), high-fidelity (mannequin), or progressive (consisting of virtual reality, task trainer, and mannequin simulator). One week later, all performed a transfer test on a hybrid simulation (standardized patient with a task trainer). We used a net benefit regression model to identify the most cost-effective training program via paired comparisons. We also created a cost-effectiveness acceptability curve to visually represent the probability that one program is more cost-effective when compared to its comparator at various 'willingness-to-pay' values. We conducted separate analyses for implementation and total costs. The results showed that the progressive program had the highest total cost (p < 0.001) whereas the high-fidelity program had the highest implementation cost (p < 0.001). While the most cost-effective program depended on the decision makers' willingness-to-pay value, the progressive training program was generally most educationally- and cost-effective. Our analyses suggest that a progressive program that strategically combines simulation modalities provides a cost-effective solution. More generally, we have introduced how a cost-effectiveness analysis may be applied to simulation training; a method that medical educators may use to investment decisions (e.g., purchasing cost-effective and educationally sound simulators).

  14. Payment for Environmental Services: Hypotheses and Evidence

    PubMed Central

    Alston, Lee J.; Andersson, Krister; Smith, Steven M.

    2014-01-01

    The use of payment for environmental services (PES) is not a new type of contract, but PES programs have become more in vogue because of the potential for sequestering carbon by paying to prevent deforestation and degradation of forestlands. We provide a framework utilizing transaction costs to hypothesize which services are more likely to be provided effectively. We then interpret the literature on PES programs to see the extent to which transaction costs vary as predicted across the type of service and to assess the performance of PES programs. As predicted, we find that transaction costs are the least for club goods like water and greatest for pure public goods like carbon reduction. Actual performance is difficult to measure and varies across the examples. More work and experimentation are needed to gain a better outlook on what elements support effective delivery of environmental services. PMID:25143798

  15. 29 CFR 1620.17 - Jobs requiring equal responsibility in performance.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 29 Labor 4 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Jobs requiring equal responsibility in performance. 1620.17... THE EQUAL PAY ACT § 1620.17 Jobs requiring equal responsibility in performance. (a) In general. The equal pay standard applies to jobs the performance of which requires equal responsibility...

  16. 29 CFR 1620.17 - Jobs requiring equal responsibility in performance.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 29 Labor 4 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Jobs requiring equal responsibility in performance. 1620.17... THE EQUAL PAY ACT § 1620.17 Jobs requiring equal responsibility in performance. (a) In general. The equal pay standard applies to jobs the performance of which requires equal responsibility...

  17. An advanced look at surgical performance under Medicare's hospital-inpatient value-based purchasing program: who is winning and who is losing?

    PubMed

    Dupree, James M; Neimeyer, Jennifer; McHugh, Megan

    2014-01-01

    The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) is beginning to shift from paying providers based on volume to more explicitly rewarding quality of care. The hospital value-based purchasing (VBP) program is the first in a series of mandatory programs to financially reward and penalize US hospitals based on quality measure performance. Our objective was to identify the characteristics of hospitals that perform well (and those that perform poorly) on the surgical measures in CMS' hospital VBP program. Using 2008 to 2010 performance data from CMS' Hospital Compare website and the 2009 American Hospital Association annual survey, we examined surgical measure performance for all acute care general hospitals in the US. Outcomes were determined by a composite surgical performance score indicating the percentage of eligible surgical performance points that a hospital received. There were 3,030 hospitals included in our study. Composite surgical performance scores were 15.6% lower at public hospitals than at for-profit hospitals (p < 0.01). Additionally, there were significant differences in the routes by which hospitals achieved points, with smaller hospitals, for-profit hospitals, Magnet hospitals, and NSQIP hospitals all more likely to obtain points via the achievement route. The results of our study indicate that public hospitals perform worse on the surgical measures in the hospital VBP program. This study raises important questions about the impact that this new, mandatory program will have on public hospitals, which serve an important safety-net role and appear to be disadvantaged in the hospital VBP program. This issue should continue to be investigated as these mandatory quality programs are updated in future years. Copyright © 2014 American College of Surgeons. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

  18. 48 CFR 622.302 - Liquidated damages and overtime pay.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 4 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Liquidated damages and overtime pay. 622.302 Section 622.302 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEPARTMENT OF STATE SOCIOECONOMIC PROGRAMS APPLICATION OF LABOR LAWS TO GOVERNMENT ACQUISITIONS Contract Work Hours and Safety...

  19. 48 CFR 622.302 - Liquidated damages and overtime pay.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 4 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Liquidated damages and overtime pay. 622.302 Section 622.302 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEPARTMENT OF STATE SOCIOECONOMIC PROGRAMS APPLICATION OF LABOR LAWS TO GOVERNMENT ACQUISITIONS Contract Work Hours and Safety...

  20. New thinking on how to link executive pay with performance.

    PubMed

    Rappaport, A

    1999-01-01

    As the stock market began its ascent in the mid-1990s, executive pay--always the subject of heated debate--mounted along with it. That's because among the largest U.S. companies, stock options now account for more than half of total CEO compensation and about 30% of senior operating managers' pay. One problem became particularly clear during the bull market's astonishing run: even below-average performers reap huge gains from stock options when the market is rising rapidly. The author proposes steps to close the gap between existing compensation practices and those needed to promote higher levels of achievement at all levels of the corporation. For top managers, he recommends replacing conventional stock options with options that are tied to a market or peer index. Below-average performers would not be rewarded under such plans; superior performers could, depending on the way plans were structured, receive even more. He notes that managers at the business unit level should not be judged on the company's stock price--over which they have little control--and advocates an approach that accurately measures the value added by each unit. Finally, he suggests how certain indicators of value can be used to measure the contribution of frontline managers and employees. The concept of pay for performance has gained wide acceptance, but the link between incentive pay and superior performance is still too weak. Reforms must be adopted at all levels of the organization. Shareholders will applaud changes in pay schemes that motivate companies to deliver more value.

  1. Regional group purchasing of vaccines: review of the Pan American Health Organization EPI revolving fund and the Gulf Cooperation Council group purchasing program.

    PubMed

    DeRoeck, Denise; Bawazir, Saleh A; Carrasco, Peter; Kaddar, Miloud; Brooks, Alan; Fitzsimmons, John; Andrus, Jon

    2006-01-01

    This paper reviews the key design features, accomplishments of and lessons learned from two regional group procurement mechanisms dealing with vaccines that have been in operation for more than 25 years. The Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) EPI Revolving Fund purchases vaccines and immunization supplies on behalf of more than 35 countries in the Latin American and Caribbean region. Based on a 'central contracting' model, the program handles most aspects of procurement-from tendering to contracting with and paying producers--using a common fund to pay producers before being reimbursed by countries once goods are received in-country. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Group Purchasing Program among seven Persian Gulf States issues joint tenders for vaccines, as well as drugs and other medical goods. Through this 'group contracting' program, countries are responsible for contracting with and paying producers on their own, once the group has selected winning bids. Both programs have experienced substantial growth in the past two decades and are considered to have contributed to or accelerated achievements of immunization programs in both regions, including the introduction of new vaccines. The paper identifies several features of both programs--both those designed to attract country participation and those designed to ensure the programs' financial viability--which help explain their success and longevity.

  2. Radiation Therapy After Breast-Conserving Surgery: Does Hospital Surgical Volume Matter? A Population-Based Study in Taiwan

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Chien, Chun-Ru; Department of Radiation Oncology, China Medical University Hospital, and School of Medicine, China Medical University, Taichung, Taiwan; Pan, I-Wen

    2012-01-01

    Purpose: To examine the association between hospital surgical volume and the use of radiation therapy (RT) after breast-conserving surgery (BCS) in Taiwan. Methods and Materials: We used claims data from the National Health Insurance program in Taiwan (1997-2005) in this retrospective population-based study. We identified patients with breast cancer, receipt of BCS, use of radiation, and the factors that could potentially associated with the use of RT from enrollment records, and the ICD-9 and billing codes in claims. We conducted logistic regression to examine factors associated with RT use after BCS, and performed subgroup analyses to examine whether the associationmore » differs by medical center status or hospital volumes. Results: Among 5,094 patients with newly diagnosed invasive breast cancer who underwent BCS, the rate of RT was significantly lower in low-volume hospitals (74% vs. 82%, p < 0.01). Patients treated in low-volume hospitals were less likely to receive RT after BCS (odds ratio = 0.72, 95% confidence interval = 0.62-0.83). In addition, patients treated after the implementation of the voluntary pay-for-performance policy in 2001 were more likely to receive RT (odds ratio = 1.23; 95% confidence interval = 1.05-1.45). Subgroup analyses indicated that the high-volume effect was limited to hospitals accredited as non-medical centers, and that the effect of the pay-for-performance policy was most pronounced among low-volume hospitals. Conclusions: Using population-based data from Taiwan, our study concluded that hospital surgical volume and pay-for-performance policy are positively associated with RT use after BCS.« less

  3. Pay Equity Act, 17 May 1988.

    PubMed

    1988-01-01

    This document contains major provisions of the 1988 Pay Equity Act of Prince Edward Island, Canada. (Nova Scotia enacted similar legislation in 1988.) This act defines "female-dominated class" or "male-dominated class" as a class with 60% or more female or male incumbents, respectively. The objective of this act is to achieve pay equity among public sector employers and employees by identifying systemic gender discrimination through a comparison of the relative wages and value of the work performed by female- and male-dominated classes. The value of work is to be determined by considering the skill, effort, and responsibility required by the work as well as the conditions under which it is performed. A difference in wages between a female- and male-dominated class performing work of equal or comparable value can be justified by a formal performance appraisal system or formal seniority system that does not discriminate on the basis of gender or by a skills shortage which requires a temporary inflation in wages to attract workers for a certain position. No wages shall be reduced to implement pay equity. Implementation of pay equity will include the work of bargaining agents to achieve agreement on salient points. Pay equity may be implemented in four stages over a period of 24 months.

