Safety Characteristics in System Application of Software for Human Rated Exploration Missions for the 8th IAASS Conference

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Mango, Edward J.

2016-01-01

NASA and its industry and international partners are embarking on a bold and inspiring development effort to design and build an exploration class space system. The space system is made up of the Orion system, the Space Launch System (SLS) and the Ground Systems Development and Operations (GSDO) system. All are highly coupled together and dependent on each other for the combined safety of the space system. A key area of system safety focus needs to be in the ground and flight application software system (GFAS). In the development, certification and operations of GFAS, there are a series of safety characteristics that define the approach to ensure mission success. This paper will explore and examine the safety characteristics of the GFAS development. The GFAS system integrates the flight software packages of the Orion and SLS with the ground systems and launch countdown sequencers through the 'agile' software development process. A unique approach is needed to develop the GFAS project capabilities within this agile process. NASA has defined the software development process through a set of standards. The standards were written during the infancy of the so-called industry 'agile development' movement and must be tailored to adapt to the highly integrated environment of human exploration systems. Safety of the space systems and the eventual crew on board is paramount during the preparation of the exploration flight systems. A series of software safety characteristics have been incorporated into the development and certification efforts to ensure readiness for use and compatibility with the space systems. Three underlining factors in the exploration architecture require the GFAS system to be unique in its approach to ensure safety for the space systems, both the flight as well as the ground systems. The first are the missions themselves, which are exploration in nature, and go far beyond the comfort of low Earth orbit operations. The second is the current exploration system will launch only one mission per year even less during its developmental phases. Finally, the third is the partnered approach through the use of many different prime contractors, including commercial and international partners, to design and build the exploration systems. These three factors make the challenges to meet the mission preparations and the safety expectations extremely difficult to implement. As NASA leads a team of partners in the exploration beyond earth's influence, it is a safety imperative that the application software used to test, checkout, prepare and launch the exploration systems put safety of the hardware and mission first. Software safety characteristics are built into the design and development process to enable the human rated systems to begin their missions safely and successfully. Exploration missions beyond Earth are inherently risky, however, with solid safety approaches in both hardware and software, the boldness of these missions can be realized for all on the home planet.

Collaborative Approaches in Developing Environmental and Safety Management Systems for Commercial Space Transportation

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Zee, Stacey; Murray, D.

2009-01-01

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Office of Commercial Space Transportation (AST) licenses and permits U.S. commercial space launch and reentry activities, and licenses the operation of non-federal launch and reentry sites. ASTs mission is to ensure the protection of the public, property, and the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States during commercial space transportation activities and to encourage, facilitate, and promote U.S. commercial space transportation. AST faces unique challenges of ensuring the protection of public health and safety while facilitating and promoting U.S. commercial space transportation. AST has developed an Environmental Management System (EMS) and a Safety Management System (SMS) to help meet its mission. Although the EMS and SMS were developed independently, the systems share similar elements. Both systems follow a Plan-Do-Act-Check model in identifying potential environmental aspects or public safety hazards, assessing significance in terms of severity and likelihood of occurrence, developing approaches to reduce risk, and verifying that the risk is reduced. This paper will describe the similarities between ASTs EMS and SMS elements and how AST is building a collaborative approach in environmental and safety management to reduce impacts to the environment and risks to the public.

Software-Based Safety Systems in Space - Learning from other Domains

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Klicker, M.; Putzer, H.

2012-01-01

Increasing complexity and new emerging capabilities for manned and unmanned missions have been the hallmark of the past decades of space exploration. One of the drivers in this process was the ever increasing use of software and software-intensive systems to implement system functions necessary to the capabilities needed. The course of technological evolution suggests that this development will continue well into the future with a number of challenges for the safety community some of which shall be discussed in this paper. The current state of the art reveals a number of problems with developing and assessing safety critical software which explains the reluctance of the space community to rely on software-based safety measures to mitigate hazards. Among others, usually lack of trustworthy evidence of software integrity in all foreseeable situations and the difficulties to integrate software in the traditional safety analysis framework are cited. Experience from other domains and recent developments in modern software development methodologies and verification techniques are analysed for the suitability for space systems and an avionics architectural framework (see STANAG 4626) for the implementation of safety critical software is proposed. This is shown to create among other features the possibility of numerous degradation modes enhancing overall system safety and interoperability of computerized space systems. It also potentially simplifies international cooperation on a technical level by introducing a higher degree of compatibility. As software safety cannot be tested or argued into a system in hindsight, the development process and especially the architecture chosen are essential to establish safety properties for the software used to implement safety functions. The core of the safety argument revolves around the separation of different functions and software modules from each other by minimal coupling of functions and credible separation mechanisms in the architecture combined with rigorous development methodologies for the software itself.

Manned space flight nuclear system safety. Volume 4: Space shuttle nuclear system transportation. Part 1: Space shuttle nuclear safety

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

1972-01-01

An analysis of the nuclear safety aspects (design and operational considerations) in the transport of nuclear payloads to and from earth orbit by the space shuttle is presented. Three representative nuclear payloads used in the study were: (1) the zirconium hydride reactor Brayton power module, (2) the large isotope Brayton power system and (3) small isotopic heat sources which can be a part of an upper stage or part of a logistics module. Reference data on the space shuttle and nuclear payloads are presented in an appendix. Safety oriented design and operational requirements were identified to integrate the nuclear payloads in the shuttle mission. Contingency situations were discussed and operations and design features were recommended to minimize the nuclear hazards. The study indicates the safety, design and operational advantages in the use of a nuclear payload transfer module. The transfer module can provide many of the safety related support functions (blast and fragmentation protection, environmental control, payload ejection) minimizing the direct impact on the shuttle.

14 CFR 25.1709 - System safety: EWIS.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 1 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false System safety: EWIS. 25.1709 Section 25.1709 Aeronautics and Space FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AIRCRAFT AIRWORTHINESS STANDARDS: TRANSPORT CATEGORY AIRPLANES Electrical Wiring Interconnection Systems (EWIS) § 25.1709...

Safety aspects of nuclear waste disposal in space

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Rice, E. E.; Edgecombe, D. S.; Compton, P. R.

1981-01-01

Safety issues involved in the disposal of nuclear wastes in space as a complement to mined geologic repositories are examined as part of an assessment of the feasibility of nuclear waste disposal in space. General safety guidelines for space disposal developed in the areas of radiation exposure and shielding, containment, accident environments, criticality, post-accident recovery, monitoring systems and isolation are presented for a nuclear waste disposal in space mission employing conventional space technology such as the Space Shuttle. The current reference concept under consideration by NASA and DOE is then examined in detail, with attention given to the waste source and mix, the waste form, waste processing and payload fabrication, shipping casks and ground transport vehicles, launch site operations and facilities, Shuttle-derived launch vehicle, orbit transfer vehicle, orbital operations and space destination, and the system safety aspects of the concept are discussed for each component. It is pointed out that future work remains in the development of an improved basis for the safety guidelines and the determination of the possible benefits and costs of the space disposal option for nuclear wastes.

SP-100 Program: space reactor system and subsystem investigations

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Harty, R.B.

1983-09-30

For a space reactor power system, a comprehensive safety program will be required to assure that no undue risk is present. This report summarizes the nuclear safety review/approval process that will be required for a space reactor system. The documentation requirements are presented along with a summary of the required contents of key documents. Finally, the aerospace safety program conducted for the SNAP-10A reactor system is summarized. The results of this program are presented to show the type of program that can be expected and to provide information that could be usable in future programs.

SP-100 program: Space reactor system and subsystem investigations

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Harty, R. B.

1983-09-01

For a space reactor power system, a comprehensive safety program will be required to assure that no undue risk is present. The nuclear safety review/approval process that is required for a space reactor system is summarized. The documentation requirements are presented along with a summary of the required contents of key documents. Finally, the aerospace safety program conducted for the SNAP-10A reactor system is summarized. The results of this program are presented to show the type of program that is expected and to provide information that could be usable in future programs.

In-space propellant logistics. Volume 1: Executive summary

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

1972-01-01

The study addresses the systems and operational problems associated with the transport, transfer, and storage of cryogenic propellants in low earth orbits. The safety problems connected with in-space propellant logistics operations are also considered.Correlation between the two projects was maintained by including safety considerations, resulting from the system safety analysis, in the trade studies and evaluations of alternate operating concepts in the systems operations analysis.

14 CFR 417.311 - Flight safety crew roles and qualifications.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Flight safety crew roles and qualifications. 417.311 Section 417.311 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION... the knowledge, skills, and abilities needed to operate the flight safety system hardware in accordance...

14 CFR 417.311 - Flight safety crew roles and qualifications.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Flight safety crew roles and qualifications. 417.311 Section 417.311 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION... the knowledge, skills, and abilities needed to operate the flight safety system hardware in accordance...

Space station internal environmental and safety concerns

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Cole, Matthew B.

1987-01-01

Space station environmental and safety concerns, especially those involving fires, are discussed. Several types of space station modules and the particular hazards associated with each are briefly surveyed. A brief history of fire detection and suppression aboard spacecraft is given. Microgravity fire behavior, spacecraft fire detector systems, space station fire suppression equipment and procedures, and fire safety in hyperbaric chambers are discussed.

14 CFR 415.131 - Flight safety system crew data.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Flight safety system crew data. 415.131... Launch Vehicle From a Non-Federal Launch Site § 415.131 Flight safety system crew data. (a) An applicant's safety review document must identify each flight safety system crew position and the role of that...

Safety policy and requirements for payloads using the space transportation system

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

1989-01-01

The safety policy and requirements are established applicable to the Space Transportation System (STS) payloads and their ground support equipment (GSE). The requirements are intended to protect flight and ground personnel, the STS, other payloads, GSE, the general public, public-private property, and the environment from payload-related hazards. The technical and system safety requirements applicable to STS payloads (including payload-provided ground and flight supports systems) during ground and flight operations are contained.

Integrated Systems Health Management for Space Exploration

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Uckun, Serdar

2005-01-01

Integrated Systems Health Management (ISHM) is a system engineering discipline that addresses the design, development, operation, and lifecycle management of components, subsystems, vehicles, and other operational systems with the purpose of maintaining nominal system behavior and function and assuring mission safety and effectiveness under off-nominal conditions. NASA missions are often conducted in extreme, unfamiliar environments of space, using unique experimental spacecraft. In these environments, off-nominal conditions can develop with the potential to rapidly escalate into mission- or life-threatening situations. Further, the high visibility of NASA missions means they are always characterized by extraordinary attention to safety. ISHM is a critical element of risk mitigation, mission safety, and mission assurance for exploration. ISHM enables: In-space maintenance and repair; a) Autonomous (and automated) launch abort and crew escape capability; b) Efficient testing and checkout of ground and flight systems; c) Monitoring and trending of ground and flight system operations and performance; d) Enhanced situational awareness and control for ground personnel and crew; e) Vehicle autonomy (self-sufficiency) in responding to off-nominal conditions during long-duration and distant exploration missions; f) In-space maintenance and repair; and g) Efficient ground processing of reusable systems. ISHM concepts and technologies may be applied to any complex engineered system such as transportation systems, orbital or planetary habitats, observatories, command and control systems, life support systems, safety-critical software, and even the health of flight crews. As an overarching design and operational principle implemented at the system-of-systems level, ISHM holds substantial promise in terms of affordability, safety, reliability, and effectiveness of space exploration missions.

Safety management for polluted confined space with IT system: a running case.

PubMed

Hwang, Jing-Jang; Wu, Chien-Hsing; Zhuang, Zheng-Yun; Hsu, Yi-Chang

2015-01-01

This study traced a deployed real IT system to enhance occupational safety for a polluted confined space. By incorporating wireless technology, it automatically monitors the status of workers on the site and upon detected anomalous events, managers are notified effectively. The system, with a redefined standard operations process, is running well at one of Formosa Petrochemical Corporation's refineries. Evidence shows that after deployment, the system does enhance the safety level by real-time monitoring the workers and by managing well and controlling the anomalies. Therefore, such technical architecture can be applied to similar scenarios for safety enhancement purposes.

Security for safety critical space borne systems

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Legrand, Sue

1987-01-01

The Space Station contains safety critical computer software components in systems that can affect life and vital property. These components require a multilevel secure system that provides dynamic access control of the data and processes involved. A study is under way to define requirements for a security model providing access control through level B3 of the Orange Book. The model will be prototyped at NASA-Johnson Space Center.

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

1989-01-01

This report provides findings, conclusions and recommendations regarding the National Space Transportation System (NSTS), the Space Station Freedom Program (SSFP), aeronautical projects and other areas of NASA activities. The main focus of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) during 1988 has been monitoring and advising NASA and its contractors on the Space Transportation System (STS) recovery program. NASA efforts have restored the flight program with a much better management organization, safety and quality assurance organizations, and management communication system. The NASA National Space Transportation System (NSTS) organization in conjunction with its prime contractors should be encouraged to continue development and incorporation of appropriate design and operational improvements which will further reduce risk. The data from each Shuttle flight should be used to determine if affordable design and/or operational improvements could further increase safety. The review of Critical Items (CILs), Failure Mode Effects and Analyses (FMEAs) and Hazard Analyses (HAs) after the Challenger accident has given the program a massive data base with which to establish a formal program with prioritized changes.

Safety, reliability, maintainability and quality provisions for the Space Shuttle program

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

1990-01-01

This publication establishes common safety, reliability, maintainability and quality provisions for the Space Shuttle Program. NASA Centers shall use this publication both as the basis for negotiating safety, reliability, maintainability and quality requirements with Shuttle Program contractors and as the guideline for conduct of program safety, reliability, maintainability and quality activities at the Centers. Centers shall assure that applicable provisions of the publication are imposed in lower tier contracts. Centers shall give due regard to other Space Shuttle Program planning in order to provide an integrated total Space Shuttle Program activity. In the implementation of safety, reliability, maintainability and quality activities, consideration shall be given to hardware complexity, supplier experience, state of hardware development, unit cost, and hardware use. The approach and methods for contractor implementation shall be described in the contractors safety, reliability, maintainability and quality plans. This publication incorporates provisions of NASA documents: NHB 1700.1 'NASA Safety Manual, Vol. 1'; NHB 5300.4(IA), 'Reliability Program Provisions for Aeronautical and Space System Contractors'; and NHB 5300.4(1B), 'Quality Program Provisions for Aeronautical and Space System Contractors'. It has been tailored from the above documents based on experience in other programs. It is intended that this publication be reviewed and revised, as appropriate, to reflect new experience and to assure continuing viability.

Flight telerobotic servicer legacy

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Shattuck, Paul L.; Lowrie, James W.

1992-11-01

The Flight Telerobotic Servicer (FTS) was developed to enhance and provide a safe alternative to human presence in space. The first step for this system was a precursor development test flight (DTF-1) on the Space Shuttle. DTF-1 was to be a pathfinder for manned flight safety of robotic systems. The broad objectives of this mission were three-fold: flight validation of telerobotic manipulator (design, control algorithms, man/machine interfaces, safety); demonstration of dexterous manipulator capabilities on specific building block tasks; and correlation of manipulator performance in space with ground predictions. The DTF-1 system is comprised of a payload bay element (7-DOF manipulator with controllers, end-of-arm gripper and camera, telerobot body with head cameras and electronics module, task panel, and MPESS truss) and an aft flight deck element (force-reflecting hand controller, crew restraint, command and display panel and monitors). The approach used to develop the DTF-1 hardware, software and operations involved flight qualification of components from commercial, military, space, and R controller, end-of-arm tooling, force/torque transducer) and the development of the telerobotic system for space applications. The system is capable of teleoperation and autonomous control (advances state of the art); reliable (two-fault tolerance); and safe (man-rated). Benefits from the development flight included space validation of critical telerobotic technologies and resolution of significant safety issues relating to telerobotic operations in the Shuttle bay or in the vicinity of other space assets. This paper discusses the lessons learned and technology evolution that stemmed from developing and integrating a dexterous robot into a manned system, the Space Shuttle. Particular emphasis is placed on the safety and reliability requirements for a man-rated system as these are the critical factors which drive the overall system architecture. Other topics focused on include: task requirements and operational concepts for servicing and maintenance of space platforms; origins of technology for dexterous robotic systems; issues associated with space qualification of components; and development of the industrial base to support space robotics.

Aeronautics and Space Report of the President: Fiscal Year 1996 Activities

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

1996-01-01

Topics considered include: (1) Space launch activities: space shuttle missions; expendable launch vehicles. (2) Space science: astronomy and space physics; solar system exploration. (3) Space flight and technology: life and microgravity sciences; space shuttle technology; reuseable launch vehicles; international space station; energy; safety and mission assurance; commercial development and regulation of space; surveillance. (4) Space communications: communications satellites; space network; ground networks; mission control and data systems. (5) Aeronautical activities: technology developments; air traffic control and navigation; weather-related aeronautical activities; flight safety and security; aviation medicine and human factors. (6) Studies of the planet earth: terrestrial studies and applications: atmospheric studies: oceanographic studies; international aeronautical and space activities; and appendices.

System Safety in Early Manned Space Program: A Case Study of NASA and Project Mercury

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Hansen, Frederick D.; Pitts, Donald

2005-01-01

This case study provides a review of National Aeronautics and Space Administration s (NASA's) involvement in system safety during research and evolution from air breathing to exo-atmospheric capable flight systems culminating in the successful Project Mercury. Although NASA has been philosophically committed to the principals of system safety, this case study points out that budget and manpower constraints-as well as a variety of internal and external pressures can jeopardize even a well-designed system safety program. This study begins with a review of the evolution and early years of NASA's rise as a project lead agency and ends with the lessons learned from Project Mercury.

Optimal Design of Integrated Systems Health Management (ISHM) Systems for improving safety in NASA's Exploration Vehicles: A Two-Level Multidisciplinary Design Approach

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Mehr, Ali Farhang; Tumer, Irem; Barszcz, Eric

2005-01-01

Integrated Vehicle Health Management (ISHM) systems are used to detect, assess, and isolate functional failures in order to improve safety of space systems such as Orbital Space Planes (OSPs). An ISHM system, as a whole, consists of several subsystems that monitor different components of an OSP including: Spacecraft, Launch Vehicle, Ground Control, and the International Space Station. In this research, therefore, we propose a new methodology to design and optimize ISHM as a distributed system with multiple disciplines (that correspond to different subsystems of OSP safety). A paramount amount of interest has been given in the literature to the multidisciplinary design optimization of problems with such architecture (as will be reviewed in the full paper).

The Space Station Freedom - International cooperation and innovation in space safety

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Rodney, George A.

1989-01-01

The Space Station Freedom (SSF) being developed by the United States, European Space Agency (ESA), Japan, and Canada poses novel safety challenges in design, operations, logistics, and program management. A brief overview discloses many features that make SSF a radical departure from earlier low earth orbit (LEO) space stations relative to safety management: size and power levels; multiphase manned assembly; 30-year planned lifetime, with embedded 'hooks and scars' forevolution; crew size and skill-mix variability; sustained logistical dependence; use of man, robotics and telepresence for on-orbit maintenance of station and free-flyer systems; closed-environment recycling; use of automation and expert systems; long-term operation of collocated life-sciences and materials-science experiments, requiring control and segregation of hazardous and chemically incompatible materials; and materials aging in space.

In-space propellant logistics and safety

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

1971-01-01

Preliminary guidelines for the basic delivery system and safety aspects of the space shuttle configuration in connection with the transport, handling, storage, and transfer of propellants are developed. It is shown that propellants are the major shuttle space load and influence shuttle traffic modeling significantly.

14 CFR 417.233 - Analysis for an unguided suborbital launch vehicle flown with a wind weighting safety system.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... vehicle flown with a wind weighting safety system. 417.233 Section 417.233 Aeronautics and Space... with a wind weighting safety system. For each launch of an unguided suborbital launch vehicle flown with a wind weighting safety system, in addition to the other requirements in this subpart outlined in...

14 CFR 417.233 - Analysis for an unguided suborbital launch vehicle flown with a wind weighting safety system.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... vehicle flown with a wind weighting safety system. 417.233 Section 417.233 Aeronautics and Space... with a wind weighting safety system. For each launch of an unguided suborbital launch vehicle flown with a wind weighting safety system, in addition to the other requirements in this subpart outlined in...

14 CFR 417.233 - Analysis for an unguided suborbital launch vehicle flown with a wind weighting safety system.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... vehicle flown with a wind weighting safety system. 417.233 Section 417.233 Aeronautics and Space... with a wind weighting safety system. For each launch of an unguided suborbital launch vehicle flown with a wind weighting safety system, in addition to the other requirements in this subpart outlined in...

14 CFR 417.233 - Analysis for an unguided suborbital launch vehicle flown with a wind weighting safety system.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... vehicle flown with a wind weighting safety system. 417.233 Section 417.233 Aeronautics and Space... with a wind weighting safety system. For each launch of an unguided suborbital launch vehicle flown with a wind weighting safety system, in addition to the other requirements in this subpart outlined in...

14 CFR 417.233 - Analysis for an unguided suborbital launch vehicle flown with a wind weighting safety system.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... vehicle flown with a wind weighting safety system. 417.233 Section 417.233 Aeronautics and Space... with a wind weighting safety system. For each launch of an unguided suborbital launch vehicle flown with a wind weighting safety system, in addition to the other requirements in this subpart outlined in...

The elements of a commercial human spaceflight safety reporting system

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Christensen, Ian

2017-10-01

In its report on the SpaceShipTwo accident the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) included in its recommendations that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) ;in collaboration with the commercial spaceflight industry, continue work to implement a database of lessons learned from commercial space mishap investigations and encourage commercial space industry members to voluntarily submit lessons learned.; In its official response to the NTSB the FAA supported this recommendation and indicated it has initiated an iterative process to put into place a framework for a cooperative safety data sharing process including the sharing of lessons learned, and trends analysis. Such a framework is an important element of an overall commercial human spaceflight safety system.

Cyber Security Threats to Safety-Critical, Space-Based Infrastructures

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Johnson, C. W.; Atencia Yepez, A.

2012-01-01

Space-based systems play an important role within national critical infrastructures. They are being integrated into advanced air-traffic management applications, rail signalling systems, energy distribution software etc. Unfortunately, the end users of communications, location sensing and timing applications often fail to understand that these infrastructures are vulnerable to a wide range of security threats. The following pages focus on concerns associated with potential cyber-attacks. These are important because future attacks may invalidate many of the safety assumptions that support the provision of critical space-based services. These safety assumptions are based on standard forms of hazard analysis that ignore cyber-security considerations This is a significant limitation when, for instance, security attacks can simultaneously exploit multiple vulnerabilities in a manner that would never occur without a deliberate enemy seeking to damage space based systems and ground infrastructures. We address this concern through the development of a combined safety and security risk assessment methodology. The aim is to identify attack scenarios that justify the allocation of additional design resources so that safety barriers can be strengthened to increase our resilience against security threats.

Safety and environmental constraints on space applications of fusion energy

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Roth, J. Reece

1990-01-01

Some of the constraints are examined on fusion reactions, plasma confinement systems, and fusion reactors that are intended for such space related missions as manned or unmanned operations in near earth orbit, interplanetary missions, or requirements of the SDI program. Of the many constraints on space power and propulsion systems, those arising from safety and environmental considerations are emphasized since these considerations place severe constraints on some fusion systems and have not been adequately treated in previous studies.

A Guide to the Application of Probability Risk Assessment Methodology and Hazard Risk Frequency Criteria as a Hazard Control for the Use of the Mobile Servicing System on the International Space Station

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

D'silva, Oneil; Kerrison, Roger

2013-09-01

A key feature for the increased utilization of space robotics is to automate Extra-Vehicular manned space activities and thus significantly reduce the potential for catastrophic hazards while simultaneously minimizing the overall costs associated with manned space. The principal scope of the paper is to evaluate the use of industry standard accepted Probability risk/safety assessment (PRA/PSA) methodologies and Hazard Risk frequency Criteria as a hazard control. This paper illustrates the applicability of combining the selected Probability risk assessment methodology and hazard risk frequency criteria, in order to apply the necessary safety controls that allow for the increased use of the Mobile Servicing system (MSS) robotic system on the International Space Station. This document will consider factors such as component failure rate reliability, software reliability, and periods of operation and dormancy, fault tree analyses and their effects on the probability risk assessments. The paper concludes with suggestions for the incorporation of existing industry Risk/Safety plans to create an applicable safety process for future activities/programs

International Cooperation in the Field of International Space Station (ISS) Payload Safety

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Heimann, Timothy; Larsen, Axel M.; Rose, Summer; Sgobba, Tommaso

2005-01-01

In the frame of the International Space Station (ISS) Program cooperation, in 1998, the European Space Agency (ESA) approached the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) with the unique concept of a Payload Safety Review Panel (PSRP) "franchise" based at the European Space Technology Center (ESTEC), where the panel would be capable of autonomously reviewing flight hardware for safety. This paper will recount the course of an ambitious idea as it progressed into a fully functional reality. It will show how a panel initially conceived at NASA to serve a national programme has evolved into an international safety cooperation asset. The PSRP established at NASA began reviewing ISS payloads approximately in late 1994 or early 1995 as an expansion of the pre-existing Shuttle Program PSRP. This paper briefly describes the fundamental Shuttle safety process and the establishment of the safety requirements for payloads intending to use the Space Transportation System and International Space Station (ISS). The paper will also offer some historical statistics about the experiments that completed the payload safety process for Shuttle and ISS. The paper 1 then presents the background of ISS agreements and international treaties that had to be taken into account when establishing the ESA PSRP. The detailed franchising model will be expounded upon, followed by an outline of the cooperation charter approved by the NASA Associate Administrator, Office of Space Flight, and ESA Director of Manned Spaceflight and Microgravity. The resulting ESA PSRP implementation and its success statistics to date will then be addressed. Additionally the paper presents the ongoing developments with the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency. The discussion will conclude with ideas for future developments, such to achieve a fully integrated international system of payload safety panels for ISS.

14 CFR 1214.501 - Applicability.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 5 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Applicability. 1214.501 Section 1214.501 Aeronautics and Space NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION SPACE FLIGHT Mission Critical Space System... the safety and success of mission critical space systems. (b) The provisions of this regulation apply...

14 CFR 1214.501 - Applicability.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 5 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Applicability. 1214.501 Section 1214.501 Aeronautics and Space NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION SPACE FLIGHT Mission Critical Space System... the safety and success of mission critical space systems. (b) The provisions of this regulation apply...

14 CFR 1214.501 - Applicability.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 5 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Applicability. 1214.501 Section 1214.501 Aeronautics and Space NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION SPACE FLIGHT Mission Critical Space System... the safety and success of mission critical space systems. (b) The provisions of this regulation apply...

14 CFR 1214.501 - Applicability.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 5 2011-01-01 2010-01-01 true Applicability. 1214.501 Section 1214.501 Aeronautics and Space NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION SPACE FLIGHT Mission Critical Space System... the safety and success of mission critical space systems. (b) The provisions of this regulation apply...

Safety and the Human Factor.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Smith, Ann

1982-01-01

Discusses four elements of safety programs: (1) safety training; (2) safety inspections; (3) accident investigations; and (4) protective safety equipment. Also discusses safety considerations in water/wastewater treatment facilities focusing on falls, drowning hazards, trickling filters, confined space entry, collection/distribution system safety,…

The Art World's Concept of Negative Space Applied to System Safety Management

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Goodin, James Ronald (Ronnie)

2005-01-01

Tools from several different disciplines can improve system safety management. This paper relates the Art World with our system safety world, showing useful art schools of thought applied to system safety management, developing an art theory-system safety bridge. This bridge is then used to demonstrate relations with risk management, the legal system, personnel management and basic management (establishing priorities). One goal of this presentation/paper is simply to be a fun diversion from the many technical topics presented during the conference.

Manned space flight nuclear system safety. Volume 1: base nuclear system safety

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

1972-01-01

The mission and terrestrial nuclear safety aspects of future long duration manned space missions in low earth orbit are discussed. Nuclear hazards of a typical low earth orbit Space Base mission (from natural sources and on-board nuclear hardware) have been identified and evaluated. Some of the principal nuclear safety design and procedural considerations involved in launch, orbital, and end of mission operations are presented. Areas of investigation include radiation interactions with the crew, subsystems, facilities, experiments, film, interfacing vehicles, nuclear hardware and the terrestrial populace. Results of the analysis indicate: (1) the natural space environment can be the dominant radiation source in a low earth orbit where reactors are effectively shielded, (2) with implementation of safety guidelines the reactor can present a low risk to the crew, support personnel, the terrestrial populace, flight hardware and the mission, (3) ten year missions are feasible without exceeding integrated radiation limits assigned to flight hardware, and (4) crew stay-times up to one year are feasible without storm shelter provisions.

14 CFR 1214.505 - Program implementation.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... 1214.505 Aeronautics and Space NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION SPACE FLIGHT Mission... each NASA Installation will designate mission critical space systems areas. (b) NASA installations will... space systems. (e) NASA Headquarters Office of Safety and Mission Quality (Code Q) will act as the...

14 CFR 1214.505 - Program implementation.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 1214.505 Aeronautics and Space NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION SPACE FLIGHT Mission... each NASA Installation will designate mission critical space systems areas. (b) NASA installations will... space systems. (e) NASA Headquarters Office of Safety and Mission Quality (Code Q) will act as the...

14 CFR 1214.505 - Program implementation.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... 1214.505 Aeronautics and Space NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION SPACE FLIGHT Mission... each NASA Installation will designate mission critical space systems areas. (b) NASA installations will... space systems. (e) NASA Headquarters Office of Safety and Mission Quality (Code Q) will act as the...

14 CFR 1214.505 - Program implementation.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 1214.505 Aeronautics and Space NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION SPACE FLIGHT Mission... each NASA Installation will designate mission critical space systems areas. (b) NASA installations will... space systems. (e) NASA Headquarters Office of Safety and Mission Quality (Code Q) will act as the...

NASA safety program activities in support of the Space Exploration Initiatives Nuclear Propulsion program

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Sawyer, J. C., Jr.

1993-01-01

The activities of the joint NASA/DOE/DOD Nuclear Propulsion Program Technical Panels have been used as the basis for the current development of safety policies and requirements for the Space Exploration Initiatives (SEI) Nuclear Propulsion Technology development program. The Safety Division of the NASA Office of Safety and Mission Quality has initiated efforts to develop policies for the safe use of nuclear propulsion in space through involvement in the joint agency Nuclear Safety Policy Working Group (NSPWG), encouraged expansion of the initial policy development into proposed programmatic requirements, and suggested further expansion into the overall risk assessment and risk management process for the NASA Exploration Program. Similar efforts are underway within the Department of Energy to ensure the safe development and testing of nuclear propulsion systems on Earth. This paper describes the NASA safety policy related to requirements for the design of systems that may operate where Earth re-entry is a possibility. The expected plan of action is to support and oversee activities related to the technology development of nuclear propulsion in space, and support the overall safety and risk management program being developed for the NASA Exploration Program.

Topics on Test Methods for Space Systems and Operations Safety: Applicability of Experimental Data

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Hirsch, David B.

2009-01-01

This viewgraph presentation reviews topics on test methods for space systems and operations safety through experimentation and analysis. The contents include: 1) Perception of reality through experimentation and analysis; 2) Measurements, methods, and correlations with real life; and 3) Correlating laboratory aerospace materials flammability data with data in spacecraft environments.

14 CFR § 1214.505 - Program implementation.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... § 1214.505 Aeronautics and Space NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION SPACE FLIGHT Mission... each NASA Installation will designate mission critical space systems areas. (b) NASA installations will... space systems. (e) NASA Headquarters Office of Safety and Mission Quality (Code Q) will act as the...

Manned space flight nuclear system safety. Volume 7: Literature review. Part 1: Literature search and evaluation

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

1972-01-01

A review of the literature used in conducting the manned space flight nuclear system safety study is presented. The objectives of the presentation are to identify and evaluate for potential application to study the existing related literature and to provide the information required to include the related literature in the NASA Aerospace Safety Research and Data Institute. More than 15,000 documents were evaluated and identification forms were prepared for 850 reports.

International Cooperation in the Field of International Space Station (ISS) Payload Safety

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Grayson, C.; Sgobba, T.; Larsen, A.; Rose, S.; Heimann, T.; Ciancone, M.; Mulhern, V.

2005-12-01

In the frame of the International Space Station (ISS) Program cooperation, in 1998 the European Space Agency (ESA) approached the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) with the unique concept of a Payload Safety Review Panel (PSRP) "franchise" based at the European Space Technology Center (ESTEC), where the panel would be capable of autonomously reviewing flight hardware for safety. This paper will recount the course of an ambitious idea as it progressed into a fully functional reality. It will show how a panel initially conceived at NASA to serve a national programme has evolved into an international safety cooperation asset. The PSRP established at NASA began reviewing ISS payloads approximately in late 1994 or early 1995 as an expansion of the pre- existing Shuttle Program PSRP. This paper briefly describes the fundamental Shuttle safety process and the establishment of the safety requirements for payloads intending to use the Space Transportation System and ISS. The paper will also offer some historical statistics about the experiments that completed the payload safety process for Shuttle and ISS. The paper then presents the background of ISS agreements and international treaties that had to be considered when establishing the ESA PSRP. The paper will expound upon the detailed franchising model, followed by an outline of the cooperation charter approved by the NASA Associate Administrator, Office of Space Flight, and ESA Director of Manned Spaceflight and Microgravity. The paper will then address the resulting ESA PSRP implementation and its success statistics to date. Additionally, the paper presents ongoing developments with the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA). The discussion will conclude with ideas for future developments, such to achieve a fully integrated international system of payload safety panels for ISS.

Nuclear space power safety and facility guidelines study

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Mehlman, W.F.

1995-09-11

This report addresses safety guidelines for space nuclear reactor power missions and was prepared by The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL) under a Department of Energy grant, DE-FG01-94NE32180 dated 27 September 1994. This grant was based on a proposal submitted by the JHU/APL in response to an {open_quotes}Invitation for Proposals Designed to Support Federal Agencies and Commercial Interests in Meeting Special Power and Propulsion Needs for Future Space Missions{close_quotes}. The United States has not launched a nuclear reactor since SNAP 10A in April 1965 although many Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators (RTGs) have been launched. An RTG powered system ismore » planned for launch as part of the Cassini mission to Saturn in 1997. Recently the Ballistic Missile Defense Office (BMDO) sponsored the Nuclear Electric Propulsion Space Test Program (NEPSTP) which was to demonstrate and evaluate the Russian-built TOPAZ II nuclear reactor as a power source in space. As of late 1993 the flight portion of this program was canceled but work to investigate the attributes of the reactor were continued but at a reduced level. While the future of space nuclear power systems is uncertain there are potential space missions which would require space nuclear power systems. The differences between space nuclear power systems and RTG devices are sufficient that safety and facility requirements warrant a review in the context of the unique features of a space nuclear reactor power system.« less

NASA's Nuclear Thermal Propulsion Project

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Houts, Mike; Mitchell, Sonny; Kim, Tony; Borowski, Stan; Power, Kevin; Scott, John; Belvin, Anthony; Clement, Steve

2015-01-01

HEOMD's (Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate) AES (Advanced Exploration Systems) Nuclear Thermal Propulsion (NTP) project is making significant progress. First of four FY 2015 milestones achieved this month. Safety is the highest priority for NTP (as with other space systems). After safety comes affordability. No centralized capability for developing, qualifying, and utilizing an NTP system. Will require a strong, closely integrated team. Tremendous potential benefits from NTP and other space fission systems. No fundamental reason these systems cannot be developed and utilized in a safe, affordable fashion.

EVA safety: Space suit system interoperability

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Skoog, A. I.; McBarron, J. W.; Abramov, L. P.; Zvezda, A. O.

1995-01-01

The results and the recommendations of the International Academy of Astronautics extravehicular activities (IAA EVA) Committee work are presented. The IAA EVA protocols and operation were analyzed for harmonization procedures and for the standardization of safety critical and operationally important interfaces. The key role of EVA and how to improve the situation based on the identified EVA space suit system interoperability deficiencies were considered.

ESA Human rating Requirements:Status

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Trujillo, M.; Sgobba, T.

2012-01-01

The European Space Agency (ESA) human rating safety requirements are based on heritage requirements of the International Space Station as well as the knowledge and experience derived from European participation on international partnerships. This expertise in conjunction with recommendations derived from past accidents (i.e.: Columbia) and lessons learned have led to the identification of m inimum core safety tech nical requirements for hum an rated space syst ems. These requirements apply to th e crewed space vehicle, integrated space system (i.e.: cre wed vehicle on its launcher) and its interfaces with control centres, la unch pad, etc. In 2009, a first draft was issued. Then, in the summer of 2010, ESA established a working group comprised of more than twenty experts (from disciplines including propulsion, pyrotechnics, structures, avionics, human factors and life support among others) across the Agency to review this draft. This paper provides an overview of ESA "Safety technical re quirements for human rated s pace systems" document, its scope a nd structure, as well as the planned steps for verification of these requirements in term s of achieving the identified safety objectives for crew safety in t erms of a quantitative risk evaluation.

Safety Assurances at Space Test Centres: Lessons Learned

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Alarcon Ruiz, Raul; O'Neil, Sean; Valls, Rafel Prades

2010-09-01

The European Space Agency’s(ESA) experts in quality, cleanliness and contamination control, safety, test facilities and test methods have accumulated valuable experience during the performance of dedicated audits of space test centres in Europe over a period of 10 years. This paper is limited to a summary of the safety findings and provides a valuable reference to the lessons learned, identifying opportunities for improvement in the areas of risk prevention measures associated to the safety of all test centre personnel, the test specimen, the test facilities and associated infrastructure. Through the analysis of the audit results the authors present what are the main lessons learned, and conclude how an effective safety management system will contribute to successful test campaigns and have a positive impact on the cost and schedule of space projects.

STS safety approval process for small self-contained payloads

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Gum, Mary A.

1988-01-01

The safety approval process established by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration for Get Away Special (GAS) payloads is described. Although the designing organization is ultimately responsible for the safe operation of its payload, the Get Away Special team at the Goddard Space Flight Center will act as advisors while iterative safety analyses are performed and the Safety Data Package inputs are submitted. This four phase communications process will ultimately give NASA confidence that the GAS payload is safe, and successful completion of the Phase 3 package and review will clear the way for flight aboard the Space Transportation System orbiter.

Annual report to the NASA Administrator by the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel on the space shuttle program. Part 2: Summary of information developed in the panel's fact-finding activities

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

1976-01-01

Safety management areas of concern include the space shuttle main engine, shuttle avionics, orbiter thermal protection system, the external tank program, and the solid rocket booster program. The ground test program and ground support equipment system were reviewed. Systems integration and technical 'conscience' were of major priorities for the investigating teams.

Assessment of the effects of the zero gravity environment on the health and safety of space workers

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

1980-01-01

A review was conducted of currently available information relating to adverse effects to the health and safety that space power system (SPS) space workers may experience. Currently available information on the responses of humans to space flight is somewhat limited and was obtained under conditions which are grossly different from conditions to be experienced by future space workers. The limitations in information and differences in conditions were considered in the assessment of potential health and safety hazards to the SPS space workers. The study did not disclose any adverse effects that would result in long term deviations to the medical physiological health of space workers so long as proper preventive or ameliorating action were taken.

Advanced Range Safety System for High Energy Vehicles

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Claxton, Jeffrey S.; Linton, Donald F.

2002-01-01

The advanced range safety system project is a collaboration between the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the United States Air Force to develop systems that would reduce costs and schedule for safety approval for new classes of unmanned high-energy vehicles. The mission-planning feature for this system would yield flight profiles that satisfy the mission requirements for the user while providing an increased quality of risk assessment, enhancing public safety. By improving the speed and accuracy of predicting risks to the public, mission planners would be able to expand flight envelopes significantly. Once in place, this system is expected to offer the flexibility of handling real-time risk management for the high-energy capabilities of hypersonic vehicles including autonomous return-from-orbit vehicles and extended flight profiles over land. Users of this system would include mission planners of Space Launch Initiative vehicles, space planes, and other high-energy vehicles. The real-time features of the system could make extended flight of a malfunctioning vehicle possible, in lieu of an immediate terminate decision. With this improved capability, the user would have more time for anomaly resolution and potential recovery of a malfunctioning vehicle.

Reliability, Safety and Error Recovery for Advanced Control Software

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Malin, Jane T.

2003-01-01

For long-duration automated operation of regenerative life support systems in space environments, there is a need for advanced integration and control systems that are significantly more reliable and safe, and that support error recovery and minimization of operational failures. This presentation outlines some challenges of hazardous space environments and complex system interactions that can lead to system accidents. It discusses approaches to hazard analysis and error recovery for control software and challenges of supporting effective intervention by safety software and the crew.

On Space Exploration and Human Error: A Paper on Reliability and Safety

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Bell, David G.; Maluf, David A.; Gawdiak, Yuri

2005-01-01

NASA space exploration should largely address a problem class in reliability and risk management stemming primarily from human error, system risk and multi-objective trade-off analysis, by conducting research into system complexity, risk characterization and modeling, and system reasoning. In general, in every mission we can distinguish risk in three possible ways: a) known-known, b) known-unknown, and c) unknown-unknown. It is probably almost certain that space exploration will partially experience similar known or unknown risks embedded in the Apollo missions, Shuttle or Station unless something alters how NASA will perceive and manage safety and reliability

ULA Emergency Egress System (EES) Demonstration

NASA Image and Video Library

2017-03-14

A team of engineers recently tested a newly installed emergency egress system at Space Launch Complex 41 at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station to prepare for crew launches for NASA’s Commercial Crew Program. Boeing’s CST-100 Starliner spacecraft and United Launch Alliance Atlas V rocket that will boost astronauts to the International Space Station, will have many safety elements built into the systems. The Starliner emergency egress system operates a lot like a zip line, with four egress cables connecting at level 12 of the Crew Access Tower to a landing zone about 1,300 feet away from the launch vehicle. Five individual seats on four separate lines can transport up to 20 people off of the tower in the unlikely event there is an emergency on the launch pad. NASA has partnered with private industry to take astronauts to the space station. Boeing and SpaceX are building their own unique systems that meet NASA safety and mission requirements. The systems also will include launch abort systems and additional controls that astronauts can use during flight to enhance crew safety. KSC Contact - Joshua Finch (321)867-2468 Headquarters Contact - Tabatha Thompson (202)358-1100 More Info - www.nasa.gov/commercialcrew

Nuclear safety considerations in the conceptual design of a fast reactor for space electric power and propulsion

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Hsieh, T.-M.; Koenig, D. R.

1977-01-01

Some nuclear safety aspects of a 3.2 mWt heat pipe cooled fast reactor with out-of-core thermionic converters are discussed. Safety related characteristics of the design including a thin layer of B4C surrounding the core, the use of heat pipes and BeO reflector assembly, the elimination of fuel element bowing, etc., are highlighted. Potential supercriticality hazards and countermeasures are considered. Impacts of some safety guidelines of space transportation system are also briefly discussed, since the currently developing space shuttle would be used as the primary launch vehicle for the nuclear electric propulsion spacecraft.

[Comment to DPR 177/011].

PubMed

De Santis, Anna Elisa

2012-01-01

The subject of this study is the analysis of DPR 177/2011 regarding occupational safety in confined environments suspected of pollution The study wishes to represent a platform for the knowledge of the relevant principles and issues that are the functional basis for occupational health professionals, to offer a scheme in which it is possible to implement local actions of occupational prevention in the confined spaces and to help Italian intervention plans Italian within the European area, such, e.g., the present "Healthy workplaces campaign working together for risk prevention" promoted by the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work. The interiorization of this behavioural scheme is needed for professionals and authorities in the occupational safety systems, both public and private, who have the institutional duty to obtain trheir effectiveness. To observe the safety system in the specific matter of confined spaces, their essential elements were considered. These elements were identified both in the DPR 177/2011 and in other pertinent documents. This study doesn't pretend to identify all relevant documents, but wishes to underline the open structure of the system for acquiring non strictly juridical documents, such as ICOH guidelines and International code of ethics for occupational health professionals and pertinent authorities. A specific matter of the study is the different role of rules and ethical principles in verifying the adequacy of the safety system. The role of guidelines and ethic principles in the internal evaluation of legal value was examined for their relevance in order to decide on adequacy of the employer's management in safety matter adequacy which can by evaluated looking at his effective knowledge of spaces and good selection of managers and professionals. Furthermore, the study establishes how central--in reaching the safety--is the method based on effectiveness in managing the prevention in occupational health. The managerial method, not based on formal interpretation but on the effective situation of the spaces and of the human resources, is a critical element in safety systems and represents an acceptable scheme for the conduct of the subjects in charge for the production cycle. They are those who effectively decide on the site, except for some situations, as it is for example the prevision of managerial liability for activity in outsourcing. It has been stressed in this study the dynamicity of safety system in confined spaces which can be derived by the employer's duty of vigilance for interference risks between his activity and the activity of other enterprises operating in outsourcing. This duty it is permanent in every space and moment of production cycle. This context of functional responsibility, and liability when it exists, based on reality as well as on the knowledge of the spaces and human resources, shows the central function of qualified MD and his functionality in both aspects. In the first, he is able to understand various risks existing for health. In the second, for the many strict contacts with workers, he can participate in developing their information and formation, which have educational importance for the safety system of the occupational health. To conclude about the occupational safety system, this study stresses that the activity of qualified MD is not a simple surveillance carried out by medical examinations as a routine, but it is a strategic issue for the realization of organizational wellness at work, which is functional to respect both the human rights and an efficient production cycle.

