High level waste storage tank farms/242-A evaporator standards/requirements identification document phase 1 assessment corrective actions/compliance schedule approval report

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Biebesheimer, E.

This document, the Standards/Requirements Identification Document (S/RID) Phase I Assessment Corrective Actions/Compliance Schedule Approval Report for the subject facility, contains the corrective actions required to bring the facility into compliance as a result of an Administrative Assessment to determine whether S/RID requirements are fully addressed by existing policies, plans or procedures. These actions are delineated in the Compliance Schedule Approvals which also contain; noncompliances, risks, compensatory measures, schedules for corrective actions, justifications for approval, and resource impacts.

Developing effective warning systems: Ongoing research at Ruapehu volcano, New Zealand

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Leonard, Graham S.; Johnston, David M.; Paton, Douglas; Christianson, Amy; Becker, Julia; Keys, Harry

2008-05-01

PurposeThis paper examines the unique challenges to volcanic risk management associated with having a ski area on an active volcano. Using a series of simulated eruption/lahar events at Ruapehu volcano, New Zealand, as a context, a model of risk management that integrates warning system design and technology, risk perceptions and the human response is explored. Principal resultsDespite increases in the observed audibility and comprehension of the warning message, recall of public education content, and people's awareness of volcanic risk, a persistent minority of the public continued to demonstrate only moderate awareness of the correct actions to take during a warning and failed to respond effectively. A relationship between level of staff competence and correct public response allowed the level of public response to be used to identify residual risk and additional staff training needs. The quality of staff awareness, action and decision-making has emerged as a critical factor, from detailed staff and public interviews and from exercise observations. Staff actions are especially important for mobilising correct public response at Ruapehu ski areas due to the transient nature of the visitor population. Introduction of education material and staff training strategies that included the development of emergency decision-making competencies improved knowledge of correct actions, and increased the proportion of people moving out of harm's way during blind tests. Major conclusionsWarning effectiveness is a function of more than good hazard knowledge and the generation and notification of an early warning message. For warning systems to be effective, these factors must be complemented by accurate knowledge of risk and risk management actions. By combining the Ruapehu findings with those of other warning system studies in New Zealand, and internationally, a practical five-step model for effective early warning systems is discussed. These steps must be based upon sound and regularly updated underpinning science and be tied to formal effectiveness evaluation, which is fed back into system improvements. The model presented emphasises human considerations, the development of which arguably require even more effort than the hardware components of early warning systems.

Use of failure mode effect analysis (FMEA) to improve medication management process.

PubMed

Jain, Khushboo

2017-03-13

Purpose Medication management is a complex process, at high risk of error with life threatening consequences. The focus should be on devising strategies to avoid errors and make the process self-reliable by ensuring prevention of errors and/or error detection at subsequent stages. The purpose of this paper is to use failure mode effect analysis (FMEA), a systematic proactive tool, to identify the likelihood and the causes for the process to fail at various steps and prioritise them to devise risk reduction strategies to improve patient safety. Design/methodology/approach The study was designed as an observational analytical study of medication management process in the inpatient area of a multi-speciality hospital in Gurgaon, Haryana, India. A team was made to study the complex process of medication management in the hospital. FMEA tool was used. Corrective actions were developed based on the prioritised failure modes which were implemented and monitored. Findings The percentage distribution of medication errors as per the observation made by the team was found to be maximum of transcription errors (37 per cent) followed by administration errors (29 per cent) indicating the need to identify the causes and effects of their occurrence. In all, 11 failure modes were identified out of which major five were prioritised based on the risk priority number (RPN). The process was repeated after corrective actions were taken which resulted in about 40 per cent (average) and around 60 per cent reduction in the RPN of prioritised failure modes. Research limitations/implications FMEA is a time consuming process and requires a multidisciplinary team which has good understanding of the process being analysed. FMEA only helps in identifying the possibilities of a process to fail, it does not eliminate them, additional efforts are required to develop action plans and implement them. Frank discussion and agreement among the team members is required not only for successfully conducing FMEA but also for implementing the corrective actions. Practical implications FMEA is an effective proactive risk-assessment tool and is a continuous process which can be continued in phases. The corrective actions taken resulted in reduction in RPN, subjected to further evaluation and usage by others depending on the facility type. Originality/value The application of the tool helped the hospital in identifying failures in medication management process, thereby prioritising and correcting them leading to improvement.

40 CFR 280.42 - Requirements for hazardous substance UST systems.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-07-01

... (CONTINUED) SOLID WASTES (CONTINUED) TECHNICAL STANDARDS AND CORRECTIVE ACTION REQUIREMENTS FOR OWNERS AND... effective corrective action technologies, health risks, and chemical and physical properties of the stored...

DETERMINATION OF TRANSFORMATION RATES OF CHIRAL PESTICIDES AND PCBS IN SOIL AND SEDIMENT MICROCOSMS

EPA Science Inventory

Risk Based Corrective Action (RBCA) has gained widespread acceptance as a favorable approach to remediating contaminated sites. The use of RBCA methods often requires computer-based modeling to assess the fate and transport of hazardous contaminants in subsurface environments, a...

Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 219: Septic Systems and Injection Wells, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Rev. No.: 0

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

David Strand

2006-05-01

This Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report has been prepared for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 219, Septic Systems and Injection Wells, in Areas 3, 16, and 23 of the Nevada Test Site, Nevada, in accordance with the ''Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order'' (1996). Corrective Action Unit 219 is comprised of the following corrective action sites (CASs): (1) 03-11-01, Steam Pipes and Asbestos Tiles; (2) 16-04-01, Septic Tanks (3); (3) 16-04-02, Distribution Box; (4) 16-04-03, Sewer Pipes; (5) 23-20-01, DNA Motor Pool Sewage and Waste System; and (6) 23-20-02, Injection Well. The purpose of this Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report ismore » to provide justification and documentation supporting the recommendation for closure of CAU 219 with no further corrective action beyond the application of a use restriction at CASs 16-04-01, 16-04-02, and 16-04-03. To achieve this, corrective action investigation (CAI) activities were performed from June 20 through October 12, 2005, as set forth in the CAU 219 Corrective Action Investigation Plan and Record of Technical Change No. 1. A best management practice was implemented at CASs 16-04-01, 16-04-02, and 16-04-03, and corrective action was performed at CAS 23-20-01 between January and April 2006. In addition, a use restriction will be applied to CASs 16-04-01, 16-04-02, and 16-04-03 to provide additional protection to Nevada Test Site personnel. The purpose of the CAI was to fulfill the following data needs as defined during the data quality objective (DQO) process: (1) Determine whether contaminants of concern (COCs) are present. (2) If COCs are present, determine their nature and extent. (3) Provide sufficient information and data to complete appropriate corrective actions. The CAU 219 dataset from the investigation results was evaluated based on the data quality indicator parameters. This evaluation demonstrated the quality and acceptability of the dataset for use in fulfilling the DQO data needs. Analytes detected during the CAI were evaluated against final action levels (FALs) established in this document. A Tier 2 evaluation was conducted, and a FAL of 185,000 micrograms per kilogram was calculated for chlordane at CASs 16-04-01, 16-04-02, and 16-04-03 based on an occasional use area exposure scenario. This evaluation of chlordane based on the Tier 2 FAL determined that no FALs were exceeded. Therefore, the DQO data needs were met, and it was determined that no corrective action (based on risk to human receptors) is necessary for the site. The following contaminants were determined to be present at concentrations exceeding their corresponding FALs: (1) The surface soil surrounding the main concrete pad at CAS 23-20-01 contained Aroclor-1254, Aroclor-1260, and chlordane above the FALs. This soil, along with the COCs, was subsequently removed at CAS 23-20-01. (2) The sludge in the concrete box of the catch basin at the large concrete pad at CAS 23-20-01 contained lead and benzo(a)pyrene above the FALs. This contamination was limited to the sludge in the concrete box of the catch basin and did not migrate to the subsurface features beneath it. The contaminated and the concrete box of the catch basin were subsequently recovered at CAS 23-20-01.« less

Addendum to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 427: Area 3 Septic Waste Systems 2, 6, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, Revision 0

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Lynn Kidman

This document constitutes an addendum to the April 1999, Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 427: Area 3 Septic Waste Systems 2, 6, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada as described in the document Recommendations and Justifications for Modifications for Use Restrictions Established under the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (UR Modification document) dated February 2008. The UR Modification document was approved by NDEP on February 26, 2008. The approval of the UR Modification document constituted approval of each of the recommended UR modifications. In conformance with the UR Modificationmore » document, this addendum consists of: • This cover page that refers the reader to the UR Modification document for additional information • The cover and signature pages of the UR Modification document • The NDEP approval letter • The corresponding section of the UR Modification document This addendum provides the documentation justifying the cancellation of the URs for: • CAS 03-05-002-SW02, Septic Waste System • CAS 03-05-002-SW06, Septic Waste System These URs were established as part of Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) corrective actions and were based on the presence of contaminants at concentrations greater than the action levels established at the time of the initial investigation (FFACO, 1996; as amended August 2006). Since these URs were established, practices and procedures relating to the implementation of risk-based corrective actions (RBCA) have changed. Therefore, these URs were re-evaluated against the current RBCA criteria as defined in the Industrial Sites Project Establishment of Final Action Levels (NNSA/NSO, 2006c). This re-evaluation consisted of comparing the original data (used to define the need for the URs) to risk-based final action levels (FALs) developed using the current Industrial Sites RBCA process. The re-evaluation resulted in a recommendation to remove these URs because contamination is not present at these sites above the risk-based FALs. Requirements for inspecting and maintaining these URs will be canceled, and the postings and signage at each site will be removed. Fencing and posting may be present at these sites that are unrelated to the FFACO URs such as for radiological control purposes as required by the NV/YMP Radiological Control Manual (NNSA/NSO, 2004f). This modification will not affect or modify any non-FFACO requirements for fencing, posting, or monitoring at these sites.« less

Addendum to the Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 452: Historical Underground Storage Tank Release Sites, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Grant Evenson

This document constitutes an addendum to the Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 452: Historical Underground Storage Tank Release Sites, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, April 1998 as described in the document Supplemental Investigation Report for FFACO Use Restrictions, Nevada Test Site, Nevada (SIR) dated November 2008. The SIR document was approved by NDEP on December 5, 2008. The approval of the SIR document constituted approval of each of the recommended UR removals. In conformance with the SIR document, this addendum consists of: • This page that refers the reader to the SIR document for additionalmore » information • The cover, title, and signature pages of the SIR document • The NDEP approval letter • The corresponding section of the SIR document This addendum provides the documentation justifying the cancellation of the URs for CASs: • 25-25-09, Spill H940825C (from UST 25-3101-1) • 25-25-14, Spill H940314E (from UST 25-3102-3) • 25-25-15, Spill H941020E (from UST 25-3152-1) These URs were established as part of Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) corrective actions and were based on the presence of contaminants at concentrations greater than the action levels established at the time of the initial investigation (FFACO, 1996). Since these URs were established, practices and procedures relating to the implementation of risk-based corrective actions (RBCA) have changed. Therefore, these URs were re-evaluated against the current RBCA criteria as defined in the Industrial Sites Project Establishment of Final Action Levels (NNSA/NSO, 2006). This re-evaluation consisted of comparing the original data (used to define the need for the URs) to risk-based final action levels (FALs) developed using the current Industrial Sites RBCA process. The re-evaluation resulted in a recommendation to remove these URs because contamination is not present at these sites above the risk-based FALs. Requirements for inspecting and maintaining these URs will be canceled, and the postings and signage at each site will be removed. Fencing and posting may be present at these sites that are unrelated to the FFACO URs such as for radiological control purposes as required by the NV/YMP Radiological Control Manual (NNSA/NSO, 2004). This modification will not affect or modify any non-FFACO requirements for fencing, posting, or monitoring at these sites.« less

Addendum to the Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 454: Historical Undrground Storage Tank Release Sites, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Lynn Kidman

This document constitutes an addendum to the April 1998, Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 454: Historical Underground Storage Tank Release Sites as described in the document Recommendations and Justifications for Modifications for Use Restrictions Established under the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (UR Modification document) dated February 2008. The UR Modification document was approved by NDEP on February 26, 2008. The approval of the UR Modification document constituted approval of each of the recommended UR modifications. In conformance with the UR Modificationmore » document, this addendum consists of: • This cover page that refers the reader to the UR Modification document for additional information • The cover and signature pages of the UR Modification document • The NDEP approval letter • The corresponding section of the UR Modification document This addendum provides the documentation justifying the cancellation of the UR for CAS 12-25-09, Spill 960722-02 (from UST 12-B-3). This UR was established as part of a Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) corrective action and is based on the presence of contaminants at concentrations greater than the action levels established at the time of the initial investigation (FFACO, 1996; as amended August 2006). Since this UR was established, practices and procedures relating to the implementation of risk-based corrective actions (RBCA) have changed. Therefore, this UR was re-evaluated against the current RBCA criteria as defined in the Industrial Sites Project Establishment of Final Action Levels (NNSA/NSO, 2006c). This re-evaluation consisted of comparing the original data (used to define the need for the UR) to risk-based final action levels (FALs) developed using the current Industrial Sites RBCA process. The re-evaluation resulted in a recommendation to remove the UR because contamination is not present at the site above the risk-based FALs. Requirements for inspecting and maintaining this UR will be canceled, and the postings and signage at this site will be removed. Fencing and posting may be present at this site that are unrelated to the FFACO UR such as for radiological control purposes as required by the NV/YMP Radiological Control Manual (NNSA/NSO, 2004f). This modification will not affect or modify any non-FFACO requirements for fencing, posting, or monitoring at this site.« less

Addendum to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 335: Area 6 Injection Well and Drain Pit Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revison 0

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Lynn Kidman

This document constitutes an addendum to the June 2003, Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 335: Area 6 Injection Well and Drain Pit as described in the document Recommendations and Justifications for Modifications for Use Restrictions Established under the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (UR Modification document) dated February 2008. The UR Modification document was approved by NDEP on February 26, 2008. The approval of the UR Modification document constituted approval of each of the recommended UR modifications. In conformance with the UR Modification document, this addendum consistsmore » of: • This cover page that refers the reader to the UR Modification document for additional information • The cover and signature pages of the UR Modification document • The NDEP approval letter • The corresponding section of the UR Modification document This addendum provides the documentation justifying the cancellation of the URs for: • CAS 06-20-02, 20-inch Cased Hole • CAS 06-23-03, Drain Pit These URs were established as part of Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) corrective actions and were based on the presence of contaminants at concentrations greater than the action levels established at the time of the initial investigation (FFACO, 1996; as amended August 2006). Since these URs were established, practices and procedures relating to the implementation of risk-based corrective actions (RBCA) have changed. Therefore, these URs were re-evaluated against the current RBCA criteria as defined in the Industrial Sites Project Establishment of Final Action Levels (NNSA/NSO, 2006c). This re-evaluation consisted of comparing the original data (used to define the need for the URs) to risk-based final action levels (FALs) developed using the current Industrial Sites RBCA process. The re-evaluation resulted in a recommendation to remove these URs because contamination is not present at these sites above the risk-based FALs. Requirements for inspecting and maintaining these URs will be canceled, and the postings and signage at each site will be removed. Fencing and posting may be present at these sites that are unrelated to the FFACO URs such as for radiological control purposes as required by the NV/YMP Radiological Control Manual (NNSA/NSO, 2004f). This modification will not affect or modify any non-FFACO requirements for fencing, posting, or monitoring at these sites.« less

Addendum to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 356: Mud Pits and Disposal Sites Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Lynn Kidman

This document constitutes an addendum to the November 2002, Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 356: Mud Pits and Disposal Sites as described in the document Recommendations and Justifications for Modifications for Use Restrictions Established under the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (UR Modification document) dated February 2008. The UR Modification document was approved by NDEP on February 26, 2008. The approval of the UR Modification document constituted approval of each of the recommended UR modifications. In conformance with the UR Modification document, this addendum consists of: •more » This cover page that refers the reader to the UR Modification document for additional information • The cover and signature pages of the UR Modification document • The NDEP approval letter • The corresponding section of the UR Modification document This addendum provides the documentation justifying the cancellation of the URs for: • CAS 03-04-01, Area 3 Change House Septic System • CAS 03-09-04, Mud Pit These URs were established as part of Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) corrective actions and were based on the presence of contaminants at concentrations greater than the action levels established at the time of the initial investigation (FFACO, 1996; as amended August 2006). Since these URs were established, practices and procedures relating to the implementation of risk-based corrective actions (RBCA) have changed. Therefore, these URs were re-evaluated against the current RBCA criteria as defined in the Industrial Sites Project Establishment of Final Action Levels (NNSA/NSO, 2006c). This re-evaluation consisted of comparing the original data (used to define the need for the URs) to risk-based final action levels (FALs) developed using the current Industrial Sites RBCA process. The re-evaluation resulted in a recommendation to remove these URs because contamination is not present at these sites above the risk-based FALs. Requirements for inspecting and maintaining these URs will be canceled, and the postings and signage at each site will be removed. Fencing and posting may be present at these sites that are unrelated to the FFACO URs such as for radiological control purposes as required by the NV/YMP Radiological Control Manual (NNSA/NSO, 2004f). This modification will not affect or modify any non-FFACO requirements for fencing, posting, or monitoring at these sites.« less

Addendum to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 398: Area 25 Spill Sites, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Lynn Kidman

This document constitutes an addendum to the April 2003, Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 398: Area 25 Spill Sites as described in the document Recommendations and Justifications for Modifications for Use Restrictions Established under the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (UR Modification document) dated February 2008. The UR Modification document was approved by NDEP on February 26, 2008. The approval of the UR Modification document constituted approval of each of the recommended UR modifications. In conformance with the UR Modification document, this addendum consists of: • Thismore » cover page that refers the reader to the UR Modification document for additional information • The cover and signature pages of the UR Modification document • The NDEP approval letter • The corresponding section of the UR Modification document This addendum provides the documentation justifying the cancellation of the UR for CAS 25-25-17, Subsurface Hydraulic Oil Spill. This UR was established as part of a Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) corrective action and is based on the presence of contaminants at concentrations greater than the action levels established at the time of the initial investigation (FFACO, 1996; as amended August 2006). Since this UR was established, practices and procedures relating to the implementation of risk-based corrective actions (RBCA) have changed. Therefore, this UR was re-evaluated against the current RBCA criteria as defined in the Industrial Sites Project Establishment of Final Action Levels (NNSA/NSO, 2006c). This re-evaluation consisted of comparing the original data (used to define the need for the UR) to risk-based final action levels (FALs) developed using the current Industrial Sites RBCA process. The re-evaluation resulted in a recommendation to remove the UR because contamination is not present at the site above the risk-based FALs. Requirements for inspecting and maintaining this UR will be canceled, and the postings and signage at this site will be removed. Fencing and posting may be present at this site that are unrelated to the FFACO UR such as for radiological control purposes as required by the NV/YMP Radiological Control Manual (NNSA/NSO, 2004f). This modification will not affect or modify any non-FFACO requirements for fencing, posting, or monitoring at this site.« less

Addendum 2 to the Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 454: Historical Underground Storage Tank Release Sites, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Grant Evenson

This document constitutes an addendum to the Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 454: Historical Underground Storage Tank Release Sites, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, April 1998 as described in the document Supplemental Investigation Report for FFACO Use Restrictions, Nevada Test Site, Nevada (SIR) dated November 2008. The SIR document was approved by NDEP on December 5, 2008. The approval of the SIR document constituted approval of each of the recommended UR removals. In conformance with the SIR document, this addendum consists of: • This page that refers the reader to the SIR document for additionalmore » information • The cover, title, and signature pages of the SIR document • The NDEP approval letter • The corresponding section of the SIR document This addendum provides the documentation justifying the cancellation of the URs for CASs: • 12-25-08, Spill H950524F (from UST 12-B-1) • 12-25-10, Spill H950919A (from UST 12-COMM-1) These URs were established as part of Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) corrective actions and were based on the presence of contaminants at concentrations greater than the action levels established at the time of the initial investigation (FFACO, 1996). Since these URs were established, practices and procedures relating to the implementation of risk-based corrective actions (RBCA) have changed. Therefore, these URs were re-evaluated against the current RBCA criteria as defined in the Industrial Sites Project Establishment of Final Action Levels (NNSA/NSO, 2006). This re-evaluation consisted of comparing the original data (used to define the need for the URs) to risk-based final action levels (FALs) developed using the current Industrial Sites RBCA process. The re-evaluation resulted in a recommendation to remove these URs because contamination is not present at these sites above the risk-based FALs. Requirements for inspecting and maintaining these URs will be canceled, and the postings and signage at each site will be removed. Fencing and posting may be present at these sites that are unrelated to the FFACO URs such as for radiological control purposes as required by the NV/YMP Radiological Control Manual (NNSA/NSO, 2004). This modification will not affect or modify any non-FFACO requirements for fencing, posting, or monitoring at these sites.« less

Addendum to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 423: Area 3 Building 03-60 Underground Discharge Point, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, Revision 0

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Lynn Kidman

This document constitutes an addendum to the July 1999, Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 423: Area 3 Building 0360 Underground Discharge Point, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada as described in the document Recommendations and Justifications for Modifications for Use Restrictions Established under the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (UR Modification document) dated February 2008. The UR Modification document was approved by NDEP on February 26, 2008. The approval of the UR Modification document constituted approval of each of the recommended UR modifications. In conformance with the UR Modificationmore » document, this addendum consists of: • This cover page that refers the reader to the UR Modification document for additional information • The cover and signature pages of the UR Modification document • The NDEP approval letter • The corresponding section of the UR Modification document This addendum provides the documentation justifying the cancellation of the UR for CAS 03-02-002-0308, Underground Discharge Point. This UR was established as part of a Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) corrective action and is based on the presence of contaminants at concentrations greater than the action levels established at the time of the initial investigation (FFACO, 1996; as amended August 2006). Since this UR was established, practices and procedures relating to the implementation of risk-based corrective actions (RBCA) have changed. Therefore, this UR was re-evaluated against the current RBCA criteria as defined in the Industrial Sites Project Establishment of Final Action Levels (NNSA/NSO, 2006c). This re-evaluation consisted of comparing the original data (used to define the need for the UR) to risk-based final action levels (FALs) developed using the current Industrial Sites RBCA process. The re-evaluation resulted in a recommendation to remove the UR because contamination is not present at the site above the risk-based FALs. Requirements for inspecting and maintaining this UR will be canceled, and the postings and signage at this site will be removed. Fencing and posting may be present at this site that are unrelated to the FFACO UR such as for radiological control purposes as required by the NV/YMP Radiological Control Manual (NNSA/NSO, 2004f). This modification will not affect or modify any non-FFACO requirements for fencing, posting, or monitoring at this site.« less

Addendum to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 214: Bunkers and Storage Areas Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Lynn Kidman

This document constitutes an addendum to the September 2006, Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 214: Bunkers and Storage Areas as described in the document Recommendations and Justifications for Modifications for Use Restrictions Established under the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (UR Modification document) dated February 2008. The UR Modification document was approved by NDEP on February 26, 2008. The approval of the UR Modification document constituted approval of each of the recommended UR modifications. In conformance with the UR Modification document, this addendum consists of: • Thismore » cover page that refers the reader to the UR Modification document for additional information • The cover and signature pages of the UR Modification document • The NDEP approval letter • The corresponding section of the UR Modification document This addendum provides the documentation justifying the cancellation of the URs for: • CAS 25-23-01, Contaminated Materials • CAS 25-23-19, Radioactive Material Storage These URs were established as part of Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) corrective actions and were based on the presence of contaminants at concentrations greater than the action levels established at the time of the initial investigation (FFACO, 1996; as amended August 2006). Since these URs were established, practices and procedures relating to the implementation of risk-based corrective actions (RBCA) have changed. Therefore, these URs were re-evaluated against the current RBCA criteria as defined in the Industrial Sites Project Establishment of Final Action Levels (NNSA/NSO, 2006c). This re-evaluation consisted of comparing the original data (used to define the need for the URs) to risk-based final action levels (FALs) developed using the current Industrial Sites RBCA process. The re-evaluation resulted in a recommendation to remove these URs because contamination is not present at these sites above the risk-based FALs. Requirements for inspecting and maintaining these URs will be canceled, and the postings and signage at each site will be removed. Fencing and posting may be present at these sites that are unrelated to the FFACO URs such as for radiological control purposes as required by the NV/YMP Radiological Control Manual (NNSA/NSO, 2004f). This modification will not affect or modify any non-FFACO requirements for fencing, posting, or monitoring at these sites.« less

Addendum to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 342: Area 23 Mercury Fire Training Pit Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Lynn Kidman

This document constitutes an addendum to the April 2000, Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 342: Area 23 Mercury Fire Training Pit as described in the document Recommendations and Justifications for Modifications for Use Restrictions Established under the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (UR Modification document) dated February 2008. The UR Modification document was approved by NDEP on February 26, 2008. The approval of the UR Modification document constituted approval of each of the recommended UR modifications. In conformance with the UR Modification document, this addendum consists of:more » • This cover page that refers the reader to the UR Modification document for additional information • The cover and signature pages of the UR Modification document • The NDEP approval letter • The corresponding section of the UR Modification document This addendum provides the documentation justifying the cancellation of the UR for CAS 23-56-01, Former Mercury Fire Training Pit. This UR was established as part of a Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) corrective action and is based on the presence of contaminants at concentrations greater than the action levels established at the time of the initial investigation (FFACO, 1996; as amended August 2006). Since this UR was established, practices and procedures relating to the implementation of risk-based corrective actions (RBCA) have changed. Therefore, this UR was re-evaluated against the current RBCA criteria as defined in the Industrial Sites Project Establishment of Final Action Levels (NNSA/NSO, 2006c). This re-evaluation consisted of comparing the original data (used to define the need for the UR) to risk-based final action levels (FALs) developed using the current Industrial Sites RBCA process. The re-evaluation resulted in a recommendation to remove the UR because contamination is not present at the site above the risk-based FALs. Requirements for inspecting and maintaining this UR will be canceled, and the postings and signage at this site will be removed. Fencing and posting may be present at this site that are unrelated to the FFACO UR such as for radiological control purposes as required by the NV/YMP Radiological Control Manual (NNSA/NSO, 2004f). This modification will not affect or modify any non-FFACO requirements for fencing, posting, or monitoring at this site.« less

Addendum to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 322: Areas 1 & 3 Release Sites and Injection Wells Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Lynn Kidman

This document constitutes an addendum to the June 2006, Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 322: Areas 1 & 3 Release Sites and Injection Wells as described in the document Recommendations and Justifications for Modifications for Use Restrictions Established under the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (UR Modification document) dated February 2008. The UR Modification document was approved by NDEP on February 26, 2008. The approval of the UR Modification document constituted approval of each of the recommended UR modifications. In conformance with the UR Modification document, thismore » addendum consists of: • This cover page that refers the reader to the UR Modification document for additional information • The cover and signature pages of the UR Modification document • The NDEP approval letter • The corresponding section of the UR Modification document This addendum provides the documentation justifying the cancellation of the URs for: • CAS 01-25-01, AST Release • CAS 03-25-03, Mud Plant AST Diesel Release These URs were established as part of Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) corrective actions and were based on the presence of contaminants at concentrations greater than the action levels established at the time of the initial investigation (FFACO, 1996; as amended August 2006). Since these URs were established, practices and procedures relating to the implementation of risk-based corrective actions (RBCA) have changed. Therefore, these URs were re-evaluated against the current RBCA criteria as defined in the Industrial Sites Project Establishment of Final Action Levels (NNSA/NSO, 2006c). This re-evaluation consisted of comparing the original data (used to define the need for the URs) to risk-based final action levels (FALs) developed using the current Industrial Sites RBCA process. The re-evaluation resulted in a recommendation to remove these URs because contamination is not present at these sites above the risk-based FALs. Requirements for inspecting and maintaining these URs will be canceled, and the postings and signage at each site will be removed. Fencing and posting may be present at these sites that are unrelated to the FFACO URs such as for radiological control purposes as required by the NV/YMP Radiological Control Manual (NNSA/NSO, 2004f). This modification will not affect or modify any non-FFACO requirements for fencing, posting, or monitoring at these sites.« less

MO-G-BRE-08: Taxonomy of Corrective Actions in Radiotherapy

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Sutlief, S; Brown, D

2014-06-15

Purpose: Various causal taxonomies have been developed for healthcare incidents and for radiation therapy in particular. The causal analysis of incidents leads to corrective actions which can also be organized into a taxonomy. Such a corrective action classification system would provide information about the situational context, the action type, and the leverage of the action in order to detect patterns in the corrective actions frequently employed in radiation therapy. It would also provide practical guidance to the radiation therapy community for determining the appropriateness and potential effectiveness of proposed corrective actions. Materials: A review of causal analysis reports and correctivemore » action plans was conducted using the following sources: US NRC medical event reports, IAEA reports, ROSIS submissions, US Veterans Health Administration reports, and singleincident report sources. The corrective actions presented in the published sources were then mapped onto four corrective action taxonomy prototypes: role-based, safety-context-based, responsibility-based, and hierarchy of hazard control. The resulting corrective action taxonomy was then validated through use of the published sources. Results: The responsibility-based taxonomy and hierarchy of hazard taxonomy provided more intuitive and sensible categories than the role-based taxonomy or the safety-context taxonomy. The most frequent corrective actions were added safety barriers, training, process standardization, and development of a quality improvement program where one was lacking. Conclusion: Published corrective action statements in radiation therapy emphasize what to do more so than whom the recipient is or which process step is affected. The hierarchy of hazard taxonomy provides a suitable framework for radiation therapy and has the advantage of providing insight into the likelihood that a particular corrective action will mitigate the recurrence of the error it was meant to correct. This information would be useful to medical center administration, safety personnel, and regulators who must assess the projected efficacy of corrective actions. Derek Brown is a director of TreatSafely, LLC.« less

Effect of gender on awareness of cardiovascular risk factors, preventive action taken, and barriers to cardiovascular health in a group of Austrian subjects.

PubMed

Haidinger, Teresa; Zweimüller, Martin; Stütz, Lena; Demir, Dondue; Kaider, Alexandra; Strametz-Juranek, Jeanette

2012-04-01

The incidence of cardiovascular disease (CVD) is increasing in industrialized countries. Preventive action is an important factor in minimizing CVD-associated morbidity and mortality. However, it is not known whether gender differences affect CVD or risk factor awareness influencing self-assessment of personal risk and preventive action. This study was performed to assess individual CVD and risk factor awareness, preventive action taken, and barriers to cardiovascular health. The study included 573 women and 336 men, randomly chosen to complete an anonymous questionnaire to assess individual CVD and risk factor awareness, preventive action taken, and barriers to cardiovascular health. The data were analyzed using SAS software. Cardiovascular disease was identified in 75% of patients, in both sexes, as the leading cause of death; however, both groups showed significant lack of knowledge about CVD risk factors. Type 2 diabetes was identified correctly in only 27.5%. Preventive action was linked more often to family members in 66.5% of women and 62.8% of men. The primary barrier to cardiovascular health in adults was incorrect assessment of personal CVD risk. More than half of female respondents (56.4%) and male respondents (52.7%) underestimated their risk of CVD. Knowledge about risk factors for CVD needs to be improved in members of both sexes. Because women, in particular, have difficulty in correctly assessing their personal CVD risk, future education programs are warranted to inform both women and men about CVD and its risk factors, thereby helping them to correctly assess their individual risk. However, greater effort is needed to inform men, compared with women, about the various ways in which to prevent CVD and to motivate them to take preventive action. Copyright © 2012 Elsevier HS Journals, Inc. All rights reserved.

[Quality assurance of hospital medical records as a risk management tool].

PubMed

Terranova, Giuseppina; Cortesi, Elisabetta; Briani, Silvia; Giannini, Raffaella

2006-01-01

A retrospective analysis of hospital medical records was performed jointly by the Medicolegal department of the Pistoia Local Health Unit N. 3 and by the management of the SS. Cosma and Damiano di Pescia Hospital. Evaluation was based on ANDEM criteria, JCAHO standards, and the 1992 discharge abstract guidelines of the Italian Health Ministry. In the first phase of the study, data were collected and processed for each hospital ward and then discussed with clinicians and audited. After auditing, appropriate actions were agreed upon for correcting identified problems. Approximately one year later a second smaller sample of medical records was evaluated and a higher compliance rate with the established corrective actions was found in all wards for all data categories. In this study the evaluation of medical records can be considered in the wider context of risk management, a multidisciplinary process directed towards identifying and monitoring risk through the use of appropriate quality indicators.

Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 567: Miscellaneous Soil Sites - Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Matthews, Patrick

2014-12-01

This Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report presents information supporting the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 567: Miscellaneous Soil Sites, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada. The purpose of this Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report is to provide justification and documentation supporting the recommendation that no further corrective action is needed for CAU 567 based on the implementation of the corrective actions. The corrective actions implemented at CAU 567 were developed based on an evaluation of analytical data from the CAI, the assumed presence of COCs at specific locations, and the detailed and comparative analysis of the CAAs. The CAAs weremore » selected on technical merit focusing on performance, reliability, feasibility, safety, and cost. The implemented corrective actions meet all requirements for the technical components evaluated. The CAAs meet all applicable federal and state regulations for closure of the site. Based on the implementation of these corrective actions, the DOE, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office provides the following recommendations: • No further corrective actions are necessary for CAU 567. • The Nevada Division of Environmental Protection issue a Notice of Completion to the DOE, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office for closure of CAU 567. • CAU 567 be moved from Appendix III to Appendix IV of the FFACO.« less

CORRRECTIVE ACTION DECISION DOCUMENT FOR CORRECTIVE ACTION UNIT 427: AREA 3 SEPTIC WASTE SYSTEMS 2 AND 6, TONOPAH TEST RANGE, NEVADA, REVISION 0, JUNE 1998

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

ITLV.

1998-06-01

This Corrective Action Decision Document has been prepared for the Area 3 Septic Waste Systems 2 and 6 (Corrective Action Unit 427) in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order of 1996 (FFACO, 1996). Corrective Action Unit 427 is located at the Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, and is comprised of the following Corrective Action Sites, each an individual septic waste system (DOE/NV, 1996a): Septic Waste System 2 is Corrective Action Site Number 03-05-002-SW02. Septic Waste System 6 is Corrective Action Site Number 03-05-002-SW06. The purpose of this Corrective Action Decision Document is to identify and provide a rationalemore » for the selection of a recommended corrective action alternative for each Corrective Action Site. The scope of this Correction Action Decision Document consists of the following tasks: Develop corrective action objectives. Identify corrective action alternative screening criteria. Develop corrective action alternatives. Perform detailed and comparative evaluations of the corrective action alternatives in relation to the corrective action objectives and screening criteria. Recommend and justify a preferred corrective action alternative for each CAS. From November 1997 through January 1998, a corrective action investigation was performed as set forth in the Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit No. 427: Area 3 Septic Waste System Numbers 2 and 6, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada (DOE/NV, 1997b). Details can be found in Appendix A of this document. The results indicated that contamination is present in some portions of the CAU and not in others as described in Table ES-1 and shown in Figure A.2-2 of Appendix A. Based on the potential exposure pathways, the following corrective action objectives have been identified for Corrective Action Unit 427: Prevent or mitigate human exposure to subsurface soils containing TPH at concentrations greater than 100 milligrams per kilogram (NAC, 1996b). Close Septic Tank 33-5 in accordance with Nevada Administrative Code 459 (NAC, 1996c). Prevent adverse impacts to groundwater quality. Based on the review of existing data, future land use, and current operations at the Tonopah Test Range, the following alternatives were developed for consideration at the Area 3 Septic Waste Systems 2 and 6: Alternative 1 - No Further Action Alternative 2 - Closure of Septic Tank 33-5 and Administrative Controls Alternative 3 - Closure of Septic Tank 33-5, Excavation, and Disposal The corrective action alternatives were evaluated based on four general corrective action standards and five remedy selection decision factors. Based on the results of this evaluation, the preferred alternative for Corrective Action Unit 427 is Alternative 2, Closure of Septic Tank 33-5 and Administrative Controls. The preferred corrective action alternative was evaluated on technical merit, focusing on performance, reliability, feasibility, and safety. The alternative was judged to meet all requirements for the technical components evaluated. The alternative meets all applicable state and federal regulations for closure of the site and will reduce potential future exposure pathways to the contaminated soils. During corrective action implementation, this alternative will present minimal potential threat to site workers who come in contact with the waste. However, procedures will be developed and implemented to ensure worker health and safety.« less

21 CFR 123.7 - Corrective actions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-04-01

... of their HACCP plans in accordance with § 123.6(c)(5), by which they predetermine the corrective... in accordance with § 123.10, to determine whether the HACCP plan needs to be modified to reduce the risk of recurrence of the deviation, and modify the HACCP plan as necessary. (d) All corrective actions...

Final corrective action study for the former CCC/USDA facility in Ramona, Kansas.

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

LaFreniere, L. M.

Past operations at a grain storage facility formerly leased and operated by the Commodity Credit Corporation of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (CCC/USDA) in Ramona, Kansas, resulted in low concentrations of carbon tetrachloride in groundwater that slightly exceed the regulatory standard in only one location. As requested by the Kansas Department of Health and Environment, the CCC/USDA has prepared a Corrective Action Study (CAS) for the facility. The CAS examines corrective actions to address groundwater impacted by the former CCC/USDA facility but not releases caused by other potential groundwater contamination sources in Ramona. Four remedial alternatives were considered in themore » CAS. The recommended remedial alternative in the CAS consists of Environmental Use Control to prevent the inadvertent use of groundwater as a water supply source, coupled with groundwater monitoring to verify the continued natural improvement in groundwater quality. The Commodity Credit Corporation of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (CCC/USDA) has directed Argonne National Laboratory to prepare a Corrective Action Study (CAS), consistent with guidance from the Kansas Department of Health and Environment (KDHE 2001a), for the CCC/USDA grain storage facility formerly located in Ramona, Kansas. This effort is pursuant to a KDHE (2007a) request. Although carbon tetrachloride levels at the Ramona site are low, they remain above the Kansas Tier 2 risk-based screening level (RBSL) and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) maximum contaminant level (MCL) of 5 {micro}g/L (Kansas 2003, 2004). In its request for the CAS, the KDHE (2007a) stated that, because of these levels, risk is associated with potential future exposure to contaminated groundwater. The KDHE therefore determined that additional measures are warranted to limit future use of the property and/or exposure to contaminated media as part of site closure. The KDHE further requested comparison of at least two corrective action alternatives to the 'no-action' alternative, as the basis for the Draft Corrective Action Decision for the site. The history and nature of the contamination and previous investigations are summarized in Section 2. Also included in Section 2 is an evaluation of human and environmental targets and potential exposure pathways. Section 3 describes the corrective action goals and applicable or relevant and appropriate requirements (ARARs). Section 4 describes four alternatives, Section 5 analyzes the alternatives in detail, and Section 6 compares the alternatives. Section 6 also includes a summary and a recommended corrective action.« less

Addendum to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 358: Areas 18, 19, 20 Cellars/Mud Pits Nevada Test Site, Nevada

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Lynn Kidman

This document constitutes an addendum to the January 2004, Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 358: Areas 18, 19, 20 Cellars/Mud Pits as described in the document Recommendations and Justifications for Modifications for Use Restrictions Established under the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (UR Modification document) dated February 2008. The UR Modification document was approved by NDEP on February 26, 2008. The approval of the UR Modification document constituted approval of each of the recommended UR modifications. In conformance with the UR Modification document, this addendum consists of:more » • This cover page that refers the reader to the UR Modification document for additional information • The cover and signature pages of the UR Modification document • The NDEP approval letter • The corresponding section of the UR Modification document This addendum provides the documentation justifying the cancellation of the URs for: • CAS 20-23-02, Postshot Cellar • CAS 20-23-03, Cellar • CAS 20-23-04, Postshot Cellar • CAS 20-23-05, Postshot Cellar • CAS 20-23-06, Cellar • CAS 20-37-01, Cellar & Mud Pit • CAS 20-37-05, Cellar These URs were established as part of Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) corrective actions and were based on the presence of contaminants at concentrations greater than the action levels established at the time of the initial investigation (FFACO, 1996; as amended August 2006). Since these URs were established, practices and procedures relating to the implementation of risk-based corrective actions (RBCA) have changed. Therefore, these URs were re-evaluated against the current RBCA criteria as defined in the Industrial Sites Project Establishment of Final Action Levels (NNSA/NSO, 2006c). This re-evaluation consisted of comparing the original data (used to define the need for the URs) to risk-based final action levels (FALs) developed using the current Industrial Sites RBCA process. The re-evaluation resulted in a recommendation to remove these URs because contamination is not present at these sites above the risk-based FALs. Requirements for inspecting and maintaining these URs will be canceled, and the postings and signage at each site will be removed. Fencing and posting may be present at these sites that are unrelated to the FFACO URs such as for radiological control purposes as required by the NV/YMP Radiological Control Manual (NNSA/NSO, 2004f). This modification will not affect or modify any non-FFACO requirements for fencing, posting, or monitoring at these sites.« less

Addendum to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 394: Areas 12, 18, and 29 Spill/Release Sites Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Lynn Kidman

This document constitutes an addendum to the September 2003, Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 394: Areas 12, 18, and 29 Spill/Release Sites as described in the document Recommendations and Justifications for Modifications for Use Restrictions Established under the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (UR Modification document) dated February 2008. The UR Modification document was approved by NDEP on February 26, 2008. The approval of the UR Modification document constituted approval of each of the recommended UR modifications. In conformance with the UR Modification document, this addendum consistsmore » of: • This cover page that refers the reader to the UR Modification document for additional information • The cover and signature pages of the UR Modification document • The NDEP approval letter • The corresponding section of the UR Modification document This addendum provides the documentation justifying the cancellation of the URs for: • CAS 12-25-04, UST 12-16-2 Waste Oil Release • CAS 18-25-01, Oil Spills • CAS 18-25-02, Oil Spills • CAS 18-25-03, Oil Spill • CAS 29-44-01, Fuel Spill These URs were established as part of Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) corrective actions and were based on the presence of contaminants at concentrations greater than the action levels established at the time of the initial investigation (FFACO, 1996; as amended August 2006). Since these URs were established, practices and procedures relating to the implementation of risk-based corrective actions (RBCA) have changed. Therefore, these URs were re-evaluated against the current RBCA criteria as defined in the Industrial Sites Project Establishment of Final Action Levels (NNSA/NSO, 2006c). This re-evaluation consisted of comparing the original data (used to define the need for the URs) to risk-based final action levels (FALs) developed using the current Industrial Sites RBCA process. The re-evaluation resulted in a recommendation to remove these URs because contamination is not present at these sites above the risk-based FALs. Requirements for inspecting and maintaining these URs will be canceled, and the postings and signage at each site will be removed. Fencing and posting may be present at these sites that are unrelated to the FFACO URs such as for radiological control purposes as required by the NV/YMP Radiological Control Manual (NNSA/NSO, 2004f). This modification will not affect or modify any non-FFACO requirements for fencing, posting, or monitoring at these sites.« less

DEVELOPMENT AND EVALUATION OF AN INTEGRATED MODEL TO FACILITATE RISK-BASED CORRECTIVE ACTION AT SUPERFUND SITES

EPA Science Inventory

We developed a numerical model to predict chemical concentrations in indoor environments resulting from soil vapor intrusion and volatilization from groundwater. The model, which integrates new and existing algorithms for chemical fate and transport, was originally...

76 FR 16588 - Risk Management Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organizations; Correction

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-03-24

... COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION 17 CFR Part 39 RIN 3038-AC98 Risk Management Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organizations; Correction AGENCY: Commodity Futures Trading Commission. ACTION: Notice of... Register of January 20, 2011, regarding Risk Management Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organizations...

Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan for Corrective Action Unit 547: Miscellaneous Contaminated Waste Sites, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 0

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Mark Krauss

2011-09-01

The purpose of this CADD/CAP is to present the corrective action alternatives (CAAs) evaluated for CAU 547, provide justification for selection of the recommended alternative, and describe the plan for implementing the selected alternative. Corrective Action Unit 547 consists of the following three corrective action sites (CASs): (1) CAS 02-37-02, Gas Sampling Assembly; (2) CAS 03-99-19, Gas Sampling Assembly; and(3) CAS 09-99-06, Gas Sampling Assembly. The gas sampling assemblies consist of inactive process piping, equipment, and instrumentation that were left in place after completion of underground safety experiments. The purpose of these safety experiments was to confirm that a nuclearmore » explosion would not occur in the case of an accidental detonation of the high-explosive component of the device. The gas sampling assemblies allowed for the direct sampling of the gases and particulates produced by the safety experiments. Corrective Action Site 02-37-02 is located in Area 2 of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) and is associated with the Mullet safety experiment conducted in emplacement borehole U2ag on October 17, 1963. Corrective Action Site 03-99-19 is located in Area 3 of the NNSS and is associated with the Tejon safety experiment conducted in emplacement borehole U3cg on May 17, 1963. Corrective Action Site 09-99-06 is located in Area 9 of the NNSS and is associated with the Player safety experiment conducted in emplacement borehole U9cc on August 27, 1964. The CAU 547 CASs were investigated in accordance with the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed by representatives of the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office. The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to determine and implement appropriate corrective actions for CAU 547. Existing radiological survey data and historical knowledge of the CASs were sufficient to meet the DQOs and evaluate CAAs without additional investigation. As a result, further investigation of the CAU 547 CASs was not required. The following CAAs were identified for the gas sampling assemblies: (1) clean closure, (2) closure in place, (3) modified closure in place, (4) no further action (with administrative controls), and (5) no further action. Based on the CAAs evaluation, the recommended corrective action for the three CASs in CAU 547 is closure in place. This corrective action will involve construction of a soil cover on top of the gas sampling assembly components and establishment of use restrictions at each site. The closure in place alternative was selected as the best and most appropriate corrective action for the CASs at CAU 547 based on the following factors: (1) Provides long-term protection of human health and the environment; (2) Minimizes short-term risk to site workers in implementing corrective action; (3) Is easily implemented using existing technology; (4) Complies with regulatory requirements; (5) Fulfills FFACO requirements for site closure; (6) Does not generate transuranic waste requiring offsite disposal; (7) Is consistent with anticipated future land use of the areas (i.e., testing and support activities); and (8) Is consistent with other NNSS site closures where contamination was left in place.« less

Addendum to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 339: Area 12 Fleet Operations Steam Cleaning Discharge Area, Nevada Test Site, Revision 0

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Grant Evenson

This document constitutes an addendum to the Closure Report for CAU 339: Area 12 Fleet Operations Steam Cleaning Discharge Area Nevada Test Site, December 1997 as described in the document Supplemental Investigation Report for FFACO Use Restrictions, Nevada Test Site, Nevada (SIR) dated November 2008. The SIR document was approved by NDEP on December 5, 2008. The approval of the SIR document constituted approval of each of the recommended UR removals. In conformance with the SIR document, this addendum consists of: • This page that refers the reader to the SIR document for additional information • The cover, title, andmore » signature pages of the SIR document • The NDEP approval letter • The corresponding section of the SIR document This addendum provides the documentation justifying the cancellation of the UR for CAS 12-19-01, A12 Fleet Ops Steam Cleaning Efflu. This UR was established as part of a Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) corrective action and is based on the presence of contaminants at concentrations greater than the action levels established at the time of the initial investigation (FFACO, 1996). Since this UR was established, practices and procedures relating to the implementation of risk-based corrective actions (RBCA) have changed. Therefore, this UR was reevaluated against the current RBCA criteria as defined in the Industrial Sites Project Establishment of Final Action Levels (NNSA/NSO, 2006). This re-evaluation consisted of comparing the original data (used to define the need for the UR) to risk-based final action levels (FALs) developed using the current Industrial Sites RBCA process. The re-evaluation resulted in a recommendation to remove the UR because contamination is not present at the site above the risk-based FALs. Requirements for inspecting and maintaining this UR will be canceled, and the postings and signage at this site will be removed. Fencing and posting may be present at this site that are unrelated to the FFACO UR such as for radiological control purposes as required by the NV/YMP Radiological Control Manual (NNSA/NSO, 2004). This modification will not affect or modify any non-FFACO requirements for fencing, posting, or monitoring at this site.« less

Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 105: Area 2 Yucca Flat Atmospheric Test Sites, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 1

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Matthews, Patrick

2014-01-01

The purpose of this Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report is to provide justification and documentation supporting the recommendation that no further corrective action is needed for CAU 105 based on the implementation of the corrective actions. Corrective action investigation (CAI) activities were performed from October 22, 2012, through May 23, 2013, as set forth in the Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 105: Area 2 Yucca Flat Atmospheric Test Sites; and in accordance with the Soils Activity Quality Assurance Plan, which establishes requirements, technical planning, and general quality practices.

Action Research of an Error Self-Correction Intervention: Examining the Effects on the Spelling Accuracy Behaviors of Fifth-Grade Students Identified as At-Risk

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Turner, Jill; Rafferty, Lisa A.; Sullivan, Ray; Blake, Amy

2017-01-01

In this action research case study, the researchers used a multiple baseline across two student pairs design to investigate the effects of the error self-correction method on the spelling accuracy behaviors for four fifth-grade students who were identified as being at risk for learning disabilities. The dependent variable was the participants'…

CORRECTIVE ACTION DECISION DOCUMENT FOR AREA 9 UXO LANDFILL, TONOPAH TEST RNGE, CAU 453, REVISION 0, MARCH 1998

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

none

1998-03-01

This Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD) has been prepared for the Area 9 Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) Landfill (Corrective Action Unit [CAU] 453) in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) of 1996. Corrective Action Unit 453 is located at the Tonopah Test Range (TTR), Nevada, and is comprised of three individual landfill cells located northwest of Area 9. The cells are listed as one Corrective Action Site (CAS) 09-55-001-0952. The landfill cells have been designated as: � Cell A9-1 � Cell A9-2 � Cell A9-3 The purpose of this CADD is to identify and provide a rationalemore » for the selection of a recommended corrective action alternative for CAU 453. The scope of this CADD consists of the following tasks: � Develop corrective action objectives. � Identify corrective action alternative screening criteria. � Develop corrective action alternatives. � Perform detailed and comparative evaluations of the corrective action alternatives in relation to the corrective action objectives and screening criteria. � Recommend and justify a preferred corrective action alternative for the CAU. In June and July 1997, a corrective action investigation was performed that consisted of activities set forth in the Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) (DOE/NV, 1997). Subsurface investigation of the soils surrounding the cells revealed no contaminants of concern (COCs) above preliminary action levels. The cell contents were not investigated due to the potential for live UXO. Details concerning the analytical and investigation results can be found in Appendix A of this CADD. Based on the potential exposure pathways, the following corrective action objectives have been identified for CAU 453: � Prevent or mitigate human exposure to subsurface soils containing COCs, solid waste, and/or UXO. � Prevent adverse impacts to groundwater quality. Based on the review of existing data, future land use, and current operations at the TTR, the following alternatives have been developed for consideration at the Area 9 UXO Landfill CAU: � Alternative 1 - No Further Action � Alternative 2 - Closure in Place by Administrative Controls � Alternative 3 - Closure in Place by Capping � Alternative 4 - Clean Closure by Removal The corrective action alternatives were evaluated based on four general corrective action standards and five remedy selection decision factors. Based on the results of this evaluation, Alternative 2, Closure in Place by Administrative Controls, was selected as the preferred corrective action alternative. The preferred corrective action alternative was evaluated on its technical merits, focusing on performance, reliability, feasibility, and safety. The alternative was judged to meet all requirements for the technical components evaluated and to represent the most cost-effective corrective action. The alternative meets all applicable state and federal regulations for closure of the site and will reduce potential future exposure pathways to the contents of the landfill. During corrective action implementation, this alternative will present minimal potential threat to site workers. However, appropriate health and safety procedures will be developed and implemented.« less

Framework for Shared Drinking Water Risk Assessment.

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Lowry, Thomas Stephen; Tidwell, Vincent C.; Peplinski, William John

Central to protecting our nation's critical infrastructure is the development of methodologies for prioritizing action and supporting resource allocation decisions associated with risk-reduction initiatives. Toward this need a web-based risk assessment framework that promotes the anonymous sharing of results among water utilities is demonstrated. Anonymous sharing of results offers a number of potential advantages such as assistance in recognizing and correcting bias, identification of 'unknown, unknowns', self-assessment and benchmarking for the local utility, treatment of shared assets and/or threats across multiple utilities, and prioritization of actions beyond the scale of a single utility. The constructed framework was demonstrated for threemore » water utilities. Demonstration results were then compared to risk assessment results developed using a different risk assessment application by a different set of analysts.« less

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Matthews, Patrick K.

This Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report presents information supporting the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 550: Smoky Contamination Area, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada. CAU 550 includes 19 corrective action sites (CASs), which consist of one weapons-related atmospheric test (Smoky), three safety experiments (Ceres, Oberon, Titania), and 15 debris sites (Table ES-1). The CASs were sorted into the following study groups based on release potential and technical similarities: • Study Group 1, Atmospheric Test • Study Group 2, Safety Experiments • Study Group 3, Washes • Study Group 4, Debris The purpose of this document is to provide justificationmore » and documentation supporting the conclusion that no further corrective action is needed for CAU 550 based on implementation of the corrective actions listed in Table ES-1. Corrective action investigation (CAI) activities were performed between August 2012 and October 2013 as set forth in the Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 550: Smoky Contamination Area; and in accordance with the Soils Activity Quality Assurance Plan. The approach for the CAI was to investigate and make data quality objective (DQO) decisions based on the types of releases present. The purpose of the CAI was to fulfill data needs as defined during the DQO process. The CAU 550 dataset of investigation results was evaluated based on a data quality assessment. This assessment demonstrated the dataset is complete and acceptable for use in fulfilling the DQO data needs.« less

Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 541: Small Boy Nevada National Security Site and Nevada Test and Training Range, Nevada, Revision 0 with ROTC-1

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Kidman, Raymond; Matthews, Patrick

The purpose of this Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report is to provide justification and documentation supporting the recommendation that no further corrective action is needed for CAU 541 based on the no further action alternative listed in Table ES-1.

Safety analysis of occupational exposure of healthcare workers to residual contaminations of cytotoxic drugs using FMECA security approach.

PubMed

Le, Laetitia Minh Mai; Reitter, Delphine; He, Sophie; Bonle, Franck Té; Launois, Amélie; Martinez, Diane; Prognon, Patrice; Caudron, Eric

2017-12-01

Handling cytotoxic drugs is associated with chemical contamination of workplace surfaces. The potential mutagenic, teratogenic and oncogenic properties of those drugs create a risk of occupational exposure for healthcare workers, from reception of starting materials to the preparation and administration of cytotoxic therapies. The Security Failure Mode Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) was used as a proactive method to assess the risks involved in the chemotherapy compounding process. FMECA was carried out by a multidisciplinary team from 2011 to 2016. Potential failure modes of the process were identified based on the Risk Priority Number (RPN) that prioritizes corrective actions. Twenty-five potential failure modes were identified. Based on RPN results, the corrective actions plan was revised annually to reduce the risk of exposure and improve practices. Since 2011, 16 specific measures were implemented successively. In six years, a cumulative RPN reduction of 626 was observed, with a decrease from 912 to 286 (-69%) despite an increase of cytotoxic compounding activity of around 23.2%. In order to anticipate and prevent occupational exposure, FMECA is a valuable tool to identify, prioritize and eliminate potential failure modes for operators involved in the cytotoxic drug preparation process before the failures occur. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Failing to Fix What is Found: Risk Accommodation in the Oil and Gas Industry.

PubMed

Stackhouse, Madelynn R D; Stewart, Robert

2017-01-01

The present program of research synthesizes the findings from three studies in line with two goals. First, the present research explores how the oil and gas industry is performing at risk mitigation in terms of finding and fixing errors when they occur. Second, the present research explores what factors in the work environment relate to a risk-accommodating environment. Study 1 presents a descriptive evaluation of high-consequence incidents at 34 oil and gas companies over a 12-month period (N = 873), especially in terms of those companies' effectiveness at investigating and fixing errors. The analysis found that most investigations were fair in terms of quality (mean = 75.50%), with a smaller proportion that were weak (mean = 11.40%) or strong (mean = 13.24%). Furthermore, most companies took at least one corrective action for high-consequence incidents, but few of these corrective actions were confirmed as having been completed (mean = 13.77%). In fact, most corrective actions were secondary interim administrative controls (e.g., having a safety meeting) rather than fair or strong controls (e.g., training, engineering elimination). Study 2a found that several environmental factors explain the 56.41% variance in safety, including management's disengagement from safety concerns, finding and fixing errors, safety management system effectiveness, training, employee safety, procedures, and a production-over-safety culture. Qualitative results from Study 2b suggest that a compliance-based culture of adhering to liability concerns, out-group blame, and a production-over-safety orientation may all impede safety effectiveness. © 2016 Society for Risk Analysis.

Development of a quantitative tool to assess the content of physical therapy for infants.

PubMed

Blauw-Hospers, Cornill H; Dirks, Tineke; Hulshof, Lily J; Hadders-Algra, Mijna

2010-01-01

The study aim was to describe and quantify physical therapy interventions for infants at high risk for developmental disorders. An observation protocol was developed based on knowledge about infant physical therapy and analysis of directly observable physiotherapeutic (PT) actions. The protocol's psychometric quality was assessed. Videos of 42 infant physical therapy sessions at 4 or 6 months of corrected age were analyzed. The observation protocol classified PT actions into 8 mutually exclusive categories. Virtually all PT actions during treatment could be classified. Inter- and intrarater agreements were satisfactory (intraclass correlations, 0.68-1.00). Approximately 40% of treatment time was spent challenging the infant to produce motor behavior by themselves, whereas approximately 30% of time facilitation techniques were applied. Tradition-based sessions could be differentiated from function-oriented ones. It is possible to document PT actions during physical therapy treatment of infants at high risk for cerebral palsy in a systematic, standardized, and reliable way.

78 FR 45983 - Acceptability of Corrective Action Programs for Fuel Cycle Facilities

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-07-30

... Programs for Fuel Cycle Facilities AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ACTION: Draft NUREG; withdrawal... withdrawing draft NUREG-2154, ``Acceptability of Corrective Action Programs for Fuel Cycle Facilities,'' based... determine whether a submittal for a Corrective Action Program (CAP), voluntarily submitted by fuel cycle...

Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 365: Baneberry Contamination Area, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 0

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Patrick Matthews

2011-09-01

Corrective Action Unit 365 comprises one corrective action site (CAS), CAS 08-23-02, U-8d Contamination Area. The purpose of this CADD/CR is to provide justification and documentation supporting the recommendation that no further corrective action is needed for CAU 365 based on the implementation of the corrective action of closure in place with a use restriction (UR). Corrective action investigation (CAI) activities were performed from January 18, 2011, through August 2, 2011, as set forth in the Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 365: Baneberry Contamination Area. The purpose of the CAI was to fulfill data needs as definedmore » during the data quality objective (DQO) process. The CAU 365 dataset of investigation results was evaluated based on a data quality assessment. This assessment demonstrated the dataset is complete and acceptable for use in supporting the DQO decisions. Investigation results were evaluated against final action levels (FALs) established in this document. A radiological dose FAL of 25 millirem per year was established based on the Remote Work Area exposure scenario (336 hours of annual exposure). Radiological doses exceeding the FAL were found to be present to the southwest of the Baneberry crater. It was also assumed that radionuclide levels present within the crater and fissure exceed the FAL. Corrective actions were undertaken that consisted of establishing a UR and posting warning signs for the crater, fissure, and the area located to the southwest of the crater where soil concentrations exceeded the FAL. These URs were recorded in the FFACO database; the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) Facility Information Management System; and the NNSA/NSO CAU/CAS files. Therefore, NNSA/NSO provides the following recommendations: (1) No further corrective actions beyond what are described in this document are necessary for CAU 365. (2) A Notice of Completion to NNSA/NSO is requested from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection for closure of CAU 365. (3) Corrective Action Unit 365 should be moved from Appendix III to Appendix IV of the FFACO.« less

Corrective Action Decision Document for Corrective Action Unit 568. Area 3 Plutonium Dispersion Sites, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada Revision 0

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Matthews, Patrick

The purpose of this Corrective Action Decision Document is to identify and provide the rationale for the recommendation of corrective action alternatives (CAAs) for the 14 CASs within CAU 568. Corrective action investigation (CAI) activities were performed from April 2014 through May 2015, as set forth in the Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 568: Area 3 Plutonium Dispersion Sites, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada; and in accordance with the Soils Activity Quality Assurance Plan, which establishes requirements, technical planning, and general quality practices. The purpose of the CAI was to fulfill data needs as defined during themore » DQO process. The CAU 568 dataset of investigation results was evaluated based on a data quality assessment. This assessment demonstrated that the dataset is complete and acceptable for use in fulfilling the DQO data needs. Based on the evaluation of analytical data from the CAI, review of future and current operations at the 14 CASs, and the detailed and comparative analysis of the potential CAAs, the following corrective actions are recommended for CAU 568: • No further action is the preferred corrective action for CASs 03-23-17, 03-23-22, 03-23-26. • Closure in place is the preferred corrective action for CAS 03-23-19; 03-45-01; the SE DCBs at CASs 03-23-20, 03-23-23, 03-23-31, 03-23-32, 03-23-33, and 03-23-34; and the Pascal-BHCA at CAS 03-23-31. • Clean closure is the preferred corrective action for CASs 03-08-04, 03-23-30, and 03-26-04; and the four well head covers at CASs 03-23-20, 03-23-23, 03-23-31, and 03-23-33.« less

[Quality assessment in anesthesia].

PubMed

Kupperwasser, B

1996-01-01

Quality assessment (assurance/improvement) is the set of methods used to measure and improve the delivered care and the department's performance against pre-established criteria or standards. The four stages of the self-maintained quality assessment cycle are: problem identification, problem analysis, problem correction and evaluation of corrective actions. Quality assessment is a measurable entity for which it is necessary to define and calibrate measurement parameters (indicators) from available data gathered from the hospital anaesthesia environment. Problem identification comes from the accumulation of indicators. There are four types of quality indicators: structure, process, outcome and sentinel indicators. The latter signal a quality defect, are independent of outcomes, are easier to analyse by statistical methods and closely related to processes and main targets of quality improvement. The three types of methods to analyse the problems (indicators) are: peer review, quantitative methods and risks management techniques. Peer review is performed by qualified anaesthesiologists. To improve its validity, the review process should be explicited and conclusions based on standards of practice and literature references. The quantitative methods are statistical analyses applied to the collected data and presented in a graphic format (histogram, Pareto diagram, control charts). The risks management techniques include: a) critical incident analysis establishing an objective relationship between a 'critical' event and the associated human behaviours; b) system accident analysis, based on the fact that accidents continue to occur despite safety systems and sophisticated technologies, checks of all the process components leading to the impredictable outcome and not just the human factors; c) cause-effect diagrams facilitate the problem analysis in reducing its causes to four fundamental components (persons, regulations, equipment, process). Definition and implementation of corrective measures, based on the findings of the two previous stages, are the third step of the evaluation cycle. The Hawthorne effect is an outcome improvement, before the implementation of any corrective actions. Verification of the implemented actions is the final and mandatory step closing the evaluation cycle.

Corrective Action Decision Document for Corrective Action Unit 204: Storage Bunkers, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Rev. No. 0

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Robert Boehlecke

2004-04-01

The six bunkers included in CAU 204 were primarily used to monitor atmospheric testing or store munitions. The ''Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) for Corrective Action Unit 204: Storage Bunkers, Nevada Test Site, Nevada'' (NNSA/NV, 2002a) provides information relating to the history, planning, and scope of the investigation; therefore, it will not be repeated in this CADD. This CADD identifies potential corrective action alternatives and provides a rationale for the selection of a recommended corrective action alternative for each CAS within CAU 204. The evaluation of corrective action alternatives is based on process knowledge and the results of investigative activitiesmore » conducted in accordance with the CAIP (NNSA/NV, 2002a) that was approved prior to the start of the Corrective Action Investigation (CAI). Record of Technical Change (ROTC) No. 1 to the CAIP (approval pending) documents changes to the preliminary action levels (PALs) agreed to by the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) and DOE, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO). This ROTC specifically discusses the radiological PALs and their application to the findings of the CAU 204 corrective action investigation. The scope of this CADD consists of the following: (1) Develop corrective action objectives; (2) Identify corrective action alternative screening criteria; (3) Develop corrective action alternatives; (4) Perform detailed and comparative evaluations of corrective action alternatives in relation to corrective action objectives and screening criteria; and (5) Recommend and justify a preferred corrective action alternative for each CAS within CAU 204.« less

Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 571: Area 9 Yucca Flat Plutonium Dispersion Sites, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 0

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Matthews, Patrick

2014-08-01

The purpose of this CADD/CR is to provide documentation and justification that no further corrective action is needed for the closure of CAU 571 based on the implementation of corrective actions. This includes a description of investigation activities, an evaluation of the data, and a description of corrective actions that were performed. The CAIP provides information relating to the scope and planning of the investigation. Therefore, that information will not be repeated in this document.

75 FR 64785 - Corporate Credit Unions

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-10-20

...NCUA is issuing final amendments to its rule governing corporate credit unions. The major revisions involve corporate credit union capital, investments, asset-liability management, governance, and credit union service organization (CUSO) activities. The amendments establish a new capital scheme, including risk-based capital requirements; impose new prompt corrective action requirements; place various new limits on corporate investments; impose new asset-liability management controls; amend some corporate governance provisions; and limit a corporate CUSO to categories of services preapproved by NCUA. In addition, this rulemaking contains conforming amendments to rules governing Prompt Corrective Action (for natural person credit unions); Investments and Deposit Activities (for federal credit unions); Administrative Actions, Adjudicative Hearings, Rules of Practice and Procedure, and Investigations; and Involuntary Liquidation of Federal Credit Unions and Adjudication of Creditor Claims Involving Federally Insured Credit Unions. These amendments will strengthen individual corporates and the corporate credit union system as a whole.

Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 105: Area 2 Yucca Flat Atmospheric Test Sites, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 0

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Matthews, Patrick

2013-09-01

This Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report presents information supporting the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 105: Area 2 Yucca Flat Atmospheric Test Sites, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada. CAU 105 comprises the following five corrective action sites (CASs): -02-23-04 Atmospheric Test Site - Whitney Closure In Place -02-23-05 Atmospheric Test Site T-2A Closure In Place -02-23-06 Atmospheric Test Site T-2B Clean Closure -02-23-08 Atmospheric Test Site T-2 Closure In Place -02-23-09 Atmospheric Test Site - Turk Closure In Place The purpose of this Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report is to provide justification and documentation supporting the recommendation that nomore » further corrective action is needed for CAU 105 based on the implementation of the corrective actions. Corrective action investigation (CAI) activities were performed from October 22, 2012, through May 23, 2013, as set forth in the Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 105: Area 2 Yucca Flat Atmospheric Test Sites; and in accordance with the Soils Activity Quality Assurance Plan, which establishes requirements, technical planning, and general quality practices.« less

Corrective Action Decision Document for Corrective Action Unit 428: Area 3 Septic Waste Systems 1 and 5, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office

2000-02-08

This Corrective Action Decision Document identifies and rationalizes the US Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office's selection of a recommended corrective action alternative (CAA) appropriate to facilitate the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 428, Septic Waste Systems 1 and 5, under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Located in Area 3 at the Tonopah Test Range (TTR) in Nevada, CAU 428 is comprised of two Corrective Action Sites (CASs): (1) CAS 03-05-002-SW01, Septic Waste System 1 and (2) CAS 03-05-002- SW05, Septic Waste System 5. A corrective action investigation performed in 1999 detected analyte concentrations that exceeded preliminarymore » action levels; specifically, contaminants of concern (COCs) included benzo(a) pyrene in a septic tank integrity sample associated with Septic Tank 33-1A of Septic Waste System 1, and arsenic in a soil sample associated with Septic Waste System 5. During this investigation, three Corrective Action Objectives (CAOs) were identified to prevent or mitigate exposure to contents of the septic tanks and distribution box, to subsurface soil containing COCs, and the spread of COCs beyond the CAU. Based on these CAOs, a review of existing data, future use, and current operations in Area 3 of the TTR, three CAAs were developed for consideration: Alternative 1 - No Further Action; Alternative 2 - Closure in Place with Administrative Controls; and Alternative 3 - Clean Closure by Excavation and Disposal. These alternatives were evaluated based on four general corrective action standards and five remedy selection decision factors. Based on the results of the evaluation, the preferred CAA was Alternative 3. This alternative meets all applicable state and federal regulations for closure of the site and will eliminate potential future exposure pathways to the contaminated soils at the Area 3 Septic Waste Systems 1 and 5.« less

Addendum to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 355: Area 2 Cellars/Mud Pits Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Lynn Kidman

This document constitutes an addendum to the November 2003, Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 355: Area 2 Cellars/Mud Pits as described in the document Recommendations and Justifications for Modifications for Use Restrictions Established under the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (UR Modification document) dated February 2008. The UR Modification document was approved by NDEP on February 26, 2008. The approval of the UR Modification document constituted approval of each of the recommended UR modifications. In conformance with the UR Modification document, this addendum consists of: • Thismore » cover page that refers the reader to the UR Modification document for additional information • The cover and signature pages of the UR Modification document • The NDEP approval letter • The corresponding section of the UR Modification document This addendum provides the documentation justifying the cancellation of the URs for: • CAS 02-37-01, Cellar & Mud Pit • CAS 02-37-03, Cellar & Mud Pit • CAS 02-37-04, Cellar & Mud Pit • CAS 02-37-05, Cellar & Mud Pit • CAS 02-37-06, Cellar & Mud Pit • CAS 02-37-07, Cellar & Mud Pit • CAS 02-37-10, Cellar & Mud Pit • CAS 02-37-11, Cellar & Mud Pit • CAS 02-37-12, Cellar & Mud Pit • CAS 02-37-13, Cellar & Mud Pit • CAS 02-37-14, Cellar & Mud Pit • CAS 02-37-15, Cellar & Mud Pit • CAS 02-37-16, Cellar & Mud Pit • CAS 02-37-17, Cellar • CAS 02-37-18, Cellar & Tanks These URs were established as part of Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) corrective actions and were based on the presence of contaminants at concentrations greater than the action levels established at the time of the initial investigation (FFACO, 1996; as amended August 2006). Since these URs were established, practices and procedures relating to the implementation of risk-based corrective actions (RBCA) have changed. Therefore, these URs were re-evaluated against the current RBCA criteria as defined in the Industrial Sites Project Establishment of Final Action Levels (NNSA/NSO, 2006c). This re-evaluation consisted of comparing the original data (used to define the need for the URs) to risk-based final action levels (FALs) developed using the current Industrial Sites RBCA process. The re-evaluation resulted in a recommendation to remove these URs because contamination is not present at these sites above the risk-based FALs. Requirements for inspecting and maintaining these URs will be canceled, and the postings and signage at each site will be removed. Fencing and posting may be present at these sites that are unrelated to the FFACO URs such as for radiological control purposes as required by the NV/YMP Radiological Control Manual (NNSA/NSO, 2004f). This modification will not affect or modify any non-FFACO requirements for fencing, posting, or monitoring at these sites.« less

Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 106: Area 5, 11 Frenchman Flat Atmospheric Sites, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 0

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Patrick Matthews and Dawn Peterson

2011-09-01

Corrective Action Unit 106 comprises four corrective action sites (CASs): (1) 05-20-02, Evaporation Pond; (2) 05-23-05, Atmospheric Test Site - Able; (3) 05-45-04, 306 GZ Rad Contaminated Area; (4) 05-45-05, 307 GZ Rad Contaminated Area. The purpose of this CADD/CR is to provide justification and documentation supporting the recommendation that no further corrective action is needed for CAU 106 based on the implementation of corrective actions. The corrective action of clean closure was implemented at CASs 05-45-04 and 05-45-05, while no corrective action was necessary at CASs 05-20-02 and 05-23-05. Corrective action investigation (CAI) activities were performed from October 20,more » 2010, through June 1, 2011, as set forth in the Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 106: Areas 5, 11 Frenchman Flat Atmospheric Sites. The approach for the CAI was divided into two facets: investigation of the primary release of radionuclides, and investigation of other releases (mechanical displacement and chemical releases). The purpose of the CAI was to fulfill data needs as defined during the data quality objective (DQO) process. The CAU 106 dataset of investigation results was evaluated based on a data quality assessment. This assessment demonstrated the dataset is complete and acceptable for use in fulfilling the DQO data needs. Investigation results were evaluated against final action levels (FALs) established in this document. A radiological dose FAL of 25 millirem per year was established based on the Industrial Area exposure scenario (2,250 hours of annual exposure). The only radiological dose exceeding the FAL was at CAS 05-45-05 and was associated with potential source material (PSM). It is also assumed that additional PSM in the form of depleted uranium (DU) and DU-contaminated debris at CASs 05-45-04 and 05-45-05 exceed the FAL. Therefore, corrective actions were undertaken at these CASs that consisted of removing PSM and collecting verification samples. Results of verification samples show that remaining soil does not contain contamination exceeding the FALs. Therefore, the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) provides the following recommendations: (1) No further corrective actions are necessary for CAU 106. (2) A Notice of Completion to NNSA/NSO is requested from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection for closure of CAU 106. (3) Corrective Action Unit 106 should be moved from Appendix III to Appendix IV of the FFACO.« less

Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 367: Area 10 Sedan, Ess and Uncle Unit Craters Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 0

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Patrick Matthews

2011-06-01

Corrective Action Unit 367 comprises four corrective action sites (CASs): • 10-09-03, Mud Pit • 10-45-01, U-10h Crater (Sedan) • 10-45-02, Ess Crater Site • 10-45-03, Uncle Crater Site The purpose of this Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report is to provide justification and documentation of the corrective actions and site closure activities implemented at CAU 367. A corrective action of closure in place with use restrictions was completed at each of the three crater CASs (10-45-01, 10-45-02, and 10-45-03); corrective actions were not required at CAS 10-09-03. In addition, a limited soil removal corrective action was conducted at the locationmore » of a potential source material release. Based on completion of these correction actions, no additional corrective action is required at CAU 367, and site closure is considered complete. Corrective action investigation (CAI) activities were performed from February 2010 through March 2011, as set forth in the Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 367: Area 10 Sedan, Ess and Uncle Unit Craters, Nevada Test Site, Nevada. The approach for the CAI was divided into two facets: investigation of the primary release of radionuclides, and investigation of non-test or other releases (e.g., migration in washes and potential source material). Based on the proximity of the Uncle, Ess, and Sedan craters, the impact of the Sedan test on the fallout deposited from the two earlier tests, and aerial radiological surveys, the CAU 367 investigation was designed to study the releases from the three crater CASs as one combined release (primary release). Corrective Action Site 10-09-03, Mud Pit, consists of two mud pits identified at CAU 367. The mud pits are considered non-test releases or other releases and were investigated independent of the three crater CASs. The purpose of the CAI was to fulfill data needs as defined during the data quality objective (DQO) process. The CAU 367 dataset of investigation results was evaluated based on a data quality assessment. This assessment demonstrated the dataset is complete and acceptable for use in fulfilling the DQO data needs. Analytes detected during the CAI were evaluated against final action levels (FALs) established in this document. For the primary release, radiological doses exceeding the FAL of 25 millirem per year were not found to be present in the surface or shallow subsurface soil outside the default contamination boundary. However, it was assumed that radionuclides are present in subsurface media within each of the three craters (Sedan, Ess, and Uncle) due to prompt injection of radionuclides from the tests. Based on the assumption of radiological dose exceeding the FAL, corrective actions were undertaken that consisted of implementing a use restriction and posting warning signs at each crater CAS. These use restrictions were recorded in the FFACO database; the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) Facility Information Management System; and the NNSA/NSO CAU/CAS files. With regard to other releases, no contaminants of concern were identified at the mud pits or any of the other release locations, with one exception. Potential source material in the form of lead was found at one location. A corrective action of clean closure was implemented at this location, and verification samples indicated that no further action is necessary. Therefore, NNSA/NSO provides the following recommendations: • A Notice of Completion to NNSA/NSO is requested from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection for closure of CAU 367. • Corrective Action Unit 367 should be promoted from Appendix III to Appendix IV of the FFACO.« less

Accidental overheating of a newborn under an infant radiant warmer: a lesson for future use.

PubMed

Molgat-Seon, Y; Daboval, T; Chou, S; Jay, O

2013-09-01

A fully functional radiant warmer induced rapid and continuous increases in regional skin temperatures, heart rate, mean arterial blood pressure and respiratory rate in a newborn patient without corrective action. We report this case of passive overheating to create awareness of the risks associated with regulating radiant heat output based upon a single servo-controlled temperature.

Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 252: Area 25 Engine Test Stand 1 Decontamination Pad, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

DOE /NV

This Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report (CADD/CR) has been prepared for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 252: Area 25 Engine Test Stand-1 Decontamination Pad, in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). Located at the Nevada Test Site in Nevada, CAU 252 consists of only one Corrective Action Site (25-07-04, Decontamination Pad). This CADD/CR identifies and rationalizes the U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office's (DOE/NV's) recommendation that no corrective action is deemed necessary at CAU 252. The Corrective Action Decision Document and Closure Report have been combined into one report because the potential contaminants of concern weremore » either not detected during the corrective action investigation or were only present at naturally occurring concentrations. Based on the field results, neither corrective action or a corrective action plan is required at this site. A Notice of Completion to DOE/NV is being requested from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection for closure of CAU 252, as well as a request that this site be moved from Appendix III to Appendix IV of the FFACO. Further, no use restrictions are required to be placed on this CAU.« less

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 573: Alpha Contaminated Sites Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Matthews, Patrick

This Closure Report (CR) presents information supporting the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 573: Alpha Contaminated Sites, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada. CAU 573 comprises the two corrective action sites (CASs): 05-23-02-GMX Alpha Contaminated Are-Closure in Place and 05-45-01-Atmospheric Test Site - Hamilton- Clean Closure. The purpose of this CR is to provide justification and documentation supporting the recommendation that no further corrective action is needed for CAU 573 based on the implementation of the corrective actions. Corrective action activities were performed at Hamilton from May 25 through June 30, 2016; and at GMX from May 25 to Octobermore » 27, 2016, as set forth in the Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD)/Corrective Action Plan (CAP) for Corrective Action Unit 573: Alpha Contaminated Sites; and in accordance with the Soils Activity Quality Assurance Plan, which establishes requirements, technical planning, and general quality practices. Verification sample results were evaluated against data quality objective criteria developed by stakeholders that included representatives from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection and the DOE, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) during the corrective action alternative (CAA) meeting held on November 24, 2015. Radiological doses exceeding the final action level were assumed to be present within the high contamination areas associated with CAS 05-23-02, thus requiring corrective action. It was also assumed that radionuclides were present at levels that require corrective action within the soil/debris pile associated with CAS 05-45-01. During the CAU 573 CAA meeting, the CAA of closure in place with a use restriction (UR) was selected by the stakeholders as the preferred corrective action of the high contamination areas at CAS 05-23-02 (GMX), which contain high levels of removable contamination; and the CAA of clean closure was selected by the stakeholders as preferred corrective action for the debris pile at CAS 05-45-01 (Hamilton). The closure in place was accomplished by posting signs containing a warning label on the existing contamination area fence line; and recording the FFACO UR and administrative UR in the FFACO database, the NNSA/NFO CAU/CAS files, and the management and operating contractor Geographic Information Systems. The clean closure was accomplished by excavating the soil/debris pile, disposing of the contents at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Complex, and collecting verification samples. The corrective actions were implemented as stipulated in the CADD/CAP, and verification sample results confirm that the criteria for the completion of corrective actions have been met. Based on the implementation of these corrective actions, NNSA/NFO provides the following recommendations: No further corrective actions are necessary for CAU 573; The Nevada Division of Environmental Protection should issue a Notice of Completion to NNSA/NFO for closure of CAU 573; CAU 573 should be moved from Appendix III to Appendix IV of the FFACO.« less

Recognising and referring children exposed to domestic abuse: a multi-professional, proactive systems-based evaluation using a modified Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA).

PubMed

Ashley, Laura; Armitage, Gerry; Taylor, Julie

2017-03-01

Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is a prospective quality assurance methodology increasingly used in healthcare, which identifies potential vulnerabilities in complex, high-risk processes and generates remedial actions. We aimed, for the first time, to apply FMEA in a social care context to evaluate the process for recognising and referring children exposed to domestic abuse within one Midlands city safeguarding area in England. A multidisciplinary, multi-agency team of 10 front-line professionals undertook the FMEA, using a modified methodology, over seven group meetings. The FMEA included mapping out the process under evaluation to identify its component steps, identifying failure modes (potential errors) and possible causes for each step and generating corrective actions. In this article, we report the output from the FMEA, including illustrative examples of the failure modes and corrective actions generated. We also present an analysis of feedback from the FMEA team and provide future recommendations for the use of FMEA in appraising social care processes and practice. Although challenging, the FMEA was unequivocally valuable for team members and generated a significant number of corrective actions locally for the safeguarding board to consider in its response to children exposed to domestic abuse. © 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 569: Area 3 Yucca Flat Atmospheric Test Sites Nevada National Security Site, Nevada with ROTC 1, Revision 0

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Sloop, Christy

2013-04-01

This Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report presents information supporting the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 569: Area 3 Yucca Flat Atmospheric Test Sites, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada. CAU 569 comprises the following nine corrective action sites (CASs): • 03-23-09, T-3 Contamination Area • 03-23-10, T-3A Contamination Area • 03-23-11, T-3B Contamination Area • 03-23-12, T-3S Contamination Area • 03-23-13, T-3T Contamination Area • 03-23-14, T-3V Contamination Area • 03-23-15, S-3G Contamination Area • 03-23-16, S-3H Contamination Area • 03-23-21, Pike Contamination Area The purpose of this Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report is to provide justification and documentation supportingmore » the recommendation that no further corrective action is needed for CAU 569 based on the implementation of the corrective actions listed in Table ES-2.« less

Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 372: Area 20 Cabriolet/Palanquin Unit Craters, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 0

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Matthews, Patrick and Sloop, Christy

2011-04-01

This Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD)/Closure Report (CR) has been prepared for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 372, Area 20 Cabriolet/Palanquin Unit Craters, located within Areas 18 and 20 at the Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). Corrective Action Unit 372 comprises four corrective action sites (CASs): • 18-45-02, Little Feller I Surface Crater • 18-45-03, Little Feller II Surface Crater • 20-23-01, U-20k Contamination Area • 20-45-01, U-20L Crater (Cabriolet) The purpose of this CADD/CR is to provide justification and documentation supporting the recommendation that no further corrective action ismore » needed for CAU 372 based on the implementation of the corrective action of closure in place with administrative controls at all CASs. Corrective action investigation (CAI) activities were performed from November 9, 2009, through December 10, 2010, as set forth in the Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 372: Area 20 Cabriolet/Palanquin Unit Craters. The approach for the CAI was divided into two facets: investigation of the primary release of radionuclides and investigation of other releases (migration in washes and chemical releases). The purpose of the CAI was to fulfill data needs as defined during the data quality objective (DQO) process. The CAU 372 dataset of investigation results was evaluated based on a data quality assessment. This assessment demonstrated the dataset is acceptable for use in fulfilling the DQO data needs. Investigation results were evaluated against final action levels (FALs) established in this document. A radiological dose FAL was established of 25 millirem per year based on the Remote Work Area exposure scenario (336 hours of annual exposure). Radiological doses exceeding the FAL were found to be present at all four CASs. It is assumed that radionuclide levels present within the Little Feller I and Cabriolet high contamination areas and within the craters at Palanquin and Cabriolet exceed the FAL. It is also assumed that potential source material in the form of lead bricks at Little Feller I and lead-acid batteries at Palanquin and Cabriolet exceed the FAL. Therefore, corrective actions were undertaken that consist of removing potential source material, where present, and implementing a use restriction and posting warning signs at each CAS. These use restrictions were recorded in the FFACO database; the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) Facility Information Management System; and the NNSA/NSO CAU/CAS files. Therefore, NNSA/NSO provides the following recommendations: • No further corrective actions are necessary for CAU 372. • A Notice of Completion to NNSA/NSO is requested from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection for closure of CAU 372. • Corrective Action Unit 372 should be moved from Appendix III to Appendix IV of the FFACO.« less

Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 371: Johnnie Boy Crater and Pin Stripe Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Patrick Matthews

This Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report has been prepared for Corrective Action Unit 371, Johnnie Boy Crater and Pin Stripe, located within Areas 11 and 18 at the Nevada Test Site, Nevada, in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 371 comprises two corrective action sites (CASs): • 11-23-05, Pin Stripe Contamination Area • 18-45-01, U-18j-2 Crater (Johnnie Boy) The purpose of this Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report is to provide justification and documentation supporting the recommendation that no further corrective action is needed for CAU 371 based on the implementation of correctivemore » actions. The corrective action of closure in place with administrative controls was implemented at both CASs. Corrective action investigation (CAI) activities were performed from January 8, 2009, through February 16, 2010, as set forth in the Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 371: Johnnie Boy Crater and Pin Stripe. The approach for the CAI was divided into two facets: investigation of the primary release of radionuclides and investigation of other releases (migration in washes and chemical releases). The purpose of the CAI was to fulfill data needs as defined during the data quality objective (DQO) process. The CAU 371 dataset of investigation results was evaluated based on the data quality indicator parameters. This evaluation demonstrated the dataset is acceptable for use in fulfilling the DQO data needs. Analytes detected during the CAI were evaluated against final action levels (FALs) established in this document. Radiological doses exceeding the FAL of 25 millirem per year were not found to be present in the surface soil. However, it was assumed that radionuclides are present in subsurface media within the Johnnie Boy crater and the fissure at Pin Stripe. Due to the assumption of radiological dose exceeding the FAL, corrective actions were undertaken that consist of implementing a use restriction and posting warning signs at each site. These use restrictions were recorded in the FFACO database; the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) Facility Information Management System; and the NNSA/NSO CAU/CAS files. Therefore, NNSA/NSO provides the following recommendations: • No further corrective actions are necessary for CAU 371. • A Notice of Completion to NNSA/NSO is requested from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection for closure of CAU 371. • Corrective Action Unit 371 should be moved from Appendix III to Appendix IV of the FFACO.« less

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 374: Area 20 Schooner Unit Crater Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Patrick Matthews

Corrective Action Unit 374 is located in Areas 18 and 20 of the Nevada Test Site, which is approximately 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. Corrective Action Unit 374 comprises the five corrective action sites (CASs) listed below: • 18-22-05, Drum • 18-22-06, Drums (20) • 18-22-08, Drum • 18-23-01, Danny Boy Contamination Area • 20-45-03, U-20u Crater (Schooner) These sites are being investigated because existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives (CAAs). Additional information will be obtained by conducting a corrective action investigation before evaluating CAAsmore » and selecting the appropriate corrective action for each CAS. The results of the field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of viable CAAs that will be presented in the Corrective Action Decision Document. The sites will be investigated based on the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed on October 20, 2009, by representatives of the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office. The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to develop and evaluate appropriate corrective actions for CAU 374.« less

Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan for Corrective Action Unit 97: Yucca Flat/Climax Mine Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 1

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Farnham, Irene

This corrective action decision document (CADD)/corrective action plan (CAP) has been prepared for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 97, Yucca Flat/Climax Mine, Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), Nevada. The Yucca Flat/Climax Mine CAU is located in the northeastern portion of the NNSS and comprises 720 corrective action sites. A total of 747 underground nuclear detonations took place within this CAU between 1957 and 1992 and resulted in the release of radionuclides (RNs) in the subsurface in the vicinity of the test cavities. The CADD portion describes the Yucca Flat/Climax Mine CAU data-collection and modeling activities completed during the corrective action investigationmore » (CAI) stage, presents the corrective action objectives, and describes the actions recommended to meet the objectives. The CAP portion describes the corrective action implementation plan. The CAP presents CAU regulatory boundary objectives and initial use-restriction boundaries identified and negotiated by DOE and the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP). The CAP also presents the model evaluation process designed to build confidence that the groundwater flow and contaminant transport modeling results can be used for the regulatory decisions required for CAU closure. The UGTA strategy assumes that active remediation of subsurface RN contamination is not feasible with current technology. As a result, the corrective action is based on a combination of characterization and modeling studies, monitoring, and institutional controls. The strategy is implemented through a four-stage approach that comprises the following: (1) corrective action investigation plan (CAIP), (2) CAI, (3) CADD/CAP, and (4) closure report (CR) stages.« less

Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 375: Area 30 Buggy Unit Craters, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 0

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Patrick Matthews

2011-08-01

Corrective Action Unit 375 comprises three corrective action sites (CASs): (1) 25-23-22, Contaminated Soils Site; (2) 25-34-06, Test Cell A Bunker; and (3) 30-45-01, U-30a, b, c, d, e Craters. The purpose of this CADD/CR is to provide justification and documentation supporting the recommendation that no further corrective action is needed for CAU 375 based on the implementation of corrective action of closure in place with administrative controls at CAS 25-23-22, no further action at CAS 25-34-06, and closure in place with administrative controls and removal of potential source material (PSM) at CAS 30-45-01. Corrective action investigation (CAI) activities weremore » performed from July 28, 2010, through April 4, 2011, as set forth in the Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 375: Area 30 Buggy Unit Craters. The approach for the CAI was divided into two facets: investigation of the primary release of radionuclides, and investigation of other releases (migration in washes and chemical releases). The purpose of the CAI was to fulfill data needs as defined during the data quality objective (DQO) process. The CAU 375 dataset of investigation results was evaluated based on the data quality assessment. This assessment demonstrated the dataset is acceptable for use in fulfilling the DQO data needs. Investigation results were evaluated against final action levels (FALs) established in this document. A radiological dose FAL of 25 millirem per year was established based on the Remote Work Area exposure scenario (336 hours of annual exposure). Radiological doses exceeding the FAL were assumed to be present within the default contamination boundaries at CASs 25-23-22 and 30-45-01. No contaminants were identified at CAS 25-34-06, and no corrective action is necessary. Potential source material in the form of lead plate, lead-acid batteries, and oil within an abandoned transformer were identified at CAS 30-45-01, and corrective actions were undertaken that consisted of removing the PSM. Use restrictions and warning signs were implemented for the remaining radiological contamination at CASs 25-23-22 and 30-45-01. These use restrictions were recorded in the FFACO database; the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) Facility Information Management System; and the NNSA/NSO CAU/CAS files. Therefore, NNSA/NSO provides the following recommendations: (1) No further corrective actions are necessary for CAU 375; (2) A Notice of Completion to NNSA/NSO is requested from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection for closure of CAU 375; and (3) Move CAU 375 from Appendix III to Appendix IV of the FFACO.« less

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 560: Septic Systems, Nevada Test Site, Nevada with ROTC1, Revision 0

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Grant Evenson

2008-05-01

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 560 is located in Areas 3 and 6 of the Nevada Test Site, which is approximately 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. Corrective Action Unit 560 is comprised of the seven corrective action sites (CASs) listed below: • 03-51-01, Leach Pit • 06-04-02, Septic Tank • 06-05-03, Leach Pit • 06-05-04, Leach Bed • 06-59-03, Building CP-400 Septic System • 06-59-04, Office Trailer Complex Sewage Pond • 06-59-05, Control Point Septic System These sites are being investigated because existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend correctivemore » action alternatives. Additional information will be obtained by conducting a corrective action investigation before evaluating corrective action alternatives and selecting the appropriate corrective action for each CAS. The results of the field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of viable corrective action alternatives that will be presented in the Corrective Action Decision Document. The sites will be investigated based on the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed on January 22, 2008, by representatives from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection; U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office; Stoller-Navarro Joint Venture; and National Security Technologies, LLC. The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to develop and evaluate appropriate corrective actions for CAU 560.« less

49 CFR 385.17 - Change to safety rating based upon corrective actions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-10-01

... in CMVs or placardable quantities of hazardous materials. (2) Within 45 days for all other motor... under subpart J of this part based on corrective action. [65 FR 50935, Aug. 22, 2000, as amended at 72...

49 CFR 385.17 - Change to safety rating based upon corrective actions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... in CMVs or placardable quantities of hazardous materials. (2) Within 45 days for all other motor... under subpart J of this part based on corrective action. [65 FR 50935, Aug. 22, 2000, as amended at 72...

Mathematical model of the loan portfolio dynamics in the form of Markov chain considering the process of new customers attraction

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Bozhalkina, Yana

2017-12-01

Mathematical model of the loan portfolio structure change in the form of Markov chain is explored. This model considers in one scheme both the process of customers attraction, their selection based on the credit score, and loans repayment. The model describes the structure and volume of the loan portfolio dynamics, which allows to make medium-term forecasts of profitability and risk. Within the model corrective actions of bank management in order to increase lending volumes or to reduce the risk are formalized.

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 412: Clean Slate I Plutonium Dispersion (TTR) Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, Revision 0

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Matthews, Patrick

This Closure Report (CR) presents information supporting the clean closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 412: Clean Slate I Plutonium Dispersion (TTR), located on the Tonopah Test Range, Nevada. CAU 412 consists of a release of radionuclides to the surrounding soil from a storage–transportation test conducted on May 25, 1963. Corrective action investigation (CAI) activities were performed in April and May 2015, as set forth in the Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan for Corrective Action Unit 412: Clean Slate I Plutonium Dispersion (TTR), Tonopah Test Range, Nevada; and in accordance with the Soils Activity Quality Assurance Plan. Themore » purpose of the CAI was to fulfill data needs as defined during the data quality objectives process. The CAU 412 dataset of investigation results was evaluated based on a data quality assessment. This assessment demonstrated the dataset is complete and acceptable for use in fulfilling the data needs identified by the data quality objectives process. This CR provides documentation and justification for the clean closure of CAU 412 under the FFACO without further corrective action. This justification is based on historical knowledge of the site, previous site investigations, implementation of the 1997 interim corrective action, and the results of the CAI. The corrective action of clean closure was confirmed as appropriate for closure of CAU 412 based on achievement of the following closure objectives: Radiological contamination at the site is less than the final action level using the ground troops exposure scenario (i.e., the radiological dose is less than the final action level): Removable alpha contamination is less than the high contamination area criterion: No potential source material is present at the site, and any impacted soil associated with potential source material has been removed so that remaining soil contains contaminants at concentrations less than the final action levels: and There is sufficient information to characterize investigation and remediation waste for disposal.« less

Addendum to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 271: Areas 25, 26, and 27 Septic Systems Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Lynn Kidman

This document constitutes an addendum to the August 2004, Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 271, Areas 25, 26, and 27 Septic Systems as described in the document Recommendations and Justifications for Modifications for Use Restrictions Established under the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (UR Modification document) dated February 2008. The UR Modification document was approved by NDEP on February 26, 2008. The approval of the UR Modification document constituted approval of each of the recommended UR modifications. In conformance with the UR Modification document, this addendum consistsmore » of: • This cover page that refers the reader to the UR Modification document for additional information • The cover and signature pages of the UR Modification document • The NDEP approval letter • The corresponding section of the UR Modification document This addendum provides the documentation justifying the modification of the UR for CAS 27-05-02, Leachfield. This UR was established as part of a Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) corrective action and is based on the presence of contaminants at concentrations greater than the action levels established at the time of the initial investigation (FFACO, 1996; as amended August 2006). Since this UR was established, practices and procedures relating to the implementation of risk-based corrective actions (RBCA) have changed. Therefore, this UR was re-evaluated against the current RBCA criteria as defined in the Industrial Sites Project Establishment of Final Action Levels (NNSA/NSO, 2006c). This re-evaluation consisted of comparing the original data (used to define the need for the UR) to risk-based final action levels (FALs) developed using the current Industrial Sites RBCA process. The re-evaluation resulted in a recommendation to modify the UR to an administrative UR. Administrative URs differ from standard URs in that they do not require onsite postings (i.e., signs) or other physical barriers (e.g., fencing, monuments), and they do not require periodic inspections (see Section 6.2 of the Industrial Sites Project Establishment of Final Action Levels [NNSA/NSO, 2006c]). This Administrative UR was based on an “Occasional Use Area” future land use scenario that was used to calculate the FAL. The administrative UR will protect workers from an exposure exceeding that used in the calculation of the FAL (i.e., 400 total work hours). Any proposed activity within this use restricted area that would potentially cause an exposure exceeding this exposure limit would require approval from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP). Requirements for inspecting and maintaining postings at this UR will be canceled, and the postings and signage at this site will be removed. Fencing and posting may be present at this site that are unrelated to the FFACO UR such as for radiological control purposes as required by the NV/YMP Radiological Control Manual (NNSA/NSO, 2004f). This modification will not affect or modify any non-FFACO requirements for fencing, posting, or monitoring at this site.« less

76 FR 16234 - Prompt Corrective Action; Amended Definition of Low-Risk Assets

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-03-23

... guaranteed by NCUA. Assets in this category receive a risk-weighting of zero for regulatory capital purposes... not apply a risk-weighting of zero even when an investment carries no credit risk. The ``Low-risk assets'' risk portfolio, in contrast, does apply a risk- weighting of zero, but the NGNs did not fall...

Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 374: Area 20 Schooner Unit Crater, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada with ROTC 1 and 2, Revision 0

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Matthews, Patrick

Corrective Action Unit 374 comprises five corrective action sites (CASs): • 18-22-05, Drum • 18-22-06, Drums (20) • 18-22-08, Drum • 18-23-01, Danny Boy Contamination Area • 20-45-03, U-20u Crater (Schooner) The purpose of this Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report is to provide justification and documentation supporting the recommendation that no further corrective action is needed for CAU 374 based on the implementation of corrective actions. The corrective action of closure in place with administrative controls was implemented at CASs 18-23-01 and 20-45-03, and a corrective action of removing potential source material (PSM) was conducted at CAS 20-45-03. The othermore » CASs require no further action; however, best management practices of removing PSM and drums at CAS 18-22-06, and removing drums at CAS 18-22-08 were performed. Corrective action investigation (CAI) activities were performed from May 4 through October 6, 2010, as set forth in the Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 374: Area 20 Schooner Unit Crater, Nevada Test Site, Nevada. The approach for the CAI was divided into two facets: investigating the primary release of radionuclides and investigating other releases (migration in washes and chemical releases). The purpose of the CAI was to fulfill data needs as defined during the data quality objective (DQO) process. The CAU 374 dataset of investigation results was evaluated based on the data quality indicator parameters. This evaluation demonstrated the dataset is acceptable for use in fulfilling the DQO data needs. Analytes detected during the CAI were evaluated against final action levels (FALs) established in this document. Radiological doses exceeding the FAL of 25 millirem per year were found to be present in the surface soil that was sampled. It is assumed that radionuclide levels present in subsurface media within the craters and ejecta fields (default contamination boundaries) at the Danny Boy and Schooner sites exceed the FAL. It is also assumed that PSM in the form of lead-acid batteries at Schooner exceeds the FAL. Therefore, corrective actions were undertaken that consist of removing PSM, where present, and implementing a use restriction and posting warning signs at the Danny Boy and Schooner sites. These use restrictions were recorded in the FFACO database; the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) Facility Information Management System; and the NNSA/NSO CAU/CAS files. Therefore, NNSA/NSO provides the following recommendations: • No further corrective actions are necessary for CAU 374. • A Notice of Completion to NNSA/NSO is requested from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection for closure of CAU 374. • Corrective Action Unit 374 should be moved from Appendix III to Appendix IV of the FFACO.« less

78 FR 17612 - Health Insurance Providers Fee; Correction

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-03-22

... Health Insurance Providers Fee; Correction AGENCY: Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Treasury. ACTION... guidance on the annual fee imposed on covered entities engaged in the business of providing health insurance for United States health risks. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Charles J. Langley, Jr. at (202...

75 FR 66298 - Prompt Corrective Action; Amended Definition of Low-Risk Assets

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-10-28

...,'' ``Investments,'' ``Low-risk assets,'' ``Average-risk assets,'' ``Loans sold with recourse,'' ``Unused MBL...-backed securities (``the distressed assets'') held in the investment portfolios of CCUs. In several cases... legally permissible investments for federal credit unions. For state-chartered credit unions, the NGNs are...

21 CFR 99.401 - Corrective actions and cessation of dissemination of information.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-04-01

... HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES GENERAL DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION ON UNAPPROVED/NEW USES FOR MARKETED DRUGS... cessation of dissemination of information. (a) FDA actions based on post dissemination data. If FDA receives... requirements; or (2) Order the manufacturer to cease dissemination of information and to take corrective action...

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 139: Waste Disposal Sites, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Rev. No.: 0

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Grant Evenson

2006-04-01

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 139 is located in Areas 3, 4, 6, and 9 of the Nevada Test Site, which is 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. Corrective Action Unit 139 is comprised of the seven corrective action sites (CASs) listed below: (1) 03-35-01, Burn Pit; (2) 04-08-02, Waste Disposal Site; (3) 04-99-01, Contaminated Surface Debris; (4) 06-19-02, Waste Disposal Site/Burn Pit; (5) 06-19-03, Waste Disposal Trenches; (6) 09-23-01, Area 9 Gravel Gertie; and (7) 09-34-01, Underground Detection Station. These sites are being investigated because existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluatemore » and recommend corrective action alternatives with the exception of CASs 09-23-01 and 09-34-01. Regarding these two CASs, CAS 09-23-01 is a gravel gertie where a zero-yield test was conducted with all contamination confined to below ground within the area of the structure, and CAS 09-34-01 is an underground detection station where no contaminants are present. Additional information will be obtained by conducting a corrective action investigation (CAI) before evaluating corrective action alternatives and selecting the appropriate corrective action for the other five CASs where information is insufficient. The results of the field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of viable corrective action alternatives that will be presented in the Corrective Action Decision Document. The sites will be investigated based on the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed on January 4, 2006, by representatives of the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection; U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office; Stoller-Navarro Joint Venture; and Bechtel Nevada. The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to develop and evaluate appropriate corrective actions for CAU 139.« less

12 CFR 702.108 - Risk mitigation credit.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 12 Banks and Banking 6 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Risk mitigation credit. 702.108 Section 702.108... CORRECTIVE ACTION Net Worth Classification § 702.108 Risk mitigation credit. (a) Who may apply. A credit union may apply for a risk mitigation credit if on any of the current or three preceding effective dates...

12 CFR 702.104 - Risk portfolios defined.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... CORRECTIVE ACTION Net Worth Classification § 702.104 Risk portfolios defined. A risk portfolio is a portfolio... 12 Banks and Banking 6 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Risk portfolios defined. 702.104 Section 702... or mature within the next five (5) years, and exclusive of all member business loans (as defined in...

12 CFR 702.108 - Risk mitigation credit.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... 12 Banks and Banking 7 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Risk mitigation credit. 702.108 Section 702.108... CORRECTIVE ACTION Net Worth Classification § 702.108 Risk mitigation credit. (a) Who may apply. A credit union may apply for a risk mitigation credit if on any of the current or three preceding effective dates...

12 CFR 702.108 - Risk mitigation credit.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... 12 Banks and Banking 7 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Risk mitigation credit. 702.108 Section 702.108... CORRECTIVE ACTION Net Worth Classification § 702.108 Risk mitigation credit. (a) Who may apply. A credit union may apply for a risk mitigation credit if on any of the current or three preceding effective dates...

12 CFR 702.108 - Risk mitigation credit.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 12 Banks and Banking 6 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Risk mitigation credit. 702.108 Section 702.108... CORRECTIVE ACTION Net Worth Classification § 702.108 Risk mitigation credit. (a) Who may apply. A credit union may apply for a risk mitigation credit if on any of the current or three preceding effective dates...

12 CFR 702.108 - Risk mitigation credit.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... 12 Banks and Banking 7 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Risk mitigation credit. 702.108 Section 702.108... CORRECTIVE ACTION Net Worth Classification § 702.108 Risk mitigation credit. (a) Who may apply. A credit union may apply for a risk mitigation credit if on any of the current or three preceding effective dates...

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 568: Area 3 Plutonium Dispersion Sites Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 1

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Matthews, Patrick

The purpose of this CR is to provide documentation and justification that no further corrective action is needed for the closure of CAU 568 based on the implementation of corrective actions. This includes a description of closure activities that were performed and an evaluation of the verification data. The CAP (NNSA/NFO, 2016a) and ROTC-1 (NNSA/NFO, 2016c) provide information relating to the selection of CAAs and the reasoning behind their selection. The CADD (NNSA/NFO, 2015) identifies the release sites that require additional corrective action and presents information supporting the selection of CAAs.

Managing Athletic Liability: An Assessment Guide.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Burling, Philip; And Others

1992-01-01

A comprehensive risk-management program associated with athletic activities contains the following essential components: (1) policies and procedures; (2) training; (3) supervision; (4) corrective action; (5) review and revision; (6) legal counsel and support. Action steps follow each of these major areas. (29 case references) (MLF)

Hybrid Cascading Outage Analysis of Extreme Events with Optimized Corrective Actions

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Vallem, Mallikarjuna R.; Vyakaranam, Bharat GNVSR; Holzer, Jesse T.

2017-10-19

Power system are vulnerable to extreme contingencies (like an outage of a major generating substation) that can cause significant generation and load loss and can lead to further cascading outages of other transmission facilities and generators in the system. Some cascading outages are seen within minutes following a major contingency, which may not be captured exclusively using the dynamic simulation of the power system. The utilities plan for contingencies either based on dynamic or steady state analysis separately which may not accurately capture the impact of one process on the other. We address this gap in cascading outage analysis bymore » developing Dynamic Contingency Analysis Tool (DCAT) that can analyze hybrid dynamic and steady state behavior of the power system, including protection system models in dynamic simulations, and simulating corrective actions in post-transient steady state conditions. One of the important implemented steady state processes is to mimic operator corrective actions to mitigate aggravated states caused by dynamic cascading. This paper presents an Optimal Power Flow (OPF) based formulation for selecting corrective actions that utility operators can take during major contingency and thus automate the hybrid dynamic-steady state cascading outage process. The improved DCAT framework with OPF based corrective actions is demonstrated on IEEE 300 bus test system.« less

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 204: Storage Bunkers, Nevada Test Site, Nevada (December 2002, Revision No.: 0), Including Record of Technical Change No. 1

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

NNSA /NSO

The Corrective Action Investigation Plan contains the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Operations Office's approach to collect the data necessary to evaluate corrective action alternatives appropriate for the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 204 under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Corrective Action Unit 204 is located on the Nevada Test Site approximately 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. This CAU is comprised of six Corrective Action Sites (CASs) which include: 01-34-01, Underground Instrument House Bunker; 02-34-01, Instrument Bunker; 03-34-01, Underground Bunker; 05-18-02, Chemical Explosives Storage; 05-33-01, Kay Blockhouse; 05-99-02, Explosive Storage Bunker.more » Based on site history, process knowledge, and previous field efforts, contaminants of potential concern for Corrective Action Unit 204 collectively include radionuclides, beryllium, high explosives, lead, polychlorinated biphenyls, total petroleum hydrocarbons, silver, warfarin, and zinc phosphide. The primary question for the investigation is: ''Are existing data sufficient to evaluate appropriate corrective actions?'' To address this question, resolution of two decision statements is required. Decision I is to ''Define the nature of contamination'' by identifying any contamination above preliminary action levels (PALs); Decision II is to ''Determine the extent of contamination identified above PALs. If PALs are not exceeded, the investigation is completed. If PALs are exceeded, then Decision II must be resolved. In addition, data will be obtained to support waste management decisions. Field activities will include radiological land area surveys, geophysical surveys to identify any subsurface metallic and nonmetallic debris, field screening for applicable contaminants of potential concern, collection and analysis of surface and subsurface soil samples from biased locations, and step-out sampling to define the extent of contamination, as necessary. The results of this field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of corrective action alternatives in the corrective action decision document.« less

Risk Assessment Approach for the Hanford Site River Corridor Closure Project

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Thomson, J.E.; Weiss, S.G.; Sands, J.P.

2007-07-01

The river corridor portion of the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Hanford Site includes the 100 Area and 300 Area, which border the Columbia River and cover 565 km{sup 2} (218 mi{sup 2}). The River Corridor Closure (RCC) Project scope of work includes 486 contaminated facilities, 4 of 9 deactivated plutonium production reactors, and 370 waste disposal sites. DOE's cleanup actions in the river corridor were initiated in 1994 under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1981 (42 U.S.C. 9601, et seq.) (CERCLA) and included source and groundwater operable units (OUs). DOE's RCC Project, awarded to Washingtonmore » Closure Hanford (WCH) in 2005, focuses on source OUs and has allowed cleanup actions to continue in the 100 and 300 Areas with completion by 2013. The regulatory authorization for cleanup actions at source OUs in the river corridor consists primarily of interim action records of decision (RODs), which were supported by qualitative risk assessments and limited field investigations. A key to establishing final cleanup decisions and proceeding toward final CERCLA closeout is completion of quantitative baseline risk assessment activities. Baseline risk assessment is necessary to determine whether cleanup actions are protective of human health and the environment and to identify any course corrections needed to ensure that current and future cleanup actions are protective. Because cleanup actions are ongoing under interim action RODs, it is desirable to establish the final cleanup decision bases as early as possible to minimize the impacts of any identified course corrections to the cleanup approach. Risk assessment is being performed by WCH as the River Corridor Baseline Risk Assessment (RCBRA). The RCBRA uses a multi-step process that summarizes existing data; uses the data quality objectives process to identify both data gaps and unresolved issues through public workshops; and solicits input from regulators, trustees, and stakeholders. Sampling and analysis plans are then developed to document quality requirements and identify field sample collection approaches. After required data are collected, the risks to human health and the environment are assessed. Sampling of upland, riparian, and near-shore environments for the 100/300 Area Component was performed in 2005 and 2006. The 100/300 Area Component includes former operational/reactor areas. The results of these efforts will be incorporated into a mid-2007 draft risk assessment report for the 100/300 Area Component of the RCBRA. Adapting methodology developed from the 100/300 Area Component, the Inter-Areas risk assessment will be conducted for the riparian and near-shore environments. The Inter-Areas Component includes shoreline areas between former operational areas addressed in the 100/300 Area Component. The Inter-Areas risk assessment will supplement results from the 100/300 Area Component to provide a more complete analysis of residual risks in the river corridor. Plans for the final element of the RCBRA, the Columbia River Component, are being developed by DOE and currently is not part of the RCC Project. The Columbia River Component includes the reach of the Columbia River located adjacent to the Hanford Site and reaches downstream to an undetermined boundary. Recommendations for final cleanup decisions at source units within the river corridor, based in part on the risk assessment results, will be presented for future public review in a River Corridor Source Unit Proposed Plan. To form an integrated cleanup approach for the river corridor, the RCBRA results for the source units require integration with risk assessment results from groundwater cleanup actions managed by other contractors. WCH's risk assessment task includes development of an integration strategy for activities leading up to the final regulatory decisions for all OUs in the river corridor. (authors)« less

Recommendations and Justifications To Remove Use Restrictions Established under the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order, Revision 0

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Birney, Cathleen; Krauss, Mark J

This document is part of an effort to reevaluate 37 FFACO and Administrative URs against the current Soils Risk-Based Corrective Action Evaluation Process. After reviewing 37 existing FFACO and Administrative URs, 3 URs addressed in this document have sufficient information to determine that these current URs may be removed, based on the RBCA criteria. This document presents recommendations on modifications to existing URs that will be consistent with the RBCA criteria.

Addendum to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 404: Roller Coaster Sewage Lagoons and North Disposal Trench, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, Revision 1

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Lynn Kidman

This document constitutes an addendum to the September 1998, Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 404: Roller Coaster Lagoons and Trench, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada as described in the document Recommendations and Justifications for Modifications for Use Restrictions Established under the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (UR Modification document) dated February 2008. The UR Modification document was approved by NDEP on February 26, 2008. The approval of the UR Modification document constituted approval of each of the recommended UR modifications. In conformance with the UR Modification document, thismore » addendum consists of: • This cover page that refers the reader to the UR Modification document for additional information • The cover and signature pages of the UR Modification document • The NDEP approval letter • The corresponding section of the UR Modification document This addendum provides the documentation justifying the modification of the UR for CAS TA-03-001-TARC Roller Coaster Lagoons. This UR was established as part of Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) corrective actions and was based on the presence of contaminants at concentrations greater than the action levels established at the time of the initial investigation (FFACO, 1996; as amended August 2006). Since this UR was established, practices and procedures relating to the implementation of risk-based corrective actions (RBCA) have changed. Therefore, this UR was re-evaluated against the current RBCA criteria as defined in the Industrial Sites Project Establishment of Final Action Levels (NNSA/NSO, 2006c). This reevaluation consisted of comparing the original data (used to define the need for the UR) to risk-based final action levels (FALs) developed using the current Industrial Sites RBCA process. The re-evaluation resulted in a recommendation to modify the UR for CAS TA-03-001-TARC to an administrative UR. Administrative URs differ from standard URs in that they do not require onsite postings (i.e., signs) or other physical barriers (e.g., fencing, monuments), and they do not require periodic inspections (see Section 6.2 of the Industrial Sites Project Establishment of Final Action Levels [NNSA/NSO, 2006c]). This Administrative UR was based on a “Remote Work Sites” future land use scenario that was used to calculate the FAL. The administrative UR will protect workers from an exposure exceeding that used in the calculation of the FAL (i.e., 336 hours per year). Any proposed activity within these use restricted areas that would potentially cause an exposure exceeding this exposure limit would require approval from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP). Requirements for inspecting and maintaining this UR will be canceled, and the postings and signage at each site will be removed. Fencing and posting may be present at these sites that are unrelated to the FFACO URs such as for radiological control purposes as required by the NV/YMP Radiological Control Manual (NNSA/NSO, 2004f). This modification will not affect or modify any non-FFACO requirements for fencing, posting, or monitoring at these sites.« less

Addendum to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 404: Roller Coaster Lagoons and Trench, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, Revision 0

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Lynn Kidman

This document constitutes an addendum to the September 1998, Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 404: Roller Coaster Lagoons and Trench, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada as described in the document Recommendations and Justifications for Modifications for Use Restrictions Established under the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (UR Modification document) dated February 2008. The UR Modification document was approved by NDEP on February 26, 2008. The approval of the UR Modification document constituted approval of each of the recommended UR modifications. In conformance with the UR Modification document, thismore » addendum consists of: • This cover page that refers the reader to the UR Modification document for additional information • The cover and signature pages of the UR Modification document • The NDEP approval letter • The corresponding section of the UR Modification document This addendum provides the documentation justifying the cancellation of the URs for: • CAS TA-03-001-TARC Roller Coaster Lagoons • CAS TA-21-001-TARC Roller Coaster N. Disposal Trench These URs were established as part of Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) corrective actions and were based on the presence of contaminants at concentrations greater than the action levels established at the time of the initial investigation (FFACO, 1996; as amended August 2006). Since these URs were established, practices and procedures relating to the implementation of risk-based corrective actions (RBCA) have changed. Therefore, these URs were re-evaluated against the current RBCA criteria as defined in the Industrial Sites Project Establishment of Final Action Levels (NNSA/NSO, 2006c). This re-evaluation consisted of comparing the original data (used to define the need for the URs) to risk-based final action levels (FALs) developed using the current Industrial Sites RBCA process. The re-evaluation resulted in a recommendation to modify these URs to administrative URs. Administrative URs differ from standard URs in that they do not require onsite postings (i.e., signs) or other physical barriers (e.g., fencing, monuments), and they do not require periodic inspections (see Section 6.2 of the Industrial Sites Project Establishment of Final Action Levels [NNSA/NSO, 2006c]). These Administrative URs were based on a “Remote Work Sites” future land use scenario that was used to calculate the FAL. The administrative UR will protect workers from an exposure exceeding that used in the calculation of the FAL (i.e., 336 hours per year). Any proposed activity within these use restricted areas that would potentially cause an exposure exceeding this exposure limit would require approval from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP). Requirements for inspecting and maintaining these URs will be canceled, and the postings and signage at each site will be removed. Fencing and posting may be present at these sites that are unrelated to the FFACO URs such as for radiological control purposes as required by the NV/YMP Radiological Control Manual (NNSA/NSO, 2004f). This modification will not affect or modify any non-FFACO requirements for fencing, posting, or monitoring at these sites.« less

Exemplar-based human action pose correction.