  4. 48 CFR 1422.302 - Liquidated damages and overtime pay.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 5 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Liquidated damages and overtime pay. 1422.302 Section 1422.302 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR SOCIOECONOMIC PROGRAMS APPLICATION OF LABOR LAWS TO GOVERNMENT ACQUISITIONS Contract Work Hours and Safety...

  5. 48 CFR 1422.302 - Liquidated damages and overtime pay.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 5 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Liquidated damages and overtime pay. 1422.302 Section 1422.302 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR SOCIOECONOMIC PROGRAMS APPLICATION OF LABOR LAWS TO GOVERNMENT ACQUISITIONS Contract Work Hours and Safety...

  6. The School Facilities Children Are Forced to Attend.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Hansen, Shirley J.

    1993-01-01

    As many as 25% of American school buildings are inadequate. However, many districts have reduced maintenance to pay utility bills. An active energy-management program can lower utility costs through efficient operation and maintenance practices and retrofits that pay back in less than three years. (MLF)

  7. Preliminary Thoughts on Netted Cable Communication Systems.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Eldridge, Frank; Mason, William

    There are five categories of cable communication systems: Conventional Community Antenna Television (CATV), Pay-TV, Subscriber Response Systems, Electronic Information Handling Systems, and Two-Way Audio/Visual Systems. CATV and Pay-TV systems are designed for the one-way transmission of programs, the former providing for better quality…

  8. 5 CFR 9701.343 - Within-band reductions.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 9701.343 Administrative Personnel DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY-OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT) DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT SYSTEM Pay and Pay Administration Performance-Based Pay § 9701.343 Within-band...

  9. 29 CFR 1620.18 - Jobs performed under similar working conditions.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 29 Labor 4 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Jobs performed under similar working conditions. 1620.18... THE EQUAL PAY ACT § 1620.18 Jobs performed under similar working conditions. (a) In general. In order for the equal pay standard to apply, the jobs are required to be performed under similar working...

  10. 29 CFR 1620.18 - Jobs performed under similar working conditions.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 29 Labor 4 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Jobs performed under similar working conditions. 1620.18... THE EQUAL PAY ACT § 1620.18 Jobs performed under similar working conditions. (a) In general. In order for the equal pay standard to apply, the jobs are required to be performed under similar working...

  11. 29 CFR 1620.18 - Jobs performed under similar working conditions.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 29 Labor 4 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Jobs performed under similar working conditions. 1620.18... THE EQUAL PAY ACT § 1620.18 Jobs performed under similar working conditions. (a) In general. In order for the equal pay standard to apply, the jobs are required to be performed under similar working...

  12. 29 CFR 1620.18 - Jobs performed under similar working conditions.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 29 Labor 4 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Jobs performed under similar working conditions. 1620.18... THE EQUAL PAY ACT § 1620.18 Jobs performed under similar working conditions. (a) In general. In order for the equal pay standard to apply, the jobs are required to be performed under similar working...

  13. 29 CFR 1620.18 - Jobs performed under similar working conditions.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 29 Labor 4 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Jobs performed under similar working conditions. 1620.18... THE EQUAL PAY ACT § 1620.18 Jobs performed under similar working conditions. (a) In general. In order for the equal pay standard to apply, the jobs are required to be performed under similar working...

  14. Beyond Measurement and Reward: Methods of Motivating Quality Improvement and Accountability.

    PubMed

    Berenson, Robert A; Rice, Thomas

    2015-12-01

    The article examines public policies designed to improve quality and accountability that do not rely on financial incentives and public reporting of provider performance. Payment policy should help temper the current "more is better" attitude of physicians and provider organizations. Incentive neutrality would better support health professionals' intrinsic motivation to act in their patients' best interests to improve overall quality than would pay-for-performance plans targeted to specific areas of clinical care. Public policy can support clinicians' intrinsic motivation through approaches that support systematic feedback to clinicians and provide concrete opportunities to collaborate to improve care. Some programs administered by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, including Partnership for Patients and Conditions of Participation, deserve more attention; they represent available, but largely ignored, approaches to support providers to improve quality and protect beneficiaries against substandard care. Public policies related to quality improvement should focus more on methods of enhancing professional intrinsic motivation, while recognizing the potential role of organizations to actively promote and facilitate that motivation. Actually achieving improvement, however, will require a reexamination of the role played by financial incentives embedded in payments and the unrealistic expectations placed on marginal incentives in pay-for-performance schemes. © Health Research and Educational Trust.

  15. Rewards and Supports

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Hershberg, Theodore; Robertson-Kraft, Claire

    2010-01-01

    Pay-for-performance systems in public schools have long been burdened with controversy. Critics of performance pay systems contend that because teachers' impact cannot be measured without error, it is impossible to create fair and accurate systems for evaluating and rewarding performance. By this standard, however, current practice fails on both…

  16. An Application of a Management Performance Audit Program.

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1980-12-01

    the s state. The francise granted the company permission to oper- ate on a public thoroughfare. A monopoly was created as no Ibid., p. 13. 5 George M...disputed. Why should commuters pay more for the same ride on a crowded bus when they could enjoy the privacy and independence of their own automobile...comprehensive transportation plan was to be formulated prior to disburse- ment of funds. Yet, the Act failed to provide additional funding to support

  17. Effects of pay-for-performance system on tuberculosis default cases control and treatment in Taiwan.

    PubMed

    Tsai, Wen-Chen; Kung, Pei-Tseng; Khan, Mahmud; Campbell, Claudia; Yang, Wen-Ta; Lee, Tsuey-Fong; Li, Ya-Hsin

    2010-09-01

    In order to make tuberculosis (TB) treatment more effective and to lower the default rate of the disease, the Bureau of National Health Insurance (BNHI) in Taiwan implemented the "pay-for-performance on Tuberculosis" program (P4P on TB) in 2004. The purpose of this study is to investigate the effectiveness of the P4P system in terms of default rate. This is a retrospective study. National Health Insurance Research Datasets in Taiwan from 2002 to 2005 has been used for the study. The study compared the differences of TB default rate before and after the implementation of P4P program, between participating and non-participating hospitals, and between P4P hospitals with and without case managers. Furthermore, logistic regression analysis was conducted to explore the related factors influencing TB patients default treatment after TB detected. The treatment default rate after "P4P on TB" was 11.37% compared with the 15.56% before "P4P on TB" implementation. The treatment default rate in P4P hospitals was 10.67% compared to 12.7% in non-P4P hospitals. In addition, the default rate was 10.4% in hospitals with case managers compared with 12.68% in hospitals without case managers. The results of the study showed that "P4P on TB" program improved the treatment default rate for TB patients. In addition, case managers improved the treatment outcome in controlling patients' default rate. Copyright 2010 The British Infection Society. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  18. Can organizations benefit from worksite health promotion?

    PubMed Central

    Leviton, L C

    1989-01-01

    A decision-analytic model was developed to project the future effects of selected worksite health promotion activities on employees' likelihood of chronic disease and injury and on employer costs due to illness. The model employed a conservative set of assumptions and a limited five-year time frame. Under these assumptions, hypertension control and seat belt campaigns prevent a substantial amount of illness, injury, and death. Sensitivity analysis indicates that these two programs pay for themselves and under some conditions show a modest savings to the employer. Under some conditions, smoking cessation programs pay for themselves, preventing a modest amount of illness and death. Cholesterol reduction by behavioral means does not pay for itself under these assumptions. These findings imply priorities in prevention for employer and employee alike. PMID:2499556

  19. Army Manpower Cost System (AMCOS): Active Enlisted Force Prototype

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1986-03-01

    cost element in both economic and budget models includes both a soldier’s Base Pay and the Service’s FICA contribu- tion at the current tax rate . a...mean base pay for the position calculated from BP T I FCAP - curret maxilum ICA payable FRATE - current FICA tax rate Tlij - total base pay distributed...Group, Santa Monica, 1982. Butler, R. and T. Neches, " HARDMAN Program Manager’s LCC Handbook: Avionics Equip- ments," D-201, The Assessment Group

  20. 28 CFR 345.51 - Inmate pay.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... (highest). (b) Eligibility. (1) An inmate shall accrue vacation time, longevity service credit, and shall receive holiday pay for the period of time the inmate is officially assigned to the Industries work detail... escape is not entitled to credit for time spent in Industries prior to said program failure. This rule...

