Weapons proliferation and organized crime: The Russian military and security force dimension

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Turbiville, G.H.

One dimension of international security of the post-Cold War era that has not received enough attention is how organized crime facilitates weapons proliferation worldwide. The former Soviet Union (FSU) has emerged as the world`s greatest counterproliferation challenge. It contains the best developed links among organized crime, military and security organizations, and weapons proliferation. Furthermore, Russian military and security forces are the principle source of arms becoming available to organized crime groups, participants in regional conflict, and corrupt state officials engaged in the black, gray, and legal arms markets in their various dimensions. The flourishing illegal trade in conventional weapons ismore » the clearest and most tangible manifestation of the close links between Russian power ministries and criminal organizations. The magnitude of the WMD proliferation problem from the FSU is less clear and less tangible. There have been many open reports of small-scale fissile material smuggling out of the FSU. The situation with regard to the proliferation of chemical weapon usually receives less attention but may be more serious. With an acknowledged stockpile of 40,000 metric tons of chemical agents, the potential for proliferation is enormous.« less

76 FR 35953 - Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to the Risk of Nuclear Proliferation Created...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-06-20

... Accumulation of Weapons-Useable Fissile Material in the Territory of the Russian Federation #0; #0; #0... National Emergency With Respect to the Risk of Nuclear Proliferation Created by the Accumulation of Weapons... Extracted from Nuclear Weapons, dated February 18, 1993, and related contracts and agreements (collectively...

78 FR 42584 - Additional Designation of Aluminat, Pars Amayesh Sanaat Kish, Parviz Khaki, Pishro Systems...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-07-16

... Order 13382, ``Blocking Property of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators and Their Supporters... materially contributed to, or pose a risk of materially contributing to, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or their means of delivery (including missiles capable of delivering such weapons), including any...

77 FR 37261 - Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to the Risk of Nuclear Proliferation Created...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2012-06-21

... National Emergency With Respect to the Risk of Nuclear Proliferation Created by the Accumulation of Weapons... Extracted from Nuclear Weapons, dated February 18, 1993, and related contracts and agreements (collectively... derived from nuclear weapons to low enriched uranium for peaceful commercial purposes. The order invoked...

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Regulating Nuclear Weapons around the World

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Middleton, Tiffany Willey

2010-01-01

In May 2010, scientists, national security experts, and state delegates from nations around the world will convene in New York for the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. They will review current guidelines for nuclear testing and possession of nuclear weapons in accordance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968,…

Vertical nuclear proliferation.

PubMed

Sidel, Victor W

2007-01-01

All the nuclear-weapon states are working to develop new nuclear-weapon systems and upgrade their existing ones. Although the US Congress has recently blocked further development of small nuclear weapons and earth-penetrating nuclear weapons, the United States is planning a range of new warheads under the Reliable Replacement Warhead programme, and renewing its nuclear weapons infrastructure. The United Kingdom is spending 1 billion pounds sterling on updating the Atomic Weapons Establishment at Aldermaston, and about 20 billion pounds sterling on replacing its Vanguard submarines and maintaining its Trident warhead stockpile. The US has withdrawn from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and plans to install missile defence systems in Poland and the Czech Republic; Russia threatens to upgrade its nuclear countermeasures. The nuclear-weapon states should comply with their obligations under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, as summarised in the 13-point plan agreed at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, and they should negotiate a Nuclear Weapons Convention.

78 FR 58859 - Provision of Defense Articles and Services to Vetted Members of the Syrian Opposition for Use in...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-09-25

... Use in Syria To Prevent the Use or Proliferation of Chemical Weapons and Related Materials... proliferation of Syria's chemical weapons, is essential to the national security interests of the United States...

75 FR 68671 - Continuation of Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-11-08

... the United States posed by the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (weapons of... Weapons of Mass Destruction #0; #0; #0; Presidential Documents #0; #0; #0;#0;Federal Register / Vol. 75... [[Page 68673

3 CFR - Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... to Weapons of Mass Destruction Presidential Documents Other Presidential Documents Notice of November 9, 2011 Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction On... United States posed by the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (weapons of mass...

3 CFR - Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... to Weapons of Mass Destruction Presidential Documents Other Presidential Documents Notice of November 1, 2012 Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction On... United States posed by the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (weapons of mass...

76 FR 70317 - Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-11-10

... proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (weapons of mass destruction) and the means of...--Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction #0; #0; #0; Presidential... the National Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction On November 14, 1994, by Executive...

77 FR 66513 - Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2012-11-05

... proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (weapons of mass destruction) and the means of delivering such weapons. On July 28, 1998, the President issued Executive Order 13094 amending Executive... the National Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction On November 14, 1994, by Executive...

Submarine and Autonomous Vessel Proliferation: Implications for Future Strategic Stability at Sea

DTIC Science & Technology

2012-12-01

missile.4 These important details of the legacy of the Cold War at sea are too often forgotten in today’s retelling of the story . Yet, as CDR (USN...vented deadly fumes. The damaged and still-burning vessel was scuttled with its nuclear weapons and reactors aboard. 8 Pavel Podvig, ed., Russian ...exception of China in the 1950s,13 the Russians generally did not provide production technology and refrained from offering sophisticated offensive systems

Military laser weapons: current controversies.

PubMed

Seet, B; Wong, T Y

2001-09-01

Military laser weapons systems are becoming indispensable in most modern armies. These lasers have undergone many stages of development, and have outpaced research on eye protection measures, which continue to have inherent limitations. Eye injuries caused by military lasers are increasingly reported, leading to speculation that these would become an important cause of blinding in modern conflicts. As part of the effort to ban inhumane weapons, international laws have been passed to restrict the proliferation of such blinding weapons. However, there are controversies concerning the interpretation, implementation and effectiveness of these laws. The ophthalmic community can play a greater role in highlighting ocular morbidity from military lasers, and in preventing their further proliferation.

Proliferation: Threat and Response

DTIC Science & Technology

1997-11-01

primary agent, the Defense Technology capabilities also contribute to ongoing efforts to Security Administration ( DTSA ). These efforts are focus and...Special Weapons Agency Organization DTSA Defense Technology Security BW Biological Weapons Administration BWC Biological and Toxin Weapons EPCI Enhanced

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

King, J.R.

Proliferation of chemical weapons and ballistic missiles in the Middle East and North Africa represents a growing risk to NATOs Southern Region. Several countries in the region possess chemical weapons and other are seeking the capability to develop and employ them. Likewise, ballistic missile trends and emerging capabilities in the region give reason for concern since the not-too-distant future may see missiles tipped with chemical warheads. The region faces explosive population growth, economic difficulties, and political turmoil. When you add the Arab/Israeli animosities and the spread of Islamic fundamentalism to this instability, the region becomes volatile. Thus, the heightened concernmore » over the proliferation of weapons use and negotiations and a discussion of the region's volatility, examines the proliferation of chemical weapons and ballistic missiles in the Middle East and North Africa. The resulting future risks to NATOs Southern Region are discussed with the focus on chemical defense preparedness. Conclusions address the continued proliferation and the risks to NATOs Southern Region. Some brief thoughts for the way ahead are offered on security, confidence-building, and cooperation in the region, as well as, on strengthening the chemical defense posture of the Southern Region.« less

Assessing State Nuclear Weapons Proliferation: Using Bayesian Network Analysis of Social Factors

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Coles, Garill A.; Brothers, Alan J.; Olson, Jarrod

A Bayesian network (BN) model of social factors can support proliferation assessments by estimating the likelihood that a state will pursue a nuclear weapon. Social factors including political, economic, nuclear capability, security, and national identity and psychology factors may play as important a role in whether a State pursues nuclear weapons as more physical factors. This paper will show how using Bayesian reasoning on a generic case of a would-be proliferator State can be used to combine evidence that supports proliferation assessment. Theories and analysis by political scientists can be leveraged in a quantitative and transparent way to indicate proliferationmore » risk. BN models facilitate diagnosis and inference in a probabilistic environment by using a network of nodes and acyclic directed arcs between the nodes whose connections, or absence of, indicate probabilistic relevance, or independence. We propose a BN model that would use information from both traditional safeguards and the strengthened safeguards associated with the Additional Protocol to indicate countries with a high risk of proliferating nuclear weapons. This model could be used in a variety of applications such a prioritization tool and as a component of state safeguards evaluations. This paper will discuss the benefits of BN reasoning, the development of Pacific Northwest National Laboratory’s (PNNL) BN state proliferation model and how it could be employed as an analytical tool.« less

Explaining weapons proliferation: Going beyond the security dilemma

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Rattray, G.J.

1994-07-01

Most analyses addressing the subject of why states choose to proliferate focus on external motivations, particularly the security dilemma, facing a country`s leaders. This paper concludes that, other factors, such as prestige, regime type and stability, and economic status, can have impact in determining proliferation outcomes. In the case of Newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union (NIS), the domestic problems generated by internal conflicts, arms remaining from the Cold War, excess defense industrial capacity, economic difficulties and the breakdown of central authority resulting in a loss of border control and corruption have all made the NIS an extremelymore » fertile ground for weapons proliferation. A more positive `rollback` situation has emerged in Latin America where both Argentina and Brazil have seemingly decided to forgo the acquisition of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. The US must understand the `strategic personality` of each potential proliferation. Not all state behavior can be explained in terms of the security dilemma. One must also keep in mind the complexity of possible motivations. Economic and technological assistance and cooperative efforts at institution-building hold great potential to combating proliferation.« less

Biotechnology

DTIC Science & Technology

2001-01-01

The former Soviet Union dedicated many resources to its offensive biological weapons program, employing over 25,000 scientists, engineers, and...compassionate partner in international affairs. The proliferation of biological weapons is a real and growing concern. The Biological Weapons ...Convention Treaty (BWC) of 1972 prohibits the development, possession and use of biological weapons , but the treaty lacks a means of verifying compliance

2001 Industry Studies: Biotechnology

DTIC Science & Technology

2001-01-01

the industry. The former Soviet Union dedicated many resources to its offensive biological weapons program, employing over 25,000 scientists...international affairs. The proliferation of biological weapons is a real and growing concern. The Biological Weapons Convention Treaty (BWC) of 1972...prohibits the development, possession and use of biological weapons , but the treaty lacks a means of verifying compliance. There is international

10 CFR 810.3 - Definitions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... of neutrons used to effect SNM production in the “subcritical assembly.” Agreement for cooperation... International Atomic Energy Agency. Non-nuclear-weapon state is a country not recognized as a nuclear-weapon...-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Nuclear reactor means an apparatus, other than a nuclear explosive device...

10 CFR 810.3 - Definitions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... of neutrons used to effect SNM production in the “subcritical assembly.” Agreement for cooperation... International Atomic Energy Agency. Non-nuclear-weapon state is a country not recognized as a nuclear-weapon...-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Nuclear reactor means an apparatus, other than a nuclear explosive device...

Myth-building: The [open quotes]Islamic[close quotes] bomb

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Hoodbhoy, P.

1993-06-01

The [open quotes]Islamic Bomb[close quotes] is roughly understood to be a nuclear weapon aquired for broad ideological reasons--a weapon that supposedly belongs to the Muslim [ital ummah] or community and, as such, is the ultimate expression of Islamic solidarity. Concern about the Islamic bomb is at the heart of the intense effort to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to Muslim countries. The official justification is a general one: proliferation must be curbed globally. But unofficially, the Islamic bomb gets special attention. The reasons behind this special attention are described in this article. The reasons include fear of terrorism, ofmore » a [ital jihad] willing to indiscriminately use nuclear weapons in hope of a reward in the Hereafter, and of the transfer of nuclear arms from nuclear to non-nuclear Muslim countries in times of crisis. Possibilities for controlling the proliferation of nuclear weapons in Muslim countries are addressed. Reasons are cited as to why various Muslim countries wish to acquire nuclear weapons.« less

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Clark, T.H.

The proliferation of surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) and weapons of mass destruction has become one of the more serious security threats to post-Cold War peace. This dissertation examines the history of proliferation within the Middle East by focusing primarily on three trend-setting countries: Israel, Syria and Iran. Building on the theoretical framework established by Lewis A. Dunn and Herman Kahn, this dissertation examines why and how Israel, Syria and Iran have procured SSMs and weapons of mass destruction. The author also includes an analysis of tactical missile defenses and their impact on proliferation trends. The final section investigates the numerous armsmore » control treaties and supplier cartels designed to halt or slow the pace of unconventional weapons proliferation. In many instances, Iraq serves as the primary example of how well-intentioned nonproliferation efforts have fallen short. This dissertation reveals some of the major flaws in these regimes while proposing necessary improvements if nonproliferation efforts are to succeed. In conclusion, this dissertation returns to the expanded Dunn-Kahn nuclear proliferation model. By categorizing the various reasons as to why countries choose to procure unconventional weapons, a more successful nonproliferation policy can be constructed. However, this dissertation warns that without political solutions to long-term disputes in the region, western-imposed nonproliferation regimes will fail. Thus, nonproliferation policies must be accompanied or preceded by a vigorous diplomatic and political effort to solve seemingly intractable differences.« less

75 FR 78154 - Updated Statements of Legal Authority To Reflect Continuation of Emergency Declared in Executive...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-12-15

... proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and the means of delivering such weapons. That... November 6, 2009, Continuation of Emergency Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, with citation to the... practice and procedure, Chemicals, Exports, Foreign trade, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements. 0...

Nuclear weapons modernizations

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Kristensen, Hans M.

2014-05-01

This article reviews the nuclear weapons modernization programs underway in the world's nine nuclear weapons states. It concludes that despite significant reductions in overall weapons inventories since the end of the Cold War, the pace of reductions is slowing - four of the nuclear weapons states are even increasing their arsenals, and all the nuclear weapons states are busy modernizing their remaining arsenals in what appears to be a dynamic and counterproductive nuclear competition. The author questions whether perpetual modernization combined with no specific plan for the elimination of nuclear weapons is consistent with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and concludes that new limits on nuclear modernizations are needed.

Nuclear Weapons: Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

DTIC Science & Technology

2007-07-12

done. Critics raised concerns about the implications of these policies for testing and new weapons. At present, Congress addresses nuclear weapon...future, but there are no plans to do so.’”7 Critics expressed concern about the implications of these policies for testing and new weapons. A statement by...opportunity to design and build new nuclear weapons, and abandon a ten-year-old moratorium on nuclear weapons testing.”8 Another critic felt that

Director`s series on proliferation

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Bailey, K.C.; Price, M.E.

1994-10-17

This series is an occasional publication of essays on the topics of nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile proliferation. Essays contained in this document include: Key issues on NPT renewal and extension, Africa and nuclear nonproliferation, Kenya`s views on the NPT, Prospects for establishing a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the middle east, effects of a special nuclear weapon materials cut-off convention, and The UK view of NPT renewal.

Evolving perceptions of security - US National Security surveys 1993--1995. Progress report, September 30, 1995--November 14, 1995

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Herron, K.G.; Jenkins-Smith, H.C.

This study analyzes findings from a national survey of 2,490 randomly selected members of the US public conducted between September 30 and November 14, 1995. It provides an over time comparison of public perceptions about nuclear weapons risks and benefits and key nuclear policy issues between 1993 and 1995. Other areas of investigation include policy preferences regarding nuclear proliferation, terrorism, US/Russian nuclear cooperation, and personal security. Public perceptions of post-cold war security were found to be evolving in unexpected ways. The perceived threat of nuclear conflict involving the US had not declined, and the threat of nuclear conflict between othermore » countries and fears of nuclear proliferation and terrorism had increased. Perceived risks associated with managing the US nuclear arsenal were also higher. Perceptions of external and domestic benefits from US nuclear weapons were not declining. Support was found for increasing funding for nuclear weapons safety, training, and maintenance, but most respondents favored decreasing funding for developing and testing new nuclear weapons. Strong support was evident for programs and funding to prevent nuclear proliferation and terrorism. Though skeptical that nuclear weapons can be eliminated, most respondents supported reducing the US nuclear arsenal, banning nuclear test explosions, and ending production of fissile materials to make nuclear weapons. Statistically significant relationships were found between perceptions of nuclear weapons risks and benefits and policy and spending preferences. Demographic variables and basic social and political beliefs were systematically related both to risk and benefit perceptions and policy and spending options.« less

31 CFR 561.324 - Designated Iranian financial institution.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-07-01

... this chapter in connection with Iran's proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction or Iran's support for international terrorism has, since the enactment...

A Policymaker’s Guide to Bioterrorism and What to Do About It

DTIC Science & Technology

2009-12-01

48 1 Introduction The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, brought together two related but distinct phenomena. First, they...weapons tend to proliferate. That proliferation is abetted when the skills that can produce a weapon are closely related to civilian skills and equipment...Press, 2004), setting forth  essentially a  secular  view of recruitment by establishing social alternatives to alienation, with Stephen P.  Lambert, Y

Stabilization and immobilization of military plutonium: A non-proliferation perspective

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Leventhal, P.

1996-05-01

The Nuclear Control Institute welcomes this DOE-sponsored technical workshop on stabilization and immobilization of weapons plutonium (W Pu) because of the significant contribution it can make toward the ultimate non-proliferation objective of eliminating weapons-usable nuclear material, plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU), from world commerce. The risk of theft or diversion of these materials warrants concern, as only a few kilograms in the hands of terrorists or threshold states would give them the capability to build nuclear weapons. Military plutonium disposition questions cannot be addressed in isolation from civilian plutonium issues. The National Academy of Sciences has urged that {open_quotes}furthermore » steps should be taken to reduce the proliferation risks posed by all of the world`s plutonium stocks, military and civilian, separated and unseparated...{close_quotes}. This report discusses vitrification and a mixed oxide fuels option, and the effects of disposition choices on civilian plutonium fuel cycles.« less

Nuclear weapons modernizations

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Kristensen, Hans M.

This article reviews the nuclear weapons modernization programs underway in the world's nine nuclear weapons states. It concludes that despite significant reductions in overall weapons inventories since the end of the Cold War, the pace of reductions is slowing - four of the nuclear weapons states are even increasing their arsenals, and all the nuclear weapons states are busy modernizing their remaining arsenals in what appears to be a dynamic and counterproductive nuclear competition. The author questions whether perpetual modernization combined with no specific plan for the elimination of nuclear weapons is consistent with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and concludesmore » that new limits on nuclear modernizations are needed.« less

75 FR 54689 - Additional Designation of an Entity Pursuant to Executive Order 13382

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-09-08

... proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or their means of delivery (including missiles capable of... means of delivery (including missiles capable of delivering such weapons), including any efforts to...

78 FR 17992 - Additional Designation of Three North Korean Individuals Pursuant to Executive Order 13382

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-03-25

..., the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or their means of delivery (including missiles... means of delivery (including missiles capable of delivering such weapons), including any efforts to...

78 FR 13140 - Additional Designation of Amr Armanazi Pursuant to Executive Order 13382

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-02-26

... means of delivery (including missiles capable of delivering such weapons), including any efforts to... proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or their means of delivery (including missiles capable of...

Coping with mass destruction: United States power projection in the nuclear and chemical third world. Monograph report

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Cheek, G.H.

1993-05-14

This monograph explores the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the Third World, their operational impact on power projection forces, and the viability of deterrence in the future. It concludes that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction may have grave consequences for the power projection forces in the future; simple assumptions of non-use, reliance on our nuclear deterrent or protective measures may give us a false sense of security. Proper analysis of operational vulnerabilities will be essential for future power projection. Proliferation of operational delivery systems and weapons of mass destruction continues despite treaties and the best intentionsmore » of world leaders. Weapons of mass destruction are becoming more common throughout the world and chemical and biological weapons continue to become more and more lethal. These trends are creating a multipolar world, which history has shown to be the most unstable. This unstable world will be the environment for future power projection. Deterrence in this environment is without precedent other than the Cold War paradigm. It is questionable whether deterrence will transfer outside this paradigm as Third World nations do not have the experience, balance of power, infrastructure or political stability needed to make the concept viable. Possession of weapons of mass destruction may even allow these nations to deter entry of US power projection forces into certain regions as deterrence is a two way concept. While deterrence is still an essential part of US National Strategy to prevent war, reliance on it to prevent use of weapons of mass destruction in the midst of a conflict may prove to be a false hope.« less

Preventing ballistic missile proliferation: Lessons from Iraq. Master`s thesis

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Talay, B.J.

1996-12-01

This thesis examines the case of Iraq to assess the performance of the missile nonproliferation regime since 1970. By analyzing the methods used by Iraq to obtain missile systems and missile technology, this thesis assesses the ability of the international community to prevent ballistic missile proliferation. Understanding Iraq`s past capabilities as well as its post-war efforts to rebuild weapons programs and procurement networks, this thesis provides suggestions for improving the regime`s performance. This thesis finds that (1) prior to 1992, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) failed in its attempts to prevent proliferation; (2) the existence of the MTCR, whilemore » necessary to slow proliferation, is not sufficient to prevent proliferation; and (3) additional enforcement is needed to counter weapons of mass destruction acquisition by resourceful and determined states.« less

Chemical and biological warfare. Should defenses be researched and deployed?

PubMed

Orient, J M

1989-08-04

The threat of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction has intensified because of improved delivery systems and advances in chemistry, genetics, and other sciences. Possible US responses to this threat include deterrence, defenses, and/or disarmament, including a reaffirmation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972, which is now in jeopardy. This article discusses the history of chemical and biological warfare, existing and potential weapons, the proliferation of weapons and delivery systems, ways to prevent the use of these weapons, and ways to protect populations from their effects.

Nonproliferation, arms control and disarmament and extended deterrence in the new security environment

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Pilat, Joseph F

2009-01-01

With the end of the Cold War, in a dramatically changed security environment, the advances in nonnuclear strategic capabilities along with reduced numbers and roles for nuclear forces has altered the calculus of deterrence and defense, at least for the United States. For many, this opened up a realistic possibility of a nuclear-free world. It soon became clear that the initial post-Cold War hopes were exaggerated. The world did change fundamentally, but it did not become more secure and stable. In place of the old Soviet threat, there has been growing concern about proliferation and terrorism involving nuclear and othermore » weapons of mass destruction (WMD), regional conflicts, global instability and increasingly serious new and emerging threats, including cyber attacks and attacks on satellites. For the United States at least, in this emerging environment, the political rationales for nuclear weapons, from deterrence to reassurance to alliance management, are changing and less central than during the Cold War to the security of the United States, its friends and allies. Nuclear weapons remain important for the US, but for a far more limited set of roles and missions. As the Perry-Schlesinger Commission report reveals, there is a domestic US consensus on nuclear policy and posture at the highest level and for the near term, including the continued role of nuclear arms in deterring WMD use and in reassuring allies. Although the value of nuclear weapons has declined for the United States, the value of these weapons for Russia, China and so-called 'rogue' states is seen to be rising. The nuclear logic of NATO during Cold War - the need for nuclear weapons to counter vastly superior conventional capabilities of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact - is today heard from Russians and even some proliferants. Moreover, these weapons present a way for rogues to achieve regional hegemony and possibly to deter interventions by the United States or others. While the vision of a nuclear-free world is powerful, both existing nuclear powers and proliferators are unlikely to forego nuclear weapons entirely in a world that is dangerous and uncertain. And the emerging world would not necessarily be more secure and stable without nuclear weapons. Even if nuclear weapons were given up by the United States and other nuclear-weapon states, there would continue to be concerns about the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, which would not disappear and could worsen. WMD terrorism would remain a concern that was largely unaffected by US and other nuclear-weapon decisions. Conventional capabilities would not disappear and the prospects for warfare could rise. In addition, new problems could arise if rogue states or other non-status-quo powers attempted to take advantage of moves toward disarmament, while friends and allies who are not reassured as in the past could reconsider their options if deterrence declined. To address these challenges, non- and counter-proliferation and counterterrorismincluding defenses and consequence management-are priorities, especially in light of an anticipated 'renaissance' in civil nuclear power. The current agenda of the United States and others includes efforts to: (1) Strengthen International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its safeguards system; (2) Strengthen export controls, especially for sensitive technologies, by limiting the development of reprocessing and enrichment technologies and by requiring the Additional Protocol as a condition of supply; (3) Establish a reliable supply regime, including the possibility of multilateral or multinational ownership of fuel cycle facilities, as a means to promote nuclear energy without increasing the risks of proliferation or terrorism; (4) Implement effectively UN Security Council Resolution 1540; and (5) Strengthen and institutionalize the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. These and other activities are important in themselves, and are essential to maintaining and strengthening the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) bargain by bolstering two of its pillars - nonproliferation and peaceful nuclear energy cooperation. There is no alternative, and little prospect for a better deal.« less

76 FR 36986 - Export Controls for High Performance Computers: Wassenaar Arrangement Agreement Implementation...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-06-24

... regimes and is working on becoming a member of the regimes. Albania and Croatia are parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Biological Weapons Convention. In...

Worldwide Emerging Environmental Issues Affecting the U.S. Military. November 2006 Report

DTIC Science & Technology

2006-11-01

should follow this development for potential improved environmental biological weapons surveillance systems. Source: Researchers use laser...Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons came into force on 12 November 2006, almost three...potentials for nanotech weapons , create unique problems of proliferation, health effects, environmental impacts, and post-conflict cleanups that are

Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 1999.

DTIC Science & Technology

1998-01-01

chemical and biological weapons technology in Africa. However, there remains much to be done: - • Terrorism: The economic and political weakness of many...OPERATIONAL GOAL: Counter the proliferation of missile technology and nuclear, chemical, and biological Weapons . Levels of cooperation with our...34 terrorism; chemical, biological , nuclear, or radiological weapons . 6. Enhance CT cooperation through the establishment of legal instruments like mutual

The Gravest Danger:. Nuclear Weapons and Their Proliferation

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Drell, S.

2005-02-01

Nuclear weapons are unique in their terrifying potential. With an energy release a million times larger than that of previous explosives, mass destruction is inevitable. The prospect of the spread of nuclear weapons and other dangerous technologies into the hands of suicidal terrorists and rogue nations unrestrained by the norms of civilized behavior has led President Bush to remark that "the gravest danger our nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology." This talk will address what can and should be done, in the face of new challenges in times punctuated by terrorist threats, to sustain and strengthen the non-proliferation regime, taking into consideration technical realities, and the roles and limits of diplomatic initiatives and of military force.

Balancing Scientific Publication and National Security Concerns: Issues for Congress

DTIC Science & Technology

2003-01-10

because of its potential relevance to biological weapons of mass destruction. Whether the current method of only using classification to limit the...terrorist groups in developing weapons of mass destruction. In 2000, researchers at the Co-operative Research Centre for the Biological Control of Pest...development of chemical, biological , or nuclear weapons is not made accessible to terrorists or countries of proliferation concern. The resolution

Educating the Army of 2010: A Strategic Plan

DTIC Science & Technology

1992-02-20

States have been identified by futurist John Naisbitt, in his books Megatrends : Ten New Directions Transforming Our Lives and Megatrends 2000. Several...information and equipment. - The proliferation of weapons will continue, including chemical, biological , and nuclear weapons. Despite the reduction of...conventional systems as well as biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction. Nuclear technology will be more common, both as a source of

Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues

DTIC Science & Technology

2012-05-10

2009. 143 Abdul Mannan, “Preventing Nuclear Terrorism in Pakistan: Sabotage of a Spent Fuel Cask or a Commercial Irradiation Source in Transport ,” in...Program.” Some analysts argue that spent nuclear fuel is more vulnerable when being transported . 144 Martellini, 2008. Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons...urgency to the program. Pakistan produced fissile material for its nuclear weapons using gas-centrifuge-based uranium enrichment technology, which it

Nuclear nonproliferation: India Pakistan. Research report

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Fallon, J.S.

1997-04-01

As most of the world continues to seek ways to reduce or eliminate the spread of nuclear weapons, two countries seem intent on pursuing a path which is contradictory. India and Pakistan, two neighboring and frequently warring nations, condemn the use of nuclear weapons as they continue to develop the capability to deliver a nuclear payload. Additionally, India has stood against the Non-Proliferation Treaty, insisting that all nations must agree to eliminate nuclear weapons. It is against this seemingly hopeless situation that this report is focused. How can nuclear proliferation in South Asia be diffused while answering the security concernsmore » of both India and Pakistan. What I offer here is a review of the history, the current situation for the area, and a proposed solution to this nuclear stalemate.« less

JPRS Report, Proliferation Issues

DTIC Science & Technology

1992-12-11

with the U.S. on the elimination of nuclear weapons be used to produce weapons. Great Britain and Kaz- deployed in the republic. Konstantin Grishenko ...cooperation and partnership. missiles would be sold to the American side. That is why, said Grishenko , Washington believes that the transfer of Observers

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Graham, T.W.

There has been a growing debate over the future of US nonproliferation policy. Some, including this author, believe that many current trends, especially the increasing delegitimization of nuclear weapons for all forms of extended deterrence, provide an opportunity to think about winning the nonproliferation battle - freezing or reversing the nuclear programs of the four current de facto nuclear-weapon states (India, Israel, Pakistan, and South Africa), and ensuring that no additional states are added to this list for at least the next 20 years. Others, including some senior Pentagon officials, believe that additional proliferation is inevitable, and that a realisticmore » reading of international politics requires the US to focus much of its nonproliferation effort on managing the proliferation that does occur - attempting to reduce the risks to international security posed by those states that gain access to nuclear weapons. The outcome of this debate could have a major impact on the spread of nuclear weapons over the next two decades, and thereby on the dangers the world will face in the post-Cold War era.« less

Non-Proliferation, the IAEA Safeguards System, and the importance of nuclear material measurements

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Stevens, Rebecca S.

2017-09-18

The objective of this project is to explain the contribution of nuclear material measurements to the system of international verification of State declarations and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

15 CFR 742.10 - Anti-terrorism: Sudan.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... controlled under ECCN 1C992. (x) Technology for the production of Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Schedule 2 and 3 chemicals controlled under ECCN 1E355. (xi) Ammonium nitrate, including certain fertilizers...: (i) Items that are controlled for chemical and biological weapons proliferation reasons to any...

15 CFR 742.10 - Anti-terrorism: Sudan.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... controlled under ECCN 1C992. (x) Technology for the production of Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Schedule 2 and 3 chemicals controlled under ECCN 1E355. (xi) Ammonium nitrate, including certain fertilizers...: (i) Items that are controlled for chemical and biological weapons proliferation reasons to any...

15 CFR 742.10 - Anti-terrorism: Sudan.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... controlled under ECCN 1C992. (x) Technology for the production of Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Schedule 2 and 3 chemicals controlled under ECCN 1E355. (xi) Ammonium nitrate, including certain fertilizers...: (i) Items that are controlled for chemical and biological weapons proliferation reasons to any...

15 CFR 742.10 - Anti-terrorism: Sudan.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... controlled under ECCN 1C992. (x) Technology for the production of Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Schedule 2 and 3 chemicals controlled under ECCN 1E355. (xi) Ammonium nitrate, including certain fertilizers...: (i) Items that are controlled for chemical and biological weapons proliferation reasons to any...

Extended Deterrence, Nuclear Proliferation, and START III

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Speed, R.D.

2000-06-20

Early in the Cold War, the United States adopted a policy of ''extended nuclear deterrence'' to protect its allies by threatening a nuclear strike against any state that attacks these allies. This threat can (in principle) be used to try to deter an enemy attack using conventional weapons or one using nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. The credibility of a nuclear threat has long been subject to debate and is dependent on many complex geopolitical factors, not the least of which is the military capabilities of the opposing sides. The ending of the Cold War has led to a significantmore » decrease in the number of strategic nuclear weapons deployed by the United States and Russia. START II, which was recently ratified by the Russian Duma, will (if implemented) reduce the number deployed strategic nuclear weapons on each side to 3500, compared to a level of over 11,000 at the end of the Cold War in 1991. The tentative limit established by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin for START III would reduce the strategic force level to 2000-2500. However, the Russians (along with a number of arms control advocates) now argue that the level should be reduced even further--to 1500 warheads or less. The conventional view is that ''deep cuts'' in nuclear weapons are necessary to discourage nuclear proliferation. Thus, as part of the bargain to get the non-nuclear states to agree to the renewal of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the United States pledged to work towards greater reductions in strategic forces. Without movement in the direction of deep cuts, it is thought by many analysts that some countries may decide to build their own nuclear weapons. Indeed, this was part of the rationale India used to justify its own nuclear weapons program. However, there is also some concern that deep cuts (to 1500 or lower) in the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal could have the opposite effect. The fear is that such cuts might undermine extended deterrence and cause a crisis in confidence among U.S. allies to such an extent that they could seek nuclear weapons of their own to protect themselves.« less

Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues

DTIC Science & Technology

2009-12-09

Nuclear Terrorism in Pakistan: Sabotage of a Spent Fuel Cask or a Commercial Irradiation Source in Transport ,” in Pakistan’s Nuclear Future, 2008...gave additional urgency to the program. Pakistan produced fissile material for its nuclear weapons using gas-centrifuge-based uranium enrichment...technology, which it mastered by the mid-1980s. Highly-enriched uranium (HEU) is one of two types of fissile material used in nuclear weapons; the other

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Peterson, J.F.

The global proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has become one of the most immediate and dangerous threats to U.S. national security. Ballistic missiles were used in four of the last six major wars. Some 190 missiles were fired by Iraqis over a six week period at Iranian cities in 1988, during the 'War of the Cities'. Iraq's firing of Scuds against coalition forces and Israel during the Gulf War provided a vivid reminder of the threat these weapons can present to the world community. During the 1980's, many Third World countries assigned a high prioritymore » to the acquisition of ballistic missiles. By 1991, more than 20 of these nations either possessed ballistic missiles or were attempting to obtain them. Today 43 nations possess ballistic missiles. Seventeen of these probably have a nuclear weapon capability, with 20 of them possessing also a chemical or biological capability. This paper seeks to: define the military challenge ballistic missiles represent; review current U.S. counter-proliferation and nonproliferation initiatives and, finally make recommendations on other potential methods or considerations to reduce ballistic missile proliferation.« less

Denuclearization for a Just World: The Failure of Non Proliferation.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Institute for World Order, New York, NY.

The document discusses the non proliferation policies of nuclear power nations. It specifically focuses on the credibility gap which exists between the actual statements of peaceful intentions made by these nations which express the need for non proliferation of nuclear weapons and their actual conduct with regards to nuclear-related issues in…

15 CFR 742.2 - Proliferation of chemical and biological weapons.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... in ECCN 1C350 (precursor and intermediate chemicals used in the production of chemical warfare agents... on the CCL, chemical detection systems controlled by 1A004.c for detecting chemical warfare agents... used in the production of chemical weapons precursors or chemical warfare agents. (vii) Equipment and...

Blocking the spread of nuclear weapons. American and European perspectives

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Smith, G.C.; Holst, J.J.

1986-01-01

This volume is the product of separate but parallel studies undertaken by two panels of experts-one from the United States, the other from Western Europe-on new approaches to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons to additional countries. Neither panel sounded a doomsday alarm; each concluded that the chances for controlling proliferation lie in good part on building on the sound foundation of existing policies and institutional structures. Among the other conclusions derived from the parallel studies: The threat of nuclear proliferation is a specific, definable danger in a limited number of countries. The incentives that appear to make nuclear weaponsmore » an interesting option to some states must be understood, and potential proliferators must be persuaded that their acquisition will not lead to national security. Effective persuasion is more likely to come from non-nuclear weapon nations. Europe and the United States must collaborate in engaging such third-party persuaders in this endeavor. The panels' intensive examination of the six states of greatest near-term concern leads to the conclusion that the uneasy status quo will probably prevail for the next several years, yet these are volatile situations. The nature of the threat demands an extraordinary degree of international collaboration.« less

The nuclear issue: where do we go from here?.

PubMed

Rotblat, Joseph

2003-01-01

The drive for the elimination of nuclear weapons is going badly and there is currently little support from the general public. The United States Nuclear Posture Review incorporates nuclear capability into conventional war planning. The Stockpile Stewardship Program is designed to maintain nuclear weapon capability. The US is planning an essentially new earth-penetrating nuclear weapon and is prepared to test this in the national interest if thought necessary. These policies could stimulate nuclear proliferation by others, do nothing to deter terrorism, promote persisting polarization of the world, are a clear breach of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and rest world security on a continued balance of terror. A renewed mass campaign to counteract all this, on legal and moral grounds in particular, is urgently needed. IPPNW and kindred organizations must restore sanity in our policies and humanity to our actions.

The proliferation of aerospace weapons technology: Ballistic missiles and the case of Brazil

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Vossen, Terrence John

1993-04-01

The rationale behind the development of ballistic missile production in Brazil is examined by exploring the political, military, and economic determinants of ballistic missile demand in that country. To ascertain how Brazil developed missile production capabilities, the contributions of aerospace industries in industrialized states, the Brazilian space program, trade between less-developed countries, and illicit trade in missile technology are assessed. It is argued that missile development increasingly became a function of economic as opposed to security considerations, and that technologies transferred from developed country aerospace firms and Brazil's space program were primarily responsible for the creation of production capabilities. It is also contended that the proliferation of missile technology to Brazil was consistent with the workings of a system evident in the aerospace weapons technology market that sustains the horizontal spread of weapons production capabilities.

The myth of the ``proliferation-resistant'' closed nuclear fuel cycle

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Lyman, Edwin S.

2000-07-01

National nuclear energy programs that engage in reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and the development of "closed" nuclear fuel cycles based on the utilization of plutonium process and store large quantities of weapons-usable nuclear materials in forms vulnerable to diversion or theft by national or subnational groups. Proliferation resistance, an idea dating back at least as far as the International Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) of the late 1970s, is a loosely defined term referring to processes for chemical separation of SNF that do not extract weapons-usable materials in a purified form.

Driving Technological Surprise: DARPA’s Mission in a Changing World

DTIC Science & Technology

2013-04-01

a plethora of new weapons and techniques in the hands of many types of actors can and do threaten our way of life and endanger our democracy in...global affairs. And a look into the future only adds uncertainty. The proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons of mass destruction...electronic device is likely to get to the Warfighter when a prime contractor incorporates it into a weapon system development contract. In some cases, the

IMPROVED TECHNNOLOGY TO PREVENT ILLICIT TRAFFICKING IN NUCLEAR MATERIALS

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Richardson, J H

2005-07-20

The proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons (collectively known as weapons of mass destruction, or WMD) and the potential acquisition and use of WMD against the world by terrorists are extremely serious threats to international security. These threats are complex and interrelated. There are myriad routes to weapons of mass destruction--many different starting materials, material sources, and production processes. There are many possible proliferators--threshold countries, rogue states, state-sponsored or transnational terrorists groups, domestic terrorists, and even international crime organizations. Motives for acquiring and using WMD are similarly wide ranging--from a desire to change the regional power balance, deny accessmore » to a strategic area, or alter international policy to extortion, revenge, or hate. Because of the complexity of this threat landscape, no single program, technology, or capability--no silver bullet--can solve the WMD proliferation and terrorism problem. An integrated program is needed that addresses the WMD proliferation and terrorism problem from end to end, from prevention to detection, reversal, and response, while avoiding surprise at all stages, with different activities directed specifically at different types of WMD and proliferators. Radiation detection technologies are an important tool in the prevention of proliferation. A variety of new developments have enabled enhanced performance in terms of energy resolution, spatial resolution, predictive modeling and simulation, active interrogation, and ease of operation and deployment in the field. The radiation properties of nuclear materials, particularly highly enriched uranium (HEU), make the detection of smuggled nuclear materials technically difficult. A number of efforts are under way to devise improved detector materials and instruments and to identify novel signatures that could be detected. Key applications of this work include monitoring for radioactive materials at choke points, searching for nuclear materials, and developing instruments for response personnel.« less

The Indefinite Extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: A Hinderence or Help to Future Arms Control

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Pella, Peter J.

1996-05-01

The indefinite and "unconditional" extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was achieved almost one year ago today. This outcome was a major foreign policy goal of the Clinton Administration. Some critics of the NPT's indefinite extension claim that nuclear weapons states parties to the NPT have now legitimized their possession of nuclear weapons for all time and that there is no incentive for future nuclear arms control and disarmament measures. A discussion of how the indefinite extension of the NPT has affected the nuclear arms control landscape and the prospects for future disarmament measures will be discussed.

Nuclear Technology in War and Peace: A Study of Issues and Choices.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Shanebrook, J. Richard

This is the syllabus of a course that explores the technology of nuclear weapons and nuclear energy for electric power generation, and considers some problems of nuclear weapons proliferation and technical alternatives. It provides a course description, a course outline, a list of required readings, and information on the films shown in the…

Proliferation: Threat and Response

DTIC Science & Technology

2001-01-01

weapons program threatens Japan, South Korea, and U.S. forces and interests in the region. In North Africa and the Middle East, states of proliferation...fanatical terrorists or self-proclaimed apocalyptic prophets. The followers of Usama bin Laden have, in fact, already trained with toxic chemicals...18 SOUTH ASIA

Chemical and Biological Contract Manufacturing Services: Potential Proliferation Concerns and Impacts on Strategic Trade Controls

DOE PAGES

Carrera, Julie A.; Castiglioni, Andrew J.; Heine, Peter M.

2017-04-01

The use of contract manufacturing services in the chemical, pharmaceutical, and biotechnology industries has grown significantly in recent years, but the potential for such service providers to be exploited for chemical or biological weapons proliferation has garnered relatively little attention, despite the role of contract manufacturers in the A.Q. Khan nuclear proliferation network. Here, we examine the dual-use potential and global spread of chemical and biological contract manufacturing and their ramifications for related strategic trade controls (STCs). Hundreds of providers of dual-use contract services were found worldwide, but they were primarily located in jurisdictions with comprehensive STC regulations. This thenmore » provides some degree of protection against their misuse. However, the results outlined below also suggest that chemical and biological contract manufacturers are a critical community to target for STC outreach activities and efforts to increase industry compliance. Targeted outreach would help prevent contract manufacturing service providers from unwittingly contributing to the production and proliferation of chemical and biological weapons.« less

Chemical and Biological Contract Manufacturing Services: Potential Proliferation Concerns and Impacts on Strategic Trade Controls

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Carrera, Julie A.; Castiglioni, Andrew J.; Heine, Peter M.

The use of contract manufacturing services in the chemical, pharmaceutical, and biotechnology industries has grown significantly in recent years, but the potential for such service providers to be exploited for chemical or biological weapons proliferation has garnered relatively little attention, despite the role of contract manufacturers in the A.Q. Khan nuclear proliferation network. Here, we examine the dual-use potential and global spread of chemical and biological contract manufacturing and their ramifications for related strategic trade controls (STCs). Hundreds of providers of dual-use contract services were found worldwide, but they were primarily located in jurisdictions with comprehensive STC regulations. This thenmore » provides some degree of protection against their misuse. However, the results outlined below also suggest that chemical and biological contract manufacturers are a critical community to target for STC outreach activities and efforts to increase industry compliance. Targeted outreach would help prevent contract manufacturing service providers from unwittingly contributing to the production and proliferation of chemical and biological weapons.« less

Nuclear Weapons: Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

DTIC Science & Technology

2007-10-29

which has been done. Critics raised concerns about the implications of these policies for testing and new weapons. At present, Congress addresses...Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Most Recent Developments On October 24, Senator Jon Kyl delivered a speech critical of the CTBT and of Section 3122 in...future, but there are no plans to do so.’”5 Critics expressed concern about the implications of these policies for testing and new weapons. A statement

Worldwide Report, Nuclear Development and Proliferation

DTIC Science & Technology

1984-06-07

A 201204 JPRS-TND-84-013 7 June 1984 Worldwide Report NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT AND PROLIFERATION \\ y0& ^ KK0 %>$JJMXSTT JWRTF-Tnuyy...Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201. JPRS-TND-84-013 7 June 1984 WORLDWIDE REPORT NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT AND...But China by no means favors nuclear proliferation by helping other countries to develop nuclear weapons, he declared. China holds, he said, that

Nuclear Weapons: Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

DTIC Science & Technology

2007-11-30

itself, which has been done. Critics raised concerns about the implications of these policies for testing and new weapons. At present, Congress...CTBT in lieu of the current treaty.1 On October 24, Senator Jon Kyl delivered a speech critical of the CTBT and of Section 3122 in H.R. 1585, the FY2008...to do so.’”6 Critics expressed concern about the implications of these policies for testing and new weapons. A statement by Physicians for Social

Nuclear Winter Revisited: can it Make a Difference This Time?

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Schneider, S.

