Sample records for security nuclear weapons

  1. Sandia National Laboratories: National Security Missions: Nuclear Weapons:

    Science.gov Websites

    Safety & Security Sandia National Laboratories Exceptional service in the national interest & Figures Programs Nuclear Weapons About Nuclear Weapons Safety & Security Weapons Science & Twitter YouTube Flickr RSS Top Nuclear Weapons About Nuclear Weapons at Sandia Safety & Security

  2. Building Foundations for Nuclear Security Enterprise Analysis Utilizing Nuclear Weapon Data

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Josserand, Terry Michael; Young, Leone; Chamberlin, Edwin Phillip

    The Nuclear Security Enterprise, managed by the National Nuclear Security Administration - a semiautonomous agency within the Department of Energy - has been associated with numerous assessments with respect to the estimating, management capabilities, and practices pertaining to nuclear weapon modernization efforts. This report identifies challenges in estimating and analyzing the Nuclear Security Enterprise through an analysis of analogous timeframe conditions utilizing two types of nuclear weapon data - (1) a measure of effort and (2) a function of time. The analysis of analogous timeframe conditions that utilizes only two types of nuclear weapon data yields four summary observations thatmore » estimators and analysts of the Nuclear Security Enterprise will find useful.« less

  3. Sandia National Laboratories: Directed-energy tech receives funding to

    Science.gov Websites

    Accomplishments Energy Stationary Power Earth Science Transportation Energy Energy Research Global Security WMD & Figures Programs Nuclear Weapons About Nuclear Weapons Safety & Security Weapons Science & Cyber & Infrastructure Security Global Security Remote Sensing & Verification Research Research

  4. The Role of the DOE Weapons Laboratories in a Changing National Security Environment: CNSS Papers No. 8, April 1988

    DOE R&D Accomplishments Database

    Hecker, S. S.

    1988-04-01

    The contributions of the Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear weapons laboratories to the nation's security are reviewed in testimony before the Subcommittee on Procurement and Military Nuclear Systems of the House Armed Services Committee. Also presented are contributions that technology will make in maintaining the strategic balance through deterrence, treaty verification, and a sound nuclear weapons complex as the nation prepares for significant arms control initiatives. The DOE nuclear weapons laboratories can contribute to the broader context of national security, one that recognizes that military strength can be maintained over the long term only if it is built upon the foundations of economic strength and energy security.

  5. Sandia National Laboratories: Privacy and Security

    Science.gov Websites

    Programs Nuclear Weapons About Nuclear Weapons Safety & Security Weapons Science & Technology Robotics R&D 100 Awards Laboratory Directed Research & Development Technology Deployment Centers Audit Sandia's Economic Impact Licensing & Technology Transfer Browse Technology Portfolios

  6. The Security of Russia's Nuclear Arsenal: The Human Factor

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Ball, D.Y.

    1999-10-12

    Assertions by the Russian military that all of their nuclear weapons are secure against theft and that nuclear units within the military are somehow insulated from the problems plaguing the Russian military should not be accepted uncritically. Accordingly, we should not give unwarranted credence to the pronouncements of military figures like Cal.-Gen. Igor Valynkin, Chief of the Defense Ministry's 12th Main Directorate, which oversees the country's nuclear arsenal. He contends that ''Russian nuclear weapons are under reliable supervision'' and that ''talk about the unreliability of our control over nuclear weapons has only one pragmatic goal--to convince international society that themore » country is incapable of maintaining nuclear safety and to introduce international oversight over those weapons, as it is done, for example, in Iraq.'' While the comparison to Iraq is preposterous, many analysts might agree with Valynkin's sanguine appraisal of the security of Russia's nuclear weapons. In contrast, I argue that the numerous difficulties confronting the military as a whole should cause concern in the West over the security of the Russian nuclear arsenal.« less

  7. Sandia National Laboratories: National Security Missions: International

    Science.gov Websites

    Prevention History 60 impacts Diversity Locations Facts & Figures Programs Nuclear Weapons About Nuclear Weapons Safety & Security Weapons Science & Technology Defense Systems & Assessments About Directed Research & Development Technology Deployment Centers Working With Sandia Working With Sandia

  8. Evolving perceptions of security - US National Security surveys 1993--1995. Progress report, September 30, 1995--November 14, 1995

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Herron, K.G.; Jenkins-Smith, H.C.

    This study analyzes findings from a national survey of 2,490 randomly selected members of the US public conducted between September 30 and November 14, 1995. It provides an over time comparison of public perceptions about nuclear weapons risks and benefits and key nuclear policy issues between 1993 and 1995. Other areas of investigation include policy preferences regarding nuclear proliferation, terrorism, US/Russian nuclear cooperation, and personal security. Public perceptions of post-cold war security were found to be evolving in unexpected ways. The perceived threat of nuclear conflict involving the US had not declined, and the threat of nuclear conflict between othermore » countries and fears of nuclear proliferation and terrorism had increased. Perceived risks associated with managing the US nuclear arsenal were also higher. Perceptions of external and domestic benefits from US nuclear weapons were not declining. Support was found for increasing funding for nuclear weapons safety, training, and maintenance, but most respondents favored decreasing funding for developing and testing new nuclear weapons. Strong support was evident for programs and funding to prevent nuclear proliferation and terrorism. Though skeptical that nuclear weapons can be eliminated, most respondents supported reducing the US nuclear arsenal, banning nuclear test explosions, and ending production of fissile materials to make nuclear weapons. Statistically significant relationships were found between perceptions of nuclear weapons risks and benefits and policy and spending preferences. Demographic variables and basic social and political beliefs were systematically related both to risk and benefit perceptions and policy and spending options.« less

  9. Physical Security Modeling for the Shipboard Nuclear Weapons Security Program,

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1982-04-01

    I AOA1IR 396 NAVAL SURFACE WEAPONS CENTER SILVER SPRING MO F/G 15/3 PHYSICAL SECURITY MODELING FOR THE SHIPROARD NUCLEAR WEAPONS SE--ETEEU) APR A2 E ...WEAPONS SECURITY )PROGRAM 0% BY E . G. JACOUES D. L BARTUSEK R. W. MONROE M. S. SCHWARTZ WEAPONS SYSTEMS DEPARTMENT 1 APRIL 1982 A4pm lvW for p uic r...ASSIPICATIO N O F Tb IS PAGE t’W "mu Dat e E DLeT R)....... t READ W~STRUCTIoNs’ REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE BEFORE COMPLETNG FORM4 . REPiQRT NUM1e[i ja. VT

  10. Norms Versus Security: What is More Important to Japan’s View of Nuclear Weapons

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2017-03-01

    objectives: “1) prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, 2) promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy , and 3...http://www.world- nuclear.org/information-library/safety-and-security/safety-of-plants/fukushima-accident.aspx. 40 “Japanese Wary of Nuclear Energy ...PewResearchCenter, accessed February 22, 2017. http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/06/05/japanese-wary-of- nuclear - energy / 41 Malcolm Foster, “Thousands

  11. Public perspectives on nuclear security. US national security surveys, 1993--1997

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Herron, K.G.; Jenkins-Smith, H.C.

    This is the third report in a series of studies to examine how US attitudes about nuclear security are evolving in the post-Cold War era and to identify trends in public perceptions and preferences relevant to the evolution of US nuclear security policy. It presents findings from three surveys: a nationwide telephone survey of randomly selected members of the US general public; a written survey of randomly selected members of American Men and Women of Science; and a written survey of randomly selected state legislators from all fifty US states. Key areas of investigation included nuclear security, cooperation between USmore » and Russian scientists about nuclear issues, vulnerabilities of critical US infrastructures and responsibilities for their protection, and broad areas of US national science policy. While international and US national security were seen to be slowly improving, the primary nuclear threat to the US was perceived to have shifted from Russia to China. Support was found for nuclear arms control measures, including mutual reductions in stockpiles. However, respondents were pessimistic about eliminating nuclear armaments, and nuclear deterrence continued to be highly values. Participants favored decreasing funding f/or developing and testing new nuclear weapons, but supported increased investments in nuclear weapons infrastructure. Strong concerns were expressed about nuclear proliferation and the potential for nuclear terrorism. Support was evident for US scientific cooperation with Russia to strengthen security of Russian nuclear assets. Elite and general public perceptions of external and domestic nuclear weapons risks and external and domestic nuclear weapons benefits were statistically significantly related to nuclear weapons policy options and investment preferences. Demographic variables and individual belief systems were systematically related both to risk and benefit perceptions and to policy and spending preferences.« less

  12. Nuclear Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Counterterrorism: Impacts on Public Health

    PubMed Central

    Pregenzer, Arian

    2014-01-01

    Reducing the risks of nuclear war, limiting the spread of nuclear weapons, and reducing global nuclear weapons stockpiles are key national and international security goals. They are pursued through a variety of international arms control, nonproliferation, and counterterrorism treaties and agreements. These legally binding and political commitments, together with the institutional infrastructure that supports them, work to establish global norms of behavior and have limited the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Beyond the primary security objectives, reducing the likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons, preventing environmental releases of radioactive material, increasing the availability of safe and secure nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, and providing scientific data relevant to predicting and managing the consequences of natural or human-caused disasters worldwide provide significant benefits to global public health. PMID:24524501

  13. Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2009-10-15

    and technical measures to prevent unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons, as well as contribute to physical security of storage ...Talks On Nuclear Security,” The Boston Globe, May 5, 2009. 79 Abdul Mannan, “Preventing Nuclear Terrorism in Pakistan: Sabotage of a Spent Fuel Cask or...a Commercial Irradiation Source in Transport ,” in Pakistan’s Nuclear Future, 2008; Martellini, 2008. 80 Martellini, 2008. 81 For more information

  14. Zero Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Security Enterprise Modernization

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2011-01-01

    national security strategy. For the first time since the Manhattan Project , the United States was no longer building nuclear weapons and was in fact...50 to 60 years to the Manhattan Project and are on the verge of catastrophic failure. Caustic chemicals and processes have sped up the corrosion and...day, the United States must fund the long-term modernization effort of the entire enter­ prise. Notes 1. Nuclear Weapon Archive, “The Manhattan

  15. Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and Agreements

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2007-08-09

    security and control over nuclear weapons and fissile materials. These projects provided Russia with bullet-proof Kevlar blankets, secure canisters ...U.S. security concerns. The United States and Soviet Union began to sign agreements limiting their strategic offensive nuclear weapons in the early...U.S.-Russian relationship. At the same time, however, the two sides began to cooperate on securing and eliminating Soviet-era nuclear , chemical, and

  16. Nuclear Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Counterterrorism: Impacts on Public Health

    DOE PAGES

    Dreicer, Mona; Pregenzer, Arian

    2014-04-01

    Reducing the risks of nuclear war, limiting the spread of nuclear weapons and reducing global nuclear weapons stockpiles are key national and international security goals. They are pursued through a variety of international arms control, nonproliferation and counter-terrorism treaties and agreements. These legally binding and political commitments, together with the institutional infrastructure that supports them, work to establish global norms of behavior and have limited the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Beyond the primary security objectives, reducing the likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons, preventing environmental releases of radioactive material, increasing the availability of safe and secure nuclearmore » technology for peaceful purposes, and providing scientific data relevant to predicting and managing the consequences of natural or human-caused disasters world-wide provide significant benefits to global public health.« less

  17. The Superpowers: Nuclear Weapons and National Security. National Issues Forums.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Mitchell, Greg; Melville, Keith

    Designed to stimulate thinking about United States-Soviet relationships in terms of nuclear weapons and national security, this document presents ideas and issues that represent differing viewpoints and positions. Chapter 1, "Rethinking the U.S.-Soviet Relationship," considers attempts to achieve true national security, and chapter 2,…

  18. Confidence in Nuclear Weapons as Numbers Decrease and Time Since Testing Increases

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Adams, Marvin

    2011-04-01

    As numbers and types of nuclear weapons are reduced, the U.S. objective is to maintain a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent without nuclear-explosive testing. A host of issues combine to make this a challenge. An evolving threat environment may prompt changes to security systems. Aging of weapons has led to ``life extension programs'' that produce weapons that differ in some ways from the originals. Outdated and changing facilities pose difficulties for life-extension, surveillance, and dismantlement efforts. A variety of factors can make it a challenge to recruit, develop, and retain outstanding people with the skills and experience that are needed to form the foundation of a credible deterrent. These and other issues will be discussed in the framework of proposals to reduce and perhaps eliminate nuclear weapons.

  19. Living with nuclear weapons

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Carnesale, A.; Doty, P.; Hoffmann, S.

    1983-01-01

    At Harvard President Derek Bok's request, six Harvard professors explain nuclear arms issues to help citizens understand all sides of the national security debates. The goal is to encourage public participation in policy formulation. The book emphasizes that escapism will not improve security; that idealistic plans to eliminate nuclear weapons are a form of escapism. Learning to live with nuclear weapons, they suggest, requires an understanding of the current nuclear predicament and the implications of alternative weapons and policy choices. After reviewing these matters, they emphasize that informed persons will continue to disagree, but that knowledge will improve understanding andmore » appreciation of their differences and improve the quality of policy debates. 54 references, 5 figures, 2 tables. (DCK)« less

  20. DoD Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability Assurance

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2016-04-27

    destructive power, and the potential consequences of an accident or unauthorized act. Assured nuclear weapons safety, security, and control remain of...DOD INSTRUCTION 5210.42 DOD NUCLEAR WEAPONS PERSONNEL RELIABILITY ASSURANCE Originating Component: Office of the Under Secretary of...from the DoD Issuances Website at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives. Reissues and renames: DoD Instruction 5210.42, “ Nuclear Weapons Personnel

  1. Design and implementation of a nuclear weapons management system submodule: Shipboard security force system. Master's thesis

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Settlemyer, S.R.

    1991-09-01

    The Nuclear Weapons Management System combines the strengths of an expert system with the flexibility of a database management system to assist the Weapons Officer, Security Officer, and the Personnel Reliability Program Officer in the performance of administrative duties associated with the nuclear weapons programs in the United States Navy. This thesis examines the need for, and ultimately the design of, a system that will assist the Security Officer in administrative duties associated with the Shipboard Self Defense Force. This system, designed and coded utilizing dBASE IV, can be implemented as a stand alone system. Furthermore, it interfaces with themore » expert system submodule that handles the PRP screening process.« less

  2. No weapons in the weapons lab

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Trebino, Rick

    2010-03-01

    I spent 12 years working at a top-secret nuclear-weapons lab that had its own dedicated force of heavily armed security guards. Of course, security-related incidents were rare, so the guards' main challenge was simply staying awake.

  3. Toward a nuclear weapons free world?

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Maaranen, S.A.

    Doubts about the wisdom of relying on nuclear weapons are as old as nuclear weapons themselves. But despite this questioning, nuclear weapons came to be seen as the indispensable element of American (indeed Western) security during the Cold War. By the 1970s and 1980s, however, discontent was growing about the intense US-Soviet nuclear arms competition, as it failed to provide any enduring improvement in security; rather, it was seen as creating ever greater risks and dangers. Arms control negotiations and limitations, adopted as a means to regulate the technical competition, may also have relieved some of the political pressures andmore » dangers. But the balance of terror, and the fears of it, continued. The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) under President Reagan was a very different approach to escaping from the precarious protection of nuclear weapons, in that it sought a way to continue to defend the US and the West, but without the catastrophic risks of mutual deterrence. As such, SDI connoted unhappiness with the precarious nuclear balance and, for many, with nuclear weapons in general. The disappearance of the Warsaw Pact, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the sudden end of the Cold War seemed to offer a unique opportunity to fashion a new, more peaceful world order that might allow for fading away of nuclear weapons. Scholars have foreseen two different paths to a nuclear free world. The first is a fundamental improvement in the relationships between states such that nuclear weapons are no longer needed. The second path is through technological development, e.g., missile defenses which could provide effective protection against nuclear attacks. The paper discusses nuclear weapon policy in the US, views of other nuclear states, the future of nuclear weapons, and issues in a less-nuclear world.« less

  4. Sandia National Laboratories: News

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    Programs Nuclear Weapons About Nuclear Weapons Safety & Security Weapons Science & Technology Robotics R&D 100 Awards Laboratory Directed Research & Development Technology Deployment Centers Audit Sandia's Economic Impact Licensing & Technology Transfer Browse Technology Portfolios

  5. Sandia National Laboratories: Locations

    Science.gov Websites

    Programs Nuclear Weapons About Nuclear Weapons Safety & Security Weapons Science & Technology Robotics R&D 100 Awards Laboratory Directed Research & Development Technology Deployment Centers Audit Sandia's Economic Impact Licensing & Technology Transfer Browse Technology Portfolios

  6. Sandia National Laboratories: Careers

    Science.gov Websites

    Programs Nuclear Weapons About Nuclear Weapons Safety & Security Weapons Science & Technology Robotics R&D 100 Awards Laboratory Directed Research & Development Technology Deployment Centers Audit Sandia's Economic Impact Licensing & Technology Transfer Browse Technology Portfolios

  7. Sandia National Laboratories: Mission

    Science.gov Websites

    Programs Nuclear Weapons About Nuclear Weapons Safety & Security Weapons Science & Technology Robotics R&D 100 Awards Laboratory Directed Research & Development Technology Deployment Centers Audit Sandia's Economic Impact Licensing & Technology Transfer Browse Technology Portfolios

  8. Sandia National Laboratories: Research

    Science.gov Websites

    Programs Nuclear Weapons About Nuclear Weapons Safety & Security Weapons Science & Technology Robotics R&D 100 Awards Laboratory Directed Research & Development Technology Deployment Centers Audit Sandia's Economic Impact Licensing & Technology Transfer Browse Technology Portfolios

  9. Sandia National Laboratories:

    Science.gov Websites

    Programs Nuclear Weapons About Nuclear Weapons Safety & Security Weapons Science & Technology Robotics R&D 100 Awards Laboratory Directed Research & Development Technology Deployment Centers Audit Sandia's Economic Impact Licensing & Technology Transfer Browse Technology Portfolios

  10. Sandia National Laboratories: Feedback

    Science.gov Websites

    Programs Nuclear Weapons About Nuclear Weapons Safety & Security Weapons Science & Technology Robotics R&D 100 Awards Laboratory Directed Research & Development Technology Deployment Centers Audit Sandia's Economic Impact Licensing & Technology Transfer Browse Technology Portfolios

  11. International Nuclear Security

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Doyle, James E.

    2012-08-14

    This presentation discusses: (1) Definitions of international nuclear security; (2) What degree of security do we have now; (3) Limitations of a nuclear security strategy focused on national lock-downs of fissile materials and weapons; (4) What do current trends say about the future; and (5) How can nuclear security be strengthened? Nuclear security can be strengthened by: (1) More accurate baseline inventories; (2) Better physical protection, control and accounting; (3) Effective personnel reliability programs; (4) Minimize weapons-usable materials and consolidate to fewer locations; (5) Consider local threat environment when siting facilities; (6) Implement pledges made in the NSS process; andmore » (7) More robust interdiction, emergency response and special operations capabilities. International cooperation is desirable, but not always possible.« less

  12. US changes course on nuclear-weapons strategy

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Gwynne, Peter

    2010-05-01

    US President Barack Obama has signalled a new approach to nuclear-weapons policy that limits their use against other states and documents how the country will ensure the viability of existing stockpiles. The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which sets out the US's nuclear strategy over a 10-year period, also calls for a highly skilled workforce to ensure "the long-term safety, security and effectiveness of the nuclear arsenal and to support the full range of nuclear-security work".

  13. Sandia National Laboratories: Search Results

    Science.gov Websites

    Programs Nuclear Weapons About Nuclear Weapons Safety & Security Weapons Science & Technology Robotics R&D 100 Awards Laboratory Directed Research & Development Technology Deployment Centers Audit Sandia's Economic Impact Licensing & Technology Transfer Browse Technology Portfolios

  14. Sandia National Laboratories: Social Media

    Science.gov Websites

    Programs Nuclear Weapons About Nuclear Weapons Safety & Security Weapons Science & Technology Robotics R&D 100 Awards Laboratory Directed Research & Development Technology Deployment Centers Audit Sandia's Economic Impact Licensing & Technology Transfer Browse Technology Portfolios

  15. Sandia National Laboratories: Visiting Research Scholars

    Science.gov Websites

    Programs Nuclear Weapons About Nuclear Weapons Safety & Security Weapons Science & Technology Robotics R&D 100 Awards Laboratory Directed Research & Development Technology Deployment Centers Audit Sandia's Economic Impact Licensing & Technology Transfer Browse Technology Portfolios

  16. Sandia National Laboratories: News: Videos

    Science.gov Websites

    Programs Nuclear Weapons About Nuclear Weapons Safety & Security Weapons Science & Technology Robotics R&D 100 Awards Laboratory Directed Research & Development Technology Deployment Centers Audit Sandia's Economic Impact Licensing & Technology Transfer Browse Technology Portfolios

  17. Sandia National Laboratories: About Sandia

    Science.gov Websites

    Programs Nuclear Weapons About Nuclear Weapons Safety & Security Weapons Science & Technology Robotics R&D 100 Awards Laboratory Directed Research & Development Technology Deployment Centers Audit Sandia's Economic Impact Licensing & Technology Transfer Browse Technology Portfolios

  18. Sandia National Laboratories: News: Image Gallery

    Science.gov Websites

    Programs Nuclear Weapons About Nuclear Weapons Safety & Security Weapons Science & Technology Robotics R&D 100 Awards Laboratory Directed Research & Development Technology Deployment Centers Audit Sandia's Economic Impact Licensing & Technology Transfer Browse Technology Portfolios

  19. Sandia National Laboratories: Research: Biodefense

    Science.gov Websites

    Programs Nuclear Weapons About Nuclear Weapons Safety & Security Weapons Science & Technology Robotics R&D 100 Awards Laboratory Directed Research & Development Technology Deployment Centers Audit Sandia's Economic Impact Licensing & Technology Transfer Browse Technology Portfolios

  20. Sandia National Laboratories: Sandia Digital Media

    Science.gov Websites

    Programs Nuclear Weapons About Nuclear Weapons Safety & Security Weapons Science & Technology Robotics R&D 100 Awards Laboratory Directed Research & Development Technology Deployment Centers Audit Sandia's Economic Impact Licensing & Technology Transfer Browse Technology Portfolios

  1. Sandia National Laboratories: Careers: Special Programs

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    Programs Nuclear Weapons About Nuclear Weapons Safety & Security Weapons Science & Technology Robotics R&D 100 Awards Laboratory Directed Research & Development Technology Deployment Centers Audit Sandia's Economic Impact Licensing & Technology Transfer Browse Technology Portfolios

  2. Sandia National Laboratories: Cooperative Monitoring Center

    Science.gov Websites

    Programs Nuclear Weapons About Nuclear Weapons Safety & Security Weapons Science & Technology Robotics R&D 100 Awards Laboratory Directed Research & Development Technology Deployment Centers Audit Sandia's Economic Impact Licensing & Technology Transfer Browse Technology Portfolios

  3. Sandia National Laboratories: Research: Bioscience

    Science.gov Websites

    Programs Nuclear Weapons About Nuclear Weapons Safety & Security Weapons Science & Technology Robotics R&D 100 Awards Laboratory Directed Research & Development Technology Deployment Centers Audit Sandia's Economic Impact Licensing & Technology Transfer Browse Technology Portfolios

  4. Sandia National Laboratories: Integrated Military Systems

    Science.gov Websites

    Programs Nuclear Weapons About Nuclear Weapons Safety & Security Weapons Science & Technology Robotics R&D 100 Awards Laboratory Directed Research & Development Technology Deployment Centers Audit Sandia's Economic Impact Licensing & Technology Transfer Browse Technology Portfolios

  5. Sandia National Laboratories: News: Image Gallery

    Science.gov Websites

    Environmental Management System Pollution Prevention History 60 impacts Diversity Locations Facts & Figures Programs Nuclear Weapons About Nuclear Weapons Safety & Security Weapons Science & Technology Robotics R&D 100 Awards Laboratory Directed Research & Development Technology Deployment Centers

  6. Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2010-10-07

    Pakistan: Sabotage of a Spent Fuel Cask or a Commercial Irradiation Source in Transport ,” in Pakistan’s Nuclear Future, 2008; Martellini, 2008. 99...prevent unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons, as well as contribute to physical security of storage facilities and personnel reliability... nuclear assets could be obtained by terrorists, or used by elements in the Pakistani government. Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael

  7. The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) : are we safer?

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Brune, Nancy E.

    2010-07-01

    Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) is designed to make world safer by reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons and reducing the salience of nuclear weapons. U.S. also seeks to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent and reinforce regional security architectures with missile defenses and other conventional military capabilities. But recent studies suggest that nuclear proliferation is a direct response to the perceived threat of U.S. conventional capabilities not U.S. nuclear stockpile. If this is true, then the intent of the NPR to reduce the role and numbers of nuclear weapons and strengthen conventional military capabilities may actually make the world lessmore » safe. First stated objective of NPR is to reduce the role and numbers of U.S. nuclear weapons, reduce the salience of nuclear weapons and move step by step toward eliminating them. Second stated objective is a reaffirmation of U.S. commitment to maintaining a strong deterrent which forms the basis of U.S. assurances to allies and partners. The pathway - made explicit throughout the NPR - for reducing the role and numbers of nuclear weapons while maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent and reinforcing regional security architectures is to give conventional forces and capabilities and missile defenses (e.g. non-nuclear elements) a greater share of the deterrence burden.« less

  8. Can Nuclear Terrorists be Deterred?

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Ferguson, Charles

    2005-04-01

    Conventional thinking since September 11, 2001, posits that nuclear-armed terrorists cannot be deterred. However, not all terrorist groups are alike. For instance, those that are strongly affiliated with a national territory or a constituency that can be held hostage are more likely to be self-deterred against using or even acquiring nuclear weapons. In contrast, international terrorist organizations, such as al Qaeda, or apocalyptic groups, such as Aum Shinrikyo, may welcome retaliatory nuclear strikes because they embrace martyrdom. Such groups may be immune to traditional deterrence, which threatens direct punishment against the group in question or against territory or people the terrorists' value. Although deterring these groups may appear hopeless, nuclear forensic techniques could provide the means to establish deterrence through other means. In particular, as long as the source of the nuclear weapon or fissile material could be identified, the United States could threaten a retaliatory response against a nation that did not provide adequate security for its nuclear weapons or weapons-usable fissile material. This type of deterrent threat could be used to compel the nation with lax security to improve its security to meet rigorous standards.

  9. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the relationship

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Graham, Thomas, Jr.

    2014-05-01

    The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the most important international security arrangement that we have that is protecting the world community and this has been true for many years. But it did not happen by accident, it is a strategic bargain in which 184 states gave up the right forever to acquire the most powerful weapon ever created in exchange for a commitment from the five states allowed to keep nuclear weapons under the NPT (U.S., U.K., Russia, France and China), to share peaceful nuclear technology and to engage in disarmament negotiations aimed at the ultimate elimination of their nuclear stockpiles. The most important part of this is the comprehensive nuclear test ban (CTBT); the thinking by the 184 NPT non-nuclear weapon states was and is that they understand that the elimination of nuclear weapon stockpiles is a long way off, but at least the NPT nuclear weapon states could stop testing the weapons. The CTBT has been ratified by 161 states but by its terms it can only come into force if 44 nuclear potential states ratify; 36 have of the 44 have ratified it, the remaining eight include the United States and seven others, most of whom are in effect waiting for the United States. No state has tested a nuclear weapon-except for complete outlier North Korea-in 15 years. There appears to be no chance that the U.S. Senate will approve the CTBT for ratification in the foreseeable future, but the NPT may not survive without it. Perhaps it is time to consider an interim measure, for the UN Security Council to declare that any future nuclear weapon test any time, anywhere is a "threat to peace and security", in effect a violation of international law, which in today's world it clearly would be.

  10. Sandia National Laboratories: News: Publications: Environmental Reports

    Science.gov Websites

    Programs Nuclear Weapons About Nuclear Weapons Safety & Security Weapons Science & Technology Robotics R&D 100 Awards Laboratory Directed Research & Development Technology Deployment Centers Audit Sandia's Economic Impact Licensing & Technology Transfer Browse Technology Portfolios

  11. Sandia National Laboratories: Sandia National Laboratories: News: Events

    Science.gov Websites

    Programs Nuclear Weapons About Nuclear Weapons Safety & Security Weapons Science & Technology Robotics R&D 100 Awards Laboratory Directed Research & Development Technology Deployment Centers Audit Sandia's Economic Impact Licensing & Technology Transfer Browse Technology Portfolios

  12. Sandia National Laboratories: About Sandia: Environmental Responsibility

    Science.gov Websites

    Programs Nuclear Weapons About Nuclear Weapons Safety & Security Weapons Science & Technology Robotics R&D 100 Awards Laboratory Directed Research & Development Technology Deployment Centers Audit Sandia's Economic Impact Licensing & Technology Transfer Browse Technology Portfolios

  13. Sandia National Laboratories: About Sandia: Community Involvement

    Science.gov Websites

    Programs Nuclear Weapons About Nuclear Weapons Safety & Security Weapons Science & Technology Robotics R&D 100 Awards Laboratory Directed Research & Development Technology Deployment Centers Audit Sandia's Economic Impact Licensing & Technology Transfer Browse Technology Portfolios

  14. Sandia National Laboratories: News: Publications: HPC Reports

    Science.gov Websites

    Programs Nuclear Weapons About Nuclear Weapons Safety & Security Weapons Science & Technology Robotics R&D 100 Awards Laboratory Directed Research & Development Technology Deployment Centers Audit Sandia's Economic Impact Licensing & Technology Transfer Browse Technology Portfolios

  15. Sandia National Laboratories: Community Involvement: Volunteer Programs

    Science.gov Websites

    Programs Nuclear Weapons About Nuclear Weapons Safety & Security Weapons Science & Technology Robotics R&D 100 Awards Laboratory Directed Research & Development Technology Deployment Centers Audit Sandia's Economic Impact Licensing & Technology Transfer Browse Technology Portfolios

  16. Sandia National Laboratories: News: Search Sandia Publications

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    Programs Nuclear Weapons About Nuclear Weapons Safety & Security Weapons Science & Technology Robotics R&D 100 Awards Laboratory Directed Research & Development Technology Deployment Centers Audit Sandia's Economic Impact Licensing & Technology Transfer Browse Technology Portfolios

  17. Sandia National Laboratories: Working with Sandia: Small Business

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    Programs Nuclear Weapons About Nuclear Weapons Safety & Security Weapons Science & Technology Robotics R&D 100 Awards Laboratory Directed Research & Development Technology Deployment Centers Audit Sandia's Economic Impact Licensing & Technology Transfer Browse Technology Portfolios

  18. Sandia National Laboratories: Microsystems Science & Technology Center

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    Programs Nuclear Weapons About Nuclear Weapons Safety & Security Weapons Science & Technology Robotics R&D 100 Awards Laboratory Directed Research & Development Technology Deployment Centers Audit Sandia's Economic Impact Licensing & Technology Transfer Browse Technology Portfolios

  19. Sandia National Laboratories: News: Publications: Strategic Plan

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    Programs Nuclear Weapons About Nuclear Weapons Safety & Security Weapons Science & Technology Robotics R&D 100 Awards Laboratory Directed Research & Development Technology Deployment Centers Audit Sandia's Economic Impact Licensing & Technology Transfer Browse Technology Portfolios

  20. Sandia National Laboratories: News: Media Resources: Media Contacts

    Science.gov Websites

    Programs Nuclear Weapons About Nuclear Weapons Safety & Security Weapons Science & Technology Robotics R&D 100 Awards Laboratory Directed Research & Development Technology Deployment Centers Audit Sandia's Economic Impact Licensing & Technology Transfer Browse Technology Portfolios

  1. Sandia National Laboratories: Employee & Retiree Resources: Technical

    Science.gov Websites

    Programs Nuclear Weapons About Nuclear Weapons Safety & Security Weapons Science & Technology Robotics R&D 100 Awards Laboratory Directed Research & Development Technology Deployment Centers Audit Sandia's Economic Impact Licensing & Technology Transfer Browse Technology Portfolios

  2. Sandia National Laboratories: Z Pulsed Power Facility

    Science.gov Websites

    Programs Nuclear Weapons About Nuclear Weapons Safety & Security Weapons Science & Technology Robotics R&D 100 Awards Laboratory Directed Research & Development Technology Deployment Centers Audit Sandia's Economic Impact Licensing & Technology Transfer Browse Technology Portfolios

  3. Sandia National Laboratories: Advanced Simulation and Computing

    Science.gov Websites

    Programs Nuclear Weapons About Nuclear Weapons Safety & Security Weapons Science & Technology Robotics R&D 100 Awards Laboratory Directed Research & Development Technology Deployment Centers Audit Sandia's Economic Impact Licensing & Technology Transfer Browse Technology Portfolios

  4. Sandia National Laboratories: News: Publications: Annual Report

    Science.gov Websites

    Programs Nuclear Weapons About Nuclear Weapons Safety & Security Weapons Science & Technology Robotics R&D 100 Awards Laboratory Directed Research & Development Technology Deployment Centers Audit Sandia's Economic Impact Licensing & Technology Transfer Browse Technology Portfolios

  5. Sandia National Laboratories: Employee & Retiree Resources: Remote Access

    Science.gov Websites

    Programs Nuclear Weapons About Nuclear Weapons Safety & Security Weapons Science & Technology Robotics R&D 100 Awards Laboratory Directed Research & Development Technology Deployment Centers Audit Sandia's Economic Impact Licensing & Technology Transfer Browse Technology Portfolios

  6. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the relationship

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Graham, Thomas Jr.

    The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the most important international security arrangement that we have that is protecting the world community and this has been true for many years. But it did not happen by accident, it is a strategic bargain in which 184 states gave up the right forever to acquire the most powerful weapon ever created in exchange for a commitment from the five states allowed to keep nuclear weapons under the NPT (U.S., U.K., Russia, France and China), to share peaceful nuclear technology and to engage in disarmament negotiations aimed at the ultimate elimination of their nuclearmore » stockpiles. The most important part of this is the comprehensive nuclear test ban (CTBT); the thinking by the 184 NPT non-nuclear weapon states was and is that they understand that the elimination of nuclear weapon stockpiles is a long way off, but at least the NPT nuclear weapon states could stop testing the weapons. The CTBT has been ratified by 161 states but by its terms it can only come into force if 44 nuclear potential states ratify; 36 have of the 44 have ratified it, the remaining eight include the United States and seven others, most of whom are in effect waiting for the United States. No state has tested a nuclear weapon-except for complete outlier North Korea-in 15 years. There appears to be no chance that the U.S. Senate will approve the CTBT for ratification in the foreseeable future, but the NPT may not survive without it. Perhaps it is time to consider an interim measure, for the UN Security Council to declare that any future nuclear weapon test any time, anywhere is a 'threat to peace and security', in effect a violation of international law, which in today's world it clearly would be.« less

  7. Nonproliferation, arms control and disarmament and extended deterrence in the new security environment

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Pilat, Joseph F

    2009-01-01

    With the end of the Cold War, in a dramatically changed security environment, the advances in nonnuclear strategic capabilities along with reduced numbers and roles for nuclear forces has altered the calculus of deterrence and defense, at least for the United States. For many, this opened up a realistic possibility of a nuclear-free world. It soon became clear that the initial post-Cold War hopes were exaggerated. The world did change fundamentally, but it did not become more secure and stable. In place of the old Soviet threat, there has been growing concern about proliferation and terrorism involving nuclear and othermore » weapons of mass destruction (WMD), regional conflicts, global instability and increasingly serious new and emerging threats, including cyber attacks and attacks on satellites. For the United States at least, in this emerging environment, the political rationales for nuclear weapons, from deterrence to reassurance to alliance management, are changing and less central than during the Cold War to the security of the United States, its friends and allies. Nuclear weapons remain important for the US, but for a far more limited set of roles and missions. As the Perry-Schlesinger Commission report reveals, there is a domestic US consensus on nuclear policy and posture at the highest level and for the near term, including the continued role of nuclear arms in deterring WMD use and in reassuring allies. Although the value of nuclear weapons has declined for the United States, the value of these weapons for Russia, China and so-called 'rogue' states is seen to be rising. The nuclear logic of NATO during Cold War - the need for nuclear weapons to counter vastly superior conventional capabilities of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact - is today heard from Russians and even some proliferants. Moreover, these weapons present a way for rogues to achieve regional hegemony and possibly to deter interventions by the United States or others. While the vision of a nuclear-free world is powerful, both existing nuclear powers and proliferators are unlikely to forego nuclear weapons entirely in a world that is dangerous and uncertain. And the emerging world would not necessarily be more secure and stable without nuclear weapons. Even if nuclear weapons were given up by the United States and other nuclear-weapon states, there would continue to be concerns about the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, which would not disappear and could worsen. WMD terrorism would remain a concern that was largely unaffected by US and other nuclear-weapon decisions. Conventional capabilities would not disappear and the prospects for warfare could rise. In addition, new problems could arise if rogue states or other non-status-quo powers attempted to take advantage of moves toward disarmament, while friends and allies who are not reassured as in the past could reconsider their options if deterrence declined. To address these challenges, non- and counter-proliferation and counterterrorismincluding defenses and consequence management-are priorities, especially in light of an anticipated 'renaissance' in civil nuclear power. The current agenda of the United States and others includes efforts to: (1) Strengthen International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its safeguards system; (2) Strengthen export controls, especially for sensitive technologies, by limiting the development of reprocessing and enrichment technologies and by requiring the Additional Protocol as a condition of supply; (3) Establish a reliable supply regime, including the possibility of multilateral or multinational ownership of fuel cycle facilities, as a means to promote nuclear energy without increasing the risks of proliferation or terrorism; (4) Implement effectively UN Security Council Resolution 1540; and (5) Strengthen and institutionalize the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. These and other activities are important in themselves, and are essential to maintaining and strengthening the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) bargain by bolstering two of its pillars - nonproliferation and peaceful nuclear energy cooperation. There is no alternative, and little prospect for a better deal.« less

  8. Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2010-02-04

    Terrorism in Pakistan: Sabotage of a Spent Fuel Cask or a Commercial Irradiation Source in Transport ,” in Pakistan’s Nuclear Future, 2008; Martellini, 2008...measures to prevent unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons, as well as contribute to physical security of storage facilities and personnel...strategic nuclear assets could be obtained by terrorists, or used by elements in the Pakistani government. Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral

  9. Joint Force Quarterly. Issue 58, 3rd Quarter

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2010-06-01

    rise to concerns over the future security of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. Anticipating the possibility of loosely controlled nuclear weapons inside...broader Cooperative Threat Reduction program—an unprecedented effort to reduce nuclear dangers by secur- ing or eliminating Russian weapons systems and...volume is about applications of the biological sciences, here called “biologi- cally inspired innovations,” to the military. Rather than treating

  10. Sandia National Laboratories: What Sandia Looks For In Our Suppliers

    Science.gov Websites

    Programs Nuclear Weapons About Nuclear Weapons Safety & Security Weapons Science & Technology Robotics R&D 100 Awards Laboratory Directed Research & Development Technology Deployment Centers Audit Sandia's Economic Impact Licensing & Technology Transfer Browse Technology Portfolios

  11. Sandia National Laboratories: Working with Sandia: What Does Sandia Buy?

    Science.gov Websites

    Programs Nuclear Weapons About Nuclear Weapons Safety & Security Weapons Science & Technology Robotics R&D 100 Awards Laboratory Directed Research & Development Technology Deployment Centers Audit Sandia's Economic Impact Licensing & Technology Transfer Browse Technology Portfolios

  12. Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2012-05-10

    2009. 143 Abdul Mannan, “Preventing Nuclear Terrorism in Pakistan: Sabotage of a Spent Fuel Cask or a Commercial Irradiation Source in Transport ,” in...Program.” Some analysts argue that spent nuclear fuel is more vulnerable when being transported . 144 Martellini, 2008. Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons...urgency to the program. Pakistan produced fissile material for its nuclear weapons using gas-centrifuge-based uranium enrichment technology, which it

  13. The Dilemmas of Developing an Indigenous Advanced Arms Industry for Developing Countries: The Case of India and China

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2006-12-01

    of providing nuclear power. Once you have the nuclear weapons, they require a delivery system resulting in a missile program. It is afforded higher...out that some domestic advancements may be made in certain sectors, such as nuclear bombs and missiles, because resources may be spent on narrowly...capital, fighter, aviation, nuclear weapons, missiles 16. PRICE CODE 17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified 18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

  14. Reviews of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and U.S. security

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Jeanloz, Raymond

    2017-11-01

    Reviews of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) by the National Academy of Sciences concluded that the United States has the technical expertise and physical means to i) maintain a safe, secure and reliable nuclear-weapons stockpile without nuclear-explosion testing, and ii) effectively monitor global compliance once the Treaty enters into force. Moreover, the CTBT is judged to help constrain proliferation of nuclear-weapons technology, so it is considered favorable to U.S. security. Review of developments since the studies were published, in 2002 and 2012, show that the study conclusions remain valid and that technical capabilities are better than anticipated.

  15. Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2009-12-09

    Nuclear Terrorism in Pakistan: Sabotage of a Spent Fuel Cask or a Commercial Irradiation Source in Transport ,” in Pakistan’s Nuclear Future, 2008...gave additional urgency to the program. Pakistan produced fissile material for its nuclear weapons using gas-centrifuge-based uranium enrichment...technology, which it mastered by the mid-1980s. Highly-enriched uranium (HEU) is one of two types of fissile material used in nuclear weapons; the other

  16. The Future of the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Program

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Brooks, Linton F.

    2007-03-01

    This paper will examine our plans for the future of the U.S. nuclear weapons program including efforts to ``transform'' the stockpile and supporting infrastructure. We proceed from the premise that the United States will need a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent for the foreseeable future. Moreover, the Stockpile Stewardship Program is working. Today's stockpile---comprised of legacy warheads left over from the Cold War---is safe and reliable. That said, we see increased risk, absent nuclear testing, in assuring the long-term safety and reliability of our current stockpile. Nor is today's nuclear weapons complex sufficiently ``responsive'' to fixing technical problems in the stockpile, or to potential adverse geopolitical change. Our task is to work to ensure that the U.S. nuclear weapons enterprise, including the stockpile and supporting infrastructure, meets long-term national security needs. Our approach is to develop and field replacement warheads for the legacy stockpile---so-called Reliable Replacement Warheads (RRW)---as a means to transform both the nuclear stockpile and supporting infrastructure.

  17. Going nuclear: The spread of nuclear weapons 1986-1987

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Spector, L.S.

    1987-01-01

    In the third annual report of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace on the spread of nuclear weapons, Spector provides a critical survey of the status of nuclear proliferation throughout the world and examines the nuclear potential of nations in the Middle East, Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Drawing on both historical documents and up-to-date reports, the author addresses such specific topics as Israel's nuclear arsenal, nuclear terrorism and its global security implications, arms control and nuclear safeguards, international treaties, weapons buildup, and political radicalism and unrest in nuclear-threshold nations.

  18. Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and Agreements

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2007-01-29

    U.S. security concerns. The United States and Soviet Union began to sign agreements limiting their strategic offensive nuclear weapons in the early...Russian relationship. At the same time, however, the two sides began to cooperate on securing and eliminating Soviet-era nuclear , chemical, and...the former Soviet Union. The United States is also a leader of an international regime that attempts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. This

  19. Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and Agreements

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2007-06-01

    security concerns. The United States and Soviet Union began to sign agreements limiting their strategic offensive nuclear weapons in the early 1970s...Russian relationship. At the same time, however, the two sides began to cooperate on securing and eliminating Soviet-era nuclear , chemical, and biological...former Soviet Union. The United States is also a leader of an international regime that attempts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. This regime

  20. 10 CFR 784.6 - National security considerations for waiver of certain sensitive inventions.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... or under any Government contract or subcontract of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program or the nuclear weapons programs or other atomic energy defense activities of the Department of Energy, a...) under the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program or the nuclear weapons programs or other atomic energy...

  1. 10 CFR 784.6 - National security considerations for waiver of certain sensitive inventions.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... or under any Government contract or subcontract of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program or the nuclear weapons programs or other atomic energy defense activities of the Department of Energy, a...) under the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program or the nuclear weapons programs or other atomic energy...

  2. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Regulating Nuclear Weapons around the World

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Middleton, Tiffany Willey

    2010-01-01

    In May 2010, scientists, national security experts, and state delegates from nations around the world will convene in New York for the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. They will review current guidelines for nuclear testing and possession of nuclear weapons in accordance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968,…

  3. One in a Million Given the Accident: Assuring Nuclear Weapon Safety

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Weaver, Jason

    2015-08-25

    Since the introduction of nuclear weapons, there has not been a single instance of accidental or unauthorized nuclear detonation, but there have been numerous accidents and “close calls.” As the understanding of these environments has increased, the need for a robust nuclear weapon safety philosophy has grown. This paper describes some of the methods used by the Nuclear Weapon Complex today to assure nuclear weapon safety, including testing, modeling, analysis, and design features. Lastly, it also reviews safety’s continued role in the future and examines how nuclear safety’s present maturity can play a role in strengthening security and other areasmore » and how increased coordination can improve safety and reduce long-term cost.« less

  4. The NPR, NPT and the prospects for disarmament

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Pilat, Joseph F

    2010-10-04

    In Prague's Hradcany Square on April 5, 2009, President Barack Obama offered a bold vision of the nuclear future that encompasses both reducing nuclear dangers and pursuing the goal of a world without nuclear weapons while maintaining, as long as nuclear weapons remain, a safe secure, and effective arsenal, to deter potential adversaries and to assure U.S. allies and other security partners that they can count on America's security commitments. The agenda put forward in Prague involves the full range of issues from deterrence to nonproliferation and disarmament. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) report, reflecting the twin objectives ofmore » the Prague speech, for the first time places the United States effort to lead expanded international efforts to rebuild and strengthen the global nuclear nonproliferation regime at the top the U.S. nuclear agenda. This attention underscores the fact that the top priority of the United States is to discourage additional states from acquiring nuclear weapon capabilities and to stop terrorist groups from acquiring weapon-usable nuclear materials. It also reinforced the view that positively influencing the 2010 Review Conference (RevCon) of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was a key objective of the Obama Administration. The NPR developed both the vision and the policy, but details of implementation will need to be developed and better understood. This paper will address the Nuclear Posture Review and its implementation, as well as it's relation to, and impact on, the NPT RevCon and the long term prospects for nonproliferation and disarmament.« less

  5. Special Issue on University Nonproliferation Education and Training Introduction.

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Leek, K. M.

    2006-07-31

    Nonproliferation, like many aspects of security, has not played out as many expected following the end of the cold war. The peace dividend has been elusive in many countries. The notion that the world would become a safer and more secure place as nuclear weapons stockpiles were reduced has been trumped by the rise in international terrorism. Hopes that nuclear weapons would lose their salience as markers of elite status among nations along with pressures to acquire them have been dashed. The drive by some countries and terrorist groups to acquire nuclear weapons has not diminished, and the threat ofmore » proliferation has increased. At the level of the nation state, the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) itself is under pressure as more nations acquire nuclear weapons, de facto weapons states fail to join, and nations that want to acquire them leave or threaten to leave. At the sub-state level, the convergence of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has introduced an element of uncertainty into nonproliferation that is unprecedented. Another feature of the post-cold war era that has taken many by surprise is the continued, and growing need for trained specialists in nonproliferation and nuclear materials management. Contained within the notion of disarmament and reduced strategic importance of nuclear weapons was the expectation of a diminishing workforce of trained nonproliferation and nuclear materials specialists. Events have overtaken this assumption.« less

  6. Leveraging success: applying Interagency Lessons learned to the Joint Air Delivered Nuclear Weapons Acquisition Process

    DTIC Science & Technology

    Effective coordination and communication between the Department of Energy (DOE) and the Department of Defense (DoD) is necessary to ensure that the... nuclear weapons stockpile remains safe, secure, and effective without nuclear testing. The science-based Stockpile Sustainment Program (SSP) is the...method used to sustain and maintain the nuclear stockpile throughout the weapons life cycle. A comprehensive review was conducted of the joint

  7. DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Martz, Joseph C; Stevens, Patrice A; Branstetter, Linda

    Until very recently, an evaluation of US policy regarding deterrence and the role of its nuclear weapons arsenal as a deterrent has been largely absent in the public debate. With President's Obama embrace of a goal of a future world without nuclear weapons, issues of nuclear policy and deterrence have just recently risen to the forefront of policy discussions. The traditional role of US nuclear weapons-to deter the use of nuclear weapons by other states-endures, but is no longer unique nor even predominant. In an increasingly multi-polar world, the US now faces growing risks of nuclear weapons proliferation; the spreadmore » of weapons of mass destruction generally to non-state, substate and transnational actors; cyber, space, economic, environmental and resource threats along with the application of numerous other forms of 'soft power' in ways that are inimical to national security and to global stability. What concept of deterrence should the US seek to maintain in the 21st Century? That question remains fluid and central to the current debate. Recently there has been a renewed focusing of attention on the role of US nuclear weapons and a national discussion about what the underlying policy should be. In this environment, both the United States and Russia have committed to drastic reductions in their nuclear arsenals, while still maintaining forces sufficient to ensure unacceptable consequence in response to acts of aggression. Further, the declared nuclear powers have maintained that a limited nuclear arsenal continues to provide insurance against uncertain developments in a changing world. In this environment of US and Russian stockpile reductions, all declared nuclear states have reiterated the central role which nuclear weapons continue to provide for their supreme national security interests. Given this new environment and the challenges of the next several decades, how might the United States structure its policy and forces with regard to nuclear weapons? Many competing objectives have been stated across the spectrum of political, social, and military thought. These objectives include goals of ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, recommitment to further downsizing of the nuclear arsenal, embracing a long-term goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons, limitations on both the production complex and upgrades to nuclear weapons and delivery systems, and controls and constraints to limit proliferation of nuclear materials and weapons, particularly to rogue states and terrorist groups.« less

  8. Nuclear Coexistence: Rethinking U.S. Policy to Promote Stability in an Era of Proliferation

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1994-04-01

    The Spread of Nuclear Weapons 1989 -90 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990). 22. See William C. Martel and Steven E. Miller, "Controlling Borders and Nuclear...Security, Fall 1989 , Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 140-41, for J. Robert Oppenheimer’s concerns about the dangers of the develop- ment of thermonuclear weapons. 4...Paradox of Technology," International Security, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Fall 1989 ), pp. 198-202. 6. Some argue that the U.S. strategy has relatively little

  9. Nuclear energy and security

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    BLEJWAS,THOMAS E.; SANDERS,THOMAS L.; EAGAN,ROBERT J.