  1. 12 CFR 268.103 - Complaints of discrimination covered by this part.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... disability), or the Equal Pay Act (sex-based wage discrimination) shall be processed in accordance with this... for employment. (c) This part does not apply to Equal Pay Act complaints of employees whose services... OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM RULES REGARDING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY Board Program To Promote Equal...

  2. 28 CFR 345.53 - Piecework rates.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 28 Judicial Administration 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Piecework rates. 345.53 Section 345.53... (FPI) INMATE WORK PROGRAMS Inmate Pay and Benefits § 345.53 Piecework rates. Piecework rates are... rates may be of two major types: individual piecework (in which an individual's pay goes up or down...

  3. 28 CFR 345.53 - Piecework rates.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 28 Judicial Administration 2 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Piecework rates. 345.53 Section 345.53... (FPI) INMATE WORK PROGRAMS Inmate Pay and Benefits § 345.53 Piecework rates. Piecework rates are... rates may be of two major types: individual piecework (in which an individual's pay goes up or down...

  4. 28 CFR 345.53 - Piecework rates.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 28 Judicial Administration 2 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Piecework rates. 345.53 Section 345.53... (FPI) INMATE WORK PROGRAMS Inmate Pay and Benefits § 345.53 Piecework rates. Piecework rates are... rates may be of two major types: individual piecework (in which an individual's pay goes up or down...

  5. 28 CFR 345.53 - Piecework rates.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 28 Judicial Administration 2 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Piecework rates. 345.53 Section 345.53... (FPI) INMATE WORK PROGRAMS Inmate Pay and Benefits § 345.53 Piecework rates. Piecework rates are... rates may be of two major types: individual piecework (in which an individual's pay goes up or down...

  6. 28 CFR 345.53 - Piecework rates.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 28 Judicial Administration 2 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Piecework rates. 345.53 Section 345.53... (FPI) INMATE WORK PROGRAMS Inmate Pay and Benefits § 345.53 Piecework rates. Piecework rates are... rates may be of two major types: individual piecework (in which an individual's pay goes up or down...

  7. 7 CFR 760.6 - Information to be furnished.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... AGRICULTURE SPECIAL PROGRAMS INDEMNITY PAYMENT PROGRAMS Dairy Indemnity Payment Program Payments to Dairy... period. (d) The average number of cows milked during the base period and during each pay period in the...

  8. 7 CFR 760.6 - Information to be furnished.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... AGRICULTURE SPECIAL PROGRAMS INDEMNITY PAYMENT PROGRAMS Dairy Indemnity Payment Program Payments to Dairy... period. (d) The average number of cows milked during the base period and during each pay period in the...

  9. 7 CFR 760.6 - Information to be furnished.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... AGRICULTURE SPECIAL PROGRAMS INDEMNITY PAYMENT PROGRAMS Dairy Indemnity Payment Program Payments to Dairy... period. (d) The average number of cows milked during the base period and during each pay period in the...

  10. 7 CFR 760.6 - Information to be furnished.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... AGRICULTURE SPECIAL PROGRAMS INDEMNITY PAYMENT PROGRAMS Dairy Indemnity Payment Program Payments to Dairy... period. (d) The average number of cows milked during the base period and during each pay period in the...

  11. Valuing the benefits of weight loss programs: an application of the discrete choice experiment.

    PubMed

    Roux, Larissa; Ubach, Christina; Donaldson, Cam; Ryan, Mandy

    2004-08-01

    Obesity is a leading health threat. Determination of optimal therapies for long-term weight loss remains a challenge. Evidence suggests that successful weight loss depends on the compliance of weight loss program participants with their weight loss efforts. Despite this, little is known regarding the attributes influencing such compliance. The purpose of this study was to assess, using a discrete choice experiment (DCE), the relative importance of weight loss program attributes to its participants and to express these preferences in terms of their willingness to pay for them. A DCE survey explored the following weight loss program attributes in a sample of 165 overweight adults enrolled in community weight loss programs: cost, travel time required to attend, extent of physician involvement (e.g., none, monthly, every 2 weeks), components (e.g., diet, exercise, behavior change) emphasized, and focus (e.g., group, individual). The rate at which participants were willing to trade among attributes and the willingness to pay for different configurations of combined attributes were estimated using regression modeling. All attributes investigated appeared to be statistically significant. The most important unit change was "program components emphasized" (e.g., moving from diet only to diet and exercise). The majority of participants were willing to pay for weight loss programs that reflected their preferences. The DCE tool was useful in quantifying and understanding individual preferences in obesity management and provided information that could help to maximize the efficiency of existing weight loss programs or the design of new programs.

  12. Managing imperfect competition by pay for performance and reference pricing.

    PubMed

    Mak, Henry Y

    2018-01-01

    I study a managed health service market where differentiated providers compete for consumers by choosing multiple service qualities, and where copayments that consumers pay and payments that providers receive for services are set by a payer. The optimal regulation scheme is two-sided. On the demand side, it justifies and clarifies value-based reference pricing. On the supply side, it prescribes pay for performance when consumers misperceive service benefits or providers have intrinsic quality incentives. The optimal bonuses are expressed in terms of demand elasticities, service technology, and provider characteristics. However, pay for performance may not outperform prospective payment when consumers are rational and providers are profit maximizing, or when one of the service qualities is not contractible. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

  13. External benefits of biomass-e in Spain: an economic valuation.

    PubMed

    Soliño, Mario

    2010-03-01

    This article analyses the willingness to pay for a program that promotes the production of electricity from forest biomass, instead of that based on fossil fuels. The program decreases greenhouse gas emissions, reduces the pressure on non-renewable resources, lowers the risk of summer forest fires, creates employment in rural areas. Results from a choice experiment show that consumers are willing to pay a higher price for electricity in order to obtain the external benefits of the substitution. Respondents attach a higher value to programs that decrease the pressure of non-renewable resources and the risk of forest fires. Copyright (c) 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  14. 29 CFR 1620.15 - Jobs requiring equal skill in performance.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 29 Labor 4 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Jobs requiring equal skill in performance. 1620.15 Section... EQUAL PAY ACT § 1620.15 Jobs requiring equal skill in performance. (a) In general. The jobs to which the equal pay standard is applicable are jobs requiring equal skill in their performance. Where the amount...

  15. 29 CFR 1620.15 - Jobs requiring equal skill in performance.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 29 Labor 4 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Jobs requiring equal skill in performance. 1620.15 Section... EQUAL PAY ACT § 1620.15 Jobs requiring equal skill in performance. (a) In general. The jobs to which the equal pay standard is applicable are jobs requiring equal skill in their performance. Where the amount...

  16. 29 CFR 1620.15 - Jobs requiring equal skill in performance.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 29 Labor 4 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Jobs requiring equal skill in performance. 1620.15 Section... EQUAL PAY ACT § 1620.15 Jobs requiring equal skill in performance. (a) In general. The jobs to which the equal pay standard is applicable are jobs requiring equal skill in their performance. Where the amount...

  17. 29 CFR 1620.15 - Jobs requiring equal skill in performance.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 29 Labor 4 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Jobs requiring equal skill in performance. 1620.15 Section... EQUAL PAY ACT § 1620.15 Jobs requiring equal skill in performance. (a) In general. The jobs to which the equal pay standard is applicable are jobs requiring equal skill in their performance. Where the amount...

  18. The value of value-based insurance design: savings from eliminating drug co-payments.

    PubMed

    Maeng, Daniel D; Pitcavage, James M; Snyder, Susan R; Davis, Duane E

    2016-02-01

    To estimate the cost impact of a $0 co-pay prescription drug program implemented by a large healthcare employer as a part of its employee wellness program. A $0 co-pay program that included approximately 200 antihypertensive, antidiabetic, and antilipid medications was offered to Geisinger Health System (GHS) employees covered by Geisinger Health Plan (GHP) in 2007. Claims data from GHP for the years 2005 to 2011 were obtained. The sample was restricted to continuously enrolled members with Geisinger primary care providers throughout the study period. The intervention group, defined as 2251 GHS employees receiving any of the drugs eligible for $0 co-pay, was propensity score matched based on 2 years of pre-intervention claims data to a comparison group, which was defined as 3857 non-GHS employees receiving the same eligible drugs at the same time. Generalized linear models were used to estimate differences in terms of per-member-per-month (PMPM) claims amounts related to prescription drugs and medical care. Total healthcare spending (medical plus prescription drug spending) among the GHS employees was lower by $144 PMPM (13%; 95% CI, $38-$250) during the months when they were taking any of the eligible drugs. Considering the drug acquisition cost and the forgone co-pay, the estimated return on investment over a 5-year period was 1.8. This finding suggests that VBID implementation within the context of a wider employee wellness program targeting the appropriate population can potentially lead to positive cost savings.