14 CFR 417.305 - Command control system testing.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Command control system testing. 417.305..., DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH SAFETY Flight Safety System § 417.305 Command control system testing. (a) General. (1) A command control system, including its subsystems and components must undergo...

14 CFR 417.305 - Command control system testing.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Command control system testing. 417.305..., DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH SAFETY Flight Safety System § 417.305 Command control system testing. (a) General. (1) A command control system, including its subsystems and components must undergo...

14 CFR 417.305 - Command control system testing.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Command control system testing. 417.305..., DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH SAFETY Flight Safety System § 417.305 Command control system testing. (a) General. (1) A command control system, including its subsystems and components must undergo...

14 CFR 417.305 - Command control system testing.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Command control system testing. 417.305..., DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH SAFETY Flight Safety System § 417.305 Command control system testing. (a) General. (1) A command control system, including its subsystems and components must undergo...

14 CFR 417.305 - Command control system testing.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Command control system testing. 417.305..., DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH SAFETY Flight Safety System § 417.305 Command control system testing. (a) General. (1) A command control system, including its subsystems and components must undergo...

14 CFR 417.123 - Computing systems and software.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Computing systems and software. 417.123... systems and software. (a) A launch operator must document a system safety process that identifies the... systems and software. (b) A launch operator must identify all safety-critical functions associated with...

14 CFR 417.123 - Computing systems and software.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Computing systems and software. 417.123... systems and software. (a) A launch operator must document a system safety process that identifies the... systems and software. (b) A launch operator must identify all safety-critical functions associated with...

14 CFR 417.123 - Computing systems and software.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Computing systems and software. 417.123... systems and software. (a) A launch operator must document a system safety process that identifies the... systems and software. (b) A launch operator must identify all safety-critical functions associated with...

14 CFR 417.123 - Computing systems and software.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Computing systems and software. 417.123... systems and software. (a) A launch operator must document a system safety process that identifies the... systems and software. (b) A launch operator must identify all safety-critical functions associated with...

14 CFR 417.123 - Computing systems and software.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Computing systems and software. 417.123... systems and software. (a) A launch operator must document a system safety process that identifies the... systems and software. (b) A launch operator must identify all safety-critical functions associated with...

Simulation of Range Safety for the NASA Space Shuttle

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Rabelo, Luis; Sepulveda, Jose; Compton, Jeppie; Turner, Robert

2005-01-01

This paper describes a simulation environment that seamlessly combines a number of safety and environmental models for the launch phase of a NASA Space Shuttle mission. The components of this simulation environment represent the different systems that must interact in order to determine the Expectation of casualties (E(sub c)) resulting from the toxic effects of the gas dispersion that occurs after a disaster affecting a Space Shuttle within 120 seconds of lift-off. The utilization of the Space Shuttle reliability models, trajectory models, weather dissemination systems, population models, amount and type of toxicants, gas dispersion models, human response functions to toxicants, and a geographical information system are all integrated to create this environment. This simulation environment can help safety managers estimate the population at risk in order to plan evacuation, make sheltering decisions, determine the resources required to provide aid and comfort, and mitigate damages in case of a disaster. This simulation environment may also be modified and used for the landing phase of a space vehicle but will not be discussed in this paper.

Post-Challenger evaluation of space shuttle risk assessment and management

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

1988-01-01

As the shock of the Space Shuttle Challenger accident began to subside, NASA initiated a wide range of actions designed to ensure greater safety in various aspects of the Shuttle system and an improved focus on safety throughout the National Space Transportation System (NSTS) Program. Certain specific features of the NASA safety process are examined: the Critical Items List (CIL) and the NASA review of the Shuttle primary and backup units whose failure might result in the loss of life, the Shuttle vehicle, or the mission; the failure modes and effects analyses (FMEA); and the hazard analysis and their review. The conception of modern risk management, including the essential element of objective risk assessment is described and it is contrasted with NASA's safety process in general terms. The discussion, findings, and recommendations regarding particular aspects of the NASA STS safety assurance process are reported. The 11 subsections each deal with a different aspect of the process. The main lessons learned by SCRHAAC in the course of the audit are summarized.

Measure Guideline: Combustion Safety for Natural Draft Appliances Through Appliance Zone Isolation

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Fitzgerald, J.; Bohac, D.

2014-04-01

This measure guideline covers how to assess and carry out the isolation of natural draft combustion appliances from the conditioned space of low-rise residential buildings. It deals with combustion appliances located either within the living space in enclosed closets or side rooms or outside the living space in an adjacent area like an attic or garage. This subset of houses does not require comprehensive combustion safety tests and simplified prescriptive procedures can be used to address safety concerns. This allows residential energy retrofit contractors inexperienced in advanced combustion safety testing to effectively address combustion safety issues and allow energy retrofitsmore » including tightening and changes to distribution and ventilation systems to proceed.« less

Design for Reliability and Safety Approach for the NASA New Launch Vehicle

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Safie, Fayssal, M.; Weldon, Danny M.

2007-01-01

The United States National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is in the midst of a space exploration program intended for sending crew and cargo to the international Space Station (ISS), to the moon, and beyond. This program is called Constellation. As part of the Constellation program, NASA is developing new launch vehicles aimed at significantly increase safety and reliability, reduce the cost of accessing space, and provide a growth path for manned space exploration. Achieving these goals requires a rigorous process that addresses reliability, safety, and cost upfront and throughout all the phases of the life cycle of the program. This paper discusses the "Design for Reliability and Safety" approach for the NASA new crew launch vehicle called ARES I. The ARES I is being developed by NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) in support of the Constellation program. The ARES I consists of three major Elements: A solid First Stage (FS), an Upper Stage (US), and liquid Upper Stage Engine (USE). Stacked on top of the ARES I is the Crew exploration vehicle (CEV). The CEV consists of a Launch Abort System (LAS), Crew Module (CM), Service Module (SM), and a Spacecraft Adapter (SA). The CEV development is being led by NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC). Designing for high reliability and safety require a good integrated working environment and a sound technical design approach. The "Design for Reliability and Safety" approach addressed in this paper discusses both the environment and the technical process put in place to support the ARES I design. To address the integrated working environment, the ARES I project office has established a risk based design group called "Operability Design and Analysis" (OD&A) group. This group is an integrated group intended to bring together the engineering, design, and safety organizations together to optimize the system design for safety, reliability, and cost. On the technical side, the ARES I project has, through the OD&A environment, implemented a probabilistic approach to analyze and evaluate design uncertainties and understand their impact on safety, reliability, and cost. This paper focuses on the use of the various probabilistic approaches that have been pursued by the ARES I project. Specifically, the paper discusses an integrated functional probabilistic analysis approach that addresses upffont some key areas to support the ARES I Design Analysis Cycle (DAC) pre Preliminary Design (PD) Phase. This functional approach is a probabilistic physics based approach that combines failure probabilities with system dynamics and engineering failure impact models to identify key system risk drivers and potential system design requirements. The paper also discusses other probabilistic risk assessment approaches planned by the ARES I project to support the PD phase and beyond.

Space Solar Power Program. Final report

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Arif, Humayun; Barbosa, Hugo; Bardet, Christophe

1992-08-01

Information pertaining to the Space Solar Power Program is presented on energy analysis; markets; overall development plan; organizational plan; environmental and safety issues; power systems; space transportation; space manufacturing, construction, operations; design examples; and finance.

Advanced missions safety. Volume 3: Appendices. Part 1: Space shuttle rescue capability

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

1972-01-01

The space shuttle rescue capability is analyzed as a part of the advanced mission safety study. The subjects discussed are: (1) mission evaluation, (2) shuttle configurations and performance, (3) performance of shuttle-launched tug system, (4) multiple pass grazing reentry from lunar orbit, (5) ground launched ascent and rendezvous time, (6) cost estimates, and (7) parallel-burn space shuttle configuration.

Report to the NASA Administrator by the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel on the Space Shuttle Program. Part 1: Observations and Conclusions

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

1976-01-01

Each system was chosen on the basis of its importance with respect to crew safety and mission success. An overview of the systems management is presented. The space shuttle main engine, orbiter thermal protection system, avionics, external tanks and solid rocket boosters were examined. The ground test and ground support equipment programs were studied. Program management was found to have an adequate understanding of the significant ground and flight risks involved.

Micro-Inspector Spacecraft for Space Exploration Missions

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Mueller, Juergen; Alkalai, Leon; Lewis, Carol

2005-01-01

NASA is seeking to embark on a new set of human and robotic exploration missions back to the Moon, to Mars, and destinations beyond. Key strategic technical challenges will need to be addressed to realize this new vision for space exploration, including improvements in safety and reliability to improve robustness of space operations. Under sponsorship by NASA's Exploration Systems Mission, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), together with its partners in government (NASA Johnson Space Center) and industry (Boeing, Vacco Industries, Ashwin-Ushas Inc.) is developing an ultra-low mass (<3.0 kg) free-flying micro-inspector spacecraft in an effort to enhance safety and reduce risk in future human and exploration missions. The micro-inspector will provide remote vehicle inspections to ensure safety and reliability, or to provide monitoring of in-space assembly. The micro-inspector spacecraft represents an inherently modular system addition that can improve safety and support multiple host vehicles in multiple applications. On human missions, it may help extend the reach of human explorers, decreasing human EVA time to reduce mission cost and risk. The micro-inspector development is the continuation of an effort begun under NASA's Office of Aerospace Technology Enabling Concepts and Technology (ECT) program. The micro-inspector uses miniaturized celestial sensors; relies on a combination of solar power and batteries (allowing for unlimited operation in the sun and up to 4 hours in the shade); utilizes a low-pressure, low-leakage liquid butane propellant system for added safety; and includes multi-functional structure for high system-level integration and miniaturization. Versions of this system to be designed and developed under the H&RT program will include additional capabilities for on-board, vision-based navigation, spacecraft inspection, and collision avoidance, and will be demonstrated in a ground-based, space-related environment. These features make the micro-inspector design unique in its ability to serve crewed as well as robotic spacecraft, well beyond Earth-orbit and into arenas such as robotic missions, where human teleoperation capability is not locally available.

The European space suit, a design for productivity and crew safety.

PubMed

Skoog, A I; Berthier, S; Ollivier, Y

1991-01-01

In order to fulfill the two major mission objectives, i.e. support planned and unplanned external servicing of the COLUMBUS FFL and support the HERMES vehicle for safety critical operations and emergencies, the European Space Suit System baseline configuration incorporates a number of design features, which shall enhance the productivity and the crew safety of EVA astronauts. The work in EVA is today--and will be for several years--a manual work. Consequently, to improve productivity, the first challenge is to design a suit enclosure which minimizes movement restrictions and crew fatigue. It is covered by the "ergonomic" aspect of the suit design. Furthermore, it is also necessary to help the EVA crewmember in his work, by giving him the right information at the right time. Many solutions exist in this field of Man-Machine Interface, from a very simple system, based on cuff check lists, up to advanced systems, including Head-Up Displays. The design concept for improved productivity encompasses following features: easy donning/doffing thru rear entry, suit ergonomy optimisation, display of operational information in alpha-numerical and graphical form, and voice processing for operations and safety critical information. Concerning crew safety the major design features are: a lower R-factor for emergency EVA operations thru increased suit pressure, zero prebreath conditions for normal operations, visual and voice processing of all safety critical functions, and an autonomous life support system to permit unrestricted operations around HERMES and the CFFL. The paper analyses crew safety and productivity criteria and describes how these features are being built into the design of the European Space Suit System.

Model Transformation for a System of Systems Dependability Safety Case

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Murphy, Judy; Driskell, Steve

2011-01-01

The presentation reviews the dependability and safety effort of NASA's Independent Verification and Validation Facility. Topics include: safety engineering process, applications to non-space environment, Phase I overview, process creation, sample SRM artifact, Phase I end result, Phase II model transformation, fault management, and applying Phase II to individual projects.

14 CFR 415.123 - Computing systems and software.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Computing systems and software. 415.123... Launch Vehicle From a Non-Federal Launch Site § 415.123 Computing systems and software. (a) An applicant's safety review document must describe all computing systems and software that perform a safety...

14 CFR 415.123 - Computing systems and software.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Computing systems and software. 415.123... Launch Vehicle From a Non-Federal Launch Site § 415.123 Computing systems and software. (a) An applicant's safety review document must describe all computing systems and software that perform a safety...

14 CFR 415.123 - Computing systems and software.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Computing systems and software. 415.123... Launch Vehicle From a Non-Federal Launch Site § 415.123 Computing systems and software. (a) An applicant's safety review document must describe all computing systems and software that perform a safety...

14 CFR 415.123 - Computing systems and software.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Computing systems and software. 415.123... Launch Vehicle From a Non-Federal Launch Site § 415.123 Computing systems and software. (a) An applicant's safety review document must describe all computing systems and software that perform a safety...

14 CFR 415.123 - Computing systems and software.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Computing systems and software. 415.123... Launch Vehicle From a Non-Federal Launch Site § 415.123 Computing systems and software. (a) An applicant's safety review document must describe all computing systems and software that perform a safety...

14 CFR 417.409 - System hazard controls.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

..., or system must account for static and dynamic loads, environmental stresses, and expected wear; (3... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false System hazard controls. 417.409 Section 417... OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH SAFETY Ground Safety § 417.409 System hazard controls. (a) General...

Defining Desirable Central Nervous System Drug Space through the Alignment of Molecular Properties, in Vitro ADME, and Safety Attributes

PubMed Central

2010-01-01

As part of our effort to increase survival of drug candidates and to move our medicinal chemistry design to higher probability space for success in the Neuroscience therapeutic area, we embarked on a detailed study of the property space for a collection of central nervous system (CNS) molecules. We carried out a thorough analysis of properties for 119 marketed CNS drugs and a set of 108 Pfizer CNS candidates. In particular, we focused on understanding the relationships between physicochemical properties, in vitro ADME (absorption, distribution, metabolism, and elimination) attributes, primary pharmacology binding efficiencies, and in vitro safety data for these two sets of compounds. This scholarship provides guidance for the design of CNS molecules in a property space with increased probability of success and may lead to the identification of druglike candidates with favorable safety profiles that can successfully test hypotheses in the clinic. PMID:22778836

Risk Monitoring for Space Systems

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Kafka, Peter

2005-12-01

The paper shows the idea, the drivers and some basics within the wide spread field of Risk Monitoring Systems (RMS) for nuclear power plants. Pros and cons are summarised and the status of last developments is touched. Based on these insights the adoption of RMS for space systems and installations is discussed with the aim to contribute to the advancement of space systems safety.

Overview of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's Nondestructive Evaluation (NDE) Program

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Generazio, Edward R.

2002-01-01

NASA's Office of Safety and Mission Assurance sponsors an Agency-wide NDE Program that supports Aeronautics and Space Transportation Technology, Human Exploration and Development of Space, Earth Science, and Space Science Enterprises. For each of these Enterprises, safety is the number one priority. Development of the next generation aero-space launch and transportation vehicles, satellites, and deep space probes have highlighted the enabling role that NDE plays in these advanced technology systems. Specific areas of advanced component development, component integrity, and structural heath management are critically supported by NDE technologies. The simultaneous goals of assuring safety, maintaining overall operational efficiency, and developing and utilizing revolutionary technologies to expand human activity and space-based commerce in the frontiers of air and space places increasing demands on the Agencies NDE infrastructure and resources. In this presentation, an overview of NASA's NDE Program will be presented, that includes a background and status of current Enterprise NDE issues, and the NDE investment areas being developed to meet Enterprise safety and mission assurance needs through the year 2009 and beyond.

Distributed Space System Technology Demonstrations with the Emerald Nanosatellite

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Twiggs, Robert

2002-01-01

A viewgraph presentation of Distributed Space System Technologies utilizing the Emerald Nanosatellite is shown. The topics include: 1) Structure Assembly; 2) Emerald Mission; 3) Payload and Mission Operations; 4) System and Subsystem Description; and 5) Safety Integration and Testing.

Use of System Safety Risk Assessments for the Space Shuttle Reusable Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM)

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Greenhalgh, Phillip O.; McCool, Alex (Technical Monitor)

2001-01-01

This paper discusses the System Safety approach used to assess risk for the Space Shuttle Reusable Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM). Previous to the first RSRM flight in the fall of 1988, all systems were analyzed extensively to assure that hazards were identified, assessed and that the baseline risk was understood and appropriately communicated. Since the original RSRM baseline was established, Thiokol and NASA have implemented a number of initiatives that have further improved the RSRM. The robust design, completion of rigorous testing and flight success of the RSRM has resulted in a wise reluctance to make changes. One of the primary assessments required to accompany the documentation of each proposed change and aid in the decision making process is a risk assessment. Documentation supporting proposed changes, including the risk assessments from System Safety, are reviewed and assessed by Thiokol and NASA technical management. After thorough consideration, approved changes are implemented adding improvements to and reducing risk of the Space Shuttle RSRM.

Space-Based Telemetry and Range Safety Project Ku-Band and Ka-Band Phased Array Antenna

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Whiteman, Donald E.; Valencia, Lisa M.; Birr, Richard B.

2005-01-01

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration Space-Based Telemetry and Range Safety study is a multiphase project to increase data rates and flexibility and decrease costs by using space-based communications assets for telemetry during launches and landings. Phase 1 used standard S-band antennas with the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System to obtain a baseline performance. The selection process and available resources for Phase 2 resulted in a Ku-band phased array antenna system. Several development efforts are under way for a Ka-band phased array antenna system for Phase 3. Each phase includes test flights to demonstrate performance and capabilities. Successful completion of this project will result in a set of communications requirements for the next generation of launch vehicles.

Ku- and Ka-Band Phased Array Antenna for the Space-Based Telemetry and Range Safety Project

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Whiteman, Donald E.; Valencia, Lisa M.; Birr, Richard B.

2005-01-01

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration Space-Based Telemetry and Range Safety study is a multiphase project to increase data rates and flexibility and decrease costs by using space-based communications assets for telemetry during launches and landings. Phase 1 used standard S-band antennas with the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System to obtain a baseline performance. The selection process and available resources for Phase 2 resulted in a Ku-band phased array antenna system. Several development efforts are under way for a Ka-band phased array antenna system for Phase 3. Each phase includes test flights to demonstrate performance and capabilities. Successful completion of this project will result in a set of communications requirements for the next generation of launch vehicles.

14 CFR 414.19 - Technical criteria for reviewing a safety approval application.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

...-developed criteria must define— (i) Design and minimum performance; (ii) Quality assurance system... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Technical criteria for reviewing a safety... AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING SAFETY APPROVALS Safety Approval Review and...

Using computer graphics to enhance astronaut and systems safety

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Brown, J. W.

1985-01-01

Computer graphics is being employed at the NASA Johnson Space Center as a tool to perform rapid, efficient and economical analyses for man-machine integration, flight operations development and systems engineering. The Operator Station Design System (OSDS), a computer-based facility featuring a highly flexible and versatile interactive software package, PLAID, is described. This unique evaluation tool, with its expanding data base of Space Shuttle elements, various payloads, experiments, crew equipment and man models, supports a multitude of technical evaluations, including spacecraft and workstation layout, definition of astronaut visual access, flight techniques development, cargo integration and crew training. As OSDS is being applied to the Space Shuttle, Orbiter payloads (including the European Space Agency's Spacelab) and future space vehicles and stations, astronaut and systems safety are being enhanced. Typical OSDS examples are presented. By performing physical and operational evaluations during early conceptual phases. supporting systems verification for flight readiness, and applying its capabilities to real-time mission support, the OSDS provides the wherewithal to satisfy a growing need of the current and future space programs for efficient, economical analyses.

Summary of the study of disposal of nuclear waste into space

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Rom, F. E.

1973-01-01

NASA, at the request of the AEC, is conducting a preliminary study to determine the feasibility of disposing of nuclear waste material into space. The study has indicated that the Space Shuttle together with expendable and nonexpendable orbital stages such as the Space Tug or Centaur can safety dispose of waste material by ejecting it from the solar system. The safety problems associated with all phases of launching and operation (normal, emergency and accident) of such a system are being examined. From the preliminary study it appears that solutions can be found that should make the risks acceptable when compared to the benefits to be obtained from the disposal of the nuclear waste.

Prototype Input and Output Data Elements for the Occupational Health and Safety Information System

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Whyte, A. A.

1980-01-01

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration plans to implement a NASA-wide computerized information system for occupational health and safety. The system is necessary to administer the occupational health and safety programs and to meet the legal and regulatory reporting, recordkeeping, and surveillance requirements. Some of the potential data elements that NASA will require as input and output for the new occupational health and safety information system are illustrated. The data elements are shown on sample forms that have been compiled from various sources, including NASA Centers and industry.

Orion moved at Kennedy Space Center on This Week @NASA - October 3, 2014

NASA Image and Video Library

2014-10-03

On Sept. 28, NASA’s Orion spacecraft was moved from Kennedy Space Center’s Payload Hazardous Servicing Facility to its Launch Abort System Facility, for installation of its launch abort system, one of the many critical safety systems that will be evaluated during Orion’s un-crewed Exploration Flight Test -1, in December. NASA’s new deep space capsule is being developed to safely transport astronauts to and from Mars and other destinations on future missions. Also, Delta IV Heavy moved to the launch pad, U.S. spacewalks previewed, NASA and India to discuss joint exploration, Helicopter safety crash test, Combined Federal Campaign underway and Stop, Think, Connect!

The European space suit, a design for productivity and crew safety

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Skoog, A. Ingemar; Berthier, S.; Ollivier, Y.

In order to fulfil the two major mission objectives, i.e. support planned and unplanned external servicing of the COLUMBUS FFL and support the HERMES vehicle for safety critical operations and emergencies, the European Space Suit System baseline configuration incorporates a number of design features, which shall enhance the productivity and the crew safety of EVA astronauts. The work in EVA is today - and will be for several years - a manual work. Consequently, to improve productivity, the first challenge is to design a suit enclosure which minimizes movement restrictions and crew fatigue. It is covered by the "ergonomic" aspect of the suit design. Furthermore, it is also necessary to help the EVA crewmember in his work, by giving him the right information at the right time. Many solutions exist in this field of Man-Machine Interface, from a very simple system, based on cuff check lists, up to advanced systems, including Head-Up Displays. The design concept for improved productivity encompasses following features: • easy donning/doffing thru rear entry, • suit ergonomy optimisation, • display of operational information in alpha-numerical and graphical from, and • voice processing for operations and safety critical information. Concerning crew safety the major design features are: • a lower R-factor for emergency EVA operations thru incressed suit pressure, • zero prebreath conditions for normal operations, • visual and voice processing of all safety critical functions, and • an autonomous life support system to permit unrestricted operations around HERMES and the CFFL. The paper analyses crew safety and productivity criteria and describes how these features are being built into the design of the European Space Suit System.

Cabin Safety Issues Related to Pre-Departure and Inflight Issues

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Connell, Linda

2014-01-01

The Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) in a partnership between the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), participating carriers, and labor organizations. It is designed to improve the National Airspace System by collecting and studying reports detailing unsafe conditions and events in the aviation industry. Employees are able to report safety issues or concerns with confidentiality and without fear of discipline. Safety reports highlighting the human element in cabin safety issues and concerns.

Fracture - An Unforgiving Failure Mode

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Goodin, James Ronald

2006-01-01

During the 2005 Conference for the Advancement for Space Safety, after a typical presentation of safety tools, a Russian in the audience simply asked, "How does that affect the hardware?" Having participated in several International System Safety Conferences, I recalled that most attention is dedicated to safety tools and little, if any, to hardware. The intent of this paper on the hazard of fracture and failure modes associated with fracture is my attempt to draw attention to the grass roots of system safety - improving hardware robustness and resilience.

Space-brain: The negative effects of space exposure on the central nervous system.

PubMed

Jandial, Rahul; Hoshide, Reid; Waters, J Dawn; Limoli, Charles L

2018-01-01

Journey to Mars will be a large milestone for all humankind. Throughout history, we have learned lessons about the health dangers associated with exploratory voyages to expand our frontiers. Travelling through deep space, the final frontier, is planned for the 2030s by NASA. The lessons learned from the adverse health effects of space exposure have been encountered from previous, less-lengthy missions. Prolonged multiyear deep space travel to Mars could be encumbered by significant adverse health effects, which could critically affect the safety of the mission and its voyagers. In this review, we discuss the health effects of the central nervous system by space exposure. The negative effects from space radiation and microgravity have been detailed. Future aims and recommendations for the safety of the voyagers have been discussed. With proper planning and anticipation, the mission to Mars can be done safely and securely.

A review of wiring system safety in space power systems

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Stavnes, Mark W.; Hammoud, Ahmad N.

1993-01-01

Wiring system failures have resulted from arc propagation in the wiring harnesses of current aerospace vehicles. These failures occur when the insulation becomes conductive upon the initiation of an arc. In some cases, the conductive path of the carbon arc track displays a high enough resistance such that the current is limited, and therefore may be difficult to detect using conventional circuit protection. Often, such wiring failures are not simply the result of insulation failure, but are due to a combination of wiring system factors. Inadequate circuit protection, unforgiving system designs, and careless maintenance procedures can contribute to a wiring system failure. This paper approaches the problem with respect to the overall wiring system, in order to determine what steps can be taken to improve the reliability, maintainability, and safety of space power systems. Power system technologies, system designs, and maintenance procedures which have led to past wiring system failures will be discussed. New technologies, design processes, and management techniques which may lead to improved wiring system safety will be introduced.

System Driven Workarounds

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Connell, Linda; Wichner, David; Jakey, Abegael Marie

2013-01-01

The Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) in a partnership between the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), participating carriers, and labor organizations. It is designed to improve the National Airspace System by collecting and studying reports detailing unsafe conditions and events in the aviation industry. Employees are able to report safety issues or concerns with confidentiality and without fear of discipline. Safety reports highlighting system driven workarounds for the aviation community highlight the human workaround for the complex aviation system.

Developing Probabilistic Safety Performance Margins for Unknown and Underappreciated Risks

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Benjamin, Allan; Dezfuli, Homayoon; Everett, Chris

2015-01-01

Probabilistic safety requirements currently formulated or proposed for space systems, nuclear reactor systems, nuclear weapon systems, and other types of systems that have a low-probability potential for high-consequence accidents depend on showing that the probability of such accidents is below a specified safety threshold or goal. Verification of compliance depends heavily upon synthetic modeling techniques such as PRA. To determine whether or not a system meets its probabilistic requirements, it is necessary to consider whether there are significant risks that are not fully considered in the PRA either because they are not known at the time or because their importance is not fully understood. The ultimate objective is to establish a reasonable margin to account for the difference between known risks and actual risks in attempting to validate compliance with a probabilistic safety threshold or goal. In this paper, we examine data accumulated over the past 60 years from the space program, from nuclear reactor experience, from aircraft systems, and from human reliability experience to formulate guidelines for estimating probabilistic margins to account for risks that are initially unknown or underappreciated. The formulation includes a review of the safety literature to identify the principal causes of such risks.

Evolution of Safety Analysis to Support New Exploration Missions

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Thrasher, Chard W.

2008-01-01

NASA is currently developing the Ares I launch vehicle as a key component of the Constellation program which will provide safe and reliable transportation to the International Space Station, back to the moon, and later to Mars. The risks and costs of the Ares I must be significantly lowered, as compared to other manned launch vehicles, to enable the continuation of space exploration. It is essential that safety be significantly improved, and cost-effectively incorporated into the design process. This paper justifies early and effective safety analysis of complex space systems. Interactions and dependences between design, logistics, modeling, reliability, and safety engineers will be discussed to illustrate methods to lower cost, reduce design cycles and lessen the likelihood of catastrophic events.

Making the Hubble Space Telescope servicing mission safe

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Bahr, N. J.; Depalo, S. V.

1992-01-01

The implementation of the HST system safety program is detailed. Numerous safety analyses are conducted through various phases of design, test, and fabrication, and results are presented to NASA management for discussion during dedicated safety reviews. Attention is given to the system safety assessment and risk analysis methodologies used, i.e., hazard analysis, fault tree analysis, and failure modes and effects analysis, and to how they are coupled with engineering and test analysis for a 'synergistic picture' of the system. Some preliminary safety analysis results, showing the relationship between hazard identification, control or abatement, and finally control verification, are presented as examples of this safety process.

Five major NASA health and safety issues

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Gavert, Raymond B.

2000-01-01

The goal has been set to establish NASA as number one in safety in the nation. This includes Systems and Mission Safety as well as Occupational Safety for all NASA employees and contractors on and off the job. There are five major health and safety issues important in the pursuit of being number one and they are: (1) Radiation (2) Hearing (3) Habitability/Toxicology (4) Extravehicular Activity (EVA) (5) Stress. The issues have features of accumulated injury since NASA's future missions involve long time human presence in space i.e., International Space Station operations and Mars missions. The objective of this paper is to discuss these five issues in terms of controlling risks and enhancing health and safety. Safety metrics are discussed in terms of the overall goal of NASA to be number one in safety. .

Influence Map Methodology for Evaluating Systemic Safety Issues

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

2008-01-01

"Raising the bar" in safety performance is a critical challenge for many organizations, including Kennedy Space Center. Contributing-factor taxonomies organize information about the reasons accidents occur and therefore are essential elements of accident investigations and safety reporting systems. Organizations must balance efforts to identify causes of specific accidents with efforts to evaluate systemic safety issues in order to become more proactive about improving safety. This project successfully addressed the following two problems: (1) methods and metrics to support the design of effective taxonomies are limited and (2) influence relationships among contributing factors are not explicitly modeled within a taxonomy.

Applicability of the Common Safety Method for Risk Evaluation and Assessment (CSM-RA) to the Space Domain

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Moreira, Francisco; Silva, Nuno

2016-08-01

Safety systems require accident avoidance. This is covered by application standards, processes, techniques and tools that support the identification, analysis, elimination or reduction to an acceptable level of system risks and hazards. Ideally, a safety system should be free of hazards. However, both industry and academia have been struggling to ensure appropriate risk and hazard analysis, especially in what concerns completeness of the hazards, formalization, and timely analysis in order to influence the specifications and the implementation. Such analysis is also important when considering a change to an existing system. The Common Safety Method for Risk Evaluation and Assessment (CSM- RA) is a mandatory procedure whenever any significant change is proposed to the railway system in a European Member State. This paper provides insights on the fundamentals of CSM-RA based and complemented with Hazard Analysis. When and how to apply them, and the relation and similarities of these processes with industry standards and the system life cycles is highlighted. Finally, the paper shows how CSM-RA can be the basis of a change management process, guiding the identification and management of the hazards helping ensuring the similar safety level as the initial system. This paper will show how the CSM-RA principles can be used in other domains particularly for space system evolution.

Preliminary risk assessment for nuclear waste disposal in space, volume 2

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Rice, E. E.; Denning, R. S.; Friedlander, A. L.

1982-01-01

Safety guidelines are presented. Waste form, waste processing and payload fabrication facilities, shipping casks and ground transport vehicles, payload primary container/core, radiation shield, reentry systems, launch site facilities, uprooted space shuttle launch vehicle, Earth packing orbits, orbit transfer systems, and space destination are discussed. Disposed concepts and risks are then discussed.

47 CFR 80.1077 - Frequencies.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-10-01

... System: Alerting: 406.0-406.1 EPIRBs 406.0-406.1 MHz (Earth-to-space).1544-1545 MHz (space-to-Earth). INMARSAT-E EPIRBs 12 1626.5-1645.5 MHz (Earth-to-space). INMARSAT Ship Earth Stations capable of voice and... MARITIME SERVICES Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS) General Provisions § 80.1077...

Large Scale System Safety Integration for Human Rated Space Vehicles

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Massie, Michael J.

2005-12-01

Since the 1960s man has searched for ways to establish a human presence in space. Unfortunately, the development and operation of human spaceflight vehicles carry significant safety risks that are not always well understood. As a result, the countries with human space programs have felt the pain of loss of lives in the attempt to develop human space travel systems. Integrated System Safety is a process developed through years of experience (since before Apollo and Soyuz) as a way to assess risks involved in space travel and prevent such losses. The intent of Integrated System Safety is to take a look at an entire program and put together all the pieces in such a way that the risks can be identified, understood and dispositioned by program management. This process has many inherent challenges and they need to be explored, understood and addressed.In order to prepare truly integrated analysis safety professionals must gain a level of technical understanding of all of the project's pieces and how they interact. Next, they must find a way to present the analysis so the customer can understand the risks and make decisions about managing them. However, every organization in a large-scale project can have different ideas about what is or is not a hazard, what is or is not an appropriate hazard control, and what is or is not adequate hazard control verification. NASA provides some direction on these topics, but interpretations of those instructions can vary widely.Even more challenging is the fact that every individual/organization involved in a project has different levels of risk tolerance. When the discrete hazard controls of the contracts and agreements cannot be met, additional risk must be accepted. However, when one has left the arena of compliance with the known rules, there can be no longer be specific ground rules on which to base a decision as to what is acceptable and what is not. The integrator must find common grounds between all parties to achieve concurrence on these non-compliant conditionsAnother area of challenge lies in determining the credibility of a proposed hazard. For example, NASA's definition of a credible hazard is accurate but does not provide specific guidance about contractors declaring a hazard "not credible" and ceasing working on that item.Unfortunately, this has the side effect of taking valuable resources from high-risk areas and using them to investigate whether these extremely low risk items have the potential to become worse than they appear.In order to deal with these types of issues, there must exist the concept of a "Safe State" and it must be used as a building block to help address many of the technical and social challenges in working safety and risk management. This "Safe State" must serve as the foundation for building the cultural modifications needed to assure that safety issues are properly identified, heard, and dispositioned by our space program management.As the space program and the countries involved in it move forward in development of human rated spacecraft, they must learn from the recent Columbia accident and establish new/modified basis for safety risk decisions. Those involved must also become more cognizant of the diversity in safety approaches and agree on how to deal with them. Most of all, those involved must never forget that while the System Safety duty maybe difficult, their efforts help to preserve the lives of space crews and their families.

Student manual, Book 2: Orientation to occupational safety compliance in DOE

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Colley, D.L.

1993-10-01

This is a student hand-book an Occupational Safety Compliance in DOE. Topics include the following: Electrical; materials handling & storage; inspection responsibilities & procedures; general environmental controls; confined space entry; lockout/tagout; office safety, ergonomics & human factors; medical & first aid, access to records; construction safety; injury/illness reporting system; and accident investigation procedures.

Space Operations Center system analysis study extension. Volume 4, book 2: SOC system analysis report

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

1982-01-01

The Space Operations Center (SOC) orbital space station research missions integration, crew requirements, SOC operations, and configurations are analyzed. Potential research and applications missions and their requirements are described. The capabilities of SOC are compared with user requirements. The SOC/space shuttle and shuttle-derived vehicle flight support operations and SOC orbital operations are described. Module configurations and systems options, SOC/external tank configurations, and configurations for geostationary orbits are described. Crew and systems safety configurations are summarized.

An Autonomous Flight Safety System

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Bull, James B.; Lanzi, Raymond J.

2007-01-01

The Autonomous Flight Safety System (AFSS) being developed by NASA s Goddard Space Flight Center s Wallops Flight Facility and Kennedy Space Center has completed two successful developmental flights and is preparing for a third. AFSS has been demonstrated to be a viable architecture for implementation of a completely vehicle based system capable of protecting life and property in event of an errant vehicle by terminating the flight or initiating other actions. It is capable of replacing current human-in-the-loop systems or acting in parallel with them. AFSS is configured prior to flight in accordance with a specific rule set agreed upon by the range safety authority and the user to protect the public and assure mission success. This paper discusses the motivation for the project, describes the method of development, and presents an overview of the evolving architecture and the current status.

Manned space flight nuclear system safety. Volume 3: Reactor system preliminary nuclear safety analysis. Part 2: Accident Model Document (AMD)

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

1972-01-01

The Accident Model Document is one of three documents of the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) - Reactor System as applied to a Space Base Program. Potential terrestrial nuclear hazards involving the zirconium hydride reactor-Brayton power module are identified for all phases of the Space Base program. The accidents/events that give rise to the hazards are defined and abort sequence trees are developed to determine the sequence of events leading to the hazard and the associated probabilities of occurence. Source terms are calculated to determine the magnitude of the hazards. The above data is used in the mission accident analysis to determine the most probable and significant accidents/events in each mission phase. The only significant hazards during the prelaunch and launch ascent phases of the mission are those which arise form criticality accidents. Fission product inventories during this time period were found to be very low due to very limited low power acceptance testing.

The Triangle of the Space Launch System Operations

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Fayolle, Eric

2010-09-01

Firemen know it as “fire triangle”, mathematicians know it as “golden triangle”, sailormen know it as “Bermuda triangle”, politicians know it as “Weimar triangle”… This article aims to present a new aspect of that shape geometry in the space launch system world: “the triangle of the space launch system operations”. This triangle is composed of these three following topics, which have to be taken into account for any space launch system operation processing: design, safety and operational use. Design performance is of course taking into account since the early preliminary phase of a system development. This design performance is matured all along the development phases, thanks to consecutives iterations in order to respect the financial and timing constraints imposed to the development of the system. This process leads to a detailed and precise design to assess the required performance. Then, the operational use phase brings its batch of constraints during the use of the system. This phase is conducted by specific procedures for each operation. Each procedure has sequences for each sub-system, which have to be conducted in a very precise chronological way. These procedures can be processed by automatic way or manual way, with the necessity or not of the implication of operators, and in a determined environment. Safeguard aims to verify the respect of the specific constraints imposed to guarantee the safety of persons and property, the protection of public health and the environment. Safeguard has to be taken into account above the operational constraints of any space operation, without forgetting the highest safety level for the operators of the space operation, and of course without damaging the facilities or without disturbing the external environment. All space operations are the result of a “win-win” compromise between these three topics. Contrary to the fire triangle where one of the topics has to be suppressed in order to avoid the combustion, no topics at all should be suppressed in the triangle of the space launch system operations. Indeed, if safeguard is not considered since the beginning of the development phase, this development will not take into account safeguard constraints. Then, the operational phase will become very difficult because unavailable, to respect safety rules required for the operational use phase of the system. Taking into account safeguard constraints in late project phases will conduct to very high operational constraints, sometimes quite disturbing for the operator, even blocking to be able to consider the operational use phase as mature and optimized. On the contrary, if design performance is not taken into account in order to favor safeguard aspect in the operational use phase, system design will not be optimized, what will lead to high planning and timing impacts. The examples detailed in this article show the compromise for what each designer should confront with during the development of any system dealing with the safety of persons and property, the protection of public health and the environment.

Real-time logic modelling on SpaceWire

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Zhou, Qiang; Ma, Yunpeng; Fei, Haidong; Wang, Xingyou

2017-04-01

A SpaceWire is a standard for on-board satellite networks as the basis for future data-handling architectures. However, it cannot meet the deterministic requirement for safety/time critical application in spacecraft, where the delay of real-time (RT) message streams must be guaranteed. Therefore, SpaceWire-D is developed that provides deterministic delivery over a SpaceWire network. Formal analysis and verification of real-time systems is critical to their development and safe implementation, and is a prerequisite for obtaining their safety certification. Failure to meet specified timing constraints such as deadlines in hard real-time systems may lead to catastrophic results. In this paper, a formal verification method, Real-Time Logic (RTL), has been proposed to specify and verify timing properties of SpaceWire-D network. Based on the principal of SpaceWire-D protocol, we firstly analyze the timing properties of fundamental transactions, such as RMAP WRITE, and RMAP READ. After that, the RMAP WRITE transaction structure is modeled in Real-Time Logic (RTL) and Presburger Arithmetic representations. And then, the associated constraint graph and safety analysis is provided. Finally, it is suggested that RTL method can be useful for the protocol evaluation and provision of recommendation for further protocol evolutions.

The application of intelligent process control to space based systems

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Wakefield, G. Steve

1990-01-01

The application of Artificial Intelligence to electronic and process control can help attain the autonomy and safety requirements of manned space systems. An overview of documented applications within various industries is presented. The development process is discussed along with associated issues for implementing an intelligence process control system.

Safety validation test equipment operation

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Kurosaki, Tadaaki; Watanabe, Takashi

1992-08-01

An overview of the activities conducted on safety validation test equipment operation for materials used for NASA manned missions is presented. Safety validation tests, such as flammability, odor, offgassing, and so forth were conducted in accordance with NASA-NHB-8060.1C using test subjects common with those used by NASA, and the equipment used were qualified for their functions and performances in accordance with NASDA-CR-99124 'Safety Validation Test Qualification Procedures.' Test procedure systems were established by preparing 'Common Procedures for Safety Validation Test' as well as test procedures for flammability, offgassing, and odor tests. The test operation organization chaired by the General Manager of the Parts and Material Laboratory of NASDA (National Space Development Agency of Japan) was established, and the test leaders and operators in the organization were qualified in accordance with the specified procedures. One-hundred-one tests had been conducted so far by the Parts and Material Laboratory according to the request submitted by the manufacturers through the Space Station Group and the Safety and Product Assurance for Manned Systems Office.

Safety and Liability Aspects of Solar Power Satellites

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Jakhu, Ram S.; Howard, Diane

2010-09-01

It is an undisputed fact that the global need for energy will grow exponentially in the future and the search for alternative energy sources will intensify. One alternative source will be space based solar power(SSP), to be collected in space and transmitted to Earth by solar power satellites(SPS). As the appropriate technology becomes proven, the economic and operational viability for the launch of SPS system(s) will, to a large extent, depend upon favorable political and legal determinants. One of such determinants relates to safety risks and possible liability of the operator(s) of SPS system(s). This paper identifies safety risks of, and analyses liability for, damage caused by SPS. Issues, specifically analyzed mainly under international law, include damage caused(in outer space, in the air and on the Earth) by electronic transmission, and mechanisms to manage liability including inter alia insurance coverage, waivers of liability, and dispute settlement mechanisms. The paper contains recommendations for the concerned governments(and their respective private entities) to take regulatory precautions in order to avoid the risks of possible liability and thereby enhances the chances for launch and operation of SPS system(s).

Autonomous Assembly of Modular Structures in Space and on Extraterrestrial Locations

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Alhorn, Dean C.

2005-02-01

The new U.S. National Vision for Space Exploration requires many new enabling technologies to accomplish the goals of space commercialization and returning humans to the moon and extraterrestrial environments. Traditionally, flight elements are complete sub-systems requiring humans to complete the integration and assembly. These bulky structures also require the use of heavy launch vehicles to send the units to a desired location. This philosophy necessitates a high degree of safety, numerous space walks at a significant cost. Future space mission costs must be reduced and safety increased to reasonably achieve exploration goals. One proposed concept is the autonomous assembly of space structures. This concept is an affordable, reliable solution to in-space and extraterrestrial assembly. Assembly is autonomously performed when two components join after determining that specifications are correct. Local sensors continue monitor joint integrity post assembly, which is critical for safety and structural reliability. Achieving this concept requires a change in space structure design philosophy and the development of innovative technologies to perform autonomous assembly. Assembly of large space structures will require significant numbers of integrity sensors. Thus simple, low-cost sensors are integral to the success of this concept. This paper addresses these issues and proposes a novel concept for assembling space structures autonomously. Core technologies required to achieve in space assembly are presented. These core technologies are critical to the goal of utilizing space in a cost efficient and safe manner. Additionally, these novel technologies can be applied to other systems both on earth and extraterrestrial environments.

A critical review of the state of foreign space technology

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Grey, J.; Gerard, M.

1978-01-01

A conference was held to exchange technical information in the area of space technology. Soviet system capability and technology both in Intersputnik and in the domestic Ekran system was discussed in detail. The thermonic power conversion system used in the Soviet Topaz nuclear power reactor was described in detail. Other areas of examination included: (1) Bioastronautics; (2) Space based industry; (3) Propulsion; (4) Astrodynamics; (5) Contact with extraterrestrial intelligence; and (6) Space rescue and safety.

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

1984-01-01

An assessment of NASA's safety performance for 1983 affirms that NASA Headquarters and Center management teams continue to hold the safety of manned flight to be their prime concern, and that essential effort and resources are allocated for maintaining safety in all of the development and operational programs. Those conclusions most worthy of NASA management concentration are given along with recommendations for action concerning; product quality and utility; space shuttle main engine; landing gear; logistics and management; orbiter structural loads, landing speed, and pitch control; the shuttle processing contractor; and the safety of flight operations. It appears that much needs to be done before the Space Transportation System can achieve the reliability necessary for safe, high rate, low cost operations.

Tracker controls development and control architecture for the Hobby-Eberly Telescope Wide Field Upgrade

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Mock, Jason R.; Beno, Joe; Rafferty, Tom H.; Cornell, Mark E.

2010-07-01

To enable the Hobby-Eberly Telescope Wide Field Upgrade, the University of Texas Center for Electromechanics and McDonald Observatory are developing a precision tracker system - a 15,000 kg robot to position a 3,100 kg payload within 10 microns of a desired dynamic track. Performance requirements to meet science needs and safety requirements that emerged from detailed Failure Modes and Effects Analysis resulted in a system of 14 precision controlled actuators and 100 additional analog and digital devices (primarily sensors and safety limit switches). This level of system complexity and emphasis on fail-safe operation is typical of large modern telescopes and numerous industrial applications. Due to this complexity, demanding accuracy requirements, and stringent safety requirements, a highly versatile and easily configurable centralized control system that easily links with modeling and simulation tools during the hardware and software design process was deemed essential. The Matlab/Simulink simulation environment, coupled with dSPACE controller hardware, was selected for controls development and realization. The dSPACE real-time operating system collects sensor information; motor commands are transmitted over a PROFIBUS network to servo amplifiers and drive motor status is received over the same network. Custom designed position feedback loops, supplemented by feed forward force commands for enhanced performance, and algorithms to accommodate self-locking gearboxes (for safety), reside in dSPACE. To interface the dSPACE controller directly to absolute Heidenhain sensors with EnDat 2.2 protocol, a custom communication board was developed. This paper covers details of software and hardware, design choices and analysis, and supporting simulations (primarily Simulink).