    2000-01-01

    Nuclear power is an important and, the authors believe, essential component of a secure nuclear future. Although nuclear fuel cycles create materials that have some potential for use in nuclear weapons, with appropriate fuel cycles, nuclear power could reduce rather than increase real proliferation risk worldwide. Future fuel cycles could be designed to avoid plutonium production, generate minimal amounts of plutonium in proliferation-resistant amounts or configurations, and/or transparently and efficiently consume plutonium already created. Furthermore, a strong and viable US nuclear infrastructure, of which nuclear power is a large element, is essential if the US is to maintain a leadershipmore » or even participatory role in defining the global nuclear infrastructure and controlling the proliferation of nuclear weapons. By focusing on new fuel cycles and new reactor technologies, it is possible to advantageously burn and reduce nuclear materials that could be used for nuclear weapons rather than increase and/or dispose of these materials. Thus, the authors suggest that planners for a secure nuclear future use technology to design an ideal future. In this future, nuclear power creates large amounts of virtually atmospherically clean energy while significantly lowering the threat of proliferation through the thoughtful use, physical security, and agreed-upon transparency of nuclear materials. The authors must develop options for policy makers that bring them as close as practical to this ideal. Just as Atoms for Peace became the ideal for the first nuclear century, they see a potential nuclear future that contributes significantly to power for peace and prosperity.« less

  10. High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) Testing

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2015-07-09

    Electromagnetic Pulse Horizontal Electromagnetic Pulse Advanced Fast Electromagnetic Pulse Nuclear Weapons Effect Testing and Environments 16. SECURITY... Weapons of Mass Destruction Agency (USANCA). In order to effectively determine criteria compliance, the TO/PE must thoroughly understand the...ELECTROMAGNETIC ENVIRONMENT AND EFFECTS. A.1 The electromagnetic environment produced by a nuclear weapon consists of the ionization of the atmosphere and

  11. U.S. Nuclear Weapons Modernization - the Stockpile Life Extension Program

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Cook, Donald

    2016-03-01

    Underground nuclear testing of U.S. nuclear weapons was halted by President George H.W. Bush in 1992 when he announced a moratorium. In 1993, the moratorium was extended by President Bill Clinton and, in 1995, a program of Stockpile Stewardship was put in its place. In 1996, President Clinton signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Twenty years have passed since then. Over the same time, the average age of a nuclear weapon in the stockpile has increased from 6 years (1992) to nearly 29 years (2015). At its inception, achievement of the objectives of the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) appeared possible but very difficult. The cost to design and construct several large facilities for precision experimentation in hydrodynamics and high energy density physics was large. The practical steps needed to move from computational platforms of less than 100 Mflops/sec to 10 Teraflops/sec and beyond were unknown. Today, most of the required facilities for SSP are in place and computational speed has been increased by more than six orders of magnitude. These, and the physicists and engineers in the complex of labs and plants within the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) who put them in place, have been the basis for underpinning an annual decision, made by the weapons lab directors for each of the past 20 years, that resort to underground nuclear testing is not needed for maintaining confidence in the safety and reliability of the U.S stockpile. A key part of that decision has been annual assessment of the physical changes in stockpiled weapons. These weapons, quite simply, are systems that invariably and unstoppably age in the internal weapon environment of radioactive materials and complex interfaces of highly dissimilar organic and inorganic materials. Without an ongoing program to rebuild some components and replace other components to increase safety or security, i.e., life extending these weapons, either underground testing would again be required to assess many changes at once, or confidence in these weapons would be reduced. The strategy and details of the U.S. Stockpile Life Extension Program will be described in this talk. In brief, the strategy is to reduce the number of weapons in the stockpile while increasing confidence in the weapons that remain and, where possible, increase their safety, increase their security, and reduce their nuclear material quantities and yields. A number of ``myths'' pertaining to nuclear weapons, the SSP, and the Stockpile Life Extension Program will be explored.

  12. Gulf States Strategic Vision to Face Iranian Nuclear Project

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2015-09-01

    STRATEGIC VISION TO FACE IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROJECT by Fawzan A. Alfawzan September 2015 Thesis Advisor: James Russell Second Reader: Anne...nuclear weapons at a high degree. Nuclear capabilities provided Iran with uranium enrichments abilities and nuclear weapons to enable the country to...IN SECURITY STUDIES (STRATEGIC STUDIES) from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL September 2015 Approved by: James Russell Thesis

  13. The ``Nuclear Renaissance'' and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Lyman, Edwin S.

    2007-05-01

    As interest grows around the world in nuclear power as an energy source that could help control greenhouse gas emissions, some have proclaimed the arrival of a ``nuclear renaissance.'' But can the increased risks of more nuclear power be managed? The political crisis surrounding Iran's pursuit of uranium enrichment has exposed weaknesses in the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Also, al Qaeda's declared interest in weapons of mass destruction raises the concern that terrorists could acquire nuclear weapons by stealing materials from poorly secured facilities. Growth of nuclear energy would require the construction of many additional uranium enrichment plants. And the generation of more spent nuclear fuel without a credible waste disposal strategy would increase political support for reprocessing, which separates large quantities of weapon-usable plutonium from spent fuel. There is little evidence that the various institutional arrangements and technical schemes proposed to mitigate the security risks of a major nuclear expansion would be effective. This talk will focus on the measures necessary to allow large-scale global growth of nuclear power without resulting in an unacceptably high risk of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism, and will discuss the feasibility of such measures. To cite this abstract, use the following reference: http://meetings.aps.org/link/BAPS.2007.OSS07.E1.2

  14. DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Ball, D Y

    The abysmal state of Russia's conventional forces has caused Russia to rely on nuclear weapons to ensure its security. This reliance was formalized in Russia's military doctrine which states that nuclear weapons can be used ''in situations critical to the national security of the RF and its allies.'' In fact, most Russian security analysts believe that this dependence on nuclear weapons will remain for the foreseeable future because the economy will have to improve significantly before a conventional force build up can be contemplated. Yet, despite Russia's need to rely on nuclear weapons, even this may be problematic because itsmore » economic plight may create difficulties in maintaining its current level of nuclear forces. Thus, Russia has a keen interest in negotiating a treaty to reduce Strategic Nuclear Forces below START II levels and would prefer to go even beyond the 2,000-2,500 numbers agreed to by Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton in Helsinki in 1997. Sergei Rogov, an influential defense analyst, believes that Russia's strategic nuclear forces will fall below 1,000 warheads by 2010 irrespective of arms control agreements. Accordingly, Russia is keen to ensure rough parity with the US. To retain a credible deterrent posture at these lower levels, Russia believes that it is important to restrain US sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM)--forces that have heretofore not been captured as strategic weapons in the START treaties. Russian officials reason that once strategic nuclear forces go to very low levels, SLCM capabilities become strategically significant. In fact, according to two well-known Russian security analysts, Anatoli Diakov and Pavel Podvig, Russia's current START III negotiating position calls for the complete elimination of all SLCMs, both nuclear and conventional. Prior to assessing Russia's position regarding cruise missiles and START III, I will examine Russia's overall view of its security position vis-a-vis the US in order to provide background for Russia's negotiating stance. I will also suggest how the US and Russia might approach START III in a manner that is equitable and focuses on creating a more stable environment.« less

  15. Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2012-06-26

    145 Abdul Mannan, “Preventing Nuclear Terrorism in Pakistan: Sabotage of a Spent Fuel Cask or a Commercial ...Pakistan’s Civil Nuclear Program.” Some analysts argue that spent nuclear fuel is more vulnerable when being transported . 146 Martellini, 2008. 147...produced fissile material for its nuclear weapons using gas-centrifuge-based uranium enrichment technology, which it mastered by the mid-1980s

  16. Administrator Highlights U.S.-Georgian Nuclear Security Cooperation in Tbilisi

    ScienceCinema

    Thomas D'Agostino

    2017-12-09

    NNSA Administrator Thomas D'Agostino highlighted the strong U.S.-Georgian cooperation on nuclear security issues during a day-long visit to the Republic of Georgia in mid-June. He briefed the media at availability at the Tbilisi airport. In April 2009, President Obama outlined an ambitious agenda to secure vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years, calling the danger of a terrorist acquiring nuclear weapons "the most immediate and extreme threat to global security." In this year's State of the Union, he called the threat of nuclear weapons, "the greatest danger to the American people." In order to meet that challenge, the President's FY2011 Budget Request includes close to $2.7 billion for the National Nuclear Security Administration's Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation program -- an increase of 25.7 percent over FY2010. Included in that request is NNSA's Second Line of Defense (SLD) program, which works around the world to strengthen the capability of foreign governments to deter, detect, and interdict illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials across international borders and through the global maritime shipping system.

  17. Administrator Highlights U.S.-Georgian Nuclear Security Cooperation in Tbilisi

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Thomas D'Agostino

    2010-07-16

    NNSA Administrator Thomas D'Agostino highlighted the strong U.S.-Georgian cooperation on nuclear security issues during a day-long visit to the Republic of Georgia in mid-June. He briefed the media at availability at the Tbilisi airport. In April 2009, President Obama outlined an ambitious agenda to secure vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years, calling the danger of a terrorist acquiring nuclear weapons "the most immediate and extreme threat to global security." In this year's State of the Union, he called the threat of nuclear weapons, "the greatest danger to the American people." In order to meet that challenge, themore » President's FY2011 Budget Request includes close to $2.7 billion for the National Nuclear Security Administration's Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation program -- an increase of 25.7 percent over FY2010. Included in that request is NNSA's Second Line of Defense (SLD) program, which works around the world to strengthen the capability of foreign governments to deter, detect, and interdict illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials across international borders and through the global maritime shipping system.« less

  18. DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    O'Brien, K H

    Nuclear weapons play an essential role in United States (U.S.) National Security Policy and a succession of official reviews has concluded that nuclear weapons will continue to have a role for the foreseeable future. Under the evolving U.S. government policy, it is clear that role will be quite different from what it was during the Cold War. The nuclear-weapons stockpile as well as the nuclear-weapons enterprise needs to continue to change to reflect this evolving role. Stockpile reductions in the early 1990s and the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP), established after the cessation of nuclear testing in 1992, began this processmore » of change. Further evolution is needed to address changing security environments, to enable further reductions in the number of stockpiled weapons, and to create a nuclear enterprise that is cost effective and sustainable for the long term. The SSP has successfully maintained the U.S. nuclear stockpile for more than a decade, since the end of nuclear testing. Current plans foresee maintaining warheads produced in the 1980s until about 2040. These warheads continue to age and they are expensive to refurbish. The current Life Extension Program plans for these legacy warheads are straining both the nuclear-weapons production and certification infrastructure making it difficult to respond rapidly to problems or changes in requirements. Furthermore, refurbishing and preserving Cold-War-era nuclear weapons requires refurbishing and preserving an infrastructure geared to support old technology. Stockpile Stewardship could continue this refurbishment approach, but an alternative approach could be considered that is more focused on sustainable technologies, and developing a more responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure. Guided by what we have learned from SSP during the last decade, the stewardship program can be evolved to address this increasing challenge using its computational and experimental tools and capabilities. This approach must start with an improved vision of the future stockpile and enterprise, and find a path that moves us toward that future. The goal of this approach is to achieve a more affordable, sustainable, and responsive enterprise. In order to transform the enterprise in this way, the SSP warhead designs that drive the enterprise must change. Designs that emphasize manufacturability, certifiability, and increased safety and security can enable enterprise transformation. It is anticipated that such warheads can be certified and sustained with high confidence without nuclear testing. The SSP provides the tools to provide such designs, and can develop replacement designs and produce them for the stockpile. The Cold War currency of optimizing warhead yield-to-weight can be replaced by SSP designs optimizing margin-to-uncertainty. The immediate challenge facing the nuclear weapons enterprise is to find a credible path that leads to this vision of the future stockpile and enterprise. Reliable warheads within a sustainable enterprise can best be achieved by shifting from a program of legacy-warhead refurbishment to one of warhead replacement. The nuclear weapons stockpile and the nuclear weapons enterprise must transform together to achieve this vision. The current Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program represents an approach that can begin this process of transformation. If the RRW program succeeds, the designs, manufacturing complex, and certification strategy can evolve together and in so doing come up with a more cost-efficient solution that meets today's and tomorrow's national security requirements.« less

  19. Nuclear weapons and medicine: some ethical dilemmas.

    PubMed

    Haines, A; de B White, C; Gleisner, J

    1983-12-01

    The enormous destructive power of present stocks of nuclear weapons poses the greatest threat to public health in human history. Technical changes in weapons design are leading to an increased emphasis on the ability to fight a nuclear war, eroding the concept of deterrence based on mutually assured destruction and increasing the risk of nuclear war. Medical planning and civil defence preparations for nuclear war have recently been increased in several countries although there is little evidence that they will be of significant value in the aftermath of a nuclear conflict. These developments have raised new ethical dilemmas for those in health professions. If there is any risk of use of weapons of mass destruction, then support for deterrence with these weapons as a policy for national or global security appears to be incompatible with basic principles of medical ethics and international law. The primary medical responsibility under such circumstances is to participate in attempts to prevent nuclear war.

  20. Nuclear security policy in the context of counter-terrorism in Cambodia

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Khun, Vuthy; Wongsawaeng, Doonyapong

    2016-01-01

    The risk of nuclear or dirty bomb attack by terrorists is one of the most urgent and threatening danger. The Cambodian national strategy to combat weapons of mass destruction (WMD) depicts a layered system of preventive measures ranging from securing materials at foreign sources to interdicting weapons or nuclear or other radioactive materials at ports, border crossings, and within the Cambodian institutions dealing with the nuclear security to manage the preventive programs. The aim of this study is to formulate guidance, to identify scenario of threat and risk, and to pinpoint necessary legal frameworks on nuclear security in the context of counterterrorism based on the International Atomic Energy Agency nuclear security series. The analysis of this study is guided by theoretical review, the review of international laws and politics, by identifying and interpreting applicable rules and norms establishing the nuclear security regime and how well enforcement of the regime is carried out and, what is the likelihood of the future reform might be. This study will examine the existing national legal frameworks of Cambodia in the context of counterterrorism to prevent acts of nuclear terrorism and the threat of a terrorist nuclear attack within the Cambodia territory. It will shed light on departmental lanes of national nuclear security responsibility, and provide a holistic perspective on the needs of additional resources and emphasis regarding nuclear security policy in the context of counterterrorism in Cambodia.

  1. Space weapon technology and policy

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Hitchens, Theresa

    2017-11-01

    The military use of space, including in support of nuclear weapons infrastructure, has greatly increased over the past 30 years. In the current era, rising geopolitical tensions between the United States and Russia and China have led to assumptions in all three major space powers that warfighting in space now is inevitable, and possible because of rapid technological advancements. New capabilities for disrupting and destroying satellites include radio-frequency jamming, the use of lasers, maneuverable space objects and more capable direct-ascent anti-satellite weapons. This situation, however, threatens international security and stability among nuclear powers. There is a continuing and necessary role for diplomacy, especially the establishment of normative rules of behavior, to reduce risks of misperceptions and crisis escalation, including up to the use of nuclear weapons. U.S. policy and strategy should seek a balance between traditional military approaches to protecting its space assets and diplomatic tools to create a more secure space environment.

  2. Leo Szilard Lectureship Award Talk: Nuclear disarmament after the cold war

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Podvig, Pavel

    2008-04-01

    Now that the cold war is long over, our thinking of nuclear weapons and the role that they play in international security has undergone serious changes. The emphasis has shifted from superpower confrontation to nuclear proliferation, spread of weapon materials, and to the dangers of countries developing nuclear weapon capability under a cover of a civilian program. At the same time, the old cold-war dangers, while receded, have not disappeared completely. The United States and Russia keep maintaining thousands of nuclear weapons in their arsenals, some of them in very high degree of readiness. This situation presents a serious challenge that the international community has to deal with. Although Russia and the United States are taking some steps to reduce their nuclear arsenals, the traditional arms control process has stalled -- the last treaty that was signed in 2002 does not place serious limits on strategic forces of either side. The START Treaty, which provides a framework for verification and transparency in reduction of nuclear arsenals, will expire at the end of 2009. Little effort has been undertaken to extend the treaty or renegotiate it. Moreover, in recent years Russia has stepped up the efforts to modernize its strategic nuclear forces. The United States has resisted joining the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and has been working on controversial new nuclear weapon development programs. The U.S. missile defense program makes the dialogue between Russia and the United States even more difficult. The reluctance of Russia and the United States to engage in a discussion about drastic reductions of their nuclear forces undermines the case of nuclear nonproliferation and seriously complicated their effort to contain the spread of nuclear weapon technologies and expertise. One of the reasons for the current lack of progress in nuclear disarmament is the contradiction between the diminished role that nuclear weapons play in security of nuclear weapon states and the inertia of cold-war institutions that are involved in their development and support. Dealing with this contradiction would require development of new mechanisms of cooperation between nuclear weapons states and their strong commitment to the cause of nuclear nonproliferation. One important area of cooperation is development of a framework that would prevent the spread of nuclear materials and technology at the time when increasing number of countries is turning toward expanded use of nuclear power to cover their energy needs.

  3. Leo Szilard Lectureship Award Talk: Controlling and eliminating nuclear-weapon materials

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    von Hippel, Frank

    2010-02-01

    Fissile material -- in practice plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) -- is the essential ingredient in nuclear weapons. Controlling and eliminating fissile material and the means of its production is therefore the common denominator for nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and the prevention of nuclear terrorism. From a fundamentalist anti-nuclear-weapon perspective, the less fissile material there is and the fewer locations where it can be found, the safer a world we will have. A comprehensive fissile-material policy therefore would have the following elements: *Consolidation of all nuclear-weapon-usable materials at a minimum number of high-security sites; *A verified ban on the production of HEU and plutonium for weapons; *Minimization of non-weapon uses of HEU and plutonium; and *Elimination of all excess stocks of plutonium and HEU. There is activity on all these fronts but it is not comprehensive and not all aspects are being pursued vigorously or competently. It is therefore worthwhile to review the situation. )

  4. Nuclear threat in the post cold-war era. Monograph

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Kurey, W.S.

    1995-05-14

    This monograph discusses the nuclear threat that the United States faces following the downfall of the Soviet Union. The Russian and Chinese nuclear arsenals represent a formidable threat that must be countered and a new threat is emerging in the third world despite efforts to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The monograph reviews the current status of both the Russian and Chinese arsenals and lists the programs that are being undertaken to modernize and improve their respective nuclear capabilities. Both nations are taking significant steps to preserve and improve their nuclear strike capability. The proliferation of nuclearmore » weapons technology, fissile material, and ballistic missiles in the third world is an emerging threat to national security interests. The lack of appropriate security measures during the on-going dismantling of the former Soviet nuclear arsenal presents an opportunity for rogue states and terrorist organizations to readily obtain the materials to produce their own nuclear weapons.« less

  5. Report of the Defense Science Board task force on tritium production technology options. Final technical report

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Welch, L.

    1999-05-01

    The long-standing national security policy of the US to maintain a robust nuclear deterrent continues to be supported by the Congress and the President. The President has stated that ``...the nuclear deterrent posture is one of the most visible and important examples of how US military capabilities can be used effectively to deter aggression and coercion. Nuclear weapons serve as a hedge against an uncertain future, a guarantee of our security commitments to allies, and a disincentive to those who would contemplate developing or otherwise acquiring their own nuclear weapons.`` US nuclear weapons designs require tritium, an isotope of hydrogen,more » which has not been produced in the US since 1988, when the last tritium production facility (the K-Reactor at the Savannah River Site) was shut down. This long period without tritium production in the US has been possible because arms control agreements reached in the early 1990s reduced the size of the US nuclear weapons stockpile and because the Department of Energy (DOE) met stockpile tritium requirements by recycling the tritium removed from dismantled nuclear weapons. However, since tritium decays at a rate of 5.5% each year, a dependable source of tritium is required to continue to sustain the US nuclear weapons stockpile to underwrite national security policy and to support arms control goals. The US does maintain a five-year reserve supply of tritium, but this reserve is to be used only in an emergency. Current guidance states the reserve must be restored to its original level within five years of being used. To sustain the START I level, tritium production needs to begin around 2005 at a production capacity of about 3.0 kg/ year. START II levels could be sustained with production of about 1.5 kg/year beginning around 2011.« less

  6. Stockpile stewardship past, present, and future

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Adams, Marvin L., E-mail: mladams@tamu.edu

    2014-05-09

    The U.S. National Academies released a report in 2012 on technical issues related to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. One important question addressed therein is whether the U.S. could maintain a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear-weapons stockpile in the absence of nuclear-explosion testing. Here we discuss two main conclusions from the 2012 Academies report, which we paraphrase as follows: 1) Provided that sufficient resources and a national commitment to stockpile stewardship are in place, the U.S. has the technical capabilities to maintain a safe, secure, and reliable stockpile of nuclear weapons into the foreseeable future without nuclear-explosion testing. 2) Doingmore » this would require: a) a strong weapons science and engineering program that addresses gaps in understanding; b) an outstanding workforce that applies deep and broad weapons expertise to deliver solutions to stockpile problems; c) a vigorous, stable surveillance program that delivers the requisite data; d) production facilities that meet stewardship needs. We emphasize that these conclusions are independent of CTBT ratification-they apply provided only that the U.S. continues its nuclear-explosion moratorium.« less

  7. Impact Upon U.S. Security of a South African Nuclear Weapons Capability.

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1981-04-01

    Simon Brand, dubbed the international companies as the " engine of growth" for the South African economy. The petroleum market, automobile industry , and...thereby halting the flow of metals key to high technology industries which in turn, are critical to U.S. national security. Should Washington’s...to produce nuclear weapons." * More specifically, we found that South Africa has: A sufficient scientific and industrial base on which to conduct

  8. Out of (South) Africa: Pretoria`s nuclear weapons experience. Final report

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Horton, R.E.

    1998-04-01

    The primary focus of this paper is the impact of key South African leaders on the successful developments and subsequent rollbacks of South Africa`s nuclear weapons capability. It highlights the key milestones in the development of South Africa`s nuclear weapon capability. It also relates how different groups within South Africa (scientists, politicians, military and technocrats) interacted to successfully produce South Africa`s nuclear deterrent. It emphasizes the pivotal influence of the senior political leadership to pursue nuclear rollback given the disadvantages of its nuclear means to achieve vital national interests. The conclusions drawn from flu`s effort are the South African nuclearmore » program was an extreme response to its own identity Crisis. Nuclear weapons became a means to achieving a long term end of a closer affiliation with the West. A South Africa yearning to be identified as a Western nation and receive guarantees of its security rationalized the need for a nuclear deterrent. The deterrent was intended to draw in Western support to counter a feared total onslaught by Communist forces in the region. Two decades later, that same South Africa relinquished its nuclear deterrent and reformed its domestic policies to secure improved economic and political integration with the West.« less

  9. The Iran Nuclear Crisis: An Update

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Sagan, Scott

    2007-05-07

    Will Iran develop nuclear weapons capabilities and what effects would such capabilities have on international peace and security? Despite two recent U.N. Security Council resolutions sanctioning Iran for its nuclear activities, the government in Tehran continues to press ahead with efforts to expand its uranium enrichment program to industrial scale. But both the Tehran regime and the Iranian people remain divided on the nuclear question, creating opportunities for a negotiated settlement. It is essential for US security that the Iranian program be contained, for nuclear weapons in Iran would increase risks of regional instability, terrorist use, and further proliferation. Themore » U.S. and its negotiating partners have already missed a number of potential opportunities for a diplomatic breakthrough, but the right mix of incentives designed to address the reasons driving Iran’s nuclear program could still succeed in producing an acceptable outcome.« less

  10. Public views on multiple dimensions of security : nuclear waepons, terrorism, energy, and the environment : 2007.

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Herron, Kerry Gale; Jenkins-Smith, Hank C.

    2008-01-01

    We analyze and compare findings from identical national surveys of the US general public on nuclear security and terrorism administered by telephone and Internet in mid-2007. Key areas of investigation include assessments of threats to US security; valuations of US nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence; perspectives on nuclear proliferation, including the specific cases of North Korea and Iran; and support for investments in nuclear weapons capabilities. Our analysis of public views on terrorism include assessments of the current threat, progress in the struggle against terrorism, preferences for responding to terrorist attacks at different levels of assumed casualties, and support formore » domestic policies intended to reduce the threat of terrorism. Also we report findings from an Internet survey conducted in mid 2007 that investigates public views of US energy security, to include: energy supplies and reliability; energy vulnerabilities and threats, and relationships among security, costs, energy dependence, alternative sources, and research and investment priorities. We analyze public assessments of nuclear energy risks and benefits, nuclear materials management issues, and preferences for the future of nuclear energy in the US. Additionally, we investigate environmental issues as they relate to energy security, to include expected implications of global climate change, and relationships among environmental issues and potential policy options.« less

  11. Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2009-07-30

    Pakistan: Sabotage of a Spent Fuel Cask or a Commercial Irradiation Source in Transport ,” in Pakistan’s Nuclear Future, 2008; Martellini, 2008. 79...that Pakistan’s strategic nuclear assets could be obtained by terrorists, or used by elements in the Pakistani government. Chair of the Joint Chiefs...that gave additional urgency to the program. Pakistan produced fissile material for its nuclear weapons using gas-centrifuge-based uranium

  12. Nuclear Arms and National Security. 1983 National Issues Forum.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Melville, Keith, Ed.

    Appropriate for secondary school social studies, this booklet outlines approaches for dealing with the threat of nuclear warfare in six sections. The first section, "Learning to Live with Nuclear Weapons," introduces the topic and considers what can be done to decrease the risk of nuclear warfare without jeopardizing the nation's security. "Arms…

  13. Nuclear security policy in the context of counter-terrorism in Cambodia

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Khun, Vuthy, E-mail: vuthy.khun@gmail.com; Wongsawaeng, Doonyapong

    The risk of nuclear or dirty bomb attack by terrorists is one of the most urgent and threatening danger. The Cambodian national strategy to combat weapons of mass destruction (WMD) depicts a layered system of preventive measures ranging from securing materials at foreign sources to interdicting weapons or nuclear or other radioactive materials at ports, border crossings, and within the Cambodian institutions dealing with the nuclear security to manage the preventive programs. The aim of this study is to formulate guidance, to identify scenario of threat and risk, and to pinpoint necessary legal frameworks on nuclear security in the contextmore » of counterterrorism based on the International Atomic Energy Agency nuclear security series. The analysis of this study is guided by theoretical review, the review of international laws and politics, by identifying and interpreting applicable rules and norms establishing the nuclear security regime and how well enforcement of the regime is carried out and, what is the likelihood of the future reform might be. This study will examine the existing national legal frameworks of Cambodia in the context of counterterrorism to prevent acts of nuclear terrorism and the threat of a terrorist nuclear attack within the Cambodia territory. It will shed light on departmental lanes of national nuclear security responsibility, and provide a holistic perspective on the needs of additional resources and emphasis regarding nuclear security policy in the context of counterterrorism in Cambodia.« less

  14. The ROK Army’s Role When North Korea Collapses Without a War with the ROK

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2001-02-01

    produced large amounts of biological and chemical weapons. In addition, North Korea continues to develop nuclear weapons and missile technology and export...process. 6. Security and safe disposal of WMD. This includes research, production and storage facilities for nuclear, biological and chemical weapons...Publishers, 1989. Naisbitt, John . Megatrends Asia: Eight Asian Megatrends That Are Reshaping Our World, New York: Simon and Schuster. 1996. The New

  15. Nuclear weapons and medicine: some ethical dilemmas.

    PubMed Central

    Haines, A; de B White, C; Gleisner, J

    1983-01-01

    The enormous destructive power of present stocks of nuclear weapons poses the greatest threat to public health in human history. Technical changes in weapons design are leading to an increased emphasis on the ability to fight a nuclear war, eroding the concept of deterrence based on mutually assured destruction and increasing the risk of nuclear war. Medical planning and civil defence preparations for nuclear war have recently been increased in several countries although there is little evidence that they will be of significant value in the aftermath of a nuclear conflict. These developments have raised new ethical dilemmas for those in health professions. If there is any risk of use of weapons of mass destruction, then support for deterrence with these weapons as a policy for national or global security appears to be incompatible with basic principles of medical ethics and international law. The primary medical responsibility under such circumstances is to participate in attempts to prevent nuclear war. PMID:6668585

  16. Integrating nuclear weapons stockpile management and nuclear arms control to enable significant stockpile reductions

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Sanders, Lani Miyoshi; DeLand, Sharon M.; Pregenzer, Arian L.

    2010-11-01

    In his 2009 Prague speech and the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, President Barack Obama committed the United States to take concrete steps toward nuclear disarmament while maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. There is an inherent tension between these two goals that is best addressed through improved integration of nuclear weapons objectives with nuclear arms control objectives. This article reviews historical examples of the interaction between the two sets of objectives, develops a framework for analyzing opportunities for future integration, and suggests specific ideas that could benefit the nuclear weapons enterprise as it undergoes transformation and that couldmore » make the future enterprise compatible with a variety of arms control futures.« less

  17. Extended Nuclear Deterrence for Europe Without Forward-based Weapons

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2012-02-15

    financial costs of nuclear burden sharing, bolsters safety and security and further reduces proliferation risks. 22 Bibliography Bildt, Carl and... Sagan , Scott D. and Waltz, Kenneth N. The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed. W. W. Norton and Company New York, NY and London...Point. Center for International Relations, Reports and Analyses. Konrad-Adenauer Foundation, Warsaw, 2011, 2. 30 Bildt, Carl and Sikorski, Radek

  18. History of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Doctrine and a Path Forward

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Chyba, Christopher

    2007-04-01

    During the Cold War, the United States considered a number of approaches for living in a world with nuclear weapons, including disarmament, preventive war, the incorporation of nuclear weapons into military strategy, passive and active defense, and deterrence. With the failure of early approaches to disarmament, and the rejection of preventive war against the Soviet Union (and later, China), deterrence became central to key nuclear relationships, though arms control continued to play an important role. The nuclear nonproliferation treaty made preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons another central component of U.S. policy. The Bush Administration has tried to devise a new policy for the post-Cold War period. Their approach has three salient pillars. First, it is characterized by an overall skepticism toward multilateral agreements, on the grounds that bad actors will not obey them, that agreements can lead to a false sense of security, and that such agreements are too often a way for the Lilliputians of the world to tie down Gulliver. The March 2005 U.S. National Defense Strategy declared that U.S. strength ``will continue to be challenged by those who employ a strategy of the weak, using international fora, judicial processes and terrorism.'' Second, the Bush Administration declared its intention to maintain a military dominance so great that other states simply would not try to catch up. The 2002 National Security Strategy states that ``Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States.'' Third, the 2002 National Security Strategy (reaffirmed by the 2006 National Security Strategy) moved preventive war (which the strategies called ``preemptive war'') to a central position, rather than deterrence and nonproliferation. In part this was because of the claim that certain ``rogue'' states, and terrorist groups, were not deterrable. This talk will sketch this history, discuss the approach of the Bush Administration in more detail and assess its successes and failures, and suggest the lines of a new approach to U.S. nuclear weapons policy for the coming decades. This approach will follow that outlined in George Bunn and Christopher Chyba (eds.), ``U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy: Confronting Today's Threats'' (Brookings, 2006, 340 pp.).

  19. The Unauthorized Movement of Nuclear Weapons and Mistaken Shipment of Classified Missile Components: An Assessment

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2012-01-01

    options to defeat any aggressor .44 The 2002 National Security Strategy further articulated the Administration‘s focus on WMD. It is this change...Review that reduced the role of U.S. nuclear weapons to largely, but not completely, a retaliatory role against any nuclear aggressor , reversing the...the Air Force‘s nuclear cognitive -dissonance that interviewees relayed to the Study Team. In addition to addressing joint operations, Goldwater

  20. Trinity to Trinity 1945-2015

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Moniz, Ernest; Carr, Alan; Bethe, Hans

    The Trinity Test of July 16, 1945 was the first full-scale, real-world test of a nuclear weapon; with the new Trinity supercomputer Los Alamos National Laboratory's goal is to do this virtually, in 3D. Trinity was the culmination of a fantastic effort of groundbreaking science and engineering by hundreds of men and women at Los Alamos and other Manhattan Project sites. It took them less than two years to change the world. The Laboratory is marking the 70th anniversary of the Trinity Test because it not only ushered in the Nuclear Age, but with it the origin of today’s advancedmore » supercomputing. We live in the Age of Supercomputers due in large part to nuclear weapons science here at Los Alamos. National security science, and nuclear weapons science in particular, at Los Alamos National Laboratory have provided a key motivation for the evolution of large-scale scientific computing. Beginning with the Manhattan Project there has been a constant stream of increasingly significant, complex problems in nuclear weapons science whose timely solutions demand larger and faster computers. The relationship between national security science at Los Alamos and the evolution of computing is one of interdependence.« less

  1. Trinity to Trinity 1945-2015

    ScienceCinema

    Moniz, Ernest; Carr, Alan; Bethe, Hans; Morrison, Phillip; Ramsay, Norman; Teller, Edward; Brixner, Berlyn; Archer, Bill; Agnew, Harold; Morrison, John

    2018-01-16

    The Trinity Test of July 16, 1945 was the first full-scale, real-world test of a nuclear weapon; with the new Trinity supercomputer Los Alamos National Laboratory's goal is to do this virtually, in 3D. Trinity was the culmination of a fantastic effort of groundbreaking science and engineering by hundreds of men and women at Los Alamos and other Manhattan Project sites. It took them less than two years to change the world. The Laboratory is marking the 70th anniversary of the Trinity Test because it not only ushered in the Nuclear Age, but with it the origin of today’s advanced supercomputing. We live in the Age of Supercomputers due in large part to nuclear weapons science here at Los Alamos. National security science, and nuclear weapons science in particular, at Los Alamos National Laboratory have provided a key motivation for the evolution of large-scale scientific computing. Beginning with the Manhattan Project there has been a constant stream of increasingly significant, complex problems in nuclear weapons science whose timely solutions demand larger and faster computers. The relationship between national security science at Los Alamos and the evolution of computing is one of interdependence.

  2. DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Walter, Andrew

    National policymakers are currently considering a dilemma of critical importance to the continued security of the United States: how can U.S. nuclear weapons policies be leveraged to benefit U.S. nuclear nonproliferation goals in the near-term, without sacrificing U.S. national security? In its role supporting U.S. nuclear weapons policy, Sandia National Laboratories has a responsibility to provide objective technical advice to support policy deliberations on this question. However, to best fulfill this duty Sandia must have a broader understanding of the context of the problem. To help develop this understanding, this paper analyzes the two predominant analytical perspectives of international relationsmore » theory to explore their prescriptions for how nuclear weapons and nonproliferation policies interact. As lenses with which to view and make sense of the world, theories of international relations must play a crucial role in framing the trade-offs at the intersection of the nuclear weapons and nonproliferation policy domains. An analysis of what these theories suggest as courses of action to leverage nuclear weapons policies to benefit nonproliferation goals is then offered, with particular emphasis on where the policy prescriptions resulting from the respective theories align to offer near-term policy changes with broad theoretical support. These policy prescriptions are then compared to the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review to understand what the theories indicate policymakers may have gotten right in their dealing with the nuclear dilemma, and where they may have gone wrong. Finally, a brief international relations research agenda is proposed to help address the dilemma between nuclear deterrence and nuclear nonproliferation policies, with particular emphasis on how such an agenda can best support the needs of the policy community and a potential 'all things nuclear' policy deliberation and decision-support framework.« less

  3. The New Era of Counterforce

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Lieber, Keir

    Nuclear deterrence rests on the survivability of nuclear arsenals. For much of the nuclear age, counterforce disarming attacks those aimed at eliminating nuclear forces were nearly impossible because of the ability of potential victims to hide and protect their weapons. However, technological developments are eroding this foundation of nuclear deterrence. Advances rooted in the computer revolution have made nuclear forces around the world far more vulnerable than before. Specifically, two key approaches that countries have relied on to ensure arsenal survivability since the dawn of the nuclear age hardening and concealment have been undercut by leaps in weapons accuracy and a revolution in remote sensing. Various models, methods, and evidence demonstrate the emergence of new possibilities for counterforce disarming strikes. In short, the task of securing nuclear arsenals against attack is a far greater challenge than it was in the past. The new era of counterforce challenges the basis for confidence in contemporary deterrence stability, raises critical issues for national and international security policy, and sheds light on one of the enduring theoretical puzzles of the nuclear era: why international security competition has endured in the shadow of the nuclear revolution.

  4. Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and Agreements

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2009-02-10

    agreements to address U.S. security concerns. The United States and Soviet Union began to sign agreements limiting their strategic offensive nuclear ...era nuclear , chemical, and biological weapons. Through these cooperative efforts, the United States now allocates more than $1 billion each year to...spread of nuclear weapons. This regime, although suffering from some setbacks in recent years in Iran and North Korea, includes formal treaties

  5. Mass and Elite Views on Nuclear Security: US National Security Surveys 1993-1999

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    HERRON,KERRY G.; JENKINS-SMITH,HANK C.; HUGHES,SCOTT D.

    This is the fourth report in an ongoing series of studies examining how US perspectives about nuclear security are evolving in the post-Cold War era. In Volume 1 the authors present findings from a nationwide telephone survey of randomly selected members of the US general public conducted from 13 September to 14 October 1999. Results are compared to findings from previous surveys in this series conducted in 1993, 1995, and 1997, and trends are analyzed. Key areas of investigation reported in Volume 1 include evolving perceptions of nuclear weapons risks and benefits, preferences for related policy and spending issues, andmore » views about three emerging issue areas: deterrent utility of precision guided munitions; response options to attacks in which mass casualty weapons are used; and expectations about national missile defenses. In this volume they relate respondent beliefs about nuclear security to perceptions of nuclear risks and benefits and to policy preferences. They develop causal models to partially explain key preferences, and they employ cluster analysis to group respondents into four policy relevant clusters characterized by similar views and preferences about nuclear security within each cluster. Systematic links are found among respondent demographic characteristics, perceptions of nuclear risks and benefits, policy beliefs, and security policy and spending preferences. In Volume 2 they provide analysis of in-depth interviews with fifty members of the US security policy community.« less

  6. Los Alamos Explosives Performance Key to Stockpile Stewardship

    ScienceCinema

    Dattelbaum, Dana

    2018-02-14

    As the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent ages, one essential factor in making sure that the weapons will continue to perform as designed is understanding the fundamental properties of the high explosives that are part of a nuclear weapons system. As nuclear weapons go through life extension programs, some changes may be advantageous, particularly through the addition of what are known as "insensitive" high explosives that are much less likely to accidentally detonate than the already very safe "conventional" high explosives that are used in most weapons. At Los Alamos National Laboratory explosives research includes a wide variety of both large- and small-scale experiments that include small contained detonations, gas and powder gun firings, larger outdoor detonations, large-scale hydrodynamic tests, and at the Nevada Nuclear Security Site, underground sub-critical experiments.

  7. Nuclear Security, Disarmament and Development

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Salam, Abdus

    The world's stock of nuclear weapons, which was three in 1945, has been growing ever since and is 50,OOOa in 1985. Nearly two trillion dollars of the public funds have been spent over the years to improve their destructive power, and the means of delivering them. One indicator of the awful power of these weapons is that the explosive yield of the nuclear weapons stockpiled today by the US, USSR, UK, France, and China is equivalent to one million Hiroshima bombs. Less than 1,000 of these 50,000 weapons could destroy USA and USSR. A thousand more in an all-out nuclear exchange could destroy the world as a habitable planet, ending life for the living and the prospects of life for those not yet born, sparing no nation, no region of the world…

  8. Evaluating Nonproliferation Bona Fides

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Seward, Amy M.; Mathews, Caroline E.; Kessler, Carol E.

    2008-07-14

    Anticipated growth of global nuclear energy in a difficult international security environment heightens concerns that states could decide to exploit their civilian nuclear fuel cycles as a means of acquiring nuclear weapons. Such concerns partly reflect a fundamental tension in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). On the one hand, Articles II and III of the NPT clearly prohibit each non-nuclear-weapon state party from acquiring nuclear weapons. On the other hand, Article IV of the NPT confers the “inalienable right” of Parties to the treaty to “develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes…,”more » and directs all Parties to “facilitate… the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy…,” and “cooperate in contributing…to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes….” This juxtaposition raises the possibility that a state could exercise its Article IV right to develop a civilian nuclear fuels cycle and then use the equipment, materials and technology to acquire nuclear weapons in violation of its Article II and III obligations.« less

  9. Nuclear nonproliferation: India Pakistan. Research report

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Fallon, J.S.

    1997-04-01

    As most of the world continues to seek ways to reduce or eliminate the spread of nuclear weapons, two countries seem intent on pursuing a path which is contradictory. India and Pakistan, two neighboring and frequently warring nations, condemn the use of nuclear weapons as they continue to develop the capability to deliver a nuclear payload. Additionally, India has stood against the Non-Proliferation Treaty, insisting that all nations must agree to eliminate nuclear weapons. It is against this seemingly hopeless situation that this report is focused. How can nuclear proliferation in South Asia be diffused while answering the security concernsmore » of both India and Pakistan. What I offer here is a review of the history, the current situation for the area, and a proposed solution to this nuclear stalemate.« less

  10. Global Security Rule Sets An Analysis of the Current Global Security Environment and Rule Sets Governing Nuclear Weapons Release

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Mollahan, K; Nattrass, L

    America is in a unique position in its history. In maintaining its position as the world's only superpower, the US consistently finds itself taking on the role of a global cop, chief exporter of hard and soft power, and primary impetus for globalization. A view of the current global situation shows an America that can benefit greatly from the effects of globalization and soft power. Similarly, America's power can be reduced significantly if globalization and its soft power are not handled properly. At the same time, America has slowly come to realize that its next major adversary is not amore » near peer competitor but terrorism and disconnected nations that seek nuclear capabilities. In dealing with this new threat, America needs to come to terms with its own nuclear arsenal and build a security rule set that will establish for the world explicitly what actions will cause the US to consider nuclear weapons release. This rule set; however, needs to be established with sensitivity to the US's international interests in globalization and soft power. The US must find a way to establish its doctrine governing nuclear weapons release without threatening other peaceful nations in the process.« less

  11. Post-Cold War Science and Technology at Los Alamos

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Browne, John C.

    2002-04-01

    Los Alamos National Laboratory serves the nation through the development and application of leading-edge science and technology in support of national security. Our mission supports national security by: ensuring the safety, security, and reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile; reducing the threat of weapons of mass destruction in support of counter terrorism and homeland defense; and solving national energy, environment, infrastructure, and health security problems. We require crosscutting fundamental and advanced science and technology research to accomplish our mission. The Stockpile Stewardship Program develops and applies, advanced experimental science, computational simulation, and technology to ensure the safety and reliability of U.S. nuclear weapons in the absence of nuclear testing. This effort in itself is a grand challenge. However, the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, reminded us of the importance of robust and vibrant research and development capabilities to meet new and evolving threats to our national security. Today through rapid prototyping we are applying new, innovative, science and technology for homeland defense, to address the threats of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons globally. Synergistically, with the capabilities that we require for our core mission, we contribute in many other areas of scientific endeavor. For example, our Laboratory has been part of the NASA effort on mapping water on the moon and NSF/DOE projects studying high-energy astrophysical phenomena, understanding fundamental scaling phenomena of life, exploring high-temperature superconductors, investigating quantum information systems, applying neutrons to condensed-matter and nuclear physics research, developing large-scale modeling and simulations to understand complex phenomena, and exploring nanoscience that bridges the atomic to macroscopic scales. In this presentation, I will highlight some of these post-cold war science and technology advances including our national security contributions, and discuss some of challenges for Los Alamos in the future.

  12. 32 CFR 223.4 - Policy.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... dissemination of unclassified information pertaining to security measures, including security plans, procedures... security by significantly increasing the likelihood of the illegal production of nuclear weapons or the... the public or the common defense and security. (d) This part and title 10 of the Code of Federal...

  13. 32 CFR 223.4 - Policy.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... dissemination of unclassified information pertaining to security measures, including security plans, procedures... security by significantly increasing the likelihood of the illegal production of nuclear weapons or the... the public or the common defense and security. (d) This part and title 10 of the Code of Federal...

  14. Stockpile Stewardship at Los Alamos(U)

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Webster, Robert B.

    2012-06-29

    Stockpile stewardship is the retention of nuclear weapons in the stockpile beyond their original design life. These older weapons have potential changes inconsistent with the original design intent and military specifications. The Stockpile Stewardship Program requires us to develop high-fidelity, physics-based capabilities to predict, assess, certify and design nuclear weapons without conducting a nuclear test. Each year, the Lab Directors are required to provide an assessment of the safety, security, and reliability our stockpile to the President of the United States. This includes assessing whether a need to return to testing exists. This is a talk to provide an overviewmore » of Stockpile Stewardship's scientific requirements and how stewardship has changed in the absence of nuclear testing. The talk is adapted from an HQ talk to the War college, and historical unclassified talks on weapon's physics.« less

  15. Los Alamos Explosives Performance Key to Stockpile Stewardship

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Dattelbaum, Dana

    2014-11-03

    As the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent ages, one essential factor in making sure that the weapons will continue to perform as designed is understanding the fundamental properties of the high explosives that are part of a nuclear weapons system. As nuclear weapons go through life extension programs, some changes may be advantageous, particularly through the addition of what are known as "insensitive" high explosives that are much less likely to accidentally detonate than the already very safe "conventional" high explosives that are used in most weapons. At Los Alamos National Laboratory explosives research includes a wide variety of both large- andmore » small-scale experiments that include small contained detonations, gas and powder gun firings, larger outdoor detonations, large-scale hydrodynamic tests, and at the Nevada Nuclear Security Site, underground sub-critical experiments.« less

  16. The 2015 National Security Strategy: Authorities, Changes, Issues for Congress

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2016-04-05

    Strategy: Authorities, Changes, Issues for Congress Congressional Research Service 3  reverse the spread of nuclear and biological weapons and...secure nuclear materials;  advance peace, security, and opportunity in the greater Middle East;  invest in the capacity of strong and capable...and norms on issues ranging from maritime security to trade and human rights.” 6 On Russia, the document says, “... we will continue to impose

  17. Application of NEPA to nuclear weapons production, storage, and testing Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Education Project

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Sauber, A.J.

    The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requirement of environmental impact statements for the testing of military equipment, specifically nuclear weapons, conflicts with national security objectives. The author examines NEPA and the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in terms of the environmental effects of weapons testing and the relevant case law. The Supreme Court's decision in Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Education Project sought to resolve the conflict by distinguishing between a project which is contemplated and one which is proposed. The classification scheme embodied in the FOIA exemption for national security may cause unwarranted frustration of NEPA's goals. The author outlinesmore » a new classification system and review mechanism that could curb military abuse in this area.« less

  18. Keeping Nuclear Materials Secure

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    None

    For 50 years, Los Alamos National Laboratory has been helping to keep nuclear materials secure. We do this by developing instruments and training inspectors that are deployed to other countries to make sure materials such as uranium are being used for peaceful purposes and not diverted for use in weapons. These measures are called “nuclear safeguards,” and they help make the world a safer place.

  19. The nuclear issue: where do we go from here?.

    PubMed

    Rotblat, Joseph

    2003-01-01

    The drive for the elimination of nuclear weapons is going badly and there is currently little support from the general public. The United States Nuclear Posture Review incorporates nuclear capability into conventional war planning. The Stockpile Stewardship Program is designed to maintain nuclear weapon capability. The US is planning an essentially new earth-penetrating nuclear weapon and is prepared to test this in the national interest if thought necessary. These policies could stimulate nuclear proliferation by others, do nothing to deter terrorism, promote persisting polarization of the world, are a clear breach of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and rest world security on a continued balance of terror. A renewed mass campaign to counteract all this, on legal and moral grounds in particular, is urgently needed. IPPNW and kindred organizations must restore sanity in our policies and humanity to our actions.

  20. 10 CFR 1017.4 - Definitions.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... ENERGY (GENERAL PROVISIONS) IDENTIFICATION AND PROTECTION OF UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION... Energy, including the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). Essential technology-related... manufacture of a nuclear weapon in violation of either domestic (e.g., the Atomic Energy Act) or international...

  1. 10 CFR 1017.4 - Definitions.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... ENERGY (GENERAL PROVISIONS) IDENTIFICATION AND PROTECTION OF UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION... Energy, including the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). Essential technology-related... manufacture of a nuclear weapon in violation of either domestic (e.g., the Atomic Energy Act) or international...

  2. 10 CFR 1017.4 - Definitions.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... ENERGY (GENERAL PROVISIONS) IDENTIFICATION AND PROTECTION OF UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION... Energy, including the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). Essential technology-related... manufacture of a nuclear weapon in violation of either domestic (e.g., the Atomic Energy Act) or international...

  3. 10 CFR 1017.4 - Definitions.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... ENERGY (GENERAL PROVISIONS) IDENTIFICATION AND PROTECTION OF UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION... Energy, including the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). Essential technology-related... manufacture of a nuclear weapon in violation of either domestic (e.g., the Atomic Energy Act) or international...

  4. 10 CFR 1017.4 - Definitions.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... ENERGY (GENERAL PROVISIONS) IDENTIFICATION AND PROTECTION OF UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION... Energy, including the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). Essential technology-related... manufacture of a nuclear weapon in violation of either domestic (e.g., the Atomic Energy Act) or international...

  5. National policy and military doctrine: development of a nuclear concept of land warfare, 1949-1964

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Bockar, D.

    In the thirty years that battle field nuclear weapons have been available, no one has originated an idea of how they might be used as an entirely new weapon. New weapons are routinely introduced into existing combat organizations before an appropriate tactical concept has been invented. But never before in history has a new weapon been deployed on so massive a scale without a tactical concept that exploited the radical implications of its novel technology for traditional warfare. This study is an attempt to understand the problem of developing a persuasive tactical concept for nuclear weapons. The process of assimilationmore » by which military organizations integrate new weapons with existing weapons in novel tactical and organizational concepts has an intellectual, and institutional, and a political dimension. The principle of civilian control, however, makes the process by which weapons are assimilated part of the process by which national security policies are made. In peacetime the military's formulation of doctrine is almost entirely consequent upon the world view, the methodological and managerial assumptions, and the domestic policy concerns of political authority.« less

  6. U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2017-02-10

    Department of Energy questioned the management practices at the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), which is responsible for the LEP, arguing...U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues Amy F. Woolf Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy February 10, 2017...

  7. Strategic defense initiative: critical issues

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Nuckolls, J.H.

    The objectives of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) as outlined by President Reagan are discussed. The principal objective for SDI is as a defense against ballistic missiles. Soviet objections and a summary of US-USSR dialogue on the subject are reviewed. Most US studies have been critical of SDI. Four critical issues are addressed in depth: are defense weapons technologically feasible which have high economic leverage relative to offensive ballistic missiles; would the defense feasibility and leverage be degraded or enhanced in the technological race between weapons innovation and countermeasures; could stability be achieved during and after the transition to themore » defense dominated world envisioned by SDI proponents; would the deployment of high leverage defensive weapons increase or decrease the security of NATO Europe, and the probability of major conventional or nuclear wars. The issue of SDI may lead to a paradox that contains the seeds of catastrophe. The author concludes by warning that nuclear disarmament may eliminate the highly successful deterrent mechanism for avoiding another major world war. In a world made safe for major conventional wars by the apparent ''elimination'' of nuclear weapons, the leaders in a conventional World War III - involving unimaginable suffering, hatred, terror, and death - would be strongly motivated to introduce nuclear weapons in the crucial decisive battles. Even if diplomacy could ''eliminate'' nuclear weapons, man's knowledge of nuclear weapons can never be eliminated. The paradox is the attempt to eliminate nuclear weapons may maximize the probability of their use. (DMC)« less

  8. Interagency Federal Laboratory Review Final Report

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1995-05-15

    technology. DOE labs have made unique contributions to national security since the days of the Manhattan Project , in designing, developing, and...Weapons Responsibility Most of DOE’s large multi-program laboratories had their origin in the Manhattan Project , to develop nuclear weapons during and

  9. All About MOX

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    None

    2009-07-29

    In 1999, the Nuclear Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) signed a contract with a consortium, now called Shaw AREVA MOX Services, LLC to design, build, and operate a Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility. This facility will be a major component in the United States program to dispose of surplus weapon-grade plutonium. The facility will take surplus weapon-grade plutonium, remove impurities, and mix it with uranium oxide to form MOX fuel pellets for reactor fuel assemblies. These assemblies will be irradiated in commercial nuclear power reactors.