PubMed

Shen, Wei; Deng, Ke; Bai, Xiang; Leyvand, Tommer; Guo, Baining; Tu, Zhuowen

2014-07-01

The launch of Xbox Kinect has built a very successful computer vision product and made a big impact on the gaming industry. This sheds lights onto a wide variety of potential applications related to action recognition. The accurate estimation of human poses from the depth image is universally a critical step. However, existing pose estimation systems exhibit failures when facing severe occlusion. In this paper, we propose an exemplar-based method to learn to correct the initially estimated poses. We learn an inhomogeneous systematic bias by leveraging the exemplar information within a specific human action domain. Furthermore, as an extension, we learn a conditional model by incorporation of pose tags to further increase the accuracy of pose correction. In the experiments, significant improvements on both joint-based skeleton correction and tag prediction are observed over the contemporary approaches, including what is delivered by the current Kinect system. Our experiments for the facial landmark correction also illustrate that our algorithm can improve the accuracy of other detection/estimation systems.

Job stress: an in-depth investigation based on the HSE questionnaire and a multistep approach in order to identify the most appropriate corrective actions.

PubMed

De Sio, S; Cedrone, F; Greco, E; Di Traglia, M; Sanità, D; Mandolesi, D; Stansfeld, S A

2016-01-01

Psychosocial hazards and work-related stress have reached epidemic proportions in Europe. The Italia law introduced in 2008 the obligation for Italian companies to assess work related stress risk in order to protect their workers' safety and health. The purpose of our study was to propose an accurate measurement tool, using the HSE indicator tool, for more appropriate and significant work-related stress' prevention measures. The study was conducted on 204 visual display unit (VDU) operators: 106 male and 98 female. All subjects were administered the HSE questionnaire. The sample was studied through a 4 step process, using HSE analysis tool and a statistical analysis, based on the odds ratio calculation. The assessment model used demonstrated the presence of work related stress in VDU operators and additional "critical" aspects which had failed to emerge by the classical use of HSE analysis tool. The approach we propose allows to obtain a complete picture of the perception of work-related stress and can point out the most appropriate corrective actions.

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 415: Project 57 No. 1 Plutonium Dispersion (NTTR) Nevada Test and Training Range, Nevada, Revision 0 with ROTC-1

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Cabble, Kevin J.; Boehlecke, Robert F.

This Closure Report (CR) presents information supporting the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 415: Project 57 No. 1 Plutonium Dispersion, which is located on Range 4808A of the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR). This CR complies with the requirements of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada; U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management; U.S. Department of Defense; and DOE, Legacy Management. CAU 415 comprises one corrective action site (CAS): NAFR-23-02, Pu Contaminated Soil. The purpose of this CR is to provide justification and documentation supporting the recommendationmore » that no further corrective action is needed for CAU 415 based on the implementation of the corrective action of Closure in Place.« less

Report: EPA Has Implemented Corrective Actions to Improve Conditions at Asheville, North Carolina Superfund Site

EPA Pesticide Factsheets

Report #12-P-0362, March 21, 2012. Region 4 took actions to implement all recommendations made in EPA OIG Report No. 10-P-0130, EPA Activities Provide Limited Assurance of the Extent of Contamination and Risk at a North Carolina Hazardous Waste Site.

Improving the treatment planning and delivery process of Xoft electronic skin brachytherapy.

PubMed

Manger, Ryan; Rahn, Douglas; Hoisak, Jeremy; Dragojević, Irena

2018-05-14

To develop an improved Xoft electronic skin brachytherapy process and identify areas of further improvement. A multidisciplinary team conducted a failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) by developing a process map and a corresponding list of failure modes. The failure modes were scored for their occurrence, severity, and detectability, and a risk priority number (RPN) was calculated for each failure mode as the product of occurrence, severity, and detectability. Corrective actions were implemented to address the higher risk failure modes, and a revised process was generated. The RPNs of the failure modes were compared between the initial process and final process to assess the perceived benefits of the corrective actions. The final treatment process consists of 100 steps and 114 failure modes. The FMEA took approximately 20 person-hours (one physician, three physicists, and two therapists) to complete. The 10 most dangerous failure modes had RPNs ranging from 336 to 630. Corrective actions were effective at addressing most failure modes (10 riskiest RPNs ranging from 189 to 310), yet the RPNs were higher than those published for alternative systems. Many of these high-risk failure modes remained due to hardware design limitations. FMEA helps guide process improvement efforts by emphasizing the riskiest steps. Significant risks are apparent when using a Xoft treatment unit for skin brachytherapy due to hardware limitations such as the lack of several interlocks, a short source lifespan, and variability in source output. The process presented in this article is expected to reduce but not eliminate these risks. Copyright © 2018 American Brachytherapy Society. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

75 FR 13145 - SBA Lender Risk Rating System

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-03-18

... SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION [Docket No. SBA-2010-0004] SBA Lender Risk Rating System AGENCY: Small Business Administration. ACTION: Notice; extension of comment period and correction. SUMMARY: On March 1, 2010, the Small Business Administration (SBA) published a notice in the Federal Register to...

A novel approach for evaluating the risk of health care failure modes.

PubMed

Chang, Dong Shang; Chung, Jenq Hann; Sun, Kuo Lung; Yang, Fu Chiang

2012-12-01

Failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) can be employed to reduce medical errors by identifying the risk ranking of the health care failure modes and taking priority action for safety improvement. The purpose of this paper is to propose a novel approach of data analysis. The approach is to integrate FMEA and a mathematical tool-Data envelopment analysis (DEA) with "slack-based measure" (SBM), in the field of data analysis. The risk indexes (severity, occurrence, and detection) of FMEA are viewed as multiple inputs of DEA. The practicality and usefulness of the proposed approach is illustrated by one case of health care. Being a systematic approach for improving the service quality of health care, the approach can offer quantitative corrective information of risk indexes that thereafter reduce failure possibility. For safety improvement, these new targets of the risk indexes could be used for management by objectives. But FMEA cannot provide quantitative corrective information of risk indexes. The novel approach can surely overcome this chief shortcoming of FMEA. After combining DEA SBM model with FMEA, the two goals-increase of patient safety, medical cost reduction-can be together achieved.

Corrective Action Decision Document for Corrective Action Unit 204: Storage Bunkers, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0 with ROTC 1, 2, and Errata

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Wickline, Alfred

2004-04-01

This Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD) has been prepared for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 204 Storage Bunkers, Nevada Test Site (NTS), Nevada, in accordance with the ''Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order'' (FFACO) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada; U.S. Department of Energy (DOE); and the U.S. Department of Defense (FFACO, 1996). The NTS is approximately 65 miles (mi) north of Las Vegas, Nevada (Figure 1-1). The Corrective Action Sites (CASs) within CAU 204 are located in Areas 1, 2, 3, and 5 of the NTS, in Nye County, Nevada (Figure 1-2). Corrective Action Unit 204 ismore » comprised of the six CASs identified in Table 1-1. As shown in Table 1-1, the FFACO describes four of these CASs as bunkers one as chemical exchange storage and one as a blockhouse. Subsequent investigations have identified four of these structures as instrumentation bunkers (CASs 01-34-01, 02-34-01, 03-34-01, 05-33-01), one as an explosives storage bunker (CAS 05-99-02), and one as both (CAS 05-18-02). The six bunkers included in CAU 204 were primarily used to monitor atmospheric testing or store munitions. The ''Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) for Corrective Action Unit 204: Storage Bunkers, Nevada Test Site, Nevada'' (NNSA/NV, 2002a) provides information relating to the history, planning, and scope of the investigation; therefore, it will not be repeated in this CADD. This CADD identifies potential corrective action alternatives and provides a rationale for the selection of a recommended corrective action alternative for each CAS within CAU 204. The evaluation of corrective action alternatives is based on process knowledge and the results of investigative activities conducted in accordance with the CAIP (NNSA/NV, 2002a) that was approved prior to the start of the Corrective Action Investigation (CAI). Record of Technical Change (ROTC) No. 1 to the CAIP (approval pending) documents changes to the preliminary action levels (PALs) agreed to by the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) and DOE, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO). This ROTC specifically discusses the radiological PALs and their application to the findings of the CAU 204 corrective action investigation.« less

A multiple-scenario assessment of the effect of a continuous-care, guideline-based decision support system on clinicians' compliance to clinical guidelines.

PubMed

Shalom, Erez; Shahar, Yuval; Parmet, Yisrael; Lunenfeld, Eitan

2015-04-01

To quantify the effect of a new continuous-care guideline (GL)-application engine, the Picard decision support system (DSS) engine, on the correctness and completeness of clinicians' decisions relative to an established clinical GL, and to assess the clinicians' attitudes towards a specific DSS. Thirty-six clinicians, including residents at different training levels and board-certified specialists at an academic OB/GYN department that handles around 15,000 deliveries annually, agreed to evaluate our continuous-care guideline-based DSS and to perform a cross-over assessment of the effects of using our guideline-based DSS. We generated electronic patient records that realistically simulated the longitudinal course of six different clinical scenarios of the preeclampsia/eclampsia/toxemia (PET) GL, encompassing 60 different decision points in total. Each clinician managed three scenarios manually without the Picard DSS engine (Non-DSS mode) and three scenarios when assisted by the Picard DSS engine (DSS mode). The main measures in both modes were correctness and completeness of actions relative to the PET GL. Correctness was further decomposed into necessary and redundant actions, relative to the guideline and the actual patient data. At the end of the assessment, a questionnaire was administered to the clinicians to assess their perceptions regarding use of the DSS. With respect to completeness, the clinicians applied approximately 41% of the GL's recommended actions in the non-DSS mode. Completeness increased to the performance of approximately 93% of the guideline's recommended actions, when using the DSS mode. With respect to correctness, approximately 94.5% of the clinicians' decisions in the non-DSS mode were correct. However, these included 68% of the actions that were correct but redundant, given the patient's data (e.g., repeating tests that had been performed), and 27% of the actions, which were necessary in the context of the GL and of the given scenario. Only 5.5% of the decisions were definite errors. In the DSS mode, 94% of the clinicians' decisions were correct, which included 3% that were correct but redundant, and 91% of the actions that were correct and necessary in the context of the GL and of the given scenario. Only 6% of the DSS-mode decisions were erroneous. The DSS was assessed by the clinicians as potentially useful. Support from the GL-based DSS led to uniformity in the quality of the decisions, regardless of the particular clinician, any particular clinical scenario, any particular decision point, or any decision type within the scenarios. Using the DSS dramatically enhances completeness (i.e., performance of guideline-based recommendations) and seems to prevent the performance of most of the redundant actions, but does not seem to affect the rate of performance of incorrect actions. The redundancy rate is enhanced by similar recent findings in recent studies. Clinicians mostly find this support to be potentially useful for their daily practice. A continuous-care GL-based DSS, such as the Picard DSS engine, has the potential to prevent most errors of omission by ensuring uniformly high quality of clinical decision making (relative to a GL-based norm), due to the increased adherence (i.e., completeness) to the GL, and most of the errors of commission that increase therapy costs, by reducing the rate of redundant actions. However, to prevent clinical errors of commission, the DSS needs to be accompanied by additional modules, such as automated control of the quality of the physician's actual actions. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.

Corrective Action Decision Document for Corrective Action Unit 340: Pesticide Release sites, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

DOE /NV

This Corrective Action Decision Document has been prepared for Corrective Action Unit 340, the NTS Pesticide Release Sites, in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order of 1996 (FFACO, 1996). Corrective Action Unit 340 is located at the Nevada Test Site, Nevada, and is comprised of the following Corrective Action Sites: 23-21-01, Area 23 Quonset Hut 800 Pesticide Release Ditch; 23-18-03, Area 23 Skid Huts Pesticide Storage; and 15-18-02, Area 15 Quonset Hut 15-11 Pesticide Storage. The purpose of this Corrective Action Decision Document is to identify and provide a rationale for the selection of a recommended correctivemore » action alternative for each Corrective Action Site. The scope of this Corrective Action Decision Document consists of the following tasks: Develop corrective action objectives; Identify corrective action alternative screening criteria; Develop corrective action alternatives; Perform detailed and comparative evaluations of the corrective action alternatives in relation to the corrective action objectives and screening criteria; and Recommend and justify a preferred corrective action alternative for each Corrective Action Site.« less

DOD Acquisition Information Management

DTIC Science & Technology

1994-09-30

instead of on a real- time management information flow. The process of identifying risks and implementing corrective actions is lengthened by using the current system; performance measurement and reporting are impeded.

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 414: Clean Slate III Plutonium Dispersion (TTR) Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, Revision 1

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Matthews, Patrick

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 414 is located on the Tonopah Test Range, which is approximately 130 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada, and approximately 40 miles southeast of Tonopah, Nevada. The CAU 414 site consists of the release of radionuclides to the surface and shallow subsurface from the conduct of the Clean Slate III (CSIII) storage–transportation test conducted on June 9, 1963. CAU 414 includes one corrective action site (CAS), TA-23-03CS (Pu Contaminated Soil). The known releases at CAU 414 are the result of the atmospheric dispersal of contamination from the 1963 CSIII test. The CSIII test was a nonnuclearmore » detonation of a nuclear device located inside a reinforced concrete bunker covered with 8 feet of soil. This test dispersed radionuclides, primarily uranium and plutonium, on the ground surface. The presence and nature of contamination at CAU 414 will be evaluated based on information collected from a corrective action investigation (CAI). The investigation is based on the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed on June 7, 2016, by representatives of the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection; the U.S. Air Force; and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office. The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to develop and evaluate appropriate corrective action alternatives for CAU 414.« less

Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan for Corrective Action Unit 413: Clean Slate II Plutonium Dispersion (TTR) Tonopah Test Range, Nevada. Revision 0

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Matthews, Patrick

This Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan provides the rationale and supporting information for the selection and implementation of corrective actions at Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 413, Clean Slate II Plutonium Dispersion (TTR). CAU 413 is located on the Tonopah Test Range and includes one corrective action site, TA-23-02CS. CAU 413 consists of the release of radionuclides to the surface and shallow subsurface from the Clean Slate II (CSII) storage–transportation test conducted on May 31, 1963. The CSII test was a non-nuclear detonation of a nuclear device located inside a concrete bunker covered with 2 feet of soil. To facilitatemore » site investigation and the evaluation of data quality objectives decisions, the releases at CAU 413 were divided into seven study groups: 1 Undisturbed Areas 2 Disturbed Areas 3 Sedimentation Areas 4 Former Staging Area 5 Buried Debris 6 Potential Source Material 7 Soil Mounds Corrective action investigation (CAI) activities, as set forth in the CAU 413 Corrective Action Investigation Plan, were performed from June 2015 through May 2016. Radionuclides detected in samples collected during the CAI were used to estimate total effective dose using the Construction Worker exposure scenario. Corrective action was required for areas where total effective dose exceeded, or was assumed to exceed, the radiological final action level (FAL) of 25 millirem per year. The results of the CAI and the assumptions made in the data quality objectives resulted in the following conclusions: The FAL is exceeded in surface soil in SG1, Undisturbed Areas; The FAL is assumed to be exceeded in SG5, Buried Debris, where contaminated debris and soil were buried after the CSII test; The FAL is not exceeded at SG2, SG3, SG4, SG6, or SG7. Because the FAL is exceeded at CAU 413, corrective action is required and corrective action alternatives (CAAs) must be evaluated. For CAU 413, three CAAs were evaluated: no further action, clean closure, and closure in place. The CAAs were evaluated on technical merit focusing on performance, reliability, feasibility, safety, and cost. Based on the evaluation of analytical data from the CAI, review of future and current operations at CAU 413, and the detailed and comparative analysis of CAAs, clean closure was selected as the preferred CAA for CAU 413 by the U.S. Air Force, Nevada Division of Environmental Protection, and U.S. Department of Energy at the CAA meeting held on August 24, 2016.« less

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 106: Areas 5, 11 Frenchman Flat Atmospheric Sites, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Patrick Matthews

2011-07-01

Corrective Action Unit 106 comprises the four corrective action sites (CASs) listed below: • 05-20-02, Evaporation Pond • 05-23-05, Atmospheric Test Site - Able • 05-45-04, 306 GZ Rad Contaminated Area • 05-45-05, 307 GZ Rad Contaminated Area These sites are being investigated because existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives (CAAs). Additional information will be obtained by conducting a corrective action investigation before evaluating CAAs and selecting the appropriate corrective action for each CAS. The results of the field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of viablemore » CAAs that will be presented in the Corrective Action Decision Document. The sites will be investigated based on the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed on January 19, 2010, by representatives of the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office. The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to develop and evaluate appropriate corrective actions for CAU 106. The presence and nature of contamination at CAU 106 will be evaluated based on information collected from a field investigation. The CAU includes land areas impacted by the release of radionuclides from groundwater pumping during the Radionuclide Migration study program (CAS 05-20-02), a weapons-related airdrop test (CAS 05-23-05), and unknown support activities at two sites (CAS 05-45-04 and CAS 05-45-05). The presence and nature of contamination from surface-deposited radiological contamination from CAS 05-23-05, Atmospheric Test Site - Able, and other types of releases (such as migration and excavation as well as any potential releases discovered during the investigation) from the remaining three CASs will be evaluated using soil samples collected from the locations most likely containing contamination, if present. Appendix A provides a detailed discussion of the DQO methodology and the DQOs specific to each CAS. The scope of the corrective action investigation for CAU 106 includes the following activities: • Conduct radiological surveys. • Collect and submit environmental samples for laboratory analysis to determine internal dose rates and the presence of contaminants of concern. • If contaminants of concern are present, collect additional samples to define the extent of the contamination and determine the area where the total effective dose at the site exceeds final action levels (i.e., corrective action boundary). • Collect samples of investigation-derived waste, as needed, for waste management purposes.« less

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 97: Yucca Flat/Climax Mine, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada with ROTCs 1, 2, and 3 (Revision 0, September 2000)

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Andrews, Robert; Marutzky, Sam

2000-09-01

This Corrective Action Investigation Plan contains the U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office's (DOE/NV's) approach to collect the data necessary to evaluate Corrective Action Alternatives (CAAs) appropriate for the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 97 under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). Corrective Action Unit 97, collectively known as the Yucca Flat/Climax Mine CAU, consists of 720 Corrective Action Sites (CASs). The Yucca Flat/Climax Mine CAU extends over several areas of the NTS and constitutes one of several areas used for underground nuclear testing in the past. The nuclear tests resulted in groundwater contamination in themore » vicinity as well as downgradient of the underground test areas. Based on site history, the Yucca Flat underground nuclear tests were conducted in alluvial, volcanic, and carbonate rocks; whereas, the Climax Mine tests were conducted in an igneous intrusion located in northern Yucca Flat. Particle-tracking simulations performed during the regional evaluation indicate that the local Climax Mine groundwater flow system merges into the much larger Yucca Flat groundwater flow systems during the 1,000-year time period of interest. Addressing these two areas jointly and simultaneously investigating them as a combined CAU has been determined the best way to proceed with corrective action investigation (CAI) activities. The purpose and scope of the CAI includes characterization activities and model development conducted in five major sequential steps designed to be consistent with FFACO Underground Test Area Project's strategy to predict the location of the contaminant boundary, develop and implement a corrective action, and close each CAU. The results of this field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of CAAs in the subsequent corrective action decision document.« less

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 371: Johnnie Boy Crater and Pin Stripe Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Patrick Matthews

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 371 is located in Areas 11 and 18 of the Nevada Test Site, which is approximately 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. Corrective Action Unit 371 is comprised of the two corrective action sites (CASs) listed below: • 11-23-05, Pin Stripe Contamination Area • 18-45-01, U-18j-2 Crater (Johnnie Boy) These sites are being investigated because existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives. Additional information will be obtained by conducting a corrective action investigation before evaluating corrective action alternatives and selecting the appropriate correctivemore » action for each CAS. The results of the field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of viable corrective action alternatives that will be presented in the Corrective Action Decision Document. The sites will be investigated based on the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed on November 19, 2008, by representatives of the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection; U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office; Stoller-Navarro Joint Venture; and National Security Technologies, LLC. The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to develop and evaluate appropriate corrective actions for CAU 371. Appendix A provides a detailed discussion of the DQO methodology and the DQOs specific to each CAS. The scope of the corrective action investigation for CAU 371 includes the following activities: • Move surface debris and/or materials, as needed, to facilitate sampling. • Conduct radiological surveys. • Measure in situ external dose rates using thermoluminescent dosimeters or other dose measurement devices. • Collect and submit environmental samples for laboratory analysis to determine internal dose rates. • Combine internal and external dose rates to determine whether total dose rates exceed final action levels (FALs). • Collect and submit environmental samples for laboratory analysis to determine whether chemical contaminants are present at concentrations exceeding FALs. • If contamination exceeds FALs, define the extent of the contamination exceeding FALs. • Investigate waste to determine whether potential source material is present. This Corrective Action Investigation Plan has been developed in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order that was agreed to by the State of Nevada; U.S. Department of Energy; and U.S. Department of Defense. Under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order, this Corrective Action Investigation Plan will be submitted to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection for approval. Fieldwork will be conducted following approval of the plan.« less

Corrective Action Decision Document for Corrective Action Unit 563: Septic Systems, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Grant Evenson

2008-02-01

This Corrective Action Decision Document has been prepared for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 563, Septic Systems, in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO, 1996; as amended January 2007). The corrective action sites (CASs) for CAU 563 are located in Areas 3 and 12 of the Nevada Test Site, Nevada, and are comprised of the following four sites: •03-04-02, Area 3 Subdock Septic Tank •03-59-05, Area 3 Subdock Cesspool •12-59-01, Drilling/Welding Shop Septic Tanks •12-60-01, Drilling/Welding Shop Outfalls The purpose of this Corrective Action Decision Document is to identify and provide the rationale for the recommendation of a correctivemore » action alternative (CAA) for the four CASs within CAU 563. Corrective action investigation (CAI) activities were performed from July 17 through November 19, 2007, as set forth in the CAU 563 Corrective Action Investigation Plan (NNSA/NSO, 2007). Analytes detected during the CAI were evaluated against appropriate final action levels (FALs) to identify the contaminants of concern (COCs) for each CAS. The results of the CAI identified COCs at one of the four CASs in CAU 563 and required the evaluation of CAAs. Assessment of the data generated from investigation activities conducted at CAU 563 revealed the following: •CASs 03-04-02, 03-59-05, and 12-60-01 do not contain contamination at concentrations exceeding the FALs. •CAS 12-59-01 contains arsenic and chromium contamination above FALs in surface and near-surface soils surrounding a stained location within the site. Based on the evaluation of analytical data from the CAI, review of future and current operations at CAS 12-59-01, and the detailed and comparative analysis of the potential CAAs, the following corrective actions are recommended for CAU 563.« less

A Predictive Safety Management System Software Package Based on the Continuous Hazard Tracking and Failure Prediction Methodology

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Quintana, Rolando

2003-01-01

The goal of this research was to integrate a previously validated and reliable safety model, called Continuous Hazard Tracking and Failure Prediction Methodology (CHTFPM), into a software application. This led to the development of a safety management information system (PSMIS). This means that the theory or principles of the CHTFPM were incorporated in a software package; hence, the PSMIS is referred to as CHTFPM management information system (CHTFPM MIS). The purpose of the PSMIS is to reduce the time and manpower required to perform predictive studies as well as to facilitate the handling of enormous quantities of information in this type of studies. The CHTFPM theory encompasses the philosophy of looking at the concept of safety engineering from a new perspective: from a proactive, than a reactive, viewpoint. That is, corrective measures are taken before a problem instead of after it happened. That is why the CHTFPM is a predictive safety because it foresees or anticipates accidents, system failures and unacceptable risks; therefore, corrective action can be taken in order to prevent all these unwanted issues. Consequently, safety and reliability of systems or processes can be further improved by taking proactive and timely corrective actions.

Cleanups In My Community (CIMC) - Hazardous Waste Corrective Actions, National Layer

EPA Pesticide Factsheets

This data layer provides access to Hazardous Waste Corrective Action sites as part of the CIMC web service. Hazardous waste is waste that is dangerous or potentially harmful to our health or the environment. Hazardous wastes can be liquids, solids, gases, or sludges. They can be discarded commercial products, like cleaning fluids or pesticides, or the by-products of manufacturing processes. The RCRA Corrective Action Program, run by EPA and 43 authorized states and territories, works with facilities that have treated, stored, or disposed of hazardous wastes (TSDs) to protect public health and the environment by investigating and cleaning up hazardous releases to soil, ground water, surface water, and air at their facilities.RCRA Corrective Action sites in all 50 states and four U.S. territories cover 18 million acres of land.EPA estimates that more than 35 million people, roughly 12 percent of the U.S. population, live within one mile of a RCRA Corrective Action site (based on the 2000 U.S. Census).RCRA Corrective Action facilities include many current and former chemical manufacturing plants, oil refineries, lead smelters, wood preservers, steel mills, commercial landfills, and a variety of other types of entities. Due to poor practices prior to environmental regulations, Corrective Action facilities have left large stretches of river sediments laden with PCBs; deposited lead in residential yards and parks beyond site boundaries; polluted drinking water wells

ASSESSING UST CORRECTIVE ACTION TECHNOLOGIES: DIAGNOSTIC EVALUATION OF IN SITU SVE-BASED SYSTEM PERFORMANCE

EPA Science Inventory

In situ corrective action technologies are being proposed and installed at an increasing number of underground storage tank (LIST) sites contaminated with petroleum products in saturated and unsaturated zones. It is often difficult to accurately assess the performance of these sy...

The use of failure mode and effect analysis in a radiation oncology setting: the Cancer Treatment Centers of America experience.

PubMed

Denny, Diane S; Allen, Debra K; Worthington, Nicole; Gupta, Digant

2014-01-01

Delivering radiation therapy in an oncology setting is a high-risk process where system failures are more likely to occur because of increasing utilization, complexity, and sophistication of the equipment and related processes. Healthcare failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) is a method used to proactively detect risks to the patient in a particular healthcare process and correct potential errors before adverse events occur. FMEA is a systematic, multidisciplinary team-based approach to error prevention and enhancing patient safety. We describe our experience of using FMEA as a prospective risk-management technique in radiation oncology at a national network of oncology hospitals in the United States, capitalizing not only on the use of a team-based tool but also creating momentum across a network of collaborative facilities seeking to learn from and share best practices with each other. The major steps of our analysis across 4 sites and collectively were: choosing the process and subprocesses to be studied, assembling a multidisciplinary team at each site responsible for conducting the hazard analysis, and developing and implementing actions related to our findings. We identified 5 areas of performance improvement for which risk-reducing actions were successfully implemented across our enterprise. © 2012 National Association for Healthcare Quality.

Recommendations and Justifications for Modifications To Downgrade Use Restrictions Established under the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order, Revision 1

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Birney, Cathleen; Krauss, Mark J

This document is part of an effort to reevaluate 37 FFACO and Administrative URs against the current Soils Risk-Based Corrective Action Evaluation Process. After reviewing 37 existing FFACO and Administrative URs, 11 URs addressed in this document have sufficient information to determine that these current URs may be downgraded to Administrative URs based on the RBCA criteria. This document presents recommendations on modifications to existing URs that will be consistent with the RBCA criteria.

Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan for Corrective Action Unit 573: Alpha Contaminated Sites Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 0

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Matthews, Patrick

CAU 573 comprises the following corrective action sites (CASs): • 05-23-02, GMX Alpha Contaminated Area • 05-45-01, Atmospheric Test Site - Hamilton These two CASs include the release at the Hamilton weapons-related tower test and a series of 29 atmospheric experiments conducted at GMX. The two CASs are located in two distinctly separate areas within Area 5. To facilitate site investigation and data quality objective (DQO) decisions, all identified releases (i.e., CAS components) were organized into study groups. The reporting of investigation results and the evaluation of DQO decisions are at the release level. The corrective action alternatives (CAAs) weremore » evaluated at the FFACO CAS level. The purpose of this CADD/CAP is to evaluate potential CAAs, provide the rationale for the selection of recommended CAAs, and provide the plan for implementation of the recommended CAA for CAU 573. Corrective action investigation (CAI) activities were performed from January 2015 through November 2015, as set forth in the CAU 573 Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP). Analytes detected during the CAI were evaluated against appropriate final action levels (FALs) to identify the contaminants of concern. Assessment of the data generated from investigation activities conducted at CAU 573 revealed the following: • Radiological contamination within CAU 573 does not exceed the FALs (based on the Occasional Use Area exposure scenario). • Chemical contamination within CAU 573 does not exceed the FALs. • Potential source material—including lead plates, lead bricks, and lead-shielded cables—was removed during the investigation and requires no additional corrective action.« less

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 165: Areas 25 and 26 Dry Well and Washdown Areas, Nevada Test Site, Nevada (including Record of Technical Change Nos. 1, 2, and 3) (January 2002, Rev. 0)

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Operations Office

This Corrective Action Investigation Plan contains the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Operations Office's approach to collect the data necessary to evaluate corrective action alternatives appropriate for the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 165 under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Corrective Action Unit 165 consists of eight Corrective Action Sites (CASs): CAS 25-20-01, Lab Drain Dry Well; CAS 25-51-02, Dry Well; CAS 25-59-01, Septic System; CAS 26-59-01, Septic System; CAS 25-07-06, Train Decontamination Area; CAS 25-07-07, Vehicle Washdown; CAS 26-07-01, Vehicle Washdown Station; and CAS 25-47-01, Reservoir and French Drain. All eight CASsmore » are located in the Nevada Test Site, Nevada. Six of these CASs are located in Area 25 facilities and two CASs are located in Area 26 facilities. The eight CASs at CAU 165 consist of dry wells, septic systems, decontamination pads, and a reservoir. The six CASs in Area 25 are associated with the Nuclear Rocket Development Station that operated from 1958 to 1973. The two CASs in Area 26 are associated with facilities constructed for Project Pluto, a series of nuclear reactor tests conducted between 1961 to 1964 to develop a nuclear-powered ramjet engine. Based on site history, the scope of this plan will be a two-phased approach to investigate the possible presence of hazardous and/or radioactive constituents at concentrations that could potentially pose a threat to human health and the environment. The Phase I analytical program for most CASs will include volatile organic compounds, semivolatile organic compounds, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act metals, total petroleum hydrocarbons, polychlorinated biphenyls, and radionuclides. If laboratory data obtained from the Phase I investigation indicates the presence of contaminants of concern, the process will continue with a Phase II investigation to define the extent of contamination. Based on the results of Phase I sampling, the analytical program for Phase II investigation may be reduced. The results of this field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of corrective action alternatives in the corrective action decision document.« less

Developing a Corrective Action Simulator to Support Decision Making Research and Training

DTIC Science & Technology

2008-05-01

positions, and any time-based simulation injects (e.g., JSTARS reporting tracks, the Engineer reporting a new aircraft bingo time, a threat being active...future instantiations would benefit from migrating to the IMPRINT Pro version. During the course of this development effort the Army Research...initiating corrective action when a subordinate is observed to make an error (of omission or commission) 58 • Benefits of a Corrective

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 541: Small Boy Nevada National Security Site and Nevada Test and Training Range, Nevada with ROTC 1

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Matthews, Patrick

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 541 is co-located on the boundary of Area 5 of the Nevada National Security Site and Range 65C of the Nevada Test and Training Range, approximately 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. CAU 541 is a grouping of sites where there has been a suspected release of contamination associated with nuclear testing. This document describes the planned investigation of CAU 541, which comprises the following corrective action sites (CASs): 05-23-04, Atmospheric Tests (6) - BFa Site; 05-45-03, Atmospheric Test Site - Small Boy. These sites are being investigated because existing information on the nature andmore » extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives (CAAs). Additional information will be obtained by conducting a corrective action investigation before evaluating CAAs and selecting the appropriate corrective action for each CAS. The results of the field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of viable CAAs that will be presented in the investigation report. The sites will be investigated based on the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed on April 1, 2014, by representatives of the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection; U.S. Air Force; and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office. The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to develop and evaluate appropriate corrective actions for CAU 541. The site investigation process also will be conducted in accordance with the Soils Activity Quality Assurance Plan, which establishes requirements, technical planning, and general quality practices to be applied to this activity. The potential contamination sources associated with CASs 05-23-04 and 05-45-03 are from nuclear testing activities conducted at the Atmospheric Tests (6) - BFa Site and Atmospheric Test Site - Small Boy sites. The presence and nature of contamination at CAU 541 will be evaluated based on information collected from field investigations. Radiological contamination will be evaluated based on a comparison of the total effective dose at sample locations to the dose-based final action level. The total effective dose will be calculated as the total of separate estimates of internal and external dose. Results from the analysis of soil samples will be used to calculate internal radiological dose. Thermoluminescent dosimeters placed at the center of each sample location will be used to measure external radiological dose. Appendix A provides a detailed discussion of the DQO methodology and the DQOs specific to each CAS.« less

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 562: Waste Systems Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Alfred Wickline

2009-04-01

Corrective Action Unit 562 is located in Areas 2, 23, and 25 of the Nevada Test Site, which is approximately 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. Corrective Action Unit 562 is comprised of the 13 corrective action sites (CASs) listed below: • 02-26-11, Lead Shot • 02-44-02, Paint Spills and French Drain • 02-59-01, Septic System • 02-60-01, Concrete Drain • 02-60-02, French Drain • 02-60-03, Steam Cleaning Drain • 02-60-04, French Drain • 02-60-05, French Drain • 02-60-06, French Drain • 02-60-07, French Drain • 23-60-01, Mud Trap Drain and Outfall • 23-99-06, Grease Trap • 25-60-04, Buildingmore » 3123 Outfalls These sites are being investigated because existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives. Additional information will be obtained by conducting a corrective action investigation before evaluating corrective action alternatives and selecting the appropriate corrective action for each CAS. The results of the field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of viable corrective action alternatives that will be presented in the Corrective Action Decision Document. The sites will be investigated based on the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed on December 11, 2008, by representatives of the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection; U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office; Stoller-Navarro Joint Venture; and National Security Technologies, LLC. The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to develop and evaluate appropriate corrective actions for CAU 562. Appendix A provides a detailed discussion of the DQO methodology and the DQOs specific to each CAS. The scope of the corrective action investigation for CAU 562 includes the following activities: • Move surface debris and/or materials, as needed, to facilitate sampling. • Conduct radiological surveys. • Perform field screening. • Collect and submit environmental samples for laboratory analysis to determine the nature and extent of any contamination released by each CAS. • Collect samples of source material to determine the potential for a release. • Collect samples of potential remediation wastes. • Collect quality control samples. This Corrective Action Investigation Plan has been developed in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order that was agreed to by the State of Nevada; DOE, Environmental Management; U.S. Department of Defense; and DOE, Legacy Management (FFACO, 1996; as amended February 2008). Under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order, this Corrective Action Investigation Plan will be submitted to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection for approval. Fieldwork will be conducted following approval of the plan.« less

Quality Interaction Between Mission Assurance and Project Team Members

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Kwong-Fu, Helenann H.; Wilson, Robert K.

2006-01-01

Mission Assurance independent assessments started during the development cycle and continued through post launch operations. In operations, Health and Safety of the Observatory is of utmost importance. Therefore, Mission Assurance must ensure requirements compliance and focus on process improvements required across the operational systems including new/modified products, tools, and procedures. The deployment of the interactive model involves three objectives: Team member Interaction, Good Root Cause Analysis Practices, and Risk Assessment to avoid reoccurrences. In applying this model, we use a metric based measurement process and was found to have the most significant effect, which points to the importance of focuses on a combination of root cause analysis and risk approaches allowing the engineers the ability to prioritize and quantify their corrective actions based on a well-defined set of root cause definitions (i.e. closure criteria for problem reports), success criteria and risk rating definitions.

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 569: Area 3 Yucca Flat Atmospheric Test Sites Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 0

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Patrick Matthews; Christy Sloop

2012-02-01

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 569 is located in Area 3 of the Nevada National Security Site, which is approximately 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. Corrective Action Unit 569 comprises the nine numbered corrective action sites (CASs) and one newly identified site listed below: (1) 03-23-09, T-3 Contamination Area (hereafter referred to as Annie, Franklin, George, and Moth); (2) 03-23-10, T-3A Contamination Area (hereafter referred to as Harry and Hornet); (3) 03-23-11, T-3B Contamination Area (hereafter referred to as Fizeau); (4) 03-23-12, T-3S Contamination Area (hereafter referred to as Rio Arriba); (5) 03-23-13, T-3T Contamination Area (hereafter referred tomore » as Catron); (6) 03-23-14, T-3V Contamination Area (hereafter referred to as Humboldt); (7) 03-23-15, S-3G Contamination Area (hereafter referred to as Coulomb-B); (8) 03-23-16, S-3H Contamination Area (hereafter referred to as Coulomb-A); (9) 03-23-21, Pike Contamination Area (hereafter referred to as Pike); and (10) Waste Consolidation Site 3A. Because CAU 569 is a complicated site containing many types of releases, it was agreed during the data quality objectives (DQO) process that these sites will be grouped. These sites are being investigated because existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives (CAAs). Additional information will be obtained by conducting a corrective action investigation before evaluating CAAs and selecting the appropriate corrective action for each study group. The results of the field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of viable CAAs that will be presented in the Corrective Action Decision Document. The sites will be investigated based on the DQOs developed on September 26, 2011, by representatives of the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office. The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to develop and evaluate appropriate corrective actions for CAU 569. The presence and nature of contamination at CAU 569 will be evaluated based on information collected from a field investigation. Radiological contamination will be evaluated based on a comparison of the total effective dose (TED) at sample locations to the dose-based final action level (FAL). The TED will be calculated as the total of separate estimates of internal and external dose. Results from the analysis of soil samples will be used to calculate internal radiological dose. Thermoluminescent dosimeters placed at the center of each sample location will be used to measure external radiological dose. A field investigation will be performed to define any areas where TED exceeds the FAL and to determine whether contaminants of concern are present at the site from other potential releases. The presence and nature of contamination from other types of releases (e.g., excavation, migration, and any potential releases discovered during the investigation) will be evaluated using soil samples collected from biased locations indicating the highest levels of contamination. Appendix A provides a detailed discussion of the DQO methodology and the objectives specific to each study group.« less

Errors in preparation and administration of parenteral drugs in neonatology: evaluation and corrective actions.

PubMed

Hasni, Nesrine; Ben Hamida, Emira; Ben Jeddou, Khouloud; Ben Hamida, Sarra; Ayadi, Imene; Ouahchi, Zeineb; Marrakchi, Zahra

2016-12-01

The medication iatrogenic risk is quite unevaluated in neonatology Objective: Assessment of errors that occurred during the preparation and administration of injectable medicines in a neonatal unit in order to implement corrective actions to reduce the occurrence of these errors. A prospective, observational study was performed in a neonatal unit over a period of one month. The practice of preparing and administering injectable medications were identified through a standardized data collection form. These practices were compared with summaries of the characteristics of each product (RCP) and the bibliography. One hundred preparations were observed of 13 different drugs. 85 errors during preparations and administration steps were detected. These errors were divided into preparation errors in 59% of cases such as changing the dilution protocol (32%), the use of bad solvent (11%) and administration errors in 41% of cases as errors timing of administration (18%) or omission of administration (9%). This study showed a high rate of errors during stages of preparation and administration of injectable drugs. In order to optimize the care of newborns and reduce the risk of medication errors, corrective actions have been implemented through the establishment of a quality assurance system which consisted of the development of injectable drugs preparation procedures, the introduction of a labeling system and staff training.

Application of ISO22000, failure mode, and effect analysis (FMEA) cause and effect diagrams and pareto in conjunction with HACCP and risk assessment for processing of pastry products.

PubMed

Varzakas, Theodoros H

2011-09-01

The Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) model has been applied for the risk assessment of pastry processing. A tentative approach of FMEA application to the pastry industry was attempted in conjunction with ISO22000. Preliminary Hazard Analysis was used to analyze and predict the occurring failure modes in a food chain system (pastry processing plant), based on the functions, characteristics, and/or interactions of the ingredients or the processes, upon which the system depends. Critical Control points have been identified and implemented in the cause and effect diagram (also known as Ishikawa, tree diagram, and fishbone diagram). In this work a comparison of ISO22000 analysis with HACCP is carried out over pastry processing and packaging. However, the main emphasis was put on the quantification of risk assessment by determining the Risk Priority Number (RPN) per identified processing hazard. Storage of raw materials and storage of final products at -18°C followed by freezing were the processes identified as the ones with the highest RPN (225, 225, and 144 respectively) and corrective actions were undertaken. Following the application of corrective actions, a second calculation of RPN values was carried out leading to considerably lower values (below the upper acceptable limit of 130). It is noteworthy that the application of Ishikawa (Cause and Effect or Tree diagram) led to converging results thus corroborating the validity of conclusions derived from risk assessment and FMEA. Therefore, the incorporation of FMEA analysis within the ISO22000 system of a pastry processing industry is considered imperative.

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 410: Waste Disposal Trenches, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, Revision 0 (includes ROTCs 1, 2, and 3)

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

NNSA /NV

This Corrective Action Investigation Plan contains the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Operations Office's approach to collect the data necessary to evaluate corrective action alternatives appropriate for the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 410 under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Corrective Action Unit 410 is located on the Tonopah Test Range (TTR), which is included in the Nevada Test and Training Range (formerly the Nellis Air Force Range) approximately 140 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. This CAU is comprised of five Corrective Action Sites (CASs): TA-19-002-TAB2, Debris Mound; TA-21-003-TANL, Disposal Trench; TA-21-002-TAAL,more » Disposal Trench; 09-21-001-TA09, Disposal Trenches; 03-19-001, Waste Disposal Site. This CAU is being investigated because contaminants may be present in concentrations that could potentially pose a threat to human health and/or the environment, and waste may have been disposed of with out appropriate controls. Four out of five of these CASs are the result of weapons testing and disposal activities at the TTR, and they are grouped together for site closure based on the similarity of the sites (waste disposal sites and trenches). The fifth CAS, CAS 03-19-001, is a hydrocarbon spill related to activities in the area. This site is grouped with this CAU because of the location (TTR). Based on historical documentation and process know-ledge, vertical and lateral migration routes are possible for all CASs. Migration of contaminants may have occurred through transport by infiltration of precipitation through surface soil which serves as a driving force for downward migration of contaminants. Land-use scenarios limit future use of these CASs to industrial activities. The suspected contaminants of potential concern which have been identified are volatile organic compounds; semivolatile organic compounds; high explosives; radiological constituents including depleted uranium, beryllium, total petroleum hydrocarbons; and total Resource Conservation and Recovery Act metals. Field activities will consist of geophysical and radiological surveys, and collecting soil samples at biased locations by appropriate methods. A two-step data quality objective strategy will be followed: (1) define the nature of contamination at each CAS location by identifying any contamination above preliminary action levels (PALs); and, (2) determine the extent of contamination identified above PALs. The results of this field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of corrective action alternatives in the corrective action decision document.« less

34 CFR 200.53 - LEA corrective action.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-07-01

... SEA to identify an LEA for corrective action; and (ii) Any underlying staffing, curriculum, or other problems in the LEA; (2) Is designed to meet the goal that each group of students described in § 200.13(b... programmatic funds or reduce administrative funds. (ii) Institute and fully implement a new curriculum based on...

34 CFR 200.53 - LEA corrective action.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... SEA to identify an LEA for corrective action; and (ii) Any underlying staffing, curriculum, or other problems in the LEA; (2) Is designed to meet the goal that each group of students described in § 200.13(b... programmatic funds or reduce administrative funds. (ii) Institute and fully implement a new curriculum based on...

An Exploration of Pennsylvania Corrective Action Plans, 2006-2007

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Morgan-Davis, Carrie Lynn

2013-01-01

With the "No Child Left Behind Act of 2001" ("NCLB"), signed into law on January 8, 2002, schools nationwide have been challenged to improve student achievement. Several middle and junior high schools in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania were identified as being in need of Corrective Action in 2006 based upon data from the…

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 413: Clean Slate II Plutonium Dispersion (TTR) Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, Revision 1

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Matthews, Patrick; Burmeister, Mark; Gallo, Patricia

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 413 is located on the Tonopah Test Range, which is approximately 130 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada, and approximately 40 miles southeast of Tonopah, Nevada. The CAU 413 site consists of the release of radionuclides to the surface and shallow subsurface from the conduct of the Clean Slate II (CSII) storage–transportation test conducted on May 31, 1963. CAU 413 includes one corrective action site (CAS), TA-23-02CS (Pu Contaminated Soil). The known releases at CAU 413 are the result of the atmospheric deposition of contamination from the 1963 CSII test. The CSII test was a non-nuclearmore » detonation of a nuclear device located inside a reinforced concrete bunker covered with 2 feet of soil. This test dispersed radionuclides, primarily plutonium, on the ground surface. The presence and nature of contamination at CAU 413 will be evaluated based on information collected from a corrective action investigation (CAI). The investigation is based on the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed on June 17, 2015, by representatives of the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection; the U.S. Air Force; and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office. The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to develop and evaluate appropriate corrective actions for CAU 413. The CAI will include radiological surveys, geophysical surveys, collection and analyses of soil samples, and assessment of investigation results. The collection of soil samples will be accomplished using both probabilistic and judgmental sampling approaches. To facilitate site investigation and the evaluation of DQO decisions, the releases at CAU 413 have been divided into seven study groups.« less

Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan for Corrective Action Unit 411. Double Tracks Plutonium Dispersion (Nellis), Nevada Test and Training Range, Nevada, Revision 0

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Matthews, Patrick K.

2015-03-01

This Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan addresses the actions needed to achieve closure for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 411, Double Tracks Plutonium Dispersion (Nellis). CAU 411 is located on the Nevada Test and Training Range and consists of a single corrective action site (CAS), NAFR-23-01, Pu Contaminated Soil. There is sufficient information and historical documentation from previous investigations and the 1996 interim corrective action to recommend closure of CAU 411 using the SAFER process. Based on existing data, the presumed corrective action for CAU 411 is clean closure. However, additional data will be obtained during a field investigationmore » to document and verify the adequacy of existing information, and to determine whether the CAU 411 closure objectives have been achieved. This SAFER Plan provides the methodology to gather the necessary information for closing the CAU. The results of the field investigation will be presented in a closure report that will be prepared and submitted to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) for review and approval. The site will be investigated based on the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed on November 20, 2014, by representatives of NDEP, the U.S. Air Force (USAF), and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office. The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to determine whether CAU 411 closure objectives have been achieved. The following text summarizes the SAFER activities that will support the closure of CAU 411; Collect environmental samples from designated target populations to confirm or disprove the presence of contaminants of concern (COCs) as necessary to supplement existing information; If COCs are no longer present, establish clean closure as the corrective action; If COCs are present, the extent of contamination will be defined and further corrective actions will be evaluated with the stakeholders (NDEP, USAF); and Confirm the preferred closure option is sufficient to protect human health and the environment.« less

Corrective Action Decision Document for Corrective Action Unit 562: Waste Systems Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Mark Krause

2010-08-01

This Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD) presents information supporting the selection of corrective action alternatives (CAAs) leading to the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 562, Waste Systems, in Areas 2, 23, and 25 of the Nevada Test Site, Nevada. This complies with the requirements of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada; U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management; U.S. Department of Defense; and DOE, Legacy Management. Corrective Action Unit 562 comprises the following corrective action sites (CASs): • 02-26-11, Lead Shot • 02-44-02, Paint Spills and French Drainmore » • 02-59-01, Septic System • 02-60-01, Concrete Drain • 02-60-02, French Drain • 02-60-03, Steam Cleaning Drain • 02-60-04, French Drain • 02-60-05, French Drain • 02-60-06, French Drain • 02-60-07, French Drain • 23-60-01, Mud Trap Drain and Outfall • 23-99-06, Grease Trap • 25-60-04, Building 3123 Outfalls The purpose of this CADD is to identify and provide the rationale for the recommendation of CAAs for the 13 CASs within CAU 562. Corrective action investigation (CAI) activities were performed from July 27, 2009, through May 12, 2010, as set forth in the CAU 562 Corrective Action Investigation Plan. The purpose of the CAI was to fulfill the following data needs as defined during the data quality objective (DQO) process: • Determine whether COCs are present. • If COCs are present, determine their nature and extent. • Provide sufficient information and data to complete appropriate corrective actions. A data quality assessment (DQA) performed on the CAU 562 data demonstrated the quality and acceptability of the data for use in fulfilling the DQO data needs. Analytes detected during the CAI were evaluated against appropriate final action levels (FALs) to identify the COCs for each CAS. The results of the CAI identified COCs at 10 of the 13 CASs in CAU 562, and thus corrective action is required. Assessment of the data generated from investigation activities conducted at CAU 562 is shown in Table ES-1. Based on the evaluation of analytical data from the CAI, review of future and current operations at the 13 CASs, and the detailed and comparative analysis of the potential CAAs, the following corrective actions are recommended for CAU 562. • No further action is the preferred corrective action for CASs 02-60-01, 02-60-06, and 02-60-07. • Clean closure is the preferred corrective action for CASs 02-26-11, 02-44-02, 02-59-01, 02-60-02, 02-60-03, 02-60-04, 02-60-05, 23-60-01, 23-99-06, and 25-60-04. The preferred CAAs were evaluated on technical merit focusing on performance, reliability, feasibility, safety, and cost. The alternatives were judged to meet all requirements for the technical components evaluated. The alternatives meet all applicable federal and state regulations for closure of the site and will reduce potential exposures to contaminated media to acceptable levels. The DOE, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office provides the following recommendations: • No further corrective action is required at CASs 02-60-01, 02-60-06, and 02-60-07. • Clean closure is recommended for the remaining 10 CASs in CAU 562. • A Corrective Action Plan will be submitted to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection that contains a detailed description of the proposed actions that will be taken to implement the selected corrective actions.« less

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 140: Waste Dumps, Burn Pits, and Storage Area, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, July 2002, Rev. No. 0

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

NNSA /NV

This Corrective Action Investigation Plan contains the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Operations Office's approach to collect the data necessary to evaluate corrective action alternatives appropriate for the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 140 under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Corrective Action Unit 140 consists of nine Corrective Action Sites (CASs): 05-08-01, Detonation Pits; 05-08-02, Debris Pits; 05-17-01, Hazardous Waste Accumulation Site (Buried); 05-19-01, Waste Disposal Site; 05-23-01, Gravel Gertie; 05-35-01, Burn Pit; 05-99-04, Burn Pit; 22-99-04, Radioactive Waste Dump; 23-17-01, Hazardous Waste Storage Area. All nine of these CASs are located withinmore » Areas 5, 22, and 23 of the Nevada Test Site (NTS) in Nevada, approximately 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas. This CAU is being investigated because disposed waste may be present without appropriate controls (i.e., use restrictions, adequate cover) and hazardous and/or radioactive constituents may be present or migrating at concentrations and locations that could potentially pose a threat to human health and the environment. The NTS has been used for various research and development projects including nuclear weapons testing. The CASs in CAU 140 were used for testing, material storage, waste storage, and waste disposal. A two-phase approach has been selected to collect information and generate data to satisfy needed resolution criteria and resolve the decision statements. Phase I will determine if contaminants of potential concern (COPCs) are present in concentrations exceeding preliminary action levels. This data will be evaluated at all CASs. Phase II will determine the extent of the contaminant(s) of concern (COCs). This data will only be evaluated for CASs with a COC identified during Phase I. Based on process knowledge, the COPCs for CAU 140 include volatile organics, semivolatile organics, petroleum hydrocarbons, explosive residues, herbicides, pesticides, polychlorinated biphenyls, metals, and radionuclides. The results of this field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of corrective action alternatives in the corrective action decision document.« less

40 CFR 63.7834 - How do I demonstrate continuous compliance with the operation and maintenance requirements that...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-07-01

... initiated corrective action, the corrective action(s) taken, and date on which corrective action was..., the corrective action(s) taken within the first 24 hours according to § 63.7833(g)(1) and whether they were successful, the corrective action(s) taken within the second 24 hours according to § 63.7833(g)(2...

40 CFR 63.7834 - How do I demonstrate continuous compliance with the operation and maintenance requirements that...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-07-01

... initiated corrective action, the corrective action(s) taken, and date on which corrective action was..., the corrective action(s) taken within the first 24 hours according to § 63.7833(g)(1) and whether they were successful, the corrective action(s) taken within the second 24 hours according to § 63.7833(g)(2...

40 CFR 63.7834 - How do I demonstrate continuous compliance with the operation and maintenance requirements that...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... initiated corrective action, the corrective action(s) taken, and date on which corrective action was..., the corrective action(s) taken within the first 24 hours according to § 63.7833(g)(1) and whether they were successful, the corrective action(s) taken within the second 24 hours according to § 63.7833(g)(2...

40 CFR 63.7834 - How do I demonstrate continuous compliance with the operation and maintenance requirements that...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-07-01

... initiated corrective action, the corrective action(s) taken, and date on which corrective action was..., the corrective action(s) taken within the first 24 hours according to § 63.7833(g)(1) and whether they were successful, the corrective action(s) taken within the second 24 hours according to § 63.7833(g)(2...

40 CFR 63.7834 - How do I demonstrate continuous compliance with the operation and maintenance requirements that...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-07-01

... initiated corrective action, the corrective action(s) taken, and date on which corrective action was..., the corrective action(s) taken within the first 24 hours according to § 63.7833(g)(1) and whether they were successful, the corrective action(s) taken within the second 24 hours according to § 63.7833(g)(2...

Serious and actionable risks, plus disclosure: Investigating an alternative approach for presenting risk information in prescription drug television advertisements.

PubMed

Betts, Kevin R; Boudewyns, Vanessa; Aikin, Kathryn J; Squire, Claudia; Dolina, Suzanne; Hayes, Jennifer J; Southwell, Brian G

2017-08-02

Broadcast direct-to-consumer (DTC) prescription drug ads that present product claims are required to also present the product's major risks. Debate exists regarding how much information should be included in these major risk statements. Some argue that such statements expose people to unnecessary amounts of information, while others argue that they leave out important information. Examine the impact of type of risk statement (unedited versus serious and actionable risks only) and a disclosure indicating that not all risks are presented on consumers' ability to remember the important risks and benefits of a drug following exposure to a DTC television advertisement (ad). Risk and benefit perceptions, ad-prompted actions, recognition of the disclosure statement, and evaluations of both the disclosure and risk statement were also examined. A web-based experiment was conducted in which US adults who self-reported as having depression (N = 500), insomnia (N = 500), or high cholesterol (N = 500) were randomly assigned to view one of four versions of the television ad, and then complete a questionnaire. The type of risk statement had a significant effect on risk recall and recognition, benefit recognition, perceived risk severity (depression condition only), and perceived benefit magnitude (high cholesterol condition only). Disclosure recognition (using bias-corrected scores) ranged from 63% to 70% across the three illness samples. The revised risk statement improved overall processing of the television ad, as evidenced by improved risk recall and recognition and improved benefit recognition. Further, the presence of the disclosure did not adversely affect consumers' processing of drug risk and benefit information. Therefore, limiting the risks presented in DTC television ads and including a disclosure alerting consumers that not all risks are presented may be an effective strategy for communicating product risks. Published by Elsevier Inc.

42 CFR 460.194 - Corrective action.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-10-01

... 42 Public Health 4 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Corrective action. 460.194 Section 460.194 Public...) Federal/State Monitoring § 460.194 Corrective action. (a) A PACE organization must take action to correct... corrective actions. (c) Failure to correct deficiencies may result in sanctions or termination, as specified...

42 CFR 460.194 - Corrective action.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... 42 Public Health 4 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Corrective action. 460.194 Section 460.194 Public...) Federal/State Monitoring § 460.194 Corrective action. (a) A PACE organization must take action to correct... corrective actions. (c) Failure to correct deficiencies may result in sanctions or termination, as specified...

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 536: Area 3 Release Site, Nevada Test Site, Nevada (Rev. 0 / June 2003), Including Record of Technical Change No. 1

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

None

This Corrective Action Investigation Plan contains the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office's approach to collect the data necessary to evaluate corrective action alternatives (CAAs) appropriate for the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 536: Area 3 Release Site, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Corrective Action Unit 536 consists of a single Corrective Action Site (CAS): 03-44-02, Steam Jenny Discharge. The CAU 536 site is being investigated because existing information on the nature and extent of possible contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives formore » CAS 03-44-02. The additional information will be obtained by conducting a corrective action investigation (CAI) prior to evaluating CAAs and selecting the appropriate corrective action for this CAS. The results of this field investigation are to be used to support a defensible evaluation of corrective action alternatives in the corrective action decision document. Record of Technical Change No. 1 is dated 3-2004.« less

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 563: Septic Systems, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, with Errata Sheet, Revision 0 (in English; Afrikaans)

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Alfred Wickline

Corrective Action Unit 563, Septic Systems, is located in Areas 3 and 12 of the Nevada Test Site, which is 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. Corrective Action Unit 563 is comprised of the four corrective action sites (CASs) below: • 03-04-02, Area 3 Subdock Septic Tank • 03-59-05, Area 3 Subdock Cesspool • 12-59-01, Drilling/Welding Shop Septic Tanks • 12-60-01, Drilling/Welding Shop Outfalls These sites are being investigated because existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives. Additional information will be obtained by conducting a corrective actionmore » investigation (CAI) before evaluating corrective action alternatives and selecting the appropriate corrective action for each CAS. The results of the field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of viable corrective action alternatives that will be presented in the Corrective Action Decision Document.« less

Towards real-time risk mitigation for NPP in Switzerland: the potential role of EEW and OEF.

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Cauzzi, Carlo; Wiemer, Stefan; Behr, Yannik; Clinton, John; Renault, Philippe; Le Guenan, Thomas; Douglas, John; Woessner, Jochen; Biro, Yesim; Caprio, Marta; Cua, Georgia

2014-05-01

Spurred by the research activities being carried out within the EC-funded project REAKT (Strategies and Tools for Real Time Earthquake Risk Reduction, FP7, contract no. 282862, 2011-2014, www.reaktproject.eu), we present herein the key elements to understanding the potential benefits of routinely using Earthquake Early Warning and Operational Earthquake Forecasting methods to mitigate the seismic risk at NPP in Switzerland. The advantages of using the aforementioned real-time risk reduction tools are critically discussed based on the limitations of the current scientific knowledge and technology, as well as on the costs associated to both system maintenance and machine- or human-triggered actions following an alert. Basic inputs to this discussion are, amongst others: a) the performances of the Swiss seismic network (http://www.seismo.ethz.ch/monitor, where SeisComP3 is used as earthquake monitoring software) and the selected EEW algorithm (the Virtual Seismologist, VS, http://www.seiscomp3.org/doc/seattle/2013.200/apps/vs.html), in terms of correct detections, false alerts, and missed events; b) the reliability of time-dependent hazard scenarios for the region of interest; c) a careful assessment of the frequency of occurrence of critical warnings based on the local and regional seismicity; d) the identification of the mitigation actions and their benefits and costs for the stakeholders.