  19. The relationship between human resource investments and organizational performance: a firm-level examination of equilibrium theory.

    PubMed

    Subramony, Mahesh; Krause, Nicole; Norton, Jacqueline; Burns, Gary N

    2008-07-01

    It is commonly believed that human resource investments can yield positive performance-related outcomes for organizations. Utilizing the theory of organizational equilibrium (H. A. Simon, D. W. Smithburg, & V. A. Thompson, 1950; J. G. March & H. A. Simon, 1958), the authors proposed that organizational inducements in the form of competitive pay will lead to 2 firm-level performance outcomes--labor productivity and customer satisfaction--and that financially successful organizations would be more likely to provide these inducements to their employees. To test their hypotheses, the authors gathered employee-survey and objective performance data from a sample of 126 large publicly traded U.S. organizations over a period of 3 years. Results indicated that (a) firm-level financial performance (net income) predicted employees' shared perceptions of competitive pay, (b) shared pay perceptions predicted future labor productivity, and (c) the relationship between shared pay perceptions and customer satisfaction was fully mediated by employee morale.

  20. Developing a new national approach to surveillance for ventilator-associated events: executive summary.

    PubMed

    Magill, Shelley S; Klompas, Michael; Balk, Robert; Burns, Suzanne M; Deutschman, Clifford S; Diekema, Daniel; Fridkin, Scott; Greene, Linda; Guh, Alice; Gutterman, David; Hammer, Beth; Henderson, David; Hess, Dean R; Hill, Nicholas S; Horan, Teresa; Kollef, Marin; Levy, Mitchell; Septimus, Edward; VanAntwerpen, Carole; Wright, Don; Lipsett, Pamela

    2013-11-01

    In September 2011, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) convened a Ventilator-Associated Pneumonia (VAP) Surveillance Definition Working Group to organize a formal process for leaders and experts of key stakeholder organizations to discuss the challenges of VAP surveillance definitions and to propose new approaches to VAP surveillance in adult patients (Table 1). The charges to the Working Group were to (1) critically review a draft, streamlined VAP surveillance definition developed for use in adult patients; (2) suggest modifications to enhance the reliability and credibility of the surveillance definition within the critical care and infection prevention communities; and (3) propose a final adult surveillance definition algorithm to be implemented in the CDC's National Healthcare Safety Network (NHSN), taking into consideration the potential future use of the definition algorithm in public reporting, interfacility comparisons, and pay-for-reporting and pay-for-performance programs. Published by Mosby, Inc.

  1. Physician Quality Reporting System Program Updates and the Impact on Emergency Medicine Practice

    PubMed Central

    Wiler, Jennifer L.; Granovsky, Michael; Cantrill, Stephen V.; Newell, Richard; Venkatesh, Arjun K.; Schuur, Jeremiah D.

    2016-01-01

    In 2007, the Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services (CMS) created a novel payment program to create incentives for physician’s to focus on quality of care measures and report quality performance for the first time. Initially termed “The Physician Voluntary Reporting Program,” various Congressional actions, including the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 (TRHCA) and Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008 (MIPPA) further strengthened and ensconced this program, eventually leading to the quality program termed today as the Physician Quality Reporting System (PQRS). As a result of passage of the Affordable Care Act of 2010, the PQRS program has expanded to include both the “traditional PQRS” reporting program and the newer “Value Modifier” program (VM). For the first time, these programs were designed to include pay-for-performance incentives for all physicians providing care to Medicare beneficiaries and to measure the cost of care. The recent passage of the Medicare Access and Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) Reauthorization Act in March of 2015 includes changes to these payment programs that will have an even more profound impact on emergency care providers. We describe the implications of these important federal policy changes for emergency physicians. PMID:26973757

  2. 24 CFR 983.5 - Description of the PBV program.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-04-01

    ... program under an annual contributions contract (ACC) with HUD. In the PBV program, the assistance is... (budget authority) available under the PHA's voucher ACC. This pool of funding is used to pay housing...

  3. 24 CFR 983.5 - Description of the PBV program.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-04-01

    ... program under an annual contributions contract (ACC) with HUD. In the PBV program, the assistance is... (budget authority) available under the PHA's voucher ACC. This pool of funding is used to pay housing...

  4. 5 CFR 9701.344 - Special within-band increases.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 5 Administrative Personnel 3 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Special within-band increases. 9701.344 Section 9701.344 Administrative Personnel DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT... HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT SYSTEM Pay and Pay Administration Performance-Based Pay § 9701.344 Special...

  5. Minimum savings requirements in shared savings provider payment.

    PubMed

    Pope, Gregory C; Kautter, John

    2012-11-01

    Payer (insurer) sharing of savings is a way of motivating providers of medical services to reduce cost growth. A Medicare shared savings program is established for accountable care organizations in the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. However, savings created by providers cannot be distinguished from the normal (random) variation in medical claims costs, setting up a classic principal-agent problem. To lessen the likelihood of paying undeserved bonuses, payers may pay bonuses only if observed savings exceed minimum levels. We study the trade-off between two types of errors in setting minimum savings requirements: paying bonuses when providers do not create savings and not paying bonuses when providers create savings. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

  6. Ability and willingness to pay for voluntary medical male circumcision: a cross-sectional survey in Kisumu County, Kenya.

    PubMed

    Wandei, Stephen; Nangami, Mabel; Egesa, Omar

    2016-01-01

    Voluntary medical male circumcision is one of the most effective measures in preventing male acquisition of HIV during heterosexual intercourse. In Kenya, the voluntary medical male circumcision programme was launched in the year 2008 as part of a comprehensive national HIV prevention strategy. With the global challenge of funding HIV intervention programs, the sustainability of the programme beyond the donor periods need to be assessed. The purpose of this study was to determine the household ability and willingness to pay for voluntary medical male circumcision as an alternative method of funding the programme. The findings show that 62.2% of the households were "able" to pay for medical circumcision. However, 60.4% of them were not "willing" to pay for the service regardless of the cost. The findings indicate that ability to pay is not a significant predictor of willingness to pay for voluntary medical male circumcision within Kisumu County. Knowledge on the role of medical circumcision is a more important factor in determining willingness to pay for the service.

  7. Pay for Performance: Whose Performance?

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Tienken, Christopher H.

    2011-01-01

    Education reform proposals are not in short supply. Recent issues of the "Kappa Delta Pi Record" examined two of these: Common Core State Standards (Winter 2011) and Charter Schools (Spring 2011). Teacher pay for performance is another policy gaining traction in state legislatures and at the federal level. The Race to the Top (RTTT)…

  8. Performance Pay Path to Improvement

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Gratz, Donald B.

    2011-01-01

    The primary goal of performance pay for the past decade has been higher test scores, and the most prominent strategy has been to increase teacher performance through financial incentives. If teachers are rewarded for success, according to this logic, they will try harder. If they try harder, more children will achieve higher test scores. The…

  9. Teacher Responses to Pay-for-Performance Policies: Survey Results from Four High-Poverty, Urban School Districts

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Wells, John

    2011-01-01

    Policymakers are increasingly adopting "pay-for-performance" policies in which teachers are compensated based on their performance as measured by classroom evaluations and/or student achievement test results. Prior research has produced largely inconclusive findings concerning support among teachers for these policies and their effects…

  10. 5 CFR 894.402 - Do the premiums I pay reflect the cost of providing benefits?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 5 Administrative Personnel 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Do the premiums I pay reflect the cost of providing benefits? 894.402 Section 894.402 Administrative Personnel OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT (CONTINUED) CIVIL SERVICE REGULATIONS (CONTINUED) FEDERAL EMPLOYEES DENTAL AND VISION INSURANCE PROGRAM Cost...

  11. 5 CFR 894.402 - Do the premiums I pay reflect the cost of providing benefits?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 5 Administrative Personnel 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Do the premiums I pay reflect the cost of providing benefits? 894.402 Section 894.402 Administrative Personnel OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT (CONTINUED) CIVIL SERVICE REGULATIONS (CONTINUED) FEDERAL EMPLOYEES DENTAL AND VISION INSURANCE PROGRAM Cost...