  10. All About MOX

    ScienceCinema

    None

    2018-01-16

    In 1999, the Nuclear Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) signed a contract with a consortium, now called Shaw AREVA MOX Services, LLC to design, build, and operate a Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility. This facility will be a major component in the United States program to dispose of surplus weapon-grade plutonium. The facility will take surplus weapon-grade plutonium, remove impurities, and mix it with uranium oxide to form MOX fuel pellets for reactor fuel assemblies. These assemblies will be irradiated in commercial nuclear power reactors.

  11. Components of a Course on National Security Policy.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Quester, George H.

    1987-01-01

    Describes the components of a course on the formation of national security policy. Includes information on the amount of emphasis and instructional approach to take with each component of the course. Components include the nature of strategy, the role of war in international politics, disarmament and arms control, nuclear weapons and nuclear war,…

  12. DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Chrzanowski, P; Walter, K

    Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's many outstanding accomplishments in 2007 are a tribute to a dedicated staff, which is shaping the Laboratory's future as we go through a period of transition and transformation. The achievements highlighted in this annual report illustrate our focus on the important problems that affect our nation's security and global stability, our application of breakthrough science and technology to tackle those problems, and our commitment to safe, secure, and efficient operations. In May 2007, the Department of Energy (DOE) awarded Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC (LLNS), a new public-private partnership, the contract to manage and operate themore » Laboratory starting in October. Since its inception in 1952, the Laboratory had been managed by the University of California (UC) for the DOE's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and predecessor organizations. UC is one of the parent organizations that make up LLNS, and UC's presence in the new management entity will help us carry forward our strong tradition of multidisciplinary science and technology. 'Team science' applied to big problems was pioneered by the Laboratory's co-founder and namesake, Ernest O. Lawrence, and has been our hallmark ever since. Transition began fully a year before DOE's announcement. More than 1,600 activities had to be carried out to transition the Laboratory from management by a not-for-profit to a private entity. People, property, and procedures as well as contracts, formal agreements, and liabilities had to be transferred to LLNS. The pre-transition and transition teams did a superb job, and I thank them for their hard work. Transformation is an ongoing process at Livermore. We continually reinvent ourselves as we seek breakthroughs that impact emerging national needs. An example is our development in the late 1990s of a portable instrument that could rapidly detect DNA signatures, research that started with a view toward the potential threat of terrorist use of biological weapons. As featured in our annual report, activities in this area have grown to many important projects contributing to homeland security and disease prevention and control. At times transformation happens in large steps. Such was the case when nuclear testing stopped in the early 1990s. As one of the nation's nuclear weapon design laboratories, Livermore embarked on the Stockpile Stewardship Program. The objectives are to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile and to develop a science-based, thorough understanding of the performance of nuclear weapons. The ultimate goal is to sustain confidence in an aging stockpile without nuclear testing. Now is another time of major change for the Laboratory as the nation is resizing its nuclear deterrent and NNSA begins taking steps to transform the nuclear weapons complex to meet 21st-century national security needs. As you will notice in the opening commentary to each section of this report, the Laboratory's senior management team is a mixture of new and familiar faces. LLNS drew the best talent from its parent organizations--Bechtel National, UC, Babcock & Wilcox, the Washington Group Division of URS, and Battelle--to lead the Laboratory. We are honored to take on the responsibility and see a future with great opportunities for Livermore to apply its exceptional science and technology to important national problems. We will work with NNSA to build on the successful Stockpile Stewardship Program and transform the nation's nuclear weapons complex to become smaller, safer, more secure, and more cost effective. Our annual report highlights progress in many relevant areas. Laboratory scientists are using astonishing computational capabilities--including BlueGene/L, the world's fastest supercomputer with a revolutionary architecture and over 200,000 processors--to gain key insights about performance of aging nuclear weapons. What we learn will help us sustain the stockpile without nuclear testing. Preparations are underway to start experiments at the National Ignition Facility (NIF), the world's largest laser. They will help us resolve the most important questions we still have about nuclear weapons performance. Future NIF experiments will also explore the promise of an essentially inexhaustible source of clean energy from nuclear fusion. In addition, we have begun the process of eliminating significant quantities of special nuclear materials from the Livermore site. We will carry forward Livermore's tradition of exceptional science and technology. This is the S&T that led to the design and construction of NIF and leadership in an international consortium that is developing the Gemini Planet Imager. When the Imager comes on line in 2010 at an observatory in Chile, the Imager will bring into sharp focus planets that are 30 to 150 light years from our solar system.« less

  13. DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Adams, C.; Arsenlis, T.; Bailey, A.

    Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Campus Capability Plan for 2018-2028. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) is one of three national laboratories that are part of the National Nuclear Security Administration. LLNL provides critical expertise to strengthen U.S. security through development and application of world-class science and technology that: Ensures the safety, reliability, and performance of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile; Promotes international nuclear safety and nonproliferation; Reduces global danger from weapons of mass destruction; Supports U.S. leadership in science and technology. Essential to the execution and continued advancement of these mission areas are responsive infrastructure capabilities. This report showcases each LLNLmore » capability area and describes the mission, science, and technology efforts enabled by LLNL infrastructure, as well as future infrastructure plans.« less

  14. Why are U.S. nuclear weapon modernization efforts controversial?

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Acton, James

    2016-03-01

    U.S. nuclear weapon modernization programs are focused on extending the lives of existing warheads and developing new delivery vehicles to replace ageing bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and ballistic missile submarines. These efforts are contested and controversial. Some critics argue that they are largely unnecessary, financially wasteful and potentially destabilizing. Other critics posit that they do not go far enough and that nuclear weapons with new military capabilities are required. At its core, this debate centers on three strategic questions. First, what roles should nuclear weapons be assigned? Second, what military capabilities do nuclear weapons need to fulfill these roles? Third, how severe are the unintended escalation risks associated with particular systems? Proponents of scaled-down modernization efforts generally argue for reducing the role of nuclear weapons but also that, even under existing policy, new military capabilities are not required. They also tend to stress the escalation risks of new--and even some existing--capabilities. Proponents of enhanced modernization efforts tend to advocate for a more expansive role for nuclear weapons in national security strategy. They also often argue that nuclear deterrence would be enhanced by lower yield weapons and/or so called bunker busters able to destroy more deeply buried targets. The debate is further fueled by technical disagreements over many aspects of ongoing and proposed modernization efforts. Some of these disagreements--such as the need for warhead life extension programs and their necessary scope--are essentially impossible to resolve at the unclassified level. By contrast, unclassified analysis can help elucidate--though not answer--other questions, such as the potential value of bunker busters.

  15. Making weapons, talking peace

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    York, H.F.

    The memoirs of the author traces his life from his first-year graduate studies in physics at the University of Rochester in 1942 to his present position as Director of the University of California's Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation. The part of his life involved in making weapons extends from 1942 to 1961. During this period, he worked with E.O. Lawrence on the Manhattan Project and served as director of Livermore after it became the Atomic Energy Commission's second nuclear weapons laboratory. He also served on many government advisory boards and commissions dealing with nuclear and other weapons. In 1961,more » the combination of a heart attack and changes in administration in Washington led York too return to the University of California for the talking peace portion of his life. He has since become a public exponent of arms control and disarmament and the futility of seeking increased security through more and better nuclear weapons. York's explanation of his move from making weapons to talking peace leaves the reader with a puzzle.« less

  16. Dealing With Russian Tactical Nuclear Weapons

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2004-01-01

    the plants, facilities, and equipment necessary to safely secure and store weapons pits (the plutonium “triggers” at the center of a thermonuclear ... bomb , and hence the most critical piece) proffered by either party. Furthermore, the statute requires the IAEA to establish control over the pits until

  17. Emerging Environmental Justice Issues in Nuclear Power and Radioactive Contamination.

    PubMed

    Kyne, Dean; Bolin, Bob

    2016-07-12

    Nuclear hazards, linked to both U.S. weapons programs and civilian nuclear power, pose substantial environment justice issues. Nuclear power plant (NPP) reactors produce low-level ionizing radiation, high level nuclear waste, and are subject to catastrophic contamination events. Justice concerns include plant locations and the large potentially exposed populations, as well as issues in siting, nuclear safety, and barriers to public participation. Other justice issues relate to extensive contamination in the U.S. nuclear weapons complex, and the mining and processing industries that have supported it. To approach the topic, first we discuss distributional justice issues of NPP sites in the U.S. and related procedural injustices in siting, operation, and emergency preparedness. Then we discuss justice concerns involving the U.S. nuclear weapons complex and the ways that uranium mining, processing, and weapons development have affected those living downwind, including a substantial American Indian population. Next we examine the problem of high-level nuclear waste and the risk implications of the lack of secure long-term storage. The handling and deposition of toxic nuclear wastes pose new transgenerational justice issues of unprecedented duration, in comparison to any other industry. Finally, we discuss the persistent risks of nuclear technologies and renewable energy alternatives.

  18. Japan's anti-nuclear weapons policy misses its target, even in the war on terrorism.

    PubMed

    DiFilippo, Anthony

    2003-01-01

    While actively working to promote the abolition of all nuclear weapons from the world since the end of the cold war, Japan's disarmament policies are not without problems. Promoting the elimination of nuclear weapons as Japan remains under the US nuclear umbrella creates a major credibility problem for Tokyo, since this decision maintains a Japanese deterrence policy at the same time that officials push for disarmament. Tokyo also advocates a gradual approach to the abolition of nuclear weapons, a decision that has had no effect on those countries that have been conducting sub-critical nuclear testing, nor stopped India and Pakistan from carrying out nuclear tests. Consistent with Article 9 of the Constitution, the Japanese war-renouncing constitutional clause, Tokyo toughened Japan's sizeable Official Development Assistance (ODA) programme in the early 1990s. Because of the anti-military guidelines included in Japan's ODA programme, Tokyo stopped new grant and loan aid to India and Pakistan in 1998 after these countries conducted nuclear tests. However, because of the criticism Japan faced from its failure to participate in the 1991 Gulf War, Tokyo has been seeking a new Japanese role in international security during the post-cold war period. Deepening its commitment to the security alliance with the US, Tokyo has become increasingly influenced by Washington's global polices, including the American war on terrorism. After Washington decided that Pakistan would be a key player in the US war on terrorism, Tokyo restored grant and loan aid to both Islamabad and New Delhi, despite the unequivocal restrictions of Japan's ODA programme.

  19. Visual Inspection Reliability for Precision Manufactured Parts.

    PubMed

    See, Judi E

    2015-12-01

    Sandia National Laboratories conducted an experiment for the National Nuclear Security Administration to determine the reliability of visual inspection of precision manufactured parts used in nuclear weapons. Visual inspection has been extensively researched since the early 20th century; however, the reliability of visual inspection for nuclear weapons parts has not been addressed. In addition, the efficacy of using inspector confidence ratings to guide multiple inspections in an effort to improve overall performance accuracy is unknown. Further, the workload associated with inspection has not been documented, and newer measures of stress have not been applied. Eighty-two inspectors in the U.S. Nuclear Security Enterprise inspected 140 parts for eight different defects. Inspectors correctly rejected 85% of defective items and incorrectly rejected 35% of acceptable parts. Use of a phased inspection approach based on inspector confidence ratings was not an effective or efficient technique to improve the overall accuracy of the process. Results did verify that inspection is a workload-intensive task, dominated by mental demand and effort. Hits for Nuclear Security Enterprise inspection were not vastly superior to the industry average of 80%, and they were achieved at the expense of a high scrap rate not typically observed during visual inspection tasks. This study provides the first empirical data to address the reliability of visual inspection for precision manufactured parts used in nuclear weapons. Results enhance current understanding of the process of visual inspection and can be applied to improve reliability for precision manufactured parts. © 2015, Human Factors and Ergonomics Society.

  20. DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Graham, T.W.

    There has been a growing debate over the future of US nonproliferation policy. Some, including this author, believe that many current trends, especially the increasing delegitimization of nuclear weapons for all forms of extended deterrence, provide an opportunity to think about winning the nonproliferation battle - freezing or reversing the nuclear programs of the four current de facto nuclear-weapon states (India, Israel, Pakistan, and South Africa), and ensuring that no additional states are added to this list for at least the next 20 years. Others, including some senior Pentagon officials, believe that additional proliferation is inevitable, and that a realisticmore » reading of international politics requires the US to focus much of its nonproliferation effort on managing the proliferation that does occur - attempting to reduce the risks to international security posed by those states that gain access to nuclear weapons. The outcome of this debate could have a major impact on the spread of nuclear weapons over the next two decades, and thereby on the dangers the world will face in the post-Cold War era.« less

  1. 78 FR 2214 - Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2013-01-10

    .... Voluntary Consensus Standards XI. Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact XII. Paperwork Reduction... ML110480470 of Nuclear Energy Institute, on the proposed ``Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks and... consensus standards. XI. Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact In the proposed rule published on...

  2. Balancing Scientific Publication and National Security Concerns: Issues for Congress

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2003-01-10

    because of its potential relevance to biological weapons of mass destruction. Whether the current method of only using classification to limit the...terrorist groups in developing weapons of mass destruction. In 2000, researchers at the Co-operative Research Centre for the Biological Control of Pest...development of chemical, biological , or nuclear weapons is not made accessible to terrorists or countries of proliferation concern. The resolution

  3. Experimental Physical Sciences Vitae 2017

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Kippen, Karen Elizabeth; Del Mauro, Diana; Patterson, Eileen Frances

    Frequently our most basic research experiments stimulate solutions for some of the most intractable national security problems, such as nuclear weapons stewardship, homeland security, intelligence and information analysis, and nuclear and alternative energy. This publication highlights our talented and creative staff who deliver solutions to these complex scientific and technological challenges by conducting cutting-edge multidisciplinary physical science research.

  4. Sandia National Laboratories: National Security Programs

    Science.gov Websites

    policy. Topics About Nuclear Weapons Safety & Security Science & Technology Defense Systems & science and technology to help defend and protect the United States. Topics About Defense Systems & . Topics Stationary Power Earth Science Transportation Energy Energy Research Global Security Birc We

  5. Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on 21st Century Defense Technology Strategies, Volume 2,

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2000-03-01

    national security. The focus should include improved intelligence on development of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, their means of...Chemical/ Biological /Nuclear Anti-Terrorism" site provides a variety of links to related materials, (http://www.mindspring.com/~nbcnco) The roots of...vital commercial supplies, and perhaps even the general population with biological or chemical weapons. Accustomed to a qualitative as well as

  6. FY 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan - Biennial Plan Summary

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    None, None

    2016-03-01

    This year’s summary report updates the Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (FY 2016 SSMP), the 25-year strategic program of record that captures the plans developed across numerous NNSA programs and organizations to maintain and modernize the scientific tools, capabilities, and infrastructure necessary to ensure the success of NNSA’s nuclear weapons mission. The SSMP is a companion to the Prevent, Counter, and Respond: A Strategic Plan to Reduce Global Nuclear Threats (FY 2017-2021) report, the planning document for NNSA’s nuclear threat reduction mission. New versions of both reports are published each year in response to new requirements andmore » challenges. Much was accomplished in FY 2015 as part of the program of record described in this year’s SSMP. The science-based Stockpile Stewardship Program allowed the Secretaries of Energy and Defense to certify for the twentieth time that the stockpile remains safe, secure, and effective without the need for underground nuclear explosive testing. The talented scientists, engineers, and technicians at the three national security laboratories, the four nuclear weapons production plants, and the national security site are primarily responsible for this continued success. Research, development, test, and evaluation programs have advanced NNSA’s understanding of weapons physics, component aging, and material properties through first-of-a-kind shock physics experiments, along with numerous other critical experiments conducted throughout the nuclear security enterprise. The multiple life extension programs (LEPs) that are under way made progress toward their first production unit dates. The W76-1 LEP is past the halfway point in total production, and the B61-12 completed three development flight tests. Critical to this success is the budget. The Administration’s budget request for NNSA’s Weapons Activities has increased for all but one of the past seven years, resulting in a total increase of approximately 45 percent since 2010. If adopted by Congress, the FY 2017 budget request will increase funding by $396 million (about 4.5 percent) from the enacted FY 2016 level. A significant portion of the increase would fund the research for multiple life extension programs, support the programs in Directed Stockpile Work, and modernize the physical infrastructure of the nuclear security enterprise.« less

  7. 32 CFR 223.5 - Responsibilities.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... regarding nuclear weapons security and the protection of SNM at DoD nuclear reactor facilities as DoD UCNI... UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION (UCNI) § 223.5 Responsibilities. (a) The Under Secretary of Defense... compliance with the DOE program for controlling DOE UCNI. (b) The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear...

  8. 32 CFR 223.5 - Responsibilities.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... regarding nuclear weapons security and the protection of SNM at DoD nuclear reactor facilities as DoD UCNI... UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION (UCNI) § 223.5 Responsibilities. (a) The Under Secretary of Defense... compliance with the DOE program for controlling DOE UCNI. (b) The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear...

  9. The long darkness: Psychological and moral perspectives on nuclear winter

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Grinspoon, L.

    1986-01-01

    This book presents papers on the risks of nuclear weapons. Topics considered include nuclear war and climatic catastrophe, evolutionary and developmental considerations, a biological comment on Erikson's notion of pseudospeciation, national security, unexamined assumptions and inescapable consequences, opposing the nuclear threat (the convergence of moral analysis and empirical data), and nuclear winter.

  10. Walk the Talk: Progress in Building a Supply Chain Security Culture

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Hund, Gretchen

    Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) has engaged industry to “go beyond compliance” for over a decade in controlling and securing their supply chains to ensure their goods are not diverted to nuclear weapons programs. This work has focused on dual-use industries that manufacture products that can be used in both commercial applications and in the development of a nuclear weapon. The team encourages industry to self-regulate to reduce proliferation risks. As part of that work, PNNL interviewed numerous companies about their compliance practices to understand their business and to build awareness around best practices to ensure security of goods, technology,more » and information along their supply chains. From conducting this work, PNNL identified indicators that a company can adopt as part of its commitment to nonproliferation ideals with a focus on supply chain security.« less

  11. Update on NRF Measurements on ^237Np for National Security and Safeguards Applications

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Angell, C. T.; Joshi, T.; Yee, R.; Swanberg, E.; Norman, E. B.; Kulp, W. D.; Warren, G.; Hicks, C. L., Jr.; Korbly, S.; Klimenko, A.; Wilson, C.; Bray, T. H.; Copping, R.; Shuh, D. K.

    2010-11-01

    Nuclear resonance fluorescence (NRF) uses γ rays to excite nuclear levels and measure their properties. This provides a unique isotopic signature, and can be used to identify and assay material. This is particularly important for applications that detect the smuggling of nuclear material or the diversion of fissile material for covert weapon programs, both of which present grave risks to world security. ^237Np presents significant safeguard challenges; it is fissile yet currently has fewer safeguard restrictions potentially making it an attractive material for covert weapon programs. This talk will present the final results of two measurements of NRF on ^237Np using a bremsstrahlung photon source. 15 NRF states have been identified between 1.5 and 2.5 MeV excitation energy.

  12. Defense Experimentation and Stockpile Stewardship

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    None

    2014-10-28

    A primary mission of the site is to help ensure that the nation's nuclear weapon stockpile remains safe, secure and reliable. The stockpile stewardship program, working with the national weapons laboratories conducts a wide range of experiments using advanced diagnostic technologies, many of which were developed right here at the NNSS.

  13. 76 FR 30986 - Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation; Imposition of Nonproliferation Measures...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-05-27

    ... control lists (Missile Technology Control Regime, Australia Group, Chemical Weapons Convention, Nuclear... the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or cruise or ballistic missile systems. The... contribution to WMD or cruise or ballistic missile systems, (b) other items with the potential of making such a...

  14. Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility

    Science.gov Websites

    4:17 How DARHT Works The weapons programs at Los Alamos have one principal mission: ensure the safety, security, and effectiveness of nuclear weapons in our nation's enduring stockpile. One critical completed a successful two-axis, multiframe hydrotest. Two additional successful tests-one of which was

  15. Defense Experimentation and Stockpile Stewardship

    ScienceCinema

    None

    2018-01-16

    A primary mission of the site is to help ensure that the nation's nuclear weapon stockpile remains safe, secure and reliable. The stockpile stewardship program, working with the national weapons laboratories conducts a wide range of experiments using advanced diagnostic technologies, many of which were developed right here at the NNSS.

  16. Evolution of Security Identity of Domestic Antimilitarism and Roles of Political Parties: Case Studies of Japan and Germany

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2009-12-01

    concerned. However, the political crisis engenered by the collapse of the Yugoslav Republic shaped conditions calling for revision of the German security...to produce atomic, biological, and chemical weapons. Second, Germany admitted the U.S. military presence and bore some of the direct costs of same...voice for removing nuclear, chemical and conventional weapons of mass destruction in line with the peace movement. Similarly, it demanded greatly

  17. Self-Reliability and Motivation in a Nuclear Security Culture Enhancement Program

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Rogers,E.; deBoer,G.; Crawford, C.

    2009-10-19

    The threat of nuclear terrorism has become a global concern. Many countries continue to make efforts to strengthen nuclear security by enhancing systems of nuclear material protection, control, and accounting (MPC&A). Though MPC&A systems can significantly upgrade nuclear security, they do not eliminate the "human factor." Gen. Eugene Habiger, a former "Assistant Secretary for Safeguards and Security" at the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) nuclear-weapons complex and a former commander of U.S. strategic nuclear forces, has observed that "good security is 20% equipment and 80% people." Although eliminating the "human factor" is not possible, accounting for and mitigating the riskmore » of the insider threat is an essential element in establishing an effective nuclear security culture. This paper will consider the organizational role in mitigating the risk associated with the malicious insider through monitoring and enhancing human reliability and motivation as well as enhancing the nuclear security culture.« less

  18. 77 FR 27208 - Renewal of Threat Reduction Advisory Committee

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2012-05-09

    ... national defense, geopolitical and national security affairs, weapons of mass destruction, nuclear physics... Defense (Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs), independent advice and recommendations on: a. Reducing the threat to the United States, its military forces, and its allies and partners posed by nuclear...

  19. 78 FR 40444 - Amendment of the Threat Reduction Advisory Committee

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2013-07-05

    ..., geopolitical and national security affairs, WMD, nuclear physics, chemistry, and biology. The Committee members... the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs (ASD(NCB..., and its allies and partners posed by nuclear, biological, chemical, conventional, and special weapons...

  20. A Uniform Framework of Global Nuclear Materials Management

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Dupree, S.A.; Mangan, D.L.; Sanders, T.L

    1999-04-20

    Global Nuclear Materials Management (GNMM) anticipates and supports a growing international recognition of the importance of uniform, effective management of civilian, excess defense, and nuclear weapons materials. We expect thereto be a continuing increase in both the number of international agreements and conventions on safety, security, and transparency of nuclear materials, and the number of U.S.-Russian agreements for the safety, protection, and transparency of weapons and excess defense materials. This inventory of agreements and conventions may soon expand into broad, mandatory, international programs that will include provisions for inspection, verification, and transparency, To meet such demand the community must buildmore » on the resources we have, including State agencies, the IAEA and regional organizations. By these measures we will meet the future expectations for monitoring and inspection of materials, maintenance of safety and security, and implementation of transparency measures.« less

  1. Nuclear Weapons Security Crisis: What Does History Teach?

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2013-07-01

    Department of Defense. Much of the work to prepare the book for publi- cation was done by NPEC’s research associate, Kate Harrison, and the staff...of the Strategic Studies Insti- tute, especially Dr. James Pierce and Rita Rummel. This book would not have been possible without their help...nuclear security crises detailed in this book gone differently—had the rebel faction of the French military seized the nuclear device that was to

  2. Nuclear Forensics: Report of the AAAS/APS Working Group

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Tannenbaum, Benn

    2008-04-01

    This report was produced by a Working Group of the American Physical Society's Program on Public Affairs in conjunction with the American Association for the Advancement of Science Center for Science, Technology and Security Policy. The primary purpose of this report is to provide the Congress, U.S. government agencies and other institutions involved in nuclear forensics with a clear unclassified statement of the state of the art of nuclear forensics; an assessment of its potential for preventing and identifying unattributed nuclear attacks; and identification of the policies, resources and human talent to fulfill that potential. In the course of its work, the Working Group observed that nuclear forensics was an essential part of the overall nuclear attribution process, which aims at identifying the origin of unidentified nuclear weapon material and, in the event, an unidentified nuclear explosion. A credible nuclear attribution capability and in particular nuclear forensics capability could deter essential participants in the chain of actors needed to smuggle nuclear weapon material or carry out a nuclear terrorist act and could also encourage states to better secure such materials and weapons. The Working Group also noted that nuclear forensics result would take some time to obtain and that neither internal coordination, nor international arrangements, nor the state of qualified personnel and needed equipment were currently enough to minimize the time needed to reach reliable results in an emergency such as would be caused by a nuclear detonation or the intercept of a weapon-size quantity of material. The Working Group assesses international cooperation to be crucial for forensics to work, since the material would likely come from inadequately documented foreign sources. In addition, international participation, if properly managed, could enhance the credibility of the deterrent effect of attribution. Finally the Working Group notes that the U.S. forensics capability involved a number of agencies and other groups that would have to cooperate rapidly in an emergency and that suitable exercises to ensure such cooperation were needed.

  3. 32 CFR Appendix A to Part 223 - Procedures for Identifying and Controlling DoD UCNI

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... security measures, including security plans, procedures, and equipment, for the physical protection of DoD... stand-alone personal computers, or shared-logic work processing systems, if protection from unauthorized... and security by increasing significantly the likelihood of the illegal production of nuclear weapons...

  4. The Test of Strength: Explaining Germany’s Reluctance towards Nuclear Weapons, 1945-2011

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2011-06-01

    and were an essential ingredient to a successful recovery.60 However, before the recovery process could start basic needs as described in Maslow ‟s...no means indicate the abolition of the security umbrella provided for allies and partners. The consideration of the needs of partnering states and...actually still have different options and needs with regards to its nuclear weapons strategy? In order to find reliable answers, one has to go

  5. Entrepreneurial proliferation: Russia`s nuclear industry suits the buyers market. Master`s thesis

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Whalen, T.D.; Williams, A.R.

    1995-06-01

    The Soviet Union collapsed in December 1991, bringing an end to four decades of the Cold War. A system of tight centralized controls has given way to chaotic freedom and un-managed, entrepreneurial capitalism. Of immediate concern to most world leaders has been the control and safety of over 30,000 Soviet nuclear weapons. After 1991, the Soviet, centralized system of management lost one key structural element: a reliable `human factor` for nuclear material control. The Soviet systems for physical security and material control are still in place in the nuclear inheritor states - Russia, Ukraine, Khazakhnstan, and Belarus - but theymore » do not restrain or regulate their nuclear industry. In the chaos created by the Soviet collapse, the nonproliferation regime may not adequately temper the supply of the nuclear materials of the new inheritor states. This could permit organizations or states seeking nuclear weapons easier access to fissile materials. New initiatives such as the United States Cooperative Threat Reduction program, which draws upon U.S. technology and expertise to help the NIS solve these complex problems, are short-tern tactics. At present there are no strategies which address the long-tern root problems caused by the Soviet collapse.This thesis demonstrates the extent of the nuclear control problems in Russia. Specifically, we examine physical security, material control and accounting regulation and enforcement, and criminal actions. It reveals that the current lack of internal controls make access to nuclear materials easier for aspiring nuclear weapons States.« less

  6. Emerging Environmental Justice Issues in Nuclear Power and Radioactive Contamination

    PubMed Central

    Kyne, Dean; Bolin, Bob

    2016-01-01

    Nuclear hazards, linked to both U.S. weapons programs and civilian nuclear power, pose substantial environment justice issues. Nuclear power plant (NPP) reactors produce low-level ionizing radiation, high level nuclear waste, and are subject to catastrophic contamination events. Justice concerns include plant locations and the large potentially exposed populations, as well as issues in siting, nuclear safety, and barriers to public participation. Other justice issues relate to extensive contamination in the U.S. nuclear weapons complex, and the mining and processing industries that have supported it. To approach the topic, first we discuss distributional justice issues of NPP sites in the U.S. and related procedural injustices in siting, operation, and emergency preparedness. Then we discuss justice concerns involving the U.S. nuclear weapons complex and the ways that uranium mining, processing, and weapons development have affected those living downwind, including a substantial American Indian population. Next we examine the problem of high-level nuclear waste and the risk implications of the lack of secure long-term storage. The handling and deposition of toxic nuclear wastes pose new transgenerational justice issues of unprecedented duration, in comparison to any other industry. Finally, we discuss the persistent risks of nuclear technologies and renewable energy alternatives. PMID:27420080

  7. The nuclear dilemma and the just war tradition

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    O'Brien, W.V.; Langan, J.

    This book presents papers on the ethical aspects of nuclear weapons. Topics considered include the concept of a ''just'' war, national defense, political aspects, religion and politics, the failure of deterrence, conventional warfare, nuclear deterrence and democratic politics, the future of the nuclear debate, non-proliferation policy, arms control, national security, and government policies.

  8. Self-Reliability and Motivation in a Nuclear Security Culture Enhancement Program

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Crawford, Cary E.; de Boer, Gloria; De Castro, Kara

    2010-10-01

    The threat of nuclear terrorism has become a global concern. Many countries continue to make efforts to strengthen nuclear security by enhancing systems of nuclear material protection, control, and accounting (MPC&A). Though MPC&A systems can significantly upgrade nuclear security, they do not eliminate the “human factor.” Gen. Eugene Habiger, a former “Assistant Secretary for Safeguards and Security” at the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) nuclear-weapons complex and a former commander of U.S. strategic nuclear forces, has observed that “good security is 20% equipment and 80% people.”1 Although eliminating the “human factor” is not possible, accounting for and mitigating the riskmore » of the insider threat is an essential element in establishing an effective nuclear security culture. This paper will consider the organizational role in mitigating the risk associated with the malicious insider through monitoring and enhancing human reliability and motivation as well as enhancing the nuclear security culture.« less

  9. The abolition of war as a goal of environmental policy.

    PubMed

    Snyder, Brian F; Ruyle, Leslie E

    2017-12-15

    Since the 1950s, select military and political leaders have had the capacity to kill all or nearly all human life on Earth. The number of people entrusted with this power grows each year through proliferation and the rise of new political leaders. If humans continue to maintain and develop nuclear weapons, it is highly probable that a nuclear exchange will occur again at some point in the future. This nuclear exchange may or may not annihilate the human species, but it will cause catastrophic effects on the biosphere. The international community has attempted to resolve this existential problem via treaties that control and potentially eliminate nuclear weapons, however, these treaties target only nuclear weapons, leaving the use of war as a normalized means for settling conflict. As long as war exists as a probable future, nations will be under pressure to develop more powerful weapons. Thus, we argue that the elimination of nuclear weapons alone is not a stable, long-term strategy. A far more secure strategy would be the elimination of war as a means of settling international disputes. Therefore, those concerned about environmental sustainability or the survival of the biosphere should work to abolish war. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

  10. Worldwide Emerging Environmental Issues Affecting the U.S. Military. Summarizing Environmental Security Monthly Scanning, July 2006-June 2007

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2007-06-01

    if used on the battlefield. Clarification of what chemicals will be allowed under the treaty’s exception is needed. “The biological weapons threat... biological , and chemical weapons countermeasures include: • adoption of amendments to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material...to Increase Enforcement of Environmental Regulations and Public Participation Sixth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention Kyoto

  11. NNSA B-Roll: MOX Facility

    ScienceCinema

    None

    2017-12-09

    In 1999, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) signed a contract with a consortium, now called Shaw AREVA MOX Services, LLC to design, build, and operate a Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility. This facility will be a major component in the United States program to dispose of surplus weapon-grade plutonium. The facility will take surplus weapon-grade plutonium, remove impurities, and mix it with uranium oxide to form MOX fuel pellets for reactor fuel assemblies. These assemblies will be irradiated in commercial nuclear power reactors.

  12. NNSA B-Roll: MOX Facility

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    None

    2010-05-21

    In 1999, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) signed a contract with a consortium, now called Shaw AREVA MOX Services, LLC to design, build, and operate a Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility. This facility will be a major component in the United States program to dispose of surplus weapon-grade plutonium. The facility will take surplus weapon-grade plutonium, remove impurities, and mix it with uranium oxide to form MOX fuel pellets for reactor fuel assemblies. These assemblies will be irradiated in commercial nuclear power reactors.

  13. Report of a workshop on nuclear forces and nonproliferation Woodrow Wilson international center for scholars, Washington, DC October 28, 2010

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Pilat, Joseph F

    2010-12-08

    A workshop sponsored by the Los Alamos National Laboratory in cooperation with the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars was held at the Wilson Center in Washington, DC, on October 28, 2010. The workshop addressed evolving nuclear forces and their impacts on nonproliferation in the context of the new strategic environment, the Obama Administration's Nuclear Posture Review and the 2010 NPT Review Conference. The discussions reflected the importance of the NPR for defining the role of US nuclear forces in dealing with 21st century threats and providing guidance for National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and Department of Defense (DoD) programsmore » and, for many but not all participants, highlighted its role in the successful outcome of the NPT RevCon. There was widespread support for the NPR and its role in developing the foundations for a sustainable nuclear-weapon program that addresses nuclear weapons, infrastructure and expertise in the broader nonproliferation, disarmament and international security contexts. However, some participants raised concerns about its implementation and its long-term effectiveness and sustainability.« less

  14. Visual inspection reliability for precision manufactured parts

    DOE PAGES

    See, Judi E.

    2015-09-04

    Sandia National Laboratories conducted an experiment for the National Nuclear Security Administration to determine the reliability of visual inspection of precision manufactured parts used in nuclear weapons. In addition visual inspection has been extensively researched since the early 20th century; however, the reliability of visual inspection for nuclear weapons parts has not been addressed. In addition, the efficacy of using inspector confidence ratings to guide multiple inspections in an effort to improve overall performance accuracy is unknown. Further, the workload associated with inspection has not been documented, and newer measures of stress have not been applied.

  15. Applying Science and Technology to Combat WMD Terrorism

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Wuest, C R; Werne, R W; Colston, B W

    2006-05-04

    Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) is developing and fielding advanced strategies that dramatically improve the nation's capabilities to prevent, prepare for, detect, and respond to terrorist use of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) weapons. The science, technology, and integrated systems we provide are informed by and developed with key partners and end users. LLNL's long-standing role as one of the two principle U.S. nuclear weapons design laboratories has led to significant resident expertise for health effects of exposure to radiation, radiation detection technologies, characterization of radioisotopes, and assessment and response capabilities for terrorist nuclear weapons use. This papermore » provides brief overviews of a number of technologies developed at LLNL that are being used to address national security needs to confront the growing threats of CBRNE terrorism.« less

  16. Applying science and technology to combat WMD terrorism

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Wuest, Craig R.; Werne, Roger W.; Colston, Billy W.; Hartmann-Siantar, Christine L.

    2006-05-01

    Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) is developing and fielding advanced strategies that dramatically improve the nation's capabilities to prevent, prepare for, detect, and respond to terrorist use of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) weapons. The science, technology, and integrated systems we provide are informed by and developed with key partners and end users. LLNL's long-standing role as one of the two principle U.S. nuclear weapons design laboratories has led to significant resident expertise for health effects of exposure to radiation, radiation detection technologies, characterization of radioisotopes, and assessment and response capabilities for terrorist nuclear weapons use. This paper provides brief overviews of a number of technologies developed at LLNL that are being used to address national security needs to confront the growing threats of CBRNE terrorism.

  17. "A Hedge against the Future": The Post-Cold War Rhetoric of Nuclear Weapons Modernization

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Taylor, Bryan C.

    2010-01-01

    Rhetoric has traditionally played an important role in constituting the nuclear future, yet that role has changed significantly since the declared end of the Cold War. Viewed from the perspectives of nuclear criticism and postmodern theories of risk and security, current rhetoric of US nuclear modernization demonstrates how contingencies of voice…

  18. Believing Your Eyes: Strengthening the Reliability of Tags and Seals

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Brim, Cornelia P.; Denlinger, Laura S.

    2013-07-01

    NNSA’s Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) is working together with scientific experts at the DOE national laboratories to develop the tools needed to safeguard and secure nuclear material from diversion, theft, and sabotage--tasks critical to support future arms control treaties that may involve the new challenge of monitoring nuclear weapons dismantlement. Use of optically stimulated luminescent material is one method to enhance the security and robustness of existing tamper indicating devices such as tags and seals.

  19. The UK Government's global partnership programme - Its achievements over the past five years and challenges ahead

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Heyes, Alan

    2007-07-01

    Through the Global Partnership the UK continues to make a significant contribution to improve national and global security. Over the past year the UK has continued to implement a wide range of projects across the breadth of its Global Partnership Programme. As well as ensuring the Programme is robust and capable of dealing with new challenges, the UK has cooperated with other donor countries to help them progress projects associated with submarine dismantling, scientist redirection, enhancing nuclear security and Chemical Weapons Destruction. The Global Partnership, although only five years old, has already achieved a great deal. Some 23 states, plusmore » the European Union, are now working closer together under the Global Partnership, and collectively have enhanced global regional and national security by reducing the availability of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) materials and expertise to both states of concern and terrorists. Considerable progress has already been made in, for example: - Improving the security of fissile materials, dangerous biological agents and chemical weapons stocks; - Reducing the number of sites containing radioactive materials; - Working towards closure of reactors still producing weapon-grade plutonium; - Improving nuclear safety to reduce the risks of further, Chernobyl style accidents; - Constructing facilities for destroying Chemical Weapons stocks, and starting actual destruction; - Providing sustainable employment for former WMD scientists to reduce the risk that their expertise will be misused by states or terrorists. By contributing to many of these activities, the UK has helped to make the world safer. This paper reports on the UK's practical and sustainable contribution to the Global Partnership and identifies a number of challenges that remain if it is to have a wider impact on reducing the threats from WMD material. (authors)« less

  20. Prospects for improved detection of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Wuest, Craig R.; Hart, Brad; Slezak, Thomas R.

    2012-07-31

    Acquisition and use of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) weapons continue to be a major focus of concern form the security apparatus of nation states because of their potential for mass casualties when used by a determined adversary.

  1. Pakistans Nuclear Weapons

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2016-02-12

    not be subject to International Atomic Energy Agency ( IAEA ) safeguards have the potential to produce 280...PNRA states that Pakistan follows IAEA physical protection standards. Proliferation A fundamental aspect of nuclear security is ensuring that...related to the design and fabrication of a nuclear explosive device,” according to the IAEA (Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the

  2. Laboratory Directed Research and Development FY2010 Annual Report

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Jackson, K J

    2011-03-22

    A premier applied-science laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) has at its core a primary national security mission - to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile without nuclear testing, and to prevent and counter the spread and use of weapons of mass destruction: nuclear, chemical, and biological. The Laboratory uses the scientific and engineering expertise and facilities developed for its primary mission to pursue advanced technologies to meet other important national security needs - homeland defense, military operations, and missile defense, for example - that evolve in response to emerging threats. For broader nationalmore » needs, LLNL executes programs in energy security, climate change and long-term energy needs, environmental assessment and management, bioscience and technology to improve human health, and for breakthroughs in fundamental science and technology. With this multidisciplinary expertise, the Laboratory serves as a science and technology resource to the U.S. government and as a partner with industry and academia. This annual report discusses the following topics: (1) Advanced Sensors and Instrumentation; (2) Biological Sciences; (3) Chemistry; (4) Earth and Space Sciences; (5) Energy Supply and Use; (6) Engineering and Manufacturing Processes; (7) Materials Science and Technology; Mathematics and Computing Science; (8) Nuclear Science and Engineering; and (9) Physics.« less

  3. Sandia technology engineering and science accomplishments

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Not Available

    1993-03-01

    Sandia is a DOE multiprogram engineering and science laboratory with major facilities at Albuquerque, New Mexico, and Livermore, California, and a test range near Tonapah, Nevada. We have major research and development responsibilities for nuclear weapons, arms control, energy, the environment, economic competitiveness, and other areas of importance to the needs of the nation. Our principal mission is to support national defense policies by ensuring that the nuclear weapon stockpile meets the highest standards of safety, reliability, security, use control, and military performance. Selected unclassified technical activities and accomplishments are reported here. Topics include advanced manufacturing technologies, intelligent machines, computationalmore » simulation, sensors and instrumentation, information management, energy and environment, and weapons technology.« less

  4. Weapon Physicist Declassifies Rescued Nuclear Test Films

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Spriggs, Greg; Moye, Jim

    2017-03-15

    The U.S. conducted 210 atmospheric nuclear tests between 1945 and 1962, with multiple cameras capturing each event at around 2,400 frames per second. But in the decades since, around 10,000 of these films sat idle, scattered across the country in high-security vaults. Not only were they gathering dust, the film material itself was slowly decomposing, bringing the data they contained to the brink of being lost forever. For the past five years, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) weapon physicist Greg Spriggs and a crack team of film experts, archivists and software developers have been on a mission to hunt down,more » scan, reanalyze and declassify these decomposing films. The goals are to preserve the films’ content before it’s lost forever, and provide better data to the post-testing-era scientists who use computer codes to help certify that the aging U.S. nuclear deterrent remains safe, secure and effective.« less

  5. Science and technology in the stockpile stewardship program, S & TR reprints

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Storm, E

    This document reports on these topics: Computer Simulations in Support of National Security; Enhanced Surveillance of Aging Weapons; A New Precision Cutting Tool: The Femtosecond Laser; Superlasers as a Tool of Stockpile Stewardship; Nova Laser Experiments and Stockpile Stewardship; Transforming Explosive Art into Science; Better Flash Radiography Using the FXR; Preserving Nuclear Weapons Information; Site 300Õs New Contained Firing Facility; The Linear Electric Motor: Instability at 1,000 gÕs; A Powerful New Tool to Detect Clandestine Nuclear Tests; High Explosives in Stockpile Surveillance Indicate Constancy; Addressing a Cold War Legacy with a New Way to Produce TATB; JumpinÕ Jupiter! Metallic Hydrogen;more » Keeping the Nuclear Stockpile Safe, Secure, and Reliable; The Multibeam FabryÐPerot Velocimeter: Efficient Measurements of High Velocities; Theory and Modeling in Material Science; The Diamond Anvil Cell; Gamma-Ray Imaging Spectrometry; X-Ray Lasers and High-Density Plasma« less

  6. Beyond Boundaries: A Promising New Model for Security and Global Development. Carnegie Results

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Theroux, Karen

    2013-01-01

    In 2007, a team of international security experts and researchers at the Henry L. Stimson Center launched an initiative to build an effective model for sustainable nonproliferation of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. The project represented an exciting and innovative way of thinking about security: a dual-use approach that operated at…

  7. Peace and security in Northeast Asia: The nuclear issue and the Korean Peninsula

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Kihl, Y.W.; Hayes, P.; Scalapino, R.A.

    1996-01-01

    Korean security was the focus of world-wide attention and concern in 1993--95 with North Korea's 'suspected' nuclear weapons program. Dubbed by some as the first post-Cold War nuclear crisis, it was triggered by the United Nations Security Council's move to impose economic sanctions on North Korea. Although the immediate crisis was defused diplomatically, the nuclear time bomb continues to tick on the Korean peninsula, and the issues remain under close international surveillance. This important book examines North Korea's nuclear controversy from a variety of perspectives, including nuclear reactor technology and technology transfer, economic sanctions and incentives, strategic calculus and confidence-buildingmore » measures, the major powers, and environmental challenges that a nuclear-free zone in Korea will present.« less

  8. 15 CFR 740.12 - Gift parcels and humanitarian donations (GFT).

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ..., and nuclear nonproliferation, missile technology or crime control reasons (see supplement No. 1 to... destinations, no items controlled for chemical and biological weapons (CB), missile technology (MT), national security (NS), nuclear proliferation (NP) or encryption items (EI) reasons on the Commerce Control List...

  9. 15 CFR 740.12 - Gift parcels and humanitarian donations (GFT).

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ..., and nuclear nonproliferation, missile technology or crime control reasons (see Supplement No. 1 to... destinations, no items controlled for chemical and biological weapons (CB), missile technology (MT), national security (NS), nuclear proliferation (NP) or encryption items (EI) reasons on the Commerce Control List...

  10. Report of a Workshop in Nuclear Forces and Nonproliferation held at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Pilat, Joseph F

    2009-01-01

    The workshop addressed evolving nuclear forces and their impacts on nonproliferation in the context of the new strategic environment, the Obama Administration's Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) Review and the 2010 Conference (RevCon) of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The issues discussed are at the heart of the debate on nuclear policy issues such asfuture nuclear weapons requirements and nonproliferation, but also the stockpile stewardship program and infrastructure modernization. The workshop discussions reflected the importance of the NPRfor defining the role of US nuclear forces in dealing with 21s1 century threats and providing guidancemore » that will shape NNSA and DoD programs. They also highlighted its importancefor NPT diplomacy. The discussion noted the report of the bipartisan Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, and the expectation that the NPR would likely reflect its consensus to a large degree (although the Administration was not bound by the report). There was widespread support for developing thefoundationsfor a sustainable nuclear-weapon program that addresses nuclear weapons, infrastructure and expertise in the broader nonproliferation, disarmament and international security contexts. The discussion also revealed a convergence of views, but no consensus, on a number of important issues, including the diminished role but continued importance of nuclear weapons; the need to take action to ensure the sustainability of the stockpile, and the recapitalization of the infrastructure and expertise; and the need to take action to promote nonproliferation, arms control and disarmament objectives.« less

  11. Evolving societal risks and necessary precautions in the age of nuclear power and therapeutic radiation: an American perspective.

    PubMed

    Pham, Martin H; Yu, Cheng; Rusch, Mairead; Holloway, Charles; Chang, Eric; Apuzzo, Michael L J

    2014-12-01

    Terrorism involving nuclear or radiologic weapons can devastate populations, city infrastructures, and entire sociopolitical systems. In our age of nuclear medicine and therapeutic radiation delivery, the unauthorized and illegal acquisition of radioactive materials needed for such an attack is always a possibility and risk. Physicians handling high-energy isotopes for medical radiotherapy must be aware of the basic security requirements as outlined by the Nuclear Regulation Commission, which include background checks and authorized access, physical protection during radionuclide use, and physical protection during its transit. The Leksell Gamma Knife and its Category 1 cobalt-60 radioactive source are discussed because of their significant potential for deployment in a weaponized device. Although this article presents a perspective relating to American rules and regulations, these precautions are applicable anywhere that similar situations exist. Understanding these materials and the security they require is essential to preventing the disastrous outcomes should these isotopes fall into terrorists' hands. Published by Elsevier Inc.

  12. Stockpile Stewardship: How We Ensure the Nuclear Deterrent Without Testing

    ScienceCinema

    None

    2018-01-16

    In the 1990s, the U.S. nuclear weapons program shifted emphasis from developing new designs to dismantling thousands of existing weapons and maintaining a much smaller enduring stockpile. The United States ceased underground nuclear testing, and the Department of Energy created the Stockpile Stewardship Program to maintain the safety, security, and reliability of the U.S. nuclear deterrent without full-scale testing. This video gives a behind the scenes look at a set of unique capabilities at Lawrence Livermore that are indispensable to the Stockpile Stewardship Program: high performance computing, the Superblock category II nuclear facility, the JASPER a two stage gas gun, the High Explosive Applications Facility (HEAF), the National Ignition Facility (NIF), and the Site 300 contained firing facility.

  13. Economic Analysis of National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Modernization Alternatives

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2007-11-01

    without nuclear testing; works to reduce global danger from weapons of mass destruction; provides the U.S. Navy with safe and effective nuclear...SFE) covers the acquisition of glove boxes, long-lead facility, and actinide chemistry/materials characterization (AC/MC) equipment whose uniqueness...Hazard Category II AC/MC and actinide Research and Development operations, special nuclear 5 Babcock

  14. Serving the Nation for Fifty Years: 1952 - 2002 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory [LLNL], Fifty Years of Accomplishments

    DOE R&D Accomplishments Database

    2002-01-01

    For 50 years, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory has been making history and making a difference. The outstanding efforts by a dedicated work force have led to many remarkable accomplishments. Creative individuals and interdisciplinary teams at the Laboratory have sought breakthrough advances to strengthen national security and to help meet other enduring national needs. The Laboratory's rich history includes many interwoven stories -- from the first nuclear test failure to accomplishments meeting today's challenges. Many stories are tied to Livermore's national security mission, which has evolved to include ensuring the safety, security, and reliability of the nation's nuclear weapons without conducting nuclear tests and preventing the proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction. Throughout its history and in its wide range of research activities, Livermore has achieved breakthroughs in applied and basic science, remarkable feats of engineering, and extraordinary advances in experimental and computational capabilities. From the many stories to tell, one has been selected for each year of the Laboratory's history. Together, these stories give a sense of the Laboratory -- its lasting focus on important missions, dedication to scientific and technical excellence, and drive to made the world more secure and a better place to live.

  15. NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) deterrence and defense after the INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) treaty. Final report, June 1988-June 1989

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Garrett, S.A.

    1989-06-21

    The treaty between the Soviet Union and the United States eliminating a whole class of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) in Europe raises a number of questions about NATO's future ability to deter Warsaw Pact aggression. Future choices on Alliance strategy and doctrine will be influenced by a variety of factors, including the image of new thinking in Soviet security policy enunciated by General Secretary Gorbachev, changing West European opinion toward the use of nuclear weapons for NATO deterrence, the complications inherent in further nuclear and conventional arms-control negotiations, assessments of the current conventional arms balance in Europe, and ongoing questionsmore » about NATO cohesion as well as the continued coupling of American security with that of her European allies. In the post-INF environment it may well be that U.S. Navy nuclear assets will assume an increasingly important role, particularly the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile/Nuclear (TLAM/N). The TLAM/N has many attractive attributes that can be supportive of NATO deterrence of the WTO, but there are also a number of unresolved questions to be addressed concerning this particular weapons system. Modernization of NATO's land-based short-range nuclear forces (SNF), such as the Lance missile, is also seen by many as critical to the maintenance of Alliance security in the aftermath of INF.« less

  16. DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Karp, A.

    Observers of Third World security watch for new weapon systems that promise to make the poor the military equals of the rich. Ballistic missiles, which combine the nuclear weapon and precision-guided munition, are a disturbing possibility that warrants regulation of the flow of ballistic missile technology. It is imperative to have a policy delineating the risks involved with ballistic missiles as a basis for action and consistency and for working with other technology suppliers. The US should initiate discussions aimed at establishing a missile technology suppliers' regime before Third World countries actually deploy nuclear missiles.