Corrective Action Decision Document for Corrective Action Unit 151: Septic Systems and Discharge Area, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Rev. No.: 0

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Grant Evenson

2006-05-01

This Corrective Action Decision Document has been prepared for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 151, Septic Systems and Discharge Area, at the Nevada Test Site, Nevada, according to the ''Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order'' (FFACO) (1996). Corrective Action Unit 151 is comprised of eight corrective action sites (CASs): (1) CAS 02-05-01, UE-2ce Pond; (2) CAS 12-03-01, Sewage Lagoons (6); (3) CAS 12-04-01, Septic Tanks; (4) CAS 12-04-02, Septic Tanks; (5) CAS 12-04-03, Septic Tank; (6) CAS 12-47-01, Wastewater Pond; (7) CAS 18-03-01, Sewage Lagoon; and (8) CAS 18-99-09, Sewer Line (Exposed). The purpose of this Corrective Action Decision Document ismore » to identify and provide the rationale for the recommendation of corrective action alternatives (CAAs) for each of the eight CASs within CAU 151. Corrective action investigation (CAI) activities were performed from September 12 through November 18, 2005, as set forth in the CAU 151 Corrective Action Investigation Plan and Record of Technical Change No. 1. Additional confirmation sampling was performed on December 9, 2005; January 10, 2006; and February 13, 2006. Analytes detected during the CAI were evaluated against appropriate final action levels (FALs) to identify the contaminants of concern for each CAS. The results of the CAI identified contaminants of concern at two of the eight CASs in CAU 151 and required the evaluation of CAAs. Assessment of the data generated from investigation activities conducted at CAU 151 revealed the following: (1) Soils at CASs 02-05-01, 12-04-01, 12-04-02, 12-04-03, 12-47-01, 18-03-01, 18-99-09, and Lagoons B through G of CAS 12-03-01 do not contain contamination at concentrations exceeding the FALs. (2) Lagoon A of CAS 12-03-01 has arsenic above FALs in shallow subsurface soils. (3) One of the two tanks of CAS 12-04-01, System No.1, has polychlorinated biphenyls (aroclor-1254), trichloroethane, and cesium-137 above FALs in the sludge. Both CAS 12-04-01, System No.1 tanks contain trichloroethane and 1,4-dichlorobenzene above ''Resource Conservation and Recovery Act'' toxicity characteristic limits. Based on the evaluation of analytical data from the CAI, review of future and current operations at the eight CASs, and the detailed and comparative analysis of the potential CAAs, the following corrective actions are recommended for CAU 151. No Further Action is the recommended corrective action for soils at CASs 02-05-01, 12-04-01, 12-04-02, 12-04-03, 18-03-01, and 18-99-09; and Lagoons C, D, F, and G of CAS 12-03-01. No Further Action with implementation of a best management practice (BMP) is recommended for soils at CAS 12-47-01 and Lagoons B and E of CAS 12-03-01. To be protective of future workers should the present scenario used to calculate FALs change, an administrative use restriction will be recorded per the FFACO agreement as a BMP. Close in Place with Administrative Controls is the recommended corrective action for Lagoon A of CAS 12-03-01. Based on the evaluation of analytical data from the CAI; review of future and current operations at CASs 12-04-01, 12-04-02, and 12-04-03; and the detailed and comparative analysis of the potential CAAs, the following corrective actions are recommended for the septic tanks at these CASs. No Further Action with implementation of BMPs is the recommended corrective action for septic tanks that do not contain potential source material from CAS 12-04-01, System No.4 (four tanks); CAS 12-04-02, System No.5 (six tanks); and CAS 12-04-03, System No.3 (four tanks). Clean Closure with implementation of BMPs is the recommended corrective action for the septic tanks from CAS 12-04-01, System No.1 (two tanks). The preferred CAAs were evaluated on technical merit focusing on performance, reliability, feasibility, safety, and cost. The alternatives were judged to meet all requirements for the technical components evaluated. The alternatives meet all applicable federal and state regulations for closure of the site and will reduce potential exposure pathways to the contaminated media to an acceptable level at CAU 151.« less

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 219: Septic Systems and Injection Wells, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Rev. No.: 0

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

David A. Strand

The Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 219, Septic Systems and Injection Wells, has been developed in accordance with the ''Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order'' (1996) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada, the U.S. Department of Energy, and the U.S. Department of Defense. The purpose of the investigation is to ensure that adequate data are collected to provide sufficient and reliable information to identify, evaluate, and select technically viable corrective actions. Corrective Action Unit 219 is located in Areas 3, 16, and 23 of the Nevada Test Site, which is 65 miles northwest ofmore » Las Vegas, Nevada. Corrective Action Unit 219 is comprised of the six Corrective Action Sites (CASs) listed below: (1) 03-11-01, Steam Pipes and Asbestos Tiles; (2) 16-04-01, Septic Tanks (3); (3) 16-04-02, Distribution Box; (4) 16-04-03, Sewer Pipes; (5) 23-20-01, DNA Motor Pool Sewage and Waste System; and (6) 23-20-02, Injection Well. These sites are being investigated because existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives. Additional information will be obtained by conducting a corrective action investigation prior to evaluating corrective action alternatives and selecting the appropriate corrective action for each CAS. The results of the field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of viable corrective action alternatives that will be presented in the Corrective Action Decision Document.« less

7 CFR 275.16 - Corrective action planning.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 7 Agriculture 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Corrective action planning. 275.16 Section 275.16... Corrective action planning. (a) Corrective action planning is the process by which State agencies shall...)/management unit(s) in the planning, development, and implementation of corrective action are those which: (1...

Application of ISO 22000 and Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) for industrial processing of salmon: a case study.

PubMed

Arvanitoyannis, Ioannis S; Varzakas, Theodoros H

2008-05-01

The Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) model was applied for risk assessment of salmon manufacturing. A tentative approach of FMEA application to the salmon industry was attempted in conjunction with ISO 22000. Preliminary Hazard Analysis was used to analyze and predict the occurring failure modes in a food chain system (salmon processing plant), based on the functions, characteristics, and/or interactions of the ingredients or the processes, upon which the system depends. Critical Control points were identified and implemented in the cause and effect diagram (also known as Ishikawa, tree diagram and fishbone diagram). In this work, a comparison of ISO 22000 analysis with HACCP is carried out over salmon processing and packaging. However, the main emphasis was put on the quantification of risk assessment by determining the RPN per identified processing hazard. Fish receiving, casing/marking, blood removal, evisceration, filet-making cooling/freezing, and distribution were the processes identified as the ones with the highest RPN (252, 240, 210, 210, 210, 210, 200 respectively) and corrective actions were undertaken. After the application of corrective actions, a second calculation of RPN values was carried out resulting in substantially lower values (below the upper acceptable limit of 130). It is noteworthy that the application of Ishikawa (Cause and Effect or Tree diagram) led to converging results thus corroborating the validity of conclusions derived from risk assessment and FMEA. Therefore, the incorporation of FMEA analysis within the ISO 22000 system of a salmon processing industry is anticipated to prove advantageous to industrialists, state food inspectors, and consumers.

Application of Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) and cause and effect analysis in conjunction with ISO 22000 to a snails (Helix aspersa) processing plant; A case study.

PubMed

Arvanitoyannis, Ioannis S; Varzakas, Theodoros H

2009-08-01

Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) has been applied for the risk assessment of snails manufacturing. A tentative approach of FMEA application to the snails industry was attempted in conjunction with ISO 22000. Preliminary Hazard Analysis was used to analyze and predict the occurring failure modes in a food chain system (snails processing plant), based on the functions, characteristics, and/or interactions of the ingredients or the processes, upon which the system depends. Critical Control points have been identified and implemented in the cause and effect diagram (also known as Ishikawa, tree diagram, and fishbone diagram). In this work a comparison of ISO22000 analysis with HACCP is carried out over snails processing and packaging. However, the main emphasis was put on the quantification of risk assessment by determining the RPN per identified processing hazard. Sterilization of tins, bioaccumulation of heavy metals, packaging of shells and poisonous mushrooms, were the processes identified as the ones with the highest RPN (280, 240, 147, 144, respectively) and corrective actions were undertaken. Following the application of corrective actions, a second calculation of RPN values was carried out leading to considerably lower values (below the upper acceptable limit of 130). It is noteworthy that the application of Ishikawa (Cause and Effect or Tree diagram) led to converging results thus corroborating the validity of conclusions derived from risk assessment and FMEA. Therefore, the incorporation of FMEA analysis within the ISO22000 system of a snails processing industry is considered imperative.

7 CFR 275.18 - Project area/management unit corrective action plan.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 7 Agriculture 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Project area/management unit corrective action plan... SYSTEM Corrective Action § 275.18 Project area/management unit corrective action plan. (a) The State agency shall ensure that corrective action plans are prepared at the project area/management unit level...

7 CFR 275.18 - Project area/management unit corrective action plan.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... 7 Agriculture 4 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Project area/management unit corrective action plan... SYSTEM Corrective Action § 275.18 Project area/management unit corrective action plan. (a) The State agency shall ensure that corrective action plans are prepared at the project area/management unit level...

7 CFR 275.18 - Project area/management unit corrective action plan.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... 7 Agriculture 4 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Project area/management unit corrective action plan... SYSTEM Corrective Action § 275.18 Project area/management unit corrective action plan. (a) The State agency shall ensure that corrective action plans are prepared at the project area/management unit level...

7 CFR 275.18 - Project area/management unit corrective action plan.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 7 Agriculture 4 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Project area/management unit corrective action plan... SYSTEM Corrective Action § 275.18 Project area/management unit corrective action plan. (a) The State agency shall ensure that corrective action plans are prepared at the project area/management unit level...

7 CFR 275.18 - Project area/management unit corrective action plan.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... 7 Agriculture 4 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Project area/management unit corrective action plan... SYSTEM Corrective Action § 275.18 Project area/management unit corrective action plan. (a) The State agency shall ensure that corrective action plans are prepared at the project area/management unit level...

Remedial Action Assessment System: A computer-based methodology for conducting feasibility studies

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

White, M.K.; Buelt, J.L.; Stottlemyre, J.A.

1991-02-01

Because of the complexity and number of potential waste sites facing the US Department of Energy (DOE) for potential cleanup, DOE is supporting the development of a computer-based methodology to streamline the remedial investigation/feasibility study process. The Remedial Action Assessment System (RAAS), can be used for screening, linking, and evaluating established technology processes in support of conducting feasibility studies. It is also intended to do the same in support of corrective measures studies. The user interface employs menus, windows, help features, and graphical information while RAAS is in operation. Object-oriented programming is used to link unit processes into sets ofmore » compatible processes that form appropriate remedial alternatives. Once the remedial alternatives are formed, the RAAS methodology can evaluate them in terms of effectiveness, implementability, and cost. RAAS will access a user-selected risk assessment code to determine the reduction of risk after remedial action by each recommended alternative. The methodology will also help determine the implementability of the remedial alternatives at a site and access cost estimating tools to provide estimates of capital, operating, and maintenance costs. This paper presents the characteristics of two RAAS prototypes currently being developed. These include the RAAS Technology Information System, which accesses graphical, tabular and textual information about technologies, and the main RAAS methodology, which screens, links, and evaluates remedial technologies. 4 refs., 3 figs., 1 tab.« less

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 104: Area 7 Yucca Flat Atmospheric Test Sites, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 0

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Patrick Matthews

2011-08-01

CAU 104 comprises the 15 CASs listed below: (1) 07-23-03, Atmospheric Test Site T-7C; (2) 07-23-04, Atmospheric Test Site T7-1; (3) 07-23-05, Atmospheric Test Site; (4) 07-23-06, Atmospheric Test Site T7-5a; (5) 07-23-07, Atmospheric Test Site - Dog (T-S); (6) 07-23-08, Atmospheric Test Site - Baker (T-S); (7) 07-23-09, Atmospheric Test Site - Charlie (T-S); (8) 07-23-10, Atmospheric Test Site - Dixie; (9) 07-23-11, Atmospheric Test Site - Dixie; (10) 07-23-12, Atmospheric Test Site - Charlie (Bus); (11) 07-23-13, Atmospheric Test Site - Baker (Buster); (12) 07-23-14, Atmospheric Test Site - Ruth; (13) 07-23-15, Atmospheric Test Site T7-4; (14) 07-23-16,more » Atmospheric Test Site B7-b; (15) 07-23-17, Atmospheric Test Site - Climax These sites are being investigated because existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives (CAAs). Additional information will be obtained by conducting a corrective action investigation before evaluating CAAs and selecting the appropriate corrective action for each CAS. The results of the field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of viable CAAs that will be presented in the Corrective Action Decision Document. The sites will be investigated based on the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed on April 28, 2011, by representatives of the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office. The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to develop and evaluate appropriate corrective actions for CAU 104. The releases at CAU 104 consist of surface-deposited radionuclides from 30 atmospheric nuclear tests. The presence and nature of contamination at CAU 104 will be evaluated based on information collected from a field investigation. Radiological contamination will be evaluated based on a comparison of the total effective dose (TED) to the dose-based final action level (FAL). The presence of TED exceeding the FAL is considered a radiological contaminant of concern (COC). Anything identified as a COC will require corrective action. The TED will be calculated as the total of separate estimates of internal and external dose. Results from the analysis of soil samples will be used to calculate internal radiological dose. Thermoluminescent dosimeters will be used to measure external radiological dose. Based on process knowledge of the releases associated with the nuclear tests and radiological survey information about the location and shape of the resulting contamination plume, it was determined that the releases from the nuclear tests are co-located and will be investigated concurrently. A field investigation will be performed to define areas where TED exceeds the FAL and to determine whether other COCs are present at the site. The investigation will also collect information to determine the presence and nature of contamination associated with migration and excavation, as well as any potential releases discovered during the investigation. Appendix A provides a detailed discussion of the DQO methodology and the DQOs specific to each CAS.« less

Closure report for Corrective Action Unit 211, Area 15 EPA Farm waste sites, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

NONE

1998-04-01

This Closure Report summarizes the corrective actions which were completed at the Corrective Action Sites within Corrective Action Unit 211 Area 15 Farm Waste Sties at the Nevada Test Site. Current site descriptions, observations and identification of wastes removed are included on FFACO Corrective Action Site housekeeping closure verification forms.

75 FR 21349 - Solicitation for a Cooperative Agreement-Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Evidence-Based...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-04-23

... DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE National Institute of Corrections Solicitation for a Cooperative Agreement--Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Evidence-Based Decisionmaking in Local Criminal Justice Systems AGENCY: National Institute of Corrections, U.S. Department of Justice. ACTION: Solicitation for a Cooperative...

45 CFR 1225.19 - Corrective action.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-10-01

... 45 Public Welfare 4 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Corrective action. 1225.19 Section 1225.19 Public... Corrective action. (a) When discrimination is found, Peace Corps or ACTION must take appropriate action to... corrective action to the agent and other class members in accordance with § 1225.10 of this part. (b) When...

45 CFR 1225.19 - Corrective action.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... 45 Public Welfare 4 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Corrective action. 1225.19 Section 1225.19 Public... Corrective action. (a) When discrimination is found, Peace Corps or ACTION must take appropriate action to... corrective action to the agent and other class members in accordance with § 1225.10 of this part. (b) When...

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 428: Area 3 Septic Waste Systems 1 and 5, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, REVISION 0, march 1999

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

ITLV.

1999-03-01

The Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 428, Area 3 Septic Waste Systems 1 and 5, has been developed in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order that was agreed to by the U. S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office; the State of Nevada Division of Environmental Protection; and the U. S. Department of Defense. Corrective Action Unit 428 consists of Corrective Action Sites 03- 05- 002- SW01 and 03- 05- 002- SW05, respectively known as Area 3 Septic Waste System 1 and Septic Waste System 5. This Corrective Action Investigation Plan is used inmore » combination with the Work Plan for Leachfield Corrective Action Units: Nevada Test Site and Tonopah Test Range, Nevada , Rev. 1 (DOE/ NV, 1998c). The Leachfield Work Plan was developed to streamline investigations at leachfield Corrective Action Units by incorporating management, technical, quality assurance, health and safety, public involvement, field sampling, and waste management information common to a set of Corrective Action Units with similar site histories and characteristics into a single document that can be referenced. This Corrective Action Investigation Plan provides investigative details specific to Corrective Action Unit 428. A system of leachfields and associated collection systems was used for wastewater disposal at Area 3 of the Tonopah Test Range until a consolidated sewer system was installed in 1990 to replace the discrete septic waste systems. Operations within various buildings at Area 3 generated sanitary and industrial wastewaters potentially contaminated with contaminants of potential concern and disposed of in septic tanks and leachfields. Corrective Action Unit 428 is composed of two leachfield systems in the northern portion of Area 3. Based on site history collected to support the Data Quality Objectives process, contaminants of potential concern for the site include oil/ diesel range total petroleum hydrocarbons, and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act characteristic volatile organic compounds, semivolatile organic compounds, and metals. A limited number of samples will be analyzed for gamma- emitting radionuclides and isotopic uranium from four of the septic tanks and if radiological field screening levels are exceeded. Additional samples will be analyzed for geotechnical and hydrological properties and a bioassessment may be performed. The technical approach for investigating this Corrective Action Unit consists of the following activities: Perform video surveys of the discharge and outfall lines. Collect samples of material in the septic tanks. Conduct exploratory trenching to locate and inspect subsurface components. Collect subsurface soil samples in areas of the collection system including the septic tanks and outfall end of distribution boxes. Collect subsurface soil samples underlying the leachfield distribution pipes via trenching. Collect surface and near- surface samples near potential locations of the Acid Sewer Outfall if Septic Waste System 5 Leachfield cannot be located. Field screen samples for volatile organic compounds, total petroleum hydrocarbons, and radiological activity. Drill boreholes and collect subsurface soil samples if required. Analyze samples for total volatile organic compounds, total semivolatile organic compounds, total Resource Conservation and Recovery Act metals, and total petroleum hydrocarbons (oil/ diesel range organics). Limited number of samples will be analyzed for gamma- emitting radionuclides and isotopic uranium from particular septic tanks and if radiological field screening levels are exceeded. Collect samples from native soils beneath the distribution system and analyze for geotechnical/ hydrologic parameters. Collect and analyze bioassessment samples at the discretion of the Site Supervisor if total petroleum hydrocarbons exceed field- screening levels.« less

Addendum to the Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 529: Area 25 Contaminated Materials, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 1

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Krauss, Mark J

This document constitutes an addendum to the Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 529: Area 25 Contaminated Materials, Nevada Test Site, Nevada as described in the document Recommendations and Justifications To Remove Use Restrictions Established under the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order dated September 2013. The Use Restriction (UR) Removal document was approved by the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection on October 16, 2013. The approval of the UR Removal document constituted approval of each of the recommended UR removals. In conformance with the URmore » Removal document, this addendum consists of: This page that refers the reader to the UR Removal document for additional information The cover, title, and signature pages of the UR Removal document The NDEP approval letter The corresponding section of the UR Removal document This addendum provides the documentation justifying the cancellation of the UR for CAS 25-23-17, Contaminated Wash (Parcel H). This UR was established as part of FFACO corrective actions and was based on the presence of total petroleum hydrocarbon diesel-range organics contamination at concentrations greater than the NDEP action level at the time of the initial investigation.« less

Contaminant Boundary at the Faultless Underground Nuclear Test

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Greg Pohll; Karl Pohlmann; Jeff Daniels

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) have reached agreement on a corrective action strategy applicable to address the extent and potential impact of radionuclide contamination of groundwater at underground nuclear test locations. This strategy is described in detail in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO, 2000). As part of the corrective action strategy, the nuclear detonations that occurred underground were identified as geographically distinct corrective action units (CAUs). The strategic objective for each CAU is to estimate over a 1,000-yr time period, with uncertainty quantified, the three-dimensional extent of groundwatermore » contamination that would be considered unsafe for domestic and municipal use. Two types of boundaries (contaminant and compliance) are discussed in the FFACO that will map the three-dimensional extent of radionuclide contamination. The contaminant boundary will identify the region wi th 95 percent certainty that contaminants do not exist above a threshold value. It will be prepared by the DOE and presented to NDEP. The compliance boundary will be produced as a result of negotiation between the DOE and NDEP, and can be coincident with, or differ from, the contaminant boundary. Two different thresholds are considered for the contaminant boundary. One is based on the enforceable National Primary Drinking Water Regulations for radionuclides, which were developed as a requirement of the Safe Drinking Water Act. The other is a risk-based threshold considering applicable lifetime excess cancer-risk-based criteria The contaminant boundary for the Faultless underground nuclear test at the Central Nevada Test Area (CNTA) is calculated using a newly developed groundwater flow and radionuclide transport model that incorporates aspects of both the original three-dimensional model (Pohlmann et al., 1999) and the two-dimensional model developed for the Faultless data decision analysis (DDA) (Pohll and Mihevc, 2000). This new model includes the uncertainty in the three-dimensional spatial distribution of lithology and hydraulic conductivity from the 1999 model as well as the uncertainty in the other flow and transport parameters from the 2000 DDA model. Additionally, the new model focuses on a much smaller region than was included in the earlier models, that is, the subsurface within the UC-1 land withdrawal area where the 1999 model predicted radionuclide transport will occur over the next 1,000 years. The purpose of this unclassified document is to present the modifications to the CNTA groundwater flow and transport model, to present the methodology used to calculate contaminant boundaries, and to present the Safe Drinking Water Act and risk-derived contaminant boundaries for the Faultless underground nuclear test CAU.« less

Corrective Action Decision Document for Corrective Action Unit 224: Decon Pad and Septic Systems Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Rev. No.: 0

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

David A. Strand

2005-05-01

This Corrective Action Decision Document has been prepared for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 224, Decon Pad and Septic Systems, in Areas 2, 3, 5, 6, 11, and 23 of the Nevada Test Site, Nevada, in accordance with the ''Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order'' (1996). Corrective Action Unit 224 is comprised of the following corrective action sites (CASs): (1) 02-04-01, Septic Tank (Buried); (2) 03-05-01, Leachfield; (3) 05-04-01, Septic Tanks (4)/Discharge Area; (4) 06-03-01, Sewage Lagoons (3); (5) 06-05-01, Leachfield; (6) 06-17-04, Decon Pad and Wastewater Catch; (7) 06-23-01, Decon Pad Discharge Piping; (8) 11-04-01, Sewage Lagoon; and (9) 23-05-02,more » Leachfield. The purpose of this Corrective Action Decision Document is to identify and provide the rationale for the recommendation of a corrective action alternative for the nine CASs within CAU 224. Corrective action investigation activities were performed from August 10, 2004, through January 18, 2005, as set forth in the CAU 224 Corrective Action Investigation Plan.« less

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 516: Septic Systems and Discharge Points

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

NSTec Environmental Restoration

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 516 is located in Areas 3, 6, and 22 of the Nevada Test Site. CAU 516 is listed in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order of 1996 as Septic Systems and Discharge Points, and is comprised of six Corrective Action Sites (CASs): {sm_bullet} CAS 03-59-01, Bldg 3C-36 Septic System {sm_bullet} CAS 03-59-02, Bldg 3C-45 Septic System {sm_bullet} CAS 06-51-01, Sump and Piping {sm_bullet} CAS 06-51-02, Clay Pipe and Debris {sm_bullet} CAS 06-51-03, Clean Out Box and Piping {sm_bullet} CAS 22-19-04, Vehicle Decontamination Area The Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP)-approved corrective action alternative for CASsmore » 06-51-02 and 22-19-04 is no further action. The NDEP-approved corrective action alternative for CASs 03-59-01, 03-59-02, 06-51-01, and 06-51-03 is clean closure. Closure activities included removing and disposing of total petroleum hydrocarbon (TPH)-impacted septic tank contents, septic tanks, distribution/clean out boxes, and piping. CAU 516 was closed in accordance with the NDEP-approved CAU 516 Corrective Action Plan (CAP). The closure activities specified in the CAP were based on the recommendations presented in the CAU 516 Corrective Action Decision Document (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office, 2004). This Closure Report documents CAU 516 closure activities. During closure activities, approximately 186 tons of hydrocarbon waste in the form of TPH-impacted soil and debris, as well as 89 tons of construction debris, were generated and managed and disposed of appropriately. Waste minimization techniques, such as field screening of soil samples and the utilization of laboratory analysis to characterize and classify waste streams, were employed during the performance of closure work.« less

9 CFR 416.15 - Corrective Actions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 9 Animals and Animal Products 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Corrective Actions. 416.15 Section 416... SANITATION § 416.15 Corrective Actions. (a) Each official establishment shall take appropriate corrective action(s) when either the establishment or FSIS determines that the establishment's Sanitation SOP's or...

77 FR 43018 - Updating OSHA Construction Standards Based on National Consensus Standards; Head Protection...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2012-07-23

.... OSHA-2011-0184] RIN 1218-AC65 Updating OSHA Construction Standards Based on National Consensus... Health Administration (OSHA), Department of Labor. ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking; correction. SUMMARY: OSHA is correcting a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) with regard to the construction...

Corrective Action Decision Document for Corrective Action Unit 204: Storage Bunkers, Nevada Test Site, Nevada: Revision 0, Including Errata Sheet

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office

2004-04-01

This Corrective Action Decision Document identifies the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office's corrective action alternative recommendation for each of the corrective action sites (CASs) within Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 204: Storage Bunkers, Nevada Test Site (NTS), Nevada, under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. An evaluation of analytical data from the corrective action investigation, review of current and future operations at each CAS, and a detailed comparative analysis of potential corrective action alternatives were used to determine the appropriate corrective action for each CAS. There are six CASs in CAU 204, which aremore » all located between Areas 1, 2, 3, and 5 on the NTS. The No Further Action alternative was recommended for CASs 01-34-01, 02-34-01, 03-34-01, and 05-99-02; and a Closure in Place with Administrative Controls recommendation was the preferred corrective action for CASs 05-18-02 and 05-33-01. These alternatives were judged to meet all requirements for the technical components evaluated as well as applicable state and federal regulations for closure of the sites and will eliminate potential future exposure pathways to the contaminated media at CAU 204.« less

A Systems Modeling Approach for Risk Management of Command File Errors

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Meshkat, Leila

2012-01-01

The main cause of commanding errors is often (but not always) due to procedures. Either lack of maturity in the processes, incompleteness of requirements or lack of compliance to these procedures. Other causes of commanding errors include lack of understanding of system states, inadequate communication, and making hasty changes in standard procedures in response to an unexpected event. In general, it's important to look at the big picture prior to making corrective actions. In the case of errors traced back to procedures, considering the reliability of the process as a metric during its' design may help to reduce risk. This metric is obtained by using data from Nuclear Industry regarding human reliability. A structured method for the collection of anomaly data will help the operator think systematically about the anomaly and facilitate risk management. Formal models can be used for risk based design and risk management. A generic set of models can be customized for a broad range of missions.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DECISION DOCUMENT FOR CORRECTIVE ACTION UNIT 383: AREA 12 E-TUNNEL SITES, NEVADA TEST SITE, REV. NO. 0

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Mark McLane

2005-03-01

This Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD) was prepared by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO). The recommendations and corrective actions described within this document apply to the future closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 383, Area 12 E-Tunnel Sites, which is a joint DTRA and NNSA/NSO site. The CAU consists of three (3) Corrective Action Sites (CASs): CAS 12-06-06 (Muckpile); CAS 12-25-02 (Oil Spill); and CAS 12-28-02 (Radioactive Material). In addition to these CASs, E-Tunnel Ponds One, Two, and Three, and the Drainage Area above themore » ponds were included since closure of the Muckpile will impact these areas. This CADD is consistent with the requirements of the ''Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order'' agreed to by the State of Nevada, the U.S. Department of Energy, and the U.S. Department of Defense. The DTRA point of contact is the Nevada Operations Office, Environmental Project Manager; currently Ms. Tiffany A. Lantow. The NNSA/NSO point of contact is the Environmental Restoration, Industrial Sites Project Manager; currently Ms. Janet Appenzeller-Wing. The purpose of this CADD is to identify and provide the rationale for the selection of a recommended corrective action alternative for CAU 383. This document presents the recommended corrective action for CAU 383 (E-Tunnel Sites); however, implementation may be affected by the corrective action (to be determined) for CAU 551 (Area 12 Muckpiles) due to the close proximity of B, C, D, and F-Tunnels. The scope of this CADD consists of the following tasks: (1) Develop corrective action objectives; (2) Identify corrective action alternative screening criteria; (3) Develop corrective action alternatives; (4) Perform detailed and comparative evaluations of the corrective action alternatives in relation to the corrective action objectives and screening criteria; and (5) Recommend and justify a preferred corrective action alternative for CAU 383.« less

Acetazolamide in the treatment of metabolic alkalosis in critically ill patients.

PubMed

Marik, P E; Kussman, B D; Lipman, J; Kraus, P

1991-09-01

Metabolic alkalosis is a common acid-base disturbance in critically ill patients. In many patients correction of fluid and electrolyte status does not fully correct the metabolic derangement. In this study we examined the effect of 500 mg of intravenous acetazolamide, after correcting for fluid and electrolyte abnormalities, on the acid-base status of 30 ventilated patients. In all patients studied there was a fall of total serum bicarbonate; the mean reduction at 24 hours was 6.4 mmol/L, with a normalization of the base excess and pH. The onset of action was rapid (within 2 hours), and the maximal effect occurred at a mean of 15.5 hours, although there was wide variation. The effect of acetazolamide was still apparent at 48 hours. No adverse effects were noted. We conclude that in patients with metabolic alkalosis, once fluid and electrolyte abnormalities have been corrected, acetazolamide is an effective and safe form of therapy with a quick onset and long duration of action.

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 536: Area 3 Release Site, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

NSTec Environmental Restoration

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 536 is located in Area 3 of the Nevada Test Site. CAU 536 is listed in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order of 1996 as Area 3 Release Site, and comprises a single Corrective Action Site (CAS): {sm_bullet} CAS 03-44-02, Steam Jenny Discharge The Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP)-approved corrective action alternative for CAS 03-44-02 is clean closure. Closure activities included removing and disposing of total petroleum hydrocarbon (TPH)- and polyaromatic hydrocarbon (PAH)-impacted soil, soil impacted with plutonium (Pu)-239, and concrete pad debris. CAU 536 was closed in accordance with the NDEP-approved CAU 536more » Corrective Action Plan (CAP), with minor deviations as approved by NDEP. The closure activities specified in the CAP were based on the recommendations presented in the CAU 536 Corrective Action Decision Document (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office, 2004). This Closure Report documents CAU 536 closure activities. During closure activities, approximately 1,000 cubic yards (yd3) of hydrocarbon waste in the form of TPH- and PAH-impacted soil and debris, approximately 8 yd3 of Pu-239-impacted soil, and approximately 100 yd3 of concrete debris were generated, managed, and disposed of appropriately. Additionally, a previously uncharacterized, buried drum was excavated, removed, and disposed of as hydrocarbon waste as a best management practice. Waste minimization techniques, such as the utilization of laboratory analysis to characterize and classify waste streams, were employed during the performance of closure« less

21 CFR 120.10 - Corrective actions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-04-01

... 21 Food and Drugs 2 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false Corrective actions. 120.10 Section 120.10 Food and... actions. Whenever a deviation from a critical limit occurs, a processor shall take corrective action by... develop written corrective action plans, which become part of their HACCP plans in accordance with § 120.8...

Differences between the family-centered "COPCA" program and traditional infant physical therapy based on neurodevelopmental treatment principles.

PubMed

Dirks, Tineke; Blauw-Hospers, Cornill H; Hulshof, Lily J; Hadders-Algra, Mijna

2011-09-01

Evidence for effectiveness of pediatric physical therapy in infants at high risk for developmental motor disorders is limited. Therefore, "Coping With and Caring for Infants With Special Needs" (COPCA), a family-centered, early intervention program, was developed. The COPCA program is based on 2 components: (1) family involvement and educational parenting and (2) the neuromotor principles of the neuronal group selection theory. The COPCA coach uses principles of coaching to encourage the family's own capacities for solving problems of daily care and incorporating variation, along with trial and error in daily activities. The purpose of this study was to evaluate whether the content of sessions of the home-based, early intervention COPCA program differs from that of traditional infant physical therapy (TIP) sessions, which in the Netherlands are largely based on neurodevelopmental treatment. The study was conducted at the University Medical Center Groningen in the Netherlands. A quantitative video analysis of therapy sessions was conducted with infants participating in a 2-arm randomized trial. Forty-six infants at high risk for developmental motor disorders were randomly assigned to receive COPCA (n=21) or TIP (n=25) between 3 and 6 months corrected age. Intervention sessions were videotaped at 4 and 6 months corrected age and analyzed with a standardized observation protocol for the classification of physical therapy actions. Outcome parameters were relative amounts of time spent on specific physical therapy actions. The content of COPCA and TIP differed substantially. For instance, in TIP sessions, more time was spent on facilitation techniques, including handling, than in COPCA sessions (29% versus 3%, respectively). During COPCA, more time was spent on family coaching and education than during TIP (16% versus 4%, respectively). The major limitation of the study was its restriction to the Netherlands, implying that findings cannot be generalized automatically to other countries. The COPCA program differs broadly from TIP as applied in the Netherlands. Studies on the effectiveness of this family-centered program are needed.

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 356: Mud Pits and Disposal Sites, Nevada Test Site, Nevada with Errata Sheet

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

NNSA /NV

2002-11-12

This Closure Report (CR) has been prepared for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 356, Mud Pits and Disposal Sites, in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. This CAU is located in Areas 3 and 20 of the Nevada Test Site (NTS) approximately 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. Corrective Action Unit 356 consists of seven Corrective Action Sites (CASs): 03-04-01, Area 3 Change House Septic System; 03-09-01, Mud Pit Spill Over; 03-09-03, Mud Pit; 03-09-04, Mud Pit; 03-09-05, Mud Pit; 20-16-01, Landfill; and 20-22-21, Drums. This CR identifies and rationalizes the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Nationalmore » Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Operations Office's (NNSA/NV's) recommendation that no further corrective action and closure in place is deemed necessary for CAU 356. This recommendation is based on the results of field investigation/closure activities conducted November 20, 2001, through January 3, 2002, and March 11 to 14, 2002. These activities were conducted in accordance with the Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration Plan (SAFER) for CAU 356. For CASs 03-09-01, 03-09-03, 20-16-01, and 22-20-21, analytes detected in soil during the corrective action investigation were evaluated against Preliminary Action Levels (PALs) and it was determined that no Contaminants of Concern (COCs) were present. Therefore, no further action is necessary for the soil at these CASs. For CASs 03-04-01, 03-09-04, and 03-09-05, analytes detected in soil during the corrective action investigation were evaluated against PALs and identifies total petroleum hydrocarbons (TPHs) and radionuclides (i.e., americium-241 and/or plutonium 239/240) as COCs. The nature, extent, and concentration of the TPH and radionuclide COCs were bounded by sampling and shown to be relatively immobile. Therefore, closure in place is recommended for these CASs in CAU 356. Further, use restrictions are not required at this CAU beyond the NTS use restrictions identified in the SAFER Plan. In addition, the septic tank associated with CAU 356 will be closed in accordance with applicable regulations.« less

77 FR 42988 - Updating OSHA Construction Standards Based on National Consensus Standards; Head Protection...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2012-07-23

.... OSHA-2011-0184] RIN 1218-AC65 Updating OSHA Construction Standards Based on National Consensus... Administration (OSHA), Department of Labor. ACTION: Direct final rule; correction. SUMMARY: OSHA is correcting a... confusion resulting from a drafting error. OSHA published the DFR on June 22, 2012 (77 FR 37587). OSHA also...

Proton therapy for prostate cancer treatment employing online image guidance and an action level threshold.

PubMed

Vargas, Carlos; Falchook, Aaron; Indelicato, Daniel; Yeung, Anamaria; Henderson, Randall; Olivier, Kenneth; Keole, Sameer; Williams, Christopher; Li, Zuofeng; Palta, Jatinder

2009-04-01

The ability to determine the accuracy of the final prostate position within a determined action level threshold for image-guided proton therapy is unclear. Three thousand one hundred ten images for 20 consecutive patients treated in 1 of our 3 proton prostate protocols from February to May of 2007 were analyzed. Daily kV images and patient repositioning were performed employing an action-level threshold (ALT) of > or = 2.5 mm for each beam. Isocentric orthogonal x-rays were obtained, and prostate position was defined via 3 gold markers for each patient in the 3 axes. To achieve and confirm our action level threshold, an average of 2 x-rays sets (median 2; range, 0-4) was taken daily for each patient. Based on our ALT, we made no corrections in 8.7% (range, 0%-54%), 1 correction in 82% (41%-98%), and 2 to 3 corrections in 9% (0-27%). No patient needed 4 or more corrections. All patients were treated with a confirmed error of < 2.5 mm for every beam delivered. After all corrections, the mean and standard deviations were: anterior-posterior (z): 0.003 +/- 0.094 cm; superior-inferior (y): 0.028 +/- 0.073 cm; and right-left (x) -0.013 +/- 0.08 cm. It is feasible to limit all final prostate positions to less than 2.5 mm employing an action level image-guided radiation therapy (IGRT) process. The residual errors after corrections were very small.

Prevention of Infection in Orthopedic Prosthetic Surgery.

PubMed

Chirca, Ioana; Marculescu, Camelia

2017-06-01

Total joint arthroplasty is a generally safe orthopedic procedure; however, infection is a potentially devastating complication. Multiple risk factors have been identified for development of prosthetic joint infections. Identification of patients at risk and preoperative correction of known risk factors, such as smoking, diabetes mellitus, anemia, malnutrition, and decolonization of Staphylococcus carriers, represent well-established actions to decrease the infection risk. Careful operative technique, proper draping and skin preparation, and appropriate selection and dosing of antimicrobials for perioperative prophylaxis are also very important in prevention of infection. Published by Elsevier Inc.

10 CFR 71.133 - Corrective action.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 10 Energy 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Corrective action. 71.133 Section 71.133 Energy NUCLEAR....133 Corrective action. The licensee, certificate holder, and applicant for a CoC shall establish... determined and corrective action taken to preclude repetition. The identification of the significant...

10 CFR 71.133 - Corrective action.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Corrective action. 71.133 Section 71.133 Energy NUCLEAR....133 Corrective action. The licensee, certificate holder, and applicant for a CoC shall establish... determined and corrective action taken to preclude repetition. The identification of the significant...

40 CFR 264.551 - Grandfathered Corrective Action Management Units (CAMUs).

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-07-01

... risks to humans or to the environment resulting from exposure to hazardous wastes or hazardous... human health and the environment, to include, for areas where wastes will remain in place, monitoring... (CONTINUED) SOLID WASTES (CONTINUED) STANDARDS FOR OWNERS AND OPERATORS OF HAZARDOUS WASTE TREATMENT, STORAGE...

40 CFR 264.551 - Grandfathered Corrective Action Management Units (CAMUs).

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-07-01

... risks to humans or to the environment resulting from exposure to hazardous wastes or hazardous... human health and the environment, to include, for areas where wastes will remain in place, monitoring... (CONTINUED) SOLID WASTES (CONTINUED) STANDARDS FOR OWNERS AND OPERATORS OF HAZARDOUS WASTE TREATMENT, STORAGE...

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 168: Areas 25 and 26 Contaminated Materials and Waste Dumps, Nevada Test Site, Nevada (Rev. 0) includes Record of Technical Change No. 1 (dated 8/28/2002), Record of Technical Change No. 2 (dated 9/23/2002), and Record of Technical Change No. 3 (dated 6/2/2004)

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada

This Corrective Action Investigation Plan contains the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Operations Office's approach to collect data necessary to evaluate corrective action alternatives appropriate for the closure of Corrective Action Unit 168 under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Corrective Action Unit 168 consists of a group of twelve relatively diverse Corrective Action Sites (CASs 25-16-01, Construction Waste Pile; 25-16-03, MX Construction Landfill; 25-19-02, Waste Disposal Site; 25-23-02, Radioactive Storage RR Cars; 25-23-18, Radioactive Material Storage; 25-34-01, NRDS Contaminated Bunker; 25-34-02, NRDS Contaminated Bunker; CAS 25-23-13, ETL - Lab Radioactive Contamination; 25-99-16, USW G3;more » 26-08-01, Waste Dump/Burn Pit; 26-17-01, Pluto Waste Holding Area; 26-19-02, Contaminated Waste Dump No.2). These CASs vary in terms of the sources and nature of potential contamination. The CASs are located and/or associated wit h the following Nevada Test Site (NTS) facilities within three areas. The first eight CASs were in operation between 1958 to 1984 in Area 25 include the Engine Maintenance, Assembly, and Disassembly Facility; the Missile Experiment Salvage Yard; the Reactor Maintenance, Assembly, and Disassembly Facility; the Radioactive Materials Storage Facility; and the Treatment Test Facility Building at Test Cell A. Secondly, the three CASs located in Area 26 include the Project Pluto testing area that operated from 1961 to 1964. Lastly, the Underground Southern Nevada Well (USW) G3 (CAS 25-99-16), a groundwater monitoring well located west of the NTS on the ridgeline of Yucca Mountain, was in operation during the 1980s. Based on site history and existing characterization data obtained to support the data quality objectives process, contaminants of potential concern (COPCs) for CAU 168 are primarily radionuclide; however, the COPCs for several CASs were not defined. To address COPC uncertainty, the analytical program for most CASs will include volatile organic compounds, semivolatile organic compounds, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act metals, total petroleum hydrocarbons, polychlorinated biphenyls, and radionuclides. Upon reviewing historical data and current site conditions, it has been determined that no further characterization is required at USW G3 (CAS 25-99-16) to select the appropriate corrective action. A cesium-137 source was encased in cement within the vadous zone during the drilling of the well (CAS 25-99-16). A corrective action of closure in place with a land-use restriction for drilling near USW G3 is appropriate. This corrective action will be documented in the Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD) for CAU 168. The results of the remaining field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of corrective action alternatives for the other CASs within CAU 168 in this CADD.« less

Study of a quadratic redshift-based correction in f(R) gravity with Baryonic matter

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Masoudi, Mozhgan; Saffari, Reza

2015-08-01

This paper is considered as a second-order redshift-based corrections in derivative of modified gravitational action, f(R), to explain the late time acceleration which is appeared by Supernova Type Ia (SNeIa) without considering the dark components. Here, we obtained the cosmological dynamic parameters of universe for this redshift depended corrections. Next, we used the recent data of SNeIa Union2, shift parameter of the cosmic background radiation, Baryon acoustic oscillation from sloan digital sky survey (SDSS), and combined analysis of these observations to put constraints on the parameters of the selected F(z) model. It is very interesting that the well-known age problem of the three old objects for combined observations can be alleviated in this model. Finally, the reference action will be constructed in terms of its Taylor expansion. Also, we show that the reconstructed action definitely pass the solar system and stability of the cosmological solution tests.

28 CFR 115.404 - Audit corrective action plan.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-07-01

... 28 Judicial Administration 2 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Audit corrective action plan. 115.404 Section 115.404 Judicial Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (CONTINUED) PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION ACT NATIONAL STANDARDS Auditing and Corrective Action § 115.404 Audit corrective action plan. (a) A finding of...

28 CFR 115.404 - Audit corrective action plan.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-07-01

... 28 Judicial Administration 2 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Audit corrective action plan. 115.404 Section 115.404 Judicial Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (CONTINUED) PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION ACT NATIONAL STANDARDS Auditing and Corrective Action § 115.404 Audit corrective action plan. (a) A finding of...

28 CFR 115.404 - Audit corrective action plan.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-07-01

... 28 Judicial Administration 2 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Audit corrective action plan. 115.404 Section 115.404 Judicial Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (CONTINUED) PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION ACT NATIONAL STANDARDS Auditing and Corrective Action § 115.404 Audit corrective action plan. (a) A finding of...

40 CFR 35.3170 - Corrective action.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... 40 Protection of Environment 1 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Corrective action. 35.3170 Section 35... STATE AND LOCAL ASSISTANCE State Water Pollution Control Revolving Funds § 35.3170 Corrective action. (a... will notify the State of such noncompliance and prescribe the necessary corrective action. Failure to...

42 CFR 431.246 - Corrective action.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-10-01

... 42 Public Health 4 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Corrective action. 431.246 Section 431.246 Public... Recipients Procedures § 431.246 Corrective action. The agency must promptly make corrective payments, retroactive to the date an incorrect action was taken, and, if appropriate, provide for admission or...

16 CFR 1209.37 - Corrective actions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 16 Commercial Practices 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Corrective actions. 1209.37 Section 1209.37... SAFETY STANDARD FOR CELLULOSE INSULATION Certification § 1209.37 Corrective actions. (a) Test failure. When any test required by § 1209.36 yields failing or unacceptable results, corrective action must be...

42 CFR 431.246 - Corrective action.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... 42 Public Health 4 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Corrective action. 431.246 Section 431.246 Public... Recipients Procedures § 431.246 Corrective action. The agency must promptly make corrective payments, retroactive to the date an incorrect action was taken, and, if appropriate, provide for admission or...

40 CFR 35.3170 - Corrective action.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-07-01

... 40 Protection of Environment 1 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Corrective action. 35.3170 Section 35... STATE AND LOCAL ASSISTANCE State Water Pollution Control Revolving Funds § 35.3170 Corrective action. (a... will notify the State of such noncompliance and prescribe the necessary corrective action. Failure to...

Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 477: Area 12 N-Tunnel Muckpile, Nevada Test Site

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

NSTec Environmental Restoration

This Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD)/Closure Report (CR) was prepared by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 477, N-Tunnel Muckpile. This CADD/CR is consistent with the requirements of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) agreed to by the State of Nevada, the U.S. Department of Energy, and the U.S. Department of Defense. Corrective Action Unit 477 is comprised of one Corrective Action Site (CAS): • 12-06-03, Muckpile The purpose of this CADD/CR is to provide justification and documentation supporting the recommendation for closure with no further action, by placing use restrictions on CAUmore » 477.« less

Patient-reported experiences of patient safety incidents need to be utilized more systematically in promoting safe care.

PubMed

Sahlström, Merja; Partanen, Pirjo; Turunen, Hannele

2018-04-16

To analyze patient safety incidents (PSIs) reported by patients and their use in Finnish healthcare organizations. Cross-sectional study. About 15 Finnish healthcare organizations ranging from specialized hospital care to home care, outpatient and inpatient clinics, and geographically diverse areas of Finland. The study population included all Finnish patients who had voluntarily reported PSI via web-based system in 2009-15. Quantitative analysis of patients' safety reports, inductive content analysis of patients' suggestions to prevent the reoccurrence incidents and how those suggestions were used in healthcare organizations. Patients reported 656 PSIs, most of which were classified by the healthcare organizations' analysts as problems associated with information flow (32.6%) and medications (18%). Most of the incidents (65%) did not cause any harm to patients. About 76% of the reports suggested ways to prevent reoccurrence of PSIs, most of which were feasible, system-based amendments of processes for reviewing or administering treatment, anticipating risks or improving diligence in patient care. However, only 6% had led to practical implementation of corrective actions in the healthcare organizations. The results indicate that patients report diverse PSIs and suggest practical systems-based solutions to prevent their reoccurrence. However, patients' reports rarely lead to corrective actions documented in the registering system, indicating that there is substantial scope to improve utilization of patients' reports. There is also a need for strong patient safety management, including willingness and commitment of HCPs and leaders to learn from safety incidents.

Defense Security Service (DSS)

Science.gov Websites

employees. May 10, 2018 Correction to DMDC DQI 945 Notice On May 1, 2018, the Defense Manpower Data Center actions initiated based on the DQI notice. However, actions are still required on items 1-5 (see below

40 CFR 257.28 - Implementation of the corrective action program.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-07-01

...-Municipal Non-Hazardous Waste Disposal Units Ground-Water Monitoring and Corrective Action § 257.28... corrective action ground-water monitoring program that: (i) At a minimum, meets the requirements of an assessment monitoring program under § 257.25; (ii) Indicates the effectiveness of the corrective action...

40 CFR 257.28 - Implementation of the corrective action program.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-07-01

...-Municipal Non-Hazardous Waste Disposal Units Ground-Water Monitoring and Corrective Action § 257.28... corrective action ground-water monitoring program that: (i) At a minimum, meets the requirements of an assessment monitoring program under § 257.25; (ii) Indicates the effectiveness of the corrective action...

40 CFR 257.28 - Implementation of the corrective action program.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-07-01

...-Municipal Non-Hazardous Waste Disposal Units Ground-Water Monitoring and Corrective Action § 257.28... corrective action ground-water monitoring program that: (i) At a minimum, meets the requirements of an assessment monitoring program under § 257.25; (ii) Indicates the effectiveness of the corrective action...

40 CFR 192.04 - Corrective action.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-07-01

... 40 Protection of Environment 25 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Corrective action. 192.04 Section 192... Corrective action. If the groundwater concentration limits established for disposal sites under provisions of § 192.02(c) are found or projected to be exceeded, a corrective action program shall be placed into...

21 CFR 123.7 - Corrective actions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-04-01

... 21 Food and Drugs 2 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false Corrective actions. 123.7 Section 123.7 Food and... CONSUMPTION FISH AND FISHERY PRODUCTS General Provisions § 123.7 Corrective actions. (a) Whenever a deviation from a critical limit occurs, a processor shall take corrective action either by: (1) Following a...

10 CFR 72.172 - Corrective action.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Corrective action. 72.172 Section 72.172 Energy NUCLEAR... Corrective action. The licensee, applicant for a license, certificate holder, and applicant for a CoC shall... that the cause of the condition is determined and corrective action is taken to preclude repetition...

45 CFR 1225.10 - Corrective action.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-10-01

... 45 Public Welfare 4 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Corrective action. 1225.10 Section 1225.10 Public... Corrective action. When it has been determined by Final Agency Decision that the aggrieved party has been subjected to illegal discrimination, the following corrective actions may be taken: (a) Selection as a...

9 CFR 417.3 - Corrective actions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 9 Animals and Animal Products 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Corrective actions. 417.3 Section 417... ANALYSIS AND CRITICAL CONTROL POINT (HACCP) SYSTEMS § 417.3 Corrective actions. (a) The written HACCP plan shall identify the corrective action to be followed in response to a deviation from a critical limit...

34 CFR 200.42 - Corrective action.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-07-01

... 34 Education 1 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Corrective action. 200.42 Section 200.42 Education... Programs Operated by Local Educational Agencies Lea and School Improvement § 200.42 Corrective action. (a) Definition. “Corrective action” means action by an LEA that— (1) Substantially and directly responds to— (i...

10 CFR 72.172 - Corrective action.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 10 Energy 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Corrective action. 72.172 Section 72.172 Energy NUCLEAR... Corrective action. The licensee, applicant for a license, certificate holder, and applicant for a CoC shall... that the cause of the condition is determined and corrective action is taken to preclude repetition...

34 CFR 200.42 - Corrective action.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... 34 Education 1 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Corrective action. 200.42 Section 200.42 Education... Programs Operated by Local Educational Agencies Lea and School Improvement § 200.42 Corrective action. (a) Definition. “Corrective action” means action by an LEA that— (1) Substantially and directly responds to— (i...

45 CFR 1225.10 - Corrective action.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... 45 Public Welfare 4 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Corrective action. 1225.10 Section 1225.10 Public... Corrective action. When it has been determined by Final Agency Decision that the aggrieved party has been subjected to illegal discrimination, the following corrective actions may be taken: (a) Selection as a...

40 CFR 192.04 - Corrective action.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... 40 Protection of Environment 24 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Corrective action. 192.04 Section 192... Corrective action. If the groundwater concentration limits established for disposal sites under provisions of § 192.02(c) are found or projected to be exceeded, a corrective action program shall be placed into...

Use of a systematic risk analysis method (FMECA) to improve quality in a clinical laboratory procedure.

PubMed

Serafini, A; Troiano, G; Franceschini, E; Calzoni, P; Nante, N; Scapellato, C

2016-01-01

Risk management is a set of actions to recognize or identify risks, errors and their consequences and to take the steps to counter it. The aim of our study was to apply FMECA (Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis) to the Activated Protein C resistance (APCR) test in order to detect and avoid mistakes in this process. We created a team and the process was divided in phases and sub phases. For each phase we calculated the probability of occurrence (O) of an error, the detectability score (D) and the severity (S). The product of these three indexes yields the RPN (Risk Priority Number). Phases with a higher RPN need corrective actions with a higher priority. The calculation of RPN showed that more than 20 activities have a score higher than 150 and need important preventive actions; 8 have a score between 100 and 150. Only 23 actions obtained an acceptable score lower than 100. This was one of the first experience of application of FMECA analysis to a laboratory process, and the first one which applies this technique to the identification of the factor V Leiden, and our results confirm that FMECA could be a simple, powerful and useful tool in risk management and helps to identify quickly the criticality in a laboratory process.

States at Risk: America's Preparedness Report Card

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Yu, R. M. S.; Strauss, B.; Kulp, S. A.; Bronzan, J.; Rodehorst, B.; Bhat, C.; Dix, B.; Savonis, M.; Wiles, R.

2015-12-01

Many states are already experiencing the costly impacts of extreme climate and weather events. The occurrence, frequency and intensity of these events may change under future climates. Preparing for these changes takes time, and state government agencies and communities need to recognize the risks they could potentially face and the response actions already undertaken. The States at Risk: America's Preparedness Report Card project is the first-ever study that quantifies five climate-change-driven hazards, and the relevant state government response actions in each of the 50 states. The changing characteristics of extreme heat, drought, wildfires, inland and coastal flooding were assessed for the baseline period (around year 2000) through the years 2030 and 2050 across all 50 states. Bias-corrected statistically-downscaled (BCSD) climate projections (Reclamation, 2013) and hydrology projections (Reclamation, 2014) from the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project phase 5 (CMIP5) under RCP8.5 were used. The climate change response action analysis covers five critical sectors: Transportation, Energy, Water, Human Health and Communities. It examined whether there is evidence that the state is taking action to (1) reduce current risks, (2) raise its awareness of future risks, (3) plan for adaptation to the future risks, and (4) implement specific actions to reduce future risks for each applicable hazards. Results from the two analyses were aggregated and translated into a rating system that standardizes assessments across states, which can be easily understood by both technical and non-technical audiences. The findings in this study not only serve as a screening tool for states to recognize the hazards they could potentially face as climate changes, but also serve as a roadmap for states to address the gaps in response actions, and to improve climate preparedness and resilience.

12 CFR 327.9 - Assessment pricing methods.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... 12 Banks and Banking 5 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Assessment pricing methods. 327.9 Section 327.9... ASSESSMENTS In General § 327.9 Assessment pricing methods. (a) Small institutions—(1) Risk Categories. Each... unless effective corrective action is taken. (4) Financial ratios method. A small insured depository...

40 CFR 258.75 - Discounting.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... § 258.72(a), and/or corrective action costs in § 258.73(a) up to the rate of return for essentially risk free investments, net of inflation, under the following conditions: (a) The State Director determines... estimate of site life; and (d) Discounted cost estimates must be adjusted annually to reflect inflation and...

40 CFR 258.75 - Discounting.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-07-01

... Protection of Environment ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (CONTINUED) SOLID WASTES CRITERIA FOR MUNICIPAL... State may allow discounting of closure cost estimates in § 258.71(a), post-closure cost estimates in § 258.72(a), and/or corrective action costs in § 258.73(a) up to the rate of return for essentially risk...

Toward Baseline Software Anomalies in NASA Missions

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Layman, Lucas; Zelkowitz, Marvin; Basili, Victor; Nikora, Allen P.

2012-01-01

In this fast abstract, we provide preliminary findings an analysis of 14,500 spacecraft anomalies from unmanned NASA missions. We provide some baselines for the distributions of software vs. non-software anomalies in spaceflight systems, the risk ratings of software anomalies, and the corrective actions associated with software anomalies.

Analyses of factors of crash avoidance maneuvers using the general estimates system.

PubMed

Yan, Xuedong; Harb, Rami; Radwan, Essam

2008-06-01

Taking an effective corrective action to a critical traffic situation provides drivers an opportunity to avoid crash occurrence and minimize crash severity. The objective of this study is to investigate the relationship between the probability of taking corrective actions and the characteristics of drivers, vehicles, and driving environments. Using the 2004 GES crash database, this study classified drivers who encountered critical traffic events (identified as P_CRASH3 in the GES database) into two pre-crash groups: corrective avoidance actions group and no corrective avoidance actions group. Single and multiple logistic regression analyses were performed to identify potential traffic factors associated with the probability of drivers taking corrective actions. The regression results showed that the driver/vehicle factors associated with the probability of taking corrective actions include: driver age, gender, alcohol use, drug use, physical impairments, distraction, sight obstruction, and vehicle type. In particular, older drivers, female drivers, drug/alcohol use, physical impairment, distraction, or poor visibility may increase the probability of failing to attempt to avoid crashes. Moreover, drivers of larger size vehicles are 42.5% more likely to take corrective avoidance actions than passenger car drivers. On the other hand, the significant environmental factors correlated with the drivers' crash avoidance maneuver include: highway type, number of lanes, divided/undivided highway, speed limit, highway alignment, highway profile, weather condition, and surface condition. Some adverse highway environmental factors, such as horizontal curves, vertical curves, worse weather conditions, and slippery road surface conditions are correlated with a higher probability of crash avoidance maneuvers. These results may seem counterintuitive but they can be explained by the fact that motorists may be more likely to drive cautiously in those adverse driving environments. The analyses revealed that drivers' distraction could be the highest risk factor leading to the failure of attempting to avoid crashes. Further analyses entailing distraction causes (e.g., cellular phone use) and their possible countermeasures need to be conducted. The age and gender factors are overrepresented in the "no avoidance maneuver." A possible solution could involve the integration of a new function in the current ITS technologies. A personalized system, which could be related to the expected type of maneuver for a driver with certain characteristics, would assist different drivers with different characteristics to avoid crashes. Further crash database studies are recommended to investigate the association of drivers' emergency maneuvers such as braking, steering, or their combination with crash severity.