  12. 75 FR 12217 - Federal Perkins Loan, Federal Work-Study, and Federal Supplemental Educational Opportunity Grant...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-03-15

    ... DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION Federal Perkins Loan, Federal Work-Study, and Federal Supplemental... undergraduate and graduate students to help pay for their education. The FWS Program encourages the part-time employment of needy undergraduate and graduate students to help pay for their education and to involve the...

  13. Farmers as Consumers of Agricultural Education Services: Willingness to Pay and Spend Time

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Charatsari, Chrysanthi; Papadaki-Klavdianou, Afroditi; Michailidis, Anastasios

    2011-01-01

    This study assessed farmers' willingness to pay for and spend time attending an Agricultural Educational Program (AEP). Primary data on the demographic and socio-economic variables of farmers were collected from 355 farmers selected randomly from Northern Greece. Descriptive statistics and multivariate analysis methods were used in order to meet…

  14. Paying for Equity: The Role of Taxation in Driving Canada's Educational Success

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Freiler, Christa

    2011-01-01

    Using research conducted by the federal government's own finance department, social policy groups released the report, "Paying for Canada: Perspectives on Public Finance and National Programs." It showed that deliberate government policy to reduce taxation levels for some of the most economically advantaged groups in Canada had resulted…

  15. Willingness to participate and Pay for a proposed national health insurance in St. Vincent and the grenadines: a cross-sectional contingent valuation approach.

    PubMed

    Adams, Rosmond; Chou, Yiing-Jenq; Pu, Christy

    2015-04-09

    Numerous Caribbean countries are considering implementing National Health Insurance (NHI) and pooling resources to finance their health sectors. Based on this increased interest in health insurance, we investigated the willingness to participate and to pay for NHI in St. Vincent and the Grenadines, an upper-middle-income Caribbean country. Four hundred heads of household in St. Vincent and the Grenadines were interviewed in August 2012 and September 2012. The samples were selected through simple random sampling, including the stratification of rural, semiurban, and urban communities to ensure the representativeness of the sample. A contingent valuation method with a pretested interviewer-led questionnaire was used. Respondents were presented with a hypothetical NHI plan. Chi-squared analysis was performed to identify factors that are associated with the willingness to participate. Multiple logistic regression was used to explore the factors that influence respondents' willingness to pay. In total, 69.5% (n = 278) of the respondents indicated that they were willing to participate in the proposed NHI plan, of whom 72.3% were willing to pay for the first bid (EC$50). When the bid was reduced to EC$25, all of the remaining respondents who indicated they were willing to participate were willing to pay this lowered bid. Overall, the respondents were willing to pay EC$77.83 (US$28.83) per month for each person to enroll in the NHI plan. Age, income, and having some form of health insurance were significantly associated with a willingness to participate in the plan. A higher socioeconomic status was the principal determinant factor for the willingness to participate. This is similar to studies on developing economies. The government can use these findings to guide the successful implementation of the proposed NHI program. People with a lower socioeconomic status must be engaged from the start of and throughout the development process to enhance their understanding of and participation in the plan.

  16. Problems with the Small Business Administration’s Merit Appraisal and Compensation System.

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1981-09-21

    TAD-AI07 181 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE WASHINGTON DC FEDERAL PERS-ETC F/6 5/9 PROBLEMS WITH THE SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION’S MERIT APPRAIS--ETC(U...Adninistrator, Small Business Administration Dear Mr. Car D Subjec::/ Problems with the Small Business Administra- tjon’s Merit Appraisal and Compensation...System, (rLP68 8i 71). We reviewed the Small Business Administration’s (SBA’s) performance appraisal/merit pay program as part of our review of

  17. Person-based differences in pay reactions: A compensation-activation theory and integrative conceptual review.

    PubMed

    Fulmer, Ingrid Smithey; Shaw, Jason D

    2018-06-07

    Compensation research has focused traditionally on how pay design characteristics (e.g., pay level, individual or group incentives) relate to average employee outcomes and, in toto, on how these outcomes affect organizational performance. Recently, scholars have begun to pay more attention to how individuals vary in the strength of their reactions to pay. Empirical research in several disciplines examines how the interplay of pay systems and person-based characteristics (psychological individual differences, demographics, and relative performance or position in a group) relate to important work-related outcomes. We develop a compensation-activation theory that frames compensation design characteristics as workplace "situations" providing cues that activate individuals' corresponding fundamental social motives made salient due to chronic or transient person-based characteristics. Where activation occurs, stronger-than-average responses to the compensation "situation" are expected. Using the theory as a lens, we synthesize and reinterpret existing research on person-based reactions to pay characteristics, including sorting, incentive/motivational effects, and effects on collective pay system reactions and unit/organizational outcomes. We conclude with a research agenda aimed at refining compensation-activation theory and advancing the study of compensation as it affects individual and organizational outcomes. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved).

  18. 76 FR 24343 - Advanced Biofuel Payment Program; Correction

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-05-02

    ...-AA75 Advanced Biofuel Payment Program; Correction AGENCY: Rural Business-Cooperative Service; Rural... Federal Register of February 11, 2011, establishing the Advanced Biofuel Payment Program authorized under... this Program, the Agency will enter into contracts with advanced biofuel producers to pay such...

  19. 7 CFR 1493.60 - Payment guarantee.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... OF AGRICULTURE EXPORT PROGRAMS CCC EXPORT CREDIT GUARANTEE PROGRAMS CCC Export Credit Guarantee Program (GSM-102) and CCC Intermediate Export Credit Guarantee Program (GSM-103) Operations § 1493.60 Payment guarantee. (a) CCC's obligation. The payment guarantee will provide that CCC agrees to pay the...

  20. 7 CFR 1493.60 - Payment guarantee.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... OF AGRICULTURE EXPORT PROGRAMS CCC EXPORT CREDIT GUARANTEE PROGRAMS CCC Export Credit Guarantee Program (GSM-102) and CCC Intermediate Export Credit Guarantee Program (GSM-103) Operations § 1493.60 Payment guarantee. (a) CCC's obligation. The payment guarantee will provide that CCC agrees to pay the...

  1. 7 CFR 1493.60 - Payment guarantee.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... OF AGRICULTURE EXPORT PROGRAMS CCC EXPORT CREDIT GUARANTEE PROGRAMS CCC Export Credit Guarantee Program (GSM-102) and CCC Intermediate Export Credit Guarantee Program (GSM-103) Operations § 1493.60 Payment guarantee. (a) CCC's obligation. The payment guarantee will provide that CCC agrees to pay the...

  2. Do client fees help or hurt?

    PubMed

    Barnett, B

    1998-01-01

    This article discusses the impact of client fees for family planning (FP) services on cost recovery and level of user services in developing countries. The UN Population Fund reports that developing country governments currently pay 75% of the costs of FP programs. Donors contribute 15%, and clients pay 10%. Current pressures are on FP services to broaden and improve their scope, while user demand is increasing. Program managers should consider the program's need for funds and the clients' willingness to pay. Clients are willing to pay about 1% of their income for contraception. A study of sterilization acceptance in Mexico finds that the average monthly case load declined by 10% after the 1st price increase from $43 to $55 and declined by 58% after the 2nd price increase to $60. Fewer low-income clients requested sterilization. A CEMOPLAF study in Ecuador finds that in three price increase situations the number of clients seeking services declined, but the economic mix of clients remained about the same. The decline was 20% in the group with a 20% price increase and 26% in the 40% increase group. In setting fees, the first need is to determine unit costs. The Futures Group International recommends considering political, regulatory, and institutional constraints for charging fees; priorities for revenue use; protection for poor clients; and monitoring of money collection and expenditure. Management Sciences for Health emphasizes consideration of the reasons for collection of fees, client affordability, and client perception of quality issues. Sliding scales can be used to protect poor clients. Charging fees for laboratory services can subsidize poor clients. A Bangladesh program operated a restaurant and catering service in order to subsidize FP services. Colombia's PROFAMILIA sells medical and surgical services and a social marketing program in order to expand clinics.

  3. Mobilization for HIV Voluntary Counseling and Testing Services in Vietnam: Clients' Risk Behaviors, Attitudes and Willingness to Pay.

    PubMed

    Nguyen, Long Hoang; Tran, Bach Xuan; Nguyen, Nhung Phuong; Phan, Huong Thu Thi; Bui, Trang Thu; Latkin, Carl A

    2016-04-01

    A multi-site survey was conducted on a sample of 365 clients to assess their willingness to pay for HIV voluntary counseling and testing (VCT) services in Ha Noi and Nam Dinh province, two epicenters of Vietnam. By using contingent valuation technique, the results showed that most of respondents (95.1 %) were willing to pay averagely 155 (95 % CI 132-177) thousands Vietnam Dong (~US $7.75, 2013) for a VCT service. Clients who were female, had middle income level, and current opioid users were willing to pay less; meanwhile clients who had university level of education were willing to pay more for a VCT service. The results highlighted the high rate of willingness to pay for the service at a high amount by VCT clients. These findings contribute to the implementation of co-payment scheme for VCT services toward the financial sustainability of HIV/AIDS programs in Vietnam.