  17. Russia’s Nuclear Weapons Dilemma: A Cooperative Approach to International Security in the 1990s

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1993-01-01

    examined in order to understand the apparent and real problems facing the Russian 2 Sam Nunn et al., "Trip Report: A Visit to the Commonwealth of...could argue that this is not an unreasonable amount 10 Bohdan Nahaylo, "The Birth of an Independent Ukraine," Report on the USSR 3, no. 50 (1991): 3-4...34 Washington Post, 29 March 1992, C3. 13 Robert L. Galluci, "Disposing of Nuclear Weapons in the Former Soviet Union," U.S. Department of State

  18. Kirtland Operations progress report, April--June 1991

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Not Available

    Kirtland Operations (KO) is an integral part of EG G Energy Measurements, Inc., whose primary mission is to support the US Department of Energy's (DOE's) programs in weapons development and testing and in nuclear safeguards and security. KO performs much of its work in close coordination with and often at the technical direction of Sandia National Laboratories. In addition to aiding Sandia's weapons programs, KO provides a wide spectrum of technical support to other Sandia activities, particularly their safeguards, security, and treaty verification programs. Support is also provided to other elements of the Department of Energy community and to othermore » federal agencies, primarily in weapons testing and safeguards. This report documents our support to these programs from April to June 1991.« less

  19. Kirtland Operations progress report, January--March 1991

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    None

    Kirtland Operations (KO) is an integral part of EG G Energy Measurements, Inc., whose primary mission is to support the US Department of Energy's (DOE's) programs in weapons development and testing and in nuclear safeguards and security. KO performs much of its work in close coordination with and often at the technical direction of Sandia National Laboratories. In addition to aiding Sandia's weapons programs, KO provides a wide spectrum of technical support to other Sandia activities, particularly their safeguards, security, and treaty verification programs. Support is also provided to other elements of the Department of Energy community and to othermore » federal agencies, primarily in weapons testing and safeguards. This report documents our support to these porgrams from January to March 1991.« less

  20. Kirtland Operations progress report, October--December 1991

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Not Available

    Kirtland Operations (KO) is an integral part of EG G Energy Measurements, Inc., whose primary mission is to support the US Department of Energy's (DOE's) programs in weapons development and testing and in nuclear safeguards and security. KO performs much of its work in close coordination with and often at the technical direction of Sandia National Laboratories. In addition to aiding Sandia's weapons programs, KO provides a wide spectrum of technical support to other Sandia activities, particularly their safeguards, security, and treaty verification programs. Support is also provided to other elements of the Department of Energy community and to othermore » federal agencies, primarily in weapons testing and safeguards. This report documents our support to these programs from October to December 1991.« less

  1. DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Hund, Gretchen

    For the past decade, a team at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) has engaged industry to “go beyond compliance” in controlling and securing their supply chains to ensure their goods are not diverted to nuclear weapons programs. This work has focused on dual-use industries that manufacture products that can be used in both commercial applications and in the development of a nuclear weapon. The team encourages industry to self-regulate to reduce proliferation risks. As part of that work, PNNL interviewed numerous companies about their compliance practices in order to understand their business and to build awareness around best practicesmore » to ensure security of goods and information along their supply chains. As a result, PNNL has identified seven indicators that a company can adopt as part of their commitment to nonproliferation ideals.« less

  2. DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Obama, Barack

    Prague, Czech Republic President Obama: Finally, this day demonstrates the determination of the United States and Russia -- the two nations that hold over 90 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons -- to pursue responsible global leadership. Together, we are keeping our commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which must be the foundation for global non-proliferation. While the New START treaty is an important first step forward, it is just one step on a longer journey. As I said last year in Prague, this treaty will set the stage for further cuts. And going forward, we hope to pursue discussionsmore » with Russia on reducing both our strategic and tactical weapons, including non-deployed weapons. President Medvedev and I have also agreed to expand our discussions on missile defense. This will include regular exchanges of information about our threat assessments, as well as the completion of a joint assessment of emerging ballistic missiles. And as these assessments are completed, I look forward to launching a serious dialogue about Russian-American cooperation on missile defense. But nuclear weapons are not simply an issue for the United States and Russia -- they threaten the common security of all nations. A nuclear weapon in the hands of a terrorist is a danger to people everywhere -- from Moscow to New York; from the cities of Europe to South Asia. So next week, 47 nations will come together in Washington to discuss concrete steps that can be taken to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials around the world in four years. And the spread of nuclear weapons to more states is also an unacceptable risk to global security -- raising the specter of arms races from the Middle East to East Asia. Earlier this week, the United States formally changed our policy to make it clear that those non-nuclear weapons states that are in compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and their non-proliferation obligations will not be threatened by America’s nuclear arsenal. This demonstrates, once more, America’s commitment to the NPT as a cornerstone of our security strategy. Those nations that follow the rules will find greater security and opportunity. Those nations that refuse to meet their obligations will be isolated, and denied the opportunity that comes with international recognition. That includes accountability for those that break the rules -- otherwise the NPT is just words on a page. That’s why the United States and Russia are part of a coalition of nations insisting that the Islamic Republic of Iran face consequences, because they have continually failed to meet their obligations. We are working together at the United Nations Security Council to pass strong sanctions on Iran. And we will not tolerate actions that flout the NPT, risk an arms race in a vital region, and threaten the credibility of the international community and our collective security. While these issues are a top priority, they are only one part of the U.S.-Russia relationship. Today, I again expressed my deepest condolences for the terrible loss of Russian life in recent terrorist attacks, and we will remain steadfast partners in combating violent extremism. We also discussed the potential to expand our cooperation on behalf of economic growth, trade and investment, as well as technological innovation, and I look forward to discussing these issues further when President Medvedev visits the United States later this year, because there is much we can do on behalf of our security and prosperity if we continue to work together. When one surveys the many challenges that we face around the world, it’s easy to grow complacent, or to abandon the notion that progress can be shared. But I want to repeat what I said last year in Prague: When nations and peoples allow themselves to be defined by their differences, the gulf between them widens. When we fail to pursue peace, then it stays forever beyond our grasp. This majestic city of Prague is in many ways a monument to human progress. And this ceremony is a testament to the truth that old adversaries can forge new partnerships. I could not help but be struck the other day by the words of Arkady Brish, who helped build the Soviet Union’s first atom bomb. At the age of 92, having lived to see the horrors of a World War and the divisions of a Cold War, he said, We hope humanity will reach the moment when there is no need for nuclear weapons, when there is peace and calm in the world. It’s easy to dismiss those voices. But doing so risks repeating the horrors of the past, while ignoring the history of human progress. The pursuit of peace and calm and cooperation among nations is the work of both leaders and peoples in the 21st century. For we must be as persistent and passionate in our pursuit of progress as any who would stand in our way. Once again, President Medvedev, thank you for your extraordinary leadership.« less

  3. Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program Annual Report: Class of 2011

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    McMakin, Andrea H.

    2012-08-20

    Annual report for the Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program (NGFP), which PNNL administers for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). Features the Class of 2011. The NGFP is a NNSA program with a mission to cultivate future technical and policy leaders in nonproliferation and international security. Through the NGFP, outstanding graduate students with career interests in nonproliferation are appointed to program offices within the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN). During their one-year assignment, Fellows participate in programs designed to detect, prevent, and reverse the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

  4. Institutional plan FY 1999--FY 2004

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    NONE

    1998-10-01

    Los Alamos has a well-defined and nationally important mission: to reduce the global nuclear danger. This central national security mission consists of four main elements: stockpile stewardship, nuclear materials management, nonproliferation and arms control, and cleanup of the environmental legacy of nuclear weapons activities. The Laboratory provides support for and ensures confidence in the nation`s nuclear stockpile without nuclear testing. This challenge requires the Laboratory to continually hone its scientific acumen and technological capabilities to perform this task reliably using an interdisciplinary approach and advanced experimental and modeling techniques. In the last two National Defense Authorization Acts, Congress identified themore » need to protect the nation from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which includes nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and their potential use by terrorists. Los Alamos is applying multidisciplinary science and engineering skills to address these problems. In addition, the Laboratory`s critical programmatic roles in stockpile stewardship and threat reduction are complemented by its waste management operations and environmental restoration work. Information on specific programs is available in Section 2 of this document.« less

  5. Stockpile Stewardship: How We Ensure the Nuclear Deterrent Without Testing

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    None

    2014-09-04

    In the 1990s, the U.S. nuclear weapons program shifted emphasis from developing new designs to dismantling thousands of existing weapons and maintaining a much smaller enduring stockpile. The United States ceased underground nuclear testing, and the Department of Energy created the Stockpile Stewardship Program to maintain the safety, security, and reliability of the U.S. nuclear deterrent without full-scale testing. This video gives a behind the scenes look at a set of unique capabilities at Lawrence Livermore that are indispensable to the Stockpile Stewardship Program: high performance computing, the Superblock category II nuclear facility, the JASPER a two stage gas gun,more » the High Explosive Applications Facility (HEAF), the National Ignition Facility (NIF), and the Site 300 contained firing facility.« less

  6. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in Context

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Davenport, Kelsey

    2017-01-01

    The 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) is the cornerstone of multilateral efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and promote efforts toward complete disarmament. In the grand bargain of the NPT, states foreswore pursuit of nuclear weapons in exchange for access to nuclear technology and limited nuclear arsenals to the five states (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) that tested such weapons before the NPT's conception. Now in its seventh decade, the NPT regime is embraced by the vast majority of the world's nations and is viewed as a critical element of international security. However, despite past successes in halting efforts in several states to pursue nuclear weapons, near universal adherence, and only one withdrawal (North Korea), the NPT regime is at a critical crossroads. The treaty has proven unable to adapt to new challenges, such as emerging technologies that threaten operational strategic realities, the devolution of state authority to non-state actors and institutions, and growing dissatisfaction with slow pace of nuclear disarmament. Additionally, the treaty leaves open critical questions, including whether or not state parties have the `right' to pursue technologies that allow for domestic production of fuels for nuclear reactors and if modernization programs for nuclear warheads are inconsistent with the treaty. If these questions remain unresolved, the international community will find itself ill prepared to confront emerging proliferation challenges and the NPT, the linchpin of international nonproliferation and disarmament efforts, may begin to erode.

  7. ''Whither Deterrence?'' A Brief Synopsis May, 2002

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Poppe, C; Vergino, E; Barker, R

    To most audiences, deterrence has been interconnected with nuclear weapons whose purpose had been to deter a Soviet attack. But, the Soviet Union has been gone for almost a decade. President George W. Bush has stated that Russia is not an enemy of the US and the numbers of nuclear weapons can be dramatically reduced. It is important to note that deterrence has always transcended nuclear weapons. The US' first line of deterrence has been its formidable conventional warfare capability, designed to prevent conflict and win wars if necessary. The role of nuclear weapons has been to deter the,use ofmore » nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction against U.S. interests during the conduct of conventional warfare and to ensure our ability to inflict massive destruction on any who would use nuclear weapons, or other weapons of mass destruction, against us. With regard to the Soviet Union, the threat of the use of nuclear weapons was a critical component of our deterrent to prevent massive Soviet conventional attack against our allies in Europe. However, the events of September 11, 2001 make clear that we have not convinced all who seek to harm us that we will be able to respond in a manner to make them wish they had not even tried. The September 11 attacks, as well as other past conflicts, do not mean that deterrence has failed-it remains effective against the threats for which it was designed. We have known there are other threats for which we did not have a credible deterrent. The challenge is to sustain deterrence against the classic threats as they evolve in technical sophistication while remaining alert to the need to evaluate continuously our ability to deter previously unforeseen challenges. How then should we be looking at deterrence as we consider fifteen or so years in the future, say to about 2015? What will be the role of nuclear weapons and other instruments of mass destruction in the future? What should the US be doing to prepare for the future? In this study, we present four futures as a tool for planners who must think ahead fifteen years or more, rather than a prediction of the future. None of the four futures will emerge in just the way we have described. Fifteen years from now, some mix of these futures is more likely, or perhaps we will see a trend towards one of the futures, but with the possibility that any of the other three could appear, perhaps quite swiftly. Any future will undoubtedly contain its own kind of unpleasant surprises and, in contrast to the Cold War; the possession of enormous nuclear-response and conventional-response capability may not be sufficient to deter these from happening. However, there are other tools that the US must include as part of its strategy and security policy in addition to deterrence, specifically dissuasion, defense, destruction, and assurance. Rather than rely on the Cold-War concept of deterrence, future security policy should be built upon the appropriate mix of these elements as a way to steer us toward a more favorable future, while ensuring that we are prepared for the kinds of surprises associated with far less favorable futures. In this study, we have defined three unfavorable futures to be avoided, and one future that represents, we believe, a more desirable global situation than the first three, but still not entirely benign. Our security policy should be defined to avoid or prevent the first three, which we have entitled ''Nuclear Giants, Global Terror'', and ''Regional Nuclear Tension and Use'', and steer us toward a more favorable future, ''Dynamic Cooperation''. We have examined the implications for both policy and military capability that are posed by these different futures. The result often raises more questions than we are able to answer without additional study-however, our primary purpose was to clarify the issues, to identify. what we believe we know, what we don't know, and where more study and effort are needed. Nevertheless, in preparing for unfavorable futures, we must also identify and plan the future we want. This study emphasizes that a desirable future in 2015 would be characterized by peaceful resolution of conflict, growing worldwide economic prosperity, an effective non-proliferation regime, the ability of the United States to control its own destiny without conflict, and expansion of political and economic freedom. Security policies, even in the face of unpleasant futures, should be crafted so as enhance, rather than diminish, these desired goals.« less

  8. Kirtland Operations progress report, October--December 1991

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Not Available

    Kirtland Operations (KO) is an integral part of EG&G Energy Measurements, Inc., whose primary mission is to support the US Department of Energy`s (DOE`s) programs in weapons development and testing and in nuclear safeguards and security. KO performs much of its work in close coordination with and often at the technical direction of Sandia National Laboratories. In addition to aiding Sandia`s weapons programs, KO provides a wide spectrum of technical support to other Sandia activities, particularly their safeguards, security, and treaty verification programs. Support is also provided to other elements of the Department of Energy community and to other federalmore » agencies, primarily in weapons testing and safeguards. This report documents our support to these programs from October to December 1991.« less

  9. Kirtland Operations progress report, April--June 1991

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Not Available

    Kirtland Operations (KO) is an integral part of EG&G Energy Measurements, Inc., whose primary mission is to support the US Department of Energy`s (DOE`s) programs in weapons development and testing and in nuclear safeguards and security. KO performs much of its work in close coordination with and often at the technical direction of Sandia National Laboratories. In addition to aiding Sandia`s weapons programs, KO provides a wide spectrum of technical support to other Sandia activities, particularly their safeguards, security, and treaty verification programs. Support is also provided to other elements of the Department of Energy community and to other federalmore » agencies, primarily in weapons testing and safeguards. This report documents our support to these programs from April to June 1991.« less

  10. Projected Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2017 to 2026

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2017-02-01

    CBO FEBRUARY 2017 Projected Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2017 to 2026 Nuclear weapons have been a cornerstone of U.S. national security since they...were developed during World War II. In the Cold War, nuclear forces were central to U.S. defense policy, resulting in the buildup of a large...arsenal. Since that time, nuclear forces have figured less prominently than conventional forces, and the United States has not built any new nuclear

  11. 75 FR 1020 - Amendments to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) Based Upon the Accession of Albania and...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-01-08

    ...--Commerce Country Chart [Reason for control] Countries Chemical & biological Nuclear National Security Missile Regional Stability Firearms Crime control Anti-terrorism weapons nonproliferation Tech convention...

  12. This is Sandia

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Not Available

    1995-02-01

    Sandia is a multiprogram engineering and science laboratory operated for the Department of Energy with major facilities at Albuquerque, New Mexico, and Livermore, California, and a test range near Tonapah, Nevada. It has major research and development responsibilities for nuclear weapons, arms control, energy, the environment, economic competitiveness, and other areas of importance to the needs of the nation. The principal mission is to support national defense policies by ensuring that the nuclear weapon stockpile meets the highest standards of safety, reliability, security, use control, and military performance. This publication gives a brief overview of the multifaceted research programs conductedmore » by the laboratory.« less

  13. Cooperative global security programs modeling & simulation.

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Briand, Daniel

    2010-05-01

    The national laboratories global security programs implement sustainable technical solutions for cooperative nonproliferation, arms control, and physical security systems worldwide. To help in the development and execution of these programs, a wide range of analytical tools are used to model, for example, synthetic tactical environments for assessing infrastructure protection initiatives and tactics, systematic approaches for prioritizing nuclear and biological threat reduction opportunities worldwide, and nuclear fuel cycle enrichment and spent fuel management for nuclear power countries. This presentation will describe how these models are used in analyses to support the Obama Administration's agenda and bilateral/multinational treaties, and ultimately, to reducemore » weapons of mass destruction and terrorism threats through international technical cooperation.« less

  14. Politics and Didactics of Peace Education: "Securing Peace in the Nuclear Age--The Case of the Neutron Weapon". A Course for Political Instruction in Schools in Hessen.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Krell, Gert

    1980-01-01

    Describes a course developed for the public schools of Hessen, Germany, through the cooperative efforts of army officers, peace researchers, and educators. Information is presented on goals and contents of peace education as a part of political education, learning goals, course sequence, and content related to the neutron weapons controversy. (DB)

  15. DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Juarez, A.

    Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories hosted the tenth annual Strategic Weapons in the 21st Century Conference (SW21) on 21 January 2016 to reinforce the national commitment to leadership and institutional excellence for nuclear deterrence. The event has been successful over the years in drawing together a diverse, high-level group of policy makers and experts from multiple disciplines to engage in informed dialogue on topics related to strategic weapons in national and international security.

  16. Industrial Sites - An Approach to Closure

    ScienceCinema

    None

    2018-01-16

    The Environmental Management (EM) Program at the Nevada Site Office was created by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to address the environmental legacy of contamination resulting from more than 50 years of nuclear weapons research, production and testing. The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NSO) is responsible for remediating portions of the Nevada National Security Site (formerly the Nevada Test Site) and the Tonopah Test Range, which is within the Nevada Test and Training Range.

  17. Abramovo Counterterrorism Training Center

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Hayes, Christopher M; Ross, Larry; Lingenfelter, Forrest E

    2011-01-01

    The U.S. government has been assisting the Russian Federation (RF) Ministry of Defense (MOD) for many years with nuclear weapons transportation security (NWTS) through the provision of specialized guard escort railcars and cargo railcars with integrated physical security and communication systems, armored transport vehicles, and armored escort vehicles. As a natural continuation of the NWTS program, a partnership has been formed to construct a training center that will provide counterterrorism training to personnel in all branches of the RF MOD. The Abramovo Counterterrorism Training Center (ACTC) is a multinational, multiagency project with funding from Canada, RF and the U.S. Departmentsmore » of Defense and Energy. ACTC will be a facility where MOD personnel can conduct basic through advanced training in various security measures to protect Category IA material against the threat of terrorist attack. The training will enhance defense-in-depth principles by integrating MOD guard force personnel into the overall physical protection systems and improving their overall response time and neutralization capabilities. The ACTC project includes infrastructure improvements, renovation of existing buildings, construction of new buildings, construction of new training facilities, and provision of training and other equipment. Classroom training will be conducted in a renovated training building. Basic and intermediate training will be conducted on three different security training areas where various obstacles and static training devices will be constructed. The central element of ACTC, where advanced training will be held, is the 'autodrome,' a 3 km road along which various terrorist events can be staged to challenge MOD personnel in realistic and dynamic nuclear weapons transportation scenarios. This paper will address the ACTC project elements and the vision for training development and integrating this training into actual nuclear weapons transportation operations.« less

  18. Stop Iran's Nuclear Weapons Program Act of 2010

    THOMAS, 111th Congress

    Rep. Sherman, Brad [D-CA-27

    2010-09-29

    House - 12/20/2010 Referred to the Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and International Law. (All Actions) Tracker: This bill has the status IntroducedHere are the steps for Status of Legislation:

  19. Atoms for peace and the nonproliferation treaty: unintended consequences

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Streeper, Charles Blamires

    2009-01-01

    In April 2009, President Obama revived nonproliferation and arms control efforts with a speech calling for the worldwide abolition of nuclear weapons. His speech correctly acknowledged the threat of nuclear terrorism and the vulnerabilities of the related unsecure nuclear materials. Unfortunately, the president did not mention and has not mentioned in any speech the threat posed by at-risk radiological materials. Nonproliferation efforts have a well documented history of focus on special nuclear materials (fissionable weapons usable materials or SNM), and other key materials (chemical and biological) and technologies for a Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD). Such intense focus on WMDmore » related materials/technologies is essential for international safety and security and merit continued attention and funding. However, the perception that radioactive sealed sources (sources) are of less concern than WMD is unfortunate. These perceptions are based solely on the potentially enormous and tragic consequences associated with their deliberate or accidental misuse and proliferation concerns. However, there is a documented history of overemphasis on the nuclear threat at the expense of ignoring the far more likely and also devastating chemical and biological threats. The radiological threat should not be minimized or excluded from policy discussions and decisions on these far ranging scopes of threat to the international community. Sources have a long history of use; and a wider distribution worldwide than fissile materials. Pair this with their broad ranges in isotopes/activities along with scant national and international attention and mechanisms for their safe and secure management and it is not difficult to envision a deadly threat. Arguments that minimize or divert attention away from sources may have the effect of distracting necessary policy attention on preventing/mitigating a radiological dispersal event. The terrorist attacks on 9/11 should be a clear reminder of the inherent danger of diminishing or dismissing lower-level threats in exchange for enhanced focus on high priority special nuclear materials with the basis for this emphasis being solely on the magnitude of the consequences of a single event. Mitigating all possible or likely terrorist attacks is impossible; however, weaponized sources, in the form of a radiological dispersal device, have been a declared target material of Al-Qaida. Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace initiative promoted the spread of the paradoxical beneficial yet destructive properties of the atom. Typically, the focus of nonproliferation efforts focuses on the fissile materials associated with Weapons of Mass Destruction, with less emphasis on radioactive materials that could be used for a Weapon of Mass Disruption. Most nonproliferation policy discussion involves securing or preventing the diversion of weapons grade fissile materials (uranium (U) with concentration of over 90% of the isotope {sup 235}U (HEU) and plutonium with more than 90% of the isotope {sup 239}Pu), with scant attention given to the threat posed by a prolific quantity of sources spread worldwide. Further acerbating the problem of inattention, it appears that the momentum of the continued evolution in the beneficial applications of sources will only increase in the near future. Several expert studies have demonstrated on the potentially devastating economic, psychological and public health impacts of terrorist use of a radiological dispersal or radiation emitting device (ROD/RED) in a metropolis. The development of such a weapon, from the acquisition of the radioactive material to the technical knowledge needed to fashion it into an ROD, is many orders of magnitude easier than diverting enough fissile material for and fabrication/acquisition of a nuclear weapon. Unlike nuclear weapons, worldwide, there are many well documented accounts of accidental and purposeful diversions of radioactive materials from regulatory control. As of the end of 2008, the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Illicit Trafficking Database had logged 1562 incidents, of which only 18 include weapons grade nuclear materials. As much as 66% of the radioactive material involved in these incidents was not recovered. Since 2004, there has been a 75% increase in incidents of unrecoverable material, much of which is labeled dangerous with potential for deterministic health affects if misused. This makes clear that a black market of illicit trade in sources exists. The incidents reported to the IAEA's database rely only on voluntary state reporting; therefore, the number of lost or stolen sources is expected to be much higher.« less

  20. American perspectives on security : energy, environment, nuclear weapons, and terrorism : 2010.

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Herron, Kerry Gale; Jenkins-Smith, Hank C.; Silva, Carol L.

    2011-03-01

    We report findings from an Internet survey and a subset of questions administered by telephone among the American public in mid-2010 on US energy and environmental security. Key areas of investigation include public perceptions shaping the context for debate about a comprehensive national energy policy, and what levels of importance are assigned to various prospective energy technologies. Additionally, we investigate how public views on global climate change are evolving, how the public assesses the risks and benefits of nuclear energy, preferences for managing used nuclear fuel, and public trust in sources of scientific and technical information. We also report findingsmore » from a national Internet survey and a subset of questions administered by telephone in mid-2010 on public views of the relevance of US nuclear weapons today, support for strategic arms control, and assessments of the potential for nuclear abolition. Additionally, we analyze evolving public views of the threat of terrorism, assessments of progress in the struggle against terrorism, and tolerance for intrusive antiterror policies. Where possible, findings from each survey are compared with previous surveys in this series for analyses of trends.« less

  1. Preserving Nuclear Grade Knowledge

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Lange, Bob

    2008-02-05

    When people think of the government they think of the President, or Congress, or the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), but there are thousands of people in government-related jobs doing things most don’t really notice everyday. You can find them everywhere, from the space science folks at NASA, to the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) watching out for the bad guys. There are Rangers, and Social Workers, Nurses and Agricultural Managers. They are people working to keep the many facets of the USA rolling. One very diverse bunch is The Department of Energy (DOE) , a group who is expanding themore » ways we make and save energy to power our cars, homes, and businesses. Tucked away under the DOE is the National Nuclear Security Administration, the NNSA is an agency that maintains the safety, security, and reliability of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. It works to reduce global danger from weapons of mass destruction. It provides the U.S. Navy with safe nuclear propulsion, and it responds to nuclear and radiological emergencies in the United States and abroad, and it supports efforts in science and technology*. (* DOE/NNSA/KCP website info)« less

  2. Whole Earth Security: A Geopolitics of Peace. Worldwatch Paper 55.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Deudney, Daniel

    The current use and potential of technology for achieving security and peace are explored. Section 1 traces the use of technology for warfare through the mastery of ocean-going sailing, the maturation of the airplane, and the development of nuclear weapons. This section suggests that these developments have led to a loss rather than an increase in…

  3. National Center for Nuclear Security - NCNS

    ScienceCinema

    None

    2018-01-16

    As the United States embarks on a new era of nuclear arms control, the tools for treaty verification must be accurate and reliable, and must work at stand-off distances. The National Center for Nuclear Security, or NCNS, at the Nevada National Security Site, is poised to become the proving ground for these technologies. The center is a unique test bed for non-proliferation and arms control treaty verification technologies. The NNSS is an ideal location for these kinds of activities because of its multiple environments; its cadre of experienced nuclear personnel, and the artifacts of atmospheric and underground nuclear weapons explosions. The NCNS will provide future treaty negotiators with solid data on verification and inspection regimes and a realistic environment in which future treaty verification specialists can be trained. Work on warhead monitoring at the NCNS will also support future arms reduction treaties.

  4. Toward an Ideal Security State for Northeast Asia 2025

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2010-04-01

    tension caused by the recent activities of North Korea , such as tests of nuclear weapons and medium- to long-range missiles, dangers for a clash...such as whether deterrence will work in the case of North Korea , whether the U.S. will be determined to extend its conventional and nuclear ...reverse North Korea’s nuclear programs, the region should make a clear distinction between acknowledging that North Korea has developed nuclear

  5. Laboratory directed research and development fy1999 annual report

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Al-Ayat, R A

    2000-04-11

    The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) was founded in 1952 and has been managed since its inception by the University of California (UC) for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). Because of this long association with UC, the Laboratory has been able to recruit a world-class workforce, establish an atmosphere of intellectual freedom and innovation, and achieve recognition in relevant fields of knowledge as a scientific and technological leader. This environment and reputation are essential for sustained scientific and technical excellence. As a DOE national laboratory with about 7,000 employees, LLNL has an essential and compelling primary mission to ensuremore » that the nation's nuclear weapons remain safe, secure, and reliable and to prevent the spread and use of nuclear weapons worldwide. The Laboratory receives funding from the DOE Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs, whose focus is stewardship of our nuclear weapons stockpile. Funding is also provided by the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, many Department of Defense sponsors, other federal agencies, and the private sector. As a multidisciplinary laboratory, LLNL has applied its considerable skills in high-performance computing, advanced engineering, and the management of large research and development projects to become the science and technology leader in those areas of its mission responsibility. The Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) Program was authorized by the U.S. Congress in 1984. The Program allows the Director of each DOE laboratory to fund advanced, creative, and innovative research and development (R&D) activities that will ensure scientific and technical vitality in the continually evolving mission areas at DOE and the Laboratory. In addition, the LDRD Program provides LLNL with the flexibility to nurture and enrich essential scientific and technical competencies, which attract the most qualified scientists and engineers. The LDRD Program also enables many collaborations with the scientific community in academia, national and international laboratories, and industry. The projects in the FY1999 LDRD portfolio were carefully selected to continue vigorous support of the strategic vision and the long-term goals of DOE and the Laboratory. Projects chosen for LDRD funding undergo stringent selection processes, which look for high-potential scientific return, emphasize strategic relevance, and feature technical peer reviews by external and internal experts. The FY1999 projects described in this annual report focus on supporting the Laboratory's national security needs: stewardship of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile, responsibility for the counter- and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, development of high-performance computing, and support of DOE environmental research and waste management programs. In the past, LDRD investments have significantly enhanced LLNL scientific capabilities and greatly contributed to the Laboratory's ability to meet its national security programmatic requirements. Examples of past investments include technical precursors to the Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative (ASCI), special-materials processing and characterization, and biodefense. Our analysis of the FY1999 portfolio shows that it strongly supports the Laboratory's national security mission. About 95% of the LDRD dollars have directly supported LLNL's national security activities in FY1999, which far exceeds the portion of LLNL's overall budget supported by National Security Programs, which is 63% for FY1999.« less

  6. Detection Technology in the 21st Century: The Case of Nuclear Weapons of Mass Destruction

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2008-03-26

    Weapons of Mass Destruction FORMAT : Strategy Research Project DATE: 26 March 2008 WORD COUNT: 6,764 PAGES: 25 KEY TERMS: National Security, Deterrence...stocks remaining in Ukraine, Belarus, Uzbekistan, and other former Soviet and Eastern European states, and the unknown amounts of highly enriched uranium ...detect emissions from the decay of radioactive nuclides, which can occur naturally, such as uranium and thorium, or are manmade, such as plutonium

  7. Iran’s Reemergence as a Major Player in Global Security

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2013-05-21

    economic sanctions levied against the Islamic Republic. Iran continues to deny International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors’ access to possible uranium ...build nuclear weapons.”55 Mr. Clapper went on to say that “Iran’s technical advancement, particularly in uranium enrichment, strengthens our assessment...will to do so.”56 During the briefing, he made clear that Iran is technically capable of producing enough highly enriched uranium for a weapon

  8. The nuclear weapons ban treaty and the non-proliferation regime.

    PubMed

    Egeland, Kjølv; Hugo, Torbjørn Graff; Løvold, Magnus; Nystuen, Gro

    2018-06-18

    The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in July 2017, has been met with mixed reactions. While supporters have described the Treaty as a watershed in the struggle for disarmament, others have expressed fervent opposition. One of the most serious charges levelled at the TPNW is that it will undermine the long-standing nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), by many regarded as a cornerstone of the international security architecture. Critics have contended that the new agreement risks eroding the system of safeguards designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, derailing disarmament efforts within the NPT framework, and aggravating political division between nuclear and non-nuclear powers. Investigating the legal and political cogency of these arguments, we argue that not only may the TPNW be reconciled with existing legal instruments, the new Treaty supports and reinforces key norms and institutions on which the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime is based. Furthermore, any technical challenges that might arise in the future may be addressed at meetings of states party; the drafters envisioned a dynamic process of institutional adaptations and expansion. The main challenge facing advocates of the Treaty is political: convincing the nuclear-armed states to disarm.

  9. Nuclear Deterrence: Strong Policy is Needed for Effective Defense

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2011-03-24

    providing anti-access to U.S. forces should conflict erupt, for example over the Taiwan sovereignty issue.29 Emerging Chinese long- range delivery systems...securing fissile material is already extremely difficult. It is quite possible that some nuclear material is unaccounted for in the world; even if banned ...Nuclear weapons are like very complicated chemical experiments, sometimes changing in unforeseen ways as metals corrode, plastics break down and

  10. Nuclear Security for Floating Nuclear Power Plants

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Skiba, James M.; Scherer, Carolynn P.

    2015-10-13

    Recently there has been a lot of interest in small modular reactors. A specific type of these small modular reactors (SMR,) are marine based power plants called floating nuclear power plants (FNPP). These FNPPs are typically built by countries with extensive knowledge of nuclear energy, such as Russia, France, China and the US. These FNPPs are built in one country and then sent to countries in need of power and/or seawater desalination. Fifteen countries have expressed interest in acquiring such power stations. Some designs for such power stations are briefly summarized. Several different avenues for cooperation in FNPP technology aremore » proposed, including IAEA nuclear security (i.e. safeguards), multilateral or bilateral agreements, and working with Russian design that incorporates nuclear safeguards for IAEA inspections in non-nuclear weapons states« less

  11. Arms control and the 1990 NPT review conference: Workshop summary

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Pilat, J.F.

    1990-07-01

    The Center for National Security Studies of the Los Alamos National Laboratory and the Department of Energy's Office of Arms Control held a workshop on Arms Control and the 1990 NPT Review Conference'' on December 5--6, 1989, at Los Alamos. The fundamental objective of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to states that do not possess them; however, another of the NPT objectives is to encourage arms control efforts in the nuclear and nonnuclear arenas. Accordingly, under Article VI, each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursuemore » negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.'' This paper discusses ideas put forward at the Review Conference.« less

  12. Anti-nuclear fantasies

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Glynn, P.

    1983-01-01

    The author critiques two recent anti-nuclear books - Indefensible Weapons by two American professors, Robert Jay Lifton and Richard Falk; and Beyond the Cold War, a collection of polemical essays by E.P. Thompson, British Marxist historian. He sees a common thread in these books of moral rejection of traditional Western policies more than a rejection of the weapons themselves. Western institutions are judged indefensible in their arrangements for genocide. Glynn finds the authors focusing their criticism on the US, while excusing the Soviet Union, because of their alienation from US politics. He feels these are examples of a specialized literaturemore » movement that lacks a clear vision of the new order it promotes, however, because it is wary of all political arrangements. Attacks on the free press and American foreign policy take on an Orwellian irony in their rejection of security facts and their emphasis on psychological ills. Criticism of this approach does not deny the threat of nuclear weapons when it points out that, so far, the political approach has prevented their use. (DCK)« less

  13. Russia`s Great Game in a nuclear South Asia

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Pilat, J.F.; Taylor, T.T.

    1998-12-31

    Lost in the noise of Pakistan`s nuclear weapon tests in the western Baluchistan desert on 28 and 30 May was a surprising diplomatic move by Russia. On 23 May, Russia became the first state to express its willingness to recognize India as a nuclear-weapon state, provided that India commits itself to the international nonproliferation regime. Russia`s Ambassador to India, Albert Chernyshev, stated in the days after the Indian but before the Pakistani nuclear tests that ``India proclaimed itself a nuclear weapons power. One now hopes that India will behave as a nuclear weapons power by acting responsibly. Every nuclear weaponsmore » state has some rights. But for getting recognition it must have some obligations. Once it is ready to show these obligations by joining the nonproliferation regime, its recognition as a nuclear weapons power will follow.`` Russia`s Great Game in South Asia in pursuit of short-term economic and other interests appears to be a serious obstacle on the path to dealing effectively with the South Asian nuclear crisis. Grave damage to security, stability and nonproliferation has already resulted from India`s and Pakistan`s actions, but the situation does not have to spiral out of control. It is imperative that the international community respond appropriately to this challenge. The international community is at a crossroads and Russia`s actions will be critical. Will it be willing to go beyond the narrow economic and political calculations reflected in its diplomatic posturing, and take actions that will serve its long-term interests by bridging differences with other great powers in order to demonstrate to India that it has not chosen the right path. If Russia decides it can gain from India`s current, perilous path and blocks or otherwise frustrates appropriate responses, the nuclear danger on the subcontinent will escalate and the global regimes to promote nonproliferation and to ban testing will be seriously, perhaps fatally, weakened with unpredictable regional and global effects.« less

  14. Assessing State Nuclear Weapons Proliferation: Using Bayesian Network Analysis of Social Factors

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Coles, Garill A.; Brothers, Alan J.; Olson, Jarrod

    A Bayesian network (BN) model of social factors can support proliferation assessments by estimating the likelihood that a state will pursue a nuclear weapon. Social factors including political, economic, nuclear capability, security, and national identity and psychology factors may play as important a role in whether a State pursues nuclear weapons as more physical factors. This paper will show how using Bayesian reasoning on a generic case of a would-be proliferator State can be used to combine evidence that supports proliferation assessment. Theories and analysis by political scientists can be leveraged in a quantitative and transparent way to indicate proliferationmore » risk. BN models facilitate diagnosis and inference in a probabilistic environment by using a network of nodes and acyclic directed arcs between the nodes whose connections, or absence of, indicate probabilistic relevance, or independence. We propose a BN model that would use information from both traditional safeguards and the strengthened safeguards associated with the Additional Protocol to indicate countries with a high risk of proliferating nuclear weapons. This model could be used in a variety of applications such a prioritization tool and as a component of state safeguards evaluations. This paper will discuss the benefits of BN reasoning, the development of Pacific Northwest National Laboratory’s (PNNL) BN state proliferation model and how it could be employed as an analytical tool.« less

  15. Deterrence and Engagement: U.S. and North Korean Interactions over Nuclear Weapons since the End of the Cold War

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2008-12-01

    Self-help,” International Security 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994-1995). 86 Bruce Auster and Kevin Whitelaw, “Upping the ante for Kim Jong Il: Pentagon Plan...and Kevin O’Neil, Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Science and International Security Press, 2002), 57-82...Minister Kim Gye Kwan “angrily denied that the DPRK had an HEU program. He dismissed my statement, claiming it was a fabrication.”234 And then, in the

  16. The Iranian Government’s Ambitions Represented in Their Nuclear Weapons Program and Its Impact on Security in the Arab Gulf Region

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2012-06-08

    UEconomic Strategy in Support of the Threatening Policy Iran relies on the abundant natural wealth from oil and gas , and has tried to develop its...Iranian government has adopted a strategic program aimed at manufacturing vehicles that use natural gas and less oil so that it can increase its oil ...aims to secure 20 percent of its electricity by nuclear material in order to reduce the consumption of gas and oil . However, the objectives referred

  17. Origins of the Tactical Nuclear Weapons Modernization Program: 1969-1979

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Yaffe, Michael David

    On December 12, 1979, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization decided to deploy new long-range theater nuclear forces, Pershing II and Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles. This marked the first major change in NATO's nuclear stockpile since the adoption of the flexible response strategy in 1967. The decision was controversial inasmuch as the Allies disagreed on the fundamental role of nuclear weapons in this strategy and, thereby, the types and number of weapons required for an effective deterrent posture. Europeans generally preferred long-range weapons capable of striking the Soviet Union and small conventional forces while Americans preferred shorter-range nuclear weapons and a stalwart conventional defense. Thus, the December decision is often described as purely politically motivated, in which the Americans reluctantly acquiesced to a European initiative for long-range weapons, prominently expressed by West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in 1977. Recently declassified US government documents reveal, however, that long-range missiles were part of a long-term comprehensive nuclear modernization program conceived in the Pentagon under Defense Secretary James Schlesinger during the period of 1973 through 1975, and presented to skeptical European elites who favored arms control negotiations over costly new deployments. This program was motivated as much by changes in the American national security culture as by an increase in the Soviet military threat to Europe. It was grounded on a clear military rationale: "that a feasible and affordable conventional defense is only possible if NATO has modern nuclear forces" that can effectively hold at risk Warsaw Pact ground and air forces throughout the depth of their employment from the inner-German border to the western military districts of the Soviet Union. When the new US administration in 1977 disagreed with the modernization plan and its rationale, opting instead for more conventional forces, the Allies in a reversal of roles lobbied the US President to deploy the long-range weapons being developed by the Defense Department. In the course of deliberations, political preferences suppressed military considerations of deterrence and only a small portion of the original modernization program was implemented.

  18. Operation ARGUS 1958.

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1982-04-30

    Nuclear Test Operations South Atlantic ARGUS Christofilos Theory FLORAL ARGUS Effect JASON Van Allen Belts Nuclear Test Personnel Review (MTPR) MIDAS ...precluded radiological exposure. Project 7.3 -- Surface Measurements (Project MIDAS ) Agencies: This project, code-named MIDAS for security reasons, was...weapon casings, but these personnel were badged and equipped with ten self-reading pocket dosimeters as well as alpha-detection equipment provided by the

  19. New Capabilities for Hostile Environments on Z Grand Challenge LDRD - Final Status

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Cuneo, Michael E.; Griffin, P. J.; Balch, D. K.

    2016-10-01

    The purpose of this project was to develop new physical simulation capabilities in order to support the science-based qualification of nonnuclear weapon components in hostile radiation environments. The project contributes directly to the goals of maintaining a safe, secure, and effective US nuclear stockpile, maintaining strategic deterrence at lower nuclear force levels, extending the life of the nuclear deterrent capability, and to be ready for technological surprise.

  20. The Manned Penetrating Bomber: Time to Reconsider

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2016-06-01

    choice: spend billions on nuclear weapons we no longer need or fund programs that educate our children and help find cures to deadly diseases. The...security of our nation’s future will be ensured by investing in education not nuclear annihilation…We need to stop pouring billions into the nuclear...event.61 Unfortunately, the president’s reaction to the launch received negative reviews from the general public. On a comical side note, the whole

  1. Rethinking the Unthinkable: Selective Proliferation and US Nuclear Strategy

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2011-06-01

    Equally commendable are the efforts of the SAASS librarian Sandhya "Sandy" Malladi and the SAASS secretaries Sheila McKitt and Kelly Rhodes. These...Nuclear Deterrence and Global Security in Transition, 177. 20 Barry R . Schneider, Future War and Counterproliferation: US Military Responses to Nbc...develop states prepared to conduct themselves as nuclear weapons 42 Barre R . Seguin, "Why Did Poland Choose the F-16?," The Marshall Center

  2. National Security to Nationalist Myth: Why Iran Wants Nuclear Weapons

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2004-09-01

    Atomic Energy Organization of Iran ( AEOI ),81 as well as Iran’s nuclear technology suppliers. By publicly embracing the “nuclear insecurity” myth and...81 The literature variously refers to the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran as “ AEOI ,” or “IAEO...I have adopted “ AEOI ,” the form used by the IAEA, except where quoting other sources. See “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the

  3. DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Scribner, R.A.

    Sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) present some particularly striking problems for both national security and arms control. These small, dual-purpose, difficult to detect weapons present some formidable challenges for verification in any scheme that attempts to limit rather than eliminate them. Conventionally armed SLCMs offer to the navies of both superpowers important offensive and defensive capabilities. Nuclear armed, long-range, land-attack SLCMs, on the other hand, seem to pose destabilizing threats and otherwise have questionable value, despite strong US support for extensive deployment of them. If these weapons are not constrained, their deployment could circumvent gains which might be made in agreementsmore » directly reducing of strategic nuclear weapons. This paper reviews the technology and planned deployments of SLCMs, the verification schemes which have been discussed and are being investigated to try to deal with the problem, and examines the proposed need for and possible uses of SLCMs. It presents an overview of the problem technically, militarily, and politically.« less

  4. Cooperative Threat Reduction: Cooperation Threat Reduction Program Liquid Propellant Disposition Project

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    2002-09-01

    This audit is one in a series of audits the Deputy Secretary of Defense requested. As part of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program, DoD agreed to assist the Russian Federation in disposing of its liquid rocket propellant. Public Law 102-228 (section 2551 NOTE, title 22, United States Code), the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991 designates DoD as the executive agent for the CTR Program. Specific objectives of the act are to destroy chemical, nuclear, and other weapons; transport, store, disable, and safeguard weapons in connection with their destruction; and establish verifiable safeguards against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Policy), under the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, develops, coordinates, and oversees implementation of policy for the CTR Program. The CTR Directorate, Defense Threat Reduction Agency operates the program.

  5. Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Garwin, Richard L.

    2003-04-01

    The National Academy of Sciences recently published a detailed study of technical factors related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), with emphasis on those issues that arose when the Senate declined to ratify the Treaty in 1999. The study considered (1) the capacity of the United States to maintain confidence in the safety and reliability of its nuclear weapons without nuclear testing; (2) the capabilities of the international nuclear-test monitoring system; and (3) the advances in nuclear weapons capabilities that other countries might make through low-yield testing that might escape detection. Excluding political factors, the committee considered three possible future worlds: (1) a world without a CTBT; (2) a world in which the signatories comply with a CTBT; and (3) a world in the signatories evade its strictures within the limits set by the detection system. The talk and ensuing discussion will elaborate on the study. The principal conclusion of the report, based solely on technical reasons, is that the national security of the United States is better served with a CTBT in force than without it, whether or not other signatories conduct low level but undetected tests in violation of the treaty. Moreover, the study finds that nuclear testing would not add substantially to the US Stockpile Stewardship Program in allowing the United States to maintain confidence in the assessment of its existing nuclear weapons.

  6. Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    2003-03-01

    The National Academy of Sciences recently completed a detailed study of the technical factors related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), with emphasis on those issues that arose when the Senate declined to ratify the Treaty in 1999. The study considered (1) the capacity of the United States to maintain confidence in the safety and reliability of its nuclear weapons without nuclear testing; (2) the capabilities of the international nuclear-test monitoring system; and (3) the advances in nuclear weapons capabilities that other countries might make through low-yield testing that might escape detection. While political factors were excluded, the committee considered three possible future worlds: (1) a world without a CTBT; (2) a world in which the signatories comply with a CTBT; and (3) a world in the signatories evade its strictures within the limits set by the detection system. The talk will elaborate on the study. The primary conclusion, based solely on technical reasons, is that the national security of the United States is better served with a CTBT in force than without it, whether or not other signatories conduct low level but undetected tests in violation of the treaty. Moreover, the study finds that nuclear testing would not add substantially to the US Stockpile Stewardship Program in allowing the United States to maintain confidence in the assessment of its existing nuclear weapons."

  7. Defense Threat Reduction Agency

    Science.gov Websites

    Sciences Protection Sciences Science to Defeat WMD Science to Secure WMD Chemical/Biological Technologies of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear instruction. Watch Read DTRA leadership meet with How Butterflies Can Detect Deadly Chemical Weapon Agents May 2 Changing World Situation Requires

  8. Sandia National Laboratories: National Security Missions: Nuclear Weapons

    Science.gov Websites

    Technology Partnerships Business, Industry, & Non-Profits Government Universities Center for Development Agreement (CRADA) Strategic Partnership Projects, Non-Federal Entity (SPP/NFE) Agreements New , in which fundamental science, computer models, and unique experimental facilities come together so

  9. Reductions without Regret: Avoiding Wrong Turns, Roach Motels, and Box Canyons

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Swegle, John A.; Tincher, Douglas J.

    This is the third of three papers (in addition to an introductory summary) aimed at providing a framework for evaluating future reductions or modifications of the U.S. nuclear force, first by considering previous instances in which nuclear-force capabilities were eliminated; second by looking forward into at least the foreseeable future at the features of global and regional deterrence (recognizing that new weapon systems currently projected will have expected lifetimes stretching beyond our ability to predict the future); and third by providing examples of past or possible undesirable outcomes in the shaping of the future nuclear force, as well as somemore » closing thoughts for the future. In this paper, we provide one example each of our judgments on what constitutes a box canyon, a roach motel, and a wrong turn: Wrong Turn: The Reliable Replacement Warhead: Roach Motel: SRAM T vs the B61: and A Possible Box Canyon: A Low-Yield Version of the W76 SLBM Warhead. Recognizing that new nuclear missions or weapons are not demanded by current circumstances ₋ a development path that yields future capabilities similar to those of today, which are adequate if not always ideal, and a broader national-security strategy that supports nonproliferation and arms control by reducing the role for, and numbers, of nuclear weapons ₋ we briefly consider alternate, less desirable futures, and their possible effect on the complex problem of regional deterrence. In this regard, we discuss the issues posed by, and possible responses to, three example regional deterrence challenges: in-country defensive use of nuclear weapons by an adversary; reassurance of U.S. allies with limited strategic depth threatened by an emergent nuclear power; and extraterritorial, non-strategic offensive use of nuclear weapons by an adversary in support of limited military objectives against a U.S. ally.« less

  10. Explaining weapons proliferation: Going beyond the security dilemma

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Rattray, G.J.

    1994-07-01

    Most analyses addressing the subject of why states choose to proliferate focus on external motivations, particularly the security dilemma, facing a country`s leaders. This paper concludes that, other factors, such as prestige, regime type and stability, and economic status, can have impact in determining proliferation outcomes. In the case of Newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union (NIS), the domestic problems generated by internal conflicts, arms remaining from the Cold War, excess defense industrial capacity, economic difficulties and the breakdown of central authority resulting in a loss of border control and corruption have all made the NIS an extremelymore » fertile ground for weapons proliferation. A more positive `rollback` situation has emerged in Latin America where both Argentina and Brazil have seemingly decided to forgo the acquisition of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. The US must understand the `strategic personality` of each potential proliferation. Not all state behavior can be explained in terms of the security dilemma. One must also keep in mind the complexity of possible motivations. Economic and technological assistance and cooperative efforts at institution-building hold great potential to combating proliferation.« less

  11. Elementary! A Nuclear Forensics Workshop Teaches Vital Skills to International Practitioners

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Brim, Cornelia P.; Minnema, Lindsay T.

    The article describes the Nuclear Forensics Workshop sponsored by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) and hosted by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory October 28-November 8, 2013 in Richland,Washington. Twenty-six participants from 10 countries attended the workshop. Experts from from Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and Pacific Northwest national laboratories collaborated with an internationally recognized cadre of experts from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and other U.S. agencies, IAEA, the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation, the United Kingdom Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE), and the European Union Joint Research Center Institute for Transuraniummore » Elements, to train practitioners in basic methodologies of nuclear forensic examinations.« less

  12. DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Pestovich, Kimberly Shay

    Harnessing the power of the nuclear sciences for national security and to benefit others is one of Los Alamos National Laboratory’s missions. MST-8 focuses on manipulating and studying how the structure, processing, properties, and performance of materials interact at the atomic level under nuclear conditions. Within this group, single crystal scintillators contribute to the safety and reliability of weapons, provide global security safeguards, and build on scientific principles that carry over to medical fields for cancer detection. Improved cladding materials made of ferritic-martensitic alloys support the mission of DOE-NE’s Fuel Cycle Research and Development program to close the nuclear fuelmore » cycle, aiming to solve nuclear waste management challenges and thereby increase the performance and safety of current and future reactors.« less

  13. Nuclear Weapons. National Nuclear Security Administration’s Plans for Its Uranium Processing Facility Should Better Reflect Funding Estimates and Technology Readiness

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2010-11-01

    metal. Recovery extraction centrifugal contactors A process that uses solvent to extract uranium for purposes of purification. Agile machining A...extraction centrifugal contactors 5 6 Yes 6 No Agile machining 5 5 No 6 No Chip management 5 6 Yes 6 No Special casting 3 6 Yes 6 No Source: GAO

  14. Comparative Strategic Cultures Curriculum Project: Assessing Strategic Culture as a Methodological Approach to Understanding WMD Decision-Making by States and Non-State Actors

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2006-10-31

    International Security and Arms Control;: Stanford University Press, 1994. Lin, Chong-Pin. China’s Nuclear Weapons Strategy : Tradition within Evolution ...analysts tend to posit interests, emphasize strategic interaction , and discount bureaucratic influence. - Paul DiMaggio, “Culture and Cognition...Additional Sources - Henry Rowen, "The Evolution of Strategic Nuclear Doctrine," in Laurence Martin, ed., Strategic Thought in the Nuclear Age

  15. The Credibility of America’s Extended Nuclear Deterrent: The Case of the Republic of Turkey

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2011-09-01

    National Security Policy, 4, 20–22. To ad- dress shortfalls in strategic vision, the US Congress commissioned a study PURPOSE OF AMERICAN NUCLEAR...Turkey’s eventual decision regarding nuclear weapons.”11 The United States should find another way to ad- dress the Armenian claims or let Turkey and...spirits, and agricultural goods (such as meat and poultry ), essentially banning these products from Turkish markets. Additionally, the USTR report

  16. Designing the Army’s Future Active Duty Weapons of Mass Destruction Response: Is the Defense Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High-Yield Explosives Response Force (DCRF) the Right Force at the Right Time?

