Emerging behavior in electronic bidding.

PubMed

Yang, I; Jeong, H; Kahng, B; Barabási, A-L

2003-07-01

We characterize the statistical properties of a large number of agents on two major online auction sites. The measurements indicate that the total number of bids placed in a single category and the number of distinct auctions frequented by a given agent follow power-law distributions, implying that a few agents are responsible for a significant fraction of the total bidding activity on the online market. We find that these agents exert an unproportional influence on the final price of the auctioned items. This domination of online auctions by an unusually active minority may be a generic feature of all online mercantile processes.

Emerging behavior in electronic bidding

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Yang, I.; Jeong, H.; Kahng, B.; Barabási, A.-L.

2003-07-01

We characterize the statistical properties of a large number of agents on two major online auction sites. The measurements indicate that the total number of bids placed in a single category and the number of distinct auctions frequented by a given agent follow power-law distributions, implying that a few agents are responsible for a significant fraction of the total bidding activity on the online market. We find that these agents exert an unproportional influence on the final price of the auctioned items. This domination of online auctions by an unusually active minority may be a generic feature of all online mercantile processes.

31 CFR 356.11 - How are bids submitted in an auction?

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-07-01

..., our computer time stamp will establish the receipt time. You are bound by your bids after the closing... failures or disruptions of equipment or communications facilities used for participating in Treasury auctions. (4) Submitters are responsible for bids submitted using computer equipment on their premises...

31 CFR 356.11 - How are bids submitted in an auction?

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-07-01

..., our computer time stamp will establish the receipt time. You are bound by your bids after the closing... failures or disruptions of equipment or communications facilities used for participating in Treasury auctions. (4) Submitters are responsible for bids submitted using computer equipment on their premises...

A False-name-Proof Double Auction Protocol for Arbitrary Evaluation Values

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Sakurai, Yuko; Yokoo, Makoto

We develop a new false-name-proof double auction protocol called the Generalized Threshold Price Double auction (GTPD) protocol. False-name-proofness generalizes strategy-proofness by incorporating the possibility of false-name bids, e.g., bids submitted using multiple e-mail addresses. An existing protocol called TPD protocol is false-name-proof but can handle only the cases where marginal utilities of each agent always decrease, while our new GTPD protocol can handle arbitrary evaluation values. When marginal utilities can increase, some bids cannot be divided into a single unit (e.g., an all-or-nothing bid). Due to the existence of such indivisible bids, meeting supply/demand becomes difficult. Furthermore, a seller/buyer can submit a false-name-bid by pretending to be a potential buyer/seller to manipulate allocations and payments. In the GTPD protocol, the auctioneer is required to absorb the supply-demand imbalance up to a given upper-bound. Also, the GTPD incorporate a new false-name-proof one-sided auction protocol that is guaranteed to sell/buy a certain number of units. Simulation results show that when the threshold price is set appropriately, this protocol can obtain a good social surplus, and the number of absorbed units is much smaller than the given upper-bound.

78 FR 11179 - Auction of Lower and Upper Paging Bands Licenses Scheduled for July 16, 2013; Comment Sought on...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-02-15

... investigating and evaluating all technical and marketplace factors that may have a bearing on the value of the... cooperate, collaborate, or communicate, including discussing bids, bidding strategies, or post-auction... schedule in order to foster an auction pace that reasonably balances speed with the bidders' need to study...

Competition strength influences individual preferences in an auction game

PubMed Central

Toelch, Ulf; Jubera-Garcia, Esperanza; Kurth-Nelson, Zeb; Dolan, Raymond J.

2014-01-01

Competitive interactions between individuals are ubiquitous in human societies. Auctions represent an institutionalized context for these interactions, a context where individuals frequently make non-optimal decisions. In particular, competition in auctions can lead to overbidding, resulting in the so-called winner’s curse, often explained by invoking emotional arousal. In this study, we investigated an alternative possibility, namely that competitors’ bids are construed as a source of information about the good’s common value thereby influencing an individuals’ private value estimate. We tested this hypothesis by asking participants to bid in a repeated all-pay auction game for five different real items. Crucially, participants had to rank the auction items for their preference before and after the experiment. We observed a clear relation between auction dynamics and preference change. We found that low competition reduced preference while high competition increased preference. Our findings support a view that competitors’ bids in auction games are perceived as valid social signal for the common value of an item. We suggest that this influence of social information constitutes a major cause for the frequently observed deviations from optimality in auctions. PMID:25168161

Biological auctions with multiple rewards

PubMed Central

Reiter, Johannes G.; Kanodia, Ayush; Gupta, Raghav; Nowak, Martin A.; Chatterjee, Krishnendu

2015-01-01

The competition for resources among cells, individuals or species is a fundamental characteristic of evolution. Biological all-pay auctions have been used to model situations where multiple individuals compete for a single resource. However, in many situations multiple resources with various values exist and single reward auctions are not applicable. We generalize the model to multiple rewards and study the evolution of strategies. In biological all-pay auctions the bid of an individual corresponds to its strategy and is equivalent to its payment in the auction. The decreasingly ordered rewards are distributed according to the decreasingly ordered bids of the participating individuals. The reproductive success of an individual is proportional to its fitness given by the sum of the rewards won minus its payments. Hence, successful bidding strategies spread in the population. We find that the results for the multiple reward case are very different from the single reward case. While the mixed strategy equilibrium in the single reward case with more than two players consists of mostly low-bidding individuals, we show that the equilibrium can convert to many high-bidding individuals and a few low-bidding individuals in the multiple reward case. Some reward values lead to a specialization among the individuals where one subpopulation competes for the rewards and the other subpopulation largely avoids costly competitions. Whether the mixed strategy equilibrium is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) depends on the specific values of the rewards. PMID:26180069

TACtic- A Multi Behavioral Agent for Trading Agent Competition

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Khosravi, Hassan; Shiri, Mohammad E.; Khosravi, Hamid; Iranmanesh, Ehsan; Davoodi, Alireza

Software agents are increasingly being used to represent humans in online auctions. Such agents have the advantages of being able to systematically monitor a wide variety of auctions and then make rapid decisions about what bids to place in what auctions. They can do this continuously and repetitively without losing concentration. To provide a means of evaluating and comparing (benchmarking) research methods in this area the trading agent competition (TAC) was established. This paper describes the design, of TACtic. Our agent uses multi behavioral techniques at the heart of its decision making to make bidding decisions in the face of uncertainty, to make predictions about the likely outcomes of auctions, and to alter the agent's bidding strategy in response to the prevailing market conditions.

10 CFR 452.5 - Bidding procedures.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... OF ENERGY ENERGY CONSERVATION PRODUCTION INCENTIVES FOR CELLULOSIC BIOFUELS § 452.5 Bidding... producer auction process open only to pre-auction eligible cellulosic biofuels producers. The following... cellulosic biofuels producers during the open window established in the solicitation. The open window shall...

10 CFR 452.5 - Bidding procedures.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... OF ENERGY ENERGY CONSERVATION PRODUCTION INCENTIVES FOR CELLULOSIC BIOFUELS § 452.5 Bidding... producer auction process open only to pre-auction eligible cellulosic biofuels producers. The following... cellulosic biofuels producers during the open window established in the solicitation. The open window shall...

10 CFR 452.5 - Bidding procedures.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... OF ENERGY ENERGY CONSERVATION PRODUCTION INCENTIVES FOR CELLULOSIC BIOFUELS § 452.5 Bidding... producer auction process open only to pre-auction eligible cellulosic biofuels producers. The following... cellulosic biofuels producers during the open window established in the solicitation. The open window shall...

10 CFR 452.5 - Bidding procedures.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... OF ENERGY ENERGY CONSERVATION PRODUCTION INCENTIVES FOR CELLULOSIC BIOFUELS § 452.5 Bidding... producer auction process open only to pre-auction eligible cellulosic biofuels producers. The following... cellulosic biofuels producers during the open window established in the solicitation. The open window shall...

Green auctions and reduction of information rents in payments for environmental services: an experimental investigation in Sunan County, northwestern China.

PubMed

Deng, Xiaohong; Xu, Zhongmin

2015-01-01

Reducing information rents is an important task for government agencies wishing to purchase maximal environmental services with limited budgets. This paper reports on several green auction options for reducing information rents and improving the performance of the "Grain for Green" Payments for environmental services (PES) program implemented in northwestern China. In r experimental auctions and investigations, door-to-door interviews were conducted and bidding envelopes and survey questionnaires were used to determine the offers and the foregone profits of the participants. Three scenarios are analyzed in this paper: a uniform price auction, a discriminatory price auction, and an opportunity-cost system. The results show that compared to the uniform price auction system, the other auction systems can increase the cost-effectiveness of conservation contracting. Competitive bidding can reveal true opportunity costs and can reduce information rents extracted from the government by farmers using private information. The demographics and average bids of these auction types were also analyzed. "Perfect information" in the opportunity-cost offer system has the best performance but is very hard to implement in reality. The results of this research show that the auction is a valuable tool for purchasing conservation contracts in northwestern China, but that in the future, the performance of these auctions should be studied with relaxed model assumptions.

Green Auctions and Reduction of Information Rents in Payments for Environmental Services: An Experimental Investigation in Sunan County, Northwestern China

PubMed Central

Deng, Xiaohong; Xu, Zhongmin

2015-01-01

Reducing information rents is an important task for government agencies wishing to purchase maximal environmental services with limited budgets. This paper reports on several green auction options for reducing information rents and improving the performance of the “Grain for Green” Payments for environmental services (PES) program implemented in northwestern China. In r experimental auctions and investigations, door-to-door interviews were conducted and bidding envelopes and survey questionnaires were used to determine the offers and the foregone profits of the participants. Three scenarios are analyzed in this paper: a uniform price auction, a discriminatory price auction, and an opportunity-cost system. The results show that compared to the uniform price auction system, the other auction systems can increase the cost-effectiveness of conservation contracting. Competitive bidding can reveal true opportunity costs and can reduce information rents extracted from the government by farmers using private information. The demographics and average bids of these auction types were also analyzed. “Perfect information” in the opportunity-cost offer system has the best performance but is very hard to implement in reality. The results of this research show that the auction is a valuable tool for purchasing conservation contracts in northwestern China, but that in the future, the performance of these auctions should be studied with relaxed model assumptions. PMID:25793263

Identification of shareholder ethics and responsibilities in online reverse auctions for construction projects.

PubMed

Hatipkarasulu, Yilmaz; Gill, James H

2004-04-01

The increasing number of companies providing internet services and auction tools helped popularize the online reverse auction trend for purchasing commodities and services in the last decade. As a result, a number of owners, both public and private, accepted the online reverse auctions as the bidding technique for their construction projects. Owners, while trying to minimize their costs for construction projects, are also required to address their ethical responsibilities to the shareholders. In the case of online reverse auctions for construction projects, the ethical issues involved in the bidding technique directly reflects on the owner's ethical and social responsibilities to their shareholders. The goal of this paper is to identify the shareholder ethics and responsibilities in online reverse auctions for construction projects by analyzing the ethical issues for the parties involved in the process. The identification of the ethical issues and responsibilities requires clear definition and understanding of professional ethics and the roles of the involved parties. In this paper, first, the concept of professional ethics and social responsibility is described in a general form. To illustrate the ethical issues and responsibilities, a sample case of bidding for a construction project using online reverse auction techniques is presented in which the shareholders were actively involved in questioning the ethical issues. The issues involved in the bidding process and their reflection on the shareholder responsibilities are described and analyzed for each stage of the process. A brief discussion of the overall process is also included to address the general ethical issues involved in online reverse auctions.

Essays on empirical analysis of multi-unit auctions: Impacts of financial transmission rights on the restructured electricity industry

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Zang, Hailing

This dissertation uses recently developed empirical methodologies for the study of multi-unit auctions to test the impacts of Financial Transmission Rights (FTRs) on the competitiveness of restructured electricity markets. FTRs are a special type of financial option that hedge against volatility in the cost of transporting electricity over the grid. Policy makers seek to use the prices of FTRs as market signals to incentivize efficient investment and utilization of transmission capacity. However, prices will not send the correct signals if market participants strategically use FTRs. This dissertation uses data from the Texas electricity market to test whether the prices of FTRs are efficient to achieve such goals. The auctions studied are multi-unit, uniform-price, sealed-bid auctions. The first part of the dissertation studies the auctions on the spot market of the wholesale electricity industry. I derive structural empirical models to test theoretical predictions as to whether bidders fully internalize the effect of FTRs on profits into their bidding decisions. I find that bidders are learning as to how to optimally bid above marginal cost for their inframarginal capacities. The bidders also learn to bid to include FTRs into their profit maximization problem during the course of the first year. But starting from the second year, they deviated from optimal bidding that includes FTRs in the profit maximization problems. Counterfactual analysis show that the primary effect of FTRs on market outcomes is changing the level of prices rather than production efficiency. Finally, I find that in most months, the current allocations of FTRs are statistically equivalent to the optimal allocations. The second part of the dissertation studies the bidding behavior in the FTR auctions. I find that FTRs' strategic impact on the FTR purchasing behavior is significant for large bidders---firms exercising market power in the FTR auctions. Second, trader forecasts future FTR credit very accurately while large generators' forecasts of future FTR credit tends to be biased upward. Finally, the bid shading patterns are consistent with theoretical predictions and support the existence of common values.

An economic and feasible Quantum Sealed-bid Auction protocol

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Zhang, Rui; Shi, Run-hua; Qin, Jia-qi; Peng, Zhen-wan

2018-02-01

We present an economic and feasible Quantum Sealed-bid Auction protocol using quantum secure direct communication based on single photons in both the polarization and the spatial-mode degrees of freedom, where each single photon can carry two bits of classical information. Compared with previous protocols, our protocol has higher efficiency. In addition, we propose a secure post-confirmation mechanism without quantum entanglement to guarantee the security and the fairness of the auction.

Statistical Properties of Online Auctions

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Namazi, Alireza; Schadschneider, Andreas

We characterize the statistical properties of a large number of online auctions run on eBay. Both stationary and dynamic properties, like distributions of prices, number of bids etc., as well as relations between these quantities are studied. The analysis of the data reveals surprisingly simple distributions and relations, typically of power-law form. Based on these findings we introduce a simple method to identify suspicious auctions that could be influenced by a form of fraud known as shill bidding. Furthermore the influence of bidding strategies is discussed. The results indicate that the observed behavior is related to a mixture of agents using a variety of strategies.

Physical contact influences how much people pay at celebrity auctions.

PubMed

Newman, George E; Bloom, Paul

2014-03-11

Contagion is a form of magical thinking in which people believe that a person's immaterial qualities or essence can be transferred to an object through physical contact. Here we investigate how a belief in contagion influences the sale of celebrity memorabilia. Using data from three high-profile estate auctions, we find that people's expectations about the amount of physical contact between the object and the celebrity positively predicts the final bids for items that belonged to well-liked individuals (e.g., John F. Kennedy) and negatively predicts final bids for items that belonged to disliked individuals (e.g., Bernard Madoff). A follow-up experiment further suggests that these effects are driven by contagion beliefs: when asked to bid on a sweater owned by a well-liked celebrity, participants report that they would pay substantially less if it was sterilized before they received it. However, sterilization increases the amount they would pay for a sweater owned by a disliked celebrity. These studies suggest that magical thinking may still have effects in contemporary Western societies and they provide some unique demonstrations of contagion effects on real-world purchase decisions.

78 FR 72081 - Closed Auction of AM Broadcast Construction Permits Scheduled for May 6, 2014; Comment Sought on...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-12-02

... Broadcast Construction Permits Scheduled for May 6, 2014; Comment Sought on Competitive Bidding Procedures... announces the auction of certain AM broadcast construction permits. Auction 84 will be a ``closed'' auction..., New York. II. Construction Permits In Auction 84 2. The Bureaus will proceed to auction for 22 new...

31 CFR 356.12 - What are the different types of bids and do they have specific requirements or restrictions?

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... the specific security being auctioned; (ii) For which the security being auctioned is one of several... increments. The third decimal must be either a zero or a five, for example, 5.320 or 5.325. We will treat any missing decimals as zero, for example, a bid of 5.32 will be treated as 5.320. The rate bid may be a...

A Robust Open Ascending-price Multi-unit Auction Protocol against False-name Bids

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Iwasaki, Atsushi; Yokoo, Makoto; Terada, Kenji

This paper develops a new ascending-price multi-unit auction protocol that has following characteristics: (i) it has an open format, (ii) sincere bidding is an equilibrium strategy even if the marginal utilities of each agent can increase and agents can submit false-name bids. False-name bids are bids submitted under fictitious names such as multiple e-mail addresses, which can be done easily in the Internet. This is the first protocol that has these two characteristics. We show that our new protocol outperforms an existing protocol, which satisfies (ii), with respect to the social surplus and the seller's revenue.

A new quantum sealed-bid auction protocol with secret order in post-confirmation

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Wang, Jing-Tao; Chen, Xiu-Bo; Xu, Gang; Meng, Xiang-Hua; Yang, Yi-Xian

2015-10-01

A new security protocol for quantum sealed-bid auction is proposed to resist the collusion attack from some malicious bidders. The most significant feature of this protocol is that bidders prepare their particles with secret order in post-confirmation for encoding bids. In addition, a new theorem and its proof are given based on the theory of combinatorial mathematics, which can be used as evaluation criteria for the collusion attack. It is shown that the new protocol is immune to the collusion attack and meets the demand for a secure auction. Compared with those previous protocols, the security, efficiency and availability of the proposed protocol are largely improved.

75 FR 61752 - Auction of FM Broadcast Construction Permits Scheduled for March 29, 2011; Comment Sought on...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-10-06

... Construction Permits Scheduled for March 29, 2011; Comment Sought on Competitive Bidding Procedures for Auction... auction of certain FM construction permits scheduled to commence on March 29, 2011 (Auction 91). This... Telecommunications and the Media Bureaus (the Bureaus) announce an auction of certain FM Broadcast construction...

47 CFR 25.403 - Bidding application and certification procedures.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... CARRIER SERVICES SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS Competitive Bidding Procedures for DARS § 25.403 Bidding...'s name; (b) Mailing Address (no Post Office boxes); (c) City; (d) State; (e) ZIP Code; (f) Auction...

47 CFR 25.403 - Bidding application and certification procedures.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-10-01

... CARRIER SERVICES SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS Competitive Bidding Procedures for DARS § 25.403 Bidding...'s name; (b) Mailing Address (no Post Office boxes); (c) City; (d) State; (e) ZIP Code; (f) Auction...

76 FR 60830 - Auction of FM Broadcast Construction Permits Scheduled for March 27, 2012; Comment Sought on...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-09-30

... Construction Permits Scheduled for March 27, 2012; Comment Sought on Competitive Bidding Procedures for Auction... auction of certain FM broadcast construction permits scheduled to commence on March 27, 2012. This... construction permits and seek comment on the procedures to be used for this auction. This auction is scheduled...

31 CFR 356.20 - How does the Treasury determine auction awards?

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-07-01

... 31 Money and Finance: Treasury 2 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false How does the Treasury determine... margin for the securities we are auctioning. (2) Accepting bids at the high yield, discount rate, or... the remaining par amount needed to fill the offering amount by the par amount of the bids at the high...

Improving the design of competitive bidding in Medicare Advantage.

PubMed

Cawley, John H; Whitford, Andrew B

2007-04-01

In 2003, Congress passed the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act, which required that in 2006 the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) implement a system of competitive bids to set payments for the Medicare Advantage program. Managed care plans now bid for the right to enroll Medicare beneficiaries. Data from the first year of bidding suggest that imperfect competition is limiting the success of the bidding system. This article offers suggestions to improve this system based on findings from auction theory and previous government-run auctions. In particular, CMS can benefit by adjusting its system of competitive bids in four ways: credibly committing to regulations governing bidding; limiting the scope for collusion, entry deterrence, and predatory behavior among bidders; adjusting how benchmark reimbursement rates are set; and accounting for asymmetric information among bidders.

Physical contact influences how much people pay at celebrity auctions

PubMed Central

Newman, George E.; Bloom, Paul

2014-01-01

Contagion is a form of magical thinking in which people believe that a person’s immaterial qualities or essence can be transferred to an object through physical contact. Here we investigate how a belief in contagion influences the sale of celebrity memorabilia. Using data from three high-profile estate auctions, we find that people’s expectations about the amount of physical contact between the object and the celebrity positively predicts the final bids for items that belonged to well-liked individuals (e.g., John F. Kennedy) and negatively predicts final bids for items that belonged to disliked individuals (e.g., Bernard Madoff). A follow-up experiment further suggests that these effects are driven by contagion beliefs: when asked to bid on a sweater owned by a well-liked celebrity, participants report that they would pay substantially less if it was sterilized before they received it. However, sterilization increases the amount they would pay for a sweater owned by a disliked celebrity. These studies suggest that magical thinking may still have effects in contemporary Western societies and they provide some unique demonstrations of contagion effects on real-world purchase decisions. PMID:24567388

78 FR 65982 - Auction of H Block Licenses in the 1915-1920 MHz and 1995-2000 MHz Bands Rescheduled for January...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-11-04

...This document announces the procedures, reserve price, and minimum opening bids for the upcoming auction of H Block licenses (Auction 96) and provides the revised schedule for Auction 96. This document is intended to familiarize prospective applicants with the procedures and other requirements for participation in the auction.

Examining the relationship between psychosocial and behavioral proxies for future consumption behavior: self-reported impact and bidding behavior in an experimental auction study on cigarette labeling

PubMed Central

Rousu, Matthew C.; Thrasher, James F.

2014-01-01

Experimental and observational research often involves asking consumers to self-report the impact of some proposed option. Because self-reported responses involve no consequence to the respondent for falsely revealing how he or she feels about an issue, self-reports may be subject to social desirability and other influences that bias responses in important ways. In this article, we analyzed data from an experiment on the impact of cigarette packaging and pack warnings, comparing smokers’ self-reported impact (four-item scale) and the bids they placed in experimental auctions to estimate differences in demand. The results were consistent across methods; however, the estimated effect size associated with different warning labels was two times greater for the four-item self-reported response scale when compared to the change in demand as indicated by auction bids. Our study provides evidence that self-reported psychosocial responses provide a valid proxy for behavioral change as reflected by experimental auction bidding behavior. More research is needed to better understand the advantages and disadvantages of behavioral economic methods and traditional self-report approaches to evaluating health behavior change interventions. PMID:24399267

78 FR 24404 - Auction of Lower and Upper Paging Band Licenses Scheduled for July 16, 2013; Notice of Filing...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-04-25

...This document announces the procedures and minimum opening bids for the upcoming auction of licenses in the lower and upper paging bands (Auction 95). This document is intended to familiarize prospective applicants with the procedures and other requirements for participation in the auction.

75 FR 74719 - Auction of VHF Commercial Television Station Construction Permits Scheduled for February 15, 2011...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-12-01

... Television Station Construction Permits Scheduled for February 15, 2011; Notice and Filing Requirements... upcoming auction of certain VHF commercial TV construction permits (Auction 90). This document is intended... December 15, 2010. Bidding for construction permits in Auction 90 is scheduled to begin on February 15...

47 CFR 1.2208 - Public notice of auction completion and auction results.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-10-01

... PROCEDURE Grants by Random Selection Competitive Bidding Proceedings Broadcast Television Spectrum Reverse... broadcast television spectrum incentive auction conducted under section 6403 of the Spectrum Act, public... indicate that the reassignments of television channels and reallocations of broadcast television spectrum...

36 CFR 223.88 - Bidding methods.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-07-01

... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 2 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Bidding methods. 223.88... Sale Contracts Advertisement and Bids § 223.88 Bidding methods. (a) Competitive sales of National Forest timber shall be offered through either sealed or oral auction bidding. The method chosen for each...

36 CFR 223.88 - Bidding methods.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-07-01

... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 2 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Bidding methods. 223.88... Sale Contracts Advertisement and Bids § 223.88 Bidding methods. (a) Competitive sales of National Forest timber shall be offered through either sealed or oral auction bidding. The method chosen for each...

A Bluff-Bidding Exercise

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Meister, J. Patrick

2011-01-01

Consider an auction in which one potential buyer wishes to participate, but the other potential buyer would rather the bidding not start. However, once bidding starts, the reluctant firm participates (submits "bluff bids") simply to make the eventual winner pay more. This incentive exists when the marginal effect of the winning bid is to increase…

36 CFR 223.88 - Bidding methods.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-07-01

... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 2 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Bidding methods. 223.88... Sale Contracts Advertisement and Bids § 223.88 Bidding methods. (a) Competitive sales of National Forest timber shall be offered through either sealed or oral auction bidding. The method chosen for each...

36 CFR 223.88 - Bidding methods.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-07-01

... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 2 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Bidding methods. 223.88... Sale Contracts Advertisement and Bids § 223.88 Bidding methods. (a) Competitive sales of National Forest timber shall be offered through either sealed or oral auction bidding. The method chosen for each...

Application for Single Price Auction Model (SPA) in AC Network

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Wachi, Tsunehisa; Fukutome, Suguru; Chen, Luonan; Makino, Yoshinori; Koshimizu, Gentarou

This paper aims to develop a single price auction model with AC transmission network, based on the principle of maximizing social surplus of electricity market. Specifically, we first formulate the auction market as a nonlinear optimization problem, which has almost the same form as the conventional optimal power flow problem, and then propose an algorithm to derive both market clearing price and trade volume of each player even for the case of market-splitting. As indicated in the paper, the proposed approach can be used not only for the price evaluation of auction or bidding market but also for analysis of bidding strategy, congestion effect and other constraints or factors. Several numerical examples are used to demonstrate effectiveness of our method.

Timber sale value as a function of sale characteristics and number of bidders

Treesearch

Paul E. Sendak; Paul E. Sendak

1991-01-01

Examines the effect of sale characteristics and number of bidders on sale value for timber sold by sealed-bid auction on the Green Mountain National Forest in Vermont. As anticipated from theory and previous empirical studies, increasing the number of bidders tended to increase the winning-bid value for the timber auctions studied. Efforts made to ensure that a timber...

Efficient Double Auction Mechanisms in the Energy Grid with Connected and Islanded Microgrids

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Faqiry, Mohammad Nazif

The future energy grid is expected to operate in a decentralized fashion as a network of autonomous microgrids that are coordinated by a Distribution System Operator (DSO), which should allocate energy to them in an efficient manner. Each microgrid operating in either islanded or grid-connected mode may be considered to manage its own resources. This can take place through auctions with individual units of the microgrid as the agents. This research proposes efficient auction mechanisms for the energy grid, with is-landed and connected microgrids. The microgrid level auction is carried out by means of an intermediate agent called an aggregator. The individual consumer and producer units are modeled as selfish agents. With the microgrid in islanded mode, two aggregator-level auction classes are analyzed: (i) price-heterogeneous, and (ii) price homogeneous. Under the price heterogeneity paradigm, this research extends earlier work on the well-known, single-sided Kelly mechanism to double auctions. As in Kelly auctions, the proposed algorithm implements the bidding without using any agent level private infor-mation (i.e. generation capacity and utility functions). The proposed auction is shown to be an efficient mechanism that maximizes the social welfare, i.e. the sum of the utilities of all the agents. Furthermore, the research considers the situation where a subset of agents act as a coalition to redistribute the allocated energy and price using any other specific fairness criterion. The price homogeneous double auction algorithm proposed in this research ad-dresses the problem of price-anticipation, where each agent tries to influence the equilibri-um price of energy by placing strategic bids. As a result of this behavior, the auction's efficiency is lowered. This research proposes a novel approach that is implemented by the aggregator, called virtual bidding, where the efficiency can be asymptotically maximized, even in the presence of price anticipatory bidders. Next, an auction mechanism for the energy grid, with multiple connected mi-crogrids is considered. A globally efficient bi-level auction algorithm is proposed. At the upper-level, the algorithm takes into account physical grid constraints in allocating energy to the microgrids. It is implemented by the DSO as a linear objective quadratic constraint problem that allows price heterogeneity across the aggregators. In parallel, each aggrega-tor implements its own lower-level price homogeneous auction with virtual bidding. The research concludes with a preliminary study on extending the DSO level auc-tion to multi-period day-ahead scheduling. It takes into account storage units and conven-tional generators that are present in the grid by formulating the auction as a mixed inte-ger linear programming problem.

A Trustworthy Internet Auction Model with Verifiable Fairness.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Liao, Gen-Yih; Hwang, Jing-Jang

2001-01-01

Describes an Internet auction model achieving verifiable fairness, a requirement aimed at enhancing the trust of bidders in auctioneers. Analysis results demonstrate that the proposed model satisfies various requirements regarding fairness and privacy. Moreover, in the proposed model, the losing bids remain sealed. (Author/AEF)

31 CFR 356.13 - When must I report my net long position and how do I calculate it?

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... auctioned you must report a zero. (iii) the total of your bids and your net long position in the security... blank) or report your net long position. (2) Also, if you have more than one bid in an auction and you must report either your net long position or a zero, you must report that figure only once. Finally, if...

36 CFR 223.231 - Bidding methods.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Bidding methods. 223.231... methods. The Contracting Officer or designated forest officer shall offer advertised sales of special forest products through sealed bid or sealed bid followed by oral auction. The method selected shall: (a...

47 CFR 90.903 - Competitive bidding mechanisms.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-10-01

... Bureau will establish and may vary the sequence in which 800 MHz SMR licenses for Spectrum Blocks A through V will be auctioned. (b) Grouping. (1) All EA licenses for Spectrum Blocks A through V will be... the auction, an alternative method of grouping these licenses for auction. (2) Spectrum blocks D...

47 CFR 90.903 - Competitive bidding mechanisms.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-10-01

... Bureau will establish and may vary the sequence in which 800 MHz SMR licenses for Spectrum Blocks A through V will be auctioned. (b) Grouping. (1) All EA licenses for Spectrum Blocks A through V will be... the auction, an alternative method of grouping these licenses for auction. (2) Spectrum blocks D...

47 CFR 90.903 - Competitive bidding mechanisms.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-10-01

... Bureau will establish and may vary the sequence in which 800 MHz SMR licenses for Spectrum Blocks A through V will be auctioned. (b) Grouping. (1) All EA licenses for Spectrum Blocks A through V will be... the auction, an alternative method of grouping these licenses for auction. (2) Spectrum blocks D...

47 CFR 90.903 - Competitive bidding mechanisms.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-10-01

... Bureau will establish and may vary the sequence in which 800 MHz SMR licenses for Spectrum Blocks A through V will be auctioned. (b) Grouping. (1) All EA licenses for Spectrum Blocks A through V will be... the auction, an alternative method of grouping these licenses for auction. (2) Spectrum blocks D...

36 CFR 223.231 - Bidding methods.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-07-01

... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 2 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Bidding methods. 223.231... Forest Products Advertisement and Bids § 223.231 Bidding methods. The Contracting Officer or designated... followed by oral auction. The method selected shall: (a) Ensure open and fair competition; (b) Ensure that...

36 CFR 223.231 - Bidding methods.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-07-01

... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 2 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Bidding methods. 223.231... Forest Products Advertisement and Bids § 223.231 Bidding methods. The Contracting Officer or designated... followed by oral auction. The method selected shall: (a) Ensure open and fair competition; (b) Ensure that...

36 CFR 223.231 - Bidding methods.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-07-01

... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 2 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Bidding methods. 223.231... Forest Products Advertisement and Bids § 223.231 Bidding methods. The Contracting Officer or designated... followed by oral auction. The method selected shall: (a) Ensure open and fair competition; (b) Ensure that...

36 CFR 223.231 - Bidding methods.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-07-01

... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 2 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Bidding methods. 223.231... Forest Products Advertisement and Bids § 223.231 Bidding methods. The Contracting Officer or designated... followed by oral auction. The method selected shall: (a) Ensure open and fair competition; (b) Ensure that...

Are Structural Estimates of Auction Models Reasonable? Evidence from Experimental Data

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Bajari, Patrick; Hortacsu, Ali

2005-01-01

Recently, economists have developed methods for structural estimation of auction models. Many researchers object to these methods because they find the strict rationality assumptions to be implausible. Using bid data from first-price auction experiments, we estimate four alternative structural models: (1) risk-neutral Bayes-Nash, (2) risk-averse…

Sold! The Elementary Classroom Auction as Learning Tool of Communication and Economics

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Boyd, Josh; Boyd, Gina

2014-01-01

An auction, though an economic tool, is essentially a performance dependent on communication (Smith, 1989). The auctioneer dictates the pace, asks for bids, and acknowledges responses; the enterprise is controlled by a voice (Boyce, 2001). Bidders must listen and respond strategically to the communication of the people around them. An auction…

Security analysis with improved design of post-confirmation mechanism for quantum sealed-bid auction with single photons

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Zhang, Ke-Jia; Kwek, Leong-Chuan; Ma, Chun-Guang; Zhang, Long; Sun, Hong-Wei

2018-02-01

Quantum sealed-bid auction (QSA) has been widely studied in quantum cryptography. For a successful auction, post-confirmation is regarded as an important mechanism to make every bidder verify the identity of the winner after the auctioneer has announced the result. However, since the auctioneer may be dishonest and collude with malicious bidders in practice, some potential loopholes could exist. In this paper, we point out two types of collusion attacks for a particular post-confirmation technique with EPR pairs. And it is not difficult to see that there exists no unconditionally secure post-confirmation mechanism in the existing QSA model, if the dishonest participants have the ability to control multiparticle entanglement. In the view of this, we note that some secure implementation could exist if the participants are supposed to be semi-quantum, i.e., they can only control single photons. Finally, two potential methods to design post-confirmation mechanism are presented in this restricted scenario.

Analyzing the prices of the most expensive sheet iron all over the world: Modeling, prediction and regime change

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Song, Fu-Tie; Zhou, Wei-Xing

2010-09-01

The private car license plates issued in Shanghai are bestowed the title of “the most expensive sheet iron all over the world”, more expensive than gold. A citizen has to bid in a monthly auction to obtain a license plate for his new private car. We perform statistical analysis to investigate the influence of the minimal price Pmin of the bidding winners, the quota N of private car license plates, the number N of bidders, as well as two external shocks including the legality debate of the auction in 2004 and the auction regime reform in January 2008 on the average price P of all bidding winners. It is found that the legality debate of the auction had marginal transient impact on the average price in a short time period. In contrast, the change of the auction rules has significant permanent influence on the average price, which reduces the price by about 3020 yuan Renminbi. It means that the average price exhibits nonlinear behaviors with a regime change. The evolution of the average price is independent of the number N of bidders in both regimes. In the early regime before January 2008, the average price P was influenced only by the minimal price Pmin in the preceding month with a positive correlation. In the current regime since January 2008, the average price is positively correlated with the minimal price and the quota in the preceding month and negatively correlated with the quota in the same month. We test the predictive power of the two models using 2-year and 3-year moving windows and find that the latter outperforms the former. It seems that the auction market becomes more efficient after the auction reform since the prediction error increases.

Land Sales - Division of Mining, Land, and Water

Science.gov Websites

to Alaska Land Sales Public Notices Residential Land Auction #484 Agricultural Land Auction #485 Over for sale Agricultural Land Auction (#485)Open until June 7th This program allows anyone (resident or non-resident) to bid on a parcel of agricultural land. Agricultural land has covenants and conditions

26 CFR 403.61 - Sale on open, competitive bids.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-04-01

... 26 Internal Revenue 18 2013-04-01 2013-04-01 false Sale on open, competitive bids. 403.61 Section... open, competitive bids. If forfeited property is to be sold at public auction to the highest bidder on open, competitive bids, the notice of sale shall so specify, and state the date, hour, and place of...

26 CFR 403.61 - Sale on open, competitive bids.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-04-01

... 26 Internal Revenue 18 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false Sale on open, competitive bids. 403.61 Section... open, competitive bids. If forfeited property is to be sold at public auction to the highest bidder on open, competitive bids, the notice of sale shall so specify, and state the date, hour, and place of...

26 CFR 403.61 - Sale on open, competitive bids.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-04-01

... 26 Internal Revenue 18 2012-04-01 2012-04-01 false Sale on open, competitive bids. 403.61 Section... open, competitive bids. If forfeited property is to be sold at public auction to the highest bidder on open, competitive bids, the notice of sale shall so specify, and state the date, hour, and place of...

26 CFR 403.61 - Sale on open, competitive bids.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-04-01

... 26 Internal Revenue 18 2011-04-01 2011-04-01 false Sale on open, competitive bids. 403.61 Section... open, competitive bids. If forfeited property is to be sold at public auction to the highest bidder on open, competitive bids, the notice of sale shall so specify, and state the date, hour, and place of...

26 CFR 403.61 - Sale on open, competitive bids.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-04-01

... 26 Internal Revenue 18 2014-04-01 2014-04-01 false Sale on open, competitive bids. 403.61 Section... open, competitive bids. If forfeited property is to be sold at public auction to the highest bidder on open, competitive bids, the notice of sale shall so specify, and state the date, hour, and place of...

25 CFR 215.8 - Submission of bids.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-04-01

... 25 Indians 1 2011-04-01 2011-04-01 false Submission of bids. 215.8 Section 215.8 Indians BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR ENERGY AND MINERALS LEAD AND ZINC MINING OPERATIONS AND LEASES, QUAPAW AGENCY § 215.8 Submission of bids. At the time of public auction bidders may submit their bids in...

47 CFR 1.2105 - Bidding application and certification procedures; prohibition of certain communications.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

....2110, a statement to that effect and a declaration, under penalty of perjury, that the applicant is... the post-auction market structure. (ix) Certification under penalty of perjury that it has not entered... amount of their bids, bidding strategies or the particular licenses on which they will or will not bid...

31 CFR 356.11 - How are bids submitted in an auction?

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... failures or disruptions of equipment or communications facilities used for participating in Treasury.... (c) TreasuryDirect. You must submit your bids through your established book-entry, online Treasury...

Efficient Nash Equilibrium Resource Allocation Based on Game Theory Mechanism in Cloud Computing by Using Auction.

PubMed

Nezarat, Amin; Dastghaibifard, G H

2015-01-01

One of the most complex issues in the cloud computing environment is the problem of resource allocation so that, on one hand, the cloud provider expects the most profitability and, on the other hand, users also expect to have the best resources at their disposal considering the budget constraints and time. In most previous work conducted, heuristic and evolutionary approaches have been used to solve this problem. Nevertheless, since the nature of this environment is based on economic methods, using such methods can decrease response time and reducing the complexity of the problem. In this paper, an auction-based method is proposed which determines the auction winner by applying game theory mechanism and holding a repetitive game with incomplete information in a non-cooperative environment. In this method, users calculate suitable price bid with their objective function during several round and repetitions and send it to the auctioneer; and the auctioneer chooses the winning player based the suggested utility function. In the proposed method, the end point of the game is the Nash equilibrium point where players are no longer inclined to alter their bid for that resource and the final bid also satisfies the auctioneer's utility function. To prove the response space convexity, the Lagrange method is used and the proposed model is simulated in the cloudsim and the results are compared with previous work. At the end, it is concluded that this method converges to a response in a shorter time, provides the lowest service level agreement violations and the most utility to the provider.

47 CFR 24.717 - Bidding credits for licenses for frequency Block F.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... Block F. 24.717 Section 24.717 Telecommunication FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (CONTINUED) COMMON CARRIER SERVICES PERSONAL COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES Competitive Bidding Procedures for Broadband PCS § 24... closed bidding in auctions that begin after March 23, 1999, a winning bidder that qualifies as a small...

47 CFR 24.712 - Bidding credits for licenses won for frequency Block C.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... Block C. 24.712 Section 24.712 Telecommunication FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (CONTINUED) COMMON CARRIER SERVICES PERSONAL COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES Competitive Bidding Procedures for Broadband PCS § 24... closed bidding in auctions that begin after March 23, 1999, a winning bidder that qualifies as a small...

36 CFR 223.88 - Bidding methods.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Bidding methods. 223.88... methods. (a) Competitive sales of National Forest timber shall be offered through either sealed or oral auction bidding. The method chosen for each sale will: (1) Insure open and fair competition, (2) Insure...

75 FR 56494 - High-Cost Universal Service Support and Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-09-16

... Wireless Services. In 2008, the Commission conducted the auction of Advanced Wireless Services (``AWS'') licenses. This auction, which as designated as Auction 78, offered 35 licenses in the AWS 1710-1755 MHz and 2110-2155 MHz bands (``AWS-1''). The AWS-1 licenses were licenses for which there were no winning bids...

A Classroom Auction with Externalities: Applied to Mergers and Acquisitions

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Meister, J. Patrick; Anderson, Kyle J.

2007-01-01

The authors describe an in-class exercise in which students participate in an auction to buy US Airways. The exercise is based on events of late 1995, in which neither United nor American Airlines decided to bid for US Airways. Two teams of students participate in an English auction. Students learn that the equilibrium of the sequential game is…

Competitive bidding for health insurance contracts: lessons from the online HMO auctions.