  4. New approach in the evaluation of a fitness program at a worksite.

    PubMed

    Shirasaya, K; Miyakawa, M; Yoshida, K; Tanaka, C; Shimada, N; Kondo, T

    1999-03-01

    The most common methods for the economic evaluation of a fitness program at a worksite are cost-effectiveness, cost-benefit, and cost-utility analyses. In this study, we applied a basic microeconomic theory, "neoclassical firm's problems," as the new approach for it. The optimal number of physical-exercise classes that constitute the core of the fitness program are determined using the cubic health production function. The optimal number is defined as the number that maximizes the profit of the program. The optimal number corresponding to any willingness-to-pay amount of the participants for the effectiveness of the program is presented using a graph. For example, if the willingness-to-pay is $800, the optimal number of classes is 23. Our method can be applied to the evaluation of any health care program if the health production function can be estimated.

  5. Improving Teaching Effectiveness: Merit Pay vs. Organizational Culture.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Bushardt, Stephen C.; Fowler, Aubrey R.

    1987-01-01

    Identifies four conditions which cause merit pay systems to fail to increase teacher performance: lack of skills, the poor timing of rewards, an inability to measure performance; and competing reinforcers. Explains why organizational culture is a more effective mediator of rewards. (SD)

  6. Findings from the most recent Medical Library Association salary survey.

    PubMed

    Wallace, Marc; McMullen, Thomas D; Corcoran, Kate

    2004-10-01

    The objective is to provide information on basic issues in library management identified by the Medical Library Association's (MLA's) seventh triennial salary survey. The survey was a Web-based questionnaire. A nonrandom sample of persons was obtained by posting messages to MLA's membership and to the MEDLIB-L e-mail discussion list. Employed MLA members and nonmembers employed in medical library settings filled out a Web-based form designed using common gateway interface (CGI) programming. Six hundred forty-five usable responses were analyzed by the Hay Group and presented in the MLA publication, Hay Group/MLA 2001 Compensation and Benefits Survey. Results from the 2001 survey in this article focus on pay and job satisfaction. Salary survey results since 1983 were analyzed to review trends in seniority, diversity, and pay equity. Given the age progression of respondents from 1983 to 2001, it is clear that succession planning is a core issue for medical libraries. Although efforts to create more diversity in medical libraries in member organizations have started to yield results, pay for white respondents has increased at a higher rate than for other racial categories. The authors found that the pay-for-performance system in the organizations of approximately two-thirds of the respondents is suboptimized and that most of the reasons medical librarians cite for leaving their organization can be addressed and potentially changed by management. Results from the eighth salary survey, slated to be conducted in the fall of 2004, will further track these trends and issues.

  7. Federal Pay Equity Act of 1984. Part 1. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Compensation and Employee Benefits of the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, House of Representatives, Ninety-Eighth Congress, Second Session on H.R. 4599...and H.R. 5092. (April 3-4, 1984).

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Congress of the U. S., Washington, DC. House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

    This document contains two congressional hearings on H.R. 4599, the Federal Pay Equity Act of 1984, and H.R. 5092, the Pay Equity Act of 1984. These bills would mandate the Office of Personnel Management to study wage discrepancies in the Federal classification structure and to devise a more equitable job evaluation program and would require…

  8. Ethnic disparities in coronary heart disease management and pay for performance in the UK.

    PubMed

    Millett, Christopher; Gray, Jeremy; Wall, Martin; Majeed, Azeem

    2009-01-01

    Few pay for performance schemes have been subject to rigorous evaluation, and their impact on disparities in chronic disease management is uncertain. To examine disparities in coronary heart disease management and intermediate clinical outcomes within a multiethnic population before and after the introduction of a major pay for performance initiative in April 2004. Comparison of two cross-sectional surveys using electronic general practice records. Thirty-two family practices in south London, United Kingdom (UK). Two thousand eight hundred and ninety-one individuals with coronary heart disease registered with participating practices in 2003 and 3,101 in 2005. Percentage achievement by ethnic group of quality indicators in the management of coronary heart disease The proportion of patients reaching national treatment targets increased significantly for blood pressure (51.2% to 58.9%) and total cholesterol (65.7% to 73.8%) after the implementation of a major pay for performance initiative in April 2004. Improvements in blood pressure control were greater in the black group compared to whites, with disparities evident at baseline being attenuated (black 54.8% vs. white 58.3% reaching target in 2005). Lower recording of blood pressure in the south Asian group evident in 2003 was attenuated in 2005. Statin prescribing remained significantly lower (p < 0.001) in the black group compared with the south Asian and white groups after the implementation of pay for performance (black 74.8%, south Asian 83.8%, white 80.2% in 2005). The introduction of pay for performance incentives in UK primary care has been associated with better and more equitable management of coronary heart disease across ethnic groups.

  9. Toward a More Comprehensive Model of Teacher Pay. Research Brief

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    National Center on Performance Incentives, 2008

    2008-01-01

    In "Toward a More Comprehensive Model of Teacher Pay"--a paper presented at the February 2008 National Center on Performance Incentives research to policy conference--Julia Koppich examines recent policy initiatives implementing new approaches to teacher pay. Her discussion focuses on four current initiatives: ProComp in Denver, Toledo…

  10. Teacher Pay for Performance: Experimental Evidence from the Project on Incentives in Teaching

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Springer, Matthew G.; Hamilton, Laura; McCaffrey, Daniel F.; Ballou, Dale; Le, Vi-Nhuan; Pepper, Matthew; Lockwood, J. R.; Stecher, Brian M.

    2010-01-01

    In an effort to explore the impact of performance incentives in education, the National Center on Performance Incentives (NCPI) partnered with the Metropolitan Nashville Public Schools (MNPS) to conduct the Project on Incentives in Teaching, or POINT. The study examines the effects on student outcomes of paying eligible teachers bonuses of up to…

  11. Teacher Evaluation in China: Latest Trends and Future Directions

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Liu, Shujie; Zhao, Decheng

    2013-01-01

    With the implementation of teacher performance pay in 2009 in China, teacher performance evaluation has become a heated topic. This research study follows up on two previous studies of teacher evaluation in China and continues the dialog by analyzing the latest trends in the context of teacher performance pay. There were two sources of information…

  12. Calculations of financial incentives for providers in a pay-for-performance program: Manual review versus data from structured fields in electronic health records

    PubMed Central

    Urech, Tracy H.; Woodard, LeChauncy D.; Virani, Salim S.; Dudley, R. Adams; Lutschg, Meghan Z.; Petersen, Laura A.

    2015-01-01

    Background Hospital report cards and financial incentives linked to performance require clinical data that are reliable, appropriate, timely, and cost-effective to process. Pay-for-performance plans are transitioning to automated electronic health record (EHR) data as an efficient method to generate data needed for these programs. Objective To determine how well data from automated processing of structured EHR fields (AP-EHR) reflect data from manual chart review and the impact of these data on performance rewards. Research Design Cross-sectional analysis of performance measures used in a cluster randomized trial assessing the impact of financial incentives on guideline-recommended care for hypertension. Subjects A total of 2,840 patients with hypertension assigned to participating physicians at 12 Veterans Affairs hospital-based outpatient clinics. Fifty-two physicians and 33 primary care personnel received incentive payments. Measures Overall, positive and negative agreement indices and Cohen's kappa were calculated for assessments of guideline-recommended antihypertensive medication use, blood pressure (BP) control, and appropriate response to uncontrolled BP. Pearson's correlation coefficient was used to assess how similar participants’ calculated earnings were between the data sources. Results By manual chart review data, 72.3% of patients were considered to have received guideline-recommended antihypertensive medications compared to 65.0% by AP-EHR review (k=0.51). Manual review indicated 69.5% of patients had controlled BP compared to 66.8% by AP-EHR review (k=0.87). Compared to 52.2% of patients per the manual review, 39.8% received an appropriate response by AP-EHR review (k=0.28). Participants’ incentive payments calculated using the two methods were highly correlated (r≥0.98). Using the AP-EHR data to calculate earnings, participants’ payment changes ranged from a decrease of $91.00 (−30.3%) to an increase of $18.20 (+7.4%) for medication use (IQR, −14.4% to 0%) and a decrease of $100.10 (−31.4%) to an increase of $36.40 (+15.4%) for BP control or appropriate response to uncontrolled BP (IQR, −11.9% to −6.1%). Conclusions Pay-for-performance plans that use only EHR data should carefully consider the measures and the structure of the EHR before data collection and financial incentive disbursement. For this study, we feel that a 10% difference in the total amount of incentive earnings disbursed based on AP-EHR data compared to manual review is acceptable given the time and resources required to abstract data from medical records. PMID:26340661

  13. The Creation of a Biofuels and Sustainable Agriculture Post-Secondary Curriculum: A True-Delphi Study

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Rubenstein, Eric D.; Thoron, Andrew C.