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2013-06-14

    ever-evolving contemporary nature of external and internal threats to the safety and security of the American homeland, it becomes increasingly...Major Justin P. Hurt, 146 pages. With the ever-evolving contemporary nature of external and internal threats to the safety and security of the American...HAZMAT Hazardous Materials HRF Homeland Response Force HSPD Homeland Security Presidential Directive JFHQ Joint Force

  17. Russian military in the year 2000. Master's thesis

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    McIlmail, J.F.; Jaworski, J.L.

    Through the use of content analysis, this paper attempts to paint a picture of the Russian military in the year 2000 and its impact on the US national security strategy. The research begins by defining the origin of Russian national security policy and how that translates into military policy and doctrine. A framework for evaluating Russian military doctrines is provided with a chronology of the military reform process and the related doctrinal reforms that has its birth in the 1987 announcement of a defensive-defense. Following from the doctrinal variant framework the new strategic missions of the 1992 draft military doctrinemore » are presented with an analysis that shows they are a clear departure from the past and truly represent a defensive-defense type doctrine. Additionally, a comparison is made with the current military reform ongoing in Russia with the historical precedent of the Russian military reform of 1924-25. A rough outline of the separate branches of the Russian military both present and future is provided based on the ongoing trends in the reform process. This thumbnail sketch of the Russian military then assists in the analysis and conclusion that even after a possible 50% cutback in US military spending, in the year 2000 the Russian military will not pose a threat to US national security. The major caveat to this conclusion is in the realm of nuclear weapons and this issue is therefore discussed in some length....Former Soviet Union, Russia, Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Conventional Forces in Europe treaty (CFE), European Security, New National Security Strategy, Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Strategy.« less

  18. 31 CFR 560.506 - Importation and exportation of certain gifts authorized.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... Finance (Continued) OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY IRANIAN TRANSACTIONS AND... controlled for chemical and biological weapons (CB), missile technology (MT), national security (NS), or nuclear proliferation (NP). See Commerce Control List, Export Administration Regulations (15 CFR part 774). ...

  19. 31 CFR 560.506 - Importation and exportation of certain gifts authorized.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... Finance (Continued) OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY IRANIAN TRANSACTIONS AND... controlled for chemical and biological weapons (CB), missile technology (MT), national security (NS), or nuclear proliferation (NP). See Commerce Control List, Export Administration Regulations (15 CFR part 774). ...

  20. 31 CFR 560.506 - Importation and exportation of certain gifts authorized.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... Money and Finance (Continued) OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY IRANIAN... controlled for chemical and biological weapons (CB), missile technology (MT), national security (NS), or nuclear proliferation (NP). See Commerce Control List, Export Administration Regulations (15 CFR part 774...

  1. 31 CFR 545.506 - Importation of certain gifts authorized.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... (Continued) OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY TALIBAN (AFGHANISTAN) SANCTIONS... individuals; and (c) The goods are not controlled for chemical and biological weapons (CB), missile technology (MT), national security (NS), or nuclear proliferation (NP) (see Commerce Control List, 15 CFR part...

  2. Redefining the U.S. Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament, Analysis and Reflections

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Dunn, Lewis A.

    With Lewis Dunn’s paper on nuclear disarmament diplomacy, we are inaugurating a new monograph series under the auspices of the Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. The series will explore complex emerging challenges in the emerging security environment as they bear on issues of deterrence, assurance, and strategic stability. Our goal is to explore these issues deeply enough to provide significant new understanding that is technically informed and policy relevant. Our premise is that thoughtful students of international security affairs continue to value such in-depth analysis as a way to help make sense of the largemore » flow of data and opinion that reaches all of us on a daily basis. Our ambition is to generate four to six such papers per year on especially salient topics. The views expressed in these papers are those of the author and should not be attributed to the Center, the Laboratory, or the U.S. government. This inaugural paper addresses one of the key questions facing national leadership seven to eight years after President Obama’s April 2009 remarks in Prague and his commitment to take practical steps towards the long-term goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons. In the interim, some important steps have been taken. But there have also been many disappointments. The new presidential administration will face a security landscape quite different from that of eight years ago and must reassess U.S. priorities and approaches. As Lewis Dunn argues, some will be tempted to walk away entirely from the disarmament agenda, while others will advocate even more forcefully for unilateral U.S. steps to further reduce the role and number of nuclear weapons in its posture. Dr. Dunn sets out his own vision of how to adapt and carry forward the disarmament agenda, in a manner informed by developments in the security environment that point to a continuing role for nuclear deterrence. The result is both fresh and compelling.« less

  3. Extreme Scale Computing to Secure the Nation

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Brown, D L; McGraw, J R; Johnson, J R

    2009-11-10

    Since the dawn of modern electronic computing in the mid 1940's, U.S. national security programs have been dominant users of every new generation of high-performance computer. Indeed, the first general-purpose electronic computer, ENIAC (the Electronic Numerical Integrator and Computer), was used to calculate the expected explosive yield of early thermonuclear weapons designs. Even the U. S. numerical weather prediction program, another early application for high-performance computing, was initially funded jointly by sponsors that included the U.S. Air Force and Navy, agencies interested in accurate weather predictions to support U.S. military operations. For the decades of the cold war, national securitymore » requirements continued to drive the development of high performance computing (HPC), including advancement of the computing hardware and development of sophisticated simulation codes to support weapons and military aircraft design, numerical weather prediction as well as data-intensive applications such as cryptography and cybersecurity U.S. national security concerns continue to drive the development of high-performance computers and software in the U.S. and in fact, events following the end of the cold war have driven an increase in the growth rate of computer performance at the high-end of the market. This mainly derives from our nation's observance of a moratorium on underground nuclear testing beginning in 1992, followed by our voluntary adherence to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) beginning in 1995. The CTBT prohibits further underground nuclear tests, which in the past had been a key component of the nation's science-based program for assuring the reliability, performance and safety of U.S. nuclear weapons. In response to this change, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) initiated the Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship (SBSS) program in response to the Fiscal Year 1994 National Defense Authorization Act, which requires, 'in the absence of nuclear testing, a progam to: (1) Support a focused, multifaceted program to increase the understanding of the enduring stockpile; (2) Predict, detect, and evaluate potential problems of the aging of the stockpile; (3) Refurbish and re-manufacture weapons and components, as required; and (4) Maintain the science and engineering institutions needed to support the nation's nuclear deterrent, now and in the future'. This program continues to fulfill its national security mission by adding significant new capabilities for producing scientific results through large-scale computational simulation coupled with careful experimentation, including sub-critical nuclear experiments permitted under the CTBT. To develop the computational science and the computational horsepower needed to support its mission, SBSS initiated the Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative, later renamed the Advanced Simulation & Computing (ASC) program (sidebar: 'History of ASC Computing Program Computing Capability'). The modern 3D computational simulation capability of the ASC program supports the assessment and certification of the current nuclear stockpile through calibration with past underground test (UGT) data. While an impressive accomplishment, continued evolution of national security mission requirements will demand computing resources at a significantly greater scale than we have today. In particular, continued observance and potential Senate confirmation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) together with the U.S administration's promise for a significant reduction in the size of the stockpile and the inexorable aging and consequent refurbishment of the stockpile all demand increasing refinement of our computational simulation capabilities. Assessment of the present and future stockpile with increased confidence of the safety and reliability without reliance upon calibration with past or future test data is a long-term goal of the ASC program. This will be accomplished through significant increases in the scientific bases that underlie the computational tools. Computer codes must be developed that replace phenomenology with increased levels of scientific understanding together with an accompanying quantification of uncertainty. These advanced codes will place significantly higher demands on the computing infrastructure than do the current 3D ASC codes. This article discusses not only the need for a future computing capability at the exascale for the SBSS program, but also considers high performance computing requirements for broader national security questions. For example, the increasing concern over potential nuclear terrorist threats demands a capability to assess threats and potential disablement technologies as well as a rapid forensic capability for determining a nuclear weapons design from post-detonation evidence (nuclear counterterrorism).« less

  4. DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    McCoy, Michel; Archer, Bill; Hendrickson, Bruce

    The Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) is an integrated technical program for maintaining the safety, surety, and reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile. The SSP uses nuclear test data, computational modeling and simulation, and experimental facilities to advance understanding of nuclear weapons. It includes stockpile surveillance, experimental research, development and engineering programs, and an appropriately scaled production capability to support stockpile requirements. This integrated national program requires the continued use of experimental facilities and programs, and the computational capabilities to support these programs. The Advanced Simulation and Computing Program (ASC) is a cornerstone of the SSP, providing simulation capabilities and computationalmore » resources that support annual stockpile assessment and certification, study advanced nuclear weapons design and manufacturing processes, analyze accident scenarios and weapons aging, and provide the tools to enable stockpile Life Extension Programs (LEPs) and the resolution of Significant Finding Investigations (SFIs). This requires a balance of resource, including technical staff, hardware, simulation software, and computer science solutions. ASC is now focused on increasing predictive capabilities in a three-dimensional (3D) simulation environment while maintaining support to the SSP. The program continues to improve its unique tools for solving progressively more difficult stockpile problems (sufficient resolution, dimensionality, and scientific details), and quantifying critical margins and uncertainties. Resolving each issue requires increasingly difficult analyses because the aging process has progressively moved the stockpile further away from the original test base. Where possible, the program also enables the use of high performance computing (HPC) and simulation tools to address broader national security needs, such as foreign nuclear weapon assessments and counter nuclear terrorism.« less

  5. Unmaking the bomb: Verifying limits on the stockpiles of nuclear weapons

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Glaser, Alexander

    2017-11-01

    Verifying limits on the stockpiles of nuclear weapons may require the ability for international in-spectors to account for individual warheads, even when non-deployed, and to confirm the authenticity of nuclear warheads prior to dismantlement. These are fundamentally new challenges for nuclear verification, and they have been known for some time; unfortunately, due to a lack of sense of urgency, research in this area has not made substantial progress over the past 20 years. This chapter explores the central outstanding issues and offers a number of possible paths forward. In the case of confirming numerical limits, these in-clude innovative tagging techniques and approaches solely based on declarations using modern crypto-graphic escrow schemes; with regard to warhead confirmation, there has recently been increasing interest in developing fundamentally new measurement approaches where, in one form or another, sensitive infor-mation is not acquired in the first place. Overall, new international R&D efforts could more usefully focus on non-intrusive technologies and approaches, which may show more promise for early demonstration and adoption. In the meantime, while warhead dismantlements remain unverified, nuclear weapon states ought to begin to document warhead assembly, refurbishment, and dismantlement activities and movements of warheads and warhead components through the weapons complex in ways that international inspectors will find credible at a later time. Again, such a process could be enabled by modern cryptographic techniques such as blockchaining. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it is important to recognize that the main reason for the complexity of technologies and approaches needed for nuclear disarmament verification is the requirement to protect information that nuclear weapon states consider sensitive. Ultimately, if information security concerns cannot be resolved to the satisfaction of all stakeholders, an alternative would be to "reveal the secret" and to make available select warhead design information.

  6. Blocking the spread of nuclear weapons. American and European perspectives

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Smith, G.C.; Holst, J.J.

    1986-01-01

    This volume is the product of separate but parallel studies undertaken by two panels of experts-one from the United States, the other from Western Europe-on new approaches to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons to additional countries. Neither panel sounded a doomsday alarm; each concluded that the chances for controlling proliferation lie in good part on building on the sound foundation of existing policies and institutional structures. Among the other conclusions derived from the parallel studies: The threat of nuclear proliferation is a specific, definable danger in a limited number of countries. The incentives that appear to make nuclear weaponsmore » an interesting option to some states must be understood, and potential proliferators must be persuaded that their acquisition will not lead to national security. Effective persuasion is more likely to come from non-nuclear weapon nations. Europe and the United States must collaborate in engaging such third-party persuaders in this endeavor. The panels' intensive examination of the six states of greatest near-term concern leads to the conclusion that the uneasy status quo will probably prevail for the next several years, yet these are volatile situations. The nature of the threat demands an extraordinary degree of international collaboration.« less

  7. Nuclear weapons modernizations

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Kristensen, Hans M.

    2014-05-01

    This article reviews the nuclear weapons modernization programs underway in the world's nine nuclear weapons states. It concludes that despite significant reductions in overall weapons inventories since the end of the Cold War, the pace of reductions is slowing - four of the nuclear weapons states are even increasing their arsenals, and all the nuclear weapons states are busy modernizing their remaining arsenals in what appears to be a dynamic and counterproductive nuclear competition. The author questions whether perpetual modernization combined with no specific plan for the elimination of nuclear weapons is consistent with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and concludes that new limits on nuclear modernizations are needed.

  8. Proliferation of nuclear weapons: opportunities for control and abolition.

    PubMed

    Sidel, Victor W; Levy, Barry S

    2007-09-01

    Nuclear weapons pose a particularly destructive threat. Prevention of the proliferation and use of nuclear weapons is urgently important to public health. "Horizontal" proliferation refers to nation-states or nonstate entities that do not have, but are acquiring, nuclear weapons or developing the capability and materials for producing them. "Vertical" proliferation refers to nation-states that do possess nuclear weapons and are increasing their stockpiles of these weapons, improving the technical sophistication or reliability of their weapons, or developing new weapons. Because nation-states or other entities that wish to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons need methods for delivering those weapons, proliferation of delivery mechanisms must also be prevented. Controlling proliferation--and ultimately abolishing nuclear weapons--involves national governments, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental and professional organizations, and society at large.

  9. West European and East Asian perspectives on defense, deterrence, and strategy. Volume 2. Western European perspectives on defense, deterrence, and strategy. Technical report, 1 December 1982-15 May 1984

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Pfaltzgraff, R.L.; Davis, J.K.; Dougherty, J.E.

    1984-05-16

    A survey of contemporary West European perspectives on defense, deterrence, and strategy, with special emphasis on the role of nuclear weapons deployed in, or assigned to, the NATO area. Changes have occurred during the past decade in the relative military strength of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, particularly as a result of the substantial growth in Soviet nuclear-capable systems and conventional forces assigned to Europe, and the momentum manifested by the Soviet Union in its deployments of intercontinental ballistic missiles. There has also been a substantial shift in West European thinking and attitudes about security and strategy. Together, these trendsmore » have created a need to reassess the posture of NATO forces generally, and especially nuclear weapons, both in a broader Euro-strategic framework and on the Central Front in the 1980s. The survey is on such issues as the future of the British and French national strategic nuclear forces; the role of the U.S.-strategic nuclear forces in the deterrence of conflict in Europe; the prospects of raising the nuclear threshold by the deployment of new conventional technologies; the impact of strategic defense initiatives on U.S.-NATO security; and the modernization of NATO intermediate-range nuclear capabilities, especially in light of the continuing deployment of the Soviet Union of new generation Euro-strategic forces targeted against Western Europe.« less

  10. Indispensable Nation: U.S. Security Guarantees and Nuclear Proliferation

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2017-06-01

    to achieve this capability. This is encapsulated in Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s famous declaration, “We will make an atomic bomb ...the Bomb " argues that states that receive sensitive nuclear assistance, in the form of aid in weapons design, enrichment facility construction, or...3 Feroz Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb . (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012), 87. 4 Matthew Kroenig, “Importing

  11. 20 Years of Success: Science, Technology, and the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    None, None

    On Oct. 22, 2015, NNSA celebrated the proven success of the Stockpile Stewardship Program at a half-day public event featuring remarks by Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz, Secretary of State John Kerry, and Under Secretary for Nuclear Security and NNSA Administrator Lt. Gen. (retired) Frank G. Klotz. The event also featured remarks by Deputy Secretary of Energy Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall and NNSA Principal Deputy Administrator Madelyn Creedon.

  12. National Labs and Nuclear Emergency Response

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Budil, Kimberly

    2015-04-01

    The DOE national laboratories, and in particular the three NNSA national security laboratories, have long supported a broad suite of national nuclear security missions for the U.S. government. The capabilities, infrastructure and base of expertise developed to support the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile have been applied to such challenges as stemming nuclear proliferation, understanding the nuclear capabilities of adversaries, and assessing and countering nuclear threats including essential support to nuclear emergency response. This talk will discuss the programs that are underway at the laboratories and the essential role that science and technology plays therein. Nuclear scientists provide expertise, fundamental understanding of nuclear materials, processes and signatures, and tools and technologies to aid in the identification and mitigation of nuclear threats as well as consequence management. This talk will also discuss the importance of direct engagement with the response community, which helps to shape research priorities and to enable development of useful tools and techniques for responders working in the field. National Labs and Nuclear Emergency Response.

  13. Defense without aggression

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Harvey, H.

    1988-09-01

    In introducing this group of articles on nonoffensive defense the author notes that the prospect of nuclear disarmament in Europe is boosting ideas, which have been around for a decade, from theory to politics. This special section of articles looks at an emerging theory that may reduce reliance on nuclear weapons by bringing stability to the conventional standoff in central Europe. The idea is to rearrange conventional forces so that they can defend but not attack. Under such monikers as nonoffensive defense (the main term used in these articles), nonprovocative defense, defensive defense, reasonable sufficiency, and mutual defensive superiority, thesemore » proposals suggest that nations can restructure weapons, personnel, and strategy to assure their own military security without posing a threat to other nations. 5 refs.« less

  14. Nuclear weapons modernizations

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Kristensen, Hans M.

    This article reviews the nuclear weapons modernization programs underway in the world's nine nuclear weapons states. It concludes that despite significant reductions in overall weapons inventories since the end of the Cold War, the pace of reductions is slowing - four of the nuclear weapons states are even increasing their arsenals, and all the nuclear weapons states are busy modernizing their remaining arsenals in what appears to be a dynamic and counterproductive nuclear competition. The author questions whether perpetual modernization combined with no specific plan for the elimination of nuclear weapons is consistent with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and concludesmore » that new limits on nuclear modernizations are needed.« less

  15. FMDP reactor alternative summary report. Volume 1 - existing LWR alternative

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Greene, S.R.; Bevard, B.B.

    1996-10-07

    Significant quantities of weapons-usable fissile materials [primarily plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU)] are becoming surplus to national defense needs in both the United States and Russia. These stocks of fissile materials pose significant dangers to national and international security. The dangers exist not only in the potential proliferation of nuclear weapons but also in the potential for environmental, safety, and health (ES&H) consequences if surplus fissile materials are not properly managed. This document summarizes the results of analysis concerned with existing light water reactor plutonium disposition alternatives.

  16. Asymmetry from the Right: Imminent Danger from Extremist Activities?

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1998-04-15

    the Texas KKKK, was indicted on federal sedition charges in 1987 and placed on the Federal Bureau Of Investigation’s Ten Most Wanted List. Later, he...the Second Amendment." Tennessee Law Review, (Spring 1995): 643-677. Eisler , Peter. "Nuclear Weapons Security Gets Overhaul," USA Today. 11

  17. Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Opportunities for Control and Abolition

    PubMed Central

    Sidel, Victor W.; Levy, Barry S.

    2007-01-01

    Nuclear weapons pose a particularly destructive threat. Prevention of the proliferation and use of nuclear weapons is urgently important to public health. “Horizontal” proliferation refers to nation-states or nonstate entities that do not have, but are acquiring, nuclear weapons or developing the capability and materials for producing them. “Vertical” proliferation refers to nation-states that do possess nuclear weapons and are increasing their stockpiles of these weapons, improving the technical sophistication or reliability of their weapons, or developing new weapons. Because nation-states or other entities that wish to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons need methods for delivering those weapons, proliferation of delivery mechanisms must also be prevented. Controlling proliferation—and ultimately abolishing nuclear weapons—involves national governments, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental and professional organizations, and society at large. PMID:17666690

  18. Advanced Simulation & Computing FY15 Implementation Plan Volume 2, Rev. 0.5

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    McCoy, Michel; Archer, Bill; Matzen, M. Keith

    2014-09-16

    The Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) is a single, highly integrated technical program for maintaining the surety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile. The SSP uses nuclear test data, computational modeling and simulation, and experimental facilities to advance understanding of nuclear weapons. It includes stockpile surveillance, experimental research, development and engineering programs, and an appropriately scaled production capability to support stockpile requirements. This integrated national program requires the continued use of experimental facilities and programs, and the computational enhancements to support these programs. The Advanced Simulation and Computing Program (ASC) is a cornerstone of the SSP, providing simulation capabilities andmore » computational resources that support annual stockpile assessment and certification, study advanced nuclear weapons design and manufacturing processes, analyze accident scenarios and weapons aging, and provide the tools to enable stockpile Life Extension Programs (LEPs) and the resolution of Significant Finding Investigations (SFIs). This requires a balance of resource, including technical staff, hardware, simulation software, and computer science solutions. As the program approaches the end of its second decade, ASC is intently focused on increasing predictive capabilities in a three-dimensional (3D) simulation environment while maintaining support to the SSP. The program continues to improve its unique tools for solving progressively more difficult stockpile problems (sufficient resolution, dimensionality, and scientific details), quantify critical margins and uncertainties, and resolve increasingly difficult analyses needed for the SSP. Where possible, the program also enables the use of high-performance simulation and computing tools to address broader national security needs, such as foreign nuclear weapon assessments and counternuclear terrorism.« less

  19. DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Ball, D

    In this paper, we will examine how Russia's military and security forces might react to the detonation of a 10-kiloton nuclear weapon placed next to the walls surrounding the Kremlin. At the time of this 'big bang,' Putin is situated outside Moscow and survives the explosion. No one claims responsibility for the detonation. No other information is known. Numerous variables will determine how events ultimately unfold and how the military and security forces will respond. Prior to examining these variables in greater detail, it is imperative to elucidate first what we mean by Russia's military and security forces.

  20. Deterrence of Nuclear Terrorism via Post-Detonation Attribution: Is the United States on Target?

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2009-12-01

    Dr. Vahid Majidi , then Assistant FBI Director for the Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate, the FBI Laboratory Division is “central” to...www.fbi.gov/hq/nsb/wmd/wmd_home.htm. 236 Joint Working Group, Nuclear Forensics: Role, State of the Art, and Program Needs, 36. 237 Vahid Majidi ...accessed November 7, 2009). Majidi , Vahid. Written Testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Homeland Security Committee, Subcommittee on

  1. Nuclear security

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Dingell, J.D.

    1991-02-01

    The Department of Energy's (DOE) Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, located in Livermore, California, generates and controls large numbers of classified documents associated with the research and testing of nuclear weapons. Concern has been raised about the potential for espionage at the laboratory and the national security implications of classified documents being stolen. This paper determines the extent of missing classified documents at the laboratory and assesses the adequacy of accountability over classified documents in the laboratory's custody. Audit coverage was limited to the approximately 600,000 secret documents in the laboratory's custody. The adequacy of DOE's oversight of the laboratory's secretmore » document control program was also assessed.« less

  2. Materials @ LANL: Solutions for National Security Challenges

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Teter, David

    2012-10-01

    Materials science activities impact many programmatic missions at LANL including nuclear weapons, nuclear energy, renewable energy, global security and nonproliferation. An overview of the LANL materials science strategy and examples of materials science programs will be presented. Major materials leadership areas are in materials dynamics, actinides and correlated electron materials, materials in radiation extremes, energetic materials, integrated nanomaterials and complex functional materials. Los Alamos is also planning a large-scale, signature science facility called MaRIE (Matter Radiation Interactions in Extremes) to address in-situ characterization of materials in dynamic and radiation environments using multiple high energy probes. An overview of this facility will also be presented.

  3. An Introduction to Risk with a Focus on Design Diversity in the Stockpile

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Noone, Bailey C

    2012-08-13

    The maintenance and security of nuclear weapons in the stockpile involves decisions based on risk analysis and quantitative measures of risk. Risk is a factor in all decisions, a particularly important factor in decisions of a large scale. One example of high-risk decisions we will discuss is the risk involved in design diversity within the stockpile of nuclear weapons arsenal. Risk is defined as 'possibility of loss or injury' and the 'degree of probability of such loss' (Kaplan and Garrick 12). To introduce the risk involved with maintaining the weapons stockpile we will draw a parallel to the design andmore » maintenance of Southwest Airlines fleet of Boeing 737 planes. The clear benefits for cost savings in maintenance of having a uniform fleet are what historically drove Southwest to have only Boeing 737s in their fleet. Less money and resources are need for maintenance, training, and materials. Naturally, risk accompanies those benefits. A defect in a part of the plane indicates a potential defect in that same part in all the planes of the fleet. As a result, safety, business, and credibility are at risk. How much variety or diversity does the fleet need to mitigate that risk? With that question in mind, a balance is needed to accommodate the different risks and benefits of the situation. In a similar way, risk is analyzed for the design and maintenance of nuclear weapons in the stockpile. In conclusion, risk must be as low as possible when it comes to the nuclear weapons stockpile. Design and care to keep the stockpile healthy involves all aspects of risk management. Design diversity is a method that helps to mitigate risk, and to help balance options in stockpile stewardship.« less

  4. Advanced Simulation and Computing Business Plan

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Rummel, E.

    To maintain a credible nuclear weapons program, the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA’s) Office of Defense Programs (DP) needs to make certain that the capabilities, tools, and expert staff are in place and are able to deliver validated assessments. This requires a complete and robust simulation environment backed by an experimental program to test ASC Program models. This ASC Business Plan document encapsulates a complex set of elements, each of which is essential to the success of the simulation component of the Nuclear Security Enterprise. The ASC Business Plan addresses the hiring, mentoring, and retaining of programmatic technical staff responsiblemore » for building the simulation tools of the nuclear security complex. The ASC Business Plan describes how the ASC Program engages with industry partners—partners upon whom the ASC Program relies on for today’s and tomorrow’s high performance architectures. Each piece in this chain is essential to assure policymakers, who must make decisions based on the results of simulations, that they are receiving all the actionable information they need.« less

  5. Vertical nuclear proliferation.

    PubMed

    Sidel, Victor W

    2007-01-01

    All the nuclear-weapon states are working to develop new nuclear-weapon systems and upgrade their existing ones. Although the US Congress has recently blocked further development of small nuclear weapons and earth-penetrating nuclear weapons, the United States is planning a range of new warheads under the Reliable Replacement Warhead programme, and renewing its nuclear weapons infrastructure. The United Kingdom is spending 1 billion pounds sterling on updating the Atomic Weapons Establishment at Aldermaston, and about 20 billion pounds sterling on replacing its Vanguard submarines and maintaining its Trident warhead stockpile. The US has withdrawn from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and plans to install missile defence systems in Poland and the Czech Republic; Russia threatens to upgrade its nuclear countermeasures. The nuclear-weapon states should comply with their obligations under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, as summarised in the 13-point plan agreed at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, and they should negotiate a Nuclear Weapons Convention.

  6. Applied Nuclear Accountability Systems: A Case Study in the System Architecture and Development of NuMAC

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Campbell, Andrea Beth

    2004-07-01

    This is a case study of the NuMAC nuclear accountability system developed at a private fuel fabrication facility. This paper investigates nuclear material accountability and safeguards by researching expert knowledge applied in the system design and development. Presented is a system developed to detect and deter the theft of weapons grade nuclear material. Examined is the system architecture that includes: issues for the design and development of the system; stakeholder issues; how the system was built and evolved; software design, database design, and development tool considerations; security and computing ethics. (author)

  7. Nuclear Proliferation Factbook. Prepared for the Subcommittees on Arms Control, International Security and Science and on International Economic Policy and Trade of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives and the Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation, and Federal Processes of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, 99th Congress, 1st session.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Library of Congress, Washington, DC. Congressional Research Service.

    To provide a handy reference for those concerned with ways to avoid the further spread, or proliferation, of nuclear weapons, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs have since 1977 sponsored periodic publication of the Nuclear Proliferation Factbook. This fourth edition of the factbook includes a…

  8. The Mesoscale Science of the Matter-Radiation Interactions in Extremes (MaRIE) project

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Kippen, Karen Elizabeth; Montoya, Donald Raymond

    The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) requires the ability to understand and test how material structures, defects, and interfaces determine performance in extreme environments such as in nuclear weapons. To do this, MaRIE will be an x-ray source that is laser-like and brilliant with very fl exible and fast pulses to see at weapons-relevant time scales, and with high enough energy to study critical materials. The Department of Energy (DOE) has determined there is a mission need for MaRIE to deliver this capability. MaRIE can use some of the existing infrastructure of the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE) andmore » its accelerator capability. MaRIE will be built as a strategic partnership of DOE national laboratories and university collaborators.« less

  9. Overview of Scientific Freedom and National Security

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Lerch, Irving

    2000-04-01

    The subject of our scrutiny is very much in the news, punctuated with nouns and modifiers both inflammatory and mundane such as espionage, justice, scientific accountability and scientific freedom. And while our discussion will focus on these issues, I want to raise some of the pragmatic questions that bear on the foundation of our support for international science. Beneath questions of guilt and the loss of secrets in the Wen Ho Lee case lay the inherent tension between the tradition of open exchange in the scientific enterprise and the need to protect the nation's security. How this balance is to be achieved in a democratic society has bedeviled us ever since the Manhattan project heralded the emergence of science and technology as instruments of great national power. If we do not find this balance, we run the risk of damaging some of the most important intellectual treasures that the US has produced the Department of Energy's national laboratories and the entire system that we call the international scientific enterprise. For while the superheated charges of lax security and criminal negligence have led some to call for ``firewalls" to isolate and protect the secrets in our weapons labs, such measures may have severe consequences for weapons and non-weapons labs alike and their many associated universities. It's estimated that from 70% to as much as 80% in the expansion of our economy is technology-driven, derived from the most productive system of scientific innovation in the world. This is also true of our national security. Science is indispensable to the development and maintenance of the nation's arsenals. The Department of Energy's Nuclear Stockpile Stewardship Program is central to the safety and reliability of American nuclear weapons and to our hope for a worldwide ban on nuclear tests. But this program will fail without a continuing intense development effort based on cutting-edge science. And a great deal of the science needed is being pursued in fundamental non-weapons-related research around the world. Science expresses the collective intelligence of humankind and it cannot be impounded by any nation. As is true of the world's economy, so is science global. Any impediment to the exchange of ideas serves only to isolate and degrade both international and domestic inquiry. We are faced with two important exigencies: we must safeguard our strategic secrets and maintain our scientific vigor. What we cannot do is permit fear and distrust to drive away our most productive scientists from the national labs and discourage the recruitment of the next generation of young, gifted scientists. We cannot tolerate the abuses of what our national security is designed to protect the Bill of Rights and our Constitutional guarantees. We cannot allow unthinking generalizations that place a cloud of suspicion over Americans and visitors from abroad simply because of their ethnicity. How we achieve this is the question at the core of this symposium.

  10. Supporting Technology for Chain of Custody of Nuclear Weapons and Materials throughout the Dismantlement and Disposition Processes

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Bunch, Kyle J.; Jones, Anthony M.; Ramuhalli, Pradeep

    The ratification and ongoing implementation of the New START Treaty have been widely regarded as noteworthy global security achievements for both the Obama Administration and the Putin (formerly Medvedev) regime. But deeper cuts that move beyond the United States and Russia to engage the P-5 and other nuclear weapons possessor states are envisioned under future arms control regimes, and are indeed required for the P-5 in accordance with their Article VI disarmament obligations in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Future verification needs will include monitoring the cessation of production of new fissile material for weapons, monitoring storage of warhead components andmore » fissile materials and verifying dismantlement of warheads, pits, secondary stages, and other materials. A fundamental challenge to implementing a nuclear disarmament regime is the ability to thwart unauthorized material diversion throughout the dismantlement and disposition process through strong chain of custody implementation. Verifying the declared presence, or absence, of nuclear materials and weapons components throughout the dismantlement and disposition lifecycle is a critical aspect of the disarmament process. From both the diplomatic and technical perspectives, verification under these future arms control regimes will require new solutions. Since any acceptable verification technology must protect sensitive design information and attributes to prevent the release of classified or other proliferation-sensitive information, non-nuclear non-sensitive modalities may provide significant new verification tools which do not require the use of additional information barriers. Alternative verification technologies based upon electromagnetic and acoustics could potentially play an important role in fulfilling the challenging requirements of future verification regimes. For example, researchers at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) have demonstrated that low frequency electromagnetic signatures of sealed metallic containers can be used to rapidly confirm the presence of specific components on a yes/no basis without revealing classified information. PNNL researchers have also used ultrasonic measurements to obtain images of material microstructures which may be used as templates or unique identifiers of treaty-limited items. Such alternative technologies are suitable for application in various stages of weapons dismantlement and often include the advantage of an inherent information barrier due to the inability to extract classified weapon design information from the collected data. As a result, these types of technologies complement radiation-based verification methods for arms control. This article presents an overview of several alternative verification technologies that are suitable for supporting a future, broader and more intrusive arms control regime that spans the nuclear weapons disarmament lifecycle. The general capabilities and limitations of each verification modality are discussed and example technologies are presented. Potential applications are defined in the context of the nuclear material and weapons lifecycle. Example applications range from authentication (e.g., tracking and signatures within the chain of custody from downloading through weapons storage, unclassified templates and unique identification) to verification of absence and final material disposition.« less

  11. Technology Advancement and the CTBT: Taking One Step Back from the Nuclear Brink

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Perry, W. J.

    2016-12-01

    Technology plays a pivotal role in international nuclear security and technological advancement continues to support a path toward stability. One near-term and readily-obtainable step back from the nuclear brink is the Comprehensive Nuclear-test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The technology to independently verify adherence to the CTBT has matured in the 20 years since the Treaty was opened for signature. Technology has also improved the safety and reliability of the US nuclear stockpile in the absence of testing. Due to these advances over the past two decades neither verification nor stockpiles effectiveness should be an impediment to the Treaty's entry into force. Other technical and geo-political evolution in this same period has changed the perceived benefit of nuclear weapons as instruments of security. Recognizing the change technology has brought to deliberation of nuclear security, nations are encouraged to take this one step away from instability.This presentation will reflect on the history and assumptions that have been used to justify the build-up and configuration of nuclear stockpiles, the changes in technology and conditions that alter the basis of these original assumptions, and the re-analysis of security using current and future assumptions that point to the need for revised nuclear policies. The author has a unique and well informed perspective as both the most senior US Defense Official and a technologist.

  12. A Poor Man's Nuclear Deterrent: Assessing the Value of Radiological Weapons for State Actors

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Donohue, Nathan

    The threat of weapons of mass destruction is an issue which remains at the forefront on national security. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons are all considered very dangerous by both state and non-state actors. Radiological weapons exist in that same category yet are not held in the same regard; the reason that is given is that these types of weapons are not the weapons of mass destruction that the other three are. Instead, radiological weapons are better considered weapons of mass disruption. Accordingly, in the academic and policy literature there has been very little perceived value associated with such weapons for use by state actors. However the historical focus on the military efficacy of radiological weapons has obscured the obvious truth that they may pose significant value for state actors. What this research shows is that the explosion of a radiological weapon could disrupt a target area in ways which could cripple the economy of an adversary state and promote widespread fear concerning exposure to radiation. Any such attack would not only necessitate large scale evacuation, but cleanup, decontamination, demolition, territory exclusion, and relocation. Moreover, the effects of such an attack would be unlikely to remain an isolated event as evacuated and displaced citizens spread across the nation carrying both fear and residual radiation. All of these factors would only be compounded by a state actor's ability to not only develop such weapons, but to manufacture them in such a composition that contemporary examples of such weapons grossly underestimate their impact. Accordingly, radiological weapons could hold great value for any state actor wishing to pursue their development and to threaten their use. Moreover, "while RDDs may not be well suited as "military weapons" in the classic sense, the use of RDDs could be powerfully coercive."1 In that sense, state actors could even acquire radiological weapons for their deterrent value. 1James L. Ford, "Radiological Dispersal Devices: Assessing the Transnational Threat," Strategic Forum, No. 136, (March 1998), March 29, 2012, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ndu/forum136.htm.

  13. The North Korean nuclear dilemma.

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Hecker, Siegfried S.

    2004-01-01

    The current nuclear crisis, the second one in ten years, erupted when North Korea expelled international nuclear inspectors in December 2002, then withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and claimed to be building more nuclear weapons with the plutonium extracted from the spent fuel rods heretofore stored under international inspection. These actions were triggered by a disagreement over U.S. assertions that North Korea had violated the Agreed Framework (which froze the plutonium path to nuclear weapons to end the first crisis in 1994) by clandestinely developing uranium enrichment capabilities providing an alternative path to nuclear weapons. With Stanford Universitymore » Professor John Lewis and three other Americans, I was allowed to visit the Yongbyon Nuclear Center on Jan. 8, 2004. We toured the 5 MWe reactor, the 50 MWe reactor construction site, the spent fuel pool storage building, and the radiochemical laboratory. We concluded that North Korea has restarted its 5 MWe reactor (which produces roughly 6 kg of plutonium annually), it removed the 8000 spent fuel rods that were previously stored under IAEA safeguards from the spent fuel pool, and that it most likely extracted the 25 to 30 kg of plutonium contained in these fuel rods. Although North Korean officials showed us what they claimed was their plutonium metal product from this reprocessing campaign, we were not able to conclude definitively that it was in fact plutonium metal and that it came from the most recent reprocessing campaign. Nevertheless, our North Korean hosts demonstrated that they had the capability, the facility and requisite capacity, and the technical expertise to produce plutonium metal. On the basis of our visit, we were not able to address the issue of whether or not North Korea had a 'deterrent' as claimed - that is, we were not able to conclude that North Korea can build a nuclear device and that it can integrate nuclear devices into suitable delivery systems. However, based on the capabilities we saw, we must assume that North Korea has the capability to produce a crude nuclear device. On the matter of uranium enrichment programs, our host categorically denied that North Korea has a uranium enrichment program - he said, 'we have no program, no equipment, and no technical expertise for uranium enrichment.' The denials were not convincing at the time and since then have proven to be quite hollow by the revelations of A.Q. Khan's nuclear black market activities. There is no easy solution to the nuclear crisis in North Korea. A military strike to eliminate the nuclear facilities was never very attractive and now has been overcome by events. The principal threat is posed by a stockpile of nuclear weapons and weapons-grade plutonium. We have no way of finding where either may be hidden. A diplomatic solution remains the only path forward, but it has proven elusive. All sides have proclaimed a nuclear weapons-free Korean Peninsula as the end goal. The U.S. Government has chosen to negotiate with North Korea by means of the six-party talks. It has very clearly outlined its position of insisting on complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement of all North Korean nuclear programs. North Korea has offered several versions of 're-freezing' its plutonium program while still denying a uranium enrichment program. It has insisted on simultaneous and reciprocal steps to a final solution. Regardless of which diplomatic path is chosen, the scientific challenges of eliminating the North Korean nuclear weapons programs (and its associated infrastructure) in a safe, secure, and verifiable manner are immense. The North Korean program is considerably more complex and developed than the fledgling Iraqi program of 1991 and Libyan program of 2004. It is more along the lines, but more complex than that of South Africa in the early 1990s. Actions taken or not taken by the North Koreans at their nuclear facilities during the course of the ongoing diplomatic discussions are key to whether or not the nuclear program can be eliminated safely and securely, and they will greatly influence the price tag for such operations. Moreover, they will determine whether or not one can verify complete elimination. Hence, cooperation of the North Koreans now and during the dismantlement and elimination stages is crucial. Technical discussions among specialists, perhaps within the framework of the working groups of the six-party talks, could be very productive in setting the stage for an effective, verifiable elimination of North Korea's nuclear weapons program.« less

  14. Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Escalation in Regional Conflicts: Lessons from North Korea and Pakistan

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2014-11-01

    brinkmanship relies on apparently suicidal and self-destructive tactics. Pakistan is often described as a country that “negotiates with a gun to its own...On 13 December 2001, five militants armed with plastic explosives, suicide vests, assault rifles, and grenades infiltrated the secure perimeter...is true, it is possible that the temptation to engage in coercive escalation will become tempered over time as relatively new nuclear powers come to

  15. Internship at Los Alamos National Laboratory

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Dunham, Ryan Q.

    2012-07-11

    Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) is located in Los Alamos, New Mexico. It provides support for our country's nuclear weapon stockpile as well as many other scientific research projects. I am an Undergraduate Student Intern in the Systems Design and Analysis group within the Nuclear Nonproliferation division of the Global Security directorate at LANL. I have been tasked with data analysis and modeling of particles in a fluidized bed system for the capture of carbon dioxide from power plant flue gas.

  16. Secrecy vs. the need for ecological information: challenges to environmental activism in Russia.

    PubMed

    Jandl, T

    1998-01-01

    This article identifies the lessons learned from the Nikitin case study in Russia. The Nikitin case involves the analysis of sources of radioactive contamination in several Russian counties and in the Russian Northern Fleet. Norway was interested in the issue due to proximity to the storage sites. The issue involved national security and environmental protection. It was learned that mixing national security issues with environmental issues offers dangerous and multiple challenges. Environmental groups must build relationships with a wide audience. International security policy must include the issues of globalization of trade and the spread of environmental problems into the global commons (oceans and atmosphere). The risk of an environmentally dangerous accident as a consequence of Cold War activities is greater than the risk of nuclear war. Secrecy in military affairs is not justified when there is inadequate storage of nuclear weapons and contaminated materials. In Russia, the concern is great due to their economic transition and shortages of funds for even the most basic needs, which excludes nuclear waste clean up. The Bellona Foundation studied the extent of nuclear pollution from military nuclear reactors in the Kola peninsula of northwest Russia, in 1994 and 1996. Russian security police arrested one of the report authors for alleged national security violations. A valuable lesson learned was that local Russian environmental groups needed international support. The military nuclear complex poses an enormous hazard. Limiting inspections is an unacceptable national security risk. The new Russian law on state secrets is too broad.

  17. DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Miller, A.J.

    The author concludes that it is probable that unconventional weapons and their associated delivery systems will form a permanent part of future political and strategic calculations in the Middle East. Some possible consequences of this situation can be divided into three classes: intra-regional, inter-regional and extra-regional. There is no doubt that Israel, driven by the need for security,precipitated the proliferation of unconventional weapons and of surface-to-surface missiles in the Middle East. It will now be driven to secure itself from the new threat to its security posed by its regional opponents. The most significant extra-regional consequence of developments in themore » Middle East may be further complication of great power arms control negotiations. To the re-discovery by the United States and the Soviet Union of their obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty to reduce the level of their nuclear weapons must now be added the desire to reduce, if not entirely eliminate, their chemical weapons stockpiles in advance of a global ban. It is possible that lesser powers will learn from the evidence of the great powers behavior, although that contradicts much of what we know of the psychology of decision making in international politics. What is necessary, though not necessarily sufficient, is that the U.S. and the USSR as the two external powers with potentially the greatest leverage, work together toward the resolution of the underlying causes of conflict in a region marked by more than a generation of competition between them.« less

  18. Nuclear Weapons: Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2007-07-12

    done. Critics raised concerns about the implications of these policies for testing and new weapons. At present, Congress addresses nuclear weapon...future, but there are no plans to do so.’”7 Critics expressed concern about the implications of these policies for testing and new weapons. A statement by...opportunity to design and build new nuclear weapons, and abandon a ten-year-old moratorium on nuclear weapons testing.”8 Another critic felt that

  19. Towards a tactical nuclear weapons treaty? Is There a Role of IAEA Tools of Safeguards?

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Saunders, Emily C.; Rowberry, Ariana N.; Fearey, Bryan L.

    2012-07-12

    In recent years, there is growing interest in formal negotiations on non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons. With the negotiations of New START, there has been much speculation that a tactical nuclear weapons treaty should be included in the follow on to New START. This paper examines the current policy environment related to tactical weapons and some of the issues surrounding the definition of tactical nuclear weapons. We then map out the steps that would need to be taken in order to begin discussions on a tactical nuclear weapons treaty. These steps will review the potential role of the IAEA inmore » verification of a tactical nuclear weapons treaty. Specifically, does IAEA involvement in various arms control treaties serve as a useful roadmap on how to overcome some of the issues pertaining to a tactical nuclear weapons treaty?« less

  20. 32 CFR 552.116 - Privately owned weapons-security.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 3 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Privately owned weapons-security. 552.116..., Ammunition, and Explosives-Fort Lewis, Washington § 552.116 Privately owned weapons—security. Privately owned arms and ammunition will be secured in the manner required for military weapons and ammunition but...

  1. 32 CFR 552.116 - Privately owned weapons-security.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 true Privately owned weapons-security. 552.116 Section..., Ammunition, and Explosives-Fort Lewis, Washington § 552.116 Privately owned weapons—security. Privately owned arms and ammunition will be secured in the manner required for military weapons and ammunition but...

  2. 32 CFR 552.116 - Privately owned weapons-security.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 3 2011-07-01 2009-07-01 true Privately owned weapons-security. 552.116 Section..., Ammunition, and Explosives-Fort Lewis, Washington § 552.116 Privately owned weapons—security. Privately owned arms and ammunition will be secured in the manner required for military weapons and ammunition but...

  3. 32 CFR 552.116 - Privately owned weapons-security.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 3 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Privately owned weapons-security. 552.116..., Ammunition, and Explosives-Fort Lewis, Washington § 552.116 Privately owned weapons—security. Privately owned arms and ammunition will be secured in the manner required for military weapons and ammunition but...

  4. 32 CFR 552.116 - Privately owned weapons-security.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 3 2012-07-01 2009-07-01 true Privately owned weapons-security. 552.116 Section..., Ammunition, and Explosives-Fort Lewis, Washington § 552.116 Privately owned weapons—security. Privately owned arms and ammunition will be secured in the manner required for military weapons and ammunition but...

  5. Nuclear deterrence in the Arab-Israeli conflict. A case study in Egyptian-Israeli relations

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Shikaki, K.I.

    1986-01-01

    In order to achieve security and stability, and maximize the chances for resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, should Egypt and Israel adopt declared nuclear deterrence doctrines. Or would such a move be ineffective, dangerous, or even disastrous. The nuclearization of the Middle East is not necessary: military threats to the survival of the states in the region do not justify the introduction of nuclear weapons. Nuclearization is not desirable: deterrence theory's assumptions and implications exhibit intellectual weakness and its explanatory power is unsatisfactory; nuclear deterrence may reduce the frequency of war, but it pays little attention to the consequences of war;more » and in comparison to defense, nuclear deterrence may lack credibility. Presently, Israel has nuclear capability and delivery systems sufficient to provide security to its vital areas through deterrence of or defense against Arab attacks. The Arabs do not, however, believe that such security extends to the Arab territories occupied by Israel during the June 1967 war. To supply security, nuclear deterrence must be effective, stable, and credible. In a multinuclear environment, the Egyptians and Israelis are likely to meet the requirement for an effective deterrence: the possession of a nuclear capability sufficient to inflict an enormous amount of death and destruction. If the Arabs and Israelis sought and adopted strategies of deterrence, they might be able to meet the requirement for a stable deterrence: the acquisition of second strike capabilities.« less

  6. Development of undergraduate nuclear security curriculum at College of Engineering, Universiti Tenaga Nasional

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Hamid, Nasri A.; Mujaini, Madihah; Mohamed, Abdul Aziz

    2017-01-01

    The Center for Nuclear Energy (CNE), College of Engineering, Universiti Tenaga Nasional (UNITEN) has a great responsibility to undertake educational activities that promote developing human capital in the area of nuclear engineering and technology. Developing human capital in nuclear through education programs is necessary to support the implementation of nuclear power projects in Malaysia in the near future. In addition, the educational program must also meet the nuclear power industry needs and requirements. In developing a certain curriculum, the contents must comply with the university's Outcomes Based Education (OBE) philosophy. One of the important courses in the nuclear curriculum is in the area of nuclear security. Basically the nuclear security course covers the current issues of law, politics, military strategy, and technology with regard to weapons of mass destruction and related topics in international security, and review legal regulations and political relationship that determine the state of nuclear security at the moment. In addition, the course looks into all aspects of the nuclear safeguards, builds basic knowledge and understanding of nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear forensics and nuclear safeguards in general. The course also discusses tools used to combat nuclear proliferation such as treaties, institutions, multilateral arrangements and technology controls. In this paper, we elaborate the development of undergraduate nuclear security course at the College of Engineering, Universiti Tenaga Nasional. Since the course is categorized as mechanical engineering subject, it must be developed in tandem with the program educational objectives (PEO) of the Bachelor of Mechanical Engineering program. The course outcomes (CO) and transferrable skills are also identified. Furthermore, in aligning the CO with program outcomes (PO), the PO elements need to be emphasized through the CO-PO mapping. As such, all assessments and distribution of Bloom Taxonomy levels are assigned in accordance with the CO-PO mapping. Finally, the course has to fulfill the International Engineering Alliance (IEA) Graduate Attributes of the Washington Accord.

  7. The Mystery of the Gun Turret in the Desert

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Hoffman, R. D.

    The mystery of the gun turret in the desert began with an ingenious idea: to develop a reusable open-air line of sight diagnostic device to support LLNL’s early nuclear weapons development efforts. Obtained from the Mare Island Navy Shipyard (MINS) in January 1957, the gun turret traveled by ship to the Naval Construction Battalion base at Port Hueneme, California, and then by truck to Area 2 in the Yucca Flats valley at the Nevada Nuclear Security Site (NNSS).