PubMed

Gupta, Alok; Parente, Stephen T; Sanyal, Pallab

2012-12-01

Healthcare is an important social and economic component of modern society, and the effective use of information technology in this industry is critical to its success. As health insurance premiums continue to rise, competitive bidding may be useful in generating stronger price competition and lower premium costs for employers and possibly, government agencies. In this paper, we assess an endeavor by several Fortune 500 companies to reduce healthcare procurement costs for their employees by having HMOs compete in open electronic auctions. Although the auctions were successful in generating significant cost savings for the companies in the first year, i.e., 1999, they failed to replicate the success and were eventually discontinued after two more years. Over the past decade since the failed auction experiment, effective utilization of information technologies have led to significant advances in the design of complex electronic markets. Using this knowledge, and data from the auctions, we point out several shortcomings of the auction design that, we believe, led to the discontinuation of the market after three years. Based on our analysis, we propose several actionable recommendations that policy makers can use to design a sustainable electronic market for procuring health insurance.

Using a Second-Price Auction to set Military Retention Bonus Levels: An Application to the Australian Army

DTIC Science & Technology

2008-03-01

and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT...auction is used to set salaries levels in a generic labor market scenario. The experimental results support the literature: a second-price auction...analyses an experiment where a sealed-bid, second-price auction is used to set salaries levels in a generic labor market scenario. The experimental

Learning Based Bidding Strategy for HVAC Systems in Double Auction Retail Energy Markets

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Sun, Yannan; Somani, Abhishek; Carroll, Thomas E.

In this paper, a bidding strategy is proposed using reinforcement learning for HVAC systems in a double auction market. The bidding strategy does not require a specific model-based representation of behavior, i.e., a functional form to translate indoor house temperatures into bid prices. The results from reinforcement learning based approach are compared with the HVAC bidding approach used in the AEP gridSMART® smart grid demonstration project and it is shown that the model-free (learning based) approach tracks well the results from the model-based behavior. Successful use of model-free approaches to represent device-level economic behavior may help develop similar approaches tomore » represent behavior of more complex devices or groups of diverse devices, such as in a building. Distributed control requires an understanding of decision making processes of intelligent agents so that appropriate mechanisms may be developed to control and coordinate their responses, and model-free approaches to represent behavior will be extremely useful in that quest.« less

Multiparty Quantum English Auction Scheme Using Single Photons as Message Carrier

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Liu, Ge; Zhang, Jian-Zhong; Xie, Shu-Cui

2018-03-01

In this paper, a secure and economic multiparty english auction protocol using the single photons as message carrier of bids is proposed. In order to achieve unconditional security, fairness, undeniability and so on, we adopt the decoy photon checking technique and quantum encryption algorithm. Analysis result shows that our protocol satisfies all the characteristics of traditional english auction, meanwhile, it can resist malicious attacks.

Essays in financial transmission rights pricing

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Posner, Barry

This work examines issues in the pricing of financial transmission rights in the PJM market region. The US federal government is advocating the creation of large-scale, not-for-profit regional transmission organizations to increase the efficiency of the transmission of electricity. As a non-profit entity, PJM needs to allocate excess revenues collected as congestion rents, and the participants in the transmission markets need to be able to hedge their exposure to congestion rents. For these purposes, PJM has developed an instrument known as the financial transmission right (FTR). This research, utilizing a new data set assembled by the author, looks at two aspects of the FTR market. The first chapter examines the problem of forecasting congestion in a transmission grid. In the PJM FTR system firms bid in a competitive auction for FTRs that cover a period of one month. The auctions take place in the middle of the previous month; therefore firms have to forecast congestion rents for the period two to six weeks after the auction. The common methods of forecasting congestion are either time-series models or full-information engineering studies. In this research, the author develops a forecasting system that is more economically grounded than a simple time-series model, but requires less information than an engineering model. This method is based upon the arbitrage-cost methodology, whereby congesting is calculated as the difference of two non-observable variables: the transmission price difference that would exist in the total absence of transmission capacity between two nodes, and the ability of the existing transmission to reduced that price difference. If the ability to reduce the price difference is greater than the price difference, then the cost of electricity at each node will be the same, and congestion rent will be zero. If transmission capacity limits are binding on the flow of power, then a price difference persists and congestion rents exist. Three transmission paths in the Delmarva Peninsula were examined. The maximum-likelihood two-way Tobit model developed in Chapter One consistently predicts the expected responses to the independent variables that have employed, but the model as defined here does a poor job of predicting prices. This is likely due to the inability to include system outages (i.e., short-term changes in the structure of the transmission grid) as variables in the estimation model. The second chapter addresses the behavior of firms in the monthly auctions for FTRs. FTRs are a claim to congestion rent revenues along a certain path within the PJM grid, and are awarded in a uniform-price divisible-goods auction. Firms typically submit a schedule of bids for different amounts of FTR at different prices, akin to a demand curve. A firm bidding too high a price may cause the clearing price of the FTR to be higher than the realized value of the FTR, creating a loss from ownership of the FTR. A firm bidding too low means that it wins no FTRs, depriving itself of the ability to profit from ownership or to hedge against congestion. Several questions concerning firm behavior are addressed in this study. It is found that firms adjust their bids in response to new information that is obtained from past auctions: they raise or lower bids in accordance with changes in recent FTR prices and payoffs. Firms consistently bid below the value of the FTR (i.e., shade their bids). This adds empirical evidence to the theoretically-posited notion that uniform-price auctions are not truth-telling, unlike the second-price auction for a non-divisible good. Firms employ greater bid-shading in response to increases in the volatility of both FTR clearing prices and realized FTR values. This validates the notion that firms are risk-averse. It is discovered that better-informed "insider" firms employ structurally different bidding strategies, but these differences do not lead to greater profits. However, profits do increase as firms gain more experience in these markets, lending credence to the notion that firms learn over time and that markets discipline poorly performing firms by either educating them or driving them out of the market. It is also found that firms that employ complicated bidding strategies enjoy greater profitability than firms which employ simple bidding strategies. A surprising corollary finding is that firm strategies do not converge to a common form, but that different firms continue to employ different strategies, and often move away from the seemingly dominant strategy. Firms can enter this market as either long-buyers or short-sellers, and it is discovered that long and short players display structurally divergent bidding strategies. This is perhaps unsurprising, given that long players can be either hedgers or speculators, but short players are overwhelmingly speculators.

47 CFR 1.2207 - Two competing participants required.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-10-01

... by Random Selection Competitive Bidding Proceedings Broadcast Television Spectrum Reverse Auction § 1... to relinquish spectrum usage rights in exchange for a share of the proceeds from the related forward auction assigning new spectrum licenses unless at least two competing licensees participate in the reverse...

47 CFR 1.2205 - Prohibition of certain communications.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-10-01

... by Random Selection Competitive Bidding Proceedings Broadcast Television Spectrum Reverse Auction § 1... provided in paragraph (b)(2) of this section, in the broadcast television spectrum incentive auction conducted under section 6403 of the Spectrum Act, beginning on the deadline for submitting applications to...

Design and implementation of location-based wireless targeted advertising

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Li, Benjamin; Xu, Deyin

2001-10-01

As advertisements are time and location sensitive, a challenge for wireless marketing is to have advertisements delivered when and where they are most convenient. In this paper we introduce a two-stage auction model for location-based wireless targeted advertising. This system extends the notion of location-based service by using location information to target advertising, and does so specifically by enabling advertisers to specify their preferences and bid for advertisement delivery, where those preferences are then used in a subsequent automated auction of actual deliveries to wireless data users. The automated auction in the second stage is especially effective because it can use information about the individual user profile data, including customer relationship management system contents as well as location from the wireless system's location management service, including potentially location history such as current trajectory from recent history and longer-term historical trip records for that user. Through two-stage auction, real-time bidding by advertisers and matching ads contents to mobile users help advertising information reach maximal value.

Bidding Behavior in a Multi-attribute First-price Auction

DTIC Science & Technology

2010-01-01

of applying key features of the multi-unit auction to proxy buyer /seller marginal valuations of the attributes of a job. Two experiments were...compensation package show promise in ascertaining buyer /seller marginal valuations of a job. This research effort was supported by a grant from the...auctions observed in the goods market, as measured by maximizing consumer and producer surplus, are likely to have promising applications to labor markets

47 CFR 1.2204 - Applications to participate in competitive bidding.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-10-01

... corporation, the name and address of the corporate office and the name and title of an officer or director. If..., if applicable. (2) The identity of the person(s) authorized to take binding action in the bidding on... submit reverse auction bids: (i) The identity of the station and its television channel; (ii) Whether it...

47 CFR 1.2105 - Bidding application and certification procedures; prohibition of certain communications.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-10-01

... include changes in ownership of the applicant that would constitute an assignment or transfer of control... Auctions and Spectrum Access Division, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, by the most expeditious means... Auctions and Spectrum Access Division, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, by the most expeditious means...

Efficient Nash Equilibrium Resource Allocation Based on Game Theory Mechanism in Cloud Computing by Using Auction

PubMed Central

Nezarat, Amin; Dastghaibifard, GH

2015-01-01

One of the most complex issues in the cloud computing environment is the problem of resource allocation so that, on one hand, the cloud provider expects the most profitability and, on the other hand, users also expect to have the best resources at their disposal considering the budget constraints and time. In most previous work conducted, heuristic and evolutionary approaches have been used to solve this problem. Nevertheless, since the nature of this environment is based on economic methods, using such methods can decrease response time and reducing the complexity of the problem. In this paper, an auction-based method is proposed which determines the auction winner by applying game theory mechanism and holding a repetitive game with incomplete information in a non-cooperative environment. In this method, users calculate suitable price bid with their objective function during several round and repetitions and send it to the auctioneer; and the auctioneer chooses the winning player based the suggested utility function. In the proposed method, the end point of the game is the Nash equilibrium point where players are no longer inclined to alter their bid for that resource and the final bid also satisfies the auctioneer’s utility function. To prove the response space convexity, the Lagrange method is used and the proposed model is simulated in the cloudsim and the results are compared with previous work. At the end, it is concluded that this method converges to a response in a shorter time, provides the lowest service level agreement violations and the most utility to the provider. PMID:26431035

76 FR 78645 - Auction of FM Broadcast Construction Permits Scheduled for March 27, 2012; Notice and Filing...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-12-19

... touch upon impermissible subject matters because they may convey pricing information and bidding... FCC auction does not constitute an endorsement by the FCC of any particular service, technology, or... habitats, historical or archaeological sites, Indian religious sites, floodplains, and surface features. In...

Health Auctions: a Valuation Experiment (HAVE) study protocol.

PubMed

Kularatna, Sanjeewa; Petrie, Dennis; Scuffham, Paul A; Byrnes, Joshua

2016-04-07

Quality-adjusted life years are derived using health state utility weights which adjust for the relative value of living in each health state compared with living in perfect health. Various techniques are used to estimate health state utility weights including time-trade-off and standard gamble. These methods have exhibited limitations in terms of complexity, validity and reliability. A new composite approach using experimental auctions to value health states is introduced in this protocol. A pilot study will test the feasibility and validity of using experimental auctions to value health states in monetary terms. A convenient sample (n=150) from a population of university staff and students will be invited to participate in 30 auction sets with a group of 5 people in each set. The 9 health states auctioned in each auction set will come from the commonly used EQ-5D-3L instrument. At most participants purchase 2 health states, and the participant who acquires the 2 'best' health states on average will keep the amount of money they do not spend in acquiring those health states. The value (highest bid and average bid) of each of the 24 health states will be compared across auctions to test for reliability across auction groups and across auctioneers. A test retest will be conducted for 10% of the sample to assess reliability of responses for health states auctions. Feasibility of conducting experimental auctions to value health states will also be examined. The validity of estimated health states values will be compared with published utility estimates from other methods. This pilot study will explore the feasibility, reliability and validity in using experimental auction for valuing health states. Ethical clearance was obtained from Griffith University ethics committee. The results will be disseminated in peer-reviewed journals and major international conferences. Published by the BMJ Publishing Group Limited. For permission to use (where not already granted under a licence) please go to http://www.bmj.com/company/products-services/rights-and-licensing/

Advertising and Sealed Bid Auctions in a Transshipment Game

DTIC Science & Technology

1996-06-01

distributors promote their sales by advertising . While the maximum quantity demanded by each customer is fixed and given, his bids on the various...brands are determined by the advertising and other promotional efforts. The bid response function for each consumer is supposed to be given and known. The...the optimal distribution of the product, and the bids of the consumers . A numerical example is provided and the solution routine is discussed.

76 FR 6154 - Notice of Realty Action: Modified Competitive Bid Sale of Public Lands in Santa Cruz County, CA

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-02-03

...; CACA 50168 06] Notice of Realty Action: Modified Competitive Bid Sale of Public Lands in Santa Cruz... fair market value of $53,000. The sale will be conducted as a modified competitive bid auction, whereby... public land. DATES: Written comments regarding this proposed sale must be received by the BLM on or...

31 CFR 356.20 - How does the Treasury determine auction awards?

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-07-01

..., but not above, par when evaluated at the yield of awards to successful competitive bidders. (2... 31 Money and Finance:Treasury 2 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false How does the Treasury determine... the yield or discount rate for the securities we are auctioning. (2) Accepting bids at the high yield...

31 CFR 356.20 - How does the Treasury determine auction awards?

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-07-01

..., but not above, par when evaluated at the yield of awards to successful competitive bidders. (2... 31 Money and Finance:Treasury 2 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false How does the Treasury determine... the yield or discount rate for the securities we are auctioning. (2) Accepting bids at the high yield...

31 CFR 356.20 - How does the Treasury determine auction awards?

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-07-01

..., but not above, par when evaluated at the yield of awards to successful competitive bidders. (2... 31 Money and Finance:Treasury 2 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false How does the Treasury determine... the yield or discount rate for the securities we are auctioning. (2) Accepting bids at the high yield...

Improving the secrecy rate by turning foes to allies: An auction scheme

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Ma, Ya-Yan; Wang, Bao-Yun

2015-09-01

Security against eavesdroppers is a critical issue in cognitive radio networks (CRNs). In this paper, a scenario consisting of one primary pair and multiple secondary pairs is considered. The secondary transmitters (STs) work in half-duplex mode and they are potential eavesdroppers on the primary transmission unless they are allowed to simultaneously transmit with the primary transmitter (PT). A modified second-price sealed-bid auction scheme is employed to model the interaction between the PT and STs. With the proposed auction scheme, the hostile relationship between the PT and STs is transformed into a cooperative relationship. An iterative algorithm based on the max-min criteria is proposed to find the optimal bidding power of the STs for an access chance in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers. Numerical results show that the proposed auction scheme not only improves the PT’s security but also increases the access opportunities of the STs. Project supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant Nos. 61271232 and 61372126) and the University Postgraduate Research and Innovation Project in Jiangsu Province, China (Grant No. CXZZ12-0472).

Auction fever: exploring informational social influences on bidder choices.

PubMed

Chen, Yi-Fen

2011-01-01

Previous investigations of herd behavior have identified the importance of informational social influences in consumer decision making. This research presents three studies examining herd behavior in online auctions. The three studies addressed the influence on bidder online choices of herd cues frequently found in online auctions, including bid number, feedback ratings, and number of questions and answers. This research also investigated the effect of different levels of herd cues on bidder online choices under high and low brand awareness in online auctions. The experimental results demonstrated that bidders use online herd cues when making decisions in online auctions. Additionally, different levels of herd cues influence bidder online choices in both high and low brand awareness product situations.

Theoretically Founded Optimization of Auctioneer's Revenues in Expanding Auctions

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Rabin, Jonathan; Shehory, Onn

The expanding auction is a multi-unit auction which provides the auctioneer with control over the outcome of the auction by means of dynamically adding items for sale. Previous research on the expanding auction has provided a numeric method to calculate a strategy that optimizes the auctioneer's revenue. In this paper, we analyze various theoretical properties of the expanding auction, and compare it to VCG, a multi-unit auction protocol known in the art. We examine the effects of errors in the auctioneer's estimation of the buyers' maximal bidding values and prove a theoretical bound on the ratio between the revenue yielded by the Informed Decision Strategy (IDS) and the post-optimal strategy. We also analyze the relationship between the auction step and the optimal revenue and introduce a method of computing this optimizing step. We further compare the revenues yielded by the use of IDS with an expanding auction to those of the VCG mechanism and determine the conditions under which the former outperforms the latter. Our work provides new insight into the properties of the expanding auction. It further provides theoretically founded means for optimizing the revenue of auctioneer.

Auctions for coastal energy resources

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Griffin, Robert M.

It is becoming increasingly common to allocate public resources to the private sector for the purpose of developing these resources. One of the earliest uses of auctions in the U.S. for allocating rights to public resources was in the offshore oil and gas industry. The U.S. Federal government, through the Department of Interior (DOI), has used auctions to allocate development rights to offshore oil and gas resources to the private sector since the 1950's. Since then many things have changed. Oil and gas markets have gone through boom and bust cycles, giant technological advances in extraction and assessment have taken place, and alternative energy based in the coastal zone is now in demand in markets as well. There has been an enormous amount of research into the drivers of bidder behavior in auctions and optimal auction design in the last 60 years as well. Throughout all of this, the DOI has continued to use basically the same exact auction design to allocate oil and gas leases. The U.S. offshore oil and gas resources sold by the Department of Interior have accounted for more than $65 billion in revenue since the program started. These offshore resources are an important source of government revenue and national wealth. Additionally, the expansion of the energy sector offshore has enormous potential for electricity generation in the U.S., estimated by the National Renewable Energy Laboratory as approaching 54 gigawatts by 2030 (U.S. Department of Energy, 2008). Taken together, the DOI controls access to a large part of the future of energy in the U.S. The research herein assesses the auction formats used to allocate both fossil fuels and renewable resources on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS). The first manuscript looks at the current method used by the DOI to allocate oil and gas leases on the OCS, and is primarily interested in how bidders behave in this environment. Using latent class estimation techniques to separate distinct bidding behavior in a laboratory simulation of current U.S. policy, it compares lab results to field data and identifies efficiency and revenue losses stemming from the endogenous entry aspect of current policy. The second manuscript identifies an alternative auction method for allocating these development rights and develops a bidding model based on that of Milgrom (2000) for private value auctions. When tested against laboratory data, the model is favorably predictive of outcomes, but the path of bidding significantly deviates from predictions due to jump bidding and bidder impatience. The final manuscript provides a qualitative assessment of alternative auction arrangements for allocating access to wind energy on the OCS. In consideration of the relative state of the wind energy and oil and gas industries, the DOI may want to employ an allocation policy that better fits the current status of the wind energy industry. Considering the federal mandates regarding allocation that the DOI is required to follow, several allocation methods are identified for the short and medium term that meet federal mandates and promote the growth of the industry.

Essays on restructured electricity markets

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Nicholson, Emma Leah

This dissertation focuses on the performance of restructured electricity markets in the United States. In chapter 1, I study bidder-specific offer caps ("BSOCs") which are used to mitigate market power in three wholesale electricity markets. The price of electricity is determined through multi-unit uniform price auctions and BSOCs impose an upper limit, which is increasing in marginal cost, on each generator's bid. I apply BSOCs in both the uniform and discriminatory price auctions and characterize the equilibria in a two firm model with stochastic demand. BSOCs unambiguously increase expected production efficiency in the uniform price auction and they can increase the expected profit of the generator with the lower cap. Chapter 2, coauthored with Ramteen Sioshansi, Ph.D., compares two types of uniform price auction formats used in wholesale electricity markets, centrally committed markets and self committed markets. In centrally committed markets, generators submit two-part bids consisting of a fixed startup cost and a variable (per MWh) energy cost, and the auctioneer ensures that no generator operates at a loss. Generators in self committed markets must incorporate their startup costs into their one part energy bids. We derive Nash equilibria for both the centrally and self committed electricity markets in a model with two symmetric generators with nonconvex costs and deterministic demand. Using a numerical example, we demonstrate that if the caps on the bid elements are chosen appropriately, the two market designs are equivalent in terms of generator revenues and settlement costs. Regulators and prominent academic experts believe that electric restructuring polices have stifled investment in new generation capacity. In chapter 3 I seek to determine whether these fears are supported by empirical evidence. I examine both total investment in megawatts and the number of new investments across regions that adopted different electric restructuring policies to determine whether electric restructuring is associated with lower levels of investment in new generation capacity. The estimation results do not prove that total investment levels are lower in regions with restructured electric systems, but I cannot rule the possibility out.

Bandwidth auction for SVC streaming in dynamic multi-overlay

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Xiong, Yanting; Zou, Junni; Xiong, Hongkai

2010-07-01

In this paper, we study the optimal bandwidth allocation for scalable video coding (SVC) streaming in multiple overlays. We model the whole bandwidth request and distribution process as a set of decentralized auction games between the competing peers. For the upstream peer, a bandwidth allocation mechanism is introduced to maximize the aggregate revenue. For the downstream peer, a dynamic bidding strategy is proposed. It achieves maximum utility and efficient resource usage by collaborating with a content-aware layer dropping/adding strategy. Also, the convergence of the proposed auction games is theoretically proved. Experimental results show that the auction strategies can adapt to dynamic join of competing peers and video layers.

27 CFR 72.67 - Sale on open, competitive bids.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-04-01

... 27 Alcohol, Tobacco Products and Firearms 2 2011-04-01 2011-04-01 false Sale on open, competitive... PROPERTY Administrative Sale or Disposition of Personal Property § 72.67 Sale on open, competitive bids. If the personal property or carrier is to be sold at public auction to the highest bidder on open...

27 CFR 72.67 - Sale on open, competitive bids.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-04-01

... 27 Alcohol, Tobacco Products and Firearms 2 2013-04-01 2013-04-01 false Sale on open, competitive... PROPERTY Administrative Sale or Disposition of Personal Property § 72.67 Sale on open, competitive bids. If the personal property or carrier is to be sold at public auction to the highest bidder on open...

27 CFR 72.67 - Sale on open, competitive bids.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-04-01

... 27 Alcohol, Tobacco Products and Firearms 2 2012-04-01 2011-04-01 true Sale on open, competitive... PROPERTY Administrative Sale or Disposition of Personal Property § 72.67 Sale on open, competitive bids. If the personal property or carrier is to be sold at public auction to the highest bidder on open...

27 CFR 72.67 - Sale on open, competitive bids.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-04-01

... 27 Alcohol, Tobacco Products and Firearms 2 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false Sale on open, competitive... PROPERTY Administrative Sale or Disposition of Personal Property § 72.67 Sale on open, competitive bids. If the personal property or carrier is to be sold at public auction to the highest bidder on open...

27 CFR 72.67 - Sale on open, competitive bids.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-04-01

... 27 Alcohol, Tobacco Products and Firearms 2 2014-04-01 2014-04-01 false Sale on open, competitive... PROPERTY Administrative Sale or Disposition of Personal Property § 72.67 Sale on open, competitive bids. If the personal property or carrier is to be sold at public auction to the highest bidder on open...

76 FR 3892 - Auction of FM Broadcast Construction Permits Rescheduled for April 27, 2011; Notice and Filing...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-01-21

.... The commenter also argues that, in the event that only one applicant places a bid on a permit, that...). The Commission makes no warranty whatsoever with respect to the FCC Auction System. In no event shall..., 2011 Short-Form Application (FCC Form 175) Filing Window Opens--January 31, 2011; 12 noon ET Short-Form...

Spectrum sharing in cognitive radio networks--an auction-based approach.

PubMed

Wang, Xinbing; Li, Zheng; Xu, Pengchao; Xu, Youyun; Gao, Xinbo; Chen, Hsiao-Hwa

2010-06-01

Cognitive radio is emerging as a promising technique to improve the utilization of the radio frequency spectrum. In this paper, we consider the problem of spectrum sharing among primary (or "licensed") users (PUs) and secondary (or "unlicensed") users (SUs). We formulate the problem based on bandwidth auction, in which each SU makes a bid for the amount of spectrum and each PU may assign the spectrum among the SUs by itself according to the information from the SUs without degrading its own performance. We show that the auction is a noncooperative game and that Nash equilibrium (NE) can be its solution. We first consider a single-PU network to investigate the existence and uniqueness of the NE and further discuss the fairness among the SUs under given conditions. Then, we present a dynamic updating algorithm in which each SU achieves NE in a distributed manner. The stability condition of the dynamic behavior for this spectrum-sharing scheme is studied. The discussion is generalized to the case in which there are multiple PUs in the network, where the properties of the NE are shown under appropriate conditions. Simulations were used to evaluate the system performance and verify the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm.

Mechanism Design for Multi-slot Ads Auction in Sponsored Search Markets

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Deng, Xiaotie; Sun, Yang; Yin, Ming; Zhou, Yunhong

In this paper, we study pricing models for multi-slot advertisements, where advertisers can bid to place links to their sales webpages at one or multiple slots on a webpage, called the multi-slot AD auction problem. We develop and analyze several important mechanisms, including the VCG mechanism for multi-slot ads auction, the optimal social welfare solution, as well as two weighted GSP-like protocols (mixed and hybrid). Furthermore, we consider that forward-looking Nash equilibrium and prove its existence in the weighted GSP-like pricing protocols.

Restoration of stormwater retention capacity at the allotment-scale through a novel economic instrument.

PubMed

Fletcher, Tim D; Walsh, Chistopher J; Bos, Darren; Nemes, Veronika; RossRakesh, Sharyn; Prosser, Toby; Hatt, Belinda; Birch, Rhiannon

2011-01-01

Urbanisation results in changes to runoff behaviour which, if not addressed, inevitably degrade receiving waters. To date, most stormwater management has focussed on the streetscape and public open space. Given that much of the catchment imperviousness is located on private land, we developed and tested a novel economic instrument (a uniform price auction) for encouraging allotment-scale stormwater retention. We evaluated bids using an integrated environmental benefit index (EBI), based on the ability of the proposed works to reduce runoff frequency, pollutant loads and to reduce potable water demand. The uniform price auction resulted in 1.4 ha of impervious areas being effectively 'disconnected' from the stormwater system. The EBI provided an objective and transparent method of comparing bids, which varied in the type of works proposed (e.g. rainwater tank, rain-garden), the cost and the resulting environmental benefit. Whilst the pilot auction was a success, the public subsidy of works undertaken was around 85%, meaning that property owners a relatively small private benefit in the works. Future auction rounds will be revised to (i) test an EBI which is more focussed on the protection of streams (assessing changes to runoff frequency, baseflow volumes and water quality) and (ii) provide an auction process which is simpler to understand, and provides greater practical support for landholders who wish to undertake works.

Optimal generator bidding strategies for power and ancillary services

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Morinec, Allen G.

As the electric power industry transitions to a deregulated market, power transactions are made upon price rather than cost. Generator companies are interested in maximizing their profits rather than overall system efficiency. A method to equitably compensate generation providers for real power, and ancillary services such as reactive power and spinning reserve, will ensure a competitive market with an adequate number of suppliers. Optimizing the generation product mix during bidding is necessary to maximize a generator company's profits. The objective of this research work is to determine and formulate appropriate optimal bidding strategies for a generation company in both the energy and ancillary services markets. These strategies should incorporate the capability curves of their generators as constraints to define the optimal product mix and price offered in the day-ahead and real time spot markets. In order to achieve such a goal, a two-player model was composed to simulate market auctions for power generation. A dynamic game methodology was developed to identify Nash Equilibria and Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibria solutions as optimal generation bidding strategies for two-player non-cooperative variable-sum matrix games with incomplete information. These games integrated the generation product mix of real power, reactive power, and spinning reserve with the generators's capability curves as constraints. The research includes simulations of market auctions, where strategies were tested for generators with different unit constraints, costs, types of competitors, strategies, and demand levels. Studies on the capability of large hydrogen cooled synchronous generators were utilized to derive useful equations that define the exact shape of the capability curve from the intersections of the arcs defined by the centers and radial vectors of the rotor, stator, and steady-state stability limits. The available reactive reserve and spinning reserve were calculated given a generator operating point in the P-Q plane. Four computer programs were developed to automatically perform the market auction simulations using the equal incremental cost rule. The software calculates the payoffs for the two competing competitors, dispatches six generators, and allocates ancillary services for 64 combinations of bidding strategies, three levels of system demand, and three different types of competitors. Matrix Game theory was utilized to calculate Nash Equilibrium solutions and mixed-strategy Nash solutions as the optimal generator bidding strategies. A method to incorporate ancillary services into the generation bidding strategy, to assure an adequate supply of ancillary services, and to allocate these necessary resources to the on-line units was devised. The optimal generator bid strategy in a power auction was shown to be the Nash Equilibrium solution found in two-player variable-sum matrix games.

77 FR 60690 - Auction of FM Broadcast Construction Permits Scheduled for March 26, 2013; Comment Sought on...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2012-10-04

... technical and marketplace factors that may have a bearing on the value of the construction permits for... balances speed with the bidders' need to study round results and adjust their bidding strategies. The... number of rounds per day, depending upon bidding activity and other factors. The Bureaus seek comment on...

76 FR 62330 - Radio Broadcasting Services; Alamo, GA; Alton, MO; Boscobel, WI; Buffalo, OK; Cove, AR; Clayton...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-10-07

... Broadcasting Services; Alamo, GA; Alton, MO; Boscobel, WI; Buffalo, OK; Cove, AR; Clayton, LA; Daisy, AR; Ennis... competitive bidding process, and are considered unsold permits that were included in Auction 91. Interested... competitive bidding process. DATES: Comments must be filed on or before October 31, 2011, and reply comments...

Estimating the impact of various menu labeling formats on parents' demand for fast-food kids' meals for their children: An experimental auction.

PubMed

Hobin, Erin; Lillico, Heather; Zuo, Fei; Sacco, Jocelyn; Rosella, Laura; Hammond, David

2016-10-01

This study experimentally tested whether parents' demand for fast-food kids' meals for their children is influenced by various menu labeling formats disclosing calorie and sodium information. The study also examined the effect of various menu labeling formats on parents' ability to identify fast-food kids' meals with higher calorie and sodium content. Online surveys were conducted among parents of children aged 3-12. Parents were randomized to view 1 of 5 menu conditions: 1) No Nutrition Information; 2) Calories-Only; 3) Calories + Contextual Statement (CS); 4) Calories, Sodium, + CS; and, 5) Calorie and Sodium in Traffic Lights + CS. Using an established experimental auction study design, parents viewed replicated McDonald's menus according to their assigned condition and were asked to bid on 4 Happy Meals. A randomly selected price was chosen; bids equal to or above this price "won" the auction, and bids less than this price "lost" the auction. After the auction, participants were asked to identify the Happy Meal with the highest calories and sodium content. Adjusting for multiple comparisons and covariates, the Calories, Sodium, + CS menu had a mean attributed value across all 4 Happy Meals which was 8% lower (-$0.31) than the Calories + CS menu (p < 0.05). Significantly more parents in the 4 menu conditions providing calories were able to correctly identify the Happy Meal with the highest calories (p < 0.0001) and significantly more parents in the 2 conditions providing sodium information were able to correctly identify the Happy Meal with the highest sodium content (p < 0.0001). Menus disclosing both calories and sodium information may reduce demand for fast-food kids' meals and better support parents in making more informed and healthier food choices for their children. Copyright © 2016. Published by Elsevier Ltd.

Competitive bidding for Medicare Part B clinical laboratory services.

PubMed

Kautter, John; Pope, Gregory C

2014-06-01

The traditional Medicare fee-for-service program may be able to purchase clinical laboratory test services at a lower cost through competitive bidding. Demonstrations of competitive bidding for clinical laboratory tests have been twice mandated or authorized by Congress but never implemented. This article provides a summary and review of the final design of the laboratory competitive bidding demonstration mandated by the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003. The design was analogous to a sealed bid (first price), clearing price auction. Design elements presented include covered laboratory tests and beneficiaries, laboratory bidding and payment status under the demonstration, composite bids, determining bidding winners and the demonstration fee schedule, and quality under the demonstration. Expanded use of competitive bidding in Medicare, including specifically for clinical laboratory tests, has been recommended in some proposals for Medicare reform. The presented design may be a useful point of departure if Medicare clinical laboratory competitive bidding is revived in the future.

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Marathe, Aniruddha P.; Harris, Rachel A.; Lowenthal, David K.

The use of clouds to execute high-performance computing (HPC) applications has greatly increased recently. Clouds provide several potential advantages over traditional supercomputers and in-house clusters. The most popular cloud is currently Amazon EC2, which provides fixed-cost and variable-cost, auction-based options. The auction market trades lower cost for potential interruptions that necessitate checkpointing; if the market price exceeds the bid price, a node is taken away from the user without warning. We explore techniques to maximize performance per dollar given a time constraint within which an application must complete. Specifically, we design and implement multiple techniques to reduce expected cost bymore » exploiting redundancy in the EC2 auction market. We then design an adaptive algorithm that selects a scheduling algorithm and determines the bid price. We show that our adaptive algorithm executes programs up to seven times cheaper than using the on-demand market and up to 44 percent cheaper than the best non-redundant, auction-market algorithm. We extend our adaptive algorithm to incorporate application scalability characteristics for further cost savings. In conclusion, we show that the adaptive algorithm informed with scalability characteristics of applications achieves up to 56 percent cost savings compared to the expected cost for the base adaptive algorithm run at a fixed, user-defined scale.« less

Solve the organ shortage: let the bidding begin!

PubMed

Kevorkian, J

2001-01-01

Commercialization of transplantable human organs is the only sure way to end the crisis of their supply. This is best accomplished by implementing a free, non-profit, nationwide, ultimately global online auction market. It should be independent of the current United Network of Organ Sharing (UNOS) system dealing solely with altruistic donation, and of governmental, sectarian, academic, and other bureaucratic control. The operation of such an auction is described with a hypothetical example. An included provision guarantees equity for poor, uninsured, and indigent recipients. Money accrued can be substantial, and would be disbursed by established formula, with major portions going to donors' families and to special funds to be used to bid for the poor and to defray costs incurred by them. As the organ shortage eases, bid prices should drop, resulting perhaps in eventual altruistic donation. Objections to commericalization based on ethics, bodily sanctity, inequity, pecuniary greed, and the slippery slope tocsin are nullified by cogent arguments and examples. The current situation has worsened despite so-called required request laws, proposed token payments to cover funeral expenses for donor families, and extensive media advertising to spur altruistic donation. Prohibitive national and state laws must be rescinded for the sake of more than 60,000 patients now on lengthening waiting lists. A profession committed to saving lives is duty-bound to endorse, help implement, and participate in an auction system dedicated to that end.

Three essays on auction markets

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Shunda, Nicholas James

This dissertation contains a series of theoretical investigations of auction markets. The essays it contains cover wholesale electricity markets, a popular selling mechanism on eBay, and supplier entry into multi-unit procurement auctions. The study in Chapter 1 compares the procurement cost-minimizing and productive efficiency performance of the auction mechanism used by independent system operators in wholesale electricity auction markets in the U.S. with that of a proposed alternative. The current practice allocates energy contracts as if the auction featured a discriminatory final payment method when, in fact, the markets are uniform price auctions. The proposed alternative explicitly accounts for the market-clearing price during the allocation phase. We find that the proposed alternative largely outperforms the current practice on the basis of procurement costs in the context of simple auction markets featuring both day-ahead and real-time auctions and that the procurement cost advantage of the alternative is complete when we simulate the effects of increased competition. We also find that a tradeoff between the objectives of procurement cost minimization and productive efficiency emerges in our simple auction markets and persists in the face of increased competition. The study in Chapter 2 considers a possible rationale for an auction with a buy price. In an auction with a buy price, the seller provides bidders with an option to end the auction early by accepting a transaction at a posted price. The "Buy-It-Now" option on eBay is a leading example of an auction with a buy price. The study develops a model of an auction with a buy price in which bidders use the auction's reserve price and buy price to formulate a reference price. The model both explains why a revenue-maximizing seller would want to augment her auction with a buy price and demonstrates that the seller sets a higher reserve price when she can affect the bidders' reference price through the auction's reserve price and buy price than when she can affect the bidders' reference price through the auction's reserve price only. Introducing a small reference-price effect can shrink the range of buy prices bidders are willing to exercise. The comparative statics properties of bidding behavior are in sharp contrast to equilibrium behavior in other models where the existence and size of the auction's buy price have no effect on bidding behavior. The study in Chapter 3 investigates endogenous entry in multi-unit auctions. We formulate and study models of multi-unit discriminatory and uniform price auctions and investigate the entry incentives and procurement costs they generate in equilibrium. We study two types of endogenous entry: in auctions with "interim entry costs," suppliers know their private cost information before deciding whether or not to undertake entry; in auctions with ex ante entry costs, suppliers do not know their private cost information before deciding whether or not to enter. The discriminatory and uniform price auctions are efficient and procurement cost equivalent in all the environments we study. With interim entry costs, the two auctions provide identical entry incentives. In contrast, with ex ante entry costs, suppliers enter the discriminatory auction at a higher rate than they enter the uniform price auction.

Designing PURPA (Public Utilities Regulatory Act) power purchase auctions: Theory and practice. [Cogenerated electricity purchasing model

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Rothkopf, M.H.; Kahn, E.P.; Teisberg, T.J.

The Public Utilities Regulatory Act (PURPA) requires there to be procedures for electric utilities to buy electric power from qualifying cogenerators and small power producers (QFs) at rates up to ''avoided cost.'' This has led to price-posting procedures at prices calculated as the utility's marginal cost. Unexpectedly large sales at these prices and slow adjustment to falling energy cost are partially responsible for payments to QFs in excess of the utility's true avoided cost. Using competitive bidding instead of posted prices has been proposed as a way to avoid this outcome. This report reviews bidding theory and explores four issuesmore » that arise in deisigning auction systems for the purchase of power from QFs under PURPA. 77 refs., 6 figs., 15 tabs.« less

Designing PURPA (Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act) power purchase auctions: Theory and practice. [Buys from cogenerators and small power generators

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Not Available

The Public Utilities Regulatory Act (PURPA) requires there to be procedures for electric utilities to buy electric power from qualifying cogenerators and small power producers (QFs) at rates up to ''avoided cost''. This has led to price-posting procedures at prices calculated as the utility's marginal cost. Unexpectedly large sales at these prices and slow adjustment to falling energy cost are partially responsible for payments to QFs in excess of the utility's true avoided cost. Using competitive bidding instead of posted prices has been proposed as a way to avoid this outcome. This report reviews bidding theory and explores four issuesmore » that arise in designing auction systems for the purchase of power from QFs under PURPA.« less

Prices need no preferences: social trends determine decisions in experimental markets for pain relief.

PubMed

Vlaev, Ivo; Seymour, Ben; Chater, Nick; Winston, Joel S; Yoshida, Wako; Wright, Nicholas; Symmonds, Mkael; Dolan, Ray

2014-01-01

A standard view in health economics is that, although there is no market that determines the "prices" for health states, people can nonetheless associate health states with monetary values (or other scales, such as quality adjusted life year [QALYs] and disability adjusted life year [DALYs]). Such valuations can be used to shape health policy, and a major research challenge is to elicit such values from people; creating experimental "markets" for health states is a theoretically attractive way to address this. We explore the possibility that this framework may be fundamentally flawed-because there may not be any stable values to be revealed. Instead, perhaps people construct ad hoc values, influenced by contextual factors, such as the observed decisions of others. The participants bid to buy relief from equally painful electrical shocks to the leg and arm in an experimental health market based on an interactive second-price auction. Thirty subjects were randomly assigned to two experimental conditions where the bids by "others" were manipulated to follow increasing or decreasing price trends for one, but not the other, pain. After the auction, a preference test asked the participants to choose which pain they prefer to experience for a longer duration. Players remained indifferent between the two pain-types throughout the auction. However, their bids were differentially attracted toward what others bid for each pain, with overbidding during decreasing prices and underbidding during increasing prices. Health preferences are dissociated from market prices, which are strongly referenced to others' choices. This suggests that the price of health care in a free-market has the capacity to become critically detached from people's underlying preferences. 2014 APA, all rights reserved

Understanding Overbidding: Using the Neural Circuitry of Reward to Design Economic Auctions

PubMed Central

Delgado, Mauricio R.; Schotter, Andrew; Ozbay, Erkut Y.; Phelps, Elizabeth A.

2011-01-01

We take advantage of our knowledge of the neural circuitry of reward to investigate a puzzling economic phenomenon: Why do people overbid in auctions? Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we observed that the social competition inherent in an auction results in a more pronounced blood oxygen level–dependent (BOLD) response to loss in the striatum, with greater overbidding correlated with the magnitude of this response. Leveraging these neuroimaging results, we design a behavioral experiment that demonstrates that framing an experimental auction to emphasize loss increases overbidding. These results highlight a role for the contemplation of loss in understanding the tendency to bid “too high.” Current economic theories suggest overbidding may result from either “joy of winning” or risk aversion. By combining neuroeconomic and behavioral economic techniques, we find that another factor, namely loss contemplation in a social context, may mediate overbidding in auctions. PMID:18818362

Understanding overbidding: using the neural circuitry of reward to design economic auctions.