    2014-01-01

    Good paying jobs, access to education, and a healthy natural environment are essential for rural communities to remain competitive in the global economy. However, rural students interested in finding good paying jobs have left or are interested in leaving rural areas. Therefore, educational programs that assist educated youth in finding jobs in…

  14. 20 CFR 10.314 - Will OWCP pay for the services of an attendant?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-04-01

    ... 20 Employees' Benefits 1 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false Will OWCP pay for the services of an attendant? 10.314 Section 10.314 Employees' Benefits OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, DEPARTMENT OF...' COMPENSATION ACT, AS AMENDED Medical and Related Benefits Medical Treatment and Related Issues § 10.314 Will...

  15. College Board Delegates Argue Controversies of the Day: Productivity and Paying for College.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Evangelauf, Jean

    1987-01-01

    The annual meeting of the College Board focused on some of the most controversial issues facing higher education including: productivity, accountability, prepaid tuition plans, Guaranteed Student Loan (GSL) program, and one alternative to the G.S.L.--students could borrow from the government and then pay a higher Social Security tax. (MLW)

  16. District Awards for Teacher Excellence: Research Brief

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    National Center on Performance Incentives, 2010

    2010-01-01

    Since 2008 Texas's District Awards for Teacher Excellence (D.A.T.E.) program has provided grants to districts for the implementation of locally designed incentive pay plans. The 2010-11 school year is the third year of the D.A.T.E. incentive pay plans with approximately $197 million in annual state funding. This research brief summarizes the key…

  17. Pay Cable: A Viable Advertising Medium?

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Krugman, Dean M.; Barban, Arnold M.

    Cable television, which cannot only clarify local signals to weak signal areas but can also bring in distant signals to areas which have been receiving few signals, has the capacity to present special television programs to customers for extra fees. The number of pay cable subscribers is growing and industry projections are that it will reach 20…

  18. 13 CFR 123.104 - What interest rate will I pay on my home disaster loan?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... my home disaster loan? 123.104 Section 123.104 Business Credit and Assistance SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION DISASTER LOAN PROGRAM Home Disaster Loans § 123.104 What interest rate will I pay on my home disaster loan? If you can obtain credit elsewhere, your interest rate is set by a statutory formula, but...

  19. 13 CFR 123.104 - What interest rate will I pay on my home disaster loan?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... my home disaster loan? 123.104 Section 123.104 Business Credit and Assistance SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION DISASTER LOAN PROGRAM Home Disaster Loans § 123.104 What interest rate will I pay on my home disaster loan? If you can obtain credit elsewhere, your interest rate is set by a statutory formula, but...

  20. 13 CFR 123.104 - What interest rate will I pay on my home disaster loan?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... my home disaster loan? 123.104 Section 123.104 Business Credit and Assistance SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION DISASTER LOAN PROGRAM Home Disaster Loans § 123.104 What interest rate will I pay on my home disaster loan? If you can obtain credit elsewhere, your interest rate is set by a statutory formula, but...

  1. 13 CFR 123.104 - What interest rate will I pay on my home disaster loan?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... my home disaster loan? 123.104 Section 123.104 Business Credit and Assistance SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION DISASTER LOAN PROGRAM Home Disaster Loans § 123.104 What interest rate will I pay on my home disaster loan? If you can obtain credit elsewhere, your interest rate is set by a statutory formula, but...

  2. Effect of pay for performance to improve quality of maternal and child care in low- and middle-income countries: a systematic review.

    PubMed

    Das, Ashis; Gopalan, Saji S; Chandramohan, Daniel

    2016-04-14

    Pay for Performance (P4P) mechanisms to health facilities and providers are currently being tested in several low- and middle-income countries (LMIC) to improve maternal and child health (MCH). This paper reviews the existing evidence on the effect of P4P program on quality of MCH care in LMICs. A systematic review of literature was conducted according to a registered protocol. MEDLINE, Web of Science, and Embase were searched using the key words maternal care, quality of care, ante natal care, emergency obstetric and neonatal care (EmONC) and child care. Of 4535 records retrieved, only eight papers met the inclusion criteria. Primary outcome of interest was quality of MCH disaggregated into structural quality, process quality and outcomes. Risk of bias across studies was assessed through a customized quality checklist. There were four controlled before after intervention studies, three cluster randomized controlled trials and one case control with post-intervention comparison of P4P programs for MCH care in Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, the Philippines, and Rwanda. There is some evidence of positive effect of P4P only on process quality of MCH. The effect of P4P on delivery, EmONC, post natal care and under-five child care were not evaluated in these studies. There is weak evidence for P4P's positive effect on maternal and neonatal health outcomes and out-of-pocket expenses. P4P program had a few negative effects on structural quality. P4P is effective to improve process quality of ante natal care. However, further research is needed to understand P4P's impact on MCH and their causal pathways in LMICs. PROSPERO registration number CRD42014013077 .

  3. 20 CFR 30.302 - Who pays the costs associated with subpoenas?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-04-01

    ... LABOR ENERGY EMPLOYEES OCCUPATIONAL ILLNESS COMPENSATION PROGRAM ACT OF 2000 CLAIMS FOR COMPENSATION UNDER THE ENERGY EMPLOYEES OCCUPATIONAL ILLNESS COMPENSATION PROGRAM ACT OF 2000, AS AMENDED...

  4. 20 CFR 30.302 - Who pays the costs associated with subpoenas?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-04-01

    ... LABOR ENERGY EMPLOYEES OCCUPATIONAL ILLNESS COMPENSATION PROGRAM ACT OF 2000 CLAIMS FOR COMPENSATION UNDER THE ENERGY EMPLOYEES OCCUPATIONAL ILLNESS COMPENSATION PROGRAM ACT OF 2000, AS AMENDED...

  5. 20 CFR 30.302 - Who pays the costs associated with subpoenas?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-04-01

    ... LABOR ENERGY EMPLOYEES OCCUPATIONAL ILLNESS COMPENSATION PROGRAM ACT OF 2000 CLAIMS FOR COMPENSATION UNDER THE ENERGY EMPLOYEES OCCUPATIONAL ILLNESS COMPENSATION PROGRAM ACT OF 2000, AS AMENDED...

  6. 20 CFR 30.302 - Who pays the costs associated with subpoenas?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-04-01

    ... LABOR ENERGY EMPLOYEES OCCUPATIONAL ILLNESS COMPENSATION PROGRAM ACT OF 2000 CLAIMS FOR COMPENSATION UNDER THE ENERGY EMPLOYEES OCCUPATIONAL ILLNESS COMPENSATION PROGRAM ACT OF 2000, AS AMENDED...

  7. 20 CFR 30.302 - Who pays the costs associated with subpoenas?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-04-01

    ... LABOR ENERGY EMPLOYEES OCCUPATIONAL ILLNESS COMPENSATION PROGRAM ACT OF 2000 CLAIMS FOR COMPENSATION UNDER THE ENERGY EMPLOYEES OCCUPATIONAL ILLNESS COMPENSATION PROGRAM ACT OF 2000, AS AMENDED...

  8. 32 CFR 716.3 - Special situations.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... of a Reserve component who performs active duty, active duty for training, or inactive-duty training..., including special pay and incentive pay if appropriate, while performing such duties. (b) Death occurring while traveling to and from active duty for training and inactive-duty training. Any member of a Reserve...

  9. 48 CFR 313.301 - Government-wide commercial purchase card.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-10-01

    ..., Appendix B, “Improving the Management of Government Charge Card Programs;” GSA's SmartPay Program guidance; and HHS Purchase Card program standards. (2) The OPDIVs, through their designated Agency/Organization... training requirements to ensure effective implementation of the HHS purchase card program. (3) OPDIVs shall...