2006-12-01

Some 23 years ago, in the middle of a Cold War and the threat of a strategic nuclear weapons exchange between NATO and the Warsaw Pact nations, atmospheric scientists pointed out that the well-anticipated side effects of a large-scale nuclear war ozone depletion, radioactive contamination and some climatic effects had massively underestimated the more likely implications: massive fires, severe dimming and cooling beneath circulating smoke clouds, disruption to agriculture in non-combatant nations, severe loss of imports of food to already-food-deficient regions and major alterations to atmospheric circulation. While the specific consequences were dependent on both scenarios of weapons use and injections and removals of smoke and dust and other chemicals into the atmosphere, it was clear that this would be despite passionately argued uncertainties a large major additional effect. As further investigations of smoke removal, patchy transport, etc., were pursued, the basic concerns remained, but the magnitude calculated with one-dimensional models diminished creating an unfortunate media debate over nuclear winter vs. nuclear autumn. Of course, one can't grow summer crops in any autumn natural or nuclear but that concern often got lost in the contentious political debate. Of course, it was pointed out that anyone who required knowing the additional environmental consequences of a major nuclear exchange to be finally deterred was already so far from the reality of the direct effects of the blasts that they might never see the concerns. But for non-combatants, it was a major awakening of their inability to escape severe consequences of the troubles of others, even if they were bystanders in the east-west conflicts. Two decades later, things have radically changed: the prospect of a massive strategic nuclear exchange is greatly diminished good news but the possibility of limited regional exchanges or terrorist incidents is widely believed to have greatly increased bad news. Therefore, the re- examination in this AGU session of the entire subject of environmental and social after-effects of any nuclear weapons use is, unfortunately, once again timely. Hopefully it will convince anyone not already convinced based on conventional damages from nuclear weapons use of the urgent need to abate proliferation and monitor and control access to and potential capabilities of those who might contemplate using such weapons for some Strangelove-like strategic or ideological objective. The extent to which a scientific re-examination of the broader horrendous implications of any scale of use of nuclear weapons will deter those contemplating their use is questionable. However, it seems likely such research would increase the resolve of the large number of countries and institutions already pressing to prevent nuclear weapons use.

China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues

DTIC Science & Technology

2014-01-03

countries) for secret nuclear weapons facilities, while experts from China worked at a uranium mine at Saghand and a centrifuge facility (for uranium...declaration from North Korea for outside verification. 89 Barbara Opall -Rome and...that the China Guangfa Bank engaged in business with the DPRK’s arms dealer, Global Trading and Technology (a front for Korea Mining Development

Proliferation Control Regimes: Background and Status

DTIC Science & Technology

2012-10-25

States has signed such agreements with Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Belize, Croatia, Cyprus, Liberia, Malta, the Marshall Islands , Mongolia...Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), and the Australia Group. The informal Australia Group...biological agents or toxins “of types and in quantities that have no justification for peaceful purposes.” The missile nonproliferation regime is founded not

An Iranium bomb?

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Albright, D.

1995-07-01

This year, the nuclear proliferation spotlight has swung away from Iraq and North Korea, only to focus on Iran. Western intelligence agencies have assembled a substantial body of evidence suggesting that, although Iran signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), it is secretly pursuing a broad, organized effort to develop nuclear weapons. US officials say that Iran is attempting to acquire nuclear technologies that are not consistent with a strictly peaceful program. Intelligence agencies have detected procurement patterns that point to a weapons program. Iran has a multifaceted strategy to develop options to make nuclear weapons: Iran has sought, with limitedmore » success, to buy nuclear power and research facilities from many countries, particularly China and Russia; Iran has shopped quietly in many countries, particularly in Western and Eastern Europe, for a wide range of nuclear-related or dual-use nuclear items that might enable it to put together facilities to enrich uranium, separate plutonium, and make nuclear weapons. There is little public information about how effective this clandestine shopping has been or which countries have been contacted; There is no evidence that Iran has bought any fissile material - but not for wont of trying, and the matter continues to be scrutinized very closely.« less

The Non-Proliferation Treaty review: An American perspective

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Dunn, L.A.

1985-01-01

Since the entry into the force in March 1970, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has played a central part in this decades-long endeavor. The Treaty's specific undertakings have been carefully crafted to serve its three major objectives. The first, which was the driving force behind the initial push for the NPT, is to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. The second is to foster peaceful nuclear cooperation under safeguards. The third objective, added during the multilateral negotiation of the NPT, is to encourage good faith negotiations to end the nuclear arms race with a viewmore » to general and complete disarmament.« less

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Martz, Joseph C; Stevens, Patrice A; Branstetter, Linda

Until very recently, an evaluation of US policy regarding deterrence and the role of its nuclear weapons arsenal as a deterrent has been largely absent in the public debate. With President's Obama embrace of a goal of a future world without nuclear weapons, issues of nuclear policy and deterrence have just recently risen to the forefront of policy discussions. The traditional role of US nuclear weapons-to deter the use of nuclear weapons by other states-endures, but is no longer unique nor even predominant. In an increasingly multi-polar world, the US now faces growing risks of nuclear weapons proliferation; the spreadmore » of weapons of mass destruction generally to non-state, substate and transnational actors; cyber, space, economic, environmental and resource threats along with the application of numerous other forms of 'soft power' in ways that are inimical to national security and to global stability. What concept of deterrence should the US seek to maintain in the 21st Century? That question remains fluid and central to the current debate. Recently there has been a renewed focusing of attention on the role of US nuclear weapons and a national discussion about what the underlying policy should be. In this environment, both the United States and Russia have committed to drastic reductions in their nuclear arsenals, while still maintaining forces sufficient to ensure unacceptable consequence in response to acts of aggression. Further, the declared nuclear powers have maintained that a limited nuclear arsenal continues to provide insurance against uncertain developments in a changing world. In this environment of US and Russian stockpile reductions, all declared nuclear states have reiterated the central role which nuclear weapons continue to provide for their supreme national security interests. Given this new environment and the challenges of the next several decades, how might the United States structure its policy and forces with regard to nuclear weapons? Many competing objectives have been stated across the spectrum of political, social, and military thought. These objectives include goals of ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, recommitment to further downsizing of the nuclear arsenal, embracing a long-term goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons, limitations on both the production complex and upgrades to nuclear weapons and delivery systems, and controls and constraints to limit proliferation of nuclear materials and weapons, particularly to rogue states and terrorist groups.« less

Chemical-biological defense remote sensing: what's happening

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Carrico, John P.

1998-08-01

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) continues to be a serious threat to the security of the US. Proliferation of chemical and biological (CB) weapons is particularly disturbing, and the threats posed can be devastating. Critical elements of the US efforts to reduce and counter WMD proliferation include: (1) the location and characterization of WMD facilities and capabilities worldwide; (2) the ability to rapidly detect and identify the use of CB weapons for expeditious warning and reporting on the battlefield; and (3) the capability to mitigate deleterious consequences of a CB incident through effective protective and medical treatment measures. Remote sensing has been touted as a key technology in these efforts. Historically, the role of remote sensing in CB defense has been to provide early warning of an attack from an extended distance. However, additional roles for remote sensing in CB defense, as well as applications in related missions, are possible and should be pursued. This paper examines what has been happening in remote sensing over the past decade to address needs in this area. Accomplishments, emerging technologies, programmatic issues, and opportunities for the future are covered. The Department of Defence chemical- biological, the Department of Energy's Chemical Analysis by Laser Interrogation of Proliferation Effluents, and other agency related programs are examined. Also, the status of remote sensing in the commercial market arena for environmental monitoring, its relevance to the WMD counterproliferation program, and opportunities for technology transfer are discussed. A course of action for the future is recommended.

Nuclear energy and security

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

BLEJWAS,THOMAS E.; SANDERS,THOMAS L.; EAGAN,ROBERT J.

2000-01-01

Nuclear power is an important and, the authors believe, essential component of a secure nuclear future. Although nuclear fuel cycles create materials that have some potential for use in nuclear weapons, with appropriate fuel cycles, nuclear power could reduce rather than increase real proliferation risk worldwide. Future fuel cycles could be designed to avoid plutonium production, generate minimal amounts of plutonium in proliferation-resistant amounts or configurations, and/or transparently and efficiently consume plutonium already created. Furthermore, a strong and viable US nuclear infrastructure, of which nuclear power is a large element, is essential if the US is to maintain a leadershipmore » or even participatory role in defining the global nuclear infrastructure and controlling the proliferation of nuclear weapons. By focusing on new fuel cycles and new reactor technologies, it is possible to advantageously burn and reduce nuclear materials that could be used for nuclear weapons rather than increase and/or dispose of these materials. Thus, the authors suggest that planners for a secure nuclear future use technology to design an ideal future. In this future, nuclear power creates large amounts of virtually atmospherically clean energy while significantly lowering the threat of proliferation through the thoughtful use, physical security, and agreed-upon transparency of nuclear materials. The authors must develop options for policy makers that bring them as close as practical to this ideal. Just as Atoms for Peace became the ideal for the first nuclear century, they see a potential nuclear future that contributes significantly to power for peace and prosperity.« less

Nuclear threat in the post cold-war era. Monograph

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Kurey, W.S.

1995-05-14

This monograph discusses the nuclear threat that the United States faces following the downfall of the Soviet Union. The Russian and Chinese nuclear arsenals represent a formidable threat that must be countered and a new threat is emerging in the third world despite efforts to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The monograph reviews the current status of both the Russian and Chinese arsenals and lists the programs that are being undertaken to modernize and improve their respective nuclear capabilities. Both nations are taking significant steps to preserve and improve their nuclear strike capability. The proliferation of nuclearmore » weapons technology, fissile material, and ballistic missiles in the third world is an emerging threat to national security interests. The lack of appropriate security measures during the on-going dismantling of the former Soviet nuclear arsenal presents an opportunity for rogue states and terrorist organizations to readily obtain the materials to produce their own nuclear weapons.« less

An Important Issue: Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Castellano, Doc

2001-03-01

Historic Facts and Philosophy: In August, 1947, I participated in a secret meeting concerning the validity and use of a hydrogen bomb. I vigorously supported a ``Super Manhattan Project" to build an ``H" bomb. My philosophy at the time was `bigger and better,' to ensure that no nation attacked the U.S. Our retaliation with ``H" bombs vs. ``A" bombs would be too overwhelming for any nation to risk attacking us should they obtain their own ``A" bombs. Thus, all nations would be forced to use diplomacy. I am older and wiser, and am now convinced that World Test Ban Treaties, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and space free of any military weapons is the best policy for all nations and humanity. With current nuclear testing at nearby Yucca Flats, Nevada, Vandenberg AF/Missile site, Cal Tech, etc., I therefore propose that our new APS California Division form a three-person committee to tabulate all pertinent data and submit it to a qualified expert for review and further action. Comments and suggestions are invited.

Strategic forum. Number 70. Regional deterrence strategies for new proliferation threats

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Kahan, J.H.

1996-04-01

The deterrence of armed aggression against the United States, its vital national interests, or its allies has moved beyond the requirements of conventional force deterrence. The proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons requires a new strategy to ensure effective deterrence against their use by regional states that could not win in a conventional conflict with the United States. Because proliferation has expanded to a number of regional actors, a single strategy is unlikely to be sufficient in deterring states with varied motivations, and social, economic, religious, cultural, and political backgrounds. The Unified Commands-principally the Pacific, Central and Europeanmore » Commands- provide a ready-made framework in which general U.S. deterrence strategies can be tailored to each proliferant state While the Unified Commands would shape the individual deterrence strategies, the national command authority (NCA) would retain control of key decisions. Guidelines for NBC regional deterrence should include developing credible counterproliferation postures, profiling potential adversaries, tailoring our military capabilities to specific threats, integrating NBC preparedness into exercises and warplans, and actively pursuing coalitions designed to deter regional proliferators from threatening to use or using NBC weapons.« less

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the relationship

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Graham, Thomas Jr.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the most important international security arrangement that we have that is protecting the world community and this has been true for many years. But it did not happen by accident, it is a strategic bargain in which 184 states gave up the right forever to acquire the most powerful weapon ever created in exchange for a commitment from the five states allowed to keep nuclear weapons under the NPT (U.S., U.K., Russia, France and China), to share peaceful nuclear technology and to engage in disarmament negotiations aimed at the ultimate elimination of their nuclearmore » stockpiles. The most important part of this is the comprehensive nuclear test ban (CTBT); the thinking by the 184 NPT non-nuclear weapon states was and is that they understand that the elimination of nuclear weapon stockpiles is a long way off, but at least the NPT nuclear weapon states could stop testing the weapons. The CTBT has been ratified by 161 states but by its terms it can only come into force if 44 nuclear potential states ratify; 36 have of the 44 have ratified it, the remaining eight include the United States and seven others, most of whom are in effect waiting for the United States. No state has tested a nuclear weapon-except for complete outlier North Korea-in 15 years. There appears to be no chance that the U.S. Senate will approve the CTBT for ratification in the foreseeable future, but the NPT may not survive without it. Perhaps it is time to consider an interim measure, for the UN Security Council to declare that any future nuclear weapon test any time, anywhere is a 'threat to peace and security', in effect a violation of international law, which in today's world it clearly would be.« less

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the relationship

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Graham, Thomas, Jr.

2014-05-01

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the most important international security arrangement that we have that is protecting the world community and this has been true for many years. But it did not happen by accident, it is a strategic bargain in which 184 states gave up the right forever to acquire the most powerful weapon ever created in exchange for a commitment from the five states allowed to keep nuclear weapons under the NPT (U.S., U.K., Russia, France and China), to share peaceful nuclear technology and to engage in disarmament negotiations aimed at the ultimate elimination of their nuclear stockpiles. The most important part of this is the comprehensive nuclear test ban (CTBT); the thinking by the 184 NPT non-nuclear weapon states was and is that they understand that the elimination of nuclear weapon stockpiles is a long way off, but at least the NPT nuclear weapon states could stop testing the weapons. The CTBT has been ratified by 161 states but by its terms it can only come into force if 44 nuclear potential states ratify; 36 have of the 44 have ratified it, the remaining eight include the United States and seven others, most of whom are in effect waiting for the United States. No state has tested a nuclear weapon-except for complete outlier North Korea-in 15 years. There appears to be no chance that the U.S. Senate will approve the CTBT for ratification in the foreseeable future, but the NPT may not survive without it. Perhaps it is time to consider an interim measure, for the UN Security Council to declare that any future nuclear weapon test any time, anywhere is a "threat to peace and security", in effect a violation of international law, which in today's world it clearly would be.

The nuclear weapons ban treaty and the non-proliferation regime.

PubMed

Egeland, Kjølv; Hugo, Torbjørn Graff; Løvold, Magnus; Nystuen, Gro

2018-06-18

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in July 2017, has been met with mixed reactions. While supporters have described the Treaty as a watershed in the struggle for disarmament, others have expressed fervent opposition. One of the most serious charges levelled at the TPNW is that it will undermine the long-standing nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), by many regarded as a cornerstone of the international security architecture. Critics have contended that the new agreement risks eroding the system of safeguards designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, derailing disarmament efforts within the NPT framework, and aggravating political division between nuclear and non-nuclear powers. Investigating the legal and political cogency of these arguments, we argue that not only may the TPNW be reconciled with existing legal instruments, the new Treaty supports and reinforces key norms and institutions on which the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime is based. Furthermore, any technical challenges that might arise in the future may be addressed at meetings of states party; the drafters envisioned a dynamic process of institutional adaptations and expansion. The main challenge facing advocates of the Treaty is political: convincing the nuclear-armed states to disarm.

China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues

DTIC Science & Technology

2010-08-16

nuclear weapons facilities, while experts from China worked at a uranium mine at Saghand and a centrifuge facility (for uranium enrichment) near...brief interruptions.”85 84 Barbara Opall -Rome and Vago Muradian, “Bush Privately Lauds...confiscated a rare metal used to produce alloy steel (called vanadium) being smuggled to North Korea. In the same month, China’s NHI Shenyang Mining

Advanced Quantification of Plutonium Ionization Potential to Support Nuclear Forensic Evaluations by Resonance Ionization Mass Spectrometry

DTIC Science & Technology

2015-06-01

Research Committee nm Nanometer Np Neptunium NPT Treaty of Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons ns Nanosecond ps Picosecond Pu Plutonium RIMS...discovery—credited also to Fritz Strassman— scientists realized these reactions also emitted secondary neutrons . These secondary neutrons could in...destructive capabilities of nuclear fission and atomic weapons . Figure 1. Uranium-235 Fission chain reaction, from [1

Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues

DTIC Science & Technology

2012-06-26

145 Abdul Mannan, “Preventing Nuclear Terrorism in Pakistan: Sabotage of a Spent Fuel Cask or a Commercial ...Pakistan’s Civil Nuclear Program.” Some analysts argue that spent nuclear fuel is more vulnerable when being transported . 146 Martellini, 2008. 147...produced fissile material for its nuclear weapons using gas-centrifuge-based uranium enrichment technology, which it mastered by the mid-1980s

Extended Nuclear Deterrence for Europe Without Forward-based Weapons

DTIC Science & Technology

2012-02-15

financial costs of nuclear burden sharing, bolsters safety and security and further reduces proliferation risks. 22 Bibliography Bildt, Carl and... Sagan , Scott D. and Waltz, Kenneth N. The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed. W. W. Norton and Company New York, NY and London...Point. Center for International Relations, Reports and Analyses. Konrad-Adenauer Foundation, Warsaw, 2011, 2. 30 Bildt, Carl and Sikorski, Radek

JPRS Report, Proliferation Issues

DTIC Science & Technology

1991-08-08

from its processing plant at Valindaba, and fuel-fabrication plants at Valindaba and Pelindaba. where fuel rods for use at the Koeberg nuclear-power...construction of the fourth one. The pulsed reactor uses special elements of nuclear fuel The site of the proposed fourth nuclear power plant can enabling...chemical, and biological weapons, including delivery systems and the transfer of weapons-relevant technologies.] AFRICA SOUTH AFRICA Civilian Uses for

Proliferation: Threat and response

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

NONE

1996-04-01

During the height of the Cold War, the Russian physicist Andre Sakharov said, `Reducing the risk of annihilating humanity in a nuclear war carries an absolute priority over all other considerations.` The end of the Cold War has reduced the threat of global nuclear war, but today a new threat is rising from the global spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Hostile groups and nations have tried - or have been able - to obtain these weapons, the technology, and homegrown ability to make them or ballistic missiles that can deliver the massive annihilation, poison, and death of thesemore » weapons hundreds of miles away. For rogue nations, these weapons are a ticket to power, stature, and confidence in regional war.« less

Testing three explanations of the emergence of weapon carrying in peer context: the roles of aggression, victimization, and the social network.

PubMed

Dijkstra, Jan Kornelis; Gest, Scott D; Lindenberg, Siegwart; Veenstra, René; Cillessen, Antonius H N

2012-04-01

To examine the relative contribution of weapon carrying of peers, aggression, and victimization to weapon carrying of male and female adolescents over time. Data were derived from a population-based sample of male (N = 224) and female (N = 244) adolescents followed from grade 10 (M age = 15.5) to grade 11 (M age = 16.5). Peer networks were derived from best friend nominations. Self-reports were used to assess weapon carrying. Aggression and victimization were assessed using both self- and peer-reports. Use of dynamic social network modeling (SIENA) allowed prediction of weapon carrying in grade 11 as a function of weapon carrying of befriended peers, aggression, and victimization in grade 10, while selection processes and structural network effects (reciprocity and transitivity) were controlled for. Peer influence processes accounted for changes in weapon carrying over time. Self-reported victimization decreased weapon carrying 1 year later. Peer-reported victimization increased the likelihood of weapon carrying, particularly for highly aggressive adolescents. Boys were more likely to carry weapons than girls, but the processes associated with weapon carrying did not differ for boys and girls. These findings revealed that, in this population-based sample, weapon carrying of best friends, as well as aggression, contributed to the proliferation of weapons in friendship networks, suggesting processes of peer contagion as well as individual vulnerability to weapon carrying. Copyright © 2012 Society for Adolescent Health and Medicine. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Difficulties in Determining If Nuclear Training of Foreigners Contributes to Weapons Proliferation. Report by the Comptroller General of the United States.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Congress of the U.S., Washington, DC. House Committee on Appropriations.

The General Accounting Office (GAO) conclusion that it is impossible to determine the contribution of U.S. nuclear training of foreigners to the spread of nuclear weapons is presented. The GAO position is that there is no way to ascertain the true intentions of foreign nationals being trained or the motivations of their countries. Issues…

India-U.S. Relations

DTIC Science & Technology

2006-07-31

military exercises. Discussions of possi- ble sales to India of major U.S.-built weapons systems are ongoing. Continuing U.S. interest in South Asia ...India and Pakistan. The United States also seeks to curtail the proliferation of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles in South Asia . Both India and...RL33515, Combat Aircraft Sales to South Asia .) ! Rates of separatist-related violence in India-controlled Kashmir have spiked following a May massacre of

Beyond Nunn-Lugar: Curbing the Next Wave of Weapons Proliferation Threat from Russia

DTIC Science & Technology

2002-04-01

international commerce in nuclear weapons-usable fuels. In addition to identifying these differences, the study’s working groups used competitive ...that Russian technical students continue to attract in international competitions , etc. 52. Author interviews with MFTI, St. Petersburg...book is different from other studies of U.S.-Russian cooperation because it relies on competitive strategies, which detail how best to pit one’s

Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues

DTIC Science & Technology

2009-07-30

Pakistan: Sabotage of a Spent Fuel Cask or a Commercial Irradiation Source in Transport ,” in Pakistan’s Nuclear Future, 2008; Martellini, 2008. 79...that Pakistan’s strategic nuclear assets could be obtained by terrorists, or used by elements in the Pakistani government. Chair of the Joint Chiefs...that gave additional urgency to the program. Pakistan produced fissile material for its nuclear weapons using gas-centrifuge-based uranium

Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues

DTIC Science & Technology

2010-10-07

Pakistan: Sabotage of a Spent Fuel Cask or a Commercial Irradiation Source in Transport ,” in Pakistan’s Nuclear Future, 2008; Martellini, 2008. 99...prevent unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons, as well as contribute to physical security of storage facilities and personnel reliability... nuclear assets could be obtained by terrorists, or used by elements in the Pakistani government. Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael

Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues

DTIC Science & Technology

2009-10-15

and technical measures to prevent unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons, as well as contribute to physical security of storage ...Talks On Nuclear Security,” The Boston Globe, May 5, 2009. 79 Abdul Mannan, “Preventing Nuclear Terrorism in Pakistan: Sabotage of a Spent Fuel Cask or...a Commercial Irradiation Source in Transport ,” in Pakistan’s Nuclear Future, 2008; Martellini, 2008. 80 Martellini, 2008. 81 For more information

The Inadvertent Effect of Assurance on Nuclear Proliferation

DTIC Science & Technology

2013-02-14

those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US government, the Department of Defense, or Air University. In...umbrella and a state’s normative desire to be viewed and treated favorably by the international community dissuades nuclear weapons development.2...desire to be viewed and treated favorably by the international community dissuades nuclear weapons development.24 Tatsumi and Schoff suggest the best

Social Data Analysis by Non-Linear Imbedding

DTIC Science & Technology

2013-09-20

Fig. 1 shows this dimenion-reduced galaxy. This example is chosen to illustrate how our “ history independent” techniques can infer major historical...DISTRIBUTION A: Distribution approved for public release. 1989 1990 1991 Middle East 2 7 6 Weapon Nonproliferation 2 6 5 Anti- Apartheid & Human Rights...the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons) #3570 (Status of the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the crime of Apartheid

Leo Szilard Lectureship Award Talk: Controlling and eliminating nuclear-weapon materials

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

von Hippel, Frank

2010-02-01

Fissile material -- in practice plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) -- is the essential ingredient in nuclear weapons. Controlling and eliminating fissile material and the means of its production is therefore the common denominator for nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and the prevention of nuclear terrorism. From a fundamentalist anti-nuclear-weapon perspective, the less fissile material there is and the fewer locations where it can be found, the safer a world we will have. A comprehensive fissile-material policy therefore would have the following elements: *Consolidation of all nuclear-weapon-usable materials at a minimum number of high-security sites; *A verified ban on the production of HEU and plutonium for weapons; *Minimization of non-weapon uses of HEU and plutonium; and *Elimination of all excess stocks of plutonium and HEU. There is activity on all these fronts but it is not comprehensive and not all aspects are being pursued vigorously or competently. It is therefore worthwhile to review the situation. )

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Harvey, J.R.; Rubin, U.

Missiles themselves are not weapons of mass destruction; they do not give states the ability to wreak unimaginable destruction, or to radically shift the balance of power, as nuclear weapons do. Hence, the primary focus of nonproliferation efforts should remain on weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, rather than on one of the many possible means of delivering them. Moreover, as discussed in more detail below, advanced strike aircraft can also be effective in delivering nuclear weapons, and are generally more effective than ballistic missiles for delivering conventional or chemical ordnance. Ultimately, if the industrialized nations seriously desire tomore » control the spread of delivery means for weapons of mass destruction, they need to consider bringing controls over ballistic missiles and advanced strike aircraft more into balance. At the same time, while efforts to control ballistic missile proliferation - centered on the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) - have had some successes and could be strengthened, US policy will be most effective if it recognizes two key realities: the spread of ballistic missiles cannot be as comprehensively controlled as the spread of nuclear weapons, nor need it be as comprehensively controlled.« less

Taking a stand against nuclear proliferation: the pediatrician's role.

PubMed

Newman, Thomas B

2008-05-01

Nuclear weapons pose a grave threat to the health of children. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which for almost 40 years has limited the spread of nuclear weapons, is in danger of unraveling. At the 2000 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference, 180 countries, including the United States, agreed on 13 practical steps to implement Article VI of the treaty, which calls for nuclear disarmament. However, the United States has acted in contravention of several of those disarmament steps, with announced plans to develop new nuclear weapons and to maintain a large nuclear arsenal for decades to come. Pediatricians, working individually and through organizations such as the American Academy of Pediatrics and International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, can educate the public and elected officials regarding the devastating and irremediable effects of nuclear weapons on children and the need for policies that comply with and strengthen the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, rather than undermining it. For the children of the world, our goal must be a nuclear weapons convention (similar to the chemical and biological weapons conventions) that would prohibit these weapons globally.

The weapons effect.

PubMed

Benjamin, Arlin James; Bushman, Brad J

2018-02-01

In some societies, weapons are plentiful and highly visible. This review examines recent trends in research on the weapons effect, which is the finding that the mere presence of weapons can prime people to behave aggressively. The General Aggression Model provides a theoretical framework to explain why the weapons effect occurs. This model postulates that exposure to weapons increases aggressive thoughts and hostile appraisals, thus explaining why weapons facilitate aggressive behavior. Data from meta-analytic reviews are consistent with the General Aggression Model. These findings have important practical as well as theoretical implications. They suggest that the link between weapons and aggression is very strong in semantic memory, and that merely seeing a weapon can make people more aggressive. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Domke, W.K.; Krantz, S.; Stulberg, A.

This report is an overview of the discussions and papers given at a workshop and brainstorming secession on missile proliferation. The relationship between missiles and nuclear and chemical weapons are also discussed. (JEF)

China's Case Against the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Rationality and Morality.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Hunt, Geoffrey

1986-01-01

China and other major Third World nations have refused to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). While this position appears morally unjustified and even irrational, their claim that the treaty is discriminatory merits serious attention. Only if certain aspects of this claim are accepted by the nuclear weapons signatories, does a moral…

Shifting Focus: Assessing the Role of U.S. Army Special Forces in the Counterproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

DTIC Science & Technology

2014-06-01

4 The Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo desired a capability so much that they purchased a ranch in Western Australia in order to mine uranium and even...Security, eds. James A. Russell and James J. Wirtz (New York: Routledge, 2008), 164. 9 interdict suspected proliferation activities would meet...Proliferation Efforts,” in Globalization and WMD Proliferation: Terrorism, Transnational Networks, and International Security, eds. James A. Russell

The Next Arms Race

DTIC Science & Technology

2012-07-01

to curb the proliferation of the means of deliv- ery for weapons of mass destruction. Looking ahead, it will be of critical importance to seek...pects, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002, p. 91. 27. As to how many nuclear weapons China has, no one knows. A sharp critic of an...in Siberia and the Far East, where Chinese military modernization has moved the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) from a mass industri- al army built to

Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues

DTIC Science & Technology

2010-02-04

Terrorism in Pakistan: Sabotage of a Spent Fuel Cask or a Commercial Irradiation Source in Transport ,” in Pakistan’s Nuclear Future, 2008; Martellini, 2008...measures to prevent unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons, as well as contribute to physical security of storage facilities and personnel...strategic nuclear assets could be obtained by terrorists, or used by elements in the Pakistani government. Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral

Vulnerability assessment of a space based weapon platform electronic system exposed to a thermonuclear weapon detonation

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Perez, C. L.; Johnson, J. O.

Rapidly changing world events, the increased number of nations with inter-continental ballistic missile capability, and the proliferation of nuclear weapon technology will increase the number of nuclear threats facing the world today. Monitoring these nation's activities and providing an early warning and/or intercept system via reconnaissance and surveillance satellites and space based weapon platforms is a viable deterrent against a surprise nuclear attack. However, the deployment of satellite and weapon platform assets in space will subject the sensitive electronic equipment to a variety of natural and man-made radiation environments. These include Van Allen Belt protons and electrons; galactic and solar flare protons; and neutrons, gamma rays, and x-rays from intentionally detonated fission and fusion weapons. In this paper, the MASH vl.0 code system is used to estimate the dose to the critical electronics components of an idealized space based weapon platform from neutron and gamma-ray radiation emitted from a thermonuclear weapon detonation in space. Fluence and dose assessments were performed for the platform fully loaded, and in several stages representing limited engagement scenarios. The results indicate vulnerabilities to the Command, Control, and Communication bay instruments from radiation damage for a nuclear weapon detonation for certain source/platform orientations. The distance at which damage occurs will depend on the weapon yield (n,(gamma)/kiloton) and size (kilotons).

On The Export Control Of High Speed Imaging For Nuclear Weapons Applications

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Watson, Scott Avery; Altherr, Michael Robert

Since the Manhattan Project, the use of high-speed photography, and its cousins flash radiography1 and schieleren photography have been a technological proliferation concern. Indeed, like the supercomputer, the development of high-speed photography as we now know it essentially grew out of the nuclear weapons program at Los Alamos2,3,4. Naturally, during the course of the last 75 years the technology associated with computers and cameras has been export controlled by the United States and others to prevent both proliferation among non-P5-nations and technological parity among potential adversaries among P5 nations. Here we revisit these issues as they relate to high-speed photographicmore » technologies and make recommendations about how future restrictions, if any, should be guided.« less

Nuclear proliferation: Will the Soviet Union's collapse spawn a new arms race

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Griffin, R.D.

Almost 30 years ago, in the midst of the US-Soviet arms race, President John F. Kennedy warned of the danger of nuclear proliferation. Ironically, now that the Cold War is over, the prospect has become a reality. The collapse of the Soviet Union may have calmed fears of a nuclear Armageddon, but it has aroused new concerns about the spread of nuclear weapons. More than a dozen nations either have or are feverishly trying to develop nuclear arsenals, including Third World nations riven by religious and territorial disputes. If the world fails to contain the spread of nuclear-weapons technology, themore » balance of power that kept relative peace during the four decades of the Cold War may be displaced by a balance of terror.« less

15 CFR Supplement No. 1 to Part 766 - Guidance on Charging and Penalty Determinations in Settlement of Administrative Enforcement Cases

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... based on nuclear, biological, and chemical weapon proliferation, missile technology proliferation, and... are relevant to the application of this guidance to their cases, to whether a violation has in fact... question—for example, export of items subject to nuclear controls to a country with a poor record of...

15 CFR Supplement No. 1 to Part 766 - Guidance on Charging and Penalty Determinations in Settlement of Administrative Enforcement Cases

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... based on nuclear, biological, and chemical weapon proliferation, missile technology proliferation, and... are relevant to the application of this guidance to their cases, to whether a violation has in fact... question—for example, export of items subject to nuclear controls to a country with a poor record of...

3 CFR - Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to the Risk of Nuclear Proliferation Created...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 3 The President 1 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to the Risk of Nuclear Proliferation Created by the Accumulation of Weapons-Useable Fissile Material in the Territory of the Russian Federation Presidential Documents Other Presidential Documents Notice of June 18, 2009 Continuation of the National...

3 CFR - Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to the Risk of Nuclear Proliferation Created...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... 3 The President 1 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to the Risk of Nuclear Proliferation Created by the Accumulation of Weapons-Usable Fissile Material in the Territory of the Russian Federation Presidential Documents Other Presidential Documents Notice of June 17, 2011 Continuation of the National...

Iran and Iraq - the proliferation challenge. Strategic research report

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Jordan, F.R.

1996-04-15

Worldwide proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles has been on the rise since the end of the Cold War. This escalation has brought a new set of challenges to post-Cold War strategists and policymakers. This study focus on the impact of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. It assesses the possibility of Iran`s and Iraq`s ability to develop a nuclear capability within the next twenty to thirty years. United States` strategy and policy to counter this potential is also considered.

Nuclear Weapons: Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

DTIC Science & Technology

2007-05-24

remain current. It indicated plans to reduce the time between a decision to conduct a nuclear test and the test itself, which has been done. Critics ...over the Summit,” Manila Bulletin, August 27, 2005. Critics expressed concern about the implications of these policies for testing and new weapons...force, seek the opportunity to design and build new nuclear weapons, and abandon a ten-year-old moratorium on nuclear weapons testing.”8 Another critic

The new politics of missile proliferation

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Karp, A.

1996-10-01

The author addresses the most consequential proliferation battle of the 1990s which occurred in Washington over the interpretation of the long-term threat to the United States from ballistic missiles. In the early 1970s, the stabilization of the US-Soviet strategic relationship led to new disputes over the other side`s future intentions, seen most graphically in Western debates over the implications of the Soviet SS-18 and SS-20 missile programs. Today, in much the same way, proliferation politics has matured to the point that surprises are few and the most challenging problem is anticipating the more distant future. Washington`s ballistic missile proliferation battlemore » was sparked by National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 95-19, entitled {open_quotes}Emerging Threats to North America During the Next 15 Years,{close_quotes} released by the National Intelligence Council in November 1995. This document updated the evidence of regional missile programs reviewed in a similar report issued in 1993, and recapitulated the previous finding that {open_quotes}No country, other than the major declared nuclear powers, will develop or otherwise acquire a ballistic missile in the next 15 years that could threatened the contiguous 48 states or Canada.{close_quotes} The new report confirmed what several other studies of missile proliferation had already established: that besides the five nuclear-weapon states (the United States, Russia, China, France and Britain), only India, Israel and Japan are in a position to develop an ICBM during the foreseeable future, and while all have relevant capabilities, none are undertaking the steps necessary to develop an actual ICBM.« less

Leo Szilard Lectureship Award: Science Matters - Technical Dimensions of Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Agreements

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Timbie, James

2017-01-01

Agreements to reduce nuclear arms and prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons are technical as well as political documents. They must be both technically sound and politically acceptable. This presentation illustrates technical aspects of arms control and non-proliferation agreements, with examples from SALT I, INF, the HEU Agreement, START, and the Iran nuclear negotiations, drawing on 44 years of personal experience in the negotiation of these agreements. The lecture is designed to convey an appreciation of the role that individuals with technical training can play in diplomatic efforts to reduce nuclear forces and prevent nuclear proliferation.

Nuclear Proliferation Factbook. Prepared for the Subcommittees on Arms Control, International Security and Science and on International Economic Policy and Trade of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives and the Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation, and Federal Processes of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, 99th Congress, 1st session.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Library of Congress, Washington, DC. Congressional Research Service.

To provide a handy reference for those concerned with ways to avoid the further spread, or proliferation, of nuclear weapons, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs have since 1977 sponsored periodic publication of the Nuclear Proliferation Factbook. This fourth edition of the factbook includes a…

31 CFR 544.702 - Pre-Penalty Notice; settlement.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

...) OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PROLIFERATORS... violator, but any oral communication with the Office of Foreign Assets Control prior to a written...

Worldwide Emerging Environmental Issues Affecting the U.S. Military. July 2006 - December 2006

DTIC Science & Technology

2006-12-01

and Biological Safety Eleventh Chemical Weapons Convention Better International Controls Needed to Prevent Bioterrorism Human Biomonitoring for...Environmental Cooperation to Increase Enforcement of Environmental Regulations and Public Participation Sixth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons ...scanning reports.] [September 2006. Military Implications, Sources] Chemical and Biological Safey Eleventh Chemical Weapons Convention The 11th

The Continued Evolution of U.S. Law of Armed Conflict Implementation: Implications for the U.S. Military

DTIC Science & Technology

2015-01-01

making independent deci - sions to fire on a target • nonlethal weapons, including directed energy weapons, acoustic weapons, and electrical weapons xiv...and the deci - sion to end the war to prevent needless slaughter made sense within the context of Operation Desert Storm. Clearly, the Coalition objec...tive of forcing Saddam Hussein from Kuwait was attained. These deci - sions also evidenced increasingly restrictive policies implementing the LOAC

The continuing risk of nuclear war.

PubMed

McCoy, Ronald

2007-01-01

Climate change and nuclear war are currently the most dangerous challenges to human civilisation and survival. The effects of climate change are now sufficient to persuade many governments to take effective measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Today there are about 27,000 nuclear warheads, many at least ten times more powerful than the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs, and a meaningful medical response to a nuclear attack is impossible. Nevertheless, the threat of nuclear war does not raise public concern, and indeed the nuclear-weapon states are upgrading their capability. The only effective preventive measure is the abolition of nuclear weapons. Steps towards this include: a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, for the nuclear weapon states to observe their obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to enter into force. The ultimate need is for a Nuclear Weapons Convention; International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War have launched an International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear weapons (ICAN) to promote a NWC.

Chemical warfare, past and future. Study project

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Tzihor, A.

1992-05-15

World War I was arena for the first use of chemical warfare. The enormous tactical success brought about by this first time use of chemical weapons caused the continued development of more sophisticated tactics and weapons in this category of unconventional warfare. This phenomenon has carried through to today. However, at present, because of technological developments, the global economic situation, and political factors, coupled with the inability of the western world to control the proliferation of chemical weapons, a situation weapon of mass destruction. Recent use by Iraq against Kurdish civilian indicates that chemical warfare is no longer limited tomore » the battlefield. The western nations have a need to understand the risk. This paper conducts an analysis of past lessons and the factors which will affect the use of chemical warfare in the future. From this analysis, the paper reaches conclusions concerning the significant threat chemical weapons pose for the entire world in the not too distant future.« less

Strategic implications of the succession of Kim Jong IL for US foreign policy towards North Korea. Master`s thesis, 2 August 1994-2 June 1995

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

McElree, J.A.

1995-06-02

This study analyzes the strategic implications of the dynastic succession of Kim Jong IL for U.S. foreign policy towards North Korea. The proliferation of nuclear weapons by North Korea threatens vital U.S. interests in Northeast Asia and challenges U.S. regional and global leadership. In order to properly respond to the North Korean nuclear threat, it is essential to understand the man who will dictate North Korean actions--Kim Jong IL. The study examines Kim Jong Il`s background, training, experience, personality, leadership characteristics, and the challenges he will face. The analysis of Kim Jong IL indicates that he is a rational actormore » who has and will continue to act in a rational manner in pursuit of his desired ends. The framework for analysis is the Strategic Estimate Process. Alternative courses of action are developed using the four elements of national power. The study identifies the strategic implications of probable North Korean actions and recommends appropriate U.S. courses of action on the basis of feasibility, acceptability, and suitability in achieving U.S. objectives in support of U.S. interests.« less

Some less conventional options for plutonium disposal

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Stoll, Dr. Wolfgang, Prof.

2000-07-01

Disposition of weapons Pu (W-Pu) aims at the replacement of military access restrictions by inherent longlasting technical barriers to make the return into the weapons state difficult and not rewarding anymore. At the time of the NAS-study in 1994, two ways were perceived to be mature and selected: Fissioning of W-Pu as LWR-MOX and the disposal in a vitrified radionuclide-spiked form.1 Both options since have been questioned for equality, met different acceptance at both superpowers and showed slow progress. A criterion to measure disarmament would be the amount of W-Pu in the different proliferation resistant forms, multiplied by the effort needed for each form to return to weapons quality.

Proliferation resistance assessment of various methods of spent nuclear fuel storage and disposal

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Kollar, Lenka

Many countries are planning to build or already are building new nuclear power plants to match their growing energy needs. Since all nuclear power plants handle nuclear materials that could potentially be converted and used for nuclear weapons, they each present a nuclear proliferation risk. Spent nuclear fuel presents the largest build-up of nuclear material at a power plant. This is a proliferation risk because spent fuel contains plutonium that can be chemically separated and used for a nuclear weapon. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards spent fuel in all non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Various safeguards methods are in use at nuclear power plants and research is underway to develop safeguards methods for spent fuel in centralized storage or underground storage and disposal. Each method of spent fuel storage presents different proliferation risks due to the nature of the storage method and the safeguards techniques that are utilized. Previous proliferation resistance and proliferation risk assessments have mainly compared nuclear material through the whole fuel cycle and not specifically focused on spent fuel storage. This project evaluates the proliferation resistance of the three main types of spent fuel storage: spent fuel pool, dry cask storage, and geological repository. The proliferation resistance assessment methodology that is used in this project is adopted from previous work and altered to be applicable to spent fuel storage. The assessment methodology utilizes various intrinsic and extrinsic proliferation-resistant attributes for each spent fuel storage type. These attributes are used to calculate a total proliferation resistant (PR) value. The maximum PR value is 1.00 and a greater number means that the facility is more proliferation resistant. Current data for spent fuel storage in the United States and around the world was collected. The PR values obtained from this data are 0.49 for the spent fuel pool, 0.42 for dry cask storage, 0.36 for the operating geological repository, and 0.28 for the closed geological repository. Therefore, the spent fuel pool is currently the most proliferation resistant method for storing spent fuel. The extrinsic attributes, mainly involving safeguards measures, affect the total PR value the most. As a result, several recommendations are made to improve the proliferation resistance of spent fuel. These recommendations include employing more advanced safeguards measures, such as verification techniques and remote monitoring, for dry cask storage and the geological repository. Dry cask storage facilities should also be located at the plant and in a secure building to minimize the proliferation risk. Finally, the cost-benefit analysis of increased safeguards needs to be considered. Taking these recommendations into account, the PR values of dry cask storage and the closed geological would be significantly increased, to 0.57 and 0.51, respectively. As a result, with increased safeguards to the safeguards level of the spent fuel pool, dry cask storage would be the most proliferation resistant method to store spent fuel. Therefore, the IAEA should continue to develop remote monitoring and cask storage verification techniques in order to improve the proliferation resistance of spent fuel.

Perceived popularity of adolescents who use weapons in violence and adolescents who only carry weapons.

PubMed

Wallace, Lacey N

2017-01-01

Prior research has found that persistently delinquent youth or more violent youth were less popular than their less delinquent peers (Young, 2013). However, recent research has also found that weapon carrying is associated with being more popular in adolescence (Dijkstra et al., 2010). The present paper examines the perceived popularity of adolescents who carry weapons in comparison to those who both carry and use weapons in acts of violence or threatened violence. Data consist of two waves from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent to Adult Health. Analyses use OLS regression with lagged predictors. This paper found no differences in number of friends between weapon carriers and weapon users. However, among both male and female gang members, those who did not use or carry weapons (abstainers) named significantly fewer friends than weapon users. Among females, weapon abstainers both named and were named by significantly more people than weapon users. These differences were not observed for males. Implications of these results and directions for future research are discussed.

Nuclear Coexistence: Rethinking U.S. Policy to Promote Stability in an Era of Proliferation

DTIC Science & Technology

1994-04-01

The Spread of Nuclear Weapons 1989 -90 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990). 22. See William C. Martel and Steven E. Miller, "Controlling Borders and Nuclear...Security, Fall 1989 , Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 140-41, for J. Robert Oppenheimer’s concerns about the dangers of the develop- ment of thermonuclear weapons. 4...Paradox of Technology," International Security, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Fall 1989 ), pp. 198-202. 6. Some argue that the U.S. strategy has relatively little

A different kind of weapon focus: simulated training with ballistic weapons reduces change blindness.

PubMed

Taylor, J Eric T; Witt, Jessica K; Pratt, Jay

2017-01-01

Attentional allocation is flexibly altered by action-related priorities. Given that tools - and specifically weapons - can affect attentional allocation, we asked whether training with a weapon or holding a weapon during search would affect change detection. In three experiments, participants searched for changes to agents, shootable objects, or environments in the popular flicker paradigm. Participants trained with a simulated weapon or watched a video from the same training perspective and then searched for changes while holding a weapon or a control object. Results show an effect of training, highlighting the importance of sensorimotor experience for the action-relevant allocation of attention, and a possible interaction between training and the object held during search. Simulated training with ballistic weapons reduces change blindness. This result has implications for the interaction between tool use and attentional allocation.

Mortality associated with use of weapons in armed conflicts, wartime atrocities, and civilian mass shootings: literature review

PubMed Central

Coupland, Robin M; Meddings, David R

1999-01-01

Objective To determine the implications of variation in mortality associated with use of weapons in different contexts. Design Literature review. Settings Armed conflicts and civilian mass shootings, 1929-96. Main outcome measure Mortality from wounds. Results During the fighting of war the number of people wounded is at least twice the number killed and may be 13 times as high; this ratio of the number wounded to the number killed results from the impact of a weapon system on human beings in the particular context of war. When firearms are used against people who are immobilised, in a confined space, or unable to defend themselves the wounded to killed ratio has been lower than 1 or even 0. Conclusions Mortality from firearms depends not only on the technology of the weapon or its ammunition but also on the context in which it is used. The increased mortality resulting from the use of firearms in situations other than war requires a complex interaction of factors explicable in terms of wound ballistics and the psychology of the user. Understanding these factors has implications for recognition of war crimes. In addition, the lethality of conventional weapons may be increased if combatants are disabled by the new non-lethal weapons beforehand; this possibility requires careful legal examination within the framework of the Geneva Conventions. Key messagesMortality from firearms varies according to the context in which they are usedIn war the number of people wounded is at least twice the number killedThe number killed may be greater than the number wounded when firearms are used against people who are immobilised, in a confined space, or unable to defend themselvesRecognising how the wounded to killed ratio varies has implications for recognising war crimesCombining use of weapons that are designed to incapacitate with use of conventional weapons requires examination under the law of war PMID:10445920

The nuclear present. A guide to recent books on nuclear war, weapons, the peace movement, and related issues, with a chronology of nuclear events, 1789-1991

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Burns, G.