Lessons Learned from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident due to Tohoku Region Pacific Coast Earthquake

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Miki, M.; Wada, M.; Takeuchi, N.

2012-01-01

On March 11 2011, Great Eastern Japan Earthquake hit Japan and caused the devastating damage. Fukushima Nuclear Power Station (NPS) also suffered damages and provided the environmental effect with radioactive products. The situation has been settled to some extent about two months after the accidents, and currently, the cooling of reactor is continuing towards settling the situation. Japanese NPSs are designed based on safety requirements and have multiple-folds of hazard controls. However, according to publicly available information, due to the lager-than-anticipated Tsunami, all the power supply were lost, which resulted in loss of hazard controls. Also, although nuclear power plants are equipped with system/procedure in case of loss of all controls, recovery was not made as planned in Fukushima NPSs because assumptions for hazard controls became impractical or found insufficient. In consequence, a state of emergency was declared. Through this accident, many lessons learned have been obtained from the several perspectives. There are many commonality between nuclear safety and space safety. Both industries perform thorough hazard assessments because hazards in both industries can result in loss of life. Therefore, space industry must learn from this accident and reconsider more robust space safety. This paper will introduce lessons learned from Fukushima nuclear accident described in the "Report of the Japanese Government to the IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety" [1], and discuss the considerations to establish more robust safety in the space systems. Detailed information of Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS are referred to this report.

Risks and issues in fire safety on the Space Station

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Friedman, Robert

1993-01-01

A fire in the inhabited portion of a spacecraft is a greatly feared hazard, but fire protection in space operations is complicated by two factors. First, the spacecraft cabin is an enclosed volume, which limits the resources for fire fighting and the options for crew escape. Second, an orbiting spacecraft experiences a balance of forces, creating a near-zero-gravity (microgravity) environment that profoundly affects the characteristics of fire initiation, spread, and suppression. The current Shuttle Orbiter is protected by a fire-detection and suppression system whose requirements are derived of necessity from accepted terrestrial and aircraft standards. While experience has shown that Shuttle fire safety is adequate, designers recognize that improved systems to respond specifically to microgravity fire characteristics are highly desirable. Innovative technology is particularly advisable for the Space Station, a forthcoming space community with a complex configuration and long-duration orbital missions, in which the effectiveness of current fire-protection systems is unpredictable. The development of risk assessments to evaluate the probabilities and consequences of fire incidents in spacecraft are briefly reviewed. It further discusses the important unresolved issues and needs for improved fire safety in the Space Station, including those of material selection, spacecraft atmospheres, fire detection, fire suppression, and post-fire restoration.

Software Dependability and Safety Evaluations ESA's Initiative

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Hernek, M.

ESA has allocated funds for an initiative to evaluate Dependability and Safety methods of Software. The objectives of this initiative are; · More extensive validation of Safety and Dependability techniques for Software · Provide valuable results to improve the quality of the Software thus promoting the application of Dependability and Safety methods and techniques. ESA space systems are being developed according to defined PA requirement specifications. These requirements may be implemented through various design concepts, e.g. redundancy, diversity etc. varying from project to project. Analysis methods (FMECA. FTA, HA, etc) are frequently used during requirements analysis and design activities to assure the correct implementation of system PA requirements. The criticality level of failures, functions and systems is determined and by doing that the critical sub-systems are identified, on which dependability and safety techniques are to be applied during development. Proper performance of the software development requires the development of a technical specification for the products at the beginning of the life cycle. Such technical specification comprises both functional and non-functional requirements. These non-functional requirements address characteristics of the product such as quality, dependability, safety and maintainability. Software in space systems is more and more used in critical functions. Also the trend towards more frequent use of COTS and reusable components pose new difficulties in terms of assuring reliable and safe systems. Because of this, its dependability and safety must be carefully analysed. ESA identified and documented techniques, methods and procedures to ensure that software dependability and safety requirements are specified and taken into account during the design and development of a software system and to verify/validate that the implemented software systems comply with these requirements [R1].

The Role of Probabilistic Design Analysis Methods in Safety and Affordability

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Safie, Fayssal M.

2016-01-01

For the last several years, NASA and its contractors have been working together to build space launch systems to commercialize space. Developing commercial affordable and safe launch systems becomes very important and requires a paradigm shift. This paradigm shift enforces the need for an integrated systems engineering environment where cost, safety, reliability, and performance need to be considered to optimize the launch system design. In such an environment, rule based and deterministic engineering design practices alone may not be sufficient to optimize margins and fault tolerance to reduce cost. As a result, introduction of Probabilistic Design Analysis (PDA) methods to support the current deterministic engineering design practices becomes a necessity to reduce cost without compromising reliability and safety. This paper discusses the importance of PDA methods in NASA's new commercial environment, their applications, and the key role they can play in designing reliable, safe, and affordable launch systems. More specifically, this paper discusses: 1) The involvement of NASA in PDA 2) Why PDA is needed 3) A PDA model structure 4) A PDA example application 5) PDA link to safety and affordability.

14 CFR 91.107 - Use of safety belts, shoulder harnesses, and child restraint systems.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 2 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Use of safety belts, shoulder harnesses... OPERATING AND FLIGHT RULES Flight Rules General § 91.107 Use of safety belts, shoulder harnesses, and child... board is briefed on how to fasten and unfasten that person's safety belt and, if installed, shoulder...

14 CFR 91.107 - Use of safety belts, shoulder harnesses, and child restraint systems.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 2 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Use of safety belts, shoulder harnesses... OPERATING AND FLIGHT RULES Flight Rules General § 91.107 Use of safety belts, shoulder harnesses, and child... board is briefed on how to fasten and unfasten that person's safety belt and, if installed, shoulder...

14 CFR 91.107 - Use of safety belts, shoulder harnesses, and child restraint systems.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Use of safety belts, shoulder harnesses... OPERATING AND FLIGHT RULES Flight Rules General § 91.107 Use of safety belts, shoulder harnesses, and child... fasten and unfasten that person's safety belt and, if installed, shoulder harness. (2) No pilot may cause...

14 CFR 91.107 - Use of safety belts, shoulder harnesses, and child restraint systems.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 2 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Use of safety belts, shoulder harnesses... OPERATING AND FLIGHT RULES Flight Rules General § 91.107 Use of safety belts, shoulder harnesses, and child... board is briefed on how to fasten and unfasten that person's safety belt and, if installed, shoulder...

14 CFR 91.107 - Use of safety belts, shoulder harnesses, and child restraint systems.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Use of safety belts, shoulder harnesses... OPERATING AND FLIGHT RULES Flight Rules General § 91.107 Use of safety belts, shoulder harnesses, and child... board is briefed on how to fasten and unfasten that person's safety belt and, if installed, shoulder...

Safety management of complex research operations

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Brown, W. J.

1981-01-01

Complex research and technology operations present many varied potential hazards which must be addressed in a disciplined independent safety review and approval process. The research and technology effort at the Lewis Research Center is divided into programmatic areas of aeronautics, space and energy. Potential hazards vary from high energy fuels to hydrocarbon fuels, high pressure systems to high voltage systems, toxic chemicals to radioactive materials and high speed rotating machinery to high powered lasers. A Safety Permit System presently covers about 600 potentially hazardous operations. The Safety Management Program described in this paper is believed to be a major factor in maintaining an excellent safety record at the Lewis Research Center.

A safety-based decision making architecture for autonomous systems

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Musto, Joseph C.; Lauderbaugh, L. K.

1991-01-01

Engineering systems designed specifically for space applications often exhibit a high level of autonomy in the control and decision-making architecture. As the level of autonomy increases, more emphasis must be placed on assimilating the safety functions normally executed at the hardware level or by human supervisors into the control architecture of the system. The development of a decision-making structure which utilizes information on system safety is detailed. A quantitative measure of system safety, called the safety self-information, is defined. This measure is analogous to the reliability self-information defined by McInroy and Saridis, but includes weighting of task constraints to provide a measure of both reliability and cost. An example is presented in which the safety self-information is used as a decision criterion in a mobile robot controller. The safety self-information is shown to be consistent with the entropy-based Theory of Intelligent Machines defined by Saridis.

Manned space flight nuclear system safety. Volume 3: Reactor system preliminary nuclear safety analysis. Part 2A: Accident model document, appendix

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

1972-01-01

The detailed abort sequence trees for the reference zirconium hydride (ZrH) reactor power module that have been generated for each phase of the reference Space Base program mission are presented. The trees are graphical representations of causal sequences. Each tree begins with the phase identification and the dichotomy between success and failure. The success branch shows the mission phase objective as being achieved. The failure branch is subdivided, as conditions require, into various primary initiating abort conditions.

System cost/performance analysis (study 2.3). Volume 1: Executive summary

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Kazangey, T.

1973-01-01

The relationships between performance, safety, cost, and schedule parameters were identified and quantified in support of an overall effort to generate program models and methodology that provide insight into a total space vehicle program. A specific space vehicle system, the attitude control system (ACS), was used, and a modeling methodology was selected that develops a consistent set of quantitative relationships among performance, safety, cost, and schedule, based on the characteristics of the components utilized in candidate mechanisms. These descriptive equations were developed for a three-axis, earth-pointing, mass expulsion ACS. A data base describing typical candidate ACS components was implemented, along with a computer program to perform sample calculations. This approach, implemented on a computer, is capable of determining the effect of a change in functional requirements to the ACS mechanization and the resulting cost and schedule. By a simple extension of this modeling methodology to the other systems in a space vehicle, a complete space vehicle model can be developed. Study results and recommendations are presented.

Space Shuttle Range Safety Command Destruct System Analysis and Verification. Phase 1. Destruct System Analysis and Verification

DTIC Science & Technology

1981-03-01

overcome the shortcomings of this system. A phase III study develops the breakup model of the Space Shuttle clus’ter at various times into flight. The...2-1 ROCKET MODEL ..................................................... 2-5 COMBUSTION CHAMBER OPERATION ................................... 2-5...2-19 RESULTS .......................................................... 2-22 ROCKET MODEL

Bleacher Safety: What Do We Look for? What Can We Do?

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

IEA Environmental Consultant, 1999

1999-01-01

Discusses safety issues surrounding aging bleacher systems, highlighting the following three primary safety considerations: space between seats and footboards; guardrails; and the structural provisions of the 1997 Uniform Building Code. Tips for bleacher accident-prevention assessment and excerpts from federal and Minnesota legislation on bleacher…

Operational environments for electrical power wiring on NASA space systems

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Stavnes, Mark W.; Hammoud, Ahmad N.; Bercaw, Robert W.

1994-01-01

Electrical wiring systems are used extensively on NASA space systems for power management and distribution, control and command, and data transmission. The reliability of these systems when exposed to the harsh environments of space is very critical to mission success and crew safety. Failures have been reported both on the ground and in flight due to arc tracking in the wiring harnesses, made possible by insulation degradation. This report was written as part of a NASA Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (Code Q) program to identify and characterize wiring systems in terms of their potential use in aerospace vehicles. The goal of the program is to provide the information and guidance needed to develop and qualify reliable, safe, lightweight wiring systems, which are resistant to arc tracking and suitable for use in space power applications. This report identifies the environments in which NASA spacecraft will operate, and determines the specific NASA testing requirements. A summary of related test programs is also given in this report. This data will be valuable to spacecraft designers in determining the best wiring constructions for the various NASA applications.

46 CFR 154.912 - Inerted spaces: Relief devices.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-10-01

... 46 Shipping 5 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Inerted spaces: Relief devices. 154.912 Section 154.912 Shipping COAST GUARD, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (CONTINUED) CERTAIN BULK DANGEROUS CARGOES SAFETY... Atmospheric Control in Cargo Containment Systems § 154.912 Inerted spaces: Relief devices. Inerted spaces must...

46 CFR 154.912 - Inerted spaces: Relief devices.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... 46 Shipping 5 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Inerted spaces: Relief devices. 154.912 Section 154.912 Shipping COAST GUARD, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (CONTINUED) CERTAIN BULK DANGEROUS CARGOES SAFETY... Atmospheric Control in Cargo Containment Systems § 154.912 Inerted spaces: Relief devices. Inerted spaces must...

46 CFR 154.912 - Inerted spaces: Relief devices.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-10-01

... 46 Shipping 5 2014-10-01 2014-10-01 false Inerted spaces: Relief devices. 154.912 Section 154.912 Shipping COAST GUARD, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (CONTINUED) CERTAIN BULK DANGEROUS CARGOES SAFETY... Atmospheric Control in Cargo Containment Systems § 154.912 Inerted spaces: Relief devices. Inerted spaces must...

46 CFR 154.912 - Inerted spaces: Relief devices.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-10-01

... 46 Shipping 5 2012-10-01 2012-10-01 false Inerted spaces: Relief devices. 154.912 Section 154.912 Shipping COAST GUARD, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (CONTINUED) CERTAIN BULK DANGEROUS CARGOES SAFETY... Atmospheric Control in Cargo Containment Systems § 154.912 Inerted spaces: Relief devices. Inerted spaces must...

46 CFR 154.912 - Inerted spaces: Relief devices.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-10-01

... 46 Shipping 5 2013-10-01 2013-10-01 false Inerted spaces: Relief devices. 154.912 Section 154.912 Shipping COAST GUARD, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (CONTINUED) CERTAIN BULK DANGEROUS CARGOES SAFETY... Atmospheric Control in Cargo Containment Systems § 154.912 Inerted spaces: Relief devices. Inerted spaces must...

Rocket propulsion hazard summary: Safety classification, handling experience and application to space shuttle payload

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Pennington, D. F.; Man, T.; Persons, B.

1977-01-01

The DOT classification for transportation, the military classification for quantity distance, and hazard compatibility grouping used to regulate the transportation and storage of explosives are presented along with a discussion of tests used in determining sensitivity of propellants to an impact/shock environment in the absence of a large explosive donor. The safety procedures and requirements of a Scout launch vehicle, Western and Eastern Test Range, and the Minuteman, Delta, and Poseidon programs are reviewed and summarized. Requirements of the space transportation system safety program include safety reviews from the subsystem level to the completed payload. The Scout safety procedures will satisfy a portion of these requirements but additional procedures need to be implemented to comply with the safety requirements for Shuttle operation from the Eastern Test Range.

Sensor Selection and Optimization for Health Assessment of Aerospace Systems

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Maul, William A.; Kopasakis, George; Santi, Louis M.; Sowers, Thomas S.; Chicatelli, Amy

2007-01-01

Aerospace systems are developed similarly to other large-scale systems through a series of reviews, where designs are modified as system requirements are refined. For space-based systems few are built and placed into service. These research vehicles have limited historical experience to draw from and formidable reliability and safety requirements, due to the remote and severe environment of space. Aeronautical systems have similar reliability and safety requirements, and while these systems may have historical information to access, commercial and military systems require longevity under a range of operational conditions and applied loads. Historically, the design of aerospace systems, particularly the selection of sensors, is based on the requirements for control and performance rather than on health assessment needs. Furthermore, the safety and reliability requirements are met through sensor suite augmentation in an ad hoc, heuristic manner, rather than any systematic approach. A review of the current sensor selection practice within and outside of the aerospace community was conducted and a sensor selection architecture is proposed that will provide a justifiable, dependable sensor suite to address system health assessment requirements.

Sensor Selection and Optimization for Health Assessment of Aerospace Systems

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Maul, William A.; Kopasakis, George; Santi, Louis M.; Sowers, Thomas S.; Chicatelli, Amy

2008-01-01

Aerospace systems are developed similarly to other large-scale systems through a series of reviews, where designs are modified as system requirements are refined. For space-based systems few are built and placed into service these research vehicles have limited historical experience to draw from and formidable reliability and safety requirements, due to the remote and severe environment of space. Aeronautical systems have similar reliability and safety requirements, and while these systems may have historical information to access, commercial and military systems require longevity under a range of operational conditions and applied loads. Historically, the design of aerospace systems, particularly the selection of sensors, is based on the requirements for control and performance rather than on health assessment needs. Furthermore, the safety and reliability requirements are met through sensor suite augmentation in an ad hoc, heuristic manner, rather than any systematic approach. A review of the current sensor selection practice within and outside of the aerospace community was conducted and a sensor selection architecture is proposed that will provide a justifiable, defendable sensor suite to address system health assessment requirements.

Evolution of International Space Station Program Safety Review Processes and Tools

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Ratterman, Christian D.; Green, Collin; Guibert, Matt R.; McCracken, Kristle I.; Sang, Anthony C.; Sharpe, Matthew D.; Tollinger, Irene V.

2013-01-01

The International Space Station Program at NASA is constantly seeking to improve the processes and systems that support safe space operations. To that end, the ISS Program decided to upgrade their Safety and Hazard data systems with 3 goals: make safety and hazard data more accessible; better support the interconnection of different types of safety data; and increase the efficiency (and compliance) of safety-related processes. These goals are accomplished by moving data into a web-based structured data system that includes strong process support and supports integration with other information systems. Along with the data systems, ISS is evolving its submission requirements and safety process requirements to support the improved model. In contrast to existing operations (where paper processes and electronic file repositories are used for safety data management) the web-based solution provides the program with dramatically faster access to records, the ability to search for and reference specific data within records, reduced workload for hazard updates and approval, and process support including digital signatures and controlled record workflow. In addition, integration with other key data systems provides assistance with assessments of flight readiness, more efficient review and approval of operational controls and better tracking of international safety certifications. This approach will also provide new opportunities to streamline the sharing of data with ISS international partners while maintaining compliance with applicable laws and respecting restrictions on proprietary data. One goal of this paper is to outline the approach taken by the ISS Progrm to determine requirements for the new system and to devise a practical and efficient implementation strategy. From conception through implementation, ISS and NASA partners utilized a user-centered software development approach focused on user research and iterative design methods. The user-centered approach used on the new ISS hazard system utilized focused user research and iterative design methods employed by the Human Computer Interaction Group at NASA Ames Research Center. Particularly, the approach emphasized the reduction of workload associated with document and data management activities so more resources can be allocated to the operational use of data in problem solving, safety analysis, and recurrence control. The methods and techniques used to understand existing processes and systems, to recognize opportunities for improvement, and to design and review improvements are described with the intent that similar techniques can be employed elsewhere in safety operations. A second goal of this paper is to provide and overview of the web-based data system implemented by ISS. The software selected for the ISS hazard systemMission Assurance System (MAS)is a NASA-customized vairant of the open source software project Bugzilla. The origin and history of MAS as a NASA software project and the rationale for (and advantages of) using open-source software are documented elsewhere (Green, et al., 2009).

Forward Skirt Structural Testing on the Space Launch System (SLS) Program

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Lohrer, J. D.; Wright, R. D.

2016-01-01

Structural testing was performed to evaluate heritage forward skirts from the Space Shuttle program for use on the NASA Space Launch System (SLS) program. Testing was needed because SLS ascent loads are 35% higher than Space Shuttle loads. Objectives of testing were to determine margins of safety, demonstrate reliability, and validate analytical models. Testing combined with analysis was able to show heritage forward skirts were acceptable to use on the SLS program.

An Exposure Prevention Plan for an Anhydrous Ammonia Handling System

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Padolewski, Cathy L.; Bower, Amy; Ponikvar, Gary; Mellott, Ken

1997-01-01

In July of 1996, the Industrial Hygiene Team of the Environmental Management Office at NASA Lewis Research Center was contacted by the Space Station Program Office to conduct ammonia awareness training for a team of engineers and technicians. The team was tasked with assembling and operating an ammonia handling system for testing of a photovoltaic radiator at the NASA Plum Brook Station Space Power Facility. The ammonia handling system supports a radiator designed to radiate excess heat from a photovoltaic array module used to provide power to the International Space Station. The system would consist of a hazardous materials trailer equipped with an anhydrous ammonia tank, heater, accumulator, chiller, and flow bench. Meetings were held with representatives from the Space Station Program Office, the engineers and Plum Brook safety personnel. Guidance was also provided by representatives from Kennedy Space Center. Determinations were made concerning the locations and types of potential exposures and a plan was developed which included training, personal protective equipment, engineering controls and emergency response. Various organizations including the Plum Brook Safety Committee, the Lewis Environmental Management Office, the Test Readiness Review Board and the Program Office all had requirements that had to be met in order to satisfy themselves that all personnel involved in the operation of the system would be safe. What resulted was a comprehensive plan that provided more than adequate safety measures and succeeded in protecting all personnel from the hazards of the ammonia system. Testing of the photovoltaic radiator was successful and although ammonia leaks were detected and maintenance of the system was ongoing, no one was injured. It was felt that the training and controls in place allowed for a comfort level that did not interfere with the operations.

Expendable second stage reusable space shuttle booster. Volume 2: Technical summary. Book 3: Booster vehicle modifications and ground systems definition

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

1972-01-01

A definition of the expendable second stage and space shuttle booster separation system is presented. Modifications required on the reusable booster for expendable second stage/payload flight and the ground systems needed to operate the expendable second stage in conjuction with the space shuttle booster are described. The safety, reliability, and quality assurance program is explained. Launch complex operations and services are analyzed.

Manned space flight nuclear system safety. Volume 3: Reactor system preliminary nuclear safety analysis. Part 3: Nuclear Safety Analysis Document (NSAD)

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

1972-01-01

Nuclear safety analysis as applied to a space base mission is presented. The nuclear safety analysis document summarizes the mission and the credible accidents/events which may lead to nuclear hazards to the general public. The radiological effects and associated consequences of the hazards are discussed in detail. The probability of occurrence is combined with the potential number of individuals exposed to or above guideline values to provide a measure of accident and total mission risk. The overall mission risk has been determined to be low with the potential exposure to or above 25 rem limited to less than 4 individuals per every 1000 missions performed. No radiological risk to the general public occurs during the prelaunch phase at KSC. The most significant risks occur from prolonged exposure to reactor debris following land impact generally associated with the disposal phase of the mission where fission product inventories can be high.

Toxic substances registry system: Index of material safety data sheets

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

1991-01-01

The Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDSs) listed in this index reflect product inventories and associated MSDSs which have been submitted to the Toxic Substance Registry database maintained by the Base Operations Contractor at the Kennedy Space Center. The purpose of this index is to provide a means to access information on the hazards associated with the toxic and otherwise hazardous chemicals stored and used at the Kennedy Space Center.

Space Food Systems Laboratory

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Perchonok, Michele; Russo, Dane M. (Technical Monitor)

2001-01-01

The Space Food Systems Laboratory (SFSL) is a multipurpose laboratory responsible for space food and package research and development. It is located on-site at Johnson Space Center in Building 17. The facility supports the development of flight food, menus, packaging and food related hardware for Shuttle, International Space Station, and Advanced Life Support food systems. All foods used to support NASA ground tests and/or missions must meet the highest standards before they are 'accepted' for use on actual space flights. The foods are evaluated for nutritional content, sensory acceptability, safety, storage and shelf life, and suitability for use in micro-gravity. The food packaging is also tested to determine its functionality and suitability for use in space. Food Scientist, Registered Dieticians, Packaging Engineers, Food Systems Engineers, and Technicians staff the Space Food Systems Laboratory.

Formal Verification Toolkit for Requirements and Early Design Stages

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Badger, Julia M.; Miller, Sheena Judson

2011-01-01

Efficient flight software development from natural language requirements needs an effective way to test designs earlier in the software design cycle. A method to automatically derive logical safety constraints and the design state space from natural language requirements is described. The constraints can then be checked using a logical consistency checker and also be used in a symbolic model checker to verify the early design of the system. This method was used to verify a hybrid control design for the suit ports on NASA Johnson Space Center's Space Exploration Vehicle against safety requirements.

Latency features of SafetyNet ground systems architecture for the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS)

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Duda, James L.; Mulligan, Joseph; Valenti, James; Wenkel, Michael

2005-01-01

A key feature of the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) is the Northrop Grumman Space Technology patent-pending innovative data routing and retrieval architecture called SafetyNetTM. The SafetyNetTM ground system architecture for the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS), combined with the Interface Data Processing Segment (IDPS), will together provide low data latency and high data availability to its customers. The NPOESS will cut the time between observation and delivery by a factor of four when compared with today's space-based weather systems, the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) and NOAA's Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites (POES). SafetyNetTM will be a key element of the NPOESS architecture, delivering near real-time data over commercial telecommunications networks. Scattered around the globe, the 15 unmanned ground receptors are linked by fiber-optic systems to four central data processing centers in the U. S. known as Weather Centrals. The National Environmental Satellite, Data and Information Service; Air Force Weather Agency; Fleet Numerical Meteorology and Oceanography Center, and the Naval Oceanographic Office operate the Centrals. In addition, this ground system architecture will have unused capacity attendant with an infrastructure that can accommodate additional users.

KSC-05pd2533

NASA Image and Video Library

2005-11-30

KENNEDY SPACE CENTER, FLA. - In Orbiter Processing Facility Bay 2, United Space Alliance technician Michael Vanwart installs thermal protection system blankets in the nose cap of space shuttle Endeavour. Endeavour recently came out of a nearly two-year Orbiter Major Modification period which began in December 2003. Engineers and technicians spent 900,000 hours performing 124 modifications to the vehicle. These included all recommended return-to-flight safety modifications, bonding more than 1,000 thermal protection system tiles and inspecting more than 150 miles of wiring throughout the orbiter. Shuttle major modification periods are scheduled at regular intervals to enhance safety and performance, infuse new technology, and allow for thorough inspections of the airframe and wiring of the vehicles. This was the second of these modification periods performed entirely at Kennedy Space Center. Endeavour's previous modification was completed in March 1997.

KSC-05pd2531

NASA Image and Video Library

2005-11-30

KENNEDY SPACE CENTER, FLA. - In Orbiter Processing Facility bay 2, United Space Alliance technician Michael Vanwart prepares to install thermal protection system blankets in the nose cap of space shuttle Endeavour. Endeavour recently came out of a nearly two-year Orbiter Major Modification period which began in December 2003. Engineers and technicians spent 900,000 hours performing 124 modifications to the vehicle. These included all recommended return-to-flight safety modifications, bonding more than 1,000 thermal protection system tiles and inspecting more than 150 miles of wiring throughout the orbiter. Shuttle major modification periods are scheduled at regular intervals to enhance safety and performance, infuse new technology, and allow for thorough inspections of the airframe and wiring of the vehicles. This was the second of these modification periods performed entirely at Kennedy Space Center. Endeavour's previous modification was completed in March 1997.

KSC-05pd2532

NASA Image and Video Library

2005-11-30

KENNEDY SPACE CENTER, FLA. - In Orbiter Processing Facility Bay 2, United Space Alliance technician Michael Vanwart installs thermal protection system blankets in the nose cap of space shuttle Endeavour. Endeavour recently came out of a nearly two-year Orbiter Major Modification period which began in December 2003. Engineers and technicians spent 900,000 hours performing 124 modifications to the vehicle. These included all recommended return-to-flight safety modifications, bonding more than 1,000 thermal protection system tiles and inspecting more than 150 miles of wiring throughout the orbiter. Shuttle major modification periods are scheduled at regular intervals to enhance safety and performance, infuse new technology, and allow for thorough inspections of the airframe and wiring of the vehicles. This was the second of these modification periods performed entirely at Kennedy Space Center. Endeavour's previous modification was completed in March 1997.

47 CFR 80.1077 - Frequencies.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-10-01

... System: Alerting: 406.0-406.1 EPIRBs 406.0-406.1 MHz (Earth-to-space).1544-1545 MHz (space-to-Earth). INMARSAT Ship Earth Stations capable of voice and/or direct printing 1626.5-1645.5 MHz (Earth-to-space... safety communications and calling: Satellite 1530-1544 MHz (space-to-Earth) and 1626.5-1645.5 MHz (Earth...

47 CFR 80.1077 - Frequencies.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-10-01

... System: Alerting: 406.0-406.1 EPIRBs 406.0-406.1 MHz (Earth-to-space).1544-1545 MHz (space-to-Earth). INMARSAT Ship Earth Stations capable of voice and/or direct printing 1626.5-1645.5 MHz (Earth-to-space... safety communications and calling: Satellite 1530-1544 MHz (space-to-Earth) and 1626.5-1645.5 MHz (Earth...

47 CFR 80.1077 - Frequencies.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-10-01

... System: Alerting: 406.0-406.1 EPIRBs 406.0-406.1 MHz (Earth-to-space).1544-1545 MHz (space-to-Earth). INMARSAT Ship Earth Stations capable of voice and/or direct printing 1626.5-1645.5 MHz (Earth-to-space... safety communications and calling: Satellite 1530-1544 MHz (space-to-Earth) and 1626.5-1645.5 MHz (Earth...

A hazard control system for robot manipulators

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Carter, Ruth Chiang; Rad, Adrian

1991-01-01

A robot for space applications will be required to complete a variety of tasks in an uncertain, harsh environment. This fact presents unusual and highly difficult challenges to ensuring the safety of astronauts and keeping the equipment they depend on from becoming damaged. The systematic approach being taken to control hazards that could result from introducing robotics technology in the space environment is described. First, system safety management and engineering principles, techniques, and requirements are discussed as they relate to Shuttle payload design and operation in general. The concepts of hazard, hazard category, and hazard control, as defined by the Shuttle payload safety requirements, is explained. Next, it is shown how these general safety management and engineering principles are being implemented on an actual project. An example is presented of a hazard control system for controlling one of the hazards identified for the Development Test Flight (DTF-1) of NASA's Flight Telerobotic Servicer, a teleoperated space robot. How these schemes can be applied to terrestrial robots is discussed as well. The same software monitoring and control approach will insure the safe operation of a slave manipulator under teleoperated or autonomous control in undersea, nuclear, or manufacturing applications where the manipulator is working in the vicinity of humans or critical hardware.

Industry Initiated Core Safety Attributes for Human Spaceflight for the 7th IAASS Conference

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Mango, Edward J.

2014-01-01

Now that the NASA Commercial Crew Program (CCP) is beginning its full certification contract for crew transportation to the International Space Station (ISS), is it time for industry to embrace a minimum set of core safety attributes? Those attributes can then be evolved into an industry-led set of basic safety standards and requirements. After 50 years of human space travel sponsored by governments, there are two basic conditions that now exist within the international space industry. The first, there is enough of a space-faring history to encourage the space industry to design, develop and operate human spaceflight systems without government contracts for anything other than services. Second, industry is capable of defining and enforcing a set of industry-based safety attributes and standards for human spaceflight to low-Earth orbit (LEO). This paper will explore both of these basic conditions with a focus on the safety attributes and standards. In the United States, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is now starting to dialogue with industry about the basic safety principles and attributes needed for potential future regulatory oversight. This process is not yet formalized and will take a number of years once approval is given to move forward. Therefore, throughout the next few years, it is an excellent time and opportunity for industry to collaborate together and develop the core set of attributes and standards. As industry engages and embraces a common set of safety attributes, then government agencies, like the FAA and NASA can use that industry-based product to strengthen their efforts on a safe commercial spaceflight foundation for the future. As the commercial space industry takes the lead role in establishing core safety attributes, and then enforcing those attributes, the entire planet can move away from governmental control of design and development and let industry expand safe and successful space operations in LEO. At that point the governmental agencies can focus on oversight of the industries' defined standards and enforcement for common welfare of the space-faring populous and overall public safety.

Reliability and Maintainability Engineering - A Major Driver for Safety and Affordability

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Safie, Fayssal M.

2011-01-01

The United States National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is in the midst of an effort to design and build a safe and affordable heavy lift vehicle to go to the moon and beyond. To achieve that, NASA is seeking more innovative and efficient approaches to reduce cost while maintaining an acceptable level of safety and mission success. One area that has the potential to contribute significantly to achieving NASA safety and affordability goals is Reliability and Maintainability (R&M) engineering. Inadequate reliability or failure of critical safety items may directly jeopardize the safety of the user(s) and result in a loss of life. Inadequate reliability of equipment may directly jeopardize mission success. Systems designed to be more reliable (fewer failures) and maintainable (fewer resources needed) can lower the total life cycle cost. The Department of Defense (DOD) and industry experience has shown that optimized and adequate levels of R&M are critical for achieving a high level of safety and mission success, and low sustainment cost. Also, lessons learned from the Space Shuttle program clearly demonstrated the importance of R&M engineering in designing and operating safe and affordable launch systems. The Challenger and Columbia accidents are examples of the severe impact of design unreliability and process induced failures on system safety and mission success. These accidents demonstrated the criticality of reliability engineering in understanding component failure mechanisms and integrated system failures across the system elements interfaces. Experience from the shuttle program also shows that insufficient Reliability, Maintainability, and Supportability (RMS) engineering analyses upfront in the design phase can significantly increase the sustainment cost and, thereby, the total life cycle cost. Emphasis on RMS during the design phase is critical for identifying the design features and characteristics needed for time efficient processing, improved operational availability, and optimized maintenance and logistic support infrastructure. This paper discusses the role of R&M in a program acquisition phase and the potential impact of R&M on safety, mission success, operational availability, and affordability. This includes discussion of the R&M elements that need to be addressed and the R&M analyses that need to be performed in order to support a safe and affordable system design. The paper also provides some lessons learned from the Space Shuttle program on the impact of R&M on safety and affordability.

14 CFR 33.75 - Safety analysis.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... Aeronautics and Space FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AIRCRAFT AIRWORTHINESS STANDARDS: AIRCRAFT ENGINES Design and Construction; Turbine Aircraft Engines § 33.75 Safety analysis. (a) (1) The applicant must analyze the engine, including the control system, to assess the likely...

NASA's Space Launch Initiative Targets Toxic Propellants

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Hurlbert, Eric; McNeal, Curtis; Davis, Daniel J. (Technical Monitor)

2001-01-01

When manned and unmanned space flight first began, the clear and overriding design consideration was performance. Consequently, propellant combinations of all kinds were considered, tested, and, when they lifted the payload a kilometer higher, or an extra kilogram to the same altitude, they became part of our operational inventory. Cost was not considered. And with virtually all of the early work being performed by the military, safety was hardly a consideration. After all, fighting wars has always been dangerous. Those days are past now. With space flight, and the products of space flight, a regular part of our lives today, safety and cost are being reexamined. NASA's focus turns naturally to its Shuttle Space Transportation System. Designed, built, and flown for the first time in the 1970s, this system remains today America's workhorse for manned space flight. Without its tremendous lift capability and mission flexibility, the International Space Station would not exist. And the Hubble telescope would be a monument to shortsighted management, rather than the clear penetrating eye on the stars it is today. But the Shuttle system fully represents the design philosophy of its period: it is too costly to operate, and not safe enough for regular long term access to space. And one of the key reasons is the utilization of toxic propellants. This paper will present an overview of the utilization of toxic propellants on the current Shuttle system.

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel report to the NASA acting administrator

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

1986-01-01

The level of activity of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel was increased smewhat during 1985 in concert with the increased mission rate of the National Space Transportation System, the evolutionary changes in management and operation of that program, and the preparation of the Vandenberg Launch Site; the implementation of the Program Definition Phase of the Space Station Program; and the actual flight testing of the X-29 research aircraft. Impending payload STS missions and NASA's overall aircraft operations are reviewed. The safety aspects of the LEASAT salvage mission were assessed. The findings and recommendation of the committee are summerized.

Toxic Substances Registry System: Index of Material Safety Data Sheets. Revised

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

1998-01-01

The January 1998 revision of the Index of Materials Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) for the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Toxic Substances Registry System (TSRS) is presented. The MSDS lists toxic substances by manufacturer, trade name, stock number, and distributor. The index provides information on hazards, use, and chemical composition of materials stored at KSC.

Toxic Substances Registry System: Index of Material Safety Data Sheets. Volume 1; Manufacturer

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

1998-01-01

The April 1998 revision of the Index of Materials Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) for the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Toxic Substances Registry System (TSRS) is presented. The MSDS lists toxic substances by manufacturer, trade name, stock number, and distributor. The index provides information on hazards, use, and chemical composition of materials stored at KSC.

Toxic Substances Registry System Index of Material Safety Data Sheets

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

1997-01-01

The July 1997 revision of the Index of Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) for the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Toxic Substances Registry System (TSRS) is presented. The MSDS lists toxic substances by manufacturer, trade name, stock number, and distributor. The index provides information on hazards, use, and chemical composition of materials stored at KSC.

Range safety signal propagation through the SRM exhaust plume of the space shuttle

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Boynton, F. P.; Davies, A. R.; Rajasekhar, P. S.; Thompson, J. A.

1977-01-01

Theoretical predictions of plume interference for the space shuttle range safety system by solid rocket booster exhaust plumes are reported. The signal propagation was calculated using a split operator technique based upon the Fresnel-Kirchoff integral, using fast Fourier transforms to evaluate the convolution and treating the plume as a series of absorbing and phase-changing screens. Talanov's lens transformation was applied to reduce aliasing problems caused by ray divergence.

Systems Engineering Technical Authority: A Path to Mission Success

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Andary, James F.; So, Maria M.; Breindel, Barry

2008-01-01

The systems engineering of space missions to study planet Earth has been an important focus of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) since its inception. But all space missions are becoming increasingly complex and this fact, reinforced by some major mishaps, has caused NASA to reevaluate their approach to achieving safety and mission success. A new approach ensures that there are adequate checks and balances in place to maximize the probability of safety and mission success. To this end the agency created the concept of Technical Authority which identifies a key individual accountable and responsible for the technical integrity of a flight mission as well as a project-independent reporting path. At the Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) this responsibility ultimately begins with the Mission Systems Engineer (MSE) for each satellite mission. This paper discusses the Technical Authority process and then describes some unique steps that are being taken at the GSFC to support these MSEs in meeting their responsibilities.

Risks, designs, and research for fire safety in spacecraft

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Friedman, Robert; Sacksteder, Kurt R.; Urban, David

1991-01-01

Current fire protection for spacecraft relies mainly on fire prevention through the use of nonflammable materials and strict storage controls of other materials. The Shuttle also has smoke detectors and fire extinguishers, using technology similar to aircraft practices. While experience has shown that the current fire protection is adequate, future improvements in fire safety technology to meet the challenges of long duration space missions, such as the Space Station Freedom, are essential. All spacecraft fire protection systems, however, must deal with the unusual combustion characteristics and operational problems in the low gravity environment. The features of low gravity combustion that affect spacecraft fire safety, and the issues in fire protection for Freedom that must be addressed eventually to provide effective and conservative fire protection systems are discussed.

Information requirements of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's safety, environmental health, and occupational medicine programs

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Whyte, A. A.

1978-01-01

A survey of the internal and external reporting and recordkeeping procedures of these programs was conducted and the major problems associated with them are outlined. The impact of probable future requirements on existing information systems is evaluated. This report also presents the benefits of combining the safety and health information systems into one computerized system and recommendations for the development and scope of that system.

Range Systems Simulation for the NASA Shuttle: Emphasis on Disaster and Prevention Management During Lift-Off

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Rabelo, Lisa; Sepulveda, Jose; Moraga, Reinaldo; Compton, Jeppie; Turner, Robert

2005-01-01

This article describes a decision-making system composed of a number of safety and environmental models for the launch phase of a NASA Space Shuttle mission. The components of this distributed simulation environment represent the different systems that must collaborate to establish the Expectation of Casualties (E(sub c)) caused by a failed Space Shuttle launch and subsequent explosion (accidental or instructed) of the spacecraft shortly after liftoff. This decision-making tool employs Space Shuttle reliability models, trajectory models, a blast model, weather dissemination systems, population models, amount and type of toxicants, gas dispersion models, human response functions to toxicants, and a geographical information system. Since one of the important features of this proposed simulation environment is to measure blast, toxic, and debris effects, the clear benefits is that it can help safety managers not only estimate the population at risk, but also to help plan evacuations, make sheltering decisions, establish the resources required to provide aid and comfort, and mitigate damages in case of a disaster.

Safety and Mission Assurance Knowledge Management Retention: Managing Knowledge for Successful Mission Operations

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Johnson, Teresa A.

2006-01-01

Knowledge Management is a proactive pursuit for the future success of any large organization faced with the imminent possibility that their senior managers/engineers with gained experiences and lessons learned plan to retire in the near term. Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) is proactively pursuing unique mechanism to ensure knowledge learned is retained and lessons learned captured and documented. Knowledge Capture Event/Activities/Management helps to provide a gateway between future retirees and our next generation of managers/engineers. S&MA hosted two Knowledge Capture Events during 2005 featuring three of its retiring fellows (Axel Larsen, Dave Whittle and Gary Johnson). The first Knowledge Capture Event February 24, 2005 focused on two Safety and Mission Assurance Safety Panels (Space Shuttle System Safety Review Panel (SSRP); Payload Safety Review Panel (PSRP) and the latter event December 15, 2005 featured lessons learned during Apollo, Skylab, and Space Shuttle which could be applicable in the newly created Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV)/Constellation development program. Gemini, Apollo, Skylab and the Space Shuttle promised and delivered exciting human advances in space and benefits of space in people s everyday lives on earth. Johnson Space Center's Safety & Mission Assurance team work over the last 20 years has been mostly focused on operations we are now beginning the Exploration development program. S&MA will promote an atmosphere of knowledge sharing in its formal and informal cultures and work processes, and reward the open dissemination and sharing of information; we are asking "Why embrace relearning the "lessons learned" in the past?" On the Exploration program the focus will be on Design, Development, Test, & Evaluation (DDT&E); therefore, it is critical to understand the lessons from these past programs during the DDT&E phase.

Microbiological assay of the Marshall Space Flight Center neutral buoyancy simulator

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Beyerle, F. J.

1973-01-01

A neutral buoyancy simulator tank system is described in terms of microbiological and medical safety for astronauts. The system was designed to simulate a gravity-free state for evaluation of orbital operations in a microorganism-free environment. Methods for the identification and elimination of specific microorganisms are dealt with as measures for a pure system of space environment simulation.

Reacting to nuclear power systems in space: American public protests over outer planetary probes since the 1980s

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Launius, Roger D.

2014-03-01

The United States has pioneered the use of nuclear power systems for outer planetary space probes since the 1970s. These systems have enabled the Viking landings to reach the surface of Mars and both Pioneers 10 and 11 and Voyagers 1 and 2 to travel to the limits of the solar system. Although the American public has long been concerned about safety of these systems, in the 1980s a reaction to nuclear accidents - especially the Soviet Cosmos 954 spacecraft destruction and the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant accidents - heightened awareness about the hazards of nuclear power and every spacecraft launch since that time has been contested by opponents of nuclear energy. This has led to a debate over the appropriateness of the use of nuclear power systems for spacecraft. It has also refocused attention on the need for strict systems of control and rigorous checks and balances to assure safety. This essay describes the history of space radioisotope power systems, the struggles to ensure safe operations, and the political confrontation over whether or not to allow the launch the Galileo and Cassini space probes to the outer planets. Effectively, these efforts have led to the successful flights of 12 deep space planetary probes, two-thirds of them operated since the accidents of Cosmos 954, Three Mile Island, and Chernobyl.

14 CFR 35.15 - Safety analysis.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

..., maintenance checks, and other similar equipment or procedures. If items of the safety system are outside the... Aeronautics and Space FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AIRCRAFT AIRWORTHINESS.... (1) Maintenance actions being carried out at stated intervals. This includes verifying that items...

23 CFR 1235.7 - Parking space design, construction, and designation.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-04-01

... 23 Highways 1 2011-04-01 2011-04-01 false Parking space design, construction, and designation. 1235.7 Section 1235.7 Highways NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION AND FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION GUIDELINES UNIFORM SYSTEM FOR PARKING FOR PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES § 1235.7 Parking space design,...

KSC-05PD-0625

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

2005-01-01

KENNEDY SPACE CENTER, FLA. Technicians photograph the exterior of Space Shuttle Discovery on its journey to Launch Pad 39B to support the Baseline Configuration Imaging (BCI) project. BCI will be collected on each orbiter prior to every mission, beginning with STS-114. The photos will be compiled into a database available for comparison, if the need arises, to photos taken on orbit from the Shuttle's Orbital Boom Sensor System (OBSS). The 50-foot-long OBSS attaches to the Remote Manipulator System, or Shuttle robotic arm, and is one of the new safety measures for Return to Flight, equipping the orbiter with cameras and laser systems to inspect the Shuttles Thermal Protection System while in space. Discovery was hard down on the pad at 1:16 a.m. EDT April 7. Launch of Discovery on its Return to Flight mission, STS-114, is targeted for May 15 with a launch window that extends to June 3. During its 12-day mission, Discoverys seven-member crew will test new hardware and techniques to improve Shuttle safety, as well as deliver supplies to the International Space Station.

KSC-05PD-0624

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

2005-01-01

KENNEDY SPACE CENTER, FLA. Technicians photograph the exterior of Space Shuttle Discovery on its journey to Launch Pad 39B to support the Baseline Configuration Imaging (BCI) project. BCI will be collected on each orbiter prior to every mission, beginning with STS-114. The photos will be compiled into a database available for comparison, if the need arises, to photos taken on orbit from the Shuttle's Orbital Boom Sensor System (OBSS). The 50-foot-long OBSS attaches to the Remote Manipulator System, or Shuttle robotic arm, and is one of the new safety measures for Return to Flight, equipping the orbiter with cameras and laser systems to inspect the Shuttles Thermal Protection System while in space. Discovery was hard down on the pad at 1:16 a.m. EDT April 7. Launch of Discovery on its Return to Flight mission, STS-114, is targeted for May 15 with a launch window that extends to June 3. During its 12-day mission, Discoverys seven-member crew will test new hardware and techniques to improve Shuttle safety, as well as deliver supplies to the International Space Station.