  10. Employee Reactions to Merit Pay: Cognitive Approach and Social Approach

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Wang, Yingchun

    2010-01-01

    The dissertation aims to tackle one of the most pressing questions facing the merit pay system researchers and practitioners: Why do merit pay raises have such a small effect on employees' satisfaction, commitment and job performance? My approach to the study of this question is to develop explanatory frameworks from two perspectives: cognitive…

  11. Partnering for Compensation Reform: Collaborations between Union and District Leadership in Four School Systems

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Sommerfeld, Meg

    2011-01-01

    A growing number of American school systems are experimenting with innovative and varied methods of tying educators' salaries more closely to their work through differential pay. Differential pay means paying teachers differently based on their performance, their responsibilities, and/or their teaching assignments. For instance, it can mean…

  12. Orthopaedic trauma care in Haiti: a cost-effectiveness analysis of an innovative surgical residency program.

    PubMed

    Carlson, Lucas C; Slobogean, Gerard P; Pollak, Andrew N

    2012-01-01

    In an effort to sustainably strengthen orthopaedic trauma care in Haiti, a 2-year Orthopaedic Trauma Care Specialist (OTCS) program for Haitian physicians has been developed. The program will provide focused training in orthopaedic trauma surgery and fracture care utilizing a train-the-trainer approach. The purpose of this analysis was to calculate the cost-effectiveness of the program relative to its potential to decrease disability in the Haitian population. Using established methodology originally outlined in the World Health Organization's Global Burden of Disease project, a cost-effectiveness analysis was performed for the OTCS program in Haiti. Costs and disability-adjusted life-years (DALYs) averted were estimated per fellow trained in the OTCS program by using a 20-year career time horizon. Probabilistic sensitivity analysis was used to simultaneously test the joint uncertainty of the cost and averted DALY estimates. A willingness-to-pay threshold of $1200 per DALY averted, equal to the gross domestic product per capita in Haiti, was selected on the basis of World Health Organization's definition of highly cost-effective health interventions. The OTCS program results in an incremental cost of $1,542,544 ± $109,134 and 12,213 ± 2,983 DALYs averted per fellow trained. The cost-effectiveness ratio of $133.97 ± $34.71 per DALY averted is well below the threshold of $1200 per DALY averted. Furthermore, sensitivity analysis suggests that implementing the OTCS program is the economically preferred strategy with more than 95% probability at a willingness-to-pay threshold of $200 per DALY averted and across the entire range of potential variable inputs. The current economic analysis suggests the OTCS program to be a highly cost-effective intervention. Probabilistic sensitivity analysis demonstrates that the conclusions remain stable even when considering the joint uncertainty of the cost and DALY estimates. Copyright © 2012 International Society for Pharmacoeconomics and Outcomes Research (ISPOR). Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

  13. Paying It Forward: A Technical Assistance Guide for Developing and Implementing Performance-Based Scholarships. The Performance-Based Scholarship Demonstration

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Welbeck, Rashida; Ware, Michelle; Cerna, Oscar; Valenzuela, Ireri

    2014-01-01

    Difficulties in paying for college and in maintaining good academic performance are two major hurdles to college graduation for low-income students. In recent years, state and federal budgets for postsecondary education have been cut significantly, limiting the options policymakers, education leaders, and communities have to improve rates of…

  14. Motivational Factors of Pay-for-Performance Plans in Educational Institutions: A Study of Select Private, Faith-Based Schools

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Wrobbel, Paul H.

    2009-01-01

    In the United States there is considerable focus on the need for continuous improvement in the quality of schools, including student achievement and teacher performance. Performance-based pay has been repeatedly suggested as a way to improve teaching in school systems. Therefore, a more thorough understanding of the differences in the perceptions…

  15. The Politics of Teacher Reform in Florida: Analyzing Causal Narratives Surrounding State Adoption of Performance-Based Evaluations, Performance Pay, and Tenure Elimination

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Harrison, Christopher; Cohen-Vogel, Lora

    2012-01-01

    Following a multiyear debate, Florida lawmakers passed the "Student Success Act" in March 2011, introducing some of the most sweeping educational reforms in the state's history--the introduction of teacher evaluation systems based on value-added modeling, mandatory "performance pay" for teachers, and the elimination of…

  16. The Implementation of Pay for Performance in Idaho Schools: A Case Study of Teacher Perceptions

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Staniec, Shelly Ann

    2013-01-01

    This is a qualitative narrative case study set in an Idaho high school where twelve educators offered their viewpoints on the implementation of Idaho's pay-for-performance legislation. In the spring of 2011, Idaho legislators passed laws aimed at increasing student performance and college or career readiness. These laws, known as Idaho's Students…

  17. Evaluation of the Teacher Incentive Fund: Implementation and Early Impacts of Pay-for-Performance after One Year. NCEE 2014-4019

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Max, Jeffrey; Constantine, Jill; Wellington, Alison; Hallgren, Kristin; Glazerman, Steven; Chiang, Hanley; Speroni, Cecilia

    2014-01-01

    The Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) provides grants to support performance-based compensation systems for teachers and principals in high-need schools. The study measures the impact of pay-for-performance bonuses as part of a comprehensive compensation system within a large, multisite random assignment study design. The treatment schools were to…

  18. Evaluation of the Teacher Incentive Fund: Implementation and Impacts of Pay-for-Performance after Two Years. NCEE 2015-4020

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Chiang, Hanley; Wellington, Alison; Hallgren, Kristin; Speroni, Cecilia; Herrmann, Mariesa; Glazerman, Steven; Constantine, Jill

    2015-01-01

    The Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) provides grants to support performance-based compensation systems for teachers and principals in high-need schools. The study measures the impact of pay-for-performance bonuses as part of a comprehensive compensation system within a large, multisite random assignment study design. The treatment schools were to…

  19. Cost sharing and hereditary cancer risk: predictors of willingness-to-pay for genetic testing.

    PubMed

    Matro, Jennifer M; Ruth, Karen J; Wong, Yu-Ning; McCully, Katen C; Rybak, Christina M; Meropol, Neal J; Hall, Michael J

    2014-12-01

    Increasing use of predictive genetic testing to gauge hereditary cancer risk has been paralleled by rising cost-sharing practices. Little is known about how demographic and psychosocial factors may influence individuals' willingness-to-pay for genetic testing. The Gastrointestinal Tumor Risk Assessment Program Registry includes individuals presenting for genetic risk assessment based on personal/family cancer history. Participants complete a baseline survey assessing cancer history and psychosocial items. Willingness-to-pay items include intention for: genetic testing only if paid by insurance; testing with self-pay; and amount willing-to-pay ($25-$2,000). Multivariable models examined predictors of willingness-to-pay out-of-pocket (versus only if paid by insurance) and willingness-to-pay a smaller versus larger sum (≤$200 vs. ≥$500). All statistical tests are two-sided (α = 0.05). Of 385 evaluable participants, a minority (42%) had a personal cancer history, while 56% had ≥1 first-degree relative with colorectal cancer. Overall, 21.3% were willing to have testing only if paid by insurance, and 78.7% were willing-to-pay. Predictors of willingness-to-pay were: 1) concern for positive result; 2) confidence to control cancer risk; 3) fewer perceived barriers to colorectal cancer screening; 4) benefit of testing to guide screening (all p < 0.05). Subjects willing-to-pay a higher amount were male, more educated, had greater cancer worry, fewer relatives with colorectal cancer, and more positive attitudes toward genetic testing (all p < 0.05). Individuals seeking risk assessment are willing-to-pay out-of-pocket for genetic testing, and anticipate benefits to reducing cancer risk. Identifying factors associated with willingness-to-pay for genetic services is increasingly important as testing is integrated into routine cancer care.

  20. Cost sharing and hereditary cancer risk: Predictors of willingness-to-pay for genetic testing

    PubMed Central

    Matro, Jennifer M.; Ruth, Karen J.; Wong, Yu-Ning; McCully, Katen C.; Rybak, Christina M.; Meropol, Neal J.; Hall, Michael J.

    2015-01-01

    Increasing use of predictive genetic testing to gauge hereditary cancer risk has been paralleled by rising cost-sharing practices. Little is known about how demographic and psychosocial factors may influence individuals’ willingness-to-pay for genetic testing. The Gastrointestinal Tumor Risk Assessment Program Registry includes individuals presenting for genetic risk assessment based on personal/family cancer history. Participants complete a baseline survey assessing cancer history and psychosocial items. Willingness-to-pay items include intention for: genetic testing only if paid by insurance; testing with self-pay; and amount willing-to-pay ($25–$2000). Multivariable models examined predictors of willingness-to-pay out-of-pocket (versus only if paid by insurance) and willingness-to-pay a smaller versus larger sum (≤200 vs. ≥$500). All statistical tests are two-sided (α=0.05). Of 385 evaluable participants, a minority (42%) had a personal cancer history, while 56% had ≥1 first-degree relative with colorectal cancer. Overall, 21.3% were willing to have testing only if paid by insurance, and 78.7% were willing-to-pay. Predictors of willingness-to-pay were: 1) concern for positive result; 2) confidence to control cancer risk; 3) fewer perceived barriers to colorectal cancer screening; 4) benefit of testing to guide screening (all p<0.05). Subjects willing-to-pay a higher amount were male, more educated, had greater cancer worry, fewer relatives with colorectal cancer, and more positive attitudes toward genetic testing (all p<0.05). Individuals seeking risk assessment are willing-to-pay out-of-pocket for genetic testing, and anticipate benefits to reducing cancer risk. Identifying factors associated with willingness-to-pay for genetic services is increasingly important as testing is integrated into routine cancer care. PMID:24794065

Top