The Nuclear Present brings the interested reader up-to-date on significant English-language books about nuclear weapons and related topics, identifying primarily important works of nuclear non-fiction that have come out since 1984. Each reference has a paragraph of comment about its subject and value. General organizational areas include the following: Reference Works; Nuclear weapons and Nuclear war (14 sub-headings including overviews, development, effects, tests, arms race, prospectives, legal considerations etc.); Strategy; proliferation; Stratigic Defense; Arms control and disarmament; ethical, pholosophical and religous perspectives; new paths to peace; periodic guide; the Chernobyl Disaster. An extensive Nuclear Chronology (1789-1991) written by the authormore » allows a fairly detailed sense of the historical record of nuclear weapons, including testing, manufacture, use and movements for arms control and disarmament.« less

Public views on multiple dimensions of security : nuclear waepons, terrorism, energy, and the environment : 2007.

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Herron, Kerry Gale; Jenkins-Smith, Hank C.

2008-01-01

We analyze and compare findings from identical national surveys of the US general public on nuclear security and terrorism administered by telephone and Internet in mid-2007. Key areas of investigation include assessments of threats to US security; valuations of US nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence; perspectives on nuclear proliferation, including the specific cases of North Korea and Iran; and support for investments in nuclear weapons capabilities. Our analysis of public views on terrorism include assessments of the current threat, progress in the struggle against terrorism, preferences for responding to terrorist attacks at different levels of assumed casualties, and support formore » domestic policies intended to reduce the threat of terrorism. Also we report findings from an Internet survey conducted in mid 2007 that investigates public views of US energy security, to include: energy supplies and reliability; energy vulnerabilities and threats, and relationships among security, costs, energy dependence, alternative sources, and research and investment priorities. We analyze public assessments of nuclear energy risks and benefits, nuclear materials management issues, and preferences for the future of nuclear energy in the US. Additionally, we investigate environmental issues as they relate to energy security, to include expected implications of global climate change, and relationships among environmental issues and potential policy options.« less

Evolution of different dual-use concepts in international and national law and its implications on research ethics and governance.

PubMed

Rath, Johannes; Ischi, Monique; Perkins, Dana

2014-09-01

This paper provides an overview of the various dual-use concepts applied in national and international non-proliferation and anti-terrorism legislation, such as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, and national export control legislation and in relevant codes of conduct. While there is a vast literature covering dual-use concepts in particular with regard to life sciences, this is the first paper that incorporates into such discussion the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540. In addition, recent developments such as the extension of dual-use export control legislation in the area of human rights protection are also identified and reviewed. The discussion of dual-use concepts is hereby undertaken in the context of human- and/or national-security-based approaches to security. This paper discusses four main concepts of dual use as applied today in international and national law: civilian versus military, peaceful versus non-peaceful, legitimate versus illegitimate and benevolent versus malevolent. In addition, the usage of the term to describe positive technology spin-offs between civilian and military applications is also briefly addressed. Attention is also given to the roles civil society and research ethics may play in the governance of dual-use sciences and technologies.

15 CFR 732.1 - Steps overview.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

..., Iran, and North Korea. For these countries, you may skip Steps 7 through 11 and go directly to Step 12..., Iran, and North Korea), prohibited activities of U.S. persons in support of proliferation of weapons of...

Global Operations and Biometrics: Next Generation Capabilities and Policy Implications

DTIC Science & Technology

2013-04-01

could help identify individuals likely to have handled certain chemical, biological or radiological precursor substances associated with weapons of...or biologic weapon production or storage site. See U.S. Department of the Army, Site Exploitation Operations, Army Field Manual FM 3-90.15...and nuclear) forces and shifting increasingly toward the non-nation state actors organized as networked violent extremists, often seeking weapons of

Toward a nuclear-weapon-free world: a Chinese perspective

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Shen, D.

In the present article, the author addresses China's policy on proliferation and nuclear testing. China, after observing an unannounced moratorium for more than a year, conducted a test last October, and maintains that it cannot exclude the need to carry out a few more tests for a certain period of time for national defense. The author discusses reasons for future tests. He suggests that a major factor in the testing may be to improve the safety and reliability of the present Chinese arsenal. He believes that whether or not China continues to test nuclear weapons will depend upon the balancemore » of different national interests as perceived by the Chinese government. Following the underground test in Xinjiang province last October, the Chinese government issued a letter to U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali saying that it was entirely for the purpose of self-defense that China developed and possessed a small number of nuclear weapons, and that it had always exercised utmost restraint on nuclear testing. The letter also states that [open quotes]after a comprehensive test ban treaty is concluded and comes into effect, China will abide by it and carry out no more nuclear tests.[close quotes] The author concludes that an international treaty banning nuclear weapons tests is important, but a no-first-use agreement would be just as useful. He discusses options for effecting a world-wide non-proliferation policy.« less

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Miller, A.J.

The author concludes that it is probable that unconventional weapons and their associated delivery systems will form a permanent part of future political and strategic calculations in the Middle East. Some possible consequences of this situation can be divided into three classes: intra-regional, inter-regional and extra-regional. There is no doubt that Israel, driven by the need for security,precipitated the proliferation of unconventional weapons and of surface-to-surface missiles in the Middle East. It will now be driven to secure itself from the new threat to its security posed by its regional opponents. The most significant extra-regional consequence of developments in themore » Middle East may be further complication of great power arms control negotiations. To the re-discovery by the United States and the Soviet Union of their obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty to reduce the level of their nuclear weapons must now be added the desire to reduce, if not entirely eliminate, their chemical weapons stockpiles in advance of a global ban. It is possible that lesser powers will learn from the evidence of the great powers behavior, although that contradicts much of what we know of the psychology of decision making in international politics. What is necessary, though not necessarily sufficient, is that the U.S. and the USSR as the two external powers with potentially the greatest leverage, work together toward the resolution of the underlying causes of conflict in a region marked by more than a generation of competition between them.« less

Nuclear obligations: Nuremberg law, nuclear weapons, and protest

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Burroughs, J.R.

1991-01-01

Nuclear weapons use and deployment and nonviolent anti-nuclear protests are evaluated. Use of nuclear weapons would constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity as defined in both the Nuremberg Charter and Allied Control Council Law No. 10 and applied by the International Military Tribunal and other Nuremberg courts. Strategic and atomic bombing during World War 2 did not set a precedent for use of nuclear weapons. The consequentialist argument for World War 2 bombing fails and the bombing has also been repudiated by codification of the law of war in Protocol 1 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The legality ofmore » deploying nuclear weapons as instruments of geopolitical policy is questionable when measured against the Nuremberg proscription of planning and preparation of aggressive war, war crimes, and crimes against humanity and the United Nations Charter's proscription of aggressive threat of force. While states' practice of deploying the weapons and the arms-control treaties that regulate but do not prohibit mere possession provide some support for legality, those treaties recognize the imperative of preventing nuclear war, and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty commits nuclear-armed states to good-faith negotiation of nuclear disarmament.« less

Perceived popularity of adolescents who use weapons in violence and adolescents who only carry weapons

PubMed Central

Wallace, Lacey N.

2017-01-01

Prior research has found that persistently delinquent youth or more violent youth were less popular than their less delinquent peers (Young, 2013). However, recent research has also found that weapon carrying is associated with being more popular in adolescence (Dijkstra et al., 2010). The present paper examines the perceived popularity of adolescents who carry weapons in comparison to those who both carry and use weapons in acts of violence or threatened violence. Data consist of two waves from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent to Adult Health. Analyses use OLS regression with lagged predictors. This paper found no differences in number of friends between weapon carriers and weapon users. However, among both male and female gang members, those who did not use or carry weapons (abstainers) named significantly fewer friends than weapon users. Among females, weapon abstainers both named and were named by significantly more people than weapon users. These differences were not observed for males. Implications of these results and directions for future research are discussed. PMID:29104446

Consistent morals

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Cohen, Howard; Amini, Ehsan; Herrera, Julio

2014-04-01

In reply to a physicsworld.com blog post about a talk by Amy Smithson, a non-proliferation expert, in which she criticized scientists who work on nuclear, chemical or biological weapons (“A question of responsibility”, 16 February, http://ow.ly/ulIWu).

Multiple exaggerated weapon morphs: a novel form of male polymorphism in harvestmen.

PubMed

Painting, Christina J; Probert, Anna F; Townsend, Daniel J; Holwell, Gregory I

2015-11-06

Alternative reproductive tactics in animals are commonly associated with distinct male phenotypes resulting in polymorphism of sexually selected weapons such as horns and spines. Typically, morphs are divided between small (unarmed) and large (armed) males according to one or more developmental thresholds in association with body size. Here, we describe remarkable weapon trimorphism within a single species, where two exaggerated weapon morphs and a third morph with reduced weaponry are present. Male Pantopsalis cheliferoides harvestmen display exaggerated chelicerae (jaws) which are highly variable in length among individuals. Across the same body size spectrum, however, some males belong to a distinct second exaggerated morph which possesses short, broad chelicerae. Multiple weapon morphs in a single species is a previously unknown phenomenon and our findings have significant implications for understanding weapon diversity and maintenance of polymorphism. Specifically, this species will be a valuable model for testing how weapons diverge by being able to test directly for the circumstances under which a certain weapon type is favoured and how weapon shape relates to performance.

FMDP reactor alternative summary report. Volume 1 - existing LWR alternative

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Greene, S.R.; Bevard, B.B.

1996-10-07

Significant quantities of weapons-usable fissile materials [primarily plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU)] are becoming surplus to national defense needs in both the United States and Russia. These stocks of fissile materials pose significant dangers to national and international security. The dangers exist not only in the potential proliferation of nuclear weapons but also in the potential for environmental, safety, and health (ES&H) consequences if surplus fissile materials are not properly managed. This document summarizes the results of analysis concerned with existing light water reactor plutonium disposition alternatives.

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Volpe, Tristan A.

Why do states wait for prolonged periods of time with the technical capacity to produce nuclear weapons? Only a handful of countries have ever acquired the sensitive nuclear fuel cycle technology needed to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. Yet the enduring trend over the last five decades is for these states to delay or forgo exercising the nuclear weapons option provided by uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing capabilities. I show that states pause at this threshold stage because they use nuclear technology to bargain for concessions from both allies and adversaries. But when does nuclear latency offer bargaining benefits?more » My central argument is that challengers must surmount a dilemma to make coercive diplomacy work: the more they threaten to proliferate, the harder it becomes to reassure others that compliance will be rewarded with nuclear restraint. I identify a range of mechanisms able to solve this credibility problem, from arms control over breakout capacity to third party mediation and confidence building measures. Since each step towards the bomb raises the costs of implementing these policies, a state hits a sweet spot when it first acquires enrichment and/or reprocessing (ENR) technology. Subsequent increases in proliferation capability generate diminishing returns at the bargaining table for two reasons: the state must go to greater lengths to make a credible nonproliferation promise, and nuclear programs exhibit considerable path dependency as they mature over time. Contrary to the conventional wisdom about power in world politics, less nuclear latency thereby yields more coercive threat advantages. I marshal new primary source evidence from archives and interviews to identify episodes in the historical record when states made clear decisions to use ENR technology as a bargaining chip, and employ this theory of proliferation persuasion to explain how Japan, North Korea, and Iran succeeded and failed to barter concessions from the United States. By clarifying when countries are able to leverage steps towards the bomb for international political gain, my work advances our understanding of proliferation and coercive diplomacy.« less

Special Issue on University Nonproliferation Education and Training Introduction.

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Leek, K. M.

2006-07-31

Nonproliferation, like many aspects of security, has not played out as many expected following the end of the cold war. The peace dividend has been elusive in many countries. The notion that the world would become a safer and more secure place as nuclear weapons stockpiles were reduced has been trumped by the rise in international terrorism. Hopes that nuclear weapons would lose their salience as markers of elite status among nations along with pressures to acquire them have been dashed. The drive by some countries and terrorist groups to acquire nuclear weapons has not diminished, and the threat ofmore » proliferation has increased. At the level of the nation state, the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) itself is under pressure as more nations acquire nuclear weapons, de facto weapons states fail to join, and nations that want to acquire them leave or threaten to leave. At the sub-state level, the convergence of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has introduced an element of uncertainty into nonproliferation that is unprecedented. Another feature of the post-cold war era that has taken many by surprise is the continued, and growing need for trained specialists in nonproliferation and nuclear materials management. Contained within the notion of disarmament and reduced strategic importance of nuclear weapons was the expectation of a diminishing workforce of trained nonproliferation and nuclear materials specialists. Events have overtaken this assumption.« less

Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing and Risks

DTIC Science & Technology

1993-10-01

Disarmament Studies Matthew S. Meselson Leonard S. Spector Department of Biochemistry Senior Associate Thomas R. Fox and Molecular Biology Carnegie...Nuclear radiation (immediate) Flash burns, blinding, burning or suffocation from building fires Nuclear radiation (delayed effects and fallout effects

A resolution commemorating the 40th anniversary of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

THOMAS, 111th Congress

Sen. Casey, Robert P., Jr. [D-PA

2010-03-08

Senate - 04/13/2010 Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 345. (All Actions) Tracker: This bill has the status IntroducedHere are the steps for Status of Legislation:

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Hooper, R.

Since the end of the Cold War the world has witnessed a remarkable series of events demonstrating that universal adherence to the principles of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament are no longer utopian dreams. The author reviews the actions of various countries to terminate or reduce nuclear weapons programs and those that are resisting the non-proliferation efforts. The author addresses efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to safeguard declared nuclear material more cost-effectively and deal with the possibility of undeclared nuclear activities.

Nuclear Symbolism and Ritual--Upholding the National Myth: A Study of Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Proliferation

DTIC Science & Technology

2017-06-01

be abolished as a means of settling any problem. Indian President Rajendra Prasad, February 21, 1955 We have a big bomb now Indian Prime...Nuclear Bomb : The Impact on Global Proliferation, Updated ed (Berkeley London: University of California Press, 1999). 33. 4 Perkovich, India’s Nuclear... Bomb . 292. 5 Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb . 409. 6 Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb . 6. 4 weapons were considered rogue. Thus, India’s refusal

Small Arms Proliferation and Homegrown Terrorism in the Great Lakes Region: Uganda’s Experience

DTIC Science & Technology

2016-12-01

prevalence of regional armed conflicts that offer markets for illicit arms and is compounded by poor arms management and control measures within the...light weapons (SALW) proliferation owes to historical factors, porous borders, and the prevalence of regional armed conflicts that offer markets for...are often diverted from markets that exist in many countries.”49 The head of UNODC further remarks: Crime networks and illicit armed dealers play

Deterring Nuclear Proliferation: The Importance of IAEA Safeguards: A TEXTBOOK

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Rosenthal, M.D.; Fishbone, L.G.; Gallini, L.

2012-03-13

Nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation are among the most pressing challenges to international peace and security that we face today. Iran and Syria remain in non-compliance with the safeguards requirements of the NPT, and the nuclear ambitions of North Korea remain unchecked. Despite these challenges, the NPT remains a cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and the safeguards implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) under the NPT play a critical role in deterring nuclear proliferation.How do they work? Where did they come from? And what is their future? This book answers these questions. Anyone studying the field ofmore » nuclear non-proliferation will benefit from reading this book, and for anyone entering the field, the book will enable them to get a running start. Part I describes the foundations of the international safeguards system: its origins in the 1930s - when new discoveries in physics made it clear immediately that nuclear energy held both peril and promise - through the entry into force in 1970 of the NPT, which codified the role of IAEA safeguards as a means to verify states NPT commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons. Part II describes the NPT safeguards system, which is based on a model safeguards agreement developed specifically for the NPT, The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States required in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which has been published by the IAEA as INFCIRC/153. Part III describes events, especially in South Africa, the DPRK, and Iraq in the early 1990s, that triggered a transformation in the way in which safeguards were conceptualized and implemented.« less

The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) : are we safer?

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Brune, Nancy E.

2010-07-01

Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) is designed to make world safer by reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons and reducing the salience of nuclear weapons. U.S. also seeks to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent and reinforce regional security architectures with missile defenses and other conventional military capabilities. But recent studies suggest that nuclear proliferation is a direct response to the perceived threat of U.S. conventional capabilities not U.S. nuclear stockpile. If this is true, then the intent of the NPR to reduce the role and numbers of nuclear weapons and strengthen conventional military capabilities may actually make the world lessmore » safe. First stated objective of NPR is to reduce the role and numbers of U.S. nuclear weapons, reduce the salience of nuclear weapons and move step by step toward eliminating them. Second stated objective is a reaffirmation of U.S. commitment to maintaining a strong deterrent which forms the basis of U.S. assurances to allies and partners. The pathway - made explicit throughout the NPR - for reducing the role and numbers of nuclear weapons while maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent and reinforcing regional security architectures is to give conventional forces and capabilities and missile defenses (e.g. non-nuclear elements) a greater share of the deterrence burden.« less

Multiple exaggerated weapon morphs: a novel form of male polymorphism in harvestmen

PubMed Central

Painting, Christina J.; Probert, Anna F.; Townsend, Daniel J.; Holwell, Gregory I.

2015-01-01

Alternative reproductive tactics in animals are commonly associated with distinct male phenotypes resulting in polymorphism of sexually selected weapons such as horns and spines. Typically, morphs are divided between small (unarmed) and large (armed) males according to one or more developmental thresholds in association with body size. Here, we describe remarkable weapon trimorphism within a single species, where two exaggerated weapon morphs and a third morph with reduced weaponry are present. Male Pantopsalis cheliferoides harvestmen display exaggerated chelicerae (jaws) which are highly variable in length among individuals. Across the same body size spectrum, however, some males belong to a distinct second exaggerated morph which possesses short, broad chelicerae. Multiple weapon morphs in a single species is a previously unknown phenomenon and our findings have significant implications for understanding weapon diversity and maintenance of polymorphism. Specifically, this species will be a valuable model for testing how weapons diverge by being able to test directly for the circumstances under which a certain weapon type is favoured and how weapon shape relates to performance. PMID:26542456

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Background and Current Developments

DTIC Science & Technology

2009-11-23

there are no plans to do so.’”5 Critics expressed concern about the implications of these policies for testing and new weapons. A statement by...opportunity to design and build new nuclear weapons, and abandon a ten-year-old moratorium on nuclear weapons testing.”6 Another critic felt that increased...cannot diagnose or remedy a problem in a warhead critical the U.S. nuclear deterrent without conducting a nuclear test.10 Similarly, a Statement of

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Background and Current Developments

DTIC Science & Technology

2010-01-06

the future, but there are no plans to do so.’”5 Critics expressed concern about the implications of these policies for testing and new weapons. A...seek the opportunity to design and build new nuclear weapons, and abandon a ten-year-old moratorium on nuclear weapons testing.”6 Another critic felt...warhead critical the U.S. nuclear deterrent without conducting a nuclear test.10 Similarly, a Statement of Administration Policy on S. 1547, FY2008

Guns in Intimate Partner Violence: Comparing Incidents by Type of Weapon.

PubMed

Sorenson, Susan B

2017-03-01

The goal of this study was to assess the frequency, nature, and outcome of weapon use in intimate partner violence (IPV) and to assess compliance with related gun policies. Data were drawn from forms police are mandated to complete at the scene of IPV in the fifth largest U.S. city during 2013. Proportions were calculated and odds ratios were adjusted for demographic and contextual characteristics and a Bonferroni correction for multiple statistical tests was applied. Of the 35,413 incidents, 6,573 involved hands, fists, or feet, and 1,866 involved external weapons of which 576 were guns. Most incidents were male-on-female: 63.4% (no weapon), 77.4% (bodily weapon), 50.2% (nongun external weapon), and 79.5% (gun). Guns were used most often to threaten the partner (69.1%). When a gun (vs. bodily or nongun external weapon) was used, IPV victims were less likely to have visible injuries (adjusted odds ratio [AOR] = 0.64 and 0.23, respectively)-offenders were less likely to have pushed or shoved, grabbed, punched, or kicked the victim-but (victims) were more likely to be frightened (AOR = 3.13 and 1.49, respectively). Weapon use of any type by an intimate partner is associated with a wide range of violent offender behavior and multiple negative outcomes for victims. The use of a gun has implications that include, but go beyond, physical injury of the victim. Documentation of the enforcement of state law regarding gun removal merits improvement, which has important implications for the evaluation of policies designed to keep guns out of the hands of abusers.

Guns in Intimate Partner Violence: Comparing Incidents by Type of Weapon

PubMed Central

2017-01-01

Abstract Objective: The goal of this study was to assess the frequency, nature, and outcome of weapon use in intimate partner violence (IPV) and to assess compliance with related gun policies. Methods: Data were drawn from forms police are mandated to complete at the scene of IPV in the fifth largest U.S. city during 2013. Proportions were calculated and odds ratios were adjusted for demographic and contextual characteristics and a Bonferroni correction for multiple statistical tests was applied. Results: Of the 35,413 incidents, 6,573 involved hands, fists, or feet, and 1,866 involved external weapons of which 576 were guns. Most incidents were male-on-female: 63.4% (no weapon), 77.4% (bodily weapon), 50.2% (nongun external weapon), and 79.5% (gun). Guns were used most often to threaten the partner (69.1%). When a gun (vs. bodily or nongun external weapon) was used, IPV victims were less likely to have visible injuries (adjusted odds ratio [AOR] = 0.64 and 0.23, respectively)—offenders were less likely to have pushed or shoved, grabbed, punched, or kicked the victim—but (victims) were more likely to be frightened (AOR = 3.13 and 1.49, respectively). Conclusions: Weapon use of any type by an intimate partner is associated with a wide range of violent offender behavior and multiple negative outcomes for victims. The use of a gun has implications that include, but go beyond, physical injury of the victim. Documentation of the enforcement of state law regarding gun removal merits improvement, which has important implications for the evaluation of policies designed to keep guns out of the hands of abusers. PMID:28134571

9/11 Five Years Later: Successes and Challenges

DTIC Science & Technology

2006-09-01

Infrastructure Protection ........................................................................................... 10 Prevent Proliferation of Weapons of...20 Challenges to Combating the Violent Extremist Ideology ..................................................... 20 Challenges to Protecting the...message, agenda, and tactics of the violent extremist movement. • Before 9/11, the protection of civil liberties was not systematically and

Chemical weapon proliferation in the Middle East; time for a US regional chemical disarmament strategy. Final report

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Horne, W.B.

1993-04-01

Our experience in the Gulf War demonstrated that we cannot be sure when or where the next conflict will arise; that the world must respond to straightforward aggression; that international coalitions can be forged, though they often will require American Leadership; that the proliferation of advanced weaponry represents a clear, present, and widespread danger; and that the United States remains the nation whose strength and leadership are essential to a stable and democratic world order.

Evaluating Nonproliferation Bona Fides

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Seward, Amy M.; Mathews, Caroline E.; Kessler, Carol E.

2008-07-14

Anticipated growth of global nuclear energy in a difficult international security environment heightens concerns that states could decide to exploit their civilian nuclear fuel cycles as a means of acquiring nuclear weapons. Such concerns partly reflect a fundamental tension in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). On the one hand, Articles II and III of the NPT clearly prohibit each non-nuclear-weapon state party from acquiring nuclear weapons. On the other hand, Article IV of the NPT confers the “inalienable right” of Parties to the treaty to “develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes…,”more » and directs all Parties to “facilitate… the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy…,” and “cooperate in contributing…to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes….” This juxtaposition raises the possibility that a state could exercise its Article IV right to develop a civilian nuclear fuels cycle and then use the equipment, materials and technology to acquire nuclear weapons in violation of its Article II and III obligations.« less

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Background and Current Developments

DTIC Science & Technology

2010-12-07

there are no plans to do so.’”4 Critics expressed concern about the implications of these policies for testing and new weapons. Physicians for...design and build new nuclear weapons, and abandon a ten-year-old moratorium on nuclear weapons testing.”5 Another critic felt that increased funding for...guarantees regarding the voluntary moratorium. We may find at some future time that we cannot diagnose or remedy a problem in a warhead critical the U.S

What Are the Legal and Policy Implications of Conducting Preemption and Interdiction Against a Weapons of Mass Destruction?

DTIC Science & Technology

2002-01-01

Manhattan project , gaseous diffusion plant, or even a weapons program. It will be used heavily in chapters 4 and 5. Both The Making of the Atomic Bomb...requirement for secrecy surrounding the Manhattan project and the lingering requirement for secrecy regarding nuclear weapons design. The application to the...another MANHATTAN Project ” to produce a nuclear device (McPhee 1973, 123-4, 136). Scientists who worked on the Manhattan Project maintain that

Nuclear threat on the Korean peninsula: The present and the future. Final report

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Kang, S.

1994-04-01

Forty years after they were divided by the Cold War, South and North Korea are closer to reunification than ever before. However, North Korea's nuclear weapons program might cause South Koreans to be much less sure about reunification. Today the Cold War is over, but the Korean peninsula is still divided into two Koreas despite the new era of reconciliation. Since December 1991 when a non-aggression pact was signed barring nuclear weapons, North Korea has pursued its nuclear weapon development. In March 1993, North Korea declared its intention to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and has been refusing amore » full inspection of its nuclear program. North Korea's nuclear issue is an international issue today. This paper discusses 'what threat we have today' and 'what should be done in the future.'.« less

76 FR 68809 - Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation; Termination of Chemical and Biological...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-11-07

..., Office of Missile, Biological, and Chemical Nonproliferation, Bureau of International Security and... DEPARTMENT OF STATE [Public Notice: 7678] Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation; Termination of Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) Proliferation Sanctions Against a Foreign Person AGENCY...

31 CFR 560.506 - Importation and exportation of certain gifts authorized.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-07-01

... Finance (Continued) OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY IRANIAN TRANSACTIONS AND... controlled for chemical and biological weapons (CB), missile technology (MT), national security (NS), or nuclear proliferation (NP). See Commerce Control List, Export Administration Regulations (15 CFR part 774). ...

31 CFR 560.506 - Importation and exportation of certain gifts authorized.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-07-01

... Finance (Continued) OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY IRANIAN TRANSACTIONS AND... controlled for chemical and biological weapons (CB), missile technology (MT), national security (NS), or nuclear proliferation (NP). See Commerce Control List, Export Administration Regulations (15 CFR part 774). ...

15 CFR 740.12 - Gift parcels and humanitarian donations (GFT).

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

..., and nuclear nonproliferation, missile technology or crime control reasons (see supplement No. 1 to... destinations, no items controlled for chemical and biological weapons (CB), missile technology (MT), national security (NS), nuclear proliferation (NP) or encryption items (EI) reasons on the Commerce Control List...

15 CFR 740.12 - Gift parcels and humanitarian donations (GFT).

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

..., and nuclear nonproliferation, missile technology or crime control reasons (see Supplement No. 1 to... destinations, no items controlled for chemical and biological weapons (CB), missile technology (MT), national security (NS), nuclear proliferation (NP) or encryption items (EI) reasons on the Commerce Control List...

76 FR 24410 - Financial Crimes Enforcement Network; Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-05-02

... Financial Crimes Enforcement Network; Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of... congressional mandate to prescribe regulations under section 104(e) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions... financial institution designated by the U.S. Government in connection with Iran's proliferation of weapons...

Terror Operations: Case Studies in Terrorism. U.S. Army DCSINT Handbook No. 1.01

DTIC Science & Technology

2005-08-15

relevant resource. A selected bibliography presents citations for detailed study of specific terrorism topics. Unless stated otherwise, masculine ...of instability within the region include hegemony , terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and ballistic missiles. Conflict is a

15 CFR 730.6 - Control purposes.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... carry out its international obligations. Some controls are designed to restrict access to dual use items... controls designed to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and controls designed to limit.... Multilateral export control cooperation is sought through arrangements such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the...

15 CFR 730.6 - Control purposes.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... carry out its international obligations. Some controls are designed to restrict access to dual use items... controls designed to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and controls designed to limit.... Multilateral export control cooperation is sought through arrangements such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the...

15 CFR 730.6 - Control purposes.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... carry out its international obligations. Some controls are designed to restrict access to dual use items... controls designed to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and controls designed to limit.... Multilateral export control cooperation is sought through arrangements such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the...

31 CFR 560.506 - Importation and exportation of certain gifts authorized.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... Money and Finance (Continued) OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY IRANIAN... controlled for chemical and biological weapons (CB), missile technology (MT), national security (NS), or nuclear proliferation (NP). See Commerce Control List, Export Administration Regulations (15 CFR part 774...

31 CFR 545.506 - Importation of certain gifts authorized.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... (Continued) OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY TALIBAN (AFGHANISTAN) SANCTIONS... individuals; and (c) The goods are not controlled for chemical and biological weapons (CB), missile technology (MT), national security (NS), or nuclear proliferation (NP) (see Commerce Control List, 15 CFR part...

Uranium and Thorium

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Finch, Warren I.

1978-01-01

The results of President Carter's policy on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons are expected to slow the growth rate in energy consumption, put the development of the breeder reactor in question, halt plans to reprocess and recycle uranium and plutonium, and expand facilities to supply enriched uranium. (Author/MA)

Global threat reduction initiative Russian nuclear material removal progress

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Cummins, Kelly; Bolshinsky, Igor

2008-07-15

In December 1999 representatives from the United States, the Russian Federation, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) started discussing a program to return to Russia Soviet- or Russian-supplied highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel stored at the Russian-designed research reactors outside Russia. Trilateral discussions among the United States, Russian Federation, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have identified more than 20 research reactors in 17 countries that have Soviet- or Russian-supplied HEU fuel. The Global Threat Reduction Initiative's Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return Program is an important aspect of the U.S. Government's commitment to cooperate with the other nationsmore » to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and weapons-usable proliferation-attractive nuclear materials. To date, 496 kilograms of Russian-origin HEU have been shipped to Russia from Serbia, Latvia, Libya, Uzbekistan, Romania, Bulgaria, Poland, Germany, and the Czech Republic. The pilot spent fuel shipment from Uzbekistan to Russia was completed in April 2006. (author)« less

National policy and military doctrine: development of a nuclear concept of land warfare, 1949-1964

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Bockar, D.

In the thirty years that battle field nuclear weapons have been available, no one has originated an idea of how they might be used as an entirely new weapon. New weapons are routinely introduced into existing combat organizations before an appropriate tactical concept has been invented. But never before in history has a new weapon been deployed on so massive a scale without a tactical concept that exploited the radical implications of its novel technology for traditional warfare. This study is an attempt to understand the problem of developing a persuasive tactical concept for nuclear weapons. The process of assimilationmore » by which military organizations integrate new weapons with existing weapons in novel tactical and organizational concepts has an intellectual, and institutional, and a political dimension. The principle of civilian control, however, makes the process by which weapons are assimilated part of the process by which national security policies are made. In peacetime the military's formulation of doctrine is almost entirely consequent upon the world view, the methodological and managerial assumptions, and the domestic policy concerns of political authority.« less

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Weimar, Mark R.; Daly, Don S.; Wood, Thomas W.

Both nuclear power and nuclear weapons programs should have (related) economic signatures which are detectible at some scale. We evaluated this premise in a series of studies using national economic input/output (IO) data. Statistical discrimination models using economic IO tables predict with a high probability whether a country with an unknown predilection for nuclear weapons proliferation is in fact engaged in nuclear power development or nuclear weapons proliferation. We analyzed 93 IO tables, spanning the years 1993 to 2005 for 37 countries that are either members or associates of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The 2009 OECDmore » input/output tables featured 48 industrial sectors based on International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) Revision 3, and described the respective economies in current country-of-origin valued currency. We converted and transformed these reported values to US 2005 dollars using appropriate exchange rates and implicit price deflators, and addressed discrepancies in reported industrial sectors across tables. We then classified countries with Random Forest using either the adjusted or industry-normalized values. Random Forest, a classification tree technique, separates and categorizes countries using a very small, select subset of the 2304 individual cells in the IO table. A nation’s efforts in nuclear power, be it for electricity or nuclear weapons, are an enterprise with a large economic footprint -- an effort so large that it should discernibly perturb coarse country-level economics data such as that found in yearly input-output economic tables. The neoclassical economic input-output model describes a country’s or region’s economy in terms of the requirements of industries to produce the current level of economic output. An IO table row shows the distribution of an industry’s output to the industrial sectors while a table column shows the input required of each industrial sector by a given industry.« less

76 FR 39859 - Notice of Federal Advisory Committee Meeting

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-07-07

... Threat Reduction Advisory Committee (Hereafter referred to as ``the Committee''). 1. Purpose of Meeting... technology security, combating weapons of mass destruction (WMD), counter terrorism and counter proliferation... discussions on WMD related national security matters. 3. Meeting Accessibility: Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552b, as...

Religious and Philosophical Justifications for War: A Synthesis of Selected Literature

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Martzen, E

The Critical Issues Forum (CIF) is a cooperative education program supported in part by the Department of Energy's Defense Programs. The Science and Technology Education Program (STEP) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory manages one component of this program. CIF engages high school students and teachers regarding issues of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, arms control, and international security. These issues are viewed in light of their scientific, economic, socio-cultural, and political/geopolitical influences and implications. This year CIF's focus is on chemical and biological weapons (CBW). CBW is becoming more of a threat today than ever before. Many countriesmore » are developing these weapons. CBW also presents certain ethical dilemmas for many individuals, especially if those individuals feel it is their religious duty to use or avoid the use of such weapons. Religion has become an important determining factor in international security because many cultures, and even governments make decisions based on religious traditions. This paper is an attempt to look at these religions and philosophical traditions with an emphasis on views of ''just war''. The ultimate purpose of this paper is to promote awareness about religion's influence on international security issues. This paper was written by Cadet Ernst ''Mitch'' Martzen, AFROTC. He is an intern with the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's Science and Technology Education Program, under the guidance of Dr. Stephen C. Sesko, the director of LLNL's CIF program. Every major religion and ethical system has developed a societal concept of ''just war''. Today, the world's largest religions include Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism. Each faith lays claim to a heritage rich with thousands of years of history, and the power of great minds to support its ethical and moral beliefs. These religions have each developed separate and distinct beliefs regarding warfare. Whether those beliefs were developed through formal theological discourse, or through the dialogue in scriptures, they are valid and necessary today because they affect contemporary political action. Even today, many religious societies base their willingness to fight on the just war ethic that they hold.« less

A perspective on the proliferation risks of plutonium mines

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Lyman, E.S.

1996-05-01

The program of geologic disposal of spent fuel and other plutonium-containing materials is increasingly becoming the target of criticism by individuals who argue that in the future, repositories may become low-cost sources of fissile material for nuclear weapons. This paper attempts to outline a consistent framework for analyzing the proliferation risks of these so-called {open_quotes}plutonium mines{close_quotes} and putting them into perspective. First, it is emphasized that the attractiveness of plutonium in a repository as a source of weapons material depends on its accessibility relative to other sources of fissile material. Then, the notion of a {open_quotes}material production standard{close_quotes} (MPS) ismore » proposed: namely, that the proliferation risks posed by geologic disposal will be acceptable if one can demonstrate, under a number of reasonable scenarios, that the recovery of plutonium from a repository is likely to be as difficult as new production of fissile material. A preliminary analysis suggests that the range of circumstances under which current mined repository concepts would fail to meet this standard is fairly narrow. Nevertheless, a broad application of the MPS may impose severe restrictions on repository design. In this context, the relationship of repository design parameters to easy of recovery is discussed.« less

Living with nuclear weapons

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Carnesale, A.; Doty, P.; Hoffmann, S.

1983-01-01

At Harvard President Derek Bok's request, six Harvard professors explain nuclear arms issues to help citizens understand all sides of the national security debates. The goal is to encourage public participation in policy formulation. The book emphasizes that escapism will not improve security; that idealistic plans to eliminate nuclear weapons are a form of escapism. Learning to live with nuclear weapons, they suggest, requires an understanding of the current nuclear predicament and the implications of alternative weapons and policy choices. After reviewing these matters, they emphasize that informed persons will continue to disagree, but that knowledge will improve understanding andmore » appreciation of their differences and improve the quality of policy debates. 54 references, 5 figures, 2 tables. (DCK)« less

Historical precedence and technical requirements of biological weapons use : a threat assessment.

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Estes, Daniel P.; Vogel, Kathleen Margaret; Gaudioso, Jennifer Marie

2004-05-01

The threat from biological weapons is assessed through both a comparative historical analysis of the patterns of biological weapons use and an assessment of the technological hurdles to proliferation and use that must be overcome. The history of biological weapons is studied to learn how agents have been acquired and what types of states and substate actors have used agents. Substate actors have generally been more willing than states to use pathogens and toxins and they have focused on those agents that are more readily available. There has been an increasing trend of bioterrorism incidents over the past century, butmore » states and substate actors have struggled with one or more of the necessary technological steps. These steps include acquisition of a suitable agent, production of an appropriate quantity and form, and effective deployment. The technological hurdles associated with the steps present a real barrier to producing a high consequence event. However, the ever increasing technological sophistication of society continually lowers the barriers, resulting in a low but increasing probability of a high consequence bioterrorism event.« less

The Nuclear Power and Nuclear Weapons Connection.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Leventhal, Paul

1990-01-01

Explains problems enforcing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968. Provides factual charts and details concerning the production of nuclear energy and arms, the processing and disposal of waste products, and outlines the nuclear fuel cycle. Discusses safeguards, the risk of nuclear terrorism, and ways to deal with these problems. (NL)

JPRS Report, Proliferation Issues

DTIC Science & Technology

1992-09-09

agency, Hammam weapons from other sites were brought there under U.N. ’Abd-al-Khaliq ’Abd-al-Ghafur. He did not go into details. supervision for eventual...to have using traditional technologies, it will take between five and a minimum of $20,000. seven years to render harmless the toxic waste already

78 FR 38782 - Lifting of Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) Proliferation Sanctions Against Chinese Entities

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-06-27

... Arms Control and International Security determined and certified to Congress that lifting sanctions on the following Chinese entities, their sub-units and successors is important to the national security... Security and Nonproliferation, Department of State, Telephone (202) 647-4930. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION...

15 CFR 730.6 - Control purposes.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... to uses inimical to U.S. interests. These include controls designed to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and controls designed to limit the military and terrorism support capability... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Control purposes. 730.6 Section 730.6...

Uncertainties in the North Korean Nuclear Threat

DTIC Science & Technology

2010-01-01

Bermudez, Joseph S., “The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Unconventional Weapons,” in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan , and James J. Wirtz, eds...Korea Has ‘Weaponized’ Plutonium,” Associated Press, January 17, 2009. Robbins, Carla Anne, and Gordon Fairclough, “North Korea Sparks Proliferation

Cooperative Threat Reduction: Cooperation Threat Reduction Program Liquid Propellant Disposition Project

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

2002-09-01

This audit is one in a series of audits the Deputy Secretary of Defense requested. As part of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program, DoD agreed to assist the Russian Federation in disposing of its liquid rocket propellant. Public Law 102-228 (section 2551 NOTE, title 22, United States Code), the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991 designates DoD as the executive agent for the CTR Program. Specific objectives of the act are to destroy chemical, nuclear, and other weapons; transport, store, disable, and safeguard weapons in connection with their destruction; and establish verifiable safeguards against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Policy), under the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, develops, coordinates, and oversees implementation of policy for the CTR Program. The CTR Directorate, Defense Threat Reduction Agency operates the program.

The globalization of the arms industry: The next proliferation challenge

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Bitzinger, R.A.

1994-12-31

The globalization of the arms industry entails a significant shift away from traditional, single-country patterns of weapons production toward internationalization of the development, production, and marketing of arms. While wholly indigenous armaments production may be on the decline, multinational arms production - through collaboration on individual weapon systems and increasingly via interfirm linkages across the international arms industry - appears actually to be expanding. In several instances, in fact, multinational armaments production is increasingly supplementing or even supplanting indigenous or autonomous weapons production or arms imports. The emergence of an increasingly transnational defense technology and industrial base is fundamentally affectingmore » the shape and content of much of the global arms trade. This changing defense market, in turn, will have a profound impact on a number of national security issues concerning the Western industrialized nations. 3 figs., 2 tabs.« less

The Power of Integrators, Financiers, and Insurers to Reduce Proliferation Risks: Nuclear Dual-Use Goods

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Weise, Rachel A.; Hund, Gretchen

2015-05-01

Globalization of manufacturing supply chains has changed the nature of nuclear proliferation. Before 1991, nonproliferation efforts focused almost exclusively on limiting the spread of materials and equipment specifically designed for nuclear use -- reactors, centrifuges, and fissile material. Dual-use items, those items with both nuclear and non-nuclear applications, were not closely scrutinized or controlled. However, in 1991 the international community discovered that Iraq had developed a fairly sophisticated nuclear weapons program by importing dual-use items; this discovery spurred the international community to increase controls on dual-use technologies. Despite these international efforts, dual-use items are still a challenge for those seekingmore » to limit proliferation.« less

Strengthening Biosecurity in Iraq: Development of a National Biorisk Management System

PubMed Central

Al Jewari, Mahdi F. H.; Koblentz, Gregory D.

2016-01-01

Since 2004, the Republic of Iraq has undertaken a concerted effort to comply with all of its international obligations to prevent the proliferation and the use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. A centerpiece of this effort is Iraq’s development of a National Biorisk Management System. The Iraqi National Monitoring Authority (INMA), which is responsible for CBRN security and non-proliferation in Iraq, has played a key role in establishing this system. This article provides an overview of Iraq’s international non-proliferation commitments, describes the legal and organizational steps it has taken to implement these commitments, and examines current initiatives to strengthen Iraq’s biosecurity. PMID:26952002

Reviews of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and U.S. security

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Jeanloz, Raymond

2017-11-01

Reviews of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) by the National Academy of Sciences concluded that the United States has the technical expertise and physical means to i) maintain a safe, secure and reliable nuclear-weapons stockpile without nuclear-explosion testing, and ii) effectively monitor global compliance once the Treaty enters into force. Moreover, the CTBT is judged to help constrain proliferation of nuclear-weapons technology, so it is considered favorable to U.S. security. Review of developments since the studies were published, in 2002 and 2012, show that the study conclusions remain valid and that technical capabilities are better than anticipated.

Environmental Detection of Clandestine Nuclear Weapon Programs

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Kemp, R. Scott

2016-06-01

Environmental sensing of nuclear activities has the potential to detect nuclear weapon programs at early stages, deter nuclear proliferation, and help verify nuclear accords. However, no robust system of detection has been deployed to date. This can be variously attributed to high costs, technical limitations in detector technology, simple countermeasures, and uncertainty about the magnitude or behavior of potential signals. In this article, current capabilities and promising opportunities are reviewed. Systematic research in a variety of areas could improve prospects for detecting covert nuclear programs, although the potential for countermeasures suggests long-term verification of nuclear agreements will need to rely on methods other than environmental sensing.

The abolition of war as a goal of environmental policy.

PubMed

Snyder, Brian F; Ruyle, Leslie E

2017-12-15

Since the 1950s, select military and political leaders have had the capacity to kill all or nearly all human life on Earth. The number of people entrusted with this power grows each year through proliferation and the rise of new political leaders. If humans continue to maintain and develop nuclear weapons, it is highly probable that a nuclear exchange will occur again at some point in the future. This nuclear exchange may or may not annihilate the human species, but it will cause catastrophic effects on the biosphere. The international community has attempted to resolve this existential problem via treaties that control and potentially eliminate nuclear weapons, however, these treaties target only nuclear weapons, leaving the use of war as a normalized means for settling conflict. As long as war exists as a probable future, nations will be under pressure to develop more powerful weapons. Thus, we argue that the elimination of nuclear weapons alone is not a stable, long-term strategy. A far more secure strategy would be the elimination of war as a means of settling international disputes. Therefore, those concerned about environmental sustainability or the survival of the biosphere should work to abolish war. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Supporting Technology for Chain of Custody of Nuclear Weapons and Materials throughout the Dismantlement and Disposition Processes

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Bunch, Kyle J.; Jones, Anthony M.; Ramuhalli, Pradeep

The ratification and ongoing implementation of the New START Treaty have been widely regarded as noteworthy global security achievements for both the Obama Administration and the Putin (formerly Medvedev) regime. But deeper cuts that move beyond the United States and Russia to engage the P-5 and other nuclear weapons possessor states are envisioned under future arms control regimes, and are indeed required for the P-5 in accordance with their Article VI disarmament obligations in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Future verification needs will include monitoring the cessation of production of new fissile material for weapons, monitoring storage of warhead components andmore » fissile materials and verifying dismantlement of warheads, pits, secondary stages, and other materials. A fundamental challenge to implementing a nuclear disarmament regime is the ability to thwart unauthorized material diversion throughout the dismantlement and disposition process through strong chain of custody implementation. Verifying the declared presence, or absence, of nuclear materials and weapons components throughout the dismantlement and disposition lifecycle is a critical aspect of the disarmament process. From both the diplomatic and technical perspectives, verification under these future arms control regimes will require new solutions. Since any acceptable verification technology must protect sensitive design information and attributes to prevent the release of classified or other proliferation-sensitive information, non-nuclear non-sensitive modalities may provide significant new verification tools which do not require the use of additional information barriers. Alternative verification technologies based upon electromagnetic and acoustics could potentially play an important role in fulfilling the challenging requirements of future verification regimes. For example, researchers at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) have demonstrated that low frequency electromagnetic signatures of sealed metallic containers can be used to rapidly confirm the presence of specific components on a yes/no basis without revealing classified information. PNNL researchers have also used ultrasonic measurements to obtain images of material microstructures which may be used as templates or unique identifiers of treaty-limited items. Such alternative technologies are suitable for application in various stages of weapons dismantlement and often include the advantage of an inherent information barrier due to the inability to extract classified weapon design information from the collected data. As a result, these types of technologies complement radiation-based verification methods for arms control. This article presents an overview of several alternative verification technologies that are suitable for supporting a future, broader and more intrusive arms control regime that spans the nuclear weapons disarmament lifecycle. The general capabilities and limitations of each verification modality are discussed and example technologies are presented. Potential applications are defined in the context of the nuclear material and weapons lifecycle. Example applications range from authentication (e.g., tracking and signatures within the chain of custody from downloading through weapons storage, unclassified templates and unique identification) to verification of absence and final material disposition.« less

Cytokines in cancer drug resistance: Cues to new therapeutic strategies.