PubMed

Delgado, Mauricio R; Schotter, Andrew; Ozbay, Erkut Y; Phelps, Elizabeth A

2008-09-26

We take advantage of our knowledge of the neural circuitry of reward to investigate a puzzling economic phenomenon: Why do people overbid in auctions? Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we observed that the social competition inherent in an auction results in a more pronounced blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) response to loss in the striatum, with greater overbidding correlated with the magnitude of this response. Leveraging these neuroimaging results, we design a behavioral experiment that demonstrates that framing an experimental auction to emphasize loss increases overbidding. These results highlight a role for the contemplation of loss in understanding the tendency to bid "too high." Current economic theories suggest overbidding may result from either "joy of winning" or risk aversion. By combining neuroeconomic and behavioral economic techniques, we find that another factor, namely loss contemplation in a social context, may mediate overbidding in auctions.

31 CFR 356.25 - How does the settlement process work?

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-07-01

... with bids. If you paid the par amount with your bids as provided for in § 356.17 (c)(2), you may have... example would be an auction where the price is a discount from par and there is no accrued interest. (2... 31 Money and Finance:Treasury 2 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false How does the settlement process work...

31 CFR 356.25 - How does the settlement process work?

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-07-01

... with bids. If you paid the par amount with your bids as provided for in § 356.17 (c)(2), you may have... example would be an auction where the price is a discount from par and there is no accrued interest. (2... 31 Money and Finance:Treasury 2 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false How does the settlement process work...

31 CFR 356.25 - How does the settlement process work?

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-07-01

... with bids. If you paid the par amount with your bids as provided for in § 356.17 (c)(2), you may have... example would be an auction where the price is a discount from par and there is no accrued interest. (2... 31 Money and Finance:Treasury 2 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false How does the settlement process work...

31 CFR 356.24 - Will I be notified directly of my awards and, if I am submitting bids for others, do I have to...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

.... (b) Notification of awards to customers. If you are a submitter for customers, you are responsible... any awards to its customers and any intermediaries from whom it received bids. (c) Notification of... institution. We will provide this notification no later than the day after the auction. (d) Customer...

Auction-based distributed efficient economic operations of microgrid systems

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Zou, Suli; Ma, Zhongjing; Liu, Xiangdong

2014-12-01

This paper studies the economic operations of the microgrid in a distributed way such that the operational schedule of each of the units, like generators, load units, storage units, etc., in a microgrid system, is implemented by autonomous agents. We apply and generalise the progressive second price (PSP) auction mechanism which was proposed by Lazar and Semret to efficiently allocate the divisible network resources. Considering the economic operation for the microgrid systems, the generators play as sellers to supply energy and the load units play as the buyers to consume energy, while a storage unit, like battery, super capacitor, etc., may transit between buyer and seller, such that it is a buyer when it charges and becomes a seller when it discharges. Furthermore in a connected mode, each individual unit competes against not only the other individual units in the microgrid but also the exogenous main grid possessing fixed electricity price and infinite trade capacity; that is to say, the auctioneer assigns the electricity among all individual units and the main grid with respect to the submitted bid strategies of all individual units in the microgrid in an economic way. Due to these distinct characteristics, the underlying auction games are distinct from those studied in the literature. We show that under mild conditions, the efficient economic operation strategy is a Nash equilibrium (NE) for the PSP auction games, and propose a distributed algorithm under which the system can converge to an NE. We also show that the performance of worst NE can be bounded with respect to the system parameters, say the energy trading price with the main grid, and based upon that, the implemented NE is unique and efficient under some conditions.

Anonymous, Yet Trustworthy Auctions

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Chanda, Prasit Bikash; Naessens, Vincent; de Decker, Bart

An auction is an inevitable market mechanism to setup prices of goods or services in a competitive and dynamic environment. Anonymity of bidders is required to conceal their business strategies from competitors. However, it is also essential to provide the seller guarantees that a bidder is trustworthy and competent enough to perform certain tasks (e.g transports). This paper proposes an auction protocol where bidders will participate anonymously, yet prove to be trustworthy and competent and can be held accountable towards auctioneers and sellers. Moreover, the protocol introduces promises, bonuses and compensations to ensure the best price for the sellers, extra profit for bidders and opportunities for newcomers in the business. It also handles ties, and copes with last minute bidding. Finally, the auction’s fair proceedings and outcome can be verified by everyone.

Exploiting Redundancy and Application Scalability for Cost-Effective, Time-Constrained Execution of HPC Applications on Amazon EC2

DOE PAGES

Marathe, Aniruddha P.; Harris, Rachel A.; Lowenthal, David K.; ...

2015-12-17

The use of clouds to execute high-performance computing (HPC) applications has greatly increased recently. Clouds provide several potential advantages over traditional supercomputers and in-house clusters. The most popular cloud is currently Amazon EC2, which provides fixed-cost and variable-cost, auction-based options. The auction market trades lower cost for potential interruptions that necessitate checkpointing; if the market price exceeds the bid price, a node is taken away from the user without warning. We explore techniques to maximize performance per dollar given a time constraint within which an application must complete. Specifically, we design and implement multiple techniques to reduce expected cost bymore » exploiting redundancy in the EC2 auction market. We then design an adaptive algorithm that selects a scheduling algorithm and determines the bid price. We show that our adaptive algorithm executes programs up to seven times cheaper than using the on-demand market and up to 44 percent cheaper than the best non-redundant, auction-market algorithm. We extend our adaptive algorithm to incorporate application scalability characteristics for further cost savings. In conclusion, we show that the adaptive algorithm informed with scalability characteristics of applications achieves up to 56 percent cost savings compared to the expected cost for the base adaptive algorithm run at a fixed, user-defined scale.« less

Estimation of Bid Curves in Power Exchanges using Time-varying Simultaneous-Equations Models

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Ofuji, Kenta; Yamaguchi, Nobuyuki

Simultaneous-equations model (SEM) is generally used in economics to estimate interdependent endogenous variables such as price and quantity in a competitive, equilibrium market. In this paper, we have attempted to apply SEM to JEPX (Japan Electric Power eXchange) spot market, a single-price auction market, using the publicly available data of selling and buying bid volumes, system price and traded quantity. The aim of this analysis is to understand the magnitude of influences to the auctioned prices and quantity from the selling and buying bids, than to forecast prices and quantity for risk management purposes. In comparison with the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation where the estimation results represent average values that are independent of time, we employ a time-varying simultaneous-equations model (TV-SEM) to capture structural changes inherent in those influences, using State Space models with Kalman filter stepwise estimation. The results showed that the buying bid volumes has that highest magnitude of influences among the factors considered, exhibiting time-dependent changes, ranging as broad as about 240% of its average. The slope of the supply curve also varies across time, implying the elastic property of the supply commodity, while the demand curve remains comparatively inelastic and stable over time.

Auctions with Dynamic Populations: Efficiency and Revenue Maximization

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Said, Maher

We study a stochastic sequential allocation problem with a dynamic population of privately-informed buyers. We characterize the set of efficient allocation rules and show that a dynamic VCG mechanism is both efficient and periodic ex post incentive compatible; we also show that the revenue-maximizing direct mechanism is a pivot mechanism with a reserve price. We then consider sequential ascending auctions in this setting, both with and without a reserve price. We construct equilibrium bidding strategies in this indirect mechanism where bidders reveal their private information in every period, yielding the same outcomes as the direct mechanisms. Thus, the sequential ascending auction is a natural institution for achieving either efficient or optimal outcomes.

Replicator dynamics with turnover of players

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Juul, Jeppe; Kianercy, Ardeshir; Bernhardsson, Sebastian; Pigolotti, Simone

2013-08-01

We study adaptive dynamics in games where players abandon the population at a given rate and are replaced by naive players characterized by a prior distribution over the admitted strategies. We demonstrate how such a process leads macroscopically to a variant of the replicator equation, with an additional term accounting for player turnover. We study how Nash equilibria and the dynamics of the system are modified by this additional term for prototypical examples such as the rock-paper-scissors game and different classes of two-action games played between two distinct populations. We conclude by showing how player turnover can account for nontrivial departures from Nash equilibria observed in data from lowest unique bid auctions.

Marginal Bidding: An Application of the Equimarginal Principle to Bidding in TAC SCM

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Greenwald, Amy; Naroditskiy, Victor; Odean, Tyler; Ramirez, Mauricio; Sodomka, Eric; Zimmerman, Joe; Cutler, Clark

We present a fast and effective bidding strategy for the Trading Agent Competition in Supply Chain Management (TAC SCM). In TAC SCM, manufacturers compete to procure computer parts from suppliers (the procurement problem), and then sell assembled computers to customers in reverse auctions (the bidding problem). This paper is concerned only with bidding, in which an agent must decide how many computers to sell and at what prices to sell them. We propose a greedy solution, Marginal Bidding, inspired by the Equimarginal Principle, which states that revenue is maximized among possible uses of a resource when the return on the last unit of the resource is the same across all areas of use. We show experimentally that certain variations of Marginal Bidding can compute bids faster than our ILP solution, which enables Marginal Bidders to consider future demand as well as current demand, and hence achieve greater revenues when knowledge of the future is valuable.

Clean air, clear market. Making emissions trading work: The role of a computer-assisted auction

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Bartels, C.W.; Marron, D.B.; Lipsky, M.I.

1993-06-15

Creating a new commodity presents the chance to develop new markets in which to trade it. In many cases, existing markets can be adapted easily; in other cases it proves worthwhile to develop new forms that reflect special characteristics of the commodity and those who trade it. In the case of the sulfur dioxide (SO[sub 2]) emission allowances created by the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, a number of standard market forms already have been adopted. While these will prove useful for handling some transactions, a new Market Clearing Auction (MCA) offers buyers and sellers a centralized marketplace formore » trading SO[sub 2] emission allowances. The MCA, which was developed by the brokerage firm Cantor Fitzgerald, is a computer-assisted [open quotes]smart[close quotes] auction designed to replicate the outcome of an efficient market in emission allowances, and accepts bids and offers for any possible combination of allowances. Orders can be submitted for streams of allowances. Orders can be submitted for streams of allowances covering more than one year. The auction then determines the combination of bids and offers that maximizes the gains from trades in the market, and establishes uniform market clearing prices for each allowance issue (1995, 1996, and so on). Once executed, trades are settled on a cash-forward basis; that is, allowances are delivered and payments are made at future dates.« less

Auction development for the price-based electric power industry

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Dekrajangpetch, Somgiat

The restructuring of the electric power industry is to move away from the cost-based monopolistic environment of the past to the priced-based competitive environment. As the electric power industry is restructuring in many places, there are still many problems that need to be solved. The work in this dissertation contributes to solve some of the electric power auction problems. The majority of this work is aimed to help develop good markets. A LaGrangian relaxation (LR) Centralized Daily Commitment Auction (CDCA) has been implemented. It has been shown that the solution might not be optimal nor fair to some generation companies (GENCOs) when identical or similar generating units participate in a LR CDCA based auction. Supporting information for bidding strategies on how to change unit data to enhance the chances of bid acceptance has been developed. The majority of this work is based on Single Period Commodity Auction (SPCA). Alternative structures for the SPCA are outlined. Whether the optimal solution is degenerated is investigated. Good pricing criteria are summarized and the pricing method following good pricing criteria is developed. Electricity is generally considered as a homogeneous product. When availability level is used as additional characteristic to distinct electricity, electricity can be considered a heterogeneous product. The procedure to trade electricity as a heterogeneous product is developed. The SPCA is formulated as a linear program. The basic IPLP algorithm has been extended so that sensitivity analysis can be performed as in the simplex method. Sensitivity analysis is used to determine market reach. Additionally, sensitivity analysis is used in combination with the investigation of historical auction results to provide raw data for power system expansion. Market power is a critical issue in electric power deregulation. Firms with market power have an advantage over other competitor firms in terms of market reach. Various approaches to determine market power and market reach are to be investigated. How firms can acquire additional customers or additional transactions, given the auction results, is to be investigated. Additionally, how firms can utilize their market power to enhance their chances of success is to be investigated.

Improving Agent Bidding in Power Stock Markets through a Data Mining Enhanced Agent Platform

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Chrysopoulos, Anthony C.; Symeonidis, Andreas L.; Mitkas, Pericles A.

Like in any other auctioning environment, entities participating in Power Stock Markets have to compete against other in order to maximize own revenue. Towards the satisfaction of their goal, these entities (agents - human or software ones) may adopt different types of strategies - from na?ve to extremely complex ones - in order to identify the most profitable goods compilation, the appropriate price to buy or sell etc, always under time pressure and auction environment constraints. Decisions become even more difficult to make in case one takes the vast volumes of historical data available into account: goods’ prices, market fluctuations, bidding habits and buying opportunities. Within the context of this paper we present Cassandra, a multi-agent platform that exploits data mining, in order to extract efficient models for predicting Power Settlement prices and Power Load values in typical Day-ahead Power markets. The functionality of Cassandra is discussed, while focus is given on the bidding mechanism of Cassandra’s agents, and the way data mining analysis is performed in order to generate the optimal forecasting models. Cassandra has been tested in a real-world scenario, with data derived from the Greek Energy Stock market.

47 CFR 1.2209 - Disbursement of incentive payments.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-10-01

... 47 Telecommunication 1 2014-10-01 2014-10-01 false Disbursement of incentive payments. 1.2209 Section 1.2209 Telecommunication FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION GENERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE Grants by Random Selection Competitive Bidding Proceedings Broadcast Television Spectrum Reverse Auction § 1...

Endogenous Market-Clearing Prices and Reference Point Adaptation

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Dragicevic, Arnaud Z.

When prices depend on the submitted bids, i.e. with endogenous market-clearing prices in repeated-round auction mechanisms, the assumption of independent private values that underlines the property of incentive-compatibility is to be brought into question; even if these mechanisms provide active involvement and market learning. In its orthodox view, adaptive bidding behavior imperils incentive-compatibility. We relax the assumption of private values' independence in the repeated-round auctions, when the market-clearing prices are made public at the end of each round. Instead of using game-theory learning models, we introduce a behavioral model that shows that bidders bid according to the anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic, which neither ignores the rationality and incentive-compatibility constraints, nor rejects the posted prices issued from others' bids. Bidders simply weight information at their disposal and adjust their discovered value using reference points encoded in the sequential price weighting function. Our model says that bidders and offerers are sincere boundedly rational utility maximizers. It lies between evolutionary dynamics and adaptive heuristics and we model the concept of inertia as high weighting of the anchor, which stands for truthful bidding and high regard to freshly discovered preferences. Adjustment means adaptive rule based on adaptation of the reference point in the direction of the posted price. It helps a bidder to maximize her expected payoff, which is after all the only purpose that matters to rationality. The two components simply suggest that sincere bidders are boundedly rational. Furthermore, by deviating from their anchor in the direction of the public signal, bidders operate in a correlated equilibrium. The correlation between bids comes from the commonly observed history of play and each bidder's actions are determined by the history. Bidders are sincere if they have limited memory and confine their reference point adaptation to their anchor and the latest posted price. S-shaped weighting mechanism reflects such a bidding strategy.

78 FR 74208 - Self-Regulatory Organizations; NYSE Arca, Inc.; Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-12-10

... systemically enforced narrow-width bid-ask differential applicable to the auction process. Since the time of... narrow-width NBBO is received from OPRA. This is a systemic solution which renders the rules-based narrow...

Ordering competition: the interactional accomplishment of the sale of art and antiques at auction.

PubMed

Heath, Christian; Luff, Paul

2007-03-01

Auctions provide an institutional solution to a social problem; they enable the legitimate pricing and exchange of goods where those goods are of uncertain value. In turn, auctions raise a number of social and organizational issues that are resolved within the interaction that arise in sales by auction. In this paper, we examine sales of fine art, antiques and objets d'art and explore the ways in which auctioneers mediate competition between buyers and establish a value for goods. In particular, we explore how bids are elicited, co-ordinated and revealed so as to rapidly escalate the price of goods in a transparent manner that enables the legitimate valuation and exchange of goods. In directing attention towards the significance of the social interaction, including talk, visual and material conduct, the paper contributes to the growing corpus of ethnographic studies of markets. It suggests that to understand the operation of markets and their outcomes, and to unpack issues of agency, trust and practice, we need to place the 'interaction order' at the heart of analytic agenda.

Network analysis of online bidding activity

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Yang, I.; Oh, E.; Kahng, B.

2006-07-01

With the advent of digital media, people are increasingly resorting to online channels for commercial transactions. The online auction is a prototypical example. In such online transactions, the pattern of bidding activity is more complex than traditional offline transactions; this is because the number of bidders participating in a given transaction is not bounded and the bidders can also easily respond to the bidding instantaneously. By using the recently developed network theory, we study the interaction patterns between bidders (items) who (that) are connected when they bid for the same item (if the item is bid by the same bidder). The resulting network is analyzed by using the hierarchical clustering algorithm, which is used for clustering analysis for expression data from DNA microarrays. A dendrogram is constructed for the item subcategories; this dendrogram is compared to a traditional classification scheme. The implication of the difference between the two is discussed.

47 CFR 1.1182 - Schedule of fees for products and services provided by the Commission in connection with...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-10-01

... telephone bill. Remote Bidding Software $175.00 per package Payment to auction contractor by credit card or... contractor by credit card or check. (Public Notice will specify exact payment procedures.) [60 FR 38280, July...

78 FR 56875 - Tribal Mobility Fund Phase I Auction Rescheduled for December 19, 2013; Notice and Filing...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-09-16

... of comparing bids and measuring the performance of Tribal Mobility Fund Phase I support recipients..., EV-DO Rev A, UMTS/HSPA, HSPA+, WiMAX, and LTE. If the Mosaik data did not show such coverage, the...

Neural correlates of reinforcement learning and social preferences in competitive bidding.

PubMed

van den Bos, Wouter; Talwar, Arjun; McClure, Samuel M

2013-01-30

In competitive social environments, people often deviate from what rational choice theory prescribes, resulting in losses or suboptimal monetary gains. We investigate how competition affects learning and decision-making in a common value auction task. During the experiment, groups of five human participants were simultaneously scanned using MRI while playing the auction task. We first demonstrate that bidding is well characterized by reinforcement learning with biased reward representations dependent on social preferences. Indicative of reinforcement learning, we found that estimated trial-by-trial prediction errors correlated with activity in the striatum and ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Additionally, we found that individual differences in social preferences were related to activity in the temporal-parietal junction and anterior insula. Connectivity analyses suggest that monetary and social value signals are integrated in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and striatum. Based on these results, we argue for a novel mechanistic account for the integration of reinforcement history and social preferences in competitive decision-making.

AUCTION MECHANISMS FOR IMPLEMENTING TRADABLE NETWORK PERMIT MARKETS

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Wada, Kentaro; Akamatsu, Takashi

This paper proposes a new auction mechanism for implementing the tradable network permit markets. Assuming that each user makes a trip from an origin to a destination along a path in a specific time period, we design an auction mechanism that enables each user to purchase a bundle of permits corresponding to a set of links in the user's preferred path. The objective of the proposed mechanism is to achieve a socially optimal state with minimal revelation of users' private information. In order to achieve this, the mechanism employs an evolutionary approach that has an auction phase and a path capacity adjustment phase, which are repeated on a day-to-day basis. We prove that the proposed mechanism has the following desirable properties: (1) truthful bidding is the dominant strategy for each user and (2) the proposed mechanism converges to an approximate socially optimal state in the sense that the achieved value of the social surplus reaches its maximum value when the number of users is large.

41 CFR 109-45.304-51 - Documentation.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... return for property sold. (g) When appropriate, full and adequate justification for not advertising the... of auction or spot bid sales, the following additional information should be included: (1) A summary listing of the advertising used (e.g., newspapers, radio, television, and public postings). (2) The names...

41 CFR 109-45.304-51 - Documentation.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... return for property sold. (g) When appropriate, full and adequate justification for not advertising the... of auction or spot bid sales, the following additional information should be included: (1) A summary listing of the advertising used (e.g., newspapers, radio, television, and public postings). (2) The names...

41 CFR 109-45.304-51 - Documentation.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-07-01

... return for property sold. (g) When appropriate, full and adequate justification for not advertising the... of auction or spot bid sales, the following additional information should be included: (1) A summary listing of the advertising used (e.g., newspapers, radio, television, and public postings). (2) The names...

41 CFR 109-45.304-51 - Documentation.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... return for property sold. (g) When appropriate, full and adequate justification for not advertising the... of auction or spot bid sales, the following additional information should be included: (1) A summary listing of the advertising used (e.g., newspapers, radio, television, and public postings). (2) The names...

41 CFR 109-45.304-51 - Documentation.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... return for property sold. (g) When appropriate, full and adequate justification for not advertising the... of auction or spot bid sales, the following additional information should be included: (1) A summary listing of the advertising used (e.g., newspapers, radio, television, and public postings). (2) The names...

75 FR 16878 - Self-Regulatory Organizations; Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board; Notice of Filing of...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-04-02

... (``ARS'') and Variable Rate Demand Obligations (``VRDOs''). The proposed rule change would: (i) Amend... that define auction procedures and interest rate setting mechanisms for ARS and liquidity facilities for VRDOs (``short-term obligation document disclosure rule change''); (b) ARS bidding information...

47 CFR 1.2201 - Purpose.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-10-01

... Competitive Bidding Proceedings Broadcast Television Spectrum Reverse Auction § 1.2201 Purpose. The provisions of §§ 1.2200 through 1.2209 implement section 6403 of the Spectrum Act, which requires the Commission... spectrum usage rights in order to make spectrum available for assignment through a system of competitive...

47 CFR 22.213 - Filing of long-form applications.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... 47 Telecommunication 2 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Filing of long-form applications. 22.213... PUBLIC MOBILE SERVICES Licensing Requirements and Procedures Competitive Bidding Procedures § 22.213 Filing of long-form applications. After an auction, the Commission will not accept long form applications...

Alternative Salary Auction Mechanisms for the Navy: An Experimental Program

DTIC Science & Technology

2007-12-01

33 2. Fidelity of WTP Information ............................................................33 3. Effects of Competition...70 3. WTA and WTP Control ....................................................................70 4. Bidding...jar of pennies would be $18, which is the maximum that buyer’s willingness to pay ( WTP ) for that object. 8 2. First-price and Second-price

47 CFR 1.2206 - Confidentiality of Commission-held data.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-10-01

... by Random Selection Competitive Bidding Proceedings Broadcast Television Spectrum Reverse Auction § 1... reassignments and reallocations under section 6403(b)(1)(B) of the Spectrum Act become effective or until two...)(1)(B) of the Spectrum Act become effective, the Commission will continue to take all reasonable...

A revealed preference approach to estimating supply curves for ecosystem services: use of auctions to set payments for soil erosion control in Indonesia.

PubMed

Jack, B Kelsey; Leimona, Beria; Ferraro, Paul J

2009-04-01

To supply ecosystem services, private landholders incur costs. Knowledge of these costs is critical for the design of conservation-payment programs. Estimating these costs accurately is difficult because the minimum acceptable payment to a potential supplier is private information. We describe how an auction of payment contracts can be designed to elicit this information during the design phase of a conservation-payment program. With an estimate of the ecosystem-service supply curve from a pilot auction, conservation planners can explore the financial, ecological, and socioeconomic consequences of alternative scaled-up programs. We demonstrate the potential of our approach in Indonesia, where soil erosion on coffee farms generates downstream ecological and economic costs. Bid data from a small-scale, uniform-price auction for soil-conservation contracts allowed estimates of the costs of a scaled-up program, the gain from integrating biophysical and economic data to target contracts, and the trade-offs between poverty alleviation and supply of ecosystem services. Our study illustrates an auction-based approach to revealing private information about the costs of supplying ecosystem services. Such information can improve the design of programs devised to protect and enhance ecosystem services.

Auction-based Security Game for Multiuser Cooperative Networks

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Wang, An; Cai, Yueming; Yang, Wendong; Cheng, Yunpeng

2013-04-01

In this paper, we develop an auction-based algorithm to allocate the relay power efficiently to improve the system secrecy rate in a cooperative network, where several source-destination pairs and one cooperative relay are involved. On the one hand, the cooperative relay assists these pairs to transmit under a peak power constraint. On the other hand, the relay is untrusty and is also a passive eavesdropper. The whole auction process is completely distributed and no instantaneous channel state information exchange is needed. We also prove the existence and uniqueness of the Nash Equilibrium (NE) for the proposed power auction game. Moreover, the Pareto optimality is also validated. Simulation results show that our proposed auction-based algorithm can effectively improve the system secrecy rate. Besides, the proposed auction-based algorithm can converge to the unique NE point within a finite number of iterations. More interestingly, we also find that the proposed power auction mechanism is cheat-proof.

Using Priced Options to Solve the Exposure Problem in Sequential Auctions

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Mous, Lonneke; Robu, Valentin; La Poutré, Han

This paper studies the benefits of using priced options for solving the exposure problem that bidders with valuation synergies face when participating in multiple, sequential auctions. We consider a model in which complementary-valued items are auctioned sequentially by different sellers, who have the choice of either selling their good directly or through a priced option, after fixing its exercise price. We analyze this model from a decision-theoretic perspective and we show, for a setting where the competition is formed by local bidders, that using options can increase the expected profit for both buyers and sellers. Furthermore, we derive the equations that provide minimum and maximum bounds between which a synergy buyer's bids should fall in order for both sides to have an incentive to use the options mechanism. Next, we perform an experimental analysis of a market in which multiple synergy bidders are active simultaneously.

Encouraging information sharing to boost the name-your-own-price auction

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Chen, Yahong; Li, Jinlin; Huang, He; Ran, Lun; Hu, Yusheng

2017-08-01

During a name-your-own-price (NYOP) auction, buyers can learn a lot of knowledge from their socially connected peers. Such social learning process makes them become more active to attend the auction and also helps them make decisions on what price to submit. Combining an information diffusion model and a belief decision model, we explore three effects of bidders' information sharing on the buyers' behaviors and the seller profit. The results indicate that information sharing significantly increases the NYOP popularity and the seller profit. When enlarging the quality or quantity of information sharing, or increasing the spreading efficiency of the network topology, the number of attenders and the seller profit are increased significantly. However, the spread of information may make bidders be more likely to bid higher and consequently lose surplus. In addition, the different but interdependent influence of the successful information and failure information are discussed in this work.

Electronic Reverse Auctions in the Federal Government

DTIC Science & Technology

2007-12-01

William R. Gates _____________________________________ Peter J. Coughlan _____________________________________ Robert N. Beck ...AND ACRONYMS BAA Buy American Act BPA Blanket Purchase Agreement CBE Competitive Bidding Event CCR Central Contractor Registration CECOM...BUY AMERICAN ACT Even if a buyer employs e-RAs to determine the price of an item, the regulations such as the Buy American Act ( BAA ) still apply

75 FR 22792 - Closed Auction of Broadcast Construction Permits Scheduled for July 20, 2010; Notice and Filing...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-04-30

... of the outstanding non-tax delinquencies. 52. On the short-form application, an applicant must... Bureaus' previous guidance on default and delinquency disclosure requirements in the context of the short... 1.2106(a) regarding default and delinquency in connection with competitive bidding are limited to...

31 CFR 356.15 - What rules apply to bids submitted by investment advisers?

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... investment advisers? 356.15 Section 356.15 Money and Finance: Treasury Regulations Relating to Money and... MARKETABLE BOOK-ENTRY TREASURY BILLS, NOTES, AND BONDS (DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY CIRCULAR, PUBLIC DEBT... investment advisers? (a) General. The auction rules that apply to investment advisers are determined by the...

Neurobiologically Validated Models of Errors in Decision-Making: Strategies for Remediation and Detection

DTIC Science & Technology

2015-03-20

performed a series of bid trials where they reported their willingness-to-pay for each of 30 snack food items; potential trial realization was...willingness-to-pay for each of 30 snack food items; potential trial realization was conducted at the end of the experiment via an auction procedure

7 CFR 3550.251 - Property management and disposition.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... property through direct sales, sealed bid, or auction. RHS will follow affirmative fair housing marketing.... RHS will also notify any potential purchaser of any known lead-based paint hazards. (3) Property on... housing during the first 60 days after the date of the first notice of sale, and during the first 30 days...

Using a Memory Test to Limit a User to One Account

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Conitzer, Vincent

In many Web-based applications, there are incentives for a user to sign up for more than one account, under false names. By doing so, the user can send spam e-mail from an account (which will eventually cause the account to be shut down); distort online ratings by rating multiple times (in particular, she can inflate her own reputation ratings); indefinitely continue using a product with a free trial period; place shill bids on items that she is selling on an auction site; engage in false-name bidding in combinatorial auctions; etc. All of these behaviors are highly undesirable from the perspective of system performance. While CAPTCHAs can prevent a bot from automatically signing up for many accounts, they do not prevent a human from signing up for multiple accounts. It may appear that the only way to prevent the latter is to require the user to provide information that identifies her in the real world (such as a credit card or telephone number), but users are reluctant to give out such information.

Truthful Incentive Mechanisms for Social Cost Minimization in Mobile Crowdsourcing Systems

PubMed Central

Duan, Zhuojun; Yan, Mingyuan; Cai, Zhipeng; Wang, Xiaoming; Han, Meng; Li, Yingshu

2016-01-01

With the emergence of new technologies, mobile devices are capable of undertaking computational and sensing tasks. A large number of users with these mobile devices promote the formation of the Mobile Crowdsourcing Systems (MCSs). Within a MCS, each mobile device can contribute to the crowdsourcing platform and get rewards from it. In order to achieve better performance, it is important to design a mechanism that can attract enough participants with mobile devices and then allocate the tasks among participants efficiently. In this paper, we are interested in the investigation of tasks allocation and price determination in MCSs. Two truthful auction mechanisms are proposed for different working patterns. A Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG)-based auction mechanism is proposed to the continuous working pattern, and a suboptimal auction mechanism is introduced for the discontinuous working pattern. Further analysis shows that the proposed mechanisms have the properties of individual rationality and computational efficiencies. Experimental results suggest that both mechanisms guarantee all the mobile users bidding with their truthful values and the optimal maximal social cost can be achieved in the VCG-based auction mechanism. PMID:27058541

Improved Monkey-King Genetic Algorithm for Solving Large Winner Determination in Combinatorial Auction

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Li, Yuzhong

Using GA solve the winner determination problem (WDP) with large bids and items, run under different distribution, because the search space is large, constraint complex and it may easy to produce infeasible solution, would affect the efficiency and quality of algorithm. This paper present improved MKGA, including three operator: preprocessing, insert bid and exchange recombination, and use Monkey-king elite preservation strategy. Experimental results show that improved MKGA is better than SGA in population size and computation. The problem that traditional branch and bound algorithm hard to solve, improved MKGA can solve and achieve better effect.

Smart Computer-Assisted Markets

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

McCabe, Kevin A.; Rassenti, Stephen J.; Smith, Vernon L.

1991-10-01

The deregulation movement has motivated the experimental study of auction markets designed for interdependent network industries such as natural gas pipelines or electric power systems. Decentralized agents submit bids to buy commodity and offers to sell transportation and commodity to a computerized dispatch center. Computer algorithms determine prices and allocations that maximize the gains from exchange in the system relative to the submitted bids and offers. The problem is important, because traditionally the scale and coordination economies in such industries were thought to require regulation. Laboratory experiments are used to study feasibility, limitations, incentives, and performance of proposed market designs for deregulation, providing motivation for new theory.

Adaptive Sniping for Volatile and Stable Continuous Double Auction Markets

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Toft, I. E.; Bagnall, A. J.

This paper introduces a new adaptive sniping agent for the Continuous Double Auction. We begin by analysing the performance of the well known Kaplan sniper in two extremes of market conditions. We generate volatile and stable market conditions using the well known Zero Intelligence-Constrained agent and a new zero-intelligence agent Small Increment (SI). ZI-C agents submit random but profitable bids/offers and cause high volatility in prices and individual trader performance. Our new zero-intelligence agent, SI, makes small random adjustments to the outstanding bid/offer and hence is more cautious than ZI-C. We present results for SI in self-play and then analyse Kaplan in volatile and stable markets. We demonstrate that the non-adaptive Kaplan sniper can be configured to suit either market conditions, but no single configuration is performs well across both market types. We believe that in a dynamic auction environment where current or future market conditions cannot be predicted a viable sniping strategy should adapt its behaviour to suit prevailing market conditions. To this end, we propose the Adaptive Sniper (AS) agent for the CDA. AS traders classify sniping opportunities using a statistical model of market activity and adjust their classification thresholds using a Widrow-Hoff adapted search. Our AS agent requires little configuration, and outperforms the original Kaplan sniper in volatile and stable markets, and in a mixed trader type scenario that includes adaptive strategies from the literature.

The impact of free trial acceptance on demand for alternative nicotine products: evidence from experimental auctions.

PubMed

Rousu, Matthew C; O'Connor, Richard J; Bansal-Travers, Maansi; Pitcavage, James M; Thrasher, James F

2015-06-11

This study explored the relationship between product trials and consumer demand for alternative nicotine products (ANP). An experimental auction was conducted with 258 adult smokers, wherein participants were randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions. The participants received the opportunity to try, but did not have to accept, one of three relatively novel ST products (i.e., snus, dissolvable tobacco, or medicinal nicotine), or they were placed into a control group (i.e., no trial). All the participants then bid on all three of these products, as well as on cigarettes. We assessed interest in using ANP based on both trial of the product and bids placed for the products in the experimental auction. Fewer smokers were willing to try snus (44%) than dissolvable tobacco (64%) or medicine nicotine (68%). For snus, we find modest evidence suggesting that willingness to try is associated with greater demand for the product. For dissolvable tobacco or medicinal nicotine, we find no evidence that those who accept the product trial have higher demand for the product. Free trials of a novel ANP were not strongly associated with product demand, as assessed by willingness to pay. Given the debate over the potential for ANP to reduce the harm from smoking, these results are important in understanding the impact of free trial offers on adoption of ST product as a strategy to reduce harm from tobacco use.

Decentralization of storm runoff via engagement of social and cultural capitals - implications for the management of flood risk at the municipal scale

EPA Science Inventory

This research tests a novel method that focuses limited community resources on a decentralized approach to storm water management. A reverse auction was used to relieve legal constraints on management implementation on private land. Residents voluntarily bid on rain gardens and r...

Allocating Non-Monetary Incentives for Navy Nurse Corps Officers: Menu Method vs. Bid Method Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM)

DTIC Science & Technology

2010-03-01

in a pyramid style, as shown in Table 6. The pyramid style gradually introduces complexity into the process and identifies learning effects by later...Corps BUMED Bethesda, Maryland 4. Captain Pamela Giza , NC, USN Deputy Director, Navy Nurse Corps BUMED Bethesda, Maryland 5. Captain Regina

42 CFR 35.49 - Sale of unclaimed effects; procedures.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... include: an inventory of the effects to be offered for sale; the names of the patients from whom the... that the articles will be available for inspection immediately prior to sale, if sold at public auction, or on a day and during the hours appointed for the inspection of articles if sold by sealed bid; a...

Using Laboratory Experiments for Policymaking: An Example from the Georgia Irrigation Reduction Auction

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Cummings, Ronald G.; Holt, Charles A.; Laury, Susan K.

2004-01-01

In recent years, interest has been growing in policy applications of different auction systems. This paper reports a series of experiments that were used to design and implement an auction in a unique policymaking environment. In April 2000, the Georgia legislature passed a law that mandated that the state hold an auction in drought years to pay…

77 FR 74258 - Self-Regulatory Organizations; NYSE MKT LLC; Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2012-12-13

... Amending Exchange Rule 952NY With Respect to Opening Trading in an Options Series December 7, 2012... 952NY (Trading Auctions) with respect to opening trading in an options series. The text of the proposed... series for trading when there are no executable orders and/or quotes and the bid-ask differential of the...

76 FR 37373 - Notice of Realty Action: Competitive Sale of Public Lands in Colusa, Glenn, and Lake Counties...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-06-27

...] Notice of Realty Action: Competitive Sale of Public Lands in Colusa, Glenn, and Lake Counties, California... Colusa, Glenn, and Lake Counties, California. The sale will be conducted as a competitive bid auction in... market value of the land. DATES: Comments regarding the proposed sale must be received by the BLM on or...

Facial Masculinity: How the Choice of Measurement Method Enables to Detect Its Influence on Behaviour

PubMed Central

Sanchez-Pages, Santiago; Rodriguez-Ruiz, Claudia; Turiegano, Enrique

2014-01-01

Recent research has explored the relationship between facial masculinity, human male behaviour and males' perceived features (i.e. attractiveness). The methods of measurement of facial masculinity employed in the literature are quite diverse. In the present paper, we use several methods of measuring facial masculinity to study the effect of this feature on risk attitudes and trustworthiness. We employ two strategic interactions to measure these two traits, a first-price auction and a trust game. We find that facial width-to-height ratio is the best predictor of trustworthiness, and that measures of masculinity which use Geometric Morphometrics are the best suited to link masculinity and bidding behaviour. However, we observe that the link between masculinity and bidding in the first-price auction might be driven by competitiveness and not by risk aversion only. Finally, we test the relationship between facial measures of masculinity and perceived masculinity. As a conclusion, we suggest that researchers in the field should measure masculinity using one of these methods in order to obtain comparable results. We also encourage researchers to revise the existing literature on this topic following these measurement methods. PMID:25389770

Facial masculinity: how the choice of measurement method enables to detect its influence on behaviour.

PubMed

Sanchez-Pages, Santiago; Rodriguez-Ruiz, Claudia; Turiegano, Enrique

2014-01-01

Recent research has explored the relationship between facial masculinity, human male behaviour and males' perceived features (i.e. attractiveness). The methods of measurement of facial masculinity employed in the literature are quite diverse. In the present paper, we use several methods of measuring facial masculinity to study the effect of this feature on risk attitudes and trustworthiness. We employ two strategic interactions to measure these two traits, a first-price auction and a trust game. We find that facial width-to-height ratio is the best predictor of trustworthiness, and that measures of masculinity which use Geometric Morphometrics are the best suited to link masculinity and bidding behaviour. However, we observe that the link between masculinity and bidding in the first-price auction might be driven by competitiveness and not by risk aversion only. Finally, we test the relationship between facial measures of masculinity and perceived masculinity. As a conclusion, we suggest that researchers in the field should measure masculinity using one of these methods in order to obtain comparable results. We also encourage researchers to revise the existing literature on this topic following these measurement methods.

Integrating watershed hydrology and economics to establish a local market for water quality improvement: A field experiment.

PubMed

Uchida, Emi; Swallow, Stephen K; Gold, Arthur; Opaluch, James; Kafle, Achyut; Merrill, Nathaniel; Michaud, Clayton; Gill, Carrie Anne

2018-04-01

Innovative market mechanisms are being increasingly recognized as effective decision-making institutions to incorporate the value of ecosystem services into the economy. We present a field experiment that integrates an economic auction and a biophysical water flux model to develop a local market process consisting of both the supply and demand sides. On the supply side, we operate an auction with small-scale livestock owners who bid for contracts to implement site-specific manure management practices that reduce phosphorus loadings to a major reservoir. On the demand side, we implement a real money, multi-unit public good auction for these contracts with residents who potentially benefit from reduced water quality risks. The experiments allow us to construct supply and demand curves to find an equilibrium price for water quality improvement. The field experiments provide a proof-of-concept for practical implementation of a local market for environmental improvements, even for the challenging context of nonpoint pollution.

Consumer preferences for micronutrient strategies in China. A comparison between folic acid supplementation and folate biofortification.

PubMed

De Steur, Hans; Feng, Shuyi; Xiaoping, Shi; Gellynck, Xavier

2014-06-01

Despite public health efforts, folate deficiency is still largely prevalent in poor, rural populations and continues to cause a large burden of disease. The present paper determines and compares consumer preferences for two folate strategies: folic acid supplementation v. folate biofortification, i.e. the enhancement of the folate content in staple crops. Experimental auctions with non-repeated information rounds are applied to rice in order to obtain willingness-to-pay for folate products. Thereby, GM or non-GM folate-biofortified rice (FBR) is auctioned together with rice that is supplemented with free folic acid pills (FAR). Shanxi Province (China) as a high-risk region of folate deficiency. One hundred and twenty-six women of childbearing age, divided into a school (n 60) and market sample (n 66). Despite differences according to the targeted sample, a general preference for folate biofortification is observed, regardless of the applied breeding technology. Premiums vary between 33·9 % (GM FBR), 36·5 % (non-GM FBR) and 19·0 % (FAR). Zero bidding behaviour as well as the product choice question, respectively, support and validate these findings. The targeted sample, the timing of the auction, the intention to consume GM food and the responsibility for rice purchases are considered key determinants of product choice. A novel ex-post negative valuation procedure shows low consistency in zero bidding. While the low attractiveness of FAR provides an additional argument for the limited effectiveness of past folic acid supplementation programmes, the positive reactions towards GM FBR further support its potential as a possible complementary micronutrient intervention.