Safety Practices Followed in ISRO Launch Complex- An Overview

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Krishnamurty, V.; Srivastava, V. K.; Ramesh, M.

2005-12-01

The spaceport of India, Satish Dhawan Space Centre (SDSC) SHAR of Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), is located at Sriharikota, a spindle shaped island on the east coast of southern India.SDSC SHAR has a unique combination of facilities, such as a solid propellant production plant, a rocket motor static test facility, launch complexes for different types of rockets, telemetry, telecommand, tracking, data acquisition and processing facilities and other support services.The Solid Propellant Space Booster Plant (SPROB) located at SDSC SHAR produces composite solid propellant for rocket motors of ISRO. The main ingredients of the propellant produced here are ammonium perchlorate (oxidizer), fine aluminium powder (fuel) and hydroxyl terminated polybutadiene (binder).SDSC SHAR has facilities for testing solid rocket motors, both at ambient conditions and at simulated high altitude conditions. Other test facilities for the environmental testing of rocket motors and their subsystems include Vibration, Shock, Constant Acceleration and Thermal / Humidity.SDSC SHAR has the necessary infrastructure for launching satellites into low earth orbit, polar orbit and geo-stationary transfer orbit. The launch complexes provide complete support for vehicle assembly, fuelling with both earth storable and cryogenic propellants, checkout and launch operations. Apart from these, it has facilities for launching sounding rockets for studying the Earth's upper atmosphere and for controlled reentry and recovery of ISRO's space capsule reentry missions.Safety plays a major role at SDSC SHAR right from the mission / facility design phase to post launch operations. This paper presents briefly the infrastructure available at SDSC SHAR of ISRO for launching sounding rockets, satellite launch vehicles, controlled reentry missions and the built in safety systems. The range safety methodology followed as a part of the real time mission monitoring is presented. The built in safety systems provided onboard the launch vehicle are automatic shut off the propulsion system based on real time mission performance and a passivation system incorporated in the orbit insertion stage are highlighted.

Shuttle Safety Improvements

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Henderson, Edward

2001-01-01

The Space Shuttle has been flying for over 20 years and based on the Orbiter design life of 100 missions it should be capable of flying at least 20 years more if we take care of it. The Space Shuttle Development Office established in 1997 has identified those upgrades needed to keep the Shuttle flying safely and efficiently until a new reusable launch vehicle (RLV) is available to meet the agency commitments and goals for human access to space. The upgrade requirements shown in figure 1 are to meet the program goals, support HEDS and next generation space transportation goals while protecting the country 's investment in the Space Shuttle. A major review of the shuttle hardware and processes was conducted in 1999 which identified key shuttle safety improvement priorities, as well as other system upgrades needed to reliably continue to support the shuttle miss ions well into the second decade of this century. The high priority safety upgrades selected for development and study will be addressed in this paper.

A Framework for Reliability and Safety Analysis of Complex Space Missions

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Evans, John W.; Groen, Frank; Wang, Lui; Austin, Rebekah; Witulski, Art; Mahadevan, Nagabhushan; Cornford, Steven L.; Feather, Martin S.; Lindsey, Nancy

2017-01-01

Long duration and complex mission scenarios are characteristics of NASA's human exploration of Mars, and will provide unprecedented challenges. Systems reliability and safety will become increasingly demanding and management of uncertainty will be increasingly important. NASA's current pioneering strategy recognizes and relies upon assurance of crew and asset safety. In this regard, flexibility to develop and innovate in the emergence of new design environments and methodologies, encompassing modeling of complex systems, is essential to meet the challenges.

Large Space Structures Fielding Plan

DTIC Science & Technology

1991-01-01

15830 STS PAYLOARE SYSTESETY 3C (A %AA IASB STS DAYLCODSICARGO SRORM 1PVFR! PR 111L 5 SOL? CIE. JR-012 SAFETY 19LENEVIASO PLA PSOR 1, ,I -1 AR S’EATIOR...support/safety measures in space will interface. Although these features can be developed to some degree as stated objectives, many must be designed from...continuity 7. Check system for mechanical continuity 8. Verify LSS assembly continuity B. Productivity Measurements 1. Note duration of assembly activities

Preliminary Results Obtained in Integrated Safety Analysis of NASA Aviation Safety Program Technologies

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

2005-01-01

This is a listing of recent unclassified RTO technical publications for January 1, 2005 through March 31, 2005 processed by the NASA Center for AeroSpace Center available on the NASA Aeronautics and Space Database. Contents include 1) Electronic Information Management; 2) Decision Support to Combined Joint Task Force and Component Commanders; 3) RTO Technical Publications : A Quarterly Listing (December 2004); 4) The Role of Humans in Intelligent and Automated Systems.

Potential Operating Orbits for Fission Electric Propulsion Systems Driven by the SAFE-400

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Houts, Mike; Kos, Larry; Poston, David; Rodgers, Stephen L. (Technical Monitor)

2002-01-01

Safety must be ensured during all phases of space fission system design, development, fabrication, launch, operation, and shutdown. One potential space fission system application is fission electric propulsion (FEP), in which fission energy is converted into electricity and used to power high efficiency (Isp greater than 3000s) electric thrusters. For these types of systems it is important to determine which operational scenarios ensure safety while allowing maximum mission performance and flexibility. Space fission systems are essentially nonradioactive at launch, prior to extended operation at high power. Once high power operation begins, system radiological inventory steadily increases as fission products build up. For a given fission product isotope, the maximum radiological inventory is typically achieved once the system has operated for a length of time equivalent to several half-lives. After that time, the isotope decays at the same rate it is produced, and no further inventory builds in. For an FEP mission beginning in Earth orbit, altitude and orbital lifetime increase as the propulsion system operates. Two simultaneous effects of fission propulsion system operation are thus (1) increasing fission product inventory and (2) increasing orbital lifetime. Phrased differently, as fission products build up, more time is required for the fission products to naturally convert back into non-radioactive isotopes. Simultaneously, as fission products build up, orbital lifetime increases, providing more time for the fission products to naturally convert back into non-radioactive isotopes. Operational constraints required to ensure safety can thus be quantified.

Potential operating orbits for fission electric propulsion systems driven by the SAFE-400

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Houts, Mike; Kos, Larry; Poston, David

2002-01-01

Safety must be ensured during all phases of space fission system design, development, fabrication, launch, operation, and shutdown. One potential space fission system application is fission electric propulsion (FEP), in which fission energy is converted into electricity and used to power high efficiency (Isp>3000s) electric thrusters. For these types of systems it is important to determine which operational scenarios ensure safety while allowing maximum mission performance and flexibility. Space fission systems are essentially non-radioactive at launch, prior to extended operation at high power. Once high power operation begins, system radiological inventory steadily increases as fission products build up. For a given fission product isotope, the maximum radiological inventory is typically achieved once the system has operated for a length of time equivalent to several half-lives. After that time, the isotope decays at the same rate it is produced, and no further inventory builds in. For an FEP mission beginning in Earth orbit, altitude and orbital lifetime increase as the propulsion system operates. Two simultaneous effects of fission propulsion system operation are thus (1) increasing fission product inventory and (2) increasing orbital lifetime. Phrased differently, as fission products build up, more time is required for the fission products to naturally convert back into non-radioactive isotopes. Simultaneously, as fission products build up, orbital lifetime increases, providing more time for the fission products to naturally convert back into non-radioactive isotopes. Operational constraints required to ensure safety can thus be quantified. .

Spreading the Word on Safety

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

2004-01-01

Beginning with the Apollo Program in the early 1960s, the NASA White Sands Test Facility (WSTF) has supported every U.S. human exploration space flight program to date. Located in Las Cruces, New Mexico, WSTF is part of Johnson Space Center. The facility's primary mission is to provide the expertise and infrastructure to test and evaluate spacecraft materials, components, and rocket propulsion systems to enable the safe human exploration and utilization of space. WSTF stores, tests, and disposes of Space Shuttle and International Space Station propellants. Since aerospace fluids can have harmful reactions with the construction materials of the systems containing them, a major component of WSTF's work is the study of propellants and hazardous materials. WSTF has a wide variety of resources to draw upon in assessing the fire, explosion, compatibility, and safety hazards of these fluids, which include hydrogen, oxygen, hydrazine fuels, and nitrogen tetroxide. In addition to developing new test methods, WSTF has created technical manuals and training courses for the safe use of aerospace fluids.

Toxic Substances Registry System: Index of Material Safety Data Sheets. Revised

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

1997-01-01

The October 1997 revision of the Index of Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) for the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Toxic Substances Registry System (TSRS) is presented. The MSDS lists toxic substances by manufacturer, trade name, stock number, and distributor. The index provides information on the hazards, use, and chemical composition of materials stored and used at KSC.

Ground Operations and ASRS

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Connell, Linda; Wichner, David; Jakey, Abegail Marie

2013-01-01

The Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) in a partnership between the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), participating carriers, and labor organizations. It is designed to improve the National Airspace System by collecting and studying reports detailing unsafe conditions and events in the aviation industry. Employees are able to report safety issues or concerns with confidentiality and without fear of discipline

KSC-05pd2530

NASA Image and Video Library

2005-11-30

KENNEDY SPACE CENTER, FLA. - In Orbiter Processing Facility Bay 2, the nose cap of space shuttle Endeavour is prepared for installation of thermal protection system blankets. Endeavour recently came out of a nearly two-year Orbiter Major Modification period which began in December 2003. Engineers and technicians spent 900,000 hours performing 124 modifications to the vehicle. These included all recommended return-to-flight safety modifications, bonding more than 1,000 thermal protection system tiles and inspecting more than 150 miles of wiring throughout the orbiter. Shuttle major modification periods are scheduled at regular intervals to enhance safety and performance, infuse new technology, and allow for thorough inspections of the airframe and wiring of the vehicles. This was the second of these modification periods performed entirely at Kennedy Space Center. Endeavour's previous modification was completed in March 1997.

Lessons Learned From the Development, Operation, and Review of Mechanical Systems on the Space Shuttle, International Space Station, and Payloads

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Dinsel, Alison; Jermstad, Wayne; Robertson, Brandan

2006-01-01

The Mechanical Design and Analysis Branch at the Johnson Space Center (JSC) is responsible for the technical oversight of over 30 mechanical systems flying on the Space Shuttle Orbiter and the International Space Station (ISS). The branch also has the responsibility for reviewing all mechanical systems on all Space Shuttle and International Space Station payloads, as part of the payload safety review process, through the Mechanical Systems Working Group (MSWG). These responsibilities give the branch unique insight into a large number of mechanical systems, and problems encountered during their design, testing, and operation. This paper contains narrative descriptions of lessons learned from some of the major problems worked on by the branch during the last two years. The problems are grouped into common categories and lessons learned are stated.

Expert systems applied to spacecraft fire safety

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Smith, Richard L.; Kashiwagi, Takashi

1989-01-01

Expert systems are problem-solving programs that combine a knowledge base and a reasoning mechanism to simulate a human expert. The development of an expert system to manage fire safety in spacecraft, in particular the NASA Space Station Freedom, is difficult but clearly advantageous in the long-term. Some needs in low-gravity flammability characteristics, ventilating-flow effects, fire detection, fire extinguishment, and decision models, all necessary to establish the knowledge base for an expert system, are discussed.

PROGRESS IN DESIGN OF THE INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL OF THE TOKAMAK COOLING WATER SYSTEM

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Korsah, Kofi; DeVan, Bill; Ashburn, David

This paper discusses progress in the design of the control, interlock and safety systems of the Tokamak Cooling Water System (TCWS) for the ITER fusion reactor. The TCWS instrumentation and control (I&C) is one of approximately 200 separate plant I&C systems (e.g., vacuum system I&C, magnets system I&C) that interface to a common central I&C system through standardized networks. Several aspects of the I&C are similar to the I&C of fission-based power plants. However, some of the unique features of the ITER fusion reactor and the TCWS (e.g., high quasi-static magnetic field, need for baking and drying as well asmore » cooling operations), also demand some unique safety and qualification considerations. The paper compares the design strategy/guidelines of the TCWS I&C and the I&C of conventional nuclear power plants. Issues such as safety classifications, independence between control and safety systems, sensor sharing, redundancy, voting schemes, and qualification methodologies are discussed. It is concluded that independence and separation requirements are similar in both designs. However, the voting schemes for safety systems in nuclear power plants typically use 2oo4 (i.e., 4 divisions of safety I&C, any 2 of which is sufficient to trigger a safety action), while 2oo3 voting logic - within each of 2 independent trains - is used in the TCWS I&C. It is also noted that 2oo3 voting is also acceptable in nuclear power plants if adequate risk assessment and reliability is demonstrated. Finally, while qualification requirements provide similar guidance [e.g., both IEC 60780 (invoked in ITER-space), and IEEE 323 (invoked in fission power plant space) provide similar guidance], an important qualification consideration is the susceptibility of I&C to the magnetic fields of ITER. Also, the radiation environments are different. In the case of magnetic fields the paper discusses some options that are being considered.« less

Fission Systems for Mars Exploration

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Houts, Michael G.; Kim, T.; Dorney, D. J.; Swint, Marion Shayne

2012-01-01

Fission systems are used extensively on earth, and 34 such systems have flown in space. The energy density of fission is over 10 million times that of chemical reactions, giving fission the potential to eliminate energy density constraints for many space missions. Potential safety and operational concerns with fission systems are well understood, and strategies exist for affordably developing such systems. By enabling a power-rich environment and highly efficient propulsion, fission systems could enable affordable, sustainable exploration of Mars.

Satellite Power Systems (SPS) laser studies. Volume 1: Laser environmental impact study

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Beverly, R. E., III

1980-01-01

The environmental impact of space to Earth power transmission using space borne laser subsystems is emphasized. A laser system is defined, estimates of relevant efficiencies for laser power generation and atmospheric transmission are developed, and a comparison is made to a microwave system. Ancillary issues, such as laser beam spreading, safety and security, mass and volume estimates and technology growth are considered.

Implementing Software Safety in the NASA Environment

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Wetherholt, Martha S.; Radley, Charles F.

1994-01-01

Until recently, NASA did not consider allowing computers total control of flight systems. Human operators, via hardware, have constituted the ultimate safety control. In an attempt to reduce costs, NASA has come to rely more and more heavily on computers and software to control space missions. (For example. software is now planned to control most of the operational functions of the International Space Station.) Thus the need for systematic software safety programs has become crucial for mission success. Concurrent engineering principles dictate that safety should be designed into software up front, not tested into the software after the fact. 'Cost of Quality' studies have statistics and metrics to prove the value of building quality and safety into the development cycle. Unfortunately, most software engineers are not familiar with designing for safety, and most safety engineers are not software experts. Software written to specifications which have not been safety analyzed is a major source of computer related accidents. Safer software is achieved step by step throughout the system and software life cycle. It is a process that includes requirements definition, hazard analyses, formal software inspections, safety analyses, testing, and maintenance. The greatest emphasis is placed on clearly and completely defining system and software requirements, including safety and reliability requirements. Unfortunately, development and review of requirements are the weakest link in the process. While some of the more academic methods, e.g. mathematical models, may help bring about safer software, this paper proposes the use of currently approved software methodologies, and sound software and assurance practices to show how, to a large degree, safety can be designed into software from the start. NASA's approach today is to first conduct a preliminary system hazard analysis (PHA) during the concept and planning phase of a project. This determines the overall hazard potential of the system to be built. Shortly thereafter, as the system requirements are being defined, the second iteration of hazard analyses takes place, the systems hazard analysis (SHA). During the systems requirements phase, decisions are made as to what functions of the system will be the responsibility of software. This is the most critical time to affect the safety of the software. From this point, software safety analyses as well as software engineering practices are the main focus for assuring safe software. While many of the steps proposed in this paper seem like just sound engineering practices, they are the best technical and most cost effective means to assure safe software within a safe system.

International Safety Regulation and Standards for Space Travel and Commerce

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Pelton, J. N.; Jakhu, R.

The evolution of air travel has led to the adoption of the 1944 Chicago Convention that created the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), headquartered in Montreal, Canada, and the propagation of aviation safety standards. Today, ICAO standardizes and harmonizes commercial air safety worldwide. Space travel and space safety are still at an early stage of development, and the adoption of international space safety standards and regulation still remains largely at the national level. This paper explores the international treaties and conventions that govern space travel, applications and exploration today and analyzes current efforts to create space safety standards and regulations at the national, regional and global level. Recent efforts to create a commercial space travel industry and to license commercial space ports are foreseen as means to hasten a space safety regulatory process.

GSFC Safety and Mission Assurance Organization

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Kelly, Michael P.

2010-01-01

This viewgraph presentation reviews NASA Goddard Space Flight Center's approach to safety and mission assurance. The contents include: 1) NASA GSFC Background; 2) Safety and Mission Assurance Directorate; 3) The Role of SMA-D and the Technical Authority; 4) GSFC Mission assurance Requirements; 5) GSFC Systems Review Office (SRO); 6) GSFC Supply Chain Management Program; and 7) GSFC ISO9001/AS9100 Status Brief.

Space transportation system payload safety guidelines handbook

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

1976-01-01

This handbook provides the payload developer with a uniform description and interpretation of the potential hazards which may be caused by or associated with a payload element, operation, or interface with other payloads or with the STS. It also includes guidelines describing design or operational safety measures which suggest means of alleviating a particular hazard or group of hazards, thereby improving payload safety.

Science in a Box: An Educator Guide with NASA Glovebox Activities in Science, Math, and Technology.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Washington, DC. Education Dept.

The Space Shuttle and International Space Station provide a unique microgravity environment for research that is a critical part of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) mission to improve the quality of life on Earth and enable the health and safety of space explorers for long duration missions beyond our solar system. This…

Aircraft Detection System Ensures Free-Space Laser Safety

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Smithgall, Brian; Wilson, Keith E.

2004-01-01

As scientists continue to explore our solar system, there are increasing demands to return greater volumes of data from smaller deep-space probes. Accordingly, NASA is studying advanced strategies based on free-space laser transmissions, which offer secure, high-bandwidth communications using smaller subsystems of much lower power and mass than existing ones. These approaches, however, can pose a danger to pilots in the beam path because the lasers may illuminate aircraft and blind them. Researchers thus are investigating systems that will monitor the surrounding airspace for aircraft that could be affected. This paper presents current methods for safe free space laser propagation.

Design of the Space Station Freedom power system

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Thomas, Ronald L.; Hallinan, George J.

1989-01-01

The design of Space Station Freedom's electric power system (EPS) is reviewed, highlighting the key design goals of performance, low cost, reliability and safety. Tradeoff study results that illustrate the competing factors responsible for many of the more important design decisions are discussed. When Freedom's EPS is compared with previous space power designs, two major differences stand out. The first is the size of the EPS, which is larger than any prior system. The second major difference between the EPS and other space power designs is the indefinite expected life of Freedom; 30 years has been used for life-cycle-cost calculations.

Automating Range Surveillance Through Radio Interferometry and Field Strength Mapping Techniques

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

2008-01-01

Space vehicle launches are often delayed because of the challenge of verifying that the range is clear, and such delays are likely to become more prevalent as more and more new spaceports are built. Range surveillance is one of the primary focuses of Range Safety for launches and often drives costs and schedules. As NASA's primary launch operation center, Kennedy Space Center is very interested in new technologies that increase the responsiveness of radio frequency (RF) surveillance systems. These systems help Range Safety personnel clear the range by identifying, pinpointing, and resolving any unknown sources of RF emissions prior to each launch.

Holographic flow diagnostics for the Space Shuttle main engine

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

1992-01-01

Summarized here are the results of an effort to produce holograms of the exhaust from the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) being tested on a test stand at the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC). The effort took place from December 1990 to January 1992, during which seven trips were made from MetroLaser to MSFC. A brief outline of each trip is given. Due to the suspension of the SSME program in Huntsville and unexpected complications in resolving safety issues, the proposed holography system was not operated until November 1991. A NASA 100 mW Argon laser was installed in the holography system for an October engine test while these safety issues were being resolved. A video camera shadowgraph was made during this test, which was shut down prematurely after 20 seconds. System problems precluded successful operation of the holography system until the January 1992 engine test. No hologram resulted during this test due to heavy fog conditions around the engine.

Shuttle: forever young?

PubMed

Sietzen, Frank

2002-01-01

NASA has started a 4-phase program of upgrades designed to increase safety and extend use of the space shuttles through the year 2020. Phase I is aimed at improving vehicle safety and supporting the space station. Phase II is aimed at combating obsolescence and includes a checkout launch and control system and protection from micrometeoroids and orbital debris. Phase III is designed to expand or enhance the capabilities of the shuttle and includes development of an auxiliary power unit, avionics, a channel-wall nozzle, extended nose landing gear, long-life fuel cells, a nontoxic orbital maneuvering system/reaction control system, and a water membrane evaporator. Phase IV is aimed at design of system changes that would alter the shuttle mold line and configuration; projects include a five-segment solid rocket booster, liquid flyback boosters, and a crew escape module.

A Dynamic Risk Model for Evaluation of Space Shuttle Abort Scenarios

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Henderson, Edward M.; Maggio, Gaspare; Elrada, Hassan A.; Yazdpour, Sabrina J.

2003-01-01

The Space Shuttle is an advanced manned launch system with a respectable history of service and a demonstrated level of safety. Recent studies have shown that the Space Shuttle has a relatively low probability of having a failure that is instantaneously catastrophic during nominal flight as compared with many US and international launch systems. However, since the Space Shuttle is a manned. system, a number of mission abort contingencies exist to primarily ensure the safety of the crew during off-nominal situations and to attempt to maintain the integrity of the Orbiter. As the Space Shuttle ascends to orbit it transverses various intact abort regions evaluated and planned before the flight to ensure that the Space Shuttle Orbiter, along with its crew, may be returned intact either to the original launch site, a transoceanic landing site, or returned from a substandard orbit. An intact abort may be initiated due to a number of system failures but the highest likelihood and most challenging abort scenarios are initiated by a premature shutdown of a Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME). The potential consequences of such a shutdown vary as a function of a number of mission parameters but all of them may be related to mission time for a specific mission profile. This paper focuses on the Dynamic Abort Risk Evaluation (DARE) model process, applications, and its capability to evaluate the risk of Loss Of Vehicle (LOV) due to the complex systems interactions that occur during Space Shuttle intact abort scenarios. In addition, the paper will examine which of the Space Shuttle subsystems are critical to ensuring a successful return of the Space Shuttle Orbiter and crew from such a situation.

Mass and Reliability System (MaRS)

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Barnes, Sarah

2016-01-01

The Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) Directorate is responsible for mitigating risk, providing system safety, and lowering risk for space programs from ground to space. The S&MA is divided into 4 divisions: The Space Exploration Division (NC), the International Space Station Division (NE), the Safety & Test Operations Division (NS), and the Quality and Flight Equipment Division (NT). The interns, myself and Arun Aruljothi, will be working with the Risk & Reliability Analysis Branch under the NC Division's. The mission of this division is to identify, characterize, diminish, and communicate risk by implementing an efficient and effective assurance model. The team utilizes Reliability and Maintainability (R&M) and Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) to ensure decisions concerning risks are informed, vehicles are safe and reliable, and program/project requirements are realistic and realized. This project pertains to the Orion mission, so it is geared toward a long duration Human Space Flight Program(s). For space missions, payload is a critical concept; balancing what hardware can be replaced by components verse by Orbital Replacement Units (ORU) or subassemblies is key. For this effort a database was created that combines mass and reliability data, called Mass and Reliability System or MaRS. The U.S. International Space Station (ISS) components are used as reference parts in the MaRS database. Using ISS components as a platform is beneficial because of the historical context and the environment similarities to a space flight mission. MaRS uses a combination of systems: International Space Station PART for failure data, Vehicle Master Database (VMDB) for ORU & components, Maintenance & Analysis Data Set (MADS) for operation hours and other pertinent data, & Hardware History Retrieval System (HHRS) for unit weights. MaRS is populated using a Visual Basic Application. Once populated, the excel spreadsheet is comprised of information on ISS components including: operation hours, random/nonrandom failures, software/hardware failures, quantity, orbital replaceable units (ORU), date of placement, unit weight, frequency of part, etc. The motivation for creating such a database will be the development of a mass/reliability parametric model to estimate mass required for replacement parts. Once complete, engineers working on future space flight missions will have access a mean time to failures and on parts along with their mass, this will be used to make proper decisions for long duration space flight missions

48 CFR 1812.301 - Solicitation provisions and contract clauses for the acquisition of commercial items. (NASA...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-10-01

... Safety and Security. (K) [Reserved] (L) 1852.228-76, Cross-Waiver of Liability for International Space Station Activities. (M) 1852.228-78, Cross-Waiver of Liability for Science or Space Exploration Activities....301 Section 1812.301 Federal Acquisition Regulations System NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE...

48 CFR 1812.301 - Solicitation provisions and contract clauses for the acquisition of commercial items. (NASA...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-10-01

... Safety and Security. (K) [Reserved] (L) 1852.228-76, Cross-Waiver of Liability for International Space Station Activities. (M) 1852.228-78, Cross-Waiver of Liability for Science or Space Exploration Activities....301 Section 1812.301 Federal Acquisition Regulations System NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE...

48 CFR 1812.301 - Solicitation provisions and contract clauses for the acquisition of commercial items. (NASA...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-10-01

... Safety and Security. (K) 1852.228-72, Cross-Waiver of Liability for Space Shuttle Services. (L) 1852.228-76, Cross-Waiver of Liability for Space Station Activities. (M) 1852.228-78, Cross-Waiver of....301 Section 1812.301 Federal Acquisition Regulations System NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE...

Aeronautics and Space Report of the President: 1977 Activities.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Washington, DC.

The national programs in aeronautics and space made steady progress in 1977 toward their long-term objectives. In aeronautics the goals were improved performance, energy efficiency, and safety in aircraft. In space the goals were: (1) better remote sensing systems to generate more sophisticated information about the Earth's environment; (2)…

NASA System Safety Framework and Concepts for Implementation

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Dezfuli, Homayoon

2012-01-01

This report has been developed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate (HEOMD) Risk Management team knowledge capture forums.. This document provides a point-in-time, cumulative, summary of actionable key lessons learned in safety framework and concepts.

Imaginable Technologies for Human Missions to Mars

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Bushnell, Dennis M.

2007-01-01

The thesis of the present discussion is that the simultaneous cost and inherent safety issues of human on-site exploration of Mars will require advanced-to-revolutionary technologies. The major crew safety issues as currently identified include reduced gravity, radiation, potentially extremely toxic dust and the requisite reliability for years-long missions. Additionally, this discussion examines various technological areas which could significantly impact Human-Mars cost and safety. Cost reductions for space access is a major metric, including approaches to significantly reduce the overall up-mass. Besides fuel, propulsion and power systems, the up-mass consists of the infrastructure and supplies required to keep humans healthy and the equipment for executing exploration mission tasks. Hence, the major technological areas of interest for potential cost reductions include propulsion, in-space and on-planet power, life support systems, materials and overall architecture, systems, and systems-of-systems approaches. This discussion is specifically offered in response to and as a contribution to goal 3 of the Presidential Exploration Vision: "Develop the Innovative Technologies Knowledge and Infrastructures both to explore and to support decisions about the destinations for human exploration".

Quality and Safety Matter

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Manha, William D.

2010-09-01

One to the expressions for the most demanding quality was made by a well-known rocket scientist, for which this center was named, Dr. Wernher Von Braun in the Foreword of a book about the design of rocket engines that was first published by NASA in 1967: “Success in space demands perfection. Many of the brilliant achievements made in this vast, austere environment seem almost miraculous. Behind each apparent miracle, however, stands the flawless performance of numerous highly complex systems. All are important. The failure of only one portion of a launch vehicle or spacecraft may cause failure of an entire mission. But the first to feel this awesome imperative for perfection are the propulsion systems, especially the engines. Unless they operate flawlessly first, none of the other systems will get a chance to perform in space. Perfection begins in the design of space hardware. This book emphasizes quality and reliability in the design of propulsion and engine systems. It draws deeply from the vast know-how and experience which have been the essence of several well-designed, reliable systems of the past and present. And, with a thoroughness and completeness not previously available, it tells how the present high state of reliability, gained through years of research and testing, can be maintained, and perhaps improved, in engines of the future. As man ventures deeper into space to explore the planets, the search for perfection in the design of propulsion systems will continue.” Some catastrophes with losses of life will be compared to show lapses in quality and safety and contrasted with a catastrophe without loss of life because of compliance with safety requirements. 1. October 24, 1960,(USSR) Nedelin Catastrophe, Death on the Steppes, 124 deaths 2. October 25, 1966,(USA) North American Rockwell, Apollo Block I Service Module Service(SM) Propulsion System fuel tank explosion/fire and destruction of SM and test cell, test engineer/conductor/author, Bill Manha,(the presenter) 0 injuries, 0 deaths 3. March 18, 1980,(USSR) Vostok 8A92M booster pad explosion, 48 deaths. 4. August 22, 2003,(Brazil) -Alcantara VLS -1, V03. Solid rocket ignited on pad, 21 deaths 5. Summer of 2006(USA) a payload organization inquired about requirements to fly a satellite with a new “safe” SpaceDev hybrid propulsion system using a solid polymer as the fuel and nitrous oxide as the oxidizer. The extensive titanium/nitrous oxide materials compatibility testing that was required discouraged the payload organization from further exploration of using the Shuttle as the launch vehicle. 6. July 26, 2007(USA) SpaceShipTwo nitrous oxide explosion, 3 seriously injured, 3 deaths The above listed catastrophic failures resulted in 210 deaths, but there were none on the Apollo SM explosion because of compliance with CalOSHA. This is an applied lesson learned of the Shuttle. Safety was not jeopardized without extensive materials compatibility testing. On the other hand, the nitrous oxide was erroneously identified as safe for launch from Shuttle or ISS which resulted in a catastrophic explosion and resulted in 3 major injuries, and 3 deaths. This is a testimony of a survivor of a catastrophic failure where safety rules were followed and the application of the lesson learned which confirmed safety and quality, as expressed by Von Braun, PERFECTION and SAFETY do MATTER!

Fire safety practices in the Shuttle and the Space Station Freedom

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Friedman, Robert

1993-01-01

The Shuttle reinforces its policy of fire-preventive measures with onboard smoke detectors and Halon 1301 fire extinguishers. The forthcoming Space Station Freedom will have expanded fire protection with photoelectric smoke detectors, radiation flame detectors, and both fixed and portable carbon dioxide fire extinguishers. Many design and operational issues remain to be resolved for Freedom. In particular, the fire-suppression designs must consider the problems of gas leakage in toxic concentrations, alternative systems for single-failure redundancy, and commonality with the corresponding systems of the Freedom international partners. While physical and engineering requirements remain the primary driving forces for spacecraft fire-safety technology, there are, nevertheless, needs and opportunities for the application of microgravity combustion knowledge to improve and optimize the fire-protective systems.

Annual report to the NASA Administrator by the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel. Part 2: Space shuttle program. Section 2: Summary of information developed in the Panel's fact-finding activities

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

1975-01-01

The management areas and the individual elements of the shuttle system were investigated. The basic management or design approach including the most obvious limits or hazards that are significant to crew safety was reviewed. Shuttle program elements that were studied included the orbiter, the space shuttle main engine, the external tank project, solid rocket boosters, and the launch and landing elements.

Dust Measurements Onboard the Deep Space Gateway

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Horanyi, M.; Kempf, S.; Malaspina, D.; Poppe, A.; Srama, R.; Sternovsky, Z.; Szalay, J.

2018-02-01

A dust instrument onboard the Deep Space Gateway will revolutionize our understanding of the dust environment at 1 AU, help our understanding of the evolution of the solar system, and improve dust hazard models for the safety of crewed and robotic missions.

NASA's Integrated Space Transportation Plan — 3 rd generation reusable launch vehicle technology update

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Cook, Stephen; Hueter, Uwe

2003-08-01

NASA's Integrated Space Transportation Plan (ISTP) calls for investments in Space Shuttle safety upgrades, second generation Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV) advanced development and third generation RLV and in-space research and technology. NASA's third generation launch systems are to be fully reusable and operation by 2025. The goals for third generation launch systems are to reduce cost by a factor of 100 and improve safety by a factor of 10,000 over current systems. The Advanced Space Transportation Program Office (ASTP) at NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, AL has the agency lead to develop third generation space transportation technologies. The Hypersonics Investment Area, part of ASTP, is developing the third generation launch vehicle technologies in two main areas, propulsion and airframes. The program's major investment is in hypersonic airbreathing propulsion since it offers the greatest potential for meeting the third generation launch vehicles. The program will mature the technologies in three key propulsion areas, scramjets, rocket-based combined cycle and turbine-based combination cycle. Ground and flight propulsion tests are being planned for the propulsion technologies. Airframe technologies will be matured primarily through ground testing. This paper describes NASA's activities in hypersonics. Current programs, accomplishments, future plans and technologies that are being pursued by the Hypersonics Investment Area under the Advanced Space Transportation Program Office will be discussed.

LERC power system autonomy program 1990 demonstration

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Faymon, Karl A.; Sundberg, Gale R.; Bercaw, Robert R.; Weeks, David J.

1987-01-01

The NASA Lewis Research Center has undertaken a program for the development of space systems automation, with a view to increased reliability, safety, payload capability, and decreased operational costs. The NASA Space Station is a primary area of application for the techniques thus developed. Attention is presently given to the activities associated with the Power Systems Autonomy Demonstration Project, which has a projected demonstration date in 1990 and will integrate knowledge-based systems into a real-time environment. Two coordinated systems under expert system control will be demonstrated.

14 CFR 417.117 - Reviews.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Reviews. 417.117 Section 417.117... TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH SAFETY Launch Safety Responsibilities § 417.117 Reviews. (a) General. A launch operator must— (1) Review the status of operations, systems, equipment, and personnel required by part 417...

Identification of crew-systems interactions and decision related trends

DOT National Transportation Integrated Search

2013-05-01

National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Vehicle System Safety Technology (VSST) project management uses systems analysis to identify key issues and maintain a portfolio of research leading to potential solutions to its three identified t...

Integrated Space Transportation Plan: Defining Technology Requirements and Next Generation Launch Systems to Meet Commercial and Government Needs. Revision 20 Oct. 1999

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Davidoff, Larry D.; Reichert, Jack M.

1999-01-01

NASA continues to focus on improving safety and reliability while reducing the annual cost of meeting human space flight and unique ISS and exploration needs. NASA's Space Transportation Architecture Study (STAS) Phase 2 in early 1998 focused on space transportation options. Subsequently, NASA directed parallel industry and government teams to conduct the Integrated Space Transportation Plan effort (STAS Phase 3). The objective of ISTP was to develop technology requirements, roadmaps, and risk reduction portfolio that considered expanded definition of "clean-sheet" and Shuttle-derived second generation ETO transportation systems in support of a 2005 RLV competition for NASA missions beginning 2010. NASA provided top-level requirements for improvements in safety, reliability, and cost and a set of design reference missions representing NASA ISS, human exploration, commercial, and other civil and government needs. This paper addresses the challenges of meeting NASA's objectives while servicing the varied market segments represented in the ISTP design reference missions and provides a summary of technology development needs and candidate system concepts. A comparison of driving requirements, architectures and technology needs is discussed and descriptions of viable Shuttle-derived and next generation systems to meet the market needs are presented.

Nuclear thermal propulsion transportation systems for lunar/Mars exploration

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Clark, John S.; Borowski, Stanley K.; Mcilwain, Melvin C.; Pellaccio, Dennis G.

1992-01-01

Nuclear thermal propulsion technology development is underway at NASA and DoE for Space Exploration Initiative (SEI) missions to Mars, with initial near-earth flights to validate flight readiness. Several reactor concepts are being considered for these missions, and important selection criteria will be evaluated before final selection of a system. These criteria include: safety and reliability, technical risk, cost, and performance, in that order. Of the concepts evaluated to date, the Nuclear Engine for Rocket Vehicle Applications (NERVA) derivative (NDR) is the only concept that has demonstrated full power, life, and performance in actual reactor tests. Other concepts will require significant design work and must demonstrate proof-of-concept. Technical risk, and hence, development cost should therefore be lowest for the concept, and the NDR concept is currently being considered for the initial SEI missions. As lighter weight, higher performance systems are developed and validated, including appropriate safety and astronaut-rating requirements, they will be considered to support future SEI application. A space transportation system using a modular nuclear thermal rocket (NTR) system for lunar and Mars missions is expected to result in significant life cycle cost savings. Finally, several key issues remain for NTR's, including public acceptance and operational issues. Nonetheless, NTR's are believed to be the 'next generation' of space propulsion systems - the key to space exploration.

Experiment Definition Using the Space Laboratory, Long Duration Exposure Facility, and Space Transportation System Shuttle

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Sheppard, Albert P.; Wood, Joan M.

1976-01-01

Candidate experiments designed for the space shuttle transportation system and the long duration exposure facility are summarized. The data format covers: experiment title, Experimenter, technical abstract, benefits/justification, technical discussion of experiment approach and objectives, related work and experience, experiment facts space properties used, environmental constraints, shielding requirements, if any, physical description, and sketch of major elements. Information was also included on experiment hardware, research required to develop experiment, special requirements, cost estimate, safety considerations, and interactions with spacecraft and other experiments.

Research reports: 1990 NASA/ASEE Summer Faculty Fellowship Program

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Freeman, L. Michael (Editor); Chappell, Charles R. (Editor); Six, Frank (Editor); Karr, Gerald R. (Editor)

1990-01-01

Reports on the research projects performed under the NASA/ASEE Summer Faculty Fellowship Program are presented. The program was conducted by The University of Alabama and MSFC during the period from June 4, 1990 through August 10, 1990. Some of the topics covered include: (1) Space Shuttles; (2) Space Station Freedom; (3) information systems; (4) materials and processes; (4) Space Shuttle main engine; (5) aerospace sciences; (6) mathematical models; (7) mission operations; (8) systems analysis and integration; (9) systems control; (10) structures and dynamics; (11) aerospace safety; and (12) remote sensing

Space-based augmentation for global navigation satellite systems.

PubMed

Grewal, Mohinder S

2012-03-01

This paper describes space-based augmentation for global navigation satellite systems (GNSS). Space-based augmentations increase the accuracy and integrity of the GNSS, thereby enhancing users' safety. The corrections for ephemeris, ionospheric delay, and clocks are calculated from reference station measurements of GNSS data in wide-area master stations and broadcast via geostationary earth orbit (GEO) satellites. This paper discusses the clock models, satellite orbit determination, ionospheric delay estimation, multipath mitigation, and GEO uplink subsystem (GUS) as used in the Wide Area Augmentation System developed by the FAA.

NASA space station automation: AI-based technology review

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Firschein, O.; Georgeff, M. P.; Park, W.; Neumann, P.; Kautz, W. H.; Levitt, K. N.; Rom, R. J.; Poggio, A. A.

1985-01-01

Research and Development projects in automation for the Space Station are discussed. Artificial Intelligence (AI) based automation technologies are planned to enhance crew safety through reduced need for EVA, increase crew productivity through the reduction of routine operations, increase space station autonomy, and augment space station capability through the use of teleoperation and robotics. AI technology will also be developed for the servicing of satellites at the Space Station, system monitoring and diagnosis, space manufacturing, and the assembly of large space structures.

46 CFR 62.35-50 - Tabulated monitoring and safety control requirements for specific systems.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

...) (9) Remote/auto fill level High Auto trip or overflow arrangement Hi. press. leakage level High Bilge... CL.3 W.T. doors Open/closed Fire detection Machinery spaces Space on fire (9) Fire main Pressure Low...

Achieving Space Shuttle Abort-to-Orbit Using the Five-Segment Booster

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Craft, Joe; Ess, Robert; Sauvageau, Don

2003-01-01

The Five-Segment Booster design concept was evaluated by a team that determined the concept to be feasible and capable of achieving the desired abort-to-orbit capability when used in conjunction with increased Space Shuttle main engine throttle capability. The team (NASA Johnson Space Center, NASA Marshall Space Flight Center, ATK Thiokol Propulsion, United Space Alliance, Lockheed-Martin Space Systems, and Boeing) selected the concept that provided abort-to-orbit capability while: 1) minimizing Shuttle system impacts by maintaining the current interface requirements with the orbiter, external tank, and ground operation systems; 2) minimizing changes to the flight-proven design, materials, and processes of the current four-segment Shuttle booster; 3) maximizing use of existing booster hardware; and 4) taking advantage of demonstrated Shuttle main engine throttle capability. The added capability can also provide Shuttle mission planning flexibility. Additional performance could be used to: enable implementation of more desirable Shuttle safety improvements like crew escape, while maintaining current payload capability; compensate for off nominal performance in no-fail missions; and support missions to high altitudes and inclinations. This concept is a low-cost, low-risk approach to meeting Shuttle safety upgrade objectives. The Five-Segment Booster also has the potential to support future heavy-lift missions.

Space Operations Center System Analysis: Requirements for a Space Operations Center, revision A

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Woodcock, G. R.

1982-01-01

The system and program requirements for a space operations center as defined by systems analysis studies are presented as a guide for future study and systems definition. Topics covered include general requirements for safety, maintainability, and reliability, service and habitat modules, the health maintenance facility; logistics modules; the docking tunnel; and subsystem requirements (structures, electrical power, environmental control/life support; extravehicular activity; data management; communications and tracking; docking/berthing; flight control/propulsion; and crew support). Facilities for flight support, construction, satellite and mission servicing, and fluid storage are included as well as general purpose support equipment.

Closeup view of the Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) Forward Skirt ...

Library of Congress Historic Buildings Survey, Historic Engineering Record, Historic Landscapes Survey

Close-up view of the Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) Forward Skirt sitting on ground support equipment in the Solid Rocket Booster Assembly and Refurbishment Facility at Kennedy Space Center while being prepared for mating with the Frustum-Nose Cap Assembly and the Forward Rocket Motor Segment. The prominent feature in this view is the electrical, data, telemetry and safety systems terminal which connects to the Aft Skirt Assembly systems via the Systems Tunnel that runs the length of the Rocket Motor. - Space Transportation System, Solid Rocket Boosters, Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center, 2101 NASA Parkway, Houston, Harris County, TX

KSC-05PD-0587

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

2005-01-01

KENNEDY SPACE CENTER, FLA. In the Orbiter Processing Facility bay 1 at NASAs Kennedy Space Center, a worker rolls the plastic cover removed from the Orbital Boom Sensor System (OBSS), at right, which will be installed in the payload bay of Atlantis. The 50- foot-long OBSS attaches to the Remote Manipulator System, or Shuttle robotic arm, and is one of the new safety measures for Return to Flight, equipping the orbiter with cameras and laser systems to inspect the Shuttles Thermal Protection System while in space. The Return to Flight mission STS-121 has a launch window of July 12 - July 31, 2005.

Safety policy and requirements for payloads using the Space Transportation System (STS)

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

1982-01-01

The Space Transportation Operations (STO) safety policy is to minimize STO involvement in the payload and its GSE (ground support equipment) design process while maintaining the assurance of a safe operation. Requirements for assuring payload mission success are the responsibility of the payload organization and are beyond the scope of this document. The intent is to provide the overall safety policies and requirements while allowing for negotiation between the payload organization and the STO operator in the method of implementation of payload safety. This revision provides for a relaxation in the monitoring requirements for inhibits, allows the payload organization to pursue design options and reflects, additionally, some new requirements. As of the issue date of this NHB, payloads which have completed the formal safety assessment reviews of their preliminary design on the basis of the May 1979 issue will be reassessed for compliance with the above changes.

Development of a safe ground to space laser propagation system for the optical communications telescope laboratory

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Wu, Janet P.

2003-01-01

Furthering pursuits in high bandwidth communications to future NASA deep space and neat-Earth probes, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) is building the Optical communications Telescope Laboratory (OCTL) atop Table Mountain in Southern California. This R&D optical antenna will be used to develop optical communication strategies for future optical ground stations. Initial experiments to be conducted include propagating high-powered, Q-switched laser beams to retro-reflecting satellites. Yet laser beam propagation from the ground to space is under the cognizance of various government agencies, namely: the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (ISHA) that is responsible for protecting workforce personnel; the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) responsible for protecting pilots and aircraft; and the Laser Clearinghouse of Space Command responsible for protecting space assets. To ensure that laser beam propagation from the OCTL and future autonomously operated ground stations comply with the guidelines of these organizations, JPL is developing a multi-tiered safety system that will meet the coordination, monitoring, and reporting functions required by the agencies. At Tier 0, laser operators will meet OSHA safety standards for protection and access to the high power lasers area will be restricted and interlocked. Tier 1, the area defined from the telescope dome out to a range of 3.4-km, will utilize long wave infrared camera sensors to alert operators of at risk aircraft in the FAA controlled airspace. Tier 2, defined to extend from 3.4-km out to the aircraft service ceiling in FAA airspace, will detect at risk aircraft by radar. Lastly, beam propagation into space, defined as Tier 3, will require coordination with the Laser Clearinghouse. A detailed description of the four tiers is presented along with the design of the integrated monitoring and beam transmission control system.