Differentiating between precursor and control variables when analyzing reasoned action theories.

PubMed

Hennessy, Michael; Bleakley, Amy; Fishbein, Martin; Brown, Larry; Diclemente, Ralph; Romer, Daniel; Valois, Robert; Vanable, Peter A; Carey, Michael P; Salazar, Laura

2010-02-01

This paper highlights the distinction between precursor and control variables in the context of reasoned action theory. Here the theory is combined with structural equation modeling to demonstrate how age and past sexual behavior should be situated in a reasoned action analysis. A two wave longitudinal survey sample of African-American adolescents is analyzed where the target behavior is having vaginal sex. Results differ when age and past behavior are used as control variables and when they are correctly used as precursors. Because control variables do not appear in any form of reasoned action theory, this approach to including background variables is not correct when analyzing data sets based on the theoretical axioms of the Theory of Reasoned Action, the Theory of Planned Behavior, or the Integrative Model.

Differentiating Between Precursor and Control Variables When Analyzing Reasoned Action Theories

PubMed Central

Hennessy, Michael; Bleakley, Amy; Fishbein, Martin; Brown, Larry; DiClemente, Ralph; Romer, Daniel; Valois, Robert; Vanable, Peter A.; Carey, Michael P.; Salazar, Laura

2010-01-01

This paper highlights the distinction between precursor and control variables in the context of reasoned action theory. Here the theory is combined with structural equation modeling to demonstrate how age and past sexual behavior should be situated in a reasoned action analysis. A two wave longitudinal survey sample of African-American adolescents is analyzed where the target behavior is having vaginal sex. Results differ when age and past behavior are used as control variables and when they are correctly used as precursors. Because control variables do not appear in any form of reasoned action theory, this approach to including background variables is not correct when analyzing data sets based on the theoretical axioms of the Theory of Reasoned Action, the Theory of Planned Behavior, or the Integrative Model PMID:19370408

5 CFR 930.113 - Corrective action.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 5 Administrative Personnel 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Corrective action. 930.113 Section 930....113 Corrective action. An agency will take adverse, disciplinary, or other appropriate action against... such action against an operator or an incidental operator: (a) The employee is convicted of operating...

5 CFR 930.113 - Corrective action.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 5 Administrative Personnel 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Corrective action. 930.113 Section 930....113 Corrective action. An agency will take adverse, disciplinary, or other appropriate action against... such action against an operator or an incidental operator: (a) The employee is convicted of operating...

Method and system for providing work machine multi-functional user interface

DOEpatents

Hoff, Brian D [Peoria, IL; Akasam, Sivaprasad [Peoria, IL; Baker, Thomas M [Peoria, IL

2007-07-10

A method is performed to provide a multi-functional user interface on a work machine for displaying suggested corrective action. The process includes receiving status information associated with the work machine and analyzing the status information to determine an abnormal condition. The process also includes displaying a warning message on the display device indicating the abnormal condition and determining one or more corrective actions to handle the abnormal condition. Further, the process includes determining an appropriate corrective action among the one or more corrective actions and displaying a recommendation message on the display device reflecting the appropriate corrective action. The process may also include displaying a list including the remaining one or more corrective actions on the display device to provide alternative actions to an operator.

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 428: Area 3 Septic Waste Systems 1 and 5, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, REVISION 0, march 1999

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

DOE /NV

1999-03-26

The Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 428, Area 3 Septic Waste Systems 1 and 5, has been developed in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order that was agreed to by the U. S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office; the State of Nevada Division of Environmental Protection; and the U. S. Department of Defense. Corrective Action Unit 428 consists of Corrective Action Sites 03- 05- 002- SW01 and 03- 05- 002- SW05, respectively known as Area 3 Septic Waste System 1 and Septic Waste System 5. This Corrective Action Investigation Plan is used inmore » combination with the Work Plan for Leachfield Corrective Action Units: Nevada Test Site and Tonopah Test Range, Nevada , Rev. 1 (DOE/ NV, 1998c). The Leachfield Work Plan was developed to streamline investigations at leachfield Corrective Action Units by incorporating management, technical, quality assurance, health and safety, public involvement, field sampling, and waste management information common to a set of Corrective Action Units with similar site histories and characteristics into a single document that can be referenced. This Corrective Action Investigation Plan provides investigative details specific to Corrective Action Unit 428. A system of leachfields and associated collection systems was used for wastewater disposal at Area 3 of the Tonopah Test Range until a consolidated sewer system was installed in 1990 to replace the discrete septic waste systems. Operations within various buildings at Area 3 generated sanitary and industrial wastewaters potentially contaminated with contaminants of potential concern and disposed of in septic tanks and leachfields. Corrective Action Unit 428 is composed of two leachfield systems in the northern portion of Area 3. Based on site history collected to support the Data Quality Objectives process, contaminants of potential concern for the site include oil/ diesel range total petroleum hydrocarbons, and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act characteristic volatile organic compounds, semivolatile organic compounds, and metals. A limited number of samples will be analyzed for gamma- emitting radionuclides and isotopic uranium from four of the septic tanks and if radiological field screening levels are exceeded. Additional samples will be analyzed for geotechnical and hydrological properties and a bioassessment may be performed. The technical approach for investigating this Corrective Action Unit consists of the following activities: (1) Perform video surveys of the discharge and outfall lines. (2) Collect samples of material in the septic tanks. (3) Conduct exploratory trenching to locate and inspect subsurface components. (4) Collect subsurface soil samples in areas of the collection system including the septic tanks and outfall end of distribution boxes. (5) Collect subsurface soil samples underlying the leachfield distribution pipes via trenching. (6) Collect surface and near- surface samples near potential locations of the Acid Sewer Outfall if Septic Waste System 5 Leachfield cannot be located. (7) Field screen samples for volatile organic compounds, total petroleum hydrocarbons, and radiological activity. (8) Drill boreholes and collect subsurface soil samples if required. (9) Analyze samples for total volatile organic compounds, total semivolatile organic compounds, total Resource Conservation and Recovery Act metals, and total petroleum hydrocarbons (oil/ diesel range organics). Limited number of samples will be analyzed for gamma- emitting radionuclides and isotopic uranium from particular septic tanks and if radiological field screening levels are exceeded. (10) Collect samples from native soils beneath the distribution system and analyze for geotechnical/ hydrologic parameters. (11) Collect and analyze bioassessment samples at the discretion of the Site Supervisor if total petroleum hydrocarbons exceed field- screening levels.« less

DOD Financial Management: Improvements Needed in the Navys Audit Readiness Efforts for Fund Balance with Treasury

DTIC Science & Technology

2016-08-01

prioritization of key information technology limits management’s ability to focus audit readiness efforts on the systems with the highest risk...corrective actions for the higher-risk systems first. For an audit readiness plan for key information technology systems, the Navy provided a schedule...prioritization of key information technology systems used in the FBWT process limits management’s ability to focus audit readiness efforts on the most

Feedback in action within bedside teaching encounters: a video ethnographic study.

PubMed

Rizan, Chantelle; Elsey, Christopher; Lemon, Thomas; Grant, Andrew; Monrouxe, Lynn V

2014-09-01

Feedback associated with teaching activities is often synonymous with reflection on action, which comprises the evaluative assessment of performance out of its original context. Feedback in action (as correction during clinical encounters) is an underexplored, complementary resource facilitating students' understanding and learning. The purpose of this study was to explore the interactional patterns and correction modalities utilised in feedback sequences between doctors and students within general practice-based bedside teaching encounters (BTEs). A qualitative video ethnographic approach was used. Participants were recorded in their natural settings to allow interactional practices to be contextually explored. We examined 12 BTEs recorded across four general practices and involving 12 patients, four general practitioners and four medical students (209 minutes and 20 seconds of data) taken from a larger corpus. Data analysis was facilitated by Transana video analysis software and informed by previous conversation analysis research in ordinary conversation, classrooms and health care settings. A range of correction strategies across a spectrum of underlying explicitness were identified. Correction strategies classified at extreme poles of this scale (high or low explicitness) were believed to be less interactionally effective. For example, those using abrupt closing of topics (high explicitness) or interactional ambiguity (low explicitness) were thought to be less effective than embedded correction strategies that enabled the student to reach the correct answer with support. We believe that educators who are explicitly taught linguistic strategies for how to manage feedback in BTEs might manage learning more effectively. For example, clinicians might maximise learning moments during BTEs by avoiding abrupt or ambiguous feedback practices. Embedded correction strategies can enhance student participation by guiding students towards the correct answer. Clinician corrections can sensitively manage student face-saving by minimising the exposure of student error to patients. Furthermore, we believe that the effective practices highlighted by our analysis might facilitate successful transformation of feedback in action into feedback for action. © 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Law enforcement suicide: a national analysis.

PubMed

Violanti, John M; Robinson, Cynthia F; Shen, Rui

2013-01-01

Previous research suggests that there is an elevated risk of suicide among workers within law enforcement occupations. The present study examined the proportionate mortality for suicide in law enforcement in comparison to the US working population during 1999, 2003-2004, and 2007, based on Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health National Occupational Mortality Surveillance data. We analyzed data for all law enforcement occupations and focused on two specific law enforcement occupational categories-detectives/criminal investigators/ police and corrections officers. Suicides were also explored by race, gender and ethnicity. The results of the study showed proportionate mortality ratios (PMRs) for suicide were significantly high for all races and sexes combined (all law enforcement--PMR = 169, 95% CI = 150-191, p < 0.01, 264 deaths; detectives/criminal investigators/police--PMR = 182, 95% CI = 150-218, p < 0.01, 115 deaths; and corrections officers-PMR = 141, 95% CI = 111-178, p < 0.01, 73 deaths). Detectives/criminal investigators/police had the higher suicide risk (an 82% increase) compared to corrections officers (a 41% increase). When analyzed by race and sex, suicide PMRs for Caucasian males were significantly high for both occupations-detectives/ criminal investigators/police (PMR = 133; 95% CI = 108-162, p < 0.01; corrections officers--PMR = 134, 95% CI = 102-173, p < 0.01). A significantly high (PMR = 244, p < 0.01, 95% CI = 147-380) ratio was found among Hispanic males in the law enforcement combined category, and a similarly high PMR was found among Hispanic detectives/criminal investigators/police (PMR = 388, p < 0.01, 95% CI = 168-765). There were small numbers of deaths among female and African American officers. The results included significantly increased risk for suicide among detectives/criminal investigators/police and corrections officers, which suggests that additional study could provide better data to inform us for preventive action.

24 CFR 115.307 - Requirements for participation in the FHAP; Corrective and remedial action for failing to comply...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-04-01

... the FHAP; Corrective and remedial action for failing to comply with requirements. 115.307 Section 115... § 115.307 Requirements for participation in the FHAP; Corrective and remedial action for failing to... to the requirements of § 115.311. (b) Corrective and remedial action for failing to comply with...

24 CFR 115.307 - Requirements for participation in the FHAP; Corrective and remedial action for failing to comply...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-04-01

... the FHAP; Corrective and remedial action for failing to comply with requirements. 115.307 Section 115... § 115.307 Requirements for participation in the FHAP; Corrective and remedial action for failing to... to the requirements of § 115.311. (b) Corrective and remedial action for failing to comply with...

24 CFR 115.307 - Requirements for participation in the FHAP; Corrective and remedial action for failing to comply...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-04-01

... the FHAP; Corrective and remedial action for failing to comply with requirements. 115.307 Section 115... § 115.307 Requirements for participation in the FHAP; Corrective and remedial action for failing to... to the requirements of § 115.311. (b) Corrective and remedial action for failing to comply with...

24 CFR 115.307 - Requirements for participation in the FHAP; Corrective and remedial action for failing to comply...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-04-01

... the FHAP; Corrective and remedial action for failing to comply with requirements. 115.307 Section 115... § 115.307 Requirements for participation in the FHAP; Corrective and remedial action for failing to... to the requirements of § 115.311. (b) Corrective and remedial action for failing to comply with...

24 CFR 115.307 - Requirements for participation in the FHAP; Corrective and remedial action for failing to comply...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-04-01

... the FHAP; Corrective and remedial action for failing to comply with requirements. 115.307 Section 115... § 115.307 Requirements for participation in the FHAP; Corrective and remedial action for failing to... to the requirements of § 115.311. (b) Corrective and remedial action for failing to comply with...

45 CFR 305.66 - Notice, corrective action year, and imposition of penalty.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... deficiency or deficiencies cited in the notice during the automatic corrective action year (i.e., the... corrected the deficiency or deficiencies cited in the notice by the end of the corrective action year. (d... which the penalty is assessed and which failed to correct the deficiency or deficiencies cited in the...

Family history of diabetes and its relationship with insulin secretion and insulin sensitivity in Iraqi immigrants and native Swedes: a population-based cohort study.

PubMed

Bennet, Louise; Franks, Paul W; Zöller, Bengt; Groop, Leif

2018-03-01

Middle Eastern immigrants to western countries are at high risk of developing type 2 diabetes. However, the heritability and impact of first-degree family history (FH) of type 2 diabetes on insulin secretion and action have not been adequately described. Citizens of Malmö, Sweden, aged 30-75 years born in Iraq or Sweden were invited to participate in this population-based study. Insulin secretion (corrected insulin response and oral disposition index) and action (insulin sensitivity index) were assessed by oral glucose tolerance tests. In total, 45.7% of Iraqis (616/1348) and 27.4% of native Swedes (201/733) had FH in parent(s), sibling(s) or single parent and sibling, i.e., FH+. Approximately 8% of Iraqis and 0.7% of Swedes had ≥ 3 sibling(s) and parent(s) with diabetes, i.e., FH++. Irrespective of family size, prediabetes and diabetes increased with family burden (FH- 29.4%; FH+ 38.8%; FH++ 61.7%) without significant differences across ethnicities. With increasing level of family burden, insulin secretion rather than insulin action decreased. Individuals with a combination of ≥ 3 siblings and parents with diabetes presented with the lowest levels of insulin secretion. The Iraqi immigrant population often present with a strong familial burden of type 2 diabetes with the worst glycemic control and highest diabetes risk in individuals with ≥ 3 siblings and parents with diabetes. Our data show that in a population still free from diabetes familial burden influences insulin secretion to a higher degree than insulin action and may be a logical target for intervention.

Seven benzimidazole pesticides combined at sub-threshold levels induce micronuclei in vitro

PubMed Central

Ermler, Sibylle; Scholze, Martin; Kortenkamp, Andreas

2013-01-01

Benzimidazoles act by disrupting microtubule polymerisation and are capable of inducing the formation of micronuclei. Considering the similarities in their mechanisms of action (inhibition of microtubule assembly by binding to the colchicine-binding site on tubulin monomers), combination effects according to the principles of concentration addition might occur. If so, it is to be expected that several benzimidazoles contribute to micronucleus formation even when each single one is present at or below threshold levels. This would have profound implications for risk assessment, but the idea has never been tested rigorously. To fill this gap, we analysed micronucleus frequencies for seven benzimidazoles, including the fungicide benomyl, its metabolite carbendazim, the anthelmintics albendazole, albendazole oxide, flubendazole, mebendazole and oxibendazole. Thiabendazole was also tested but was inactive. We used the cytochalasin-blocked micronucleus assay with CHO-K1 cells according to OECD guidelines, and employed an automated micronucleus scoring system based on image analysis to establish quantitative concentration–response relationships for the seven active benzimidazoles. Based on this information, we predicted additive combination effects for a mixture of the seven benzimidazoles by using the concepts of concentration addition and independent action. The observed effects of the mixture agreed very well with those predicted by concentration addition. Independent action underestimated the observed combined effects by a large margin. With a mixture that combined all benzimidazoles at their estimated threshold concentrations for micronucleus induction, micronucleus frequencies of ~15.5% were observed, correctly anticipated by concentration addition. On the basis of independent action, this mixture was expected to produce no effects. Our data provide convincing evidence that concentration addition is applicable to combinations of benzimidazoles that form micronuclei by disrupting microtubule polymerisation. They present a rationale for grouping these chemicals together for the purpose of cumulative risk assessment. PMID:23547264

Management of a toxic cyanobacterium bloom (Planktothrix rubescens) affecting an Italian drinking water basin: a case study.

PubMed

Bogialli, Sara; Nigro di Gregorio, Federica; Lucentini, Luca; Ferretti, Emanuele; Ottaviani, Massimo; Ungaro, Nicola; Abis, Pier Paolo; Cannarozzi de Grazia, Matteo

2013-01-02

An extraordinary bloom of Planktothrix rubescens, which can produce microcystins (MCs), was observed in early 2009 in the Occhito basin, used even as a source of drinking water in Southern Italy. Several activities, coordinated by a task force, were implemented to assess and manage the risk associated to drinking water contaminated by cyanobacteria. Main actions were: evaluation of analytical protocols for screening and confirmatory purpose, monitoring the drinking water supply chain, training of operators, a dedicated web site for risk communication. ELISA assay was considered suitable for health authorities as screening method for MCs and to optimize frequency of sampling according to alert levels, and as internal control for the water supplier. A liquid chromatography-tandem mass spectrometric method able to quantify 9 MCs was optimized with the aim of supporting health authorities in a comprehensive risk evaluation based on the relative toxicity of different congeners. Short, medium, and long-term corrective actions were implemented to mitigate the health risk. Preoxidation with chlorine dioxide followed by flocculation and settling have been shown to be effective in removing MCs in the water treatment plant. Over two years, despite the high levels of cyanobacteria (up to 160 × 10(6) cells/L) and MCs (28.4 μg/L) initially reached in surface waters, the drinking water distribution was never limited.

Consistency of FMEA used in the validation of analytical procedures.

PubMed

Oldenhof, M T; van Leeuwen, J F; Nauta, M J; de Kaste, D; Odekerken-Rombouts, Y M C F; Vredenbregt, M J; Weda, M; Barends, D M

2011-02-20

In order to explore the consistency of the outcome of a Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) in the validation of analytical procedures, an FMEA was carried out by two different teams. The two teams applied two separate FMEAs to a High Performance Liquid Chromatography-Diode Array Detection-Mass Spectrometry (HPLC-DAD-MS) analytical procedure used in the quality control of medicines. Each team was free to define their own ranking scales for the probability of severity (S), occurrence (O), and detection (D) of failure modes. We calculated Risk Priority Numbers (RPNs) and we identified the failure modes above the 90th percentile of RPN values as failure modes needing urgent corrective action; failure modes falling between the 75th and 90th percentile of RPN values were identified as failure modes needing necessary corrective action, respectively. Team 1 and Team 2 identified five and six failure modes needing urgent corrective action respectively, with two being commonly identified. Of the failure modes needing necessary corrective actions, about a third were commonly identified by both teams. These results show inconsistency in the outcome of the FMEA. To improve consistency, we recommend that FMEA is always carried out under the supervision of an experienced FMEA-facilitator and that the FMEA team has at least two members with competence in the analytical method to be validated. However, the FMEAs of both teams contained valuable information that was not identified by the other team, indicating that this inconsistency is not always a drawback. Copyright © 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 127: Areas 25 and 26 Storage Tanks, Nevada Test Site, Nevada (Rev. No.: 0, August 2002)

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

NNSA /NV

This Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) contains the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Operations Offices's approach to collect the data necessary to evaluate corrective action alternatives appropriate for the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 127 under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Corrective Action Unit 127 is located on the Nevada Test Site approximately 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. This CAU is comprised of 12 Corrective Action Sites (CASs) located at Test Cell C; the Engine Maintenance, Assembly, and Disassembly (E-MAD) Facility; the X-Tunnel in Area 25; the Pluto Disassembly Facility; themore » Pluto Check Station; and the Port Gaston Training Facility in Area 26. These CASs include: CAS 25-01-05, Aboveground Storage Tank (AST); CAS 25-02-02, Underground Storage Tank (UST); CAS 25-23-11, Contaminated Materials; CAS 25-12-01, Boiler; CAS 25-01-06, AST; CAS 25-01-07, AST; CAS 25-02-13, UST; CAS 26- 01-01, Filter Tank (Rad) and Piping; CAS 26-01-02, Filter Tank (Rad); CAS 26-99-01, Radioactively Contaminated Filters; CAS 26-02-01, UST; CAS 26-23-01, Contaminated Liquids Spreader. Based on site history, process knowledge, and previous field efforts, contaminants of potential concern for CAU 127 include radionuclides, metals, total petroleum hydrocarbons, volatile organic compounds, asbestos, and polychlorinated biphenyls. Additionally, beryllium may be present at some locations. The sources of potential releases are varied, but releases of contaminated liquids may have occurred and may have migrated into and impacted soil below and surrounding storage vessels at some of the CASs. Also, at several CASs, asbestos-containing materials may be present on the aboveground structures and may be friable. Exposure pathways are limited to ingestion, inhalation, and dermal contact (adsorption) of soils/sediments or liquids, or inhalation of contaminants by site workers due to disturbance of contaminated materials. Future land-use scenarios limit subsequent uses of the CASs to various nonresidential (i.e., industrial) activities. Field activities will consist of radiological walkover and screening surveys, and field-screening and collecting of both tank content and soil samples, and further sample testing as appropriate. A two-step data quality objective strategy will be followed: (1) Phase I will be to collect environmental samples for laboratory analysis to confirm the presence or absence of contaminants at concentrations exceeding preliminary action levels; and (2) Phase II will be to collect additional environmental samples for laboratory analysis to determine the extent of contamination identified in Phase I. The results of this field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of corrective action alternatives in the corrective action decision document.« less

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 516: Septic Systems and Discharge Points, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Rev. 0, Including Record of Technical Change No. 1

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

None

This Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) contains the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Sites Office's (NNSA/NSO's) approach to collect the data necessary to evaluate corrective action alternatives appropriate for the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 516, Septic Systems and Discharge Points, Nevada Test Site (NTS), Nevada, under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. CAU 516 consists of six Corrective Action Sites: 03-59-01, Building 3C-36 Septic System; 03-59-02, Building 3C-45 Septic System; 06-51-01, Sump Piping, 06-51-02, Clay Pipe and Debris; 06-51-03, Clean Out Box and Piping; and 22-19-04, Vehicle Decontamination Area. Located in Areasmore » 3, 6, and 22 of the NTS, CAU 516 is being investigated because disposed waste may be present without appropriate controls, and hazardous and/or radioactive constituents may be present or migrating at concentrations and locations that could potentially pose a threat to human health and the environment. Existing information and process knowledge on the expected nature and extent of contamination of CAU 516 are insufficient to select preferred corrective action alternatives; therefore, additional information will be obtained by conducting a corrective action investigation. The results of this field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of corrective action alternatives in the corrective action decision document. Record of Technical Change No. 1 is dated 3/2004.« less

Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 560: Septic Systems, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Grant Evenson

2010-04-01

Corrective Action Unit 560 comprises seven corrective action sites (CASs): •03-51-01, Leach Pit •06-04-02, Septic Tank •06-05-03, Leach Pit •06-05-04, Leach Bed •06-59-03, Building CP-400 Septic System •06-59-04, Office Trailer Complex Sewage Pond •06-59-05, Control Point Septic System The purpose of this CADD/CR is to provide justification and documentation supporting the recommendation for closure of CAU 560 with no further corrective action. To achieve this, corrective action investigation (CAI) activities were performed from October 7, 2008, through February 24, 2010, as set forth in the Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 560: Septic Systems, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, and Recordmore » of Technical Change No. 1. The purpose of the CAI was to fulfill the following data needs as defined during the data quality objective (DQO) process: •Determine whether contaminants of concern (COCs) are present. •If COCs are present, determine their nature and extent. •Provide sufficient information and data to complete appropriate corrective actions. The CAU 560 dataset from the investigation results was evaluated based on the data quality indicator parameters. This evaluation demonstrated the quality and acceptability of the dataset for use in fulfilling the DQO data needs. Analytes detected during the CAI were evaluated against final action levels (FALs) established in this document. The following contaminants were determined to be present at concentrations exceeding their corresponding FALs: •No contamination exceeding the FALs was identified at CASs 03-51-01, 06-04-02, and 06-59-04. •The soil at the base of the leach pit chamber at CAS 06-05-03 contains arsenic above the FAL of 23 milligrams per kilogram (mg/kg) and polychlorinated biphenyl (PCBs) above the FAL of 0.74 mg/kg, confined vertically from a depth of approximately 5 to 20 feet (ft) below ground surface. The contamination is confined laterally to the walls of the leach pit chamber and leach rock. The contamination present at CAS 06-05-03 within the leach pit was not feasible to remove. •The surface and subsurface soils within and surrounding the septic system at CAS 06-05-04 contained PCB concentrations above the FAL of 0.74 mg/kg. The lateral and vertical extent of COCs was determined for this CAS. Contaminated soils were removed up to within 18 ft of the building. The remaining contamination is confined to subsurface soils adjacent to and beneath Building CP-162 and was not feasible to remove. •The solid materials within the septic tank and soils immediately surrounding the inlet end of the tank at CAS 06-59-03 contained benzo(a)pyrene above the FAL of 0.21 mg/kg. The soils, tank contents, and tank were removed. Materials remaining at this CAS do not contain contamination exceeding FALs. •The solids contained within the septic tank and inlet pipe at CAS 06-59-05 contained the following contaminants above their respective FALs: PCBs, arsenic, lead, benzo(a)pyrene, and pesticides. The tank and inlet pipe contents were removed. Materials remaining at this CAS do not contain contamination exceeding FALs. Therefore, the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) provides the following corrective action recommendations: •No further action for CASs 03-51-01, 06-04-02, and 06-59-04, as no contaminants of potential concern were present that exceed FALs. •Closure in place for CAS 06-05-03 under a corrective action with a use restriction (UR) for remaining PCB- and arsenic-impacted potential source material (PSM). The UR form and map have been filed in the NNSA/NSO Facility Information Management System, the FFACO database, and NNSA/NSO CAU/CAS files. •Closure in place for CAS 06-05-04 under a corrective action with a UR for remaining PCBs in soil adjacent to and beneath Building CP-162. The UR form and map have been filed in the NNSA/NSO Facility Information Management System, the FFACO database, and NNSA/NSO CAU/CAS files. •No further action for CAS 06-59-03, as the COC of benzo(a)pyrene in soil and PSM have been removed. •No further action for CAS 06-59-05, as the COCs in PSM within the septic tank and inlet piping have been removed and the tank was filled with concrete.« less

Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 478: Area 12 T-Tunnel Ponds, Nevada Test Site

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

NSTec Environmental Restoration

This Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD)/Closure Report (CR) was prepared by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 478, Area 12 T-Tunnel Ponds. This CADD/CR is consistent with the requirements of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) agreed to by the State of Nevada, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), and the U.S. Department of Defense. Corrective Action Unit 478 is comprised of one corrective action site (CAS): • 12-23-01, Ponds (5) RAD Area The purpose of this CADD/CR is to provide justification and documentation supporting the recommendation for closure in place with usemore » restrictions for CAU 478.« less

Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 559: T Tunnel Compressor/Blower Pad, Nevada Test Site

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

NSTec Environmental Restoration

This Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD)/Closure Report (CR) was prepared by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 559, T-Tunnel Compressor/Blower Pad. This CADD/CR is consistent with the requirements of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) agreed to by the State of Nevada, the U.S. Department of Energy, and the U.S. Department of Defense. Corrective Action Unit 559 is comprised of one Corrective Action Site (CAS): • 12-25-13, Oil Stained Soil and Concrete The purpose of this CADD/CR is to provide justification and documentation supporting the recommendation for closure in place with use restrictionsmore » for CAU 559.« less

Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration Plan for Corrective Action Unit 574: Neptune, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

NSTec Environmental Restoration

2011-08-31

This Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan identifies the activities required for closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 574, Neptune. CAU 574 is included in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (1996 [as amended March 2010]) and consists of the following two Corrective Action Sites (CASs) located in Area 12 of the Nevada National Security Site: (1) CAS 12-23-10, U12c.03 Crater (Neptune); (2) CAS 12-45-01, U12e.05 Crater (Blanca). This plan provides the methodology for the field activities that will be performed to gather the necessary information for closure of the two CASs. There is sufficient information andmore » process knowledge regarding the expected nature and extent of potential contaminants to recommend closure of CAU 574 using the SAFER process. Based on historical documentation, personnel interviews, site process knowledge, site visits, photographs, field screening, analytical results, the results of the data quality objective (DQO) process (Section 3.0), and an evaluation of corrective action alternatives (Appendix B), closure in place with administrative controls is the expected closure strategy for CAU 574. Additional information will be obtained by conducting a field investigation to verify and support the expected closure strategy and provide a defensible recommendation that no further corrective action is necessary. This will be presented in a Closure Report that will be prepared and submitted to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) for review and approval.« less

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks, Department of Education. Performance and Accountability Series.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Comptroller General of the U.S., Washington, DC.

This report addresses the major performance and management challenges that have limited the effectiveness of the Department of Education in carrying out its mission. The booklet addresses corrective actions that Education has taken or initiated on these challenges--including a number of management initiatives to improve controls over the…

The Psychodrama-Social Dramatics Separation.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Klepac, Richard L.

Social dramatics is a therapeutic and educational program that can act as a mirror to reflect images of the self in action with others. It is the modality for experiential learning to correct social dysfunction by providing models for imitation, opportunities to practice and develop individual forms from that model, and risk free environments for…

78 FR 9915 - Agency Information Collection Activities: Submission for OMB Review; Comment Request; Basel II...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-02-12

... effort to reduce paperwork and respondent burden, invites the general public and other Federal agencies... on the proposal. The FDIC hereby gives notice of its plan to submit to OMB a request to approve... Corrective Action (77 FR 52792); Regulatory Capital Rules: Standardized Approach for Risk-Weighted Assets...

76 FR 45262 - Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposed Collection; Comment Request; Current Good...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-07-28

... blood and blood components notify donors who have reactive test results for HIV, Hepatitis B Virus (HBV... who are at increased risk for transmitting human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) or hepatitis C virus... require immediate corrective action. Under the reporting requirements, Sec. 606.170(b), in brief, requires...

9 CFR 416.15 - Corrective Actions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 9 Animals and Animal Products 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Corrective Actions. 416.15 Section 416... SANITATION § 416.15 Corrective Actions. (a) Each official establishment shall take appropriate corrective... the procedures specified therein, or the implementation or maintenance of the Sanitation SOP's, may...

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 151: Septic Systems and Discharge Area, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Rev. No.: 0

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

David A. Strand

2004-06-01

This Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) contains project-specific information for conducting site investigation activities at Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 151: Septic Systems and Discharge Area, Nevada Test Site, Nevada. Information presented in this CAIP includes facility descriptions, environmental sample collection objectives, and criteria for the selection and evaluation of environmental corrective action alternatives. Corrective Action Unit 151 is located in Areas 2, 12, 18, and 20 of the Nevada Test Site, which is 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. Corrective Action Unit 151 is comprised of the nine Corrective Action Sites (CAS) listed below: (1) 02-05-01, UE-2ce Pond; (2)more » 12-03-01, Sewage Lagoons (6); (3) 12-04-01, Septic Tanks; (4) 12-04-02, Septic Tanks; (5) 12-04-03, Septic Tank; (6) 12-47-01, Wastewater Pond; (7) 18-03-01, Sewage Lagoon; (8) 18-99-09, Sewer Line (Exposed); and (9) 20-19-02, Photochemical Drain. The CASs within CAU 151 are discharge and collection systems. Corrective Action Site 02-05-01 is located in Area 2 and is a well-water collection pond used as a part of the Nash test. Corrective Action Sites 12-03-01, 12-04-01, 12-04-02, 12-04-03, and 12-47-01 are located in Area 12 and are comprised of sewage lagoons, septic tanks, associated piping, and two sumps. The features are a part of the Area 12 Camp housing and administrative septic systems. Corrective Action Sites 18-03-01 and 18-99-09 are located in the Area 17 Camp in Area 18. These sites are sewage lagoons and associated piping. The origin and terminus of CAS 18-99-09 are unknown; however, the type and configuration of the pipe indicates that it may be a part of the septic systems in Area 18. Corrective Action Site 20-19-02 is located in the Area 20 Camp. This site is comprised of a surface discharge of photoprocessing chemicals.« less

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 375: Area 30 Buggy Unit Craters, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Patrick Matthews

2010-03-01

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 375 is located in Areas 25 and 30 of the Nevada Test Site, which is approximately 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. Corrective Action Unit 375 comprises the two corrective action sites (CASs) listed below: • 25-23-22, Contaminated Soils Site • 30-45-01, U-30a, b, c, d, e Craters Existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination present at the CAU 375 CASs is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives (CAAs). This document details an investigation plan that will provide for the gathering of sufficient information to evaluate and recommend CAAs. Correctivemore » Action Site 25-23-22 is composed of the releases associated with nuclear rocket testing at Test Cell A (TCA). Test Cell A was used to test and develop nuclear rocket motors as part of the Nuclear Rocket Development Station from its construction in 1958 until 1966, when rocket testing began being conducted at Test Cell C. The rocket motors were built with an unshielded nuclear reactor that produced as much as 1,100 kilowatts (at full power) to heat liquid hydrogen to 4,000 degrees Fahrenheit, at which time the expanded gases were focused out a nozzle to produce thrust. The fuel rods in the reactor were not clad and were designed to release fission fragments to the atmosphere, but due to vibrations and loss of cooling during some operational tests, fuel fragments in excess of planned releases became entrained in the exhaust and spread in the immediate surrounding area. Cleanup efforts have been undertaken at times to collect the fuel rod fragments and other contamination. Previous environmental investigations in the TCA area have resulted in the creation of a number of use restrictions. The industrial area of TCA is encompassed by a fence and is currently posted as a radioactive material area. Corrective Action Site 30-45-01 (releases associated with the Buggy Plowshare test) is located in Area 30 on Chukar Mesa. It was a Plowshare test where five nuclear devices were buried 140 feet (ft) deep in a row at 150-ft intervals. These devices were detonated on March 12, 1968, to produce a trench 254 ft wide, 865 ft long, and 70 ft deep. The mesa where the test was conducted is surrounded on three sides by ravines, and the entire end of the mesa is fenced and posted as a contamination area. These sites are being investigated because existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend CAAs. Additional information will be obtained by conducting a corrective action investigation before evaluating CAAs and selecting the appropriate corrective action for each CAS. The results of the field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of viable CAAs that will be presented in the Corrective Action Decision Document. The sites will be investigated based on the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed on December 2, 2009, by representatives of the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office. The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to develop and evaluate appropriate corrective actions for CAU 375.« less

Documents Pertaining to Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Corrective Action Event Codes

EPA Pesticide Factsheets

Document containing RCRA Corrective Action event codes and definitions, including national requirements, initiating sources, dates, and guidance, from the first facility assessment until the Corrective Action is terminated.

40 CFR 258.58 - Implementation of the corrective action program.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-07-01

... WASTES CRITERIA FOR MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE LANDFILLS Ground-Water Monitoring and Corrective Action § 258... implement a corrective action ground-water monitoring program that: (i) At a minimum, meet the requirements of an assessment monitoring program under § 258.55; (ii) Indicate the effectiveness of the corrective...

Performing a preliminary hazard analysis applied to administration of injectable drugs to infants.

PubMed

Hfaiedh, Nadia; Kabiche, Sofiane; Delescluse, Catherine; Balde, Issa-Bella; Merlin, Sophie; Carret, Sandra; de Pontual, Loïc; Fontan, Jean-Eudes; Schlatter, Joël

2017-08-01

Errors in hospitals during the preparation and administration of intravenous drugs to infants and children have been reported to a rate of 13% to 84%. This study aimed to investigate the potential for hazardous events that may lead to an accident for preparation and administration of drug injection in a pediatric department and to describe a reduction plan of risks. The preliminary hazard analysis (PHA) method was implemented by a multidisciplinary working group over a period of 5 months (April-August 2014) in infants aged from 28 days to 2 years. The group identified required hazard controls and follow-up actions to reduce the error risk. To analyze the results, the STATCART APR software was used. During the analysis, 34 hazardous situations were identified, among 17 were quoted very critical and drawn 69 risk scenarios. After follow-up actions, the scenarios with unacceptable risk declined from 17.4% to 0%, and these with acceptable under control from 46.4% to 43.5%. The PHA can be used as an aid in the prioritization of corrective actions and the implementation of control measures to reduce risk. The PHA is a complement of the a posteriori risk management already exists. © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Apollo experience report: Problem reporting and corrective action system

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Adams, T. J.

1974-01-01

The Apollo spacecraft Problem Reporting and Corrective Action System is presented. The evolution from the early system to the present day system is described. The deficiencies and the actions taken to correct them are noted, as are management controls for both the contractor and NASA. Significant experience gained from the Apollo Problem Reporting and Corrective Action System that may be applicable to future manned spacecraft is presented.

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 576: Miscellaneous Radiological Sites and Debris Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 0

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Matthews, Patrick

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 576 is located in Areas 2, 3, 5, 8, and 9 of the Nevada National Security Site, which is approximately 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. CAU 576 is a grouping of sites where there has been a suspected release of contamination associated with nuclear testing. This document describes the planned investigation of CAU 576, which comprises the following corrective action sites (CASs): 00-99-01, Potential Source Material; 02-99-12, U-2af (Kennebec) Surface Rad-Chem Piping; 03-99-20, Area 3 Subsurface Rad-Chem Piping; 05-19-04, Frenchman Flat Rad Waste Dump ; 09-99-08, U-9x (Allegheny) Subsurface Rad-Chem Piping; 09-99-09, U-9its u24more » (Avens-Alkermes) Surface Contaminated Flex Line These sites are being investigated because existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives (CAAs). Additional information will be obtained by conducting a corrective action investigation before evaluating CAAs and selecting the appropriate corrective action for each CAS. The results of the field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of viable CAAs that will be presented in the Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD).« less

Knowledge about breast cancer and hereditary breast cancer among nurses in a public hospital 1

PubMed Central

Prolla, Carmen Maria Dornelles; da Silva, Patrícia Santos; Netto, Cristina Brinckmann Oliveira; Goldim, José Roberto; Ashton-Prolla, Patricia

2015-01-01

OBJECTIVE: To assess the knowledge of nurses involved in the care of oncology patients in a public university hospital, regarding breast cancer and hereditary breast cancer, and to verify the use of such knowledge in their daily practice. METHODS: This is a descriptive cross-sectional study. Data were obtained through a structured, self-administered questionnaire. Out of 154 nurses, 137 (88.9%) agreed to participate in the study. Two questionnaires were excluded such that 135 questionnaires were analyzed. RESULTS: The global percentage of correct answers was not associated with age (p=0.173) or degree/specialization (p=0.815). Questions were classified into categories. In categories involving knowledge of established breast cancer risk factors and indicators of hereditary breast cancer, the rate of correct answers was 65.8% and 66.4%, respectively. On the practice of genetic counseling, 40.7% of those interviewed were not sure about the definition of genetic counseling and 78.5% reported never having identified or referred a patient at genetic risk for specialized risk assessment. Practice of educational actions regarding this subject was reported by 48.5% of those interviewed. CONCLUSION: This study reinforces the need to develop qualifying actions for nurses, so that strategies to control breast cancer become effective in their health care practice. PMID:25806636

Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action 405: Area 3 Septic Systems, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada Rev. No.: 0, April 2002

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

IT Coroporation, Las Vegas, NV

2002-04-17

This Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report (CADD/CR) has been prepared for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 405, Area 3 Septic Systems, in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Located on the Tonopah Test Range (TTR) approximately 235 miles north of Las Vegas, Nevada, CAU 405 consists of three Corrective Action Sites (CASs): 03-05-002-SW03, Septic Waste System (aka: Septic Waste System [SWS] 3); 03-05-002-SW04, Septic Waste System (aka: SWS 4); 03-05-002-SW07, Septic Waste System (aka: SWS 7). The CADD and CR have been combined into one report because no further action is recommended for this CAU, and this reportmore » provides specific information necessary to support this recommendation. The CAU consists of three leachfields and associated collection systems that were installed in or near Area 3 for wastewater disposal. These systems were used until a consolidated sewer system was installed in 1990. Historically, operations within various buildin gs in and near Area 3 of the TTR generated sanitary and industrial wastewaters. There is a potential that contaminants of concern (COCs) were present in the wastewaters and were disposed of in septic tanks and leachfields. The justification for closure of this CAU without further action is based on process knowledge and the results of the investigative activities. Closure activities were performed at these CASs between January 14 and February 2, 2002, and included the removal and proper disposal of media containing regulated constituents and proper closure of septic tanks. No further action is appropriate because all necessary activities have been completed. No use restrictions are required to be imposed for these sites since the investigation showed no evidence of COCs identified in the soil for CAU 405.« less

40 CFR 258.73 - Financial assurance for corrective action.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-07-01

... action. 258.73 Section 258.73 Protection of Environment ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (CONTINUED) SOLID... the cost of hiring a third party to perform the corrective action in accordance with the program required under § 258.58 of this part. The corrective action cost estimate must account for the total costs...

40 CFR 258.73 - Financial assurance for corrective action.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... action. 258.73 Section 258.73 Protection of Environment ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (CONTINUED) SOLID... the cost of hiring a third party to perform the corrective action in accordance with the program required under § 258.58 of this part. The corrective action cost estimate must account for the total costs...

Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 570: Area 9 Yucca Flat Atmospheric Test Sites, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 0

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Matthews, Patrick

2013-11-01

This Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report presents information supporting the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 570: Area 9 Yucca Flat Atmospheric Test Sites, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada. This complies with the requirements of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada; U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management; U.S. Department of Defense; and DOE, Legacy Management. The purpose of the CADD/CR is to provide justification and documentation supporting the recommendation that no further corrective action is needed.

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 563: Septic Systems, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

NSTec Environmental Restoration

2010-02-28

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 563 is identified in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) as “Septic Systems” and consists of the following four Corrective Action Sites (CASs), located in Areas 3 and 12 of the Nevada Test Site: · CAS 03-04-02, Area 3 Subdock Septic Tank · CAS 03-59-05, Area 3 Subdock Cesspool · CAS 12-59-01, Drilling/Welding Shop Septic Tanks · CAS 12-60-01, Drilling/Welding Shop Outfalls Closure activities were conducted from September to November 2009 in accordance with the FFACO (1996, as amended February 2008) and the Corrective Action Plan for CAU 563. The corrective action alternatives includedmore » No Further Action and Clean Closure.« less

4 CFR 28.131 - Corrective action proceedings.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... Accounts GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE GENERAL PROCEDURES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE PERSONNEL APPEALS BOARD; PROCEDURES APPLICABLE TO CLAIMS CONCERNING EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES AT THE GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE Corrective Action, Disciplinary and Stay Proceedings § 28.131 Corrective action proceedings...

Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 383: Area E-Tunnel Sites, Nevada Test Site

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

NSTec Environmental Restoration

This Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report (CADD/CR) was prepared by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 383, Area 12 E-Tunnel Sites, which is the joint responsibility of DTRA and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO). This CADD/CR is consistent with the requirements of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) agreed to by the State of Nevada, the DOE, and the U.S. Department of Defense. Corrective Action Unit 383 is comprised of three Corrective Action Sites (CASs) and two adjacent areas: • CAS 12-06-06, Muckpile •more » CAS 12-25-02, Oil Spill • CAS 12-28-02, Radioactive Material • Drainage below the Muckpile • Ponds 1, 2, and 3 The purpose of this CADD/CR is to provide justification and documentation to support the recommendation for closure with no further corrective action, by placing use restrictions at the three CASs and two adjacent areas of CAU 383.« less

Failure mode and effect analysis: improving intensive care unit risk management processes.

PubMed

Askari, Roohollah; Shafii, Milad; Rafiei, Sima; Abolhassani, Mohammad Sadegh; Salarikhah, Elaheh

2017-04-18

Purpose Failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) is a practical tool to evaluate risks, discover failures in a proactive manner and propose corrective actions to reduce or eliminate potential risks. The purpose of this paper is to apply FMEA technique to examine the hazards associated with the process of service delivery in intensive care unit (ICU) of a tertiary hospital in Yazd, Iran. Design/methodology/approach This was a before-after study conducted between March 2013 and December 2014. By forming a FMEA team, all potential hazards associated with ICU services - their frequency and severity - were identified. Then risk priority number was calculated for each activity as an indicator representing high priority areas that need special attention and resource allocation. Findings Eight failure modes with highest priority scores including endotracheal tube defect, wrong placement of endotracheal tube, EVD interface, aspiration failure during suctioning, chest tube failure, tissue injury and deep vein thrombosis were selected for improvement. Findings affirmed that improvement strategies were generally satisfying and significantly decreased total failures. Practical implications Application of FMEA in ICUs proved to be effective in proactively decreasing the risk of failures and corrected the control measures up to acceptable levels in all eight areas of function. Originality/value Using a prospective risk assessment approach, such as FMEA, could be beneficial in dealing with potential failures through proposing preventive actions in a proactive manner. The method could be used as a tool for healthcare continuous quality improvement so that the method identifies both systemic and human errors, and offers practical advice to deal effectively with them.

34 CFR 200.49 - SEA responsibilities for school improvement, corrective action, and restructuring.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... 34 Education 1 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false SEA responsibilities for school improvement, corrective... Agencies Lea and School Improvement § 200.49 SEA responsibilities for school improvement, corrective action... subject to corrective action on January 7, 2002, the SEA must ensure that the LEA for that school provides...

77 FR 48168 - Correction for Notice of Realty Action; Recreation and Public Purposes Act Classification...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2012-08-13

... DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR Bureau of Land Management [LLCAD09000.L14300000.ES0000; CACA- 051457] Correction for Notice of Realty Action; Recreation and Public Purposes Act Classification; California AGENCY: Bureau of Land Management, Interior. ACTION: Correction SUMMARY: This notice corrects a Notice of Realty...

Corrective Action Sites around the Nation

EPA Pesticide Factsheets

Provide info to the public/community orgs, local officials & consultants on nearby corrective action cleanups, the status of the cleanup and future plans. Links to the Natl Corrective Action, Cleanups in My Community & Cleaning Up Our Land, Water & Air

16 CFR 1209.37 - Corrective actions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... Commercial Practices CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY ACT REGULATIONS INTERIM SAFETY STANDARD FOR CELLULOSE INSULATION Certification § 1209.37 Corrective actions. (a) Test failure... insulation product itself. Corrective action may consist of equipment adjustment, equipment repair, equipment...

Proposed Tier 2 Screening Criteria and Tier 3 Field Procedures for Evaluation of Vapor Intrusion (ESTCP Cost and Performance Report)

DTIC Science & Technology

2012-08-01

Interstate Technology & Regulatory Council, Washington, DC, Copyright 2007. McHugh T.E., D.E. Hammond, T. Nickels , and B. Hartman. 2008. Use of...based corrective action have realized significant cost savings for their corrective action programs (Connor and McHugh , 2002). As described above...Groundwater (Tier 2) VOCs USEPA 8260B 40 mL VOA vial HCl 14 days Vapor (Tier 2 and Tier 3) Radon McHugh et al., 2008 500 mL Tedlar bag None 14

42 CFR 431.992 - Corrective action plan.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... CMS, designed to reduce improper payments in each program based on its analysis of the error causes in... State must take the following actions: (1) Data analysis. States must conduct data analysis such as reviewing clusters of errors, general error causes, characteristics, and frequency of errors that are...

42 CFR 431.992 - Corrective action plan.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-10-01

... CMS, designed to reduce improper payments in each program based on its analysis of the error causes in... State must take the following actions: (1) Data analysis. States must conduct data analysis such as reviewing clusters of errors, general error causes, characteristics, and frequency of errors that are...

Corrective Action Glossary

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Not Available

1992-07-01

The glossary of technical terms was prepared to facilitate the use of the Corrective Action Plan (CAP) issued by OSWER on November 14, 1986. The CAP presents model scopes of work for all phases of a corrective action program, including the RCRA Facility Investigation (RFI), Corrective Measures Study (CMS), Corrective Measures Implementation (CMI), and interim measures. The Corrective Action Glossary includes brief definitions of the technical terms used in the CAP and explains how they are used. In addition, expected ranges (where applicable) are provided. Parameters or terms not discussed in the CAP, but commonly associated with site investigations ormore » remediations are also included.« less

Phase I Hydrologic Data for the Groundwater Flow and Contaminant Transport Model of Corrective Action Unit 97: Yucca Flat/Climax Mine, Nevada Test Site, Nye County, Nevada, Rev. No.: 0

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

John McCord

2006-06-01

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) initiated the Underground Test Area (UGTA) Project to assess and evaluate the effects of the underground nuclear weapons tests on groundwater beneath the Nevada Test Site (NTS) and vicinity. The framework for this evaluation is provided in Appendix VI, Revision No. 1 (December 7, 2000) of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO, 1996). Section 3.0 of Appendix VI ''Corrective Action Strategy'' of the FFACO describes the process that will be used to complete corrective actions specifically for the UGTA Project. The objective of themore » UGTA corrective action strategy is to define contaminant boundaries for each UGTA corrective action unit (CAU) where groundwater may have become contaminated from the underground nuclear weapons tests. The contaminant boundaries are determined based on modeling of groundwater flow and contaminant transport. A summary of the FFACO corrective action process and the UGTA corrective action strategy is provided in Section 1.5. The FFACO (1996) corrective action process for the Yucca Flat/Climax Mine CAU 97 was initiated with the Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) (DOE/NV, 2000a). The CAIP included a review of existing data on the CAU and proposed a set of data collection activities to collect additional characterization data. These recommendations were based on a value of information analysis (VOIA) (IT, 1999), which evaluated the value of different possible data collection activities, with respect to reduction in uncertainty of the contaminant boundary, through simplified transport modeling. The Yucca Flat/Climax Mine CAIP identifies a three-step model development process to evaluate the impact of underground nuclear testing on groundwater to determine a contaminant boundary (DOE/NV, 2000a). The three steps are as follows: (1) Data compilation and analysis that provides the necessary modeling data that is completed in two parts: the first addressing the groundwater flow model, and the second the transport model. (2) Development of a groundwater flow model. (3) Development of a groundwater transport model. This report presents the results of the first part of the first step, documenting the data compilation, evaluation, and analysis for the groundwater flow model. The second part, documentation of transport model data will be the subject of a separate report. The purpose of this document is to present the compilation and evaluation of the available hydrologic data and information relevant to the development of the Yucca Flat/Climax Mine CAU groundwater flow model, which is a fundamental tool in the prediction of the extent of contaminant migration. Where appropriate, data and information documented elsewhere are summarized with reference to the complete documentation. The specific task objectives for hydrologic data documentation are as follows: (1) Identify and compile available hydrologic data and supporting information required to develop and validate the groundwater flow model for the Yucca Flat/Climax Mine CAU. (2) Assess the quality of the data and associated documentation, and assign qualifiers to denote levels of quality. (3) Analyze the data to derive expected values or spatial distributions and estimates of the associated uncertainty and variability.« less

Corrective Action Plan for Corrective Action Unit 562: Waste Systems, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

NSTec Environmental Restoration

2011-04-30

This Corrective Action Plan has been prepared for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 562, Waste Systems, in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (1996; as amended March 2010). CAU 562 consists of 13 Corrective Action Sites (CASs) located in Areas 2, 23, and 25 of the Nevada National Security Site. Site characterization activities were performed in 2009 and 2010, and the results are presented in Appendix A of the Corrective Action Decision Document for CAU 562. The scope of work required to implement the recommended closure alternatives is summarized. (1) CAS 02-26-11, Lead Shot, will be clean closedmore » by removing shot. (2) CAS 02-44-02, Paint Spills and French Drain, will be clean closed by removing paint and contaminated soil. As a best management practice (BMP), asbestos tile will be removed. (3) CAS 02-59-01, Septic System, will be clean closed by removing septic tank contents. As a BMP, the septic tank will be removed. (4) CAS 02-60-01, Concrete Drain, contains no contaminants of concern (COCs) above action levels. No further action is required; however, as a BMP, the concrete drain will be removed. (5) CAS 02-60-02, French Drain, was clean closed. Corrective actions were completed during corrective action investigation activities. As a BMP, the drain grates and drain pipe will be removed. (6) CAS 02-60-03, Steam Cleaning Drain, will be clean closed by removing contaminated soil. As a BMP, the steam cleaning sump grate and outfall pipe will be removed. (7) CAS 02-60-04, French Drain, was clean closed. Corrective actions were completed during corrective action investigation activities. (8) CAS 02-60-05, French Drain, will be clean closed by removing contaminated soil. (9) CAS 02-60-06, French Drain, contains no COCs above action levels. No further action is required. (10) CAS 02-60-07, French Drain, requires no further action. The french drain identified in historical documentation was not located during corrective action investigation activities. (11) CAS 23-60-01, Mud Trap Drain and Outfall, will be clean closed by removing sediment from the mud trap. As a BMP, the mud trap and outfall pipe will be removed. (12) CAS 23-99-06, Grease Trap, will be clean closed by removing sediment from the grease trap and backfilling the grease trap with grout. (13) CAS 25-60-04, Building 3123 Outfalls, will be clean closed by removing contaminated soil and the sludge-containing outfall pipe.« less

DOUBLE TRACKS Test Site interim corrective action plan

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

NONE

The DOUBLE TRACKS site is located on Range 71 north of the Nellis Air Force Range, northwest of the Nevada Test Site (NTS). DOUBLE TRACKS was the first of four experiments that constituted Operation ROLLER COASTER. On May 15, 1963, weapons-grade plutonium and depleted uranium were dispersed using 54 kilograms of trinitrotoluene (TNT) explosive. The explosion occurred in the open, 0.3 m above the steel plate. No fission yield was detected from the test, and the total amount of plutonium deposited on the ground surface was estimated to be between 980 and 1,600 grams. The test device was composed primarilymore » of uranium-238 and plutonium-239. The mass ratio of uranium to plutonium was 4.35. The objective of the corrective action is to reduce the potential risk to human health and the environment and to demonstrate technically viable and cost-effective excavation, transportation, and disposal. To achieve these objectives, Bechtel Nevada (BN) will remove soil with a total transuranic activity greater then 200 pCI/g, containerize the soil in ``supersacks,`` transport the filled ``supersacks`` to the NTS, and dispose of them in the Area 3 Radioactive Waste Management Site. During this interim corrective action, BN will also conduct a limited demonstration of an alternative method for excavation of radioactive near-surface soil contamination.« less

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 214: Bunkers and Storage Areas Nevada Test Site, Nevada: Revision 0, Including Record of Technical Change No. 1 and No. 2

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office

This Corrective Action Investigation Plan contains the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office's approach to collect the data necessary to evaluate corrective action alternatives appropriate for the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 214 under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Located in Areas 5, 11, and 25 of the Nevada Test Site, CAU 214 consists of nine Corrective Action Sites (CASs): 05-99-01, Fallout Shelters; 11-22-03, Drum; 25-99-12, Fly Ash Storage; 25-23-01, Contaminated Materials; 25-23-19, Radioactive Material Storage; 25-99-18, Storage Area; 25-34-03, Motor Dr/Gr Assembly (Bunker); 25-34-04, Motor Dr/Gr Assembly (Bunker); and 25-34-05, Motormore » Dr/Gr Assembly (Bunker). These sites are being investigated because existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives (CAAs). The suspected contaminants and critical analyte s for CAU 214 include oil (total petroleum hydrocarbons-diesel-range organics [TPH-DRO], polychlorinated biphenyls [PCBs]), pesticides (chlordane, heptachlor, 4,4-DDT), barium, cadmium, chronium, lubricants (TPH-DRO, TPH-gasoline-range organics [GRO]), and fly ash (arsenic). The land-use zones where CAU 214 CASs are located dictate that future land uses will be limited to nonresidential (i.e., industrial) activities. The results of this field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of viable corrective action alternatives that will be presented in the corrective action decision document.« less

75 FR 29803 - Agency Information Collection Activity Seeking OMB Approval

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-05-27

... action to correct unsafe conditions in aircraft, engines, propellers, and appliances. Reports of... issued to require correct corrective action to correct unsafe conditions in aircraft, engines, propellers...

One-loop light-cone QCD, effective action for reggeized gluons and QCD RFT calculus

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Bondarenko, S.; Lipatov, L.; Pozdnyakov, S.; Prygarin, A.

2017-09-01

The effective action for reggeized gluons is based on the gluodynamic Yang-Mills Lagrangian with external current for longitudinal gluons added, see Lipatov (Nucl Phys B 452:369, 1995; Phys Rep 286:131, 1997; Subnucl Ser 49:131, 2013; Int J Mod Phys Conf Ser 39:1560082, 2015; Int J Mod Phys A 31(28/29):1645011, 2016; EPJ Web Conf 125:01010, 2016). On the base of classical solutions, obtained in Bondarenko et al. (Eur Phys J C 77(8):527, 2017), the one-loop corrections to this effective action in light-cone gauge are calculated. The RFT calculus for reggeized gluons similarly to the RFT introduced in Gribov (Sov Phys JETP 26:414, 1968) is proposed and discussed. The correctness of the results is verified by calculation of the propagators of A+ and A- reggeized gluons fields and application of the obtained results is discussed as well.

Evaluation of Corrective Action Team (CAT) Leader Training in Aeronautical Systems Division

DTIC Science & Technology

1991-09-01

00A DI EVALUATION OF CORRECTIVE ACTION TEAM ( CAT ) LEADER TRAINING IN AERONAUTICAL SYSTEMS DIVISION CA THESIS Kirk J. Streitrater, Captain, USAF AFIT...EVALUATION OF CORRECTIVE ACTION TEAM ( CAT ) LEADER TRAINING IN AERONAUTICAL SYSTEMS DIVISION THESIS Kirk J. Streitmater, Captain, USAF AFIT/GSM/LSR/91S-25...8217, , C- s :C AFIT/GSM/LSR/91S-25 EVALUATION OF CORRECTIVE ACTION TEAM ( CAT ) LEADER TRAINING IN AERONAUTICAL SYSTEMS DIVISION THESIS Presented to the

40 CFR 147.2914 - Corrective action for wells authorized by rule.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... potential endangerment of an USDW, then action as described in paragraph (a) (1) or (2) of this section must... 40 Protection of Environment 22 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Corrective action for wells authorized... PROGRAMS Osage Mineral Reserve-Class II Wells § 147.2914 Corrective action for wells authorized by rule...