Profiting from competition: Financial tools for electric generation companies

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Richter, Charles William, Jr.

Regulations governing the operation of electric power systems in North America and many other areas of the world are undergoing major changes designed to promote competition. This process of change is often referred to as deregulation. Participants in deregulated electricity systems may find that their profits will greatly benefit from the implementation of successful bidding strategies. While the goal of the regulators may be to create rules which balance reliable power system operation with maximization of the total benefit to society, the goal of generation companies is to maximize their profit, i.e., return to their shareholders. The majority of the research described here is conducted from the point of view of generation companies (GENCOs) wishing to maximize their expected utility function, which is generally comprised of expected profit and risk. Strategies that help a GENCO to maximize its objective function must consider the impact of (and aid in making) operating decisions that may occur within a few seconds to multiple years. The work described here assumes an environment in which energy service companies (ESCOs) buy and GENCOs sell power via double auctions in regional commodity exchanges. Power is transported on wires owned by transmission companies (TRANSCOs) and distribution companies (DISTCOs). The proposed market framework allows participants to trade electrical energy contracts via the spot, futures, options, planning, and swap markets. An important method of studying these proposed markets and the behavior of participating agents is the field of experimental/computational economics. For much of the research reported here, the market simulator developed by Kumar and Sheble and similar simulators has been adapted to allow computerized agents to trade energy. Creating computerized agents that can react as rationally or irrationally as a human trader is a difficult problem for which we have turned to the field of artificial intelligence. Some of our work uses GP-Automata, a technique which combines genetic programming and finite state machines, to represent adaptive agents. We use a genetic algorithm to evolve these adaptive agents (each with its own bidding strategy) for use in a double auction. The agent's strategies may be judged by the amount of profit they produce and are tested by computerized agents repeatedly buying and selling electricity in an auction simulator. In addition to the obvious profit-maximization strategies, one can also design strategies which exhibit other types of trading behaviors. The resulting strategies can be used directly in on-line trading, or as realistic models of competitors in a trading simulator. In addition to developing double auction bidding strategies, we investigate and discuss methods of an energy trader's risk. This can be done using such financial vehicles as futures and options contracts or through the inclusion of risk while judging strategies used in the market simulations described above. We discuss the role of fuzzy logic in the competitive electric marketplace, including how it can be applied in developing bidding strategies. Since competition promises to drive the power system closer to its operating limits, improvements in measurement and system control will be important. We provide an example of using fuzzy logic to do automatic generation control and discuss extensions that would make it superior to traditional controllers. Since the GENCO's forte is primarily generating electricity, we examine unit commitment and discuss how to update it for the competitive environment. We discuss the role of unit commitment in developing bidding strategies, as well as, the role of bidding strategies in solving the unit commitment problem. Depending on the market structure adopted by a particular location, large amounts of bidding data may be available to regulators or market participants. Ideally, regulators could use this data to verify dig the market is efficient. Market participants with access to this data might gain an advantage over their competitors if they could somehow determine their competitor's bidding strategy. We outline methods of automatically inferring other participants' trading rules based on historical data. Much of the work described here should aid in the design of effective operating procedures, trading strategies and profitable portfolios for energy producers.

31 CFR 356.17 - How and when do I pay for securities awarded in an auction?

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-07-01

... 31 Money and Finance: Treasury 2 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false How and when do I pay for securities... telephone, you must pay for any securities awarded to you by debit entry to a deposit account. (2) Bidding... account. In your payment amount you must include the par amount and any announced accrued interest and/or...

31 CFR 356.17 - How and when do I pay for securities awarded in an auction?

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-07-01

... 31 Money and Finance:Treasury 2 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false How and when do I pay for securities... telephone, you must pay for any securities awarded to you by debit entry to a deposit account. (2) Bidding... account. In your payment amount you must include the par amount and any announced accrued interest and/or...

31 CFR 356.17 - How and when do I pay for securities awarded in an auction?

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-07-01

... 31 Money and Finance:Treasury 2 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false How and when do I pay for securities... telephone, you must pay for any securities awarded to you by debit entry to a deposit account. (2) Bidding... account. In your payment amount you must include the par amount and any announced accrued interest and/or...

31 CFR 356.17 - How and when do I pay for securities awarded in an auction?

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-07-01

... 31 Money and Finance:Treasury 2 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false How and when do I pay for securities... telephone, you must pay for any securities awarded to you by debit entry to a deposit account. (2) Bidding... account. In your payment amount you must include the par amount and any announced accrued interest and/or...

An Auction-Based Spectrum Leasing Mechanism for Mobile Macro-Femtocell Networks of IoT.

PubMed

Chen, Xin; Xing, Lei; Qiu, Tie; Li, Zhuo

2017-02-16

The Internet of Things (IoT) is a vision of the upcoming society. It can provide pervasive communication between two or more entities using 4G-LTE (Long Term Evolution) communication technology. In 4G-LTE networks, there are two important problems: helping manage the spectrum demands of IoT devices and achieving much more revenue with the limited resource. This paper proposes a pricing framework to investigate the spectrum leasing in mobile heterogeneous networks with single macrocell and multiple femtocells. We modeled the leasing procedure between the macrocell service provider (MSP) and femtocell holders (FHs) as an auction to motivate the MSP to lease its spectrum resource. All FHs act as the bidders, and the monopolist MSP acts as the auctioneer. In the auction, FHs submit their bids to rent the spectrum resource so that they can make a profit by selling it to their subscribers. The MSP determines the spectrum leasing amount and chooses the winning FHs by solving the dynamic programming-based 0-1 knapsack problem. In our proposed framework, we focus on the spectrum pricing strategy and revenue maximization of the MSP. The simulation results show that the proposed scheme provides effective motivation for the MSP to lease the spectrum to FHs, and both the MSP and FHs can benefit from spectrum leasing.

Minimizing forced outage risk in generator bidding

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Das, Dibyendu

Competition in power markets has exposed the participating companies to physical and financial uncertainties. Generator companies bid to supply power in a day-ahead market. Once their bids are accepted by the ISO they are bound to supply power. A random outage after acceptance of bids forces a generator to buy power from the expensive real-time hourly spot market and sell to the ISO at the set day-ahead market clearing price, incurring losses. A risk management technique is developed to assess this financial risk associated with forced outages of generators and then minimize it. This work presents a risk assessment module which measures the financial risk of generators bidding in an open market for different bidding scenarios. The day-ahead power market auction is modeled using a Unit Commitment algorithm and a combination of Normal and Cauchy distributions generate the real time hourly spot market. Risk profiles are derived and VaRs are calculated at 98 percent confidence level as a measure of financial risk. Risk Profiles and VaRs help the generators to analyze the forced outage risk and different factors affecting it. The VaRs and the estimated total earning for different bidding scenarios are used to develop a risk minimization module. This module will develop a bidding strategy of the generator company such that its estimated total earning is maximized keeping the VaR below a tolerable limit. This general framework of a risk management technique for the generating companies bidding in competitive day-ahead market can also help them in decisions related to building new generators.

Naval Supply Systems Command Fleet Logistics Center

DTIC Science & Technology

2012-08-08

Partial small business set - aside is a potential consideration   12-month Base plus two options   Synopsis N00604-11-R-3006 on NECO and FedBizOpps...2012 Navy Gold Coast Small Business Procurement Event 8 August 2012 #1 PRIORITY = Operating Forces Support …while ensuring Joint...while ensuring Joint Base Success FedBid.com Reverse Auction Website 8 Small Business Assistance #1 PRIORITY = Operating Forces

Coalition Formation under Uncertainty

DTIC Science & Technology

2010-03-01

world robotics and demonstrate the algorithm’s scalability. This provides a framework well suited to decentralized task allocation in general collectives...impatience and acquiescence to define a robot allocation to a task in a decentralized manner. The tasks are assigned to the entire collective, and one...20] allocates tasks to robots with a first-price auction method [31]. It announces a task with defined metrics, then the robots issue bids. The task

Examining the Relationship between Psychosocial and Behavioral Proxies for Future Consumption Behavior: Self-Reported Impact and Bidding Behavior in an Experimental Auction Study on Cigarette Labeling

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Rousu, Matthew C.; Thrasher, James F.

2014-01-01

Experimental and observational research often involves asking consumers to self-report the impact of some proposed option. Because self-reported responses involve no consequence to the respondent for falsely revealing how he or she feels about an issue, self-reports may be subject to social desirability and other influences that bias responses in…

31 CFR 356.24 - Will I be notified directly of my awards and, if I am submitting bids for others, do I have to...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-07-01

... awarded a par amount of $2 billion or more in an auction must send us a confirmation in written form or... 31 Money and Finance: Treasury 2 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Will I be notified directly of my.... (2) Notice to clearing corporations. If we are to deliver awarded securities under a delivery and...

Record bid for Einstein letter

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Jeandron, Michelle

2008-06-01

A letter written by Albert Einstein the year before his death has sold for the staggering amount of £170 000 at an auction in London last month. The previously unrecorded letter, which has spent the past 50 years in a private collection, includes a discussion of Einstein's views on religion, bringing new material to the debate about whether or not he believed in God. The lot had been expected to fetch between £6000-£8000.

An Auction-Based Spectrum Leasing Mechanism for Mobile Macro-Femtocell Networks of IoT

PubMed Central

Chen, Xin; Xing, Lei; Qiu, Tie; Li, Zhuo

2017-01-01

The Internet of Things (IoT) is a vision of the upcoming society. It can provide pervasive communication between two or more entities using 4G-LTE (Long Term Evolution) communication technology. In 4G-LTE networks, there are two important problems: helping manage the spectrum demands of IoT devices and achieving much more revenue with the limited resource. This paper proposes a pricing framework to investigate the spectrum leasing in mobile heterogeneous networks with single macrocell and multiple femtocells. We modeled the leasing procedure between the macrocell service provider (MSP) and femtocell holders (FHs) as an auction to motivate the MSP to lease its spectrum resource. All FHs act as the bidders, and the monopolist MSP acts as the auctioneer. In the auction, FHs submit their bids to rent the spectrum resource so that they can make a profit by selling it to their subscribers. The MSP determines the spectrum leasing amount and chooses the winning FHs by solving the dynamic programming-based 0–1 knapsack problem. In our proposed framework, we focus on the spectrum pricing strategy and revenue maximization of the MSP. The simulation results show that the proposed scheme provides effective motivation for the MSP to lease the spectrum to FHs, and both the MSP and FHs can benefit from spectrum leasing. PMID:28212317

Market reaction to a bid-ask spread change: A power-law relaxation dynamics

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Ponzi, Adam; Lillo, Fabrizio; Mantegna, Rosario N.

2009-07-01

We study the relaxation dynamics of the bid-ask spread and of the midprice after a sudden variation of the spread in a double auction financial market. We find that the spread decays as a power law to its normal value. We measure the price reversion dynamics and the permanent impact, i.e., the long-time effect on price, of a generic event altering the spread and we find an approximately linear relation between immediate and permanent impact. We hypothesize that the power-law decay of the spread is a consequence of the strategic limit order placement of liquidity providers. We support this hypothesis by investigating several quantities, such as order placement rates and distribution of prices and times of submitted orders, which affect the decay of the spread.

Contracting Officer Workload and Contractual Terms: Theory and Evidence

DTIC Science & Technology

2012-08-30

should be conducted in accordance with simplified acquisitions procedures and are explicitly set aside for small businesses . These awards are known as...analyze a set of California Highway Procurement auctions and find that the ex-post adaptation costs make up between 7 and 13% of the winning bid...and simply assume he is facing some set of incentives that leads him to value saving time and money on the project and on its procurement . Having him

Limitations on Design Principles for Public Key Protocols

DTIC Science & Technology

1996-01-01

preserves nonrepudiation|assuming, as in the last example, that signatures are added to each message. Note that for all the messages save one, the...digital money must be put up against any bid in their auction, the attack requires the active partic- ipation of a bank. Second, since they protect...ACM Press, New York, November 1993. [5] R. Bird, I. Gopal, A. Herzberg , P. Janson, S. Kut- ten, R. Molva, and M. Yung. Systematic Design of a Family

Application of a Uniform Price Quality Adjusted Discount Auction for Assigning Surface Warfare Officer Retention Bonuses

DTIC Science & Technology

2012-03-01

O4 19.5% 14.7% Married 65.0% 61.8% Unmarried 35.0% 38.2% *2010 DoD Demographics Report D. ESTIMATION OF THE PARAMETERS The study uses the...120 $240 $360 $480 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 B id ( in $ 1 ,0 0 0 ’s ) Quality Score Bid vs Quality Score 27 VI

Evaluating the impacts of farmers' behaviors on a hypothetical agricultural water market based on double auction

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Du, Erhu; Cai, Ximing; Brozović, Nicholas; Minsker, Barbara

2017-05-01

Agricultural water markets are considered effective instruments to mitigate the impacts of water scarcity and to increase crop production. However, previous studies have limited understanding of how farmers' behaviors affect the performance of water markets. This study develops an agent-based model to explicitly incorporate farmers' behaviors, namely irrigation behavior (represented by farmers' sensitivity to soil water deficit λ) and bidding behavior (represented by farmers' rent seeking μ and learning rate β), in a hypothetical water market based on a double auction. The model is applied to the Guadalupe River Basin in Texas to simulate a hypothetical agricultural water market under various hydrological conditions. It is found that the joint impacts of the behavioral parameters on the water market are strong and complex. In particular, among the three behavioral parameters, λ affects the water market potential and its impacts on the performance of the water market are significant under most scenarios. The impacts of μ or β on the performance of the water market depend on the other two parameters. The water market could significantly increase crop production only when the following conditions are satisfied: (1) λ is small and (2) μ is small and/or β is large. The first condition requires efficient irrigation scheduling, and the second requires well-developed water market institutions that provide incentives to bid true valuation of water permits.

Emissions markets, power markets and market power: A study of the interactions between contemporary emissions markets and deregulated electricity markets

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Dormady, Noah Christopher

Chapter 1: A Monte Carlo Approach. The use of auctions to distribute tradeable property rights to firms in already heavily concentrated markets may further exacerbate the problems of market power that exist within those markets. This chapter provides a model of a two-stage emissions market modeled after a contemporary regional permit trading market in the United States, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Inc. (RGGI). It then introduces Oligopsony 1.0, a C# software package constructed in the .NET environment that simulates uniform-price auctions using stochastic Monte Carlo simulation for modeling market power in tradeable property rights auctions. Monte Carlo methods add a probabilistic element to standard auction theoretic equilibria. The results of these simulations indicate that there can be significant non-linearities between profit and market power as exercised through strategic demand reduction. This analysis finds the optimum point of strategic demand reduction that enables the firm to exploit these non-linearities, and it determines the probability distributions of these optima using kernel density analysis. Chapter 2: An Experimental Approach. How will emerging auction-based emissions markets function within the context of today's deregulated auction-based electricity markets? This chapter provides an experimental analysis of a joint energy-emissions market. The impact of market power and collusion among dominant firms is evaluated to determine the extent to which an auction-based tradeable permit market influences performance in an adjacent electricity market. The experimental treatment design controls for a variety of real-world institutional features, including variable demand, permit banking, inter-temporal (multi-round) dynamics, a tightening cap, and resale. Results suggest that the exercise of market power significantly increases electricity auction clearing prices, without significantly increasing emissions auction clearing prices, and in some cases, even significantly suppresses them. The institution of auction-based carbon markets in the already-concentrated energy sector can further strengthen the market position of dominant firms who can leverage energy-emissions market linkages to their operational advantage. Chapter 3: Regulatory Mechanisms and Policy Approaches. Contemporary deregulated electricity markets are defined by a complex array of multi-settlement markets, with additional market-based mechanisms designed, to a large extent, to limit the exercise of market power by dominant firms. On top of the already complex nature of these markets, policymakers are also adding market-based mechanisms to curtail greenhouse gases. Key linkages exist between electricity and emissions markets that may be utilized by dominant firms. This chapter provides an analysis of three specific policy mechanisms that are utilized in contemporary markets to effectively reduce the incentive of dominant firms to exercise market power. These include convergence bidding, consignment auctions and multilevel holding accounts.

Catchment-scale stormwater management via economic incentives – An overview and lessons-learned

USGS Publications Warehouse

Schuster, W.; Garmestani, A.S.; Green, O.O.; Rhea, l.K.; Roy, Allison; Thurston, H.W.; Myers, Baden Robert; Beecham, Simon; Lucke, Terry; Boogaard, Floris

2013-01-01

Long-term field studies of the effectiveness and sustainability of decentralized stormwater management are rare. From 2005-2011, we tested an incentive-based approach to citizen participation in stormwater management in the Shepherd Creek catchment, located in Cincinnati, OH, USA. Hydrologic, biological, and water quality data were characterized in a baseline monitoring effort 2005- 2007. Reverse auctions held successively in 2007 and 2008 engaged citizens to voluntarily bid on stormwater control measures (SCMs); and successful bids led to implementation of SCMs, which led to an enhancement of catchment detention capacity. We tested for attributes of sustainability (coconsideration of social, economic, and environmental (hydrologic, soils, aquatic biology) aspects), and summarize lessons-learned. Our results and outcomes provide a basis for planning future field studies that more fully determine the effectiveness of stormwater management in terms of sustainability.

Intelligent agents for e-commerce applications

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Vuppala, Krishna

1999-12-01

This thesis focuses on development of intelligent agent solutions for e-commerce applications. E-Commerce has several complexities like: lack of information about the players, learning the nature of one's business partners/competitors, finding the right business partner to do business with, using the right strategy to get best profit out of the negotiations etc. The agent models developed can be used in any agent solution for e-commerce. Concepts and techniques from Game Theory and Artificial Intelligence are used. The developed models have several advantages over the existing ones as: the models assume the non-availability of information about other players in the market, the models of players get updated over the time as and when new information comes about the players, the negotiation model incorporates the patience levels of the players and expectations from other players in the market. Power industry has been chosen as the application area for the demonstration of the capabilities and usage of the developed agent models. Two e-commerce scenarios where sellers and buyers can go through the power exchanges to bid in auctions, or make bilateral deals outside of the exchange are addressed. In the first scenario agent helps market participants in coordinating strategies with other participants, bidding in auctions by analyzing and understanding the behavior of other participants. In the second scenario, called "Power Traders Assistant" agent helps power trader, who buys and sells power through bilateral negotiations, in negotiating deals with his customers.

Using Economic Incentives to Manage Stormwater Runoff in ...

EPA Pesticide Factsheets

Communities nationwide are facing increased responsibility for controlling stormwater runoff, and, subsequently, rising costs of stormwater management. In this report we describe and test a methodology that can be used by communities to focus limited budgets on the most efficient and ecologically-effective installation of stormwater management practices. The overall project has two primary objectives: (1) to test the use of an auction to cost-effectively allocate stormwater management practices among landowners, and (2) to determine the effectiveness of the resulting implementation in terms of hydrological, water quality, and ecological measures. Here, we describe the theories, methods, and criteria used to distribute rain gardens and rain barrels to homeowners in a small, midwestern watershed. The first round of the reverse auction in 2007 resulted in 50 rain gardens and 100 rain barrels installed at 67 of the approximately 350 residential properties in the experimental watershed. In 2008, the auction was repeated and we accepted bids for an additional 35 rain gardens and 74 rain barrels. Stormwater management practices were distributed relatively evenly throughout the watershed and are expected to result in significant improvements in stream quality. We describe our monitoring approach, including 1) parcel-scale hydrology and water quality monitoring of selected rain gardens, and 2) stream monitoring following before-after-control-impact approach for as

Forward and Spot Prices in Multi-Settlement Wholesale Electricity Markets

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Larrieu, Jeremy

In organized wholesale electricity markets, power is sold competitively in a multi-unit multi-settlement single-price auction comprised of a forward and a spot market. This dissertation attempts to understand the structure of the forward premium in these markets, and to identify the factors that may lead forward and spot prices to converge or diverge. These markets are unique in that the forward demand is price-sensitive, while spot residual demand is perfectly inelastic and must be met in full, a crucial design feature the literature often glosses over. An important contribution of this dissertation is the explicit modeling of each market separately in order to understand how generation and load choose to act in each one, and the consequences of these actions on equilibrium prices and quantities given that firms maximize joint profits over both markets. In the first essay, I construct a two-settlement model of electricity prices in which firms that own asymmetric capacity-constrained units facing convex costs compete to meet demand from consumers, first in quantities, then in prices. I show that the forward premium depends on the costliness of spot production relative to firms' ability to exercise market power by setting quantities in the forward market. In the second essay, I test the model from the first essay with unit-level capacity and marginal cost data from the California Independent System Operator (CAISO). I show that the model closely replicates observed price formation in the CAISO. In the third essay, I estimate a time series model of the CAISO forward premium in order to measure the impact that virtual bidding has had on forward and spot price convergence in California between April 2009 and March 2014. I find virtual bidding to have caused forward and spot prices to diverge due to the large number of market participants looking to hedge against - or speculate on - the occurrence of infrequent but large spot price spikes by placing virtual demand bids.

When winning is everything.

PubMed

Malhotra, Deepak; Ku, Gillian; Murnighan, J Keith

2008-05-01

In the heat of competition, executives can easily become obsessed with beating their rivals. This adrenaline-fueled emotional state, which the authors call competitive arousal, often leads to bad decisions. Managers can minimize the potential for competitive arousal and the harm it can inflict by avoiding certain types of interaction and targeting the causes of a win-at-all-costs approach to decision making. Through an examination of companies such as Boston Scientific and Paramount, and through research on auctions, the authors identified three principal drivers of competitive arousal: intense rivalry, especially in the form of one-on-one competitions; time pressure, found in auctions and other bidding situations, for example; and being in the spotlight--that is, working in the presence of an audience. Individually, these factors can seriously impair managerial decision making; together, their consequences can be dire, as evidenced by many high-profile business disasters. It's not possible to avoid destructive competitions and bidding wars completely. But managers can help prevent competitive arousal by anticipating potentially harmful competitive dynamics and then restructuring the deal-making process. They can also stop irrational competitive behavior from escalating by addressing the causes of competitive arousal. When rivalry is intense, for instance, managers can limit the roles of those who feel it most. They can reduce time pressure by extending or eliminating arbitrary deadlines. And they can deflect the spotlight by spreading the responsibility for critical competitive decisions among team members. Decision makers will be most successful when they focus on winning contests in which they have a real advantage--and take a step back from those in which winning exacts too high a cost.

Essays in applied microeconomics

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Wang, Xiaoting

In this dissertation I use Microeconomic theory to study firms' behavior. Chapter One introduces the motivations and main findings of this dissertation. Chapter Two studies the issue of information provision through advertisement when markets are segmented and consumers' price information is incomplete. Firms compete in prices and advertising strategies for consumers with transportation costs. High advertising costs contribute to market segmentation. Low advertising costs promote price competition among firms and improves consumer welfare. Chapter Three also investigates market power as a result of consumers' switching costs. A potential entrant can offer a new product bundled with an existing product to compensate consumers for their switching cost. If the primary market is competitive, bundling simply plays the role of price discrimination, and it does not dominate unbundled sales in the process of entry. If the entrant has market power in the primary market, then bundling also plays the role of leveraging market power and it dominates unbundled sales. The market for electric power generation has been opened to competition in recent years. Chapter Four looks at issues involved in the deregulated electricity market. By comparing the performance of the competitive market with the social optimum, we identify the conditions under which market equilibrium generates socially efficient levels of electric power. Chapter Two to Four investigate the strategic behavior among firms. Chapter Five studies the interaction between firms and unemployed workers in a frictional labor market. We set up an asymmetric job auction model, where two types of workers apply for two types of job openings by bidding in auctions and firms hire the applicant offering them the most profits. The job auction model internalizes the determination of the share of surplus from a match, therefore endogenously generates incentives for an efficient division of the matching surplus. Microeconomic foundation for competitive auctions is also discussed in this chapter.

Essays in Energy Economics

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Myers, Erica Catherine

This dissertation combines research on three topics in applied energy economics. The first two papers investigate whether consumers are informed about and pay attention to energy costs in residential housing. The first paper explores this issue in the rental housing market, while the second paper focuses on housing purchases. The third paper, based on joint work with AJ Bostian and Harrison Fell, uses a laboratory experiment to test the effects of positive versus negative cost shocks on mulit-unit procurement auction performance. The first paper explores whether there are energy cost information asymmetries between landlords and tenants. If tenants are uninformed about energy costs, landlords cannot capitalize energy efficiency investments into higher rents, leading to under-investment. I exploit variation in energy costs in the form of relative heating fuel price changes in the northeastern United States where some apartment units heat with oil and some units heat with natural gas. I develop a search model to describe the matching of landlords and tenants, and derive predictions about the incidence of relative fuel price changes, tenant turnover, and efficiency investments under both symmetric and asymmetric information. My model predicts that, under symmetric full information, these outcomes will not differ depending on whether landlords or tenants pay for energy. In contrast, under asymmetric information, the demand of uninformed tenants for units that heat with oil rather than gas will not shift when oil prices rise relative to gas prices. In a search model, this leads to different market outcomes when landlords, rather than tenants, pay for energy. I find that the capitalization of energy prices into rents, turnover rates, and energy efficiency investments differ between the two payment regimes in ways that are consistent with asymmetric information. The second paper explores whether home buyers are myopic about future energy costs. I exploit variation in energy costs in the form of fuel price changes in Massachusetts where there is an even distribution of homes that heat with oil and homes that heat with natural gas. I find that relative fuel price shifts cause relative changes in housing transaction prices that are consistent with full capitalization of the present value of future energy cost differences under low discount rates. These findings are consistent with home buyers being attentive to energy costs at point of sale and are not consistent with myopia. The third paper uses a laboratory experiment to test the effects of positive versus negative costs shocks on multi-unit procurement auction performance. Output prices tend to respond more quickly to increases in input prices than to decreases in input prices. While standard economic theory would not predict this pattern, it is found in many market settings. We compare outcomes in uniform price and discriminatory (pay-as-bid) auctions for two different kinds of costs shocks. First we look at ''industry wide'' cost shocks where the cost of a common input changes uniformly for all bidders. We also look at idiosyncratic cost shocks, where bidders' individual costs are changing, but the expected Walrasian price remains fixed. We find evidence for a new explanation of asymmetric passthrough in multi-unit procurement auctions related to the bidding incentives in discriminatory auctions. Discriminatory auctions may be worse than uniform at ''tracking'' shifts in underlying costs, leading to price adjustment asymmetries and production inefficiencies.

Essays on competition in electricity markets

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Bustos Salvagno, Ricardo Javier

The first chapter shows how technology decisions affect entry in commodity markets with oligopolistic competition, like the electricity market. I demonstrate an entry deterrence effect that works through cost uncertainty. Technology's cost uncertainty affects spot market expected profits through forward market trades. Therefore, incentives to engage in forward trading shape firms' decisions on production technologies. I show that high-cost but low-risk technologies are adopted by risk-averse incumbents to deter entry. Strategic technology adoption can end in a equilibrium where high-cost technologies prevail over low-cost but riskier ones. In the case of incumbents who are less risk-averse than entrants, entry deterrence is achieved by choosing riskier technologies. The main results do not depend on who chooses their technology first. Chapter two examines the Chilean experience on auctions for long-term supply contracts in electricity markets from 2006 to 2011. Using a divisible-good auction model, I provide a theoretical framework that explains bidding behavior in terms of expected spot prices and contracting positions. The model is extended to include potential strategic behavior on contracting decisions. Empirical estimations confirm the main determinants of bidding behavior and show heterogeneity in the marginal cost of over-contracting depending on size and incumbency. Chapter three analyzes the lag in capacity expansion in the Chilean electricity market from 2000 to 2004. Regarded as a result of regulatory uncertainty, the role of delays in the construction of a large hydro-power plant has been overlooked by the literature. We argue that those delays postponed projected investment and gave small windows of opportunity that only incumbents could take advantage of. We are able to retrace the history of investments through real-time information from the regulator's reports and a simple model enables us to explain the effect of those delays on suggested and under-construction investments.

A Three Stage Multi-attribute Procurement Auction: A Proposal for Department of Defense (DoD) Vendor Selection Decisions.

DTIC Science & Technology

2010-04-30

regarding production capabilities and costs, but must somehow form beliefs about the likelihood of a bid being accepted. We facilitate formulation...which both vendors believe the buyer places equal weight on the two attributes, but the vendors differ in their capabilities of producing those...exchange—the future of B2B . Harvard Business Review, 78(6), 86-96. = ^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã= do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= 444= k^s^i

Learning to dislike safe water products: results from a randomized controlled trial of the effects of direct and peer experience on willingness to pay.

PubMed

Luoto, Jill; Mahmud, Minhaj; Albert, Jeff; Luby, Stephen; Najnin, Nusrat; Unicomb, Leanne; Levine, David I

2012-06-05

Low-cost point-of-use (POU) safe water products have the potential to reduce waterborne illness, but adoption by the global poor remains low. We performed an eight-month randomized trial of four low-cost household water treatment products in Dhaka, Bangladesh. Intervention households (n = 600) received repeated educational messages about the importance of drinking safe water along with consecutive two-month free trials with each of four POU products in random order. Households randomly assigned to the control group (n = 200) did not receive free products or repeated educational messages. Households' willingness to pay for these products was quite low on average (as measured by bids in an incentive-compatible real-money auction), although a modest share was willing to pay the actual or expected retail price for low-cost chlorine-based products. Furthermore, contrary to our hypotheses that both one's own personal experience and the influence of one's peers would increase consumers' willingness to pay, direct experience significantly decreased mean bids by 18-55% for three of the four products and had no discernible effect on the fourth. Neighbor experience also did not increase bids. Widespread dissemination of safe water products is unlikely until we better understand the preferences and aspirations of these at-risk populations.

Body Image Disturbance in 1000 Male Appearance and Performance Enhancing Drug Users

PubMed Central

Hildebrandt, Tom; Alfano, Lauren; Langenbucher, James W.

2010-01-01

Body image disturbance (BID) among men has only recently become a phenomenon of clinical significance with noted heterogeneity in the behavioral consequences of these disturbances. The degree of heterogeneity among appearance and performance enhancing drug (APED) users is unknown and an empirically derived framework for studying BID is necessary. 1000 APED users were recruited via the Internet and they completed a comprehensive online assessment APED use patterns, motivations, consequences, and BID. Data were evaluated using latent trait, latent class, and factor mixture models. Model results were validated using a range of covariates including cycle characteristics, age, APED history, and APED risk. A 1-Factor, 4-Class model provided the best fit to the data with Class 1 scoring the highest on all measures of BID and Class 4 the lowest on all measures. Class 2 differed in their preference for being lean over muscular and Class 3 preferred adding mass and size. Each class was associated with unique risks, APED history, and training identity. Not all APED users suffer from significant BID and there are unique profiles for those with elevated BID. Future research on male BID should account for this structure in order to better define relevant diagnostic categories and evaluate the clinical significance of BID. PMID:20110092

Power Management in Regenerative Life Support Systems

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Crawford, Sekou; Pawlowski, Christopher; Finn, Cory; Mead, Susan C. (Technical Monitor)

1999-01-01

Effective management of power can reduce the cost of launch and operation of regenerative life support systems. Variations in power may be quite severe and may manifest as surges or spikes, While the power plant may have some ability to deal with these variations, with batteries for example, over-capacity is expensive and does nothing to address the fundamental issue of excessive demand. Because the power unit must be sized to accommodate the largest demand, avoiding power spikes has the potential to reduce the required size of the power plant while at the same time increasing the dependability of the system. Scheduling of processors can help to reduce potential power spikes. However, not all power-consuming equipment is easily scheduled. Therefore, active power management is needed to further decrease the risk of surges or spikes. We investigate the use of a hierarchical scheme to actively manage power for a model of a regenerative life support system. Local level controllers individually determine subsystem power usage. A higher level controller monitors overall system power and detects surges or spikes. When a surge condition is detected, the higher level controller conducts an 'auction' and describes subsystem power usage to re-allocate power. The result is an overall reduction in total power during a power surge. The auction involves each subsystem making a 'bid' to buy or sell power based on local needs. However, this re-allocation cannot come at the expense of life support function. To this end, participation in the auction is restricted to those processes meeting certain tolerance constraints. These tolerances represent acceptable limits within which system processes can be operated. We present a simulation model and discuss some of our results.

Transactive Control and Coordination of Distributed Assets for Ancillary Services: Controls, Markets and Simulations

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Subbarao, Krishnappa; Fuller, Jason C.; Kalsi, Karanjit

2015-02-01

The purpose of this project is to develop a plausible transactive framework for DER participation in a regulation market. This document focuses on the methodology for creating a transactive-based regulation market, using one class of end-use devices as an example. The system contains two parts, one for acquiring resources at a longer timescale and a second for controlling the devices in a distributed manner at much shorter timescales. The first is based on a formal double-auction market where every five minutes each device bids the amount of resource it is able to provide and the minimum price that it wouldmore » accept to provide that resource. The bid price is determined by the current state of the device and the willingness of the consumer to participate. The market system collects and orders the bids by price, and then determines a cleared price to meet the level of regulation needed. It broadcasts the cleared price to the devices, which results in contracting the services of the least cost resources. By contract, the devices that cleared the market are now engaged for the next five-minute market period. They are part of a distributed control system that allows them to respond at four-second intervals to a broadcasted regulation signal. The approach also limits the number of times devices can cycle between states (say on to off) in a given amount of time to protect the equipment life.« less

Short-selling constraints as cause for price distortions: An experimental study

PubMed Central

Hauser, Florian; Huber, Jürgen

2012-01-01

In this paper we explore the influence of the possibility to short stocks and/or borrow money in laboratory markets. A key innovation of our study is that subjects can simultaneously trade two risky assets on two double-auction markets, allowing us to differentiate between assets with relatively high versus low capitalization. Divergence of opinions is created by providing each trader with noisy information on the intrinsic values of both assets. We find that when borrowing money or shorting stocks is restricted prices are systematically distorted. Specifically, stocks with high (low) capitalization are traded at lower (higher) prices than their fundamental value. Lifting the restrictions leads to more efficient prices and more liquidity, thereby also lowering volatility and bid-ask spreads. PMID:26523081

Concave utility, transaction costs, and risk in measuring discounting of delayed rewards.

PubMed

Kirby, Kris N; Santiesteban, Mariana

2003-01-01

Research has consistently found that the decline in the present values of delayed rewards as delay increases is better fit by hyperbolic than by exponential delay-discounting functions. However, concave utility, transaction costs, and risk each could produce hyperbolic-looking data, even when the underlying discounting function is exponential. In Experiments 1 (N = 45) and 2 (N = 103), participants placed bids indicating their present values of real future monetary rewards in computer-based 2nd-price auctions. Both experiments suggest that utility is not sufficiently concave to account for the superior fit of hyperbolic functions. Experiment 2 provided no evidence that the effects of transaction costs and risk are large enough to account for the superior fit of hyperbolic functions.

MEG-BIDS, the brain imaging data structure extended to magnetoencephalography

PubMed Central

Niso, Guiomar; Gorgolewski, Krzysztof J.; Bock, Elizabeth; Brooks, Teon L.; Flandin, Guillaume; Gramfort, Alexandre; Henson, Richard N.; Jas, Mainak; Litvak, Vladimir; T. Moreau, Jeremy; Oostenveld, Robert; Schoffelen, Jan-Mathijs; Tadel, Francois; Wexler, Joseph; Baillet, Sylvain

2018-01-01

We present a significant extension of the Brain Imaging Data Structure (BIDS) to support the specific aspects of magnetoencephalography (MEG) data. MEG measures brain activity with millisecond temporal resolution and unique source imaging capabilities. So far, BIDS was a solution to organise magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) data. The nature and acquisition parameters of MRI and MEG data are strongly dissimilar. Although there is no standard data format for MEG, we propose MEG-BIDS as a principled solution to store, organise, process and share the multidimensional data volumes produced by the modality. The standard also includes well-defined metadata, to facilitate future data harmonisation and sharing efforts. This responds to unmet needs from the multimodal neuroimaging community and paves the way to further integration of other techniques in electrophysiology. MEG-BIDS builds on MRI-BIDS, extending BIDS to a multimodal data structure. We feature several data-analytics software that have adopted MEG-BIDS, and a diverse sample of open MEG-BIDS data resources available to everyone. PMID:29917016

MEG-BIDS, the brain imaging data structure extended to magnetoencephalography.

PubMed

Niso, Guiomar; Gorgolewski, Krzysztof J; Bock, Elizabeth; Brooks, Teon L; Flandin, Guillaume; Gramfort, Alexandre; Henson, Richard N; Jas, Mainak; Litvak, Vladimir; T Moreau, Jeremy; Oostenveld, Robert; Schoffelen, Jan-Mathijs; Tadel, Francois; Wexler, Joseph; Baillet, Sylvain

2018-06-19

We present a significant extension of the Brain Imaging Data Structure (BIDS) to support the specific aspects of magnetoencephalography (MEG) data. MEG measures brain activity with millisecond temporal resolution and unique source imaging capabilities. So far, BIDS was a solution to organise magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) data. The nature and acquisition parameters of MRI and MEG data are strongly dissimilar. Although there is no standard data format for MEG, we propose MEG-BIDS as a principled solution to store, organise, process and share the multidimensional data volumes produced by the modality. The standard also includes well-defined metadata, to facilitate future data harmonisation and sharing efforts. This responds to unmet needs from the multimodal neuroimaging community and paves the way to further integration of other techniques in electrophysiology. MEG-BIDS builds on MRI-BIDS, extending BIDS to a multimodal data structure. We feature several data-analytics software that have adopted MEG-BIDS, and a diverse sample of open MEG-BIDS data resources available to everyone.

Guidance and control of swarms of spacecraft

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Morgan, Daniel James

There has been considerable interest in formation flying spacecraft due to their potential to perform certain tasks at a cheaper cost than monolithic spacecraft. Formation flying enables the use of smaller, cheaper spacecraft that distribute the risk of the mission. Recently, the ideas of formation flying have been extended to spacecraft swarms made up of hundreds to thousands of 100-gram-class spacecraft known as femtosatellites. The large number of spacecraft and limited capabilities of each individual spacecraft present a significant challenge in guidance, navigation, and control. This dissertation deals with the guidance and control algorithms required to enable the flight of spacecraft swarms. The algorithms developed in this dissertation are focused on achieving two main goals: swarm keeping and swarm reconfiguration. The objectives of swarm keeping are to maintain bounded relative distances between spacecraft, prevent collisions between spacecraft, and minimize the propellant used by each spacecraft. Swarm reconfiguration requires the transfer of the swarm to a specific shape. Like with swarm keeping, minimizing the propellant used and preventing collisions are the main objectives. Additionally, the algorithms required for swarm keeping and swarm reconfiguration should be decentralized with respect to communication and computation so that they can be implemented on femtosats, which have limited hardware capabilities. The algorithms developed in this dissertation are concerned with swarms located in low Earth orbit. In these orbits, Earth oblateness and atmospheric drag have a significant effect on the relative motion of the swarm. The complicated dynamic environment of low Earth orbits further complicates the swarm-keeping and swarm-reconfiguration problems. To better develop and test these algorithms, a nonlinear, relative dynamic model with J2 and drag perturbations is developed. This model is used throughout this dissertation to validate the algorithms using computer simulations. The swarm-keeping problem can be solved by placing the spacecraft on J2-invariant relative orbits, which prevent collisions and minimize the drift of the swarm over hundreds of orbits using a single burn. These orbits are achieved by energy matching the spacecraft to the reference orbit. Additionally, these conditions can be repeatedly applied to minimize the drift of the swarm when atmospheric drag has a large effect (orbits with an altitude under 500 km). The swarm reconfiguration is achieved using two steps: trajectory optimization and assignment. The trajectory optimization problem can be written as a nonlinear, optimal control problem. This optimal control problem is discretized, decoupled, and convexified so that the individual femtosats can efficiently solve the optimization. Sequential convex programming is used to generate the control sequences and trajectories required to safely and efficiently transfer a spacecraft from one position to another. The sequence of trajectories is shown to converge to a Karush-Kuhn-Tucker point of the nonconvex problem. In the case where many of the spacecraft are interchangeable, a variable-swarm, distributed auction algorithm is used to determine the assignment of spacecraft to target positions. This auction algorithm requires only local communication and all of the bidding parameters are stored locally. The assignment generated using this auction algorithm is shown to be near optimal and to converge in a finite number of bids. Additionally, the bidding process is used to modify the number of targets used in the assignment so that the reconfiguration can be achieved even when there is a disconnected communication network or a significant loss of agents. Once the assignment is achieved, the trajectory optimization can be run using the terminal positions determined by the auction algorithm. To implement these algorithms in real time a model predictive control formulation is used. Model predictive control uses a finite horizon to apply the most up-to-date control sequence while simultaneously calculating a new assignment and trajectory based on updated state information. Using a finite horizon allows collisions to only be considered between spacecraft that are near each other at the current time. This relaxes the all-to-all communication assumption so that only neighboring agents need to communicate. Experimental validation is done using the formation flying testbed. The swarm-reconfiguration algorithms are tested using multiple quadrotors. Experiments have been performed using sequential convex programming for offline trajectory planning, model predictive control and sequential convex programming for real-time trajectory generation, and the variable-swarm, distributed auction algorithm for optimal assignment. These experiments show that the swarm-reconfiguration algorithms can be implemented in real time using actual hardware. In general, this dissertation presents guidance and control algorithms that maintain and reconfigure swarms of spacecraft while maintaining the shape of the swarm, preventing collisions between the spacecraft, and minimizing the amount of propellant used.