14 CFR 125.179 - Fuel system independence.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 3 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Fuel system independence. 125.179 Section... Requirements § 125.179 Fuel system independence. (a) Each airplane fuel system must be arranged so that the... the fuel system incorporates features that provide equivalent safety. ...

14 CFR 125.179 - Fuel system independence.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 3 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Fuel system independence. 125.179 Section... Requirements § 125.179 Fuel system independence. (a) Each airplane fuel system must be arranged so that the... the fuel system incorporates features that provide equivalent safety. ...

14 CFR 125.179 - Fuel system independence.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 3 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Fuel system independence. 125.179 Section... Requirements § 125.179 Fuel system independence. (a) Each airplane fuel system must be arranged so that the... the fuel system incorporates features that provide equivalent safety. ...

ISO 14624 Series - Space Systems - Safety and Compatibility of Materials Flammability Assessment of Spacecraft Materials

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Hirsch, David B.

2007-01-01

A viewgraph presentation on the flammability of spacecraft materials is shown. The topics include: 1) Spacecraft Fire Safety; 2) Materials Flammability Test; 3) Impetus for enhanced materials flammability characterization; 4) Exploration Atmosphere Working Group Recommendations; 5) Approach; and 6) Status of implementation

Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) Evolution

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Worlund, Len A.; Hastings, J. H.; McCool, Alex (Technical Monitor)

2001-01-01

The SSME when developed in the 1970's was a technological leap in space launch propulsion system design. The engine has safely supported the space shuttle for the last two decades and will be required for at least another decade to support human space flight to the international space station. This paper discusses the continued improvements and maturing of the system to its current state and future considerations for its critical role in the nations space program. Discussed are the initiatives of the late 1980's, which lead to three major upgrades through the 1990's. The current capabilities of the propulsion system are defined in the areas of highest programmatic importance: ascent risk, in-flight abort thrust, reusability, and operability. Future initiatives for improved shuttle safety, the paramount priority of the Space Shuttle program are discussed.

A scientific operations plan for the NASA space telescope. [ground support systems, project planning

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

West, D. K.; Costa, S. R.

1975-01-01

A ground system is described which is compatible with the operational requirements of the space telescope. The goal of the ground system is to minimize the cost of post launch operations without seriously compromising the quality and total throughput of space telescope science, or jeopardizing the safety of the space telescope in orbit. The resulting system is able to accomplish this goal through optimum use of existing and planned resources and institutional facilities. Cost is also reduced and efficiency in operation increased by drawing on existing experience in interfacing guest astronomers with spacecraft as well as mission control experience obtained in the operation of present astronomical spacecraft.

Ultrashort pulse energy distribution for propulsion in space

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Bergstue, Grant Jared

This thesis effort focuses on the development of a novel, space-based ultrashort pulse transmission system for spacecraft. The goals of this research include: (1) ultrashort pulse transmission strategies for maximizing safety and efficiency; (2) optical transmission system requirements; (3) general system requirements including control techniques for stabilization; (4) optical system requirements for achieving effective ablative propulsion at the receiving spacecraft; and (5) ultrashort pulse transmission capabilities required for future missions in space. A key element of the research is the multiplexing device required for aligning the ultrashort pulses from multiple laser sources along a common optical axis for transmission. This strategy enables access to the higher average and peak powers required for useful missions in space.

A home away from home. [life support system design for Space Station

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Powell, L. E.; Hager, R. W.; Mccown, J. W.

1985-01-01

The role of the NASA-Marshall center in the development of the Space Station is discussed. The tasks of the center include the development of the life-support system; the design of the common module, which will form the basis for all pressurized Space Station modules; the design and outfit of a common module for the Material and Technology Laboratory (MTL) and logistics use; accommodations for operations of the Orbit Maneuvering Vehicle (OMV) and the Orbit Transfer Vehicle (OTV); and the Space Station propulsion system. A description of functions and design is given for each system, with particular emphasis on the goals of safety, efficiency, automation, and cost effectiveness.

Advanced Health Management System for the Space Shuttle Main Engine

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Davidson, Matt; Stephens, John; Rodela, Chris

2006-01-01

Pratt & Whitney Rocketdyne, Inc., in cooperation with NASA-Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), has developed a new Advanced Health Management System (AHMS) controller for the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) that will increase the probability of successfully placing the shuttle into the intended orbit and increase the safety of the Space Transportation System (STS) launches. The AHMS is an upgrade o the current Block II engine controller whose primary component is an improved vibration monitoring system called the Real-Time Vibration Monitoring System (RTVMS) that can effectively and reliably monitor the state of the high pressure turbomachinery and provide engine protection through a new synchronous vibration redline which enables engine shutdown if the vibration exceeds predetermined thresholds. The introduction of this system required improvements and modification to the Block II controller such as redesigning the Digital Computer Unit (DCU) memory and the Flight Accelerometer Safety Cut-Off System (FASCOS) circuitry, eliminating the existing memory retention batteries, installation of the Digital Signal Processor (DSP) technology, and installation of a High Speed Serial Interface (HSSI) with accompanying outside world connectors. Test stand hot-fire testing along with lab testing have verified successful implementation and is expected to reduce the probability of catastrophic engine failures during the shuttle ascent phase and improve safely by about 23% according to the Quantitative Risk Assessment System (QRAS), leading to a safer and more reliable SSME.

Report by the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

1981-01-01

The process of preparation for the first two shuttle flights was observed and information from both flights was gathered in order to confirm the concept and performance of the major elements of the space transportation system. To achieve truly operational operating safety, regularity, and minimum practical cost, the organization of efforts between the R&D community and any transportation service organization should be clearly separated with the latter organization assuming responsibilities for marketing its services; planning and acquiring prime hardware and spares; maintainance; certification of procedures; training; and creation of requirements for future development. A technical audit of the application of redundancy concepts to shuttle systems is suggested. The state of the art of space transportation hardware suggests that a number of concept changes may improve reliability, costs, and operational safety. For the remaining R&D flights, it is suggested that a redline audit be made of limits that should not be exceeded for ready to launch.

Risk of Performance Decrement and Crew Illness Due to an Inadequate Food System

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Douglas, Grace L.; Cooper, Maya; Bermudez-Aguirre, Daniela; Sirmons, Takiyah

2016-01-01

NASA is preparing for long duration manned missions beyond low-Earth orbit that will be challenged in several ways, including long-term exposure to the space environment, impacts to crew physiological and psychological health, limited resources, and no resupply. The food system is one of the most significant daily factors that can be altered to improve human health, and performance during space exploration. Therefore, the paramount importance of determining the methods, technologies, and requirements to provide a safe, nutritious, and acceptable food system that promotes crew health and performance cannot be underestimated. The processed and prepackaged food system is the main source of nutrition to the crew, therefore significant losses in nutrition, either through degradation of nutrients during processing and storage or inadequate food intake due to low acceptability, variety, or usability, may significantly compromise the crew's health and performance. Shelf life studies indicate that key nutrients and quality factors in many space foods degrade to concerning levels within three years, suggesting that food system will not meet the nutrition and acceptability requirements of a long duration mission beyond low-Earth orbit. Likewise, mass and volume evaluations indicate that the current food system is a significant resource burden. Alternative provisioning strategies, such as inclusion of bioregenerative foods, are challenged with resource requirements, and food safety and scarcity concerns. Ensuring provisioning of an adequate food system relies not only upon determining technologies, and requirements for nutrition, quality, and safety, but upon establishing a food system that will support nutritional adequacy, even with individual crew preference and self-selection. In short, the space food system is challenged to maintain safety, nutrition, and acceptability for all phases of an exploration mission within resource constraints. This document presents the evidence for the Risk of Performance Decrement and Crew Illness Due to an Inadequate Food System and the gaps in relation to exploration, as identified by the NASA Human Research Program (HRP). The research reviewed here indicates strategies to establish methods, technologies, and requirements that increase food stability, support adequate nutrition, quality, and variety, enable supplementation with grow-pick-and-eat salad crops, ensure safety, and reduce resource use. Obtaining the evidence to establish an adequate food system is essential, as the resources allocated to the food system may be defined based on the data relating nutritional stability and food quality requirements to crew performance and health.

Space Fission Propulsion System Development Status

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Houts, Mike; VanDyke, Melissa; Godfroy, Tom; Pedersen, Kevin; Martin, James; Dickens, Ricky; Williams, Eric; Harper, Roger; Salvail, Pat; Hrbud, Ivana;

Historical overview of the US use of space nuclear power

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Bennett, Gary L.

1989-01-01

Since 1961, the United States has successfully flown 35 space nuclear power sources on 20 space systems. These space systems have included the Apollo, Pioneer, Viking and Voyager spacecraft launched by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and navigation and communications satellites launched by the Department of Defense. These power sources performed as planned and i8n many cases exceeded their power requirements and/or lifetimes. All of the power sources met their safety requirements. This paper surveys past uses of space nuclear power in the US and thus serves as a historical framework for other papers in this Conference dealing with future US applications of space nuclear power.

The French Space Operation Act: Technical Regulations

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Trinchero, J. P.; Lazare, B.

2010-09-01

The French Space Operation Act(FSOA) stipulates that a prime objective of the National technical regulations is to protect people, property, public health and the environment. Compliance with these technical regulations is mandatory as of 10 December 2010 for space operations by French space operators and for space operations from French territory. The space safety requirements and regulations governing procedures are based on national and international best practices and experience. A critical design review of the space system and procedures shall be carried out by the applicant, in order to verify compliance with the Technical Regulations. An independent technical assessment of the operation is delegated to CNES. The principles applied when drafting technical regulations are as follows: requirements must as far as possible establish the rules according to the objective to be obtained, rather than how it is to be achieved; requirements must give preference to international standards recognised as being the state of the art; requirements must take previous experience into account. Technical regulations are divided into three sections covering common requirements for the launch, control and return of a space object. A dedicated section will cover specific rules to be applied at the Guiana Space Centre. The main topics addressed by the technical regulations are: operator safety management system; study of risks to people, property, public health and the Earth’s environment; impact study on the outer space environment: space debris generated by the operation; planetary protection.

Quantitative evolutionary design

PubMed Central

Diamond, Jared

2002-01-01

The field of quantitative evolutionary design uses evolutionary reasoning (in terms of natural selection and ultimate causation) to understand the magnitudes of biological reserve capacities, i.e. excesses of capacities over natural loads. Ratios of capacities to loads, defined as safety factors, fall in the range 1.2-10 for most engineered and biological components, even though engineered safety factors are specified intentionally by humans while biological safety factors arise through natural selection. Familiar examples of engineered safety factors include those of buildings, bridges and elevators (lifts), while biological examples include factors of bones and other structural elements, of enzymes and transporters, and of organ metabolic performances. Safety factors serve to minimize the overlap zone (resulting in performance failure) between the low tail of capacity distributions and the high tail of load distributions. Safety factors increase with coefficients of variation of load and capacity, with capacity deterioration with time, and with cost of failure, and decrease with costs of initial construction, maintenance, operation, and opportunity. Adaptive regulation of many biological systems involves capacity increases with increasing load; several quantitative examples suggest sublinear increases, such that safety factors decrease towards 1.0. Unsolved questions include safety factors of series systems, parallel or branched pathways, elements with multiple functions, enzyme reaction chains, and equilibrium enzymes. The modest sizes of safety factors imply the existence of costs that penalize excess capacities. Those costs are likely to involve wasted energy or space for large or expensive components, but opportunity costs of wasted space at the molecular level for minor components. PMID:12122135

Simulation analysis of adaptive cruise prediction control

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Zhang, Li; Cui, Sheng Min

2017-09-01

Predictive control is suitable for multi-variable and multi-constraint system control.In order to discuss the effect of predictive control on the vehicle longitudinal motion, this paper establishes the expected spacing model by combining variable pitch spacing and the of safety distance strategy. The model predictive control theory and the optimization method based on secondary planning are designed to obtain and track the best expected acceleration trajectory quickly. Simulation models are established including predictive and adaptive fuzzy control. Simulation results show that predictive control can realize the basic function of the system while ensuring the safety. The application of predictive and fuzzy adaptive algorithm in cruise condition indicates that the predictive control effect is better.

The procedure safety system

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Obrien, Maureen E.

1990-01-01

Telerobotic operations, whether under autonomous or teleoperated control, require a much more sophisticated safety system than that needed for most industrial applications. Industrial robots generally perform very repetitive tasks in a controlled, static environment. The safety system in that case can be as simple as shutting down the robot if a human enters the work area, or even simply building a cage around the work space. Telerobotic operations, however, will take place in a dynamic, sometimes unpredictable environment, and will involve complicated and perhaps unrehearsed manipulations. This creates a much greater potential for damage to the robot or objects in its vicinity. The Procedural Safety System (PSS) collects data from external sensors and the robot, then processes it through an expert system shell to determine whether an unsafe condition or potential unsafe condition exists. Unsafe conditions could include exceeding velocity, acceleration, torque, or joint limits, imminent collision, exceeding temperature limits, and robot or sensor component failure. If a threat to safety exists, the operator is warned. If the threat is serious enough, the robot is halted. The PSS, therefore, uses expert system technology to enhance safety thus reducing operator work load, allowing him/her to focus on performing the task at hand without the distraction of worrying about violating safety criteria.

46 CFR 154.1205 - Mechanical ventilation system: Standards.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-10-01

... operational controls outside the ventilated space. (g) No ventilation duct for a gas-dangerous space may pass... Section 154.1205 Shipping COAST GUARD, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (CONTINUED) CERTAIN BULK DANGEROUS CARGOES SAFETY STANDARDS FOR SELF-PROPELLED VESSELS CARRYING BULK LIQUEFIED GASES Design, Construction and...

46 CFR 154.1205 - Mechanical ventilation system: Standards.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-10-01

... operational controls outside the ventilated space. (g) No ventilation duct for a gas-dangerous space may pass... Section 154.1205 Shipping COAST GUARD, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (CONTINUED) CERTAIN BULK DANGEROUS CARGOES SAFETY STANDARDS FOR SELF-PROPELLED VESSELS CARRYING BULK LIQUEFIED GASES Design, Construction and...

46 CFR 154.1205 - Mechanical ventilation system: Standards.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-10-01

... operational controls outside the ventilated space. (g) No ventilation duct for a gas-dangerous space may pass... Section 154.1205 Shipping COAST GUARD, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (CONTINUED) CERTAIN BULK DANGEROUS CARGOES SAFETY STANDARDS FOR SELF-PROPELLED VESSELS CARRYING BULK LIQUEFIED GASES Design, Construction and...

NASA's Commercial Crew Program, the Next Step in U.S. Space Transportation

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Mango, Edward J., Jr.

2013-01-01

The Commercial Crew Program (CCP) is leading NASA's efforts to develop the next U.S. capability for crew transportation and rescue services to and from the International Space Station (ISS) by the middecade timeframe. The outcome of this capability is expected to stimulate and expand the U.S. space transportation industry. NASA is relying on its decades of human space flight experience to certify U.S. crewed vehicles to the ISS and is doing so in a two phase certification approach. NASA certification will cover all aspects of a crew transportation system, including: Development, test, evaluation, and verification. Program management and control. Flight readiness certification. Launch, landing, recovery, and mission operations. Sustaining engineering and maintenance/upgrades. To ensure NASA crew safety, NASA certification will validate technical and performance requirements, verify compliance with NASA requirements, validate that the crew transportation system operates in the appropriate environments, and quantify residual risks. The Commercial Crew Program will present progress to date and how it manages safety and reduces risk.

Solving Autonomy Technology Gaps through Wireless Technology and Orion Avionics Architectural Principles

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Black, Randy; Bai, Haowei; Michalicek, Andrew; Shelton, Blaine; Villela, Mark

2008-01-01

Currently, autonomy in space applications is limited by a variety of technology gaps. Innovative application of wireless technology and avionics architectural principles drawn from the Orion crew exploration vehicle provide solutions for several of these gaps. The Vision for Space Exploration envisions extensive use of autonomous systems. Economic realities preclude continuing the level of operator support currently required of autonomous systems in space. In order to decrease the number of operators, more autonomy must be afforded to automated systems. However, certification authorities have been notoriously reluctant to certify autonomous software in the presence of humans or when costly missions may be jeopardized. The Orion avionics architecture, drawn from advanced commercial aircraft avionics, is based upon several architectural principles including partitioning in software. Robust software partitioning provides "brick wall" separation between software applications executing on a single processor, along with controlled data movement between applications. Taking advantage of these attributes, non-deterministic applications can be placed in one partition and a "Safety" application created in a separate partition. This "Safety" partition can track the position of astronauts or critical equipment and prevent any unsafe command from executing. Only the Safety partition need be certified to a human rated level. As a proof-of-concept demonstration, Honeywell has teamed with the Ultra WideBand (UWB) Working Group at NASA Johnson Space Center to provide tracking of humans, autonomous systems, and critical equipment. Using UWB the NASA team can determine positioning to within less than one inch resolution, allowing a Safety partition to halt operation of autonomous systems in the event that an unplanned collision is imminent. Another challenge facing autonomous systems is the coordination of multiple autonomous agents. Current approaches address the issue as one of networking and coordination of multiple independent units, each with its own mission. As a proof-of-concept Honeywell is developing and testing various algorithms that lead to a deterministic, fault tolerant, reliable wireless backplane. Just as advanced avionics systems control several subsystems, actuators, sensors, displays, etc.; a single "master" autonomous agent (or base station computer) could control multiple autonomous systems. The problem is simplified to controlling a flexible body consisting of several sensors and actuators, rather than one of coordinating multiple independent units. By filling technology gaps associated with space based autonomous system, wireless technology and Orion architectural principles provide the means for decreasing operational costs and simplifying problems associated with collaboration of multiple autonomous systems.

HETDEX tracker control system design and implementation

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Beno, Joseph H.; Hayes, Richard; Leck, Ron; Penney, Charles; Soukup, Ian

2012-09-01

To enable the Hobby-Eberly Telescope Dark Energy Experiment, The University of Texas at Austin Center for Electromechanics and McDonald Observatory developed a precision tracker and control system - an 18,000 kg robot to position a 3,100 kg payload within 10 microns of a desired dynamic track. Performance requirements to meet science needs and safety requirements that emerged from detailed Failure Modes and Effects Analysis resulted in a system of 13 precision controlled actuators and 100 additional analog and digital devices (primarily sensors and safety limit switches). Due to this complexity, demanding accuracy requirements, and stringent safety requirements, two independent control systems were developed. First, a versatile and easily configurable centralized control system that links with modeling and simulation tools during the hardware and software design process was deemed essential for normal operation including motion control. A second, parallel, control system, the Hardware Fault Controller (HFC) provides independent monitoring and fault control through a dedicated microcontroller to force a safe, controlled shutdown of the entire system in the event a fault is detected. Motion controls were developed in a Matlab-Simulink simulation environment, and coupled with dSPACE controller hardware. The dSPACE real-time operating system collects sensor information; motor commands are transmitted over a PROFIBUS network to servo amplifiers and drive motor status is received over the same network. To interface the dSPACE controller directly to absolute Heidenhain sensors with EnDat 2.2 protocol, a custom communication board was developed. This paper covers details of operational control software, the HFC, algorithms, tuning, debugging, testing, and lessons learned.

Software Safety Analysis of a Flight Guidance System

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Butler, Ricky W. (Technical Monitor); Tribble, Alan C.; Miller, Steven P.; Lempia, David L.

2004-01-01

This document summarizes the safety analysis performed on a Flight Guidance System (FGS) requirements model. In particular, the safety properties desired of the FGS model are identified and the presence of the safety properties in the model is formally verified. Chapter 1 provides an introduction to the entire project, while Chapter 2 gives a brief overview of the problem domain, the nature of accidents, model based development, and the four-variable model. Chapter 3 outlines the approach. Chapter 4 presents the results of the traditional safety analysis techniques and illustrates how the hazardous conditions associated with the system trace into specific safety properties. Chapter 5 presents the results of the formal methods analysis technique model checking that was used to verify the presence of the safety properties in the requirements model. Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes the main conclusions of the study, first and foremost that model checking is a very effective verification technique to use on discrete models with reasonable state spaces. Additional supporting details are provided in the appendices.

International Space Station Materials: Selected Lessons Learned

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Golden, Johnny L.

2007-01-01

The International Space Station (ISS) program is of such complexity and scale that there have been numerous issues addressed regarding safety of materials: from design to manufacturing, test, launch, assembly on-orbit, and operations. A selection of lessons learned from the ISS materials perspective will be provided. Topics of discussion are: flammability evaluation of materials with connection to on-orbit operations; toxicity findings for foams; compatibility testing for materials in fluid systems; and contamination control in precision clean systems and critical space vehicle surfaces.

Autonomous Assembly of Modular Structures in Space and on Extraterrestrial Locations

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Alhorn, Dean C.

2005-01-01

The new U.S. National Vision for Space Exploration requires many new enabling technologies to accomplish the goals of space commercialization and returning humans to the moon and extraterrestrial environments. Traditionally, flight elements are complete subsystems requiring humans to complete the integration and assembly. These bulky structures also require the use of heavy launch vehicles to send the units to a desired location. This philosophy necessitates a high degree of safety, numerous space walks at a significant cost. Future space mission costs must be reduced and safety increased to reasonably achieve exploration goals. One proposed concept is the autonomous assembly of space structures. This concept is an affordable, reliable solution to in-space and extraterrestrial assembly. Assembly is autonomously performed when two components join after determining that specifications are correct. Local sensors continue monitor joint integrity post assembly, which is critical for safety and structural reliability. Achieving this concept requires a change in space structure design philosophy and the development of innovative technologies to perform autonomous assembly. Assembly of large space structures will require significant numbers of integrity sensors. Thus simple, low-cost sensors are integral to the success of this concept. This paper addresses these issues and proposes a novel concept for assembling space structures autonomously. Core technologies required to achieve in space assembly are presented. These core technologies are critical to the goal of utilizing space in a cost efficient and safe manner. Additionally, these novel technologies can be applied to other systems both on earth and extraterrestrial environments.

A knowledge-based system for monitoring the electrical power system of the Hubble Space Telescope

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Eddy, Pat

1987-01-01

The design and the prototype for the expert system for the Hubble Space Telescope's electrical power system are discussed. This prototype demonstrated the capability to use real time data from a 32k telemetry stream and to perform operational health and safety status monitoring, detect trends such as battery degradation, and detect anomalies such as solar array failures. This prototype, along with the pointing control system and data management system expert systems, forms the initial Telemetry Analysis for Lockheed Operated Spacecraft (TALOS) capability.

Progress in space nuclear reactor power systems technology development - The SP-100 program

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Davis, H. S.

1984-01-01

Activities related to the development of high-temperature compact nuclear reactors for space applications had reached a comparatively high level in the U.S. during the mid-1950s and 1960s, although only one U.S. nuclear reactor-powered spacecraft was actually launched. After 1973, very little effort was devoted to space nuclear reactor and propulsion systems. In February 1983, significant activities toward the development of the technology for space nuclear reactor power systems were resumed with the SP-100 Program. Specific SP-100 Program objectives are partly related to the determination of the potential performance limits for space nuclear power systems in 100-kWe and 1- to 100-MW electrical classes. Attention is given to potential missions and applications, regimes of possible space power applicability, safety considerations, conceptual system designs, the establishment of technical feasibility, nuclear technology, materials technology, and prospects for the future.

Space debris protection: A standard procedure in future?

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Yasaka, Tetsuo

2003-08-01

The near earth orbital environment is getting hazardous due to increasing space debris accumulated as a result of human space activities. Man tended facility is being designed so that the main structure may be protected from a collision with a limited size debris. Other space systems are generally found inadequate to possess protection shields because of functional requirement of space-viewing faces and cost burden in terms of added mass. In the future, where the debris hazard is expected to become severer, the situation is not expected to change and most space systems will be left unprotected. The present situation and future projection of the orbital debris environment will be first reviewed. The possible hazard to space systems will be described in terms of colliding debris size at various orbits. Some of the measures to secure safety of the system will be then proposed for future application.

Space Debris Protection: A Standard Procedure in Future?

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Yasaka, Tetsuo

2002-01-01

The near earth orbital environment is getting hazardous due to increasing space debris accumulated as a result of human space activities. Man tended facility is being designed so that the main structure may be protected from a collision with a limited size debris.Other space systems are generally found inadequate to possess protection shields because of functional requirement of space-viewing faces and cost burden in terms of added mass. In the future, where the debris hazard is expected to become severer, the situation is not expected to change and most space systems will be left un-protected. The present situation and future projection of the orbital debris environment will be first reviewed. The possible hazard to space systems will be described in terms of colliding debris size at various orbits. Some of the measures to secure safety of the system will be then proposed for future application.

Probabilistic risk assessment of the Space Shuttle. Phase 3: A study of the potential of losing the vehicle during nominal operation. Volume 5: Auxiliary shuttle risk analyses

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Fragola, Joseph R.; Maggio, Gaspare; Frank, Michael V.; Gerez, Luis; Mcfadden, Richard H.; Collins, Erin P.; Ballesio, Jorge; Appignani, Peter L.; Karns, James J.

1995-01-01

Volume 5 is Appendix C, Auxiliary Shuttle Risk Analyses, and contains the following reports: Probabilistic Risk Assessment of Space Shuttle Phase 1 - Space Shuttle Catastrophic Failure Frequency Final Report; Risk Analysis Applied to the Space Shuttle Main Engine - Demonstration Project for the Main Combustion Chamber Risk Assessment; An Investigation of the Risk Implications of Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster Chamber Pressure Excursions; Safety of the Thermal Protection System of the Space Shuttle Orbiter - Quantitative Analysis and Organizational Factors; Space Shuttle Main Propulsion Pressurization System Probabilistic Risk Assessment, Final Report; and Space Shuttle Probabilistic Risk Assessment Proof-of-Concept Study - Auxiliary Power Unit and Hydraulic Power Unit Analysis Report.

Artificial intelligent decision support for low-cost launch vehicle integrated mission operations

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Szatkowski, Gerard P.; Schultz, Roger

1988-11-01

The feasibility, benefits, and risks associated with Artificial Intelligence (AI) Expert Systems applied to low cost space expendable launch vehicle systems are reviewed. This study is in support of the joint USAF/NASA effort to define the next generation of a heavy-lift Advanced Launch System (ALS) which will provide economical and routine access to space. The significant technical goals of the ALS program include: a 10 fold reduction in cost per pound to orbit, launch processing in under 3 weeks, and higher reliability and safety standards than current expendables. Knowledge-based system techniques are being explored for the purpose of automating decision support processes in onboard and ground systems for pre-launch checkout and in-flight operations. Issues such as: satisfying real-time requirements, providing safety validation, hardware and Data Base Management System (DBMS) interfacing, system synergistic effects, human interfaces, and ease of maintainability, have an effect on the viability of expert systems as a useful tool.

Artificial intelligent decision support for low-cost launch vehicle integrated mission operations

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Szatkowski, Gerard P.; Schultz, Roger

1988-01-01

The feasibility, benefits, and risks associated with Artificial Intelligence (AI) Expert Systems applied to low cost space expendable launch vehicle systems are reviewed. This study is in support of the joint USAF/NASA effort to define the next generation of a heavy-lift Advanced Launch System (ALS) which will provide economical and routine access to space. The significant technical goals of the ALS program include: a 10 fold reduction in cost per pound to orbit, launch processing in under 3 weeks, and higher reliability and safety standards than current expendables. Knowledge-based system techniques are being explored for the purpose of automating decision support processes in onboard and ground systems for pre-launch checkout and in-flight operations. Issues such as: satisfying real-time requirements, providing safety validation, hardware and Data Base Management System (DBMS) interfacing, system synergistic effects, human interfaces, and ease of maintainability, have an effect on the viability of expert systems as a useful tool.

Space Shuttle 2 Advanced Space Transportation System. Volume 1: Executive Summary

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Adinaro, James N.; Benefield, Philip A.; Johnson, Shelby D.; Knight, Lisa K.

1989-01-01

An investigation into the feasibility of establishing a second generation space transportation system is summarized. Incorporating successful systems from the Space Shuttle and technological advances made since its conception, the second generation shuttle was designed to be a lower-cost, reliable system which would guarantee access to space well into the next century. A fully reusable, all-liquid propellant booster/orbiter combination using parallel burn was selected as the base configuration. Vehicle characteristics were determined from NASA ground rules and optimization evaluations. The launch profile was constructed from particulars of the vehicle design and known orbital requirements. A stability and control analysis was performed for the landing phase of the orbiter's flight. Finally, a preliminary safety analysis was performed to indicate possible failure modes and consequences.

NASA's Spaceliner Investment Area Technology Activities

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Hueter, Uwe; Lyles, Garry M. (Technical Monitor)

2001-01-01

NASA's has established long term goals for access-to-space. The third generation launch systems are to be fully reusable and operational around 2025. The goals for the third generation launch system are to significantly reduce cost and improve safety over current conditions. The Advanced Space Transportation Program Office (ASTP) at the NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, AL has the agency lead to develop space transportation technologies. Within ASTP, under the Spaceliner Investment Area, third generation technologies are being pursued in the areas of propulsion, airframes, integrated vehicle health management (IVHM), avionics, power, operations, and range. The ASTP program will mature these technologies through both ground and flight system testing. The Spaceliner Investment Area plans to mature vehicle technologies to reduce the implementation risks for future commercially developed reusable launch vehicles (RLV). The plan is to substantially increase the design and operating margins of the third generation RLV (the Space Shuttle is the first generation) by incorporating advanced technologies in propulsion, materials, structures, thermal protection systems, avionics, and power. Advancements in design tools and better characterization of the operational environment will allow improvements in design margins. Improvements in operational efficiencies will be provided through use of advanced integrated health management, operations, and range technologies. The increase in margins will allow components to operate well below their design points resulting in improved component operating life, reliability, and safety which in turn reduces both maintenance and refurbishment costs. These technologies have the potential of enabling horizontal takeoff by reducing the takeoff weight and achieving the goal of airline-like operation. These factors in conjunction with increased flight rates from an expanding market will result in significant improvements in safety and reductions in operational costs of future vehicles. The paper describes current status, future plans and technologies that are being matured by the Spaceliner Investment Area under the Advanced Space Transportation Program Office.

Novel Concepts for Radiation Shielding Materials

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Oliva-Buisson, Yvette J.

2014-01-01

It is critical that safety factors be maximized with respect to long duration, extraterrestrial space flight. Any significant improvement in radiation protection will be critical in ensuring the safety of crew and hardware on such missions. The project goal is to study novel concepts for radiation shielding materials that can be used for long-duration space missions. As part of this project we will investigate the use of thin films for the evaluation of a containment system that can retain liquid hydrogen and provide the necessary hydrogen density for effective shielding.

Study of solid rocket motor for space shuttle booster, volume 2, book 1

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

1972-01-01

The technical requirements for the solid propellant rocket engine to be used with the space shuttle orbiter are presented. The subjects discussed are: (1) propulsion system definition, (2) solid rocket engine stage design, (3) solid rocket engine stage recovery, (4) environmental effects, (5) manrating of the solid rocket engine stage, (6) system safety analysis, and (7) ground support equipment.

Technology Innovations from NASA's Next Generation Launch Technology Program

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Cook, Stephen A.; Morris, Charles E. K., Jr.; Tyson, Richard W.

2004-01-01

NASA's Next Generation Launch Technology Program has been on the cutting edge of technology, improving the safety, affordability, and reliability of future space-launch-transportation systems. The array of projects focused on propulsion, airframe, and other vehicle systems. Achievements range from building miniature fuel/oxygen sensors to hot-firings of major rocket-engine systems as well as extreme thermo-mechanical testing of large-scale structures. Results to date have significantly advanced technology readiness for future space-launch systems using either airbreathing or rocket propulsion.

SY Tank Farm ventilation isolation option risk assessment report

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Powers, T.B.; Morales, S.D.

The safety of the 241-SY Tank Farm ventilation system has been under extensive scrutiny due to safety concerns associated with tank 101-SY. Hydrogen and other gases are generated and trapped in the waste below the liquid surface. Periodically, these gases are released into the dome space and vented through the exhaust system. This attention to the ventilation system has resulted in the development of several alternative ventilation system designs. The ventilation system provides the primary means of mitigation of accidents associated with flammable gases. This report provides an assessment of various alternatives ventilation system designs.

KSC All Hands

NASA Image and Video Library

2018-01-11

Russ DeLoach, director of Safety and Mission Assurance, speaks to Kennedy Space Center employees about plans for the coming year. The event took place in the Lunar Theater at the Kennedy Space Center Visitor Complex’s Apollo Saturn V Center. The year will be highlighted with NASA's partners preparing test flights for crewed missions to the International Space Station as part of the agency's Commercial Crew Program and six launches by the Launch Services Program. Exploration Ground Systems will be completing facilities to support the Space Launch System rocket and Orion spacecraft. Exploration Research and Technology Programs will continue to provide supplies to the space station launched as part of the Commercial Resupply Services effort.

In-Space Structural Assembly: Applications and Technology

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Belvin, W. Keith; Doggett, Bill R.; Watson, Judith J.; Dorsey, John T.; Warren, Jay; Jones, Thomas C.; Komendera, Erik E.; Mann, Troy O.; Bowman, Lynn

2016-01-01

As NASA exploration moves beyond earth's orbit, the need exists for long duration space systems that are resilient to events that compromise safety and performance. Fortunately, technology advances in autonomy, robotic manipulators, and modular plug-and-play architectures over the past two decades have made in-space vehicle assembly and servicing possible at acceptable cost and risk. This study evaluates future space systems needed to support scientific observatories and human/robotic Mars exploration to assess key structural design considerations. The impact of in-space assembly is discussed to identify gaps in structural technology and opportunities for new vehicle designs to support NASA's future long duration missions.

The Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Panel's Galileo safety evaluation report

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Nelson, R.C.; Gray, L.B.; Huff, D.A.

The safety evaluation report (SER) for Galileo was prepared by the Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Panel (INSRP) coordinators in accordance with Presidential directive/National Security Council memorandum 25. The INSRP consists of three coordinators appointed by their respective agencies, the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy (DOE), and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). These individuals are independent of the program being evaluated and depend on independent experts drawn from the national technical community to serve on the five INSRP subpanels. The Galileo SER is based on input provided by the NASA Galileo Program Office, review and assessment ofmore » the final safety analysis report prepared by the Office of Special Applications of the DOE under a memorandum of understanding between NASA and the DOE, as well as other related data and analyses. The SER was prepared for use by the agencies and the Office of Science and Technology Policy, Executive Office of the Present for use in their launch decision-making process. Although more than 20 nuclear-powered space missions have been previously reviewed via the INSRP process, the Galileo review constituted the first review of a nuclear power source associated with launch aboard the Space Transportation System.« less

Practical Applications of Cosmic Ray Science: Spacecraft, Aircraft, Ground-Based Computation and Control Systems, Exploration, and Human Health and Safety

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Koontz, Steve

2015-01-01

In this presentation a review of galactic cosmic ray (GCR) effects on microelectronic systems and human health and safety is given. The methods used to evaluate and mitigate unwanted cosmic ray effects in ground-based, atmospheric flight, and space flight environments are also reviewed. However not all GCR effects are undesirable. We will also briefly review how observation and analysis of GCR interactions with planetary atmospheres and surfaces and reveal important compositional and geophysical data on earth and elsewhere. About 1000 GCR particles enter every square meter of Earth’s upper atmosphere every second, roughly the same number striking every square meter of the International Space Station (ISS) and every other low- Earth orbit spacecraft. GCR particles are high energy ionized atomic nuclei (90% protons, 9% alpha particles, 1% heavier nuclei) traveling very close to the speed of light. The GCR particle flux is even higher in interplanetary space because the geomagnetic field provides some limited magnetic shielding. Collisions of GCR particles with atomic nuclei in planetary atmospheres and/or regolith as well as spacecraft materials produce nuclear reactions and energetic/highly penetrating secondary particle showers. Three twentieth century technology developments have driven an ongoing evolution of basic cosmic ray science into a set of practical engineering tools needed to design, test, and verify the safety and reliability of modern complex technological systems and assess effects on human health and safety effects. The key technology developments are: 1) high altitude commercial and military aircraft; 2) manned and unmanned spacecraft; and 3) increasingly complex and sensitive solid state micro-electronics systems. Space and geophysical exploration needs drove the development of the instruments and analytical tools needed to recover compositional and structural data from GCR induced nuclear reactions and secondary particle showers. Finally, the possible role of GCR secondary particle showers in addressing an important homeland security problem, finding nuclear contraband and weapons, will be briefly reviewed.

Comments on dual-mode nuclear space power and propulsion system concepts

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Layton, J. Preston; Grey, Jerry

1991-01-01

Some form of Dual-Mode Nuclear Space Power & Propulsion System (D-MNSP&PS) will be essential to spacefaring throughout teh solar system and that such systems must evolve as mankind moves into outer space. The initial D-MNPSP&PS Reference System should be based on (1) present (1990), and (2) advanced (1995) technology for use on comparable mission in the 2000 and 2005 time period respectively. D-MNSP&PS can be broken down into a number of subsystems: Nuclear subsystems including the energy source and controls for the release of thermal power at elevated temperatures; power conversion subsystems; waste heat rejection subsystems; and control and safety subsystems. These systems are briefly detailed.

NASA's Next Generation Launch Technology Program - Strategy and Plans

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Hueter, Uwe

2003-01-01

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration established a new program office, Next Generation Launch Technology (NGLT) Program Office, last year to pursue technologies for future space launch systems. NGLT will fund research in key technology areas such as propulsion, launch vehicles, operations and system analyses. NGLT is part of NASA s Integrated Space Technology Plan. The NGLT Program is sponsored by NASA s Office of Aerospace Technology and is part of the Space Launch Initiative theme that includes both NGLT and Orbital Space Plane. NGLT will focus on technology development to increase safety and reliability and reduce overall costs associated with building, flying and maintaining the nation s next-generations of space launch vehicles. These investments will be guided by systems engineering and analysis with a focus on the needs of National customers.

Building Safer Systems With SpecTRM

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

2003-01-01

System safety, an integral component in software development, often poses a challenge to engineers designing computer-based systems. While the relaxed constraints on software design allow for increased power and flexibility, this flexibility introduces more possibilities for error. As a result, system engineers must identify the design constraints necessary to maintain safety and ensure that the system and software design enforces them. Safeware Engineering Corporation, of Seattle, Washington, provides the information, tools, and techniques to accomplish this task with its Specification Tools and Requirements Methodology (SpecTRM). NASA assisted in developing this engineering toolset by awarding the company several Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) contracts with Ames Research Center and Langley Research Center. The technology benefits NASA through its applications for Space Station rendezvous and docking. SpecTRM aids system and software engineers in developing specifications for large, complex safety critical systems. The product enables engineers to find errors early in development so that they can be fixed with the lowest cost and impact on the system design. SpecTRM traces both the requirements and design rationale (including safety constraints) throughout the system design and documentation, allowing engineers to build required system properties into the design from the beginning, rather than emphasizing assessment at the end of the development process when changes are limited and costly.System safety, an integral component in software development, often poses a challenge to engineers designing computer-based systems. While the relaxed constraints on software design allow for increased power and flexibility, this flexibility introduces more possibilities for error. As a result, system engineers must identify the design constraints necessary to maintain safety and ensure that the system and software design enforces them. Safeware Engineering Corporation, of Seattle, Washington, provides the information, tools, and techniques to accomplish this task with its Specification Tools and Requirements Methodology (SpecTRM). NASA assisted in developing this engineering toolset by awarding the company several Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) contracts with Ames Research Center and Langley Research Center. The technology benefits NASA through its applications for Space Station rendezvous and docking. SpecTRM aids system and software engineers in developing specifications for large, complex safety critical systems. The product enables engineers to find errors early in development so that they can be fixed with the lowest cost and impact on the system design. SpecTRM traces both the requirements and design rationale (including safety constraints) throughout the system design and documentation, allowing engineers to build required system properties into the design from the beginning, rather than emphasizing assessment at the end of the development process when changes are limited and costly.

Practical Applications of Cosmic Ray Science: Spacecraft, Aircraft, Ground Based Computation and Control Systems and Human Health and Safety

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Atwell, William; Koontz, Steve; Normand, Eugene

2012-01-01

In this paper we review the discovery of cosmic ray effects on the performance and reliability of microelectronic systems as well as on human health and safety, as well as the development of the engineering and health science tools used to evaluate and mitigate cosmic ray effects in earth surface, atmospheric flight, and space flight environments. Three twentieth century technological developments, 1) high altitude commercial and military aircraft; 2) manned and unmanned spacecraft; and 3) increasingly complex and sensitive solid state micro-electronics systems, have driven an ongoing evolution of basic cosmic ray science into a set of practical engineering tools (e.g. ground based test methods as well as high energy particle transport and reaction codes) needed to design, test, and verify the safety and reliability of modern complex electronic systems as well as effects on human health and safety. The effects of primary cosmic ray particles, and secondary particle showers produced by nuclear reactions with spacecraft materials, can determine the design and verification processes (as well as the total dollar cost) for manned and unmanned spacecraft avionics systems. Similar considerations apply to commercial and military aircraft operating at high latitudes and altitudes near the atmospheric Pfotzer maximum. Even ground based computational and controls systems can be negatively affected by secondary particle showers at the Earth's surface, especially if the net target area of the sensitive electronic system components is large. Accumulation of both primary cosmic ray and secondary cosmic ray induced particle shower radiation dose is an important health and safety consideration for commercial or military air crews operating at high altitude/latitude and is also one of the most important factors presently limiting manned space flight operations beyond low-Earth orbit (LEO).

Preliminary Results Obtained in Integrated Safety Analysis of NASA Aviation Safety Program Technologies

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

2001-01-01

This is a listing of recent unclassified RTO technical publications processed by the NASA Center for AeroSpace Information from January 1, 2001 through March 31, 2001 available on the NASA Aeronautics and Space Database. Contents include 1) Cognitive Task Analysis; 2) RTO Educational Notes; 3) The Capability of Virtual Reality to Meet Military Requirements; 4) Aging Engines, Avionics, Subsystems and Helicopters; 5) RTO Meeting Proceedings; 6) RTO Technical Reports; 7) Low Grazing Angle Clutter...; 8) Verification and Validation Data for Computational Unsteady Aerodynamics; 9) Space Observation Technology; 10) The Human Factor in System Reliability...; 11) Flight Control Design...; 12) Commercial Off-the-Shelf Products in Defense Applications.

Preparing a health care delivery system for Space Station

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Logan, J. S.; Stewart, G. R.

1985-01-01

NASA's Space Station is viewed as the beginning of man's permanent presence in space. This paper presents the guidelines being developed by NASA's medical community in preparing a quality, permanent health care delivery system for Space Station. The guidelines will be driven by unique Space Station requirements such as mission duration, crew size, orbit altitude and inclination, EVA frequency and rescue capability. The approach will emphasize developing a health care system that is modular and flexible. It will also incorporate NASA's requirements for growth capability, commonality, maintainability, and advanced technology development. Goals include preventing unnecessary rescue attempts, as well as maintaining the health and safety of the crew. Proper planning will determine the levels of prevention, diagnosis, and treatment necessary to achieve these goals.

Egalitarianism, Safety, and Virtue in Education: A Response to Callan

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Turcotte-Summers, Jonathan

2016-01-01

In this article, Turcotte-Summers responds to Eamonn Callan's essay "Education in Safe and Unsafe Spaces" (2016) with three main counterarguments. First, the correct response to the systemic oppressions faced by our students is not a more liberal but a more liberatory and radical education. Second, dignity safety is not a useful…

46 CFR 13.121 - Courses for tankerman endorsements.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-10-01

... during repair and maintenance work X X safety measures for hot and cold work X X electrical safety X X... X X X X Construction, materials, coating, & insulation of cargo tanks X X General arrangement of..., carbon dioxide (CO2), foam * * * X Pressure-water spray system in special-category spaces X Automatic...

The International Safety Framework for nuclear power source applications in outer space-Useful and substantial guidance

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Summerer, L.; Wilcox, R. E.; Bechtel, R.; Harbison, S.

2015-06-01

In 2009, the International Safety Framework for Nuclear Power Source Applications in Outer Space was adopted, following a multi-year process that involved all major space faring nations under the auspices of a partnership between the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and the International Atomic Energy Agency. The Safety Framework reflects an international consensus on best practices to achieve safety. Following the 1992 UN Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space, it is the second attempt by the international community to draft guidance promoting the safety of applications of nuclear power sources in space missions. NPS applications in space have unique safety considerations compared with terrestrial applications. Mission launch and outer space operational requirements impose size, mass and other space environment limitations not present for many terrestrial nuclear facilities. Potential accident conditions could expose nuclear power sources to extreme physical conditions. The Safety Framework is structured to provide guidance for both the programmatic and technical aspects of safety. In addition to sections containing specific guidance for governments and for management, it contains technical guidance pertinent to the design, development and all mission phases of space NPS applications. All sections of the Safety Framework contain elements directly relevant to engineers and space mission designers for missions involving space nuclear power sources. The challenge for organisations and engineers involved in the design and development processes of space nuclear power sources and applications is to implement the guidance provided in the Safety Framework by integrating it into the existing standard space mission infrastructure of design, development and operational requirements, practices and processes. This adds complexity to the standard space mission and launch approval processes. The Safety Framework is deliberately generic to remain relevantly independent of technological progress, of national organisational setups and of space mission types. Implementing its guidance therefore leaves room for interpretation and adaptation. Relying on reported practices, we analyse the guidance particularly relevant to engineers and space mission designers.

A survey of advanced battery systems for space applications

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Attia, Alan I.