PubMed

Jones, Valerie Sloane; Huang, Ren-Yu; Chen, Li-Pai; Chen, Zhe-Sheng; Fu, Liwu; Huang, Ruo-Pan

2016-04-01

The development of oncoprotein-targeted anticancer drugs is an invaluable weapon in the war against cancer. However, cancers do not give up without a fight. They may develop multiple mechanisms of drug resistance, including apoptosis inhibition, drug expulsion, and increased proliferation that reduce the effectiveness of the drug. The collective work of researchers has highlighted the role of cytokines in the mechanisms of cancer drug resistance, as well as in cancer cell progression. Furthermore, recent studies have described how specific cytokines secreted by cancer stromal cells confer resistance to chemotherapeutic treatments. In order to gain a better understanding of mechanism of cancer drug resistance and a prediction of treatment outcome, it is imperative that correlations are established between global cytokine profiles and cancer drug resistance. Here we discuss the recent discoveries in this field of research and discuss their implications for the future development of effective anti-cancer medicines. Copyright © 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

A National Security Strategy for A New Century.

DTIC Science & Technology

1997-05-01

enhancing the prospects for political stability , peaceful conflict resolution and greater hope for the people of the world. At the same time, the dangers we...proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are global concerns that transcend national borders; and environmental damage and rapid population growth undermine economic prosperity and political stability in many countries.

International Access to American Higher Education

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Academe, 2003

2003-01-01

In the wake of September 11, 2001, and in light of heightened concerns about terrorism and the proliferation of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons, the U.S. government has implemented a series of measures to regulate and monitor the flow of international students and scholars into the United States. Some of these measures are designed to…

The nuclear dilemma and the just war tradition

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

O'Brien, W.V.; Langan, J.

This book presents papers on the ethical aspects of nuclear weapons. Topics considered include the concept of a ''just'' war, national defense, political aspects, religion and politics, the failure of deterrence, conventional warfare, nuclear deterrence and democratic politics, the future of the nuclear debate, non-proliferation policy, arms control, national security, and government policies.

31 CFR 544.203 - Holding of funds in interest-bearing accounts; investment and reinvestment.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-07-01

... 31 Money and Finance:Treasury 3 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Holding of funds in interest-bearing accounts; investment and reinvestment. 544.203 Section 544.203 Money and Finance: Treasury Regulations... WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PROLIFERATORS SANCTIONS REGULATIONS Prohibitions § 544.203 Holding of funds in...

Assessing the Net Effects of Sanctions on the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

DTIC Science & Technology

2012-12-01

354 Tabassum Zakaria and Caren Bohan, “Obama’s Olive Branch to Iran Turned into Sanctions Hammer,” Reuters, January...110 Zakaria , Tabassum and Caren Bohan, “Obama’s Olive Branch to Iran Turned into Sanctions Hammer,” Reuters, January 13, 2012, accessed on November

Pakistans Nuclear Weapons

DTIC Science & Technology

2016-02-12

not be subject to International Atomic Energy Agency ( IAEA ) safeguards have the potential to produce 280...PNRA states that Pakistan follows IAEA physical protection standards. Proliferation A fundamental aspect of nuclear security is ensuring that...related to the design and fabrication of a nuclear explosive device,” according to the IAEA (Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Murray, B.L.; Hallenbeck, R.A.; Gill, J.M.

This seminar provided an overview on the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons as well as missiles and missile technology, and set the stage for subsequent seminar meetings of the 1993 program. A multiplicity of factors -- different nations, regions, and capabilities -- is making dealing with proliferation increasingly complicated. Additionally, recent or upcoming world events introduce further uncertainty into proliferation calculations. These proliferation accelerators and decelerators, will greatly shape and define the overall proliferation picture. These factors combine to raise a whole new series of stability issues which require new analyses and approaches for managing proliferation in themore » post-Cold War era. While technology cannot alone solve the proliferation problem, a particularly promising application is in new information technologies and interactive information management systems. A proliferation information network could be used to fuse large amounts of information and data on exports; license; treaty reporting, notifications, and other obligations; dual use technologies and related scientific advances; and others information of proliferation relevance. This type of network could use readily available technologies, would be simple to use and relatively inexpensive to create and maintain, and could be made available to almost of all of the nations of the world.« less

Proliferation resistance of small modular reactors fuels

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Polidoro, F.; Parozzi, F.; Fassnacht, F.

2013-07-01

In this paper the proliferation resistance of different types of Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) has been examined and classified with criteria available in the literature. In the first part of the study, the level of proliferation attractiveness of traditional low-enriched UO{sub 2} and MOX fuels to be used in SMRs based on pressurized water technology has been analyzed. On the basis of numerical simulations both cores show significant proliferation risks. Although the MOX core is less proliferation prone in comparison to the UO{sub 2} core, it still can be highly attractive for diversion or undeclared production of nuclear material. Inmore » the second part of the paper, calculations to assess the proliferation attractiveness of fuel in typical small sodium cooled fast reactor show that proliferation risks from spent fuel cannot be neglected. The core contains a highly attractive plutonium composition during the whole life cycle. Despite some aspects of the design like the sealed core that enables easy detection of unauthorized withdrawal of fissile material and enhances proliferation resistance, in case of open Non-Proliferation Treaty break-out, weapon-grade plutonium in sufficient quantities could be extracted from the reactor core.« less

New Horizons and New Strategies in Arms Control

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Brown, J. editor

In the last ten years, since the break-up of the Soviet Union, remarkable progress in arms control and disarmament has occurred. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the completion of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and the Chemical Weapons Treaty (CWC) are indicative of the great strides made in the non- proliferation arena. Simultaneously, the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), the Conventional Forces Treaty in Europe (CFE), and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START), all associated with US-Soviet Union (now Russia) relations have assisted in redefining European relations and the security landscape. Finally, it now appears that progress is inmore » the offing in developing enhanced compliance measures for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). In sum, all of these achievements have set the stage for the next round of arms control activities, which may lead to a much broader, and perhaps more diffused multilateral agenda. In this new and somewhat unpredictable international setting, arms control and disarmament issues will require solutions that are both more creative and innovative than heretofore.« less

Make the World Safer from Nuclear Weapons

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Bowyer, Ted

Senior Nuclear Scientist Ted Bowyer knows firsthand the challenges associated with protecting our nation. Ted and his colleagues help detect the proliferation of nuclear weapons. They developed award-winning technologies that give international treaty verification authorities “eyes and ears” around the globe. The instruments, located in 80 countries, help ensure compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, or CTBT. They are completely automated radionuclide monitoring systems that would detect airborne radioactive particles if a nuclear detonation occurred in the air, underground or at sea. Some samples collected through these technologies are sent to PNNL’s Shallow Underground Laboratory—the only certified U.S. radionuclidemore » laboratory for the CTBT’s International Monitoring System Organization.« less

Long-Term Implications of the 2016 Future Years Defense Program

DTIC Science & Technology

2016-01-01

operation and maintenance activities; acquisition includes research, development, test, and evaluation as well as procurement of weapon systems and other...group includes procurement and research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E). Appropriations for procurement fund the purchase of new weapon...and Evaluation Military Construction Family Housing OCO Funding Actual FYDP Period Beyond the FYDP PeriodDoD’s Estimates For 2017 through 2020 DoD

The role of science in treaty verification.

PubMed

Gavron, Avigdor

2005-01-01

Technologically advanced nations are currently applying more science to treaty verification than ever before. Satellites gather a multitude of information relating to proliferation concerns using thermal imaging analysis, nuclear radiation measurements, and optical and radio frequency signals detection. Ground stations gather complementary signals such as seismic events and radioactive emissions. Export controls in many countries attempt to intercept materials and technical means that could be used for nuclear proliferation. Nevertheless, we have witnessed a plethora of nuclear proliferation episodes, that were undetected (or were belatedly detected) by these technologies--the Indian nuclear tests in 1998, the Libyan nuclear buildup, the Iranian enrichment program and the North Korea nuclear weapons program are some prime examples. In this talk, we will discuss some of the technologies used for proliferation detection. In particular, we will note some of the issues relating to nuclear materials control agreements that epitomize political difficulties as they impact the implementation of science and technology.

Printing Insecurity? The Security Implications of 3D-Printing of Weapons.

PubMed

Walther, Gerald

2015-12-01

In 2013, the first gun printed out of plastic by a 3D-printer was successfully fired in the U.S. This event caused a major media hype about the dangers of being able to print a gun. Law enforcement agencies worldwide were concerned about this development and the potentially huge security implications of these functional plastic guns. As a result, politicians called for a ban of these weapons and a control of 3D-printing technology. This paper reviews the security implications of 3D-printing technology and 3D guns. It argues that current arms control and transfer policies are adequate to cover 3D-printed guns as well. However, while this analysis may hold up currently, progress in printing technology needs to be monitored to deal with future dangers pre-emptively.

The future of the NPT and measures to reduce nuclear dangers in the age of Trump

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Kimball, Daryl G.

2017-11-01

Through the decades, the international nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation enterprise, though imperfect, has curbed nuclear proliferation and limited the number of nuclear-armed states to nine, forced reductions in major-power nuclear arsenals, ended nuclear testing by all but one state, and created an informal taboo against nuclear weapons use.

10 CFR 75.43 - Circumstances requiring advance notification.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... referred to in Article III(2) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 21 U.S.T. 483). If... specified in this section. (b) Exports. Notification shall be given of any proposed shipment of nuclear material for peaceful purposes under an export license issued pursuant to part 110 of this chapter, in an...

10 CFR 75.43 - Circumstances requiring advance notification.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... referred to in Article III(2) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 21 U.S.T. 483). If... specified in this section. (b) Exports. Notification shall be given of any proposed shipment of nuclear material for peaceful purposes under an export license issued pursuant to part 110 of this chapter, in an...

10 CFR 75.43 - Circumstances requiring advance notification.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... referred to in Article III(2) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 21 U.S.T. 483). If... specified in this section. (b) Exports. Notification shall be given of any proposed shipment of nuclear material for peaceful purposes under an export license issued pursuant to part 110 of this chapter, in an...

10 CFR 75.43 - Circumstances requiring advance notification.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... referred to in Article III(2) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 21 U.S.T. 483). If... specified in this section. (b) Exports. Notification shall be given of any proposed shipment of nuclear material for peaceful purposes under an export license issued pursuant to part 110 of this chapter, in an...

10 CFR 75.43 - Circumstances requiring advance notification.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... referred to in Article III(2) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 21 U.S.T. 483). If... specified in this section. (b) Exports. Notification shall be given of any proposed shipment of nuclear material for peaceful purposes under an export license issued pursuant to part 110 of this chapter, in an...

Global Explosive Ordnance Disposal Conference and Exhibition Held in Fort Walton Beach, Florida on 4-5 May 2011

DTIC Science & Technology

2011-05-05

technology that may be used by rogue states or terrorists to make chemical, biological or nuclear weapons OEE Priorities • WMD Proliferation • Terrorism...to locate and return shipments to OEE Agents • Export Enforcement Agents can detain any outgoing shipment suspected of being illegal Disrupt…using

Hans Bethe, Powering the Stars, and Nuclear Physics

Science.gov Websites

dropdown arrow Site Map A-Z Index Menu Synopsis Hans Bethe, Energy Production in Stars, and Nuclear Physics physics, built atomic weapons, and called for a halt to their proliferation. Bethe's dual legacy is one of Laboratory] from 1943 to 1946. Prior to joining the Manhattan Project, Bethe taught physics at Cornell

15 CFR 742.2 - Proliferation of chemical and biological weapons.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... Country Chart (Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR) is indicated in the appropriate ECCN, a license is... ECCN, a license is required to all destinations except countries in Country Group A:3 (see Supplement... in ECCN 1C350 (precursor and intermediate chemicals used in the production of chemical warfare agents...

Intelligence Community Programs, Management, and Enduring Issues

DTIC Science & Technology

2016-11-08

proliferators, money launderers , drug kingpins, and other national security threats.” 110 The Senate Intelligence Committee report accompanying the IAA...and economic expertise. Financial intelligence analysts focus on terrorist financing, counterfeiting, money laundering , funds transfers, weapons...budgets provide resources ( money and manpower) considered necessary to accomplish IC goals, directives, duties and responsibilities defined by the U.S

The Science of Nuclear Materials: A Modular, Laboratory-based Curriculum

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Cahill, C.L., E-mail: cahill@gwu.edu; Feldman, G.; Briscoe, W.J.

The development of a curriculum for nuclear materials courses targeting students pursuing Master of Arts degrees at The George Washington University is described. The courses include basic concepts such as radiation and radioactivity as well as more complex topics such the nuclear fuel cycle, nuclear weapons, radiation detection and technological aspects of non-proliferation.

When Friendship Is Used as a Weapon: Using Life Space Crisis Intervention Skills to Confront Bullying

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Whitson, Signe

2012-01-01

Bullying has received international attention since the pioneering research over thirty years ago by Scandinavian psychologist Dan Olweus (1978). While prevention programs have proliferated, this article charts new ground by applying Life Space Crisis Intervention (LSCI) to bullying in an example involving young girls. The author describes how…

State-of-the-art in biosafety and biosecurity in European countries.

PubMed

Bielecka, Anna; Mohammadi, Ali Akbar

2014-06-01

The terms biosafety and biosecurity are widely used in different concepts and refer not only to protection of human beings and their surrounding environment against hazardous biological agent, but also to global disarmament of weapons of mass destruction. As a result, the biosafety and biosecurity issues should be considered interdisciplinary based on multilateral agreements against proliferation of biological weapons, public health and environmental protection. This publication presents information on both, international and national biosafety and biosecurity legislation. Status of national implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, penalization issues and measures to account for and secure production, use, storage of particularly dangerous pathogens or activities involving humans, plants and animals where infection may pose a risk have been analyzed. Safety and security measures in laboratories have been studied. Moreover, dual-use technology and measures of secure transport of biohazard materials have been also taken into account. In addition, genetic engineering regulations, biosecurity activities in laboratories and code of conducts have been investigated, as well.

Weapons of mass destruction in the developing world. What are the operational options. Final report

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Minner, D.K.

1992-06-19

The proliferation in quantity and quality of weapons of mass destruction serve as a threat of great consequence to U.S. operational forces. Operational options for action are explored within the national military strategy concepts of forward presence, deterrence, and crisis/regional contingency response. Three questions and associated issues related to operational art are posed for each concept: (1) what condition must be produced to achieve the strategic goal, (2) what events will most likely result in the desired condition, and (3) how should resources be applied to produce those events. The resulting analysis offers the following conclusions: (1) complementary efforts bymore » all instruments of national power--political, diplomatic, economic, and military--are necessary; (2) knowledge, training, and equipment are the first line of defense; (3) persuasion as well as confrontation is necessary; (4) effective deterrence requires capability, credibility, and communication; and (5) training and weapons for retaliation-in-kind remain the final alternative.« less

Weapon Use in Korean Homicide: Differences Between Homicides Involving Sharp and Blunt Instruments.

PubMed

Park, Jisun; Son, Hyeonseo

2017-10-23

On the basis of information regarding 276 homicides committed in South Korea between 1987 and 2008, we compared offenders' and victims' characteristics, injury locations, weapon-related behavior, and offending behavior between homicides involving sharp and blunt instruments. The victims of sharp-force homicide were much younger relative to those of blunt-force homicide. In addition, homicides involving blunt instruments were more likely to be committed by offenders who lived with the victims. Most sharp-force homicides involved injuries to the torso, while blunt-force homicides involved mainly head injuries. Furthermore, perpetrators of sharp-force homicides tended to preselect their weapons, while those of blunt-force homicides were likely to use weapons of opportunity. Logistic regression analysis identified a number of factors, including injury location and body transportation, which significantly predicted weapon type. As this was the first South Korean study to compare sharp- and blunt-force homicides, the results have practical implications for homicide investigations. © 2017 American Academy of Forensic Sciences.

Reducing Proliferation Rick Through Multinational Fuel Cycle Facilities

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Amanda Rynes

2010-11-01

With the prospect of rapid expansion of the nuclear energy industry and the ongoing concern over weapons proliferation, there is a growing need for a viable alternative to traditional nation-based fuel production facilities. While some in the international community remain apprehensive, the advantages of multinational fuel cycle facilities are becoming increasingly apparent, with states on both sides of the supply chain able to garner the security and financial benefits of such facilities. Proliferation risk is minimized by eliminating the need of states to establish indigenous fuel production capabilities and the concept's structure provides an additional internationally monitored barrier against themore » misuse or diversion of nuclear materials. This article gives a brief description of the arguments for and against the implementation of a complete multinational fuel cycle.« less

Biomechanical and performance implications of weapon design: comparison of bullpup and conventional configurations.

PubMed

Stone, Richard T; Moeller, Brandon F; Mayer, Robert R; Rosenquist, Bryce; Van Ryswyk, Darin; Eichorn, Drew

2014-06-01

Shooter accuracy and stability were monitored while firing two bullpup and two conventional configuration rifles of the same caliber in order to determine if one style of weapon results in superior performance. Considerable debate exists among police and military professionals regarding the differences between conventional configuration weapons, where the magazine and action are located ahead of the trigger, and bullpup configuration, where they are located behind the trigger (closer to the user). To date, no published research has attempted to evaluate this question from a physical ergonomics standpoint, and the knowledge that one style might improve stability or result in superior performance is of interest to countless military, law enforcement, and industry experts. A live-fire evaluation of both weapon styles was performed using a total of 48 participants. Shooting accuracy and fluctuations in biomechanical stability (center of pressure) were monitored while subjects used the weapons to perform standard drills. The bullpup weapon designs were found to provide a significant advantage in accuracy and shooter stability, while subjects showed considerable preference toward the conventional weapons. Although many mechanical and maintenance issues must be considered before committing to a bullpup or conventional weapon system, it is clear in terms of basic human stability that the bullpup is the more advantageous configuration. Results can be used by competitive shooter, military, law enforcement, and industry experts while outfitting personnel with a weapon system that leads to superior performance.

Physical and emotional health problems experienced by youth engaged in physical fighting and weapon carrying.

PubMed

Walsh, Sophie D; Molcho, Michal; Craig, Wendy; Harel-Fisch, Yossi; Huynh, Quynh; Kukaswadia, Atif; Aasvee, Katrin; Várnai, Dora; Ottova, Veronika; Ravens-Sieberer, Ulrike; Pickett, William

2013-01-01

Then aims of the current study were 1) to provide cross-national estimates of the prevalence of physical fighting and weapon carrying among adolescents aged 11-15 years; (2) To examine the possible effects of physical fighting and weapon carrying on the occurrence of physical (medically treated injuries) and emotional health outcomes (multiple health complaints) among adolescents within the theoretical framework of Problem Behaviour Theory. 20,125 adolescents aged 11-15 in five countries (Belgium, Israel, USA, Canada, FYR Macedonia) were surveyed via the 2006 Health Behaviour in School Aged Children survey. Prevalence was calculated for physical fighting and weapon carrying along with physical and emotional measures that potentially result from violence. Regression analyses were used to quantify associations between violence/weapon carrying and the potential health consequences within each country. Large variations in fighting and weapon carrying were observed across countries. Boys reported more frequent episodes of fighting/weapon carrying and medically attended injuries in every country, while girls reported more emotional symptoms. Although there were some notable variations in findings between different participating countries, increased weapon carrying and physical fighting were both independently and consistently associated with more frequent reports of the potential health outcomes. Adolescents engaging in fighting and weapon carrying are also at risk for physical and emotional health outcomes. Involvement in fighting and weapon carrying can be seen as part of a constellation of risk behaviours with obvious health implications. Our findings also highlight the importance of the cultural context when examining the nature of violent behaviour for adolescents.

Physical and Emotional Health Problems Experienced by Youth Engaged in Physical Fighting and Weapon Carrying

PubMed Central

Walsh, Sophie D.; Molcho, Michal; Craig, Wendy; Harel-Fisch, Yossi; Huynh, Quynh; Kukaswadia, Atif; Aasvee, Katrin; Várnai, Dora; Ottova, Veronika; Ravens-Sieberer, Ulrike; Pickett, William

2013-01-01

Then aims of the current study were 1) to provide cross-national estimates of the prevalence of physical fighting and weapon carrying among adolescents aged 11–15 years; (2) To examine the possible effects of physical fighting and weapon carrying on the occurrence of physical (medically treated injuries) and emotional health outcomes (multiple health complaints) among adolescents within the theoretical framework of Problem Behaviour Theory. 20,125 adolescents aged 11–15 in five countries (Belgium, Israel, USA, Canada, FYR Macedonia) were surveyed via the 2006 Health Behaviour in School Aged Children survey. Prevalence was calculated for physical fighting and weapon carrying along with physical and emotional measures that potentially result from violence. Regression analyses were used to quantify associations between violence/weapon carrying and the potential health consequences within each country. Large variations in fighting and weapon carrying were observed across countries. Boys reported more frequent episodes of fighting/weapon carrying and medically attended injuries in every country, while girls reported more emotional symptoms. Although there were some notable variations in findings between different participating countries, increased weapon carrying and physical fighting were both independently and consistently associated with more frequent reports of the potential health outcomes. Adolescents engaging in fighting and weapon carrying are also at risk for physical and emotional health outcomes. Involvement in fighting and weapon carrying can be seen as part of a constellation of risk behaviours with obvious health implications. Our findings also highlight the importance of the cultural context when examining the nature of violent behaviour for adolescents. PMID:23437126

Psychological markers underlying murder weapon profile: a quantitative study.

PubMed

Kamaluddin, M R; Othman, A; Ismail, K H; Mat Saat, G A

2017-12-01

The horrific nature of murder using different types of weapons has been an important focal point of many criminological studies. Weapons that are used in murders seem to play dominant roles in murder investigations as they may provide information leading to arrest. The established factors for weapon usage include environmental context, demography and availability of weapons. However, there is insufficient research attention on the psychological functioning of murderers for particular weapon usage. In light of this, the current study seeks to narrow this gap of information by identifying the influences of psychological traits on weapon usage among a sample of male murderers. The present cross-sectional study was conducted among 71 male murderers incarcerated in 11 prisons within Peninsular Malaysia. The selection of the sample was based on predetermined selection criteria using a purposive sampling method. A guided self-administered questionnaire comprising sociodemography variables and four Malay validated psychometric instruments: Zuckerman-Kuhlman Personality Questionnaire-40-Cross-Culture, Self-control Scale, "How I Think" Questionnaire and Aggression Questionnaire; was used. Independent sample t-test was performed to establish the mean score differences of psychological traits between the murderers who used single and multiple weapons while Kruskal-Wallis tests were carried out to ascertain the differences between the specific types of weapons used among the murderers. Following this, one-way ANOVA was carried out to ascertain the psychological trait differences among the murderers according to the different sources of weapon. Results indicated specific psychological traits influenced the number(s), source(s) and type(s) of weapon used in committing murder. The findings have implications for the psychological profiling of unknown murderers within the Malaysian context.

Strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime : focus on the civilian nuclear fuel cycle.

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Saltiel, David H.; Pregenzer, Arian Leigh

2005-04-01

Leaders around the world and across the ideological spectrum agree that the global nonproliferation regime is facing a serious test. The emergence of sophisticated terrorist networks, black markets in nuclear technology, and technological leaps associated with globalization have conspired to threaten one of the most successful examples of international cooperation in history. The rampant proliferation of nuclear weapons that was predicted at the start of the nuclear age has been largely held in check and the use of those weapons avoided. Nonetheless, with the thirty-fifth anniversary of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the threat of nuclearmore » proliferation seems more serious than ever. Although experts readily concede that there exist many pathways to proliferation, the threat posed by the misuse of the civilian nuclear fuel cycle has received considerable recent attention. While the connection between nuclear energy and nonproliferation has been a topic of discussion since the dawn of the nuclear age, world events have brought the issue to the forefront once again. United States President George W. Bush and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Mohammad ElBaradei are among those who have highlighted proliferation risks associated with civilian nuclear power programs and called for revitalizing the nuclear nonproliferation regime to address new threats. From the possibility of diversion or theft of nuclear material or technology, to the use of national civilian programs as a cover for weapons programs - what some have called latent proliferation - the fuel cycle appears to many to represent a glaring proliferation vulnerability. Just as recognition of these risks is not new, neither is recognition of the many positive benefits of nuclear energy. In fact, a renewed interest in exploiting these benefits has increased the urgency of addressing the risks. Global energy demand is expected to at least double by the middle of the century and could increase even more quickly. Much of the new demand will come from the rapidly expanding economies in China and India, but much of the developing world stands poised to follow the same path. This growth in demand is paralleled by concerns about global warming and the long-term reliability of carbon-based fuel supplies, concerns which expanded use of nuclear power can help to address. For these reasons and others, many countries in Asia have already clearly signaled that nuclear energy will play a key role for years to come. Numerous proposals have been made in the last two years for reducing the proliferation risk of the civilian nuclear fuel cycle. These range from a ban on export of enrichment and reprocessing technology to countries not already possessing operational capabilities to multinational management of the nuclear fuel cycle and strengthening existing monitoring and security mechanisms. The need for international willingness to enforce nonproliferation commitments and norms has also been emphasized. Some of these proposals could significantly impact the production of nuclear energy. Because the successful strengthening of the nonproliferation regime and the expansion of nuclear energy are so closely related, any successful approach to resolving these issues will require the creative input of experts from both the nuclear energy and nonproliferation communities. Against this backdrop, Sandia National Laboratories organized its 14th International Security Conference (ISC) around the theme: Strengthening the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: Focus on the Civilian Nuclear Fuel Cycle. The goal of the conference was to begin a constructive dialogue between the nuclear energy and nuclear nonproliferation communities. The conference was held in Chantilly, Virginia, just outside Washington, D.C. on April 4-6, 2005, and was attended by approximately 125 participants from fifteen countries. The ISC agenda was structured to produce a systematic review of the connection between civilian nuclear energy programs and the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to identify constructive approaches to strengthen the nonproliferation regime. The conference began by reviewing the energy and security context that has, once again, raised the profile of this issue. A discussion of the risks associated with the civilian nuclear fuel cycle was then used to inform the analysis of several potential risk-management tools. The conference concluded by looking for lessons from the past as well as looking forward to future opportunities, with a particular focus on East Asia. In this paper we summarize the debates and ideas that emerged during the conference. Although we have drawn on material presented by speakers and comments made by participants, we do not quote or cite the specific contributions of individuals.« less

Diplomatic Solutions to Additive Challenges

DTIC Science & Technology

Additive manufacturing (AM) technology, colloquially known as 3D printing , will bring significant benefits to society, but also poses great risks...regimes, are not sufficient to address the challenges presented by 3D printing technology. The DOS should evaluate and promote unconventional strategies...from printed weapons proliferation. Working with other nations to resolve the appropriate balance between development and security, and to promote norms

Pre-Emption and Precedent: The Significance of Iraq (1981) and Syria (2007) for an Israeli Response to an Iranian Nuclear Threat

DTIC Science & Technology

2011-06-10

x CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ...79 1 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION Background You don‘t want a messianic apocalyptic cult controlling atomic...Elli_Louka_Nuclear_Weapons_Proliferation.pdf (accessed 15 April 2011). 8 This study consists of five chapters. Chapter 1, ― Introduction ‖ announces the topic and describes its

15 CFR 742.2 - Proliferation of chemical and biological weapons.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... medical, analytical, diagnostic, and food testing kits that consist of pre-packaged materials of defined... health purposes: (1) Test kits containing no more than 300 grams of any chemical controlled by ECCN 1C350... part 745 of the EAR). Such test kits are controlled by ECCN 1C395 for CB and CW reasons, to States not...

15 CFR 742.2 - Proliferation of chemical and biological weapons.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... medical, analytical, diagnostic, and food testing kits that consist of pre-packaged materials of defined... health purposes: (1) Test kits containing no more than 300 grams of any chemical controlled by ECCN 1C350... part 745 of the EAR). Such test kits are controlled by ECCN 1C395 for CB and CW reasons, to States not...

15 CFR 742.2 - Proliferation of chemical and biological weapons.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

..., analytical, diagnostic, and food testing kits that consist of pre-packaged materials of defined composition... purposes: (1) Test kits containing no more than 300 grams of any chemical controlled by ECCN 1C350.b or .c... the EAR). Such test kits are controlled by ECCN 1C395 for CB and CW reasons, to States not Party to...

The Dilemma of Porous Borders: Uganda’s Experience in Combating Terrorism

DTIC Science & Technology

2017-01-10

34 c. The Anti- money Laundering Act, 2013 ............................36 d. Anti-terrorism Amendment Bill, 2015...ALIR Liberation Army of Rwanda AMISOM African Mission to Somalia AMLA Anti- Money Laundering Act AU Africa Union AUPSC African Union Peace Security...of transnational crimes, including proliferation of weapons, money laundering , corruption and drug trafficking, all of which have reinforced the

Eye injuries from electrical weapon probes: Incidents, prevalence, and legal implications.

PubMed

Kroll, Mark W; Ritter, Mollie B; Kennedy, Eric A; Silverman, Nora K; Shinder, Roman; Brave, Michael A; Williams, Howard E

2018-04-01

While generally reducing morbidity and mortality, electrical weapons have risks associated with their usage, including burn injuries and trauma associated with uncontrolled fall impacts. However, the prevalence of significant eye injury has not been investigated. We searched for incidents of penetrating eye injury from TASER ® conducted electrical weapon (CEW) probes via open source media, litigation filings, and a survey of CEW law-enforcement master instructors. We report 20 previously-unpublished cases of penetrating eye injury from electrical weapon probes in law-enforcement field uses. Together with the 8 previously published cases, there are a total of 28 cases out of 3.44 million field uses, giving a demonstrated CEW field-use risk of penetrating eye injury of approximately 1:123 000. Confidence limits [85 000, 178 000] by Wilson score interval. There have been 18 cases of total unilateral blindness or enucleation. We also present legal decisions on this topic. The use of electrical weapons presents a rare but real risk of total or partial unilateral blindness from electrical weapon probes. Catastrophic eye injuries appear to be the dominant non-fatal complication of electronic control. Copyright © 2018 Elsevier Ltd and Faculty of Forensic and Legal Medicine. All rights reserved.

Improving proliferation resistance of high breeding gain generation 4 reactors using blankets composed of light water reactor waste

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Hellesen, C.; Grape, S.; Haakanson, A.

2013-07-01

Fertile blankets can be used in fast reactors to enhance the breeding gain as well as the passive safety characteristics. However, such blankets typically result in the production of weapons grade plutonium. For this reason they are often excluded from Generation IV reactor designs. In this paper we demonstrate that using blankets manufactured directly from spent light water (LWR) reactor fuel it is possible to produce a plutonium product with non-proliferation characteristics on a par with spent LWR fuel of 30-50 MWd/kg burnup. The beneficial breeding and safety characteristics are retained. (authors)

The bioscience revolution & the biological weapons threat: levers & interventions

PubMed Central

D'Agostino, Mark; Martin, Greg

2009-01-01

In December 2008, the US Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, released a report, World At Risk. The Report points to the fact that, not only is the use of a weapon of mass destruction in a terrorist attack before the end of 2013, more likely than not, but also to the fact that terrorists are more likely to be able to obtain and use biological weapons than nuclear. This paper examines the recommendations of the report in the context of the historic and geopolitical changes, in particular globalization. The authors highlight the "dual-use" dilemma, as described in the report, as the paradoxical use of technology developed for the benefit of mankind being used for sinister purposes. The mitigation of such a threat lies in broad stakeholder involvement and cooperation, including non-state actors, governments and the bio-tech industry itself. The importance of vigilance measures within the life science community is emphasized and, the authors propose, could include a web-based didactic course in bioterrorism and weapons of mass destruction identification. The site could outline safety protocols, have detailed disaster management tutorials, and could be specifically tailored for different subsets of industry and health professionals. The paper concludes with an endorsement of a multi-pronged approach including strong international guidelines and intelligence cooperation and preparatory measures such as the wide-spread use of detection systems as well as diagnostic decision support systems for bioterrorism detection at the local level. PMID:19220910

Nuclear programs in India and Pakistan

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Mian, Zia

India and Pakistan launched their respective nuclear programs in the 1940s and 1950s with considerable foreign technical support, especially from the United States Atoms for Peace Program. The technology and training that was acquired served as the platform for later nuclear weapon development efforts that included nuclear weapon testing in 1974 and in 1998 by India, and also in 1998 by Pakistan - which had illicitly acquired uranium enrichment technology especially from Europe and received assistance from China. As of 2013, both India and Pakistan were continuing to produce fissile material for weapons, in the case of India also formore » nuclear naval fuel, and were developing a diverse array of ballistic and cruise missiles. International efforts to restrain the South Asian nuclear build-up have been largely set aside over the past decade as Pakistani support became central for the U.S. war in Afghanistan and as U.S. geopolitical and economic interests in supporting the rise of India, in part as a counter to China, led to India being exempted both from U.S non-proliferation laws and international nuclear trade guidelines. In the absence of determined international action and with Pakistan blocking the start of talks on a fissile material cutoff treaty, nuclear weapon programs in South Asia are likely to keep growing for the foreseeable future.« less

Nuclear programs in India and Pakistan

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Mian, Zia

2014-05-01

India and Pakistan launched their respective nuclear programs in the 1940s and 1950s with considerable foreign technical support, especially from the United States Atoms for Peace Program. The technology and training that was acquired served as the platform for later nuclear weapon development efforts that included nuclear weapon testing in 1974 and in 1998 by India, and also in 1998 by Pakistan - which had illicitly acquired uranium enrichment technology especially from Europe and received assistance from China. As of 2013, both India and Pakistan were continuing to produce fissile material for weapons, in the case of India also for nuclear naval fuel, and were developing a diverse array of ballistic and cruise missiles. International efforts to restrain the South Asian nuclear build-up have been largely set aside over the past decade as Pakistani support became central for the U.S. war in Afghanistan and as U.S. geopolitical and economic interests in supporting the rise of India, in part as a counter to China, led to India being exempted both from U.S non-proliferation laws and international nuclear trade guidelines. In the absence of determined international action and with Pakistan blocking the start of talks on a fissile material cutoff treaty, nuclear weapon programs in South Asia are likely to keep growing for the foreseeable future.

The ``Nuclear Renaissance'' and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Lyman, Edwin S.

2007-05-01

As interest grows around the world in nuclear power as an energy source that could help control greenhouse gas emissions, some have proclaimed the arrival of a ``nuclear renaissance.'' But can the increased risks of more nuclear power be managed? The political crisis surrounding Iran's pursuit of uranium enrichment has exposed weaknesses in the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Also, al Qaeda's declared interest in weapons of mass destruction raises the concern that terrorists could acquire nuclear weapons by stealing materials from poorly secured facilities. Growth of nuclear energy would require the construction of many additional uranium enrichment plants. And the generation of more spent nuclear fuel without a credible waste disposal strategy would increase political support for reprocessing, which separates large quantities of weapon-usable plutonium from spent fuel. There is little evidence that the various institutional arrangements and technical schemes proposed to mitigate the security risks of a major nuclear expansion would be effective. This talk will focus on the measures necessary to allow large-scale global growth of nuclear power without resulting in an unacceptably high risk of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism, and will discuss the feasibility of such measures. To cite this abstract, use the following reference: http://meetings.aps.org/link/BAPS.2007.OSS07.E1.2

Implications of the President's strategic defense initiative and antisatellite weapons policy. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security and Science of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-Ninth Congress, First Session, April 24 and May 1, 1985

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Not Available

1985-01-01

The House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security and Science held hearings on April 24 and May 1, 1985, to consider the implications of the strategic defense initiative and antisatellite weapons policy for arms control in space. This document is the transcript of that hearing and includes the prepared statements of congressmen, two former secretaries of defense and representatives of several organizations concerned with arms control. Previously published reports and the text of the ABM Treaty are attached as appendices.

Armed and attentive: holding a weapon can bias attentional priorities in scene viewing.

PubMed

Biggs, Adam T; Brockmole, James R; Witt, Jessica K

2013-11-01

The action-specific perception hypothesis (Witt, Current Directions in Psychological Science 20: 201-206, 2011) claims that the environment is represented with respect to potential interactions for objects present within said environment. This investigation sought to extend the hypothesis beyond perceptual mechanisms and assess whether action-specific potential could alter attentional allocation. To do so, we examined a well-replicated attention bias in the weapon focus effect (Loftus, Loftus, & Messo, Law and Human Behaviour 1, 55-62, 1987), which represents the tendency for observers to attend more to weapons than to neutral objects. Our key manipulation altered the anticipated action-specific potential of observers by providing them a firearm while they freely viewed scenes with and without weapons present. We replicated the original weapon focus effect using modern eye tracking and confirmed that the increase in time looking at weapons comes at a cost of less time spent looking at faces. Additionally, observers who held firearms while viewing the various scenes showed a general bias to look at faces over objects, but only if the firearm was in a readily usable position (i.e., pointed at the scenes rather than holstered at one's side). These two effects, weapon focus and the newly found bias to look more at faces when armed, canceled out one another without interacting. This evidence confirms that the action capabilities of the observer alter more than just perceptual mechanisms and that holding a weapon can change attentional priorities. Theoretical and real-world implications are discussed.

Non-proliferation, safeguards, and security for the fissile materials disposition program immobilization alternatives

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Duggan, R.A.; Jaeger, C.D.; Tolk, K.M.

1996-05-01

The Department of Energy is analyzing long-term storage and disposition alternatives for surplus weapons-usable fissile materials. A number of different disposition alternatives are being considered. These include facilities for storage, conversion and stabilization of fissile materials, immobilization in glass or ceramic material, fabrication of fissile material into mixed oxide (MOX) fuel for reactors, use of reactor based technologies to convert material into spent fuel, and disposal of fissile material using geologic alternatives. This paper will focus on how the objectives of reducing security and proliferation risks are being considered, and the possible facility impacts. Some of the areas discussed inmore » this paper include: (1) domestic and international safeguards requirements, (2) non-proliferation criteria and measures, (3) the threats, and (4) potential proliferation, safeguards, and security issues and impacts on the facilities. Issues applicable to all of the possible disposition alternatives will be discussed in this paper. However, particular attention is given to the plutonium immobilization alternatives.« less

Protecting Americans from the Proliferation of Weapons to Terrorists Act of 2013

THOMAS, 113th Congress

Rep. DesJarlais, Scott [R-TN-4

2013-06-25

House - 06/25/2013 Referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on Armed Services, and Intelligence (Permanent Select), for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the... (All Actions) Tracker: This bill has the status IntroducedHere are the steps for Status of Legislation:

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Hund, Gretchen

For the past decade, a team at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) has engaged industry to “go beyond compliance” in controlling and securing their supply chains to ensure their goods are not diverted to nuclear weapons programs. This work has focused on dual-use industries that manufacture products that can be used in both commercial applications and in the development of a nuclear weapon. The team encourages industry to self-regulate to reduce proliferation risks. As part of that work, PNNL interviewed numerous companies about their compliance practices in order to understand their business and to build awareness around best practicesmore » to ensure security of goods and information along their supply chains. As a result, PNNL has identified seven indicators that a company can adopt as part of their commitment to nonproliferation ideals.« less

Institutional plan FY 1999--FY 2004

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

NONE

1998-10-01

Los Alamos has a well-defined and nationally important mission: to reduce the global nuclear danger. This central national security mission consists of four main elements: stockpile stewardship, nuclear materials management, nonproliferation and arms control, and cleanup of the environmental legacy of nuclear weapons activities. The Laboratory provides support for and ensures confidence in the nation`s nuclear stockpile without nuclear testing. This challenge requires the Laboratory to continually hone its scientific acumen and technological capabilities to perform this task reliably using an interdisciplinary approach and advanced experimental and modeling techniques. In the last two National Defense Authorization Acts, Congress identified themore » need to protect the nation from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which includes nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and their potential use by terrorists. Los Alamos is applying multidisciplinary science and engineering skills to address these problems. In addition, the Laboratory`s critical programmatic roles in stockpile stewardship and threat reduction are complemented by its waste management operations and environmental restoration work. Information on specific programs is available in Section 2 of this document.« less

US arms control obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Not Available

1986-06-27

Article VI of the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) obligates the nuclear weapon states parties to the Treaty ''to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race, ... to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.'' The preamble to the NPT recalls the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty ''determination ... to achieve the discontinuance of ... explosions.'' These provisions are interpreted by a majority of the non-nuclear weapon states parties to the Treaty as an obligation of the nuclear weapon states parties tomore » the Treaty to pursue a comprehensive test ban (CTB). However, a review of the history of the NPT negotiations and US ratification proceedings makes clear that the NPT imposes no legal obligation on the US to pursue a CTB. The US did not make a one-to-one correspondence between Article VI and any specific arms control measure; to the contrary, the US argued successfully that such a connection (to any specific measure) would be pernicious to the attempt to achieve agreement on the NPT. This interpretation, which was sustained through the negotiations and the ratification proceedings, still reflects the limits of the legal obligations the US has accepted. But, in the absence of progress on other arms control measures, which would relieve the pressure for a CTB, the majority interpretation creates political difficulties for the US and could threaten the NPT regime in the future. These problems highlight the need for the US to better defend its compliance with Article VI and to develop a long-term strategy that will permit necessary testing while assuring the survival of the NPT regime in effective form.« less

United States' arms control obligations under the NonProliferation Treaty

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Not Available

1986-06-27

Article VI of the 1986 Non-Proliferation Treaty obligates the nuclear weapon states party to the Treaty ''to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race, ...to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.'' The preamble to the NPT refers to the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty ''determination...to achieve the discontinuance of...explosions.'' These provisions are interpreted by many non-nuclear weapon states party to the NPT as an obligation of the nuclear weapon states party to the treaty to pursue a comprehensive test banmore » (CTB). However, a review of the history of the NPT negotiations and US ratification proceedings makes clear that Article VI imposes no legal obligation on the US to pursue a CTB. The United States did not make a one-to-one correspondence between Article VI and any specific arms control measure; to the contrary, the United States argued successfully that such a connection (to any specific measure) would be pernicious to the attempt to achieve agreement on the NPT. This interpretation held through the negotiations and ratification proceedings. However, a majority of NPT signatories assert that Article VI does indeed imply a commitment to a CTB. In the absence of progress on other arms control measures, which would relieve the pressure for a CTB, this interpretation creates a political problem for the US and could threaten the NPT regime in the future. These problems emphasize the need for the United States to more clearly explain its compliance with Article VI and to develop a long-term strategy that will permit necessary testing while assuring the survival of the NPT regime in effective form.« less

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Background and Current Developments

DTIC Science & Technology

2008-09-18

needed to conduct a nuclear test. Critics raised concerns about the implications of these policies for testing and new weapons. At present, Congress...as it is reduced, is reliable and safe. So he has not ruled out testing in the future, but there are no plans to do so.’”4 Critics expressed concern...ten-year-old moratorium on nuclear weapons testing.”5 Another critic felt that increased funding for test readiness would in effect give prior

Report of a Workshop in Nuclear Forces and Nonproliferation held at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Pilat, Joseph F

2009-01-01

The workshop addressed evolving nuclear forces and their impacts on nonproliferation in the context of the new strategic environment, the Obama Administration's Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) Review and the 2010 Conference (RevCon) of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The issues discussed are at the heart of the debate on nuclear policy issues such asfuture nuclear weapons requirements and nonproliferation, but also the stockpile stewardship program and infrastructure modernization. The workshop discussions reflected the importance of the NPRfor defining the role of US nuclear forces in dealing with 21s1 century threats and providing guidancemore » that will shape NNSA and DoD programs. They also highlighted its importancefor NPT diplomacy. The discussion noted the report of the bipartisan Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, and the expectation that the NPR would likely reflect its consensus to a large degree (although the Administration was not bound by the report). There was widespread support for developing thefoundationsfor a sustainable nuclear-weapon program that addresses nuclear weapons, infrastructure and expertise in the broader nonproliferation, disarmament and international security contexts. The discussion also revealed a convergence of views, but no consensus, on a number of important issues, including the diminished role but continued importance of nuclear weapons; the need to take action to ensure the sustainability of the stockpile, and the recapitalization of the infrastructure and expertise; and the need to take action to promote nonproliferation, arms control and disarmament objectives.« less

The NPR, NPT and the prospects for disarmament

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Pilat, Joseph F

2010-10-04

In Prague's Hradcany Square on April 5, 2009, President Barack Obama offered a bold vision of the nuclear future that encompasses both reducing nuclear dangers and pursuing the goal of a world without nuclear weapons while maintaining, as long as nuclear weapons remain, a safe secure, and effective arsenal, to deter potential adversaries and to assure U.S. allies and other security partners that they can count on America's security commitments. The agenda put forward in Prague involves the full range of issues from deterrence to nonproliferation and disarmament. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) report, reflecting the twin objectives ofmore » the Prague speech, for the first time places the United States effort to lead expanded international efforts to rebuild and strengthen the global nuclear nonproliferation regime at the top the U.S. nuclear agenda. This attention underscores the fact that the top priority of the United States is to discourage additional states from acquiring nuclear weapon capabilities and to stop terrorist groups from acquiring weapon-usable nuclear materials. It also reinforced the view that positively influencing the 2010 Review Conference (RevCon) of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was a key objective of the Obama Administration. The NPR developed both the vision and the policy, but details of implementation will need to be developed and better understood. This paper will address the Nuclear Posture Review and its implementation, as well as it's relation to, and impact on, the NPT RevCon and the long term prospects for nonproliferation and disarmament.« less

Use of open source information and commercial satellite imagery for nuclear nonproliferation regime compliance verification by a community of academics

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Solodov, Alexander

The proliferation of nuclear weapons is a great threat to world peace and stability. The question of strengthening the nonproliferation regime has been open for a long period of time. In 1997 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors (BOG) adopted the Additional Safeguards Protocol. The purpose of the protocol is to enhance the IAEA's ability to detect undeclared production of fissile materials in member states. However, the IAEA does not always have sufficient human and financial resources to accomplish this task. Developed here is a concept for making use of human and technical resources available in academia that could be used to enhance the IAEA's mission. The objective of this research was to study the feasibility of an academic community using commercially or publicly available sources of information and products for the purpose of detecting covert facilities and activities intended for the unlawful acquisition of fissile materials or production of nuclear weapons. In this study, the availability and use of commercial satellite imagery systems, commercial computer codes for satellite imagery analysis, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) verification International Monitoring System (IMS), publicly available information sources such as watchdog groups and press reports, and Customs Services information were explored. A system for integrating these data sources to form conclusions was also developed. The results proved that publicly and commercially available sources of information and data analysis can be a powerful tool in tracking violations in the international nuclear nonproliferation regime and a framework for implementing these tools in academic community was developed. As a result of this study a formation of an International Nonproliferation Monitoring Academic Community (INMAC) is proposed. This would be an independent organization consisting of academics (faculty, staff and students) from both nuclear weapon states (NWS) and non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS). This community analyzes all types of unclassified publicly and commercially available information to aid in detection of violations of the non-proliferation regime. INMAC shares all of this information with the IAEA and the public. Since INMAC is composed solely by members of the academic community, this organization would not demonstrate any biases in its investigations or reporting.