40 CFR 73.70 - Auctions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-07-01

...—Allowance Schedule for Auctions Year of purchase Spot auction Advance auction Advance auction* 1993 50,000 a... for therein. (b) Timing of the auctions. The spot auction and the advance auction will be held on the... Administrator will conduct one spot auction and one advance auction in each calendar year. (c) Submittal for...

40 CFR 73.70 - Auctions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

...—Allowance Schedule for Auctions Year of purchase Spot auction Advance auction Advance auction* 1993 50,000 a... for therein. (b) Timing of the auctions. The spot auction and the advance auction will be held on the... Administrator will conduct one spot auction and one advance auction in each calendar year. (c) Submittal for...

40 CFR 73.70 - Auctions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-07-01

...—Allowance Schedule for Auctions Year of purchase Spot auction Advance auction Advance auction* 1993 50,000 a... for therein. (b) Timing of the auctions. The spot auction and the advance auction will be held on the... Administrator will conduct one spot auction and one advance auction in each calendar year. (c) Submittal for...

40 CFR 73.70 - Auctions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-07-01

...—Allowance Schedule for Auctions Year of purchase Spot auction Advance auction Advance auction* 1993 50,000 a... for therein. (b) Timing of the auctions. The spot auction and the advance auction will be held on the... Administrator will conduct one spot auction and one advance auction in each calendar year. (c) Submittal for...

40 CFR 73.70 - Auctions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-07-01

...—Allowance Schedule for Auctions Year of purchase Spot auction Advance auction Advance auction* 1993 50,000 a... for therein. (b) Timing of the auctions. The spot auction and the advance auction will be held on the... Administrator will conduct one spot auction and one advance auction in each calendar year. (c) Submittal for...

76 FR 1158 - Auction of 700 MHz Band Licenses Scheduled for July 19, 2011; Comment Sought on Competitive...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-01-07

... relating to Auction 92. A. Auction Structure i. Simultaneous Multiple-Round Auction Design 7. The Bureau proposes to auction all licenses included in Auction 92 using the Commission's standard simultaneous... competitiveness and economic efficiency of a simultaneous multiple-round auction may be enhanced if such...

Poisson-process generalization for the trading waiting-time distribution in a double-auction mechanism

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Cincotti, Silvano; Ponta, Linda; Raberto, Marco; Scalas, Enrico

2005-05-01

In this paper, empirical analyses and computational experiments are presented on high-frequency data for a double-auction (book) market. Main objective of the paper is to generalize the order waiting time process in order to properly model such empirical evidences. The empirical study is performed on the best bid and best ask data of 7 U.S. financial markets, for 30-stock time series. In particular, statistical properties of trading waiting times have been analyzed and quality of fits is evaluated by suitable statistical tests, i.e., comparing empirical distributions with theoretical models. Starting from the statistical studies on real data, attention has been focused on the reproducibility of such results in an artificial market. The computational experiments have been performed within the Genoa Artificial Stock Market. In the market model, heterogeneous agents trade one risky asset in exchange for cash. Agents have zero intelligence and issue random limit or market orders depending on their budget constraints. The price is cleared by means of a limit order book. The order generation is modelled with a renewal process. Based on empirical trading estimation, the distribution of waiting times between two consecutive orders is modelled by a mixture of exponential processes. Results show that the empirical waiting-time distribution can be considered as a generalization of a Poisson process. Moreover, the renewal process can approximate real data and implementation on the artificial stocks market can reproduce the trading activity in a realistic way.

The HARMONY Trial: Combined Ranolazine and Dronedarone in the Management of Paroxysmal Atrial Fibrillation: Mechanistic and Therapeutic Synergism.

PubMed

Reiffel, James A; Camm, A John; Belardinelli, Luiz; Zeng, Dewan; Karwatowska-Prokopczuk, Ewa; Olmsted, Ann; Zareba, Wojciech; Rosero, Spencer; Kowey, Peter

2015-10-01

Atrial fibrillation (AF) requires arrhythmogenic changes in atrial ion channels/receptors and usually altered atrial structure. AF is commonly treated with antiarrhythmic drugs; the most effective block many ion channels/receptors. Modest efficacy, intolerance, and safety concerns limit current antiarrhythmic drugs. We hypothesized that combining agents with multiple anti-AF mechanisms at reduced individual drug doses might produce synergistic efficacy plus better tolerance/safety. HARMONY tested midrange ranolazine (750 mg BID) combined with 2 reduced dronedarone doses (150 mg BID and 225 mg BID; chosen to reduce dronedarone's negative inotropic effect-see text below) over 12 weeks in 134 patients with paroxysmal AF and implanted pacemakers where AF burden (AFB) could be continuously assessed. Patients were randomized double-blind to placebo, ranolazine alone (750 mg BID), dronedarone alone (225 mg BID), or one of the combinations. Neither placebo nor either drugs alone significantly reduced AFB. Conversely, ranolazine 750 mg BID/dronedarone 225 mg BID reduced AFB by 59% versus placebo (P=0.008), whereas ranolazine 750 mg BID/dronedarone 150 mg BID reduced AFB by 43% (P=0.072). Both combinations were well tolerated. HARMONY showed synergistic AFB reduction by moderate dose ranolazine plus reduced dose dronedarone, with good tolerance/safety, in the population enrolled. ClinicalTrials.gov; Unique identifier: NCT01522651. © 2015 American Heart Association, Inc.

The use of importance and performance analysis (IPA) to evaluate effectiveness of the forward auction market agro commodities: A case study

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Wulansari, Dwi Ratna; Sutopo, Wahyudi; Hisjam, Muh.

2018-02-01

The empowering auction market for commodities in East Java Province is one of five auction market revitalization programs conducted by the Republic of Indonesia c.q. Ministry of Trading started in 2014. One of the districts in East Java Province, namely Magetan District utilizes the commodity auction market to improve the competitiveness of their agricultural industry by shortening the supply chain. The Magetan District needs to evaluate their support for farmers or farmer groups to participate in the forward auction market (FAM). Implementation of the FAM commodities is divided into three main processes, namely pre-auction, auction, and post-auction. The auction market is organized to shorten the trading chain. Implementation of the FAM requires good planning, among Seller (namely Farmer or Farmer Group), organizer of Auction (namely Commodity Auction Company), Buyer, and Local Government (namely the farmer facilitator). This article is aimed to develop the instrument of a Performance Measurement Model Using Important and Performance Analysis (IPA) for Improving the FAM Effectiveness of Agro Commodity from Magetan District with Supply Chain Management approach. IPA is implemented at pre-auction, auction, and post-auction. The IPA model results in the diagram to decide the strategies in improving the FAM effectiveness, and then it can encourage farmers to improve welfare and realize the competitiveness of the auctioneer.

Continuous-Time Random Walk with multi-step memory: an application to market dynamics

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Gubiec, Tomasz; Kutner, Ryszard

2017-11-01

An extended version of the Continuous-Time Random Walk (CTRW) model with memory is herein developed. This memory involves the dependence between arbitrary number of successive jumps of the process while waiting times between jumps are considered as i.i.d. random variables. This dependence was established analyzing empirical histograms for the stochastic process of a single share price on a market within the high frequency time scale. Then, it was justified theoretically by considering bid-ask bounce mechanism containing some delay characteristic for any double-auction market. Our model appeared exactly analytically solvable. Therefore, it enables a direct comparison of its predictions with their empirical counterparts, for instance, with empirical velocity autocorrelation function. Thus, the present research significantly extends capabilities of the CTRW formalism. Contribution to the Topical Issue "Continuous Time Random Walk Still Trendy: Fifty-year History, Current State and Outlook", edited by Ryszard Kutner and Jaume Masoliver.

Evolution of optimal Lévy-flight strategies in human mental searches

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Radicchi, Filippo; Baronchelli, Andrea

2012-06-01

Recent analysis of empirical data [Radicchi, Baronchelli, and Amaral, PloS ONE1932-620310.1371/journal.pone.0029910 7, e029910 (2012)] showed that humans adopt Lévy-flight strategies when exploring the bid space in online auctions. A game theoretical model proved that the observed Lévy exponents are nearly optimal, being close to the exponent value that guarantees the maximal economical return to players. Here, we rationalize these findings by adopting an evolutionary perspective. We show that a simple evolutionary process is able to account for the empirical measurements with the only assumption that the reproductive fitness of the players is proportional to their search ability. Contrary to previous modeling, our approach describes the emergence of the observed exponent without resorting to any strong assumptions on the initial searching strategies. Our results generalize earlier research, and open novel questions in cognitive, behavioral, and evolutionary sciences.

A maximum (non-extensive) entropy approach to equity options bid-ask spread

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Tapiero, Oren J.

2013-07-01

The cross-section of options bid-ask spreads with their strikes are modelled by maximising the Kaniadakis entropy. A theoretical model results with the bid-ask spread depending explicitly on the implied volatility; the probability of expiring at-the-money and an asymmetric information parameter (κ). Considering AIG as a test case for the period between January 2006 and October 2008, we find that information flows uniquely from the trading activity in the underlying asset to its derivatives. Suggesting that κ is possibly an option implied measure of the current state of trading liquidity in the underlying asset.

31 CFR 356.23 - How are the auction results announced?

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-07-01

... 31 Money and Finance: Treasury 2 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false How are the auction results announced...-93) Determination of Auction Awards; Settlement § 356.23 How are the auction results announced? (a) After the conclusion of the auction, we will announce the auction results through a press release that...

31 CFR 356.23 - How are the auction results announced?

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-07-01

... 31 Money and Finance:Treasury 2 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false How are the auction results announced...) Determination of Auction Awards; Settlement § 356.23 How are the auction results announced? (a) After the conclusion of the auction, we will announce the auction results through a press release that is available on...

31 CFR 356.23 - How are the auction results announced?

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-07-01

... 31 Money and Finance:Treasury 2 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false How are the auction results announced...) Determination of Auction Awards; Settlement § 356.23 How are the auction results announced? (a) After the conclusion of the auction, we will announce the auction results through a press release that is available on...

31 CFR 356.23 - How are the auction results announced?

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... 31 Money and Finance: Treasury 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false How are the auction results announced...) Determination of Auction Awards; Settlement § 356.23 How are the auction results announced? (a) After the conclusion of the auction, we will announce the auction results through a press release that is available on...

China's Land Market Auctions: Evidence of Corruption?

PubMed

Cai, Hongbin; Henderson, J Vernon; Zhang, Qinghua

2013-01-01

This paper studies the urban land market in China in 2003-2007. In China, all urban land is owned by the state. Leasehold use rights for land for (re)development are sold by city governments and are a key source of city revenue. Leasehold sales are viewed as a major venue for corruption, prompting a number of reforms over the years. Reforms now require all leasehold rights be sold at public auction. There are two main types of auction: regular English auction and an unusual type which we call a "two stage auction". The latter type of auction seems more subject to corruption, and to side deals between potential bidders and the auctioneer. Absent corruption, theory suggests that two stage auctions would most likely maximize sales revenue for properties which are likely to have relatively few bidders, or are "cold", which would suggest negative selection on property unobservables into such auctions. However, if such auctions are more corruptible, that could involve positive selection as city officials divert hotter properties to a more corruptible auction form. The paper finds that, overall, sales prices are lower for two stage auctions, and there is strong evidence of positive selection. The price difference is explained primarily by the fact that two stage auctions typically have just one bidder, or no competition despite the vibrant land market in Chinese cities.

Essays in market power mitigation and supply function equilibrium

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Subramainam, Thiagarajah Natchie

Market power mitigation has been an integral part of wholesale electricity markets since deregulation. In wholesale electricity markets, different regions in the US take different approaches to regulating market power. While the exercise of market power has received considerable attention in the literature, the issue of market power mitigation has attracted scant attention. In the first chapter, I examine the market power mitigation rules used in New York ISO (Independent System Operator) and California ISO (CAISO) with respect to day-ahead and real-time energy markets. I test whether markups associated with New York in-city generators would be lower with an alternative approach to mitigation, the CAISO approach. Results indicate the difference in markups between these two mitigation rules is driven by the shape of residual demand curves for suppliers. Analysis of residual demand curves faced by New York in-city suppliers show similar markups under both mitigation rules when no one supplier is necessary to meet the demand (i.e., when no supplier is pivotal). However, when some supplier is crucial for the market to clear, the mitigation rule adopted by the NYISO consistently leads to higher markups than would the CAISO rule. This result suggest that market power episodes in New York is confined to periods where some supplier is pivotal. As a result, I find that applying the CAISOs' mitigation rules to the New York market could lower wholesale electricity prices by 18%. The second chapter of my dissertation focuses on supply function equilibrium. In power markets, suppliers submit offer curves in auctions, indicating their willingness to supply at different price levels. Although firms are allowed to submit different offer curves for different time periods, surprisingly many firms stick to a single offer curve for the entire day. This essentially means that firms are submitting a single offer curve for multiple demand realizations. A suitable framework to analyze such oligopolistic competition between power market suppliers is supply function equilibrium models. Using detailed bidding data, I develop equilibrium in supply functions by restricting supplier offers to a class of supply functions. By collating equilibrium supply functions corresponding to different realizations of demand, I obtain a single optimal supply function for the entire day. Then I compare the resulting supply function with actual day-ahead offers in New York. In addition to supply function equilibrium, I also develop a conservative bidding approach in which each firm assumes that rivals bid at marginal costs. Results show that the supply functions derived from equilibrium bidding model in this paper is not consistent with actual bidding in New York. This result is mainly driven by the class of supply functions used in this study to generate the equilibrium. Further, actual offers do not resemble offers generated by the conservative bidding algorithm.

7 CFR 46.25 - Auction sales.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... 7 Agriculture 2 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Auction sales. 46.25 Section 46.25 Agriculture... THAN RULES OF PRACTICE) UNDER THE PERISHABLE AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES ACT, 1930 Auction Sales § 46.25 Auction sales. Commission merchants, dealers and brokers who offer produce for sale through auction...

7 CFR 46.25 - Auction sales.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... 7 Agriculture 2 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Auction sales. 46.25 Section 46.25 Agriculture... THAN RULES OF PRACTICE) UNDER THE PERISHABLE AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES ACT, 1930 Auction Sales § 46.25 Auction sales. Commission merchants, dealers and brokers who offer produce for sale through auction...

7 CFR 46.25 - Auction sales.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... 7 Agriculture 2 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Auction sales. 46.25 Section 46.25 Agriculture... THAN RULES OF PRACTICE) UNDER THE PERISHABLE AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES ACT, 1930 Auction Sales § 46.25 Auction sales. Commission merchants, dealers and brokers who offer produce for sale through auction...

7 CFR 46.25 - Auction sales.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 7 Agriculture 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Auction sales. 46.25 Section 46.25 Agriculture... THAN RULES OF PRACTICE) UNDER THE PERISHABLE AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES ACT, 1930 Auction Sales § 46.25 Auction sales. Commission merchants, dealers and brokers who offer produce for sale through auction...

29 CFR 780.617 - Adjunct livestock auction operations.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... 29 Labor 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Adjunct livestock auction operations. 780.617 Section 780... Employment in Agriculture and Livestock Auction Operations Under the Section 13(b)(13) Exemption Requirements for Exemption § 780.617 Adjunct livestock auction operations. The livestock auction operations...

How many cents on the dollar? Women and men in product markets.

PubMed

Kricheli-Katz, Tamar; Regev, Tali

2016-02-01

Gender inequality in contemporary U.S. society is a well-documented, widespread phenomenon. However, little is known about gender disparities in product markets. This study is the first to use actual market data to study the behavior of women and men as sellers and buyers and differences in market outcomes. We analyze a unique and large data set containing all eBay auction transactions of most popular products by private sellers between the years 2009 and 2012. Women sellers received a smaller number of bids and lower final prices than did equally qualified men sellers of the exact same product. On average, women sellers received about 80 cents for every dollar a man received when selling the identical new product and 97 cents when selling the same used product. These findings held even after controlling for the sentiments that appear in the text of the sellers' listings. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that this gap varied by the type of the product being sold. As a policy, eBay does not reveal the gender of users. We attribute the price differences to the ability of buyers to discern the gender of the seller. We present results from an experiment that shows that people accurately identify the gender of sellers on the basis of typical information provided in postings. We supplement the analysis with an additional off-eBay experiment showing that, in a controlled setting, people are willing to pay less for money-value gift cards when they are sold by women rather than men.

How many cents on the dollar? Women and men in product markets

PubMed Central

Kricheli-Katz, Tamar; Regev, Tali

2016-01-01

Gender inequality in contemporary U.S. society is a well-documented, widespread phenomenon. However, little is known about gender disparities in product markets. This study is the first to use actual market data to study the behavior of women and men as sellers and buyers and differences in market outcomes. We analyze a unique and large data set containing all eBay auction transactions of most popular products by private sellers between the years 2009 and 2012. Women sellers received a smaller number of bids and lower final prices than did equally qualified men sellers of the exact same product. On average, women sellers received about 80 cents for every dollar a man received when selling the identical new product and 97 cents when selling the same used product. These findings held even after controlling for the sentiments that appear in the text of the sellers’ listings. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that this gap varied by the type of the product being sold. As a policy, eBay does not reveal the gender of users. We attribute the price differences to the ability of buyers to discern the gender of the seller. We present results from an experiment that shows that people accurately identify the gender of sellers on the basis of typical information provided in postings. We supplement the analysis with an additional off-eBay experiment showing that, in a controlled setting, people are willing to pay less for money-value gift cards when they are sold by women rather than men. PMID:26989770

China’s Land Market Auctions: Evidence of Corruption?

PubMed Central

Cai, Hongbin; Henderson, J. Vernon; Zhang, Qinghua

2013-01-01

This paper studies the urban land market in China in 2003—2007. In China, all urban land is owned by the state. Leasehold use rights for land for (re)development are sold by city governments and are a key source of city revenue. Leasehold sales are viewed as a major venue for corruption, prompting a number of reforms over the years. Reforms now require all leasehold rights be sold at public auction. There are two main types of auction: regular English auction and an unusual type which we call a “two stage auction”. The latter type of auction seems more subject to corruption, and to side deals between potential bidders and the auctioneer. Absent corruption, theory suggests that two stage auctions would most likely maximize sales revenue for properties which are likely to have relatively few bidders, or are “cold”, which would suggest negative selection on property unobservables into such auctions. However, if such auctions are more corruptible, that could involve positive selection as city officials divert hotter properties to a more corruptible auction form. The paper finds that, overall, sales prices are lower for two stage auctions, and there is strong evidence of positive selection. The price difference is explained primarily by the fact that two stage auctions typically have just one bidder, or no competition despite the vibrant land market in Chinese cities. PMID:25506125

9 CFR 11.20 - Responsibilities and liabilities of management.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... liabilities of management. (a) The management of any horse show, horse exhibition, or horse sale or auction..., horse exhibition, horse sale, or horse auction. Horses entered for sale or auction at a horse sale or... the sale or auction and prohibited from entering the sale or auction ring. Sore horses or horses...

9 CFR 11.20 - Responsibilities and liabilities of management.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... liabilities of management. (a) The management of any horse show, horse exhibition, or horse sale or auction..., horse exhibition, horse sale, or horse auction. Horses entered for sale or auction at a horse sale or... the sale or auction and prohibited from entering the sale or auction ring. Sore horses or horses...

Nash equilibrium strategy in the deregulated power industry and comparing its lost welfare with Iran wholesale electricity market

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Mousavi, Seyed Hosein; Nazemi, Ali; Hafezalkotob, Ashkan

2016-09-01

With the increasing use of different types of auctions in market designing, modeling of participants' behaviors to evaluate the market structure is one of the main discussions in the studies related to the deregulated power industries. In this article, we apply an approach of the optimal bidding behavior to the Iran wholesale electricity market as a restructured electric power industry and model how the participants of the market bid in the spot electricity market. The problem is formulated analytically using the Nash equilibrium concept composed of large numbers of players having discrete and very large strategy spaces. Then, we compute and draw supply curve of the competitive market in which all generators' proposed prices are equal to their marginal costs and supply curve of the real market in which the pricing mechanism is pay-as-bid. We finally calculate the lost welfare or inefficiency of the Nash equilibrium and the real market by comparing their supply curves with the competitive curve. We examine 3 cases on November 24 (2 cases) and July 24 (1 case), 2012. It is observed that in the Nash equilibrium on November 24 and demand of 23,487 MW, there are 212 allowed plants for the first case (plants are allowed to choose any quantity of generation except one of them that should be equal to maximum Power) and the economic efficiency or social welfare of Nash equilibrium is 2.77 times as much as the real market. In addition, there are 184 allowed plants for the second case (plants should offer their maximum power with different prices) and the efficiency or social welfare of Nash equilibrium is 3.6 times as much as the real market. On July 24 and demand of 42,421 MW, all 370 plants should generate maximum energy due to the high electricity demand that the economic efficiency or social welfare of the Nash equilibrium is about 2 times as much as the real market.

32 CFR 644.541 - Award of contract.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-07-01

... auctioneers, are in a position to give other advice and assistance, and may authorize auction sales on behalf... auctioneers. Consideration should be given to auction sales when there is likely to be considerable interest...

75 FR 8703 - Auction of Lower and Upper Paging Bands Licenses Scheduled for May 25, 2010; Notice and Filing...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-02-25

...: Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, Auctions and Spectrum Access Division: For legal questions: Scott...://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/87/ . Due to the large number of licenses in Auction 87, the complete list of... ``Attachment A'' files at http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/87/ . A paper copy of the complete list of licenses...

77 FR 57085 - Mobility Fund Phase I Auction; Release of Files with Recalculated Road Miles for Auction 901...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2012-09-17

... FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION [AU Docket No. 12-25; DA 12-1446] Mobility Fund Phase I Auction... Mobility Fund Phase I support to be offered in Auction 901, which is to be held on September 27, 2012, and the change of the mock auction date from September 25, 2012 to September 21, 2012. DATES: The mock...

The Use of Reverse Auction Within the U.S. Army

DTIC Science & Technology

2016-12-01

by conducting a literature review on auction theory and the economic principles surrounding open markets and competition. Books, magazine articles...economic principles within auction theory examine buyer and seller motivation. B. AUCTION THEORY Auction theory explains how market participants...that leverage the power of fluid market conditions through a dynamic pricing environment. This project examines the use of RAs within the Army

78 FR 68839 - Tribal Mobility Fund Phase I Auction Rescheduled for February 25, 2014; Notice of Changes to...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-11-15

...) announce the rescheduling of Auction 902 and revise the dates and deadlines for the filing window for short...-auction deadlines for Auction 902. 2. The Auction 902 short-form application filing window opened at 12... short-form application (FCC Form 180) filing window will reopen on November 18, 2013, at 12:00 noon ET...

Auction-based bandwidth allocation in the Internet

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Wei, Jiaolong; Zhang, Chi

2002-07-01

It has been widely accepted that auctioning which is the pricing approach with minimal information requirement is a proper tool to manage scare network resources. Previous works focus on Vickrey auction which is incentive compatible in classic auction theory. In the beginning of this paper, the faults of the most representative auction-based mechanisms are discussed. And then a new method called uniform-price auction (UPA), which has the simplest auction rule is proposed and it's incentive compatibility in the network environment is also proved. Finally, the basic mode is extended to support applications which require minimum bandwidth guarantees for a given time period by introducing derivative market, and a market mechanism for network resource allocation which is predictable, riskless, and simple for end-users is completed.

Effects of scarcity, aesthetics and ecology on wildlife auction prices of large African mammals.

PubMed

Dalerum, Fredrik; Miranda, María; Muñiz, Cristina; Rodríguez, Plácido

2018-02-01

For successful integration of biological conservation into economic markets, economic processes need to capture ecological values. South African wildlife ranching is a tourist-based activity that generates unique information on the economic value of wildlife species. We used public data from South African wildlife auctions to evaluate if annual prices 1991-2012 related to species characteristics associated with scarcity, aesthetics and ecology of South African carnivores and ungulates. While none of the species characteristics influenced carnivore prices, ungulate prices were related to characteristics associated with novelty and aesthetics, which relative importance had increased over time. We raise both ecological and economic concerns for this apparent focus. Our results also suggest a potential importance of non-species-related factors, such as market and buyer characteristics. We encourage further evaluation of the relative influences of species characteristics versus factors that are intrinsically linked to economic processes on price variations in South African wildlife.

Autonomous Guidance Strategy for Spacecraft Formations and Reconfiguration Maneuvers

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Wahl, Theodore P.

A guidance strategy for autonomous spacecraft formation reconfiguration maneuvers is presented. The guidance strategy is presented as an algorithm that solves the linked assignment and delivery problems. The assignment problem is the task of assigning the member spacecraft of the formation to their new positions in the desired formation geometry. The guidance algorithm uses an auction process (also called an "auction algorithm''), presented in the dissertation, to solve the assignment problem. The auction uses the estimated maneuver and time of flight costs between the spacecraft and targets to create assignments which minimize a specific "expense'' function for the formation. The delivery problem is the task of delivering the spacecraft to their assigned positions, and it is addressed through one of two guidance schemes described in this work. The first is a delivery scheme based on artificial potential function (APF) guidance. APF guidance uses the relative distances between the spacecraft, targets, and any obstacles to design maneuvers based on gradients of potential fields. The second delivery scheme is based on model predictive control (MPC); this method uses a model of the system dynamics to plan a series of maneuvers designed to minimize a unique cost function. The guidance algorithm uses an analytic linearized approximation of the relative orbital dynamics, the Yamanaka-Ankersen state transition matrix, in the auction process and in both delivery methods. The proposed guidance strategy is successful, in simulations, in autonomously assigning the members of the formation to new positions and in delivering the spacecraft to these new positions safely using both delivery methods. This guidance algorithm can serve as the basis for future autonomous guidance strategies for spacecraft formation missions.

New 2',6'-dimethyl-L-tyrosine (Dmt) opioid peptidomimetics based on the Aba-Gly scaffold. Development of unique mu-opioid receptor ligands.

PubMed

Ballet, Steven; Salvadori, Severo; Trapella, Claudio; Bryant, Sharon D; Jinsmaa, Yunden; Lazarus, Lawrence H; Negri, Lucia; Giannini, Elisa; Lattanzi, Roberta; Tourwé, Dirk; Balboni, Gianfranco

2006-06-29

The Aba-Gly scaffold, incorporated into Dmt-Tic ligands (H-Dmt-Tic-Gly-NH-CH2-Ph, H-Dmt-Tic-Gly-NH-Ph, H-Dmt-Tic-NH-CH2-Bid), exhibited mixed micro/delta or delta opioid receptor activities with micro agonism. Substitution of Tic by Aba-Gly coupled to -NH-CH2-Ph (1), -NH-Ph (2), or -Bid (Bid=1H-benzimidazole-2-yl) (3) shifted affinity (Ki(micro)=0.46, 1.48, and 19.9 nM, respectively), selectivity, and bioactivity to micro-opioid receptors. These compounds represent templates for a new class of lead opioid agonists that are easily synthesized and suitable for therapeutic pain relief.

Essays on wholesale auctions in deregulated electricity markets

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Baltaduonis, Rimvydas

2007-12-01

The early experience in the restructured electric power markets raised several issues, including price spikes, inefficiency, security, and the overall relationship of market clearing prices to generation costs. Unsatisfactory outcomes in these markets are thought to have resulted in part from strategic generator behaviors encouraged by inappropriate market design features. In this dissertation, I examine the performance of three auction mechanisms for wholesale power markets - Offer Cost Minimization auction, Payment Cost Minimization auction and Simple-Offer auction - when electricity suppliers act strategically. A Payment Cost Minimization auction has been proposed as an alternative to the traditional Offer Cost Minimization auction with the intention to solve the problem of inflated wholesale electricity prices. Efficiency concerns for this proposal were voiced due to insights predicated on the assumption of true production cost revelation. Using a game theoretic approach and an experimental method, I compare the two auctions, strictly controlling for the level of unilateral market power. A specific feature of these complex-offer auctions is that the sellers submit not only the quantities and the minimum prices that they are willing to sell at, but also the start-up fees, which are designed to reimburse the fixed start-up costs of the generation plants. I find that the complex structure of the offers leaves considerable room for strategic behavior, which consequently leads to anti-competitive and inefficient market outcomes. In the last chapter of my dissertation, I use laboratory experiments to contrast the performance of two complex-offer auctions against the performance of a simple-offer auction, in which the sellers have to recover all their generation costs - fixed and variable - through a uniform market-clearing price. I find that a simple-offer auction significantly reduces consumer prices and lowers price volatility. It mitigates anti-competitive effects that are present in the complex-offer auctions and achieves allocative efficiency more quickly.

7 CFR 1955.148 - Auction sales.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... 7 Agriculture 14 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Auction sales. 1955.148 Section 1955.148 Agriculture... REGULATIONS (CONTINUED) PROPERTY MANAGEMENT Disposal of Inventory Property General § 1955.148 Auction sales. This section provides guidance on the sale of all inventory property by auction, except FSA real...

7 CFR 1955.148 - Auction sales.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 7 Agriculture 14 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Auction sales. 1955.148 Section 1955.148 Agriculture... REGULATIONS (CONTINUED) PROPERTY MANAGEMENT Disposal of Inventory Property General § 1955.148 Auction sales. This section provides guidance on the sale of all inventory property by auction, except FSA real...

7 CFR 1955.148 - Auction sales.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... 7 Agriculture 14 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Auction sales. 1955.148 Section 1955.148 Agriculture... REGULATIONS (CONTINUED) PROPERTY MANAGEMENT Disposal of Inventory Property General § 1955.148 Auction sales. This section provides guidance on the sale of all inventory property by auction, except FSA real...

7 CFR 1955.148 - Auction sales.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... 7 Agriculture 14 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Auction sales. 1955.148 Section 1955.148 Agriculture... REGULATIONS (CONTINUED) PROPERTY MANAGEMENT Disposal of Inventory Property General § 1955.148 Auction sales. This section provides guidance on the sale of all inventory property by auction, except FSA real...

7 CFR 1955.148 - Auction sales.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... complexity of the sale. When the services of a professional auctioneer are advisable, the services will be... 7 Agriculture 14 2010-01-01 2009-01-01 true Auction sales. 1955.148 Section 1955.148 Agriculture... REGULATIONS (CONTINUED) PROPERTY MANAGEMENT Disposal of Inventory Property General § 1955.148 Auction sales...

Exploring Online Auction Behaviors and Motivations

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Jeon, Sua; Crutsinger, Christy; Kim, Haejung

2008-01-01

The availability and convenience of the Internet, combined with the variety of products available at any given time, have contributed to the success of online auctions.This exploratory study examined online auction behaviors among college students in an attempt to identify underlying dimensions of auction motivations. Questionnaires completed by…

Internet Auction Sellers: Does Size Really Matter?

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Halstead, Diane; Becherer, Richard C.

2003-01-01

Examines the Internet auction phenomenon as it relates to the marketing mix of online auction sellers. The data indicate that, while there is great diversity among businesses that utilize online auctions, distinct cost leadership and differentiation marketing strategies are both evident. These two approaches are further distinguished in terms of…

76 FR 81932 - Auction of FM Broadcast Construction Permits; Revised Construction Permit Number in Auction 93

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-12-29

... Construction Permits; Revised Construction Permit Number in Auction 93 AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission. ACTION: Notice. SUMMARY: This document announces a change to the construction permit number for one of the FM broadcast construction permits for Auction 93. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Linda...

Competencies Needed by Livestock Sale Barn Employees.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Reidel, Wallace Franklin, Jr.

To determine the competencies needed by managers, assistant managers, and auctioneers in the livestock auction sale business and to determine the implications for educational programs, a questionnaire of 20 competencies compiled from a survey of livestock auction businesses was sent to every livestock auction sale barn listed with the Iowa…

Auctioneering Training Certificate Program 93-1001. Final Report.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Clark, Charles H.

A project was conducted to prepare a catalog of duties and tasks, performance objectives and guides, and instructional materials that would enable schools to develop instructional programs designed to prepare persons to enter the career of auctioneering. An occupational survey of auctioneers was conducted; a writing team of auctioneers prepared…

A Good Beginning Makes a Good Market: The Effect of Different Market Opening Structures on Market Quality

PubMed Central

Hinterleitner, Gernot; Leopold-Wildburger, Ulrike

2015-01-01

This paper deals with the market structure at the opening of the trading day and its influence on subsequent trading. We compare a single continuous double auction and two complement markets with different call auction designs as opening mechanisms in a unified experimental framework. The call auctions differ with respect to their levels of transparency. We find that a call auction not only improves market efficiency and liquidity at the beginning of the trading day when compared to the stand-alone continuous double auction, but also causes positive spillover effects on subsequent trading. Concerning the design of the opening call auction, we find no significant differences between the transparent and nontransparent specification with respect to opening prices and liquidity. In the course of subsequent continuous trading, however, market quality is slightly higher after a nontransparent call auction. PMID:26351653

A Good Beginning Makes a Good Market: The Effect of Different Market Opening Structures on Market Quality.

PubMed

Hinterleitner, Gernot; Leopold-Wildburger, Ulrike; Mestel, Roland; Palan, Stefan

2015-01-01

This paper deals with the market structure at the opening of the trading day and its influence on subsequent trading. We compare a single continuous double auction and two complement markets with different call auction designs as opening mechanisms in a unified experimental framework. The call auctions differ with respect to their levels of transparency. We find that a call auction not only improves market efficiency and liquidity at the beginning of the trading day when compared to the stand-alone continuous double auction, but also causes positive spillover effects on subsequent trading. Concerning the design of the opening call auction, we find no significant differences between the transparent and nontransparent specification with respect to opening prices and liquidity. In the course of subsequent continuous trading, however, market quality is slightly higher after a nontransparent call auction.

75 FR 31820 - Notice of Applications for Deregistration Under Section 8(f) of the Investment Company Act of 1940

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-06-04

.... Each applicant also distributed preferred shares of Dutch Auction Rate Transferable Securities (``DARTS'') of the acquiring fund to holders of applicants' Auction Rate Preferred Shares, DARTS, or Auction... distributed Dutch Auction Rate Transferable Securities (``DARTS'') of the acquiring fund to the holders of...

29 CFR 780.619 - Work “in connection with” livestock auction operations.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... 29 Labor 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Work âin connection withâ livestock auction operations. 780... FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT Employment in Agriculture and Livestock Auction Operations Under the Section 13(b)(13) Exemption Requirements for Exemption § 780.619 Work “in connection with” livestock auction...

75 FR 8070 - Closed Auction of Broadcast Construction Permits Scheduled for July 20, 2010; Auction 88...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-02-23

... Construction Permits Scheduled for July 20, 2010; Auction 88 Applicants Must Provide Supplemental Information..., AM, and FM Translator construction permits scheduled to commence on July 20, 2010 (Auction 88). This.... Any envelopes must be disposed of before entering the building. Commercial overnight mail (other than...

77 FR 38803 - Mobility Fund Phase I Auction Updated Data For Auction 901

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2012-06-29

... FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION [AU Docket No. 12-25; DA 12-990] Mobility Fund Phase I Auction Updated Data For Auction 901 AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission. ACTION: Notice. SUMMARY: In this... blocks. The map is a visual representation of data from the Attachment A files, which contain more...

78 FR 28265 - Self-Regulatory Organizations; Chicago Board Options Exchange, Incorporated; Notice of Filing and...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-05-14

... (2) a non-price specific commitment to auto-match all Auction responses received during the Auction... enhance competition in the Auctions and provide customers with additional opportunities for price... Auction processing, and specify (i) a single price at which it seeks to cross the Agency Order (with...

78 FR 61350 - Tribal Mobility Fund Phase I Auction (Auction 902); Short-Form Application Filing Window...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-10-03

... Fund Phase I Auction (Auction 902); Short-Form Application Filing Window Rescheduled To Open on... rescheduling of the filing window for short-form applications and release an updated list of eligible areas for... Application Filing Window Rescheduled To Open on September 30, 2013 1. The Bureaus announce that the filing...

Auctions vs negotiations: a study of price differentials.

PubMed

Kjerstad, Egil

2005-12-01

Recent contributions in auction and bargaining theory suggest that a procurer should place more faith in the power of competition among alternative suppliers than in his or her own negotiating skill. Based on data from 216 contracts between procurers and suppliers of medical and surgical articles, we test whether auctions and bargaining result in significantly different prices. The main results are that auctions give 'thicker' markets compared with negotiations, as expected, but that auctions do not result in significantly lower prices compared with negotiations. Copyright (c) 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Impact of information and in-home sensory exposure on liking and willingness to pay: The beginning of Fairtrade labeled coffee in France.

PubMed

Lange, C; Combris, P; Issanchou, S; Schlich, P

2015-10-01

This study was conducted to assess how the Fairtrade label interacts with the perception of intrinsic product characteristics on liking and purchase decisions and to estimate the evolution of this interaction after exposure to coffees and/or exposure to ethical information. In the first session, 119 consumers gave liking scores for 2 regular and 2 Fairtrade coffees under a blind tasting condition. Then, they were asked to indicate the maximum price they would pay for each product in 2 auctions taking place under different information conditions. In the first auction, participants saw the packaging but did not taste the coffee; in the second auction, they could both taste the coffee and see the packaging. After the first session, the consumers were randomly split into 4 groups, and these groups were exposed for one month to different conditions before returning to the lab for exactly the same measurements as in the first session. The first of the 4 groups was not exposed to sensory characteristics or ethical information. Each consumer of the second group was only exposed to sensory characteristics of the coffees (one packet of his/her least liked regular and ethical coffees delivered in blind packaging for home consumption). The third group was exposed to sensory characteristics and ethical information (the same as the second group but using the original coffee packaging showing fair trade information). The final group was only exposed to ethical information. Results showed that the hedonic scores of the least liked ethical and regular products increased from sessions 1 to 2, but not significantly more when consumers were exposed to these products between the sessions. However, while consumers offered lower prices for ethical products at the first session, those who were exposed to ethical information increased their willingness to pay for ethical products. This effect became statistically significant when consumers could taste the products before making their bid. The effect of exposure to ethical information was also transferred to the willingness to pay for the ethical product to which the consumers were not exposed. This study highlights the interest of a design, which makes it possible to assess the impact over time of sensory and external information on the willingness to pay. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

A Combinatorial Auction among Versatile Experts and Amateurs

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Ito, Takayuki; Yokoo, Makoto; Matsubara, Shigeo

Auctions have become an integral part of electronic commerce and a promising field for applying multi-agent technologies. Correctly judging the quality of auctioned goods is often difficult for amateurs, in particular, in Internet auctions. However, experts can correctly judge the quality of goods. In this situation, it is difficult to make experts tell the truth and attain an efficient allocation, since experts have a clear advantage over amateurs and they would not reveal their valuable information without some reward. In our previous work, we have succeeded in developing such auction protocols under the following two cases: (1) the case of a single-unit auction among experts and amateurs, and (2) the case of a combinatorial auction among single-skilled experts and amateurs. In this paper, we focus on versatile experts. Versatile experts have an interest in, and expert knowledge on the qualities of several goods. In the case of versatile experts, there would be several problems, e.g., free riding problems, if we simply extended the previous VCG-style auction protocol. Thus, in this paper, we employ PORF (price-oriented, rationing-free) protocol for designing our new protocol to realize a strategy-proof auction protocol for experts. In the protocol, the dominant strategy for experts is truth-telling. Also, for amateurs, truth-telling is the best response when two or more experts select the dominant strategy. Furthermore, the protocol is false-name-proof.