  8. Teaching Activities on Horizontal Nuclear Proliferation.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Zola, John

    1990-01-01

    Provides learning activities concerning the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. Includes step-by-step directions for four activities: (1) the life cycle of nuclear weapons; (2) nuclear nonproliferation: pros and cons; (3) the nuclear power/nuclear weapons connection; and (4) managing nuclear proliferation. (NL)

  9. How NIF Works

    ScienceCinema

    None

    2017-12-09

    The National Ignition Facility, located at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, is the world's largest laser system... 192 huge laser beams in a massive building, all focused down at the last moment at a 2 millimeter ball containing frozen hydrogen gas. The goal is to achieve fusion... getting more energy out than was used to create it. It's never been done before under controlled conditions, just in nuclear weapons and in stars. We expect to do it within the next 2-3 years. The purpose is threefold: to create an almost limitless supply of safe, carbon-free, proliferation-free electricity; examine new regimes of astrophysics as well as basic science; and study the inner-workings of the U.S. stockpile of nuclear weapons to ensure they remain safe, secure and reliable without the need for underground testing. More information about NIF can be found at:

  10. Taking a stand against nuclear proliferation: the pediatrician's role.

    PubMed

    Newman, Thomas B

    2008-05-01

    Nuclear weapons pose a grave threat to the health of children. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which for almost 40 years has limited the spread of nuclear weapons, is in danger of unraveling. At the 2000 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference, 180 countries, including the United States, agreed on 13 practical steps to implement Article VI of the treaty, which calls for nuclear disarmament. However, the United States has acted in contravention of several of those disarmament steps, with announced plans to develop new nuclear weapons and to maintain a large nuclear arsenal for decades to come. Pediatricians, working individually and through organizations such as the American Academy of Pediatrics and International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, can educate the public and elected officials regarding the devastating and irremediable effects of nuclear weapons on children and the need for policies that comply with and strengthen the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, rather than undermining it. For the children of the world, our goal must be a nuclear weapons convention (similar to the chemical and biological weapons conventions) that would prohibit these weapons globally.

  11. Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Their Purpose and Placement

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2015-06-01

    War II, nuclear scientists argued against the development of fusion weapons .3 In the 1970s, politicians debated the use of neutron bombs, weapons ...Tactical Nuclear Weapons : Their Purpose and Placement BY EDWARD G. FERGUSON A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE...This study answers the question -- Why does America have tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) in Europe today? – treating America and the North

  12. Assessment on security system of radioactive sources used in hospitals of Thailand

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Jitbanjong, Petchara; Wongsawaeng, Doonyapong

    2016-01-01

    Unsecured radioactive sources have caused deaths and serious injuries in many parts of the world. In Thailand, there are 17 hospitals that use teletherapy with cobalt-60 radioactive sources. They need to be secured in order to prevent unauthorized removal, sabotage and terrorists from using such materials in a radiological weapon. The security system of radioactive sources in Thailand is regulated by the Office of Atoms for Peace in compliance with Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), U.S. DOE, which has started to be implemented since 2010. This study aims to perform an assessment on the security system of radioactive sources used in hospitals in Thailand and the results can be used as a recommended baseline data for development or improvement of hospitals on the security system of a radioactive source at a national regulatory level and policy level. Results from questionnaires reveal that in 11 out of 17 hospitals (64.70%), there were a few differences in conditions of hospitals using radioactive sources with installation of the security system and those without installation of the security system. Also, personals working with radioactive sources did not clearly understand the nuclear security law. Thus, government organizations should be encouraged to arrange trainings on nuclear security to increase the level of understanding. In the future, it is recommended that the responsible government organization issues a minimum requirement of nuclear security for every medical facility using radioactive sources.

  13. Proliferation dangers associated with nuclear medicine: getting weapons-grade uranium out of radiopharmaceutical production.

    PubMed

    Williams, Bill; Ruff, Tilman A

    2007-01-01

    Abolishing the threat of nuclear war requires the outlawing of nuclear weapons and dismantling current nuclear weapon stockpiles, but also depends on eliminating access to fissile material (nuclear weapon fuel). The near-universal use of weapons-grade, highly enriched uranium (HEU) to produce radiopharmaceuticals is a significant proliferation hazard. Health professionals have a strategic opportunity and obligation to progress the elimination of medically-related commerce in HEU, closing one of the most vulnerable pathways to the much-feared 'terrorist bomb'.

  14. 76 FR 6087 - Draft Weapons Safety Assessment on the Use of Enhanced Weapons; Notice of Availability and...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-02-03

    ... holders, and other stakeholders on a draft guidance document entitled ``Weapons Safety Assessment'' (WSA... weapons under the NRC's proposed rule titled ``Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security.... You should not include any site-specific security information in your comments. Federal rulemaking Web...

  15. JPRS Report, China, Handbook of Military Knowledge for Commanders

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1988-03-07

    Chemical and Biological Weapons Chapter I Nuclear Weapons (178) A. Summary Statement on Nuclear Weapons (178) 1. Basic Principles of Nuclear...199) 1. Basic Principles of Protection Against Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Weapons* (199) 2. Maior Actions For Protection Against Nuclear...people’s bodies through the digestive tract. Skin contact. Biological warfare agents may enter the body directly through the skin , mucous membranes or

  16. Coping with mass destruction: United States power projection in the nuclear and chemical third world. Monograph report

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Cheek, G.H.

    1993-05-14

    This monograph explores the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the Third World, their operational impact on power projection forces, and the viability of deterrence in the future. It concludes that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction may have grave consequences for the power projection forces in the future; simple assumptions of non-use, reliance on our nuclear deterrent or protective measures may give us a false sense of security. Proper analysis of operational vulnerabilities will be essential for future power projection. Proliferation of operational delivery systems and weapons of mass destruction continues despite treaties and the best intentionsmore » of world leaders. Weapons of mass destruction are becoming more common throughout the world and chemical and biological weapons continue to become more and more lethal. These trends are creating a multipolar world, which history has shown to be the most unstable. This unstable world will be the environment for future power projection. Deterrence in this environment is without precedent other than the Cold War paradigm. It is questionable whether deterrence will transfer outside this paradigm as Third World nations do not have the experience, balance of power, infrastructure or political stability needed to make the concept viable. Possession of weapons of mass destruction may even allow these nations to deter entry of US power projection forces into certain regions as deterrence is a two way concept. While deterrence is still an essential part of US National Strategy to prevent war, reliance on it to prevent use of weapons of mass destruction in the midst of a conflict may prove to be a false hope.« less

  17. Strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime : focus on the civilian nuclear fuel cycle.

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Saltiel, David H.; Pregenzer, Arian Leigh

    2005-04-01

    Leaders around the world and across the ideological spectrum agree that the global nonproliferation regime is facing a serious test. The emergence of sophisticated terrorist networks, black markets in nuclear technology, and technological leaps associated with globalization have conspired to threaten one of the most successful examples of international cooperation in history. The rampant proliferation of nuclear weapons that was predicted at the start of the nuclear age has been largely held in check and the use of those weapons avoided. Nonetheless, with the thirty-fifth anniversary of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the threat of nuclearmore » proliferation seems more serious than ever. Although experts readily concede that there exist many pathways to proliferation, the threat posed by the misuse of the civilian nuclear fuel cycle has received considerable recent attention. While the connection between nuclear energy and nonproliferation has been a topic of discussion since the dawn of the nuclear age, world events have brought the issue to the forefront once again. United States President George W. Bush and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Mohammad ElBaradei are among those who have highlighted proliferation risks associated with civilian nuclear power programs and called for revitalizing the nuclear nonproliferation regime to address new threats. From the possibility of diversion or theft of nuclear material or technology, to the use of national civilian programs as a cover for weapons programs - what some have called latent proliferation - the fuel cycle appears to many to represent a glaring proliferation vulnerability. Just as recognition of these risks is not new, neither is recognition of the many positive benefits of nuclear energy. In fact, a renewed interest in exploiting these benefits has increased the urgency of addressing the risks. Global energy demand is expected to at least double by the middle of the century and could increase even more quickly. Much of the new demand will come from the rapidly expanding economies in China and India, but much of the developing world stands poised to follow the same path. This growth in demand is paralleled by concerns about global warming and the long-term reliability of carbon-based fuel supplies, concerns which expanded use of nuclear power can help to address. For these reasons and others, many countries in Asia have already clearly signaled that nuclear energy will play a key role for years to come. Numerous proposals have been made in the last two years for reducing the proliferation risk of the civilian nuclear fuel cycle. These range from a ban on export of enrichment and reprocessing technology to countries not already possessing operational capabilities to multinational management of the nuclear fuel cycle and strengthening existing monitoring and security mechanisms. The need for international willingness to enforce nonproliferation commitments and norms has also been emphasized. Some of these proposals could significantly impact the production of nuclear energy. Because the successful strengthening of the nonproliferation regime and the expansion of nuclear energy are so closely related, any successful approach to resolving these issues will require the creative input of experts from both the nuclear energy and nonproliferation communities. Against this backdrop, Sandia National Laboratories organized its 14th International Security Conference (ISC) around the theme: Strengthening the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: Focus on the Civilian Nuclear Fuel Cycle. The goal of the conference was to begin a constructive dialogue between the nuclear energy and nuclear nonproliferation communities. The conference was held in Chantilly, Virginia, just outside Washington, D.C. on April 4-6, 2005, and was attended by approximately 125 participants from fifteen countries. The ISC agenda was structured to produce a systematic review of the connection between civilian nuclear energy programs and the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to identify constructive approaches to strengthen the nonproliferation regime. The conference began by reviewing the energy and security context that has, once again, raised the profile of this issue. A discussion of the risks associated with the civilian nuclear fuel cycle was then used to inform the analysis of several potential risk-management tools. The conference concluded by looking for lessons from the past as well as looking forward to future opportunities, with a particular focus on East Asia. In this paper we summarize the debates and ideas that emerged during the conference. Although we have drawn on material presented by speakers and comments made by participants, we do not quote or cite the specific contributions of individuals.« less

  18. 76 FR 23515 - Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-04-27

    ... material and would add new event notification requirements on the theft or loss of enhanced weapons...-2011-0017] RIN 3150-AI49 Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications... regulations governing security event notifications. These proposed regulations are consistent with the...

  19. The nuclear weapons free world . We already live in

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Antonini, R.

    We do live in a nuclear weapons free world, already. After a long debate about nuclear weapons the situation today is such that, officially, no governement is in favor of them. The reason is to be found in the strongest moral stigma on nuclear weapons. Moreover the vast majority of the most influencial people share this view.

  20. A Historical Evaluation of the U12t Tunnel, Nevada Test Site, Nye County, Nevada, Volume 1 of 6

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Drollinger, Harold; Jones, Robert C.; Thomas F. Bullard

    2009-02-01

    This report presents a historical evaluation of the U12t Tunnel on the Nevada Test Site in southern Nevada. The work was conducted by the Desert Research Institute at the request of the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office and the U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). The U12t Tunnel is one of a series of tunnels used for underground nuclear weapons effects tests on the east side of Rainier and Aqueduct Mesas. Six nuclear weapons effects tests, Mint Leaf, Diamond Sculls, Husky Pup, Midas Myth/Milagro, Mighty Oak, and Mission Ghost, and onemore » high explosive test, SPLAT, were conducted within the U12t Tunnel from 1970 to 1987. All six of the nuclear weapons effects tests and the high explosive test were sponsored by DTRA. Two conventional weapons experiments, Dipole Knight and Divine Eagle, were conducted in the tunnel portal area in 1997 and 1998. These experiments were sponsored by the Defense Special Weapons Agency. The U12t Tunnel complex is composed of the Portal and Mesa Areas and includes an underground tunnel with a main access drift and nine primary drifts, a substantial tailings pile fronting the tunnel portal, a series of discharge ponds downslope of the tailings pile, and two instrumentation trailer parks and 16 drill holes on top of Aqueduct Mesa. A total of 89 cultural features were recorded: 54 at the portal and 35 on the mesa. In the Portal Area, cultural features are mostly concrete pads and building foundations; other features include the portal, rail lines, the camel back, ventilation and cooling system components, communication equipment, and electrical equipment. On the mesa are drill holes, a few concrete pads, a loading ramp, and electrical equipment.« less

  1. A Historical Evaluation of the U12t Tunnel, Nevada Test Site, Nye County, Nevada, Volume 5 of 6

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Harold Drollinger; Robert C. Jones; and Thomas F. Bullard

    2009-02-01

    This report presents a historical evaluation of the U12t Tunnel on the Nevada Test Site in southern Nevada. The work was conducted by the Desert Research Institute at the request of the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office and the U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). The U12t Tunnel is one of a series of tunnels used for underground nuclear weapons effects tests on the east side of Rainier and Aqueduct Mesas. Six nuclear weapons effects tests, Mint Leaf, Diamond Sculls, Husky Pup, Midas Myth/Milagro, Mighty Oak, and Mission Ghost, and onemore » high explosive test, SPLAT, were conducted within the U12t Tunnel from 1970 to 1987. All six of the nuclear weapons effects tests and the high explosive test were sponsored by DTRA. Two conventional weapons experiments, Dipole Knight and Divine Eagle, were conducted in the tunnel portal area in 1997 and 1998. These experiments were sponsored by the Defense Special Weapons Agency. The U12t Tunnel complex is composed of the Portal and Mesa Areas and includes an underground tunnel with a main access drift and nine primary drifts, a substantial tailings pile fronting the tunnel portal, a series of discharge ponds downslope of the tailings pile, and two instrumentation trailer parks and 16 drill holes on top of Aqueduct Mesa. A total of 89 cultural features were recorded: 54 at the portal and 35 on the mesa. In the Portal Area, cultural features are mostly concrete pads and building foundations; other features include the portal, rail lines, the camel back, ventilation and cooling system components, communication equipment, and electrical equipment. On the mesa are drill holes, a few concrete pads, a loading ramp, and electrical equipment.« less

  2. A Historical Evaluation of the U12t Tunnel, Nevada Test Site, Nye County, Nevada, Volume 6 of 6

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Harold Drollinger; Robert C. Jones; and Thomas F. Bullard

    2009-02-01

    This report presents a historical evaluation of the U12t Tunnel on the Nevada Test Site in southern Nevada. The work was conducted by the Desert Research Institute at the request of the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office and the U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). The U12t Tunnel is one of a series of tunnels used for underground nuclear weapons effects tests on the east side of Rainier and Aqueduct Mesas. Six nuclear weapons effects tests, Mint Leaf, Diamond Sculls, Husky Pup, Midas Myth/Milagro, Mighty Oak, and Mission Ghost, and onemore » high explosive test, SPLAT, were conducted within the U12t Tunnel from 1970 to 1987. All six of the nuclear weapons effects tests and the high explosive test were sponsored by DTRA. Two conventional weapons experiments, Dipole Knight and Divine Eagle, were conducted in the tunnel portal area in 1997 and 1998. These experiments were sponsored by the Defense Special Weapons Agency. The U12t Tunnel complex is composed of the Portal and Mesa Areas and includes an underground tunnel with a main access drift and nine primary drifts, a substantial tailings pile fronting the tunnel portal, a series of discharge ponds downslope of the tailings pile, and two instrumentation trailer parks and 16 drill holes on top of Aqueduct Mesa. A total of 89 cultural features were recorded: 54 at the portal and 35 on the mesa. In the Portal Area, cultural features are mostly concrete pads and building foundations; other features include the portal, rail lines, the camel back, ventilation and cooling system components, communication equipment, and electrical equipment. On the mesa are drill holes, a few concrete pads, a loading ramp, and electrical equipment.« less

  3. A Historical Evaluation of the U12t Tunnel, Nevada Test Site, Nye County, Nevada, Volume 3 of 6

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Harold Drollinger; Robert C. Jones; and Thomas F. Bullard

    2009-02-01

    This report presents a historical evaluation of the U12t Tunnel on the Nevada Test Site in southern Nevada. The work was conducted by the Desert Research Institute at the request of the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office and the U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). The U12t Tunnel is one of a series of tunnels used for underground nuclear weapons effects tests on the east side of Rainier and Aqueduct Mesas. Six nuclear weapons effects tests, Mint Leaf, Diamond Sculls, Husky Pup, Midas Myth/Milagro, Mighty Oak, and Mission Ghost, and onemore » high explosive test, SPLAT, were conducted within the U12t Tunnel from 1970 to 1987. All six of the nuclear weapons effects tests and the high explosive test were sponsored by DTRA. Two conventional weapons experiments, Dipole Knight and Divine Eagle, were conducted in the tunnel portal area in 1997 and 1998. These experiments were sponsored by the Defense Special Weapons Agency. The U12t Tunnel complex is composed of the Portal and Mesa Areas and includes an underground tunnel with a main access drift and nine primary drifts, a substantial tailings pile fronting the tunnel portal, a series of discharge ponds downslope of the tailings pile, and two instrumentation trailer parks and 16 drill holes on top of Aqueduct Mesa. A total of 89 cultural features were recorded: 54 at the portal and 35 on the mesa. In the Portal Area, cultural features are mostly concrete pads and building foundations; other features include the portal, rail lines, the camel back, ventilation and cooling system components, communication equipment, and electrical equipment. On the mesa are drill holes, a few concrete pads, a loading ramp, and electrical equipment.« less

  4. A Historical Evaluation of the U12t Tunnel, Nevada Test Site, Nye County, Nevada, Volume 2 of 6

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Harold Drollinger; Robert C. Jones; and Thomas F. Bullard

    2009-02-01

    This report presents a historical evaluation of the U12t Tunnel on the Nevada Test Site in southern Nevada. The work was conducted by the Desert Research Institute at the request of the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office and the U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). The U12t Tunnel is one of a series of tunnels used for underground nuclear weapons effects tests on the east side of Rainier and Aqueduct Mesas. Six nuclear weapons effects tests, Mint Leaf, Diamond Sculls, Husky Pup, Midas Myth/Milagro, Mighty Oak, and Mission Ghost, and onemore » high explosive test, SPLAT, were conducted within the U12t Tunnel from 1970 to 1987. All six of the nuclear weapons effects tests and the high explosive test were sponsored by DTRA. Two conventional weapons experiments, Dipole Knight and Divine Eagle, were conducted in the tunnel portal area in 1997 and 1998. These experiments were sponsored by the Defense Special Weapons Agency. The U12t Tunnel complex is composed of the Portal and Mesa Areas and includes an underground tunnel with a main access drift and nine primary drifts, a substantial tailings pile fronting the tunnel portal, a series of discharge ponds downslope of the tailings pile, and two instrumentation trailer parks and 16 drill holes on top of Aqueduct Mesa. A total of 89 cultural features were recorded: 54 at the portal and 35 on the mesa. In the Portal Area, cultural features are mostly concrete pads and building foundations; other features include the portal, rail lines, the camel back, ventilation and cooling system components, communication equipment, and electrical equipment. On the mesa are drill holes, a few concrete pads, a loading ramp, and electrical equipment.« less

  5. A Historical Evaluation of the U12t Tunnel, Nevada Test Site, Nye County, Nevada, Volume 4 of 6

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Harold Drollinger; Robert C. Jones; and Thomas F. Bullard

    2009-02-01

    This report presents a historical evaluation of the U12t Tunnel on the Nevada Test Site in southern Nevada. The work was conducted by the Desert Research Institute at the request of the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office and the U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). The U12t Tunnel is one of a series of tunnels used for underground nuclear weapons effects tests on the east side of Rainier and Aqueduct Mesas. Six nuclear weapons effects tests, Mint Leaf, Diamond Sculls, Husky Pup, Midas Myth/Milagro, Mighty Oak, and Mission Ghost, and onemore » high explosive test, SPLAT, were conducted within the U12t Tunnel from 1970 to 1987. All six of the nuclear weapons effects tests and the high explosive test were sponsored by DTRA. Two conventional weapons experiments, Dipole Knight and Divine Eagle, were conducted in the tunnel portal area in 1997 and 1998. These experiments were sponsored by the Defense Special Weapons Agency. The U12t Tunnel complex is composed of the Portal and Mesa Areas and includes an underground tunnel with a main access drift and nine primary drifts, a substantial tailings pile fronting the tunnel portal, a series of discharge ponds downslope of the tailings pile, and two instrumentation trailer parks and 16 drill holes on top of Aqueduct Mesa. A total of 89 cultural features were recorded: 54 at the portal and 35 on the mesa. In the Portal Area, cultural features are mostly concrete pads and building foundations; other features include the portal, rail lines, the camel back, ventilation and cooling system components, communication equipment, and electrical equipment. On the mesa are drill holes, a few concrete pads, a loading ramp, and electrical equipment.« less

  6. National Security Issues 1981 Symposium. Strategic Nuclear Policies, Weapons, and the C3 Connection, October 13-14, 1981,

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1981-01-01

    of prob- being an attack assessment. From there it goes to lems due to the atmosphere and due to solar the National Command Authority who acts on the...19-4-19"-8). MITRE/Bedford Panel Member for Institute for (omputer ’Kiences and 1959 Technology Evaluation Panal for the National Bureau of

  7. DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Chrzanowski, P; Walter, K

    For the Laboratory and staff, 2006 was a year of outstanding achievements. As our many accomplishments in this annual report illustrate, the Laboratory's focus on important problems that affect our nation's security and our researchers breakthroughs in science and technology have led to major successes. As a national laboratory that is part of the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA), Livermore is a key contributor to the Stockpile Stewardship Program for maintaining the safety, security, and reliability of the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile. The program has been highly successful, and our annual report features some of the Laboratory'smore » significant stockpile stewardship accomplishments in 2006. A notable example is a long-term study with Los Alamos National Laboratory, which found that weapon pit performance will not sharply degrade from the aging effects on plutonium. The conclusion was based on a wide range of nonnuclear experiments, detailed simulations, theoretical advances, and thorough analyses of the results of past nuclear tests. The study was a superb scientific effort. The continuing success of stockpile stewardship enabled NNSA in 2006 to lay out Complex 2030, a vision for a transformed nuclear weapons complex that is more responsive, cost efficient, and highly secure. One of the ways our Laboratory will help lead this transformation is through the design and development of reliable replacement warheads (RRWs). Compared to current designs, these warheads would have enhanced performance margins and security features and would be less costly to manufacture and maintain in a smaller, modernized production complex. In early 2007, NNSA selected Lawrence Livermore and Sandia National Laboratories-California to develop ''RRW-1'' for the U.S. Navy. Design efforts for the RRW, the plutonium aging work, and many other stockpile stewardship accomplishments rely on computer simulations performed on NNSA's Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC) Program supercomputers at Livermore. ASC Purple and BlueGene/L, the world's fastest computer, together provide nearly a half petaflop (500 trillion operations per second) of computer power for use by the three NNSA national laboratories. Livermore-led teams were awarded the Gordon Bell Prize for Peak Performance in both 2005 and 2006. The winning simulations, run on BlueGene/L, investigated the properties of materials at the length and time scales of atomic interactions. The computing power that makes possible such detailed simulations provides unprecedented opportunities for scientific discovery. Laboratory scientists are meeting the extraordinary challenge of creating experimental capabilities to match the resolution of supercomputer simulations. Working with a wide range of collaborators, we are developing experimental tools that gather better data at the nanometer and subnanosecond scales. Applications range from imaging biomolecules to studying matter at extreme conditions of pressure and temperature. The premier high-energy-density experimental physics facility in the world will be the National Ignition Facility (NIF) when construction is completed in 2009. We are leading the national effort to perform the first fusion ignition experiments using NIF's 192-beam laser and prepare to explore some of the remaining important issues in weapons physics. With scientific colleagues from throughout the nation, we are also designing revolutionary experiments on NIF to advance the fields of astrophysics, planetary physics, and materials science. Mission-directed, multidisciplinary science and technology at Livermore is also focused on reducing the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as well as their acquisition and use by terrorists. The Laboratory helps this important national effort by providing its unique expertise, integration analyses, and operational support to the Department of Homeland Security. For this vital facet of the Laboratory's national security mission, we are developing advanced technologies, such as a pocket-size explosives detector and an airborne persistent surveillance system, both of which earned R&D 100 Awards. Altogether, Livermore won seven R&D 100 Awards in 2006, the most for any organization. Emerging threats to national and global security go beyond defense and homeland security. Livermore pursues major scientific and technical advances to meet the need for a clean environment; clean, abundant energy; better water management; and improved human health. Our annual report highlights the link between human activities and the warming of tropical oceans, as well as techniques for imaging biological molecules and detecting bone cancer in its earliest stages. In addition, we showcase many scientific discoveries: distant planets, the composition of comets, a new superheavy element.« less

  8. 10 CFR 810.3 - Definitions.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... of neutrons used to effect SNM production in the “subcritical assembly.” Agreement for cooperation... International Atomic Energy Agency. Non-nuclear-weapon state is a country not recognized as a nuclear-weapon...-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Nuclear reactor means an apparatus, other than a nuclear explosive device...

  9. 10 CFR 810.3 - Definitions.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... of neutrons used to effect SNM production in the “subcritical assembly.” Agreement for cooperation... International Atomic Energy Agency. Non-nuclear-weapon state is a country not recognized as a nuclear-weapon...-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Nuclear reactor means an apparatus, other than a nuclear explosive device...

  10. A brief history of Sandia's National security missions.

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Drewien, Celeste A.; O'Canna, Myra Lynn; Stikar, John Anthony.

    2014-09-01

    To help members of the workforce understand what factors contribute to Sandia National Laboratories national security mission, the authors describe the evolution of Sandias core mission and its other mission components. The mission of Sandia first as a division of Los Alamos and later as Sandia Corporation underlies our core nuclear weapon mission of today. Sandias mission changed in 1963 and twice more in the 1970s. This report should help staff and management appreciate the need for mission evolution. A clear definition and communication of a consistent corporate mission statement is still needed.

  11. Your Career and Nuclear Weapons: A Guide for Young Scientists and Engineers.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Albrecht, Andreas; And Others

    This four-part booklet examines various issues related to nuclear weapons and how they will affect an individual working as a scientist or engineer. It provides information about the history of nuclear weapons, about the weapons industry which produces them, and about new weapons programs. Issues are raised so that new or future graduates may make…

  12. Fluorescent sensors for the detection of chemical warfare agents.

    PubMed

    Burnworth, Mark; Rowan, Stuart J; Weder, Christoph

    2007-01-01

    Along with biological and nuclear threats, chemical warfare agents are some of the most feared weapons of mass destruction. Compared to nuclear weapons they are relatively easy to access and deploy, which makes them in some aspects a greater threat to national and global security. A particularly hazardous class of chemical warfare agents are the nerve agents. Their rapid and severe effects on human health originate in their ability to block the function of acetylcholinesterase, an enzyme that is vital to the central nervous system. This article outlines recent activities regarding the development of molecular sensors that can visualize the presence of nerve agents (and related pesticides) through changes of their fluorescence properties. Three different sensing principles are discussed: enzyme-based sensors, chemically reactive sensors, and supramolecular sensors. Typical examples are presented for each class and different fluorescent sensors for the detection of chemical warfare agents are summarized and compared.

  13. How NIF Works

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    None

    2009-07-30

    The National Ignition Facility, located at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, is the world's largest laser system... 192 huge laser beams in a massive building, all focused down at the last moment at a 2 millimeter ball containing frozen hydrogen gas. The goal is to achieve fusion... getting more energy out than was used to create it. It's never been done before under controlled conditions, just in nuclear weapons and in stars. We expect to do it within the next 2-3 years. The purpose is threefold: to create an almost limitless supply of safe, carbon-free, proliferation-free electricity; examine new regimes ofmore » astrophysics as well as basic science; and study the inner-workings of the U.S. stockpile of nuclear weapons to ensure they remain safe, secure and reliable without the need for underground testing. More information about NIF can be found at:« less

  14. Russian Contract Procurement Document

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Tobin, J G

    2010-03-29

    This contract supports the enhancement of physical protection or nuclear material control and accounting systems at institutes or enterprises of the newly independent states under the material protection control and accounting (MPC&A) program. The contract is entered into pursuant to the MPC&A Program, a gratuitous technical assistance program, in accordance with the bilateral Agreements between the Russian Federation and the United States of America concerning the Safe and Secure Transportation, Storage and Destruction of Weapons and the Prevention of Weapons Proliferation of June 1992, as extended and amended by Protocol signed of June 1999, Agreement between the Government of themore » Russian Federation regarding Cooperation in the Area of Nuclear Materials Physical Protection, Control and Accounting of October 1999 and the Russian Federation law of May 1999 on the taxation exemption of gratuitous technical assistance with Russian Federation under registration No.DOE001000.« less

  15. What Happens to Deterrence as Nuclear Weapons Decrease Toward Zero?

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Drell, Sidney

    2011-04-01

    Steps reducing reliance on deployed nuclear weapons en route to zero will be discussed. They include broadly enhancing cooperation and transparency agreements beyond the provisions for verifying limits on deployed strategic nuclear warheads and delivery systems in the New START treaty. Two questions that will be addressed are: What conditions would have to be established in order to maintain strategic stability among nations as nuclear weapons recede in importance? What would nuclear deterrence be like in a world without nuclear weapons?

  16. The nuclear arsenals and nuclear disarmament.

    PubMed

    Barnaby, F

    1998-01-01

    Current world stockpiles of nuclear weapons and the status of treaties for nuclear disarmament and the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons are summarised. The need for including stockpiles of civil plutonium in a programme for ending production and disposing of fissile materials is emphasized, and the ultimate difficulty of disposing of the last few nuclear weapons discussed.

  17. U.S. Nuclear Weapons Enterprise: A Strategic Past and Unknown Future

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2012-04-25

    are left to base their planning assumptions, weapons designs and capabilities on outdated models . The likelihood of a large-scale nuclear war has...conduct any testing on nuclear weapons and must rely on computer modeling . While this may provide sufficient confidence in the current nuclear...unlikely the world will be free of nuclear weapons. 24 APPENDIX A – Acronyms ACC – Air Combat Command ACM – Advanced cruise missle CSAF

  18. Pakistan: Frontline state again. Master`s thesis

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Rivard, D.S.

    1995-12-01

    The objective of this study is to determine Pakistan`s place in contemporary U.S. national security strategy. Today, U.S.-Pakistan relations are strained due to the Pressler Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act. The Pressler Amendment prohibits arms transfers from the United States to Pakistan in response to Pakistani efforts to develop a nuclear weapon capability. This thesis provides a historical background to the current impasse by examining Pakistani foreign policy since 1947. Next, the study examines the evolution of U.S. interests and security objectives in South and Southwest Asia. Current security objectives analyzed are the U.S. strategies to contain Iran andmore » Iraq and to prevent nuclear proliferation in the region. In order to attain security objectives in the region, the author concludes that the U.S. needs a close cooperative relationship with Pakistan. Since the Pressler Amendment stands as the greatest obstacle to improved U.S.-Pakistan relations, the amendment should be repealed.« less

  19. Assessment on security system of radioactive sources used in hospitals of Thailand

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Jitbanjong, Petchara, E-mail: petcharajit@gmail.com; Wongsawaeng, Doonyapong

    Unsecured radioactive sources have caused deaths and serious injuries in many parts of the world. In Thailand, there are 17 hospitals that use teletherapy with cobalt-60 radioactive sources. They need to be secured in order to prevent unauthorized removal, sabotage and terrorists from using such materials in a radiological weapon. The security system of radioactive sources in Thailand is regulated by the Office of Atoms for Peace in compliance with Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), U.S. DOE, which has started to be implemented since 2010. This study aims to perform an assessment on the security system of radioactive sources usedmore » in hospitals in Thailand and the results can be used as a recommended baseline data for development or improvement of hospitals on the security system of a radioactive source at a national regulatory level and policy level. Results from questionnaires reveal that in 11 out of 17 hospitals (64.70%), there were a few differences in conditions of hospitals using radioactive sources with installation of the security system and those without installation of the security system. Also, personals working with radioactive sources did not clearly understand the nuclear security law. Thus, government organizations should be encouraged to arrange trainings on nuclear security to increase the level of understanding. In the future, it is recommended that the responsible government organization issues a minimum requirement of nuclear security for every medical facility using radioactive sources.« less

  20. Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence Measurements on ^237Np for Security and Safeguards Applications

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Angell, C. T.; Joshi, T.; Yee, Ryan; Norman, E. B.; Kulp, W. D.; Warren, G. A.; Korbly, S.; Klimenko, A.; Wilson, C.; Copping, R.; Shuh, D. K.

    2009-10-01

    The smuggling of nuclear material and the diversion of fissile material for covert weapon programs both present grave risks to world security. Methods are needed to detect nuclear material smuggled in cargo, and for proper material accountability in civilian fuel re-processing facilities. Nuclear resonance fluorescence (NRF) is a technique that can address both needs. It is a non-destructive active interrogation method that provides isotope-specific information. It works by using a γ-ray beam to resonantly excite levels in a nucleus and observing the γ-rays emitted whose energy and intensity are characteristic of that isotope. ^237Np presents significant safeguard challenges; it is fissile yet currently has fewer safeguard restrictions. NRF measurements on ^237Np will expand the nuclear database and will permit designing interrogation and assay systems. Measurements were made using the bremsstrahlung beam at the HVRL at MIT on a 7 g target of ^237Np with two incident electron energies of 2.8 and 3.1 MeV. Results will be presented with discussion of the relevant nuclear structure necessary to predict levels in other actinides.

  1. Proliferation: Threat and Response

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1997-11-01

    primary agent, the Defense Technology capabilities also contribute to ongoing efforts to Security Administration ( DTSA ). These efforts are focus and...Special Weapons Agency Organization DTSA Defense Technology Security BW Biological Weapons Administration BWC Biological and Toxin Weapons EPCI Enhanced

  2. Nuclear Weapons, Psychology, and International Relations

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Dougherty, James E.

    1976-01-01

    Fear of nuclear energy, nuclear weapons, and nuclear was is widespread among the peoples of the world. However, to what extent do the fears (both rational and irrational) of policy-making elites and political masses produce actual effects upon the behavior of governments (who, after all, control the use of nuclear weapons)? (Author/RK)

  3. Myth-building: The [open quotes]Islamic[close quotes] bomb

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Hoodbhoy, P.

    1993-06-01

    The [open quotes]Islamic Bomb[close quotes] is roughly understood to be a nuclear weapon aquired for broad ideological reasons--a weapon that supposedly belongs to the Muslim [ital ummah] or community and, as such, is the ultimate expression of Islamic solidarity. Concern about the Islamic bomb is at the heart of the intense effort to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to Muslim countries. The official justification is a general one: proliferation must be curbed globally. But unofficially, the Islamic bomb gets special attention. The reasons behind this special attention are described in this article. The reasons include fear of terrorism, ofmore » a [ital jihad] willing to indiscriminately use nuclear weapons in hope of a reward in the Hereafter, and of the transfer of nuclear arms from nuclear to non-nuclear Muslim countries in times of crisis. Possibilities for controlling the proliferation of nuclear weapons in Muslim countries are addressed. Reasons are cited as to why various Muslim countries wish to acquire nuclear weapons.« less

  4. Challenging Minimum Deterrence: Articulating the Contemporary Relevance of Nuclear Weapons

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2016-07-13

    Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Accident , and the Illusion of Safety (New York: Penguin Press, 2013), 484. 36. Keir A. Lieber and...Remembrance of Things Past,” 78. 53. Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents , and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton, NJ: Princeton...16 | Air & Space Power Journal Challenging Minimum Deterrence Articulating the Contemporary Relevance of Nuclear Weapons Maj Joshua D. Wiitala, USAF

  5. The continuing risk of nuclear war.

    PubMed

    McCoy, Ronald

    2007-01-01

    Climate change and nuclear war are currently the most dangerous challenges to human civilisation and survival. The effects of climate change are now sufficient to persuade many governments to take effective measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Today there are about 27,000 nuclear warheads, many at least ten times more powerful than the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs, and a meaningful medical response to a nuclear attack is impossible. Nevertheless, the threat of nuclear war does not raise public concern, and indeed the nuclear-weapon states are upgrading their capability. The only effective preventive measure is the abolition of nuclear weapons. Steps towards this include: a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, for the nuclear weapon states to observe their obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to enter into force. The ultimate need is for a Nuclear Weapons Convention; International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War have launched an International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear weapons (ICAN) to promote a NWC.

  6. Physicochemical characterization of discrete weapons grade plutonium metal particles originating from the 1960 BOMARC incident

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Bowen, James M.

    The goal of this research was to investigate the physicochemical properties of weapons grade plutonium particles originating from the 1960 BOMARC incident for the purpose of predicting their fate in the environment and to address radiation protection and nuclear security concerns. Methods were developed to locate and isolate the particles in order to characterize them. Physical, chemical, and radiological characterization was performed using a variety of techniques. And finally, the particles were subjected to a sequential extraction procedure, a series of increasingly aggressive reagents, to simulate an accelerated environmental exposure. A link between the morphology of the particles and their partitioning amongst environmental mechanisms was established.

  7. DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Hughes, Joan F.

    The US Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR) is located in Roane and Anderson counties in East Tennessee, about 40 km (25 miles) from Knoxville. ORR is one of DOE’s most unique and complex sites. It encompasses three major facilities and thousands of employees that perform every mission in the DOE portfolio—energy research, environmental restoration, national security, nuclear fuel supply, reindustrialization, science education, basic and applied research in areas important to US security, and technology transfer. ORR was established in the early 1940s as part of the Manhattan Project for the purposes of enriching uranium and pioneering methodsmore » for producing and separating plutonium. Today, scientists at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), DOE’s largest multipurpose national laboratory, conduct world-leading research in advanced materials, alternative fuels, climate change, and supercomputing. The Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12 or Y-12 Complex) is vital to maintaining the safety, security, and effectiveness of the US nuclear weapons stockpile and reducing the global threat posed by nuclear proliferation and terrorism. The East Tennessee Technology Park (ETTP), a former uranium enrichment complex, is being transitioned to a clean, revitalized industrial park.« less

  8. Nuclear Weapons: Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2007-05-24

    remain current. It indicated plans to reduce the time between a decision to conduct a nuclear test and the test itself, which has been done. Critics ...over the Summit,” Manila Bulletin, August 27, 2005. Critics expressed concern about the implications of these policies for testing and new weapons...force, seek the opportunity to design and build new nuclear weapons, and abandon a ten-year-old moratorium on nuclear weapons testing.”8 Another critic

  9. Nuclear obligations: Nuremberg law, nuclear weapons, and protest

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Burroughs, J.R.

    1991-01-01

    Nuclear weapons use and deployment and nonviolent anti-nuclear protests are evaluated. Use of nuclear weapons would constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity as defined in both the Nuremberg Charter and Allied Control Council Law No. 10 and applied by the International Military Tribunal and other Nuremberg courts. Strategic and atomic bombing during World War 2 did not set a precedent for use of nuclear weapons. The consequentialist argument for World War 2 bombing fails and the bombing has also been repudiated by codification of the law of war in Protocol 1 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The legality ofmore » deploying nuclear weapons as instruments of geopolitical policy is questionable when measured against the Nuremberg proscription of planning and preparation of aggressive war, war crimes, and crimes against humanity and the United Nations Charter's proscription of aggressive threat of force. While states' practice of deploying the weapons and the arms-control treaties that regulate but do not prohibit mere possession provide some support for legality, those treaties recognize the imperative of preventing nuclear war, and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty commits nuclear-armed states to good-faith negotiation of nuclear disarmament.« less

  10. Reagan and the Nuclear Freeze: "Stars Wars" as a Rhetorical Strategy.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Bjork, Rebecca S.

    1988-01-01

    Analyzes the interaction between nuclear freeze activists and proponents of a Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Argues that SDI strengthens Reagan's rhetorical position concerning nuclear weapons policy because it reduces the argumentative ground of the freeze movement by envisioning a defensive weapons system that would nullify nuclear weapons.…

  11. Progress in alternative neutron detection to address the helium-3 shortage

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Kouzes, Richard T.; Lintereur, Azaree T.; Siciliano, Edward R.

    2015-06-01

    One of the main uses for 3He is in gas proportional counters for neutron detection. Such detectors are used at neutron scattering science facilities and in radiation portal monitors deployed for homeland security and non-proliferation applications. Other uses of 3He are for research detectors, commercial instruments, well logging detectors, dilution refrigerators, lung imaging, for targets in nuclear research, and for basic research in condensed matter physics. The supply of 3He comes entirely from the decay of tritium produced for nuclear weapons in the U.S. and Russia. Due to the large increase in use of 3He for science and homeland security (since 2002), the supply could no longer meet the demand. This has led to the development of a number of alternative neutron detection schemes.

  12. Sandia technology: Engineering and science applications

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Maydew, M. C.; Parrot, H.; Dale, B. C.; Floyd, H. L.; Leonard, J. A.; Parrot, L.

    1990-12-01

    This report discusses: protecting environment, safety, and health; Sandia's quality initiative; Sandia vigorously pursues technology transfer; scientific and technical education support programs; nuclear weapons development; recognizing battlefield targets with trained artificial neural networks; battlefield robotics: warfare at a distance; a spinning shell sizes up the enemy; thwarting would-be nuclear terrorists; unattended video surveillance system for nuclear facilities; making the skies safer for travelers; onboard instrumentation system to evaluate performance of stockpile bombs; keeping track with lasers; extended-life lithium batteries; a remote digital video link acquires images securely; guiding high-performance missiles with laser gyroscopes; nonvolatile memory chips for space applications; initiating weapon explosives with lasers; next-generation optoelectronics and microelectronics technology developments; chemometrics: new methods for improving chemical analysis; research team focuses ion beam to record-breaking intensities; standardizing the volt to quantum accuracy; new techniques improve robotic software development productivity; a practical laser plasma source for generating soft x-rays; exploring metal grain boundaries; massively parallel computing; modeling the amount of desiccant needed for moisture control; attacking pollution with sunshine; designing fuel-conversion catalysts with computers; extending a nuclear power plant's useful life; plasma-facing components for the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor.

  13. High-pressure swing system for measurements of radioactive fission gases in air samples

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Schell, W. R.; Vives-Battle, J.; Yoon, S. R.; Tobin, M. J.

    1999-01-01

    Radionuclides emitted from nuclear reactors, fuel reprocessing facilities and nuclear weapons tests are distributed widely in the atmosphere but have very low concentrations. As part of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), identification and verification of the emission of radionuclides from such sources are fundamental in maintaining nuclear security. To detect underground and underwater nuclear weapons tests, only the gaseous components need to be analyzed. Equipment has now been developed that can be used to collect large volumes of air, separate and concentrate the radioactive gas constituents, such as xenon and krypton, and measure them quantitatively. By measuring xenon isotopes with different half-lives, the time since the fission event can be determined. Developments in high-pressure (3500 kPa) swing chromatography using molecular sieve adsorbents have provided the means to collect and purify trace quantities of the gases from large volumes of air automatically. New scintillation detectors, together with timing and pulse shaping electronics, have provided the low-background levels essential in identifying the gamma ray, X-ray, and electron energy spectra of specific radionuclides. System miniaturization and portability with remote control could be designed for a field-deployable production model.

  14. Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2016

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Wills

    This Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report (NNSSER) was prepared to satisfy DOE Order DOE O 231.1B, “Environment, Safety and Health Reporting.” Its purpose is to (1) report compliance status with environmental standards and requirements, (2) present results of environmental monitoring of radiological and nonradiological effluents, (3) report estimated radiological doses to the public from releases of radioactive material, (4) summarize environmental incidents of noncompliance and actions taken in response to them, (5) describe the National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) Environmental Management System and characterize its performance, and (6) highlight significant environmental programs and efforts. This NNSSERmore » summarizes data and compliance status for calendar year 2016 at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) and its two Nevada-based support facilities, the North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF) and the Remote Sensing Laboratory–Nellis (RSL-Nellis). It also addresses environmental restoration (ER) projects conducted at the Tonopah Test Range (TTR) and the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR). NNSA/NFO directs the management and operation of the NNSS and six sites across the nation. In addition to the NNSA itself, the six sites include two in Nevada (NLVF and RSL-Nellis) and four in other states (RSL-Andrews in Maryland, Livermore Operations in California, Los Alamos Operations in New Mexico, and Special Technologies Laboratory in California). Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia National Laboratories are the principal organizations that sponsor and implement the nuclear weapons programs at the NNSS. National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec), is the current Management and Operating contractor accountable for the successful execution of work and ensuring that work is performed in compliance with environmental regulations. The six sites all provide support to enhance the NNSS as a location for its multiple missions. The three major NNSS missions include National Security/Defense, Environmental Management, and Nondefense. The major programs that support these missions are Stockpile Stewardship and Management, Nonproliferation and Counterterrorism, Nuclear Emergency Response, Strategic Partnership Projects, Environmental Restoration, Waste Management, Conservation and Renewable Energy, Other Research and Development, and Infrastructure. The major facilities that support the programs include the U1a Facility, Big Explosives Experimental Facility (BEEF), Device Assembly Facility, Dense Plasma Focus Facility, Joint Actinide Shock Physics Experimental Research Facility, Radiological/Nuclear Countermeasures Test and Evaluation Complex, Nonproliferation Test and Evaluation Complex (NPTEC), Radiological/Nuclear Weapons of Mass Destruction Incident Exercise Site, the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC), and the Area 3 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS).« less

  15. Multi-Detector Analysis System for Spent Nuclear Fuel Characterization

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Reber, Edward Lawrence; Aryaeinejad, Rahmat; Cole, Jerald Donald

    1999-09-01

    The Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Non-Destructive Analysis (NDA) program at INEEL is developing a system to characterize SNF for fissile mass, radiation source term, and fissile isotopic content. The system is based on the integration of the Fission Assay Tomography System (FATS) and the Gamma-Neutron Analysis Technique (GNAT) developed under programs supported by the DOE Office of Non-proliferation and National Security. Both FATS and GNAT were developed as separate systems to provide information on the location of special nuclear material in weapons configuration (FATS role), and to measure isotopic ratios of fissile material to determine if the material was frommore » a weapon (GNAT role). FATS is capable of not only determining the presence and location of fissile material but also the quantity of fissile material present to within 50%. GNAT determines the ratios of the fissile and fissionable material by coincidence methods that allow the two prompt (immediately) produced fission fragments to be identified. Therefore, from the combination of FATS and GNAT, MDAS is able to measure the fissile material, radiation source term, and fissile isotopics content.« less

  16. DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Laughlin, Gary L.

    The International, Homeland, and Nuclear Security (IHNS) Program Management Unit (PMU) oversees a broad portfolio of Sandia’s programs in areas ranging from global nuclear security to critical asset protection. We use science and technology, innovative research, and global engagement to counter threats, reduce dangers, and respond to disasters. The PMU draws on the skills of scientists and engineers from across Sandia. Our programs focus on protecting US government installations, safeguarding nuclear weapons and materials, facilitating nonproliferation activities, securing infrastructures, countering chemical and biological dangers, and reducing the risk of terrorist threats. We conduct research in risk and threat analysis, monitoringmore » and detection, decontamination and recovery, and situational awareness. We develop technologies for verifying arms control agreements, neutralizing dangerous materials, detecting intruders, and strengthening resiliency. Our programs use Sandia’s High-Performance Computing resources for predictive modeling and simulation of interdependent systems, for modeling dynamic threats and forecasting adaptive behavior, and for enabling decision support and processing large cyber data streams. In this report, we highlight four advanced computation projects that illustrate the breadth of the IHNS mission space.« less

  17. Cox report and the US-China arms control technical exchange program

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Di Capua, M S

    The ACE program furthered the national security interests of the US by promoting technical approaches to the implementation and verification of arms control treaties that the international community embraces. The Cox Committee report suggests that uncontrolled interactions were taking place between US and Chinese nuclear weapons scientists in the course of the ACE program. On the contrary, elaborate controls were in place at the very beginning and remained in place to control the interactions and protect US national security information. The ACE program payoff to national security was just beginning and its suspension, resulting from the Cox reports allegations, ismore » a setback to US-China progress on arms control.« less

  18. Civil Defense, U. S. A.: A Programmed Orientation to Civil Defense. Unit 2. Nuclear Weapons Effects and Shelter.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DOD), Battle Creek, MI.

    Basic information about nuclear weapons is presented so that their effects can be meaningfully related to the defensive countermeasures which will be most effective against them. Major topics include: (1) Explosive power of nuclear weapons, (2) Major effects of nuclear explosions, (3) Two basic types of nuclear explosions, (4) Contrast between air…

  19. Nuclear materials stewardship: Our enduring mission

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Isaacs, T.H.

    1998-12-31

    The US Department of Energy (DOE) and its predecessors have handled a remarkably wide variety of nuclear materials over the past 50 yr. Two fundamental changes have occurred that shape the current landscape regarding nuclear materials. If one recognizes the implications and opportunities, one sees that the stewardship of nuclear materials will be a fundamental and important job of the DOE for the foreseeable future. The first change--the breakup of the Soviet Union and the resulting end to the nuclear arms race--altered US objectives. Previously, the focus was on materials production, weapon design, nuclear testing, and stockpile enhancements. Now themore » attention is on dismantlement of weapons, excess special nuclear material inventories, accompanying increased concern over the protection afforded to such materials; new arms control measures; and importantly, maintenance of the safety and reliability of the remaining arsenal without testing. The second change was the raised consciousness and sense of responsibility for dealing with the environmental legacies of past nuclear arms programs. Recognition of the need to clean up radioactive contamination, manage the wastes, conduct current operations responsibly, and restore the environment have led to the establishment of what is now the largest program in the DOE. Two additional features add to the challenge and drive the need for recognition of nuclear materials stewardship as a fundamental, enduring, and compelling mission of the DOE. The first is the extraordinary time frames. No matter what the future of nuclear weapons and no matter what the future of nuclear power, the DOE will be responsible for most of the country`s nuclear materials and wastes for generations. Even if the Yucca Mountain program is successful and on schedule, it will last more than 100 yr. Second, the use, management, and disposition of nuclear materials and wastes affect a variety of nationally important and diverse objectives, from national security to the future of nuclear power in this country and abroad, to the care of the environment. Sometimes these objectives are in concert, but often they are seen as competing or being in conflict. By recognizing the corporate responsibility for these materials and the accompanying programs, national decision making will be improved.« less

  20. 75 FR 34919 - Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect To the Risk of Nuclear Proliferation Created...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-06-18

    ... To the Risk of Nuclear Proliferation Created By the Accumulation of Weapons-usable Fissile Material... Risk of Nuclear Proliferation Created By the Accumulation of Weapons-usable Fissile Material In the... Russian Federation Concerning the Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted from Nuclear Weapons...

  1. 77 FR 37261 - Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to the Risk of Nuclear Proliferation Created...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2012-06-21

    ... National Emergency With Respect to the Risk of Nuclear Proliferation Created by the Accumulation of Weapons... Extracted from Nuclear Weapons, dated February 18, 1993, and related contracts and agreements (collectively... derived from nuclear weapons to low enriched uranium for peaceful commercial purposes. The order invoked...