1989-01-01

The results of a survey on advanced secondary battery systems for space applications are presented. Fifty-five battery experts from government, industry and universities participated in the survey by providing their opinions on the use of several battery types for six space missions, and their predictions of likely technological advances that would impact the development of these batteries. The results of the survey predict that only four battery types are likely to exceed a specific energy of 150 Wh/kg and meet the safety and reliability requirements for space applications within the next 15 years.

78 FR 1265 - Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel; Meeting

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-01-08

... NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION [Notice 13-001] Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel... Aeronautics and Space Administration announces a forthcoming meeting of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel..., Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel Executive Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration...

76 FR 62455 - Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel; Meeting

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-10-07

... NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION [Notice (11-088)] Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel... Aeronautics and Space Administration announces a forthcoming meeting of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel... Burch, Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel Administrative Officer, National Aeronautics and Space...

Space Based Communications

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Simpson, James; Denson, Erik; Valencia, Lisa; Birr, Richard

2003-01-01

Current space lift launches on the Eastern and Western Range require extensive ground-based real-time tracking, communications and command/control systems. These are expensive to maintain and operate and cover only limited geographical areas. Future spaceports will require new technologies to provide greater launch and landing opportunities, support simultaneous missions, and offer enhanced decision support models and simulation capabilities. These ranges must also have lower costs and reduced complexity while continuing to provide unsurpassed safety to the public, flight crew, personnel, vehicles and facilities. Commercial and government space-based assets for tracking and communications offer many attractive possibilities to help achieve these goals. This paper describes two NASA proof-of-concept projects that seek-to exploit the advantages of a space-based range: Iridium Flight Modem and Space-Based Telemetry and Range Safety (STARS). Iridium Flight Modem uses the commercial satellite system Iridium for extremely low cost, low rate two-way communications and has been successfully tested on four aircraft flights. A sister project at Goddard Space Flight Center's (GSFC) Wallops Flight Facility (WFF) using the Globalstar system has been tested on one rocket. The basic Iridium Flight Modem system consists of a L1 carrier Coarse/Acquisition (C/A)-Code Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver, an on-board computer, and a standard commercial satellite modem and antennas. STARS uses the much higher data rate NASA owned Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS), a C/A-Code GPS receiver, an experimental low-power transceiver, custom built command and data handler processor, and digitized flight termination system (FTS) commands. STARS is scheduled to fly on an F-15 at Dryden Flight Research Center in the spring of 2003, with follow-on tests over the next several years.

Shuttle Upgrade Using 5-Segment Booster (FSB)

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Sauvageau, Donald R.; Huppi, Hal D.; McCool, A. A. (Technical Monitor)

2000-01-01

In support of NASA's continuing effort to improve the over-all safety and reliability of the Shuttle system- a 5-segment booster (FSB) has been identified as an approach to satisfy that overall objective. To assess the feasibility of a 5-segment booster approach, NASA issued a feasibility study contract to evaluate the potential of a 5-segment booster to improve the overall capability of the Shuttle system, especially evaluating the potential to increase the system reliability and safety. In order to effectively evaluate the feasibility of the 5-segment concept, a four-member contractor team was established under the direction of NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC). MSFC provided the overall program oversight and integration as well as program contractual management. The contractor team consisted of Thiokol, Boeing North American Huntington Beach (BNA), Lockheed Martin Michoud Space Systems (LMMSS) and United Space Alliance (USA) and their subcontractor bd Systems (Control Dynamics Division, Huntsville, AL). United Space Alliance included the former members of United Space Booster Incorporated (USBI) who managed the booster element portion of the current Shuttle solid rocket boosters. Thiokol was responsible for the overall integration and coordination of the contractor team across all of the booster elements. They were also responsible for all of the motor modification evaluations. Boeing North American (BNA) was responsible for all systems integration analyses, generation of loads and environments. and performance and abort mode capabilities. Lockheed Martin Michoud Space Systems (LMMSS) was responsible for evaluating the impacts of any changes to the booster on the external tank (ET), and evaluating any design changes on the external tank necessary to accommodate the FSB. USA. including the former USBI contingent. was responsible for evaluating any modifications to facilities at the launch site as well as any booster component design modifications.

14 CFR 417.411 - Safety clear zones for hazardous operations.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safety clear zones for hazardous operations. 417.411 Section 417.411 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH SAFETY Ground Safety § 417.411 Safety clear zones...

14 CFR 27.1435 - Hydraulic systems.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... in addition to hydraulic loads. (b) Tests. Each system must be substantiated by proof pressure tests... 14 Aeronautics and Space 1 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Hydraulic systems. 27.1435 Section 27.1435... STANDARDS: NORMAL CATEGORY ROTORCRAFT Equipment Safety Equipment § 27.1435 Hydraulic systems. (a) Design...

14 CFR 27.1435 - Hydraulic systems.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... in addition to hydraulic loads. (b) Tests. Each system must be substantiated by proof pressure tests... 14 Aeronautics and Space 1 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Hydraulic systems. 27.1435 Section 27.1435... STANDARDS: NORMAL CATEGORY ROTORCRAFT Equipment Safety Equipment § 27.1435 Hydraulic systems. (a) Design...

14 CFR 27.1435 - Hydraulic systems.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... in addition to hydraulic loads. (b) Tests. Each system must be substantiated by proof pressure tests... 14 Aeronautics and Space 1 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Hydraulic systems. 27.1435 Section 27.1435... STANDARDS: NORMAL CATEGORY ROTORCRAFT Equipment Safety Equipment § 27.1435 Hydraulic systems. (a) Design...

14 CFR 27.1435 - Hydraulic systems.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... in addition to hydraulic loads. (b) Tests. Each system must be substantiated by proof pressure tests... 14 Aeronautics and Space 1 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Hydraulic systems. 27.1435 Section 27.1435... STANDARDS: NORMAL CATEGORY ROTORCRAFT Equipment Safety Equipment § 27.1435 Hydraulic systems. (a) Design...

14 CFR 27.1435 - Hydraulic systems.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... in addition to hydraulic loads. (b) Tests. Each system must be substantiated by proof pressure tests... 14 Aeronautics and Space 1 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Hydraulic systems. 27.1435 Section 27.1435... STANDARDS: NORMAL CATEGORY ROTORCRAFT Equipment Safety Equipment § 27.1435 Hydraulic systems. (a) Design...

Space Station crew safety alternatives study. Volume 5: Space Station safety plan

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Mead, G. H.; Peercy, R. L., Jr.; Raasch, R. F.

1985-01-01

The Space Station Safety Plan has been prepared as an adjunct to the subject contract final report, suggesting the tasks and implementation procedures to ensure that threats are addressed and resolution strategy options identified and incorporated into the space station program. The safety program's approach is to realize minimum risk exposure without levying undue design and operational constraints. Safety objectives and risk acceptances are discussed.

ASAP Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

2004-01-01

This is the First Quarterly Report for the newly reconstituted Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP). The NASA Administrator rechartered the Panel on November 18,2003, to provide an independent, vigilant, and long-term oversight of NASA's safety policies and programs well beyond Return to Flight of the Space Shuttle. The charter was revised to be consistent with the original intent of Congress in enacting the statute establishing ASAP in 1967 to focus on NASA's safety and quality systems, including industrial and systems safety, risk-management and trend analysis, and the management of these activities.The charter also was revised to provide more timely feedback to NASA by requiring quarterly rather than annual reports, and by requiring ASAP to perform special assessments with immediate feedback to NASA. ASAP was positioned to help institutionalize the safety culture of NASA in the post- Stafford-Covey Return to Flight environment.

Summary of the study of disposal of nuclear waste into space

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Rom, F. E.

1973-01-01

The space shuttle together with expendable and nonexpendable orbital stages such as the space tug or Centaur can safely dispose of waste material by ejecting it from the solar system. The safety problems associated with all phases of launching and operation (normal, emergency, and accident) of such a system are being examined. It appears that solutions can be found that should make the risks acceptable when compared to the benefits to be obtained from the disposal of the nuclear waste. The techniques proposed to make such a system acceptable need to be carefully verified by further study and experiment.

Space Station flight telerobotic servicer functional requirements development

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Oberright, John; Mccain, Harry; Whitman, Ruth I.

1987-01-01

The Space Station flight telerobotic servicer (FTS), a flight robotic system for use on the first Space Station launch, is described. The objectives of the FTS program include: (1) the provision of an alternative crew EVA by supporting the crew in assembly, maintenance, and servicing activities, and (2) the improvement of crew safety by performing hazardous tasks such as spacecraft refueling or thermal and power system maintenance. The NASA/NBS Standard Reference Model provides the generic, hierarchical, structured functional control definition for the system. It is capable of accommodating additional degrees of machine intelligence in the future.

The experience in operation and improving the Orlan-type space suits.

PubMed

Abramov, I P

1995-07-01

Nowadays significant experience has been gained in Russia concerning extravehicular activity (EVA) with cosmonauts wearing a semi-rigid space suit of the "Orlan" type. The conditions for the cosmonauts' vital activities, the operational and ergonomic features of the space suit and its reliability are the most critical factors defining the efficiency of the scheduled operation to be performed by the astronaut and his safety. As the missions performed by the cosmonauts during EVA become more and more elaborate, the requirements for EVA space suits and their systems become more and more demanding, resulting in their consistent advancement. This paper provides certain results of the space suit's operation and analysis of its major problems as applied to the Salyut and MIR orbiting stations. The modification steps of the space suit in the course of operation (Orlan-D, Orlan-DM, Orlan-DMA) and its specific features are presented. The concept of the suited cosmonauts' safety is described as well as trends for future space suit improvements.

Distributed Space Solar Power

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Fork, Richard L.

2001-01-01

The objective was to assess the feasibility of safely collecting solar power at geostationary orbit and delivering it to earth. A strategy which could harness a small fraction of the millions of gigawatts of sunlight passing near earth could adequately supply the power needs of earth and those of space exploration far into the future. Light collected and enhanced both spatially and temporally in space and beamed to earth provides probably the only practical means of safe and efficient delivery of this space solar power to earth. In particular, we analyzed the feasibility of delivering power to sites on earth at a comparable intensity, after conversion to a usable form, to existing power needs. Two major obstacles in the delivery of space solar power to earth are safety and the development of a source suitable for space. We focused our approach on: (1) identifying system requirements and designing a strategy satisfying current eye and skin safety requirements; and (2) identifying a concept for a potential space-based source for producing the enhanced light.

Integrated Systems Health Management for Sustainable Habitats (Using Sustainability Base as a Testbed)

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Martin, Rodney A.

2017-01-01

Habitation systems provide a safe place for astronauts to live and work in space and on planetary surfaces. They enable crews to live and work safely in deep space, and include integrated life support systems, radiation protection, fire safety, and systems to reduce logistics and the need for resupply missions. Innovative health management technologies are needed in order to increase the safety and mission-effectiveness for future space habitats on other planets, asteroids, or lunar surfaces. For example, off-nominal or failure conditions occurring in safety-critical life support systems may need to be addressed quickly by the habitat crew without extensive technical support from Earth due to communication delays. If the crew in the habitat must manage, plan and operate much of the mission themselves, operations support must be migrated from Earth to the habitat. Enabling monitoring, tracking, and management capabilities on-board the habitat and related EVA platforms for a small crew to use will require significant automation and decision support software.Traditional caution and warning systems are typically triggered by out-of-bounds sensor values, but can be enhanced by including machine learning and data mining techniques. These methods aim to reveal latent, unknown conditions while still retaining and improving the ability to provide highly accurate alerts for known issues. A few of these techniques will briefly described, along with performance targets for known faults and failures. Specific system health management capabilities required for habitat system elements (environmental control and life support systems, etc.) may include relevant subsystems such as water recycling systems, photovoltaic systems, electrical power systems, and environmental monitoring systems. Sustainability Base, the agency's flagship LEED-platinum certified green building acts as a living laboratory for testing advanced information and sustainable technologies that provides an opportunity to test novel machine learning and controls capabilities. In this talk, key features of Sustainability Base that make it relevant to deep space habitat technology and its use of these kinds of subsystems previously listed will be presented. The fact that all such systems require less power to support human occupancy can be used as a focal point to serve as a testbed for deep space habitats that will need to operate within finite energy budgets.

Orion Returns to KSC after Successful Mission

NASA Image and Video Library

2014-12-18

NASA's Orion crew module, enclosed in its crew module transportation fixture and secured on a flatbed truck passes by the Space Shuttle Atlantis building at the Kennedy Space Center Visitor Complex on its way to the entrance gate to Kennedy Space Center in Florida. Orion made the overland trip from Naval Base San Diego in California. Orion was recovered from the Pacific Ocean after completing a two-orbit, four-and-a-half hour mission Dec. 5 to test systems critical to crew safety, including the launch abort system, the heat shield and the parachute system. The Ground Systems Development and Operations Program led the recovery, offload and transportation efforts.

NASA's Hypersonic Investment Area

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Hueter, Uwe; Hutt, John; McClinton, Charles

2002-01-01

NASA has established long term goals for access to space. The third generation launch systems are to be fully reusable and operational around 2025. The goal for third-generation launch systems represents significant reduction in cost and improved safety over the current first generation system. The Advanced Space Transportation Office (ASTP) at NASA s Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) has the agency lead to develop space transportation technologies. Within ASTP, under the Hypersonic Investment Area (HIA), third generation technologies are being pursued in the areas of propulsion, airframe, integrated vehicle health management (IVHM), avionics, power, operations and system analysis. These technologies are being matured through research and both ground and flight-testing. This paper provides an overview of the HIA program plans and recent accomplishments.

Biomedical systems analysis program

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

1979-01-01

Biomedical monitoring programs which were developed to provide a system analysis context for a unified hypothesis for adaptation to space flight are presented and discussed. A real-time system of data analysis and decision making to assure the greatest possible crew safety and mission success is described. Information about man's abilities, limitations, and characteristic reactions to weightless space flight was analyzed and simulation models were developed. The predictive capabilities of simulation models for fluid-electrolyte regulation, erythropoiesis regulation, and calcium regulation are discussed.

NASA Exploration Team (NExT) In-Space Transportation Overview

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Drake, Bret G.; Cooke, Douglas R.; Kos, Larry D.; Brady, Hugh J. (Technical Monitor)

2002-01-01

This presentation provides an overview of NASA Exploration Team's (NEXT) vision of in-space transportation in the future. Hurdles facing in-space transportation include affordable power sources, crew health and safety, optimized robotic and human operations and space systems performance. Topics covered include: exploration of Earth's neighborhood, Earth's neighborhood architecture and elements, Mars mission trajectory options, delta-v variations, Mars mission duration options, Mars mission architecture, nuclear electric propulsion advantages and miscellaneous technology needs.

Autonomous Control of Space Reactor Systems

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Belle R. Upadhyaya; K. Zhao; S.R.P. Perillo

2007-11-30

Autonomous and semi-autonomous control is a key element of space reactor design in order to meet the mission requirements of safety, reliability, survivability, and life expectancy. Interrestrial nuclear power plants, human operators are avilable to perform intelligent control functions that are necessary for both normal and abnormal operational conditions.

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

1985-01-01

The following areas of NASA's responsibilities are examined: (1) the Space Transportation System (STS) operations and evolving program elements; (2) establishment of the Space Station program organization and issuance of requests for proposals to the aerospace industry; and (3) NASA's aircraft operations, including research and development flight programs for two advanced X-type aircraft.

75 FR 61219 - Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel; Meeting

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-10-04

... NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION [Notice (10-116)] Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel... Aeronautics and Space Administration announces a forthcoming meeting of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel... Dakon, Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel Executive Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration...

76 FR 19147 - Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel; Meeting.

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-04-06

... NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION [Notice (11-030)] Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel... Aeronautics and Space Administration announce a forthcoming meeting of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel.... Kathy Dakon, Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel Executive Director, National Aeronautics and Space...

78 FR 56941 - Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel; Meeting

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-09-16

... NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION [Notice: 13-114] Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel... Aeronautics and Space Administration announces a forthcoming meeting of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel.... Harmony Myers, Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel Executive Director, National Aeronautics and Space...

77 FR 58413 - Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel; Meeting

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2012-09-20

... NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION [Notice 12-074] Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel... Aeronautics and Space Administration announces a forthcoming meeting of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel.... Harmony Myers, Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel Executive Director, National Aeronautics and Space...

77 FR 38090 - Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel; Meeting.

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2012-06-26

... NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION [Notice 12-044] Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel... Aeronautics and Space Administration announces a forthcoming meeting of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel.... Harmony Myers, Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel Executive Director, National Aeronautics and Space...

Range Safety for an Autonomous Flight Safety System

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Lanzi, Raymond J.; Simpson, James C.

2010-01-01

The Range Safety Algorithm software encapsulates the various constructs and algorithms required to accomplish Time Space Position Information (TSPI) data management from multiple tracking sources, autonomous mission mode detection and management, and flight-termination mission rule evaluation. The software evaluates various user-configurable rule sets that govern the qualification of TSPI data sources, provides a prelaunch autonomous hold-launch function, performs the flight-monitoring-and-termination functions, and performs end-of-mission safing

So What's an RTG and Are They Safe?

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Barret, Chris; Hughes, R. W. (Technical Monitor)

2001-01-01

When one considers space missions to the outer edges of our solar system and far beyond, our sun cannot be relied on to produce the required spacecraft (s/c) power. Solar energy diminishes as the square of the distance from the Sun. At Mars it is only 43% of that at earth. At Jupiter, it falls off to only 3.6% of Earth's. By the time we get out to Pluto, solar energy is only .066% what it is on Earth. Beyond the orbit of Mars, it is not practical to depend on solar power for a s/c. However, the farther out we go the more power we need to heat the s/c and to transmit data back to Earth over the long distances. On Earth, knowledge is power. In the outer solar system, power is knowledge. Solar arrays only operate at 19% efficiency, are very vulnerable to damage from radiation and temperature extremes, and cannot be used for even nearby missions that operate in extended darkness, or under the surface of a planet or moon. Twenty-six U.S. space missions, from the Transit to Cassini, have used radioisotope power systems and heater units to take s/c to the far reaches of our solar system and have demonstrated an outstanding record of safety and reliability. Radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTG's) have proven to be safe, reliable, maintenance-free, and capable of providing both thermal and electrical power for decades under the harsh environments of deep space. RTG's have no problem operating in the high radiation belts of space, the extreme temperatures, or the severe dust storms of Mars, and they have proven to be the most reliable power source ever flown on U.S. s/c. For example, the two Pioneer s/c operated for more than two decades and the Voyager s/c may last for 40 years. RTG's are not nuclear reactors, they serve only as power generators and are not involved in the propulsion of the s/c. They operate on the principle of thermoelectric generation that converts heat directly into electricity, they have no moving parts, are extremely reliable, and have met or exceeded all safety and performance expectations. Federal laws and regulations require analysis and evaluation of the safety risks and any potential environmental impacts. Extensive safety testing of RTG's and RTG components has been performed by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to demonstrate the ability to survive accidents related to Space Shuttle launches and assure that the systems would be safe under all accident conditions, including accidents at or near the launch pad or during orbital reentry. Many design improvements have been made over the four decades that RTG's have been flown on space missions. This paper outlines the operation and safety standards of RTG's and the advanced developments expected to be used on future deep space missions such as the Europa Orbiter, Pluto/Kuiper Express, Solar Probe, Europa Lander, and Titan Explorer missions.

KSC-04PD-2687

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

2004-01-01

KENNEDY SPACE CENTER, FLA. A shipping container transporting part of the new Orbiter Boom Sensor System (OBSS) is delivered by truck to the Remote Manipulator System lab in the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB). Once the entire structure has arrived, the OBSS will be assembled and undergo final checkout and testing in the lab prior to being transferred to the Orbiter Processing Facility (OPF) for installation on Space Shuttle Discovery. The 50-foot-long OBSS will be attached to the Remote Manipulator System, or Shuttle arm, and is one of the new safety measures for Return to Flight, equipping the orbiter with cameras and laser systems to inspect the Shuttle's Thermal Protection System while in space. Discovery is slated to fly mission STS-114 once Space Shuttle launches resume. The launch planning window is May 12 to June 3, 2005.

Putting the Power of Configuration in the Hands of the Users

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Al-Shihabi, Mary-Jo; Brown, Mark; Rigolini, Marianne

2011-01-01

Goal was to reduce the overall cost of human space flight while maintaining the most demanding standards for safety and mission success. In support of this goal, a project team was chartered to replace 18 legacy Space Shuttle nonconformance processes and systems with one fully integrated system Problem Reporting and Corrective Action (PRACA) processes provide a closed-loop system for the identification, disposition, resolution, closure, and reporting of all Space Shuttle hardware/software problems PRACA processes are integrated throughout the Space Shuttle organizational processes and are critical to assuring a safe and successful program Primary Project Objectives Develop a fully integrated system that provides an automated workflow with electronic signatures Support multiple NASA programs and contracts with a single "system" architecture Define standard processes, implement best practices, and minimize process variations

Overview of NASA Glenn Seal Project

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Steinetz, Bruce M.; Dunlap, Patrick H., Jr.; Proctor, Margaret; Delgado, Irebert; Finkbeiner,Joshua; deGroh, Henry; Ritzert, Frank; Daniels, Christopher; DeMange, Jeff; Taylor, Shawn;

Commercial Crew Vehicle Ascent Abort Simulation and Analysis

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Gnam, Christopher

2017-01-01

SpaceX and Boeing have been selected to develop and operate crew vehicles to transport astronauts to and from the International Space Station. Their design work is to be analyzed to ensure that they are meeting all of the safety and operational requirements put forth by NASA. Throughout my time here, I worked familiarized myself with the SpaceX Dragon Abort system, as well as the NASA Human-Systems Integration Requirements (HSIR). This included understanding the different abort scenarios, and how each one could potentially impact the astronaut crew. In addition, I familiarized myself with the simulation developed my NASA to test and analyze the Guidance Navigation and Control (GN&C) systems developed by SpaceX and Boeing.

Application of Quality by Design (QbD) Principles to Extractables/Leachables Assessment. Establishing a Design Space for Terminally Sterilized Aqueous Drug Products Stored in a Plastic Packaging System.

PubMed

Jenke, Dennis

2010-01-01

The concept of quality by design (QbD) reflects the current global regulatory thinking related to pharmaceutical products. A cornerstone of the QbD paradigm is the concept of a design space, where the design space is a multidimensional combination of input variables and process parameters that have been demonstrated to provide the assurance of product quality. If a design space can be established for a pharmaceutical process or product, then operation within the design space confirms that the product or process output possesses the required quality attributes. This concept of design space can be applied to the safety (leachables) assessment of drug products manufactured and stored in packaging systems. Critical variables in such a design space would include those variables that affect the interaction of the drug product and its packaging, including (a) composition of the drug product, (b) composition of the packaging system, (c) configuration of the packaging system, and (d) the conditions of contact. This paper proposes and justifies such a leachables design space for aqueous drug products packaged in a specific plastic packaging system. Such a design space has the following boundaries:Aqueous drug products with a pH in the range of 2 to 8 and that contain no polarity-impacting agents such as organic solubilizers and stabilizers (addressing variable a). Packaging systems manufactured from materials that meet the system's existing material specifications (addressing variable b). Nominal fill volumes from 50 to 1000 mL (addressing variable c). Products subjected to terminal sterilization and then stored at room temperature for a period of up to 24 months (addressing variable d). The ramification of such a design space is that any drug product that falls within these boundaries is deemed to be compatible with the packaging system, from the perspective of safety, without the requirement of supporting drug product testing. When drug products are packaged in plastic container systems, substances may leach from the container and accumulate in the product. It is necessary that the drug product's vendor demonstrate that any such leaching does not occur to the extent that the leached substances adversely affect the product's safety and/or efficacy. One method for accomplishing this objective is via analysis of the drug product to identify and quantify the leached substances. When a particular packaging system is utilized for multiple drug products, one reaches the point, after testing numerous drug products, where the leaching properties of the packaging system are well known and readily predictable. In such a case, testing of additional products in the same packaging system produces no new information and thus becomes redundant and unnecessary. The quality by design (QbD) principle can be simply stated as follows: once a system has been tested to the extent that the test results are predictable, further testing can be replaced by establishing that the system was operating within a defined design space. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the application of QbD principles to a packaging system that has been utilized with over 12 parenteral drug products. The paper concludes that the leachables profile of all drug products that fit a certain description (the design space) is known and predicable.

Overall Control on Solid Rocket Motor Hazard Zone: Example of VEGA an Innovative Solution at System Level

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Vertueux, M.

2013-09-01

The arrival of additional Space launch vehicles Soyouz and Vega in Guiana Space Center facilities faced a new ground range safety major question: The technical hazards assessment and management related to the preparation of these three launchers simultaneously with the same high level of safety. The objective of this publication is to highlight the new safety solutions that are applied in CSG to reduce the risk of self-propulsion of the stages of VEGA launcher. During all the preparation campaign of VEGA launch vehicle, the explosive risk due to the use of solid propellant is permanent. Uncontrolled propulsion of a solid rocket motor is capable of destruction of other important installations with catastrophic effects. This event could cause loss of human lives and great damages to the CSG launch site structures. Early in the space program development phases of VEGA, the risk of self- propulsion of solid rocket motors and the solutions to avoid the "domino effects" on neighboring facilities have been issued as one of the major concern in term of safety.

Arianespace Launch Service Operator Policy for Space Safety (Regulations and Standards for Safety)

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Jourdainne, Laurent

2013-09-01

Since December 10, 2010, the French Space Act has entered into force. This French Law, referenced as LOS N°2008-518 ("Loi relative aux Opérations Spatiales"), is compliant with international rules. This French Space Act (LOS) is now applicable for any French private company whose business is dealing with rocket launch or in orbit satellites operations. Under CNES leadership, Arianespace contributed to the consolidation of technical regulation applicable to launch service operators.Now for each launch operation, the operator Arianespace has to apply for an authorization to proceed to the French ministry in charge of space activities. In the files issued for this purpose, the operator is able to justify a high level of warranties in the management of risks through robust processes in relation with the qualification maintenance, the configuration management, the treatment of technical facts and relevant conclusions and risks reduction implementation when needed.Thanks to the historic success of Ariane launch systems through its more than 30 years of exploitation experience (54 successes in a row for latest Ariane 5 launches), Arianespace as well as European public and industrial partners developed key experiences and knowledge as well as competences in space security and safety. Soyuz-ST and Vega launch systems are now in operation from Guiana Space Center with identical and proved risks management processes. Already existing processes have been slightly adapted to cope with the new roles and responsibilities of each actor contributing to the launch preparation and additional requirements like potential collision avoidance with inhabited space objects.Up to now, more than 12 Ariane 5 launches and 4 Soyuz-ST launches have been authorized under the French Space Act regulations. Ariane 5 and Soyuz- ST generic demonstration of conformity have been issued, including exhaustive danger and impact studies for each launch system.This article will detail how Arianespace succeeded to contribute to the maturation of the LOS. How Arianespace managed to demonstrate t he full compliance to the technical regulation for the two launch systems under exploitation (Ariane 5 andSoyuz-ST). Up to now, Vega launch system organization is still in an intermediate transition phase between development and exploitation prior to its second flight. Vega launch system will benefit of Arianespace experience capitalized through Ariane and Soyuz."Safet y is not an option". For our company regarding the mid and long term interest of space business of the launch operations and associated customers, it is a must!

Beyond the Baseline: Proceedings of the Space Station Evolution Symposium. Volume 1, Part 2; Space Station Freedom

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

1990-01-01

This report contains the individual presentations delivered at the Space Station Evolution Symposium in League City, Texas on February 6, 7, 8, 1990. Personnel responsible for Advanced Systems Studies and Advanced Development within the Space Station Freedom Program reported on the results of their work to date. Systems Studies presentations focused on identifying the baseline design provisions (hooks and scars) necessary to enable evolution of the facility to support changing space policy and anticipated user needs. Also emphasized were evolution configuration and operations concepts including on-orbit processing of space transfer vehicles. Advanced Development task managers discussed transitioning advanced technologies to the baseline program, including those near-term technologies which will enhance the safety and productivity of the crew and the reliability of station systems. Special emphasis was placed on applying advanced automation technology to ground and flight systems.

Lightning threat extent of a small thunderstorm

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Nicholson, James R.; Maier, Launa M.; Weems, John

1988-01-01

The concern for safety of the personnel at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) has caused NASA to promulgate strict safety procedures requiring either termination or substantial curtailment when ground lightning threat is believed to exist within 9.3 km of a covered operation. In cases where the threat is overestimated, in either space or time, an opportunity cost is accrued. This paper describes a small thunderstorm initiated over the KSC by terrain effects, that serves to exemplify the impact such an event may have on ground operations at the Center. Data from the Air Force Lightning Location and Protection System, the AF/NASA Launch Pad Lightning Warning System field mill network, radar, and satellite imagery are used to describe the thunderstorm and to discuss its impact.

Metrication report to the Congress

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

1989-01-01

The major NASA metrication activity of 1988 concerned the Space Station. Although the metric system was the baseline measurement system for preliminary design studies, solicitations for final design and development of the Space Station Freedom requested use of the inch-pound system because of concerns with cost impact and potential safety hazards. Under that policy, however use of the metric system would be permitted through waivers where its use was appropriate. Late in 1987, several Department of Defense decisions were made to increase commitment to the metric system, thereby broadening the potential base of metric involvement in the U.S. industry. A re-evaluation of Space Station Freedom units of measure policy was, therefore, initiated in January 1988.

Orbital transfer vehicle concept definition and system analysis study. Volume 1A: Executive summary. Phase 2

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Ketchum, W. J.

1986-01-01

The objectives of the Phase 2 study were to improve the orbit transfer vehicle (OTV) concept definition by focusing on the following issues: the impact of mission requirements on OTV system design; OTV basing concepts on the Space Shuttle, separate platforms, and/or remote locations; cost reduction of an OTV program to improve its economic benefits and support its acquisition. The OTV mission scenario includes a wide range of missions the main drivers of which are manned GEO servicing, mid-inclination/polar DOD, and lunar/planetary projects. A mission model is presented which includes the type and number of missions per year and the estimated propellant requirements. To accomplish the missions, many OTV concepts were defined including ground-based OTVs launched either in the STS orbiter, the aft cargo carrier, or a heavy lift launch vehicle, and a space-based OTV. System and program trade studies were conducted using performance, cost, safety/risk, and operations/growth criteria. The study shows that mission requirements and substantial economic benefits justify a reusable, cryogenic (H2/O2) space-based OTV. Such a system would not be subjected to Earth-to-orbit launch loads and would not be constained in size or weight. Safety is enhanced by the fact that the system components are launched unfueled. Its inherent reusability and ability to be refueled in space make the space-based OTV very economical to operate.

Purpose, Principles, and Challenges of the NASA Engineering and Safety Center

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Gilbert, Michael G.

2016-01-01

NASA formed the NASA Engineering and Safety Center in 2003 following the Space Shuttle Columbia accident. It is an Agency level, program-independent engineering resource supporting NASA's missions, programs, and projects. It functions to identify, resolve, and communicate engineering issues, risks, and, particularly, alternative technical opinions, to NASA senior management. The goal is to help ensure fully informed, risk-based programmatic and operational decision-making processes. To date, the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) has conducted or is actively working over 600 technical studies and projects, spread across all NASA Mission Directorates, and for various other U.S. Government and non-governmental agencies and organizations. Since inception, NESC human spaceflight related activities, in particular, have transitioned from Shuttle Return-to-Flight and completion of the International Space Station (ISS) to ISS operations and Orion Multi-purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV), Space Launch System (SLS), and Commercial Crew Program (CCP) vehicle design, integration, test, and certification. This transition has changed the character of NESC studies. For these development programs, the NESC must operate in a broader, system-level design and certification context as compared to the reactive, time-critical, hardware specific nature of flight operations support.

76 FR 52016 - NASA International Space Station Advisory Committee and the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel; Meeting

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-08-19

... NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION [Notice (11-074)] NASA International Space Station Advisory Committee and the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel; Meeting AGENCY: National Aeronautics and Space... meeting of the NASA International Space Station Advisory Committee and the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel...

Evaluation of Geometric Design Needs of Freeway Systems Based on Traffic and Geometric Data

DOT National Transportation Integrated Search

2013-10-20

In Las Vegas, Nevada, the increased traffic competes for the limited spaces available in the freeway system and thus reduces safety performance. This study identified geometric design issues on freeway systems in Las Vegas, Nevada, based on available...

Use of Shuttle Heritage Hardware in Space Launch System (SLS) Application-Structural Assessment

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Aggarwal, Pravin; Booker, James N.

2018-01-01

NASA is moving forward with the development of the next generation system of human spaceflight to meet the Nation's goals of human space exploration. To meet these goals, NASA is aggressively pursuing the development of an integrated architecture and capabilities for safe crewed and cargo missions beyond low-Earth orbit. Two important tenets critical to the achievement of NASA's strategic objectives are Affordability and Safety. The Space Launch System (SLS) is a heavy-lift launch vehicle being designed/developed to meet these goals. The SLS Block 1 configuration (Figure 1) will be used for the first Exploration Mission (EM-1). It utilizes existing hardware from the Space Shuttle inventory, as much as possible, to save cost and expedite the schedule. SLS Block 1 Elements include the Core Stage, "Heritage" Boosters, Heritage Engines, and the Integrated Spacecraft and Payload Element (ISPE) consisting of the Launch Vehicle Stage Adapter (LVSA), the Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) Stage Adapter (MSA), and an Interim Cryogenic Propulsion Stage (ICPS) for Earth orbit escape and beyond-Earth orbit in-space propulsive maneuvers. When heritage hardware is used in a new application, it requires a systematic evaluation of its qualification. In addition, there are previously-documented Lessons Learned (Table -1) in this area cautioning the need of a rigorous evaluation in any new application. This paper will exemplify the systematic qualification/assessment efforts made to qualify the application of Heritage Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) hardware in SLS. This paper describes the testing and structural assessment performed to ensure the application is acceptable for intended use without having any adverse impact to Safety. It will further address elements such as Loads, Material Properties and Manufacturing, Testing, Analysis, Failure Criterion and Factor of Safety (FS) considerations made to reach the conclusion and recommendation.

[NASA] in the 21st Century

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Horn, Thomas J.

2006-01-01

This viewgraph presentation reviews the NASA programs in support of Aeronautical and Space research. This research involves imagining the future of air travel. There are three major Aeronautics technology programs: (1) Fundamental Aeronautics, (2) Aviation Safety and (3) Airspace Systems. The aim of exploring the depths of the universe through earth based and space based assets. Other Space programs include the plans for exploration of the moon and Mars.

Engineering and Safety Partnership Enhances Safety of the Space Shuttle Program (SSP)

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Duarte, Alberto

2007-01-01

Project Management must use the risk assessment documents (RADs) as tools to support their decision making process. Therefore, these documents have to be initiated, developed, and evolved parallel to the life of the project. Technical preparation and safety compliance of these documents require a great deal of resources. Updating these documents after-the-fact not only requires substantial increase in resources - Project Cost -, but this task is also not useful and perhaps an unnecessary expense. Hazard Reports (HRs), Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEAs), Critical Item Lists (CILs), Risk Management process are, among others, within this category. A positive action resulting from a strong partnership between interested parties is one way to get these documents and related processes and requirements, released and updated in useful time. The Space Shuttle Program (SSP) at the Marshall Space Flight Center has implemented a process which is having positive results and gaining acceptance within the Agency. A hybrid Panel, with equal interest and responsibilities for the two larger organizations, Safety and Engineering, is the focal point of this process. Called the Marshall Safety and Engineering Review Panel (MSERP), its charter (Space Shuttle Program Directive 110 F, April 15, 2005), and its Operating Control Plan emphasizes the technical and safety responsibilities over the program risk documents: HRs; FMEA/CILs; Engineering Changes; anomalies/problem resolutions and corrective action implementations, and trend analysis. The MSERP has undertaken its responsibilities with objectivity, assertiveness, dedication, has operated with focus, and has shown significant results and promising perspectives. The MSERP has been deeply involved in propulsion systems and integration, real time technical issues and other relevant reviews, since its conception. These activities have transformed the propulsion MSERP in a truly participative and value added panel, making a difference for the safety of the Space Shuttle Vehicle, its crew, and personnel. Because of the MSERP's valuable contribution to the assessment of safety risk for the SSP, this paper also proposes an enhanced Panel concept that takes this successful partnership concept to a higher level of 'true partnership'. The proposed panel is aimed to be responsible for the review and assessment of all risk relative to Safety for new and future aerospace and related programs.

New research opportunities for roadside safety barriers improvement

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Cantisani, Giuseppe; Di Mascio, Paola; Polidori, Carlo

2017-09-01

Among the major topics regarding the protection of roads, restraint systems still represent a big opportunity in order to increase safety performances. When accidents happen, in fact, the infrastructure can substantially contribute to the reduction of consequences if its marginal spaces are well designed and/or effective restraint systems are installed there. Nevertheless, basic concepts and technology of road safety barriers have not significantly changed for the last two decades. The paper proposes a new approach to the study aimed to define possible enhancements of restraint safety systems performances, by using new materials and defining innovative design principles. In particular, roadside systems can be developed with regard to vehicle-barrier interaction, vehicle-oriented design (included low-mass and extremely low-mass vehicles), traffic suitability, user protection, working width reduction. In addition, thanks to sensors embedded into the barriers, it is also expected to deal with new challenges related to the guidance of automatic vehicles and I2V communication.

Deviance in Space Habitats: A Preliminary Look at Health and Safety Violations

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Pass, J.

It is easy to take a well-functioning complex system for granted, even when we do not quite understand how it will work in great detail before starting it up for the first time, or exactly how it works thereafter (given its complexity). At the system level, the normal operation of the space habitat can result in accidents. On the personal level, complacency, and the false sense of security that comes with it, become the enemy quite quickly and usually without much - or any - notice. Workers do not intend to overlook important signs of behavioral aberrations or equipment malfunctions, but they may lose their sharpness and objectivity over time. In isolated settings, a variety of causes can result in devastating accidents, which may result in illnesses, injuries, and deaths. In the worst circumstances, within the confines of a space habitat or spacecraft, an entire population could be lost. Oil refineries provide a good, though obviously imperfect, analogy for the space habitat. Refineries are complex systems that transport and process oils and fuels at varying steps during the refining process within a complex system. Space habitats represent even more extreme closed systems. There is often no escape, as the habitat provides the atmosphere and other elements necessary for survival. Inhabitants of space habitats must avoid the types of accidents that have occurred in refineries on Earth if they expect to survive as individuals and as a social system. Submarines present a better analogy of a closed system. A challenge that never disappears relates to the possibility that the system may operate on a "normally" on one day and then malfunction on another day for no apparent reason. Another challenge among members of a space society is to avoid complacency, because an imminent failure may occur at any time. Yet another challenge is to avoid engaging in health and safety violations in order to serve expediency due to pressures exerted by superiors and for other reasons. Maintenance workers and others must also avoid succumbing to peer pressure based on a variety of rationales. We can learn much from the existing social scientific health and safety literature. Theoretical application of these lessons to space habitats presents a difficult task for the astrosociologist before we build these extraterrestrial physical and social structures. These findings need to become part of the planning process in the future, but we must understand them now rather than after we place human beings at risk in hostile space ecologies. This article takes an initial, and thus cursory, look at these issues related to one form of deviance, hoping to serve as an impetus to provoke future research into this largely unexplored area.

Non-Nuclear Testing of Space Nuclear Systems at NASA MSFC

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Houts, Michael G.; Pearson, Boise J.; Aschenbrenner, Kenneth C.; Bradley, David E.; Dickens, Ricky; Emrich, William J.; Garber, Anne; Godfroy, Thomas J.; Harper, Roger T.; Martin, Jim J.;

NPOESS C3S Expandability: SafetyNetTM and McMurdo Improvements

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Jamilkowski, M. L.; Paciaroni, J.; Pela, F.

2010-12-01

The National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Department of Defense (DoD), and National Aeronautics & Space Administration (NASA) are jointly acquiring the next-generation weather & environmental satellite system; the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS). NPOESS replaces the current NOAA Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites (POES) and Dod's Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP). The NPOESS satellites carry a suite of sensors that collect meteorological, oceanographic, climatological, and solar-geophysical observations of the earth, atmosphere, and space. The command & telemetry portion of NPOESS is the Command, Control and Communications Segment (C3S), developed by Raytheon Intelligence & Information Systems. C3S is responsible for managing the overall NPOESS mission from control and status of the space and ground assets to ensuring delivery of timely, high quality data from the Space Segment (SS) to the Interface Data Processing Segment (IDPS) for processing. In addition, the C3S provides the globally distributed ground assets necessary to collect and transport mission, telemetry, and command data between the satellites and the processing locations. The C3S provides all functions required for day-to-day commanding & state-of-health monitoring of the NPP & NPOESS satellites, and delivery of Stored Mission Data (SMD) to each US Weather Central Interface Data Processor (IDP) for data products development and transfer to System subscribers. The C3S also monitors and reports system-wide health and status & data communications with external systems and between NPOESS segments. Two crucial elements of NPOESS C3S expandability are SafetyNetTM and communications improvements to McMurdo Station, Antarctica. SafetyNetTM is a key feature of NPOESS and a vital element of the C3S and Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems patented data collection architecture. The centerpiece of SafetyNetTM is the system of fifteen globally-distributed ground receptors developed by Raytheon Company. These antennae will collect up to five times as much environmental data approximately four times faster than current polar-orbiting weather satellites. Once collected, these data will be forwarded near-instantaneously to US weather centrals via the global fiber optic network for processing in environmental prediction models. In January 2008, Raytheon Company achieved a significant milestone for the NPOESS program by successfully completing the first phase of a major communications upgrade for Antarctica. The upgrade of the off-continent satellite communications link at McMurdo Station more than tripled the bandwidth available for scientific research, weather prediction, and health & safety of those stationed at McMurdo. The project is part of the company’s C3S under development for NPOESS. This upgrade paves the way for a second major communications upgrade planned for 2012 in preparation for the use of McMurdo Station as one of the 15 NPOESS ground stations worldwide that will be receiving environmental data collected by the NPOESS satellites. SafetyNet is a trademark of Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems.

Aviation Safety Reporting System: Process and Procedures

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Connell, Linda J.

1997-01-01

The Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) was established in 1976 under an agreement between the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). This cooperative safety program invites pilots, air traffic controllers, flight attendants, maintenance personnel, and others to voluntarily report to NASA any aviation incident or safety hazard. The FAA provides most of the program funding. NASA administers the program, sets its policies in consultation with the FAA and aviation community, and receives the reports submitted to the program. The FAA offers those who use the ASRS program two important reporting guarantees: confidentiality and limited immunity. Reports sent to ASRS are held in strict confidence. More than 350,000 reports have been submitted since the program's beginning without a single reporter's identity being revealed. ASRS removes all personal names and other potentially identifying information before entering reports into its database. This system is a very successful, proof-of-concept for gathering safety data in order to provide timely information about safety issues. The ASRS information is crucial to aviation safety efforts both nationally and internationally. It can be utilized as the first step in safety by providing the direction and content to informed policies, procedures, and research, especially human factors. The ASRS process and procedures will be presented as one model of safety reporting feedback systems.

Tactile display landing safety and precision improvements for the Space Shuttle

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Olson, John M.

A tactile display belt using 24 electro-mechanical tactile transducers (tactors) was used to determine if a modified tactile display system, known as the Tactile Situation Awareness System (TSAS) improved the safety and precision of a complex spacecraft (i.e. the Space Shuttle Orbiter) in guided precision approaches and landings. The goal was to determine if tactile cues enhance safety and mission performance through reduced workload, increased situational awareness (SA), and an improved operational capability by increasing secondary cognitive workload capacity and human-machine interface efficiency and effectiveness. Using both qualitative and quantitative measures such as NASA's Justiz Numerical Measure and Synwork1 scores, an Overall Workload (OW) measure, the Cooper-Harper rating scale, and the China Lake Situational Awareness scale, plus Pre- and Post-Flight Surveys, the data show that tactile displays decrease OW, improve SA, counteract fatigue, and provide superior warning and monitoring capacity for dynamic, off-nominal, high concurrent workload scenarios involving complex, cognitive, and multi-sensory critical scenarios. Use of TSAS for maintaining guided precision approaches and landings was generally intuitive, reduced training times, and improved task learning effects. Ultimately, the use of a homogeneous, experienced, and statistically robust population of test pilots demonstrated that the use of tactile displays for Space Shuttle approaches and landings with degraded vehicle systems, weather, and environmental conditions produced substantial improvements in safety, consistency, reliability, and ease of operations under demanding conditions. Recommendations for further analysis and study are provided in order to leverage the results from this research and further explore the potential to reduce the risk of spaceflight and aerospace operations in general.

Overview of NASA Glenn Seal Project

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Steinetz, Bruce M.; Dunlap, Patrick; Proctor, Margaret; Delgado, Irebert; Finkbeiner, Josh; DeMange, Jeff; Daniels, Christopher C.; Taylor, Shawn; Oswald, Jay

2006-01-01

NASA Glenn is currently performing seal research supporting both advanced turbine engine development and advanced space vehicle/propulsion system development. Studies have shown that decreasing parasitic leakage through applying advanced seals will increase turbine engine performance and decrease operating costs. Studies have also shown that higher temperature, long life seals are critical in meeting next generation space vehicle and propulsion system goals in the areas of performance, reusability, safety, and cost. NASA Glenn is developing seal technology and providing technical consultation for the Agency s key aero- and space technology development programs.