29 CFR 780.620 - Minimum wage for livestock auction work.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... minimum rate required by section 6(a)(1) of the Act for the time spent in livestock auction work. The exemption does not apply unless there is payment for all hours spent in livestock auction work at not less... 29 Labor 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Minimum wage for livestock auction work. 780.620 Section...

29 CFR 516.13 - Livestock auction employees exempt from overtime pay requirements under section 13(b)(13) of the...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... 29 Labor 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Livestock auction employees exempt from overtime pay....13 Livestock auction employees exempt from overtime pay requirements under section 13(b)(13) of the... employee is employed both in agriculture and in connection with livestock auction operations: (a) The total...

Auction Mechanism to Allocate Air Traffic Control Slots

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Raffarin, Marianne

2003-01-01

This article deals with an auction mechanism for airspace slots, as a means of solving the European airspace congestion problem. A disequilibrium, between Air Traffic Control (ATC) services supply and ATC services demand are at the origin of almost one fourth of delays in the air transport industry in Europe. In order to tackle this congestion problem, we suggest modifying both pricing and allocation of ATC services, by setting up an auction mechanism. Objects of the auction will be the right for airlines to cross a part of the airspace, and then to benefit from ATC services over a period corresponding to the necessary time for the crossing. Allocation and payment rules have to be defined according to the objectives of this auction. The auctioneer is the public authority in charge of ATC services, whose aim is to obtain an efficient allocation. Therefore, the social value will be maximized. Another objective is to internalize congestion costs. To that end, we apply the principle of Clarke-Groves mechanism auction: each winner has to pay the externalities imposed on other bidders. The complex context of ATC leads to a specific design for this auction.

Market power in auction and efficiency in emission permits allocation.

PubMed

Jiang, Min Xing; Yang, Dong Xiao; Chen, Zi Yue; Nie, Pu Yan

2016-12-01

This paper analyzes how to achieve the cost-effectiveness by initial allocation of CO 2 emission permits when a single dominant firm in production market has market power in auction, and compare two prevalent allocation patterns, mixed allocation and single auction. We show how the firm with market power may manipulate the auction price, thereby this leads to fail to achieve cost-effective solution by auction unless the total permits for allocation equal to the effective emissions cap. Provided that the market power firm receives strictly positive free permits, the effective emissions cap of mixed allocation is larger than that of single auction. The production market share of dominant firm is increasing with the free permits it holds. Finally, we examine the compliance costs and welfare of mixed allocation and single auction, the result show that the former is preferred to the later when policy makers consider economic welfare without welfare cost due to CO 2 emissions. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Alternative pavement designs : Randolph park and ride.

DOT National Transportation Integrated Search

2013-05-01

Previous research on alternative pavement type bidding has proven that various treatments : are unique in terms of constructability, material characteristics, and associated performance. : While some treatments may have higher initial costs, it is im...

Cooperation based dynamic team formation in multi-agent auctions

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Pippin, Charles E.; Christensen, Henrik

2012-06-01

Auction based methods are often used to perform distributed task allocation on multi-agent teams. Many existing approaches to auctions assume fully cooperative team members. On in-situ and dynamically formed teams, reciprocal collaboration may not always be a valid assumption. This paper presents an approach for dynamically selecting auction partners based on observed team member performance and shared reputation. In addition, we present the use of a shared reputation authority mechanism. Finally, experiments are performed in simulation on multiple UAV platforms to highlight situations in which it is better to enforce cooperation in auctions using this approach.

Auction and Game Theory Based Recommendations for DOD Acquisitions

DTIC Science & Technology

2015-03-24

SPONSORED REPORT SERIES Auction and Game Theory Based Recommendations for DOD Acquisitions 24 March 2015 Justin Blott, 2d Lt; Nicholas...TYPE 3. DATES COVERED 00-00-2015 to 00-00-2015 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Auction and Game Theory Based Recommendations for DOD Acquisitions 5a...Postgraduate School Abstract This paper synthesizes auction and game theory literature into specific military acquisition improvement

40 CFR 74.41 - Identifying allowances.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... for auction. (1) An authorized account representative may offer for sale in the spot auction under... compliance use date earlier than the year in which the spot auction is to be held and if the Administrator...

Combining auctions and performance-based payments in a forest enrichment field trial in Western Kenya.

PubMed

Khalumba, Mercelyne; Wünscher, Tobias; Wunder, Sven; Büdenbender, Mirjam; Holm-Müller, Karin

2014-06-01

Cost-effectiveness is an important aspect in the assessment of payments for environmental services (PES) initiatives. In participatory field trials with communities in Western Kenya, we combined procurement auctions for forest enrichment contracts with performance-based payments and compared the outcomes with a baseline scenario currently used by the Kenyan Forest Service. Procurement auctions were the most cost-effective. The competitive nature of the auction reduced contracting expenses (provision costs), and the result-oriented payments provided additional incentives to care for the planted seedlings, resulting in their improved survival rates (service quantity). These gains clearly exceeded increases in transaction costs associated with conducting an auction. The number of income-poor auction participants and winners was disproportionately high and local institutional buy-in was remarkably strong. Our participatory approach may, however, require adaptations when conducted at a larger scale. Although the number of contracts we monitored was limited and prohibited the use of statistical tests, our study is one of the first to reveal the benefits of using auctions for PES in developing countries. © 2014 Society for Conservation Biology.

47 CFR 1.8003 - Providing the FRN in Commission filings.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-10-01

... subpart G of this part, anyone participating in a spectrum auction, making up-front payments or deposits in a spectrum auction, anyone making a payment on an auction loan, anyone making a contribution to...

47 CFR 1.8003 - Providing the FRN in Commission filings.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... subpart G of this part, anyone participating in a spectrum auction, making up-front payments or deposits in a spectrum auction, anyone making a payment on an auction loan, anyone making a contribution to...

47 CFR 1.8003 - Providing the FRN in Commission filings.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-10-01

... from paying statutory charges under subpart G of this part, anyone participating in a spectrum auction, making up-front payments or deposits in a spectrum auction, anyone making a payment on an auction loan...

47 CFR 1.8003 - Providing the FRN in Commission filings.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-10-01

... from paying statutory charges under subpart G of this part, anyone participating in a spectrum auction, making up-front payments or deposits in a spectrum auction, anyone making a payment on an auction loan...

Approximating the Qualitative Vickrey Auction by a Negotiation Protocol

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Hindriks, Koen V.; Tykhonov, Dmytro; de Weerdt, Mathijs

A result of Bulow and Klemperer has suggested that auctions may be a better tool to obtain an efficient outcome than negotiation. For example, some auction mechanisms can be shown to be efficient and strategy-proof. However, they generally also require that the preferences of at least one side of the auction are publicly known. However, sometimes it is very costly, impossible, or undesirable to publicly announce such preferences. It thus is interesting to find methods that do not impose this constraint but still approximate the outcome of the auction. In this paper we show that a multi-round multi-party negotiation protocol may be used to this end if the negotiating agents are capable of learning opponent preferences. The latter condition can be met by current state of the art negotiation technology. We show that this protocol approximates the theoretical outcome predicted by a so-called Qualitative Vickrey auction mechanism (even) on a complex multi-issue domain.

Design and Promotion Strategy of Marketing Platform of Aquatic Auction based on Internet

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Peng, Jianliang

For the online trade and promotion of aquatic products and related materials through the network between supply and demand, the design content and effective promotional strategies of aquatic auctions online marketing platform is proposed in this paper. Design elements involve the location of customer service, the basic function of the platform including the purchase of general orders, online auctions, information dissemination, and recommendation of fine products, human services, and payment preferences. Based on network and mobile e-commerce transaction support, the auction platform makes the transaction of aquatic products well in advance. The results are important practical value for the design and application of online marketing platform of aquatic auction.

Auctions in Defense Acquisition: Theory and Experimental Evidence

DTIC Science & Technology

2002-01-01

Department of Defense (DoD) has recently begun purchasing with online auctions — receiving offers from suppli- ers for things ranging from computers to...equipment for U.S. Navy vessels. The Navy was the first to try online auctions for procuring airplane and ship parts. The Army’s first venture into...system. The Air Force first tested the online auction waters in Au- gust 2000 to acquire computer equipment and saved about $88,000, or 27 percent of

A Two-Phase Model for Trade Matching and Price Setting in Double Auction Water Markets

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Xu, Tingting; Zheng, Hang; Zhao, Jianshi; Liu, Yicheng; Tang, Pingzhong; Yang, Y. C. Ethan; Wang, Zhongjing

2018-04-01

Delivery in water markets is generally operated by agencies through channel systems, which imposes physical and institutional market constraints. Many water markets allow water users to post selling and buying requests on a board. However, water users may not be able to choose efficiently when the information (including the constraints) becomes complex. This study proposes an innovative two-phase model to address this problem based on practical experience in China. The first phase seeks and determines the optimal assignment that maximizes the incremental improvement of the system's social welfare according to the bids and asks in the water market. The second phase sets appropriate prices under constraints. Applying this model to China's Xiying Irrigation District shows that it can improve social welfare more than the current "pool exchange" method can. Within the second phase, we evaluate three objective functions (minimum variance, threshold-based balance, and two-sided balance), which represent different managerial goals. The threshold-based balance function should be preferred by most users, while the two-sided balance should be preferred by players who post extreme prices.

Trust or robustness? An ecological approach to the study of auction and bilateral markets.

PubMed

Hernández, Laura; Vignes, Annick; Saba, Stéphanie

2018-01-01

Centralized markets are often considered more efficient than bilateral exchanges because information is public and the same for all the agents. On decentralized markets, where the information is private, the influence of trust on the market outcome has been underlined by many authors. We present an empirical study of the distinctive Boulogne-sur-Mer Fish Market (where both buyers and sellers can choose to trade by either bidding or bargaining), focused on the interactions between agents. Our approach is inspired by studies of mutualistic ecosystems, where the agents are of two different types (as in plant-pollinator networks) and the interactions only take place between agents of different kinds, naturally providing benefits to both. In our context, where the two kinds of agents are buyers and sellers, our study shows that not only do their interactions bring economic benefits for the agents directly involved, but they also contribute to the stability of the market. Our results help to explain the surprising coexistence of the two forms of market in the distinctive Boulogne sur Mer Fish Market.

Trust or robustness? An ecological approach to the study of auction and bilateral markets

PubMed Central

Vignes, Annick; Saba, Stéphanie

2018-01-01

Centralized markets are often considered more efficient than bilateral exchanges because information is public and the same for all the agents. On decentralized markets, where the information is private, the influence of trust on the market outcome has been underlined by many authors. We present an empirical study of the distinctive Boulogne-sur-Mer Fish Market (where both buyers and sellers can choose to trade by either bidding or bargaining), focused on the interactions between agents. Our approach is inspired by studies of mutualistic ecosystems, where the agents are of two different types (as in plant-pollinator networks) and the interactions only take place between agents of different kinds, naturally providing benefits to both. In our context, where the two kinds of agents are buyers and sellers, our study shows that not only do their interactions bring economic benefits for the agents directly involved, but they also contribute to the stability of the market. Our results help to explain the surprising coexistence of the two forms of market in the distinctive Boulogne sur Mer Fish Market. PMID:29734331

Sequential Auctions with Partially Substitutable Goods

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Vetsikas, Ioannis A.; Jennings, Nicholas R.

In this paper, we examine a setting in which a number of partially substitutable goods are sold in sequential single unit auctions. Each bidder needs to buy exactly one of these goods. In previous work, this setting has been simplified by assuming that bidders do not know their valuations for all items a priori, but rather are informed of their true valuation for each item right before the corresponding auction takes place. This assumption simplifies the strategies of bidders, as the expected revenue from future auctions is the same for all bidders due to the complete lack of private information. In our analysis we don't make this assumption. This complicates the computation of the equilibrium strategies significantly. We examine this setting both for first and second-price auction variants, initially when the closing prices are not announced, for which we prove that sequential first and second-price auctions are revenue equivalent. Then we assume that the prices are announced; because of the asymmetry in the announced prices between the two auction variants, revenue equivalence does not hold in this case. We finish the paper, by giving some initial results about the case when free disposal is allowed, and therefore a bidder can purchase more than one item.

19 CFR 127.34 - Auctioneer's commissions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-04-01

... 19 Customs Duties 1 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false Auctioneer's commissions. 127.34 Section 127.34 Customs Duties U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY GENERAL ORDER, UNCLAIMED, AND ABANDONED MERCHANDISE Proceeds of Sale § 127.34 Auctioneer's...

7 CFR 29.36 - Auction market.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 7 Agriculture 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Auction market. 29.36 Section 29.36 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERVICE (Standards, Inspections, Marketing... INSPECTION Regulations Definitions § 29.36 Auction market. A place to which tobacco is delivered by the...

Careers in Data Science: A Berkeley Perspective

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Koy, K.

2015-12-01

Last year, I took on an amazing opportunity to serve as the Executive Director of the new Berkeley Institute for Data Science (BIDS). After a 15-year career working with geospatial data to advance our understanding of the environment, I have been presented with a unique opportunity through BIDS to work with talented researchers from a wide variety of backgrounds. Founded in 2013, BIDS is a central hub of research and education at UC Berkeley designed to facilitate and nurture data-intensive science. We are building a community centered on a cohort of talented data science fellows and senior fellows who are representative of the world-class researchers from across our campus and are leading the data science revolution within their disciplines. Our initiatives are designed to bring together broad constituents of the data science community, including domain experts from the life, social, and physical sciences and methodological experts from computer science, statistics, and applied mathematics. While many of these individuals rarely cross professional paths, BIDS actively seeks new and creative ways to engage and foster collaboration across these different research fields. In this presentation, I will share my own story, along with some insights into how BIDS is supporting the careers of data scientists, including graduate students, postdocs, faculty, and research staff. I will also describe how these individuals we are helping support are working to address a number of data science-related challenges in scientific research.

77 FR 9655 - Mobility Fund Phase I Auction Updated List of Potentially Eligible Census Blocks

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2012-02-17

... Updated List of Potentially Eligible Census Blocks AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission. ACTION... Bureaus provide an updated list of potentially eligible census blocks for Auction 901 scheduled to... summary of the Mobility Fund Phase I Auction Updated List of Potentially Eligible Census Blocks Public...

75 FR 44296 - Self-Regulatory Organizations; Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board; Notice of Filing of...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-07-28

... currently collected and made transparent by the MSRB on municipal Auction Rate Securities (``ARS'') and... MSRB on municipal Auction Rate Securities (``ARS'') and Variable Rate Demand Obligations (``VRDOs... auction procedures and interest rate setting mechanisms for ARS and liquidity facilities for VRDOs...

75 FR 52793 - Self-Regulatory Organizations; Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board; Order Granting Approval of...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-08-27

... the MSRB on municipal Auction Rate Securities (``ARS'') and Variable Rate Demand Obligations (``VRDOs... information currently collected and made transparent by the MSRB on municipal Auction Rate Securities (``ARS... that define auction procedures and interest rate setting mechanisms for ARS and liquidity facilities...

75 FR 56533 - Wireless Telecommunications Bureau Postpones Auction of 218-219 MHz Service and Phase II 220 MHz...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-09-16

... FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION [AU Docket No. 10-107; DA 10-1630] Wireless Telecommunications... Auction 89. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, Auctions and Spectrum... by the Chief, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau pursuant to authority delegated by 47 CFR 0.131...

Auction-theoretic analyses of the first offshore wind energy auction in Germany

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Kreiss, J.; Ehrhart, K.-M.; Hanke, A.-K.

2017-11-01

The first offshore wind energy auction in Germany led to a striking result. The average award price was 0.44 ct/kWh and even more interesting, 3 out of 4 awarded projects had a strike price of 0.0 ct/kWh. That implies that those projects will only receive the actual wholesale market price for electricity as revenue. Although there has been a strong decline in costs of offshore wind projects, such a result is still surprising. We analyzed this result auction-theoretically and showed how the auction design and the market environment can explain part of the outcome. However, another aspect of the explanation is the high risk that the awarded bidders take regarding the future development of both the project costs and the wholesale market price.

30 CFR 285.220 - What auction format may MMS use in a lease sale?

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... OFFSHORE RENEWABLE ENERGY ALTERNATE USES OF EXISTING FACILITIES ON THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF Issuance of OCS Renewable Energy Leases Competitive Lease Award Process § 285.220 What auction format may MMS use... renewable energy leases and will use one of the following auction formats, as determined through the lease...

30 CFR 285.220 - What auction format may MMS use in a lease sale?

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-07-01

... ENFORCEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR OFFSHORE RENEWABLE ENERGY ALTERNATE USES OF EXISTING FACILITIES ON THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF Issuance of OCS Renewable Energy Leases Competitive Lease Award Process § 285... competitive auctions to award renewable energy leases and will use one of the following auction formats, as...

30 CFR 585.220 - What auction format may BOEM use in a lease sale?

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-07-01

... INTERIOR OFFSHORE RENEWABLE ENERGY AND ALTERNATE USES OF EXISTING FACILITIES ON THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF Issuance of OCS Renewable Energy Leases Competitive Lease Award Process § 585.220 What auction format may... award renewable energy leases and will use one of the following auction formats, as determined through...

30 CFR 585.220 - What auction format may BOEM use in a lease sale?

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-07-01

... INTERIOR OFFSHORE RENEWABLE ENERGY AND ALTERNATE USES OF EXISTING FACILITIES ON THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF Issuance of OCS Renewable Energy Leases Competitive Lease Award Process § 585.220 What auction format may... award renewable energy leases and will use one of the following auction formats, as determined through...

30 CFR 585.220 - What auction format may BOEM use in a lease sale?

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-07-01

... INTERIOR OFFSHORE RENEWABLE ENERGY AND ALTERNATE USES OF EXISTING FACILITIES ON THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF Issuance of OCS Renewable Energy Leases Competitive Lease Award Process § 585.220 What auction format may... award renewable energy leases and will use one of the following auction formats, as determined through...

9 CFR 2.76 - Records: Operators of auction sales and brokers.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 9 Animals and Animal Products 1 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Records: Operators of auction sales and brokers. 2.76 Section 2.76 Animals and Animal Products ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE ANIMAL WELFARE REGULATIONS Records § 2.76 Records: Operators of auction sales and...

9 CFR 2.76 - Records: Operators of auction sales and brokers.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... 9 Animals and Animal Products 1 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Records: Operators of auction sales and brokers. 2.76 Section 2.76 Animals and Animal Products ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE ANIMAL WELFARE REGULATIONS Records § 2.76 Records: Operators of auction sales and...

9 CFR 2.76 - Records: Operators of auction sales and brokers.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... 9 Animals and Animal Products 1 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Records: Operators of auction sales and brokers. 2.76 Section 2.76 Animals and Animal Products ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE ANIMAL WELFARE REGULATIONS Records § 2.76 Records: Operators of auction sales and...

77 FR 57171 - Self-Regulatory Organizations; Chicago Board Options Exchange, Incorporated; Notice of Filing of...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2012-09-17

... Change Relating to Complex Order Auctions September 11, 2012. Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the... of the Proposed Rule Change The Exchange proposed to amend its Rules regarding complex order auctions... Exchange may activate the electronic complex order request for responses (``RFR'') auction (``COA''), which...

76 FR 82336 - Self-Regulatory Organizations; Chicago Board Options Exchange, Incorporated; Notice of Filing of...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-12-30

... (2) a non-price specific commitment to auto- match all Auction responses achieved during the Auction... price responses, leading to more robust competition in AIM. \\16\\ See supra note 3; see also Securities... enhance competition in the AIM Auctions and provide customers with additional opportunities for price...

Electronic Reverse Auctions: Integrating an E-Sourcing Tool into a Sales and Purchasing Cross-Course Negotiation Project

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Williams, Jacqueline A.; Dobie, Kathryn

2011-01-01

Electronic reverse auctions are increasingly being used by firms to improve firm financial and operational performance. The described teaching innovation serves as a model for introducing electronic reverse auctions as a central element in a comprehensive negotiation exercise involving sales management and purchasing management students. Results…

Ergodic Transition in a Simple Model of the Continuous Double Auction

PubMed Central

Radivojević, Tijana; Anselmi, Jonatha; Scalas, Enrico

2014-01-01

We study a phenomenological model for the continuous double auction, whose aggregate order process is equivalent to two independent queues. The continuous double auction defines a continuous-time random walk for trade prices. The conditions for ergodicity of the auction are derived and, as a consequence, three possible regimes in the behavior of prices and logarithmic returns are observed. In the ergodic regime, prices are unstable and one can observe a heteroskedastic behavior in the logarithmic returns. On the contrary, non-ergodicity triggers stability of prices, even if two different regimes can be seen. PMID:24558377

Ergodic transition in a simple model of the continuous double auction.

PubMed

Radivojević, Tijana; Anselmi, Jonatha; Scalas, Enrico

2014-01-01

We study a phenomenological model for the continuous double auction, whose aggregate order process is equivalent to two independent M/M/1 queues. The continuous double auction defines a continuous-time random walk for trade prices. The conditions for ergodicity of the auction are derived and, as a consequence, three possible regimes in the behavior of prices and logarithmic returns are observed. In the ergodic regime, prices are unstable and one can observe a heteroskedastic behavior in the logarithmic returns. On the contrary, non-ergodicity triggers stability of prices, even if two different regimes can be seen.

Physiological and behavioral patterns of corruption

PubMed Central

Jaber-López, Tarek; García-Gallego, Aurora; Perakakis, Pandelis; Georgantzis, Nikolaos

2014-01-01

We study the behavior and emotional arousal of the participants in an experimental auction, leading to an asymmetric social dilemma involving an auctioneer and two bidders. An antisocial transfer (bribe) which is beneficial for the auctioneer (official) is paid, if promised, by the winner of the auction. Some pro-social behavior on both the auctioneers' and the bidders' sides is observed even in the absence of any punishment mechanism (Baseline, Treatment 0). However, pro-social behavior is adopted by the vast majority of subjects when the loser of the auction can inspect the transaction between the winner and the auctioneer (Inspection, Treatment 1). The inspection and punishment mechanism is such that, if a bribe is (not) revealed, both corrupt agents (the denouncing bidder) lose(s) this period's payoffs. This renders the inspection option unprofitable for the loser and is rarely used, especially toward the end of the session, when pro-social behavior becomes pervasive. Subjects' emotional arousal was obtained through skin conductance responses. Generally speaking, our findings suggest that stronger emotions are associated with decisions deviating from pure monetary reward maximization, rather than with (un)ethical behavior per se. In fact, using response times as a measure of the subject's reflection during the decision-making process, we can associate emotional arousal with the conflict between primary or instinctive and secondary or contemplative motivations and, more specifically, with deviations from the subject's pure monetary interest. PMID:25566002

Physiological and behavioral patterns of corruption.

PubMed

Jaber-López, Tarek; García-Gallego, Aurora; Perakakis, Pandelis; Georgantzis, Nikolaos

2014-01-01

We study the behavior and emotional arousal of the participants in an experimental auction, leading to an asymmetric social dilemma involving an auctioneer and two bidders. An antisocial transfer (bribe) which is beneficial for the auctioneer (official) is paid, if promised, by the winner of the auction. Some pro-social behavior on both the auctioneers' and the bidders' sides is observed even in the absence of any punishment mechanism (Baseline, Treatment 0). However, pro-social behavior is adopted by the vast majority of subjects when the loser of the auction can inspect the transaction between the winner and the auctioneer (Inspection, Treatment 1). The inspection and punishment mechanism is such that, if a bribe is (not) revealed, both corrupt agents (the denouncing bidder) lose(s) this period's payoffs. This renders the inspection option unprofitable for the loser and is rarely used, especially toward the end of the session, when pro-social behavior becomes pervasive. Subjects' emotional arousal was obtained through skin conductance responses. Generally speaking, our findings suggest that stronger emotions are associated with decisions deviating from pure monetary reward maximization, rather than with (un)ethical behavior per se. In fact, using response times as a measure of the subject's reflection during the decision-making process, we can associate emotional arousal with the conflict between primary or instinctive and secondary or contemplative motivations and, more specifically, with deviations from the subject's pure monetary interest.

77 FR 22575 - The Auction Block Company, an Alaska Corporation v. the City of Homer, a Municipal Corporation...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2012-04-16

... FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION [Docket No. 12-03] The Auction Block Company, an Alaska Corporation v. the City of Homer, a Municipal Corporation and Its Port of Homer; Notice of Filing of Complaint and...) by The Auction Block Company, an Alaska Corporation, hereinafter ``Complainant,'' against the City of...

76 FR 33015 - Self-Regulatory Organizations; Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed Rule...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-06-07

..., specifically a Complex Order Live Auction (``COLA'').\\5\\ The Exchange is not amending the Rebate for Adding... (collectively ``Other Auctions''). \\5\\ COLA is the automated Complex Order Live Auction process. A COLA may take place upon identification of the existence of a COLA- eligible order either: (1) Following a COOP, or (2...

76 FR 64413 - Self-Regulatory Organizations; NASDAQ OMX BX, Inc.; Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-10-18

... Customers in Section 1c is $0.07 per executed contract for all non-PIP transactions. The Exchange proposes to amend Section 1c to expand this applicable fee to all non-Auction Transactions and define the term ``Auction Transactions'' to include all transactions executed through PIP, the Solicitation Auction...

Hipster Racism and Sexism in Charity Date Auctions: Individualism, Privilege Blindness and Irony in the Academy

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Current, Cheris Brewer; Tillotson, Emily

2018-01-01

This paper follows one small, Christian university's five-year experience with student charity date auctions. The contemporary re-emergence of date auctions represents a backlash against gender and racial progress. Student leaders believe that in a post-racial and post-sexist society, race and gender are decontextualised neutral elements of…

Decentralized Planning for Autonomous Agents Cooperating in Complex Missions

DTIC Science & Technology

2010-09-01

Consensus - based decentralized auctions for robust task allocation ," IEEE Transactions on Robotics...Robotics, vol. 24, pp. 209-222, 2006. [44] H.-L. Choi, L. Brunet, and J. P. How, " Consensus - based decentralized auctions for robust task allocation ...2003. 123 [31] L. Brunet, " Consensus - Based Auctions for Decentralized Task Assignment," Master’s thesis, Dept.

77 FR 65751 - Self-Regulatory Organizations; Chicago Board Options Exchange, Incorporated; Order Approving...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2012-10-30

... Relating to the Complex Order Auction Process October 24, 2012. I. Introduction On August 30, 2012, the... Complex Order RFR Auction,'' to: (i) Include the side of the market in the request for response (``RFR'') message sent to Trading Permit Holders at the start of a Complex Order Auction (``COA''); and (ii) require...

Auctioning Airport Slots?

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Gruyer, Nicolas; Lenoir, Nathalie

2003-01-01

The current allocation of slots on congested European airports constitutes an obstacle to the effective liberalisation of air transportation undertaken in Europe. With a view to favouring effluent slot utilisation and competition, as is the goal of the Euopean commission, we propose to use a market mechanism, based on temporary" utilisation licences. In order to allocate those licences, we propose and describe an iterated combinatorial auction mechanism where a percentage of licences would be reallocated each season. A secondary market would also be set up in order to reallocate slots during a season. Since a combinatorial auction involve a complex optimisation procedure, we describe how it can be made to work in the case of auctions.

Model of Auctioneer Estimation of Swordtip Squid (Loligo edulis) Quality

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Nakamura, Makoto; Matsumoto, Keisuke; Morimoto, Eiji; Ezoe, Satoru; Maeda, Toshimichi; Hirano, Takayuki

The knowledge of experienced auctioneers regarding the circulation of marine products is an essential skill and is necessary for evaluating product quality and managing aspects such as freshness. In the present study, the ability of an auctioneer to quickly evaluate the freshness of swordtip squid (Loligo edulis) at fish markets was analyzed. Evaluation characteristics used by an auctioneer were analyzed and developed using a fuzzy logic model. Forty boxes containing 247 swordtip squid with mantles measuring 220 mm that had been evaluated and assigned to one of five quality categories by an auctioneer were used for the analysis and the modeling. The relationships between the evaluations of appearance, body color, and muscle freshness were statistically analyzed. It was found that a total of four indexes of the epidermis color strongly reflected evaluations of appearance: dispersion ratio of the head, chroma on the head-end mantle and the difference in the chroma and brightness of the mantle. The fuzzy logic model used these indexes for the antecedent-part of the linguistic rules. The results of both simulation and evaluations demonstrate that the model is robust, with the predicted results corresponding with more than 96% of the quality assignments of the auctioneers.

Estimating and bidding for the Space Station Processing Facility

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Brown, Joseph A.

1993-01-01

This new, unique Cost Engineering Report introduces the 800-page, C-100 government estimate for the Space Station Processing Facility (SSPF) and Volume IV Aerospace Construction Price Book. At the January 23, 1991, bid opening for the SSPF, the government cost estimate was right on target. Metric, Inc., Prime Contractor, low bid was 1.2 percent below the government estimate. This project contains many different and complex systems. Volume IV is a summary of the cost associated with construction, activation and Ground Support Equipment (GSE) design, estimating, fabrication, installation, testing, termination, and verification of this project. Included are 13 reasons the government estimate was so accurate; abstract of bids, for 8 bidders and government estimate with additive alternates, special labor and materials, budget comparison and system summaries; and comments on the energy credit from local electrical utility. This report adds another project to our continuing study of 'How Does the Low Bidder Get Low and Make Money?' which was started in 1967, and first published in the 1973 AACE Transaction with 10 more ways the low bidder got low. The accuracy of this estimate proves the benefits of our Kennedy Space Center (KSC) teamwork efforts and KSC Cost Engineer Tools which are contributing toward our goals of the Space Station.

77 FR 69933 - Expanding the Economic and Innovation Opportunities of Spectrum Through Incentive Auctions

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2012-11-21

...In the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, ``Expanding the Economic and Innovation Opportunities of Spectrum Through Incentive Auctions'' (NPRM), released October 2, 2012, the Commission considers matters related to the implementation of Congress's mandate to conduct an incentive auction of broadcast television spectrum as set forth in the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 (Spectrum Act).

Linking Internet strategy to high-quality, cost-effective managed care.

PubMed

Beauregard, T R

2000-01-01

This article describes an experimental pilot project incorporating e-commerce and the Internet into the traditional process of health benefit negotiations through the utilization of an HMO Internet auction. The timeline and process of the auction are described, with the final auction taking place during the last week of negotiations. The results reveal an efficient and effective system to augment the traditional benefit negotiation process.

78 FR 21355 - Tribal Mobility Fund Phase I Auction Scheduled for October 24, 2013; Comment Sought on...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-04-10

... unit is the basic unit that will be used to determine the winners in Auction 902 and to measure... Bureaus will measure coverage based on population rather than road miles. Under the auction design options...: EV-DO, EV-DO Rev A, UMTS/HSPA, HSPA+, WiMAX, and LTE. If the Mosaik data did not show such coverage...

Agent Based Model of Livestock Movements

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Miron, D. J.; Emelyanova, I. V.; Donald, G. E.; Garner, G. M.

The modelling of livestock movements within Australia is of national importance for the purposes of the management and control of exotic disease spread, infrastructure development and the economic forecasting of livestock markets. In this paper an agent based model for the forecasting of livestock movements is presented. This models livestock movements from farm to farm through a saleyard. The decision of farmers to sell or buy cattle is often complex and involves many factors such as climate forecast, commodity prices, the type of farm enterprise, the number of animals available and associated off-shore effects. In this model the farm agent's intelligence is implemented using a fuzzy decision tree that utilises two of these factors. These two factors are the livestock price fetched at the last sale and the number of stock on the farm. On each iteration of the model farms choose either to buy, sell or abstain from the market thus creating an artificial supply and demand. The buyers and sellers then congregate at the saleyard where livestock are auctioned using a second price sealed bid. The price time series output by the model exhibits properties similar to those found in real livestock markets.

A Greedy Double Auction Mechanism for Grid Resource Allocation

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Ding, Ding; Luo, Siwei; Gao, Zhan

To improve the resource utilization and satisfy more users, a Greedy Double Auction Mechanism(GDAM) is proposed to allocate resources in grid environments. GDAM trades resources at discriminatory price instead of uniform price, reflecting the variance in requirements for profits and quantities. Moreover, GDAM applies different auction rules to different cases, over-demand, over-supply and equilibrium of demand and supply. As a new mechanism for grid resource allocation, GDAM is proved to be strategy-proof, economically efficient, weakly budget-balanced and individual rational. Simulation results also confirm that GDAM outperforms the traditional one on both the total trade amount and the user satisfaction percentage, specially as more users are involved in the auction market.

Human remains sold to the highest bidder! A snapshot of the buying and selling of human skeletal remains on eBay, an Internet auction site.

PubMed

Huxley, Angie K; Finnegan, Michael

2004-01-01

Internet auction sites have become increasingly popular, with diverse items up for sale to the public worldwide. The purposes of this paper are to inform the forensic community that human skeletal remains, old and new, are for sale on the eBay internet auction site, and to advise forensic scientists that eBay does not use a forensic anthropologist to assess photographs of these materials. Over the last few years, this website was "surfed," with numerous auctions during this period. After contacting eBay by email, representatives responded that they adhere to Native American Grave Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA) and that their website indicates that auctions must state that sale of human remains is for instructional purposes only. Based on the photographs, the remains appear to be of prehistoric and modern origin. An unfortunate consequence of such sale may generate interest in stealing remains from graves, mortuaries, hospitals, or county morgues worldwide.

On Revenue-Optimal Dynamic Auctions for Bidders with Interdependent Values

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Constantin, Florin; Parkes, David C.

In a dynamic market, being able to update one's value based on information available to other bidders currently in the market can be critical to having profitable transactions. This is nicely captured by the model of interdependent values (IDV): a bidder's value can explicitly depend on the private information of other bidders. In this paper we present preliminary results about the revenue properties of dynamic auctions for IDV bidders. We adopt a computational approach to design single-item revenue-optimal dynamic auctions with known arrivals and departures but (private) signals that arrive online. In leveraging a characterization of truthful auctions, we present a mixed-integer programming formulation of the design problem. Although a discretization is imposed on bidder signals the solution is a mechanism applicable to continuous signals. The formulation size grows exponentially in the dependence of bidders' values on other bidders' signals. We highlight general properties of revenue-optimal dynamic auctions in a simple parametrized example and study the sensitivity of prices and revenue to model parameters.

Combinatorial Market Processing for Multilateral Coordination

DTIC Science & Technology

2005-09-01

8 In the classical auction theory literature, most of the attention is focused on one-sided, single-item auctions [86]. There is now a growing body of...Programming in Infinite-dimensional Spaces: Theory and Applications, Wiley, 1987. [3] K. J. Arrow, “An extension of the basic theorems of classical ...Commodities, Princeton University Press, 1969. [43] D. Friedman and J. Rust, The Double Auction Market: Institutions, Theories, and Evidence, Addison

Successes and Challenges in the Resale of Alternative Fuel Vehicles: July 2001 - March 2002

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Not Available

2002-05-01

This report provides the outcome of Dorfman & O'Neal's effort to examine the resale market for automobiles as it relates to the resale of late-model, original equipment manufacture (OEM), alternative fuel vehicles. Auctions provide an exceptionally rapid, effective, and efficient market for the transfer of property between buyers and sellers at reasonable prices. The first automobile auction in the United States was successful because used cars were in reasonably constant supply, were uniformly packaged, and were easily graded for quality. Also, the auction had sufficient volume to significantly lower the handling and transaction costs for wholesalers and dealers. To thismore » day, the automobile auction industry conducts business primarily with registered wholesalers and dealers. Except for the U.S. General Services Administration (GSA) auctions and some consignment auctions, nearly all automobile auctions are closed to the public. The auction system represents a near-perfect market, validated by the lack of statistical price differences in value of specific model cars between various regions of the country. However, specialty cars may be subject to arbitrage. The buyer purchases the vehicle believing that it can be sold immediately at a profit in another region. A variety of vehicle pricing services are available to serve the consumer and the wholesale automobile industry. Each has a different philosophy for collecting, analyzing, and reporting data. ''The Automobile Lease Guide'' (ALG) is clearly the authority on vehicle residual values. Auction companies continue to apply automated technologies to lower transaction costs. Automated technologies are the only way to track the increasing number of transactions in the growing industry. Nevertheless, people-to-people relationships remain critical to the success of all auction companies. Our assessment is that everyone in the secondary automobile market is aware of alternative fuel vehicles (AFVs) and is interested to watch how the wholesale market for these vehicles may develop. However, none of the industry representatives we interviewed appears to be willing to take a leadership role in this market. Exact figures are not publicly available, but the GSA is probably the largest reseller of bifuel and dedicated compressed natural gas vehicles. These vehicles number in the hundreds; the total number of vehicles disposed by GSA each year is more than 20,000. GSA representatives have stated that bi-fuel vehicles are selling at approximately 80% of Black Book'' national average and dedicated vehicles are selling at 60% of ''Black Book national average compared to gasoline-only vehicles.« less

Designing a School Library Media Center for the Future.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Erikson, Rolf; Markuson, Carolyn

This booklet presents guidance on building superior school library media centers by outlining conceptual plans from actual school libraries and explaining how to address specific planning and operational issues. The booklet discusses how to address the unique ergonomic and technology needs of children; how to control costs using proven bidding and…

Evaluation of Aviation Career Pay Incentives Among the Naval Aviation Enterprise Utilizing Auction Mechanisms

DTIC Science & Technology

2015-03-01

the cm1·ent program has failed to meet targeted retention across conununities while ove1paying nearly $5,300,000 dming FY-2013, according to Eric...Kelso. This thesis examines the potential improvements of applying unif01m-price auction, Quality Adjusted Discount (QUAD), and Combinatorial Retention ...responses, we developed individual quality scores and reservation prices to apply three auction mechanisms to the retention goals and costs of the

Modelling of auctioning mechanism for solar photovoltaic capacity

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Poullikkas, Andreas

2016-10-01

In this work, a modified optimisation model for the integration of renewable energy sources for power-generation (RES-E) technologies in power-generation systems on a unit commitment basis is developed. The purpose of the modified optimisation procedure is to account for RES-E capacity auctions for different solar photovoltaic (PV) capacity electricity prices. The optimisation model developed uses a genetic algorithm (GA) technique for the calculation of the required RES-E levy (or green tax) in the electricity bills. Also, the procedure enables the estimation of the level of the adequate (or eligible) feed-in-tariff to be offered to future RES-E systems, which do not participate in the capacity auctioning procedure. In order to demonstrate the applicability of the optimisation procedure developed the case of PV capacity auctioning for commercial systems is examined. The results indicated that the required green tax, in order to promote the use of RES-E technologies, which is charged to the electricity customers through their electricity bills, is reduced with the reduction in the final auctioning price. This has a significant effect related to the reduction of electricity bills.

The influence of an online auction's product price and e-retailer reputation on consumers' perception, attitude, and behavioral intention.

PubMed

Wu, Wann-Yih; Huang, Po-Ching; Fu, Chen-Su

2011-06-01

Online auctions combine the conventional auction model with information technology. However, information asymmetry within such auctions causes risks and uncertainties that influence consumer purchase intentions. In this study, a 2 (product price: high vs. low) × 2 (e-retailer reputation: high vs. low) experimental design was used to understand whether the product price and e-retailer reputation will influence consumers' perceived risk, attitude toward the website and purchase intention. The results of this study indicate that perceived risk negatively influences consumer attitude toward the website and online purchase intention, while consumer attitude toward the website positively influences purchase intention. Moreover, involvement moderates the influence of product price and e-retailer reputation only on social risk but does not have a significant effect on consumer attitude toward the website. This study contributes to a more comprehensive understanding of online auction users' behavior. Finally, the managerial implications, limitations and future research directions are also provided. © 2011 The Authors. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology © 2011 The Scandinavian Psychological Associations.

Statistical Mechanics of Combinatorial Auctions

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Galla, Tobias; Leone, Michele; Marsili, Matteo; Sellitto, Mauro; Weigt, Martin; Zecchina, Riccardo

2006-09-01

Combinatorial auctions are formulated as frustrated lattice gases on sparse random graphs, allowing the determination of the optimal revenue by methods of statistical physics. Transitions between computationally easy and hard regimes are found and interpreted in terms of the geometric structure of the space of solutions. We introduce an iterative algorithm to solve intermediate and large instances, and discuss competing states of optimal revenue and maximal number of satisfied bidders. The algorithm can be generalized to the hard phase and to more sophisticated auction protocols.

43 CFR 2546.4 - Public auctions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-10-01

..., DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR LAND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (2000) COLOR-OF-TITLE AND OMITTED LANDS Snake River... public auction any lands for which preference-claimants do not qualify for patents under the regulations...