Leo Szilard Lectureship Award Talk: Nuclear disarmament after the cold war

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Podvig, Pavel

2008-04-01

Now that the cold war is long over, our thinking of nuclear weapons and the role that they play in international security has undergone serious changes. The emphasis has shifted from superpower confrontation to nuclear proliferation, spread of weapon materials, and to the dangers of countries developing nuclear weapon capability under a cover of a civilian program. At the same time, the old cold-war dangers, while receded, have not disappeared completely. The United States and Russia keep maintaining thousands of nuclear weapons in their arsenals, some of them in very high degree of readiness. This situation presents a serious challenge that the international community has to deal with. Although Russia and the United States are taking some steps to reduce their nuclear arsenals, the traditional arms control process has stalled -- the last treaty that was signed in 2002 does not place serious limits on strategic forces of either side. The START Treaty, which provides a framework for verification and transparency in reduction of nuclear arsenals, will expire at the end of 2009. Little effort has been undertaken to extend the treaty or renegotiate it. Moreover, in recent years Russia has stepped up the efforts to modernize its strategic nuclear forces. The United States has resisted joining the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and has been working on controversial new nuclear weapon development programs. The U.S. missile defense program makes the dialogue between Russia and the United States even more difficult. The reluctance of Russia and the United States to engage in a discussion about drastic reductions of their nuclear forces undermines the case of nuclear nonproliferation and seriously complicated their effort to contain the spread of nuclear weapon technologies and expertise. One of the reasons for the current lack of progress in nuclear disarmament is the contradiction between the diminished role that nuclear weapons play in security of nuclear weapon states and the inertia of cold-war institutions that are involved in their development and support. Dealing with this contradiction would require development of new mechanisms of cooperation between nuclear weapons states and their strong commitment to the cause of nuclear nonproliferation. One important area of cooperation is development of a framework that would prevent the spread of nuclear materials and technology at the time when increasing number of countries is turning toward expanded use of nuclear power to cover their energy needs.

Does the Fast Patrol Boat Have a Future in the Navy?

DTIC Science & Technology

2002-05-31

Admiral Dennis Blair (Commander and Chief, United States Pacific Command) testified to Congress “countering terrorism, weapons proliferation...United States Navy. Blair, Dennis C., Admiral, USN. 2001a. Interview by Maria Ressa, CNN Jakarta Bureau, December 1. Interview transcript on-line...Available from http://www. pacom.mil/speeches/sst2001/011201blairCNN.htm. Internet accessed 3 March 2002. Blair, Dennis C., Admiral, USN. 2001b

JPRS Report Proliferation Issues

DTIC Science & Technology

1991-12-02

Nuclear Arms [Sao Paulo FOLHA DE SAO PAULO 11 Nov] 36 Ukraine Official Views Defense Plans, Nuclear Weapons [Prague RUDE PRAVO 7Nov] 36 Yakutsk...1992 92WP0057A Sao Paulo GAZETA MERCANTIL in Portuguese 22 Oct 91 p 15 [Article by Sao Paulo correspondent Luis Leonel] [Text] The 1992 budget for...Misinterpretation He explained that Minister of the Infrastructure Joao Santana had been misinterpreted when he said two weeks ago that the

Indispensable Nation: U.S. Security Guarantees and Nuclear Proliferation

DTIC Science & Technology

2017-06-01

to achieve this capability. This is encapsulated in Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s famous declaration, “We will make an atomic bomb ...the Bomb " argues that states that receive sensitive nuclear assistance, in the form of aid in weapons design, enrichment facility construction, or...3 Feroz Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb . (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012), 87. 4 Matthew Kroenig, “Importing

India-U.S. Relations

DTIC Science & Technology

2006-11-09

Asia focuses on ongoing tensions between India and Pakistan, a problem rooted in unfinished business from the 1947 Partition and competing claims to the...between India and Pakistan. The United States also seeks to curtail the proliferation of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles in South Asia . Both...qdr/fulltext/nss2002.pdf] and [http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/nss2006.pdf]. President Bill Clinton’s March 2000 visit to South Asia seemed a major

China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues

DTIC Science & Technology

2009-12-23

including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson...Congressional Research Service 5 Operational since 2001, the Chashma reactor has IAEA safeguards but not full scope safeguards (Nucleonics Week, April 26...reports indicated that M-11 missiles were “ operational ” in Pakistan, but these findings were disputed by some policymakers. Secretary of Defense William

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

NONE

Although the Cold War has ended, the threat of proliferation with chemical, biological, and nuclear warheads continues. Two factors further increase the threat from these weapons of mass destruction: knowledge of missile technology has spread extensively, and, in recent years, many countries - some of them unfriendly to the US and its allies - have obtained short- and intermediate-range missiles. The threat posed by such missiles was amply demonstrated during the Gulf War. Thus, the need to protect US and allied forces from these weapons has never been greater. When nuclear-tipped defensive missiles, such as Sprint and Spartan, were phasedmore » out years ago, the US turned for its defense to kinetic-energy {open_quotes}kill{close_quotes} interceptors - missiles that destroy an enemy missile by striking it with lethal force and accuracy at some point in its trajectory. The Patriot missile is probably the best-known kinetic-energy (KE) interceptor in the US defensive arsenal. To counter the spreading threat of proliferation, LLNL and other laboratories have been participating in a joint program funded by the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO), within the Department of Defense, to develop defensive missile systems. Participants are designing, testing, and certifying KE interceptors to defend against current and future missile threats. These research efforts are described.« less

History of Nuclear India

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Chaturvedi, Ram

2000-04-01

India emerged as a free and democratic country in 1947, and entered into the nuclear age in 1948 by establishing the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), with Homi Bhabha as the chairman. Later on the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) was created under the Office of the Prime Minister Jawahar Lal Nehru. Initially the AEC and DAE received international cooperation, and by 1963 India had two research reactors and four nuclear power reactors. In spite of the humiliating defeat in the border war by China in 1962 and China's nuclear testing in 1964, India continued to adhere to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. On May 18, 1974 India performed a 15 kt Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE). The western powers considered it nuclear weapons proliferation and cut off all financial and technical help, even for the production of nuclear power. However, India used existing infrastructure to build nuclear power reactors and exploded both fission and fusion devices on May 11 and 13, 1998. The international community viewed the later activity as a serious road block for the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; both deemed essential to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. India considers these treaties favoring nuclear states and is prepared to sign if genuine nuclear disarmament is included as an integral part of these treaties.

Satellite Power System (SPS) military implications

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Bain, C. N.

1978-01-01

The military implications of the reference satellite power system (SPS) were examined is well as important military related study tasks. Primary areas of investigation were the potential of the SPS as a weapon, for supporting U.S. military preparedness, and for affecting international relations. In addition, the SPS's relative vulnerability to overt military action, terrorist attacks, and sabotage was considered.

Medical implications of enhanced radiation weapons.

PubMed

Reeves, Glen I

2010-12-01

During the 1960s through 1980s the United States and several other nations developed, and even considered deploying, enhanced-radiation warheads (ERWs). The main effect of ERWs (sometimes called "neutron bombs"), as compared to other types of nuclear weapons, is to enhance radiation casualties while reducing blast and thermal damage to the infrastructure. Five nations were reported to have developed and tested ERWs during this period, but since the termination of the "Cold War" there have been no threats of development, deployment, or use of such weapons. However, if the technology of a quarter of a century ago has been developed, maintained, or even advanced since then, it is conceivable that the grim possibility of future ERW use exists. The type of destruction, initial triage of casualties, distribution of patterns of injury, and medical management of ERWs will be shown to significantly differ from that of fission weapons. Emergency response planners and medical personnel, civilian or military, must be aware of these differences to reduce the horrible consequences of ERW usage and appropriately treat casualties.

OPTIMIZATION OF HETEROGENEOUS UTILIZATION OF THORIUM IN PWRS TO ENHANCE PROLIFERATION RESISTANCE AND REDUCE WASTE.

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

TODOSOW,M.; KAZIMI,M.

2004-08-01

Issues affecting the implementation, public perception and acceptance of nuclear power include: proliferation, radioactive waste, safety, and economics. The thorium cycle directly addresses the proliferation and waste issues, but optimization studies of core design and fuel management are needed to ensure that it fits within acceptable safety and economic margins. Typical pressurized water reactors, although loaded with uranium fuel, produce 225 to 275 kg of plutonium per gigawatt-year of operation. Although the spent fuel is highly radioactive, it nevertheless offers a potential proliferation pathway because the plutonium is relatively easy to separate, amounts to many critical masses, and does notmore » present any significant intrinsic barrier to weapon assembly. Uranium 233, on the other hand, produced by the irradiation of thorium, although it too can be used in weapons, may be ''denatured'' by the addition of natural, depleted or low enriched uranium. Furthermore, it appears that the chemical behavior of thoria or thoria-urania fuel makes it a more stable medium for the geological disposal of the spent fuel. It is therefore particularly well suited for a once-through fuel cycle. The use of thorium as a fertile material in nuclear fuel has been of interest since the dawn of nuclear power technology due to its abundance and to potential neutronic advantages. Early projects include homogeneous mixtures of thorium and uranium oxides in the BORAX-IV, Indian Point I, and Elk River reactors, as well as heterogeneous mixtures in the Shippingport seed-blanket reactor. However these projects were developed under considerably different circumstances than those which prevail at present. The earlier applications preceded the current proscription, for non-proliferation purposes, of the use of uranium enriched to more than 20 w/o in {sup 235}U, and has in practice generally prohibited the use of uranium highly enriched in {sup 235}U. They were designed when the expected burnup of light water fuel was on the order of 25 MWD/kgU--about half the present day value--and when it was expected that the spent fuel would be recycled to recover its fissile content.« less

Forensic Analysis of Terrorist Counter-Financing to Combat Nuclear Proliferation

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Drame, B.; Toler, L.; Bachner, Katherine

The single greatest threat to U.S. homeland security remains the proliferation of nuclear weapons, especially among terrorists and other non-state actors who are not governed by the Non-Proliferation Treaty. One of the most important tools for combating terrorism among such rogue actors is counter-financing. Without funding, terrorists cannot acquire, maintain, or deploy nuclear weapons. According to the official report of the 9/11 Commission, counter-financing could have prevented the attacks of September 11, 2001. Unfortunately, no single country can defeat global terrorism. Successful counter-financing requires significant international cooperation. Since 2001, the United States and the European Union, despite vastly different approachesmore » to intelligence gathering, have shared information through the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP). That shared information allows authorities to trace suspicious transactions, identify culprits, and map out global terrorist networks. The TFTP successfully thwarted a 2011 plot to assassinate the Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the U.S. and multiple threats during the 2012 Summer Olympics in London; it also aided in the investigation of the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing. That program is necessary but not sufficient. To strengthen our ability to detect and disrupt terrorist plotting and prevent nuclear proliferation, we must expand and coordinate two additional transnational measures: (1) the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT), a standardized global messaging network for financial institutions to quickly, accurately, and securely send and receive money transfer instructions, and (2) International Bank Account Numbers (IBAN) to identify individual accounts involved in international transactions. Both initiatives were incompletely adopted in the wake of 9/11, but most global banks use one or neither. More fully implementing and coordinating these two systems would allow for coherent information sharing, an essential tool for combating money laundering and terrorist financing, verifying sanctions against rogue nations and non-state actors, tracking nuclear proliferation networks, and protecting dual-use materials. These steps can save lives without interfering with state sovereignty or individual rights. The specter of nuclear threat is real and constant. This paper will provide forensic analysis of the most effective financial tools and policies to combat that threat, placing special emphasis on multinational and public-private cooperation.« less

Sandia Dynamic Materials Program Strategic Plan.

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Flicker, Dawn Gustine; Benage, John F.; Desjarlais, Michael P.

2017-05-01

Materials in nuclear and conventional weapons can reach multi-megabar pressures and 1000s of degree temperatures on timescales ranging from microseconds to nanoseconds. Understanding the response of complex materials under these conditions is important for designing and assessing changes to nuclear weapons. In the next few decades, a major concern will be evaluating the behavior of aging materials and remanufactured components. The science to enable the program to underwrite decisions quickly and confidently on use, remanufacturing, and replacement of these materials will be critical to NNSA’s new Stockpile Responsiveness Program. Material response is also important for assessing the risks posed bymore » adversaries or proliferants. Dynamic materials research, which refers to the use of high-speed experiments to produce extreme conditions in matter, is an important part of NNSA’s Stockpile Stewardship Program.« less

How NIF Works

ScienceCinema

None

2017-12-09

The National Ignition Facility, located at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, is the world's largest laser system... 192 huge laser beams in a massive building, all focused down at the last moment at a 2 millimeter ball containing frozen hydrogen gas. The goal is to achieve fusion... getting more energy out than was used to create it. It's never been done before under controlled conditions, just in nuclear weapons and in stars. We expect to do it within the next 2-3 years. The purpose is threefold: to create an almost limitless supply of safe, carbon-free, proliferation-free electricity; examine new regimes of astrophysics as well as basic science; and study the inner-workings of the U.S. stockpile of nuclear weapons to ensure they remain safe, secure and reliable without the need for underground testing. More information about NIF can be found at:

Cluster munitions: a threat to health and human rights.

PubMed

Parikh, Sujal M

2010-01-01

Over the course of 2009, dozens of nations signed a new convention on cluster munitions, and several nations ratified the convention. To determine how public health professionals can participate in preventing death and injury from cluster munitions, we review the history of these weapons, their effects on individuals and communities, the history of efforts to limit their use, the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and ways that health professionals can support efforts to ban their use. Cluster munitions are a threat to civilians in conflict and post-conflict settings. They render homes, farms and businesses dangerous and inaccessible, and delay resettlement after the end of a conflict. Health professionals have led efforts to limit the use and proliferation of other weapons, and global collaboration to support the Convention on Cluster Munitions would be a step towards protecting the public's health.

Satellite power system (SPS) military implications

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Bain, C.N.

1978-10-01

This study was conducted to examine military implications of the NASA Reference SPS and to identify important military related study tasks that could be completed during fiscal year 1979. Primary areas of investigation were the potential of the SPS as a weapon, for supporting U.S. military preparedness and for affecting international relations. In addition, the SPS's relative vulnerability to overt military action, terrorist attacks, and sabotage was considered. The SPS could act as an electronic warfare weapon and, with modification, as a marginally effective energy-beaming weapon. The system could support military preparedness by providing energy for a strong and stablemore » U.S. economy and by providing a powered platform for military systems, system segments, and operations. The SPS would be vulnerable to military action, terrorism and sabotage unless hardened against these attacks by design, security, and a self-defense system. Tasks identified for completion in fiscal year 1979 include (a) a detailed vulnerability study, (b) evaluation of an SPS self-defense system concept, (c) determination of the effect of SPS flexibility to deliver different sized electrical loads on the ability to gain SPS support from individual nations, and (d) investigation of the effect of SPS deployment schedule on obtaining needed agreements, providing security, and controlling risks of armed conflict. A fifth and long-term task would consist of a worldwide survey identifiying military implications of the SPS that result from the specific requirements of potential SPS power customers.« less

Dose Rate Calculation of TRU Metal Ingot in Pyroprocessing - 12202

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Lee, Yoon Hee; Lee, Kunjai

Spent fuel management has been a main problem to be solved for continuous utilization of nuclear energy. Spent fuel management policy of Korea is 'Wait and See'. It is focused on Pyro-process and SFR (Sodium-cooled Fast Reactor) for closed-fuel cycle research and development in Korea. For peaceful use of nuclear facilities, the proliferation resistance has to be proved. Proliferation resistance is one of key constraints in the deployment of advanced nuclear energy systems. Non-proliferation and safeguard issues have been strengthening internationally. Barriers to proliferation are that reduces desirability or attractiveness as an explosive and makes it difficult to gain accessmore » to the materials, or makes it difficult to misuse facilities and/or technologies for weapons applications. Barriers to proliferation are classified into intrinsic and extrinsic barriers. Intrinsic barrier is inherent quality of reactor materials or the fuel cycle that is built into the reactor design and operation such as material and technical barriers. As one of the intrinsic measures, the radiation from the material is considered significantly. Therefore the radiation of TRU metal ingot from the pyro-process was calculated using ORIGEN and MCNP code. (authors)« less

The Hidden Complexity of Biological "Dirty Bombs": Implications for Special Operations Medical Personnel.

PubMed

Washington, Michael A; Blythe, Jauchia

The recent capture of a terrorist in Belgium carrying explosives, fecal matter, and animal tissue may indicate a shift from conventional weapons to crude bacteriological preparations as instruments of terror. It is important to note that although such weapons lack technological sophistication, bacteria are inherently complex, unpredictable, and undetectable in the field. Therefore, it is important that Special Operations medical personnel understand the complications that such seemingly simple devices can add to the treatment of casualties in the field and subsequent evaluation in the clinic. 2016.

The British Nuclear Deterrent After the Cold War,

DTIC Science & Technology

1995-01-01

Scope for Further Franco-British Cooperation 86 Attitudes of Friends and Allies 9° 7 . SOME POLICY IMPLICATIONS 94 A " Blessing in Disguise" for...on French decision, and French decision alone." 94 SOME POLICY IMPLICATIONS A " BLESSING IN DISGUISE" FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY It is time to take...but those disposing of any form of "weapon of mass i:LVictor A. Utgoff, "The Biotechnology Revolution and Its Potential Military Implications ," in

Proliferation resistance design of a plutonium cycle (Proliferation Resistance Engineering Program: PREP)

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Sorenson, R.J.; Roberts, F.P.; Clark, R.G.

1979-01-19

This document describes the proliferation resistance engineering concepts developed to counter the threat of proliferation of nuclear weapons in an International Fuel Service Center (IFSC). The basic elements of an International Fuel Service Center are described. Possible methods for resisting proliferation such as processing alternatives, close-coupling of facilities, process equipment layout, maintenance philosophy, process control, and process monitoring are discussed. Political and institutional issues in providing proliferation resistance for an International Fuel Service Center are analyzed. The conclusions drawn are (1) use-denial can provide time for international response in the event of a host nation takeover. Passive use-denial is moremore » acceptable than active use-denial, and acceptability of active-denial concepts is highly dependent on sovereignty, energy dependence and economic considerations; (2) multinational presence can enhance proliferation resistance; and (3) use-denial must be nonprejudicial with balanced interests for governments and/or private corporations being served. Comparisons between an IFSC as a national facility, an IFSC with minimum multinational effect, and an IFSC with maximum multinational effect show incremental design costs to be less than 2% of total cost of the baseline non-PRE concept facility. The total equipment acquisition cost increment is estimated to be less than 2% of total baseline facility costs. Personnel costs are estimated to increase by less than 10% due to maximum international presence. 46 figures, 9 tables.« less

China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues

DTIC Science & Technology

2012-11-07

facilities, while experts from China worked at a uranium mine at Saghand and a centrifuge facility (for uranium enrichment) near Isfahan, reported the...Barbara Opall -Rome and Vago Muradian, “Bush Privately Lauds Israeli Attack on Syria,” Defense News, January 14, 2008; Paul Richter, “West Says N... Mining Development Trading Corporation).123 Also, in December 2009, Japan arrested two traders who exported expensive cosmetics from Japan to North

China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues

DTIC Science & Technology

2012-03-30

from China worked at a uranium mine at Saghand and a centrifuge facility (for uranium enrichment) near Isfahan, reported the Washington Post (December...Facilities,” China News Agency, September 3, 2007; Xinhua, September 4 and 6, 2007. 99 Barbara Opall -Rome and Vago Muradian, “Bush Privately Lauds...with the DPRK’s arms dealer, Global Trading and Technology (a front for Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation).119 Also, in December 2009

Rethinking the Unthinkable: Selective Proliferation and US Nuclear Strategy

DTIC Science & Technology

2011-06-01

Equally commendable are the efforts of the SAASS librarian Sandhya "Sandy" Malladi and the SAASS secretaries Sheila McKitt and Kelly Rhodes. These...Nuclear Deterrence and Global Security in Transition, 177. 20 Barry R . Schneider, Future War and Counterproliferation: US Military Responses to Nbc...develop states prepared to conduct themselves as nuclear weapons 42 Barre R . Seguin, "Why Did Poland Choose the F-16?," The Marshall Center

An Influence Analysis of Dissuading Nation States from Producing and Proliferating Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

DTIC Science & Technology

2011-03-01

author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number ______N/A__________...18 5. Lead Up to the Fission Device Test 1974 .........................................22 6. Maintaining Nuclear Policy 1974-1998...out to produce nuclear energy for research and civilian energy consumption. Its government maintained a policy of peace nuclear energy usage unless

Report on Activities and Programs for Countering Proliferation and NBC Terrorism. Volume 1, Executive Summary, Addendum to 2011 Report

DTIC Science & Technology

2013-06-01

Executive Branch report on research , development, and acquisition (RDA) programs to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Other interagency committees...characterize, secure, disable , and/or destroy a state or non-state actor’s WMD programs and related capabilities in hostile or uncertain environments. Threat...special operations, and security operations to defend against conventionally and unconventionally delivered WMD. WMD Consequence Management. Actions

Responding to Terror: A Report on the U.S. Army War College Consequence Management Symposium

DTIC Science & Technology

2002-05-01

the combination of unconventional weapons proliferation, with the persistence of international terrorism, will end the relative invulnerability of...because it can easily evoke “ the black helicopter syndrome ” in the great state of Kansas. Whatever the case, 144 the main proponents for the initiative are...boundless. The father of the service member killed in the Middle East, or the mother of a child blown up in

Tudo Pela Patria: The Brazilian Navy’s Drive to Blue Water

DTIC Science & Technology

2005-06-01

Institutional Theory Approach,” in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, New York: Columbia...University Press, 2003. 61 Eyre, Dana P. and Mark C. Suchman, “Status, Norms, and the Proliferation of Conventional Weapons: An Institutional ... Theory Approach,” in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, New York: Columbia University

Churning Historic Waters: Maritime And National Security In The Palk Bay And Sri Lanka

DTIC Science & Technology

2017-12-01

protects U.S. sovereignty and maritime resources, supports free and open seaborne commerce, and counters weapons proliferation, terrorism...organizations use the sea as an economic asset.86In Libya, for example, an extremist movement in 2014 allied with Al Qaeda earned colossal amounts of money ...traffickers because this lucrative business generates great sums of money , allowing terrorists to fund their campaigns.127 He points out the LTTE engaged

Military Cooperation Frameworks: Effective Models to Address Transnational Security Challenges of the Asia-Pacific Region

DTIC Science & Technology

2011-05-04

evolving security challenges. Issues such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, impacts of climate change , and the ever...impacts of climate change , and the ever-growing competition for valuable natural resources are a few of the these challenges. As an integral part...destruction, impacts of climate change , and the ever-growing competition for valuable natural resources have resulted in a new set of security

China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues

DTIC Science & Technology

2009-07-27

Isfahan Nuclear Research Center to provide “a lifelong supply” of hundreds of tons of anhydrous hydrogen fluoride (AHF), or hydrofluoric acid ...Nuclear Tests, 1964-1996,” Physics Today, September 2008; Alex Kingsbury, “ Why China Helped Countries Like Pakistan, North Korea Build Bombs,” U.S...that PRC export controls are weak , even as government repression can be harsh (e.g., against journalists or dissidents). They also doubt that trade

JPRS Report, Proliferation Issues

DTIC Science & Technology

1992-10-30

systemChina, the potential is there for enormous profits to be is marketed as a high-speed target drone , that can be usedmade. for training anti-aircraft and...maintenance support equipment, fully transportable by modernisation of older weapons systems. During the arms road, sea and air. The drone can be controlled...said the whole issue was and speculation. The Drone goes on display at the DEXSA shrouded in secrecy. 󈨠 Exposition, the report concludes. He said the

Off-Site Monitoring of Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Plants for Nuclear Weapons Proliferation

DTIC Science & Technology

1980-01-01

of commercial nuclear power reactors by the collection of cesium and neodynium radionuclides and the use-of isotopic correlation techniques.Both...Both Goodwin (ref 1) and Clark (ref 2) investigated off-site monitoring of commercial nuclear power reactoze by the collection of cesium and neodynium...manner than that which is used for power production.Economical generation of electrical power requires a long sus- tained fission cycle whereas Pu-239

DTIC review. Volume 1, Number 1: Nuclear proliferation and deterrence in a changing political world

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Cupp, C.M.; Lee, C.; Foster, H.

1995-08-01

This collection of selected documents from the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) addresses the formidable issue of protecting the United States and its people from potential nuclear destruction. With the dissolution of the former Soviet Union and, concomitantly, the end of the Cold War, new strategies for nonproliferation and deterrence must be devised and implemented. Potential threats from countries not previously seen as a danger, the escalation of regional conflicts and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are but a few of the considerations to be addressed. The authors of the following papers propose various plans and tactics tomore » ensure United States national security and maintain world peace.« less

Public perspectives on nuclear security. US national security surveys, 1993--1997

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Herron, K.G.; Jenkins-Smith, H.C.

This is the third report in a series of studies to examine how US attitudes about nuclear security are evolving in the post-Cold War era and to identify trends in public perceptions and preferences relevant to the evolution of US nuclear security policy. It presents findings from three surveys: a nationwide telephone survey of randomly selected members of the US general public; a written survey of randomly selected members of American Men and Women of Science; and a written survey of randomly selected state legislators from all fifty US states. Key areas of investigation included nuclear security, cooperation between USmore » and Russian scientists about nuclear issues, vulnerabilities of critical US infrastructures and responsibilities for their protection, and broad areas of US national science policy. While international and US national security were seen to be slowly improving, the primary nuclear threat to the US was perceived to have shifted from Russia to China. Support was found for nuclear arms control measures, including mutual reductions in stockpiles. However, respondents were pessimistic about eliminating nuclear armaments, and nuclear deterrence continued to be highly values. Participants favored decreasing funding f/or developing and testing new nuclear weapons, but supported increased investments in nuclear weapons infrastructure. Strong concerns were expressed about nuclear proliferation and the potential for nuclear terrorism. Support was evident for US scientific cooperation with Russia to strengthen security of Russian nuclear assets. Elite and general public perceptions of external and domestic nuclear weapons risks and external and domestic nuclear weapons benefits were statistically significantly related to nuclear weapons policy options and investment preferences. Demographic variables and individual belief systems were systematically related both to risk and benefit perceptions and to policy and spending preferences.« less

Summary Report - Strategic Weapons on the 21st Century Conference

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Roberts, B.

2017-04-21

This 11th annual event focused on changes in the security environment and their implications for the U.S. approach to deterrence, with special attention to extended deterrence in Europe and East Asia.

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Obama, Barack

Prague, Czech Republic President Obama: Finally, this day demonstrates the determination of the United States and Russia -- the two nations that hold over 90 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons -- to pursue responsible global leadership. Together, we are keeping our commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which must be the foundation for global non-proliferation. While the New START treaty is an important first step forward, it is just one step on a longer journey. As I said last year in Prague, this treaty will set the stage for further cuts. And going forward, we hope to pursue discussionsmore » with Russia on reducing both our strategic and tactical weapons, including non-deployed weapons. President Medvedev and I have also agreed to expand our discussions on missile defense. This will include regular exchanges of information about our threat assessments, as well as the completion of a joint assessment of emerging ballistic missiles. And as these assessments are completed, I look forward to launching a serious dialogue about Russian-American cooperation on missile defense. But nuclear weapons are not simply an issue for the United States and Russia -- they threaten the common security of all nations. A nuclear weapon in the hands of a terrorist is a danger to people everywhere -- from Moscow to New York; from the cities of Europe to South Asia. So next week, 47 nations will come together in Washington to discuss concrete steps that can be taken to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials around the world in four years. And the spread of nuclear weapons to more states is also an unacceptable risk to global security -- raising the specter of arms races from the Middle East to East Asia. Earlier this week, the United States formally changed our policy to make it clear that those non-nuclear weapons states that are in compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and their non-proliferation obligations will not be threatened by America’s nuclear arsenal. This demonstrates, once more, America’s commitment to the NPT as a cornerstone of our security strategy. Those nations that follow the rules will find greater security and opportunity. Those nations that refuse to meet their obligations will be isolated, and denied the opportunity that comes with international recognition. That includes accountability for those that break the rules -- otherwise the NPT is just words on a page. That’s why the United States and Russia are part of a coalition of nations insisting that the Islamic Republic of Iran face consequences, because they have continually failed to meet their obligations. We are working together at the United Nations Security Council to pass strong sanctions on Iran. And we will not tolerate actions that flout the NPT, risk an arms race in a vital region, and threaten the credibility of the international community and our collective security. While these issues are a top priority, they are only one part of the U.S.-Russia relationship. Today, I again expressed my deepest condolences for the terrible loss of Russian life in recent terrorist attacks, and we will remain steadfast partners in combating violent extremism. We also discussed the potential to expand our cooperation on behalf of economic growth, trade and investment, as well as technological innovation, and I look forward to discussing these issues further when President Medvedev visits the United States later this year, because there is much we can do on behalf of our security and prosperity if we continue to work together. When one surveys the many challenges that we face around the world, it’s easy to grow complacent, or to abandon the notion that progress can be shared. But I want to repeat what I said last year in Prague: When nations and peoples allow themselves to be defined by their differences, the gulf between them widens. When we fail to pursue peace, then it stays forever beyond our grasp. This majestic city of Prague is in many ways a monument to human progress. And this ceremony is a testament to the truth that old adversaries can forge new partnerships. I could not help but be struck the other day by the words of Arkady Brish, who helped build the Soviet Union’s first atom bomb. At the age of 92, having lived to see the horrors of a World War and the divisions of a Cold War, he said, We hope humanity will reach the moment when there is no need for nuclear weapons, when there is peace and calm in the world. It’s easy to dismiss those voices. But doing so risks repeating the horrors of the past, while ignoring the history of human progress. The pursuit of peace and calm and cooperation among nations is the work of both leaders and peoples in the 21st century. For we must be as persistent and passionate in our pursuit of progress as any who would stand in our way. Once again, President Medvedev, thank you for your extraordinary leadership.« less

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in Context

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Davenport, Kelsey

2017-01-01

The 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) is the cornerstone of multilateral efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and promote efforts toward complete disarmament. In the grand bargain of the NPT, states foreswore pursuit of nuclear weapons in exchange for access to nuclear technology and limited nuclear arsenals to the five states (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) that tested such weapons before the NPT's conception. Now in its seventh decade, the NPT regime is embraced by the vast majority of the world's nations and is viewed as a critical element of international security. However, despite past successes in halting efforts in several states to pursue nuclear weapons, near universal adherence, and only one withdrawal (North Korea), the NPT regime is at a critical crossroads. The treaty has proven unable to adapt to new challenges, such as emerging technologies that threaten operational strategic realities, the devolution of state authority to non-state actors and institutions, and growing dissatisfaction with slow pace of nuclear disarmament. Additionally, the treaty leaves open critical questions, including whether or not state parties have the `right' to pursue technologies that allow for domestic production of fuels for nuclear reactors and if modernization programs for nuclear warheads are inconsistent with the treaty. If these questions remain unresolved, the international community will find itself ill prepared to confront emerging proliferation challenges and the NPT, the linchpin of international nonproliferation and disarmament efforts, may begin to erode.

The Iran Nuclear Crisis: An Update

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Sagan, Scott

2007-05-07

Will Iran develop nuclear weapons capabilities and what effects would such capabilities have on international peace and security? Despite two recent U.N. Security Council resolutions sanctioning Iran for its nuclear activities, the government in Tehran continues to press ahead with efforts to expand its uranium enrichment program to industrial scale. But both the Tehran regime and the Iranian people remain divided on the nuclear question, creating opportunities for a negotiated settlement. It is essential for US security that the Iranian program be contained, for nuclear weapons in Iran would increase risks of regional instability, terrorist use, and further proliferation. Themore » U.S. and its negotiating partners have already missed a number of potential opportunities for a diplomatic breakthrough, but the right mix of incentives designed to address the reasons driving Iran’s nuclear program could still succeed in producing an acceptable outcome.« less

Walk the Talk: Progress in Building a Supply Chain Security Culture

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Hund, Gretchen

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) has engaged industry to “go beyond compliance” for over a decade in controlling and securing their supply chains to ensure their goods are not diverted to nuclear weapons programs. This work has focused on dual-use industries that manufacture products that can be used in both commercial applications and in the development of a nuclear weapon. The team encourages industry to self-regulate to reduce proliferation risks. As part of that work, PNNL interviewed numerous companies about their compliance practices to understand their business and to build awareness around best practices to ensure security of goods, technology,more » and information along their supply chains. From conducting this work, PNNL identified indicators that a company can adopt as part of its commitment to nonproliferation ideals with a focus on supply chain security.« less

High-Temperature Oxidation of Plutonium Surrogate Metals and Alloys

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Sparks, Joshua C.; Krantz, Kelsie E.; Christian, Jonathan H.

The Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA) is a nuclear non-proliferation agreement designed to remove 34 tons of weapons-grade plutonium from Russia and the United States. While several removal options have been proposed since the agreement was first signed in 2000, processing the weapons-grade plutonium to mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel has remained the leading candidate for achieving the goals of the PMDA. However, the MOX program has received its share of criticisms, which causes its future to be uncertain. One alternative pathway for plutonium disposition would involve oxidizing the metal followed by impurity down blending and burial in the Waste Isolationmore » Pilot Plant (WIPP) in Carlsbad, New Mexico. This pathway was investigated by use of a hybrid microwave and a muffle furnace with Fe and Al as surrogate materials. Oxidation occurred similarly in the microwave and muffle furnace; however, the microwave process time was significantly faster.« less

How NIF Works

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

None

2009-07-30

The National Ignition Facility, located at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, is the world's largest laser system... 192 huge laser beams in a massive building, all focused down at the last moment at a 2 millimeter ball containing frozen hydrogen gas. The goal is to achieve fusion... getting more energy out than was used to create it. It's never been done before under controlled conditions, just in nuclear weapons and in stars. We expect to do it within the next 2-3 years. The purpose is threefold: to create an almost limitless supply of safe, carbon-free, proliferation-free electricity; examine new regimes ofmore » astrophysics as well as basic science; and study the inner-workings of the U.S. stockpile of nuclear weapons to ensure they remain safe, secure and reliable without the need for underground testing. More information about NIF can be found at:« less

Russian Contract Procurement Document

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Tobin, J G

2010-03-29

This contract supports the enhancement of physical protection or nuclear material control and accounting systems at institutes or enterprises of the newly independent states under the material protection control and accounting (MPC&A) program. The contract is entered into pursuant to the MPC&A Program, a gratuitous technical assistance program, in accordance with the bilateral Agreements between the Russian Federation and the United States of America concerning the Safe and Secure Transportation, Storage and Destruction of Weapons and the Prevention of Weapons Proliferation of June 1992, as extended and amended by Protocol signed of June 1999, Agreement between the Government of themore » Russian Federation regarding Cooperation in the Area of Nuclear Materials Physical Protection, Control and Accounting of October 1999 and the Russian Federation law of May 1999 on the taxation exemption of gratuitous technical assistance with Russian Federation under registration No.DOE001000.« less

Quality, Quantity, And Surprise! Trade-Offs In X-Raser ASAT Attrition

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Callaham, Michael B.; Scibilia, Frank M.

1984-08-01

In order to characterize the effects of technological superiority, numerical superiority, and pre-emption on space battle outcomes, we have constructed a battle simulation in which "Red" and "Blue" ASATs, each armed with a specified number of x-ray lasers of specified range, move along specified orbits and fire on one another according to a pair of battle management algorithms. The simulated battle proceeds until apparent steady-state force levels are reached. Battle outcomes are characterized by terminal force ratio and by terminal force-exchange ratio as effective weapon range, multiplicity (x-rasers per ASAT), and pre-emptive role are varied parametrically. A major conclusion is that pre-emptive advantage increases with increasing x-raser range and multiplicity (x-rasers per ASAT) and with increasing force size. That is, the "use 'em or lose 'em" dilemma will become more stark as such weapons are refined and proliferated.

Advances in neuroscience and the biological and toxin weapons convention.

PubMed

Dando, Malcolm

2011-01-01

This paper investigates the potential threat to the prohibition of the hostile misuse of the life sciences embodied in the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention from the rapid advances in the field of neuroscience. The paper describes how the implications of advances in science and technology are considered at the Five Year Review Conferences of the Convention and how State Parties have developed their appreciations since the First Review Conference in 1980. The ongoing advances in neurosciences are then assessed and their implications for the Convention examined. It is concluded that State Parties should consider a much more regular and systematic review system for such relevant advances in science and technology when they meet at the Seventh Review Conference in late 2011, and that neuroscientists should be much more informed and engaged in these processes of protecting their work from malign misuse.

Advances in Neuroscience and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

PubMed Central

Dando, Malcolm

2011-01-01

This paper investigates the potential threat to the prohibition of the hostile misuse of the life sciences embodied in the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention from the rapid advances in the field of neuroscience. The paper describes how the implications of advances in science and technology are considered at the Five Year Review Conferences of the Convention and how State Parties have developed their appreciations since the First Review Conference in 1980. The ongoing advances in neurosciences are then assessed and their implications for the Convention examined. It is concluded that State Parties should consider a much more regular and systematic review system for such relevant advances in science and technology when they meet at the Seventh Review Conference in late 2011, and that neuroscientists should be much more informed and engaged in these processes of protecting their work from malign misuse. PMID:21350673

Policy Challenges of Accelerating Technological Change: Security Policy and Strategy Implications of Parallel Scientific Revolutions

DTIC Science & Technology

2014-09-01

generation, exotic storage technologies, smart power grid management, and better power sources for directed-energy weapons (DEW). Accessible partner nation...near term will help to mitigate risks and improve outcomes. 2 Forecasting typically extrapolates predictions based...eventually, diminished national power . Within this context, this paper examines policy, legal, ethical, and strategy implications for DoD from the impact

The nuclear arms debate: Ethical and political implications

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Johansen, R.C.

1984-01-01

This book contains the following seven papers: Moral Aspects of the Nuclear Arms Debate: The Contribution of the U.S. Catholic Bishops; The Strategic and Arms Control Implications of the Bishop's Pastoral Letter; Applying Just-War Doctrine to Nuclear Deterrence; Nuclearism in Western Culture; Mutal Assured Destruction: A Stable Nuclear Deterrent; The Prospect for a Freeze on Nuclear Weapons; and The Soviet Union and Arms Control.

China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues

DTIC Science & Technology

2006-12-11

Ghauri (Hatf-5) medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), which is based on the North Korean No Dong missile. U.S. intelligence was said to suspect that...confirming these stories, the DCI reported in August 2000 that, besides North Korean help, PRC entities provided “increased assistance” to Pakistan’s...ranges, respectively, of about 800 mi. and 1,250 mi.). Over 100 PRC and North Korean experts worked there, reported the Washington Times (November 23

Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons Learned from the Iraqi Case

DTIC Science & Technology

1992-12-01

RECONNAISSANCE ... ........ 85 B. POLITICAL WEAPONS ........... ............... 94 C. EXPORT CONTROLS AND ECONOMIC TOOLS ...... 105 CONCLUSION...contain a clause that allows the I.A.E.A. to inspect undeclared facilities, but the I.A.E.A. has "virtually" never had the political will to invoke it...provisions, since the agency has no method of enforcement on its own. The issue of " political will" is one that must be discussed in more detail, since the

What to Do About That Pack of Wolves at the Door: A Binational Organization and Acquisitions Approach to Homeland Cruise Missile Defense

DTIC Science & Technology

2016-04-04

throughout the world . While the United States and its near-peer competitors have focused their non-proliferation treaties, missile defense...The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order (Yale: Harcourt Brace, 1946), 76. 2 US Census Bureau Report (2010). 3 destruction (WMDs). The...spending, procurement, and capabilities. Russia’s involvement in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria demonstrate this desire for greater influence in world

West European and East Asian perspectives on defense, deterrence, and strategy. Volume 6. South Korean perspectives on defense, deterrence, and strategy. Technical report, 1 December 1981-30 November 1982

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Pfaltzgraff, R.L.; Dougherty, J.E.; Davis, J.K.

1984-04-11

This study addresses the international security perspectives of the Republic of Korea (South Korea). Particular emphasis is placed on the way in which American, Soviet, Chinese and Japanese interests intersect on the Korean Peninsula and on their impact upon the military balance between North and South Korea. A major portion of this analysis is devoted as well to an examination of inter-Korean relations, spotlighting the varying security implications of the continued partition, as opposed to the eventual reunification of the two Koreas. The importance to South Korea of the Seoul-Washington-Tokyo relationship is discussed, as well as the effect of themore » Sino-Soviet dispute on South Korean defense and foreign policies. In order to clarify further the strategic perspectives of key decision makers in Seoul, the study reviewed and assessed South Korean views on such controversial issues as the expansion of Japan's self-defense forces, the withdrawal of the U.S. ground troops from the Korean peninsula, Sino-Soviet moves toward rapprochement, and the proliferation of nuclear weapons in Northeast Asia.« less

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Hoffman, B.

This report examines recent trends and future prospects of terrorism in the United States and assesses their implications for the possibility of a terrorist group attempting an act of nuclear terrorism involving either the theft of a weapons system or strategic nuclear material or an attack on a weapons facility. An emerging trend of ideologically motivated terrorism by groups espousing white supremacist and anti-federalist beliefs or opposing specific issues such as abortion has largely supplanted the ethnic centered violence that dominated earlier domestic terrorist activity. The threat to U.S. nuclear weapons facilities from unknown terrorist groups in this country cannotmore » be considered high at this time. There is no evidence to suggest that any of the organizations reviewed in this study have seriously contemplated a nuclear-related act, nor is there any indication that any group is poised to undertake such an attack in the future. Nevertheless, trends in the terrorist activities of certain groups must be considered in the context of possible operations directed against nuclear weapons sites. Members of these groups are considerably more skilled with weapons than are other terrorist in this country, they possess large stockpiles of sophisticated weapons, they are well trained guerrilla warfare and survival techniques, and they possess an apocalyptic vision of the future-factors that make them the most likely domestic terrorists to attempt an act of nuclear terrorism. In sum, while the volume of annual terrorist incidents in the United States is relatively small, the emerging trends merit intensive and continuing attention.« less

Should bioengineering graduates seek employment in the defense industry?