14 CFR 23.1416 - Pneumatic de-icer boot system.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... Safety Equipment § 23.1416 Pneumatic de-icer boot system. If certification with ice protection provisions is desired and a pneumatic de-icer boot system is installed— (a) The system must meet the... 14 Aeronautics and Space 1 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Pneumatic de-icer boot system. 23.1416...

14 CFR 23.1416 - Pneumatic de-icer boot system.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... Safety Equipment § 23.1416 Pneumatic de-icer boot system. If certification with ice protection provisions is desired and a pneumatic de-icer boot system is installed— (a) The system must meet the... 14 Aeronautics and Space 1 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Pneumatic de-icer boot system. 23.1416...

14 CFR 23.1416 - Pneumatic de-icer boot system.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... Safety Equipment § 23.1416 Pneumatic de-icer boot system. If certification with ice protection provisions is desired and a pneumatic de-icer boot system is installed— (a) The system must meet the... 14 Aeronautics and Space 1 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Pneumatic de-icer boot system. 23.1416...

14 CFR 23.1416 - Pneumatic de-icer boot system.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 1 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Pneumatic de-icer boot system. 23.1416... Safety Equipment § 23.1416 Pneumatic de-icer boot system. If certification with ice protection provisions is desired and a pneumatic de-icer boot system is installed— (a) The system must meet the...

14 CFR 23.1416 - Pneumatic de-icer boot system.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 1 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Pneumatic de-icer boot system. 23.1416... Safety Equipment § 23.1416 Pneumatic de-icer boot system. If certification with ice protection provisions is desired and a pneumatic de-icer boot system is installed— (a) The system must meet the...

Drugs in space: Pharmacokinetics and pharmacodynamics in astronauts.

PubMed

Kast, Johannes; Yu, Yichao; Seubert, Christoph N; Wotring, Virginia E; Derendorf, Hartmut

2017-11-15

Space agencies are working intensely to push the current boundaries of human spaceflight by sending astronauts deeper into space than ever before, including missions to Mars and asteroids. Spaceflight alters human physiology due to fluid shifts, muscle and bone loss, immune system dysregulation, and changes in the gastrointestinal tract and metabolic enzymes. These alterations may change the pharmacokinetics and/or pharmacodynamics of medications used by astronauts and subsequently might impact drug efficacy and safety. Most commonly, medications are administered during space missions to treat sleep disturbances, allergies, space motion sickness, pain, and sinus congestion. These medications are administered under the assumption that they act in a similar way as on Earth, an assumption that has not been investigated systematically yet. Few inflight pharmacokinetic data have been published, and pharmacodynamic and pharmacokinetic/pharmacodynamic studies during spaceflight are also lacking. Therefore, bed-rest models are often used to simulate physiological changes observed during microgravity. In addition to pharmacokinetic/pharmacodynamic changes, decreased drug and formulation stability in space could also influence efficacy and safety of medications. These alterations along with physiological changes and their resulting pharmacokinetic and pharmacodynamic effects must to be considered to determine their ultimate impact on medication efficacy and safety during spaceflight. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Radioisotope Power System Delivery, Ground Support and Nuclear Safety Implementation: Use of the Multi-Mission Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator for the NASA's Mars Science Laboratory

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

S.G. Johnson; K.L. Lively; C.C. Dwight

Radioisotope power systems have been used for over 50 years to enable missions in remote or hostile environments. They are a convenient means of supplying a few milliwatts up to a few hundred watts of useable, long-term electrical power. With regard to use of a radioisotope power system, the transportation, ground support and implementation of nuclear safety protocols in the field is a complex process that requires clear identification of needed technical and regulatory requirements. The appropriate care must be taken to provide high quality treatment of the item to be moved so it arrives in a condition to fulfillmore » its missions in space. Similarly it must be transported and managed in a manner compliant with requirements for shipment and handling of special nuclear material. This presentation describes transportation, ground support operations and implementation of nuclear safety and security protocols for a radioisotope power system using recent experience involving the Multi-Mission Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator for National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s Mars Science Laboratory, which launched in November of 2011.« less

Request for Naval Reactors Comment on Proposed Prometheus Space Flight Nuclear Reactor High Tier Reactor Safety Requirements and for Naval Reactors Approval to Transmit These Requirements to JPL

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

D. Kokkinos

2005-04-28

The purpose of this letter is to request Naval Reactors comments on the nuclear reactor high tier requirements for the PROMETHEUS space flight reactor design, pre-launch operations, launch, ascent, operation, and disposal, and to request Naval Reactors approval to transmit these requirements to Jet Propulsion Laboratory to ensure consistency between the reactor safety requirements and the spacecraft safety requirements. The proposed PROMETHEUS nuclear reactor high tier safety requirements are consistent with the long standing safety culture of the Naval Reactors Program and its commitment to protecting the health and safety of the public and the environment. In addition, the philosophymore » on which these requirements are based is consistent with the Nuclear Safety Policy Working Group recommendations on space nuclear propulsion safety (Reference 1), DOE Nuclear Safety Criteria and Specifications for Space Nuclear Reactors (Reference 2), the Nuclear Space Power Safety and Facility Guidelines Study of the Applied Physics Laboratory.« less

14 CFR 437.81 - Public safety responsibility.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Public safety responsibility. 437.81 Section 437.81 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION... an experimental permit is safe, and must protect public health and safety and the safety of property. ...

14 CFR 437.81 - Public safety responsibility.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Public safety responsibility. 437.81 Section 437.81 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION... an experimental permit is safe, and must protect public health and safety and the safety of property. ...

Cost effective management of space venture risks

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Giuntini, Ronald E.; Storm, Richard E.

1986-01-01

The development of a model for the cost-effective management of space venture risks is discussed. The risk assessment and control program of insurance companies is examined. A simplified system development cycle which consists of a conceptual design phase, a preliminary design phase, a final design phase, a construction phase, and a system operations and maintenance phase is described. The model incorporates insurance safety risk methods and reliability engineering, and testing practices used in the development of large aerospace and defense systems.

Adaptations of advanced safety and reliability techniques to petroleum and other industries

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Purser, P. E.

1974-01-01

The underlying philosophy of the general approach to failure reduction and control is presented. Safety and reliability management techniques developed in the industries which have participated in the U.S. space and defense programs are described along with adaptations to nonaerospace activities. The examples given illustrate the scope of applicability of these techniques. It is indicated that any activity treated as a 'system' is a potential user of aerospace safety and reliability management techniques.

24 CFR 982.605 - SRO: Housing quality standards.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-04-01

... an SRO unit without passing through any other unit. (4) Sprinkler system. A sprinkler system that protects all major spaces, hard wired smoke detectors, and such other fire and safety improvements as State... utilize an approvable public or private disposal system. (E) Sanitary facilities must be reasonably...

24 CFR 982.605 - SRO: Housing quality standards.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-04-01

... an SRO unit without passing through any other unit. (4) Sprinkler system. A sprinkler system that protects all major spaces, hard wired smoke detectors, and such other fire and safety improvements as State... utilize an approvable public or private disposal system. (E) Sanitary facilities must be reasonably...

24 CFR 982.605 - SRO: Housing quality standards.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-04-01

... an SRO unit without passing through any other unit. (4) Sprinkler system. A sprinkler system that protects all major spaces, hard wired smoke detectors, and such other fire and safety improvements as State... utilize an approvable public or private disposal system. (E) Sanitary facilities must be reasonably...

24 CFR 982.605 - SRO: Housing quality standards.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-04-01

... an SRO unit without passing through any other unit. (4) Sprinkler system. A sprinkler system that protects all major spaces, hard wired smoke detectors, and such other fire and safety improvements as State... utilize an approvable public or private disposal system. (E) Sanitary facilities must be reasonably...

NASA wiring for space applications program

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Schulze, Norman

1995-01-01

An overview of the NASA Wiring for Space Applications Program and its relationship to NASA's space technology enterprise is given in viewgraph format. The mission of the space technology enterprise is to pioneer, with industry, the development and use of space technology to secure national economic competitiveness, promote industrial growth, and to support space missions. The objectives of the NASA Wiring for Space Applications Program is to improve the safety, performance, and reliability of wiring systems for space applications and to develop improved wiring technologies for NASA flight programs and commercial applications. Wiring system failures in space and commercial applications have shown the need for arc track resistant wiring constructions. A matrix of tests performed versus wiring constructions is presented. Preliminary data indicate the performance of the Tensolite and Filotex hybrid constructions are the best of the various candidates.

Fire safety design considerations for advanced space vehicles

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

1988-01-01

The desire to understand and explore space has driven man to overcome the confines of the Earth's atmosphere and accept the challenge of spaceflight. With our increasing ability to travel, work, and explore in space comes a need for a better understanding of the hazards in this relatively new endeavor. One of the most important and immediate needs is to be able to predict the ignition, spread, and growth of fire on board spacecraft. Fire safety aboard spacecraft has always been a concern; however, with the increasing number and duration of proposed missions, it is imperative that the spacecraft be designed with a solid understanding of fire hazards, insuring that all risks have been minimized and extinguishment systems are available.

Preparing safety data packages for experimenters using the Get Away Special (GAS) carrier system

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Kosko, Jerome

1992-01-01

The implementation of NSTS 1700.7B and more forceful scruntiny of data packages by the Johnson Space Flight Center (JSC) lead to the development of a classification policy for GAS/CAP payloads. The purpose of this policy is to classify experiments using the carrier system so that they receive an appropriate level of JSC review (i.e., one or multiphase reviews). This policy is based on energy containment to show inherent payload safety. It impacts the approach to performing hazard analyses and the nature of the data package. This paper endeavors to explain the impact of this policy as well as the impact of recent JSC as well as Kennedy Space Flight Center (KSC) 'interpretations' of existing requirements. The GAS canister does adequately contain most experiments when flown in the sealed configuration (however this must be shown, not merely stated). This paper also includes data package preparation guidelines for those experiments that require an opening door which often present unique safety issues.

History of remote operations and robotics in nuclear facilities. Robotics and Intelligent Systems Program

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Herndon, J.N.

1992-05-01

The field of remote technology is continuing to evolve to support man`s efforts to perform tasks in hostile environments. Remote technology has roots which reach into the early history of man. Fireplace pokers, blacksmith`s tongs, and periscopes are examples of the beginnings of remote technology. The technology which we recognize today has evolved over the last 45-plus years to support human operations in hostile environments such as nuclear fission and fusion, space, underwater, hazardous chemical, and hazardous manufacturing. The four major categories of approach to remote technology have been (1) protective clothing and equipment for direct human entry, (2) extendedmore » reach tools using distance for safety, (3) telemanipulators with barriers for safety, and (4) teleoperators incorporating mobility with distance and/or barriers for safety. The government and commercial nuclear industry has driven the development of the majority of the actual teleoperator hardware available today. This hardware has been developed due to the unsatisfactory performance of the protective-clothing approach in many hostile applications. Systems which have been developed include crane/impact wrench systems, unilateral power manipulators, mechanical master/slaves, and servomanipulators. Work for space applications has been primarily research oriented with few successful space applications, although the shuttle`s remote manipulator system has been successful. In the last decade, underwater applications have moved forward significantly, with the offshore oil industry and military applications providing the primary impetus. This document consists of viewgraphs and subtitled figures.« less

FY 1991 safety program status report

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

1991-01-01

In FY 1991, the NASA Safety Division continued efforts to enhance the quality and productivity of its safety oversight function. Recent initiatives set forth in areas such as training, risk management, safety assurance, operational safety, and safety information systems have matured into viable programs contributing to the safety and success of activities throughout the Agency. Efforts continued to develop a centralized intra-agency safety training program with establishment of the NASA Safety Training Center at the Johnson Space Center (JSC). The objective is to provide quality training for NASA employees and contractors on a broad range of safety-related topics. Courses developed by the Training Center will be presented at various NASA locations to minimize travel and reach the greatest number of people at the least cost. In FY 1991, as part of the ongoing efforts to enhance the total quality of NASA's safety work force, the Safety Training Center initiated development of a Certified Safety Professional review course. This course provides a comprehensive review of the skills and knowledge that well-rounded safety professionals must possess to qualify for professional certification. FY 1992 will see the course presented to NASA and contractor employees at all installations via the NASA Video Teleconference System.

Energy Storage Technology Development for Space Exploration

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Mercer, Carolyn R.; Jankovsky, Amy L.; Reid, Concha M.; Miller, Thomas B.; Hoberecht, Mark A.

2011-01-01

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration is developing battery and fuel cell technology to meet the expected energy storage needs of human exploration systems. Improving battery performance and safety for human missions enhances a number of exploration systems, including un-tethered extravehicular activity suits and transportation systems including landers and rovers. Similarly, improved fuel cell and electrolyzer systems can reduce mass and increase the reliability of electrical power, oxygen, and water generation for crewed vehicles, depots and outposts. To achieve this, NASA is developing non-flow-through proton-exchange-membrane fuel cell stacks, and electrolyzers coupled with low permeability membranes for high pressure operation. The primary advantage of this technology set is the reduction of ancillary parts in the balance-of-plant fewer pumps, separators and related components should result in fewer failure modes and hence a higher probability of achieving very reliable operation, and reduced parasitic power losses enable smaller reactant tanks and therefore systems with lower mass and volume. Key accomplishments over the past year include the fabrication and testing of several robust, small-scale non-flow-through fuel cell stacks that have demonstrated proof-of-concept. NASA is also developing advanced lithium-ion battery cells, targeting cell-level safety and very high specific energy and energy density. Key accomplishments include the development of silicon composite anodes, lithiatedmixed- metal-oxide cathodes, low-flammability electrolytes, and cell-incorporated safety devices that promise to substantially improve battery performance while providing a high level of safety.

Implementation of the Enhanced Flight Termination System at National Aeronautics and Space Administration Dryden Flight Research Center

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Tow, David

2010-01-01

This paper discusses the methodology, requirements, tests, and results of the implementation of the current operating capability for the Enhanced Flight Termination System (EFTS) at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Dryden Flight Research Center (DFRC). The implementation involves the development of the EFTS at NASA DFRC starting from the requirements to system safety review to full end to end system testing, and concluding with the acceptance of the system as an operational system. The paper discusses the first operational usage and subsequent flight utilizing EFTS successfully.

NASA's Spaceliner 100 Investment Area Technology Activities

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Hueter, Uwe; Lyles, Garry M. (Technical Monitor)

2001-01-01

NASA's has established long term goals for access-to-space. The third generation launch systems are to be fully reusable and operational around 2025. The goals for the third generation launch system are to reduce cost by a factor of 100 and improve safety by a factor of 10,000 over current conditions. The Advanced Space Transportation Program Office (ASTP) at the NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, AL has the agency lead to develop space transportation technologies. Within ASTP, under the Spaceliner100 Investment Area, third generation technologies are being pursued in the areas of propulsion, airframes, integrated vehicle health management (IVHM), launch systems, and operations and range. The ASTP program will mature these technologies through ground system testing. Flight testing where required, will be advocated on a case by case basis.

A historical perspective of remote operations and robotics in nuclear facilities. Robotics and Intelligent Systems Program

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Herndon, J.N.

1992-12-31

The field of remote technology is continuing to evolve to support man`s efforts to perform tasks in hostile environments. The technology which we recognize today as remote technology has evolved over the last 45 years to support human operations in hostile environments such as nuclear fission and fusion, space, underwater, hazardous chemical, and hazardous manufacturing. The four major categories of approach to remote technology have been (1) protective clothing and equipment for direct human entry, (2) extended reach tools using distance for safety, (3) telemanipulators with barriers for safety, and (4) teleoperators incorporating mobility with distance and/or barriers for safety.more » The government and commercial nuclear industry has driven the development of the majority of the actual teleoperator hardware available today. This hardware has been developed largely due to the unsatisfactory performance of the protective-clothing approach in many hostile applications. Manipulation systems which have been developed include crane/impact wrench systems, unilateral power manipulators, mechanical master/slaves, and servomanipulators. Viewing systems have included periscopes, shield windows, and television systems. Experience over the past 45 years indicates that maintenance system flexibility is essential to typical repair tasks because they are usually not repetitive, structured, or planned. Fully remote design (manipulation, task provisions, remote tooling, and facility synergy) is essential to work task efficiency. Work for space applications has been primarily research oriented with relatively few successful space applications, although the shuttle`s remote manipulator system has been quite successful. In the last decade, underwater applications have moved forward significantly, with the offshore oil industry and military applications providing the primary impetus.« less

An Approach to Establishing System Benefits for Technology in NASA's Hypersonics Investment Area

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Hueter, Uwe; Pannell, Bill; Cook, Stephen (Technical Monitor)

2001-01-01

NASA's has established long term goals for access-to-space. The third generation launch systems are to be fully reusable and operational around 2025. The goals for the third generation launch system are to significantly reduce cost and improve safety over current systems. The Advanced Space Transportation Program (ASTP) Office at the NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, AL has the agency lead to develop space transportation technologies. Within ASTP, under the Hypersonics Investment Area, third generation technologies are being pursued. The Hypersonics Investment Area's primary objective is to mature vehicle technologies to enable substantial increases in the design and operating margins of third generation RLVs (current Space Shuttle is considered the first generation RLV) by incorporating advanced propulsion systems, materials, structures, thermal protection systems, power, and avionics technologies. The paper describes the system process, tools and concepts used to determine the technology benefits. Preliminary results will be presented along with the current technology investments that are being made by ASTP's Hypersonics Investment Area.

Space Station man-machine automation trade-off analysis

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Zimmerman, W. F.; Bard, J.; Feinberg, A.

1985-01-01

The man machine automation tradeoff methodology presented is of four research tasks comprising the autonomous spacecraft system technology (ASST) project. ASST was established to identify and study system level design problems for autonomous spacecraft. Using the Space Station as an example spacecraft system requiring a certain level of autonomous control, a system level, man machine automation tradeoff methodology is presented that: (1) optimizes man machine mixes for different ground and on orbit crew functions subject to cost, safety, weight, power, and reliability constraints, and (2) plots the best incorporation plan for new, emerging technologies by weighing cost, relative availability, reliability, safety, importance to out year missions, and ease of retrofit. A fairly straightforward approach is taken by the methodology to valuing human productivity, it is still sensitive to the important subtleties associated with designing a well integrated, man machine system. These subtleties include considerations such as crew preference to retain certain spacecraft control functions; or valuing human integration/decision capabilities over equivalent hardware/software where appropriate.

Automation of closed environments in space for human comfort and safety

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

1991-01-01

The results of the second year of a three year design project on the automation of the Environmental Control and Life Support System (ECLSS) of the Space Station Freedom (SSF) are presented. The results are applicable to other space missions that require long duration space habitats. A description of conceptual controls which are developed for the Water Recovery and Management (WRM) Subassembly is given. Mathematical modeling of the Air Revitalization (AR) Subassembly is presented. The work done by the Kansas State University NASA/USRA interdisciplinary student design team is concluded with a discussion of the expert system which was developed for the AR Subassembly.

KSC-04PD-2689

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

2004-01-01

KENNEDY SPACE CENTER, FLA. A shipping container housing part of the new Orbiter Boom Sensor System (OBSS) is lifted from a truck into the Remote Manipulator System lab in the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB). Once the entire structure has arrived, the OBSS will be assembled and undergo final checkout and testing in the lab prior to being transferred to the Orbiter Processing Facility (OPF) for installation on Space Shuttle Discovery. The 50-foot- long OBSS will be attached to the Remote Manipulator System, or Shuttle arm, and is one of the new safety measures for Return to Flight, equipping the orbiter with cameras and laser systems to inspect the Shuttle's Thermal Protection System while in space. Discovery is slated to fly mission STS-114 once Space Shuttle launches resume. The launch planning window is May 12 to June 3, 2005.

14 CFR 1214.608 - Safety requirements.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 5 2011-01-01 2010-01-01 true Safety requirements. 1214.608 Section 1214... Space Shuttle Flights § 1214.608 Safety requirements. The contents of OFK's and PPK's must meet the requirements set forth in NASA Handbook 1700.7, “Safety Policy and Requirements for Payloads Using the Space...

14 CFR 1214.608 - Safety requirements.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 5 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safety requirements. 1214.608 Section 1214... Space Shuttle Flights § 1214.608 Safety requirements. The contents of OFK's and PPK's must meet the requirements set forth in NASA Handbook 1700.7, “Safety Policy and Requirements for Payloads Using the Space...

Geostationary Communications Satellites as Sensors for the Space Weather Environment: Telemetry Event Identification Algorithms

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Carlton, A.; Cahoy, K.

2015-12-01

Reliability of geostationary communication satellites (GEO ComSats) is critical to many industries worldwide. The space radiation environment poses a significant threat and manufacturers and operators expend considerable effort to maintain reliability for users. Knowledge of the space radiation environment at the orbital location of a satellite is of critical importance for diagnosing and resolving issues resulting from space weather, for optimizing cost and reliability, and for space situational awareness. For decades, operators and manufacturers have collected large amounts of telemetry from geostationary (GEO) communications satellites to monitor system health and performance, yet this data is rarely mined for scientific purposes. The goal of this work is to acquire and analyze archived data from commercial operators using new algorithms that can detect when a space weather (or non-space weather) event of interest has occurred or is in progress. We have developed algorithms, collectively called SEER (System Event Evaluation Routine), to statistically analyze power amplifier current and temperature telemetry by identifying deviations from nominal operations or other events and trends of interest. This paper focuses on our work in progress, which currently includes methods for detection of jumps ("spikes", outliers) and step changes (changes in the local mean) in the telemetry. We then examine available space weather data from the NOAA GOES and the NOAA-computed Kp index and sunspot numbers to see what role, if any, it might have played. By combining the results of the algorithm for many components, the spacecraft can be used as a "sensor" for the space radiation environment. Similar events occurring at one time across many component telemetry streams may be indicative of a space radiation event or system-wide health and safety concern. Using SEER on representative datasets of telemetry from Inmarsat and Intelsat, we find events that occur across all or many of telemetry files at certain dates. We compare these system-wide events to known space weather storms, such as the 2003 Halloween storms, and to spacecraft operational events, such as maneuvers. We also present future applications and expansions of SEER for robust space environment sensing and system health and safety monitoring.

Development of control systems for solar water and solar space heating equipment. Choice of heat conducting fluid. Testing

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Meyer, H.

1981-11-01

Flat plate collector systems suitable for hot water supply, swimming pool heating, and auxiliary space heating were developed. A control and ready made packaged pipe assembly, adapted to synthetic fluid, was developed. A heat transfer fluid was selected, pumps, safety devices, armatures and seals were tested for their long term performance. External heat exchangers for simple and cascade arrangement of the hot water tanks were tested. It is found that the channel design of a roll bonded absorber has only limited effect on collector performance if the channel width approximates the space between the plates. Systems already installed work satisfactorily.

Second NASA Workshop on Wiring for Space Applications

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

1994-01-01

This document contains the proceedings of the Second NASA Workshop on Wiring for Space Applications held at NASA LeRC in Cleveland, OH, 6-7 Oct. 1993. The workshop was sponsored by NASA Headquarters Code QW Office of Safety and Mission Quality, Technical Standards Division and hosted by NASA LeRC, Power Technology Division, Electrical Components and Systems Branch. The workshop addressed key technology issues in the field of electrical power wiring for space applications. Speakers from government, industry, and academia presented and discussed topics on arc tracking phenomena, wiring system design, insulation constructions, and system protection. Presentation materials provided by the various speakers are included in this document.

Space Station environmental control and life support system distribution and loop closure studies

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Humphries, William R.; Reuter, James L.; Schunk, Richard G.

1986-01-01

The NASA Space Station's environmental control and life support system (ECLSS) encompasses functional elements concerned with temperature and humidity control, atmosphere control and supply, atmosphere revitalization, fire detection and suppression, water recovery and management, waste management, and EVA support. Attention is presently given to functional and physical module distributions of the ECLSS among these elements, with a view to resource requirements and safety implications. A strategy of physical distribution coupled with functional centralization is for the air revitalization and water reclamation systems. Also discussed is the degree of loop closure desirable in the initial operational capability status Space Station's oxygen and water reclamation loops.

Hybrid propulsion technology program: Phase 1, volume 2

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Schuler, A. L.; Wiley, D. R.

1989-01-01

The program objectives of developing hybrid propulsion technology (HPT) to enable its application for manned and unmanned high thrust, high performance space launch vehicles are examined. The studies indicate that the hybrid propulsion (HP) is very attractive, especially when applied to large boosters for programs such as the Advanced Launch System (ALS) and the second generation Space Shuttle. Some of the advantages of HP are identified. Space launch vehicles using HP are less costly than those flying today because their propellant and insulation costs are much less and there are fewer operational restraints due to reduced safety requirements. Boosters using HP have safety features that are highly desirable, particularly for manned flights. HP systems will have a clean exhaust and high performance. Boosters using HP readily integrate with launch vehicles and their launch operations, because they are very compact for the amount of energy contained. Hybrid propulsion will increase the probability of mission success. In order to properly develop the technologies of HP, preliminary HP concepts are evaluated. System analyses and trade studies were performed to identify technologies applicable to HP.

An Accident Precursor Analysis Process Tailored for NASA Space Systems

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Groen, Frank; Stamatelatos, Michael; Dezfuli, Homayoon; Maggio, Gaspare

2010-01-01

Accident Precursor Analysis (APA) serves as the bridge between existing risk modeling activities, which are often based on historical or generic failure statistics, and system anomalies, which provide crucial information about the failure mechanisms that are actually operative in the system and which may differ in frequency or type from those in the various models. These discrepancies between the models (perceived risk) and the system (actual risk) provide the leading indication of an underappreciated risk. This paper presents an APA process developed specifically for NASA Earth-to-Orbit space systems. The purpose of the process is to identify and characterize potential sources of system risk as evidenced by anomalous events which, although not necessarily presenting an immediate safety impact, may indicate that an unknown or insufficiently understood risk-significant condition exists in the system. Such anomalous events are considered accident precursors because they signal the potential for severe consequences that may occur in the future, due to causes that are discernible from their occurrence today. Their early identification allows them to be integrated into the overall system risk model used to intbrm decisions relating to safety.

Operational specification and forecasting advances for Dst, LEO thermospheric densities, and aviation radiation dose and dose rate

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Tobiska, W.; Knipp, D. J.; Burke, W. J.; Bouwer, D.; Bailey, J. J.; Hagan, M. P.; Didkovsky, L. V.; Garrett, H. B.; Bowman, B. R.; Gannon, J. L.; Atwell, W.; Blake, J. B.; Crain, W.; Rice, D.; Schunk, R. W.; Fulgham, J.; Bell, D.; Gersey, B.; Wilkins, R.; Fuschino, R.; Flynn, C.; Cecil, K.; Mertens, C. J.; Xu, X.; Crowley, G.; Reynolds, A.; Azeem, S. I.; Wiley, S.; Holland, M.; Malone, K.

2013-12-01

Space weather's effects upon the near-Earth environment are due to dynamic changes in the energy transfer processes from the Sun's photons, particles, and fields. Of the space environment domains that are affected by space weather, the magnetosphere, thermosphere, and even troposphere are key regions that are affected. Space Environment Technologies (SET) has developed and is producing innovative space weather applications. Key operational systems for providing timely information about the effects of space weather on these domains are SET's Magnetosphere Alert and Prediction System (MAPS), LEO Alert and Prediction System (LAPS), and Automated Radiation Measurements for Aviation Safety (ARMAS) system. MAPS provides a forecast Dst index out to 6 days through the data-driven, redundant data stream Anemomilos algorithm. Anemomilos uses observational proxies for the magnitude, location, and velocity of solar ejecta events. This forecast index is used by satellite operations to characterize upcoming geomagnetic storms, for example. LAPS is the SET fully redundant operational system providing recent history, current epoch, and forecast solar and geomagnetic indices for use in operational versions of the JB2008 thermospheric density model. The thermospheric densities produced by that system, driven by the LAPS data, are forecast to 72-hours to provide the global mass densities for satellite operators. ARMAS is a project that has successfully demonstrated the operation of a micro dosimeter on aircraft to capture the real-time radiation environment due to Galactic Cosmic Rays and Solar Energetic Particles. The dose and dose-rates are captured on aircraft, downlinked in real-time via the Iridium satellites, processed on the ground, incorporated into the most recent NAIRAS global radiation climatology data runs, and made available to end users via the web and smart phone apps. ARMAS provides the 'weather' of the radiation environment to improve air-crew and passenger safety. Many of the data products from MAPS, LAPS, and ARMAS are available on the SpaceWx smartphone app for iPhone, iPad, iPod, and Android professional users and public space weather education. We describe recent forecasting advances for moving the space weather information from these automated systems into operational, derivative products for communications, aviation, and satellite operations uses.

14 CFR 121.1111 - Electrical wiring interconnection systems (EWIS) maintenance program.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 3 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Electrical wiring interconnection systems... Airworthiness and Safety Improvements § 121.1111 Electrical wiring interconnection systems (EWIS) maintenance program. (a) Except as provided in paragraph (f) of this section, this section applies to transport...

The New Era in Operational Forecasting

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Tobiska, W.; Schunk, R. W.; Sojka, J. J.; Carlson, H. C.; Gardner, L. C.; Scherliess, L.; Zhu, L.; Eccles, J. V.; Rice, D. D.; Bouwer, D.; Bailey, J. J.; Knipp, D. J.; Blake, J. B.; Rex, J.; Fuschino, R.; Mertens, C. J.; Gersey, B.; Wilkins, R.; Atwell, W.

2012-12-01

Space weather's effects upon the near-Earth environment are due to dynamic changes in the energy transfer processes from the Sun's photons, particles, and fields. Of the space environment domains that are affected by space weather, the ionosphere, thermosphere, and even troposphere are key regions that are affected. The Utah State University (USU) Space Weather Center (SWC) and Space Environment Technologies (SET) are developing and producing commercial space weather applications. Key systems for providing timely information about the effects of space weather are SWC's Global Assimilation of Ionospheric Measurements (GAIM) system, SET's Magnetosphere Alert and Prediction System (MAPS), and SET's Automated Radiation Measurements for Aviation Safety (ARMAS) system. GAIM, operated by SWC, improves real-time communication and navigation systems by continuously ingesting up to 10,000 slant TEC measurements every 15-minutes from approximately 500 stations. Ionosonde data from several dozen global stations is ingested every 15 minutes to improve the vertical profiles within GAIM. These operational runs enable the reporting of global radio high frequency (HF) signal strengths and near vertical incidence skywave (NVIS) maps used by amateur radio operators and emergency responders via the http://q-upnow.com website. MAPS provides a forecast Dst index out to 6 days through the data-driven Anemomilos algorithm. Anemomilos uses observational proxies for the magnitude, location, and velocity of solar ejecta events. This forecast index is used by satellite operations to characterize upcoming geomagnetic storms, for example. ARMAS is demonstrating a prototype flight of microdosimeters on aircraft to capture the "weather" of the radiation environment for air-crew and passenger safety. It assimilates real-time radiation dose and dose rate data into the global NAIRAS radiation system to correct the global climatology for more accurate radiation fields along flight tracks. This team also provides the space weather smartphone app called SpaceWx for iPhone, iPad, iPod, and Android for professional users and public space weather education. SpaceWx displays the real-time solar, heliosphere, magnetosphere, thermosphere, and ionosphere drivers to changes in the total electron content, for example, as well as global NVIS maps. We describe recent forecasting advances for moving space weather information through automated systems into operational, derivative products for communications, aviation, and satellite operations uses.

Applications of Advanced Nondestructive Measurement Techniques to Address Safety of Flight Issues on NASA Spacecraft

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Prosser, Bill

2016-01-01

Advanced nondestructive measurement techniques are critical for ensuring the reliability and safety of NASA spacecraft. Techniques such as infrared thermography, THz imaging, X-ray computed tomography and backscatter X-ray are used to detect indications of damage in spacecraft components and structures. Additionally, sensor and measurement systems are integrated into spacecraft to provide structural health monitoring to detect damaging events that occur during flight such as debris impacts during launch and assent or from micrometeoroid and orbital debris, or excessive loading due to anomalous flight conditions. A number of examples will be provided of how these nondestructive measurement techniques have been applied to resolve safety critical inspection concerns for the Space Shuttle, International Space Station (ISS), and a variety of launch vehicles and unmanned spacecraft.

Microbial Monitoring of Crewed Habitats in Space—Current Status and Future Perspectives

PubMed Central

Yamaguchi, Nobuyasu; Roberts, Michael; Castro, Sarah; Oubre, Cherie; Makimura, Koichi; Leys, Natalie; Grohmann, Elisabeth; Sugita, Takashi; Ichijo, Tomoaki; Nasu, Masao

2014-01-01

Previous space research conducted during short-term flight experiments and long-term environmental monitoring on board orbiting space stations suggests that the relationship between humans and microbes is altered in the crewed habitat in space. Both human physiology and microbial communities adapt to spaceflight. Microbial monitoring is critical to crew safety in long-duration space habitation and the sustained operation of life support systems on space transit vehicles, space stations, and surface habitats. To address this critical need, space agencies including NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration), ESA (European Space Agency), and JAXA (Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency) are working together to develop and implement specific measures to monitor, control, and counteract biological contamination in closed-environment systems. In this review, the current status of microbial monitoring conducted in the International Space Station (ISS) as well as the results of recent microbial spaceflight experiments have been summarized and future perspectives are discussed. PMID:25130885

System Guidelines for EMC Safety-Critical Circuits: Design, Selection, and Margin Demonstration

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Lawton, R. M.

1996-01-01

Demonstration of required safety margins on critical electrical/electronic circuits in large complex systems has become an implementation and cost problem. These margins are the difference between the activation level of the circuit and the electrical noise on the circuit in the actual operating environment. This document discusses the origin of the requirement and gives a detailed process flow for the identification of the system electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) critical circuit list. The process flow discusses the roles of engineering disciplines such as systems engineering, safety, and EMC. Design and analysis guidelines are provided to assist the designer in assuring the system design has a high probability of meeting the margin requirements. Examples of approaches used on actual programs (Skylab and Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster) are provided to show how variations of the approach can be used successfully.

A systems engineering initiative for NASA's space communications

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Hornstein, Rhoda S.; Hei, Donald J., Jr.; Kelly, Angelita C.; Lightfoot, Patricia C.; Bell, Holland T.; Cureton-Snead, Izeller E.; Hurd, William J.; Scales, Charles H.

1993-01-01

In addition to but separate from the Red and Blue Teams commissioned by the NASA Administrator, NASA's Associate Administrator for Space Communications commissioned a Blue Team to review the Office of Space Communications (Code O) Core Program and determine how the program could be conducted faster, better, and cheaper, without compromising safety. Since there was no corresponding Red Team for the Code O Blue Team, the Blue Team assumed a Red Team independent attitude and challenged the status quo. The Blue Team process and results are summarized. The Associate Administrator for Space Communications subsequently convened a special management session to discuss the significance and implications of the Blue Team's report and to lay the groundwork and teamwork for the next steps, including the transition from engineering systems to systems engineering. The methodology and progress toward realizing the Code O Family vision and accomplishing the systems engineering initiative for NASA's space communications are presented.

Lockheed Martin Response to the OSP Challenge

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Sullivan, Robert T.; Munkres, Randy; Megna, Thomas D.; Beckham, Joanne

2003-01-01

The Lockheed Martin Orbital Space Plane System provides crew transfer and rescue for the International Space Station more safely and affordably than current human space transportation systems. Through planned upgrades and spiral development, it is also capable of satisfying the Nation's evolving space transportation requirements and enabling the national vision for human space flight. The OSP System, formulated through rigorous requirements definition and decomposition, consists of spacecraft and launch vehicle flight elements, ground processing facilities and existing transportation, launch complex, range, mission control, weather, navigation, communication and tracking infrastructure. The concept of operations, including procurement, mission planning, launch preparation, launch and mission operations and vehicle maintenance, repair and turnaround, is structured to maximize flexibility and mission availability and minimize program life cycle cost. The approach to human rating and crew safety utilizes simplicity, performance margin, redundancy, abort modes and escape modes to mitigate credible hazards that cannot be designed out of the system.

Analysis of quasi-hybrid solid rocket booster concepts for advanced earth-to-orbit vehicles

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Zurawski, Robert L.; Rapp, Douglas C.

1987-01-01

A study was conducted to assess the feasibility of quasi-hybrid solid rocket boosters for advanced Earth-to-orbit vehicles. Thermochemical calculations were conducted to determine the effect of liquid hydrogen addition, solids composition change plus liquid hydrogen addition, and the addition of an aluminum/liquid hydrogen slurry on the theoretical performance of a PBAN solid propellant rocket. The space shuttle solid rocket booster was used as a reference point. All three quasi-hybrid systems theoretically offer higher specific impulse when compared with the space shuttle solid rocket boosters. However, based on operational and safety considerations, the quasi-hybrid rocket is not a practical choice for near-term Earth-to-orbit booster applications. Safety and technology issues pertinent to quasi-hybrid rocket systems are discussed.

Test Facilities and Experience on Space Nuclear System Developments at the Kurchatov Institute

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Ponomarev-Stepnoi, Nikolai N.; Garin, Vladimir P.; Glushkov, Evgeny S.; Kompaniets, George V.; Kukharkin, Nikolai E.; Madeev, Vicktor G.; Papin, Vladimir K.; Polyakov, Dmitry N.; Stepennov, Boris S.; Tchuniyaev, Yevgeny I.; Tikhonov, Lev Ya.; Uksusov, Yevgeny I.

2004-02-01

The complexity of space fission systems and rigidity of requirement on minimization of weight and dimension characteristics along with the wish to decrease expenditures on their development demand implementation of experimental works which results shall be used in designing, safety substantiation, and licensing procedures. Experimental facilities are intended to solve the following tasks: obtainment of benchmark data for computer code validations, substantiation of design solutions when computational efforts are too expensive, quality control in a production process, and ``iron'' substantiation of criticality safety design solutions for licensing and public relations. The NARCISS and ISKRA critical facilities and unique ORM facility on shielding investigations at the operating OR nuclear research reactor were created in the Kurchatov Institute to solve the mentioned tasks. The range of activities performed at these facilities within the implementation of the previous Russian nuclear power system programs is briefly described in the paper. This experience shall be analyzed in terms of methodological approach to development of future space nuclear systems (this analysis is beyond this paper). Because of the availability of these facilities for experiments, the brief description of their critical assemblies and characteristics is given in this paper.

Design Development Test and Evaluation (DDT and E) Considerations for Safe and Reliable Human Rated Spacecraft Systems

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Miller, James; Leggett, Jay; Kramer-White, Julie

2008-01-01

A team directed by the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) collected methodologies for how best to develop safe and reliable human rated systems and how to identify the drivers that provide the basis for assessing safety and reliability. The team also identified techniques, methodologies, and best practices to assure that NASA can develop safe and reliable human rated systems. The results are drawn from a wide variety of resources, from experts involved with the space program since its inception to the best-practices espoused in contemporary engineering doctrine. This report focuses on safety and reliability considerations and does not duplicate or update any existing references. Neither does it intend to replace existing standards and policy.

Overview of NASA Ultracapacitor Technology

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Hill, Curtis W.

2017-01-01

NASA needed a lower mass, reliable, and safe medium for energy storage for ground-based and space applications. Existing industry electrochemical systems are limited in weight, charge rate, energy density, reliability, and safety. We chose a ceramic perovskite material for development, due to its high inherent dielectric properties, long history of use in the capacitor industry, and the safety of a solid state material.

Forming Human-Robot Teams Across Time and Space

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Hambuchen, Kimberly; Burridge, Robert R.; Ambrose, Robert O.; Bluethmann, William J.; Diftler, Myron A.; Radford, Nicolaus A.

2012-01-01

NASA pushes telerobotics to distances that span the Solar System. At this scale, time of flight for communication is limited by the speed of light, inducing long time delays, narrow bandwidth and the real risk of data disruption. NASA also supports missions where humans are in direct contact with robots during extravehicular activity (EVA), giving a range of zero to hundreds of millions of miles for NASA s definition of "tele". . Another temporal variable is mission phasing. NASA missions are now being considered that combine early robotic phases with later human arrival, then transition back to robot only operations. Robots can preposition, scout, sample or construct in advance of human teammates, transition to assistant roles when the crew are present, and then become care-takers when the crew returns to Earth. This paper will describe advances in robot safety and command interaction approaches developed to form effective human-robot teams, overcoming challenges of time delay and adapting as the team transitions from robot only to robots and crew. The work is predicated on the idea that when robots are alone in space, they are still part of a human-robot team acting as surrogates for people back on Earth or in other distant locations. Software, interaction modes and control methods will be described that can operate robots in all these conditions. A novel control mode for operating robots across time delay was developed using a graphical simulation on the human side of the communication, allowing a remote supervisor to drive and command a robot in simulation with no time delay, then monitor progress of the actual robot as data returns from the round trip to and from the robot. Since the robot must be responsible for safety out to at least the round trip time period, the authors developed a multi layer safety system able to detect and protect the robot and people in its workspace. This safety system is also running when humans are in direct contact with the robot, so it involves both internal fault detection as well as force sensing for unintended external contacts. The designs for the supervisory command mode and the redundant safety system will be described. Specific implementations were developed and test results will be reported. Experiments were conducted using terrestrial analogs for deep space missions, where time delays were artificially added to emulate the longer distances found in space.

Space Tethers Design Criteria

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Tomlin, Donald D.; Faile, Gwyn C.; Hayashida, Kazuo B.; Frost, Cynthia L.; Wagner, Carole Y.; Mitchell, Michael L.; Vaughn, Jason A.; Galuska, Michael J.

1998-01-01

The small expendable deployable system and tether satellite system programs did not have a uniform written criteria for tethers. The JSC safety panel asked what criteria was used to design the tethers. Since none existed, a criteria was written based on past experience for future tether programs.

Bounding the Spacecraft Atmosphere Design Space for Future Exploration Missions

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Lange, Kevin E.; Perka, Alan T.; Duffield, Bruce E.; Jeng, Frank F.

2005-01-01

The selection of spacecraft and space suit atmospheres for future human space exploration missions will play an important, if not critical, role in the ultimate safety, productivity, and cost of such missions. Internal atmosphere pressure and composition (particularly oxygen concentration) influence many aspects of spacecraft and space suit design, operation, and technology development. Optimal atmosphere solutions must be determined by iterative process involving research, design, development, testing, and systems analysis. A necessary first step in this process is the establishment of working bounds on the atmosphere design space.

Life sciences - On the critical path for missions of exploration

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Sulzman, Frank M.; Connors, Mary M.; Gaiser, Karen

1988-01-01

Life sciences are important and critical to the safety and success of manned and long-duration space missions. The life science issues covered include gravitational physiology, space radiation, medical care delivery, environmental maintenance, bioregenerative systems, crew and human factors within and outside the spacecraft. The history of the role of life sciences in the space program is traced from the Apollo era, through the Skylab era to the Space Shuttle era. The life science issues of the space station program and manned missions to the moon and Mars are covered.

Safety in earth orbit study. Volume 5: Space shuttle payloads: Safety requirements and guidelines on-orbit phase

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

1972-01-01

Safety requirements and guidelines are listed for the sortie module, upper stage vehicle, and space station for the earth orbit operations of the space shuttle program. The requirements and guidelines are for vehicle design, safety devices, warning devices, operational procedures, and residual hazards.

Space-planning and structural solutions of low-rise buildings: Optimal selection methods

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Gusakova, Natalya; Minaev, Nikolay; Filushina, Kristina; Dobrynina, Olga; Gusakov, Alexander

2017-11-01

The present study is devoted to elaboration of methodology used to select appropriately the space-planning and structural solutions in low-rise buildings. Objective of the study is working out the system of criteria influencing the selection of space-planning and structural solutions which are most suitable for low-rise buildings and structures. Application of the defined criteria in practice aim to enhance the efficiency of capital investments, energy and resource saving, create comfortable conditions for the population considering climatic zoning of the construction site. Developments of the project can be applied while implementing investment-construction projects of low-rise housing at different kinds of territories based on the local building materials. The system of criteria influencing the optimal selection of space-planning and structural solutions of low-rise buildings has been developed. Methodological basis has been also elaborated to assess optimal selection of space-planning and structural solutions of low-rise buildings satisfying the requirements of energy-efficiency, comfort and safety, and economical efficiency. Elaborated methodology enables to intensify the processes of low-rise construction development for different types of territories taking into account climatic zoning of the construction site. Stimulation of low-rise construction processes should be based on the system of approaches which are scientifically justified; thus it allows enhancing energy efficiency, comfort, safety and economical effectiveness of low-rise buildings.

The Role of ESA TEC-QTE in the ISS Safety Process

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Orlandi, M.; Rohr, T.; Stienstra, M. H.; Semprimoschnig, C.

2013-09-01

On the 17th of July 2000, the Materials and Processes Reciprocal Agreement was signed between NASA and ESA to define the process for selection and certification of materials used in the Space Shuttle and the International Space Station. Consecutively, on the 20th of June 2003 this agreement was extended to the Automated Transport Vehicle (ATV). It is therefore the responsibility of ESA TEC-QTE, the Materials Space Evaluation and Radiation Effects section, part of the Product Assurance and Safety Department, to ensure that all materials, parts and processes of each of the ISS payloads not only function as required but also do not pose a risk to the safety of the crew members. In this context, TEC-QTE provides qualified expertise to support the ESA Flight Safety Review and assesses safety aspects related to manned projects (materials properties, fluid system compatibility, fungus resistance). This is supported by the Materials Space Evaluation and Radiation Effects section's Materials and Electrical Components laboratory having at its disposition a range of facilities designed to perform environmental effects testing of which off-gassing tests according to ECSS-Q-ST-70-29C (equivalent to NASA STD 6001 test 7) and outgassing tests according to ECSS-Q-ST-70-02C (equivalent to ASTM-E-595). The ESA facility to perform flammability tests according to ECSS-Q-ST-70-21A (equivalent to NASA STD 6001 test1) was moved to Astrium Bremen.TEC-QTE is in charge of reviewing and approving, via RFA or MUA , all materials that do not meet safety requirements as well as COTS or CAM (black boxes) equipment.The safety process ends with the issue of the Materials Certification of the reviewed payload hardware that shows compliance with the relevant materials and processes requirements and standards.In addition to the safety related activities for the ISS, specialised TEC-QTE personnel provide measurements of the air quality inside the ATV and assess whether the toxicity index is within requirements.