Comparisons of auction mechanisms in a multiple unit setting: A consideration for restructuring electric power markets

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Bernard, John Charles

The objective of this study was to compare the performance of five single sided auctions that could be used in restructured electric power markets across different market sizes in a multiple unit setting. Auction selection would profoundly influence an industry over $200 billion in size in the United States, and the consequences of implementing an inappropriate mechanism would be great. Experimental methods were selected to analyze the auctions. Two rounds of experiments were conducted, the first testing the sealed offer last accepted offer (LAO) and first rejected offer (FRO), and the clock English (ENG) and sealed offer English (SOE) in markets of sizes two and six. The FRO, SOE, and ENG used the same pricing rule. Second round testing was on the LAO, FRO, and the nonuniform price multiple unit Vickrey (MUV) in markets of sizes two, four, and six. Experiments lasted 23 and 75 periods for rounds 1 and 2 respectively. Analysis of variance and contrast analysis were used to examine the data. The four performance measures used were price, efficiency, profits per unit, and supply revelation. Five basic principles were also assessed: no sales at losses, all low cost capacity should be offered and sold, no high cost capacity should sell, and the market should clear. It was expected group size and auction type would affect performance. For all performance measures, group size was a significant variable, with smaller groups showing poorer performance. Auction type was significant only for the efficiency performance measure, where clock auctions outperformed the others. Clock auctions also proved superior for the first four principles. The FRO performed poorly in almost all situations, and should not be a preferred mechanism in any market. The ENG was highly efficient, but expensive for the buyer. The SOE appeared superior to the FRO and ENG. The clock improves efficiency over the FRO while less information kept prices under the ENG. The MUV was superior in revealing costs, but performed less well in other categories. While concerns existed for all the mechanisms investigated, the commonly proposed LAO was the best option for restructured electric power markets.

The Modified Values Auction: A Data Analytic Classroom Game

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Miller, Larry D.

1978-01-01

Describes a modified values auction simulation game, reports on three levels of analysis employing actual classroom data (group, subgroup, and individual), and offers suggestions for utilizing values data in social research. (CMV)

Analysis on trust influencing factors and trust model from multiple perspectives of online Auction

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Yu, Wang

2017-10-01

Current reputation models lack the research on online auction trading completely so they cannot entirely reflect the reputation status of users and may cause problems on operability. To evaluate the user trust in online auction correctly, a trust computing model based on multiple influencing factors is established. It aims at overcoming the efficiency of current trust computing methods and the limitations of traditional theoretical trust models. The improved model comprehensively considers the trust degree evaluation factors of three types of participants according to different participation modes of online auctioneers, to improve the accuracy, effectiveness and robustness of the trust degree. The experiments test the efficiency and the performance of our model under different scale of malicious user, under environment like eBay and Sporas model. The experimental results analysis show the model proposed in this paper makes up the deficiency of existing model and it also has better feasibility.

An Economic Evalution of Demand-side Energy Storage Systems by using a Multi-agent based Electricity Market

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Furusawa, Ken; Sugihara, Hideharu; Tsuji, Kiichiro

Opened wholesale electric power market in April 2005, deregulation of electric power industry in Japan has faced a new competitive environment. In the new environment, Independent Power Producer (: IPP), Power Producer and Supplier (: PPS), Load Service Entity (: LSE) and electric utility can trade electric energy through both bilateral contracts and single-price auction at the electricity market. In general, the market clearing price (: MCP) is largely changed by amount of total load demand in the market. The influence may cause price spike, and consequently the volatility of MCP will make LSEs and their customers to face a risk of revenue and cost. DSM is attracted as a means of load leveling, and has effect on decreasing MCP at peak load period. Introducing Energy Storage systems (: ES) is one of DSM in order to change demand profile at customer-side. In case that customers decrease their own demand at jumped MCP, a bidding strategy of generating companies may be changed their strategy. As a result, MCP is changed through such complex mechanism. In this paper the authors evaluate MCP by multi-agent. It is considered that customer-side ES has an effect on MCP fluctuation. Through numerical examples, this paper evaluates the influence on MCP by controlling customer-side ES corresponding to variation of MCP.

Consumer sensory acceptance and value of wet-aged and dry-aged beef steaks.

PubMed

Sitz, B M; Calkins, C R; Feuz, D M; Umberger, W J; Eskridge, K M

2006-05-01

To determine sensory preference and value of fresh beef steak differing in aging technique, strip steaks were evaluated by consumers in Denver (n = 132 consumers) and Chicago (n = 141 consumers). Wet-aged Choice strip loins were matched with dry-aged Choice strip loins, whereas wet-aged Prime strip loins were matched with dry-aged Prime strip loins. Dry-aged strip loins were commercially aged in air in a controlled environment for 30 d and vacuum-aged for 7 d during shipping and storage. Wet-aged strip loins were vacuum-packaged and aged for 37 d in a 1 degrees C cooler. Pairs of strip loins were matched to similar Warner-Bratzler shear force values and marbling scores. Twelve sensory evaluation panels (of 12 scheduled panelists each) were conducted over a 3-d period in each city. Individual samples from a pair of steaks were evaluated by the panelists for sensory traits. Bids were placed on the samples after sensory traits were obtained utilizing a variation of the Vickery auction with silent, sealed bids. No significant differences for sensory traits of flavor, juiciness, tenderness, or overall acceptability were detected between wet-aged Choice samples and dry-aged Choice samples. Although wet-aged Choice samples were numerically superior for all sensory traits, consumers placed similar bid values (P = 0.12) on wet- and dry-aged Choice samples ($3.82 per 0.45 kg and $3.57 per 0.45 kg, respectively). Wet-aged Prime samples were rated more desirable (P < 0.001) for flavor, tenderness, and overall acceptability than dry-aged Prime samples. Wet-aged Prime samples were valued at $4.02 per 0.45 kg, whereas dry-aged Prime samples brought $3.58 per 0.45 kg (P = 0.008). Consumers (29.3%) who preferred the dry-aged Choice samples over the wet-aged Choice samples were willing to pay $1.99/0.45 kg more (P < 0.001) for dry-aged samples. The consumers who preferred the wet-aged Choice over the dry-aged Choice samples (39.2%) were willing to pay $1.77/0.45 kg more (P < 0.0001). Consumers who preferred wet-aged Prime over dry-aged Prime samples (45.8%) paid $1.92/0.45 kg more (P < 0.0001). Consumers who preferred dry-aged Prime samples (27.5%) were willing to pay $1.92/0.45 kg more than for the wet-aged Prime samples. Although more consumers preferred wet-aged samples, markets do exist for dry-aged beef, and consumers are willing to pay a premium for this product.

7 CFR 46.25 - Auction sales.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 7 Agriculture 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Auction sales. 46.25 Section 46.25 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERVICE (Standards, Inspections, Marketing Practices), DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE MARKETING OF PERISHABLE AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES REGULATIONS (OTHER...

7 CFR 29.73 - Designation of markets; termination of designation.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... markets; termination of designation. An auction market where tobacco bought or sold thereon at auction or... considered as a new market, as defined in § 29.1, and any future application for services shall be filed and...

Space Station Facility government estimating

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Brown, Joseph A.

1993-01-01

This new, unique Cost Engineering Report introduces the 800-page, C-100 government estimate for the Space Station Processing Facility (SSPF) and Volume IV Aerospace Construction Price Book. At the January 23, 1991, bid opening for the SSPF, the government cost estimate was right on target. Metric, Inc., Prime Contractor, low bid was 1.2 percent below the government estimate. This project contains many different and complex systems. Volume IV is a summary of the cost associated with construction, activation and Ground Support Equipment (GSE) design, estimating, fabrication, installation, testing, termination, and verification of this project. Included are 13 reasons the government estimate was so accurate; abstract of bids, for 8 bidders and government estimate with additive alternates, special labor and materials, budget comparison and system summaries; and comments on the energy credit from local electrical utility. This report adds another project to our continuing study of 'How Does the Low Bidder Get Low and Make Money?' which was started in 1967, and first published in the 1973 AACE Transaction with 18 ways the low bidders get low. The accuracy of this estimate proves the benefits of our Kennedy Space Center (KSC) teamwork efforts and KSC Cost Engineer Tools which are contributing toward our goals of the Space Station.

The impact of information disclosure on market liquidity: Evidence from firms' use of Twitter

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Qu, Qixing; Wang, Lin; Qin, Liangjuan; Zhao, Xiaoye; Wang, Lijie

2017-01-01

Despite the popular use of social media by firms, empirical research investigating their economic values still lags. Based on the Security Exchange Commission's (SEC) new regulation on Fair Disclosure valid important corporate information discloses via social media (RIDSM), in this study, we examine the effectiveness of this new regulation to market liquidity. We collect trade data including daily volume and bid-ask spread to assemble a unique data set at individual firm level from S&P 500 firms and analyze the firms' bid-ask spread and volume before and after issuing the regulation. This natural experiment allows us to separate the effect of regulation from the effect of other confounding factors. The results from our panel data analyses indicate that bid-ask spread has decreased by about 5% in response to the new regulation. Our results are statistically significant and highly robust. We also examine the impact of the new regulation on a volume-based measure of liquidity, and find that the regulation is associated with greater volume, consistent with a reduction in information asymmetry. Moreover, this result holds mainly for firms that are high-tech, consistent with them being in greater need of this additional information disclosure channel.

Delineating unique cellular responses to PDT (Invited paper)

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Kessel, David

2005-04-01

Photodamage to mitochondria, endoplasmic reticulum (ER) or lysosomes can lead to activation of the apoptotic program, as can exposure of cells to the non-peptidic Bcl-2/Bcl-xL antagonist HA14-1. Many signaling pathways are evoked by photodynamic therapy (PDT), presumably from oxidative stress effects. To discover which of the latter effects might be unique to PDT, we compared some photodynamic effects with HA14-1 treatment, using murine leukemia L1210 cells in culture. Two photosensitizers were employed: the porphycene CPO and the chlorin NPe6. The former targets the endoplasmic reticulum (ER) and causes Bcl-2 photodamage, while NPe6 targets lysosomes, resulting in protease-induced cleavage and activation of Bid to form the pro-apoptotic product t-Bid. PDT at either target will lead to loss of the mitochondrial membrane potential ΔΨm, translocation of cytochrome c to the cytosol and an apoptotic response. Photodynamic effects of CPO or NPe6 led to activation of several 'stress proteins' and intracellular oxidation of the probe dihydrodichlorofluorescein (H2DCF). All of these effects were mimicked by HA14-1, indicating that these early responses to PDT result from initiation of apoptosis, however achieved. After CPO-catalyzed PDT or HA14-1 treatment, we observed a prompt release of Ca2+ into the cytosol, but this was insufficient to significantly alter mitochondrial calcium levels. The apoptotic response to HA14-1 or Bcl-2 photodamage was markedly promoted by the protein kinase C (PKC) inhibitor staurosporin (STS). These effects were not observed after photodamage catalyzed by NPe6, indicating that calcium release and PKC interactions are associated with loss of Bcl-2 function, but not Bid activation.

9 CFR 2.76 - Records: Operators of auction sales and brokers.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

..., DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE ANIMAL WELFARE REGULATIONS Records § 2.76 Records: Operators of auction sales and... breed or type of animal; (ii) The sex of the animal; and (iii) The date of birth or approximate age; and...

The Balloon Popping Problem Revisited: Lower and Upper Bounds

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Jung, Hyunwoo; Chwa, Kyung-Yong

We consider the balloon popping problem introduced by Immorlica et al. in 2007 [13]. This problem is directly related to the problem of profit maximization in online auctions, where an auctioneer is selling a collection of identical items to anonymous unit-demand bidders. The auctioneer has the full knowledge of bidders’ private valuations for the items and tries to maximize his profit. Compared with the profit of fixed price schemes, the competitive ratio of Immorlica et al.’s algorithm was in the range [1.64, 4.33]. In this paper, we narrow the gap to [1.659, 2].

31 CFR 356.20 - How does the Treasury determine auction awards?

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... and bond issues. We set the interest rate at a 1/8 of one percent increment. If a Treasury inflation-protected securities auction results in a negative or zero yield, the interest rate will be set at zero, and...

78 FR 45589 - Self-Regulatory Organizations; NASDAQ OMX PHLX LLC; Notice of Designation of a Longer Period for...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-07-29

... on Proposed Rule Change Relating To Which Complex Orders Can Initiate a Complex Order Live Auction... Exchange to determine by order sender which complex orders can initiate a Complex Order Live Auction...

49 CFR 580.9 - Odometer record retention for auction companies.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-10-01

... the buyer; (c) The vehicle identification number; and (d) The odometer reading on the date which the auction company took possession of the motor vehicle. ... permits systematic retrieval, for five years following the date of sale of each motor vehicle, the...

49 CFR 580.9 - Odometer record retention for auction companies.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-10-01

... the buyer; (c) The vehicle identification number; and (d) The odometer reading on the date which the auction company took possession of the motor vehicle. ... permits systematic retrieval, for five years following the date of sale of each motor vehicle, the...

49 CFR 580.9 - Odometer record retention for auction companies.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-10-01

... the buyer; (c) The vehicle identification number; and (d) The odometer reading on the date which the auction company took possession of the motor vehicle. ... permits systematic retrieval, for five years following the date of sale of each motor vehicle, the...

49 CFR 580.9 - Odometer record retention for auction companies.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... the buyer; (c) The vehicle identification number; and (d) The odometer reading on the date which the auction company took possession of the motor vehicle. ... permits systematic retrieval, for five years following the date of sale of each motor vehicle, the...

49 CFR 580.9 - Odometer record retention for auction companies.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-10-01

... the buyer; (c) The vehicle identification number; and (d) The odometer reading on the date which the auction company took possession of the motor vehicle. ... permits systematic retrieval, for five years following the date of sale of each motor vehicle, the...

76 FR 4827 - High-Cost Universal Service Support and Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-01-27

... Wireless Services (``AWS'') licenses. This auction, which was designated as Auction 78, offered 35 licenses in the AWS 1710-1755 MHz and 2110-2155 MHz bands (``AWS-1''). The AWS-1 licenses were licenses for...

47 CFR 1.1182 - Schedule of fees for products and services provided by the Commission in connection with...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-10-01

... Payment to auction contractor by credit card or check. (Public Notice will specify exact payment...) to same person or entity Payment to auction contractor by credit card or check. (Public Notice will...

47 CFR 1.1182 - Schedule of fees for products and services provided by the Commission in connection with...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-10-01

... Payment to auction contractor by credit card or check. (Public Notice will specify exact payment...) to same person or entity Payment to auction contractor by credit card or check. (Public Notice will...

47 CFR 1.1182 - Schedule of fees for products and services provided by the Commission in connection with...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-10-01

... Payment to auction contractor by credit card or check. (Public Notice will specify exact payment...) to same person or entity Payment to auction contractor by credit card or check. (Public Notice will...

The impact of product information and trials on demand for smokeless tobacco and cigarettes: Evidence from experimental auctions

PubMed Central

Rousu, Matthew C.; O'Connor, Richard; Thrasher, James F; June, Kristie; Bansal-Travers, Maansi; Pitcavage, James

2014-01-01

Introduction Epidemiological and toxicological evidence suggests lower risk of smokeless tobacco (ST) products compared to cigarettes. Less is known, however, about consumer perceptions and use of novel forms of ST, including snus and dissolvable tobacco. Methods In this study, we conducted in-person experimental auctions in Buffalo, NY, Columbia, SC, and Selinsgrove, PA with 571 smokers to test the impact of information and product trials on smokers’ preferences. Auctions were conducted between November 2010-November 2011. Results We found no evidence of an impact of product trials on demand in our auctions. Anti-ST information increased demand for cigarettes when presented alone, but when presented with Pro-ST information it decreased demand for cigarettes. It did not decrease demand for ST products. Anti-smoking information increased demand for ST products, but did not affect cigarette demand. Conclusions These findings suggest that credible and effective communications about tobacco harm reduction should reinforce the negative effects of smoking. PMID:24321456

The impact of product information and trials on demand for smokeless tobacco and cigarettes: evidence from experimental auctions.

PubMed

Rousu, Matthew C; O'Connor, Richard J; Thrasher, James F; June, Kristie M; Bansal-Travers, Maansi; Pitcavage, James

2014-03-01

Epidemiological and toxicological evidence suggests lower risk of smokeless tobacco (ST) products compared to cigarettes. Less is known, however, about consumer perceptions and use of novel forms of ST, including snus and dissolvable tobacco. In this study, we conducted in-person experimental auctions in Buffalo, NY, Columbia, SC, and Selinsgrove, PA with 571 smokers to test the impact of information and product trials on smokers' preferences. Auctions were conducted between November 2010-November 2011. We found no evidence of an impact of product trials on demand in our auctions. Anti-ST information increased demand for cigarettes when presented alone, but when presented with pro-ST information it decreased demand for cigarettes. It did not decrease demand for ST products. Anti-smoking information increased demand for ST products, but did not affect cigarette demand. These findings suggest that credible and effective communications about tobacco harm reduction should reinforce the negative effects of smoking. Copyright © 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

From Walras’ auctioneer to continuous time double auctions: a general dynamic theory of supply and demand

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Donier, J.; Bouchaud, J.-P.

2016-12-01

In standard Walrasian auctions, the price of a good is defined as the point where the supply and demand curves intersect. Since both curves are generically regular, the response to small perturbations is linearly small. However, a crucial ingredient is absent of the theory, namely transactions themselves. What happens after they occur? To answer the question, we develop a dynamic theory for supply and demand based on agents with heterogeneous beliefs. When the inter-auction time is infinitely long, the Walrasian mechanism is recovered. When transactions are allowed to happen in continuous time, a peculiar property emerges: close to the price, supply and demand vanish quadratically, which we empirically confirm on the Bitcoin. This explains why price impact in financial markets is universally observed to behave as the square root of the excess volume. The consequences are important, as they imply that the very fact of clearing the market makes prices hypersensitive to small fluctuations.

Coadministration of lorcaserin and phentermine for weight management: A 12‐week, randomized, pilot safety study

PubMed Central

Garvey, W. Timothy; Greenway, Frank L.; Zhou, Sharon; Fain, Randi; Pilson, Robert; Fujioka, Ken; Aronne, Louis J.

2017-01-01

Objective To assess the short‐term tolerability of lorcaserin alone or with two dose regimens of phentermine. Methods This was a 12‐week, randomized, double‐blind, pilot safety study of N = 238 nondiabetic patients with obesity or overweight with ≥1 comorbidity randomized to lorcaserin 10 mg twice daily (BID; LOR BID) alone or with phentermine 15 mg once daily (QD; LOR BID+PHEN QD) or 15 mg twice daily (LOR BID+PHEN BID). Patients reporting ≥ 1 of 9 potentially serotonergic adverse events (AEs), mean weight loss (WL), and ≥5% WL are reported. Results N = 238 were randomized, and N = 235 were treated. N = 94 reported potentially serotonergic AEs: 37.2% LOR BID, 42.3% LOR BID+PHEN QD, and 40.5% LOR BID+PHEN BID. AEs leading to discontinuation were reported approximately twice as often in the LOR BID+PHEN BID group versus the LOR BID group. Mean WL was 3.5 kg/3.3%, 7.0 kg/6.7%, and 7.6 kg/7.2% for LOR BID, LOR BID+PHEN QD, and LOR BID+PHEN BID, respectively. At least 5% WL was achieved by 28.2% LOR BID, 59.0% LOR BID+PHEN QD (P = 0.0002 vs. LOR BID), and 70.9% LOR BID+PHEN BID (P < 0.0001 vs. LOR BID) patients. Conclusions Phentermine added to lorcaserin enhanced short‐term weight loss but did not increase incidence of potentially serotonergic AEs; however, phentermine twice daily increased discontinuation compared to both lorcaserin alone and lorcaserin plus phentermine once daily. PMID:28440045

Coadministration of lorcaserin and phentermine for weight management: A 12-week, randomized, pilot safety study.

PubMed

Smith, Steven R; Garvey, W Timothy; Greenway, Frank L; Zhou, Sharon; Fain, Randi; Pilson, Robert; Fujioka, Ken; Aronne, Louis J

2017-05-01

To assess the short-term tolerability of lorcaserin alone or with two dose regimens of phentermine. This was a 12-week, randomized, double-blind, pilot safety study of N = 238 nondiabetic patients with obesity or overweight with ≥1 comorbidity randomized to lorcaserin 10 mg twice daily (BID; LOR BID) alone or with phentermine 15 mg once daily (QD; LOR BID+PHEN QD) or 15 mg twice daily (LOR BID+PHEN BID). Patients reporting ≥ 1 of 9 potentially serotonergic adverse events (AEs), mean weight loss (WL), and ≥5% WL are reported. N = 238 were randomized, and N = 235 were treated. N = 94 reported potentially serotonergic AEs: 37.2% LOR BID, 42.3% LOR BID+PHEN QD, and 40.5% LOR BID+PHEN BID. AEs leading to discontinuation were reported approximately twice as often in the LOR BID+PHEN BID group versus the LOR BID group. Mean WL was 3.5 kg/3.3%, 7.0 kg/6.7%, and 7.6 kg/7.2% for LOR BID, LOR BID+PHEN QD, and LOR BID+PHEN BID, respectively. At least 5% WL was achieved by 28.2% LOR BID, 59.0% LOR BID+PHEN QD (P = 0.0002 vs. LOR BID), and 70.9% LOR BID+PHEN BID (P < 0.0001 vs. LOR BID) patients. Phentermine added to lorcaserin enhanced short-term weight loss but did not increase incidence of potentially serotonergic AEs; however, phentermine twice daily increased discontinuation compared to both lorcaserin alone and lorcaserin plus phentermine once daily. © 2017 The Authors. Obesity published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. on behalf of The Obesity Society (TOS).

Economics and computer science of a radio spectrum reallocation.

PubMed

Leyton-Brown, Kevin; Milgrom, Paul; Segal, Ilya

2017-07-11

The recent "incentive auction" of the US Federal Communications Commission was the first auction to reallocate radio frequencies between two different kinds of uses: from broadcast television to wireless Internet access. The design challenge was not just to choose market rules to govern a fixed set of potential trades but also, to determine the broadcasters' property rights, the goods to be exchanged, the quantities to be traded, the computational procedures, and even some of the performance objectives. An essential and unusual challenge was to make the auction simple enough for human participants while still ensuring that the computations would be tractable and capable of delivering nearly efficient outcomes.

41 CFR 102-38.95 - What is an auction?

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... 41 Public Contracts and Property Management 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false What is an auction? 102-38.95 Section 102-38.95 Public Contracts and Property Management Federal Property Management Regulations System (Continued) FEDERAL MANAGEMENT REGULATION PERSONAL PROPERTY 38-SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY...

41 CFR 102-38.95 - What is an auction?

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... 41 Public Contracts and Property Management 3 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false What is an auction? 102-38.95 Section 102-38.95 Public Contracts and Property Management Federal Property Management Regulations System (Continued) FEDERAL MANAGEMENT REGULATION PERSONAL PROPERTY 38-SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY...

41 CFR 102-38.95 - What is an auction?

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-07-01

... 41 Public Contracts and Property Management 3 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false What is an auction? 102-38.95 Section 102-38.95 Public Contracts and Property Management Federal Property Management Regulations System (Continued) FEDERAL MANAGEMENT REGULATION PERSONAL PROPERTY 38-SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY...

41 CFR 102-38.95 - What is an auction?

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... 41 Public Contracts and Property Management 3 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false What is an auction? 102-38.95 Section 102-38.95 Public Contracts and Property Management Federal Property Management Regulations System (Continued) FEDERAL MANAGEMENT REGULATION PERSONAL PROPERTY 38-SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY...

41 CFR 102-38.95 - What is an auction?

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 41 Public Contracts and Property Management 3 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false What is an auction? 102-38.95 Section 102-38.95 Public Contracts and Property Management Federal Property Management Regulations System (Continued) FEDERAL MANAGEMENT REGULATION PERSONAL PROPERTY 38-SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY...

Cleavage by Caspase 8 and Mitochondrial Membrane Association Activate the BH3-only Protein Bid during TRAIL-induced Apoptosis*

PubMed Central

Huang, Kai; Zhang, Jingjing; O'Neill, Katelyn L.; Gurumurthy, Channabasavaiah B.; Quadros, Rolen M.; Tu, Yaping; Luo, Xu

2016-01-01

The BH3-only protein Bid is known as a critical mediator of the mitochondrial pathway of apoptosis following death receptor activation. However, since full-length Bid possesses potent apoptotic activity, the role of a caspase-mediated Bid cleavage is not established in vivo. In addition, due to the fact that multiple caspases cleave Bid at the same site in vitro, the identity of the Bid-cleaving caspase during death receptor signaling remains uncertain. Moreover, as Bid maintains its overall structure following its cleavage by caspase 8, it remains unclear how Bid is activated upon cleavage. Here, Bid-deficient (Bid KO) colon cancer cells were generated by gene editing, and were reconstituted with wild-type or mutants of Bid. While the loss of Bid blocked apoptosis following treatment by TNF-related apoptosis inducing ligand (TRAIL), this blockade was relieved by re-introduction of the wild-type Bid. In contrast, the caspase-resistant mutant BidD60E and a BH3 defective mutant BidG94E failed to restore TRAIL-induced apoptosis. By generating Bid/Bax/Bak-deficient (TKO) cells, we demonstrated that Bid is primarily cleaved by caspase 8, not by effector caspases, to give rise to truncated Bid (tBid) upon TRAIL treatment. Importantly, despite the presence of an intact BH3 domain, a tBid mutant lacking the mitochondrial targeting helices (α6 and α7) showed diminished apoptotic activity. Together, these results for the first time establish that cleavage by caspase 8 and the subsequent association with the outer mitochondrial membrane are two critical events that activate Bid during death receptor-mediated apoptosis. PMID:27053107

Cleavage by Caspase 8 and Mitochondrial Membrane Association Activate the BH3-only Protein Bid during TRAIL-induced Apoptosis.

PubMed

Huang, Kai; Zhang, Jingjing; O'Neill, Katelyn L; Gurumurthy, Channabasavaiah B; Quadros, Rolen M; Tu, Yaping; Luo, Xu

2016-05-27

The BH3-only protein Bid is known as a critical mediator of the mitochondrial pathway of apoptosis following death receptor activation. However, since full-length Bid possesses potent apoptotic activity, the role of a caspase-mediated Bid cleavage is not established in vivo In addition, due to the fact that multiple caspases cleave Bid at the same site in vitro, the identity of the Bid-cleaving caspase during death receptor signaling remains uncertain. Moreover, as Bid maintains its overall structure following its cleavage by caspase 8, it remains unclear how Bid is activated upon cleavage. Here, Bid-deficient (Bid KO) colon cancer cells were generated by gene editing, and were reconstituted with wild-type or mutants of Bid. While the loss of Bid blocked apoptosis following treatment by TNF-related apoptosis inducing ligand (TRAIL), this blockade was relieved by re-introduction of the wild-type Bid. In contrast, the caspase-resistant mutant Bid(D60E) and a BH3 defective mutant Bid(G94E) failed to restore TRAIL-induced apoptosis. By generating Bid/Bax/Bak-deficient (TKO) cells, we demonstrated that Bid is primarily cleaved by caspase 8, not by effector caspases, to give rise to truncated Bid (tBid) upon TRAIL treatment. Importantly, despite the presence of an intact BH3 domain, a tBid mutant lacking the mitochondrial targeting helices (α6 and α7) showed diminished apoptotic activity. Together, these results for the first time establish that cleavage by caspase 8 and the subsequent association with the outer mitochondrial membrane are two critical events that activate Bid during death receptor-mediated apoptosis. © 2016 by The American Society for Biochemistry and Molecular Biology, Inc.

Preventing conflicts among bid curves used with transactive controllers in a market-based resource allocation system

DOEpatents

Fuller, Jason C.; Chassin, David P.; Pratt, Robert G.; Hauer, Matthew; Tuffner, Francis K.

2017-03-07

Disclosed herein are representative embodiments of methods, apparatus, and systems for distributing a resource (such as electricity) using a resource allocation system. One of the disclosed embodiments is a method for operating a transactive thermostatic controller configured to submit bids to a market-based resource allocation system. According to the exemplary method, a first bid curve is determined, the first bid curve indicating a first set of bid prices for corresponding temperatures and being associated with a cooling mode of operation for a heating and cooling system. A second bid curve is also determined, the second bid curve indicating a second set of bid prices for corresponding temperatures and being associated with a heating mode of operation for a heating and cooling system. In this embodiment, the first bid curve, the second bid curve, or both the first bid curve and the second bid curve are modified to prevent overlap of any portion of the first bid curve and the second bid curve.

49 CFR 599.201 - Identification of salvage auctions and disposal facilities.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... facilities. 599.201 Section 599.201 Transportation Other Regulations Relating to Transportation (Continued... and Disposal Facilities § 599.201 Identification of salvage auctions and disposal facilities. (a... disposal facility identified in paragraph (a)(2) or (a)(3) of this section. (2) A disposal facility listed...

77 FR 73969 - Expanding the Economic and Innovation Opportunities of Spectrum Through Incentive Auctions

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2012-12-12

...] Expanding the Economic and Innovation Opportunities of Spectrum Through Incentive Auctions AGENCY: Federal... Media Bureau extends the deadline for filing comments and reply comments on the Notice of Proposed... delivery, by commercial overnight courier, or by first-class or overnight U.S. Postal Service mail...

76 FR 20783 - Self-Regulatory Organizations; Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board; Order Granting Approval of...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-04-13

... rates and descriptive information about Auction Rate Securities (``ARS'') and Variable Rate Demand... interest rate setting mechanisms for ARS and liquidity facilities for VDROs, information about orders submitted for an ARS auction, and additional information about VRDOs.\\5\\ To provide subscribers with access...

75 FR 78768 - Proposed Exemptions From Certain Prohibited Transaction Restrictions

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-12-16

... Securities, as discussed herein. 2. The Applicant describes Auction Rate Securities (or ARS) and the arrangement by which ARS are bought and sold as follows. Auction Rate Securities are preferred stock or bonds... to perpetuity. ARS interest rates or dividend yields are determined and periodically reset at...

76 FR 11547 - Self-Regulatory Organizations; Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board; Notice of Filing of...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-03-02

... interest rates and descriptive information about Auction Rate Securities (``ARS'') and Variable Rate Demand... interest rate setting mechanisms for ARS and liquidity facilities for VRDOs, information about orders submitted for an ARS auction, and additional information about VRDOs.\\4\\ To provide subscribers with access...

Making Marketing Principles Tangible: Online Auctions as Living Case Studies

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Wood, Charles M.; Suter, Tracy A.

2004-01-01

This article presents an effective course supplement for Principles of Marketing classes. An experiential project involving online auctions is offered to instructors seeking to create a more participatory student environment and an interactive teaching style. A number of learning points are illustrated that allow instructors to use an auction…

77 FR 38061 - Mobility Fund Phase I Auction Supplemental Short-Form Instructions and Other Information

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2012-06-26

... FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION [AU Docket No. 12-25; DA 12-947] Mobility Fund Phase I Auction Supplemental Short-Form Instructions and Other Information AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission. ACTION... number, for example, DA 12-947. The Supplemental Filing Instructions Public Notice and related documents...

Books at Auction: The Art of Deaccessioning.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Model, Peter

1981-01-01

Lack of space and budget cuts force many libraries to weed out books and to be selective in accepting collection bequests. The approach for deciding which books to weed out and whether to dispose of these books through dealers or auctions are decisions private clubs and many libraries must make. (RBF)

23 CFR 635.113 - Bid opening and bid tabulations.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-04-01

... CONSTRUCTION AND MAINTENANCE Contract Procedures § 635.113 Bid opening and bid tabulations. (a) All bids... contractors, during the period following the opening of bids and before the award of the contract shall not be...

Reciprocity in Online Markets: Empirical Studies of Auction and Barter Markets

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Ye, Shun

2013-01-01

My dissertation seeks to understand how reciprocity affects transaction outcomes and mechanism design in online markets. The first essay examines negative reciprocity illustrated as feedback-revoking behavior in the eBay auction market, focusing on its impact and implications for reputation system design. I utilize the biggest policy change of…

30 CFR 285.308 - How will MMS conduct an auction for ROW grants and RUE grants?

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-07-01

... and RUE grants? 285.308 Section 285.308 Mineral Resources BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MANAGEMENT, REGULATION, AND ENFORCEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR OFFSHORE RENEWABLE ENERGY ALTERNATE USES OF EXISTING... Renewable Energy Activities Obtaining Row Grants and Rue Grants § 285.308 How will MMS conduct an auction...

75 FR 53366 - Self-Regulatory Organizations; NASDAQ OMX PHLX, Inc.; Notice of Filing and Immediate...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-08-31

... Rule Change Relating to Routing Fees, the Monthly Cap and Electronic Auctions August 25, 2010. Pursuant... Monthly Cap on equity option transaction fees; and (iii) clarify language relating to electronic auctions...-105. The Exchange also proposes to amend its Monthly Cap assessed on Registered Options Traders...

78 FR 67421 - Self-Regulatory Organizations; BOX Options Exchange LLC; Notice of Filing and Immediate...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-11-12

... Broker Dealers and adjust the Tiered Auction Transaction Fees for Initiating Participants based upon... Exchange proposes to increase the existing liquidity fees and credits for certain PIP Transactions within... Transaction \\5\\ fees for Professional Customers and Broker Dealers to $0.37 from $0.35. For Non-Auction...

78 FR 16743 - Self-Regulatory Organizations; BOX Options Exchange LLC; Notice of Filing and Immediate...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-03-18

... interests of investors to have lower Auction Transaction costs for non-Professional, Public Customers, and that the BOX fee structure will continue to attract this customer order flow to these auction... simple fact that price improvement occurs in the PIP. Since the PIP began in 2004, customers have...

78 FR 66955 - Exemptions From Certain Prohibited Transaction Restrictions

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-11-07

... Auction Rate Securities by UBS AG (ARS Rights) in connection with a Settlement Agreement, (b) the sale of an Auction Rate Security to UBS pursuant to such ARS Rights, where such sale (a Settlement Sale) is... the offer of ARS Rights (the ARS Rights Offer) are consistent with the requirements set forth in the...

76 FR 9366 - Proposed Exemptions From Certain Prohibited Transaction Restrictions

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-02-17

... Security'' or ``ARS'' means a security: (1) That is either a debt instrument (generally with a long-term... purchase of an ARS by Wachovia from a Plan. DATES: Effective Date: If granted, this proposed exemption will... describes Auction Rate Securities and the arrangement by which ARS are bought and sold as follows. Auction...

77 FR 7152 - Mobility Fund Phase I Auction Scheduled for September 27, 2012; Comment Sought on Competitive...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2012-02-10

... application deadlines and other dates related to Auction 901 after considering comments provided in response... must file an application for support. Only after review of the application to confirm compliance with... for support to Tribal lands. 7. The USF/ICC Transformation Order established application, performance...

Design Implications of Real-Time Feedback in Continuous Combinatorial Auctions: An Experimental Investigation

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Sanyal, Pallab

2009-01-01

Information Technology (IT) has spawned the growth of novel and innovative market mechanisms (such as online auctions) and associated businesses (such as eBay and Priceline) that were not feasible without the capabilities and reach of these modern information technologies. Previous studies on designing trading mechanisms for online markets…

78 FR 56874 - Comment Sought on Petition for Reconsideration of Auction 902 Procedures Public Notice

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-09-16

... FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION [AU Docket No. 13-53; DA 13-1876] Comment Sought on Petition for Reconsideration of Auction 902 Procedures Public Notice AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission. ACTION: Notice. SUMMARY: This document announces that on September 6, 2013, Smith Bagley, Inc. (SBI) filed a petition...

Hospital treatment as a foal does not adversely affect future sales performance in Thoroughbred horses.

PubMed

Corley, K T T; Corley, M M B

2012-02-01

Many Thoroughbred foals are intended to be sold at public auction. The impact of disease conditions necessitating hospital treatment as a foal on future sales performance is unknown. To determine whether Thoroughbred horses that were treated in a hospital before age 125 days and presented to public auction sell for a different mean price than controls. Foals aged < 125 days, treated at a hospital in Ireland in 2007 or 2008 and presented for sale to a public auction recorded on a publicly accessible database were selected for inclusion in the study. The sales outcome of these subjects was compared to that of 6 controls for each subject, consisting of the 3 horses that were presented to the same sale immediately before and immediately after the subject. Results were controlled for the sale at which the animal presented and the sex of the subject and controls. Sixty-three subjects were presented to public auction: 19 at the foal sales, 39 at the yearling sales and 5 at the 2-year-old sales. Forty-five subjects were sold. There was no difference in the mean sales price (subjects Euros 38,207; controls Euros 35,026) or percentage of animals sold (subjects 71.4%; controls 66.4%) between subjects and controls. If Thoroughbred horses are presented for public auction following hospital treatment as a foal, there is no impact on sales outcome. This information may help commercial breeders of Thoroughbred foals make informed decisions about treatment of their foals.

Survey of quality defects in market beef and dairy cows and bulls sold through livestock auction markets in the Western United States: I. Incidence rates.

PubMed

Ahola, J K; Foster, H A; Vanoverbeke, D L; Jensen, K S; Wilson, R L; Glaze, J B; Fife, T E; Gray, C W; Nash, S A; Panting, R R; Rimbey, N R

2011-05-01

A survey was conducted to quantify incidence of Beef Quality Assurance (BQA)-related defects in market beef and dairy cows and bulls selling at auction during 2 seasons in 2008. Twenty-three BQA-related traits were evaluated by 9 trained personnel during sales at 10 livestock auction markets in Idaho (n = 5; beef and dairy), California, (n = 4; dairy only), and Utah (n = 1; beef and dairy). Overall, 18,949 unique lots (8,213 beef cows, 1,036 beef bulls, 9,177 dairy cows, and 523 dairy bulls,) consisting of 23,479 animals (9,299 beef cows, 1,091 beef bulls, 12,429 dairy cows, and 660 dairy bulls) were evaluated during 125 sales (64 spring, 61 fall) for dairy and 79 sales (40 spring, 39 fall) for beef. The majority of market beef cows and bulls (60.9 and 71.3%, respectively) were predominantly black-hided, and the Holstein hide pattern was observed in 95.4 and 93.6% of market dairy cows and bulls, respectively. Market cattle weighed 548 ± 103.6 kg (beef cows), 751 ± 176.1 kg (beef bulls), 658 ± 129.7 kg (dairy cows), and 731 ± 150.8 kg (dairy bulls). Most beef cows (79.6%) weighed 455 to 726 kg, and most beef bulls (73.8%) weighed 545 to 954 kg, respectively. Among market beef cattle, 16.0% of cows and 14.5% of bulls weighed less than 455 and 545 kg, respectively, and 63.7% of dairy cows and 81.5% of dairy bulls weighed 545 to 817 kg or 545 to 954 kg, respectively. However, 19.5% of dairy cows and 13.1% of dairy bulls weighed less than 545 kg. Mean BCS for beef cattle (9-point scale) was 4.7 ± 1.2 (cows) and 5.3 ± 0.9 (bulls), and for dairy cattle (5-point scale) was 2.6 ± 0.8 (cows) and 2.9 ± 0.6 (bulls). Some 16.5% of beef cows and 4.1% of beef bulls had a BCS of 1 to 3, whereas 34.8% of dairy cows and 10.4% of dairy bulls had a BCS of 2 or less. Emaciation (beef BCS = 1, dairy BCS = 1.0) or near-emaciation (beef BCS = 2, dairy BCS = 1.5) was observed in 13.3% of dairy cows and 3.9% of beef cows. Among beef cattle, 15.1% of cows and 15.4% of bulls were considered lame. In contrast, 44.7% of dairy cows and 26.1% of dairy bulls were lame. Ocular neoplasia (cancer eye) was observed in only 0.6% of beef cows, 0.3% of beef bulls, 0.3% of dairy cows, and 0.0% of dairy bulls. However, among animals with ocular neoplasia, it was cancerous in 34.4% of beef bulls, 48.0% of dairy cows, and 73.3% of beef cows. In conclusion, numerous quality defects are present in market beef and dairy cattle selling at auction in the Western United States, which could influence their value at auction.

42 CFR 423.286 - Rules regarding premiums.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-10-01

... section for the difference between the bid and the national average monthly bid amount, any supplemental... percentage as specified in paragraph (b) of this section; and (2) National average monthly bid amount... reflect difference between bid and national average bid. If the amount of the standardized bid amount...

48 CFR 14.202-8 - Electronic bids.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-10-01

... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2013-10-01 2013-10-01 false Electronic bids. 14.202-8... AND CONTRACT TYPES SEALED BIDDING Solicitation of Bids 14.202-8 Electronic bids. In accordance with subpart 4.5, contracting officers may authorize use of electronic commerce for submission of bids. If...