PubMed

Johnson, Arthur T

2014-01-01

They say that the difference between a mechanical engineer and a civil engineer is that the mechanical engineer develops weapons whereas a civil engineer designs targets. The implication is that some engineers are involved with building peaceful infrastructure whereas others contribute to destruction. This brings to mind the question: what is the proper role for engineers in the creation of weapons and defenses against them? In particular, should engineers specializing in biology or medicine be involved in the defense industry? After all, bioengineers are supposed to be builders or healers rather than warriors or destroyers.

History of Nuclear Weapons Design and Production

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Oelrich, Ivan

2007-04-01

The nuclear build-up of the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War is often portrayed as an arms race. Some part was indeed a bilateral competition, but much was the result of automatic application of technical advances as they became available, without careful consideration of strategic implications. Thus, the history of nuclear weapon design is partly designers responding to stated military needs and partly the world responding to constant innovations in nuclear capability. Today, plans for a new nuclear warhead are motivated primarily by the desire to maintain a nuclear design and production capability for the foreseeable future.

JAEA's actions and contributions to the strengthening of nuclear non-proliferation

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Suda, Kazunori; Suzuki, Mitsutoshi; Michiji, Toshiro

2012-06-01

Japan, a non-nuclear weapons state, has established a commercial nuclear fuel cycle including LWRs, and now is developing a fast neutron reactor fuel cycle as part of the next generation nuclear energy system, with commercial operation targeted for 2050. Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) is the independent administrative agency for conducting comprehensive nuclear R&D in Japan after the merger of Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI) and Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute (JNC). JAEA and its predecessors have extensive experience in R&D, facility operations, and safeguards development and implementation for new types of nuclear facilities for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. As the operator of various nuclear fuel cycle facilities and numerous nuclear materials, JAEA makes international contributions to strengthen nuclear non-proliferation. This paper provides an overview of JAEA's development of nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards technologies, including remote monitoring of nuclear facilities, environmental sample analysis methods and new efforts since the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington D.C.

High-temperature Gas Reactor (HTGR)

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Abedi, Sajad

2011-05-01

General Atomics (GA) has over 35 years experience in prismatic block High-temperature Gas Reactor (HTGR) technology design. During this period, the design has recently involved into a modular have been performed to demonstrate its versatility. This versatility is directly related to refractory TRISO coated - particle fuel that can contain any type of fuel. This paper summarized GA's fuel cycle studies individually and compares each based upon its cycle sustainability, proliferation-resistance capabilities, and other performance data against pressurized water reactor (PWR) fuel cycle data. Fuel cycle studies LEU-NV;commercial HEU-Th;commercial LEU-Th;weapons-grade plutonium consumption; and burning of LWR waste including plutonium and minor actinides in the MHR. results show that all commercial MHR options, with the exception of HEU-TH, are more sustainable than a PWR fuel cycle. With LEU-NV being the most sustainable commercial options. In addition, all commercial MHR options out perform the PWR with regards to its proliferation-resistance, with thorium fuel cycle having the best proliferation-resistance characteristics.

Nuclear Energy Present and Future

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Hutchinson, I. H.

2006-10-01

Nuclear power plants currently generate about 20% of US and 17% of world electricity, which makes nuclear the largest non-emitting energy source in current use. Concerns about global climate change have led to a remarkable transformation of attitudes towards nuclear energy. There remain key challenges that must be faced when considering expansion of its contribution. In summary they are: Economics, Safety, Waste Disposal, and Proliferation. Electricity from legacy fission plants is highly competitive with fossil, but perceived financial risks make the large capital cost fraction a key hurdle to new-construction, and costs of 2 per installed Watt electrical are currently considered only just economically attractive. Proliferation of nuclear-weapons-enabling technology is a major concern for global stability, in which fusion may have significant technical advantages over fission. But proliferation control requires a combination of both technical and political initiatives. The feasibility of supplying process heat or hydrogen from nuclear energy inspires additional research into novel reactor concepts and associated technologies. The presentation will lay out this overall context of the nuclear energy renaissance.

Cardiovascular effects of SPARK conducted electrical weapon in healthy subjects.

PubMed

Scherr, Carlos; de Carvalho, Antonio Carlos; Belem, Luciano Juaçaba; Loyola, Luiz Henrique; Guerra, Renata Leborato; Blanco, Fernanda; Mangia, Claudio

2016-12-15

The increasing use of conducted electronic weapons (CEW) cause concern regarding its secure application, specially regarding the implications in the cardiovascular system. The objective was to determine Spark CEW safety through cardiovascular parameters analysis of healthy volunteers subjected to its use. Volunteers over 18years without cardiovascular disease or recent use of illegal drugs were submitted, before and after being affected with Spark CEW, to clinical evaluation; blood collection for serum laboratory tests; transthoracic electrocardiography at rest, transthoracic echodopplercardiogram and 24hour Holter. All 71 patients reported being incapable of any voluntary reaction during the shock of the application time. No arrhythmia or myocardial necrosis was related to the use of non-lethal weapon SPARK. Reported adverse events were self-limited, and mostly mild. SPARK brand CEW is effective in incapacitating individuals by the shock of the application time, without causing. Copyright © 2016. Published by Elsevier Ireland Ltd.

Technology Changes Intelligence: Societal Implications and Soaring IQs.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Sternberg, Robert J.

1997-01-01

Discusses the effects technology may have on human intelligence. Topics include the use of computational devices, including calculators, in schools; the changes word processing has brought about in writing; the use of television; and the effects of weapons on children. (LRW)

Prevailing in a Well-Armed World: Devising Competitive Strategies Against Weapons Proliferation

DTIC Science & Technology

2000-03-01

mysterious. It comes from within, and we are more concerned with the final product than with the process of its production . Teaching policy as art...large economies of scale, and no substitute products often lead to oligopolies or monopolies and high profit margins. 34 At this point we do not... Policy , New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993, pp. 234, 239-240. 12. On these points, see Chris Williams, "DoD’s Counter

Transnational architecting for homeland defense

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

O'Brien, Thomas W.

2002-07-01

The homeland security interests of a many nations are being increasingly threatened by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, drug trafficking, mass migration, global terrorism, environmental concerns, international crime and other global issues. This paper presents the case for development of such a transnational ballistic missile defense architecture for homeland defense and specifically addresses the architecture methodology and process, as well as the potential benefits and the top-level architecture trade issues that would have to be addressed if the community should decide to seriously pursue such an approach.

China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues

DTIC Science & Technology

2009-05-26

hundreds of tons of anhydrous hydrogen fluoride (AHF), or hydrofluoric acid , under falsified documents about end-users. (The AHF chemical could be used to...Kingsbury, “ Why China Helped Countries Like Pakistan, North Korea Build Bombs,” U.S. News & World Report, January 5, 2009. 9 Senate Select Committee...the issue of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. They stress that PRC export controls are weak , even as government repression can be harsh (e.g., against

The Strategic Alternatives of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC): Disruption of Maritime Traffic in the Arabian Gulf as a Result of Iranian Threats to Close the Strait of Hormuz

DTIC Science & Technology

2012-03-01

71Saira Khan, Iran and Nuclear Weapons: Protracted Conflict and Proliferation. (London: Routledge, 2010), 73. 72 Hays, Peter, Brenda, Vallance , and...exports, are by sea; thus, closure of the 74 Heinberg, Richard , et al. The Middle East Unrest and...11 Reaction.” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 59, No. 1 (Fall/Winter 2005):157–178. Hays, Peter L., Brenda J. Vallance , and Alan R. Tassel

Middle East Security Issues: In the Shadow of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation

DTIC Science & Technology

1999-12-01

same t ime, Iran’s confrontation with Afghanistan pits a Shi’ite religious regime against a much more extreme Tal i- ban reg ime in Afghanistan...I ran has increasingly suppl ied arms and aid to the opposi t ion to the Tal iban, and deployed several hundred thousand t roops for exercises...rapidly deploy a few combat strength bat tal ions to defend i ts terr i tory, and Saudi Arabia would take days to deploy even one heavy brigade into

China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues

DTIC Science & Technology

2007-05-09

medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), which is based on the North Korean No Dong missile. U.S. intelligence was said to suspect that China Poly Ventures...stories, the DCI reported in August 2000 that, besides North Korean help, PRC entities provided “increased assistance” to Pakistan’s ballistic missile...development of the Shahab-3 and Shahab-4 MRBMs (with ranges, respectively, of about 800 mi. and 1,250 mi.). Over 100 PRC and North Korean experts worked there

China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues

DTIC Science & Technology

2007-01-31

based on the North Korean No Dong missile. U.S. intelligence was said to suspect that China Poly Ventures Company delivered, perhaps in 1999, U.S.-made...besides North Korean help, PRC entities provided “increased assistance” to Pakistan’s ballistic missile program in the second half of 1999. Also...the Shahab-3 and Shahab-4 MRBMs (with ranges, respectively, of about 800 mi. and 1,250 mi.). Over 100 PRC and North Korean experts worked there

Living with the Devil: Stability in the 21st Century World With or Without Nuclear Weapons

DTIC Science & Technology

2012-03-01

author’s opinion - if we are not progressing, we must be falling behind . While an arms race is not desired, a strong and unwavering approach towards...than your congresses: on the day that two army corps can mutually annihilate each other in a second, all civilised nations will surely recoil with...we must thus consider this a driving force behind nuclear proliferation. Therefore, as diplomatic, political and social consequences continue to

The arms race and nuclear war

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Barash, D.P.

Addressing the history, physics, biology, economics, politics, psychology, and ethics of nuclear armaments, the author provides a survey of diverse facets of the nuclear controversy. The study encompasses such key areas as nuclear hardware and technology; the short- and long-term effects of nuclear weapons; strategic doctrine, deterrence and defense policy; the arms race, arms control, and nuclear proliferation; and the economic impact, psychology, and ethics of nuclear armaments. A ''Policy Issues'' section, presenting both the advocate and opponent sides of the debate, is included with each chapter.

Emerging Environmental Justice Issues in Nuclear Power and Radioactive Contamination.

PubMed

Kyne, Dean; Bolin, Bob

2016-07-12

Nuclear hazards, linked to both U.S. weapons programs and civilian nuclear power, pose substantial environment justice issues. Nuclear power plant (NPP) reactors produce low-level ionizing radiation, high level nuclear waste, and are subject to catastrophic contamination events. Justice concerns include plant locations and the large potentially exposed populations, as well as issues in siting, nuclear safety, and barriers to public participation. Other justice issues relate to extensive contamination in the U.S. nuclear weapons complex, and the mining and processing industries that have supported it. To approach the topic, first we discuss distributional justice issues of NPP sites in the U.S. and related procedural injustices in siting, operation, and emergency preparedness. Then we discuss justice concerns involving the U.S. nuclear weapons complex and the ways that uranium mining, processing, and weapons development have affected those living downwind, including a substantial American Indian population. Next we examine the problem of high-level nuclear waste and the risk implications of the lack of secure long-term storage. The handling and deposition of toxic nuclear wastes pose new transgenerational justice issues of unprecedented duration, in comparison to any other industry. Finally, we discuss the persistent risks of nuclear technologies and renewable energy alternatives.

Is crisis stability still achievable?

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Pollack, Joshua

During the Cold War, the idea of crisis stability concerned whether the United States and the Soviet Union would be faced with powerful incentives to strike each other first with their nuclear weapons during periods of tension. This idea influenced the design of nuclear forces and guided aspects of nuclear arms control. The United States and Russia continue to operate large, alert nuclear forces, but at least three new factors have emerged that add significantly greater complexity to this picture. The first new factor consists of the development and deployment of new strategic military technologies that are entangled with nuclear weapons. These include strategic ballistic missile defenses, counter-space weapons, and strategic conventional weapons. The second new factor consists of new dyads of interacting strategic forces beyond US-Russia. These include US-China, US-North Korea, India-Pakistan, and India-China. The third new factor consists of the emergence of three-actor crisis stability dynamics, where the third actor is not necessarily nuclear-armed. This paper illustrates the concept with the US-North Korea-South Korea triangle. It briefly discusses the implications of these developments and reflects on the broad policy options that may be available.

RTO Technical Publications: A Quarterly Listing

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

2004-01-01

This is a listing of recent unclassified RTO technical publications processed by the NASA Center for AeroSpace Information. Contents include the following: RTO Technical Publications: A Quarterly Listing. Implications of Multilingual Interoperability of Speech Technology for Military Use. Non-Lethal Weapons and Future Peace Enforcement Operations.

Counterproliferation: The emperor has no clothes. Strategy research project

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Newing, E.W.

1995-04-03

The proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and their means of delivery is a National Emergency. The National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy admirably highlight counterproliferation as urgent national priorities. Despite these well intentioned efforts, counterproliferation initiatives, begun in 1993, have to date only yielded grand policies and little progress. Lack of national leadership, multiplicitous and overlapping programs, interagency friction, and misplaced priorities could doom the laudable efforts to failure. As the National Command Authority seeks to dress themselves in a cloak of protection against the threats of weapons of mass destruction, who is brave enough to tell themmore » the Emperor has no clothes. This assessment covers counterproliferation strategies via an ends, ways, and means methodology, analyzes the complexity of current initiatives, and provides benefits and challenges to the eight areas of the Counterproliferation Support Program. After conclusions about the illusionary success of these efforts, the assessment offers recommendations to enhance meaningful progress.« less

''Whither Deterrence?'' A Brief Synopsis May, 2002

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Poppe, C; Vergino, E; Barker, R

To most audiences, deterrence has been interconnected with nuclear weapons whose purpose had been to deter a Soviet attack. But, the Soviet Union has been gone for almost a decade. President George W. Bush has stated that Russia is not an enemy of the US and the numbers of nuclear weapons can be dramatically reduced. It is important to note that deterrence has always transcended nuclear weapons. The US' first line of deterrence has been its formidable conventional warfare capability, designed to prevent conflict and win wars if necessary. The role of nuclear weapons has been to deter the,use ofmore » nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction against U.S. interests during the conduct of conventional warfare and to ensure our ability to inflict massive destruction on any who would use nuclear weapons, or other weapons of mass destruction, against us. With regard to the Soviet Union, the threat of the use of nuclear weapons was a critical component of our deterrent to prevent massive Soviet conventional attack against our allies in Europe. However, the events of September 11, 2001 make clear that we have not convinced all who seek to harm us that we will be able to respond in a manner to make them wish they had not even tried. The September 11 attacks, as well as other past conflicts, do not mean that deterrence has failed-it remains effective against the threats for which it was designed. We have known there are other threats for which we did not have a credible deterrent. The challenge is to sustain deterrence against the classic threats as they evolve in technical sophistication while remaining alert to the need to evaluate continuously our ability to deter previously unforeseen challenges. How then should we be looking at deterrence as we consider fifteen or so years in the future, say to about 2015? What will be the role of nuclear weapons and other instruments of mass destruction in the future? What should the US be doing to prepare for the future? In this study, we present four futures as a tool for planners who must think ahead fifteen years or more, rather than a prediction of the future. None of the four futures will emerge in just the way we have described. Fifteen years from now, some mix of these futures is more likely, or perhaps we will see a trend towards one of the futures, but with the possibility that any of the other three could appear, perhaps quite swiftly. Any future will undoubtedly contain its own kind of unpleasant surprises and, in contrast to the Cold War; the possession of enormous nuclear-response and conventional-response capability may not be sufficient to deter these from happening. However, there are other tools that the US must include as part of its strategy and security policy in addition to deterrence, specifically dissuasion, defense, destruction, and assurance. Rather than rely on the Cold-War concept of deterrence, future security policy should be built upon the appropriate mix of these elements as a way to steer us toward a more favorable future, while ensuring that we are prepared for the kinds of surprises associated with far less favorable futures. In this study, we have defined three unfavorable futures to be avoided, and one future that represents, we believe, a more desirable global situation than the first three, but still not entirely benign. Our security policy should be defined to avoid or prevent the first three, which we have entitled ''Nuclear Giants, Global Terror'', and ''Regional Nuclear Tension and Use'', and steer us toward a more favorable future, ''Dynamic Cooperation''. We have examined the implications for both policy and military capability that are posed by these different futures. The result often raises more questions than we are able to answer without additional study-however, our primary purpose was to clarify the issues, to identify. what we believe we know, what we don't know, and where more study and effort are needed. Nevertheless, in preparing for unfavorable futures, we must also identify and plan the future we want. This study emphasizes that a desirable future in 2015 would be characterized by peaceful resolution of conflict, growing worldwide economic prosperity, an effective non-proliferation regime, the ability of the United States to control its own destiny without conflict, and expansion of political and economic freedom. Security policies, even in the face of unpleasant futures, should be crafted so as enhance, rather than diminish, these desired goals.« less

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Background and Current Developments

DTIC Science & Technology

2008-04-30

resumed testing, and has no plans to test. It has reduced the time needed to conduct a nuclear test. Critics raised concerns about the implications of...lieu of the current treaty.1 On October 24, Senator Jon Kyl delivered a speech critical of the CTBT and of Section 3122 in H.R. 1585, the FY2008...2007. Critics expressed concern about the implications of these policies for testing and new weapons. A statement by Physicians for Social

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Nelson, Paul

By “Quantitative Empirical Analysis” (QEA) is intended the use of statistical methods to infer, from data that often tend to be of a historical nature, the characteristics of states that correlate with some designated dependent variable (e.g. proliferation of nuclear weapons). QEA is a well-established approach in the social sciences, but is not notably well-known among physical scientists, who tend to think of the social sciences as inherently qualitative. This article attempts to provide a snapshot of research, most of which has evolved over the past decade, involving the application of QEA to issues in which the dependent variable ofmore » interest is intended as some measure of nuclear proliferation. Standard practices in QEA are described, especially as they relate to data collection. The QEA approach is compared and contrasted to other quantitative approaches to studying proliferation-related issues, including a “figure of merit” approach that has largely been developed within the DOE complex, and two distinct methodologies termed in a recent US National Academy of Sciences study as “case by case” and “predefined framework.” Sample results from QEA applied to proliferation are indicated, as are doubts about such quantitative approaches. A simplistic decision-theoretic model of the optimal time for the international community to intervene in a possible proliferation scenario is used to illustrate the possibility of synergies between different approaches« less

Economic and Non-proliferation Policy Considerations of Uranium Enrichment in Brazil and Argentina

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Short, Steven M.; Phillips, Jon R.; Weimar, Mark R.

2008-09-01

The nuclear development programs of both Argentina and Brazil have, since the 1970s, been premised on the desire for self-sufficiency and assurance of nuclear fuel supply. While military rivalry and mutual distrust led to nuclear weapons related development programs in the 1970s and 1980s, both countries have since terminated these programs. Furthermore, the governments of both countries have pledged their commitment to exclusively non-explosive use of nuclear energy and have signed the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Utilizing rights provided for under the NPT, both Argentina and Brazil have nuclear fuel production facilities, with the notable exception of enrichment plants, thatmore » provide much of the current indigenous fuel requirements for their nuclear power plants. However, both countries are actively developing enrichment capability to fill this gap. The purpose of this report is to assess the economic basis and non-proliferation policy considerations for indigenous enrichment capability within the context of their desired self-sufficiency and to evaluate possible United States Government policy options.« less

Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program Annual Report: Class of 2011

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

McMakin, Andrea H.

2012-08-20

Annual report for the Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program (NGFP), which PNNL administers for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). Features the Class of 2011. The NGFP is a NNSA program with a mission to cultivate future technical and policy leaders in nonproliferation and international security. Through the NGFP, outstanding graduate students with career interests in nonproliferation are appointed to program offices within the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN). During their one-year assignment, Fellows participate in programs designed to detect, prevent, and reverse the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Cladding and duct materials for advanced nuclear recycle reactors

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Allen, T. R.; Busby, J. T.; Klueh, R. L.; Maloy, S. A.; Toloczko, M. B.

2008-01-01

The expanded use of nuclear energy without risk of nuclear weapons proliferation and with safe nuclear waste disposal is a primary goal of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). To achieve that goal the GNEP is exploring advanced technologies for recycling spent nuclear fuel that do not separate pure plutonium, and advanced reactors that consume transuranic elements from recycled spent fuel. The GNEP’s objectives will place high demands on reactor clad and structural materials. This article discusses the materials requirements of the GNEP’s advanced nuclear recycle reactors program.

Ordnance News

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Bofman, Ryan K.

Since July of 2016 I have been assigned as a Guest Scientist at Los Alamos National Laboratory under the Training With Industries (TWI) Program. Los Alamos National Laboratory has proven to be a challenging and rewarding assignment in which I have found myself at the cutting edge of technologies pertinent to the Explosive Ordnance Disposal career field. In the last 7 months I have had the pleasure of working in an applications group that conducts research at the DOE “Q” and SCI levels. The group “uses a broad range of engineering and scientific expertise to support nuclear counter proliferation (NCP),more » nuclear counter terrorism (NCT), and nuclear emergency response (ER) missions. The Group contributes to national programs intended to protect, deter, and respond to weapons of mass destruction through tailored training and by using specialized applied electromagnetic solutions, rapid prototyping, designing/building/testing/delivering tools and trainers along with novel safing technologies, RF solutions, and cyberphysical applications”. While the specifics of the work performed are classified, the groups “core expertise includes pulsed power; EMP effects; nuclear weapons engineering; weapons effects and materials; predictive/hydrodynamic modeling and testing; firing and penalty systems; x-ray and non-destructive evaluation of threat devices; applied physics; advanced RF systems; powerline communications; novel electronics; 3-D printing of specialized components and cyber assessment/response technologies”. (int.lanl.gov/org/padgs/threat-identification-response/analytics-intelligencetechnology/ a-3/index.shtml)« less

The changing proliferation threat

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Sopko, J.F.

Technological advances and new adversaries with new motives have reduced the relevancy and effectiveness of the American nonproliferation strategy that was developed during the Cold War. The Cold War`s end and the breakup of the Soviet Union have created new proliferation dangers even as they have reduced others. The familiar balance of nuclear terror that linked the superpowers and their client states for nearly 50 years in a choreographed series of confrontations has given way to a much less predictable situation, where weapons of unthinkable power appear within the grasp of those more willing to use them. Rogue nations andmore » {open_quotes}clientless{close_quotes} states, terrorist groups, religious cults, ethnic minorities, disaffected political groups, and even individuals appear to have jointed a new arms race toward mass destruction. The author describes recent events that suggest the new trends and a serious challenge to US national security.« less

Emerging Environmental Justice Issues in Nuclear Power and Radioactive Contamination

PubMed Central

Kyne, Dean; Bolin, Bob

2016-01-01

Nuclear hazards, linked to both U.S. weapons programs and civilian nuclear power, pose substantial environment justice issues. Nuclear power plant (NPP) reactors produce low-level ionizing radiation, high level nuclear waste, and are subject to catastrophic contamination events. Justice concerns include plant locations and the large potentially exposed populations, as well as issues in siting, nuclear safety, and barriers to public participation. Other justice issues relate to extensive contamination in the U.S. nuclear weapons complex, and the mining and processing industries that have supported it. To approach the topic, first we discuss distributional justice issues of NPP sites in the U.S. and related procedural injustices in siting, operation, and emergency preparedness. Then we discuss justice concerns involving the U.S. nuclear weapons complex and the ways that uranium mining, processing, and weapons development have affected those living downwind, including a substantial American Indian population. Next we examine the problem of high-level nuclear waste and the risk implications of the lack of secure long-term storage. The handling and deposition of toxic nuclear wastes pose new transgenerational justice issues of unprecedented duration, in comparison to any other industry. Finally, we discuss the persistent risks of nuclear technologies and renewable energy alternatives. PMID:27420080

Female sexual homicide offenders: an analysis of the offender racial profiles in offending process.

PubMed

Chan, Heng Choon Oliver; Frei, Autumn M; Myers, Wade C

2013-12-10

Despite the recent effort by Chan and Frei in studying female sexual homicide offenders (SHOs), much is still unknown about this underresearched offender population. One largely unexplored area is how female SHOs of different races commit their killings. Using FBI Supplemental Homicide Reports (SHR) data (1976-2007), 105 White and 94 Black female SHOs (N=204) were examined for their differential offending patterns. Most female SHOs, regardless of race, killed victims of the opposite gender (i.e., heterosexual offenses). Most frequently targeted by female SHOs of both races (44% of Whites and 57% of Blacks) were known victims (e.g., friends, acquaintances) who were not intimate partners or family members. Firearms were the most common weapons used by female SHOs (60% of Whites and 48% of Blacks). The second most common weapon type used by Black offenders was an edged weapon (32%), whereas for White offenders it was a personal weapon (17%). Black female SHOs normally perpetrated their offense in large cities (69%), while White female SHOs most often committed their crime in suburban areas (40%). This study underscores importance of considering the offender racial group in female sexual murder investigations. Hence, several implications for offender profiling are offered. Copyright © 2013 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.

[The Chinese nuclear test and 'atoms for peace' as a measure for preventing nuclear armament of Japan: the nuclear non-proliferation policy of the United States and the introduction of light water reactors into Japan, 1964-1968].

PubMed

Yamazaki, Masakatsu

2014-07-01

Japan and the United States signed in 1968 a new atomic energy agreement through which US light-water nuclear reactors, including those of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant of Tokyo Electric Power Company, were to be introduced into Japan. This paper studies the history of negotiations for the 1968 agreement using documents declassified in the 1990s in the US and Japan. After the success of the Chinese nuclear test in October 1964, the United States became seriously concerned about nuclear armament of other countries in Asia including Japan. Expecting that Japan would not have its own nuclear weapons, the US offered to help the country to demonstrate its superiority in some fields of science including peaceful nuclear energy to counter the psychological effect of the Chinese nuclear armament. Driven by his own political agenda, the newly appointed Prime Minister Eisaku Sato responded to the US expectation favorably. When he met in January 1965 with President Johnson, Sato made it clear that Japan would not pursue nuclear weapons. Although the US continued its support after this visit, it nevertheless gave priority to the control of nuclear technology in Japan through the bilateral peaceful nuclear agreement. This paper argues that the 1968 agreement implicitly meant a strategic measure to prevent Japan from going nuclear and also a tactic to persuade Japan to join the Nuclear Non -Proliferation Treaty.

The Relationship of Gender, Sex Role, and Law-and-Order Attitudes to Nuclear Opinions.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Peterson, Candida C.; And Others

1990-01-01

Examines the effect of gender, sex role orientation, and political orientation on attitudes among 46 male and 62 female first-year university students in Perth, Australia, concerning nuclear weapons. Females were found to be more opposed to their development and use. Discusses practical implications for political behavior. (DM)

Soviet strategic nuclear doctrine under Gorbachev. Study project

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Winkel, R.J.

This paper examines Soviet offensive strategic nuclear doctrine under General Secretary and President Mikail S. Gorbachev. The development of Soviet nuclear doctrine starting with the Stalin era is reviewed. A close look at those pieces of Gorbachev's new thinking that pertain to nuclear weapons doctrine are presented. Implications for U.S. strategy are offered.

Coding ethical behaviour: the challenges of biological weapons.

PubMed

Rappert, Brian

2003-10-01

Since 11 September 2001 and the anthrax attacks that followed in the US, public and policy concerns about the security threats posed by biological weapons have increased significantly. With this has come an expansion of those activities in civil society deemed as potential sites for applying security controls. This paper examines the assumptions and implications of national and international efforts in one such area: how a balance or integration can take place between security and openness in civilian biomedical research through devising professional codes of conduct for scientists. Future attempts to establish such codes must find a way of reconciling or at least addressing dilemmatic and tension-ridden issues about the appropriateness of research; a topic that raises fundamental questions about the position of science within society.

Medical experimentation concerning chemical and biological weapons for mass destruction.

PubMed

Deutsch, Erwin

2003-04-01

This article is the text of a speech originally presented at the Second World Conference on Medical Ethics at Gijon, Spain, on 2 October 2002 under the title "Medical Experimentation Concerning Chemical and Biological Weapons for Mass Destruction: Clinical Design for New Smallpox Vaccines: Ethical and Legal Aspects." Experimentation on vaccines such as smallpox is subject to the usual ethical rules such as the need for informed consent. However, the participants will not often be at risk of catching the disease but expose themselves by taking part in the experimentation. Professor Deutsch explores the implications of this, including the position of vulnerable groups such as children, those with mental handicaps, and those acting under orders such as the miliary, the policy and fire officers.

Legal Implications of Military Uses of Outer Space

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Catena, Johanna

2002-01-01

Acquisition of Space Weapons, the Legal, Political and Military Impact for International Peace and At the dawn of a new century an immediate danger is upon us: The weaponization of outer space, including potential cost implications upon the prospect of ushering an era of peace and prosperity. But, can such statements be explained as pure sentimentality for hopes of a new era? Or is the danger misplaced that the threat to peace and security is an ever more ominous? By militarising outer space one could monitor crisis areas that could become a potential threat and this would in turn build confidence and security amongst nations. However the Outer Space Treaty prohibits placing in orbit nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. This does not include other military systems. Many countries feel the prohibition should be extended in the Treaty. Other military systems may involve anti-satellite weapons, (ASATS), emitting or simply placing technologies in space using laser and /or particle beams from space to intercept presently specific military targets such as ballistic missiles and hostile satellites, but in the future this may extend to destroying a target on earth. Military presence in space however, is not founded on weapons alone, but also through military surveillance systems and seen by some countries as an effective measure in verification on arms control. It is also seen as intensifying an arms race. At the forefront of the debate for space weapons is the possibility of countries deploying a National Missile Defence system. How does one reconcile such a system with present treaties? There has always been a direct relationship between weapons and space exploration, particularly if traced through the history of the late nineteenth century to the era of the space race. Konstantin Tsiolkovsky, (1857 - 1935), was one of the founders to astronautics. Robert Goddard, (1882-1945) an Englishman, developed Tsiolkovskys' work further. He built the first liquid-fuelled rocket. Goddard's work coincided with the work of a German scientist Werner Von Braun, (1912-77) who designed the V1 and V2 rocket. The V2 was the first intercontinental ballistic missile. Compared to the V1, the V2 could carry a heavier payload and the range was much longer. Von Braun had originally sketched his ideas to the Germans, that the V2 was an effective design for space travel and it was rejected. After the war the V2 became the foundation to many new technologies and these modifications marked the beginning of the space race. This competition led to space travel, taking men to the moon using the Saturn V rocket, robotic missions to the planets, and into tactical nuclear missiles (Redstone). This also marked the future for such dual-purpose technologies (i.e. military and/or civilian use) and more interestingly it took the design of weapons for space travel to be taken seriously. Arthur C Clarke commented on the possibilities of placing weapons in outer space, `the only defence against the weapons of the future is to prevent them ever being used. The problem is political and not military at all.' Ambassador Peter Jankowitsch, quoting Stockholm International Peace Research Institute in his opening address to COPUOS in Austria 1978, `we must make sure that outer space can be spared the fate of so many human discoveries of previous ages, namely becoming a mere battlefield.' These statements may be analysed by applying the United Nations Charter alongside other international treaties, such as the Outer Space Treaty 1967, the Test Ban Treaty 1963 and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in conjunction with the new Agreement signed by Russian and the USA. This may assist to highlight and conclude where problems reside whether political, legal, military, or a combination; and the impact for international peace and security.

It's No Secret: Fifty-eight Years of National Security Programs at BNL (463rd Brookhaven Lecture)

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Indusi, Joseph

2010-11-17

Prepare for a true tale of suspense and international intrigue. A tale that began in 1952, continued through the Cold War, and is not yet complete today. A tale of unexpected allies. Hear the true tale of one Laboratory’s efforts to keep nuclear materials out of the hands of evildoers. Freidlander. Higinbotham. Dodson. Kouts. And many more! See some of BNL’s all-star cast in the defining roles that shaped their careers as they worked toward keeping the nation and the world safe from the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Carter's breeder policy has failed, claims Westinghouse manager

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Not Available

1979-07-01

Nuclear nations developing liquid metal fast breeder reactor (LMFBR) technology have not been dissuaded by President Carter's efforts to stop the breeder program as a way to control the proliferation of nuclear weapons. There is no evidence that Carter's policy of moral persuasion has had any impact on their efforts. A review of the eight leading countries cites their extensive progress in the areas of breeder technology and fuel reprocessing, while the US has made only slight gains. The Fast Flux Test Facility at Hanford is near completion, but the Clinch River project has been slowed to a minimum.

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Oehler, G.C.

As dramatic as are the recent changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union political happenings, some other factors are having at least as important an impact on the intelligence community's business. For example, new and more global problems have arisen, such as the proliferation of advanced weapons, economic competitiveness, and environmental concerns. It is obvious that intelligence requirements are on the increase. For the intelligence community whose business is information gathering and processing, advanced information management tools are needed. Fortunately, recent technical advances offer these tools. Some of the more notable advances in information documentation, storage, and retrieval aremore » described.« less

Detection of dim targets in multiple environments

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Mirsky, Grace M.; Woods, Matthew; Grasso, Robert J.

2013-10-01

The proliferation of a wide variety of weapons including Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA), rockets, and small arms presents a substantial threat to both military and civilian aircraft. To address this ever-present threat, Northrop Grumman has assessed unguided threat phenomenology to understand the underlying physical principles for detection. These principles, based upon threat transit through the atmosphere, exploit a simple phenomenon universal to all objects moving through an atmosphere comprised of gaseous media to detect and track the threat in the presence of background and clutter. Threat detection has rapidly become a crucial component of aircraft survivability systems that provide situational awareness to the crew. It is particularly important to platforms which may spend a majority of their time at low altitudes and within the effective range of a large variety of weapons. Detection of these threats presents a unique challenge as this class of threat typically has a dim signature coupled with a short duration. Correct identification of each of the threat components (muzzle flash and projectile) is important to determine trajectory and intent while minimizing false alarms and maintaining a high detection probability in all environments.

History of chemical and biological warfare agents.

PubMed

Szinicz, L

2005-10-30

Chemical and biological warfare agents constitute a low-probability, but high-impact risk both to the military and to the civilian population. The use of hazardous materials of chemical or biological origin as weapons and for homicide has been documented since ancient times. The first use of chemicals in terms of weapons of mass destruction goes back to World War I, when on April 22, 1915 large amounts of chlorine were released by German military forces at Ypres, Belgium. Until around the 1970s of the 20th century, the awareness of the threat by chemical and biological agents had been mainly confined to the military sector. In the following time, the development of increasing range delivery systems by chemical and biological agents possessors sensitised public attention to the threat emanating from these agents. Their proliferation to the terrorists field during the 1990s with the expanding scale and globalisation of terrorist attacks suggested that these agents are becoming an increasing threat to the whole world community. The following article gives a condensed overview on the history of use and development of the more prominent chemical and biological warfare agents.

Multi-Detector Analysis System for Spent Nuclear Fuel Characterization

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Reber, Edward Lawrence; Aryaeinejad, Rahmat; Cole, Jerald Donald

1999-09-01

The Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Non-Destructive Analysis (NDA) program at INEEL is developing a system to characterize SNF for fissile mass, radiation source term, and fissile isotopic content. The system is based on the integration of the Fission Assay Tomography System (FATS) and the Gamma-Neutron Analysis Technique (GNAT) developed under programs supported by the DOE Office of Non-proliferation and National Security. Both FATS and GNAT were developed as separate systems to provide information on the location of special nuclear material in weapons configuration (FATS role), and to measure isotopic ratios of fissile material to determine if the material was frommore » a weapon (GNAT role). FATS is capable of not only determining the presence and location of fissile material but also the quantity of fissile material present to within 50%. GNAT determines the ratios of the fissile and fissionable material by coincidence methods that allow the two prompt (immediately) produced fission fragments to be identified. Therefore, from the combination of FATS and GNAT, MDAS is able to measure the fissile material, radiation source term, and fissile isotopics content.« less

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Swift, Alicia L.

There is no better time than now to close the loophole in Article IV of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) that excludes military uses of fissile material from nuclear safeguards. Several countries have declared their intention to pursue and develop naval reactor technology, including Argentina, Brazil, Iran, and Pakistan, while other countries such as China, India, Russia, and the United States are expanding their capabilities. With only a minority of countries using low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel in their naval reactors, it is possible that a state could produce highly enriched uranium (HEU) under the guise of a nuclear navymore » while actually stockpiling the material for a nuclear weapon program. This paper examines the likelihood that non-nuclear weapon states exploit the loophole to break out from the NPT and also the regional ramifications of deterrence and regional stability of expanding naval forces. Possible solutions to close the loophole are discussed, including expanding the scope of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, employing LEU fuel instead of HEU fuel in naval reactors, amending the NPT, creating an export control regime for naval nuclear reactors, and forming individual naval reactor safeguards agreements.« less

Entrepreneurial proliferation: Russia`s nuclear industry suits the buyers market. Master`s thesis

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Whalen, T.D.; Williams, A.R.

1995-06-01

The Soviet Union collapsed in December 1991, bringing an end to four decades of the Cold War. A system of tight centralized controls has given way to chaotic freedom and un-managed, entrepreneurial capitalism. Of immediate concern to most world leaders has been the control and safety of over 30,000 Soviet nuclear weapons. After 1991, the Soviet, centralized system of management lost one key structural element: a reliable `human factor` for nuclear material control. The Soviet systems for physical security and material control are still in place in the nuclear inheritor states - Russia, Ukraine, Khazakhnstan, and Belarus - but theymore » do not restrain or regulate their nuclear industry. In the chaos created by the Soviet collapse, the nonproliferation regime may not adequately temper the supply of the nuclear materials of the new inheritor states. This could permit organizations or states seeking nuclear weapons easier access to fissile materials. New initiatives such as the United States Cooperative Threat Reduction program, which draws upon U.S. technology and expertise to help the NIS solve these complex problems, are short-tern tactics. At present there are no strategies which address the long-tern root problems caused by the Soviet collapse.This thesis demonstrates the extent of the nuclear control problems in Russia. Specifically, we examine physical security, material control and accounting regulation and enforcement, and criminal actions. It reveals that the current lack of internal controls make access to nuclear materials easier for aspiring nuclear weapons States.« less

Implications of Using Computer-Based Training with the AN/SQQ-89(v) Sonar System: Operating and Support Costs

DTIC Science & Technology

2012-06-01

Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Costs (VAMOSC...VAMOSC Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Costs VMA Variant Manning Average WAP Weapons Alternate Processor WCS Work Center...Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Costs (VAMOSC), under Unit Level Consumption and Manhours—Organizational Corrective Maintenance. C

Political and Socio-Economic Change: Revolutions and Their Implications for the U.S. Military

DTIC Science & Technology

2014-09-01

redlines and then being embarrassed by them. The use of chemical weapons by Syria is the lat- est, where the redline has been diluted to a “range of...thus engen - ders doubts about U.S. credibility and undermines confidence in U.S. judgment, thereby diminishing American power. 62 Third, the

Consequences of Regional Scale Nuclear Conflicts and Acts of Individual Nuclear Terrorism

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Toon, O. B.; Turco, R. P.; Robock, A.; Bardeen, C.; Oman, L.; Stenchikov, G. L.

2006-12-01

The number of nuclear warheads in the world has fallen by about a factor of three since its peak in 1986. However, the potential exists for numerous regional nuclear arms races, and for a significant expansion in the number of nuclear weapons states. Eight countries are known to have nuclear weapons, 2 are constructing them, and an additional 32 nations already have the fissile material needed to build weapons if they so desire. Population and economic activity worldwide are congregated to an increasing extent in "megacities", which are ideal targets for nuclear weapons. We find that low yield weapons, which new nuclear powers are likely to construct, can produce 100 times as many fatalities and 100 times as much smoke from fires per kt yield as high-yield weapons, if they are targeted at city centers. A single low-yield nuclear detonation in an urban center could lead to more fatalities, in some cases by orders of magnitude, than have occurred in major historical conflicts. A regional war between the smallest current nuclear states involving 100 15-kt explosions (less than 0.1% of the explosive yield of the current global nuclear arsenal) could produce direct fatalities comparable to all of those worldwide in World War II (WW-II), or to those once estimated for a "counterforce" nuclear war between the superpowers. Portions of megacities attacked with nuclear devices or exposed to fallout of long-lived isotopes, through armed conflict or terrorism, would likely be abandoned indefinitely, with severe national and international implications. Smoke from urban firestorms in a regional war might induce significant climatic and ozone anomalies on global scales. While there are many uncertainties in the issues we discuss here, the major uncertainties are the type and scale of conflict that might occur. Each of these potential hazards deserves careful analysis by governments worldwide advised by a broad section of the world scientific community, as well as widespread debate.

Nuclear capabilities of the Arabs and Israel and their implications for the Arab-Israeli conflict

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Mustajel, S.Y.

The dissertation discusses the implications of such capabilities for the ongoing Arab-Israeli confict within the context of traditional deterrence - especially nuclear deterrence - theory. The major focus is on the resulting balance of terror and how it is likely to determine the outcome of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In part 1, a brief survey of the present and planned nuclear power and nuclear-power-related facilities, installations, research institutions, and possible nuclear delivery means possessed by the Arabs and the Israelis is presented. This survey is based only on readily available information. Part 2 presents an examination of the implications of themore » introduction of nuclear military capabilties by both sides or either side in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Egypt, with whatever nuclear capability it has, or will have, is considered in this study to be part of the Arab camp even though it has recently signed a separate peace treaty with Israel. Then, suggestions, based on conclusions and findings are provided to countries involved on how to avoid the catastrophic consequences of introducing nuclear weapons into the Arab-Israeli confict. In order to avoid catastrophic consequences of introducing nuclear weapons into the Arab-Israeli conflict, it is suggested that there must be a general peace settlement, followed by denuclearization of the Middle East region.« less

Uranium induces oxidative stress in lung epithelial cells

PubMed Central

Periyakaruppan, Adaikkappan; Kumar, Felix; Sarkar, Shubhashish; Sharma, Chidananda S.

2009-01-01

Uranium compounds are widely used in the nuclear fuel cycle, antitank weapons, tank armor, and also as a pigment to color ceramics and glass. Effective management of waste uranium compounds is necessary to prevent exposure to avoid adverse health effects on the population. Health risks associated with uranium exposure includes kidney disease and respiratory disorders. In addition, several published results have shown uranium or depleted uranium causes DNA damage, mutagenicity, cancer and neurological defects. In the current study, uranium toxicity was evaluated in rat lung epithelial cells. The study shows uranium induces significant oxidative stress in rat lung epithelial cells followed by concomitant decrease in the antioxidant potential of the cells. Treatment with uranium to rat lung epithelial cells also decreased cell proliferation after 72 h in culture. The decrease in cell proliferation was attributed to loss of total glutathione and superoxide dismutase in the presence of uranium. Thus the results indicate the ineffectiveness of antioxidant system’s response to the oxidative stress induced by uranium in the cells. PMID:17124605

Fermi's Conundrum: Proliferation and Closed Societies

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Teller, Wendy; Westfall, Catherine

2007-04-01

On January 1, 1946 Emily Taft Douglas, a freshman Representative at Large for Illinois, sent a letter to Enrico Fermi. She wanted to know whether, if atomic energy was used for peaceful purposes, it might be possible to clandestinely divert some material for bombs. Douglas first learned about the bomb not quite five months before when Hiroshima was bombed. Even though she was not a scientist she identified a key problem of the nuclear age. Fermi responded with requirements to allow peaceful uses of atomic energy and still outlaw nuclear weapons. First, free interchange of information between people was required, and second, people who reported possible violations had to be protected. Fermi had lived in Mussolini's Italy and worked under the war time secrecy restrictions of the Manhattan Project. He was not optimistic that these conditions could be met. This paper discusses how Douglas came to recognize the proliferation issue and what led Fermi to his solution and his pessimism about its practicality.

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Background and Current Developments

DTIC Science & Technology

2013-06-10

subcritical; that is, no critical mass is formed and no self-sustaining nuclear chain reaction can occur; thus, there is no nuclear explosion.”211 SCEs...45 The National Academy of Sciences Study and Its Critics ...the future, but there are no plans to do so.”8 Critics expressed concern about the implications of these policies for testing and new weapons

China-U.S. Relations: Current Issues and Implications for U.S. Policy

DTIC Science & Technology

2007-06-14

countries, the effectiveness of current U.S. food safety inspection regimes, and the vulnerability of the U.S. food supply to accidental contamination or...that allow it to purchase U.S. weapons offered for sale in 2001, and the periodic independence-leaning actions and rhetoric of its President and other... Food Contamination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Unfair Trade Subsidies

Cosmic muon background and reactor neutrino detectors: the Angra experiment

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Casimiro, E.; Anjos, J. C.

2008-06-01

We discuss on the importance of appropriately taking into account the cosmic background in the design of reactor neutrino detectors. In particular, as a practical study case, we describe the Angra Project, a new reactor neutrino oscillation experiment proposed to be built in the coming years at the Brazilian nuclear power complex, located near the Angra dos Reis city. The main goal of the experiment is to measure with high precision θ13, the last unknown of the three neutrino mixing angles. The experiment will in addition explore the possibility of using neutrino detectors for purposes of safeguards and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

It's No Secret: Fifty-eight Years of National Security Programs at BNL (463rd Brookhaven Lecture)

ScienceCinema

Indusi, Joseph [BNL Nonproliferation and National Security Department

2017-12-09

Prepare for a true tale of suspense and international intrigue. A tale that began in 1952, continued through the Cold War, and is not yet complete today. A tale of unexpected allies. Hear the true tale of one Laboratory’s efforts to keep nuclear materials out of the hands of evildoers. Freidlander. Higinbotham. Dodson. Kouts. And many more! See some of BNL’s all-star cast in the defining roles that shaped their careers as they worked toward keeping the nation and the world safe from the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Project Coast: eugenics in apartheid South Africa.