  2. Irans Nuclear Program: Tehrans Compliance with International Obligations

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2016-04-07

    ratified the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970. Article III of the treaty requires non-nuclear- weapon states-parties 1 to accept...concern that Tehran is pursuing nuclear weapons . Tehran’s construction of gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facilities is currently the main source...uranium (HEU), which is one of the two types of fissile material used in nuclear weapons . HEU can also be used as fuel in certain types of nuclear

  3. Irans Nuclear Program: Tehrans Compliance with International Obligations

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2016-03-03

    ratified the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970. Article III of the treaty requires non-nuclear- weapon states-parties 1 to accept...concern that Tehran is pursuing nuclear weapons . Tehran’s construction of gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facilities is currently the main source...uranium (HEU), which is one of the two types of fissile material used in nuclear weapons . HEU can also be used as fuel in certain types of nuclear

  4. Radiation Detection for Homeland Security Applications

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Ely, James

    2008-05-01

    In the past twenty years or so, there have been significant changes in the strategy and applications for homeland security. Recently there have been significant at deterring and interdicting terrorists and associated organizations. This is a shift in the normal paradigm of deterrence and surveillance of a nation and the `conventional' methods of warfare to the `unconventional' means that terrorist organizations resort to. With that shift comes the responsibility to monitor international borders for weapons of mass destruction, including radiological weapons. As a result, countries around the world are deploying radiation detection instrumentation to interdict the illegal shipment of radioactive material crossing international borders. These efforts include deployments at land, rail, air, and sea ports of entry in the US and in European and Asian countries. Radioactive signatures of concern include radiation dispersal devices (RDD), nuclear warheads, and special nuclear material (SNM). Radiation portal monitors (RPMs) are used as the main screening tool for vehicles and cargo at borders, supplemented by handheld detectors, personal radiation detectors, and x-ray imaging systems. This talk will present an overview of radiation detection equipment with emphasis on radiation portal monitors. In the US, the deployment of radiation detection equipment is being coordinated by the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office within the Department of Homeland Security, and a brief summary of the program will be covered. Challenges with current generation systems will be discussed as well as areas of investigation and opportunities for improvements. The next generation of radiation portal monitors is being produced under the Advanced Spectroscopic Portal program and will be available for deployment in the near future. Additional technologies, from commercially available to experimental, that provide additional information for radiation screening, such as density imaging equipment, will be reviewed. Opportunities for further research and development to improve the current equipment and methodologies for radiation detection for the important task of homeland security will be the final topic to be discussed.

  5. Optical detection of special nuclear materials: an alternative approach for standoff and remote sensing

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Johnson, J. Bruce; Reeve, S. W.; Burns, W. A.; Allen, Susan D.

    2010-04-01

    Termed Special Nuclear Material (SNM) by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, fissile materials, such as 235U and 239Pu, are the primary components used to construct modern nuclear weapons. Detecting the clandestine presence of SNM represents an important capability for Homeland Security. An ideal SNM sensor must be able to detect fissile materials present at ppb levels, be able to distinguish between the source of the detected fissile material, i.e., 235U, 239Pu, 233U or other fission source, and be able to perform the discrimination in near real time. A sensor with such capabilities would provide not only rapid identification of a threat but, ultimately, information on the potential source of the threat. For example, current detection schemes for monitoring clandestine nuclear testing and nuclear fuel reprocessing to provide weapons grade fissile material rely largely on passive air sampling combined with a subsequent instrumental analysis or some type of wet chemical analysis of the collected material. It would be highly useful to have a noncontact method of measuring isotopes capable of providing forensic information rapidly at ppb levels of detection. Here we compare the use of Kr, Xe and I as "canary" species for distinguishing between 235U and 239Pu fission sources by spectroscopic methods.

  6. The Future of Nuclear Archaeology: Reducing Legacy Risks of Weapons Fissile Material

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Wood, Thomas W.; Reid, Bruce D.; Toomey, Christopher M.

    2014-01-01

    This report describes the value proposition for a "nuclear archeological" technical capability and applications program, targeted at resolving uncertainties regarding fissile materials production and use. At its heart, this proposition is that we can never be sure that all fissile material is adequately secure without a clear idea of what "all" means, and that uncertainty in this matter carries risk. We argue that this proposition is as valid today, under emerging state and possible non-state nuclear threats, as it was in an immediate post-Cold-War context, and describe how nuclear archeological methods can be used to verify fissile materials declarations, ormore » estimate and characterize historical fissile materials production independently of declarations.« less

  7. Sandia National Laboratories focus issue: introduction.

    PubMed

    Boye, Robert

    2014-08-20

    For more than six decades, Sandia has provided the critical science and technology to address the nation's most challenging issues. Our original nuclear weapons mission has been complemented with work in defense systems, energy and climate, as well as international and homeland security. Our vision is to be a premier science and engineering laboratory for technology solutions to the most challenging problems that threaten peace and freedom for our nation and the globe.

  8. Russian Nonproliferation Policy and the Korean Peninsula

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2006-12-01

    petroleum and natural gas, and potential market , Washington would not allow Russia to use Iran in its attempt to increase Russia’s influence in the...ASEM).30 The second goal is to open markets for Russia’s competitive products such as energy resources, high- tech weapons, and nuclear technology...to the Korean weaponry market that the United States has monopolized, its entry into world economic organizations, and, finally, its security

  9. An All-Hazards Training Center for a Catastrophic Emergency

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2009-12-01

    Physical Security, Military Academy, and Medical Service Corps. He held college faculty appointments as: adjunct professor for California College...Stewart has more than 20 years experience in healthcare as a Respiratory Care Practitioner. He is a registered respiratory therapist and practiced in...program.43 “The barriers to developing a nuclear weapon today are not intellectual; the barriers instead are the physical requirements needed to make a

  10. The Future of NATO and an Evolving European Security Interest

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2010-03-03

    Secondly, how can NATO engage Russia in a binding and mutually beneficial relationship with Europe and the wider North Atlantic community ? Thirdly, how...Atlantic community faces a terrorist network whose main weapons are of more psychological than military character, fuelled by religious ideology, and...periphery. Former Communist countries, fueled by a subliminal fear of the Soviet “bear”, looked immediately for NATO membership, which implied the nuclear

  11. The French Strategic Dilemma.

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1984-03-01

    THE FRENCH STRATEGIC DILEMMA This paper identifies a basic strategic dilemma for France . On the one hand, French leaders identify the political purpose...are inducing a need for France to provide a more explicit definition of the role of French nuclear weapons in the West European security system. In...defense policy in France . This section concludes with an assessment of the alternative scenarios for the evolution of French defense policy in the 1980s

  12. Iran: Politics, Gulf Security, and U.S. Policy

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2016-08-19

    nuclear weapon if it decided to do so. President Obama has asserted that the JCPOA has the potential to produce the added benefit of improving U.S... benefits , and can spend significant amounts of unbudgeted funds on arms, technology, and support to pro-Iranian movements. Society of Militant...international isolation, continues to back state intervention in the economy to benefit workers and lower classes. Appeared at some of the 2009 protests

  13. Worldwide Report, Arms Control

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1985-10-21

    antimissile, the United States will increase its " powerful strategic triad" for inflicting a crucial first strike against the USSR. Thus, what...the United States — the leader of the aggressive NATO bloc — cannot fully use the colossal military power concentrated in its hands for securing its...course of nuclear disarmament; insistently proposing to the United States the conduct of negotia- tions on the complex of nucler and space weapons

  14. U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue, Phase II

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2007-04-12

    Chinese Presentation 12:00-1:30p Lunch – Hibiscus Suite (Kalia Tower-2nd floor) 1:30p Panel II: Crisis Escalation in Theory and History Paper...Lunch Hibiscus Suite (Kalia Tower-2nd floor) 1:30p Panel IV: Nuclear Weapons Safety and Security: Comparing national approaches and discussing... Hibiscus Suite (Kalia Tower-2nd floor) 25 APPENDIX II: CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS 26 China Rear Admiral Yang Yi Director Institute of

  15. Possible Impacts of Major Counter Terrorism Security Actions on Research, Development, and Higher Education

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2002-04-08

    purpose is to avert the spread of weapons of mass destruction and missile delivery systems, maintain U.S. advantage in some militarily critical...the Production and Use of Nuclear Material for Military Applications, 3. Missile / missile Technology: Technologies Associated with Air Vehicles And...Unmanned Missile Systems. 4. Aircraft and Missile Propulsion and Vehicular Systems: Technologies Associated With Liquid and Solid Rocket Propulsion

  16. Weapons of mass destruction: Overview of the CBRNEs (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives).

    PubMed

    Prockop, Leon D

    2006-11-01

    The events of September 11, 2001, made citizens of the world acutely aware of disasters consequent to present-day terrorism. This is a war being waged for reasons obscure to many of its potential victims. The term "NBCs" was coined in reference to terrorist weapons of mass destruction, i.e., nuclear, biological and chemical. The currently accepted acronym is "CBRNE" which includes Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive weapons. Non-nuclear explosives are the most common terrorist weapon now in use. Nuclear and radiological weapons are beyond the scope of this publication, which focuses on the "CBEs", i.e. chemical, biological and explosive weapons. Although neurologists will not be the first responders to CBEs, they must know about the neurological effects in order to provide diagnosis and treatment to survivors. Neurological complications of chemical, biological and explosive weapons which have or may be used by terrorists are reviewed by international experts in this publication. Management and treatment profiles are outlined.

  17. 28 CFR 13.6 - Criteria for reward.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... Judicial Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ATOMIC WEAPONS AND SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS REWARDS... reward under the Atomic Weapons and Special Nuclear Materials Rewards Act must be original, and must..., acquire or export special nuclear material or atomic weapons, or (5) Loss, diversion or disposal or...

  18. 28 CFR 13.6 - Criteria for reward.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... Judicial Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ATOMIC WEAPONS AND SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS REWARDS... reward under the Atomic Weapons and Special Nuclear Materials Rewards Act must be original, and must..., acquire or export special nuclear material or atomic weapons, or (5) Loss, diversion or disposal or...

  19. 28 CFR 13.6 - Criteria for reward.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... Judicial Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ATOMIC WEAPONS AND SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS REWARDS... reward under the Atomic Weapons and Special Nuclear Materials Rewards Act must be original, and must..., acquire or export special nuclear material or atomic weapons, or (5) Loss, diversion or disposal or...

  20. 28 CFR 13.6 - Criteria for reward.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... Judicial Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ATOMIC WEAPONS AND SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS REWARDS... reward under the Atomic Weapons and Special Nuclear Materials Rewards Act must be original, and must..., acquire or export special nuclear material or atomic weapons, or (5) Loss, diversion or disposal or...

  1. 28 CFR 13.6 - Criteria for reward.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... Judicial Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ATOMIC WEAPONS AND SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS REWARDS... reward under the Atomic Weapons and Special Nuclear Materials Rewards Act must be original, and must..., acquire or export special nuclear material or atomic weapons, or (5) Loss, diversion or disposal or...

  2. Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2017-02-21

    missiles; cruise missiles; and gravity bombs . In contrast with the longer-range “strategic” nuclear weapons, these weapons had a lower profile in policy...States sought to deploy dual-capable aircraft and nuclear bombs at bases on the territories of NATO members in eastern Europe. Neither NATO, as an...ballistic missiles; cruise missiles; and gravity bombs . The United States deployed these weapons with its troops in the field, aboard aircraft, on

  3. Multidimensional Analysis of Nuclear Detonations

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2015-09-17

    Features on the nuclear weapons testing films because of the expanding and emissive nature of the nuclear fireball. The use of these techniques to produce...Treaty (New Start Treaty) have reduced the acceptable margins of error. Multidimensional analysis provides the modern approach to nuclear weapon ...scientific community access to the information necessary to expand upon the knowledge of nuclear weapon effects. This data set has the potential to provide

  4. Nuclear Weapons: DOD Assessed the Need for Each Leg of the Strategic Triad and Considered Other Reductions to Nuclear Forces

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2016-09-01

    NUCLEAR WEAPONS DOD Assessed the Need for Each Leg of the Strategic Triad and Considered Other Reductions to... Nuclear Forces Report to Congressional Requesters September 2016 GAO-16-740 United States Government Accountability Office United States...Government Accountability Office Highlights of GAO-16-740, a report to congressional requesters September 2016 NUCLEAR WEAPONS DOD Assessed

  5. Active interrogation of highly enriched uranium

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Fairrow, Nannette Lea

    Safeguarding special nuclear material (SNM) in the Department of Energy Complex is vital to the national security of the United States. Active and passive nondestructive assays are used to confirm the presence of SNM in various configurations ranging from waste to nuclear weapons. Confirmation measurements for nuclear weapons are more challenging because the design complicates the detection of a distinct signal for highly enriched uranium. The emphasis of this dissertation was to investigate a new nondestructive assay technique that provides an independent and distinct signal to confirm the presence of highly enriched uranium (HEU). Once completed and tested this assay method could be applied to confirmation measurements of nuclear weapons. The new system uses a 14-MeV neutron source for interrogation and records the arrival time of neutrons between the pulses with a high efficiency detection system. The data is then analyzed by the Feynman reduced variance method. The analysis determined the amount of correlation in the data and provided a unique signature of correlated fission neutrons. Measurements of HEU spheres were conducted at Los Alamos with the new system. Then, Monte Carlo calculations were performed to verify hypothesis made about the behavior of the neutrons in the experiment. Comparisons of calculated counting rates by the Monte Carlo N-Particle Transport Code (MCNP) were made with the experimental data to confirm that the measured response reflected the desired behavior of neutron interactions in the highly enriched uranium. In addition, MCNP calculations of the delayed neutron build-up were compared with the measured data. Based on the results obtained from this dissertation, this measurement method has the potential to be expanded to include mass determinations of highly enriched uranium. Although many safeguards techniques exist for measuring special nuclear material, the number of assays that can be used to confirm HEU in shielded systems is limited. These assays also rely on secondary characteristics of the material to be measured. A review of the nondestructive techniques with potential applications for nuclear weapons confirmatory measurements were evaluated with summaries of the pros and cons involved in implementing the methods at production type facilities.

  6. DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Lakamp, M.A.

    The United States has adopted a policy of calculated ambiguity regarding the role of nuclear weapons in response to a potential chemical or biological weapons (CBW) attack. Many factors affect decisions about the role nuclear weapons play in US counterproliferation strategy. This thesis describes the policy of calculated ambiguity and offers some observations about its prospects and pitfalls. The thesis presents evidence that suggests nuclear weapons could play a positive role in the US counterproliferation strategy, at least in some circumstances. It also explains how such a role could conflict with the US nonproliferation strategy. Such a role would alsomore » violate the nuclear taboo and be seen by a majority of countries as illegal and immoral. The United States has chosen a policy of calculated ambiguity in an attempt to retain the deterrent value of nuclear weapons without paying the political, legal, and moral costs of explicit reliance on nuclear weapons to deter the use of CBW. This may have short-term benefits, but ultimately may damage the national interest.« less

  7. It's No Secret: Fifty-eight Years of National Security Programs at BNL (463rd Brookhaven Lecture)

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Indusi, Joseph

    2010-11-17

    Prepare for a true tale of suspense and international intrigue. A tale that began in 1952, continued through the Cold War, and is not yet complete today. A tale of unexpected allies. Hear the true tale of one Laboratory’s efforts to keep nuclear materials out of the hands of evildoers. Freidlander. Higinbotham. Dodson. Kouts. And many more! See some of BNL’s all-star cast in the defining roles that shaped their careers as they worked toward keeping the nation and the world safe from the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

  8. The doctrine of the nuclear-weapon states and the future of non-proliferation

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Panofsky, W.K.H.; Bunn, G.

    Less than a year remains before the critical conference in April 1995 to review and extend the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the main international barrier to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This is a critical moment for the United States. With the end of the Cold War, the likelihood of nuclear war with the states of the former Soviet Union has been radically reduced, but there is greatly increased concern over the potential threats from states or sub-state groups seeking to develop or acquire nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

  9. Wartime nuclear weapons research in Germany and Japan.

    PubMed

    Grunden, Walter E; Walker, Mark; Yamnazaki, Masakatsu

    2005-01-01

    This article compares military research projects during the Second World War to develop nuclear weapons in Germany and Japan, two countries who lost the war and failed to create nuclear weapons. The performance and motivations of the scientists, as well as the institutional support given the work, is examined, explaining why, in each case, the project went as far as it did-but no further. The story is carried over into the postwar period, when the two cultures and their scientists had to deal with the buildup of nuclear weapons during the cold war and the new nuclear power industry.

  10. IMPROVED TECHNNOLOGY TO PREVENT ILLICIT TRAFFICKING IN NUCLEAR MATERIALS

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Richardson, J H

    2005-07-20

    The proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons (collectively known as weapons of mass destruction, or WMD) and the potential acquisition and use of WMD against the world by terrorists are extremely serious threats to international security. These threats are complex and interrelated. There are myriad routes to weapons of mass destruction--many different starting materials, material sources, and production processes. There are many possible proliferators--threshold countries, rogue states, state-sponsored or transnational terrorists groups, domestic terrorists, and even international crime organizations. Motives for acquiring and using WMD are similarly wide ranging--from a desire to change the regional power balance, deny accessmore » to a strategic area, or alter international policy to extortion, revenge, or hate. Because of the complexity of this threat landscape, no single program, technology, or capability--no silver bullet--can solve the WMD proliferation and terrorism problem. An integrated program is needed that addresses the WMD proliferation and terrorism problem from end to end, from prevention to detection, reversal, and response, while avoiding surprise at all stages, with different activities directed specifically at different types of WMD and proliferators. Radiation detection technologies are an important tool in the prevention of proliferation. A variety of new developments have enabled enhanced performance in terms of energy resolution, spatial resolution, predictive modeling and simulation, active interrogation, and ease of operation and deployment in the field. The radiation properties of nuclear materials, particularly highly enriched uranium (HEU), make the detection of smuggled nuclear materials technically difficult. A number of efforts are under way to devise improved detector materials and instruments and to identify novel signatures that could be detected. Key applications of this work include monitoring for radioactive materials at choke points, searching for nuclear materials, and developing instruments for response personnel.« less

  11. The US nuclear weapon infrastructure and a stable global nuclear weapon regime

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Immele, John D; Wagner, Richard L

    2009-01-01

    US nuclear weapons capabilities -- extant force structure and nuclear weapons infrastructure as well as declared policy -- influence other nations' nuclear weapons postures, at least to some extent. This influence can be desirable or undesirable, and is, of course, a mixture of both. How strong the influence is, and its nature, are complicated, controversial, and -- in our view -- not well understood but often overstated. Divergent views about this influence and how it might shape the future global nuclear weapons regime seem to us to be the most serious impediment to reaching a national consensus on US weaponsmore » policy, force structure and supporting infrastructure. We believe that a paradigm shift to capability-based deterrence and dissuasion is not only consistent with the realities of the world and how it has changed, but also a desirable way for nuclear weapon postures and infrastructures to evolve. The US and other nuclear states could not get to zero nor even reduce nuclear arms and the nuclear profile much further without learning to manage latent capability. This paper has defined three principles for designing NW infrastructure both at the 'next plateau' and 'near zero.' The US can be a leader in reducing weapons and infrastructure and in creating an international regime in which capability gradually substitutes for weapons in being and is transparent. The current 'strategy' of not having policy or a Congressionally-approved plan for transforming the weapons complex is not leadership. If we can conform the US infrastructure to the next plateau and architect it in such a way that it is aligned with further arms reductions, it will have these benefits: The extant stockpile can be reduced in size, while the smaller stockpile still deters attack on the US and Allies. The capabilities of the infrastructure will dissuade emergence of new challenges/threats; if they emerge, nevertheless, the US will be able to deal with them in time. We will begin to transform the way other major powers view their nuclear capability. Finally, and though of less cosmic importance, it will save money in the long run.« less

  12. JAEA's actions and contributions to the strengthening of nuclear non-proliferation

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Suda, Kazunori; Suzuki, Mitsutoshi; Michiji, Toshiro

    2012-06-01

    Japan, a non-nuclear weapons state, has established a commercial nuclear fuel cycle including LWRs, and now is developing a fast neutron reactor fuel cycle as part of the next generation nuclear energy system, with commercial operation targeted for 2050. Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) is the independent administrative agency for conducting comprehensive nuclear R&D in Japan after the merger of Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI) and Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute (JNC). JAEA and its predecessors have extensive experience in R&D, facility operations, and safeguards development and implementation for new types of nuclear facilities for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. As the operator of various nuclear fuel cycle facilities and numerous nuclear materials, JAEA makes international contributions to strengthen nuclear non-proliferation. This paper provides an overview of JAEA's development of nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards technologies, including remote monitoring of nuclear facilities, environmental sample analysis methods and new efforts since the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington D.C.

  13. Nukes in the Post-Cold War Era A View of the World from Inside the US Nuclear Weapons Program

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Wood, Blake Philip

    Why do we have nuclear weapons? What is in the US stockpile, how is it deployed and controlled, and how it has changed over the years? What is in the “nuclear weapons complex” and what does each lab and plant do? How do the DOE/NNSA Design Labs interact with the Intelligence Community? How does the US stockpile, NW complex, and NW policy compare with those of other countries? What is easy and hard about designing nuclear weapons?

  14. Y-12 Integrated Materials Management System

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Alspaugh, D. H.; Hickerson, T. W.

    2002-06-03

    The Integrated Materials Management System, when fully implemented, will provide the Y-12 National Security Complex with advanced inventory information and analysis capabilities and enable effective assessment, forecasting and management of nuclear materials, critical non-nuclear materials, and certified supplies. These capabilities will facilitate future Y-12 stockpile management work, enhance interfaces to existing National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) corporate-level information systems, and enable interfaces to planned NNSA systems. In the current national nuclear defense environment where, for example, weapons testing is not permitted, material managers need better, faster, more complete information about material properties and characteristics. They now must manage non-special nuclearmore » material at the same high-level they have managed SNM, and information capabilities about both must be improved. The full automation and integration of business activities related to nuclear and non-nuclear materials that will be put into effect by the Integrated Materials Management System (IMMS) will significantly improve and streamline the process of providing vital information to Y-12 and NNSA managers. This overview looks at the kinds of information improvements targeted by the IMMS project, related issues, the proposed information architecture, and the progress to date in implementing the system.« less

  15. DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Yarnall, C.A.; Caruthers, J.R.

    This study was performed under FUTURE LOOK, a joint Defense Nuclear Agency/Department of Energy (DNA/DOE) sponsored study. The intent of FUTURE LOOK is to identify and develop means of providing requisite security and survivability to the Non-Strategic Nuclear Forces (NSNF) in the Twenty-First Century. Our current thinking about the future world in Europe is summarized. In this report we develop four scenarios/stockpile cases to cover the spectrum of potential happenings in Europe; we also develop general security and survivability implications and recommendations for each case. The four cases are: (1) a substantially reduced (factor of 2--10) European stockpile; (2) amore » near-zero stockpile, with no Army weapons remaining in Europe; (3) current stockpile in Europe remains; and (4) current stockpile numbers remain, but aggressive modernization is allowed. We plan to use the information in this report to assist in developing detailed security and survivability options as part of our follow-on to FUTURE LOOK studies. 8 refs., 6 tabs.« less

  16. Red China’s Capitalist Bomb: Inside the Chinese Neutron Bomb Program

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2015-01-01

    developed an enhanced radiation weapon (ERW) but did not deploy it. ERWs, better known as “ neutron bombs,” are specialized nuclear weapons with...contemporary systems of concern. An ERW is a specialized nuclear weapon optimized to produce prompt radiation. Such a device emits neutrons with high...Council stated that China mastered “in succession the neutron bomb design technology and the nuclear weapon miniaturization technology.”10 This statement

  17. Status of Iran's nuclear program and negotiations

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Albright, David

    2014-05-09

    Iran's nuclear program poses immense challenges to international security. Its gas centrifuge program has grown dramatically in the last several years, bringing Iran close to a point where it could produce highly enriched uranium in secret or declared gas centrifuge plants before its breakout would be discovered and stopped. To reduce the risk posed by Iran's nuclear program, the P5+1 have negotiated with Iran short term limits on the most dangerous aspects of its nuclear programs and is negotiating long-term arrangements that can provide assurance that Iran will not build nuclear weapons. These long-term arrangements need to include a farmore » more limited and transparent Iranian nuclear program. In advance of arriving at a long-term arrangement, the IAEA will need to resolve its concerns about the alleged past and possibly on-going military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program.« less

  18. Chemical Terrorism: US Policies to Reduce the Chemical Terror Threat

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2008-09-01

    In- stitute 1992-present CARLA HILLS US Trade Representative 1989-93 RICHARD HOLBROOKE Ambassador to UN, 1999-2001 THOMAS KEAN Governor New...Jersey 1982- 1990 ANTHONY LAKE National Security Advisor 1993-97 JOHN LEHMAN Secretary of the Navy 1981-87 RICHARD C. LEONE President, The...chemical, or biologi- cal, or nuclear weapons.” President George W. Bush, Remarks at the National Defense University, February 11, 2004. 3 “We must be

  19. How to Deter and Coerce Iran into Giving Up Its Nuclear Weapons Program

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2011-12-01

    ix LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS AEOI Atomic Energy Organization of Iran CBI Central Bank of Iran EU European Union GCC Gulf...Atomic Energy Organization of Iran ( AEOI ) indicate a strong belief in the policy-makers’ minds that this deterrence lens has considerable merit. This...Presidents and Cabinet, the AEOI , the IRGC, the Supreme National Security Council, and the Majles. The Supreme Leader controls the IRGC, and the

  20. Oil as a Weapon of the 21st Century: Energy Security and the U.S. Pivot to Asia-Pacific

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2016-03-01

    11 Compared to hydrocarbons, nuclear power offers a carbon-free power generation source, but carries the risk of radiological contamination . With...South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia , Singapore, Australia, Bangladesh, and Burma.88,89 Enhancing...engagement between the countries comprising CTF 151 has resulted in several documented instances where Canadian and British forces gave food and water

  1. The nuclear present. A guide to recent books on nuclear war, weapons, the peace movement, and related issues, with a chronology of nuclear events, 1789-1991

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Burns, G.

    The Nuclear Present brings the interested reader up-to-date on significant English-language books about nuclear weapons and related topics, identifying primarily important works of nuclear non-fiction that have come out since 1984. Each reference has a paragraph of comment about its subject and value. General organizational areas include the following: Reference Works; Nuclear weapons and Nuclear war (14 sub-headings including overviews, development, effects, tests, arms race, prospectives, legal considerations etc.); Strategy; proliferation; Stratigic Defense; Arms control and disarmament; ethical, pholosophical and religous perspectives; new paths to peace; periodic guide; the Chernobyl Disaster. An extensive Nuclear Chronology (1789-1991) written by the authormore » allows a fairly detailed sense of the historical record of nuclear weapons, including testing, manufacture, use and movements for arms control and disarmament.« less

  2. WMD Forecasting in Historical and Contemporary Perspective

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2010-03-01

    a nuclear weapon; Use of a nuclear weapon; Withdrawal from the NPT; Emergence of a nuclear-exports grey market; Widespread dissemination of...Many studies saw technology diffusion and the globalization of commerce as ineluctable forces that contribute to the spread of nuclear (and other...engineering diffuses , the spread of biological weapon capabilities among state actors can be expected to expand in advanced and developing states. This

  3. DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Benton, J; Wall, D; Parker, E

    This paper presents the latest information on one of the Accelerated Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Disposition initiatives that resulted from the May 2002 Summit meeting between Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir V. Putin. These initiatives are meant to strengthen nuclear nonproliferation objectives by accelerating the disposition of nuclear weapons-useable materials. The HEU Transparency Implementation Program (TIP), within the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is working to implement one of the selected initiatives that would purchase excess Russian HEU (93% 235U) for use as fuel in U.S. research reactors over the next ten years. This will parallel efforts to convertmore » the reactors' fuel core from HEU to low enriched uranium (LEU) material, where feasible. The paper will examine important aspects associated with the U.S. research reactor HEU purchase. In particular: (1) the establishment of specifications for the Russian HEU, and (2) transportation safeguard considerations for moving the HEU from the Mayak Production Facility in Ozersk, Russia, to the Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, TN.« less

  4. Joseph A. Burton Forum Award: Some Nuclear Weapons Dilemmas

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    May, Michael

    2014-03-01

    Nuclear weapons pose a combination of political and ethical dilemmas the solution to which has not been found. On one hand, in the view of both US government leaders and US allies, nuclear deterrence continues to play an essential part in the US role as the ultimate source of military strength for the alliances among the major democratic countries. It also continues to be in demand by countries that believe themselves to be isolated and threatened. On the other hand, nuclear weapons, besides being effective deterrents, can cause unprecedented loss of life and risk the demise of civilizations. No ban or technical precaution could prevent the rebuilding of nuclear weapons in a crisis. No diplomatic arrangement to date has erased the threat of invasion and war in the world. Only the abandonment of war and the threat of war as instruments of policy can make nuclear weapons obsolete. The slow, halting, risky road to that end remains the only hope for a world in which lasting solutions to the nuclear dilemmas are possible.

  5. 76 FR 35953 - Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to the Risk of Nuclear Proliferation Created...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-06-20

    ... Accumulation of Weapons-Useable Fissile Material in the Territory of the Russian Federation #0; #0; #0... National Emergency With Respect to the Risk of Nuclear Proliferation Created by the Accumulation of Weapons... Extracted from Nuclear Weapons, dated February 18, 1993, and related contracts and agreements (collectively...

  6. 3 CFR - Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to the Risk of Nuclear Proliferation Created...

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... to the Risk of Nuclear Proliferation Created by the Accumulation of Weapons-Usable Fissile Material... Proliferation Created by the Accumulation of Weapons-Usable Fissile Material in the Territory of the Russian... Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted from Nuclear Weapons, dated February 18, 1993, and related...

  7. 3 CFR - Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to the Risk of Nuclear Proliferation Created...

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... to the Risk of Nuclear Proliferation Created by the Accumulation of Weapons-usable Fissile Material... Proliferation Created by the Accumulation of Weapons-usable Fissile Material in the Territory of the Russian... Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted from Nuclear Weapons, dated February 18, 1993, and related...

  8. ADVANCED CERAMIC MATERIALS FOR NEXT-GENERATION NUCLEAR APPLICATIONS

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Marra, J.

    2010-09-29

    Rising global energy demands coupled with increased environmental concerns point to one solution; they must reduce their dependence on fossil fuels that emit greenhouse gases. As the global community faces the challenge of maintaining sovereign nation security, reducing greenhouse gases, and addressing climate change nuclear power will play a significant and likely growing role. In the US, nuclear energy already provides approximately one-fifth of the electricity used to power factories, offices, homes, and schools with 104 operating nuclear power plants, located at 65 sites in 31 states. Additionally, 19 utilities have applied to the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) formore » construction and operating licenses for 26 new reactors at 17 sites. This planned growth of nuclear power is occurring worldwide and has been termed the 'nuclear renaissance.' As major industrial nations craft their energy future, there are several important factors that must be considered about nuclear energy: (1) it has been proven over the last 40 years to be safe, reliable and affordable (good for Economic Security); (2) its technology and fuel can be domestically produced or obtained from allied nations (good for Energy Security); and (3) it is nearly free of greenhouse gas emissions (good for Environmental Security). Already an important part of worldwide energy security via electricity generation, nuclear energy can also potentially play an important role in industrial processes and supporting the nation's transportation sector. Coal-to-liquid processes, the generation of hydrogen and supporting the growing potential for a greatly increased electric transportation system (i.e. cars and trains) mean that nuclear energy could see dramatic growth in the near future as we seek to meet our growing demand for energy in cleaner, more secure ways. In order to address some of the prominent issues associated with nuclear power generation (i.e., high capital costs, waste management, and proliferation), the worldwide community is working to develop and deploy new nuclear energy systems and advanced fuel cycles. These new nuclear systems address the key challenges and include: (1) extracting the full energy value of the nuclear fuel; (2) creating waste solutions with improved long term safety; (3) minimizing the potential for the misuse of the technology and materials for weapons; (4) continually improving the safety of nuclear energy systems; and (5) keeping the cost of energy affordable.« less

  9. Extended Deterrence, Nuclear Proliferation, and START III

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Speed, R.D.

    2000-06-20

    Early in the Cold War, the United States adopted a policy of ''extended nuclear deterrence'' to protect its allies by threatening a nuclear strike against any state that attacks these allies. This threat can (in principle) be used to try to deter an enemy attack using conventional weapons or one using nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. The credibility of a nuclear threat has long been subject to debate and is dependent on many complex geopolitical factors, not the least of which is the military capabilities of the opposing sides. The ending of the Cold War has led to a significantmore » decrease in the number of strategic nuclear weapons deployed by the United States and Russia. START II, which was recently ratified by the Russian Duma, will (if implemented) reduce the number deployed strategic nuclear weapons on each side to 3500, compared to a level of over 11,000 at the end of the Cold War in 1991. The tentative limit established by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin for START III would reduce the strategic force level to 2000-2500. However, the Russians (along with a number of arms control advocates) now argue that the level should be reduced even further--to 1500 warheads or less. The conventional view is that ''deep cuts'' in nuclear weapons are necessary to discourage nuclear proliferation. Thus, as part of the bargain to get the non-nuclear states to agree to the renewal of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the United States pledged to work towards greater reductions in strategic forces. Without movement in the direction of deep cuts, it is thought by many analysts that some countries may decide to build their own nuclear weapons. Indeed, this was part of the rationale India used to justify its own nuclear weapons program. However, there is also some concern that deep cuts (to 1500 or lower) in the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal could have the opposite effect. The fear is that such cuts might undermine extended deterrence and cause a crisis in confidence among U.S. allies to such an extent that they could seek nuclear weapons of their own to protect themselves.« less

  10. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Background and Current Developments

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2009-11-23

    there are no plans to do so.’”5 Critics expressed concern about the implications of these policies for testing and new weapons. A statement by...opportunity to design and build new nuclear weapons, and abandon a ten-year-old moratorium on nuclear weapons testing.”6 Another critic felt that increased...cannot diagnose or remedy a problem in a warhead critical the U.S. nuclear deterrent without conducting a nuclear test.10 Similarly, a Statement of

  11. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Background and Current Developments

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2010-01-06

    the future, but there are no plans to do so.’”5 Critics expressed concern about the implications of these policies for testing and new weapons. A...seek the opportunity to design and build new nuclear weapons, and abandon a ten-year-old moratorium on nuclear weapons testing.”6 Another critic felt...warhead critical the U.S. nuclear deterrent without conducting a nuclear test.10 Similarly, a Statement of Administration Policy on S. 1547, FY2008

  12. Cooperative monitoring and its role in regional security

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Biringer, K.; Olsen, J.; Lincoln, R.

    1997-03-01

    Cooperative monitoring systems can play an important part in promoting the implementation of regional cooperative security agreements. These agreements advance the national security interests of the United States in a post Cold War environment. Regional issues as widely varying as nuclear nonproliferation, trade and environmental pollution can be the source of tensions which may escalate to armed conflict which could have global implications. The Office of National Security Policy Analysis at the US Department of Energy (DOE) has an interest in seeking ways to promote regional cooperation that can reduce the threats posed by regional conflict. DOE technologies and technicalmore » expertise can contribute to developing solutions to a wide variety of these international problems. Much of this DOE expertise has been developed in support of the US nuclear weapons and arms control missions. It is now being made available to other agencies and foreign governments in their search for regional security and cooperation. This report presents two examples of interest to DOE in which monitoring technologies could be employed to promote cooperation through experimentation. The two scenarios include nuclear transparency in Northeast Asia and environmental restoration in the Black Sea. Both offer the potential for the use of technology to promote regional cooperation. The issues associated with both of these monitoring applications are presented along with examples of appropriate monitoring technologies, potential experiments and potential DOE contributions to the scenarios.« less

  13. DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Beck, James B.

    Welcome to the February newsletter. Recent highlights include progress on the nuclear deal with Iran, the continued challenges with North Korea, the developing situation in Ukraine and Georgia, and issues related to the Unites States Nuclear Deterrent. In this newsletter, some key messages from the recent Nuclear Deterrent summit, which is annually held in Washington, DC, asre also included. The NSO recently hosted a workshop organized with the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) at Stanford University on how other States view nuclear weapons and deterrence. Participants included Dr. Bradley Roberts, Gen. (Ret.) Robert Kehler, Bridge Colby, Dr. Robertmore » Gromoll, and other experts. If you would like to have a more in-depth discussion on this or any related topics, please contact Sylvia Martinez at 667-6120 to set up some time.« less

  14. The state of nuclear forensics

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Kristo, Michael J.; Tumey, Scott J.

    2013-01-01

    Nuclear terrorism has been identified as one of the most serious security threats facing the world today. Many countries, including the United States, have incorporated nuclear forensic analysis as a component of their strategy to prevent nuclear terrorism. Nuclear forensics involves the laboratory analysis of seized illicit nuclear materials or debris from a nuclear detonation to identify the origins of the material or weapon. Over the years, a number of forensic signatures have been developed to improve the confidence with which forensic analysts can draw conclusions. These signatures are validated and new signatures are discovered through research and development programs and in round-robin exercises among nuclear forensic laboratories. The recent Nuclear Smuggling International Technical Working Group Third Round Robin Exercise and an on-going program focused on attribution of uranium ore concentrate provide prime examples of the current state of nuclear forensics. These case studies will be examined and the opportunities for accelerator mass spectrometry to play a role in nuclear forensics will be discussed.

  15. Conventional nuclear strategy and the American doctrine of counterforce

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    David, C.P.

    Debate over nuclear weapons still lingers and one cause of this trend, as suggested by this thesis, is the rise of conventional nuclear strategy or, in other words, the attempt by the US government to apply through the counterforce doctrine a conventional weapons strategy in an age of nuclear weapons. That debate is analyzed, as well as the thinking underlining conventional nuclear strategy, and explains why conventionalization has become popular in US nuclear weapons policies. A feature of the American nuclear debate has been the unresolved tension between two approaches to nuclear strategy, namely: the apocalyptic approach and the conventionalmore » approach. The confrontation between these camps has resulted over the years in a gradual but steady erosion of the strategic consensus to the point where, under the Reagan administration, the conventional camp appears to have emerged as a clear winner from the nuclear debate. The attractiveness of conventional nuclear strategy can be attributed to the influence and working of an American style of nuclear strategy, i.e., a specific approach to the phenomena of nuclear weapons. The author concludes that the conventional and official strategic view that nuclear problems can be solved by technological progress may, in fact, contribute to worsen rather than improve the thermonuclear condition of the world.« less

  16. Large Bilateral Reductions in Superpower Nuclear Weapons.

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1985-07-01

    missile ( ABM ) systems were deployed, e.g., the current Soviet ABM system around Moscow. Although there have been no further wartime uses of nuclear...have placed more emphasis on strategic defense than the U.S.; however, by agreeing to the ABM Treaty, the 6Soviets implicitly accepted the fundamental...required for the reliability testing of existing nuclear weapons and the development of future nuclear weapons. The ABM Treaty of 1972 was a

  17. SECURITY GATE FOR WEAPONS STORAGE AREA. FROM LEFT TO RIGHT, ...

    Library of Congress Historic Buildings Survey, Historic Engineering Record, Historic Landscapes Survey

    SECURITY GATE FOR WEAPONS STORAGE AREA. FROM LEFT TO RIGHT, STORAGE BUILDING (BUILDING 3584), CONVENTIONAL MUNITIONS SHOP (BUILDING 3580), AND SECURITY POLICE ENTRY CONTROL BUILDING (BUILDING 3582). VIEW TO SOUTHWEST - Plattsburgh Air Force Base, U.S. Route 9, Plattsburgh, Clinton County, NY

  18. A Sandia weapon review bulletin : defense programs, Autumn 1992.

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Not Available

    1992-09-01

    Topics in this issue: (1) Focal Point and STEP. Sandia National Laboratories has always focused its advanced weapon development not only on future weapon needs, but also on the engineering and manufacturing sciences needed to meet them. Both areas are changing dramatically. As the nation dismantles many of its warheads, it becomes essential that those that remain are increasingly reliable, secure, capable, and safe. And as development resources diminish, it becomes vital that they are applied to the most critical technologies in a disciplined manner. The mission of the Focal Point program and the Stockpile Transition Enabling Program (STEP) ismore » to develop processes for meeting these challenges. Focal Point offers a decision-making process for allocating Sandia's resources to meets its defense programs strategic goals. (2) Defense Programs news in brief. (3) Dismantling the nuclear stockpile. (4) W88/MK5: Arming, Fuzing, and Firing system meets all requirements and goals. (5) The Common Radar Fuze. (6) Insertable-explosive arming of firing sets. (7) Preparing for fewer underground tests.« less

  19. HOW OLD IS IT? - 241PU/241AM NUCLEAR FORENSIC CHRONOLOGY REFERENCE MATERIALS

    PubMed Central

    Fitzgerald, Ryan; Inn, Kenneth G.W.; Horgan, Christopher

    2018-01-01

    One material attribute for nuclear forensics is material age. 241Pu is almost always present in uranium- and plutonium-based nuclear weapons, which pose the greatest threat to our security. The in-growth of 241Am due to the decay of 241Pu provides an excellent chronometer of the material. A well-characterized 241Pu/241Am standard is needed to validate measurement capability, as a basis for between-laboratory comparability, and as material for verifying laboratory performance. This effort verifies the certification of a 38 year old 241Pu Standard Reference Material (SRM4340) through alpha-gamma anticoincidence counting, and also establishes the separation date to two weeks of the documented date. PMID:29720779

  20. Dangers associated with civil nuclear power programmes: weaponization and nuclear waste.

    PubMed

    Boulton, Frank

    2015-07-24

    The number of nuclear power plants in the world rose exponentially to 420 by 1990 and peaked at 438 in 2002; but by 2014, as closed plants were not replaced, there were just 388. In spite of using more renewable energy, the world still relies on fossil fuels, but some countries plan to develop new nuclear programmes. Spent nuclear fuel, one of the most dangerous and toxic materials known, can be reprocessed into fresh fuel or into weapons-grade materials, and generates large amounts of highly active waste. This article reviews available literature on government and industry websites and from independent analysts on world energy production, the aspirations of the 'new nuclear build' programmes in China and the UK, and the difficulties in keeping the environment safe over an immense timescale while minimizing adverse health impacts and production of greenhouse gases, and preventing weaponization by non-nuclear-weapons states acquiring civil nuclear technology.

  1. U.S. Nuclear Weapons: Changes in Policy and Force Structure

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2006-08-10

    the Mound Plant , near Dayton OH; the Pinellas Plant , in Clearwater, FL; and the Pantex Plant near Amarillo, TX. These facilities were also operated...major nuclear weapons production facilities. These included the Rocky Flats Plant , outside Denver, CO; the Kansas City Plant , near Kansas City, MO...response to safety concerns. The Rocky Flats Plant , which produced the nuclear triggers, or “pits,” for nuclear weapons closed in 1989, in response

  2. Twenty-Five Year Site Plan FY2013 - FY2037

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Jones, William H.

    2012-07-12

    Los Alamos National Laboratory (the Laboratory) is the nation's premier national security science laboratory. Its mission is to develop and apply science and technology to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of the United States (U.S.) nuclear stockpile; reduce the threat of weapons of mass destruction, proliferation, and terrorism; and solve national problems in defense, energy, and the environment. The fiscal year (FY) 2013-2037 Twenty-Five Year Site Plan (TYSP) is a vital component for planning to meet the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) commitment to ensure the U.S. has a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent. The Laboratory also usesmore » the TYSP as an integrated planning tool to guide development of an efficient and responsive infrastructure that effectively supports the Laboratory's missions and workforce. Emphasizing the Laboratory's core capabilities, this TYSP reflects the Laboratory's role as a prominent contributor to NNSA missions through its programs and campaigns. The Laboratory is aligned with Nuclear Security Enterprise (NSE) modernization activities outlined in the NNSA Strategic Plan (May 2011) which include: (1) ensuring laboratory plutonium space effectively supports pit manufacturing and enterprise-wide special nuclear materials consolidation; (2) constructing the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Facility (CMRR-NF); (3) establishing shared user facilities to more cost effectively manage high-value, experimental, computational and production capabilities; and (4) modernizing enduring facilities while reducing the excess facility footprint. Th is TYSP is viewed by the Laboratory as a vital planning tool to develop an effi cient and responsive infrastructure. Long range facility and infrastructure development planning are critical to assure sustainment and modernization. Out-year re-investment is essential for sustaining existing facilities, and will be re-evaluated on an annual basis. At the same time, major modernization projects will require new line-item funding. This document is, in essence, a roadmap that defines a path forward for the Laboratory to modernize, streamline, consolidate, and sustain its infrastructure to meet its national security mission.« less

  3. It's No Secret: Fifty-eight Years of National Security Programs at BNL (463rd Brookhaven Lecture)

    ScienceCinema

    Indusi, Joseph [BNL Nonproliferation and National Security Department

    2017-12-09

    Prepare for a true tale of suspense and international intrigue. A tale that began in 1952, continued through the Cold War, and is not yet complete today. A tale of unexpected allies. Hear the true tale of one Laboratory’s efforts to keep nuclear materials out of the hands of evildoers. Freidlander. Higinbotham. Dodson. Kouts. And many more! See some of BNL’s all-star cast in the defining roles that shaped their careers as they worked toward keeping the nation and the world safe from the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

  4. Misunderstood Dragon or Underestimated Panda: How China Reacts to External National Security Crises

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2009-06-01

    Emphasis added. Scobell, 84. 28 Li, Millett, and Yu, 40. 29 Peng Dehuai, Memoirs of a Chinese Marshal: The Autobiographical Notes of Peng Dehuai...was prepared to fight, even if the US used nuclear weapons. 34 This message was not lost on the Johnson administration. The recent memory of US...1953. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2000. Dehuai, Peng. Memoirs of a Chinese Marshal: The autobiographical notes of Peng Dehuai (1898

  5. Nuclear Weapons and NATO, Analytical Survey of Literature

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1975-06-01

    contribution to the current debate on important issues now facing the Alliance." 3 EUROPEAN SECURITY AND THE AT- LANTIC SYSTEM, ed. by William T. R...a good long run ahead of it." (*)—CRISIS IN EUROPEAN DEFENCE: THE NEXT TEN YEARS, by Geoffrey Lee Wil- liams and Alan Lee Williams . London...with its Headquarters at Rhein- dahlen , and Fourth Allied Tactical Air Force with its headquarters at Ramstein." NATO RESHAPING TACTICAL AIR POS

  6. The Implications of the Rise of China’s Military for Mongolian Security

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2010-06-01

    Regional Forum ASAT – Anti-satellite ASUW – Anti- surface warfare ASW – Antisubmarine Warfare AWACS – Airborne Warning and Control System CCP – Chinese...Military Region NAM – Non-Aligned Movements NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization NCO – Non-commissioned Officer NWFZ – Nuclear-Weapon- Free Zone...currency ROC – Republic of China RRU – Rapid Reaction Units SAM – Surface to Air Missile SCO – Shanghai Cooperation Organization SIPRI – Stockholm

  7. The British Nuclear Deterrent After the Cold War,

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1995-01-01

    Scope for Further Franco-British Cooperation 86 Attitudes of Friends and Allies 9° 7 . SOME POLICY IMPLICATIONS 94 A " Blessing in Disguise" for...on French decision, and French decision alone." 94 SOME POLICY IMPLICATIONS A " BLESSING IN DISGUISE" FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY It is time to take...but those disposing of any form of "weapon of mass i:LVictor A. Utgoff, "The Biotechnology Revolution and Its Potential Military Implications ," in

  8. U.S.-India Relations: Partners in Democracy

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2014-02-01

    1029-49. Dasgupta, Sunil and Stephen P. Cohen. "Is India Ending Its Strategic Restraint Doctrine?" Washington Quarterly 34, no. 2(Spring 2011): 163-77...Security on the Borders of India." The Journal of Asian Studies 68, no. 2(May 2009): 519-42. Dasgupta, Sunil and Stephen P..Cohen. "Arms Sales for India...Nuclear Weapons: Aspiring to “Indefinite Retention”? " Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 68, no. 5(September 2012-October 2012): 88-95. Dasgupta, Sunil

  9. Technical solutions to nonproliferation challenges

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Satkowiak, Lawrence

    2014-05-01

    The threat of nuclear terrorism is real and poses a significant challenge to both U.S. and global security. For terrorists, the challenge is not so much the actual design of an improvised nuclear device (IND) but more the acquisition of the special nuclear material (SNM), either highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium, to make the fission weapon. This paper provides two examples of technical solutions that were developed in support of the nonproliferation objective of reducing the opportunity for acquisition of HEU. The first example reviews technologies used to monitor centrifuge enrichment plants to determine if there is any diversion of uranium materials or misuse of facilities to produce undeclared product. The discussion begins with a brief overview of the basics of uranium processing and enrichment. The role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), its safeguard objectives and how the technology evolved to meet those objectives will be described. The second example focuses on technologies developed and deployed to monitor the blend down of 500 metric tons of HEU from Russia's dismantled nuclear weapons to reactor fuel or low enriched uranium (LEU) under the U.S.-Russia HEU Purchase Agreement. This reactor fuel was then purchased by U.S. fuel fabricators and provided about half the fuel for the domestic power reactors. The Department of Energy established the HEU Transparency Program to provide confidence that weapons usable HEU was being blended down and thus removed from any potential theft scenario. Two measurement technologies, an enrichment meter and a flow monitor, were combined into an automated blend down monitoring system (BDMS) and were deployed to four sites in Russia to provide 24/7 monitoring of the blend down. Data was downloaded and analyzed periodically by inspectors to provide the assurances required.

  10. Technical solutions to nonproliferation challenges

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Satkowiak, Lawrence

    2014-05-09

    The threat of nuclear terrorism is real and poses a significant challenge to both U.S. and global security. For terrorists, the challenge is not so much the actual design of an improvised nuclear device (IND) but more the acquisition of the special nuclear material (SNM), either highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium, to make the fission weapon. This paper provides two examples of technical solutions that were developed in support of the nonproliferation objective of reducing the opportunity for acquisition of HEU. The first example reviews technologies used to monitor centrifuge enrichment plants to determine if there is any diversionmore » of uranium materials or misuse of facilities to produce undeclared product. The discussion begins with a brief overview of the basics of uranium processing and enrichment. The role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), its safeguard objectives and how the technology evolved to meet those objectives will be described. The second example focuses on technologies developed and deployed to monitor the blend down of 500 metric tons of HEU from Russia's dismantled nuclear weapons to reactor fuel or low enriched uranium (LEU) under the U.S.-Russia HEU Purchase Agreement. This reactor fuel was then purchased by U.S. fuel fabricators and provided about half the fuel for the domestic power reactors. The Department of Energy established the HEU Transparency Program to provide confidence that weapons usable HEU was being blended down and thus removed from any potential theft scenario. Two measurement technologies, an enrichment meter and a flow monitor, were combined into an automated blend down monitoring system (BDMS) and were deployed to four sites in Russia to provide 24/7 monitoring of the blend down. Data was downloaded and analyzed periodically by inspectors to provide the assurances required.« less

  11. Radiological Weapons Control: A Soviet and US Perspective. Occasional Paper 29.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Issraelyan, Victor L.; Flowerree, Charles C.

    Two international diplomats from the Soviet Union and the United States focus on the need for a treaty to ban the use of radiological weapons. Radiological weapons are those based on the natural decay of nuclear material such as waste from military or civilian nuclear reactors. Such devices include both weapons and equipment, other than a nuclear…

  12. Vulnerability assessment of a space based weapon platform electronic system exposed to a thermonuclear weapon detonation

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Perez, C. L.; Johnson, J. O.