Installation Restoration Program. Phase II: Stage 1 Problem Confirmation Study, Duluth International Airport, Duluth, Minnesota.

DTIC Science & Technology

1984-10-01

8 iii "i t-. Table of Contents (cont.) Section Title Page -APPENDIX A Acronyms, Definitions, Nomenclature and Units of Measure B Scope of Work, Task...Identification/Records Search Phase II - Problem Confirmation and Quantification Phase III - Technology Base Development Phase IV - Corrective Action Only...Problem Identification/Records Search Phase II - Problem Confirmation and Quantification Phase III - Technology Base Development Phase IV - Corrective

Extractive waste management: A risk analysis approach.

PubMed

Mehta, Neha; Dino, Giovanna Antonella; Ajmone-Marsan, Franco; Lasagna, Manuela; Romè, Chiara; De Luca, Domenico Antonio

2018-05-01

Abandoned mine sites continue to present serious environmental hazards because the heavy metals associated with extractive waste are continuously released into the environment, where they threaten human life and the environment. Remediating and securing extractive waste are complex, lengthy and costly processes. Thus, in most European countries, a site is considered for intervention when it poses a risk to human health and the surrounding environment. As a consequence, risk analysis presents a viable decisional approach towards the management of extractive waste. To evaluate the effects posed by extractive waste to human health and groundwater, a risk analysis approach was used for an abandoned nickel extraction site in Campello Monti in North Italy. This site is located in the Southern Italian Alps. The area consists of large and voluminous mafic rocks intruded by mantle peridotite. The mining activities in this area have generated extractive waste. A risk analysis of the site was performed using Risk Based Corrective Action (RBCA) guidelines, considering the properties of extractive waste and water for the properties of environmental matrices. The results showed the presence of carcinogenic risk due to arsenic and risks to groundwater due to nickel. The results of the risk analysis form a basic understanding of the current situation at the site, which is affected by extractive waste. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 527: Horn Silver Mine, Nevada Test Site, Nevada: Revision 1 (Including Records of Technical Change No.1, 2, 3, and 4)

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Operations Office

This Corrective Action Investigation Plan contains the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Operations Office's approach to collect the data necessary to evaluate corrective action alternatives appropriate for the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 527, Horn Silver Mine, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Corrective Action Unit 527 consists of one Corrective Action Site (CAS): 26-20-01, Contaminated Waste Dump No.1. The site is located in an abandoned mine site in Area 26 (which is the most arid part of the NTS) approximately 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas. Historicalmore » documents may refer to this site as CAU 168, CWD-1, the Wingfield mine (or shaft), and the Wahmonie mine (or shaft). Historical documentation indicates that between 1959 and the 1970s, nonliquid classified material and unclassified waste was placed in the Horn Silver Mine's shaft. Some of the waste is known to be radioactive. Documentation indicates that the waste is present from 150 feet to the bottom of the mine (500 ft below ground surface). This CAU is being investigated because hazardous constituents migrating from materials and/or wastes disposed of in the Horn Silver Mine may pose a threat to human health and the environment as well as to assess the potential impacts associated with any potential releases from the waste. The results of this field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of corrective action alternatives in the corrective action decision document.« less

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 224: Decon Pad and Septic Systems Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Rev. No.: 0, with ROTC 1 and 2

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

David A. Strand

This Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) contains project-specific information including facility descriptions, environmental sample collection objectives, and criteria for conducting site investigation activities at Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 224: Decon Pad and Septic Systems, Nevada Test Site (NTS), Nevada. This CAIP has been developed in accordance with the ''Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order'' (FFACO) (1996) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), and the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). The NTS is approximately 65 miles (mi) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada (Figure 1-1). Corrective Action Unit 224 is comprised of themore » nine Corrective Action Sites (CASs) listed below: 02-04-01, Septic Tank (Buried); 03-05-01, Leachfield; 05-04-01, Septic Tanks (4)/Discharge Area; 06-03-01, Sewage Lagoons (3); 06-05-01, Leachfield; 06-17-04, Decon Pad and Wastewater Catch; 06-23-01, Decon Pad Discharge Piping; 11-04-01, Sewage Lagoon; and 23-05-02, Leachfield. Corrective Action Sites 06-05-01, 06-23-01, and 23-05-02 were identified in the 1991 Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Co., Inc. (REECo) inventory (1991). The remaining sites were identified during review of various historical documents. Additional information will be obtained by conducting a corrective action investigation (CAI) prior to evaluating and selecting a corrective action alternative for each CAS. The CAI will include field inspections, radiological and geological surveys, and sample collection. Data will also be obtained to support investigation-derived waste (IDW) disposal and potential future waste management decisions.« less

Events at blood collection area due to nonconforming blood bags and plateletpheresis kits: need for timely corrective and preventive actions.

PubMed

Verma, Anupam; Sachan, Deepti; Elhence, Priti; Pandey, Hem; Dubey, Anju

2012-07-01

Good blood banking practice requires that every effort should be made to detect any deviation or defect in blood bank products and to identify any potential risk to blood donor or recipient(s). We report the findings of an exercise that provide an insight into why feedback from the user side is crucial. Various events involving blood bags and plateletpheresis kits and the corresponding appropriate actions instituted for remedial measures were recorded. These scattered events were recorded for 6 months following the use of a new batch of improved blood bags with add-on features. Several events related to plateletpheresis kits from three different manufacturers were also recorded for 1 year. The affected blood bags were utilized with no untoward incident. The complaint was closed following satisfactory response from the blood bag manufacturing company that acted in a timely manner in addressing the root causes of the problems. However, corrective and preventive actions (CAPA) could not be implemented for plateletpheresis kits. The rate of undesirable events was higher with plateletpheresis kits as compared with whole blood bags (1.75% vs. 0.06%). As defects or deviations that trigger the need for CAPA can stem from numerous sources, it is important to clearly identify and document the problems and level of risk so that appropriate investigations can be instituted and remedial actions can be taken in a timely manner. This study demonstrates the usefulness of a quality initiative to collate and analyze blood product faults in conjunction with blood product manufacturers. © 2012 American Association of Blood Banks.

Risk control and the minimum significant risk

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Seiler, F.A.; Alvarez, J.L.

1996-06-01

Risk management implies that the risk manager can, by his actions, exercise at least a modicum of control over the risk in question. In the terminology of control theory, a management action is a control signal imposed as feedback on the system to bring about a desired change in the state of the system. In the terminology of risk management, an action is taken to bring a predicted risk to lower values. Even if it is assumed that the management action taken is 100% effective and that the projected risk reduction is infinitely well known, there is a lower limitmore » to the desired effects that can be achieved. It is based on the fact that all risks, such as the incidence of cancer, exhibit a degree of variability due to a number of extraneous factors such as age at exposure, sex, location, and some lifestyle parameters such as smoking or the consumption of alcohol. If the control signal is much smaller than the variability of the risk, the signal is lost in the noise and control is lost. This defines a minimum controllable risk based on the variability of the risk over the population considered. This quantity is the counterpart of the minimum significant risk which is defined by the uncertainties of the risk model. Both the minimum controllable risk and the minimum significant risk are evaluated for radiation carcinogenesis and are shown to be of the same order of magnitude. For a realistic management action, the assumptions of perfectly effective action and perfect model prediction made above have to be dropped, resulting in an effective minimum controllable risk which is determined by both risk limits. Any action below that effective limit is futile, but it is also unethical due to the ethical requirement of doing more good than harm. Finally, some implications of the effective minimum controllable risk on the use of the ALARA principle and on the evaluation of remedial action goals are presented.« less

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 573: Alpha Contaminated Sites, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 0

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Matthews, Patrick

2014-05-01

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 573 is located in Area 5 of the Nevada National Security Site, which is approximately 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. CAU 573 is a grouping of sites where there has been a suspected release of contamination associated with non-nuclear experiments and nuclear testing. This document describes the planned investigation of CAU 573, which comprises the following corrective action sites (CASs): • 05-23-02, GMX Alpha Contaminated Area • 05-45-01, Atmospheric Test Site - Hamilton These sites are being investigated because existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate andmore » recommend corrective action alternatives.« less

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Corrective Action Training: Strategies for Meeting the 2020 Vision

EPA Pesticide Factsheets

RCRA Corrective Action training to develop and enhance the skills of qualified personnel who will implement corrective actions for their sites by the year 2020 that are protective of human health and the environment while encouraging revitalization.

40 CFR 280.66 - Corrective action plan.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... 40 Protection of Environment 26 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Corrective action plan. 280.66 Section 280.66 Protection of Environment ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (CONTINUED) SOLID WASTES (CONTINUED... additional information or to develop and submit a corrective action plan for responding to contaminated soils...

40 CFR 35.3170 - Corrective action.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-07-01

... 40 Protection of Environment 1 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Corrective action. 35.3170 Section 35.3170 Protection of Environment ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY GRANTS AND OTHER FEDERAL ASSISTANCE STATE AND LOCAL ASSISTANCE State Water Pollution Control Revolving Funds § 35.3170 Corrective action. (a...

40 CFR 35.3170 - Corrective action.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-07-01

... 40 Protection of Environment 1 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Corrective action. 35.3170 Section 35.3170 Protection of Environment ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY GRANTS AND OTHER FEDERAL ASSISTANCE STATE AND LOCAL ASSISTANCE State Water Pollution Control Revolving Funds § 35.3170 Corrective action. (a...

40 CFR 35.3170 - Corrective action.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-07-01

... 40 Protection of Environment 1 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Corrective action. 35.3170 Section 35.3170 Protection of Environment ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY GRANTS AND OTHER FEDERAL ASSISTANCE STATE AND LOCAL ASSISTANCE State Water Pollution Control Revolving Funds § 35.3170 Corrective action. (a...

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 568: Area 3 Plutonium Dispersion Sites Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 0

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Matthews, Patrick

2014-01-01

CAU 568 is a grouping of sites where there has been a suspected release of contamination associated with nuclear testing. This document describes the planned investigation of CAU 568, which comprises the following corrective action sites (CASs): • 03-23-17, S-3I Contamination Area • 03-23-19, T-3U Contamination Area • 03-23-20, Otero Contamination Area • 03-23-22, Platypus Contamination Area • 03-23-23, San Juan Contamination Area • 03-23-26, Shrew/Wolverine Contamination Area These sites are being investigated because existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives (CAAs). Additional information will be obtained bymore » conducting a corrective action investigation before evaluating CAAs and selecting the appropriate corrective action for each CAS. The results of the field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of viable CAAs that will be presented in the investigation report.« less

Development of the TARGET Training Effectiveness Tool and Underlying Algorithms Specifying Training Method - Performance Outcome Relationships

DTIC Science & Technology

2014-05-01

hand and right hand on the piano, or strumming and chording on the guitar . Perceptual This skill category involves detecting and interpreting sensory...measured as the percent correct, # correct, accumulated points, task/test scoring correct action/timing/performance. This also includes quality rating by...competition and scoring , as well as constraints, privileges and penalties. Simulation-Based The primary delivery environment is an interactive synthetic

40 CFR 63.1382 - Emission standards

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... complete corrective actions in a timely manner according to the procedures in the operations, maintenance... or operator must initiate corrective action within 1 hour of an alarm from a bag leak detection system and complete corrective actions in a timely manner according to the procedures in the operations...

9 CFR 417.3 - Corrective actions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... 9 Animals and Animal Products 2 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Corrective actions. 417.3 Section 417.3 Animals and Animal Products FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE... ANALYSIS AND CRITICAL CONTROL POINT (HACCP) SYSTEMS § 417.3 Corrective actions. (a) The written HACCP plan...

9 CFR 417.3 - Corrective actions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... 9 Animals and Animal Products 2 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Corrective actions. 417.3 Section 417.3 Animals and Animal Products FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE... ANALYSIS AND CRITICAL CONTROL POINT (HACCP) SYSTEMS § 417.3 Corrective actions. (a) The written HACCP plan...

9 CFR 417.3 - Corrective actions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 9 Animals and Animal Products 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Corrective actions. 417.3 Section 417.3 Animals and Animal Products FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE... ANALYSIS AND CRITICAL CONTROL POINT (HACCP) SYSTEMS § 417.3 Corrective actions. (a) The written HACCP plan...

9 CFR 417.3 - Corrective actions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... 9 Animals and Animal Products 2 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Corrective actions. 417.3 Section 417.3 Animals and Animal Products FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE... ANALYSIS AND CRITICAL CONTROL POINT (HACCP) SYSTEMS § 417.3 Corrective actions. (a) The written HACCP plan...

7 CFR 1730.25 - Corrective action.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 7 Agriculture 11 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Corrective action. 1730.25 Section 1730.25... AGRICULTURE ELECTRIC SYSTEM OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE Operations and Maintenance Requirements § 1730.25 Corrective action. (a) For any items on the RUS Form 300 rated unsatisfactory (i.e., 0 or 1) by the borrower...

40 CFR 264.101 - Corrective action for solid waste management units.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-07-01

..., storage or disposal of hazardous waste must institute corrective action as necessary to protect human... 40 Protection of Environment 27 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Corrective action for solid waste... (CONTINUED) SOLID WASTES (CONTINUED) STANDARDS FOR OWNERS AND OPERATORS OF HAZARDOUS WASTE TREATMENT, STORAGE...

40 CFR 264.101 - Corrective action for solid waste management units.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-07-01

..., storage or disposal of hazardous waste must institute corrective action as necessary to protect human... 40 Protection of Environment 26 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Corrective action for solid waste... (CONTINUED) SOLID WASTES (CONTINUED) STANDARDS FOR OWNERS AND OPERATORS OF HAZARDOUS WASTE TREATMENT, STORAGE...

40 CFR 264.101 - Corrective action for solid waste management units.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-07-01

..., storage or disposal of hazardous waste must institute corrective action as necessary to protect human... 40 Protection of Environment 27 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Corrective action for solid waste... (CONTINUED) SOLID WASTES (CONTINUED) STANDARDS FOR OWNERS AND OPERATORS OF HAZARDOUS WASTE TREATMENT, STORAGE...

40 CFR 264.101 - Corrective action for solid waste management units.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-07-01

... 40 Protection of Environment 26 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Corrective action for solid waste... (CONTINUED) SOLID WASTES (CONTINUED) STANDARDS FOR OWNERS AND OPERATORS OF HAZARDOUS WASTE TREATMENT, STORAGE, AND DISPOSAL FACILITIES Releases From Solid Waste Management Units § 264.101 Corrective action for...

40 CFR 264.101 - Corrective action for solid waste management units.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... 40 Protection of Environment 25 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Corrective action for solid waste... (CONTINUED) SOLID WASTES (CONTINUED) STANDARDS FOR OWNERS AND OPERATORS OF HAZARDOUS WASTE TREATMENT, STORAGE, AND DISPOSAL FACILITIES Releases From Solid Waste Management Units § 264.101 Corrective action for...

Eighteen- and 24-Month-Old Infants Correct Others in Anticipation of Action Mistakes

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Knudsen, Birgit; Liszkowski, Ulf

2012-01-01

Much of human communication and collaboration is predicated on making predictions about others' actions. Humans frequently use predictions about others' action mistakes to correct others and spare them mistakes. Such anticipatory correcting reveals a social motivation for unsolicited helping. Cognitively, it requires forward inferences about…

40 CFR 257.28 - Implementation of the corrective action program.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-07-01

...-Hazardous Waste Disposal Units Ground-Water Monitoring and Corrective Action § 257.28 Implementation of the... ground-water monitoring program that: (i) At a minimum, meets the requirements of an assessment monitoring program under § 257.25; (ii) Indicates the effectiveness of the corrective action remedy; and (iii...

Corrective Action Plan for Corrective Action Unit 453: Area 9 UXO Landfill, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Bechtel Nevada

1998-09-30

This corrective action plan proposes the closure method for the area 9 unexploded Ordnance landfill, corrective action unit 453 located at the Tonopah Test Range. The area 9 UXO landfill consists of corrective action site no. 09-55-001-0952 and is comprised of three individual landfill cells designated as A9-1, A9-2, and A9-3. The three landfill cells received wastes from daily operations at area 9 and from range cleanups which were performed after weapons testing. Cell locations and contents were not well documented due to the unregulated disposal practices commonly associated with early landfill operations. However, site process knowledge indicates that themore » landfill cells were used for solid waste disposal, including disposal of UXO.« less

Progressing beyond SLMTA: Are internal audits and corrective action the key drivers of quality improvement?

PubMed

Maina, Robert N; Mengo, Doris M; Mohamud, Abdikher D; Ochieng, Susan M; Milgo, Sammy K; Sexton, Connie J; Moyo, Sikhulile; Luman, Elizabeth T

2014-01-01

Kenya has implemented the Strengthening Laboratory Management Toward Accreditation (SLMTA) programme to facilitate quality improvement in medical laboratories and to support national accreditation goals. Continuous quality improvement after SLMTA completion is needed to ensure sustainability and continue progress toward accreditation. Audits were conducted by qualified, independent auditors to assess the performance of five enrolled laboratories using the Stepwise Laboratory Quality Improvement Process Towards Accreditation (SLIPTA) checklist. End-of-programme (exit) and one year post-programme (surveillance) audits were compared for overall score, star level (from zero to five, based on scores) and scores for each of the 12 Quality System Essential (QSE) areas that make up the SLIPTA checklist. All laboratories improved from exit to surveillance audit (median improvement 38 percentage points, range 5-45 percentage points). Two laboratories improved from zero to one star, two improved from zero to three stars and one laboratory improved from three to four stars. The lowest median QSE scores at exit were: internal audit; corrective action; and occurrence management and process improvement (< 20%). Each of the 12 QSEs improved substantially at surveillance audit, with the greatest improvement in client management and customer service, internal audit and information management (≥ 50 percentage points). The two laboratories with the greatest overall improvement focused heavily on the internal audit and corrective action QSEs. Whilst all laboratories improved from exit to surveillance audit, those that focused on the internal audit and corrective action QSEs improved substantially more than those that did not; internal audits and corrective actions may have acted as catalysts, leading to improvements in other QSEs. Systematic identification of core areas and best practices to address them is a critical step toward strengthening public medical laboratories.

Progressing beyond SLMTA: Are internal audits and corrective action the key drivers of quality improvement?

PubMed Central

Mengo, Doris M.; Mohamud, Abdikher D.; Ochieng, Susan M.; Milgo, Sammy K.; Sexton, Connie J.; Moyo, Sikhulile; Luman, Elizabeth T.

2014-01-01

Background Kenya has implemented the Strengthening Laboratory Management Toward Accreditation (SLMTA) programme to facilitate quality improvement in medical laboratories and to support national accreditation goals. Continuous quality improvement after SLMTA completion is needed to ensure sustainability and continue progress toward accreditation. Methods Audits were conducted by qualified, independent auditors to assess the performance of five enrolled laboratories using the Stepwise Laboratory Quality Improvement Process Towards Accreditation (SLIPTA) checklist. End-of-programme (exit) and one year post-programme (surveillance) audits were compared for overall score, star level (from zero to five, based on scores) and scores for each of the 12 Quality System Essential (QSE) areas that make up the SLIPTA checklist. Results All laboratories improved from exit to surveillance audit (median improvement 38 percentage points, range 5–45 percentage points). Two laboratories improved from zero to one star, two improved from zero to three stars and one laboratory improved from three to four stars. The lowest median QSE scores at exit were: internal audit; corrective action; and occurrence management and process improvement (< 20%). Each of the 12 QSEs improved substantially at surveillance audit, with the greatest improvement in client management and customer service, internal audit and information management (≥ 50 percentage points). The two laboratories with the greatest overall improvement focused heavily on the internal audit and corrective action QSEs. Conclusion Whilst all laboratories improved from exit to surveillance audit, those that focused on the internal audit and corrective action QSEs improved substantially more than those that did not; internal audits and corrective actions may have acted as catalysts, leading to improvements in other QSEs. Systematic identification of core areas and best practices to address them is a critical step toward strengthening public medical laboratories. PMID:29043193

Landslide risk models for decision making.

PubMed

Bonachea, Jaime; Remondo, Juan; de Terán, José Ramón Díaz; González-Díez, Alberto; Cendrero, Antonio

2009-11-01

This contribution presents a quantitative procedure for landslide risk analysis and zoning considering hazard, exposure (or value of elements at risk), and vulnerability. The method provides the means to obtain landslide risk models (expressing expected damage due to landslides on material elements and economic activities in monetary terms, according to different scenarios and periods) useful to identify areas where mitigation efforts will be most cost effective. It allows identifying priority areas for the implementation of actions to reduce vulnerability (elements) or hazard (processes). The procedure proposed can also be used as a preventive tool, through its application to strategic environmental impact analysis (SEIA) of land-use plans. The underlying hypothesis is that reliable predictions about hazard and risk can be made using models based on a detailed analysis of past landslide occurrences in connection with conditioning factors and data on past damage. The results show that the approach proposed and the hypothesis formulated are essentially correct, providing estimates of the order of magnitude of expected losses for a given time period. Uncertainties, strengths, and shortcomings of the procedure and results obtained are discussed and potential lines of research to improve the models are indicated. Finally, comments and suggestions are provided to generalize this type of analysis.

5 CFR 735.103 - What other regulations pertain to employee conduct?

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... employee's violation of those regulations may cause the employee's agency to take disciplinary action, or corrective action as that term is used in 5 CFR part 2635. Such disciplinary action or corrective action may...

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 224: Decon Pad and Septic Systems, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

NSTec Environmental Restoration

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 224 is located in Areas 02, 03, 05, 06, 11, and 23 of the Nevada Test Site, which is situated approximately 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. CAU 224 is listed in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) of 1996 as Decon Pad and Septic Systems and is comprised of the following nine Corrective Action Sites (CASs): CAS 02-04-01, Septic Tank (Buried); CAS 03-05-01, Leachfield; CAS 05-04-01, Septic Tanks (4)/Discharge Area; CAS 06-03-01, Sewage Lagoons (3); CAS 06-05-01, Leachfield; CAS 06-17-04, Decon Pad and Wastewater Catch; CAS 06-23-01, Decon Pad Discharge Piping; CASmore » 11-04-01, Sewage Lagoon; and CAS 23-05-02, Leachfield. The Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP)-approved corrective action alternative for CASs 02-04-01, 03-05-01, 06-03-01, 11-04-01, and 23-05-02 is no further action. As a best management practice, the septic tanks and distribution box were removed from CASs 02-04-01 and 11-04-01 and disposed of as hydrocarbon waste. The NDEP-approved correction action alternative for CASs 05-04-01, 06-05-01, 06-17-04, and 06-23-01 is clean closure. Closure activities for these CASs included removing and disposing of radiologically and pesticide-impacted soil and debris. CAU 224 was closed in accordance with the NDEP-approved CAU 224 Corrective Action Plan (CAP). The closure activities specified in the CAP were based on the recommendations presented in the CAU 224 Corrective Action Decision Document (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office, 2005). This Closure Report documents CAU 224 closure activities. During closure activities, approximately 60 cubic yards (yd3) of mixed waste in the form of soil and debris; approximately 70 yd{sup 3} of sanitary waste in the form of soil, liquid from septic tanks, and concrete debris; approximately 10 yd{sup 3} of hazardous waste in the form of pesticide-impacted soil; approximately 0.5 yd{sup 3} of universal waste in the form of fluorescent light bulbs; and approximately 0.5 yd{sup 3} of low-level waste in the form of a radiologically impacted fire hose rack were generated, managed, and disposed of appropriately. Waste minimization techniques, such as the utilization of laboratory analysis and field screening to guide the extent of excavations, were employed during the performance of closure work.« less

Comprehensive Geriatric Assessment (CGA) based risk factors for increased caregiver burden among elderly Asian patients with cancer.

PubMed

Rajasekaran, Tanujaa; Tan, Tira; Ong, Whee Sze; Koo, Khai Nee; Chan, Lili; Poon, Donald; Roy Chowdhury, Anupama; Krishna, Lalit; Kanesvaran, Ravindran

2016-05-01

This study aims to identify Comprehensive Geriatric Assessment (CGA) based risk factors to help predict caregiver burden among elderly patients with cancer. The study evaluated 249 patients newly diagnosed with cancer, aged 70years and above, who attended the geriatric oncology clinic at the National Cancer Centre Singapore between 2007 and 2010. Out of 249 patients, 244 patients had information available on family caregiver burden and were analysed. On univariate analysis, ADL dependence, lower IADL scores, ECOG performance status of 3-4, higher fall risk, lower scores in dominant hand grip strength test and mini mental state examination, polypharmacy, higher nutritional risk, haemoglobin <12g/dL and presence of geriatric syndromes were significantly associated with mild to severe caregiver burden. On multivariate analysis, only ECOG performance status of 3-4 (odds ratio [OR], 4.47; 95% confidence interval [CI], 2.27-8.80) and haemoglobin <12g/dL (OR, 2.38; 95% CI, 1.14-4.99) were associated with an increased probability of mild to severe caregiver burden. The model achieved a good fit (Hosmer-Lemeshow's p=0.196) and discrimination (area under the curve [AUC]=0.742; bias-corrected AUC=0.737). Based on this, patients were stratified into 3 risk groups with different proportion of patients with increased caregiver burden (low risk: 3.9% vs intermediate risk: 18.8% vs high risk: 39.6%; p<0.001). ECOG performance status and haemoglobin were associated with increased caregiver burden among elderly patients with cancer. Using these two factors in the clinic may help clinicians identify caregivers at risk and take preventive action to mitigate that. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Quenching the XXZ spin chain: quench action approach versus generalized Gibbs ensemble

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Mestyán, M.; Pozsgay, B.; Takács, G.; Werner, M. A.

2015-04-01

Following our previous work (Pozsgay et al 2014 Phys. Rev. Lett. 113 117203) we present here a detailed comparison of the quench action approach and the predictions of the generalized Gibbs ensemble, with the result that while the quench action formalism correctly captures the steady state, the GGE does not give a correct description of local short-distance correlation functions. We extend our studies to include another initial state, the so-called q-dimer state. We present important details of our construction, including new results concerning exact overlaps for the dimer and q-dimer states, and we also give an exact solution of the quench-action-based overlap-TBA for the q-dimer. Furthermore, we extend our computations to include the xx spin correlations besides the zz correlations treated previously, and give a detailed discussion of the underlying reasons for the failure of the GGE, especially in the light of new developments.

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 555: Septic Systems Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Rev. No.: 0 with Errata

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Pastor, Laura

2005-12-01

This Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) contains project-specific information including facility descriptions, environmental sample collection objectives, and criteria for conducting site investigation activities at Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 555: Septic Systems, Nevada Test Site (NTS), Nevada. This CAIP has been developed in accordance with the ''Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order'' (FFACO) (1996) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), and the U.S. Department of Defense. Corrective Action Unit 555 is located in Areas 1, 3 and 6 of the NTS, which is approximately 65 miles (mi) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada,more » and is comprised of the five corrective action sites (CASs) shown on Figure 1-1 and listed below: (1) CAS 01-59-01, Area 1 Camp Septic System; (2) CAS 03-59-03, Core Handling Building Septic System; (3) CAS 06-20-05, Birdwell Dry Well; (4) CAS 06-59-01, Birdwell Septic System; and (5) CAS 06-59-02, National Cementers Septic System. An FFACO modification was approved on December 14, 2005, to include CAS 06-20-05, Birdwell Dry Well, as part of the scope of CAU 555. The work scope was expanded in this document to include the investigation of CAS 06-20-05. The Corrective Action Investigation (CAI) will include field inspections, radiological surveys, geophysical surveys, sampling of environmental media, analysis of samples, and assessment of investigation results, where appropriate. Data will be obtained to support corrective action alternative evaluations and waste management decisions. The CASs in CAU 555 are being investigated because hazardous and/or radioactive constituents may be present in concentrations that could potentially pose a threat to human health and the environment. Existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives for the CASs. Additional information will be generated by conducting a CAI before the evaluation and selection of corrective action alternatives.« less

Quick Reaction Report on DoD Procurements Through the Tennessee Valley Authority

DTIC Science & Technology

1992-04-03

from non-DoD agencies that includes sections to be completed and signed by a contracting officer. Recommendations for Corrective Actions We recommend...in the DD 350 Individual Contract Action Reporting System. The Assistant Secretary did not provide planned dates for completing the corrective actions ...will be reprocured. Tentative milestones for completion of the corrective actions were not identified. Defense Logistics Agency comments. The Deputy

How to Assess the Biomechanical Risk Levels in Beekeeping.

PubMed

Maina, G; Rossi, F; Baracco, A

2016-01-01

Beekeepers are at particular risk of developing work-related musculoskeletal disorders, but many of the studies lack detailed exposure assessment. To evaluate the biomechanical overload exposure in a specific farming activity, a multitasking model has been developed through the characterization of 37 basic operational tasks typical of the beekeeping activity. The Occupational Repetitive Actions (OCRA) Checklist and the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) Lifting Index methodologies have been applied to these elementary tasks to evaluate the exposure, and the resulting risk indices have been time-weighted averaged. Finally, an easy access, computer-assisted toolkit has been developed to help the beekeepers in the biomechanical risk assessment process. The risk of biomechanical overload for the upper limbs ranges from acceptable (maintenance and recovery of woody material and honey packaging with dosing machine tasks) to high (distribution of the top supers) risk level. The risk for back injury is always borderline in women and increases with exposure time, whereas it ranges from acceptable to borderline in men. The definition of the biomechanical risk levels allows for planning of corrective actions aimed at preventing and reducing the risk of musculoskeletal disorders through engineering, administrative, and behavioral interventions. The methodology can be used for risk assessment in other mainly manual agricultural activities.

[FMEA applied to the radiotherapy patient care process].

PubMed

Meyrieux, C; Garcia, R; Pourel, N; Mège, A; Bodez, V

2012-10-01

Failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA), is a risk analysis method used at the Radiotherapy Department of Institute Sainte-Catherine as part of a strategy seeking to continuously improve the quality and security of treatments. The method comprises several steps: definition of main processes; for each of them, description for every step of prescription, treatment preparation, treatment application; identification of the possible risks, their consequences, their origins; research of existing safety elements which may avoid these risks; grading of risks to assign a criticality score resulting in a numerical organisation of the risks. Finally, the impact of proposed corrective actions was then estimated by a new grading round. For each process studied, a detailed map of the risks was obtained, facilitating the identification of priority actions to be undertaken. For example, we obtain five steps in patient treatment planning with an unacceptable level of risk, 62 a level of moderate risk and 31 an acceptable level of risk. The FMEA method, used in the industrial domain and applied here to health care, is an effective tool for the management of risks in patient care. However, the time and training requirements necessary to implement this method should not be underestimated. Copyright © 2012 Société française de radiothérapie oncologique (SFRO). Published by Elsevier SAS. All rights reserved.

Removal site evaluation report for the Isotope Facilities at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

NONE

This removal site evaluation (RmSE) report of the Isotope Facilities at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) was prepared to provide the Environmental Restoration Program with information necessary to evaluate whether hazardous and/or radiological contaminants in and around the Isotopes Facility pose a substantial risk to human health or the environment and if remedial site evaluations (RSEs) or removal actions are required. The scope of the project included: (1) a review of historical evidence regarding operations and use of the facility; (2) interviews with facility personnel concerning current and past operating practices; (3) a site inspection; and (4) identification of hazardmore » areas requiring maintenance, removal, or remedial actions. The results of RmSE indicate that no substantial risks exist from contaminants present in the Isotope Facilities because adequate controls and practices exist to protect human health and the environment. The recommended correction from the RmSE are being conducted as maintenance actions; accordingly, this RmSE is considered complete and terminated.« less

78 FR 23626 - Agency Information Collection Activities; Requests for Comments; Clearance of Renewed Approval of...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-04-19

..., page 73114. Airworthiness Directives are regulations issued to require action to correct unsafe... emergency corrective action is taken to determine if the action was adequate to correct the unsafe condition... DePaepe at (405) 954-9362, or by email at: [email protected] . SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: [[Page...

42 CFR 431.992 - Corrective action plan.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-10-01

... Estimating Improper Payments in Medicaid and CHIP § 431.992 Corrective action plan. (a) The State agency must develop a separate corrective action plan for Medicaid and CHIP, which is not required to be approved by... which the State's Medicaid or CHIP error rates are posted on the CMS contractor's Web site. (d) The...

42 CFR 431.992 - Corrective action plan.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-10-01

... Estimating Improper Payments in Medicaid and CHIP § 431.992 Corrective action plan. (a) The State agency must develop a separate corrective action plan for Medicaid and CHIP, which is not required to be approved by... which the State's Medicaid or CHIP error rates are posted on the CMS contractor's Web site. (d) The...

42 CFR 431.992 - Corrective action plan.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-10-01

... Estimating Improper Payments in Medicaid and CHIP § 431.992 Corrective action plan. (a) The State agency must develop a separate corrective action plan for Medicaid and CHIP, which is not required to be approved by... which the State's Medicaid or CHIP error rates are posted on the CMS contractor's Web site. (d) The...

10 CFR 26.41 - Audits and corrective action.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... 10 Energy 1 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Audits and corrective action. 26.41 Section 26.41 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FITNESS FOR DUTY PROGRAMS Program Elements § 26.41 Audits and corrective action. (a) General. Each licensee and other entity who is subject to this subpart is responsible for the...

10 CFR 26.41 - Audits and corrective action.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... 10 Energy 1 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Audits and corrective action. 26.41 Section 26.41 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FITNESS FOR DUTY PROGRAMS Program Elements § 26.41 Audits and corrective action. (a) General. Each licensee and other entity who is subject to this subpart is responsible for the...

10 CFR 26.41 - Audits and corrective action.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... 10 Energy 1 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Audits and corrective action. 26.41 Section 26.41 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FITNESS FOR DUTY PROGRAMS Program Elements § 26.41 Audits and corrective action. (a) General. Each licensee and other entity who is subject to this subpart is responsible for the...

10 CFR 26.41 - Audits and corrective action.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 10 Energy 1 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Audits and corrective action. 26.41 Section 26.41 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FITNESS FOR DUTY PROGRAMS Program Elements § 26.41 Audits and corrective action. (a) General. Each licensee and other entity who is subject to this subpart is responsible for the...

10 CFR 26.41 - Audits and corrective action.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 10 Energy 1 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Audits and corrective action. 26.41 Section 26.41 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FITNESS FOR DUTY PROGRAMS Program Elements § 26.41 Audits and corrective action. (a) General. Each licensee and other entity who is subject to this subpart is responsible for the...

Corrective Action Framework for the Office of Student Financial Assistance.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Advanced Technology, Inc., Reston, VA.

An ongoing corrective action framework for the Office of Student Financial Assistance (OSFA) is presented. Attention is directed to the formal management structure in OSFA and current initiatives to improve management, and the placement of the corrective action process in the organizational hierarchy. Four formal mechanisms needed to implement the…

77 FR 74024 - Sunshine Act Meetings; Correction

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2012-12-12

... INTER-AMERICAN FOUNDATION BOARD MEETING Sunshine Act Meetings; Correction AGENCY: Inter-American Foundation. ACTION: Correction. SUMMARY: This action corrects the order of the MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED and... September 24, 2012, Meeting of the Board of Directors'' subsections. CONTACT PERSON FOR MORE INFORMATION...

Corrective Action Plan for Corrective Action Unit 271: Areas 25, 26, and 27 Septic Systems, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

R. B. Jackson

2003-05-01

The Areas 25, 26 and 27 Septic Systems are in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) of 1996 as Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 271. This Corrective Action Plan (CAP) provides selected corrective action alternatives and proposes the closure methodology for CAU 271. CAU 271 is located on the Nevada Test Site (NTS) approximately 105 kilometers (65 miles) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada, and consists of the following 15 Corrective Action Sites (CAS): CAS 25-04-1, Septic System; CAS 25-04-03, Septic System; CAS25-04-04, Septic System; CAS 25-04-08, Septic System; CAS 25-04-09, Septic System; CAS 25-04-10, Septic System; CAS 25-04-11, Septicmore » System; CAS 26-03-01, Contaminated Water Reservoir; CAS 26-04-1, Septic System; CAS 26-04-02, Septic System; CAS 26-05-01, Radioactive Leachfield; CAS-26-05-03, Septic System; CAS 26-05-04, Septic System; CAS 26-05-05, Septic System; and CAS 27-05-02, Leachfield.« less

CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN FOR CORRECTIVE ACTION UNIT 516: SEPTIC SYSTEMS AND DISCHARGE POINTS, NEVADA TEST SITE, NEVADA

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

BECHTEL NEVADA; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION NEVADA SITE OFFICE

2005-08-01

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 516, Septic Systems and Discharge Points, is listed in the ''Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order'' (FFACO) of 1996 (FFACO, 1996). CAU 516 consists of six Corrective Action Sites (CASs) located in Areas 3, 6, and 22 of the Nevada Test Site (NTS), which is located approximately 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada (Figure 1). CAU 516 is comprised of the following six CASs: (1) 03-59-01 Building 3C-36 Septic System; (2) 03-59-02 Building 3C-45 Septic System; (3) 06-51-01 Sump and Piping; (4) 06-51-02 Clay Pipe and Debris; (5) 06-51-03 Clean-Out Box and Piping; and (6)more » 22-19-04 Vehicle Decontamination Area. Details on site history and site characterization results for CAU 516 are provided in the approved Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP), (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office [NNSA/NSO], 2003), and the approved Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD) (NNSA/NSO, 2004).« less

An in vivo investigative protocol for HDR prostate brachytherapy using urethral and rectal thermoluminescence dosimetry.

PubMed

Toye, Warren; Das, Ram; Kron, Tomas; Franich, Rick; Johnston, Peter; Duchesne, Gillian

2009-05-01

To develop an in vivo dosimetry based investigative action level relevant for a corrective protocol for HDR brachytherapy boost treatment. The dose delivered to points within the urethra and rectum was measured using TLD in vivo dosimetry in 56 patients. Comparisons between the urethral and rectal measurements and TPS calculations showed differences, which are related to the relative position of the implant and TLD trains, and allowed shifts of implant position relative to the prostate to be estimated. Analysis of rectal dose measurements is consistent with implant movement, which was previously only identified with the urethral data. Shift corrected doses were compared with results from the TPS. Comparison of peak doses to the urethra and rectum has been assessed against the proposed corrective protocol to limit overdosing these critical structures. An initial investigative level of 20% difference between measured and TPS peak dose was established, which corresponds to 1/3 of patients which was practical for the caseload. These patients were assessed resulting in corrective action being applied for one patient. Multiple triggering for selective investigative action is outlined. The use of a single in vivo measurement in the first fraction optimizes patient benefit at acceptable cost.

Research Priorities in Mental Health, Justice, and Safety: A Multidisciplinary Stakeholder Report

PubMed Central

Crocker, Anne G.; Nicholls, Tonia L.; Seto, Michael C.; Roy, Laurence; Leclair, Marichelle C.; Brink, Johann; Simpson, Alexander I. F.; Côté, Gilles

2015-01-01

This paper is based on the report following the National Research Agenda Meeting on Mental Health, Justice, and Safety held in Montreal on November 19, 2014, which convened academics; health, social, and legal professionals; and people with lived experience of mental illness from across Canada. The goal was to identify research priorities addressing relevant knowledge gaps and research strategies that can translate into public policy action and improvements in evidence-based services. Participants identified key challenges: (1) inadequate identification and response to needs by civil mental health services and frontline law enforcement, (2) limited specialized resources in forensic and correctional settings, (3) fragmented care and gaps between systems, (4) limited resources for adequate community reintegration, and (5) poor knowledge transfer strategies as obstacles to evidence-based policies. Knowledge gaps were identified in epidemiology and risk reduction, frontline training and programs, forensic and correctional practices, organizations and institutions, knowledge transfer, and rehabilitation. Finally, participants identified potential sources of support to conduct real time research with regard to data collection and sharing. The findings represent a roadmap for how forensic mental health systems can best proceed to address current challenges through research and practice initiatives, drawing from lived, clinical and research experiences of a multidisciplinary group of experts. PMID:26681928

New ShakeMaps for Georgia Resulting from Collaboration with EMME

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Kvavadze, N.; Tsereteli, N. S.; Varazanashvili, O.; Alania, V.

2015-12-01

Correct assessment of probabilistic seismic hazard and risks maps are first step for advance planning and action to reduce seismic risk. Seismic hazard maps for Georgia were calculated based on modern approach that was developed in the frame of EMME (Earthquake Modl for Middle east region) project. EMME was one of GEM's successful endeavors at regional level. With EMME and GEM assistance, regional models were analyzed to identify the information and additional work needed for the preparation national hazard models. Probabilistic seismic hazard map (PSH) provides the critical bases for improved building code and construction. The most serious deficiency in PSH assessment for the territory of Georgia is the lack of high-quality ground motion data. Due to this an initial hybrid empirical ground motion model is developed for PGA and SA at selected periods. An application of these coefficients for ground motion models have been used in probabilistic seismic hazard assessment. Obtained results of seismic hazard maps show evidence that there were gaps in seismic hazard assessment and the present normative seismic hazard map needed a careful recalculation.

Deviation Management: Key Management Subsystem Driver of Knowledge-Based Continuous Improvement in the Henry Ford Production System.

PubMed

Zarbo, Richard J; Copeland, Jacqueline R; Varney, Ruan C

2017-10-01

To develop a business subsystem fulfilling International Organization for Standardization 15189 nonconformance management regulatory standard, facilitating employee engagement in problem identification and resolution to effect quality improvement and risk mitigation. From 2012 to 2016, the integrated laboratories of the Henry Ford Health System used a quality technical team to develop and improve a management subsystem designed to identify, track, trend, and summarize nonconformances based on frequency, risk, and root cause for elimination at the level of the work. Programmatic improvements and training resulted in markedly increased documentation culminating in 71,641 deviations in 2016 classified by a taxonomy of 281 defect types into preanalytic (74.8%), analytic (23.6%), and postanalytic (1.6%) testing phases. The top 10 deviations accounted for 55,843 (78%) of the total. Deviation management is a key subsystem of managers' standard work whereby knowledge of nonconformities assists in directing corrective actions and continuous improvements that promote consistent execution and higher levels of performance. © American Society for Clinical Pathology, 2017. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com

Risk of cardiac events in Long QT syndrome patients when taking antiseizure medications.

PubMed

Auerbach, David S; Biton, Yitschak; Polonsky, Bronislava; McNitt, Scott; Gross, Robert A; Dirksen, Robert T; Moss, Arthur J

2018-01-01

Many antiseizure medications (ASMs) affect ion channel function. We investigated whether ASMs alter the risk of cardiac events in patients with corrected QT (QT c ) prolongation. The study included people from the Rochester-based Long QT syndrome (LQTS) Registry with baseline QT c prolongation and history of ASM therapy (n = 296). Using multivariate Anderson-Gill models, we assessed the risk of recurrent cardiac events associated with ASM therapy. We stratified by LQTS genotype and predominant mechanism of ASM action (Na + channel blocker and gamma-aminobutyric acid modifier.) There was an increased risk of cardiac events when participants with QT c prolongation were taking vs off ASMs (HR 1.65, 95% confidence interval [CI] 1.36-2.00, P < 0.001). There was an increased risk of cardiac events when LQTS2 (HR 1.49, 95% CI 1.03-2.15, P = 0.036) but not LQTS1 participants were taking ASMs (interaction, P = 0.016). Na + channel blocker ASMs were associated with an increased risk of cardiac events in participants with QT c prolongation, specifically LQTS2, but decreased risk in LQTS1. The increased risk when taking all ASMs and Na + channel blocker ASMs was attenuated by concurrent beta-adrenergic blocker therapy (interaction, P < 0.001). Gamma-aminobutyric acid modifier ASMs were associated with an increased risk of events in patients not concurrently treated with beta-adrenergic blockers. Female participants were at an increased risk of cardiac events while taking all ASMs and each class of ASMs. Despite no change in overall QT c duration, pharmacogenomic analyses set the stage for future prospective clinical and mechanistic studies to validate that ASMs with predominantly Na + channel blocking actions are deleterious in LQTS2, but protective in LQTS1. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Extending the Strategy Based Risk Model Using the Delphi Method: An Application to the Validation Process for Research and Developmental (R&D) Satellites

DTIC Science & Technology

2009-12-01

correctly Risk before validation step: 41-60% - Is this too high/ low ? Why? Risk 8: Operational or data latency impacts based on relationship between...too high, too low , or correct. We also asked them to comment on why they felt this way. Finally, we left additional space on the survey for any...cost of each validation effort was too high, too low , or acceptable. They then gave us rationale for their beliefs. The second cost associated with

RCRA, superfund and EPCRA hotline training module. Introduction to: RCRA corrective action updated July 1996

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

NONE

1996-07-01

The module discusses the regulatory and statutory requirements and authorities governing the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) corrective action process. There are minimal regulatory requirements at present, but the Agency has issued a proposed rule (55 FR 30798; July 27, 1990) that would establish a comprehensive regulatory framework for implementing the corrective action program. This proposed rule and other guidance developed pursuant to statutory authorities are used to structure corrective action requirements in facility permits and orders. This module describes the current statutory and regulatory structure and discusses the future of the proposed rule.

Risk management.

PubMed

Chambers, David W

2010-01-01

Every plan contains risk. To proceed without planning some means of managing that risk is to court failure. The basic logic of risk is explained. It consists in identifying a threshold where some corrective action is necessary, the probability of exceeding that threshold, and the attendant cost should the undesired outcome occur. This is the probable cost of failure. Various risk categories in dentistry are identified, including lack of liquidity; poor quality; equipment or procedure failures; employee slips; competitive environments; new regulations; unreliable suppliers, partners, and patients; and threats to one's reputation. It is prudent to make investments in risk management to the extent that the cost of managing the risk is less than the probable loss due to risk failure and when risk management strategies can be matched to type of risk. Four risk management strategies are discussed: insurance, reducing the probability of failure, reducing the costs of failure, and learning. A risk management accounting of the financial meltdown of October 2008 is provided.

What experimental experience affects dogs' comprehension of human communicative actions?

PubMed

Hauser, Marc D; Comins, Jordan A; Pytka, Lisa M; Cahill, Donal P; Velez-Calderon, Sofia

2011-01-01

Studies of dogs report that individuals reliably respond to the goal-directed communicative actions (e.g., pointing) of human experimenters. All of these studies use some version of a multi-trial approach, thereby allowing for the possibility of rapid learning within an experimental session. The experiments reported here ask whether dogs can respond correctly to a communicative action based on only a single presentation, thereby eliminating the possibility of learning within the experimental context. We tested 173 dogs. For each dog reaching our test criteria, we used a single presentation of six different goal-directed actions within a session, asking whether they correctly follow to a target goal (container with concealed food) a (1) distal hand point, (2) step toward one container, (3) hand point to one container followed by step toward the other, (4) step toward one container and point to the other, (5) distal foot point with the experimenter's hands free, and (6) distal foot point with the experimenter's hands occupied. Given only a single presentation, dogs selected the correct container when the experimenter hand pointed, foot pointed with hands occupied, or stepped closer to the target container, but failed on the other actions, despite using the same method. The fact that dogs correctly followed foot pointing with hands occupied, but not hands free, suggests that they are sensitive to environmental constraints, and use this information to infer rational, goal-directed action. We discuss these results in light of the role of experience in recognizing communicative gestures, as well as the significance of coding criteria for studies of canine competence. Copyright © 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

36 CFR 1280.34 - What are the types of corrective action NARA imposes for prohibited behavior?

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-07-01

... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 3 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false What are the types of corrective action NARA imposes for prohibited behavior? 1280.34 Section 1280.34 Parks, Forests, and Public... corrective action NARA imposes for prohibited behavior? (a) Individuals who violate the provisions of this...

36 CFR 1280.34 - What are the types of corrective action NARA imposes for prohibited behavior?

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-07-01

... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 3 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false What are the types of corrective action NARA imposes for prohibited behavior? 1280.34 Section 1280.34 Parks, Forests, and Public... corrective action NARA imposes for prohibited behavior? (a) Individuals who violate the provisions of this...

36 CFR 1280.34 - What are the types of corrective action NARA imposes for prohibited behavior?

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false What are the types of corrective action NARA imposes for prohibited behavior? 1280.34 Section 1280.34 Parks, Forests, and Public... corrective action NARA imposes for prohibited behavior? (a) Individuals who violate the provisions of this...

36 CFR 1280.34 - What are the types of corrective action NARA imposes for prohibited behavior?

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-07-01

... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 3 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false What are the types of corrective action NARA imposes for prohibited behavior? 1280.34 Section 1280.34 Parks, Forests, and Public... corrective action NARA imposes for prohibited behavior? (a) Individuals who violate the provisions of this...

Failing Schools: A Study of Corrective Actions in Relation to Underperforming Elementary Schools in California

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Stewart, Francine A.

2016-01-01

The purpose of this study was to find out which corrective actions have a positive impact on improving students' learning and achievement and ultimately moving underperforming elementary schools out of Program Improvement (PI) status in California. Some common corrective actions include, but are not limited to, instructional program, instructional…

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 117: Area 26 Pluto Disassembly Facility, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Mark Burmeister

This Closure Report (CR) presents information supporting the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 117: Area 26 Pluto Disassembly Facility, Nevada Test Site, Nevada. This CR complies with the requirements of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order that was agreed to by the State of Nevada; U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management; U.S. Department of Defense; and DOE, Legacy Management. Corrective Action Unit 117 comprises Corrective Action Site (CAS) 26-41-01, Pluto Disassembly Facility, located in Area 26 of the Nevada Test Site. The purpose of this CR is to provide documentation supporting the completed corrective actions and providemore » data confirming that the closure objectives for CAU 117 were met. To achieve this, the following actions were performed: • Review the current site conditions, including the concentration and extent of contamination. • Implement any corrective actions necessary to protect human health and the environment. • Properly dispose of corrective action and investigation wastes. • Document Notice of Completion and closure of CAU 117 issued by the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection. From May 2008 through February 2009, closure activities were performed as set forth in the Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration Plan for Corrective Action Unit 117, Area 26 Pluto Disassembly Facility, Nevada Test Site, Nevada. The purpose of the activities as defined during the data quality objectives process were: • Determine whether contaminants of concern (COCs) are present. • If COCs are present, determine their nature and extent, implement appropriate corrective actions, and properly dispose of wastes. Analytes detected during the closure activities were evaluated against final action levels to determine COCs for CAU 117. Assessment of the data generated from closure activities indicated that the final action levels were exceeded for polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) reported as total Aroclor and radium-226. A corrective action was implemented to remove approximately 50 cubic yards of PCB-contaminated soil, approximately 1 cubic foot of radium-226 contaminated soil (and scabbled asphalt), and a high-efficiency particulate air filter that was determined to meet the criteria of a potential source material (PSM). Electrical and lighting components (i.e., PCB-containing ballasts and capacitors) and other materials (e.g., mercury-containing thermostats and switches, lead plugs and bricks) assumed to be PSM were also removed from Building 2201, as practical, without the need for sampling. Because the COC contamination and PSMs have been removed, clean closure of CAS 26-41-01 is recommended, and no use restrictions are required to be placed on this CAU. No further action is necessary because no other contaminants of potential concern were found above preliminary action levels. The physical end state for Building 2201 is expected to be eventual demolition to slab. The DOE, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office provides the following recommendations: • Clean closure is the recommended corrective action for CAS 26-41-01 in CAU 117. • A Notice of Completion to the DOE, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office is requested from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection for closure of CAU 117. • Corrective Action Unit 117 should be moved from Appendix III to Appendix IV of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order.« less

Predicting Correctness of Problem Solving from Low-Level Log Data in Intelligent Tutoring Systems

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Cetintas, Suleyman; Si, Luo; Xin, Yan Ping; Hord, Casey

2009-01-01

This paper proposes a learning based method that can automatically determine how likely a student is to give a correct answer to a problem in an intelligent tutoring system. Only log files that record students' actions with the system are used to train the model, therefore the modeling process doesn't require expert knowledge for identifying…

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 261: Area 25 Test Cell A Leachfield System, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

T. M. Fitzmaurice

2001-04-01

The purpose of this Closure Report (CR) is to provide documentation of the completed corrective action at the Test Cell A Leachfield System and to provide data confirming the corrective action. The Test Cell A Leachfield System is identified in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) of 1996 as Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 261. Remediation of CAU 261 is required under the FFACO (1996). CAU 261 is located in Area 25 of the Nevada Test Site (NTS) which is approximately 140 kilometers (87 miles) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada (Figure 1). CAU 261 consists of two Corrective Actionmore » Sites (CASS): CAS 25-05-01, Leachfield; and CAS 25-05-07, Acid Waste Leach Pit (AWLP) (Figures 2 and 3). Test Cell A was operated during the 1960s and 1970s to support the Nuclear Rocket Development Station. Various operations within Building 3124 at Test Cell A resulted in liquid waste releases to the Leachfield and the AWLP. The following existing site conditions were reported in the Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD) (U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office [DOE/NV], 1999): Soil in the leachfield was found to exceed the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) Action Level for petroleum hydrocarbons, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) preliminary remediation goals for semi volatile organic compounds, and background concentrations for strontium-90; Soil below the sewer pipe and approximately 4.5 meters (m) (15 feet [ft]) downstream of the initial outfall was found to exceed background concentrations for cesium-137 and strontium-90; Sludge in the leachfield septic tank was found to exceed the NDEP Action Level for petroleum hydrocarbons and to contain americium-241, cesium-137, uranium-234, uranium-238, potassium-40, and strontium-90; No constituents of concern (COC) were identified at the AWLP. The NDEP-approved CADD (DOWNV, 1999) recommended Corrective Action Alternative 2, ''Closure of the Septic Tank and Distribution Box, Partial Excavation, and Administrative Controls.'' The corrective action was performed following the NDEP-approved Corrective Action Plan (CAP) (DOE/NV, 2000).« less

A manual for addressing ineffectiveness within a Corrective Action System and driving on-time dispositions

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Mallari, Lawrence Anthony Castro

This project proposes a manual specifically for remedying an ineffective Corrective Action Request System for Company ABC by providing dispositions within the company's quality procedure. A Corrective Action Request System is a corrective action tool that provides a means for employees to engage in the process improvement, problem elimination cycle. At Company ABC, Corrective Action Recommendations (CARs) are not provided with timely dispositions; CARs are being ignored due to a lack of training and awareness of Company ABC's personnel and quality procedures. In this project, Company ABC's quality management software database is scrutinized to identify the number of delinquent, non-dispositioned CARs in 2014. These CARs are correlated with the number of nonconformances generated for the same issue while the CAR is still open. Using secondary data, the primary investigator finds that nonconformances are being remediated at the operational level. However, at the administrative level, CARS are being ignored and forgotten.

78 FR 63903 - Airworthiness Directives; the Boeing Company Airplanes

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-10-25

... Airplanes AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT. ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM... corrective actions if necessary. This proposed AD also specifies an optional action of doing an inspection for corrosion damage of the bonding brackets, and corrective actions if necessary, which would...

77 FR 68711 - Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Airplanes

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2012-11-16

... test for indications of corrosion and damage to the bogie assembly base material, and a magnetic particle inspection for cracks, corrosion, and damage of the bogie beam. Corrective actions include...

The application of hazard analysis and critical control points and risk management in the preparation of anti-cancer drugs.

PubMed

Bonan, Brigitte; Martelli, Nicolas; Berhoune, Malik; Maestroni, Marie-Laure; Havard, Laurent; Prognon, Patrice

2009-02-01

To apply the Hazard analysis and Critical Control Points method to the preparation of anti-cancer drugs. To identify critical control points in our cancer chemotherapy process and to propose control measures and corrective actions to manage these processes. The Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points application began in January 2004 in our centralized chemotherapy compounding unit. From October 2004 to August 2005, monitoring of the process nonconformities was performed to assess the method. According to the Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points method, a multidisciplinary team was formed to describe and assess the cancer chemotherapy process. This team listed all of the critical points and calculated their risk indexes according to their frequency of occurrence, their severity and their detectability. The team defined monitoring, control measures and corrective actions for each identified risk. Finally, over a 10-month period, pharmacists reported each non-conformity of the process in a follow-up document. Our team described 11 steps in the cancer chemotherapy process. The team identified 39 critical control points, including 11 of higher importance with a high-risk index. Over 10 months, 16,647 preparations were performed; 1225 nonconformities were reported during this same period. The Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points method is relevant when it is used to target a specific process such as the preparation of anti-cancer drugs. This method helped us to focus on the production steps, which can have a critical influence on product quality, and led us to improve our process.

Systems Biology & Mode of Action Based Risk Assessment

EPA Science Inventory

The application of systems biology for risk assessment of environmental chemicals is a national extension of its use in pharmaceutical research. The basis for this is the concept of a key event network that builds on existing mode of action frameworks for risk assessment. The a...

78 FR 28780 - Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement: Detection and Avoidance of Counterfeit...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-05-16

... clause at FAR 52.244-2, Subcontracts. (1) Unallowability of costs of rework and corrective action. A new... cost of rework or corrective action that may be required to remedy the use or inclusion of such parts... such products and for any rework or corrective action that may be required to remedy the use or...

36 CFR § 1280.34 - What are the types of corrective action NARA imposes for prohibited behavior?

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-07-01

... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 3 2013-07-01 2012-07-01 true What are the types of corrective action NARA imposes for prohibited behavior? § 1280.34 Section § 1280.34 Parks, Forests, and... of corrective action NARA imposes for prohibited behavior? (a) Individuals who violate the provisions...

77 FR 4392 - Agency Information Collection Activities: Requests for Comments; Clearance of Renewed Approval of...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2012-01-27

..., no. 225, page 72237. Airworthiness Directives are regulations issued to require correct corrective... inspections are often needed when emergency corrective action is taken to determine if the action was adequate...

Planning Protective Action Decision-Making: Evacuate or Shelter-in-Place

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Sorensen, J.H.