PubMed

Singh, Jerome Amir

2008-03-01

It is a decade since the exposure of Project Coast, apartheid South Africa's covert chemical and biological warfare program. In that time, attention has been focused on several aspects of the program, particularly the production of narcotics and poisons for use against anti-apartheid activists and the proliferation of both chemical and biological weapons. The eugenic dimension of Project Coast has, by contrast, received scant attention. It is time to revisit the testimony that brought the suggestion of eugenic motives to light, reflect on some of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's findings and search for lessons that can be taken from this troubled chapter in South Africa's history.

Relationship of strategic and theater nuclear forces

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Nitze, P.

Policies governing the development of nuclear forces and the relationship of strategic and theater forces are examined from five different levels: (1) the hierarchy of 10 levels of potential violence, (2) the military implications at each interface between levels, (3) historical aspects of changes in the way nuclear weapons are viewed, (4) strategic rivalry, and (5) a global challenge. The challenge acknowledges that the Soviet perception differs from the American view as is indicated by the extent of the Soviet civil defense effort. These differences are detailed in terms of specific weaponry and their effect on negotiations to limit strategicmore » nuclear arms. There has been a tendency to avoid the facts of the Soviet nuclear capability and, once faced, to avoid deciding what action to take. The author contends that the appropriate step is to deny the Soviets intercontinental nuclear supremacy by maintaining equivalent levels of force. To do this the U.S. must add strategically based cruise missiles and should consider including gray-area systems to its negotiations. The author also advocates deterrence by the unilateral use of nuclear weapons for self-defense and the use of short-range weapons by both sides on the edge of a battlefield. (DCK)« less

The predictive influence of family and neighborhood assets on fighting and weapon carrying from mid- to late adolescence.

PubMed

Haegerich, Tamara M; Oman, Roy F; Vesely, Sara K; Aspy, Cheryl B; Tolma, Eleni L

2014-08-01

Using a developmental, social-ecological approach to understand the etiology of health-risk behavior and inform primary prevention efforts, we assess the predictive effects of family and neighborhood social processes on youth physical fighting and weapon carrying. Specifically, we focus on relationships among youth and their parents, family communication, parental monitoring, as well as sense of community and neighborhood informal social control, support, concerns, and disorder. This study advances knowledge through its investigation of family and neighborhood structural factors and social processes together, employment of longitudinal models that estimate effects over adolescent development, and use of self-report and observational measures. Data from 1,093 youth/parent pairs were analyzed from the Youth Assets Study using a Generalized Estimating Equation approach; family and neighborhood assets and risks were analyzed as time varying and lagged. Similar family assets affected physical fighting and weapon carrying, whereas different neighborhood social processes influenced the two forms of youth violence. Study findings have implications for the primary prevention of youth violence, including the use of family-based approaches that build relationships and parental monitoring skills and community-level change approaches that promote informal social control and reduce neighborhood concerns about safety.

The Ukrainian Crisis and European Security: Implications for the United States and U.S. Army

DTIC Science & Technology

2015-01-01

Finland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 New Uncertainties in the Black Sea Region...increas- ing pressure if Putin is successful in destabilizing eastern Ukraine. Putin’s Increasing Commitment to the Pro -Russian Separatists Since the...downing of the MH17 commercial airliner in July 2014, Russia has increased weapon deliveries to the pro -Russian rebels, as well as the firepower of

Serving the Nation for Fifty Years: 1952 - 2002 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory [LLNL], Fifty Years of Accomplishments

DOE R&D Accomplishments Database

2002-01-01

For 50 years, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory has been making history and making a difference. The outstanding efforts by a dedicated work force have led to many remarkable accomplishments. Creative individuals and interdisciplinary teams at the Laboratory have sought breakthrough advances to strengthen national security and to help meet other enduring national needs. The Laboratory's rich history includes many interwoven stories -- from the first nuclear test failure to accomplishments meeting today's challenges. Many stories are tied to Livermore's national security mission, which has evolved to include ensuring the safety, security, and reliability of the nation's nuclear weapons without conducting nuclear tests and preventing the proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction. Throughout its history and in its wide range of research activities, Livermore has achieved breakthroughs in applied and basic science, remarkable feats of engineering, and extraordinary advances in experimental and computational capabilities. From the many stories to tell, one has been selected for each year of the Laboratory's history. Together, these stories give a sense of the Laboratory -- its lasting focus on important missions, dedication to scientific and technical excellence, and drive to made the world more secure and a better place to live.

On the future of civilian plutonium: An assessment of technological impediments to nuclear terrorism and proliferation

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Avedon, Roger Edmond

This dissertation addresses the value of developing diversion- and theft-resistant nuclear power technology, given uncertain future demand for nuclear power, and uncertain risks of nuclear terrorism and of proliferation from the reprocessing of civilian plutonium. The methodology comprises four elements: Economics. An economic growth model coupled with market penetration effects for plutonium and for the hypothetical new technology provides a range of estimates for future nuclear demand. A flow model accounts for the longevity of capital assets (nuclear plants) over time. Terrorism. The commercial nuclear fuel cycle may provide a source of fissile material for terrorists seeking to construct a crude nuclear device. An option value model is used to estimate the effects of the hypothetical new technology on reducing the probability of theft. A game theoretic model is used to explore the deterrence value of physical security and then to draw conclusions about how learning on the part of terrorists or security forces might affect the theft estimate. The principal uncertainties in the theft model can be updated using Bayesian techniques as new data emerge. Proliferation. Access to fissile material is the principal technical impediment to a state's acquisition of nuclear weapons. A game theoretic model is used to determine the circumstances under which a state may proliferate via diversion. The model shows that the hypothetical new technology will have little value for counter-proliferation if diversion is not a preferred proliferation method. A technology policy analysis of the choice of proliferation method establishes that diversion is unlikely to be used because it has no constituency among the important parties to the decision, namely the political leadership, the scientific establishment, and the military. Value. The decision whether to develop a diversion- and theft-resistant fuel cycle depends on the perceived value of avoiding nuclear terrorism and proliferation. The opportunity cost of such events is prohibitively difficult to assess. Instead, recent nonproliferation efforts and long term funding of organizations with nonproliferation objectives suggest a willingness-to-pay to avoid breaches in nuclear security. The cancellation of the Integral Fast Reactor in 1994 is analyzed using the methodology developed in the dissertation.

PPARδ INDUCES CELL PROLIFERATION BY A CYCLIN E1-DEPENDENT MECHANISM AND IS UPREGULATED IN THYROID TUMORS

PubMed Central

Zeng, Lingchun; Geng, Yan; Tretiakova, Maria; Yu, Xuemei; Sicinski, Peter; Kroll, Todd G.

2008-01-01

Peroxisome proliferator-activated receptors (PPARs) are lipid sensing nuclear receptors that have been implicated in multiple physiologic processes including cancer. Here, we determine that PPARδ induces cell proliferation through a novel cyclin E1-dependent mechanism and is upregulated in many human thyroid tumors. The expression of PPARδ was induced coordinately with proliferation in primary human thyroid cells by activation of serum, TSH/cAMP/pKa or EGF/MEK/ERK mitogenic signaling pathways. Engineered overexpression of PPARδ increased thyroid cell number, the incorporation of BrdU and the phosphorylation of Rb 40–45% in just 2 days, one usual cell population doubling. The synthetic PPARδ agonist GW501516 augmented these PPARδ proliferation effects in a dose-dependent manner. Overexpression of PPARδ increased cyclin E1 protein 9-fold, whereas knock down of PPARδ by siRNA reduced both cyclin E1 protein and cell proliferation 2-fold. Induction of proliferation by PPARδ wasabrogated by knockdown of cyclin E1 by siRNA in primary thyroid cells and by knockout of cyclin E1 in mouse embryo fibroblasts, confirming a cyclin E1 dependence for this PPARδ pathway. In addition, the mean expression of native PPARδ was increased 2- to 5-fold (p<0.0001) and correlated with that of the in situ proliferation marker Ki67 (R=0.8571; p=0.02381) in six different classes of benign and malignant human thyroid tumors. Our experiments identify a PPARδ mechanism that induces cell proliferation through cyclin E1 and is regulated by growth factor and lipid signals. The data argue for systematic investigation of PPARδ antagonists as anti-neoplastic agents and implicate altered PPARδ-cyclin E1 signaling in thyroid and other carcinomas. PMID:18701481

PEROXISOME-PROLIFERATOR ACTIVATED RECEPTORS AS A MACROMOLECULAR TARGET FOR CHEMICAL TOXICITY: MODELS OF THE INTERACTIONS OF PPARS WITH PERFLUORINATED ORGANIC COMPOUNDS.

EPA Science Inventory

The Peroxisome Proliferator Activated Receptors (PPARs), a class of nuclear receptors that modulate both transcription and metabolic processes, are implicated in a variety of metabolic disorders linked to lipidogenesis, adipose tissue accumulation, fatty-acid oxidation pathways, ...

Suicide Terrorism in America?: The Complex Social Conditions of This Phenomenon and the Implications for Homeland Security

DTIC Science & Technology

2014-11-05

including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215...necessary. Bloom writes that this support can come in several forms: Food, safe houses, recruits, financial support for weapons, remuneration of families...Virginia 2. Dudley Knox Library Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 3. Mark Sullivan, Director United States Secret Service Washington, DC

Worldwide Emerging Environmental Issues Affecting the U.S. Military

DTIC Science & Technology

2010-12-01

Cooperation in Africa to Counter Wildlife Trafficking……………………7 6.6 Bioethics Commission Calls for Enhanced Federal Oversight of Synthetic Biology…...7...Statute Include Amendments on the Crime of Aggression and Expansion of Criminalizing the Use of Certain Weapons in Non-international Conflicts in...engineered) utilizing them. Military Implications: Relevant military personnel should investigate to determine if this biological solution for iron

Allelochemical Control of Non-Indigenous Invasive Plant Species Affecting Military Testing and Training Activities

DTIC Science & Technology

2010-10-01

Evolution in invasive plants : implications for biological control. Trends in Ecology & Evolution . 19:417-422. Newingham, B.A. and R.M. Callaway...2008. Soil ecological interactions of spotted knapweed and native plant species. M.S. Thesis. Colorado State University. Fort Collins, CO...weapons and exotic plant invasions. NSF workshop on ecology and biochemical interactions , Lima. Peru. May. Keynote presentation. Callaway, R.M

Veiled Normalization: The Implications of Japanese Missile Defense

DTIC Science & Technology

2008-09-01

phasizing defensive principles . Si milarly, a s tate that is intent on reg ional hegemony or aggressive expansion will shap e its forces and...1 Mindy Kotler and Daisuke Okuyama. “Japan’s Global Ambivalence.” Foreign Policy, no. 130, (2002): 96-97. 19...the use of nuclear warheads on defensive weapons would be constitutional.23 It bears mention that Japan’s three Non-Nuclear Principles , stating that

Types of Weapon Programs and Their Implications for NATO Standardization or Interoperability

DTIC Science & Technology

1978-07-01

mines , etc.). 3. Enemy Counter-measures. Lack of standardisation or Interoperability complicates Warsaw Pact problem by forcing them to counter...Licensed Production U.K. Sikorsky S-5F helicopter (U.S.) (Westland, "Hessex") Canada Canadair CC-106 transport (derivative of the Bristol Britannia ...U.K.) Canadair CP-107 Argus maritime reconnaissance aircraft (modification of the Bristol Britannia , U.K.) Federal Republic of Germany Air-Fouga

The Islamic State We Knew: Insights Before the Resurgence and Their Implications

DTIC Science & Technology

2015-01-01

smuggling process, such as the physical distribution process, and it can also broaden the fight against both oil and antiquities smuggling by...extortion, and create weapon shops . Observing a pattern of intimidation and assassinations against established government authorities can provide a...be targeted. This would degrade the Islamic State’s ability to sell oil and refined products. To broaden the fight against both oil and antiquities

Heightened condition-dependent growth of sexually selected weapons in the rhinoceros beetle, Trypoxylus dichotomus (Coleoptera: Scarabaeidae).

PubMed

Johns, A; Gotoh, H; McCullough, E L; Emlen, D J; Lavine, L C

2014-10-01

The exaggerated weapons and ornaments of sexual selection are condition-dependent traits that often grow to exaggerated proportions. The horns of male rhinoceros beetles are extremely sensitive to the larval nutritional environment and are used by rival males in combat over access to females. In contrast to horns, other parts of the body, such as wings, eyes, and legs, scale proportionally with body size, whereas others, such as males' external genitalia, are invariant with body size, regardless of nutrition. We document how body parts of the Asian rhinoceros beetle, Trypoxylus dichotomus, exhibit plasticity and constraint in response to nutritional condition. We discuss the implications of these results for the evolution of condition-dependent and condition-independent traits in animals. © The Author 2014. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Integrative and Comparative Biology. All rights reserved. For permissions please email: journals.permissions@oup.com.

Trajectory tracking and backfitting techniques against theater ballistic missiles

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Hutchins, Robert G.; Britt, Patrick T.

1999-10-01

Since the SCUD launches in the Gulf War, theater ballistic missile (TBM) systems have become a growing concern for the US military. Detection, fast track initiation, backfitting for launch point determination, and tracking and engagement during boost phase or shortly after booster cutoff are goals that grow in importance with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This paper focuses on track initiation and backfitting techniques, as well as extending some earlier results on tracking a TBM during boost phase cutoff. Results indicate that Kalman techniques are superior to third order polynomial extrapolations in estimating the launch point, and that some knowledge of missile parameters, especially thrust, is extremely helpful in track initiation.

Tritium as an indicator of venues for nuclear tests.

PubMed

Lyakhova, O N; Lukashenko, S N; Mulgin, S I; Zhdanov, S V

2013-10-01

Currently, due to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons there is a highly topical issue of an accurate verification of nuclear explosion venues. This paper proposes to consider new method for verification by using tritium as an indicator. Detailed studies of the tritium content in the air were carried in the locations of underground nuclear tests - "Balapan" and "Degelen" testing sites located in Semipalatinsk Test Site. The paper presents data on the levels and distribution of tritium in the air where tunnels and boreholes are located - explosion epicentres, wellheads and tunnel portals, as well as in estuarine areas of the venues for the underground nuclear explosions (UNE). Copyright © 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Proceedings of the 1988 International Meeting on Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Not Available

1993-07-01

The international effort to develop and implement new research reactor fuels utilizing low-enriched uranium, instead of highly- enriched uranium, continues to make solid progress. This effort is the cornerstone of a widely shared policy aimed at reducing, and possibly eliminating, international traffic in highly-enriched uranium and the nuclear weapon proliferation concerns associated with this traffic. To foster direct communication and exchange of ideas among the specialists in this area, the Reduced Enrichment Research and Test Reactor (RERTR) Program, at Argonne National Laboratory, sponsored this meeting as the eleventh of a series which began 1978. Individual papers presented at the meetingmore » have been cataloged separately.« less

The Predictive Influence of Family and Neighborhood Assets on Fighting and Weapon Carrying from Mid- to Late-Adolescence

PubMed Central

Haegerich, Tamara M.; Oman, Roy F.; Vesely, Sara K.; Aspy, Cheryl B.; Tolma, Eleni L.

2015-01-01

Using a developmental, social-ecological approach to understand the etiology of health risk behavior and inform primary prevention efforts, we assess the predictive effects of family and neighborhood social processes on youth physical fighting and weapon carrying. Specifically, we focus on relationships among youth and their parents, family communication, and parental monitoring, as well as sense of community and neighborhood informal social control, support, concerns, and disorder. This study advances knowledge through its investigation of family and neighborhood structural factors and social processes together, employment of longitudinal models that estimate effects over adolescent development, and use of self-report and observational measures. Data from 1,093 youth/parent pairs were analyzed from the Youth Assets Study using a Generalized Estimating Equation (GEE) approach; family and neighborhood assets and risks were analyzed as time-varying and lagged. Similar family assets affected physical fighting and weapon carrying, whereas different neighborhood social processes influenced the two forms of youth violence. Study findings have implications for the primary prevention of youth violence, including the use of family-based approaches that build relationships and parental monitoring skills, and community-level change approaches that promote informal social control and reduce neighborhood concerns about safety. PMID:23677457

The Gulf War's impact on ballistic missile defense systems

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Likourezos, G.

1993-01-01

During Desert Storm the United States and its allies had an overwhelming advantage over the Iraqi armed forces. Nonetheless, the Iraqis managed to strike Israel and Saudi Arabia with Scud missiles. Because of the changing political climate and the expanding transfer of technology among nations, there is great concern by the US Government about missile proliferation and the ability of any country to obtain weapons of mass destruction. The US Government tried to downplay this concern for many years until the recent events in the Middle East affirmed its seriousness. The truth is that every year countries once thought tomore » pose no international threat are acquiring biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. Moreover, state-sponsored terrorist organizations could conceivably acquire these weapons in the future. In response to these concerns and in light of the lessons learned from the Gulf War, President George Bush in January 1991 redirected the SDI Program to concentrate on providing protection from limited ballistic missile strikes, rather than from an all-out nuclear missile attack by the Soviet Union. The Patriot air defense system, after knocking out Iraqi Scuds in the Gulf War with a near perfect record, appears for now to be the working model for the development of advanced ballistic missile defense systems - direct-kill missiles and projectiles instead of laser and particle beams. Even though the Patriot's use in Desert Storm has been argued by some to have been militarily insignificant, it has managed to change the viewpoint of many political and scientific leaders into believing that ballistic missile defense systems are needed to defend peaceful population centers and military installations from missile strikes like the ones on Israel and Saudi Arabia. 18 refs.« less

Climatic Consequences of Nuclear Conflict

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Robock, A.

2011-12-01

A nuclear war between Russia and the United States could still produce nuclear winter, even using the reduced arsenals of about 4000 total nuclear weapons that will result by 2017 in response to the New START treaty. A nuclear war between India and Pakistan, with each country using 50 Hiroshima-sized atom bombs as airbursts on urban areas, could produce climate change unprecedented in recorded human history. This scenario, using much less than 1% of the explosive power of the current global nuclear arsenal, would produce so much smoke from the resulting fires that it would plunge the planet to temperatures colder than those of the Little Ice Age of the 16th to 19th centuries, shortening the growing season around the world and threatening the global food supply. Crop model studies of agriculture in the U.S. and China show massive crop losses, even for this regional nuclear war scenario. Furthermore, there would be massive ozone depletion with enhanced ultraviolet radiation reaching the surface. These surprising conclusions are the result of recent research (see URL) by a team of scientists including those who produced the pioneering work on nuclear winter in the 1980s, using the NASA GISS ModelE and NCAR WACCM GCMs. The soot is self-lofted into the stratosphere, and the effects of regional and global nuclear war would last for more than a decade, much longer than previously thought. Nuclear proliferation continues, with nine nuclear states now, and more working to develop or acquire nuclear weapons. The continued environmental threat of the use of even a small number of nuclear weapons must be considered in nuclear policy deliberations in Russia, the U.S., and the rest of the world.

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Pelland, B.

Four years ago, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait with the intention of annexing it as Iraq's 19th state. The disclosure of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program in the aftermath of the Gulf War--through the IAEA inspections--signaled the end of one proliferation era and the start of the next. In the author's remarks here, he has found it useful to identify four distinct proliferation eras, each with different features, each calling for different emphasis in international nonproliferation efforts. They provide a convenient way to look at the history of nonproliferation, and to look into the future and to the new dimensions inmore » nonproliferation that are slowly emerging. Since the Gulf War, the nuclear world experienced a series of events of fundamental significance that changed the nature of nonproliferation, forcing changes in the mission of the IAEA and its methods. Certainly some of these events came in the form of unpleasant surprises, such as in Iraq, but very positive progress was also made on other fronts. He would like to share some perceptions of the events creating the present situation, and some views anticipating the requirements most likely to emerge in the coming years.« less

Neutronics calculations on the impact of burnable poisons to safety and non-proliferation aspects of inert matrix fuel

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Pistner, C.; Liebert, W.; Fujara, F.

2006-06-01

Inert matrix fuels (IMF) with plutonium may play a significant role to dispose of stockpiles of separated plutonium from military or civilian origin. For reasons of reactivity control of such fuels, burnable poisons (BP) will have to be used. The impact of different possible BP candidates (B, Eu, Er and Gd) on the achievable burnup as well as on safety and non-proliferation aspects of IMF are analyzed. To this end, cell burnup calculations have been performed and burnup dependent reactivity coefficients (boron worth, fuel temperature and moderator void coefficient) were calculated. All BP candidates were analyzed for one initial BP concentration and a range of different initial plutonium-concentrations (0.4-1.0 g cm-3) for reactor-grade plutonium isotopic composition as well as for weapon-grade plutonium. For the two most promising BP candidates (Er and Gd), a range of different BP concentrations was investigated to study the impact of BP concentration on fuel burnup. A set of reference fuels was identified to compare the performance of uranium-fuels, MOX and IMF with respect to (1) the fraction of initial plutonium being burned, (2) the remaining absolute plutonium concentration in the spent fuel and (3) the shift in the isotopic composition of the remaining plutonium leading to differences in the heat and neutron rate produced. In the case of IMF, the remaining Pu in spent fuel is unattractive for a would be proliferator. This underlines the attractiveness of an IMF approach for disposal of Pu from a non-proliferation perspective.

Functional and molecular characterization of kinin B1 and B 2 receptors in human bladder cancer: implication of the PI3Kγ pathway.

PubMed

Sgnaolin, V; Pereira, T C B; Bogo, M R; Zanin, R; Battastini, A M O; Morrone, F B; Campos, M M

2013-08-01

Kinins and their receptors have been recently implicated in cancer. Using functional and molecular approaches, we investigated the relevance of kinin B1 and B2 receptors in bladder cancer. Functional studies were conducted using bladder cancer cell lines, and human biopsies were employed for molecular studies. Both B1 des-Arg(9)-BK and B2 BK receptor agonists stimulated the proliferation of grade 3-derived T24 bladder cancer cells. Furthermore, treatment with B1 and B2 receptor antagonists (SSR240612 and HOE140) markedly inhibited the proliferation of T24 cells. Only higher concentrations of BK increased the proliferation of the grade 1 bladder cancer cell line RT4, while des-Arg(9)-BK completely failed to induce its proliferation. Real-time PCR revealed that the mRNA expression of kinin receptors, particularly B1 receptors, was increased in T24 cells relative to RT4 cells. Data from bladder cancer human biopsies revealed that B1 receptor expression was increased in all tumor samples and under conditions of chronic inflammation. We also show novel evidence demonstrating that the pharmacological inhibition of PI3Kγ (phosphatidylinositol 3-kinase) with AS252424, concentration-dependently reduced T24 cell proliferation induced by BK or des-Arg(9)-BK. Finally, the incubation of T24 cells with kinin agonists led to a marked activation of the PI3K/AKT and ERK 1/2 signaling pathways, whereas p38 MAP kinase remained unaffected. Kinin receptors, especially B1 receptors, appear to be implicated in bladder cancer progression. It is tempting to suggest that selective kinin antagonists might represent potential alternative therapies for bladder cancer.

Atoms for peace and the nonproliferation treaty: unintended consequences

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Streeper, Charles Blamires

2009-01-01

In April 2009, President Obama revived nonproliferation and arms control efforts with a speech calling for the worldwide abolition of nuclear weapons. His speech correctly acknowledged the threat of nuclear terrorism and the vulnerabilities of the related unsecure nuclear materials. Unfortunately, the president did not mention and has not mentioned in any speech the threat posed by at-risk radiological materials. Nonproliferation efforts have a well documented history of focus on special nuclear materials (fissionable weapons usable materials or SNM), and other key materials (chemical and biological) and technologies for a Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD). Such intense focus on WMDmore » related materials/technologies is essential for international safety and security and merit continued attention and funding. However, the perception that radioactive sealed sources (sources) are of less concern than WMD is unfortunate. These perceptions are based solely on the potentially enormous and tragic consequences associated with their deliberate or accidental misuse and proliferation concerns. However, there is a documented history of overemphasis on the nuclear threat at the expense of ignoring the far more likely and also devastating chemical and biological threats. The radiological threat should not be minimized or excluded from policy discussions and decisions on these far ranging scopes of threat to the international community. Sources have a long history of use; and a wider distribution worldwide than fissile materials. Pair this with their broad ranges in isotopes/activities along with scant national and international attention and mechanisms for their safe and secure management and it is not difficult to envision a deadly threat. Arguments that minimize or divert attention away from sources may have the effect of distracting necessary policy attention on preventing/mitigating a radiological dispersal event. The terrorist attacks on 9/11 should be a clear reminder of the inherent danger of diminishing or dismissing lower-level threats in exchange for enhanced focus on high priority special nuclear materials with the basis for this emphasis being solely on the magnitude of the consequences of a single event. Mitigating all possible or likely terrorist attacks is impossible; however, weaponized sources, in the form of a radiological dispersal device, have been a declared target material of Al-Qaida. Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace initiative promoted the spread of the paradoxical beneficial yet destructive properties of the atom. Typically, the focus of nonproliferation efforts focuses on the fissile materials associated with Weapons of Mass Destruction, with less emphasis on radioactive materials that could be used for a Weapon of Mass Disruption. Most nonproliferation policy discussion involves securing or preventing the diversion of weapons grade fissile materials (uranium (U) with concentration of over 90% of the isotope {sup 235}U (HEU) and plutonium with more than 90% of the isotope {sup 239}Pu), with scant attention given to the threat posed by a prolific quantity of sources spread worldwide. Further acerbating the problem of inattention, it appears that the momentum of the continued evolution in the beneficial applications of sources will only increase in the near future. Several expert studies have demonstrated on the potentially devastating economic, psychological and public health impacts of terrorist use of a radiological dispersal or radiation emitting device (ROD/RED) in a metropolis. The development of such a weapon, from the acquisition of the radioactive material to the technical knowledge needed to fashion it into an ROD, is many orders of magnitude easier than diverting enough fissile material for and fabrication/acquisition of a nuclear weapon. Unlike nuclear weapons, worldwide, there are many well documented accounts of accidental and purposeful diversions of radioactive materials from regulatory control. As of the end of 2008, the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Illicit Trafficking Database had logged 1562 incidents, of which only 18 include weapons grade nuclear materials. As much as 66% of the radioactive material involved in these incidents was not recovered. Since 2004, there has been a 75% increase in incidents of unrecoverable material, much of which is labeled dangerous with potential for deterministic health affects if misused. This makes clear that a black market of illicit trade in sources exists. The incidents reported to the IAEA's database rely only on voluntary state reporting; therefore, the number of lost or stolen sources is expected to be much higher.« less

Nuclear Weapons: Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

DTIC Science & Technology

2007-04-04

indicated plans to reduce the time between a decision to conduct a nuclear test and the test itself, which has been done. Critics raised concerns...testing in the future, but there are no plans to do so.’”6 Critics expressed concern about the implications of these policies for testing and new... critic felt that increased funding for test readiness would in effect give prior approval for testing. CRS-4 8 The National Academies, “Academy

Airpower in Hybrid War: Ethical Implications for the Joint Force Commander

DTIC Science & Technology

2014-05-15

waging war) aspect of just war theory . 13 In light of the issue, the spirit of US acquisition is one that historically and presently puts...by the NWC or the Department of the Navy. 14. ABSTRACT In the foreseeable future, the United States ( US ) will likely find itself engaged in hybrid...behaviors. Moreover, political risk aversion, coupled with the perceived “sanitary” use of technologically advanced weapons systems, makes US airpower

Army Attack Helicopters: Can They Survive on the Airland Battlefield?

DTIC Science & Technology

1987-06-05

include details of air action given by ground observors on both sides, but contains a great dcal of minutia . A thorough 13 reading will give one all...volunteered ..... and they were firmly fastened on the lateral stretchers, their automatic weapons pointing forward. Twenty minutes later, astonished...detonation point area. The implications for lessor degrees of warfighting were readily apparent and would be soon self evident. By this time, combat units

Russia-Georgia Conflict in South Ossetia: Context and Implications for U.S. Interests

DTIC Science & Technology

2008-09-22

Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, Edmond Mulet , reported to the U.N. Security Council that the U.N. Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG; about 100...movement by the Abkhaz side of substantial numbers of heavy weapons and military personnel towards the Kodori Valley.” Mulet also warned that Abkhaz...Russian “peacekeepers” “did not attempt to stop such deployments” of Abkhaz rebel weaponry, Mulet reported. Fifteen UNOMIG observers were withdrawn

Russia-Georgia Conflict in August 2008: Context and Implications for U.S. Interests

DTIC Science & Technology

2009-03-03

Mulet , reported to the U.N. Security Council that the U.N. Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG; about 100 observers in all) had witnessed “ongoing...substantial numbers of heavy weapons and military personnel towards the Kodori Valley.” Mulet also warned that Abkhaz separatist leader Sergey...not attempt to stop such deployments” of Abkhaz rebel weaponry, Mulet reported. Fifteen UNOMIG observers were withdrawn from the Kodori Valley because

Russia-Georgia Conflict in South Ossetia: Context and Implications for U.S. Interests

DTIC Science & Technology

2008-10-24

Edmond Mulet , reported to the U.N. Security Council that the U.N. Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG; about 100 observers in all) had witnessed...side of substantial numbers of heavy weapons and military personnel towards the Kodori Valley.” Mulet also warned that Abkhaz separatist leader Sergey...did not attempt to stop such deployments” of Abkhaz rebel weaponry, Mulet reported. Fifteen UNOMIG observers were withdrawn from the Kodori Valley

Russia-Georgia Conflict in South Ossetia: Context and Implications for U.S. Interests

DTIC Science & Technology

2008-08-13

from possible attack. Actions in Abkhazia and Western Georgia. On August 10, the U.N. Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, Edmond Mulet ...weapons and military personnel towards the Kodori Valley.” Mulet also warned that Abkhaz separatist leader Sergei Bagapsh had threatened to push the...deployments” of Abkhaz rebel weaponry, Mulet reported. Fifteen UNOMIG observers were withdrawn from the Kodori Valley because the Abkhaz rebels announced that

Airpower Journal Index, 1987-1996

DTIC Science & Technology

1998-07-01

AirpowerJournal Airpower Research Institute Author Index Aldrich, Maj Richard W. "The International Legal Implications of Information Warfare," vol . 10...no . 3 (Fall 1996) : 99-110. Aldrich, Maj Richard W., and Maj Norman K. Thompson . "Verifying Chemical and Biological Weapons Treaties: Is the...Perspective," vol . 3, no . 4 (Winter 1989) : 10-33. Casebeer, 1st Lt William D. ; Col Richard Szafranski ; and Dr. James H. Toner. "Military Ethics," vol. 8

Weapon System Implications of RLPG Technology

DTIC Science & Technology

2000-01-01

the extreme emphasis placed on minimizing volume under armor . For an RLPG, the space required is further reduced because, unlike the case with an SPG...ensuring that all the on-board missiles can be launched from under armor . Currently, vehicle-launched missiles are fired from racks of four launch...reload is not done under armor . External, manual reload for the direct-fire role is simply not feasible operationally. It is possible to design a

Legal and Political Implications of Offensive Actions from and Against the Space Segment

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

de Angelis, Iole M.

2002-01-01

Hundreds of satellites now present in space benefit the people of the world economically, scientifically and by their contribution to international security. So far, activities in space have proceeded without much conflict. Means have been found for regulation and agreement to minimize interference in the radio spectrum, while making more efficient use of limited spectrum resources. The Outer Space Treaty bars the stationing of nuclear weapons in space, or other weapons of mass destruction. Nations are responsible for damages that their space activities may cause to others, perhaps including destruction of the space assets of another nation. Today, maintaining the peaceful use of space is becoming more complicated by the privatisation of the notion of security by commercial actors and by the emerging of high technology non-state threats, that are not bind by international treaties. SPACE WEAPONS The Outer Space Treaty had been adopted to avoid the possible denial of peaceful uses of outer space, and because, technically speaking, jeopardizing a satellite was a difficult task to perform. For example, an orbiting laser might take hours or days for the Earth to rotate and the laser to be at an appropriate point in its orbit to threaten a target on the ground or in the air. Conversely, a substantial number of such weapons in space might be able to destroy targets within minutes of the command to do so, if the targets were visible and not below clouds. It is currently very difficult to oppose space weapons. For this reason, they could be significantly effective against an adversary. However, there are several obvious ways to counter nation controlled space-based weapons: anti-satellite systems, economic and technological blockade and an international legal system that forbids/restricts such weapons. The problem remains for non-state international actors which are not bound by international treaties. For this reason, the principle established by the United States to tie a common responsibility among the non state-actor Al-Quaida and the State of Afghanistan - that supported and hosted such organisation - is an exemple that deserves special consideration. ANTISATELLITE WEAPONS In a world in which Russia and the United States are no longer enemies, no individual nation has a strong motivation to develop and deploy space weapons for solely military purposes. Such weapons could be seen as inextricably tied to the purpose of achieving space dominance not only for military reasons - achieving full spectrum dominance thanks to a superior information management - but also for economical and political reasons. It is important to remind that the military use of outer space has both stabilizing and destabilizing potential. Military and civilian satellites perform functions that contribute to treaties verification, transparency, confidence building and nuclear deterrence. Putting weapons in space - that is a military use of outer-space - would threaten the instruments and sensors deployed into orbit to monitor potential enemies, control the compliance to disarmament treaties, detect ballistic missile launches, and maintain reliable communications. A sudden attack against such systems would lead to a main international crisis. In this context, in February 2000 the Chinese delegation to the United Nations Conference on Disarmament circulated a paper identifying a present and pressing necessity to prevent an arms race in outer space. A treaty forestalling the use of any kind of weapons in space, argued the delegation, would greatly support global peace and security." Moscow agreed with Beijing on this subject. CONCLUSIONS The deployment of space weapons will bring negative consequences to the international image of the country that does so, but is it an inevitable process? What tools can the international community do to prevent the escalation of conflicts into the outer space? From an international legal perspective, the development and the deployment of strategic weapons, kinetic energy weapons and directed energy weapons are already contained within existing rules and such issues are being actively addressed by the international community. At the same time, the use of cyberwar and electronic warfare to counter space technology not only encounters a void of international rules, but it is a question that is very rarely taken into consideration while addressing to the issues of preventing space warfare. Finally, these techniques are easily available to non-state organisations - terrorist organisations and commercial companies - and individuals. In conclusion, the issues related to offensive actions towards and from space shall be taken into consideration not only in a military perspective, but also in a political perspective - terrorist actions against the space segment - and from an economical point of view.

When the Music Changes, So Should the Dance: Cultural and Spiritual Considerations in Paradigm "Proliferation"

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Dillard, Cynthia B.

2006-01-01

This paper explores the subtle (and often not so subtle) cultural, social, political and spiritual meanings behind the very notion of paradigm "proliferation" including the often exclusionary intentions and implications in how research is undertaken, represented and for what (and whose) purposes. Dealing with these contested meanings brings a…

Comprehensive test ban negotiations

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Grab, G. Allen; Heckrotte, Warren

1983-10-01

Although it has been a stated policy goal of American and Soviet leaders since 1958 (with the exception of Ronald Reagan), the world today is still without a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Throughout their history, test an negotiatins have been plagued by a number of persistent problems. Chief among these is East-West differences on the verification question, with the United States concerned about the problem of possible Soviet cheating and the USSR concerned about the protection of its national sovereignty. In addition, internal bureaucratic politics have played a major role in preventing the successful conclusion of an agreement. Despite these problems, the superpowers have concluded several significant partial meausres: a brief (1958-1961) total moratorium on nuclear weapons tests; the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, banning tests in the air, water and outer space; the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974 (150 KT limit on underground explosions); and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty of 1976 (150 KT limit on individal PNEs). Today, the main U.S. objections to a CTBT center is the nuclear weapons laboratories, the Department of Energy, and the Pentagon, who all stress the issues of stockpile reliability and verification. Those who remain committed to a CTBT emphasize and the potential political leverage it offers in checking both horizontal and vertical proliferation.

Adverse Childhood Experiences and School-Based Victimization and Perpetration.

PubMed

Forster, Myriam; Gower, Amy L; McMorris, Barbara J; Borowsky, Iris W

2017-01-01

Retrospective studies using adult self-report data have demonstrated that adverse childhood experiences (ACEs) increase risk of violence perpetration and victimization. However, research examining the associations between adolescent reports of ACE and school violence involvement is sparse. The present study examines the relationship between adolescent reported ACE and multiple types of on-campus violence (bringing a weapon to campus, being threatened with a weapon, bullying, fighting, vandalism) for boys and girls as well as the risk of membership in victim, perpetrator, and victim-perpetrator groups. The analytic sample was comprised of ninth graders who participated in the 2013 Minnesota Student Survey ( n ~ 37,000). Multinomial logistic regression models calculated the risk of membership for victim only, perpetrator only, and victim-perpetrator subgroups, relative to no violence involvement, for students with ACE as compared with those with no ACE. Separate logistic regression models assessed the association between cumulative ACE and school-based violence, adjusting for age, ethnicity, family structure, poverty status, internalizing symptoms, and school district size. Nearly 30% of students were exposed to at least one ACE. Students with ACE represent 19% of no violence, 38% of victim only, 40% of perpetrator only, and 63% of victim-perpetrator groups. There was a strong, graded relationship between ACE and the probability of school-based victimization: physical bullying for boys but not girls, being threatened with a weapon, and theft or property destruction ( ps < .001) and perpetration: bullying and bringing a weapon to campus ( ps < .001), with boys especially vulnerable to the negative effects of cumulative ACE. We recommend that schools systematically screen for ACE, particularly among younger adolescents involved in victimization and perpetration, and develop the infrastructure to increase access to trauma-informed intervention services. Future research priorities and implications are discussed.

The Evolution of India’s Nuclear Program: Implications for the United States

DTIC Science & Technology

2008-05-22

be a part of the global nuclear regime: “On the one hand, nuclear weapons were considered a shameful badge worn by the great powers of the cold war ...Asian region, balancing their policies between the needed Pakistani support for the Global War on Terror (GWOT) with the desire to maintain India as an...1990s: On the Brink of Nuclear War in South Asia .................................................... 25 Section 3: Indian Military Capability

Russia-Georgia Conflict in South Ossetia: Context and Implications for U.S. Interests

DTIC Science & Technology

2008-10-07

for Peacekeeping, Edmond Mulet , reported to the U.N. Security Council that the U.N. Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG; about 100 observers in all...by the Abkhaz side of substantial numbers of heavy weapons and military personnel towards the Kodori Valley.” Mulet also warned that Abkhaz separatist...peacekeepers” “did not attempt to stop such deployments” of Abkhaz rebel weaponry, Mulet reported. Fifteen UNOMIG observers were withdrawn from the

The Guns-For-Drugs Trade: Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy

DTIC Science & Technology

1991-12-01

arms a buyers market. There are several reasons for this. According to Jess B. Guy, Resident Agent in Charge of the San Jose, California field office of...abundant. 29 Interview with Jess B. Guy, Resident Agent in Charge, of the Bureau of Alcohol. Tobacco, and Firearms (BATF or ATF) office in San Jose...SMUGGLING TECHNIQUES A. PREFERRED WEAPONS According to Mike Kuntz, Special Agent of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the connection

The Implications of the Rise of China’s Military for Mongolian Security

DTIC Science & Technology

2010-06-01

Regional Forum ASAT – Anti-satellite ASUW – Anti- surface warfare ASW – Antisubmarine Warfare AWACS – Airborne Warning and Control System CCP – Chinese...Military Region NAM – Non-Aligned Movements NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization NCO – Non-commissioned Officer NWFZ – Nuclear-Weapon- Free Zone...currency ROC – Republic of China RRU – Rapid Reaction Units SAM – Surface to Air Missile SCO – Shanghai Cooperation Organization SIPRI – Stockholm

Tactical Implications of Air Blast Variations from Nuclear Tests

DTIC Science & Technology

1976-11-30

work com- pleted under Contract ODlA 001-76-C-0284. The objective of this analysis was to assess the rationale for additional underground tests ( UGT ) to...applications wore based, and additional applications of the methodology for a more complete assessment of the UGT rationale. This report summarizes work...corresponding to a 25 percent to 50 percent reduction in yield. The maximum improvement possible through UGT is, of course, when the variance in the weapon

Military Transformation and the Defense Industry After Next: The Defense Industrial Implications of Network-Centric Warfare

DTIC Science & Technology

2002-09-01

including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services , Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson...require the acquisition of unfamiliar weapons and support systems. Joint and service visions of the military after next raise serious questions that...and the U.S. Defense Industry The U.S. military is awash in visions of transformation. There is an array of joint and service visions of what has become

Flexible weapons architecture design

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Pyant, William C., III

Present day air-delivered weapons are of a closed architecture, with little to no ability to tailor the weapon for the individual engagement. The closed architectures require weaponeers to make the target fit the weapon instead of fitting the individual weapons to a target. The concept of a flexible weapons aims to modularize weapons design using an open architecture shell into which different modules are inserted to achieve the desired target fractional damage while reducing cost and civilian casualties. This thesis shows that the architecture design factors of damage mechanism, fusing, weapons weight, guidance, and propulsion are significant in enhancing weapon performance objectives, and would benefit from modularization. Additionally, this thesis constructs an algorithm that can be used to design a weapon set for a particular target class based on these modular components.

Engineering micropatterned surfaces to modulate the function of vascular stem cells

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Li, Jennifer; Wu, Michelle; Chu, Julia

2014-02-21

Highlights: • We examine vascular stem cell function on microgrooved and micropost patterned polymer substrates. • 10 μm microgrooved surfaces significantly lower VSC proliferation but do not modulate calcified matrix deposition. • Micropost surfaces significantly lower VSC proliferation and decrease calcified matrix deposition. - Abstract: Multipotent vascular stem cells have been implicated in vascular disease and in tissue remodeling post therapeutic intervention. Hyper-proliferation and calcified extracellular matrix deposition of VSC cause blood vessel narrowing and plaque hardening thereby increasing the risk of myocardial infarct. In this study, to optimize the surface design of vascular implants, we determined whether micropatterned polymermore » surfaces can modulate VSC differentiation and calcified matrix deposition. Undifferentiated rat VSC were cultured on microgrooved surfaces of varied groove widths, and on micropost surfaces. 10 μm microgrooved surfaces elongated VSC and decreased cell proliferation. However, microgrooved surfaces did not attenuate calcified extracellular matrix deposition by VSC cultured in osteogenic media conditions. In contrast, VSC cultured on micropost surfaces assumed a dendritic morphology, were significantly less proliferative, and deposited minimal calcified extracellular matrix. These results have significant implications for optimizing the design of cardiovascular implant surfaces.« less

Youths carrying a weapon or using a weapon in a fight: what makes the difference?

PubMed

Thurnherr, Judit; Michaud, Pierre-André; Berchtold, André; Akré, Christina; Suris, Joan-Carles

2009-04-01

The objective of this study was to characterize weapon-carrying adolescents and to assess whether weapon carriers differ from weapon users. Data were drawn from a cross-sectional school-based survey of 7548 adolescents aged 16-20 years in Switzerland. Youths carrying a weapon were compared with those who do not. Subsequently, weapon carriers were divided into those who had used it in a fight and those who had not. Individual, family, school and social factors were analyzed using bivariate and stepwise multivariate analysis. For both genders, delinquent behavior and being victim of physical violence were associated with weapon carrying. For males, quarreling while intoxicated, being an apprentice, being sensation seekers, having a tattoo, having a poor relationship with parents and practicing unsafe sex were also related to weapon carrying. Compared with weapon carriers, female weapon users were more likely to be regular smokers. Male weapon users were foreign born, urban and apprentices; had poor school connectedness; practiced unsafe sex and quarreled while intoxicated. Carrying a weapon is a relatively frequent behavior among youths in Switzerland and a sizeable proportion of weapon carriers have used it in a fight. Weapon carrying should be part of the clinical assessment and preventive counseling of adolescents. Preventive programs specific for at-risk youth groups need to be developed.

Youths Carrying a Weapon or Using a Weapon in a Fight: What Makes the Difference?

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Thurnherr, Judit; Michaud, Pierre-Andre; Berchtold, Andre; Akre, Christina; Suris, Joan-Carles

2009-01-01

The objective of this study was to characterize weapon-carrying adolescents and to assess whether weapon carriers differ from weapon users. Data were drawn from a cross-sectional school-based survey of 7548 adolescents aged 16-20 years in Switzerland. Youths carrying a weapon were compared with those who do not. Subsequently, weapon carriers were…

College Students Opinions on Gun Violence.