Lessons learned from the Galileo and Ulysses flight safety review experience

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Bennett, Gary L.

In preparation for the launches of the Galileo and Ulysses spacecraft, a very comprehensive aerospace nuclear safety program and flight safety review were conducted. A review of this work has highlighted a number of important lessons which should be considered in the safety analysis and review of future space nuclear systems. These lessons have been grouped into six general categories: (1) establishment of the purpose, objectives and scope of the safety process; (2) establishment of charters defining the roles of the various participants; (3) provision of adequate resources; (4) provision of timely peer-reviewed information to support the safety program; (5)more » establishment of general ground rules for the safety review; and (6) agreement on the kinds of information to be provided from the safety review process.« less

Technical Guidance from the International Safety Framework for Nuclear Power Source Applications in Outer Space for Design and Development Phases

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Summerer, Leopold

2014-08-01

In 2009, the International Safety Framework for Nuclear Power Source Applications in Outer Space [1] has been adopted, following a multi-year process that involved all major space faring nations in the frame of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. The safety framework reflects an international consensus on best practices. After the older 1992 Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space, it is the second document at UN level dedicated entirely to space nuclear power sources.This paper analyses aspects of the safety framework relevant for the design and development phases of space nuclear power sources. While early publications have started analysing the legal aspects of the safety framework, its technical guidance has not yet been subject to scholarly articles. The present paper therefore focuses on the technical guidance provided in the safety framework, in an attempt to assist engineers and practitioners to benefit from these.

Development of U.S. Government General Technical Requirements for UAS Flight Safety Systems Utilizing the Iridium Satellite Constellation

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Murray, Jennifer; Birr, Richard

2010-01-01

This slide presentation reviews the development of technical requirements for Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) utilization of the Iridium Satellite Constellation to provide flight safety. The Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) required an over-the-horizon communication standard to guarantee flight safety before permitting widespread UAS flights in the National Air Space (NAS). This is important to ensure reliable control of UASs during loss-link and over-the-horizon scenarios. The core requirement was to utilize a satellite system to send GPS tracking data and other telemetry from a flight vehicle down to the ground. Iridium was chosen as the system because it is one of the only true satellite systems that has world wide coverage, and the service has a highly reliable link margin. The Iridium system, the flight modems, and the test flight are described.

Achieving Space Shuttle ATO Using the Five-Segment Booster (FSB)

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Sauvageau, Donald R.; McCool, Alex (Technical Monitor)

2001-01-01

As part of the continuing effort to identify approaches to improve the safety and reliability of the Space Shuttle system, a Five-Segment Booster (FSB) design was conceptualized as a replacement for the current Space Shuttle boosters. The FSB offers a simple, unique approach to improve astronaut safety and increase performance margin. To determine the feasibility of the FSB, a Phase A study effort was sponsored by NASA and directed by the Marshall Space Flight Center. This study was initiated in March of 1999 and completed in December of 2000. The basic objective of this study was to assess the feasibility of the FSB design concept and also estimate the cost and scope of a full-scale development program for the FSB. In order to ensure an effective and thorough evaluation of the FSB concept, four team members were put on contract to support various areas of importance in assessing the overall feasibility of the design approach.

Lessons Learned for Space Safety from the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant Accident

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Nogami, Manami; Miki, Masami; Mitsui, Masami; Kawada, Ysuhiro; Takeuchi, Nobuo

2013-09-01

On March 11 2011, Tohoku Region Pacific Coast Earthquake hit Japan and caused the devastating damage. The Fukushima Nuclear Power Station (NPS) was also severely damaged.The Japanese NPSs are designed based on the detailed safety requirements and have multiple-folds of hazard controls to the catastrophic hazards as in space system. However, according to the initial information from the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) and the Japanese government, the larger-than-expected tsunami and subsequent events lost the all hazard controls to the release of radioactive materials.At the 5th IAASS, Lessons Learned from this disaster was reported [1] mainly based on the "Report of the Japanese Government to the IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety" [2] published by Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters in June 2011, three months after the earthquake.Up to 2012 summer, the major investigation boards, including the Japanese Diet, the Japanese Cabinet and TEPCO, published their final reports, in which detailed causes of this accident and several recommendations are assessed from each perspective.In this paper, the authors examine to introduce the lessons learned to be applied to the space safety as findings from these reports.

Mission safety evaluation report for STS-35: Postflight edition

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Hill, William C.; Finkel, Seymour I.

1991-01-01

Space Transportation System 35 (STS-35) safety risk factors that represent a change from previous flights that had an impact on this flight, and factors that were unique to this flight are discussed. While some changes to the safety risk baseline since the previous flight are included to highlight their significance in risk level change, the primary purpose is to insure that changes which were too late too include in formal changes through the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis/Critical Items List (FMEA/CIL) and Hazard Analysis process are documented along with the safety position, which includes the acceptance rationale.

Musculoskeletal adaptation to mechanical forces on Earth and in space

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Whalen, Robert

1993-01-01

A major concern of the US and Russian space programs is the health and safety of astronauts and cosmonauts. One of the areas receiving the most attention has been the effects of long duration space flight on the musculoskeletel system. After three decades of space flight and research, questions continue. Can exercise in space maintain musculoskeletal tissue mass and function in an adult? The objective of this paper is to address this question in a way that hopefully provides a rational basis for quantifying and evaluating the influnence of daily activities on muscle and bone on Earth and in space.

Study of solid rocket motor for space shuttle booster, volume 2, book 2

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

1972-01-01

A technical analysis of the solid propellant rocket engines for use with the space shuttle is presented. The subjects discussed are: (1) solid rocket motor stage recovery, (2) environmental effects, (3) man rating of the solid propellant rocket engines, (4) system safety analysis, (5) ground support equipment, and (6) transportation, assembly, and checkout.

76 FR 36937 - Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel; Meeting

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-06-23

... NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION [Notice (11-055)] Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel; Meeting AGENCY: National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). ACTION: Notice of meeting. SUMMARY... Aeronautics and Space Administration announce a forthcoming meeting of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel...

77 FR 1955 - Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel; Meeting

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2012-01-12

... NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION [Notice 12-001] Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel; Meeting AGENCY: National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). ACTION: Notice of meeting. SUMMARY... Aeronautics and Space Administration announce a forthcoming meeting of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel...

78 FR 36793 - Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel; Meeting

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-06-19

... NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION [Notice 13-068] Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel; Meeting AGENCY: National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). ACTION: Notice of meeting. SUMMARY... Aeronautics and Space Administration announce a forthcoming meeting of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel...

75 FR 36697 - Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel; Meeting

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-06-28

... NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION [Notice (10-071)] Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel; Meeting AGENCY: National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). ACTION: Notice of meeting. SUMMARY... Aeronautics and Space Administration announce a forthcoming meeting of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel...

77 FR 25502 - Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel; Meeting

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2012-04-30

... NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION [Notice (12-030)] Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel; Meeting AGENCY: National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). ACTION: Notice of meeting. SUMMARY... Aeronautics and Space Administration announce a forthcoming meeting of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel...

75 FR 6407 - Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel; Meeting

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-02-09

... NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION [Notice (10- 020)] Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel; Meeting AGENCY: National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). ACTION: Notice of Meeting. SUMMARY... Aeronautics and Space Administration announce a forthcoming meeting of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel...

76 FR 2923 - Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel; Meeting

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-01-18

... NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION [Notice (11-004)] Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel; Meeting AGENCY: National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). ACTION: Notice of Meeting. SUMMARY... Aeronautics and Space Administration announce a forthcoming meeting of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel...

78 FR 15976 - Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel; Meeting.

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-03-13

... NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION [Notice: 13-023] Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel... Aeronautics and Space Administration announce a forthcoming meeting of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel... Space Administration, Washington, DC 20546, (202) 358-1857. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Aerospace...

75 FR 19662 - Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel; Meeting

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-04-15

... NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION [Notice (10-043)] Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel; Meeting AGENCY: National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). ACTION: Notice of meeting. SUMMARY... Aeronautics and Space Administration announce a forthcoming meeting of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel...

Feasibility of space disposal of radioactive nuclear waste. 2: Technical summary

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

1974-01-01

The feasibility of transporting radioactive waste produced in the process of generating electricity in nuclear powerplants into space for ultimate disposal was investigated at the request of the AEC as a NASA in-house effort. The investigation is part of a broad AEC study of methods for long-term storage or disposal of radioactive waste. The results of the study indicate that transporting specific radioactive wastes, particularly the actinides with very long half-lives, into space using the space shuttle/tug as the launch system, appears feasible from the engineering and safety viewpoints. The space transportation costs for ejecting the actinides out of the solar system would represent less than a 5-percent increase in the average consumer's electric bill.

Space fusion energy conversion using a field reversed configuration reactor: A new technical approach for space propulsion and power

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Schulze, Norman R.; Miley, George H.; Santarius, John F.

1991-01-01

The fusion energy conversion design approach, the Field Reversed Configuration (FRC) - when burning deuterium and helium-3, offers a new method and concept for space transportation with high energy demanding programs, like the Manned Mars Mission and planetary science outpost missions require. FRC's will increase safety, reduce costs, and enable new missions by providing a high specific power propulsion system from a high performance fusion engine system that can be optimally designed. By using spacecraft powered by FRC's the space program can fulfill High Energy Space Missions (HESM) in a manner not otherwise possible. FRC's can potentially enable the attainment of high payload mass fractions while doing so within shorter flight times.

The servicing aid tool: A teleoperated robotics system for space applications

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Dorman, Keith W.; Pullen, John L.; Keksz, William O.; Eismann, Paul H.; Kowalski, Keith A.; Karlen, James P.

1994-01-01

The Servicing Aid Tool (SAT) is a teleoperated, force-reflecting manipulation system designed for use on the Space Shuttle. The system will assist Extravehicular Activity (EVA) servicing of spacecraft such as the Hubble Space Telescope. The SAT stands out from other robotics development programs in that special attention was given to provide a low-cost, space-qualified design which can easily and inexpensively be reconfigured and/or enhanced through the addition of existing NASA funded technology as that technology matures. SAT components are spaceflight adaptations of existing ground-based designs from Robotics Research Corporation (RRC), the leading supplier of robotics systems to the NASA and university research community in the United States. Fairchild Space is the prime contractor and provides the control electronics, safety system, system integration, and qualification testing. The manipulator consists of a 6-DOF Slave Arm mounted on a 1-DOF Positioning Link in the shuttle payload bay. The Slave Arm is controlled via a highly similar, 6-DOF, force-reflecting Master Arm from Schilling Development, Inc. This work is being performed under contract to the Goddard Space Flight Center Code, Code 442, Hubble Space Telescope Flight Systems and Servicing Project.

Automation of closed environments in space for human comfort and safety

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

1990-01-01

The results are presented of the first year of a three year project on the automation of the Environmental Control and Life Support System (ECLSS) of the Space Station Freedom (SSF). The results are applicable to other future space mission. The work was done by the Kansas State University NASA/USRA interdisciplinary student design team. The six ECLSS subsystems and how they interact are discussed. Proposed control schemes and their rationale are discussed for the Atmosphere Revitalization (AR) subsystem. Finally, a description of the mathematical models for many components of the ECLSS control system is given.

From Earth to Orbit: An assessment of transportation options

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Gavin, Joseph G., Jr.; Blond, Edmund; Brill, Yvonne C.; Budiansky, Bernard; Cooper, Robert S.; Demisch, Wolfgang H.; Hawk, Clark W.; Kerrebrock, Jack L.; Lichtenberg, Byron K.; Mager, Artur

1992-01-01

The report assesses the requirements, benefits, technological feasibility, and roles of Earth-to-Orbit transportation systems and options that could be developed in support of future national space programs. Transportation requirements, including those for Mission-to-Planet Earth, Space Station Freedom assembly and operation, human exploration of space, space science missions, and other major civil space missions are examined. These requirements are compared with existing, planned, and potential launch capabilities, including expendable launch vehicles (ELV's), the Space Shuttle, the National Launch System (NLS), and new launch options. In addition, the report examines propulsion systems in the context of various launch vehicles. These include the Advanced Solid Rocket Motor (ASRM), the Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM), the Solid Rocket Motor Upgrade (SRMU), the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME), the Space Transportation Main Engine (STME), existing expendable launch vehicle engines, and liquid-oxygen/hydrocarbon engines. Consideration is given to systems that have been proposed to accomplish the national interests in relatively cost effective ways, with the recognition that safety and reliability contribute to cost-effectiveness. Related resources, including technology, propulsion test facilities, and manufacturing capabilities are also discussed.

14 CFR 1300.1 - Purpose.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... and Space AIR TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM STABILIZATION OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET AVIATION DISASTER RELIEF-AIR CARRIER GUARANTEE LOAN PROGRAM General § 1300.1 Purpose. This part is issued by the Office of Management and Budget, (OMB) pursuant to Title I of the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization...

14 CFR 1310.1 - Purpose and scope.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... Aeronautics and Space AIR TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM STABILIZATION AIR TRANSPORTATION STABILIZATION BOARD AIR... OF GUARANTEED LOAN § 1310.1 Purpose and scope. This part is issued by the Air Transportation Stabilization Board pursuant to Section 102(c)(2)(B) of the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization...

NASA Astronauts on Soyuz: Experience and Lessons for the Future

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

2010-01-01

The U. S., Russia, and, China have each addressed the question of human-rating spacecraft. NASA's operational experience with human-rating primarily resides with Mercury, Gemini, Apollo, Space Shuttle, and International Space Station. NASA s latest developmental experience includes Constellation, X38, X33, and the Orbital Space Plane. If domestic commercial crew vehicles are used to transport astronauts to and from space, Soyuz is another example of methods that could be used to human-rate a spacecraft and to work with commercial spacecraft providers. For Soyuz, NASA's normal assurance practices were adapted. Building on NASA's Soyuz experience, this report contends all past, present, and future vehicles rely on a range of methods and techniques for human-rating assurance, the components of which include: requirements, conceptual development, prototype evaluations, configuration management, formal development reviews (safety, design, operations), component/system ground-testing, integrated flight tests, independent assessments, and launch readiness reviews. When constraints (cost, schedule, international) limit the depth/breadth of one or more preferred assurance means, ways are found to bolster the remaining areas. This report provides information exemplifying the above safety assurance model for consideration with commercial or foreign-government-designed spacecraft. Topics addressed include: U.S./Soviet-Russian government/agency agreements and engineering/safety assessments performed with lessons learned in historic U.S./Russian joint space ventures

Model Transformation for a System of Systems Dependability Safety Case

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Murphy, Judy; Driskell, Stephen B.

2010-01-01

Software plays an increasingly larger role in all aspects of NASA's science missions. This has been extended to the identification, management and control of faults which affect safety-critical functions and by default, the overall success of the mission. Traditionally, the analysis of fault identification, management and control are hardware based. Due to the increasing complexity of system, there has been a corresponding increase in the complexity in fault management software. The NASA Independent Validation & Verification (IV&V) program is creating processes and procedures to identify, and incorporate safety-critical software requirements along with corresponding software faults so that potential hazards may be mitigated. This Specific to Generic ... A Case for Reuse paper describes the phases of a dependability and safety study which identifies a new, process to create a foundation for reusable assets. These assets support the identification and management of specific software faults and, their transformation from specific to generic software faults. This approach also has applications to other systems outside of the NASA environment. This paper addresses how a mission specific dependability and safety case is being transformed to a generic dependability and safety case which can be reused for any type of space mission with an emphasis on software fault conditions.

Study of industry requirements that can be fulfilled by combustion experimentation aboard space station

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Priem, Richard J.

1988-01-01

The purpose of this study is to define the requirements of commercially motivated microgravity combustion experiments and the optimal way for space station to accommodate these requirements. Representatives of commercial organizations, universities and government agencies were contacted. Interest in and needs for microgravity combustion studies are identified for commercial/industrial groups involved in fire safety with terrestrial applications, fire safety with space applications, propulsion and power, industrial burners, or pollution control. From these interests and needs experiments involving: (1) no flow with solid or liquid fuels; (2) homogeneous mixtures of fuel and air; (3) low flow with solid or liquid fuels; (4) low flow with gaseous fuel; (5) high pressure combustion; and (6) special burner systems are described and space station resource requirements for each type of experiment provided. Critical technologies involving the creation of a laboratory environment and methods for combining experimental needs into one experiment in order to obtain effective use of space station are discussed. Diagnostic techniques for monitoring combustion process parameters are identified.

Space nuclear power systems; Proceedings of the 8th Symposium, Albuquerque, NM, Jan. 6-10, 1991. Pts. 1-3

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

El-Genk, Mohamed S. (Editor); Hoover, Mark D. (Editor)

1991-01-01

The present conference discusses NASA mission planning for space nuclear power, lunar mission design based on nuclear thermal rockets, inertial-electrostatic confinement fusion for space power, nuclear risk analysis of the Ulysses mission, the role of the interface in refractory metal alloy composites, an advanced thermionic reactor systems design code, and space high power nuclear-pumped lasers. Also discussed are exploration mission enhancements with power-beaming, power requirement estimates for a nuclear-powered manned Mars rover, SP-100 reactor design, safety, and testing, materials compatibility issues for fabric composite radiators, application of the enabler to nuclear electric propulsion, orbit-transfer with TOPAZ-type power sources, the thermoelectric properties of alloys, ruthenium silicide as a promising thermoelectric material, and innovative space-saving device for high-temperature piping systems. The second volume of this conference discusses engine concepts for nuclear electric propulsion, nuclear technologies for human exploration of the solar system, dynamic energy conversion, direct nuclear propulsion, thermionic conversion technology, reactor and power system control, thermal management, thermionic research, effects of radiation on electronics, heat-pipe technology, radioisotope power systems, and nuclear fuels for power reactors. The third volume discusses space power electronics, space nuclear fuels for propulsion reactors, power systems concepts, space power electronics systems, the use of artificial intelligence in space, flight qualifications and testing, microgravity two-phase flow, reactor manufacturing and processing, and space and environmental effects.

14 CFR 27.1413 - Safety belts.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 1 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Safety belts. 27.1413 Section 27.1413 Aeronautics and Space FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AIRCRAFT AIRWORTHINESS STANDARDS: NORMAL CATEGORY ROTORCRAFT Equipment Safety Equipment § 27.1413 Safety belts. Each safety belt...

14 CFR 27.1413 - Safety belts.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 1 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safety belts. 27.1413 Section 27.1413 Aeronautics and Space FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AIRCRAFT AIRWORTHINESS STANDARDS: NORMAL CATEGORY ROTORCRAFT Equipment Safety Equipment § 27.1413 Safety belts. Each safety belt...

Formal Verification of Safety Properties for Aerospace Systems Through Algorithms Based on Exhaustive State-Space Exploration

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Ciardo, Gianfranco

2004-01-01

The Runway Safety Monitor (RSM) designed by Lockheed Martin is part of NASA's effort to reduce aviation accidents. We developed a Petri net model of the RSM protocol and used the model checking functions of our tool SMART to investigate a number of safety properties in RSM. To mitigate the impact of state-space explosion, we built a highly discretized model of the system, obtained by partitioning the monitored runway zone into a grid of smaller volumes and by considering scenarios involving only two aircraft. The model also assumes that there are no communication failures, such as bad input from radar or lack of incoming data, thus it relies on a consistent view of reality by all participants. In spite of these simplifications, we were able to expose potential problems in the RSM conceptual design. Our findings were forwarded to the design engineers, who undertook corrective action. Additionally, the results stress the efficiency attained by the new model checking algorithms implemented in SMART, and demonstrate their applicability to real-world systems. Attempts to verify RSM with NuSMV and SPIN have failed due to excessive memory consumption.

Assessment of Literature Related to Combustion Appliance Venting Systems

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Rapp, V. H.; Less, B. D.; Singer, B. C.

In many residential building retrofit programs, air tightening to increase energy efficiency is often constrained by safety concerns with naturally vented combustion appliances. Tighter residential buildings more readily depressurize when exhaust equipment is operated, making combustion appliances more prone to backdraft or spill combustion exhaust into the living space. Several measures, such as installation guidelines, vent sizing codes, and combustion safety diagnostics, are in place with the intent to prevent backdrafting and combustion spillage, but the diagnostics conflict and the risk mitigation objective is inconsistent. This literature review summarizes the metrics and diagnostics used to assess combustion safety, documents theirmore » technical basis, and investigates their risk mitigations. It compiles information from the following: codes for combustion appliance venting and installation; standards and guidelines for combustion safety diagnostics; research evaluating combustion safety diagnostics; research investigating wind effects on building depressurization and venting; and software for simulating vent system performance.« less

Power Extension Package (PEP) system definition extension, orbital service module systems analysis study. Volume 12: PEP data item descriptions

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

1979-01-01

Contractor information requirements necessary to support the power extension package project of the space shuttle program are specified for the following categories of data: project management; configuration management; systems engineering and test; manufacturing; reliability, quality assurance and safety; logistics; training; and operations.

Addressing the Influence of Space Weather on Airline Navigation

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Sparks, Lawrence

2012-01-01

The advent of satellite-based augmentation systems has made it possible to navigate aircraft safely using radio signals emitted by global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) such as the Global Positioning System. As a signal propagates through the earth's ionosphere, it suffers delay that is proportional to the total electron content encountered along the raypath. Since the magnitude of this total electron content is strongly influenced by space weather, the safety and reliability of GNSS for airline navigation requires continual monitoring of the state of the ionosphere and calibration of ionospheric delay. This paper examines the impact of space weather on GNSS-based navigation and provides an overview of how the Wide Area Augmentation System protects its users from positioning error due to ionospheric disturbances

Review of NASA programs in applying aerospace technology to energy

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Schwenk, F. C.

1981-01-01

NASA's role in energy research and development, with the aid of aerospace technology, is reviewed. A brief history, which began in 1974 with studies of solar energy systems on earth, is presented, and the major energy programs, consisting of over 60 different projects, are described, and include solar terrestrial systems, conservation and fossil energy systems, and space utilization systems. Special attention is given to the Satellite Power System and the isolation of nuclear wastes in space. Emerging prospects for NASA programs in energy technology include bioenergy, and ocean thermal energy conversion, coal extraction and conversion technologies, and support to the nuclear industry in power plant systems safety.

Summary of NASA Aerospace Flight Battery Systems Program activities

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Manzo, Michelle; Odonnell, Patricia

1994-01-01

A summary of NASA Aerospace Flight Battery Systems Program Activities is presented. The NASA Aerospace Flight Battery Systems Program represents a unified NASA wide effort with the overall objective of providing NASA with the policy and posture which will increase the safety, performance, and reliability of space power systems. The specific objectives of the program are to: enhance cell/battery safety and reliability; maintain current battery technology; increase fundamental understanding of primary and secondary cells; provide a means to bring forth advanced technology for flight use; assist flight programs in minimizing battery technology related flight risks; and ensure that safe, reliable batteries are available for NASA's future missions.

KSC-05PD-0175

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

2005-01-01

KENNEDY SPACE CENTER, FLA. In the Orbiter Processing Facility bay 3, workers oversee the lowering of the Orbiter Boom Sensor System (OBSS) on the starboard side of Discoverys payload bay. At lower right is the Remote Manipulator System (RMS), or Shuttle robotic arm. The 50-foot-long OBSS attaches to the RMS, and is one of the new safety measures for Return to Flight, equipping the orbiter with cameras and laser systems to inspect the Shuttles Thermal Protection System while in space. The Return to Flight mission, STS-114, has a launch window of May 12 to June 3, 2005.

KSC-04PD-0956

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

2004-01-01

KENNEDY SPACE CENTER, FLA. Mario Busacca, with the Safety, Occupational Health and Environmental Division, handles a snake at one of the exhibits for KSCs annual Environmental and Energy Awareness Week, held April 20-22. Presentations included Chemistry Safety, Cost-Effective Solar Applications, Non-Native Invasive Plant Identification and Control, Energy Efficient Lighting Systems, and Historical Changes in KSCs Ecosystems. The slogan for this years event was Today's Conservation Defines Tomorrow's Future.

International R&M/Safety Cooperation Lessons Learned Between NASA and JAXA

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Fernandez, Rene; Havenhill, Maria T.; Zampino, Edward J.; Kiefer, Dwayne E.

2013-01-01

Presented are a number of important experiences gained and lessons learned from the collaboration of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) on the CoNNeCT (Communications, Navigation, and Networking re-Configurable Testbed) project. Both space agencies worked on the CoNNeCT Project to design, assemble, test, integrate, and launch a communications testbed facility mounted onto the International Space Station (ISS) truss. At the 2012 RAMS, two papers about CoNNeCT were presented: one on Ground Support Equipment Reliability & System Safety, and the other one on combined application of System Safety & Reliability for the flight system. In addition to the logistics challenges present when two organizations are on the opposite side of the world, there is also a language barrier. The language barrier encompasses not only the different alphabet, it encompasses the social interactions; these were addressed by techniques presented in the paper. The differences in interpretation and application of Spaceflight Requirements will be discussed in this paper. Although many, but definitely not all, of JAXA's Spaceflight Requirements were inspired by NASA, there were significant and critically important differences in how they were interpreted and applied. This paper intends to summarize which practices worked and which did not for an international collaborative effort so that future missions may benefit from our experiences. The CoNNeCT flight system has been successfully assembled, integrated, tested, shipped, launched and installed on the ISS without incident. This demonstrates that the steps taken to facilitate international understanding, communication, and coordination were successful and warrant discussion as lessons learned.

Fault Injection Validation of a Safety-Critical TMR Sysem

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Irrera, Ivano; Madeira, Henrique; Zentai, Andras; Hergovics, Beata

2016-08-01

Digital systems and their software are the core technology for controlling and monitoring industrial systems in practically all activity domains. Functional safety standards such as the European standard EN 50128 for railway applications define the procedures and technical requirements for the development of software for railway control and protection systems. The validation of such systems is a highly demanding task. In this paper we discuss the use of fault injection techniques, which have been used extensively in several domains, particularly in the space domain, to complement the traditional procedures to validate a SIL (Safety Integrity Level) 4 system for railway signalling, implementing a TMR (Triple Modular Redundancy) architecture. The fault injection tool is based on JTAG technology. The results of our injection campaign showed a high degree of tolerance to most of the injected faults, but several cases of unexpected behaviour have also been observed, helping understanding worst-case scenarios.

14 CFR 431.33 - Safety organization.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Safety organization. 431.33 Section 431.33 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF... for all mission decisions that may affect public safety. Lines of communication within the applicant's...

14 CFR 431.33 - Safety organization.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Safety organization. 431.33 Section 431.33 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF... for all mission decisions that may affect public safety. Lines of communication within the applicant's...

14 CFR 431.71 - Public safety responsibility.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Public safety responsibility. 431.71 Section 431.71 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION... Requirements-Reusable Launch Vehicle Mission License Terms and Conditions § 431.71 Public safety responsibility...

14 CFR 431.71 - Public safety responsibility.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Public safety responsibility. 431.71 Section 431.71 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION... Requirements-Reusable Launch Vehicle Mission License Terms and Conditions § 431.71 Public safety responsibility...

14 CFR 431.71 - Public safety responsibility.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Public safety responsibility. 431.71 Section 431.71 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION... Requirements-Reusable Launch Vehicle Mission License Terms and Conditions § 431.71 Public safety responsibility...

14 CFR 431.33 - Safety organization.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Safety organization. 431.33 Section 431.33 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF... for all mission decisions that may affect public safety. Lines of communication within the applicant's...

14 CFR 417.7 - Public safety responsibility.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Public safety responsibility. 417.7 Section 417.7 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION... safety responsibility. A launch operator is responsible for ensuring the safe conduct of a licensed...

14 CFR 417.7 - Public safety responsibility.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Public safety responsibility. 417.7 Section 417.7 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION... safety responsibility. A launch operator is responsible for ensuring the safe conduct of a licensed...

Analysis of microgravity space experiments Space Shuttle programmatic safety requirements

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Terlep, Judith A.

1996-01-01

This report documents the results of an analysis of microgravity space experiments space shuttle programmatic safety requirements and recommends the creation of a Safety Compliance Data Package (SCDP) Template for both flight and ground processes. These templates detail the programmatic requirements necessary to produce a complete SCDP. The templates were developed from various NASA centers' requirement documents, previously written guidelines on safety data packages, and from personal experiences. The templates are included in the back as part of this report.

Safety Assessment of Multi Purpose Small Payload Rack(MSPR)

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Mizutani, Yoshinobu; Takada, Satomi; Murata, Kosei; Ozawa, Daisaku; Kobayashi, Ryoji; Nakamura, Yasuhiro

2010-09-01

We are reporting summary of preliminary safety assessment for Multi Purpose Small Payload Rack(MSPR), which is one of the micro gravity experiment facilities that are being developed for the 2nd phase JEM utilization(JEM: Japanese Experiment Module) that will be launched on H-II Transfer Vehicle(HTV) 2nd flight in 2011. MSPR is used for multi-purpose micro-g experiment providing experimental spaces and work stations. MSPR has three experimental spaces; first, there is a space called Work Volume(WV) with capacity volume of approximately 350 litters, in which multiple resources including electricity, communication, and moving image functions can be used. Within this space, installation of devices can be done by simple, prompt attachment by Velcro and pins with high degree of flexibility. Second, there is Small Experiment Area(SEA), with capacity volume of approximately 70 litters, in which electricity, communication, and moving image functions can also be used in the same way as WV. These spaces protect experiment devices and specimens from contingent loads by the crewmembers. Third, there is Work Bench with area of 0.5 square meters, on which can be used for maintenance, inspection and data operations of installed devices, etc. This bench can be stored in the rack during contingency. Chamber for Combustion Experiment(CCE) that is planned to be installed in WV is a pressure-resistant experimental container that can be used to seal hazardous materials from combustion experiments. This CCE has double sealing design in chamber itself, which resist gas leakage under normal the temperature and pressure. Electricity, communication, moving image function can be used in the same way as WV. JAXA Phase 2 Safety Review Panel(SRP) has been held in April, 2010. For safety analysis of MSPR, hazards were identified based on Fault Tree Analysis methodology and then these hazards were classified into either eight ISS standard-type hazards or eight unique-type hazards that requires special controls based on ISS common safety assessment methodology. Safety evaluation results are reported in the Safety Assessment Report(SAR) 1). Regarding structural failure, unique hazards are especially evaluated considering not only the tolerance for launch load but also load by crewmembers or orbital loads. Regarding electrical shock, electricity design up to secondary power is evaluated in unique hazard from a view point of Electrical design suitable for high voltage(32VDC or more) circuit. Regarding rupture/leakage of pressure system, hazards of fuel supply line, waste line for combustion gas, and pressure system including CCE are evaluated. Also evaluation for contamination due to hazardous gas leakage from CCE is conducted. External propagation of fire from CCE is also evaluated. In this report, we will show the overview of the result of safety assessment and future plan toward critical design phase activity.

National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) Partnered Development of Cryogenic Life Support Technologies

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Bush, David R.

2017-01-01

Cryogenic life support technology, used by NASA to protect crews working around hazardous gases soon could be called on for a number of life-saving applications as well as the agency's new human spaceflight endeavors. This technology under development in Kennedy Space Center's Biomedical Laboratory has the potential to store more than twice the amount of breathable air than traditional compressed gas systems. The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) is contributing to the funding for this project in the hopes that the liquid air-based systems could change the way workers dependent on life support technologies accomplish their mission, improving their safety and efficiency.

Automation of closed environments in space for human comfort and safety

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Cogley, Allen C.; Tucker, Nathan P.

1992-01-01

For prolonged missions into space and colonization outside the Earth's atmosphere, development of Environmental Control and Life Support Systems (ECLSS) are essential to provide astronauts with habitable environments. The Kansas State University Advanced Design Team have researched and designed a control system for an ECLSS like that on Space Station Freedom. The following milestones have been accomplished: (1) completed computer simulation of the CO2 Removal Assembly; (2) created a set of rules for the expert control system of the CO2 Removal Assembly; (3) created a classical controls system for the CO2 Removal Assembly; (4) established a means of communication between the mathematical model and the two controls systems; and (5) analyzed the dynamic response of the simulation and compared the two methods of control.

Safety of High Speed Guided Ground Transportation Systems : Intrusion Barrier Design Study

DOT National Transportation Integrated Search

1994-11-01

This report presents a study on the development of anti-intrusion systems that will perform the function of preventing a derailed railroad car or an errant highway vehicle or some type of dislodged load from intruding into the operational space of th...

NPOESS C3S Expandability: SafetyNet(TM) and McMurdo Improvements

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Paciaroni, J.; Jamilkowski, M. L.

2009-12-01

The National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Department of Defense (DoD), and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) are jointly acquiring the next-generation weather and environmental satellite system; the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS). NPOESS replaces the current Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites (POES) managed by NOAA and the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) managed by the DoD. The NPOESS satellites carry a suite of sensors that collect meteorological, oceanographic, climatological, and solar-geophysical observations of the earth, atmosphere, and space. The command and telemetry portion of NPOESS is the Command, Control and Communications Segment (C3S), developed by Raytheon Intelligence & Information Systems. C3S is responsible for managing the overall NPOESS mission from control and status of the space and ground assets to ensuring delivery of timely, high quality data from the Space Segment (SS) to the Interface Data Processing Segment (IDPS) for processing. In addition, the C3S provides the globally distributed ground assets necessary to collect and transport mission, telemetry, and command data between the satellites and the processing locations. The C3S provides all functions required for day-to-day commanding and state-of-health monitoring of the NPP and NPOESS satellites, and delivery of Stored Mission Data (SMD) to each U.S. Weather Central Interface Data Processor (IDP) for data products development and transfer to System subscribers. The C3S also monitors and reports system-wide health and status and data communications with external systems and between the NPOESS segments. Two crucial elements of NPOESS C3S expandability are SafetyNet(TM) and communications improvements to McMurdo Station, Antarctica. ‘SafetyNet(TM)’ is a key feature of the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS), vital element of the C3S and Northrop Grumman Space Technology patented data collection architecture. The centerpiece of SafetyNet(TM) is the system of fifteen globally-distributed ground receptors developed by Raytheon Company. These receptors or antennae will collect up to five times as much environmental data approximately four times faster than current polar-orbiting weather satellites. Once collected, these data will be forwarded near-instantaneously to U.S. weather centrals via global fiber optic network for processing and production of data records for use in environmental prediction models. In January 2008, Raytheon Company achieved a significant milestone for the NPOESS program by successfully completing the first phase of a major communications upgrade for Antarctica. The upgrade of the off-continent satellite communications link at McMurdo Station more than tripled the bandwidth available for scientific research, weather prediction, and health and safety of those stationed at McMurdo. The project is part of the company’s C3S under development for NPOESS. This upgrade paves the way for a second major communications upgrade planned for 2012 in preparation for the use of McMurdo Station as one of the 15 NPOESS ground stations worldwide that will be receiving environmental data collected by the NPOESS satellites.

The Evolution of the NASA Commercial Crew Program Mission Assurance Process

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Canfield, Amy C.

2016-01-01

In 2010, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) established the Commercial Crew Program (CCP) in order to provide human access to the International Space Station and low Earth orbit via the commercial (non-governmental) sector. A particular challenge to NASA has been how to determine that the Commercial Provider's transportation system complies with programmatic safety requirements. The process used in this determination is the Safety Technical Review Board which reviews and approves provider submitted hazard reports. One significant product of the review is a set of hazard control verifications. In past NASA programs, 100% of these safety critical verifications were typically confirmed by NASA. The traditional Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) model does not support the nature of the CCP. To that end, NASA S&MA is implementing a Risk Based Assurance process to determine which hazard control verifications require NASA authentication. Additionally, a Shared Assurance Model is also being developed to efficiently use the available resources to execute the verifications.

History of remote operations and robotics in nuclear facilities

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Herndon, J.N.

1992-01-01

The field of remote technology is continuing to evolve to support man's efforts to perform tasks in hostile environments. Remote technology has roots which reach into the early history of man. Fireplace pokers, blacksmith's tongs, and periscopes are examples of the beginnings of remote technology. The technology which we recognize today has evolved over the last 45-plus years to support human operations in hostile environments such as nuclear fission and fusion, space, underwater, hazardous chemical, and hazardous manufacturing. The four major categories of approach to remote technology have been (1) protective clothing and equipment for direct human entry, (2) extendedmore » reach tools using distance for safety, (3) telemanipulators with barriers for safety, and (4) teleoperators incorporating mobility with distance and/or barriers for safety. The government and commercial nuclear industry has driven the development of the majority of the actual teleoperator hardware available today. This hardware has been developed due to the unsatisfactory performance of the protective-clothing approach in many hostile applications. Systems which have been developed include crane/impact wrench systems, unilateral power manipulators, mechanical master/slaves, and servomanipulators. Work for space applications has been primarily research oriented with few successful space applications, although the shuttle's remote manipulator system has been successful. In the last decade, underwater applications have moved forward significantly, with the offshore oil industry and military applications providing the primary impetus. This document consists of viewgraphs and subtitled figures.« less

17. NBS TOOL ROOM. MISCELLANEOUS TOOLS USED DURING EXTRA VEHICULAR ...

Library of Congress Historic Buildings Survey, Historic Engineering Record, Historic Landscapes Survey

17. NBS TOOL ROOM. MISCELLANEOUS TOOLS USED DURING EXTRA VEHICULAR ACTIVITY (EVA) MISSIONS AND NBS TRAINING. FROM LEFT TO RIGHT THE TOOLS ARE: SHUTTLE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM (STS) PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT (PFR), ESSEX WRENCH, SOCKET WRENCH, SAFETY TETHER REEL (LEFT REAR), MINI WORKSTATION (CENTER REAR), TETHERS (FRONT CENTER), HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE (HST) POWER TOOL (FRONT RIGHT), HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE & PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT (REAR RIGHT). - Marshall Space Flight Center, Neutral Buoyancy Simulator Facility, Rideout Road, Huntsville, Madison County, AL

Space Station Environmental Health System water quality monitoring

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Vincze, Johanna E.; Sauer, Richard L.

1990-01-01

One of the unique aspects of the Space Station is that it will be a totally encapsulated environment and the air and water supplies will be reclaimed for reuse. The Environmental Health System, a subsystem of CHeCS (Crew Health Care System), must monitor the air and water on board the Space Station Freedom to verify that the quality is adequate for crew safety. Specifically, the Water Quality Subsystem will analyze the potable and hygiene water supplies regularly for organic, inorganic, particulate, and microbial contamination. The equipment selected to perform these analyses will be commercially available instruments which will be converted for use on board the Space Station Freedom. Therefore, the commercial hardware will be analyzed to identify the gravity dependent functions and modified to eliminate them. The selection, analysis, and conversion of the off-the-shelf equipment for monitoring the Space Station reclaimed water creates a challenging project for the Water Quality engineers and scientists.

China national space remote sensing infrastructure and its application

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Li, Ming

2016-07-01

Space Infrastructure is a space system that provides communication, navigation and remote sensing service for broad users. China National Space Remote Sensing Infrastructure includes remote sensing satellites, ground system and related systems. According to the principle of multiple-function on one satellite, multiple satellites in one constellation and collaboration between constellations, series of land observation, ocean observation and atmosphere observation satellites have been suggested to have high, middle and low resolution and fly on different orbits and with different means of payloads to achieve a high ability for global synthetically observation. With such an infrastructure, we can carry out the research on climate change, geophysics global surveying and mapping, water resources management, safety and emergency management, and so on. I This paper gives a detailed introduction about the planning of this infrastructure and its application in different area, especially the international cooperation potential in the so called One Belt and One Road space information corridor.

FY 2001 and Beyond Program Plan

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Bowles, Dave

2000-01-01

The scope of the project summarized in this viewgraph presentation is to develop and demonstrate third generation airframe technologies that provide significant reductions in cost of space transportation systems while dramatically improving the safety and higher operability of those systems. The Earth-to-orbit goal is to conduct research and technology development and demonstrations which will enable US industry to increase safety by four orders of magnitude (loss of vehicle/crew probability less than 1 in 1,000,000 missions) and reduce costs by two orders of magnitude within 25 years.

Operations analysis (study 2.1). Contingency analysis. [of failure modes anticipated during space shuttle upper stage planning

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

1974-01-01

Future operational concepts for the space transportation system were studied in terms of space shuttle upper stage failure contingencies possible during deployment, retrieval, or space servicing of automated satellite programs. Problems anticipated during mission planning were isolated using a modified 'fault tree' technique, normally used in safety analyses. A comprehensive space servicing hazard analysis is presented which classifies possible failure modes under the catagories of catastrophic collision, failure to rendezvous and dock, servicing failure, and failure to undock. The failure contingencies defined are to be taken into account during design of the upper stage.

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

1992-01-01

The results of the Panel's activities are presented in a set of findings and recommendations. Highlighted here are both improvements in NASA's safety and reliability activities and specific areas where additional gains might be realized. One area of particular concern involves the curtailment or elimination of Space Shuttle safety and reliability enhancements. Several findings and recommendations address this area of concern, reflecting the opinion that safety and reliability enhancements are essential to the continued successful operation of the Space Shuttle. It is recommended that a comprehensive and continuing program of safety and reliability improvements in all areas of Space Shuttle hardware/software be considered an inherent component of ongoing Space Shuttle operations.

Panel summary of recommendations

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Dunbar, Bonnie J.; Coleman, Martin E.; Mitchell, Kenneth L.

1990-01-01

The following Space Station internal contamination topics were addressed: past flight experience (Skylab and Spacelab missions); present flight activities (Spacelabs and Soviet Space Station Mir); future activities (materials science and life science experiments); Space Station capabilities (PPMS, FMS, ECLSS, and U.S. Laboratory overview); manned systems/crew safety; internal contamination detection; contamination control - stowage and handling; and contamination control - waste gas processing. Space Station design assumptions are discussed. Issues and concerns are discussed as they relate to (1) policy and management, (2) subsystem design, (3) experiment design, and (4) internal contamination detection and control. The recommendations generated are summarized.

14 CFR 431.5 - Policy and safety approvals.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Policy and safety approvals. 431.5 Section 431.5 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION... Policy and safety approvals. To obtain either type of RLV mission license, an applicant must obtain...

14 CFR 431.5 - Policy and safety approvals.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Policy and safety approvals. 431.5 Section 431.5 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION... Policy and safety approvals. To obtain either type of RLV mission license, an applicant must obtain...

14 CFR 431.5 - Policy and safety approvals.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Policy and safety approvals. 431.5 Section 431.5 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION... Policy and safety approvals. To obtain either type of RLV mission license, an applicant must obtain...

14 CFR 431.5 - Policy and safety approvals.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Policy and safety approvals. 431.5 Section 431.5 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION... Policy and safety approvals. To obtain either type of RLV mission license, an applicant must obtain...

14 CFR 431.5 - Policy and safety approvals.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Policy and safety approvals. 431.5 Section 431.5 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION... Policy and safety approvals. To obtain either type of RLV mission license, an applicant must obtain...

14 CFR 417.401 - Scope.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH SAFETY Ground Safety § 417.401 Scope. This subpart contains public safety.... Ground safety requirements in this subpart apply to activities performed by, or on behalf of, a launch...

Annual Report to the NASA Administrator by the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel on the Space Shuttle Program. Part 2: Summary of Information Developed in the Panel's Fact-Finding Activities

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

1977-01-01

The panel focused its attention on those areas that are considered most significant for flight success and safety. Elements required for the Approach and Landing Test Program, the Orbital Flight Test Program, and those management systems and their implementation which directly affect safety, reliability, and quality control, were investigated. Ground facilities and the training programs for the ground and flight crews were studied. Of special interest was the orbiter thermal protection subsystems.

The Advanced Technology Development Center (ATDC)

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Clements, G. R.; Willcoxon, R. (Technical Monitor)

2001-01-01

NASA is building the Advanced Technology Development Center (ATDC) to provide a 'national resource' for the research, development, demonstration, testing, and qualification of Spaceport and Range Technologies. The ATDC will be located at Space Launch Complex 20 (SLC-20) at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station (CCAFS) in Florida. SLC-20 currently provides a processing and launch capability for small-scale rockets; this capability will be augmented with additional ATDC facilities to provide a comprehensive and integrated in situ environment. Examples of Spaceport Technologies that will be supported by ATDC infrastructure include densified cryogenic systems, intelligent automated umbilicals, integrated vehicle health management systems, next-generation safety systems, and advanced range systems. The ATDC can be thought of as a prototype spaceport where industry, government, and academia, in partnership, can work together to improve safety of future space initiatives. The ATDC is being deployed in five separate phases. Major ATDC facilities will include a Liquid Oxygen Area; a Liquid Hydrogen Area, a Liquid Nitrogen Area, and a multipurpose Launch Mount; 'Iron Rocket' Test Demonstrator; a Processing Facility with a Checkout and Control System; and Future Infrastructure Developments. Initial ATDC development will be completed in 2006.