Appropriate protective action recommendations or decisions (PARs/PADs) are needed to achieve maximum protection of a population at risk. The factors that affect protective action decisions are complex but fairly well documented. Protective action decisions take into account population distributions, projected or actual exposure to a chemical substance, availability of adequate shelters, evacuation time estimates, and other relevant factors. To choose in-place sheltering, there should be a reasonable assurance that the movement of people beyond their residence, workplace, or school will endanger the health and safety of the public more so than allowing them to remain in place. The decision tomore » evacuate the public should be based on the reasonable assurance that the movement of people to an area outside of an affected area is in the best interest of their health and safety, and is of minimal risk to them. In reality, an evacuation decision is also a resource-dependent decision. The availability of transportation and other resources, including shelters, may factor heavily in the protective action decision-making process. All strategies to protect the health and safety of the public from a release of hazardous chemicals are explicitly considered during emergency decision making. Each institutional facility (such as hospitals, schools, day care centers, correctional facilities, assisted living facilities or nursing homes) in the community should be considered separately to determine what special protective actions may be necessary. Deciding whether to evacuate or to shelter-in-place is one of the most important questions facing local emergency planners responding to a toxic chemical release. That such a complex decision with such important potential consequences must be made with such urgency places tremendous responsibility on the planners and officials involved. Researchers have devoted considerable attention to the evacuation/shelter-in-place protection decision. While several decision aids have been developed, no single approach has achieved widespread acceptance based on validity, utility, and effectiveness (Ujihara 1989, Mannan and Kilpatrick 2000). In the absence of an agreed-upon methodology for making this decision, the best strategy for local emergency planners and officials is a thorough understanding of all the components affecting the decision. This paper summarizes what is currently known about the evacuation/shelter-in-place protection decision and points to available literature that more thoroughly explores the individual components of the decision. The next section summarizes the major issues in protective action decision process. This is followed by a discussion of all the factors that may bear on the protective action decision process. The final section address how to make a protective action decision.« less

Quantitative risk assessment of the New York State operated West Valley Radioactive Waste Disposal Area.

PubMed

Garrick, B John; Stetkar, John W; Bembia, Paul J

2010-08-01

This article is based on a quantitative risk assessment (QRA) that was performed on a radioactive waste disposal area within the Western New York Nuclear Service Center in western New York State. The QRA results were instrumental in the decision by the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority to support a strategy of in-place management of the disposal area for another decade. The QRA methodology adopted for this first of a kind application was a scenario-based approach in the framework of the triplet definition of risk (scenarios, likelihoods, consequences). The measure of risk is the frequency of occurrence of different levels of radiation dose to humans at prescribed locations. The risk from each scenario is determined by (1) the frequency of disruptive events or natural processes that cause a release of radioactive materials from the disposal area; (2) the physical form, quantity, and radionuclide content of the material that is released during each scenario; (3) distribution, dilution, and deposition of the released materials throughout the environment surrounding the disposal area; and (4) public exposure to the distributed material and the accumulated radiation dose from that exposure. The risks of the individual scenarios are assembled into a representation of the risk from the disposal area. In addition to quantifying the total risk to the public, the analysis ranks the importance of each contributing scenario, which facilitates taking corrective actions and implementing effective risk management. Perhaps most importantly, quantification of the uncertainties is an intrinsic part of the risk results. This approach to safety analysis has demonstrated many advantages of applying QRA principles to assessing the risk of facilities involving hazardous materials.

Neuropsychological Evidence for Visual- and Motor-Based Affordance: Effects of Reference Frame and Object-Hand Congruence

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Humphreys, Glyn W.; Wulff, Melanie; Yoon, Eun Young; Riddoch, M. Jane

2010-01-01

Two experiments are reported that use patients with visual extinction to examine how visual attention is influenced by action information in images. In Experiment 1 patients saw images of objects that were either correctly or incorrectly colocated for action, with the objects held by hands that were congruent or incongruent with those used…

Hypnotic clever hands: Agency and automatic responding.

PubMed

Polito, Vince; Barnier, Amanda J; Connors, Michael H

2018-06-01

The Clever Hands task (Wegner, Fuller, & Sparrow, 2003) is a behavioral illusion in which participants make responses to a trivia quiz for which they have no sense of agency. Sixty high hypnotizable participants completed two versions of the Clever Hands task. Quiz One was a replication of the original study. Quiz Two was a hypnotic adaptation using three suggestions that were based on clinical disruptions to the sense of agency. The suggestions were for: random responding, thought insertion, and alien control. These suggestions led to differences in accuracy (action production) and estimates of accuracy (action projection). Specifically, whereas the random responding suggestion had little effect, the two clinically based suggestions had opposite impacts on action production: the thought insertion suggestion led to an increase in the rate of correct responses (although participants still believed they were responding randomly); while the alien control suggestion led to a reduction in the rate of correct answers and a pattern of results that more closely approximated randomness. Contrary to theoretical accounts that claim that hypnosis affects executive monitoring rather than executive control, this result indicates that specific hypnotic suggestions can also influence the implicit processes involved in action production. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved).

76 FR 72237 - Agency Information Collection Activities: Requests for Comments; Clearance of Renewed Approval of...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-11-22

... correct corrective action to correct unsafe conditions in aircraft, engines, propellers, and appliances... action was adequate to correct the unsafe condition. The respondents are aircraft owners and operators... when an unsafe condition is discovered on a specific aircraft type. If the condition is serious enough...

77 FR 73114 - Agency Information Collection Activities: Requests for Comments; Clearance of Renewed Approval of...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2012-12-07

... correct corrective action to correct unsafe conditions in aircraft, engines, propellers, and appliances... action was adequate to correct the unsafe condition. The respondents are aircraft owners and operators... when an unsafe condition is discovered on a specific aircraft type. If the condition is serious enough...

Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan for the 92-Acre Area and Corrective Action Unit 111: Area 5 WMD Retired Mixed Waste Pits, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

NSTec Environmental Restoration

This Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan (CADD/CAP) has been prepared for the 92-Acre Area, the southeast quadrant of the Radioactive Waste Management Site, located in Area 5 of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The 92-Acre Area includes Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 111, 'Area 5 WMD Retired Mixed Waste Pits.' Data Quality Objectives (DQOs) were developed for the 92-Acre Area, which includes CAU 111. The result of the DQO process was that the 92-Acre Area is sufficiently characterized to provide the input data necessary to evaluate corrective action alternatives (CAAs) without the collection of additional data. The DQOs aremore » included as Appendix A of this document. This CADD/CAP identifies and provides the rationale for the recommended CAA for the 92-Acre Area, provides the plan for implementing the CAA, and details the post-closure plan. When approved, this CADD/CAP will supersede the existing Pit 3 (P03) Closure Plan, which was developed in accordance with Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 265, 'Interim Status Standards for Owners and Operators of Hazardous Waste Treatment, Storage, and Disposal Facilities.' This document will also serve as the Closure Plan and the Post-Closure Plan, which are required by 40 CFR 265, for the 92-Acre Area. After closure activities are complete, a request for the modification of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Permit that governs waste management activities at the NNSS will be submitted to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection to incorporate the requirements for post-closure monitoring. Four CAAs, ranging from No Further Action to Clean Closure, were evaluated for the 92-Acre Area. The CAAs were evaluated on technical merit focusing on performance, reliability, feasibility, safety, and cost. Based on the evaluation of the data used to develop the conceptual site model; a review of past, current, and future operations at the site; and the detailed and comparative analysis of the potential CAAs, Closure in Place with Administrative Controls is the preferred CAA for the 92-Acre Area. Closure activities will include the following: (1) Constructing an engineered evapotranspiration cover over the 92-Acre Area; (2) Installing use restriction (UR) warning signs, concrete monuments, and subsidence survey monuments; (3) Establishing vegetation on the cover; (4) Implementing a UR; and (5) Implementing post-closure inspections and monitoring. The Closure in Place with Administrative Controls alternative meets all requirements for the technical components evaluated, fulfills all applicable federal and state regulations for closure of the site, and will minimize potential future exposure pathways to the buried waste at the site.« less

Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan for the 92-Acre Area and Corrective Action Unit 111: Area 5 WMD Retired Mixed Waste Pits, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

NSTec Environmental Restoration

2009-07-31

This Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan (CADD/CAP) has been prepared for the 92-Acre Area, the southeast quadrant of the Radioactive Waste Management Site, located in Area 5 of the Nevada Test Site (NTS). The 92-Acre Area includes Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 111, 'Area 5 WMD Retired Mixed Waste Pits.' Data Quality Objectives (DQOs) were developed for the 92-Acre Area, which includes CAU 111. The result of the DQO process was that the 92-Acre Area is sufficiently characterized to provide the input data necessary to evaluate corrective action alternatives (CAAs) without the collection of additional data. The DQOs are includedmore » as Appendix A of this document. This CADD/CAP identifies and provides the rationale for the recommended CAA for the 92-Acre Area, provides the plan for implementing the CAA, and details the post-closure plan. When approved, this CADD/CAP will supersede the existing Pit 3 (P03) Closure Plan, which was developed in accordance with Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 265, 'Interim Status Standards for Owners and Operators of Hazardous Waste Treatment, Storage, and Disposal Facilities.' This document will also serve as the Closure Plan and the Post-Closure Plan, which are required by 40 CFR 265, for the 92-Acre Area. After closure activities are complete, a request for the modification of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Permit that governs waste management activities at the NTS will be submitted to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection to incorporate the requirements for post-closure monitoring. Four CAAs, ranging from No Further Action to Clean Closure, were evaluated for the 92-Acre Area. The CAAs were evaluated on technical merit focusing on performance, reliability, feasibility, safety, and cost. Based on the evaluation of the data used to develop the conceptual site model; a review of past, current, and future operations at the site; and the detailed and comparative analysis of the potential CAAs, Closure in Place with Administrative Controls is the preferred CAA for the 92-Acre Area. Closure activities will include the following: (1) Constructing an engineered evapotranspiration cover over the 92-Acre Area; (2) Installing use restriction (UR) warning signs, concrete monuments, and subsidence survey monuments; (3) Establishing vegetation on the cover; (4) Implementing a UR; and (5) Implementing post-closure inspections and monitoring. The Closure in Place with Administrative Controls alternative meets all requirements for the technical components evaluated, fulfills all applicable federal and state regulations for closure of the site, and will minimize potential future exposure pathways to the buried waste at the site.« less

49 CFR 385.323 - May FMCSA extend the period under § 385.319(c) for a new entrant to take corrective action to...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

...) for a new entrant to take corrective action to remedy its safety management practices? 385.323 Section....319(c) for a new entrant to take corrective action to remedy its safety management practices? (a... determines the new entrant is making a good faith effort to remedy its safety management practices. (b) FMCSA...

Actions for prevention and control of health threats related to maritime transport in European Union.

PubMed

Hadjichristodoulou, Christos; Mouchtouri, Varvara A; Guglielmetti, Paolo; Lemos, Cinthia Menel; Nichols, Gordon; Paux, Thierry; Schlaich, Clara; Cornejo, Miguel Davila; Martinez, Carmen Varela; Dionisio, Mauro; Rehmet, Sybille; Jaremin, Bogdan; Kremastinou, Jenny

2013-01-01

Actions at European Union level for International Health Regulations (IHR) 2005 implementation and maritime transport were focused on two European projects implemented between 2006 and 2011. Situation analysis and needs assessment were conducted, a Manual including European standards and best practice and training material was developed and training courses were delivered. Ship-to-port and port-to-port communication web-based network and database for recording IHR Ship Sanitation Certificates (SSC) were established. Fifty pilot inspections based on the Manual were conducted on passenger ships. A total of 393 corrective actions were implemented according to recommendations given to Captains during pilot inspections. The web-based communication network of competent authorities at ports in EU Member States was used to manage 13 events/outbreaks (dengue fever, Legionnaires' disease, gastroenteritis, meningitis, varicella and measles). The European information database system was used for producing and recording 1018 IHR SSC by 156 inspectors in 6 countries in accordance with the WHO Handbook for inspection of ships and issuance of SSC. Implementation of corrective actions after pilot inspections increased the level of compliance with the hygiene standards in passenger ships sailing within the EU waters and improved hygiene conditions. The communication tool contributed to improvement of outbreak identification and better management through rapid sharing of public health information, allowing a more timely and coordinated response. After the implementation of actions on passenger ships, the European Commission co-funded a Joint action that will expand the activities to all types of ships and chemical, biological and radio-nuclear threats (deliberate acts/accidental). Copyright © 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Dramatic Impact of Action Research of Arts-Based Teaching on At-Risk Students

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Li, Xin; Kenzy, Patty; Underwood, Lucy; Severson, Laura

2015-01-01

This study was presented at the American Educational Research Association 2012 conference in Vancouver, Canada. The study explored how action research of arts-based teaching (ABT) impacted at-risk students in three urban public schools in southern California, USA. ABT was defined as using arts, music, drama, and dance in teaching other subjects. A…

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 394: Areas 12, 18, and 29 Spill/Release Sites, Nevada Test Site, Nevada: Revision 0

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office

This Closure Report (CR) presents information supporting a closure recommendation for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 394: Areas 12, 18, and 29 Spill/Release Sites, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, in compliance with the requirements of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. This CAU contains six Corrective Action Sites (CASs): 12-25-04, UST 12-16-2 Waste Oil Release; 18-25-01, 18-25-02, 18-25-03, Oil Spills; 18-25-04, Spill (Diesel Fuel); and 29-44-01, Fuel Spill, located within Areas 12, 18, and 29 on the Nevada Test Site. The purpose of this CR is to provide documentation supporting recommendations of no further action or closure in place for CASsmore » within CAU 394. Throughout late 2002 and early to mid 2003, closure activities were performed as set forth in the CAU 394 Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration Plan. The closure activities identified the nature and extent of contaminants of potential concern at the CASs, and provided sufficient information and data to complete appropriate corrective actions for the CASs. Soil in CASs 18-25-02 and 18-25-03 containing polychlorinated biphenyls exceeding the action levels established by the Nevada Administrative Code were removed for proper disposal. The soil remaining in these CASs containing petroleum hydrocarbons exceeding the action level were closed in place with use restrictions. Corrective Action Sites 18-25-04 required no further corrective action; closure in place is required at CASs 12-25-04, 18-25-01, 18-25-02, 18-25-03, and 29-44-01; and use restrictions are required at CASs 12-25-04, 18-25-01, 18-25-02, 18-25-03 and 29-44-01. In summary, no corrective action plan is required for CAU 394.« less

21 CFR 820.100 - Corrective and preventive action.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-04-01

..., work operations, concessions, quality audit reports, quality records, service records, complaints, returned product, and other sources of quality data to identify existing and potential causes of... (CONTINUED) MEDICAL DEVICES QUALITY SYSTEM REGULATION Corrective and Preventive Action § 820.100 Corrective...

21 CFR 820.100 - Corrective and preventive action.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-04-01

..., work operations, concessions, quality audit reports, quality records, service records, complaints, returned product, and other sources of quality data to identify existing and potential causes of... (CONTINUED) MEDICAL DEVICES QUALITY SYSTEM REGULATION Corrective and Preventive Action § 820.100 Corrective...

21 CFR 820.100 - Corrective and preventive action.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-04-01

..., work operations, concessions, quality audit reports, quality records, service records, complaints, returned product, and other sources of quality data to identify existing and potential causes of... (CONTINUED) MEDICAL DEVICES QUALITY SYSTEM REGULATION Corrective and Preventive Action § 820.100 Corrective...

21 CFR 820.100 - Corrective and preventive action.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-04-01

..., work operations, concessions, quality audit reports, quality records, service records, complaints, returned product, and other sources of quality data to identify existing and potential causes of... (CONTINUED) MEDICAL DEVICES QUALITY SYSTEM REGULATION Corrective and Preventive Action § 820.100 Corrective...

21 CFR 820.100 - Corrective and preventive action.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-04-01

..., work operations, concessions, quality audit reports, quality records, service records, complaints, returned product, and other sources of quality data to identify existing and potential causes of... (CONTINUED) MEDICAL DEVICES QUALITY SYSTEM REGULATION Corrective and Preventive Action § 820.100 Corrective...

Corrective action investigation plan for Corrective Action Unit 340, Pesticide Release Sites, Nevada Test Site, Nye County, Nevada

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

NONE

This Correction Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) has been developed in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) that was agreed to by the US Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office (DOE/NV); the State of Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP); and the US Department of Defense. As required by the FFACO (1996), this document provides or references all of the specific information for planning investigation activities associated with three Corrective Action Sites (CASs) located at the Nevada Test Site (NTS). These CASs are collectively known as Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 340, Pesticide Release Sites. According to themore » FFACO, CASs are sites that may require corrective action(s) and may include solid waste management units or individual disposal or release sites. These sites are CAS 23-21-01, Area 23 Quonset Hut 800 (Q800) Pesticide Release Ditch; CAS 23-18-03, Area 23 Skid Huts Pesticide Storage; and CAS 15-18-02, Area 15 Quonset Hut 15-11 Pesticide Storage (Q15-11). The purpose of this CAIP for CAU 340 is to direct and guide the investigation for the evaluation of the nature and extent of pesticides, herbicides, and other contaminants of potential concern (COPCs) that were stored, mixed, and/or disposed of at each of the CASs.« less

Corrective action investigation plan for CAU Number 453: Area 9 Landfill, Tonopah Test Range

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

NONE

This Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) contains the environmental sample collection objectives and criteria for conducting site investigation activities at the Area 9 Landfill, Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 453/Corrective Action (CAS) 09-55-001-0952, which is located at the Tonopah Test Range (TTR). The TTR, included in the Nellis Air Force Range, is approximately 255 kilometers (140 miles) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. The Area 9 Landfill is located northwest of Area 9 on the TTR. The landfill cells associated with CAU 453 were excavated to receive waste generated from the daily operations conducted at Area 9 and from range cleanup whichmore » occurred after test activities.« less

Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan for Corrective Action Unit 117: Area 26 Pluto Disassembly Facility, Nevada Test Site, Nevada With Errata Sheets, Revision 0

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Pat Matthews

This Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan addresses the actions needed to achieve closure for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 117, Pluto Disassembly Facility, identified in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Corrective Action Unit 117 consists of one Corrective Action Site (CAS), CAS 26-41-01, located in Area 26 of the Nevada Test Site. This plan provides the methodology for field activities needed to gather the necessary information for closing CAS 26-41-01. There is sufficient information and process knowledge from historical documentation and investigations of similar sites regarding the expected nature and extent of potential contaminants to recommend closuremore » of CAU 117 using the SAFER process. Additional information will be obtained by conducting a field investigation before finalizing the appropriate corrective action for this CAS. The results of the field investigation will support a defensible recommendation that no further corrective action is necessary following SAFER activities. This will be presented in a Closure Report that will be prepared and submitted to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) for review and approval. The site will be investigated to meet the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed on June 27, 2007, by representatives of NDEP; U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office; Stoller-Navarro Joint Venture; and National Security Technologies, LLC. The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to determine and implement appropriate corrective actions for CAS 26-41-01 in CAU 117.« less

7 CFR 275.17 - State corrective action plan.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 7 Agriculture 4 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false State corrective action plan. 275.17 Section 275.17 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued) FOOD AND NUTRITION SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF... be taken, the expected outcome of each action, the target date for each action, and the date by which...

7 CFR 275.17 - State corrective action plan.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 7 Agriculture 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false State corrective action plan. 275.17 Section 275.17 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued) FOOD AND NUTRITION SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF... be taken, the expected outcome of each action, the target date for each action, and the date by which...

A service evaluation of on-line image-guided radiotherapy to lower extremity sarcoma: Investigating the workload implications of a 3 mm action level for image assessment and correction prior to delivery.

PubMed

Taylor, C; Parker, J; Stratford, J; Warren, M

2018-05-01

Although all systematic and random positional setup errors can be corrected for in entirety during on-line image-guided radiotherapy, the use of a specified action level, below which no correction occurs, is also an option. The following service evaluation aimed to investigate the use of this 3 mm action level for on-line image assessment and correction (online, systematic set-up error and weekly evaluation) for lower extremity sarcoma, and understand the impact on imaging frequency and patient positioning error within one cancer centre. All patients were immobilised using a thermoplastic shell attached to a plastic base and an individual moulded footrest. A retrospective analysis of 30 patients was performed. Patient setup and correctional data derived from cone beam CT analysis was retrieved. The timing, frequency and magnitude of corrections were evaluated. The population systematic and random error was derived. 20% of patients had no systematic corrections over the duration of treatment, and 47% had one. The maximum number of systematic corrections per course of radiotherapy was 4, which occurred for 2 patients. 34% of episodes occurred within the first 5 fractions. All patients had at least one observed translational error during their treatment greater than 0.3 cm, and 80% of patients had at least one observed translational error during their treatment greater than 0.5 cm. The population systematic error was 0.14 cm, 0.10 cm, 0.14 cm and random error was 0.27 cm, 0.22 cm, 0.23 cm in the lateral, caudocranial and anteroposterial directions. The required Planning Target Volume margin for the study population was 0.55 cm, 0.41 cm and 0.50 cm in the lateral, caudocranial and anteroposterial directions. The 3 mm action level for image assessment and correction prior to delivery reduced the imaging burden and focussed intervention on patients that exhibited greater positional variability. This strategy could be an efficient deployment of departmental resources if full daily correction of positional setup error is not possible. Copyright © 2017. Published by Elsevier Ltd.

49 CFR 385.325 - What happens after a new entrant has been notified under § 385.319(c) to take corrective action...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... under § 385.319(c) to take corrective action to remedy its safety management practices? 385.325 Section... been notified under § 385.319(c) to take corrective action to remedy its safety management practices... not be revoked and it may continue operations. (b) If a new entrant, after being notified that it is...

TERRA Battery Thermal Control Anomaly - Simulation and Corrective Actions

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Grob, Eric W.

2010-01-01

The TERRA spacecraft was launched in December 1999 from Vandenberg Air Force Base, becoming the flagship of NASA's Earth Observing System program to gather data on how the planet's processes create climate. Originally planned as a 5 year mission, it still provides valuable science data after nearly 10 years on orbit. On October 13th, 2009 at 16:23z following a routine inclination maneuver, TERRA experienced a battery cell failure and a simultaneous failure of several battery heater control circuits used to maintain cell temperatures and gradients within the battery. With several cells nearing the minimum survival temperature, preventing the electrolyte from freezing was the first priority. After several reset attempts and power cycling of the control electronics failed to reestablish control authority on the primary side of the controller, it was switched to the redundant side, but anomalous performance again prevented full heater control of the battery cells. As the investigation into the cause of the anomaly and corrective action continued, a battery thermal model was developed to be used in determining the control ability remaining and to simulate and assess corrective actions. Although no thermal model or detailed reference data of the battery was available, sufficient information was found to allow a simplified model to be constructed, correlated against pre-anomaly telemetry, and used to simulate the thermal behavior at several points after the anomaly. It was then used to simulate subsequent corrective actions to assess their impact on cell temperatures. This paper describes the rapid development of this thermal model, including correlation to flight data before and after the anomaly., along with a comparative assessment of the analysis results used to interpret the telemetry to determine the extent of damage to the thermal control hardware, with near-term corrective actions and long-term operations plan to overcome the anomaly.

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 340: NTS Pesticide Release Sites Nevada Test Site, Nevada

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

C. M. Obi

The purpose of this report is to provide documentation of the completed corrective action and to provide data confirming the corrective action. The corrective action was performed in accordance with the approved Corrective Action Plan (CAP) (U.S. Department of Energy [DOE], 1999) and consisted of clean closure by excavation and disposal. The Area 15 Quonset Hut 15-11 was formerly used for storage of farm supplies including pesticides, herbicides, and fertilizers. The Area 23 Quonset Hut 800 was formerly used to clean pesticide and herbicide equipment. Steam-cleaning rinsate and sink drainage occasionally overflowed a sump into adjoining drainage ditches. One ditchmore » flows south and is referred to as the quonset hut ditch. The other ditch flows southeast and is referred to as the inner drainage ditch. The Area 23 Skid Huts were formerly used for storing and mixing pesticide and herbicide solutions. Excess solutions were released directly to the ground near the skid huts. The skid huts were moved to a nearby location prior to the site characterization performed in 1998 and reported in the Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD) (DOE, 1998). The vicinity and site plans of the Area 23 sites are shown in Figures 2 and 3, respectively.« less

Action planning as predictor of health protective and health risk behavior: an investigation of fruit and snack consumption

PubMed Central

van Osch, Liesbeth; Beenackers, Mariëlle; Reubsaet, Astrid; Lechner, Lilian; Candel, Math; de Vries, Hein

2009-01-01

Background Large discrepancies between people's intention to eat a healthy diet and actual dietary behavior indicate that motivation is not a sufficient instigator for healthy behavior. Research efforts to decrease this 'intention - behavior gap' have centered on aspects of self-regulation, most importantly self-regulatory planning. Most studies on the impact of self-regulatory planning in health and dietary behavior focus on the promotion of health protective behaviors. This study investigates and compares the predictive value of action planning in health protective behavior and the restriction of health risk behavior. Methods Two longitudinal observational studies were performed simultaneously, one focusing on fruit consumption (N = 572) and one on high-caloric snack consumption (N = 585) in Dutch adults. Structural equation modeling was used to investigate and compare the predictive value of action planning in both behaviors, correcting for demographics and the influence of motivational factors and past behavior. The nature of the influence of action planning was investigated by testing mediating and moderating effects. Results Action planning was a significant predictor of fruit consumption and restricted snack consumption beyond the influence of motivational factors and past behavior. The strength of the predictive value of action planning did not differ between the two behaviors. Evidence for mediation of the intention - behavior relationship was found for both behaviors. Positive moderating effects of action planning were demonstrated for fruit consumption, indicating that individuals who report high levels of action planning are significantly more likely to translate their intentions into actual behavior. Conclusion The results indicate that the planning of specific preparatory actions predicts the performance of healthy dietary behavior and support the application of self-regulatory planning in both health protective and health risk behaviors. Future interventions in dietary modification may turn these findings to advantage by incorporating one common planning protocol to increase the likelihood that good intentions are translated into healthy dietary behavior. PMID:19825172

Addendum to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 357: Mud Pits and Waste Dump, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Krauss, Mark J

This document constitutes an addendum to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 357: Mud Pits and Waste Dump, Nevada Test Site, Nevada as described in the document Recommendations and Justifications To Remove Use Restrictions Established under the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order dated September 2013. The Use Restriction Removal document was approved by the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection on October 16, 2013. The approval of the UR Removal document constituted approval of each of the recommended UR removals. In conformance with the UR Removal document, thismore » addendum consists of: This page that refers the reader to the UR Removal document for additional information The cover, title, and signature pages of the UR Removal document The NDEP approval letter The corresponding section of the UR Removal document This addendum provides the documentation justifying the cancellation of the UR for CAS 04-26-03, Lead Bricks. This UR was established as part of FFACO corrective actions and was based on the presence of lead contamination at concentrations greater than the action level established at the time of the initial investigation.« less

Agent-Based Simulations for Project Management

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

White, J. Chris; Sholtes, Robert M.

2011-01-01

Currently, the most common approach used in project planning tools is the Critical Path Method (CPM). While this method was a great improvement over the basic Gantt chart technique being used at the time, it now suffers from three primary flaws: (1) task duration is an input, (2) productivity impacts are not considered , and (3) management corrective actions are not included. Today, computers have exceptional computational power to handle complex simulations of task e)(eculion and project management activities (e.g ., dynamically changing the number of resources assigned to a task when it is behind schedule). Through research under a Department of Defense contract, the author and the ViaSim team have developed a project simulation tool that enables more realistic cost and schedule estimates by using a resource-based model that literally turns the current duration-based CPM approach "on its head." The approach represents a fundamental paradigm shift in estimating projects, managing schedules, and reducing risk through innovative predictive techniques.

Satellite-Enhanced Dynamical Downscaling of Extreme Events

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Nunes, A.

2015-12-01

Severe weather events can be the triggers of environmental disasters in regions particularly susceptible to changes in hydrometeorological conditions. In that regard, the reconstruction of past extreme weather events can help in the assessment of vulnerability and risk mitigation actions. Using novel modeling approaches, dynamical downscaling of long-term integrations from global circulation models can be useful for risk analysis, providing more accurate climate information at regional scales. Originally developed at the National Centers for Environmental Prediction (NCEP), the Regional Spectral Model (RSM) is being used in the dynamical downscaling of global reanalysis, within the South American Hydroclimate Reconstruction Project. Here, RSM combines scale-selective bias correction with assimilation of satellite-based precipitation estimates to downscale extreme weather occurrences. Scale-selective bias correction is a method employed in the downscaling, similar to the spectral nudging technique, in which the downscaled solution develops in agreement with its coarse boundaries. Precipitation assimilation acts on modeled deep-convection, drives the land-surface variables, and therefore the hydrological cycle. During the downscaling of extreme events that took place in Brazil in recent years, RSM continuously assimilated NCEP Climate Prediction Center morphing technique precipitation rates. As a result, RSM performed better than its global (reanalysis) forcing, showing more consistent hydrometeorological fields compared with more sophisticated global reanalyses. Ultimately, RSM analyses might provide better-quality initial conditions for high-resolution numerical predictions in metropolitan areas, leading to more reliable short-term forecasting of severe local storms.

Some ethical problems of hazardous substances in the working environment1

PubMed Central

Lee, W. R.

1977-01-01

ABSTRACT Exposure of persons to conditions at work may involve some risk to health. It is not possible always to ensure that exposure can be kept below a level from which it may be categorically stated that there is no risk. The decision that has to be made, what ought to be done, poses an ethical problem. What principles are available for examining such ethical problems? Two theories from the study of ethics seem relevant. On the one hand Intuitionism asserts that we possess a moral sense which, correctly applied, enables us to determine what is a right action. The familiar use of 'conscience' and the teachings of some of the influential Western religions follow this theory. On the other hand Utilitarianism (in particular Objective Utilitarianism) asserts that we may judge the rightness of an action by looking at its consequences. This theory, translated into legislative reform, has provided a substantial basis for much of the social reforming legislation of the last century. In economic terms it appears as cost benefit analysis. Despite its attraction and almost plausible objectivity, Utilitarianism requires the quantification and even costing of consequences which cannot always be measured (for example, emotions) but which from an important part of the totality of life. Decisions about the right course of action are required politically but cannot always be made objectively. They may require an element of judgement—a correct application of the moral sense—to use the Intuitionists' phrase. Doctors, used to making ethical decisions in the clinical setting, must examine carefully their role when contributing to ethical decisions in the industrial setting. PMID:588483

Comparison of RCRA SWMU Corrective Action and CERCLA Remedial Action

DTIC Science & Technology

1991-09-30

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5 . FUNDING NUMBERS Comparison of RCRA SWMU Corrective Action and CERCLA Remedial Action 6. AUTHOR(S) Sam Capps Rupe, Major -1...Interim Status for TSD Facilities .................... 19 5 . Closure and Postclosure Requirements for TSD Facilities ........... 25 D. State Role... 65 1. RCRA Facility Assessment . ............................... 65 2. RCRA Facility Investigation . .............................. 66 3

School--Possibility or (New) Risk for Young Females in Correctional Institutions

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Boric, Ivana Jedud; Mirosavljevic, Anja

2015-01-01

In this paper, the authors deal with the education of girls in a Croatian correctional institution as a risk factor for social exclusion based on the data obtained via semi-structured interviews with experts and the girls and via the documentation analysis method. In this regard, the paper deals with two perspectives, i.e. the girls' and experts',…

Autonomous power expert system advanced development

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Quinn, Todd M.; Walters, Jerry L.

1991-01-01

The autonomous power expert (APEX) system is being developed at Lewis Research Center to function as a fault diagnosis advisor for a space power distribution test bed. APEX is a rule-based system capable of detecting faults and isolating the probable causes. APEX also has a justification facility to provide natural language explanations about conclusions reached during fault isolation. To help maintain the health of the power distribution system, additional capabilities were added to APEX. These capabilities allow detection and isolation of incipient faults and enable the expert system to recommend actions/procedure to correct the suspected fault conditions. New capabilities for incipient fault detection consist of storage and analysis of historical data and new user interface displays. After the cause of a fault is determined, appropriate recommended actions are selected by rule-based inferencing which provides corrective/extended test procedures. Color graphics displays and improved mouse-selectable menus were also added to provide a friendlier user interface. A discussion of APEX in general and a more detailed description of the incipient detection, recommended actions, and user interface developments during the last year are presented.

Communication strategies for enhancing understanding of the behavioral implications of genetic and biomarker tests for disease risk: the role of coherence.

PubMed

Cameron, Linda D; Marteau, Theresa M; Brown, Paul M; Klein, William M P; Sherman, Kerry A

2012-06-01

Individuals frequently have difficulty understanding how behavior can reduce genetically-conferred risk for diseases such as colon cancer. With increasing opportunities to purchase genetic tests, communication strategies are needed for presenting information in ways that optimize comprehension and adaptive behavior. Using the Common-Sense Model, we tested the efficacy of a strategy for providing information about the relationships (links) among the physiological processes underlying disease risk and protective action on understanding, protective action motivations, and willingness to purchase tests. We tested the generalizability of the strategy's effects across varying risk levels, for genetic tests versus tests of a non-genetic biomarker, and when using graphic and numeric risk formats. In an internet-based experiment, 749 adults from four countries responded to messages about a hypothetical test for colon cancer risk. Messages varied by Risk-Action Link Information (provision or no provision of information describing how a low-fat diet reduces risk given positive results, indicating presence of a gene fault), Risk Increment (20%, 50%, or 80% risk given positive results), Risk Format (numeric or graphic presentation of risk increments), and Test Type (genetic or enzyme). Providing risk-action link information enhanced beliefs of coherence (understanding how a low-fat diet reduces risk) and response efficacy (low-fat diets effectively reduce risk) and lowered appraisals of anticipated risk of colon cancer given positive results. These effects held across risk increments, risk formats, and test types. For genetic tests, provision of risk-action link information reduced the amount individuals were willing to pay for testing. Brief messages explaining how action can reduce genetic and biomarker-detected risks can promote beliefs motivating protective action. By enhancing understanding of behavioral control, they may reduce the perceived value of genetic risk information.

Optimizing inpatient glycemic control with basal-bolus insulin therapy.

PubMed

Pollom, R Daniel

2010-11-01

Hyperglycemia is highly prevalent in the acute-care setting and is associated with an increased risk of morbidity and mortality. Evidence suggests that glycemic control in this population is suboptimal, due in part to continued use of nonphysiologic sliding-scale insulin strategies without scheduled basal insulin doses or prandial insulin with concomitant correction doses. Although the ineffectiveness and risks of sliding-scale insulin regimens have been criticized for decades, sliding-scale insulin is still the most commonly prescribed subcutaneous insulin regimen among inpatients. Improving inpatient management requires the use of scheduled basal-bolus insulin therapy that includes basal insulin, nutritional insulin, and supplemental, or correctional, insulin. Insulin analogs are the preferred insulins, as they provide a more physiologic action than human insulin regimens, are associated with a lower risk of hypoglycemia, and are more convenient to administer than human insulins. Standardized insulin protocols and subcutaneous insulin order sets are critical components of effective inpatient glycemic control. Although preliminary data have demonstrated that inpatient diabetes management programs involving basal-bolus insulin therapy are effective and well tolerated, more research is needed.

77 FR 59728 - Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2012-10-01

... correct installation of certain bonding straps, and applicable corrective actions. This new AD adds... the potential of ignition sources inside fuel tanks in the event of a severe lightning strike, which... installation of certain bonding straps, and applicable corrective actions. That NPRM also proposed to add...

7 CFR 225.11 - Corrective action procedures.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... 7 Agriculture 4 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Corrective action procedures. 225.11 Section 225.11 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued) FOOD AND NUTRITION SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE CHILD NUTRITION PROGRAMS SUMMER FOOD SERVICE PROGRAM State Agency Provisions § 225.11 Corrective...

7 CFR 225.11 - Corrective action procedures.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... 7 Agriculture 4 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Corrective action procedures. 225.11 Section 225.11 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued) FOOD AND NUTRITION SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE CHILD NUTRITION PROGRAMS SUMMER FOOD SERVICE PROGRAM State Agency Provisions § 225.11 Corrective...

7 CFR 225.11 - Corrective action procedures.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... 7 Agriculture 4 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Corrective action procedures. 225.11 Section 225.11 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued) FOOD AND NUTRITION SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE CHILD NUTRITION PROGRAMS SUMMER FOOD SERVICE PROGRAM State Agency Provisions § 225.11 Corrective...

20 CFR 633.315 - Replacement, corrective action, termination.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-04-01

... subrecipient agreements, development of and compliance with corrective action plans, etc. (c) In cases where..., section 402 programs by reason of congressional action, whether by authorization, appropriation, deferral... onsite, seize bank accounts relating to the program, arrange for the payment of legitimate bills and...

20 CFR 633.315 - Replacement, corrective action, termination.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-04-01

... subrecipient agreements, development of and compliance with corrective action plans, etc. (c) In cases where..., section 402 programs by reason of congressional action, whether by authorization, appropriation, deferral... onsite, seize bank accounts relating to the program, arrange for the payment of legitimate bills and...

Children's and adults' use of verbal information to visually anticipate others' actions: A study on explicit and implicit social-cognitive processing.

PubMed

Paulus, Markus; Schuwerk, Tobias; Sodian, Beate; Ganglmayer, Kerstin

2017-03-01

According to recent theories, social cognition is based on two different types of information-processing; an implicit or action-based one and an explicit or verbal one. The present study examined whether implicit and explicit social-cognitive information processing interact with each other by investigating young children's and adults' use of verbal (i.e., explicit) information to predict others' actions. Employing eye-tracking to measure anticipatory eye-movements as a measure of implicit processing, Experiment 1 presented 1.5-, 2.5-, and 3.5-year-old children as well as adults with agents who announced to move to either of two possible targets. The results show that only the 3.5-year-old children and adults, but not the 1.5- and 2.5-year-old children were able to use verbal information to correctly anticipate others' actions. Yet, Experiments 2 and 3 showed that 2.5-year-old children were able to use explicit information to give a correct explicit answer (Experiment 2) and that they were able to use statistical information to anticipate the other's actions (Experiment 3). Overall, the study is in line with theoretical claims that two types of information-processing underlie human social cognition. It shows that these two inform each other by 3years of age. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

7 CFR 275.3 - Federal monitoring.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... necessitate long range analytical and evaluative measures for corrective action development shall be... effective. In addition, FNS will examine the State agency's corrective action monitoring and evaluative...

7 CFR 275.3 - Federal monitoring.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... necessitate long range analytical and evaluative measures for corrective action development shall be... effective. In addition, FNS will examine the State agency's corrective action monitoring and evaluative...

7 CFR 275.3 - Federal monitoring.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... necessitate long range analytical and evaluative measures for corrective action development shall be... effective. In addition, FNS will examine the State agency's corrective action monitoring and evaluative...

7 CFR 275.3 - Federal monitoring.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... necessitate long range analytical and evaluative measures for corrective action development shall be... effective. In addition, FNS will examine the State agency's corrective action monitoring and evaluative...

7 CFR 275.3 - Federal monitoring.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... necessitate long range analytical and evaluative measures for corrective action development shall be... effective. In addition, FNS will examine the State agency's corrective action monitoring and evaluative...

Food safety security: a new concept for enhancing food safety measures.

PubMed

Iyengar, Venkatesh; Elmadfa, Ibrahim

2012-06-01

The food safety security (FSS) concept is perceived as an early warning system for minimizing food safety (FS) breaches, and it functions in conjunction with existing FS measures. Essentially, the function of FS and FSS measures can be visualized in two parts: (i) the FS preventive measures as actions taken at the stem level, and (ii) the FSS interventions as actions taken at the root level, to enhance the impact of the implemented safety steps. In practice, along with FS, FSS also draws its support from (i) legislative directives and regulatory measures for enforcing verifiable, timely, and effective compliance; (ii) measurement systems in place for sustained quality assurance; and (iii) shared responsibility to ensure cohesion among all the stakeholders namely, policy makers, regulators, food producers, processors and distributors, and consumers. However, the functional framework of FSS differs from that of FS by way of: (i) retooling the vulnerable segments of the preventive features of existing FS measures; (ii) fine-tuning response systems to efficiently preempt the FS breaches; (iii) building a long-term nutrient and toxicant surveillance network based on validated measurement systems functioning in real time; (iv) focusing on crisp, clear, and correct communication that resonates among all the stakeholders; and (v) developing inter-disciplinary human resources to meet ever-increasing FS challenges. Important determinants of FSS include: (i) strengthening international dialogue for refining regulatory reforms and addressing emerging risks; (ii) developing innovative and strategic action points for intervention {in addition to Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP) procedures]; and (iii) introducing additional science-based tools such as metrology-based measurement systems.

Predicting Physical Activity-Related Outcomes in Overweight and Obese Adults: A Health Action Process Approach.

PubMed

Hattar, Anne; Pal, Sebely; Hagger, Martin S

2016-03-01

We tested the adequacy of a model based on the Health Action Process Approach (HAPA) in predicting changes in psychological, body composition, and cardiovascular risk outcomes with respect to physical activity participation in overweight and obese adults. Measures of HAPA constructs (action and maintenance self-efficacy, outcome expectancies, action planning, risk perceptions, intentions, behaviour), psychological outcomes (quality of life, depression, anxiety, stress symptoms), body composition variables (body weight, body fat mass), cardiovascular risk measures (total cholesterol, low density lipoprotein), and self-reported physical activity behaviour were administered to participants (N = 74) at baseline, and 6 and 12 weeks later. Data were analysed using variance-based structural equation modelling with residualised change scores for HAPA variables. The model revealed effects of action self-efficacy and outcome expectancies on physical activity intentions, action self-efficacy on maintenance self-efficacy, and maintenance self-efficacy and intentions on action planning. Intention predicted psychological and body composition outcomes indirectly through physical activity behaviour. Action planning was a direct predictor of psychological, cardiovascular, and body composition outcomes. Data supported HAPA hypotheses in relation to intentions and behaviour, but not the role of action planning as a mediator of the intention-behaviour relationship. Action planning predicted outcomes independent of intentions and behaviour. © 2016 The International Association of Applied Psychology.

Cognitive problem solving patterns of medical students correlate with success in diagnostic case solutions.

PubMed

Kiesewetter, Jan; Ebersbach, René; Görlitz, Anja; Holzer, Matthias; Fischer, Martin R; Schmidmaier, Ralf

2013-01-01

Problem-solving in terms of clinical reasoning is regarded as a key competence of medical doctors. Little is known about the general cognitive actions underlying the strategies of problem-solving among medical students. In this study, a theory-based model was used and adapted in order to investigate the cognitive actions in which medical students are engaged when dealing with a case and how patterns of these actions are related to the correct solution. Twenty-three medical students worked on three cases on clinical nephrology using the think-aloud method. The transcribed recordings were coded using a theory-based model consisting of eight different cognitive actions. The coded data was analysed using time sequences in a graphical representation software. Furthermore the relationship between the coded data and accuracy of diagnosis was investigated with inferential statistical methods. The observation of all main actions in a case elaboration, including evaluation, representation and integration, was considered a complete model and was found in the majority of cases (56%). This pattern significantly related to the accuracy of the case solution (φ = 0.55; p<.001). Extent of prior knowledge was neither related to the complete model nor to the correct solution. The proposed model is suitable to empirically verify the cognitive actions of problem-solving of medical students. The cognitive actions evaluation, representation and integration are crucial for the complete model and therefore for the accuracy of the solution. The educational implication which may be drawn from this study is to foster students reasoning by focusing on higher level reasoning.

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 405: Area 3 Septic Systems, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada(April 2001, Rev. 0) with Record of Technical Change No. 1

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

DOE /NV

2001-04-26

This Corrective Action Investigation Plan contains the U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office's (DOE/NV's) approach to collect the data necessary to evaluate corrective action alternatives appropriate for the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 405, Area 3 Septic Systems, Tonopah Test Range (TTR), under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Corrective Action Unit 405 consists of Corrective Action Sites 03-05-002-SW03, 03-05-002-SW04, and 03-05-002-SW07 (also collectively known as: Septic Waste Systems [SWSs] 3, 4, and 7). Located in Area 3 in the northwest section of the TTR, approximately 140 miles northwest of Las Vegas, this location was historically (betweenmore » 1960 and 1990) used as a research facility with the mission to perform defense-related projects, and whose operations generated sanitary and industrial wastewaters potentially contaminated with COPCs and disposed of in septic tanks and leachfields. Though Septic Waste Systems 3, 4, and 7 were origin ally constructed to receive sanitary sewage, they may have inadvertently received effluent containing potentially hazardous and radiological constituents containing acetone, benzene, ethylbenzene, 4-methyl-2-pentanone, toluene, xylenes, volatile organic compound constituents, phenols, arsenic, barium, lead, mercury, hydrocarbons of oil and grease, and uranium-234, -235, and -238. The Area 3 septic systems were documented in a DOE/NV 1996 report as being included in the septic tank abandonment program conducted by Sandia National Laboratories in 1993; however, this program was not completed and the possibility exists that some of the Area 3 septic tanks may not have been abandoned. Even though all of the SWSs addressed in this CAIP are inactive, geophysical surveys conducted in 1993 were generally inconclusive and did not provide useful data for the purposes of this investigation. The scope of this current investigation, therefore, will be to determine the existence of the identified CO PCs and excavation will be the primary investigation method employed for these leachfield systems, but this effort may be limited by existing facilities and utilities. The results of this field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of corrective action alternatives in the subsequent corrective action decision document.« less

Time-Tagged Risk/Reliability Assessment Program for Development and Operation of Space System

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Kubota, Yuki; Takegahara, Haruki; Aoyagi, Junichiro

We have investigated a new method of risk/reliability assessment for development and operation of space system. It is difficult to evaluate risk of spacecraft, because of long time operation, maintenance free and difficulty of test under the ground condition. Conventional methods are FMECA, FTA, ETA and miscellaneous. These are not enough to assess chronological anomaly and there is a problem to share information during R&D. A new method of risk and reliability assessment, T-TRAP (Time-tagged Risk/Reliability Assessment Program) is proposed as a management tool for the development and operation of space system. T-TRAP consisting of time-resolved Fault Tree and Criticality Analyses, upon occurrence of anomaly in the system, facilitates the responsible personnel to quickly identify the failure cause and decide corrective actions. This paper describes T-TRAP method and its availability.

Error, rather than its probability, elicits specific electrocortical signatures: a combined EEG-immersive virtual reality study of action observation.

PubMed

Pezzetta, Rachele; Nicolardi, Valentina; Tidoni, Emmanuele; Aglioti, Salvatore Maria

2018-06-06

Detecting errors in one's own actions, and in the actions of others, is a crucial ability for adaptable and flexible behavior. Studies show that specific EEG signatures underpin the monitoring of observed erroneous actions (error-related negativity, error-positivity, mid-frontal theta oscillations). However, the majority of studies on action observation used sequences of trials where erroneous actions were less frequent than correct actions. Therefore, it was not possible to disentangle whether the activation of the performance monitoring system was due to an error - as a violation of the intended goal - or a surprise/novelty effect, associated with a rare and unexpected event. Combining EEG and immersive virtual reality (IVR-CAVE system), we recorded the neural signal of 25 young adults who observed in first-person perspective, simple reach-to-grasp actions performed by an avatar aiming for a glass. Importantly, the proportion of erroneous actions was higher than correct actions. Results showed that the observation of erroneous actions elicits the typical electro-cortical signatures of error monitoring and therefore the violation of the action goal is still perceived as a salient event. The observation of correct actions elicited stronger alpha suppression. This confirmed the role of the alpha frequency band in the general orienting response to novel and infrequent stimuli. Our data provides novel evidence that an observed goal error (the action slip) triggers the activity of the performance monitoring system even when erroneous actions, which are, typically, relevant events, occur more often than correct actions and thus are not salient because of their rarity.

Temporal sequence learning in winner-take-all networks of spiking neurons demonstrated in a brain-based device.

PubMed

McKinstry, Jeffrey L; Edelman, Gerald M

2013-01-01

Animal behavior often involves a temporally ordered sequence of actions learned from experience. Here we describe simulations of interconnected networks of spiking neurons that learn to generate patterns of activity in correct temporal order. The simulation consists of large-scale networks of thousands of excitatory and inhibitory neurons that exhibit short-term synaptic plasticity and spike-timing dependent synaptic plasticity. The neural architecture within each area is arranged to evoke winner-take-all (WTA) patterns of neural activity that persist for tens of milliseconds. In order to generate and switch between consecutive firing patterns in correct temporal order, a reentrant exchange of signals between these areas was necessary. To demonstrate the capacity of this arrangement, we used the simulation to train a brain-based device responding to visual input by autonomously generating temporal sequences of motor actions.

Clinical Validity, Understandability, and Actionability of Online Cardiovascular Disease Risk Calculators: Systematic Review.

PubMed

Bonner, Carissa; Fajardo, Michael Anthony; Hui, Samuel; Stubbs, Renee; Trevena, Lyndal

2018-02-01

Online health information is particularly important for cardiovascular disease (CVD) prevention, where lifestyle changes are recommended until risk becomes high enough to warrant pharmacological intervention. Online information is abundant, but the quality is often poor and many people do not have adequate health literacy to access, understand, and use it effectively. This project aimed to review and evaluate the suitability of online CVD risk calculators for use by low health literate consumers in terms of clinical validity, understandability, and actionability. This systematic review of public websites from August to November 2016 used evaluation of clinical validity based on a high-risk patient profile and assessment of understandability and actionability using Patient Education Material Evaluation Tool for Print Materials. A total of 67 unique webpages and 73 unique CVD risk calculators were identified. The same high-risk patient profile produced widely variable CVD risk estimates, ranging from as little as 3% to as high as a 43% risk of a CVD event over the next 10 years. One-quarter (25%) of risk calculators did not specify what model these estimates were based on. The most common clinical model was Framingham (44%), and most calculators (77%) provided a 10-year CVD risk estimate. The calculators scored moderately on understandability (mean score 64%) and poorly on actionability (mean score 19%). The absolute percentage risk was stated in most (but not all) calculators (79%), and only 18% included graphical formats consistent with recommended risk communication guidelines. There is a plethora of online CVD risk calculators available, but they are not readily understandable and their actionability is poor. Entering the same clinical information produces widely varying results with little explanation. Developers need to address actionability as well as clinical validity and understandability to improve usefulness to consumers with low health literacy. ©Carissa Bonner, Michael Anthony Fajardo, Samuel Hui, Renee Stubbs, Lyndal Trevena. Originally published in the Journal of Medical Internet Research (http://www.jmir.org), 01.02.2018.

Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan for Corrective Action Unit 104: Area 7 Yucca Flat Atmospheric Test Sites Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 0

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Patrick Matthews

2012-10-01

CAU 104 comprises the following corrective action sites (CASs): • 07-23-03, Atmospheric Test Site T-7C • 07-23-04, Atmospheric Test Site T7-1 • 07-23-05, Atmospheric Test Site • 07-23-06, Atmospheric Test Site T7-5a • 07-23-07, Atmospheric Test Site - Dog (T-S) • 07-23-08, Atmospheric Test Site - Baker (T-S) • 07-23-09, Atmospheric Test Site - Charlie (T-S) • 07-23-10, Atmospheric Test Site - Dixie • 07-23-11, Atmospheric Test Site - Dixie • 07-23-12, Atmospheric Test Site - Charlie (Bus) • 07-23-13, Atmospheric Test Site - Baker (Buster) • 07-23-14, Atmospheric Test Site - Ruth • 07-23-15, Atmospheric Test Site T7-4 •more » 07-23-16, Atmospheric Test Site B7-b • 07-23-17, Atmospheric Test Site - Climax These 15 CASs include releases from 30 atmospheric tests conducted in the approximately 1 square mile of CAU 104. Because releases associated with the CASs included in this CAU overlap and are not separate and distinguishable, these CASs are addressed jointly at the CAU level. The purpose of this CADD/CAP is to evaluate potential corrective action alternatives (CAAs), provide the rationale for the selection of recommended CAAs, and provide the plan for implementation of the recommended CAA for CAU 104. Corrective action investigation (CAI) activities were performed from October 4, 2011, through May 3, 2012, as set forth in the CAU 104 Corrective Action Investigation Plan.« less

40 CFR 146.64 - Corrective action for wells in the area of review.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-07-01

... requiring corrective action other than pressure limitations shall include a compliance schedule requiring... require observance of appropriate pressure limitations under paragraph (d)(3) until all other corrective... have been taken. (3) The Director may require pressure limitations in lieu of plugging. If pressure...

21 CFR 120.10 - Corrective actions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-04-01

... 21 Food and Drugs 2 2013-04-01 2013-04-01 false Corrective actions. 120.10 Section 120.10 Food and Drugs FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (CONTINUED) FOOD FOR HUMAN CONSUMPTION HAZARD ANALYSIS AND CRITICAL CONTROL POINT (HACCP) SYSTEMS General Provisions § 120.10 Corrective...

21 CFR 120.10 - Corrective actions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-04-01

... 21 Food and Drugs 2 2011-04-01 2011-04-01 false Corrective actions. 120.10 Section 120.10 Food and Drugs FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (CONTINUED) FOOD FOR HUMAN CONSUMPTION HAZARD ANALYSIS AND CRITICAL CONTROL POINT (HACCP) SYSTEMS General Provisions § 120.10 Corrective...

21 CFR 120.10 - Corrective actions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-04-01

... 21 Food and Drugs 2 2012-04-01 2012-04-01 false Corrective actions. 120.10 Section 120.10 Food and Drugs FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (CONTINUED) FOOD FOR HUMAN CONSUMPTION HAZARD ANALYSIS AND CRITICAL CONTROL POINT (HACCP) SYSTEMS General Provisions § 120.10 Corrective...

21 CFR 120.10 - Corrective actions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-04-01

... 21 Food and Drugs 2 2014-04-01 2014-04-01 false Corrective actions. 120.10 Section 120.10 Food and Drugs FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (CONTINUED) FOOD FOR HUMAN CONSUMPTION HAZARD ANALYSIS AND CRITICAL CONTROL POINT (HACCP) SYSTEMS General Provisions § 120.10 Corrective...

40 CFR 258.58 - Implementation of the corrective action program.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-07-01

... (CONTINUED) SOLID WASTES CRITERIA FOR MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE LANDFILLS Ground-Water Monitoring and Corrective...) Establish and implement a corrective action ground-water monitoring program that: (i) At a minimum, meet the requirements of an assessment monitoring program under § 258.55; (ii) Indicate the effectiveness of the...

40 CFR 258.58 - Implementation of the corrective action program.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-07-01

... (CONTINUED) SOLID WASTES CRITERIA FOR MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE LANDFILLS Ground-Water Monitoring and Corrective...) Establish and implement a corrective action ground-water monitoring program that: (i) At a minimum, meet the requirements of an assessment monitoring program under § 258.55; (ii) Indicate the effectiveness of the...

40 CFR 258.58 - Implementation of the corrective action program.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-07-01

... (CONTINUED) SOLID WASTES CRITERIA FOR MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE LANDFILLS Ground-Water Monitoring and Corrective...) Establish and implement a corrective action ground-water monitoring program that: (i) At a minimum, meet the requirements of an assessment monitoring program under § 258.55; (ii) Indicate the effectiveness of the...

Addressing excess risk of overdose among recently incarcerated people in the USA: harm reduction interventions in correctional settings.

PubMed

Brinkley-Rubinstein, Lauren; Cloud, David H; Davis, Chelsea; Zaller, Nickolas; Delany-Brumsey, Ayesha; Pope, Leah; Martino, Sarah; Bouvier, Benjamin; Rich, Josiah

2017-03-13

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to discuss overdose among those with criminal justice experience and recommend harm reduction strategies to lessen overdose risk among this vulnerable population. Design/methodology/approach Strategies are needed to reduce overdose deaths among those with recent incarceration. Jails and prisons are at the epicenter of the opioid epidemic but are a largely untapped setting for implementing overdose education, risk assessment, medication assisted treatment, and naloxone distribution programs. Federal, state, and local plans commonly lack corrections as an ingredient in combating overdose. Harm reduction strategies are vital for reducing the risk of overdose in the post-release community. Findings Therefore, the authors recommend that the following be implemented in correctional settings: expansion of overdose education and naloxone programs; establishment of comprehensive medication assisted treatment programs as standard of care; development of corrections-specific overdose risk assessment tools; and increased collaboration between corrections entities and community-based organizations. Originality/value In this policy brief the authors provide recommendations for implementing harm reduction approaches in criminal justice settings. Adoption of these strategies could reduce the number of overdoses among those with recent criminal justice involvement.

Comparison of the effect of rocuronium dosing based on corrected or lean body weight on rapid sequence induction and neuromuscular blockade duration in obese female patients

PubMed Central

Sakızcı-Uyar, Bahar; Çelik, Şeref; Postacı, Aysun; Bayraktar, Yeşim; Dikmen, Bayazit; Özkoçak-Turan, Işıl; Saçan, Özlem

2016-01-01

Objectives: To compare onset time, duration of action, and tracheal intubation conditions in obese patients when the intubation dose of rocuronium was based on corrected body weight (CBW) versus lean body weight (LBW) for rapid sequence induction. Methods: This prospective study was carried out at Numune Education and Research Hospital, Ankara, Turkey between August 2013 and May 2014. Forty female obese patients scheduled for laparoscopic surgery under general anesthesia were randomized into 2 groups. Group CBW (n=20) received 1.2 mg/kg rocuronium based on CBW, and group LBW (n=20) received 1.2 mg/kg rocuronium based on LBW. Endotracheal intubation was performed 60 seconds after injection of muscle relaxant, and intubating conditions were evaluated. Neuromuscular transmission was monitored using acceleromyography of the adductor pollicis. Onset time, defined as time to depression of the twitch tension to 95% of its control value, and duration of action, defined as time to achieve one response to train-of-four stimulation (T1) were recorded. Results: No significant differences were observed between the groups in intubation conditions or onset time (50-60 seconds median, 30-30 interquartile range [IQR]). Duration of action was significantly longer in the CBW group (60 minutes median, 12 IQR) than the LBW group (35 minutes median, 16 IQR; p<0.01). Conclusion: In obese patients, dosing of 1.2 mg/kg rocuronium based on LBW provides excellent or good tracheal intubating conditions within 60 seconds after administration and does not lead to prolonged duration of action. PMID:26739976

40 CFR 146.7 - Corrective action.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-07-01

... INJECTION CONTROL PROGRAM: CRITERIA AND STANDARDS General Provisions § 146.7 Corrective action. In...; (b) Nature of native fluids or by-products of injection; (c) Potentially affected population; (d...