PubMed

Lewis, Rhonda K; LoCurto, Jamie; Brown, Kyrah; Stowell, David; Maryman, J'Vonnah; Dean, Amber; McNair, Thoi; Ojeda, Debbie; Siwierka, Julia

2016-06-01

Gun violence and control issues have become serious public health problems. This study gathered the opinions from 419 college students from a Midwestern University. Participants were asked about beliefs about purchasing assault weapons, beliefs about bringing handguns to college campuses and beliefs about contributing factors that lead to gun violence. Participants completed surveys online. The findings showed that overall 54 % of respondents believed that military assault weapons should be banned and 53 % agree that teachers should be allowed to carry a registered handgun on campus. There were statistically significant differences between males and females on these issues. For instance, females believed military assault weapons and high capacity magazines should be banned more than 1.9 times (p = .004) p < .05 compared to male students. On the other hand, female students were more likely to believe that school teachers should be allowed to carry registered handguns on school campuses more than 1.55 times (p = .046) p < .05 compared to their male student counterparts. There were no statistically significant differences between ethnic groups. The top four contributing factors that students believed led to gun violence were decline in parenting and family values (17 %), gang involvement (14 %), bullying (13.8 %) and guns being easy to obtain (13.8 %). Limitations and implications for policy work are discussed.

An Experimental Investigation of the Functional Hypothesis and Evolutionary Advantage of Stone-Tipped Spears

PubMed Central

Wilkins, Jayne; Schoville, Benjamin J.; Brown, Kyle S.

2014-01-01

Stone-tipped weapons were a significant innovation for Middle Pleistocene hominins. Hafted hunting technology represents the development of new cognitive and social learning mechanisms within the genus Homo, and may have provided a foraging advantage over simpler forms of hunting technology, such as a sharpened wooden spear. However, the nature of this foraging advantage has not been confirmed. Experimental studies and ethnographic reports provide conflicting results regarding the relative importance of the functional, economic, and social roles of hafted hunting technology. The controlled experiment reported here was designed to test the functional hypothesis for stone-tipped weapons using spears and ballistics gelatin. It differs from previous investigations of this type because it includes a quantitative analysis of wound track profiles and focuses specifically on hand-delivered spear technology. Our results do not support the hypothesis that tipped spears penetrate deeper than untipped spears. However, tipped spears create a significantly larger inner wound cavity that widens distally. This inner wound cavity is analogous to the permanent wound cavity in ballistics research, which is considered the key variable affecting the relative ‘stopping power’ or ‘killing power’ of a penetrating weapon. Tipped spears conferred a functional advantage to Middle Pleistocene hominins, potentially affecting the frequency and regularity of hunting success with important implications for human adaptation and life history. PMID:25162397

Sandia National Laboratories: National Security Missions: Nuclear Weapons:

Science.gov Websites

Safety & Security Sandia National Laboratories Exceptional service in the national interest & Figures Programs Nuclear Weapons About Nuclear Weapons Safety & Security Weapons Science & Twitter YouTube Flickr RSS Top Nuclear Weapons About Nuclear Weapons at Sandia Safety & Security

The Complete Burning of Weapons Grade Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium with (Laser Inertial Fusion-Fission Energy) LIFE Engine

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Farmer, J C; Diaz de la Rubia, T; Moses, E

2008-12-23

The National Ignition Facility (NIF) project, a laser-based Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) experiment designed to achieve thermonuclear fusion ignition and burn in the laboratory, is under construction at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and will be completed in April of 2009. Experiments designed to accomplish the NIF's goal will commence in late FY2010 utilizing laser energies of 1 to 1.3 MJ. Fusion yields of the order of 10 to 20 MJ are expected soon thereafter. Laser initiated fusion-fission (LIFE) engines have now been designed to produce nuclear power from natural or depleted uranium without isotopic enrichment, and from spentmore » nuclear fuel from light water reactors without chemical separation into weapons-attractive actinide streams. A point-source of high-energy neutrons produced by laser-generated, thermonuclear fusion within a target is used to achieve ultra-deep burn-up of the fertile or fissile fuel in a sub-critical fission blanket. Fertile fuels including depleted uranium (DU), natural uranium (NatU), spent nuclear fuel (SNF), and thorium (Th) can be used. Fissile fuels such as low-enrichment uranium (LEU), excess weapons plutonium (WG-Pu), and excess highly-enriched uranium (HEU) may be used as well. Based upon preliminary analyses, it is believed that LIFE could help meet worldwide electricity needs in a safe and sustainable manner, while drastically shrinking the nation's and world's stockpile of spent nuclear fuel and excess weapons materials. LIFE takes advantage of the significant advances in laser-based inertial confinement fusion that are taking place at the NIF at LLNL where it is expected that thermonuclear ignition will be achieved in the 2010-2011 timeframe. Starting from as little as 300 to 500 MW of fusion power, a single LIFE engine will be able to generate 2000 to 3000 MWt in steady state for periods of years to decades, depending on the nuclear fuel and engine configuration. Because the fission blanket in a fusion-fission hybrid system is subcritical, a LIFE engine can burn any fertile or fissile nuclear material, including unenriched natural or depleted U and SNF, and can extract a very high percentage of the energy content of its fuel resulting in greatly enhanced energy generation per metric ton of nuclear fuel, as well as nuclear waste forms with vastly reduced concentrations of long-lived actinides. LIFE engines could thus provide the ability to generate vast amounts of electricity while greatly reducing the actinide content of any existing or future nuclear waste and extending the availability of low cost nuclear fuels for several thousand years. LIFE also provides an attractive pathway for burning excess weapons Pu to over 99% FIMA (fission of initial metal atoms) without the need for fabricating or reprocessing mixed oxide fuels (MOX). Because of all of these advantages, LIFE engines offer a pathway toward sustainable and safe nuclear power that significantly mitigates nuclear proliferation concerns and minimizes nuclear waste. An important aspect of a LIFE engine is the fact that there is no need to extract the fission fuel from the fission blanket before it is burned to the desired final level. Except for fuel inspection and maintenance process times, the nuclear fuel is always within the core of the reactor and no weapons-attractive materials are available outside at any point in time. However, an important consideration when discussing proliferation concerns associated with any nuclear fuel cycle is the ease with which reactor fuel can be converted to weapons usable materials, not just when it is extracted as waste, but at any point in the fuel cycle. Although the nuclear fuel remains in the core of the engine until ultra deep actinide burn up is achieved, soon after start up of the engine, once the system breeds up to full power, several tons of fissile material is present in the fission blanket. However, this fissile material is widely dispersed in millions of fuel pebbles, which can be tagged as individual accountable items, and thus made difficult to divert in large quantities. This report discusses the application of the LIFE concept to nonproliferation issues, initially looking at the LIFE (Laser Inertial Fusion-Fission Energy) engine as a means of completely burning WG Pu and HEU. By combining a neutron-rich inertial fusion point source with energy-rich fission, the once-through closed fuel-cycle LIFE concept has the following characteristics: it is capable of efficiently burning excess weapons or separated civilian plutonium and highly enriched uranium; the fission blanket is sub-critical at all times (keff < 0.95); because LIFE can operate well beyond the point at which light water reactors (LWRs) need to be refueled due to burn-up of fissile material and the resulting drop in system reactivity, fuel burn-up of 99% or more appears feasible. The objective of this work is to develop LIFE technology for burning of WG-Pu and HEU.« less

32 CFR 234.10 - Weapons.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-07-01

... 32 National Defense 2 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Weapons. 234.10 Section 234.10 National Defense... PENTAGON RESERVATION § 234.10 Weapons. (a) Except as otherwise authorized under this section, the following are prohibited: (1) Possessing a weapon. (2) Carrying a weapon. (3) Using a weapon. (b) This section...

32 CFR 234.10 - Weapons.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-07-01

... 32 National Defense 2 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Weapons. 234.10 Section 234.10 National Defense... PENTAGON RESERVATION § 234.10 Weapons. (a) Except as otherwise authorized under this section, the following are prohibited: (1) Possessing a weapon. (2) Carrying a weapon. (3) Using a weapon. (b) This section...

32 CFR 234.10 - Weapons.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... 32 National Defense 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Weapons. 234.10 Section 234.10 National Defense... PENTAGON RESERVATION § 234.10 Weapons. (a) Except as otherwise authorized under this section, the following are prohibited: (1) Possessing a weapon. (2) Carrying a weapon. (3) Using a weapon. (b) This section...

32 CFR 234.10 - Weapons.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-07-01

... 32 National Defense 2 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Weapons. 234.10 Section 234.10 National Defense... PENTAGON RESERVATION § 234.10 Weapons. (a) Except as otherwise authorized under this section, the following are prohibited: (1) Possessing a weapon. (2) Carrying a weapon. (3) Using a weapon. (b) This section...

32 CFR 234.10 - Weapons.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-07-01

... 32 National Defense 2 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Weapons. 234.10 Section 234.10 National Defense... PENTAGON RESERVATION § 234.10 Weapons. (a) Except as otherwise authorized under this section, the following are prohibited: (1) Possessing a weapon. (2) Carrying a weapon. (3) Using a weapon. (b) This section...

Enhancement by Enlargement: The Proliferation Security Initiative

DTIC Science & Technology

2008-01-01

Minister Mahathir Mohammad. In any event, Malaysia’s expressions of common interest with the United States in cooperative efforts to combat terrorism...instances 10 The sharp change in the current Malaysian government’s stance toward cooperation with the United States from that of the preceding, Mahathir ...preceding prime minister, Mahathir , Malaysia was implicated in the proliferation network of Pakistan’s A. Q. Khan. As part of that network

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Background and Current Developments

DTIC Science & Technology

2008-05-28

testing, and has no plans to test. It has reduced the time needed to conduct a nuclear test. Critics raised concerns about the implications of these...particularly as it is reduced, is reliable and safe. So he has not ruled out testing in the future, but there are no plans to do so.’”4 Critics ...Secretary of State, to Honorable Pete Domenici, United States Senate, June 25, 2007. a ten-year-old moratorium on nuclear weapons testing.”5 Another critic

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Background and Current Developments

DTIC Science & Technology

2009-01-28

safe. So he has not ruled out testing in the future, but there are no plans to do so.’”5 Critics expressed concern about the implications of these...nuclear weapons testing.”6 Another critic felt that increased funding for test readiness would in effect give prior approval for testing. In July 2002 a...moratorium. We may find at some future time that we cannot diagnose or remedy a problem in a warhead critical the U.S. nuclear deterrent without

Improving DLA Aviation Engineering’s Support to its Customers and the DoD Supply Chain

DTIC Science & Technology

2014-10-01

costs and first article test costs) and (2) DLA supply chain responsiveness as measured in terms of the days required to satisfy unfilled orders ( UFOs ...135,000 UFOs or requisitions at any time. This number of UFOs overstates the magnitude of the backorder problem since many of these backorders are...backorders or long term unfilled orders ( UFOs ). This can have serious implications for the materiel readiness of those weapon systems that utilize

Logistics Implications of Composite Wings

DTIC Science & Technology

1993-12-01

Composite Wing and Air Logistics Center Locations 33 12 F-15E Strike Eagle Aircraft 34 la F-16C Fighting Falcon Aircraft 35 14 E-3 Sentry...Structure , 12 2 366th Wing Maintenance Concept 41 vOt Foreword The US Air Force has taken the initiative to reorganize into objective wings, at...the Air Force in 1967. He began his Air Force career as an F-102 radar weapon system specialist and worked on the flight line at Ramstein Air Base

Intelligence Reform and Implications for North Korea’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Program

DTIC Science & Technology

2005-09-01

August 2005). 36 Desmond Ball, “Signals Intelligence in North Korea,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 8, Issue 1 (January 1996 ), 1. 26...Ball, “Signals Intelligence in North Korea,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 8, Issue 1 (January 1996 ), 10. 38 Jeremy Kirk, “Intel Experts: N. Korea a...www.wmd.gov/report/index.html (accessed August 2005). Hereafter referred to as WMD Commission Report. 47 Michael Warner and J. Kenneth McDonald, “U.S

Implications of Present Knowledge and Past Experience for a Possible Future Chemical/Conventional Conflict

DTIC Science & Technology

1985-01-01

talk, but I haven’t really sorted them out yet. I’ve been busy scratching up the data. Nonetheless, one of the things that impressed me most in my...to interven- tion and power projection in various Third World countries. Chemical weapons have central roles in all these comtemporary Soviet...percutaneous hazard as well. Since the United States has been. essentially. " out of the business " of chemical/biological offensive weaponry production since

Chinese-Middle East Relations and Their Implications for U.S. Policy

DTIC Science & Technology

1992-06-01

their region also retains a timeless mystique; Levantine and Arabian uniqueness, coupled with the attraction of Jerusalem and Mecca, have been magnets...phrases such as "via dolorosa", "the hajj" or "next year in Jerusalem ". Portions of the Middle East have, however, escaped colonization: much of Arabia...relations with USSR, E. Europe, Mongolia USSR atomic weapons Office of Israeli ban proposal is Prime Minister now in rejected by UN Jerusalem PRC seizes

Armed Drones and Targeted Killing: Policy Implications for Their Use in Deterring Violent Extremism

DTIC Science & Technology

2017-04-17

launched some 200 pilotless balloons mounted with bombs against the city of Venice.”6 It was not until World War I, with the advent of radio...into World War II, weapons manufacturers began fitting them with bombs and explosives to give them a strike capability. Bombers, like the B-17...would release these “flying bombs ”, which were more akin to guided missiles, near a target area, and then a pilot would remotely guide the drone to its

America’s Post-9/11 Grand Strategy: Matching the Response to the Threat, and Implications for U.S. National Power

DTIC Science & Technology

2012-05-17

CONTRACT NUMBER Sb. GRANT NUMBER Sc. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER Sd. PROJECT NUMBER Se. TASK NUMBER Sf. WORK UNIT NUMBER 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION...construction projects in Afghanistan. In 1984, while continuing his construction support, he turned his focus to funding Afghan training camps, and more...of terrorism, pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, and the notion of using action against Iraq as an example to other regimes. President Bush

Military Doctrine and Strategy in the Former Soviet Union: Implications for the Navy

DTIC Science & Technology

1993-08-01

tions were raised a4ut the real accuracy of American high- technology weapons. Commentary by the Russian Federation Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev in an...April 1991 New Times article recognized the vital importance of host nation support to the outcome of the campaign. Kozyrev suggested that without it...the DESERT STORM would have been "seriously hindered."" Kozyrev did not raise the presence of American seapower as an alternative mechanism to stage

IPCS implications for future supersonic transport aircraft

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Billig, L. O.; Kniat, J.; Schmidt, R. D.

1976-01-01

The Integrated Propulsion Control System (IPCS) demonstrates control of an entire supersonic propulsion module - inlet, engine afterburner, and nozzle - with an HDC 601 digital computer. The program encompasses the design, build, qualification, and flight testing of control modes, software, and hardware. The flight test vehicle is an F-111E airplane. The L.H. inlet and engine will be operated under control of a digital computer mounted in the weapons bay. A general description and the current status of the IPCS program are given.

The New Condottieri and US Policy: The Privatization of Conflict and Its Implications

DTIC Science & Technology

2002-01-01

South Africa and Great Britain.14 Initially its employees were drawn almost exclusively from the ranks of veterans of the South African Special Forces...the direct rule or political control by the British East India Company of almost all of India south and west of the Punjab.8 106 Parameters State...well trained. Training demanded constant drill- ing to master the movements required to individually fire a weapon and maneu- ver in formation on the

Into the Crystal Ball. Third World Military Industries: Implications for the Global Arms Transfer System and U.S. National Security Interests,

DTIC Science & Technology

1983-05-01

transfers. AI -8- Second, the number of countries entering the arms production business seems to have plateaued ..n recent years . Although theLDC... year the transfer of technical data and industrial know-how has increased in proportion to the sale of military end-items and new arms production...B. Qualitative Capabilities 9 1. Type of Weapons Produced 12 2. Level of Industrial Production Capacity 17 3. Age of Technology 19 Part It

[Chemical weapons and chemical terrorism].

PubMed

Nakamura, Katsumi

2005-10-01

Chemical Weapons are kind of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). They were used large quantities in WWI. Historically, large quantities usage like WWI was not recorded, but small usage has appeared now and then. Chemical weapons are so called "Nuclear weapon for poor countrys" because it's very easy to produce/possession being possible. They are categorized (1) Nerve Agents, (2) Blister Agents, (3) Cyanide (blood) Agents, (4) Pulmonary Agents, (5) Incapacitating Agents (6) Tear Agents from the viewpoint of human body interaction. In 1997 the Chemical Weapons Convention has taken effect. It prohibits chemical weapons development/production, and Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) verification regime contributes to the chemical weapons disposal. But possibility of possession/use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist group represented in one by Matsumoto and Tokyo Subway Sarin Attack, So new chemical terrorism countermeasures are necessary.

Bugs and gas: Agreements banning chemical and biological weapons

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Mikulak, Robert P.

2017-11-01

The use of chemical or biological weapons, whether by a State or terrorists, continues to be a serious security concern. Both types of weapons are prohibited by multilateral treaties that have very broad membership, but both the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention are facing major challenges. In particular, the continued use of chemical weapons in the Syrian civil war by government forces risks eroding the norm against the use of such weapons. This paper briefly explore the recent history of efforts to constrain chemical and biological weapons and outlines challenges for the future.

36 CFR 2.4 - Weapons, traps and nets.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-07-01

... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 1 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Weapons, traps and nets. 2.4... PROTECTION, PUBLIC USE AND RECREATION § 2.4 Weapons, traps and nets. (a)(1) Except as otherwise provided in... prohibited: (i) Possessing a weapon, trap or net (ii) Carrying a weapon, trap or net (iii) Using a weapon...

36 CFR 2.4 - Weapons, traps and nets.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-07-01

... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 1 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Weapons, traps and nets. 2.4... PROTECTION, PUBLIC USE AND RECREATION § 2.4 Weapons, traps and nets. (a)(1) Except as otherwise provided in... prohibited: (i) Possessing a weapon, trap or net (ii) Carrying a weapon, trap or net (iii) Using a weapon...

36 CFR 2.4 - Weapons, traps and nets.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-07-01

... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 1 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Weapons, traps and nets. 2.4... PROTECTION, PUBLIC USE AND RECREATION § 2.4 Weapons, traps and nets. (a)(1) Except as otherwise provided in... prohibited: (i) Possessing a weapon, trap or net (ii) Carrying a weapon, trap or net (iii) Using a weapon...

36 CFR 2.4 - Weapons, traps and nets.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-07-01

... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 1 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Weapons, traps and nets. 2.4... PROTECTION, PUBLIC USE AND RECREATION § 2.4 Weapons, traps and nets. (a)(1) Except as otherwise provided in... prohibited: (i) Possessing a weapon, trap or net (ii) Carrying a weapon, trap or net (iii) Using a weapon...

36 CFR 2.4 - Weapons, traps and nets.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 1 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Weapons, traps and nets. 2.4... PROTECTION, PUBLIC USE AND RECREATION § 2.4 Weapons, traps and nets. (a)(1) Except as otherwise provided in... prohibited: (i) Possessing a weapon, trap or net (ii) Carrying a weapon, trap or net (iii) Using a weapon...

Inhibition of Smooth Muscle Proliferation by Urea-Based Alkanoic Acids via Peroxisome Proliferator-Activated Receptor α–Dependent Repression of Cyclin D1

PubMed Central

Ng, Valerie Y.; Morisseau, Christophe; Falck, John R.; Hammock, Bruce D.; Kroetz, Deanna L.

2007-01-01

Objective Proliferation of smooth muscle cells is implicated in cardiovascular complications. Previously, a urea-based soluble epoxide hydrolase inhibitor was shown to attenuate smooth muscle cell proliferation. We examined the possibility that urea-based alkanoic acids activate the nuclear receptor peroxisome proliferator-activated receptor α (PPARα) and the role of PPARα in smooth muscle cell proliferation. Methods and Results Alkanoic acids transactivated PPARα, induced binding of PPARα to its response element, and significantly induced the expression of PPARα-responsive genes, showing their function as PPARα agonists. Furthermore, the alkanoic acids attenuated platelet-derived growth factor–induced smooth muscle cell proliferation via repression of cyclin D1 expression. Using small interfering RNA to decrease endogenous PPARα expression, it was determined that PPARα was partially involved in the cyclin D1 repression. The antiproliferative effects of alkanoic acids may also be attributed to their inhibitory effects on soluble epoxide hydrolase, because epoxyeicosatrienoic acids alone inhibited smooth muscle cell proliferation. Conclusions These results show that attenuation of smooth muscle cell proliferation by urea-based alkanoic acids is mediated, in part, by the activation of PPARα. These acids may be useful for designing therapeutics to treat diseases characterized by excessive smooth muscle cell proliferation. PMID:16917105

Atmospheric Extremes in a Changing Climate: A Strategy for Improved Understanding Driven by International Security Concerns

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Davis, A. B.; Kao, C. J.

2001-05-01

The overarching mission of Los Alamos National Laboratory is to use science and technology to reduce nuclear danger. In the complex multipolar reality of the post cold-war era, this core mission is naturally enlarged to include all weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, and biological) as well as acts of terrorism. Traditionally, LANL and other institutions in the DOE weapons complex pay little attention to the reasons a country or group of individuals chooses the road of proliferation. That is considered a ``soft'' science at best and, at any rate, is left to other government agencies, their non-governmental and their international partners. However, this division-of-labor overlooks an area of challenging science where DOE laboratories such as LANL, in partnership with academia, can offer valuable insight into a sensitive ``trigger'' in the proliferation process. Indeed, a population subjected to catastrophic environmental degradation becomes far more likely to endorse a proliferant regime or spawn terrorist groups simply because it has little more to lose. Once physical health and economic survival is in jeopardy, whole populations and individuals alike become desperate. This situation is more easily exploited politically than remedied through international aid, especially when the region is already volatile. Scenarios of political de-stabilization due to environmental degradation become even more likely when reminded that the planet is gradually warming and, quite possibly, this trend in the mean will drive changes in extreme weather patterns, quite possibly, for the worse in terms of intensity, duration and frequency. Of the long list of natural disasters that threaten populations and infrastructure, most involve the atmosphere, largely because it is the least inert (hence most turbulent) of the geophysical fluids. Furthermore, the dominant nonlinear response in a complex socio-environmental system is generically not to a change in the mean, but to a critical threshold crossing. So extreme atmospheric phenomena are of the essence yet they are poorly understood, even in a steady climate, because they challenge both dynamical modelers and statisticians. The authors will describe a preliminary proposal to harness some of the unique human, computational and observational resources at LANL that could lead to a significant breakthrough in our understanding of extreme weather mechanisms and how they relate to climate and climate change. If implemented, this program could open new relationships between the laboratory and presently unsuspecting client-agencies such as FEMA, CDC, EPA, State Department, and so on.

Correlates of weapon carrying in school among adolescents in three countries.

PubMed

Stickley, Andrew; Koyanagi, Ai; Koposov, Roman; Blatný, Marek; Hrdlička, Michal; Schwab-Stone, Mary; Ruchkin, Vladislav

2015-01-01

To determine the factors associated with weapon carrying in school among Czech, Russian, and US adolescents. Logistic regression was used to analyze data drawn from the Social and Health Assessment (SAHA). Violent behavior (perpetration / victimization) was linked to adolescent weapon carrying in all countries. Substance use was associated with weapon carrying among boys in all countries. Greater parental warmth reduced the odds for weapon carrying among Czech and Russian adolescents. Associating with delinquent peers was important for weapon carrying only among US adolescents. Factors associated with weapon carrying in school vary among countries although violent behavior and substance use may be associated with weapon carrying across countries.

Analyses of battle casualties by weapon type aboard U.S. Navy warships.

PubMed

Blood, C G

1992-03-01

The number of casualties was determined for 513 incidents involving U.S. Navy warships sunk or damaged during World War II. Ship type and weapon were significant factors in determining the numbers of wounded and killed. Multiple weapon attacks and kamikazes yielded more wounded in action than other weapon types. Multiple weapons and torpedos resulted in a higher incidence of killed in action than other weapons. Penetrating wounds and burns were the most prominent injury types. Kamikaze attacks yielded significantly more burns than incidents involving bombs, gunfire, torpedos, mines, and multiple weapons. Mine explosions were responsible for more strains, sprains, and dislocations than the other weapon types.

Weapon carrying and psychopathic-like features in a population-based sample of Finnish adolescents.

PubMed

Saukkonen, Suvi; Laajasalo, Taina; Jokela, Markus; Kivivuori, Janne; Salmi, Venla; Aronen, Eeva T

2016-02-01

We investigated the prevalence of juvenile weapon carrying and psychosocial and personality-related risk factors for carrying different types of weapons in a nationally representative, population-based sample of Finnish adolescents. Specifically, we aimed to investigate psychopathic-like personality features as a risk factor for weapon carrying. The participants were 15-16-year-old adolescents from the Finnish self-report delinquency study (n = 4855). Four different groups were formed based on self-reported weapon carrying: no weapon carrying, carrying knife, gun or other weapon. The associations between psychosocial factors, psychopathic-like features and weapon carrying were examined with multinomial logistic regression analysis. 9% of the participants had carried a weapon in the past 12 months. Adolescents with a history of delinquency, victimization and antisocial friends were more likely to carry weapons in general; however, delinquency and victimization were most strongly related to gun carrying, while perceived peer delinquency (antisocial friends) was most strongly related to carrying a knife. Better academic performance was associated with a reduced likelihood of carrying a gun and knife, while feeling secure correlated with a reduced likelihood of gun carrying only. Psychopathic-like features were related to a higher likelihood of weapon carrying, even after adjusting for other risk factors. The findings of the study suggest that adolescents carrying a weapon have a large cluster of problems in their lives, which may vary based on the type of weapon carried. Furthermore, psychopathic-like features strongly relate to a higher risk of carrying a weapon.

Atmospheric effects and societal consequences of regional scale nuclear conflicts and acts of individual nuclear terrorism

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Toon, O. B.; Turco, R. P.; Robock, A.; Bardeen, C.; Oman, L.; Stenchikov, G. L.

2007-04-01

We assess the potential damage and smoke production associated with the detonation of small nuclear weapons in modern megacities. While the number of nuclear warheads in the world has fallen by about a factor of three since its peak in 1986, the number of nuclear weapons states is increasing and the potential exists for numerous regional nuclear arms races. Eight countries are known to have nuclear weapons, 2 are constructing them, and an additional 32 nations already have the fissile material needed to build substantial arsenals of low-yield (Hiroshima-sized) explosives. Population and economic activity worldwide are congregated to an increasing extent in megacities, which might be targeted in a nuclear conflict. We find that low yield weapons, which new nuclear powers are likely to construct, can produce 100 times as many fatalities and 100 times as much smoke from fires per kt yield as previously estimated in analyses for full scale nuclear wars using high-yield weapons, if the small weapons are targeted at city centers. A single "small" nuclear detonation in an urban center could lead to more fatalities, in some cases by orders of magnitude, than have occurred in the major historical conflicts of many countries. We analyze the likely outcome of a regional nuclear exchange involving 100 15-kt explosions (less than 0.1% of the explosive yield of the current global nuclear arsenal). We find that such an exchange could produce direct fatalities comparable to all of those worldwide in World War II, or to those once estimated for a "counterforce" nuclear war between the superpowers. Megacities exposed to atmospheric fallout of long-lived radionuclides would likely be abandoned indefinitely, with severe national and international implications. Our analysis shows that smoke from urban firestorms in a regional war would rise into the upper troposphere due to pyro-convection. Robock et al. (2007) show that the smoke would subsequently rise deep into the stratosphere due to atmospheric heating, and then might induce significant climatic anomalies on global scales. We also anticipate substantial perturbations of global ozone. While there are many uncertainties in the predictions we make here, the principal unknowns are the type and scale of conflict that might occur. The scope and severity of the hazards identified pose a significant threat to the global community. They deserve careful analysis by governments worldwide advised by a broad section of the world scientific community, as well as widespread public debate.

Progress in alternative neutron detection to address the helium-3 shortage

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Kouzes, Richard T.; Lintereur, Azaree T.; Siciliano, Edward R.

2015-06-01

One of the main uses for 3He is in gas proportional counters for neutron detection. Such detectors are used at neutron scattering science facilities and in radiation portal monitors deployed for homeland security and non-proliferation applications. Other uses of 3He are for research detectors, commercial instruments, well logging detectors, dilution refrigerators, lung imaging, for targets in nuclear research, and for basic research in condensed matter physics. The supply of 3He comes entirely from the decay of tritium produced for nuclear weapons in the U.S. and Russia. Due to the large increase in use of 3He for science and homeland security (since 2002), the supply could no longer meet the demand. This has led to the development of a number of alternative neutron detection schemes.

Assuaging Nuclear Energy Risks: The Angarsk International Uranium Enrichment Center

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Myers, Astasia

2011-06-01

The recent nuclear renaissance has motivated many countries, especially developing nations, to plan and build nuclear power reactors. However, domestic low enriched uranium demands may trigger nations to construct indigenous enrichment facilities, which could be redirected to fabricate high enriched uranium for nuclear weapons. The potential advantages of establishing multinational uranium enrichment sites are numerous including increased low enrichment uranium access with decreased nuclear proliferation risks. While multinational nuclear initiatives have been discussed, Russia is the first nation to actualize this concept with their Angarsk International Uranium Enrichment Center (IUEC). This paper provides an overview of the historical and modern context of the multinational nuclear fuel cycle as well as the evolution of Russia's IUEC, which exemplifies how international fuel cycle cooperation is an alternative to domestic facilities.

Hollow waveguides for the transmission of quantum cascade laser (QCL) energy for spectroscopic applications

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Harrington, James A.; Bledt, Carlos M.; Kriesel, Jason M.

2011-03-01

Spectroscopy in the long-wave infrared (LWIR) wavelength region (8 to 12 μm) is useful for detecting trace chemical compounds, such as those indicative of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). To enable the development of field portable systems for anti-proliferation efforts, current spectroscopy systems need to be made more robust, convenient, and practical (e.g., miniaturized). Hollow glass waveguides have been used with a Quantum Cascade Laser source for the delivery of single-mode laser radiation from 9 to 10 μm. The lowest loss measured for a straight, 484 μm-bore guide was 0.44 dB/m at 10 μm. The smallest 300 μm-bore waveguide transmitted singlemode radiation even while bent to radii less than 30 cm.

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Kouzes, Richard T.; Lintereur, Azaree T.; Siciliano, Edward R.

One of the main uses for 3He is in gas proportional counters for neutron detection. Such detectors are used at neutron scattering science facilities and in radiation portal monitors deployed for homeland security and non-proliferation applications. Other uses of 3He are for research detectors, commercial instruments, well logging detectors, dilution refrigerators, lung imaging, for targets in nuclear research, and for basic research in condensed matter physics. The supply of 3He comes entirely from the decay of tritium produced for nuclear weapons in the U.S. and Russia. Due to the large increase in use of 3He for science and homeland securitymore » (since 2002), the supply has dwindled, and can no longer meet the demand. This has led to the development of a number of alternative neutron detection schemes.« less

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Nagler, R.G.

This report, based solely on information available from unclassified sources, provides a coherent picture of the scope and trends of ballistic missile proliferation. The focus is on countries developing, producing, or owning ballistic missiles capable of threatening the military forces, assets, or populations of neighboring or geographically remote countries. The report also identifies other countries expected to obtain operational ballistic missile capabilities, discusses expected growth in performance, and examines the projected availability of warheads of mass destruction. The emphasis is on ballistic missiles of ranges greater than approximately 300 km, though shorter range battlefield weapons are discussed as forerunners. Themore » assessment excludes principal U.S. allies and countries formerly in the Warsaw Pact, except where these countries have sold missiles, technology; or personnel services to developing nations in support of their missile programs.« less

Aircrew laser eye protection: visual consequences and mission performance.

PubMed

Thomas, S R

1994-05-01

Battlefield laser proliferation poses a mounting risk to aircrew and ground personnel. Laser eye protection (LEP) based on current mature, mass-producible technologies absorbs visible light and can impact visual performance and color identification. These visual consequences account for many of the mission incompatibilities associated with LEP. Laboratory experiments and field investigations that examined the effects of LEP on visual performance and mission compatibility are reviewed. Laboratory experiments assessed the ability of subjects to correctly read and identify the color of head-down display symbology and tactical pilotage charts (TPC's) with three prototype LEP visors. Field investigations included Weapons Systems Trainer (WST), ground, and flight tests of the LEP visors. Recommendations for modifying aviation lighting systems to improve LEP compatibility are proposed. Issues concerning flight safety when using LEP during air operation are discussed.

Issues in national missile defense

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Canavan, G.H.

1998-12-01

Strategic missiles and weapons are proliferating rapidly; thus, the US and its Allies are likely to face both capable bilateral threats and multilateral configurations with complex coalitions for which defenses could be essential for stability. Current hit-to-kill interceptor and radar and infrared detection, track, and discrimination technology should suffice for limited threats, but it is necessary to meet those threats in time while maintaining growth potential for the more sophisticated threats likely to follow. National Missile Defense faces a confusing array of threats, programs, and alternatives, but the technologies in development are clearly an appropriate first step towards any ofmore » them. They are likely to succeed in the near term; the challenge is to retain flexibility to provide needed options in the mid and long terms.« less

Far Field Modeling Methods For Characterizing Surface Detonations

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Garrett, A.

2015-10-08

Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) analyzed particle samples collected during experiments that were designed to replicate tests of nuclear weapons components that involve detonation of high explosives (HE). SRNL collected the particle samples in the HE debris cloud using innovative rocket propelled samplers. SRNL used scanning electronic microscopy to determine the elemental constituents of the particles and their size distributions. Depleted uranium composed about 7% of the particle contents. SRNL used the particle size distributions and elemental composition to perform transport calculations that indicate in many terrains and atmospheric conditions the uranium bearing particles will be transported long distances downwind.more » This research established that HE tests specific to nuclear proliferation should be detectable at long downwind distances by sampling airborne particles created by the test detonations.« less

Air gun wounding and current UK laws controlling air weapons.

PubMed

Bruce-Chwatt, Robert Michael

2010-04-01

Air weapons whether rifles or pistols are, potentially, lethal weapons. The UK legislation is complex and yet little known to the public. Hunting with air weapons and the laws controlling those animals that are permitted to be shot with air weapons is even more labyrinthine due to the legal power limitations on the possession of air weapons. Still relatively freely available by mail order or on the Internet, an increasing number of deaths have been reported from the misuse of air weapons or accidental discharges. Ammunition for air weapons has become increasingly sophisticated, effective and therefore increasingly dangerous if misused, though freely available being a mere projectile without a concomitant cartridge containing a propellant and an initiator.

Effects of Weapons on Aggressive Thoughts, Angry Feelings, Hostile Appraisals, and Aggressive Behavior: A Meta-Analytic Review of the Weapons Effect Literature.

PubMed

Benjamin, Arlin J; Kepes, Sven; Bushman, Brad J

2017-09-01

Guns are associated with aggression. A landmark 1967 study showed that simply seeing a gun can increase aggression-called the "weapons effect." This meta-analysis integrates the findings of weapons effect studies conducted from 1967 to 2017. It includes 162 effect-size estimates from 78 independent studies involving 7,668 participants. The theoretical framework used to explain the weapons effect was the General Aggression Model (GAM), which proposes three routes to aggression-cognitive, affective, and arousal. The GAM also proposes that hostile appraisals can facilitate aggression. As predicted by the GAM, the mere presence of weapons increased aggressive thoughts, hostile appraisals, and aggression, suggesting a cognitive route from weapons to aggression. Weapons did not significantly increase angry feelings. Only one study tested the effects of weapons on arousal. These findings also contribute to the debate about social priming by showing that incidental exposure to a stimulus (weapon) can affect subsequent related behavior (aggression).

Biological agents with potential for misuse: a historical perspective and defensive measures.

PubMed

Bhalla, Deepak K; Warheit, David B

2004-08-15

Biological and chemical agents capable of producing serious illness or mortality have been used in biowarfare from ancient times. Use of these agents has progressed from crude forms in early and middle ages, when snakes and infected cadavers were used as weapons in battles, to sophisticated preparations for use during and after the second World War. Cults and terrorist organizations have attempted the use of biological agents with an aim to immobilize populations or cause serious harm. The reasons for interest in these agents by individuals and organizations include relative ease of acquisition, potential for causing mass casualty or panic, modest financing requirement, availability of technology, and relative ease of delivery. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has classified Critical Biological Agents into three major categories. This classification was based on several criteria, which include severity of impact on human health, potential for delivery in a weapon, capacity to cause panic and special needs for development, and stockpiling of medication. Agents that could cause the greatest harm following deliberate use were placed in category A. Category B included agents capable of producing serious harm and significant mortality but of lower magnitude than category A agents. Category C included emerging pathogens that could be developed for mass dispersion in future and their potential as a major health threat. A brief description of the category A bioagents is included and the pathophysiology of two particularly prominent agents, namely anthrax and smallpox, is discussed in detail. The potential danger from biological agents and their ever increasing threat to human populations have created a need for developing technologies for their early detection, for developing treatment strategies, and for refinement of procedures to ensure survival of affected individuals so as to attain the ultimate goal of eliminating the threat from intentional use of these agents. International treaties limiting development and proliferation of weapons and continuing development of defense strategies and safe guards against agents of concern are important elements of plans for eliminating this threat.

Neutrophils Turn Plasma Proteins into Weapons against HIV-1

PubMed Central

Hagleitner, Magdalena; Rambach, Günter; Van Aken, Hugo; Dierich, Manfred; Kehrel, Beate E.

2013-01-01

As a consequence of innate immune activation granulocytes and macrophages produce hypochlorite/hypochlorous acid (HOCl) via secretion of myeloperoxidase (MPO) to the outside of the cells, where HOCl immediately reacts with proteins. Most proteins that become altered by this system do not belong to the invading microorganism but to the host. While there is no doubt that the myeloperoxidase system is capable of directly inactivating HIV-1, we hypothesized that it may have an additional indirect mode of action. We show in this article that HOCl is able to chemically alter proteins and thus turn them into Idea-Ps (Idea-P = immune defence-altered protein), potent amyloid-like and SH-groups capturing antiviral weapons against HIV-1. HOCl-altered plasma proteins (Idea-PP) have the capacity to bind efficiently and with high affinity to the HIV-1 envelope protein gp120, and to its receptor CD4 as well as to the protein disulfide isomerase (PDI). Idea-PP was able to inhibit viral infection and replication in a cell culture system as shown by reduced number of infected cells and of syncytia, resulting in reduction of viral capsid protein p24 in the culture supernatant. The unmodified plasma protein fraction had no effect. HOCl-altered isolated proteins antithrombin III and human serum albumin, taken as representative examples of the whole pool of plasma proteins, were both able to exert the same activity of binding to gp120 and inhibition of viral proliferation. These data offer an opportunity to improve the understanding of the intricacies of host-pathogen interactions and allow the generation of the following hypothetical scheme: natural immune defense mechanisms generate by posttranslational modification of plasma proteins a potent virucidal weapon that immobilizes the virus as well as inhibits viral fusion and thus entry into the host cells. Furthermore simulation of this mechanism in vitro might provide an interesting new therapeutic approach against microorganisms. PMID:23840401

32 CFR 552.104 - Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-07-01

... 32 National Defense 3 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. 552... RESERVATIONS AND NATIONAL CEMETERIES REGULATIONS AFFECTING MILITARY RESERVATIONS Firearms and Weapons § 552.104 Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. All weapons, ammunition, explosives or other devices defined in...

32 CFR 552.104 - Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-07-01

... 32 National Defense 3 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. 552... RESERVATIONS AND NATIONAL CEMETERIES REGULATIONS AFFECTING MILITARY RESERVATIONS Firearms and Weapons § 552.104 Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. All weapons, ammunition, explosives or other devices defined in...

32 CFR 552.104 - Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... 32 National Defense 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 true Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. 552... RESERVATIONS AND NATIONAL CEMETERIES REGULATIONS AFFECTING MILITARY RESERVATIONS Firearms and Weapons § 552.104 Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. All weapons, ammunition, explosives or other devices defined in...

32 CFR 552.104 - Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-07-01

... 32 National Defense 3 2012-07-01 2009-07-01 true Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. 552... RESERVATIONS AND NATIONAL CEMETERIES REGULATIONS AFFECTING MILITARY RESERVATIONS Firearms and Weapons § 552.104 Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. All weapons, ammunition, explosives or other devices defined in...

32 CFR 552.104 - Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-07-01

... 32 National Defense 3 2011-07-01 2009-07-01 true Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. 552... RESERVATIONS AND NATIONAL CEMETERIES REGULATIONS AFFECTING MILITARY RESERVATIONS Firearms and Weapons § 552.104 Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. All weapons, ammunition, explosives or other devices defined in...

77 FR 59891 - Proposed Information Collection; Comment Request; Chemical Weapons Convention Declaration and...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2012-10-01

... Request; Chemical Weapons Convention Declaration and Report Handbook and Forms AGENCY: Bureau of Industry.... Abstract The Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 and Commerce Chemical Weapons... Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), an international arms control treaty. II. Method of Collection Submitted...

School violence and bullying among sexual minority high school students, 2009-2011.

PubMed

O'Malley Olsen, Emily; Kann, Laura; Vivolo-Kantor, Alana; Kinchen, Steve; McManus, Tim

2014-09-01

School-based victimization has short- and long-term implications for the health and academic lives of sexual minority students. This analysis assessed the prevalence and relative risk of school violence and bullying among sexual minority and heterosexual high school students. Youth Risk Behavior Survey data from 10 states and 10 large urban school districts that assessed sexual identity and had weighted data in the 2009 and/or 2011 cycle were combined to create two large population-based data sets, one containing state data and one containing district data. Prevalence of physical fighting, being threatened or injured with a weapon, weapon carrying, and being bullied on school property and not going to school because of safety concerns was calculated. Associations between these behaviors and sexual identity were identified. In the state data, sexual minority male students were at greater risk for being threatened or injured with a weapon, not going to school because of safety concerns and being bullied than heterosexual male students. Sexual minority female students were at greater risk than heterosexual female students for all five behaviors. In the district data, with one exception, sexual minority male and female students were at greater risk for all five behaviors than heterosexual students. Sexual minority students still routinely experience more school victimization than their heterosexual counterparts. The implementation of comprehensive, evidence-based programs and policies has the ability to reduce school violence and bullying, especially among sexual minority students. Published by Elsevier Inc.

14 CFR 1204.1005 - Unauthorized introduction of firearms or weapons, explosives, or other dangerous materials.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... weapons, explosives, or other dangerous materials. 1204.1005 Section 1204.1005 Aeronautics and Space... Weapons or Dangerous Materials § 1204.1005 Unauthorized introduction of firearms or weapons, explosives... or causing to be introduced, or using firearms or other dangerous weapons, explosives or other...

14 CFR 1204.1005 - Unauthorized introduction of firearms or weapons, explosives, or other dangerous materials.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... weapons, explosives, or other dangerous materials. 1204.1005 Section 1204.1005 Aeronautics and Space... Weapons or Dangerous Materials § 1204.1005 Unauthorized introduction of firearms or weapons, explosives... or causing to be introduced, or using firearms or other dangerous weapons, explosives or other...

14 CFR 1204.1005 - Unauthorized introduction of firearms or weapons, explosives, or other dangerous materials.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... weapons, explosives, or other dangerous materials. 1204.1005 Section 1204.1005 Aeronautics and Space... Weapons or Dangerous Materials § 1204.1005 Unauthorized introduction of firearms or weapons, explosives... or causing to be introduced, or using firearms or other dangerous weapons, explosives or other...

32 CFR 552.130 - Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-07-01

... 32 National Defense 3 2011-07-01 2009-07-01 true Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. 552..., Ammunition and Other Dangerous Weapons on Fort Gordon § 552.130 Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. All weapons, ammunition, explosives, or other devices defined in this subpart, that are confiscated...

48 CFR 217.173 - Multiyear contracts for weapon systems.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... weapon systems. 217.173 Section 217.173 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEFENSE ACQUISITION... Mulityear Contracting 217.173 Multiyear contracts for weapon systems. As authorized by 10 U.S.C. 2306b(h... contract for— (a) A weapon system and associated items, services, and logistics support for a weapon system...

32 CFR 552.130 - Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... 32 National Defense 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 true Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. 552..., Ammunition and Other Dangerous Weapons on Fort Gordon § 552.130 Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. All weapons, ammunition, explosives, or other devices defined in this subpart, that are confiscated...

32 CFR 552.130 - Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-07-01

... 32 National Defense 3 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. 552..., Ammunition and Other Dangerous Weapons on Fort Gordon § 552.130 Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. All weapons, ammunition, explosives, or other devices defined in this subpart, that are confiscated...

14 CFR 1204.1005 - Unauthorized introduction of firearms or weapons, explosives, or other dangerous materials.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... weapons, explosives, or other dangerous materials. 1204.1005 Section 1204.1005 Aeronautics and Space... Weapons or Dangerous Materials § 1204.1005 Unauthorized introduction of firearms or weapons, explosives... or causing to be introduced, or using firearms or other dangerous weapons, explosives or other...

32 CFR 552.130 - Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-07-01

... 32 National Defense 3 2012-07-01 2009-07-01 true Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. 552..., Ammunition and Other Dangerous Weapons on Fort Gordon § 552.130 Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. All weapons, ammunition, explosives, or other devices defined in this subpart, that are confiscated...

32 CFR 552.130 - Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-07-01

... 32 National Defense 3 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. 552..., Ammunition and Other Dangerous Weapons on Fort Gordon § 552.130 Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. All weapons, ammunition, explosives, or other devices defined in this subpart, that are confiscated...