48 CFR 14.202-8 - Electronic bids.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-10-01

... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2014-10-01 2014-10-01 false Electronic bids. 14.202-8... AND CONTRACT TYPES SEALED BIDDING Solicitation of Bids 14.202-8 Electronic bids. In accordance with subpart 4.5, contracting officers may authorize use of electronic commerce for submission of bids. If...

48 CFR 14.202-8 - Electronic bids.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-10-01

... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Electronic bids. 14.202-8... AND CONTRACT TYPES SEALED BIDDING Solicitation of Bids 14.202-8 Electronic bids. In accordance with subpart 4.5, contracting officers may authorize use of electronic commerce for submission of bids. If...

48 CFR 14.202-8 - Electronic bids.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-10-01

... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2012-10-01 2012-10-01 false Electronic bids. 14.202-8... AND CONTRACT TYPES SEALED BIDDING Solicitation of Bids 14.202-8 Electronic bids. In accordance with subpart 4.5, contracting officers may authorize use of electronic commerce for submission of bids. If...

48 CFR 14.202-8 - Electronic bids.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Electronic bids. 14.202-8... AND CONTRACT TYPES SEALED BIDDING Solicitation of Bids 14.202-8 Electronic bids. In accordance with subpart 4.5, contracting officers may authorize use of electronic commerce for submission of bids. If...

48 CFR 14.202-1 - Bidding time.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Bidding time. 14.202-1... AND CONTRACT TYPES SEALED BIDDING Solicitation of Bids 14.202-1 Bidding time. (a) Policy. A reasonable time for prospective bidders to prepare and submit bids shall be allowed in all invitations, consistent...

48 CFR 14.202-1 - Bidding time.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-10-01

... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2012-10-01 2012-10-01 false Bidding time. 14.202-1... AND CONTRACT TYPES SEALED BIDDING Solicitation of Bids 14.202-1 Bidding time. (a) Policy. A reasonable time for prospective bidders to prepare and submit bids shall be allowed in all invitations, consistent...

48 CFR 14.202-1 - Bidding time.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-10-01

... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Bidding time. 14.202-1... AND CONTRACT TYPES SEALED BIDDING Solicitation of Bids 14.202-1 Bidding time. (a) Policy. A reasonable time for prospective bidders to prepare and submit bids shall be allowed in all invitations, consistent...

48 CFR 14.202-1 - Bidding time.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-10-01

... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2014-10-01 2014-10-01 false Bidding time. 14.202-1... AND CONTRACT TYPES SEALED BIDDING Solicitation of Bids 14.202-1 Bidding time. (a) Policy. A reasonable time for prospective bidders to prepare and submit bids shall be allowed in all invitations, consistent...

48 CFR 14.202-1 - Bidding time.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-10-01

... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2013-10-01 2013-10-01 false Bidding time. 14.202-1... AND CONTRACT TYPES SEALED BIDDING Solicitation of Bids 14.202-1 Bidding time. (a) Policy. A reasonable time for prospective bidders to prepare and submit bids shall be allowed in all invitations, consistent...

Health information sources accessed by college females: differences between body-image distorted and non-body-image distorted.

PubMed

Nustad, Jill; Adams, Troy; Moore, Monique

2008-01-01

This study examined and compared sources of health-related information accessed by female college students with and without body image distortions, and the believability of those sources. Survey data from the American College Health Association, National College Health Assessment were studied retrospectively (N = 27,648). Body image distorted (BID) and non-BID students' most frequent health information sources were parents (76.1% BID; 77.1% non-BID) and internet (70.3% BID; 69.5% non-BID). Believability was greatest for health educators (90.6% BID; 91.1% non-BID) and lowest for television (14.4% BID; 14.5% non-BID). Health intervention strategies for college women should market to parents and teach recognition of credible internet sources of health information.

Dynamic imaging of interaction between protein 14-3-3 and Bid in living cells

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Chen, Tongsheng; Xing, Da; Wang, Jinjun

2006-02-01

The 14-3-3 proteins are known to sequester certain pro-apoptotic members of this family. BH3- interacting domain death agonist (Bid) may contribute to tumor necrosis factor α(TNF-α)-induced neuronal death, although regulation by 14-3-3 has not been reported. In this study we examined whether 14-3-3 proteins interact with Bid/tBid during TNF-α-induced cell death. The TNF-αtriggered Bid cleavage and tBid translocated to mitochondria. Human lung adenocarcinoma cells were co-transfected with both CFP-Bid and 14-3-3-YFP plasmids, and the dynamical interaction between the Bid/tBid and 14-3-3 were performed on laser confocal fluorescence microscope in single living cell during TNF-α-induced cell apoptosis. The Bid distribute equally only in the cytoplasm of healthy cells, and the 14-3-3 protein distribute not only in the cytoplasm but also in the nucleus of healthy cells. Our data showed that the tBid aggregate, but the 14-3-3 protein does not aggregate as the tBid, and the 14-3-3 protein separate from the aggregated tBid, implying that the 14-3-3 proteins do not interact with the aggregated tBid after TNF-αtreatment.

Targeting the BH3-interacting domain death agonist to develop mechanistically unique antidepressants

PubMed Central

Malkesman, O; Austin, DR; Tragon, T; Henter, ID; Reed, JC; Pellecchia, M; Chen, G; Manji, HK

2011-01-01

The BH3-interacting domain death agonist (Bid) is a pro-apoptotic member of the B-cell lymphoma-2 (Bcl-2) protein family. Previous studies have shown that stress reduces levels of Bcl-2 in brain regions implicated in the pathophysiology of mood disorders, whereas antidepressants and mood stabilizers increase Bcl-2 levels. The Bcl-2 protein family has an essential role in cellular resilience as well as synaptic and neuronal plasticity and may influence mood and affective behaviors. This study inhibited Bid in mice using two pharmacological antagonists (BI-11A7 and BI-2A7); the selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor citalopram was used as a positive control. These agents were studied in several well-known rodent models of depression—the forced swim test (FST), the tail suspension test (TST), and the learned helplessness (LH) paradigm—as well as in the female urine sniffing test (FUST), a measure of sex-related reward-seeking behavior. Citalopram and BI-11A7 both significantly reduced immobility time in the FST and TST and attenuated escape latencies in mice that underwent the LH paradigm. In the FUST, both agents significantly improved duration of female urine sniffing in mice that had developed helplessness. LH induction increased the activation of apoptosis-inducing factor (AIF), a caspase-independent cell death constituent activated by Bid, and mitochondrial AIF expression was attenuated by chronic BI-11A7 infusion. Taken together, the results suggest that functional perturbation of apoptotic proteins such as Bid and, alternatively, enhancement of Bcl-2 function, is a putative strategy for developing novel therapeutics for mood disorders. PMID:21727899

77 FR 60163 - Self-Regulatory Organizations; C2 Options Exchange, Incorporated; Notice of Filing and Immediate...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2012-10-02

... Change Related to AIM and SAM September 26, 2012. Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange.... Under Rule 6.52, Solicitation Auction Mechanism (``SAM''), a Trading Permit Holder that represents... Agency Order for electronic execution into the SAM auction process, under which both the Agency Order and...

Integrating Monetary and Non-monetary Reenlistment Incentives Utilizing the Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM)

DTIC Science & Technology

2008-12-01

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS INTEGRATING MONETARY AND NON-MONETARY REENLISTMENT INCENTIVES UTILIZING THE...Monetary and Non- monetary Reenlistment Incentives Utilizing the Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM) 6. AUTHOR(S) Brooke Zimmerman 5...iii Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited INTEGRATING MONETARY AND NON-MONETARY REENLISTMENT INCENTIVES UTILIZING THE

34 CFR 682.302 - Payment of special allowance on FFEL loans.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-07-01

... disbursement is made on or after January 1, 2000; or (B) The 91-day Treasury bills auctioned during the 3-month... the bond equivalent rate of the 91-day Treasury bills auctioned during that quarter, plus 3.1 percent... associated committees of such, the for-profit entity is authorized by law, agreement, or otherwise to approve...

See Art History in a New Light: Have an Art Auction

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Benter, Doris J.

2008-01-01

At Portledge School in Locust Valley, New York, ninth graders in their upper school study art history for one semester. The visual arts department has created a vigorous new syllabus culminating in an hour-long mock art auction. The department selects several art movements (e.g., Post-Impressionism, Cubism, Abstract Expressionism, Social Realism,…

77 FR 75459 - Self-Regulatory Organizations; BATS Exchange, Inc.; Notice of Filing of a Proposed Rule Change To...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2012-12-20

... both sides would participate in an Exchange Auction, this proposed change would aid in price discovery... auction price. This proposed change would aid in price discovery and help to reduce the likelihood of... Sell Shares and, therefore, a User would never have complete knowledge of liquidity available on both...

77 FR 25522 - Self-Regulatory Organizations; Fixed Income Clearing Corporation; Order Approving Proposed Rule...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2012-04-30

... trades with final money calculations on the night of Auction Date, after the Treasury auction results... end of day netting process. However, when Interactive Messaging was implemented in 2000, this... efficiency, competition, and capital formation. See 15 U.S.C. 78c(f). \\9\\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12). For the...

76 FR 25711 - Proposed Exemptions from Certain Prohibited Transaction Restrictions

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-05-05

...)) of an Auction Rate Security (ARS, as defined in Section III(c)) to Northern Trust Corporation or an... of section 4975 of the Code. Section II. Conditions (a) The Plan acquired the ARS in connection with brokerage or advisory services provided by Northern to the Plan; (b) The last auction for the ARS was...

78 FR 43930 - Proposed Exemptions From Certain Prohibited Transaction Restrictions

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-07-22

...), of certain rights issued to owners of Auction Rate Securities by UBS AG (ARS Rights) in connection with a Settlement Agreement, (b) the sale of an Auction Rate Security to UBS pursuant to such ARS... in Section III (a) The terms and delivery of the offer of ARS Rights (the ARS Rights Offer) are...

Understanding Persuasive Online Sales Messages from eBay Auctions

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

White, Barbara Jo; Clapper, Danial; Noel, Rita; Fortier, Jenny; Grabolosa, Pierre

2007-01-01

Online auctions are dominated by eBay, which started bringing together buyers and sellers in 1995. eBay product listings can easily be used in business communication courses to better understand online sales messages. One great advantage is that the vast majority of nearly 15 million listings a day are written and assembled by everyday consumers…

75 FR 57947 - Auction of VHF Commercial Television Station Construction Permits Scheduled for February 15, 2011...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-09-23

... technical and marketplace factors that may have a bearing on the value of the construction permits for... auction pace that reasonably balances speed with the bidders' need to study round results and adjust their... and other factors. The Bureaus seek comment on this proposal. Commenters may wish to address the role...

78 FR 46425 - Sale and Issue of Marketable Book-Entry Treasury Bills, Notes, and Bonds

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-07-31

... a simple-interest money market yield computed on an actual/360 basis, subject to an appropriate... 13-week Treasury bill auction High Rate (stop out rate) converted into a simple actual/360 interest...-week Treasury bill auction High Rate that has been translated into a simple-interest money market yield...

31 CFR 356.4 - What are the book-entry systems in which auctioned Treasury securities may be issued?

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... in which auctioned Treasury securities may be issued? There are three book-entry securities systems... marketable Treasury securities. We maintain and transfer securities in these three book-entry systems at... inflation. Securities may be transferred from one system to the other, unless the securities are not...

49 CFR 599.402 - Requirements and limitations for salvage auctions that are consigned trade-in vehicles under the...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-10-01

... 49 Transportation 7 2014-10-01 2014-10-01 false Requirements and limitations for salvage auctions that are consigned trade-in vehicles under the CARS program. 599.402 Section 599.402 Transportation Other Regulations Relating to Transportation (Continued) NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION (CONTINUED)...

49 CFR 599.402 - Requirements and limitations for salvage auctions that are consigned trade-in vehicles under the...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-10-01

... 49 Transportation 7 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Requirements and limitations for salvage auctions that are consigned trade-in vehicles under the CARS program. 599.402 Section 599.402 Transportation Other Regulations Relating to Transportation (Continued) NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION (CONTINUED)...

49 CFR 599.402 - Requirements and limitations for salvage auctions that are consigned trade-in vehicles under the...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-10-01

... 49 Transportation 7 2012-10-01 2012-10-01 false Requirements and limitations for salvage auctions that are consigned trade-in vehicles under the CARS program. 599.402 Section 599.402 Transportation Other Regulations Relating to Transportation (Continued) NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION (CONTINUED)...

49 CFR 599.402 - Requirements and limitations for salvage auctions that are consigned trade-in vehicles under the...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-10-01

... 49 Transportation 7 2013-10-01 2013-10-01 false Requirements and limitations for salvage auctions that are consigned trade-in vehicles under the CARS program. 599.402 Section 599.402 Transportation Other Regulations Relating to Transportation (Continued) NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION (CONTINUED)...

Teaching Auction Strategy Using Experiments Administered Via the Internet

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Asker, John; Grosskopf, Brit; McKinney, C. Nicholas; Niederle, Muriel; Roth, Alvin E.; Weizsacker, Georg

2004-01-01

The authors present an experimental design used to teach concepts in the economics of auctions and implications for e-Business procurement. The experiment is easily administered and can be adapted to many different treatments. The chief innovation is that it does not require the use of a lab or class time. Instead, the design can be implemented on…

77 FR 57173 - Self-Regulatory Organizations; C2 Options Exchange, Incorporated; Notice of Filing of a Proposed...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2012-09-17

... Organizations; C2 Options Exchange, Incorporated; Notice of Filing of a Proposed Rule Change Relating to Complex... its Rules regarding complex order auctions. The text of the proposed rule change is available on the... basis, the Exchange may activate the electronic complex order request for responses (``RFR'') auction...

77 FR 65754 - Self-Regulatory Organizations; C2 Options Exchange, Incorporated; Order Approving Proposed Rule...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2012-10-30

... Organizations; C2 Options Exchange, Incorporated; Order Approving Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Complex...,\\2\\ a proposed rule change to modify C2 Rule 6.13(c), ``Process for Complex Order RFR Auction,'' to... at the start of a Complex Order Auction (``COA''); and (ii) require responses to an RFR message...

77 FR 9279 - Self-Regulatory Organizations; BATS Exchange, Inc.; Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2012-02-16

...-032). Specifically, the Exchange proposes to amend several portions of Rule 11.23 to allow MOO, LOO, and LLOO orders to participate in IPO Auctions. Under the proposal, MOO orders would behave like... modifications to the definitions of MOO, LOO, and LLOO orders and to make clear that these Opening Auction...

78 FR 55254 - Information Collection Being Reviewed by the Federal Communications Commission Under Delegated...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-09-10

... of their bids or bidding strategies from the short-form application filing deadline to the post... communication of bids or bidding strategies is limited to one applicant's bids or bidding strategies, it may unfairly disadvantage the other bidders in the market by creating an asymmetry of information. Section 1...

Study on Comparison of Bidding and Pricing Behavior Distinction between Estimate Methods

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Morimoto, Emi; Namerikawa, Susumu

The most characteristic trend on bidding and pricing behavior distinction in recent years is the increasing number of bidders just above the criteria for low-price bidding investigations. The contractor's markup is the difference between the bidding price and the execution price. Therefore, the contractor's markup is the difference between criteria for low-price bidding investigations price and the execution price in the public works bid in Japan. Virtually, bidder's strategies and behavior have been controlled by public engineer's budgets. Estimation and bid are inseparably linked in the Japanese public works procurement system. The trial of the unit price-type estimation method begins in 2004. On another front, accumulated estimation method is one of the general methods in public works. So, there are two types of standard estimation methods in Japan. In this study, we did a statistical analysis on the bid information of civil engineering works for the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transportation in 2008. It presents several issues that bidding and pricing behavior is related to an estimation method (several estimation methods) for public works bid in Japan. The two types of standard estimation methods produce different results that number of bidders (decide on bid-no bid strategy) and distribution of bid price (decide on mark-up strategy).The comparison on the distribution of bid prices showed that the percentage of the bid concentrated on the criteria for low-price bidding investigations have had a tendency to get higher in the large-sized public works by the unit price-type estimation method, comparing with the accumulated estimation method. On one hand, the number of bidders who bids for public works estimated unit-price tends to increase significantly Public works estimated unit-price is likely to have been one of the factors for the construction companies to decide if they participate in the biddings.

Terror in the Board Room: The Bid-Opening Process

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Shoop, James

2009-01-01

Competitive bids and the bid-opening process are the cornerstones of public school purchasing. The bid-opening process does not begin on the day of the bid opening. It begins with good planning by the purchasing agent to ensure that the advertised bid complies with the public school contracts law. In New Jersey, that raises the following…

48 CFR 14.408-6 - Equal low bids.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Equal low bids. 14.408-6... AND CONTRACT TYPES SEALED BIDDING Opening of Bids and Award of Contract 14.408-6 Equal low bids. (a) Contracts shall be awarded in the following order of priority when two or more low bids are equal in all...

Procurement of construction services: a case study on bidding competition in Singapore public sector contracts

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Oo, B. L.; Yan, Y.

2018-04-01

There are many variables that public clients need to consider in their bidding procedure to enhance efficiency in their procurement for construction services. This paper focusses on the competitive bidding process for public sector procurement of construction services in Singapore. A distinctive feature of the Singapore government competitive bidding process is that full bidding feedback information is released to all competing bidders (and public). The specific objectives are: (i) to examine the degree of competition in the construction markets; and (ii) to examine the bidding performance of competing bidders. Based on a collection of bidding data for a 15-month period, the results show the market environment of the Singapore public sector construction contracting is highly competitive with long bidder lists. In selection of contractors, only 50% of the contracts were awarded to lowest bidders. The results also show that the competing contractors can be broadly classified into three groups based on their bidding performance in terms of number of bidding attempts, bidding success rate and bidding competitiveness. These results provide a useful insight into the bidding competition in the Singapore public sector construction contracting, especially to new market entrants and foreign contractors who want to bid for jobs in Singapore.

COMPETITIVE BIDDING IN MEDICARE ADVANTAGE: EFFECT OF BENCHMARK CHANGES ON PLAN BIDS

PubMed Central

Song, Zirui; Landrum, Mary Beth; Chernew, Michael E.

2013-01-01

Bidding has been proposed to replace or complement the administered prices in Medicare pays to hospitals and health plans. In 2006, the Medicare Advantage program implemented a competitive bidding system to determine plan payments. In perfectly competitive models, plans bid their costs and thus bids are insensitive to the benchmark. Under many other models of competition, bids respond to changes in the benchmark. We conceptualize the bidding system and use an instrumental variable approach to study the effect of benchmark changes on bids. We use 2006–2010 plan payment data from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, published county benchmarks, actual realized fee-for-service costs, and Medicare Advantage enrollment. We find that a $1 increase in the benchmark leads to about a $0.53 increase in bids, suggesting that plans in the Medicare Advantage market have meaningful market power. PMID:24308881

Competitive bidding in Medicare Advantage: effect of benchmark changes on plan bids.

PubMed

Song, Zirui; Landrum, Mary Beth; Chernew, Michael E

2013-12-01

Bidding has been proposed to replace or complement the administered prices that Medicare pays to hospitals and health plans. In 2006, the Medicare Advantage program implemented a competitive bidding system to determine plan payments. In perfectly competitive models, plans bid their costs and thus bids are insensitive to the benchmark. Under many other models of competition, bids respond to changes in the benchmark. We conceptualize the bidding system and use an instrumental variable approach to study the effect of benchmark changes on bids. We use 2006-2010 plan payment data from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, published county benchmarks, actual realized fee-for-service costs, and Medicare Advantage enrollment. We find that a $1 increase in the benchmark leads to about a $0.53 increase in bids, suggesting that plans in the Medicare Advantage market have meaningful market power. Copyright © 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Generating spatially optimized habitat in a trade-off between social optimality and budget efficiency.

PubMed

Drechsler, Martin

2017-02-01

Auctions have been proposed as alternatives to payments for environmental services when spatial interactions and costs are better known to landowners than to the conservation agency (asymmetric information). Recently, an auction scheme was proposed that delivers optimal conservation in the sense that social welfare is maximized. I examined the social welfare and the budget efficiency delivered by this scheme, where social welfare represents the difference between the monetized ecological benefit and the conservation cost incurred to the landowners and budget efficiency is defined as maximizing the ecological benefit for a given conservation budget. For the analysis, I considered a stylized landscape with land patches that can be used for agriculture or conservation. The ecological benefit was measured by an objective function that increases with increasing number and spatial aggregation of conserved land patches. I compared the social welfare and the budget efficiency of the auction scheme with an agglomeration payment, a policy scheme that considers spatial interactions and that was proposed recently. The auction delivered a higher level of social welfare than the agglomeration payment. However, the agglomeration payment was more efficient budgetarily than the auction, so the comparative performances of the 2 schemes depended on the chosen policy criterion-social welfare or budget efficiency. Both policy criteria are relevant for conservation. Which one should be chosen depends on the problem at hand, for example, whether social preferences should be taken into account in the decision of how much money to invest in conservation or whether the available conservation budget is strictly limited. © 2016 Society for Conservation Biology.

[Current status of illegal trade in pharmaceutical products on Internet auction sites in Japan and responses of site administrators to such transactions].

PubMed

Ohtani, Hisakazu; Imaoka, Ayuko; Akiyoshi, Takeshi

2015-01-01

In Japan, it is illegal to sell pharmaceuticals on Internet auction sites, although a considerable number of pharmaceuticals are listed on such sites. We investigated the current situation regarding the illegal trade in pharmaceuticals on Japanese Internet auction sites and the responses of site administrators to such transactions. We searched for pharmaceuticals and "gray" items that were suspected of being pharmaceuticals on Yahoo-oku! (Yahoo! Auctions, Japan) over a 37-day period and then submitted violation reports indicating that selling pharmaceuticals is illegal or that the description of an item was insufficient. The reports were directed to the site administrators and forwarded to the sellers. One hundred and six pharmaceutical products and 34 gray items were identified during the study period. After the submission of the violation reports, only 28 of the pharmaceutical products and one of the gray items were deleted by the administrator, while 18 of the pharmaceutical products and 7 of the gray items were withdrawn by their sellers. However, 41 pharmaceuticals and 20 gray items were sold. Most of the gray items were listed using characteristic terms or abbreviations without photographic images. More than 70% of the identified pharmaceuticals had a contraindication(s) other than hypersensitivity. In conclusion, the illegal trade in pharmaceuticals on Internet auction sites remains a serious problem in Japan, and the responses of site administrators to such transactions are inadequate. The government and pharmaceutical industry may have to take measures such as providing public and administrative guidance to stop the illegal trade in pharmaceuticals on the Internet.

30 CFR 260.130 - What criteria does MMS use for selecting bidding systems and bidding system components?

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... 30 Mineral Resources 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false What criteria does MMS use for selecting bidding systems and bidding system components? 260.130 Section 260.130 Mineral Resources MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR OFFSHORE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL AND GAS LEASING Bidding Systems Bidding System Selection Criteria §...

31 CFR 356.5 - What types of securities does the Treasury auction?

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-07-01

... securities. (a) Treasury bills. (1) Are issued at a discount or at par, depending upon the auction results; (2) Are redeemed at their par amount at maturity; and (3) Have maturities of not more than one year... 31 Money and Finance:Treasury 2 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false What types of securities does the...

31 CFR 356.5 - What types of securities does the Treasury auction?

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-07-01

... securities. (a) Treasury bills. (1) Are issued at a discount or at par, depending upon the auction results; (2) Are redeemed at their par amount at maturity; and (3) Have maturities of not more than one year... 31 Money and Finance: Treasury 2 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false What types of securities does the...

31 CFR 356.5 - What types of securities does the Treasury auction?

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-07-01

... securities. (a) Treasury bills. (1) Are issued at a discount or at par, depending upon the auction results; (2) Are redeemed at their par amount at maturity; and (3) Have maturities of not more than one year... 31 Money and Finance:Treasury 2 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false What types of securities does the...

31 CFR 356.5 - What types of securities does the Treasury auction?

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-07-01

... securities. (a) Treasury bills. (1) Are issued at a discount or at par, depending upon the auction results; (2) Are redeemed at their par amount at maturity; and (3) Have maturities of not more than one year... 31 Money and Finance:Treasury 2 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false What types of securities does the...

34 CFR 685.202 - Charges for which Direct Loan Program borrowers are responsible.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... held prior to that June 1 plus 3.1 percentage points, but does not exceed 8.25 percent. (ii) Loans... plus 2.5 percentage points, but does not exceed 8.25 percent. (B) During all other periods. The...-day Treasury bills auctioned at the final auction held prior to that June 1 plus 3.1 percentage points...

Teaching Undergraduate Money and Banking: T-Bill Auctions and Stock Market Models

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Saros, Daniel E.

2009-01-01

The author offers innovative approaches to 3 topics that are typically only briefly mentioned (if at all) in money and banking courses. The first topic is a Treasury bill auction experiment in which students have an opportunity to participate directly. The results from a class of 14 money and banking students are used to explain how an instructor…

77 FR 32092 - Mobility Fund Phase I Auction Scheduled for September 27, 2012; Notice and Filing Requirements...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2012-05-31

... Mobility Fund Phase I support they seek, including any agreements relating to post-auction market structure... FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION [AU Docket No. 12-25; DA 12-641 and DA 12-721] Mobility Fund... million in one-time Mobility Fund Phase I support scheduled to commence on September 27, 2012. The Bureaus...

76 FR 2920 - Notice of Correction to Notice of Realty Action: Competitive Online Auction of Public Lands in...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-01-18

... DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR Bureau of Land Management [LLNVS00560 L58530000.EU0000 241A; N-81926 et al.; 11-08807; TAS: 14X5232] Notice of Correction to Notice of Realty Action: Competitive Online Auction of Public Lands in Clark County, NV AGENCY: Bureau of Land Management, Interior. ACTION: Notice of...

12 CFR 617.7620 - What should the System institution do when it decides to sell acquired agricultural real estate...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... decides to sell acquired agricultural real estate at a public auction? 617.7620 Section 617.7620 Banks and... What should the System institution do when it decides to sell acquired agricultural real estate at a public auction? System institutions electing to sell or lease acquired agricultural real estate or a...

12 CFR 617.7620 - What should the System institution do when it decides to sell acquired agricultural real estate...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... decides to sell acquired agricultural real estate at a public auction? 617.7620 Section 617.7620 Banks and... What should the System institution do when it decides to sell acquired agricultural real estate at a public auction? System institutions electing to sell or lease acquired agricultural real estate or a...

25 CFR 215.4 - Leases to be sold at public auction.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-04-01

... 25 Indians 1 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false Leases to be sold at public auction. 215.4 Section 215.4 Indians BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR ENERGY AND MINERALS LEAD AND ZINC MINING... provided in the regulations in this part, no lead and zinc mining lease under this part of restricted or...

25 CFR 215.4 - Leases to be sold at public auction.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-04-01

... 25 Indians 1 2011-04-01 2011-04-01 false Leases to be sold at public auction. 215.4 Section 215.4 Indians BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR ENERGY AND MINERALS LEAD AND ZINC MINING... provided in the regulations in this part, no lead and zinc mining lease under this part of restricted or...

75 FR 38545 - Notice of Realty Action: Competitive Auction of Public Lands in White Pine County, NV

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-07-02

... DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR Bureau of Land Management [LLNVL01000 L14300000.EU0000 241A; N-86667; 10-08807; MO 4500012445; TAS: 14X5232] Notice of Realty Action: Competitive Auction of Public Lands..., cashier's check, certified check or U.S. postal money order, or any combination thereof, and made payable...

7 CFR 29.75a - Display of burley tobacco on auction warehouse floors in designated markets.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... in designated markets. 29.75a Section 29.75a Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture... § 29.75a Display of burley tobacco on auction warehouse floors in designated markets. (a)(1) Each lot... arrayed sequence of lots and rows of tobacco, shall have prior approval of the Set Work Leader or Circuit...

77 FR 15369 - Mobility Fund Phase I Auction GIS Data of Potentially Eligible Census Blocks

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2012-03-15

....fcc.gov/auctions/901/ , are the following: Downloadable shapefile Web mapping service MapBox map tiles... GIS software allows you to add this service as a layer to your session or project. 6. MapBox map tiles are cached map tiles of the data. With this open source software approach, these image tiles can be...

A Hierarchical Auction-Based Mechanism for Real-Time Resource Allocation in Cloud Robotic Systems.

PubMed

Wang, Lujia; Liu, Ming; Meng, Max Q-H

2017-02-01

Cloud computing enables users to share computing resources on-demand. The cloud computing framework cannot be directly mapped to cloud robotic systems with ad hoc networks since cloud robotic systems have additional constraints such as limited bandwidth and dynamic structure. However, most multirobotic applications with cooperative control adopt this decentralized approach to avoid a single point of failure. Robots need to continuously update intensive data to execute tasks in a coordinated manner, which implies real-time requirements. Thus, a resource allocation strategy is required, especially in such resource-constrained environments. This paper proposes a hierarchical auction-based mechanism, namely link quality matrix (LQM) auction, which is suitable for ad hoc networks by introducing a link quality indicator. The proposed algorithm produces a fast and robust method that is accurate and scalable. It reduces both global communication and unnecessary repeated computation. The proposed method is designed for firm real-time resource retrieval for physical multirobot systems. A joint surveillance scenario empirically validates the proposed mechanism by assessing several practical metrics. The results show that the proposed LQM auction outperforms state-of-the-art algorithms for resource allocation.

Real-time single cell analysis of Bid cleavage and translocation in cisplatin-induced apoptosis

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Liu, Lei; Xing, Da; Pei, Yihui; Chen, Wei R.

2007-02-01

Cancer cell apoptosis can be induced by cisplatin, an efficient anticancer agent. However, its mechanism is not fully understood. Bcl-2 homology domain (BH) 3-only proteins couple stress signals to mitochondrial apoptotic pathways. Calpain-mediated cleavage of the BH3-only protein Bid into a 14 kD truncated protein (tBid) has been implicated in cisplatin-induced apoptotic pathway. We utilized a recombinant fluorescence resonance energy transfer (FRET) Bid probe to determine the kinetics of Bid cleavage during cisplatin-induced apoptosis in ASTC-a-1 cells. The cells were also co-transfected with Bid-CFP and DsRed-Mit to dynamically detect tBid translocation. Cells showed a cleavage of the Bid-FRET probe occurring at about 4-5 h after treated with 20 µM cisplatin. Cleavage of the Bid-FRET probe coincided with a translocation of tBid from the cytosolic to the mitochondria, and the translocation lasted about 1.5 h. Using real-time single-cell analysis, we first observed the kinetics of Bid cleavage and translocation to mitochondria in living cells during cisplatin-induced apoptosis.

Effect of herd cues and product involvement on bidder online choices.

PubMed

Chen, Yi-Fen; Wang, Ya-Ju

2010-08-01

Previous works have shown that consumers are influenced by others in decision making. Herd behavior is common in situations in which consumers infer product quality from other consumer choices and incorporate that information into their own decision making. This research presents two studies examining herd effect and the moderating role of product involvement on bidder choices in online auctions. The two studies addressed the influence on bidder online choices of herd cues frequently found in online auctions, including feedback ratings and number of questions and answers. The experimental results demonstrated that bidders use online herd cues when making decisions in online auctions. Additionally, the effects of herd cues on bidder online choices were stronger in high-involvement than low-involvement participants. Results and implications are discussed.

Low-traffic limit and first-passage times for a simple model of the continuous double auction

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Scalas, Enrico; Rapallo, Fabio; Radivojević, Tijana

2017-11-01

We consider a simplified model of the continuous double auction where prices are integers varying from 1 to N with limit orders and market orders, but quantity per order limited to a single share. For this model, the order process is equivalent to two M / M / 1 queues. We study the behavior of the auction in the low-traffic limit where limit orders are immediately matched by market orders. In this limit, the distribution of prices can be computed exactly and gives a reasonable approximation of the price distribution when the ratio between the rate of order arrivals and the rate of order executions is below 1 / 2. This is further confirmed by the analysis of the first-passage time in 1 or N.

Collective induction without cooperation? Learning and knowledge transfer in cooperative groups and competitive auctions.

PubMed

Maciejovsky, Boris; Budescu, David V

2007-05-01

There is strong evidence that groups perform better than individuals do on intellective tasks with demonstrably correct solutions. Typically, these studies assume that group members share common goals. The authors extend this line of research by replacing standard face-to-face group interactions with competitive auctions, allowing for conflicting individual incentives. In a series of studies involving the well-known Wason selection task, they demonstrate that competitive auctions induce learning effects equally impressive as those of standard group interactions, and they uncover specific and general knowledge transfers from these institutions to new reasoning problems. The authors identify payoff feedback and information pooling as the driving factors underlying these findings, and they explain these factors within the theoretical framework of collective induction. ((c) 2007 APA, all rights reserved).

Bid purchasing of pharmaceuticals.

PubMed

Swift, R G; Ryan, M R

1978-11-01

The effects of bid purchasing of drug products by hospitals and the factors to consider in bid purchasing of pharmaceuticals are reviewed; further, the prices available with bid purchasing to a specific hospital in 1974 and 1977 are presented. Factors important for a successful bid purchasing system of pharmaceuticals are: (1) use of a formulary policy, (2) an effective procedure for handling bid purchasing and (3) criteria for evaluation of drug products. Significant differences were found between prices available with and without bid purchasing for 50 nonproprietary drug products in 1974 and for 19 products in 1977. Although monetary savings to hospitals do exist with bid purchasing of pharmaceuticals, the degree of savings is dependent upon the drug usage for that hospital.

48 CFR 14.203 - Methods of soliciting bids.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-10-01

... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2014-10-01 2014-10-01 false Methods of soliciting bids. 14.203 Section 14.203 Federal Acquisition Regulations System FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES SEALED BIDDING Solicitation of Bids 14.203 Methods of soliciting bids. ...

48 CFR 14.203 - Methods of soliciting bids.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Methods of soliciting bids. 14.203 Section 14.203 Federal Acquisition Regulations System FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES SEALED BIDDING Solicitation of Bids 14.203 Methods of soliciting bids. ...

Bid Participates in Genotoxic Drug-Induced Apoptosis of HeLa Cells and Is Essential for Death Receptor Ligands' Apoptotic and Synergistic Effects

PubMed Central

Concannon, Caoimhin G.; Rehm, Markus; Kögel, Donat; Prehn, Jochen H. M.

2008-01-01

Background The BH3-only protein Bid is an important component of death receptor-mediated caspase activation. Bid is cleaved by caspase-8 or -10 into t-Bid, which translocates to mitochondria and triggers the release of caspase-activating factors. Bid has also been reported to be cleaved by other proteases. Methodology/Principal Findings To test the hypothesis that Bid is a central mediator of stress-induced apoptosis, we investigated the effects of a small molecule Bid inhibitor on stress-induced apoptosis, and generated HeLa cells deficient for Bid. Stable knockdown of bid lead to a pronounced resistance to Fas/CD95- and TRAIL-induced caspase activation and apoptosis, and significantly increased clonogenic survival. While Bid-deficient cells were equally sensitive to ER stress-induced apoptosis, they showed moderate, but significantly reduced levels of apoptosis, as well as increased clonogenic survival in response to the genotoxic drugs Etoposide, Oxaliplatin, and Doxorubicin. Similar effects were observed using the Bid inhibitor BI6C9. Interestingly, Bid-deficient cells were dramatically protected from apoptosis when subtoxic concentrations of ER stressors, Etoposide or Oxaliplatin were combined with subtoxic TRAIL concentrations. Conclusions/Significance Our data demonstrate that Bid is central for death receptor-induced cell death and participates in anti-cancer drug-induced apoptosis in human cervical cancer HeLa cells. They also show that the synergistic effects of TRAIL in combination with either ER stressors or genotoxic anti-cancer drugs are nearly exclusively mediated via an increased activation of Bid-induced apoptosis signalling. PMID:18665234

Dynamic Interaction of cBid with Detergents, Liposomes and Mitochondria

PubMed Central

Bleicken, Stephanie; García-Sáez, Ana J.; Conte, Elena; Bordignon, Enrica

2012-01-01

The BH3-only protein Bid plays a key role in the induction of mitochondrial apoptosis, but its mechanism of action is still not completely understood. Here we studied the two main activation events of Bid: Caspase-8 cleavage and interaction with the membrane bilayer. We found a striking reversible behaviour of the dissociation-association events between the Bid fragments p15 and p7. Caspase-8 cleavage does not induce per se separation of the two Bid fragments, which remain in a stable complex resembling the full length Bid. Detergents trigger a complete dissociation, which can be fully reversed by detergent removal in a range of protein concentrations from 100 µM down to 500 nM. Incubation of cBid with cardiolipin-containing liposomes leads to partial dissociation of the complex. Only p15 (tBid) fragments are found at the membrane, while p7 shows no tendency to interact with the bilayer, but complete removal of p7 strongly increases the propensity of tBid to become membrane-associated. Despite the striking structural similarities of inactive Bid and Bax, Bid does not form oligomers and reacts differently in the presence of detergents and membranes, highlighting clear differences in the modes of action of the two proteins. The partial dissociation of cBid triggered by the membrane is suggested to depend on the strong and specific interaction between p15 and p7. The reversible disassembly and re-assembly of the cBid molecules at the membrane was as well proven by EPR using spin labeled cBid in the presence of isolated mitochondria. The observed dynamic dissociation of the two Bid fragments could allow the assistance to the pore-forming Bax to occur repeatedly and may explain the proposed “hit-and-run" mode of action of Bid at the bilayer. PMID:22540011

48 CFR 14.101 - Elements of sealed bidding.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-10-01

... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2013-10-01 2013-10-01 false Elements of sealed bidding. 14.101 Section 14.101 Federal Acquisition Regulations System FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES SEALED BIDDING Use of Sealed Bidding 14.101 Elements of sealed bidding...

48 CFR 14.101 - Elements of sealed bidding.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-10-01

... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2014-10-01 2014-10-01 false Elements of sealed bidding. 14.101 Section 14.101 Federal Acquisition Regulations System FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES SEALED BIDDING Use of Sealed Bidding 14.101 Elements of sealed bidding...

48 CFR 14.101 - Elements of sealed bidding.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-10-01

... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Elements of sealed bidding. 14.101 Section 14.101 Federal Acquisition Regulations System FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES SEALED BIDDING Use of Sealed Bidding 14.101 Elements of sealed bidding...

48 CFR 14.101 - Elements of sealed bidding.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Elements of sealed bidding. 14.101 Section 14.101 Federal Acquisition Regulations System FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES SEALED BIDDING Use of Sealed Bidding 14.101 Elements of sealed bidding...

48 CFR 14.101 - Elements of sealed bidding.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-10-01

... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2012-10-01 2012-10-01 false Elements of sealed bidding. 14.101 Section 14.101 Federal Acquisition Regulations System FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES SEALED BIDDING Use of Sealed Bidding 14.101 Elements of sealed bidding...

48 CFR 2014.407 - Mistakes in bids.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 6 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 true Mistakes in bids. 2014.407 Section 2014.407 Federal Acquisition Regulations System NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES SEALED BIDDING Opening of Bids and Award of Contract 2014.407 Mistakes in bids. ...

The Proposed U.S.-Panama Free Trade Agreement

DTIC Science & Technology

2004-08-23

unique among Latin American countries. CRS-6 7 American Chamber of Commerce in Panama. [http://panamcham.com] and EIU. Panama: Country Profile 2003, p...Transportation Institute to USTR Robert Zoellick, June 10, 2004. Interestingly, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in Panama, which represents a wide spectrum of U.S...facilities. Transparency in the bidding process for government contracts was listed as one of the most important issues by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in

Variability of Valuation of Non-Monetary Incentives: Motivating and Implementing the Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism

DTIC Science & Technology

2009-03-01

homeport, geographic stability for two tours and compressed work week; homeport, lump sum SRB, and telecommuting ). The Monte Carlo simulation...Geographic stability 2 tours, and compressed work week). The Add 2 combination includes home port choice, lump sum SRB, and telecommuting ...VALUATION OF NON-MONETARY INCENTIVES: MOTIVATING AND IMPLEMENTING THE COMBINATORIAL RETENTION AUCTION MECHANISM by Jason Blake Ellis March 2009

31 CFR 356.34 - What could happen if someone does not fully comply with the auction rules or fails to pay for...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... 31 Money and Finance: Treasury 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false What could happen if someone does not... Finance: Treasury Regulations Relating to Money and Finance (Continued) FISCAL SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE... person or entity from participating in future auctions under this part. We also may refer the matter to...

31 CFR 356.34 - What could happen if someone does not fully comply with the auction rules or fails to pay for...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-07-01

... 31 Money and Finance:Treasury 2 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false What could happen if someone does not... Finance: Treasury Regulations Relating to Money and Finance (Continued) FISCAL SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE... person or entity from participating in future auctions under this part. We also may refer the matter to...