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 539: Areas 25 and 26 Railroad Tracks Nevada National Security Site, Nevada with ROTC-1, Revision 0

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Mark Kauss

2011-06-01

This Closure Report (CR) presents information supporting the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 539: Areas 25 and 26 Railroad Tracks, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada. This CR complies with the requirements of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada; U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management; U.S. Department of Defense; and DOE, Legacy Management. The corrective action sites (CASs) within CAU 539 are located within Areas 25 and 26 of the Nevada National Security Site. Corrective Action Unit 539 comprises the following CASs: • 25-99-21, Area 25 Railroad Tracksmore » • 26-99-05, Area 26 Railroad Tracks The purpose of this CR is to provide documentation supporting the completed corrective actions and provide data confirming that the closure objectives for CASs within CAU 539 were met. To achieve this, the following actions were performed: • Reviewed documentation on historical and current site conditions, including the concentration and extent of contamination. • Conducted radiological walkover surveys of railroad tracks in both Areas 25 and 26. • Collected ballast and soil samples and calculated internal dose estimates for radiological releases. • Collected in situ thermoluminescent dosimeter measurements and calculated external dose estimates for radiological releases. • Removed lead bricks as potential source material (PSM) and collected verification samples. • Implemented corrective actions as necessary to protect human health and the environment. • Properly disposed of corrective action and investigation wastes. • Implemented an FFACO use restriction (UR) for radiological contamination at CAS 25-99-21. The approved UR form and map are provided in Appendix F and will be filed in the DOE, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO), Facility Information Management System; the FFACO database; and the NNSA/NSO CAU/CAS files. From November 29, 2010, through May 2, 2011, closure activities were performed as set forth in the Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan for Corrective Action Unit 539: Areas 25 and 26 Railroad Tracks, Nevada Test Site, Nevada. The purposes of the activities as defined during the data quality objectives process were as follows: • Determine whether contaminants of concern (COCs) are present. • If COCs are present, determine their nature and extent, implement appropriate corrective actions, and properly dispose of wastes. Analytes detected during the closure activities were evaluated against final action levels (FALs) to determine COCs for CAU 539. Assessment of the data generated from closure activities revealed the following: • At CAS 26-99-05, the total effective dose for radiological releases did not exceed the FAL of 25 millirem per Industrial Area year. Potential source material in the form of lead bricks was found at three locations. A corrective action of clean closure was implemented at these locations, and verification samples indicated that no further action is necessary. • At CAS 25-99-21, the total effective dose for radiological releases exceeds the FAL of 25 millirem per Industrial Area year. Potential source material in the form of lead bricks was found at eight locations. A corrective action was implemented by removing the lead bricks and soil above FALs at these locations, and verification samples indicated that no further action is necessary. Pieces of debris with high radioactivity were identified as PSM and remain within the CAS boundary. A corrective action of closure in place with a UR was implemented at this CAS because closure activities showed evidence of remaining soil contamination and radioactive PSM. Future land use will be restricted from surface and intrusive activities. Closure activities generated waste streams consisting of industrial solid waste, recyclable materials, low-level radioactive waste, and mixed low-level radioactive waste. Wastes were disposed of in the appropriate onsite landfills. The NNSA/NSO provides the following recommendations: • Clean closure is required at CAS 26-99-05. • Closure in place is required at CAS 25-99-21. • A UR is required at CAS 25-99-21. • A Notice of Completion to the NNSA/NSO is requested from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection for closure of CAU 539. • Corrective Action Unit 539 should be moved from Appendix III to Appendix IV of the FFACO.« less

Corrective action investigation plan for Corrective Action Unit Number 423: Building 03-60 Underground Discharge Point, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

NONE

1997-10-27

This Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) contains the environmental sample collection objectives and the criteria for conducting site investigation activities at Corrective Action Unit (CAU) Number 423, the Building 03-60 Underground Discharge Point (UDP), which is located in Area 3 at the Tonopah Test Range (TTR). The TTR, part of the Nellis Air Force Range, is approximately 225 kilometers (140 miles) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. CAU Number 423 is comprised of only one Corrective Action Site (CAS) which includes the Building 03-60 UDP and an associated discharge line extending from Building 03-60 to a point approximately 73 meters (240more » feet) northwest. The UDP was used between approximately 1965 and 1990 to dispose of waste fluids from the Building 03-60 automotive maintenance shop. It is likely that soils surrounding the UDP have been impacted by oil, grease, cleaning supplies and solvents as well as waste motor oil and other automotive fluids released from the UDP.« less

24 CFR 3282.416 - Supervision of notification and correction actions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-04-01

... 24 Housing and Urban Development 5 2012-04-01 2012-04-01 false Supervision of notification and correction actions. 3282.416 Section 3282.416 Housing and Urban Development Regulations Relating to Housing... REGULATIONS Consumer Complaint Handling and Remedial Actions § 3282.416 Supervision of notification and...

42 CFR 431.836 - Corrective action under the MQC claims processing assessment system.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... assessment system. 431.836 Section 431.836 Public Health CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, DEPARTMENT... ADMINISTRATION Quality Control Medicaid Quality Control (mqc) Claims Processing Assessment System § 431.836 Corrective action under the MQC claims processing assessment system. The agency must— (a) Take action to...

78 FR 16401 - Institutional Review Boards; Correcting Amendments

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-03-15

... Administration, HHS. ACTION: Final rule; correcting amendments. SUMMARY: The Food and Drug Administration (FDA... the regulatory text and to update contact information. This action is editorial in nature and is... action under the Administrative Procedures Act (5 U.S.C. 553). FDA has determined that notice and public...

78 FR 11903 - Acceptability of Corrective Action Programs for Fuel Cycle Facilities

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-02-20

... Cycle Facilities AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ACTION: Draft NUREG; request for public comment... ``Acceptability of Corrective Action Programs for Fuel Cycle Facilities.'' The draft NUREG provides guidance to... a fuel cycle facility is acceptable. DATES: Comments may be submitted by April 22, 2013. Comments...

Mental Health Research in Correctional Settings: Perceptions of Risk and Vulnerabilities

PubMed Central

Johnson, Mark E.; Kondo, Karli K.; Brems, Christiane; Ironside, Erica F.; Eldridge, Gloria D.

2015-01-01

With over half of individuals incarcerated having serious mental health concerns, correctional settings offer excellent opportunities for epidemiological, prevention, and intervention research. However, due to unique ethical and structural challenges, these settings create risks and vulnerabilities for participants not typically encountered in research populations. We surveyed 1,224 researchers, IRB members, and IRB prisoner representatives to assess their perceptions of risks associated with mental health research conducted in correctional settings. Highest-ranked risks were related to privacy, stigma, and confidentiality; lowest-ranked risks were related to prisoners’ loss of privileges or becoming targets of violence due to having participated in research. Cognitive impairment, mental illness, lack of autonomy, and limited access to services emerged as the greatest sources of vulnerability; being male, being female, being over age of 60, being a minority, and being pregnant were the lowest-ranked sources of vulnerability. Researchers with corrections experience perceived lower risks and vulnerabilities than all other groups, raising the question whether these researchers accurately appraise risk and vulnerability based on experience, or if their lower risk and vulnerability perceptions reflect potential bias due to their vested interests. By identifying areas of particular risk and vulnerability, this study provides important information for researchers and research reviewers alike. PMID:27092025

A method of depth image based human action recognition

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Li, Pei; Cheng, Wanli

2017-05-01

In this paper, we propose an action recognition algorithm framework based on human skeleton joint information. In order to extract the feature of human motion, we use the information of body posture, speed and acceleration of movement to construct spatial motion feature that can describe and reflect the joint. On the other hand, we use the classical temporal pyramid matching algorithm to construct temporal feature and describe the motion sequence variation from different time scales. Then, we use bag of words to represent these actions, which is to present every action in the histogram by clustering these extracted feature. Finally, we employ Hidden Markov Model to train and test the extracted motion features. In the experimental part, the correctness and effectiveness of the proposed model are comprehensively verified on two well-known datasets.

Towards automated assistance for operating home medical devices.

PubMed

Gao, Zan; Detyniecki, Marcin; Chen, Ming-Yu; Wu, Wen; Hauptmann, Alexander G; Wactlar, Howard D

2010-01-01

To detect errors when subjects operate a home medical device, we observe them with multiple cameras. We then perform action recognition with a robust approach to recognize action information based on explicitly encoding motion information. This algorithm detects interest points and encodes not only their local appearance but also explicitly models local motion. Our goal is to recognize individual human actions in the operations of a home medical device to see if the patient has correctly performed the required actions in the prescribed sequence. Using a specific infusion pump as a test case, requiring 22 operation steps from 6 action classes, our best classifier selects high likelihood action estimates from 4 available cameras, to obtain an average class recognition rate of 69%.

4 CFR 28.130 - General authority.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... Corrective Action, Disciplinary and Stay Proceedings § 28.130 General authority. The procedures in this subpart relate to the Board's functions “to consider, decide and order corrective or disciplinary action...

Reframing climate change assessments around risk: recommendations for the US National Climate Assessment

DOE PAGES

Weaver, C. P.; Moss, Richard H.; Ebi, Kristie L.; ...

2017-07-21

Climate change is a risk management challenge for society, with uncertain but potentially severe outcomes affecting natural and human systems, across generations. Managing climate-related risks will be more difficult without a base of knowledge and practice aimed at identifying and evaluating specific risks, and their likelihood and consequences, as well as potential actions to promote resilience in the face of these risks. Here, we suggest three improvements to the process of conducting climate change assessments to better characterize risk and inform risk management actions.

Reframing climate change assessments around risk: recommendations for the US National Climate Assessment

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Weaver, C. P.; Moss, Richard H.; Ebi, Kristie L.

Climate change is a risk management challenge for society, with uncertain but potentially severe outcomes affecting natural and human systems, across generations. Managing climate-related risks will be more difficult without a base of knowledge and practice aimed at identifying and evaluating specific risks, and their likelihood and consequences, as well as potential actions to promote resilience in the face of these risks. Here, we suggest three improvements to the process of conducting climate change assessments to better characterize risk and inform risk management actions.

49 CFR 385.17 - Change to safety rating based upon corrective actions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-10-01

... in CMVs or placardable quantities of hazardous materials. (2) Within 45 days for all other motor..., it shall remain in effect during the period of any administrative review. [65 FR 50935, Aug. 22, 2000...

FORTRAN Automated Code Evaluation System (faces) system documentation, version 2, mod 0. [error detection codes/user manuals (computer programs)

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

1975-01-01

A system is presented which processes FORTRAN based software systems to surface potential problems before they become execution malfunctions. The system complements the diagnostic capabilities of compilers, loaders, and execution monitors rather than duplicating these functions. Also, it emphasizes frequent sources of FORTRAN problems which require inordinate manual effort to identify. The principle value of the system is extracting small sections of unusual code from the bulk of normal sequences. Code structures likely to cause immediate or future problems are brought to the user's attention. These messages stimulate timely corrective action of solid errors and promote identification of 'tricky' code. Corrective action may require recoding or simply extending software documentation to explain the unusual technique.

Burden of typhoid fever in low-income and middle-income countries: a systematic, literature-based update with risk-factor adjustment.

PubMed

Mogasale, Vittal; Maskery, Brian; Ochiai, R Leon; Lee, Jung Seok; Mogasale, Vijayalaxmi V; Ramani, Enusa; Kim, Young Eun; Park, Jin Kyung; Wierzba, Thomas F

2014-10-01

No access to safe water is an important risk factor for typhoid fever, yet risk-level heterogeneity is unaccounted for in previous global burden estimates. Since WHO has recommended risk-based use of typhoid polysaccharide vaccine, we revisited the burden of typhoid fever in low-income and middle-income countries (LMICs) after adjusting for water-related risk. We estimated the typhoid disease burden from studies done in LMICs based on blood-culture-confirmed incidence rates applied to the 2010 population, after correcting for operational issues related to surveillance, limitations of diagnostic tests, and water-related risk. We derived incidence estimates, correction factors, and mortality estimates from systematic literature reviews. We did scenario analyses for risk factors, diagnostic sensitivity, and case fatality rates, accounting for the uncertainty in these estimates and we compared them with previous disease burden estimates. The estimated number of typhoid fever cases in LMICs in 2010 after adjusting for water-related risk was 11·9 million (95% CI 9·9-14·7) cases with 129 000 (75 000-208 000) deaths. By comparison, the estimated risk-unadjusted burden was 20·6 million (17·5-24·2) cases and 223 000 (131 000-344 000) deaths. Scenario analyses indicated that the risk-factor adjustment and updated diagnostic test correction factor derived from systematic literature reviews were the drivers of differences between the current estimate and past estimates. The risk-adjusted typhoid fever burden estimate was more conservative than previous estimates. However, by distinguishing the risk differences, it will allow assessment of the effect at the population level and will facilitate cost-effectiveness calculations for risk-based vaccination strategies for future typhoid conjugate vaccine. Copyright © 2014 Mogasale et al. Open Access article distributed under the terms of CC BY-NC-SA. Published by .. All rights reserved.

No duty to warn in California: now unambiguously solely a duty to protect.

PubMed

Weinstock, Robert; Bonnici, Daniel; Seroussi, Ariel; Leong, Gregory B

2014-01-01

In 2013, legislation went into effect clarifying that the Tarasoff duty in California is now unambiguously solely a duty to protect. Warning the potential victim and the police is not a requirement, but a clinician can obtain immunity from liability by using this safe harbor. In situations in which a therapist believes warning might exacerbate the patient's risk, however, alternative protective actions can satisfy the duty to protect. For a clinician to be found liable, those alternative actions would have to be proven negligent. This flexibility can sometimes be crucial in protecting potential victims and thereby, indirectly, patients from the consequences of dangerous action. Explaining the reasoning for the action chosen should obviate any significant liability risk of doing the right thing, even without immunity. Legislation was enacted in 2007 as an attempt to clarify the requirement, but the revised immunity statute at the time retained the phrase 'duty to warn and protect', which perpetuated the now-eliminated confusion. Correctly understanding the California law is important to avoid having the restored flexibility eroded again by belief in a nonexistent duty to warn. The Tarasoff duty originated in California, but since many other states later established similar duties, the developments in California may have national implications.

Corrective Action Plan for Corrective Action Unit 366: Area 11 Plutonium Valley Dispersion Sites, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

None

This Corrective Action Plan has been prepared for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 366, Area 11 Plutonium Valley Dispersion Sites, in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO, 1996 as amended). CAU 366 consists of the following six Corrective Action Sites (CASs) located in Area 11 of the Nevada National Security Site: · CAS 11-08-01, Contaminated Waste Dump #1 · CAS 11-08-02, Contaminated Waste Dump #2 · CAS 11-23-01, Radioactively Contaminated Area A · CAS 11-23-02, Radioactively Contaminated Area B · CAS 11-23-03, Radioactively Contaminated Area C · CAS 11-23-04, Radioactively Contaminated Area D Site characterization activities weremore » performed in 2011 and 2012, and the results are presented in Appendix A of the Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD) for CAU 366 (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office [NNSA/NSO], 2012a). The following closure alternatives were recommended in the CADD: · No further action for CAS 11-23-01 · Closure in place for CASs 11-08-01, 11-08-02, 11-23-02, 11-23-03, and 11-23-04 The scope of work required to implement the recommended closure alternatives includes the following: · Non-engineered soil covers approximately 3 feet thick will be constructed at CAS 11-08-01 over contaminated waste dump (CWD) #1 and at CAS 11-08-02 over CWD #2. · FFACO use restrictions (URs) will be implemented for the areas where the total effective dose (TED) exceeds the final action level (FAL) of 25 millirems per Occasional Use Area year (mrem/OU-yr). The FAL is based on an assumption that the future use of the site includes occasional work activities and that workers will not be assigned to the area on a regular basis. A site worker under this scenario is assumed to be on site for a maximum of 80 hours per year for 5 years. The FFACO UR boundaries will encompass the areas where a worker would be exposed to 25 millirems of radioactivity per year if they are present for 80 hours per year. These boundaries will be defined as follows: – It is assumed that radiological contaminants are present at CAS 11-08-01 and CAS 11-08-02 within CWDs #1 and #2 at levels exceeding the FAL. Therefore, UR boundaries will be established around the perimeters of the soil covers that will be constructed at CWD #1 and CWD #2. A geophysical survey revealed buried metallic debris outside the fence and adjacent to CWD #1. Therefore, the UR boundary for CWD #1 will be expanded to include the mound containing buried material. – It is assumed that radiological contaminants are present at CAS 11-23-02, CAS 11-23-03, and CAS 11-23-04, within the three High Contamination Area (HCA) boundaries associated with the 11b, 11c, and 11d test areas at levels exceeding the FAL. Therefore, the UR boundaries will be established around the perimeters of the HCAs. The TED at an area of soil impacted by radiological debris outside the fence and adjacent to the 11c test area HCA exceeds the FAL of 25 mrem/OU-yr. Because the radiological impact from the debris at this location is visible on the aerial flyover radiological survey, all other areas within this isopleth of the flyover survey are conservatively also assumed to exceed the FAL. Therefore, the UR boundaries for the 11b, 11c, and 11d test areas will be expanded to include the areas within this isopleth. · The FFACO URs will all be located within the large Contamination Area (CA) that encompasses Plutonium Valley. Because access to the CA is limited and entry into the CA for post-closure inspections and maintenance would be impractical, UR warning signs will be posted along the existing CA fence. In accordance with the Soils Risk-Based Corrective Action Evaluation Process (NNSA/NSO, 2012b), an administrative UR will be implemented as a best management practice for the areas where the TED exceeds 25 millirems per Industrial Area year. This limit is based on continuous industrial use of the site and addresses exposure to industrial workers who would regularly be assigned to the work area for an entire career (250 days per year, 8 hours per day, for 25 years). Establishing an administrative UR will prevent inadvertent exposure of workers to radioactivity if a more intensive use of the site were to be considered in the future. As a precautionary measure, the administrative UR boundary will be expanded to include the areas where removable contamination is present that exceeds the criterion for a CA. This will further ensure that workers will not perform future activities within this area without being notified of the presence of site contaminants. Therefore, the administrative UR boundary will be established around the perimeters of the large CA that encompasses the site and the CAs associated with the decontamination station and hot park.« less

40 CFR 63.11648 - What are my notification, reporting, and recordkeeping requirements?

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-07-01

... facility must submit the test data to EPA by entering the data electronically into EPA's WebFIRE data base... data into EPA's data base using the Electronic Reporting Tool or other compatible electronic..., monitoring data, and corrective actions required by §§ 63.11646 and 63.11647, and the information identified...

40 CFR 63.11648 - What are my notification, reporting, and recordkeeping requirements?

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-07-01

... facility must submit the test data to EPA by entering the data electronically into EPA's WebFIRE data base... data into EPA's data base using the Electronic Reporting Tool or other compatible electronic..., monitoring data, and corrective actions required by §§ 63.11646 and 63.11647, and the information identified...

40 CFR 63.11648 - What are my notification, reporting, and recordkeeping requirements?

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-07-01

... facility must submit the test data to EPA by entering the data electronically into EPA's WebFIRE data base... data into EPA's data base using the Electronic Reporting Tool or other compatible electronic..., monitoring data, and corrective actions required by §§ 63.11646 and 63.11647, and the information identified...

40 CFR 63.11648 - What are my notification, reporting, and recordkeeping requirements?

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-07-01

... facility must submit the test data to EPA by entering the data electronically into EPA's WebFIRE data base... data into EPA's data base using the Electronic Reporting Tool or other compatible electronic..., monitoring data, and corrective actions required by §§ 63.11646 and 63.11647, and the information identified...

Habits, action sequences, and reinforcement learning

PubMed Central

Dezfouli, Amir; Balleine, Bernard W.

2012-01-01

It is now widely accepted that instrumental actions can be either goal-directed or habitual; whereas the former are rapidly acquire and regulated by their outcome, the latter are reflexive, elicited by antecedent stimuli rather than their consequences. Model-based reinforcement learning (RL) provides an elegant description of goal-directed action. Through exposure to states, actions and rewards, the agent rapidly constructs a model of the world and can choose an appropriate action based on quite abstract changes in environmental and evaluative demands. This model is powerful but has a problem explaining the development of habitual actions. To account for habits, theorists have argued that another action controller is required, called model-free RL, that does not form a model of the world but rather caches action values within states allowing a state to select an action based on its reward history rather than its consequences. Nevertheless, there are persistent problems with important predictions from the model; most notably the failure of model-free RL correctly to predict the insensitivity of habitual actions to changes in the action-reward contingency. Here, we suggest that introducing model-free RL in instrumental conditioning is unnecessary and demonstrate that reconceptualizing habits as action sequences allows model-based RL to be applied to both goal-directed and habitual actions in a manner consistent with what real animals do. This approach has significant implications for the way habits are currently investigated and generates new experimental predictions. PMID:22487034

Field safety notices released by manufacturers in cases of failure of products for infection testing: analysis of cases reported to the BfArM between 2005 and 2007

PubMed Central

2010-01-01

The European Directive 98/79/EC for in vitro diagnostic medical devices (IVD) regulates marketing and post marketing surveillance of IVD in the European Economic Area. Manufacturers have to inform the responsible Competent Authorities (CA) about incidents and field safety corrective actions (FSCA) related to IVD. In Germany, the Federal Institute for Drugs and Medical Devices (BfArM) is the responsible CA for most IVD, only few IVD as specified in Annex II of the Directive are under the responsibility of the Paul Ehrlich Institute (PEI). In case of a FSCA manufacturers have to inform customers by means of a Field Safety Notice (FSN) which should be sent to BfArM prior to release and is published on the BfArM home-page. Between beginning of 2005 and end of 2007 the BfArM received a total of 1025 reports regarding IVD. From these, 38 related to tests, reagents, calibrators, and control materials for infection testing, 13 related to analysers and general consumables (n = 8 and n = 5, respectively) based on culture techniques, and 7 related to analysers and general consumables (n = 5 and n = 2, respectively) based on molecular biological methods. FSCA were performed in Germany in 32 (84.2%) of all notifications related to tests reagents, calibrators, and control materials as well as in 13 (100%) and 7 (100%) of notifications related to analysers and consumables based on culture techniques and molecular biological methods, respectively. A number of relevant deficiencies regarding the quality of the FSN were separately demonstrated for FSN in German and English language. In brief, manufacturers often sent their FSN to the BfArM with delay. Additionally, a subset of FSN provided insufficient information on the product related risks or the measures to be performed by the customer to mitigate product related risks. Furthermore, customer confirmation forms often were missing in the FSN sent to the BfArM. Our data suggest that for IVD for infection testing FSCA and FSN are frequently performed. For better vigilance performance, manufacturers could shorten the time until release and improve the contents of FSN to ensure the safety of IVD in cases of product related corrective actions. PMID:21147647

Field safety notices released by manufacturers in cases of failure of products for infection testing: analysis of cases reported to the BfArM between 2005 and 2007.

PubMed

Siekmeier, R; Lisson, K; Wetzel, D

2010-11-04

The European Directive 98/79/EC for in vitro diagnostic medical devices (IVD) regulates marketing and post marketing surveillance of IVD in the European Economic Area. Manufacturers have to inform the responsible Competent Authorities (CA) about incidents and field safety corrective actions (FSCA) related to IVD. In Germany, the Federal Institute for Drugs and Medical Devices (BfArM) is the responsible CA for most IVD, only few IVD as specified in Annex II of the Directive are under the responsibility of the Paul Ehrlich Institute (PEI). In case of a FSCA manufacturers have to inform customers by means of a Field Safety Notice (FSN) which should be sent to BfArM prior to release and is published on the BfArM homepage. Between beginning of 2005 and end of 2007 the BfArM received a total of 1025 reports regarding IVD. From these, 38 related to tests, reagents, calibrators, and control materials for infection testing, 13 related to analysers and general consumables (n = 8 and n = 5, respectively) based on culture techniques, and 7 related to analysers and general consumables (n = 5 and n = 2, respectively) based on molecular biological methods. FSCA were performed in Germany in 32 (84.2%) of all notifications related to tests reagents, calibrators, and control materials as well as in 13 (100%) and 7 (100%) of notifications related to analysers and consumables based on culture techniques and molecular biological methods, respectively. A number of relevant deficiencies regarding the quality of the FSN were separately demonstrated for FSN in German and English language. In brief, manufacturers often sent their FSN to the BfArM with delay. Additionally, a subset of FSN provided insufficient information on the product related risks or the measures to be performed by the customer to mitigate product related risks. Furthermore, customer confirmation forms often were missing in the FSN sent to the BfArM. Our data suggest that for IVD for infection testing FSCA and FSN are frequently performed. For better vigilance performance, manufacturers could shorten the time until release and improve the contents of FSN to ensure the safety of IVD in cases of product related corrective actions.

40 CFR 63.2998 - What records must I maintain?

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

...) Records of maintenance and inspections performed on the control devices. (e) If an operating parameter... which corrective actions were initiated and completed; (4) A brief description of the corrective actions...

7 CFR 248.17 - Management evaluations and reviews.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... deficiencies and prevent their future recurrence. (iii) If the corrective action plan is acceptable, FNS will... plan, and whether the deficiency is resolved or further corrective action is needed. Compliance buys...

Hepatitis C and the correctional population.

PubMed

Reindollar, R W

1999-12-27

The hepatitis C epidemic has extended well into the correctional population where individuals predominantly originate from high-risk environments and have high-risk behaviors. Epidemiologic data estimate that 30% to 40% of the 1.8 million inmates in the United States are infected with the hepatitis C virus (HCV), the majority of whom were infected before incarceration. As in the general population, injection drug use accounts for the majority of HCV infections in this group--one to two thirds of inmates have a history of injection drug use before incarceration and continue to do so while in prison. Although correctional facilities also represent a high-risk environment for HCV infection because of a continued high incidence of drug use and high-risk sexual activities, available data indicate a low HCV seroconversion rate of 1.1 per 100 person-years in prison. Moreover, a high annual turnover rate means that many inmates return to their previous high-risk environments and behaviors that are conducive either to acquiring or spreading HCV. Despite a very high prevalence of HCV infection within the US correctional system, identification and treatment of at-risk individuals is inconsistent, at best. Variable access to correctional health-care resources, limited funding, high inmate turnover rates, and deficient follow-up care after release represent a few of the factors that confound HCV control and prevention in this group. Future efforts must focus on establishing an accurate knowledge base and implementing education, policies, and procedures for the prevention and treatment of hepatitis C in correctional populations.

Role of contingency in striatal response to incentive in adolescents with anxiety.

PubMed

Benson, Brenda E; Guyer, Amanda E; Nelson, Eric E; Pine, Daniel S; Ernst, Monique

2015-03-01

This study examines the effect of contingency on reward function in anxiety. We define contingency as the aspect of a situation in which the outcome is determined by one's action-that is, when there is a direct link between one's action and the outcome of the action. Past findings in adolescents with anxiety or at risk for anxiety have revealed hypersensitive behavioral and neural responses to higher value rewards with correct performance. This hypersensitivity to highly valued (salient) actions suggests that the value of actions is determined not only by outcome magnitude, but also by the degree to which the outcome is contingent on correct performance. Thus, contingency and incentive value might each modulate reward responses in unique ways in anxiety. Using fMRI with a monetary reward task, striatal response to cue anticipation is compared in 18 clinically anxious and 20 healthy adolescents. This task manipulates orthogonally reward contingency and incentive value. Findings suggest that contingency modulates the neural response to incentive magnitude differently in the two groups. Specifically, during the contingent condition, right-striatal response tracks incentive value in anxious, but not healthy, adolescents. During the noncontingent condition, striatal response is bilaterally stronger to low than to high incentive in anxious adolescents, while healthy adolescents exhibit the expected opposite pattern. Both contingency and reward magnitude differentiate striatal activation in anxious versus healthy adolescents. These findings may reflect exaggerated concern about performance and/or alterations of striatal coding of reward value in anxious adolescents. Abnormalities in reward function in anxiety may have treatment implications.

Documents Related to the National Institutes of Health Public Notice

EPA Pesticide Factsheets

EPA is announcing its Proposed RCRA Corrective Action - Cleanup Completed for National Institutes of Health in Bethesda, MD - EPA ID: MD6150004095 under Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA-Corrective Action).

Response to Request for Correction #10007

EPA Pesticide Factsheets

Response to the American Chemistry Council's Request for Correction #10007 that challenged the objectivity and utility of statements in the EPA Bisphenol A Action Plan and refusal to edit the EPA Bisphenol A Action Plan.

A new risk and stochastic analysis of monitoring and remediation in subsurface contamination

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Papapetridis, K.; Paleologos, E.

2012-04-01

Sanitary landfills constitute the most widely used management approach for the disposal of solid wastes because of their simplicity and cost effectiveness. However, historical records indicate that landfills exhibit a high failure rate of groundwater contamination. Successful detection of aquifer contamination via monitoring wells is a complicated problem with many factors, such as the heterogeneity of the geologic environment, the dispersion of contamination into the geologic medium, the quantity and nature of the contaminants, the number and location of the monitoring wells, and the frequency of sampling, all contributing to the uncertainty of early detection. Detection of contaminants, of course, is of value if remedial actions follow as soon as possible, so that the volume of contaminated groundwater to be treated is minimized. Practically, there is always a time lag between contaminant detection and remedial action response. Administrative decisions and arrangements with local contractors initiate remedial procedures introduces a time lag between detection and remediation time. During this time lag a plume continues to move into an aquifer contaminating larger groundwater volumes. In the present study these issues are addressed by investigating the case of instantaneous leakage from a landfill facility into a heterogeneous aquifer. The stochastic Monte Carlo framework was used to address, in two dimensions, the problem of evaluating the effectiveness of contaminant detection in heterogeneous aquifers by linear networks of monitoring wells. Numerical experiments based on the random-walk tracking-particle method were conducted to determine the detection probabilities and to calculate contaminated areas at different time steps. Several cases were studied assuming different levels of geologic heterogeneity, contamination dispersion, detectable contamination limits and monitoring wells' sampling frequencies. A new perspective is introduced for the correction of risk analyses; contemporary risk analyses consider the cost of alternative remediation procedures by assuming that the contamination area to be remediated coincides with the area calculated at the time of detection. However, there is always a considerable lag between the time that a plume is detected and the time when remediation commences. This time lag constitutes a random variable that depends on available resources and technologies, as well as efficiency of administration decision-making. An expression is proposed that accounts for the delay between detection and remedial action in order to provide a correction to decision analyses that evaluate the economic worth of well monitoring. This expression illustrates that delays over 3 years are equivalent to reducing the monitoring performance of 12 wells to that of a much lower number of wells, or equally, having to consider higher failure costs than those assumed in current risk analyses.

Pharmacological treatments and risks for the food chain.

PubMed

Girardi, C; Odore, R

2008-09-01

Veterinarians play a pivotal role in public health control, in particular in the management of risks deriving from pharmacological treatments of food-producing animals. Veterinary medicinal products can represent a risk for animal health and welfare (side effects, decreased efficacy), for farmers and practitioners administering the drug, for consumers of food of animal origin (presence of residues, occurrence of antibiotic resistance) and for the environment. According to pending European guidelines, risk management starts from marketing authorisation that must be based on risk evaluation and can be denied when the risk/benefit ratio is not favourable considering the advantages for animal health and welfare and for safety of consumers. Veterinarians can prevent and control risks by using correct pharmacological criteria to choose and administer medicinal products and undertaking risk-based inspection of residues of drugs in food of animal origin. Moreover, a major tool for veterinarians to prevent and control drug-borne risk is "pharmacovigilance". Risks for the environment are usually assessed during the pre-marketing approval process, however veterinarians, as risk managers, should educate farmers about correct drug handling and disposal, and periodically verify that suggested measures are applied.

Senior Cross-Functional Support -- Essential for Implementing Corrective Actions at C3RS Sites

DOT National Transportation Integrated Search

2012-08-01

The Federal Railroad Administrations (FRA) Office of Railroad Policy and Development believes that, in addition to process and technology innovations, human factors-based solutions can make a significant contribution to improving safety in the rai...

75 FR 27401 - List of Approved Spent Fuel Storage Casks: NUHOMS® HD System Revision 1; Correction

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-05-17

... Storage Casks: NUHOMS[reg] HD System Revision 1; Correction AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ACTION... HD spent fuel storage cask system. This action is necessary to correctly specify the effective date... on May 6, 2010 (75 FR 24786), that amends the regulations that govern storage of spent nuclear fuel...

75 FR 31282 - Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Model A319-100, A320-200, A321-100, and A321-200 Series Airplanes

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-06-03

... published in the Federal Register on May 12, 2006. The error resulted in an incorrect component maintenance... related investigative and corrective actions if necessary. DATES: This correction is effective June 3... wall-mounted cabin attendant seat, and related investigative and corrective actions if necessary. As...

Presentation of laboratory test results in patient portals: influence of interface design on risk interpretation and visual search behaviour.

PubMed

Fraccaro, Paolo; Vigo, Markel; Balatsoukas, Panagiotis; van der Veer, Sabine N; Hassan, Lamiece; Williams, Richard; Wood, Grahame; Sinha, Smeeta; Buchan, Iain; Peek, Niels

2018-02-12

Patient portals are considered valuable instruments for self-management of long term conditions, however, there are concerns over how patients might interpret and act on the clinical information they access. We hypothesized that visual cues improve patients' abilities to correctly interpret laboratory test results presented through patient portals. We also assessed, by applying eye-tracking methods, the relationship between risk interpretation and visual search behaviour. We conducted a controlled study with 20 kidney transplant patients. Participants viewed three different graphical presentations in each of low, medium, and high risk clinical scenarios composed of results for 28 laboratory tests. After viewing each clinical scenario, patients were asked how they would have acted in real life if the results were their own, as a proxy of their risk interpretation. They could choose between: 1) Calling their doctor immediately (high interpreted risk); 2) Trying to arrange an appointment within the next 4 weeks (medium interpreted risk); 3) Waiting for the next appointment in 3 months (low interpreted risk). For each presentation, we assessed accuracy of patients' risk interpretation, and employed eye tracking to assess and compare visual search behaviour. Misinterpretation of risk was common, with 65% of participants underestimating the need for action across all presentations at least once. Participants found it particularly difficult to interpret medium risk clinical scenarios. Participants who consistently understood when action was needed showed a higher visual search efficiency, suggesting a better strategy to cope with information overload that helped them to focus on the laboratory tests most relevant to their condition. This study confirms patients' difficulties in interpreting laboratories test results, with many patients underestimating the need for action, even when abnormal values were highlighted or grouped together. Our findings raise patient safety concerns and may limit the potential of patient portals to actively involve patients in their own healthcare.

Flood vulnerability evaluation in complex urban areas

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Giosa, L.; Pascale, S.; Sdao, F.; Sole, A.; Cantisani, A.

2009-04-01

This paper deals the conception, the development and the subsequent validation of an integrated numerical model for the assessment of systemic vulnerability in complex and urbanized areas, subject to flood risk. The proposed methodology is based on the application of the concept of "systemic vulnerability", the model is a mathematician-decisional model action to estimate the vulnerability of complex a territorial system during a flood event. The model uses a group of "pressure pointers" in order to define, qualitatively and quantitatively, the influence exercised on the territorial system from factors like as those physicists, social, economic, etc.. The model evaluates the exposure to the flood risk of the elements that belong to a system. The proposed model, which is based on the studies of Tamura et al., 2000; Minciardi et al., 2004; Pascale et al., 2008; considers the vulnerability not as a characteristic of a particular element at risk, but as a peculiarity of a complex territorial system, in which the different elements are reciprocally linked in a functional way. The proposed model points out the elements with the major functional lost and that make the whole system critical. This characteristic makes the proposed model able to support a correct territorial planning and a suitable management of the emergency following natural disasters such as floods. The proposed approach was tested on the study area in the city of Potenza, southern Italy.

Neuromotor Noise Is Malleable by Amplifying Perceived Errors

PubMed Central

Zhang, Zhaoran; Abe, Masaki O.; Sternad, Dagmar

2016-01-01

Variability in motor performance results from the interplay of error correction and neuromotor noise. This study examined whether visual amplification of error, previously shown to improve performance, affects not only error correction, but also neuromotor noise, typically regarded as inaccessible to intervention. Seven groups of healthy individuals, with six participants in each group, practiced a virtual throwing task for three days until reaching a performance plateau. Over three more days of practice, six of the groups received different magnitudes of visual error amplification; three of these groups also had noise added. An additional control group was not subjected to any manipulations for all six practice days. The results showed that the control group did not improve further after the first three practice days, but the error amplification groups continued to decrease their error under the manipulations. Analysis of the temporal structure of participants’ corrective actions based on stochastic learning models revealed that these performance gains were attained by reducing neuromotor noise and, to a considerably lesser degree, by increasing the size of corrective actions. Based on these results, error amplification presents a promising intervention to improve motor function by decreasing neuromotor noise after performance has reached an asymptote. These results are relevant for patients with neurological disorders and the elderly. More fundamentally, these results suggest that neuromotor noise may be accessible to practice interventions. PMID:27490197

A strategy for prioritizing threats and recovery actions for at-risk species.

PubMed

Darst, Catherine R; Murphy, Philip J; Strout, Nathan W; Campbell, Steven P; Field, Kimberleigh J; Allison, Linda; Averill-Murray, Roy C

2013-03-01

Ensuring the persistence of at-risk species depends on implementing conservation actions that ameliorate threats. We developed and implemented a method to quantify the relative importance of threats and to prioritize recovery actions based on their potential to affect risk to Mojave desert tortoises (Gopherus agassizii). We used assessments of threat importance and elasticities of demographic rates from population matrix models to estimate the relative contributions of threats to overall increase in risk to the population. We found that urbanization, human access, military operations, disease, and illegal use of off highway vehicles are the most serious threats to the desert tortoise range-wide. These results suggest that, overall, recovery actions that decrease habitat loss, predation, and crushing will be most effective for recovery; specifically, we found that habitat restoration, topic-specific environmental education, and land acquisition are most likely to result in the greatest decrease in risk to the desert tortoise across its range. In addition, we have developed an application that manages the conceptual model and all supporting information and calculates threat severity and potential effectiveness of recovery actions. Our analytical approach provides an objective process for quantifying threats, prioritizing recovery actions, and developing monitoring metrics for those actions for adaptive management of any at-risk species.

ER Consolidated Qtrly Rpt_July-September 2015_January 2016

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Cochran, John R.

2016-01-01

This Environmental Restoration Operations (ER) Consolidated Quarterly Report (ER Quarterly Report) provides the status of ongoing corrective action activities being implemented by Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico (SNL/NM) for the July, August, and September 2015 quarterly reporting period. The Solid Waste Management Units (SWMUs) and Areas of Concern (AOCs) identified for corrective action at SNL/NM are listed in Table I-1. The work completed during this quarter is reported below in Sections I.2.1 and I.2.2. Section I.2.1 summarizes the quarterly activities at sites undergoing corrective action field activities (SWMUs 8 and 58, 68, 149, 154, and 502, and three groundwater AOCs).more » Section I.2.2 summarizes quarterly activities at sites where the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED) has issued a certificate of completion and the site is in the corrective action complete (CAC) regulatory process. Currently, the Mixed Waste Landfill (MWL, SWMU 76) is the only site in the CAC regulatory process. Corrective action activities have been deferred at the Long Sled Track (SWMU 83), the Gun Facilities (SWMU 84), and the Short Sled Track (SWMU 240) because these are active mission facilities.« less

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Cochran, John R.

This Environmental Restoration Operations (ER) Consolidated Quarterly Report (ER Quarterly Report) provides the status of ongoing corrective action activities being implemented at Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico (SNL/NM) during the July, August, and September 2016 quarterly reporting period. The Solid Waste Management Units (SWMUs) and Areas of Concern (AOCs) identified for corrective action at SNL/NM are listed in Table I-1. Sections I.2.1 and I.2.2 summarize the work completed during this quarter. Section I.2.1 summarizes the quarterly activities at sites undergoing corrective action field activities. Field activities are conducted at the three groundwater AOCs (Burn Site Groundwater [BSG AOC], Technical Areamore » [TA]-V Groundwater [TAVG AOC], and Tijeras Arroyo Groundwater [TAG AOC]). Section I.2.2 summarizes quarterly activities at sites where the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED) issued a certificate of completion and the sites are in the corrective action complete (CAC) regulatory process. Currently, SWMUs 8 and 58, 68, 149, 154, and 502 are in the CAC regulatory process. Corrective action activities are deferred at the Long Sled Track (SWMU 83), the Gun Facilities (SWMU 84), and the Short Sled Track (SWMU 240) because these three sites are active mission facilities. These three active sites are located in TA-III.« less

Conservation of ζ with radiative corrections from heavy field

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Tanaka, Takahiro; Yukawa Institute for Theoretical Physics, Kyoto University,Kyoto, 606-8502; Urakawa, Yuko

2016-06-08

In this paper, we address a possible impact of radiative corrections from a heavy scalar field χ on the curvature perturbation ζ. Integrating out χ, we derive the effective action for ζ, which includes the loop corrections of the heavy field χ. When the mass of χ is much larger than the Hubble scale H, the loop corrections of χ only yield a local contribution to the effective action and hence the effective action simply gives an action for ζ in a single field model, where, as is widely known, ζ is conserved in time after the Hubble crossing time.more » Meanwhile, when the mass of χ is comparable to H, the loop corrections of χ can give a non-local contribution to the effective action. Because of the non-local contribution from χ, in general, ζ may not be conserved, even if the classical background trajectory is determined only by the evolution of the inflaton. In this paper, we derive the condition that ζ is conserved in time in the presence of the radiative corrections from χ. Namely, we show that when the dilatation invariance, which is a part of the diffeomorphism invariance, is preserved at the quantum level, the loop corrections of the massive field χ do not disturb the constant evolution of ζ at super Hubble scales. In this discussion, we show the Ward-Takahashi identity for the dilatation invariance, which yields a consistency relation for the correlation functions of the massive field χ.« less

40 CFR 63.6660 - In what form and how long must I keep my records?

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... years following the date of each occurrence, measurement, maintenance, corrective action, report, or... years after the date of each occurrence, measurement, maintenance, corrective action, report, or record...

Guidance on Initial Site Assessment at Corrective Action Sites

EPA Pesticide Factsheets

Guidance to be used to conduct Corrective Action site assessment efforts. Informs Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) permit writers and enforcement officials of procedures to be used in conducting RCRA Facility Assessments.

28 CFR 115.277 - Corrective action for contractors and volunteers.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-07-01

... volunteers. 115.277 Section 115.277 Judicial Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (CONTINUED) PRISON RAPE... Corrective action for contractors and volunteers. (a) Any contractor or volunteer who engages in sexual abuse... contractor or volunteer. ...

28 CFR 115.277 - Corrective action for contractors and volunteers.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-07-01

... volunteers. 115.277 Section 115.277 Judicial Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (CONTINUED) PRISON RAPE... Corrective action for contractors and volunteers. (a) Any contractor or volunteer who engages in sexual abuse... contractor or volunteer. ...

28 CFR 115.277 - Corrective action for contractors and volunteers.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-07-01

... volunteers. 115.277 Section 115.277 Judicial Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (CONTINUED) PRISON RAPE... Corrective action for contractors and volunteers. (a) Any contractor or volunteer who engages in sexual abuse... contractor or volunteer. ...

An architecture for a continuous, user-driven, and data-driven application of clinical guidelines and its evaluation.

PubMed

Shalom, Erez; Shahar, Yuval; Lunenfeld, Eitan

2016-02-01

Design, implement, and evaluate a new architecture for realistic continuous guideline (GL)-based decision support, based on a series of requirements that we have identified, such as support for continuous care, for multiple task types, and for data-driven and user-driven modes. We designed and implemented a new continuous GL-based support architecture, PICARD, which accesses a temporal reasoning engine, and provides several different types of application interfaces. We present the new architecture in detail in the current paper. To evaluate the architecture, we first performed a technical evaluation of the PICARD architecture, using 19 simulated scenarios in the preeclampsia/toxemia domain. We then performed a functional evaluation with the help of two domain experts, by generating patient records that simulate 60 decision points from six clinical guideline-based scenarios, lasting from two days to four weeks. Finally, 36 clinicians made manual decisions in half of the scenarios, and had access to the automated GL-based support in the other half. The measures used in all three experiments were correctness and completeness of the decisions relative to the GL. Mean correctness and completeness in the technical evaluation were 1±0.0 and 0.96±0.03 respectively. The functional evaluation produced only several minor comments from the two experts, mostly regarding the output's style; otherwise the system's recommendations were validated. In the clinically oriented evaluation, the 36 clinicians applied manually approximately 41% of the GL's recommended actions. Completeness increased to approximately 93% when using PICARD. Manual correctness was approximately 94.5%, and remained similar when using PICARD; but while 68% of the manual decisions included correct but redundant actions, only 3% of the actions included in decisions made when using PICARD were redundant. The PICARD architecture is technically feasible and is functionally valid, and addresses the realistic continuous GL-based application requirements that we have defined; in particular, the requirement for care over significant time frames. The use of the PICARD architecture in the domain we examined resulted in enhanced completeness and in reduction of redundancies, and is potentially beneficial for general GL-based management of chronic patients. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 408: Bomblet Target Area Tonopah Test Range (TTR), Nevada, Revision 0

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Mark Krauss

2010-09-01

This Closure Report (CR) presents information supporting the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 408: Bomblet Target Area (TTR), Tonopah Test Range, Nevada. This CR complies with the requirements of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order that was agreed to by the State of Nevada; U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management; U.S. Department of Defense; and DOE, Legacy Management. Corrective Action Unit 408 is located at the Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, and consists of Corrective Action Site (CAS) TA-55-002-TAB2, Bomblet Target Areas. This CAS includes the following seven target areas: • Mid Target • Flightline Bomblet Location •more » Strategic Air Command (SAC) Target Location 1 • SAC Target Location 2 • South Antelope Lake • Tomahawk Location 1 • Tomahawk Location 2 The purpose of this CR is to provide documentation supporting the completed corrective actions and data confirming that the closure objectives for the CAS within CAU 408 were met. To achieve this, the following actions were performed: • Review the current site conditions, including the concentration and extent of contamination. • Implement any corrective actions necessary to protect human health and the environment. • Properly dispose of corrective action and investigation wastes. • Document Notice of Completion and closure of CAU 408 issued by the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection. From July 2009 through August 2010, closure activities were performed as set forth in the Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration Plan for CAU 408: Bomblet Target Area, Tonopah Test Range (TTR), Nevada. The purposes of the activities as defined during the data quality objectives process were as follows: • Identify and remove munitions of explosive concern (MEC) associated with DOE activities. • Investigate potential disposal pit locations. • Remove depleted uranium-contaminated fragments and soil. • Determine whether contaminants of concern (COCs) are present. • If COCs are present, determine their nature and extent, implement appropriate corrective actions, and properly dispose of wastes. Analytes detected during the closure activities were evaluated against final action levels to determine COCs for CAU 408. Assessment of the data indicated COCs are not present at CAS TA-55-002-TAB2; therefore, no corrective action is necessary. No use restrictions are required to be placed on this CAU because the investigation showed no evidence of remaining soil contamination or remaining debris/waste upon completion of all investigation activities. The MEC was successfully removed and dispositioned as planned using current best available technologies. As MEC guidance and general MEC standards acknowledge that MEC response actions cannot determine with 100 percent certainty that all MEC and unexploded ordnance (UXO) are removed, the clean closure of CAU 408 will implement a best management practice of posting UXO hazard warning signs near the seven target areas. The signs will warn future land users of the potential for encountering residual UXO hazards. The DOE, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office, provides the following recommendations: • A Notice of Completion to the DOE, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office, is requested from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection for closure of CAU 408. • Corrective Action Unit 408 should be moved from Appendix III to Appendix IV of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order.« less

Addendum to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 411: Double Tracks Plutonium Dispersion (Nellis), Nevada Test and Training Range, Nevada, Revision 0

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Burmeister, Mark

2016-11-01

The Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 411 Closure Report (CR) was published in June 2016 (NNSA/NFO, 2016). The purpose of this addendum is to clarify language in the CR relating to the field instrument for the detection of low-energy radiation (FIDLER), provide the waste disposal documentation for waste generated during the corrective action investigation (CAI), and reference a letter from the U.S. Air Force (USAF) regarding the closure of CAU 411.

Corrective Action Plan in response to the March 1992 Tiger Team Assessment of the Ames Laboratory

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Not Available

1992-11-20

On March 5, 1992, a Department of Energy (DOE) Tiger Team completed an assessment of the Ames Laboratory, located in Ames, Iowa. The purpose of the assessment was to provide the Secretary of Energy with a report on the status and performance of Environment, Safety and Health (ES H) programs at Ames Laboratory. Detailed findings of the assessment are presented in the report, DOE/EH-0237, Tiger Team Assessment of the Ames Laboratory. This document, the Ames Laboratory Corrective Action Plan (ALCAP), presents corrective actions to overcome deficiencies cited in the Tiger Team Assessment. The Tiger Team identified 53 Environmental findings, frommore » which the Team derived four key findings. In the Safety and Health (S H) area, 126 concerns were identified, eight of which were designated Category 11 (there were no Category I concerns). Seven key concerns were derived from the 126 concerns. The Management Subteam developed 19 findings which have been summarized in four key findings. The eight S H Category 11 concerns identified in the Tiger Team Assessment were given prompt management attention. Actions to address these deficiencies have been described in individual corrective action plans, which were submitted to DOE Headquarters on March 20, 1992. The ALCAP includes actions described in this early response, as well as a long term strategy and framework for correcting all remaining deficiencies. Accordingly, the ALCAP presents the organizational structure, management systems, and specific responses that are being developed to implement corrective actions and to resolve root causes identified in the Tiger Team Assessment. The Chicago Field Office (CH), IowaState University (ISU), the Institute for Physical Research and Technology (IPRT), and Ames Laboratory prepared the ALCAP with input from the DOE Headquarters, Office of Energy Research (ER).« less

Corrective Action Plan in response to the March 1992 Tiger Team Assessment of the Ames Laboratory

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Not Available

1992-11-20

On March 5, 1992, a Department of Energy (DOE) Tiger Team completed an assessment of the Ames Laboratory, located in Ames, Iowa. The purpose of the assessment was to provide the Secretary of Energy with a report on the status and performance of Environment, Safety and Health (ES&H) programs at Ames Laboratory. Detailed findings of the assessment are presented in the report, DOE/EH-0237, Tiger Team Assessment of the Ames Laboratory. This document, the Ames Laboratory Corrective Action Plan (ALCAP), presents corrective actions to overcome deficiencies cited in the Tiger Team Assessment. The Tiger Team identified 53 Environmental findings, from whichmore » the Team derived four key findings. In the Safety and Health (S&H) area, 126 concerns were identified, eight of which were designated Category 11 (there were no Category I concerns). Seven key concerns were derived from the 126 concerns. The Management Subteam developed 19 findings which have been summarized in four key findings. The eight S&H Category 11 concerns identified in the Tiger Team Assessment were given prompt management attention. Actions to address these deficiencies have been described in individual corrective action plans, which were submitted to DOE Headquarters on March 20, 1992. The ALCAP includes actions described in this early response, as well as a long term strategy and framework for correcting all remaining deficiencies. Accordingly, the ALCAP presents the organizational structure, management systems, and specific responses that are being developed to implement corrective actions and to resolve root causes identified in the Tiger Team Assessment. The Chicago Field Office (CH), IowaState University (ISU), the Institute for Physical Research and Technology (IPRT), and Ames Laboratory prepared the ALCAP with input from the DOE Headquarters, Office of Energy Research (ER).« less

USE OF BIOLOGICALLY BASED COMPUTATIONAL MODELING IN MODE OF ACTION-BASED RISK ASSESSMENT – AN EXAMPLE OF CHLOROFORM

EPA Science Inventory

The objective of current work is to develop a new cancer dose-response assessment for chloroform using a physiologically based pharmacokinetic/pharmacodynamic (PBPK/PD) model. The PBPK/PD model is based on a mode of action in which the cytolethality of chloroform occurs when the ...

Addendum to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 165: Area 25 and 26 Dry Well and Washdown Areas, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Krauss, Mark J

This document constitutes an addendum to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 165: Area 25 and 26 Dry Well and Washdown Areas, Nevada Test Site, Nevada as described in the document Recommendations and Justifications To Remove Use Restrictions Established under the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order dated September 2013. The Use Restriction Removal document was approved by the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection on October 16, 2013. The approval of the UR Removal document constituted approval of each of the recommended UR removals. In conformance with themore » UR Removal document, this addendum consists of: This page that refers the reader to the UR Removal document for additional information The cover, title, and signature pages of the UR Removal document The NDEP approval letter The corresponding section of the UR Removal document This addendum provides the documentation justifying the cancellation of the UR for CAS 25-20-01, Lab Drain Dry Well. This UR was established as part of FFACO corrective actions and was based on the presence of tetrachloroethene contamination at concentrations greater than the action level established at the time of the initial investigation. Although total petroleum hydrocarbon diesel-range organics contamination at concentrations greater than the NDEP action level was present at the site, no hazardous constituents of TPH-DRO exceeded the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Region 9 preliminary remediation goals established at the time of the initial investigation.« less

13 CFR 120.1400 - Grounds for enforcement actions-SBA Lenders.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 13 Business Credit and Assistance 1 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Grounds for enforcement actions-SBA Lenders. 120.1400 Section 120.1400 Business Credit and Assistance SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION BUSINESS LOANS Risk-Based Lender Oversight Enforcement Actions § 120.1400 Grounds for enforcement actions...

Uniform Federal Policy for Quality Assurance Project Plans: Evaluating, Assessing, and Documenting Environmental Data Collection and Use Programs. Part 1. UFP-QAPP Manual

DTIC Science & Technology

2004-07-01

sampler, project manager, data reviewer, statistician , risk assessor, assessment personnel, and laboratory QC manager. In addition, a complete copy of...sample • Corrective actions to be taken if the QC sample fails these criteria • A description of how the QC data and results are to be documented and...Intergovernmental Data Quality Task Force Uniform Federal Policy for Quality Assurance Project Plans Evaluating, Assessing, and Documenting

Enterobacter aerogenes Needle Stick Leads to Improved Biological Management System

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Johanson, Richard E.

2004-08-01

A laboratory worker who received a needle stick from a contaminated needle while working with a culture containing Enterobactor aerogenes developed a laboratory acquired infection. Although this organism has been shown to cause community and nosocomial infections, there have been no documented cases of a laboratory acquired infections. Lessons learned from the event led to corrective actions which included modification of lab procedures, development of a biological inventory tracking and risk identification system and the establishment of an effective biological safety program.

5 CFR 2638.504 - Director's finding.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... facts upon which the finding is based and a reference to the specific ethics provision in issue. A copy....504 Administrative Personnel OFFICE OF GOVERNMENT ETHICS GOVERNMENT ETHICS OFFICE OF GOVERNMENT ETHICS AND EXECUTIVE AGENCY ETHICS PROGRAM RESPONSIBILITIES Corrective and Remedial Action in Cases Involving...

49 CFR 385.17 - Change to safety rating based upon corrective actions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-10-01

... in CMVs or placardable quantities of hazardous materials. (2) Within 45 days for all other motor.... [65 FR 50935, Aug. 22, 2000, as amended at 72 FR 36788, July 5, 2007; 75 FR 17241, Apr. 5, 2010; 77 FR...

49 CFR 385.17 - Change to safety rating based upon corrective actions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-10-01

... in CMVs or placardable quantities of hazardous materials. (2) Within 45 days for all other motor.... [65 FR 50935, Aug. 22, 2000, as amended at 72 FR 36788, July 5, 2007; 75 FR 17241, Apr. 5, 2010; 77 FR...

40 CFR 63.3131 - In what form and for how long must I keep my records?

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... following the date of each occurrence, measurement, maintenance, corrective action, report, or record, as... least 2 years after the date of each occurrence, measurement, maintenance, corrective action, report, or...

40 CFR 63.7343 - In what form and how long must I keep my records?

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... for 5 years following the date of each occurrence, measurement, maintenance, corrective action, report... occurrence, measurement, maintenance, corrective action, report, or record, according to § 63.10(b)(1). You...

Revised Total Coliform Rule Assessments and Corrective Actions

EPA Pesticide Factsheets

EPA has developed the Revised Total Coliform Rule Assessment and Corrective Actions Guidance Manual for public water systems (e.g., owners and operators) to assist in complying with the requirements of the Revised Total Coliform Rule.

Reducing the risk of healthcare-associated infections through Lean Six Sigma: The case of the medicine areas at the Federico II University Hospital in Naples (Italy).

PubMed

Improta, Giovanni; Cesarelli, Mario; Montuori, Paolo; Santillo, Liberatina Carmela; Triassi, Maria

2018-04-01

Lean Six Sigma (LSS) has been recognized as an effective management tool for improving healthcare performance. Here, LSS was adopted to reduce the risk of healthcare-associated infections (HAIs), a critical quality parameter in the healthcare sector. Lean Six Sigma was applied to the areas of clinical medicine (including general medicine, pulmonology, oncology, nephrology, cardiology, neurology, gastroenterology, rheumatology, and diabetology), and data regarding HAIs were collected for 28,000 patients hospitalized between January 2011 and December 2016. Following the LSS define, measure, analyse, improve, and control cycle, the factors influencing the risk of HAI were identified by using typical LSS tools (statistical analyses, brainstorming sessions, and cause-effect diagrams). Finally, corrective measures to prevent HAIs were implemented and monitored for 1 year after implementation. Lean Six Sigma proved to be a useful tool for identifying variables affecting the risk of HAIs and implementing corrective actions to improve the performance of the care process. A reduction in the number of patients colonized by sentinel bacteria was achieved after the improvement phase. The implementation of an LSS approach could significantly decrease the percentage of patients with HAIs. © 2017 The Authors. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.