    Rapidly changing world events, the increased number of nations with inter-continental ballistic missile capability, and the proliferation of nuclear weapon technology will increase the number of nuclear threats facing the world today. Monitoring these nation's activities and providing an early warning and/or intercept system via reconnaissance and surveillance satellites and space based weapon platforms is a viable deterrent against a surprise nuclear attack. However, the deployment of satellite and weapon platform assets in space will subject the sensitive electronic equipment to a variety of natural and man-made radiation environments. These include Van Allen Belt protons and electrons; galactic and solar flare protons; and neutrons, gamma rays, and x-rays from intentionally detonated fission and fusion weapons. In this paper, the MASH vl.0 code system is used to estimate the dose to the critical electronics components of an idealized space based weapon platform from neutron and gamma-ray radiation emitted from a thermonuclear weapon detonation in space. Fluence and dose assessments were performed for the platform fully loaded, and in several stages representing limited engagement scenarios. The results indicate vulnerabilities to the Command, Control, and Communication bay instruments from radiation damage for a nuclear weapon detonation for certain source/platform orientations. The distance at which damage occurs will depend on the weapon yield (n,(gamma)/kiloton) and size (kilotons).

  13. DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Harvey, J.R.; Rubin, U.

    Missiles themselves are not weapons of mass destruction; they do not give states the ability to wreak unimaginable destruction, or to radically shift the balance of power, as nuclear weapons do. Hence, the primary focus of nonproliferation efforts should remain on weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, rather than on one of the many possible means of delivering them. Moreover, as discussed in more detail below, advanced strike aircraft can also be effective in delivering nuclear weapons, and are generally more effective than ballistic missiles for delivering conventional or chemical ordnance. Ultimately, if the industrialized nations seriously desire tomore » control the spread of delivery means for weapons of mass destruction, they need to consider bringing controls over ballistic missiles and advanced strike aircraft more into balance. At the same time, while efforts to control ballistic missile proliferation - centered on the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) - have had some successes and could be strengthened, US policy will be most effective if it recognizes two key realities: the spread of ballistic missiles cannot be as comprehensively controlled as the spread of nuclear weapons, nor need it be as comprehensively controlled.« less

  14. OPERATIONS TOGGLE, ARBOR and BEDROCK Events: DIAMOND SCULLS, DIDO QUEEN, HUSKY ACE, MING BLADE, HYBLA FAIR and DINING CAR, 20 July 1972 - 5 April 1975

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1987-11-30

    1975 to study weapons effects . All six were tunnel-type nuclear tests. The following table summarizes data on these events: OPERATION TOGGLE ARBOR...194 nuclear device tests conducted, 161 were for weapons related or effects purposes, and 33 were safety ex- periments. An additional 22 nuclear...on 25 April 1962 until the last atmospheric test on 4 November 1962, 40 weapons development and weapons effects tests were conducted as part of

  15. DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Schock, R N

    This report draws on a series of international workshops held to mark the fiftieth anniversary of President Dwight D. Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace address before the United Nations General Assembly. A half-century after President Eisenhower's landmark speech, the world is vastly different, but mankind still faces the challenge he identified--gaining the benefits of nuclear technology in a way that limits the risks to security. Fifty years after Eisenhower declared that the people of the world should be ''armed with the significant facts of today's existence,'' the consequences of his bold vision should be evaluated to provide a foundation upon whichmore » to shape the next fifty years. Policy and technology communities cannot escape the legacy of a half-century of nuclear technology expansion. At the same time, citizens need to consider the future role of military and civilian nuclear technology in a global strategy to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century. The new century brought with it a set of contradictions regarding nuclear technology. Nuclear knowledge, technology, materials, and facilities have spread around the world, but control and management of the nuclear genie have not kept pace. The Cold War is over, but not the threat from weapons of mass destruction, including the prospect that nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons may get into the hands of terrorists. Nevertheless, mankind continues to explore the frontiers of technology, including nuclear technology. Public concern about nuclear safety and security--exacerbated by accidents, nuclear weapon proliferation, and terrorism--confronts major growth in applications of nuclear technology in nuclear power, medicine, agriculture, and industry. While some developed countries have essentially stopped civilian nuclear-power expansion, mainly for economic reasons, several developing states--notably China and India--plan increases in the nuclear generation of electricity. Ironically, while governments still seek answers to long-term, nuclear waste disposal, other concerns about the environmental health of the planet such as climate change, regional air pollution, and possible rising natural gas prices have also renewed interest in nuclear power, even in countries that once sought to terminate their own nuclear programs. Many of these contradictions can and will be resolved--for better or worse. A wide range of forces--economic, political, and technical--will determine the impact of nuclear technology in the future, and no consensus exists on the outcome. The significance of nuclear technology for civilian or military purposes may expand, contract, or remain the same. This suggests a matrix of basic possibilities from which we focus on five alternative futures: (1) More civilian/Less military significance, (2) Less civilian/Less military significance, (3) Less civilian/More military significance, and (4) More civilian/More military significance. Of course, changed circumstances could also result in (5) the significance of both civilian and military nuclear technologies remaining about the same as today. Experts offer compelling logic why each of these alternatives is more likely or desirable. For each of these futures or their modifications, a more comprehensive vision can be presented and specific measures recommended. Some call for a new nuclear ''compact'' or ''bargain'' to share benefits and reduce risks. No matter which alternative future emerges, however, dealing with the legacy of existing civilian and military nuclear materials and infrastructure will keep important nuclear issues active for the next half-century.« less

  16. Atoms for Peace After 50 Years: The New Challenges and Opportunities

    DOE R&D Accomplishments Database

    2003-12-01

    This report draws on a series of international workshops held to mark the fiftieth anniversary of President Dwight D. Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace address before the United Nations General Assembly. A half-century after President Eisenhower's landmark speech, the world is vastly different, but mankind still faces the challenge he identified--gaining the benefits of nuclear technology in a way that limits the risks to security. Fifty years after Eisenhower declared that the people of the world should be "armed with the significant facts of today's existence," the consequences of his bold vision should be evaluated to provide a foundation upon which to shape the next fifty years. Policy and technology communities cannot escape the legacy of a half-century of nuclear technology expansion. At the same time, citizens need to consider the future role of military and civilian nuclear technology in a global strategy to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century. The new century brought with it a set of contradictions regarding nuclear technology. Nuclear knowledge, technology, materials, and facilities have spread around the world, but control and management of the nuclear genie have not kept pace. The Cold War is over, but not the threat from weapons of mass destruction, including the prospect that nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons may get into the hands of terrorists. Nevertheless, mankind continues to explore the frontiers of technology, including nuclear technology. Public concern about nuclear safety and security--exacerbated by accidents, nuclear weapon proliferation, and terrorism--confronts major growth in applications of nuclear technology in nuclear power, medicine, agriculture, and industry. While some developed countries have essentially stopped civilian nuclear-power expansion, mainly for economic reasons, several developing states--notably China and India--plan increases in the nuclear generation of electricity. Ironically, while governments still seek answers to long-term, nuclear waste disposal, other concerns about the environmental health of the planet such as climate change, regional air pollution, and possible rising natural gas prices have also renewed interest in nuclear power, even in countries that once sought to terminate their own nuclear programs. Many of these contradictions can and will be resolved--for better or worse. A wide range of forces--economic, political, and technical--will determine the impact of nuclear technology in the future, and no consensus exists on the outcome. The significance of nuclear technology for civilian or military purposes may expand, contract, or remain the same. This suggests a matrix of basic possibilities from which we focus on five alternative futures: (1) More civilian/Less military significance, (2) Less civilian/Less military significance, (3) Less civilian/More military significance, and (4) More civilian/More military significance. Of course, changed circumstances could also result in (5) the significance of both civilian and military nuclear technologies remaining about the same as today. Experts offer compelling logic why each of these alternatives is more likely or desirable. For each of these futures or their modifications, a more comprehensive vision can be presented and specific measures recommended. Some call for a new nuclear "compact" or "bargain" to share benefits and reduce risks. No matter which alternative future emerges, however, dealing with the legacy of existing civilian and military nuclear materials and infrastructure will keep important nuclear issues active for the next half-century.

  17. Deterring Nuclear Proliferation: The Importance of IAEA Safeguards: A TEXTBOOK

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Rosenthal, M.D.; Fishbone, L.G.; Gallini, L.

    2012-03-13

    Nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation are among the most pressing challenges to international peace and security that we face today. Iran and Syria remain in non-compliance with the safeguards requirements of the NPT, and the nuclear ambitions of North Korea remain unchecked. Despite these challenges, the NPT remains a cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and the safeguards implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) under the NPT play a critical role in deterring nuclear proliferation.How do they work? Where did they come from? And what is their future? This book answers these questions. Anyone studying the field ofmore » nuclear non-proliferation will benefit from reading this book, and for anyone entering the field, the book will enable them to get a running start. Part I describes the foundations of the international safeguards system: its origins in the 1930s - when new discoveries in physics made it clear immediately that nuclear energy held both peril and promise - through the entry into force in 1970 of the NPT, which codified the role of IAEA safeguards as a means to verify states NPT commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons. Part II describes the NPT safeguards system, which is based on a model safeguards agreement developed specifically for the NPT, The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States required in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which has been published by the IAEA as INFCIRC/153. Part III describes events, especially in South Africa, the DPRK, and Iraq in the early 1990s, that triggered a transformation in the way in which safeguards were conceptualized and implemented.« less

  18. Teaching with the News: North Korea and Nuclear Weapons. Choices for the 21st Century.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Brown Univ., Providence, RI. Thomas J. Watson, Jr. Inst. for International Studies.

    In October 2002 North Korea admitted that it had been operating a secret nuclear weapons program in violation of international treaties and the 1994 Agreed Framework with the United States. North Korea also appeared to be taking steps to begin production of nuclear weapons and, according to U.S. officials, may have a missile that can hit…

  19. Physical cryptographic verification of nuclear warheads

    PubMed Central

    Kemp, R. Scott; Danagoulian, Areg; Macdonald, Ruaridh R.; Vavrek, Jayson R.

    2016-01-01

    How does one prove a claim about a highly sensitive object such as a nuclear weapon without revealing information about the object? This paradox has challenged nuclear arms control for more than five decades. We present a mechanism in the form of an interactive proof system that can validate the structure and composition of an object, such as a nuclear warhead, to arbitrary precision without revealing either its structure or composition. We introduce a tomographic method that simultaneously resolves both the geometric and isotopic makeup of an object. We also introduce a method of protecting information using a provably secure cryptographic hash that does not rely on electronics or software. These techniques, when combined with a suitable protocol, constitute an interactive proof system that could reject hoax items and clear authentic warheads with excellent sensitivity in reasonably short measurement times. PMID:27432959

  20. Physical cryptographic verification of nuclear warheads

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Kemp, R. Scott; Danagoulian, Areg; Macdonald, Ruaridh R.; Vavrek, Jayson R.

    2016-08-01

    How does one prove a claim about a highly sensitive object such as a nuclear weapon without revealing information about the object? This paradox has challenged nuclear arms control for more than five decades. We present a mechanism in the form of an interactive proof system that can validate the structure and composition of an object, such as a nuclear warhead, to arbitrary precision without revealing either its structure or composition. We introduce a tomographic method that simultaneously resolves both the geometric and isotopic makeup of an object. We also introduce a method of protecting information using a provably secure cryptographic hash that does not rely on electronics or software. These techniques, when combined with a suitable protocol, constitute an interactive proof system that could reject hoax items and clear authentic warheads with excellent sensitivity in reasonably short measurement times.

  1. Physical cryptographic verification of nuclear warheads.

    PubMed

    Kemp, R Scott; Danagoulian, Areg; Macdonald, Ruaridh R; Vavrek, Jayson R

    2016-08-02

    How does one prove a claim about a highly sensitive object such as a nuclear weapon without revealing information about the object? This paradox has challenged nuclear arms control for more than five decades. We present a mechanism in the form of an interactive proof system that can validate the structure and composition of an object, such as a nuclear warhead, to arbitrary precision without revealing either its structure or composition. We introduce a tomographic method that simultaneously resolves both the geometric and isotopic makeup of an object. We also introduce a method of protecting information using a provably secure cryptographic hash that does not rely on electronics or software. These techniques, when combined with a suitable protocol, constitute an interactive proof system that could reject hoax items and clear authentic warheads with excellent sensitivity in reasonably short measurement times.

  2. Effects of Nuclear Weapons.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Sartori, Leo

    1983-01-01

    Fundamental principles governing nuclear explosions and their effects are discussed, including three components of a nuclear explosion (thermal radiation, shock wave, nuclear radiation). Describes how effects of these components depend on the weapon's yield, its height of burst, and distance of detonation point. Includes effects of three…

  3. The Nuclear Arsenals of the US and USSR.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Levi, Barbara G.

    1983-01-01

    Compares United States and Soviet nuclear arsenals, surveying strategic and tactical weapons the two countries have (includes chart detailing strategic nuclear arsenals). Also summarizes trends in nuclear weapons, including use of electronics in surveillance and in command, communication, and control structures. (JN)

  4. The Manhattan Project; A very brief introduction to the physics of nuclear weapons

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Reed, B. Cameron

    2017-05-01

    The development of nuclear weapons by the Manhattan Project during World War II was one of the most dramatic scientific/technological episodes in human history. This book, prepared by a recognized expert on the Manhattan Project, offers a concise survey of the essential physics concepts underlying fission weapons. The text describes the energetics and timescales of fast-neutron chain reactions, why only certain isotopes of uranium and plutonium are suitable for use in fission weapons, how critical mass and bomb yield can be estimated, how the efficiency of nuclear weapons can be enhanced, how the fissile forms of uranium and plutonium were obtained, some of the design details of the 'Little Boy' and 'Fat Man' bombs, and some of the thermal, shock, and radiation effects of nuclear weapons. Calculation exercises are provided, and a Bibliography lists authoritative print and online sources of information for readers who wish to pursue more detailed study of this fascinating topic.

  5. The Artisanal Nuke

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Dixon, M. C.

    2014-02-07

    There have been many words written about the value and importance of nuclear disarmament. There have been many words written about the value and importance to the U.S. defense posture of nuclear weapons. This thesis will not be about either one of those points of view. The commentary will not purport to tell anyone that there is a need or there is not a need for one nuclear weapon or thousands of nuclear weapons. This study is more about, "well, they are here -- now what?"

  6. [Consequences for military medicine of new nuclear weapons developments].

    PubMed

    Vogler, H

    1985-01-15

    The development and production of qualitatively new nuclear weapons (e.g. neutron weapons) has consequences also for the medical protection under conditions of war. In the present paper the peculiarities of these new systems of arms as well as the profile of injured persons which is to be expected after use of neutron weapons are analysed and general conclusions for the medical service are drawn.

  7. 11. VIEW OF A SITE RETURN WEAPONS COMPONENT. SITE RETURNS ...

    Library of Congress Historic Buildings Survey, Historic Engineering Record, Historic Landscapes Survey

    11. VIEW OF A SITE RETURN WEAPONS COMPONENT. SITE RETURNS WERE NUCLEAR WEAPONS SHIPPED TO THE ROCKY FLATS PLANT FROM THE NUCLEAR WEAPON STOCKPILE FOR RETIREMENT, TESTING, OR UPGRADING. FISSILE MATERIALS (PLUTONIUM, URANIUM, ETC.) AND RARE MATERIALS (BERYLLIUM) WERE RECOVERED FOR REUSE, AND THE REMAINDER WAS DISPOSED. (8/7/62) - Rocky Flats Plant, Plutonium Fabrication, Central section of Plant, Golden, Jefferson County, CO

  8. The relationship between human security, demand for arms and disarmament in the horn of Africa.

    PubMed

    Gebrewold, Kiflemariam

    2002-01-01

    The drive to find security through possession of weapons is linked to the history and culture of a social group. Amongst pastoralists in the Horn of Africa there is a failure of security through state systems such as police and the recent replacement of less-lethal traditional weapons by small arms and other light weapons. A warrior or vendetta culture with these arms leads to violent inter-clan clashes with many casualties, although traditional methods of weapons control still seem operational within clans. Understanding the drive to seek weapons is essential in finding ways to control their use. Improving the capacities of the police must come hand in hand with human rights training and an end to corruption. Further work is required on how traditional methods of arms control can be co-operatively linked with state controls.

  9. Who Did It? Using International Forensics to Detect and Deter Nuclear Terrorism

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Dunlop, W H; Smith, H P

    On February 2, the ''New York Times'' reported that the Pentagon has formed a nuclear forensics team tasked with identifying the terrorist attackers should the United States be hit with a nuclear bomb. Adapting nuclear technology to the forensics of exploded nuclear weapons is an old but rapidly evolving field. It dates back to at least 1949, when analysis of airborne debris, retrieved at high altitude off the coast of China, convinced President Harry Truman that the Soviet Union had exploded a nuclear device on the steppes of central Asia. The technology is neither new nor has it been particularlymore » secret, but the formation of a national nuclear forensics team was newsworthy and a useful development. An international team, however, would be even better. Although Washington has naturally focused on preventing a nuclear terrorism attack in the United States, a U.S. city is not necessarily the most likely target for nuclear terrorists. It is doubtful that a terrorist organization would be able to acquire a U.S. nuclear device and even more doubtful that it would acquire one on U.S. soil. Accordingly, if a terrorist organization does get its hands on a fission device, it is likely that it will do so on foreign territory. At that point, the terrorists will have an enormously valuable political weapon in their hands and will be loath to risk losing that asset. Given the risks associated with getting the device into the United States, the rational choice would be to deploy the device abroad against much softer targets. For Islamist terrorists, a major ''Christian'' capital such as London, Rome, or Moscow might offer a more suitable target. Among these, Moscow perhaps presents the most compelling case for international cooperation on post-detonation nuclear forensics. Russia has the largest stockpile of poorly secured nuclear devices in the world. It also has porous borders and poor internal security, and it continues to be a potential source of contraband nuclear material and weapons, despite the best efforts of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program. If terrorists obtained the nuclear material in Russia and set Moscow as their target, they would not have to risk transporting the weapon, stolen or makeshift, across international borders. Attacks by Chechen terrorists in Beslan and the Dubrovka Theater in Moscow offer ample proof that a willingness to commit mass murder for fanatical reasons rests within Russian borders, and a foreign source of operatives, particularly from the neighboring Islamic states to the south, is by no means inconceivable. Moscow is also a predominantly Christian city where local authorities routinely discriminate against Muslim minorities. Furthermore, extremists might conclude that a nuclear blast in Moscow could inflict damage well beyond those directly stemming from the attack. The Soviet generation that came to power during the Cold War retained a memory of the United States as an ally in the Great Patriotic War. The present Russian generation has no such remembrance but seems to have retained the animosities and suspicions that were a part of the nuclear standoff. Hence, nuclear terrorists may well believe that they could cause another East-West cold war or even encourage Russia to retaliate against the United States. After all, the sinking of the Kursk was believed by some influential Russians to be the result of American action. How much more likely would be such a view if the Kremlin were destroyed? As long as the world is filled with suspicion and conflict, such reactions are to be expected and, more importantly, anticipated. One has only to remember the early reactions and suspicions in the United States following the 1996 TWA Flight 800 airline disaster. Because the United States is the technological leader in nuclear forensics, its capability will certainly be offered and probably demanded no matter what foreign city is subjected to the devastation of a nuclear explosion. The entire world, not just Americans, will live in fear of a second or third nuclear explosion, and forensics could play a vital role in removing or at least narrowing that fear. Because of such worldwide dread, there will be an international aspect to nuclear forensics regardless of where the explosion takes place. It would be better to be prepared in advance for such contingencies than to delve into the arcane world of nuclear weapons and radiochemistry on the fly.« less

  10. Sandia National Laboratories: National Security Missions: International

    Science.gov Websites

    Weapons Safety & Security Weapons Science & Technology Defense Systems & Assessments About Directed Research & Development Technology Deployment Centers Working With Sandia Working With Sandia Payable Contract Information Construction & Facilities Contract Audit Sandia's Economic Impact

  11. Legal Implications of Military Uses of Outer Space

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Catena, Johanna

    2002-01-01

    Acquisition of Space Weapons, the Legal, Political and Military Impact for International Peace and At the dawn of a new century an immediate danger is upon us: The weaponization of outer space, including potential cost implications upon the prospect of ushering an era of peace and prosperity. But, can such statements be explained as pure sentimentality for hopes of a new era? Or is the danger misplaced that the threat to peace and security is an ever more ominous? By militarising outer space one could monitor crisis areas that could become a potential threat and this would in turn build confidence and security amongst nations. However the Outer Space Treaty prohibits placing in orbit nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. This does not include other military systems. Many countries feel the prohibition should be extended in the Treaty. Other military systems may involve anti-satellite weapons, (ASATS), emitting or simply placing technologies in space using laser and /or particle beams from space to intercept presently specific military targets such as ballistic missiles and hostile satellites, but in the future this may extend to destroying a target on earth. Military presence in space however, is not founded on weapons alone, but also through military surveillance systems and seen by some countries as an effective measure in verification on arms control. It is also seen as intensifying an arms race. At the forefront of the debate for space weapons is the possibility of countries deploying a National Missile Defence system. How does one reconcile such a system with present treaties? There has always been a direct relationship between weapons and space exploration, particularly if traced through the history of the late nineteenth century to the era of the space race. Konstantin Tsiolkovsky, (1857 - 1935), was one of the founders to astronautics. Robert Goddard, (1882-1945) an Englishman, developed Tsiolkovskys' work further. He built the first liquid-fuelled rocket. Goddard's work coincided with the work of a German scientist Werner Von Braun, (1912-77) who designed the V1 and V2 rocket. The V2 was the first intercontinental ballistic missile. Compared to the V1, the V2 could carry a heavier payload and the range was much longer. Von Braun had originally sketched his ideas to the Germans, that the V2 was an effective design for space travel and it was rejected. After the war the V2 became the foundation to many new technologies and these modifications marked the beginning of the space race. This competition led to space travel, taking men to the moon using the Saturn V rocket, robotic missions to the planets, and into tactical nuclear missiles (Redstone). This also marked the future for such dual-purpose technologies (i.e. military and/or civilian use) and more interestingly it took the design of weapons for space travel to be taken seriously. Arthur C Clarke commented on the possibilities of placing weapons in outer space, `the only defence against the weapons of the future is to prevent them ever being used. The problem is political and not military at all.' Ambassador Peter Jankowitsch, quoting Stockholm International Peace Research Institute in his opening address to COPUOS in Austria 1978, `we must make sure that outer space can be spared the fate of so many human discoveries of previous ages, namely becoming a mere battlefield.' These statements may be analysed by applying the United Nations Charter alongside other international treaties, such as the Outer Space Treaty 1967, the Test Ban Treaty 1963 and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in conjunction with the new Agreement signed by Russian and the USA. This may assist to highlight and conclude where problems reside whether political, legal, military, or a combination; and the impact for international peace and security.

  12. Nuclear metaphors: Why risk communication and public education haven't worked

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Flank, S.; Hansen, K.

    1991-11-01

    Broad public acceptability is a necessary condition for the future success of nuclear power in the US and will be determined by the way the public perceives nuclear power - specifically, through nuclear power's metaphoric equivalences. A content analysis of a cross section of the debate over nuclear power shows that the public does not share a single concept of what nuclear power is - nuclear energy has yet to be firmly anchored in a particular context or caught in a web of relations to the rest of society. The political battleground for the contest over nuclear power is notmore » patterns of risk perception or shortcomings in public education but rather nuclear power as metaphor. For example, is nuclear power a factory producing electricity, or is it indistinguishable from nuclear weapons By highlighting the metaphors that underlie competing conceptions of nuclear power, one can illuminate parts of the political debate that otherwise are consigned to psychology, irrationality, or ignorance. Understanding these metaphors also makes clear the kind of deep changes that would be necessary to secure public acceptance of nuclear power.« less

  13. 2012 Review on the Extension of the AMedP-8(C) Methodology to New Agents, Materials, and Conditions

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2013-10-01

    Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to estimate casualties from chemical, biological , radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons . The final draft...chemical, biological , radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons . The final draft documenting this methodology was published by IDA in 2009 and was...from Battlefield Exposure to Chemical, Biological and Radiological Agents and Nuclear Weapon Effects. IDA Document D- 4465. Alexandria, VA: IDA

  14. New Horizons and New Strategies in Arms Control

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Brown, J. editor

    In the last ten years, since the break-up of the Soviet Union, remarkable progress in arms control and disarmament has occurred. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the completion of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and the Chemical Weapons Treaty (CWC) are indicative of the great strides made in the non- proliferation arena. Simultaneously, the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), the Conventional Forces Treaty in Europe (CFE), and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START), all associated with US-Soviet Union (now Russia) relations have assisted in redefining European relations and the security landscape. Finally, it now appears that progress is inmore » the offing in developing enhanced compliance measures for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). In sum, all of these achievements have set the stage for the next round of arms control activities, which may lead to a much broader, and perhaps more diffused multilateral agenda. In this new and somewhat unpredictable international setting, arms control and disarmament issues will require solutions that are both more creative and innovative than heretofore.« less

  15. Legal and Political Implications of Offensive Actions from and Against the Space Segment

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    de Angelis, Iole M.

    2002-01-01

    Hundreds of satellites now present in space benefit the people of the world economically, scientifically and by their contribution to international security. So far, activities in space have proceeded without much conflict. Means have been found for regulation and agreement to minimize interference in the radio spectrum, while making more efficient use of limited spectrum resources. The Outer Space Treaty bars the stationing of nuclear weapons in space, or other weapons of mass destruction. Nations are responsible for damages that their space activities may cause to others, perhaps including destruction of the space assets of another nation. Today, maintaining the peaceful use of space is becoming more complicated by the privatisation of the notion of security by commercial actors and by the emerging of high technology non-state threats, that are not bind by international treaties. SPACE WEAPONS The Outer Space Treaty had been adopted to avoid the possible denial of peaceful uses of outer space, and because, technically speaking, jeopardizing a satellite was a difficult task to perform. For example, an orbiting laser might take hours or days for the Earth to rotate and the laser to be at an appropriate point in its orbit to threaten a target on the ground or in the air. Conversely, a substantial number of such weapons in space might be able to destroy targets within minutes of the command to do so, if the targets were visible and not below clouds. It is currently very difficult to oppose space weapons. For this reason, they could be significantly effective against an adversary. However, there are several obvious ways to counter nation controlled space-based weapons: anti-satellite systems, economic and technological blockade and an international legal system that forbids/restricts such weapons. The problem remains for non-state international actors which are not bound by international treaties. For this reason, the principle established by the United States to tie a common responsibility among the non state-actor Al-Quaida and the State of Afghanistan - that supported and hosted such organisation - is an exemple that deserves special consideration. ANTISATELLITE WEAPONS In a world in which Russia and the United States are no longer enemies, no individual nation has a strong motivation to develop and deploy space weapons for solely military purposes. Such weapons could be seen as inextricably tied to the purpose of achieving space dominance not only for military reasons - achieving full spectrum dominance thanks to a superior information management - but also for economical and political reasons. It is important to remind that the military use of outer space has both stabilizing and destabilizing potential. Military and civilian satellites perform functions that contribute to treaties verification, transparency, confidence building and nuclear deterrence. Putting weapons in space - that is a military use of outer-space - would threaten the instruments and sensors deployed into orbit to monitor potential enemies, control the compliance to disarmament treaties, detect ballistic missile launches, and maintain reliable communications. A sudden attack against such systems would lead to a main international crisis. In this context, in February 2000 the Chinese delegation to the United Nations Conference on Disarmament circulated a paper identifying a present and pressing necessity to prevent an arms race in outer space. A treaty forestalling the use of any kind of weapons in space, argued the delegation, would greatly support global peace and security." Moscow agreed with Beijing on this subject. CONCLUSIONS The deployment of space weapons will bring negative consequences to the international image of the country that does so, but is it an inevitable process? What tools can the international community do to prevent the escalation of conflicts into the outer space? From an international legal perspective, the development and the deployment of strategic weapons, kinetic energy weapons and directed energy weapons are already contained within existing rules and such issues are being actively addressed by the international community. At the same time, the use of cyberwar and electronic warfare to counter space technology not only encounters a void of international rules, but it is a question that is very rarely taken into consideration while addressing to the issues of preventing space warfare. Finally, these techniques are easily available to non-state organisations - terrorist organisations and commercial companies - and individuals. In conclusion, the issues related to offensive actions towards and from space shall be taken into consideration not only in a military perspective, but also in a political perspective - terrorist actions against the space segment - and from an economical point of view.

  16. Nuclear Weapons and Communication Studies: A Review Essay.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Taylor, Bryan C.

    1998-01-01

    Reviews the body of work inspired by the late Cold War period, where nuclear weapons briefly became a compelling object for communication scholars. Considers the prospects for nuclear communication scholarship in post-Cold War culture. Discusses "nuclear criticism" and issues regarding the bomb in communication. (SC)

  17. MSTD 2007 Publications and Patents

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    King, W E

    2008-04-01

    The Materials Science and Technology Division (MSTD) supports the central scientific and technological missions of the Laboratory, and at the same time, executes world-class, fundamental research and novel technological development over a wide range of disciplines. Our organization is driven by the institutional needs in nuclear weapons stockpile science, high-energy-density science, nuclear reactor science, and energy and environment science and technology. We maintain expertise and capabilities in many diverse areas, including actinide science, electron microscopy, laser-materials interactions, materials theory, simulation and modeling, materials synthesis and processing, materials science under extreme conditions, ultrafast materials science, metallurgy, nanoscience and technology, nuclear fuelsmore » and energy security, optical materials science, and surface science. MSTD scientists play leadership roles in the scientific community in these key and emerging areas.« less

  18. CF NEUTRON TIME OF FLIGHT TRANSMISSION FOR MATERIAL IDENTIFICATION FOR WEAPONS TRAINERS

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Mihalczo, John T; Valentine, Timothy E; Blakeman, Edward D

    2011-01-01

    The neutron transmission, elastic scattering, and non elastic reactions can be used to distinguish various isotopes. Neutron transmission as a function of energy can be used in some cases to identify materials in unknown objects. A time tagged californium source that provides a fission spectrum of neutrons is a useful source for neutron time-of-flight (TOF) transmission measurements. Many nuclear weapons trainer units for a particular weapons system (no fissile, but of same weight and center of gravity) in shipping containers were returned to the National Nuclear Security Administration Y-12 National Security Complex in the mid 1990s. Nuclear Materials Identification Systemmore » (NMIS) measurements with a time tagged californium neutron source were used to verify that these trainers did not contain fissile material. In these blind tests, the time distributions of neutrons through the containers were measured as a function of position to locate the approximate center of the trainer in the container. Measurements were also performed with an empty container. TOF template matching measurements were then performed at this location for a large number of units. In these measurements, the californium source was located on one end of the container and a proton recoil scintillator was located on the other end. The variations in the TOF transmission for times corresponding to 1 to 5 MeV were significantly larger than statistical. Further examination of the time distribution or the energy dependence revealed that these variations corresponded to the variations in the neutron cross section of aluminum averaged over the energy resolution of the californium TOF measurement with a flight path of about 90 cm. Measurements using different thicknesses of aluminum were also performed with the source and detector separated the same distance as for the trainer measurements. These comparison measurements confirmed that the material in the trainers was aluminum, and the total thickness of aluminum through the trainers was determined. This is an example of how californium transmission TOF measurements can be used to identify materials.« less

  19. Deterrence and National Security in the Face of an Amorphous Threat

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Werne, R

    2001-01-05

    The National Security threats that we face today and, in turn, the National Security . requirements, are more diverse and complex than they were during the Cold-War from 1945-1990. During that period, and bolstered by the experiences of World Wars I and II, US National Security policy was focused on the stabilization of post WW II country boundaries and containment of the Soviet block and China. The result was the bipolar world in which the nuclear and conventional forces of the United States, the Soviet Union, and their respective allies ensured a measure of political stability through a military stalematemore » of world wide proportions. The practical result was that large scale changes in national borders were unlikely, but internal conflict within countries, and local conflicts between neighboring countries could still occur, albeit with participation from one or both of the Superpower camps. US National Security Policy was designed primarily for stabilization of the bipolar world on the military front and for competition with the Soviet Union and China on economic and political fronts. The collapse of the Soviet Union changed the global picture. The bipolar world and its military stalemate appear to be gone for the moment and the threat which was the foundation for US National Security policy has changed significantly. Some will argue that China has intentions of replacing the Soviet Union as a military superpower and thus recreate the bipolar world. Furthermore, Russia still has significant nuclear forces and has recently talked of lowering the nuclear threshold in an apparent attempt to make up for its weakened conventional forces. Clearly the threat of large scale nuclear war is much reduced, but not gone entirely. Having acknowledged the Chinese and Russian threats, what does the global picture look like today? The boundaries of most countries are secure but there are significant frictions, that have, or could lead, to armed conflict. Most of these are today's manifestations of long standing problems with no easy solution in sight. It can be argued that most local conflicts will be of no direct threat to US interests. However there are situations where local conflict can have significant international impact if left unchecked, For example localized conflict in the Middle East could affect oil supplies world wide, open conflict between China and Taiwan could draw in Japan and the United States, India and Pakistan have armed conflict over Kashmir threatening a nuclear exchange, and North Korea continues to be a concern with its long range missile and nuclear and CBW, development programs. There is also the problem of state sponsored or sanctioned terrorism against the US and its allies. As with Korea, a number of countries have been identified as having had, or still having active chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs along with strategic missile programs that would enable them to deliver warheads to the US mainland or similarly threaten US allies. Furthermore the problem of the clandestine delivery of a weapon of mass destruction designed to target US civilian population centers is very real. Such threats designed to deter US policy initiatives abroad, have been termed ''asymmetric'' warfare and appear to be an emerging capability in a number of countries.« less

  20. Nuclear Energy, Nuclear Weapons Proliferation, and the Arms Race.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Hollander, Jack, Ed.

    A symposium was organized to reexamine the realities of vertical proliferation between the United States and the Soviet Union and to place into perspective the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons throughout the world, including the possible role of commercial nuclear power in facilitating proliferation. The four invited symposium…

  1. 10 CFR 810.3 - Definitions.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... pursuant to section 142 of the Atomic Energy Act. Sensitive nuclear technology means any information... nuclear material (SNM) or which a U.S. provider of assistance knows or has reason to know will be used for... International Atomic Energy Agency. Non-nuclear-weapon state is a country not recognized as a nuclear-weapon...

  2. A comparison of the additional protocols of the five nuclear weapon states and the ensuing safeguards benefits to international nonproliferation efforts

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Uribe, Eva C; Sandoval, M Analisa; Sandoval, Marisa N

    2009-01-01

    With the 6 January 2009 entry into force of the Additional Protocol by the United States of America, all five declared Nuclear Weapon States that are part of the Nonproliferation Treaty have signed, ratified, and put into force the Additional Protocol. This paper makes a comparison of the strengths and weaknesses of the five Additional Protocols in force by the five Nuclear Weapon States with respect to the benefits to international nonproliferation aims. This paper also documents the added safeguards burden to the five declared Nuclear Weapon States that these Additional Protocols put on the states with respect to accessmore » to their civilian nuclear programs and the hosting of complementary access activities as part of the Additional Protocol.« less

  3. What Are Nuclear Weapons For?

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Drell, Sidney

    2007-03-01

    Through the decades of the Cold War the prospect of a nuclear holocaust was all too real. With the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, that threat to civilization as we know it had receded. But today we face a grave new danger, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by hostile or unstable governments and terrorists. What can and should we be doing to meet this challenge and prevent the world's most dangerous weapons from falling into very dangerous hands? Are there any reasons for us to still retain thousands of nuclear warheads in our arsenals? What are they for? Can we rekindle the bold vision of a world free of nuclear weapons that President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev brought to their remarkable summit meeting at Reykjavik twenty years ago, and define practical steps toward achieving such a goal?

  4. Normative Factors in U.S. Nuclear Policy

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2016-09-01

    policymakers. No weapon since the 1960’s generated such a large ethical debate as the neutron bomb. Domestically and internationally the moral values of...recognized that the neutron bomb was still a kind of nuclear weapon . Paul argues that the Carter administration was constrained by this reality, and...148 While the neutron bomb was a nuclear weapon , it was unique in that it specialized in taking human life through radiation poisoning, without

  5. Planning U.S. General Purpose Forces: The Theater Nuclear Forces

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1977-01-01

    usefulness in combat. All U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in Europe are fitted with Permissive Action Links (PAL), coded devices designed to impede...may be proposed. The Standard Missile 2, the Harpoon missile, the Mk48 tor- pedo , and the SUBROC anti-submarine rocket are all being considered for...Permissive Action Link . A coded device attached to nuclear weapons deployed abroad that impedes the unauthorized arming or firing of the weapon. Pershing

  6. Equation of State and Shock-Driven Decomposition of 'Soft' Materials

    DOE PAGES

    Coe, Joshua Damon; Dattelbaum, Dana Mcgraw

    2017-12-01

    Equation of state (EOS) efforts at National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) national laboratories tend to focus heavily on metals, and rightly so given their obvious primacy in nuclear weapons. Our focus here, however, is on the EOS of 'soft' matter such as polymers and their derived foams, which present a number of challenges distinct from those of other material classes. This brief description will cover only one aspect of polymer EOS modeling: treatment of shock-driven decomposition. Here, these interesting (and sometimes neglected) materials exhibit a number of other challenging features— glass transitions, complex thermal behavior, response that is both viscousmore » and elastic—each warranting additional discussions of their own.« less

  7. Equation of State and Shock-Driven Decomposition of 'Soft' Materials

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Coe, Joshua Damon; Dattelbaum, Dana Mcgraw

    Equation of state (EOS) efforts at National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) national laboratories tend to focus heavily on metals, and rightly so given their obvious primacy in nuclear weapons. Our focus here, however, is on the EOS of 'soft' matter such as polymers and their derived foams, which present a number of challenges distinct from those of other material classes. This brief description will cover only one aspect of polymer EOS modeling: treatment of shock-driven decomposition. Here, these interesting (and sometimes neglected) materials exhibit a number of other challenging features— glass transitions, complex thermal behavior, response that is both viscousmore » and elastic—each warranting additional discussions of their own.« less

  8. Sandia National Laboratories: National Security Missions: International

    Science.gov Websites

    Weapons Safety & Security Weapons Science & Technology Defense Systems & Assessments About Directed Research & Development Technology Deployment Centers Working With Sandia Working With Sandia Licensing & Technology Transfer Browse Technology Portfolios Technology Partnerships Business, Industry

  9. 76 FR 30280 - Public Meeting To Discuss the Proposed Rule on Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-05-25

    ... Proposed Rule on Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications AGENCY... the proposed enhanced weapons rule, the two draft regulatory guides, and the draft weapons safety.... No formal comments on the proposed enhanced weapons rule or the draft guidance documents will be...

  10. Evolution of United States and NATO tactical nuclear doctrine and limited nuclear war options, 1949-1964. Master's thesis

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Maiorano, A.G.

    The debate over nuclear weapons in Europe and their utility as part of NATO's forward defense strategy persisted since the mid-1950s. Existing tactical nuclear employment doctrine and strategies are based on obsolete criteria and defense concepts established when the U.S. possessed superiority in nearly all nuclear categories. NATO has allowed its tactical nuclear doctrine and arsenal of battlefield nuclear weapons to deteriorate, choosing instead to rely on the American strategic nuclear umbrella for all but the most localized of conflicts. This thesis examines the development, stagnation and decline of NATO tactical nuclear doctrine and strategy from 1949 to 1984. Itmore » analyzes four tactical nuclear postures, drawing from each to recommend a viable tactical nuclear strategy for NATO today. The presence and potential employment of tactical nuclear weapons make it imperative that NATO devise an effective limited nuclear war strategy.« less

  11. 75 FR 2482 - Submission for OMB Review; Comment Request

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-01-15

    ...: Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS). Title: Chemical Weapons Convention Declaration and Report Handbook... the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), an international arms control treaty. The Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 and Commerce Chemical Weapons Convention Regulations (CWCR) specify the...

  12. Information barrier technology applied to less restrictive environments

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    MacArthur, D. W.; Langner, D. C.; Hypes, P. A.

    2004-01-01

    The information barrier is an important part of any system that allows inspector verification of declared classified materials. In this context, the information barrier must protect classified information while allowing the inspectors to reach correct and independent conclusions concerning the veracity of the declaration. Although other applications may not involve national security, information barrier techniques can still be used to protect information considered sensitive by individuals, commercial entities, or national organizations. Other potential areas of application include homeland security and airport screening, personal information disclosed by modern scanning techniques, nuclear information not considered classified but still sensitive, and industrial secretmore » information that could be compromised during 3rd party acceptance testing. Modern personnel screening devices are limited more by their potential for release of personal information than by technology. Screening systems that could be used in airports and other sensitive areas are often not utilized because the same system that can show the details of weapons carried on a person's body can also reveal potentially embarrassing and sensitive details of the body itself. Much other nuclear information, as well as industrially secret information, while not actually classified, is not appropriate for widespread dissemination. In both cases an inspector may need to verify elements of the manufacturer's or owner's claims, but at the same time not disclose sensitive information to either the inspector or the general public. Thus, information barrier technology, although originally developed for protection of nuclear weapons information, is also directly usable in a number of counter-terrorism and nonproliferation applications. Although these applications may not (or may) require the same level of rigor as the original application to classified items, many of the same techniques can be used in protecting this non-classified, but still sensitive, information.« less

  13. Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response; HHS Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise implementation plan for chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats. Notice.

    PubMed

    2007-04-23

    The United States faces serious public health threats from the deliberate use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)--chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN)--by hostile States or terrorists, and from naturally emerging infectious diseases that have a potential to cause illness on a scale that could adversely impact national security. Effective strategies to prevent, mitigate, and treat the consequences of CBRN threats is an integral component of our national security strategy. To that end, the United States must be able to rapidly develop, stockpile, and deploy effective medical countermeasures to protect the American people. The HHS Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise (PHEMCE) has taken a holistic, end-to-end approach that considers multiple aspects of the medical countermeasures mission including research, development, acquisition, storage, maintenance, deployment, and guidance for utilization. Phase one of this approach established the HHS PHEMCE Strategy for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Threats (HHS PHEMCE Strategy). The HHS PHEMCE Strategy, published in the Federal Register on March 20, 2007, described a framework of strategic policy goals and objectives for identifying medical countermeasure requirements and establishing priorities for medical countermeasure evaluation, development and acquisition. These strategic policy goals and objectives were used to establish the Four Pillars upon which this HHS Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise Implementation Plan (HHS PHEMCE Implementation Plan) is based. The HHS PHEMCE Implementation Plan considers the full spectrum of medical countermeasures-related activities, including research, development, acquisition, storage/maintenance, deployment, and utilization. The HHS PHEMCE Implementation Plan is consistent with the President's Biodefense for the 21st Century and is aligned with the National Strategy for Medical Countermeasures against Weapons of Mass Destruction.

  14. Open-area concealed-weapon detection system

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Pati, P.; Mather, P.

    2011-06-01

    Concealed Weapon Detection (CWD) has become a significant challenge to present day security needs; individuals carrying weapons into airplanes, schools, and secured establishments are threat to public security. Although controlled screening, of people for concealed weapons, has been employed in many establishments, procedures and equipment are designed to work in restricted environments like airport passport control, military checkpoints, hospitals, school and university entrance. Furthermore, screening systems do not effectively decipher between threat and non-threat metal objects, thus leading to high rate of false alarms which can become a liability to daily operational needs of establishments. Therefore, the design and development of a new CWD system to operate in a large open area environment with large numbers of people reduced incidences of false alarms and increased location accuracy is essential.

  15. Nuclear Weapons and the Future: An "Unthinkable" Proposal.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Tyler, Robert L.

    1982-01-01

    The author looks ahead 30 or 40 years to see what might come of the nuclear weapons predicament. As a minimal first step in the campaign against nuclear warfare, he suggests a unilateral and complete disarmament by the United States. (AM)

  16. Cooperative measures to support the Indo-Pak Agreement Reducing Risk from Accidents Relating to Nuclear Weapons.

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Mishra, Sitakanta; Ahmed, Mansoor

    In 2012, India and Pakistan reaffirmed the Agreement on Reducing the Risk from Accidents Relating to Nuclear Weapons. Despite a history of mutual animosity and persistent conflict between the two countries, this agreement derives strength from a few successful nuclear confidence building measures that have stood the test of time. It also rests on the hope that the region would be spared a nuclear holocaust from an accidental nuclear weapon detonation that might be misconstrued as a deliberate use of a weapon by the other side. This study brings together two emerging strategic analysts from South Asia to explore measuresmore » to support the Agreement and further develop cooperation around this critical issue. This study briefly dwells upon the strategic landscape of nuclear South Asia with the respective nuclear force management structures, doctrines, and postures of India and Pakistan. It outlines the measures in place for the physical protection and safety of nuclear warheads, nuclear materials, and command and control mechanisms in the two countries, and it goes on to identify the prominent, emerging challenges posed by the introduction of new weapon technologies and modernization of the respective strategic forces. This is followed by an analysis of the agreement itself leading up to a proposed framework for cooperative measures that might enhance the spirit and implementation of the agreement.« less

  17. 3 CFR 13617 - Executive Order 13617 of June 25, 2012. Blocking Property of the Government of the Russian...

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... Extracted From Nuclear Weapons 13617 Order 13617 Presidential Documents Executive Orders Executive Order... to the Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted From Nuclear Weapons By the authority vested... accumulation of a large volume of weapons-usable fissile material in the territory of the Russian Federation...

  18. Changes in Russia's Military and Nuclear Doctrine

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Wolkov, Benjamin M.; Balatsky, Galya I.

    In 1993, the Russian Federation set out a new military doctrine that would determine the direction of its armed forces until President Putin set out the next doctrine in 2000. The Russian Federation creating the doctrine was new; the USSR had recently collapsed, Gorbachev - the creator of the predecessor to this doctrine in 1987 - was out of office, and the new Russian military had only been formed in May, 1992.1 The analysis of the 1993 doctrine is as follows: a definition of how doctrine is defined; a short history of Russian military doctrine leading up to the 1993more » doctrine (officially the Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation); and finally, what the doctrine established. An overview of the 1993 doctrine is: (1) Russia's 1993 doctrine was a return to older, more aggressive doctrine as a result of stability concerns surrounding the recent collapse of the USSR; (2) Russia turned from Gorbachev's 'defensive defense' in the 1987 doctrine to aggressive defense with the option of preempting or striking back against an aggressor; (3) Russia was deeply concerned about how nationalism would affect the former Soviet Republics, particularly in respect to the ethnic Russians still living abroad; and (4) Nuclear doctrine pledged to not be the first to use nuclear weapons but provided for the potential for escalation from a conventional to a nuclear war. The 2000 doctrine (officially the Russian Federation Military Doctrine) was created in a more stable world than the 1993 doctrine was. The Russian Federation had survived independence and the 'threat of direct military aggression against the Russian Federation and its allies' had diminished. It had secured all of the nuclear weapons from its neighbors Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, and had elected a new president, Vladimir Putin, to replace Boris Yeltsin. Yet, even as the doctrine took more defensive tones than the 1993 doctrine, it expanded its nuclear options. Below are a new definition of what doctrine meant in 2000 and an outline of the 2000 doctrine. An overview of the 2000 doctrine is: (1) The 2000 doctrine was a return to a more defensive posture; the threat of nuclear retaliation, rather than that of preemptive force, would be its deterrence; (2) In order to strengthen its nuclear deterrence, Russia extended and redefined the cases in which nuclear weapons could be used to include a wider range of conflict types and a larger spectrum of attackers; and (3) Russia's threats changed to reflect its latest fear of engaging in a limited conflict with no prospect of the use of nuclear deterrence. In 2006, the defense minister and deputy prime minister Sergei Ivanov announced that the government was starting on a draft of a future doctrine. Four years later, in 2010, the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation was put into effect with the intent of determining Russian doctrine until 2020. The 2010 doctrine, like all previous doctrines, was a product of the times in which it was written. Gone were many of the fears that had followed Russia for the past two decades. Below are an examination of the 2010 definition of doctrine as well as a brief analysis of the 2010 doctrine and its deviations from past doctrines. An overview of the 2010 doctrine is: (1) The new doctrine emphasizes the political centralization of command both in military policy and the use of nuclear weapons; (2) Nuclear doctrine remains the same in many aspects including the retention of first-use; (3) At the same time, doctrine was narrowed to using nuclear weapons only when the Russian state's existence is in danger; to continue strong deterrence, Russia also opted to follow the United States by introducing precision conventional weapons; (4) NATO is defined as Russia's primary external threat because of its increased global presence and its attempt to recruit states that are part of the Russian 'bloc'; and (5) The 2000 doctrine's defensive stance was left out of the doctrine; rumored options for use of nuclear weapons in local wars and in preemptive strikes were also left out.« less

  19. Consequences of Regional Scale Nuclear Conflicts and Acts of Individual Nuclear Terrorism

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Toon, O. B.; Turco, R. P.; Robock, A.; Bardeen, C.; Oman, L.; Stenchikov, G. L.

    2006-12-01

    The number of nuclear warheads in the world has fallen by about a factor of three since its peak in 1986. However, the potential exists for numerous regional nuclear arms races, and for a significant expansion in the number of nuclear weapons states. Eight countries are known to have nuclear weapons, 2 are constructing them, and an additional 32 nations already have the fissile material needed to build weapons if they so desire. Population and economic activity worldwide are congregated to an increasing extent in "megacities", which are ideal targets for nuclear weapons. We find that low yield weapons, which new nuclear powers are likely to construct, can produce 100 times as many fatalities and 100 times as much smoke from fires per kt yield as high-yield weapons, if they are targeted at city centers. A single low-yield nuclear detonation in an urban center could lead to more fatalities, in some cases by orders of magnitude, than have occurred in major historical conflicts. A regional war between the smallest current nuclear states involving 100 15-kt explosions (less than 0.1% of the explosive yield of the current global nuclear arsenal) could produce direct fatalities comparable to all of those worldwide in World War II (WW-II), or to those once estimated for a "counterforce" nuclear war between the superpowers. Portions of megacities attacked with nuclear devices or exposed to fallout of long-lived isotopes, through armed conflict or terrorism, would likely be abandoned indefinitely, with severe national and international implications. Smoke from urban firestorms in a regional war might induce significant climatic and ozone anomalies on global scales. While there are many uncertainties in the issues we discuss here, the major uncertainties are the type and scale of conflict that might occur. Each of these potential hazards deserves careful analysis by governments worldwide advised by a broad section of the world scientific community, as well as widespread debate.

  20. Sabotage at Nuclear Power Plants

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Purvis, James W.

    1999-07-21

    Recently there has been a noted worldwide increase in violent actions including attempted sabotage at nuclear power plants. Several organizations, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency and the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, have guidelines, recommendations, and formal threat- and risk-assessment processes for the protection of nuclear assets. Other examples are the former Defense Special Weapons Agency, which used a risk-assessment model to evaluate force-protection security requirements for terrorist incidents at DOD military bases. The US DOE uses a graded approach to protect its assets based on risk and vulnerability assessments. The Federal Aviation Administration and Federal Bureau of Investigationmore » conduct joint threat and vulnerability assessments on high-risk US airports. Several private companies under contract to government agencies use formal risk-assessment models and methods to identify security requirements. The purpose of this paper is to survey these methods and present an overview of all potential types of sabotage at nuclear power plants. The paper discusses emerging threats and current methods of choice for sabotage--especially vehicle bombs and chemical attacks. Potential consequences of sabotage acts, including economic and political; not just those that may result in unacceptable radiological exposure to the public, are also discussed. Applicability of risk-assessment methods and mitigation techniques are also presented.« less

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